

On leaving the Burmese chiefs, our officers told them that the British general would not prolong the truce, but recommence offensive operations forthwith. On the 29th Sir Archibald took up a position at Patnagow directly opposite to Melloone, and with the aid of the flotilla scattered some of the king's war-boat people, and destroyed some batteries by the river side.* The flotilla, led by the "Diana" steam-vessel, glided up until it came abreast of the town, and pointed its guns against the stockades of Melloone. Upon this the Burmese commanders gave unequivocal proof of their being anxious to treat; not a shot was fired upon our vessels, nor was a shot fired by them: a chief put off in a war-boat to compliment the commander of the flotilla, and to tell him that the new and high delegate from Ava would gladly open negotiations on the 1st of January. At the appointed day and hour the conferences were commenced on board of a large boat moored in the middle of the Irawaddi between the two armies. After four meetings, and long and most wearisome discussions, the Burmese accepted the conditions which were offered, and a treaty of peace and amity was signed. Fifteen days were allowed for obtaining the ratification of the Golden Foot and the execution of preliminaries, such as the delivery of Mr. Henry Gouger and all other prisoners up the country, and the payment of the first instalment of the money indemnity. During the interval which ensued, the Burmese visited our camp by day in the most friendly manner, and by night they worked at their stockades. On the 17th of January, the day preceding that upon which the ratified treaty was to be presented to Sir Archibald and his coadjutors, three officers of state visited the British camp, and declared that some un-

fortunate accident, of which they were entirely ignorant, must have delayed the arrival of the king's ratification, and the arrival of the prisoners and money. They vowed, in their way, that they had not heard from Ava since the treaty was sent up for his majesty's signature. They offered to pay on the spot a small instalment, and to give hostages for the payment of the rest of the money and the due execution of the other articles of the treaty, if Sir Archibald would only return to Prome. Having received a decided negative to this proposal and to another, they at last entreated for a delay of five or six days. This also was refused by Sir Archibald, who acquainted them that if they evacuated Melloone within thirty-six hours, and continued retiring with their forces before the British army upon Ava, hostilities would not be recommenced, and our march would be suspended as soon as the ratified treaty should be received—but not until then. The Burmese officers rejected this proposition as peremptorily as our commissioners had rejected theirs. On the next day, the 18th, three British officers proceeded to Melloone to tell the Wongees that they had broken their promises, and had rendered it impossible to trust them, and that after twelve o'clock that night hostilities would recommence. And at the midnight hour the British camp was on the alert; and by ten o'clock the next morning twenty-eight pieces of artillery were in battery, and ready to open upon the enemy's defences. Two hours of heavy firing opened the way for our storming column (formed of the 13th and the 38th British regiments), which was carried across the river in boats under the superintendence of Captain Chads, now senior naval officer, and which was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Frith, Lieutenant-Colonel Sale having been badly wounded in the boats. In a very brief space of time the column entered by escalade, and established itself in the interior of the works. This always finished the affair. From 10,000 to 15,000 armed men were driven away in a confused and helpless mass from the strongest work they had ever erected. Our other brigades, cutting in

* Here, at Patnagow, the Bengal division, while encamped on the base and slope of a hill covered with high grass, was attacked by cholera, particularly the 13th and 38th regiments; but on their removal to a hill adjacent, which was clear of grass and underwood, it immediately ceased. To the cholera, succeeded several cases of remittent fever; but during the latter part of their stay the troops were tolerably healthy.—*Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, Statistical Reports, &c.*

upon the retreat, completed their discomfiture: the Burmese were driven with severe loss from all their stockades, and they left the whole of their artillery and military stores in our possession. Our 13th and 38th had only 5 men killed and 20 wounded. In the house of Prince Memiaboo, cash to the amount of 30,000 or 40,000 rupees was found; all his stud was likewise taken; and, what was considered of still more consequence, as affording undeniable proof of the perfidious conduct of the Burmese during the late negotiations, both the English and Burmese copies of the treaty were also found in the house, just in the same state as when signed and sealed at the meeting of the 3rd, together with other papers, some of which were written by a fanatic Buddhist priest, styled the Raj Goroo, a spiritual friend and counsellor of the king of Ava, and one of the over-confident men who had urged his majesty to persevere in the war.

Prince Memiaboo and his beaten army continued to retreat upon Ava with all possible speed. Sir Archibald Campbell prepared to follow them up without delay, but before commencing his march he dispatched a messenger with the unratified treaty to the Kee Wongee, telling that prime minister, with nice irony, that, in the hurry of his departure from Mel-loone, he had forgotten a document which he might now find more acceptable to his government than they had a few days previously considered it. The Wongee and his colleague politely returned their best thanks for the paper, but observed that the same hurry which had made them forget the treaty had also compelled them to leave behind a large sum of money, which, they were quite sure, the British general only wanted an opportunity of returning!*

On the 25th of January the army resumed its march over a barren country and execrable roads. On the 31st, headquarters were at Zaynan-gheoun. Here Sir Archibald was met by Dr. Price, one of the captive American missionaries (who had been seized at Ava with Mr. Henry

Gouger), and by Assistant-Surgeon Sandford of the Royal regiment, who had been taken prisoner some months before. These gentlemen came on their parole of honour to return again to Ava. They were accompanied by four prisoners of war, returned to the English general as a compliment from the Golden Foot. These poor fellows exhibited a sad and most uncouth appearance, for they had been shamefully treated in their prison, and their hair had not been cut nor their beards shaved since the day they were taken. Doctor Price explained that they were dispatched to express the sincere desire of his Burmese majesty for peace, and to bring back a statement of the terms that the English would grant him.

By this time the Golden Face was completely clouded with despair. Every hope and promise had failed; every day fixed upon by his star-gazers as a lucky day had turned out an unlucky day; and all his astrologers and soothsayers had proved themselves to be but cheats and liars. One ingenious experiment, from which the luckiest results had been anticipated, had been tried, and tried in vain. Some of his wise men had discovered that the British standard bore the effigies of a lion rampant. A short time before this war began the Arab Imaum of Muscat, some of whose subjects occasionally visited Rangoon for the purposes of trade, had sent a fine large lioness as an honourable and acceptable present to his majesty of the Golden Foot, in whose dominions the king of beasts was an unknown animal. Gladly did his majesty receive, and much did he pet, this present; the white elephant—the living symbol of his own greatness and dignity—was neglected, and even the most beloved wives and queens seemed to be as nothing in his affections compared with the Imaum of Muscat's lioness.* A cage almost as large as one

* The lioness had, however, one formidable rival. When Mr. Gouger was about to return to Calcutta from his first experimental visit to the court of Ava, the king said to him—"Captain! my brother, the Prince of Sarrawaddy, possesses a large dog, bred in some foreign country, the largest dog that was ever seen in my dominions, a dog much larger than any dog that I possess. Now, it is not proper that a subject should have a bigger dog than the king. Captain! buy for

* Suodgrass,

of the state apartments, and, like those apartments, gilded and decorated, was prepared for the lioness, whose growl was held to be of as solemn an import as the grunt of the white elephant. All the courtiers paid compliments to the lioness as a means of gaining face with the king; and the court poets or songsters wrote songs about the lioness. But now the wise men, who had discovered the effigies of the lion in our national standard, persuaded the king that there must be a mysterious connexion and sympathy between that artificial lion and the real, living beast which the Imaum of Muscat had sent him, and that the surest way to expel and starve out the English invaders would be to starve the lioness to death. One night the English and American prisoners, who had been removed from Ava to a solitary place up the country called the "Field of Victory," were roused from their uneasy slumbers by a loud rumbling noise, which seemed to proceed from the rough road which led from Ava to their wretched prison, and which sounded like distant thunder. The noise came nearer and nearer, and became louder and yet more

loud, until it ceased altogether, apparently in the compound, or inclosed space which surrounded the prison. They could not tell from what the noise proceeded, but some of them surmised that the Burmese had brought up some heavy artillery in order to blow them from the mouths of the cannons. When they asked their jailers what it meant, those ruffians replied, with a grin, that when daylight came they would see clearly enough what it meant. At last the daylight did come, and then, the door of the prison being thrown open for a few minutes, they saw an enormous truck, and on the truck the enormous cage, and in the cage the lioness! They had been threatened with many kinds of horrible deaths before—the Burmese possessing in great perfection the art of ingeniously tormenting; but now they felt assured that the lioness—that prime favourite of the king—had been sent thither to kill and devour them one by one. That day and the next, however, passed over without any incident; but their abating apprehensions were revived and magnified when they discovered that nothing was given to the lioness to eat, and that she was becoming ferocious and desperate through want of food. The conclusion was, that this was done to render their fate the more certain when they should be thrown into the cage of the hungered beast. But more days and nights passed, and they were all left as they were in their treble fetters and their noxious dungeon, the lioness all the while growling and moaning, and beating with impotent rage the bars of her prison-house. For fourteen days the noble animal bore the agonies of hunger and thirst, but on the fifteenth day she died. On the twelfth day she was so weak and exhausted that she could not kill or touch a little Pariah dog that was thrown into the cage by a poor woman of the country. And bootless was all this torture, and the pang it had cost the Golden Foot to part with his favourite: for, while the animate lioness was starving, the inanimate lion on the proud standard of Britain kept advancing; and when she died, instead of flying down the Irawaddi, it advanced faster than ever upon the royal city and capital.

me and bring me back a dog bigger than the Prince of Sarrawuddy's, and you shall thereby gain face (favour)." Mr. Gouger bought the largest dog that he could find in all Calcutta, and took it back with him as a present to the king. Amazing was the excitement produced when the Englishman and his dog landed at Ava! Such a dog had never been seen anywhere; the Prince of Sarrawuddy's was nothing to it! Courtiers and nobles of high degree came running down to the river-side to beseech that they might be allowed to conduct the marvellous animal to the Golden Foot, and thereby gain face for themselves. But Mr. Gouger would not part company with the dog, nor lose the merit and favour to be obtained by presenting it himself; and so, accompanied and surrounded by these chiefs, and followed by half the populace of Ava, he led the dog in a leash to the palace, and there introduced him to his new and royal master. The king was in an ecstasy of surprise and delight. Forthwith he ordered a dress of the finest velvet (such as none but Wongsers or princes could presume to wear) to be made for the stranger (who was but a big mongrel after all), and appointed one of his courtiers to have charge of the dog and to be answerable for its welfare. But the king's own fondness very soon destroyed the poor animal, for he fed it and crammed it until it grew fat, weazy, and unwieldy, and so died.

The wise men had again proved themselves no better than fools!*

Yet even in his despair the Lord of the White Elephant could not for a long time make up his mind to prostrate himself before the British Lion. Once, when some of his chiefs ventured to represent that submission was unavoidable, and that the terms proposed by the British general were not so very harsh or humiliating, his majesty was seized with a furious and ungovernable rage, and seizing a spear, wounded the messenger who had brought the last bad news, and threatened to kill them all. He was in a calmer mood, and better convinced that his troops could not resist the conquerors, when he liberated Dr. Price and Mr. Sandford, and sent them down to Sir Archibald Campbell. Sir Archibald assured these two gentlemen that he was desirous of peace, and that his terms would vary very little from those which had been offered and accepted by the Wongees at Melloone previous to our victory at that place. He furnished them with a statement of his terms, and promised at their request not to pass Pagahm-mew for twelve days. On the following morning, the 1st of February, 1826, the two delegates quitted the English camp to return to Ava, the American missionary being sanguine in his expectations of returning in a few days with cash and a treaty of peace duly signed by the king. Yet, in truth, his Burmese majesty was still undecided, and in the course of two or three days it became known in the British camp that he was again collecting troops, and displaying a determination to try the fortune of war once more ere he submitted. He was probably encouraged herein by a knowledge of the smallness of the force with which Sir Archibald Campbell was advancing upon his capital, and by intelligence received of the defeat of a weak British detachment before the strong stockade of Zitoung in Pegu, where the commanding officer, Colonel Conroy, and another officer were killed, and several wounded, and where the loss in men was very heavy for so small a force.

Sir Archibald Campbell continued his advance. On approaching Pagahm-mew, a town about one hundred miles above Melloone, he obtained positive information that a levy of 40,000 men had been ordered, and that the people had been induced to enrol by means of a high bounty and several honourable privileges and distinctions; that the Golden Foot had bestowed upon this new army the flattering appellation of "Retrievers of the King's Glory;" and that this army had been placed under the command of a savage warrior, styled Nee Woon-Breen, which has been variously translated as "Prince of Darkness," "King of Hell," and "Prince of the Setting Sun." Upon the 8th of February, when within a few days' march from Pagahm-mew, Sir Archibald ascertained that the Retrievers of the King's Glory and the Prince of Darkness were prepared to meet him under the walls of that city. On the 9th the British column moved forward in order of attack, being much reduced by the absence of two brigades, and considerably under 2000 fighting men. The advanced-guard was met in the jungle by strong bodies of skirmishers; and after maintaining a running fight for several miles, the column debouched into the open country, and there discovered the Burmese army, from 16,000 to 20,000 strong, drawn up in an inverted crescent, the wings of which threatened the little body of assailants on both their flanks. But Sir Archibald pushed boldly forward for their centre, threw the whole weight of his column upon that point, broke and shattered it in the twinkling of an eye, and left the unconnected wings severed from each other. The Retrievers of the King's Glory did not fight so well as those who had been accused of forfeiting his majesty's glory: they all fled as fast as their legs could carry them to a second line of redoubts and stockades, close under the walls of Pagahm-mew; but the British column followed them so closely that they had little time for rallying in those works; and as soon as a few English bayonets got within the stockades, all the Burmese went off, screaming like a scared flock of wild-geese. Hundreds jumped into the river to escape their as-

* Information communicated by Henry Gouger, Esq.

sailants, and perished in the water; and, with the exception of 2000 or 3000 men, the whole army dispersed upon the spot. The unfortunate Prince of Darkness, or King of Hell, or Prince of the Setting Sun, fled to Ava; and he had no sooner reached the court than he was put to a cruel death by order of the king.* One immediate and very gratifying result of this victory was the liberation of the people of the country from the restraint under which they had been kept by the Burmese army, and the compulsory separation from their homes. As soon as the action was over, they began to come in to the British camp for protection, and many hundred boats, crowded with people, passed Pagahm-mew downwards, on their way to their native towns and villages. By this time Colonel Conroy's disaster in Pegu had been remedied and avenged by Colonel Pepper, who, with a stronger detachment, carried the strong stockade of Zitoung, scattered a force of 3000 or 4000, and killed 300 of them within the stockade alone.†

In order to refresh his troops after their late fatigues, Sir Archibald Campbell halted for a few days at Pagahm-mew. On the evening of the 13th of February Mr. Price, the American missionary, and Mr. Sandford, now liberated, arrived in camp. The missionary, who had been selected as mediator, announced that the king and court of Ava had now given in; that the last defeat had deprived them of all hope, and that our terms had been accepted and agreed to. But the missionary neither brought the rest of the prisoners nor the first instalment of the money payment. Mr. Price, however, explained that everything demanded was in readiness to be delivered, but that the king demurred about letting the cash out of his hands, from an idea that after its payment the English would still keep his country, or would act as his Majesty himself assuredly would have done under similar circumstances. His Majesty was, therefore, anxious to know whether Sir Archibald could not be prevailed upon to accept of six lacs of rupees

upon the spot, and to receive the other nineteen lacs of the first instalment on the return of the army to Prome. The king begged at the same time, that in any case the English should not approach nearer to his capital. A positive refusal was given to every part of these requests; and on the following morning Mr. Price returned to Ava to acquaint the king that all the prisoners must be liberated, that the twenty-five lacs must be paid down, and that Sir Archibald Campbell was resuming his march upon Ava.

"The country from Pagahm-mew to Ava," says the historian of this very interesting war, "is most beautiful—extensive plains of the finest land, watered by the Irawaddi, interspersed with ever-green woods, only sufficiently large to give beauty and variety to the scenery; and the banks of the river so thickly studded with villages, pagodas, temples, Buddhist monasteries, and other handsome buildings, as to give, under one *coup d'œil*, all the charms of a richly varied landscape, with the more sterling beauties of a populous and fertile country."*

The army, continuing to advance, was met at Yandaboo, only forty-five miles from Ava, by Mr. Price and two Burmese ministers of state, accompanied by Mr. Henry Gouger, Mr. Judson, the American missionary and his wife, an adventurous Scotch skipper of the name of Laird, who had gone up the country before the war to make some contract about timber, and all the rest of the prisoners, whether Europeans or sepoys. A sadder spectacle has seldom been presented by living human beings than that which was offered to the English camp by these liberated captives. They were covered with filthy rags; they were worn to skin and bone, and their haggard countenances, sunken, wandering, half-maniacal eyes, told but too plainly the frightful story of their long suffering, their incessant alarms, and their apprehensions of a doom worse than death.

The sight exasperated our troops, and made them more eager than ever to advance upon the capital, and take vengeance upon the tyrant and his savage

* Snodgrass.

† Horace Hayman Wilson. Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

court. Among the restored prisoners was a brave old Irish sergeant, who shed tears of rage when he learned that a treaty was to be concluded without going to Ava at all. "Ah!" said he, "if I could but get over those walls with my bayonet in my hand, I would pay off some of our old scores, and then die a happy man!" It was better that our Irishman should not have the opportunity he desired; and, besides humanity, there were other considerations which made it expedient to give at once to the Golden Foot that peace which he now most sincerely and most earnestly prayed for.

Mr. Price and the two Wongees brought the stipulated sum of twenty-five lacs of rupees, and an authority under the sign manual to accept of and sign whatever terms the English might insist upon. On the 24th of February the treaty of peace was for a second time settled and finally signed at Yandaboo, the Burmese government at the same time engaging to furnish boats for the conveyance of a great part of our force back to Rangoon. By this treaty it was agreed that there should be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and his Majesty the King of Ava—that the King of Ava should renounce all claims and abstain from all future interference with the principality of Asam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar, Jyntee, and Munnipoor—that his Majesty should cede to the Company in perpetuity the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four great divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandoway—that the Arracan mountains should henceforward form the boundary between the two great nations on that side—that his Majesty should also cede the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui, and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Saluen river as the line of demarcation on that frontier—that his Majesty, as part indemnification for the expenses of the war, should pay the sum of one crore of rupees*—that henceforth accredited British ministers, with a body-guard of

fifty men, should be allowed to reside at Ava, and that an accredited Burmese minister should be sent to reside at Calcutta; and that free trade should be allowed to British subjects in all the dominions of his Majesty, who should abolish all exactions upon British ships entering his ports, &c.—and that "the good and faithful ally of the British government, his Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war," should "to the fullest extent, as far as regards his Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty."

The money demanded as part indemnification was far too moderate a sum. The king was rich and given to hoarding, and both gold and silver bullion abounded in Ava. The court could easily have paid three or four times the amount, and in all probability it would have paid it rather than evacuate the capital, and burn it or abandon it to the English. During his whole reign, and more especially during this war, the Golden Foot had given the most convincing proofs of his belief that his life, and the lives of his wives and children, would not be safe anywhere except in the capital; that to remove from Ava would be to leave his throne open to a usurper. A crore of sicca rupees, at par, were barely equivalent to 1,000,000*l.* sterling. The war had cost us from 7,000,000*l.* to 8,000,000*l.* With an easy liberality (for it cost them nothing, and saved the time and trouble of discussion) our commissioners waived all claims for indemnities or recompenses for the cruel sufferings of our unfortunate prisoners, or for the losses they had sustained, not only in property, but in health, by their long and torturing captivity; and although they stipulated in an article that private debts owing by Burmese to British subjects should be liquidated, they consented to consider a part of the property which had been seized by the king, at the time

total, were paid down when the treaty was signed. Upon the further payment of a similar sum at Rangoon, within one hundred days from the date of the treaty, our army was to evacuate the dominions of the King of Ava, leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid, by equal annual instalments, in two years.

* Twenty-five lacs or one-fourth of the sum

when he threw the Englishmen at Ava into prison, as *confiscated* by the laws of the country, and so removed out of the operation of any treaty of peace.*

* Owing to this very bungling diplomacy, Mr. Henry Gouger did not recover one-half of the property he had in the country, losing several thousand pounds sterling, in addition to the loss of nearly two years of the very prime of an active and profitably employed life, and a shock to the constitution, and an amount of suffering which none but a strong constitution could have long survived. [With the exception of this gentleman, and Judson, the American missionary, all the prisoners have been long since in their graves. They nearly all died very shortly after their release, their health and spirits being destroyed by their prolonged agony in the filthy dungeons of the tyrant.] Mr. Gouger might have the more reason to complain, as his knowledge of business and India cash accounts were the means of getting for government a good round sum which would otherwise have been lost. At the crim. con. trial of Francis, when the court were giving damages, Mr. Justice Hyde called out to Sir Elijah Impey, who had named the sum of 50,000 rupees—"Siccas, brother Impey!" [See vol. i. pp. 219, 220.] Mr. Gouger gave a similar admonition to our negotiators, who appear not to have known, or to have been careless about, the difference of value between Bengal rupees, Madras rupees, and *Sicca* rupees. In the English copy of the treaty presented to Mr. Judson and Mr. Gouger for translation into the Burman language, the sum of "one Crore of Rupees" was stipulated as the price of peace. The Burmese knew, or pretended to know, no other rupee than that of Madras, in which the British troops had been paid throughout the war, and the value of which was then about 64 per cent. less than the value of the *Sicca* rupee. At Mr. Gouger's suggestion the word "*Sicca*" was introduced into both copies of the treaty, and thus a sum amounting to between 60,000*l.* and 70,000*l.* was added to the fine exacted from the conquered party.

The treaty was signed by Sir A. Campbell, T. C. Robertson, Esq., Civil Commissioner, and H. D. Chads, Captain of the Royal Navy. Sir Archibald was a plain, fighting soldier, who knew nothing of such matters, and gladly left the work to be done by his colleagues, who seem to have known little more than he knew. Captain Chads was the one that laid down the curious law about his Majesty of Ava's right of confiscation, and that threw cold water upon every proposition for obtaining remuneration and a full recovery of property to the prisoners. John Crawford, Esq. was not added to the commission until some time afterwards, when our army had returned to Rangoon.

Generally our land and sea commanders are but poor negotiators in matters of detail. Similar omissions and oversights have been committed all over the world; and whether the party be a Pasha of Tripoli, a Turkish Sultan, or a King of Ava, the principle appears to be admitted that he is not to be vexed and troubled by the prosecution of the claims of British mer-

In other respects the treaty was such as it should be. The cession of Arracan gave us an admirable mountain-frontier, and amply provided for the freedom from Burmese interference with our Indian territories on that side. Our troublesome neighbours are now confined within their ancient boundaries by the lofty Arracan chain, and their court is not ignorant that we can now march a force across those mountains from our post at Aeng, appear on the Irawaddi in eight or ten days, and reach the city of Ava within a month. The possession of the Tenasserim provinces, and of the islands that lie off that coast and off the coast of Arracan, gives increased security to our commercial navigation, opens the road to an inland commerce with the Siamese, Shans, and other distant people, places at our disposal teak-forests of enormous extent and productive of the very best timber. Moreover a variety of valuable raw produce is procurable, or may be raised, from these new territories, to be replaced by the manufactures of India or of Great Britain. Indigo, cotton, salt, spices, lac, dyeing woods, antimony, and tin are among the products of Arracan and the Tenasserim coast. The whole country of Tenasserim is known to be rich in minerals: gold is found in some of the rivers, but, like all river gold, in small quantities: iron-ore of good quality is found in abundance in the vicinity of Tavoy, and at several other places farther south; and extensive coal-measures have been lately discovered in several places on the banks of the Tenasserim river. The coal is generally of good quality, and the best kind is near the banks of the river below the last rapids, so that it can be brought to Mergui on the coast at a moderate expense. The discovery of these coal-measures must have an advantageous effect on the steam-navigation of the Gulf of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca. The provinces of Cachar and Asam, though holding out less promising prospects to commerce, helped to form a well

chants. The French certainly manage these matters in a different way, as the history of the Tripoli claims will show—a startling little history or episode, which ought to be made more fully known to the existing British government.

defined and strong frontier, and in the approximation they afford to Thibet and China, our trade may possibly be extended, in process of time, in those directions.

Nor was there wanting the consolation that the condition and prospects of some millions of natives were improved by the results of our Burmese war. "These countries, distracted hitherto by incessant feuds, and overrun by hostile armies or by predatory bands, regions once animated by a happy and numerous population, had been converted into wide and unwholesome thickets, and had ceased not only to be the haunts of man, but had become hostile to human life. Under their new masters, Asam, Cachar, Arakan, and the Tenasserim provinces will experience a tranquillity and security they have not known for ages, and must once more assume that character of plenty and prosperity which the latter wore when the Europeans first visited their coasts, and which tradition, and the remains of roads and towns still found in them, indicate were equally the enjoyment of all. The contracted territory of the Birman kingdom will be productive of little real diminution of its resources, on account of the desolate condition of the provinces which it has consented to relinquish. Its most valuable districts, those along the Irawaddi, and at the mouths of that river, are still untouched, and if the lesson the late war has inculcated should induce the court of Ava to forego schemes of military conquest, and in their room to cultivate the ample means of domestic wealth which the forests, the fields, and the mines of Ava, and an active and intelligent population supply, it will derive from the contest more solid benefits than if it had come out of the struggle with undiminished honour or augmented rule. The advantage to the British Empire of India is dependent upon that which its new acquisitions will realize, and will be proportionate to their increased prosperity."* This was written immediately after the termination of the war, and the progressive improve-

ment which the writer anticipated has been gradually advancing ever since. None but visionaries and makers of theories and systems can hope for a sudden and vast change, or can expect that a wilderness may be turned into a garden and savages converted into civilized men in a single generation. Our troops stationed in the Tenasserim provinces appear to have suffered much less in sickness and mortality than is usual in tropical climates, and their experience confirms the conclusion as to the comparative salubrity of the country.* In some places on the coast of Arracan the case is very different, the climate being in the highest degree inimical to the European constitution, but better stations may be found for our troops, and the pestilential fevers may be gradually checked by clearing the jungles, opening the courses of the rivers, and draining the marshes, which now cover so large a portion of the country. In the Tenasserim provinces, an extensive territory, 420 miles in length and from 50 to 70 miles in breadth, had been for centuries past almost a desert, notwithstanding the amazing fertility of its soil and the variety of its productions. The population at the time it was delivered over to the British government did not exceed 30,000 souls in a space comprising 33,000 square miles; and with the exception of the inhabitants of the towns of Tavoy and Mergui, the people were wandering tribes subsisting chiefly on the produce of the forests, and yielding only a nominal subjection to any government. On the British taking possession, however, many thousands from Rangoon and its vicinity took refuge under our flag, and every succeeding year has brought such accessions to their number, that on the left bank of the Saluén river alone the population in 1841 exceeded 30,000, and the entire population of the provinces had risen to above 112,000.†

* Horace Hayman Wilson, Esq. Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, &c.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander M. Tulloch, Statistical Reports on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among her Majesty's Troops, &c., prepared from the Records of the Army Medical Department, and War-Office Returns. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, 1841.

† Id. id.

The discovery of the tea-plant growing wild in Asam, and the subsequent attempts to cultivate the plant so as to rival the teas of China, seems to open a new field to industry and speculation. Nor must we exclude from this enumeration of immediate and prospective benefits the advantages conferred upon science by the often repudiated Burmese war. "In all these countries," says Mr. H. H. Wilson, "valuable accessions to science are already made, and must gradually accumulate. In geography alone, the dark mist that overhung so extensive and interesting a tract is rapidly clearing away, and the natural features of river and mountain which are here developed on a magnificent scale are becoming visible and distinct. Geographical knowledge may seem indeed an inadequate compensation for the cost and peril of war, but its consequences are of the utmost importance to humanity as well as to science, as a country that has been once rendered accessible to European energy is no longer excluded from the chance of being visited by the blessings of CIVILIZATION."* Time has proved that the severe lesson the court of Ava received was not thrown away upon them: since the year 1826 the Burmese have never attempted to trouble our frontiers or to disturb the peace of any of our neighbours and dependants.

The sufferings of our troops during nearly the whole of the war were excessively great, but they were equalled in magnitude by the fortitude and spirit of the men who survived. The loss by the sword was as nothing compared with the ravages of disease and the mortality caused by excessive fatigue. It was not often that a score of men fell in escalading and carrying even the strongest stockades; but they died by heaps on their marches through the pestilential jungles or in their unhealthy camp-stations. Throughout the campaigns, and all the way from Rangoon, every British soldier had to carry his knapsack, sixty rounds of ammunition, a blanket, and three days'

provisions, together with his arms and accoutrements, under the scorching rays of a tropical sun. "Perhaps," adds an officer who served in the war, "there are few instances on record in the history of any nation of a mere handful of men, with constitutions broken down by many months of previous disease and privation, forcing their way in the face of such difficulties, and through a wilderness hitherto untrodden by Europeans, to the distance of five hundred miles from the spot where they originally disembarked, and ultimately dictating a peace within three days' march of the enemy's capital."*

In the month of January, 1825, while the army of Sir Archibald Campbell was cooped up at Rangoon, General Morrison, with his majesty's 44th and 54th regiments, about 200 European artillery, and several regiments of native infantry and pioneers, who had all been assembled at Chittagong, near the north-west frontier of the Burmese empire, began his march from Chittagong, with the view of taking possession of the whole province of Arracan, and then reaching the upper part of the Irawaddi, in the vicinity of the Burmese capital. This line of march upon Ava was very short and direct, compared with the course that Sir Archibald Campbell had taken, as the reader will perceive by looking at the map; and with the exception of a few mountain-passes, which might have been cleared by proper manœuvres, and a liberal employment of shrapnels, the country between Chittagong and Ava was not of a very difficult nature. In fact there was a fine road—the only good road in the Burmese empire—which traversed the mountains of Arracan and ran nearly the whole way to the city of Ava. Although this road was annually frequented by native traders—many of whom were the Company's own subjects—who went and came between the Burmese capital and our frontiers, the existence of the route does not appear to have been known to those who planned the invasion. It was afterwards proved, practically, that an army with baggage, artillery, and

* Documents illustrative of the Burmese War, with an Introductory Sketch of the Events of the War.

* Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander M. Tulloch, Statistical Report on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among her Majesty's Troops, &c.

all its matériel, might march from the upper part of the Irawaddi to Aeng, on our frontier, in less than twenty days, the distance being not much more than 200 English miles.* And it appears scarcely doubtful, that if General Morrison had pushed quickly through Arracan, without halting to occupy the unhealthy part of the country, he would have cleared the mountain-passes, and have reached the upper part of the Irawaddi and the denuded capital, while all the force of the empire was engaged or was concentrating in the lowest part of the river near Rangoon. General Morrison encountered none but the most contemptible opposition in his march from Chittagong to the town of Arracan, a distance of about 150 miles: but his means of transport or something else must have been defective, as it was the first of April before he arrived at Arracan, and took possession of that town with a very trifling loss. And here, in one of the most unhealthy places anywhere between the tropics, he halted to complete the occupation of the country where there was hardly anything left to subdue; and here he put his troops in quarters for the season of rain. In the month of May, as the monsoon set in, fever began to appear, and continued augmenting, both in prevalence and severity, till scarcely a man was left fit for duty. Even to the animal creation the climate seemed inimical; scarcely a single indigenous quadruped of any description was met with during

the stay of our troops; and the cattle, horses, and elephants which accompanied the force, deteriorated daily after their arrival, and ultimately perished by hundreds. The mortality in the two British regiments, the unlucky 44th and the 54th, was prodigious: together they did not average above 1004 men, and 595, or three-fifths of the whole, perished at Arracan in the course of eight months. When the 44th was removed, and when it reached Madras in the end of December, the whole effective strength of the regiment was scarcely sufficient to form a guard for the colours. It was almost annihilated by disease, as it was afterwards by the sword of the Afghans. Owing to these fatalities, General Morrison's divisions never crossed the mountains which form the western boundary of the valley of the Irawaddi: his entire force was reduced to a state of inefficiency, for the sepoy suffered quite as much as the British soldiers.*

* Lieutenant-Colonel Tulloch, 'Statistical Reports,' &c.

"Among the causes independent of climate which may have contributed to swell the mortality on this occasion, it may be stated that the quantity and description of medicine sent with this army was complained of as being inadequate to the wants of the hospitals, and by no means adapted for the nature of the service."—*Id. Id.*

In some concluding remarks on the Burmese war, Tulloch says—"The result of an investigation by Mr. Edmonds, actuary of one of the London Insurance Companies, into the loss sustained during the Peninsular war, as established by the adjutant-general's returns, to which he had access, has shown that between January, 1811, and May, 1814, a period of forty-one months, during which that war was prosecuted with the utmost rigour, the total deaths were 33,819, or 9900 annually, out of a mean force of 61,511, being nearly 16 per cent. of those employed. Of that mortality about 4 per cent. occurred in battle or of wounds which proved fatal within a few days thereafter, and 12 per cent. was from disease and other causes. Whereas in the first year of the Burmese war, 96 were killed in action or died of their wounds out of an average force of 2716 British soldiers serving under Sir Archibald Campbell, being 3½ per cent., and 1215 died by disease and other causes, being 45 per cent., thus making a total loss of 48½ per cent.; consequently each person employed throughout that year encountered more risk of life than in three Peninsular campaigns. In the second year of the war, the proportion of deaths in action or by disease was only about one-half of what occurred in the first; but even then the risk of life was considerably more than during

* This was proved by Captain Ross, who, in March, 1826, when our army was returning homeward, marched with the 18th regiment of Madras infantry, 50 pioneers, and all the elephants of the army, from Yandaboo to Aeng (crossing the Arracan mountains by the excellent road) within nineteen days.

After the war was over, and all our enormous, and in part unnecessary, expenses of movement had been incurred, great pains were taken to procure a knowledge of the country and of the best approaches to the capital; and a mass of most valuable and correct information was obtained, as will be perceived by a glance at the Appendix of Topographical and Statistical Notices to Mr. Wilson's 'Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.'

Better late than never. But if some of these pains had been taken antecedently to the commencement of the war, some millions of pounds sterling and some thousands of human lives might possibly have been spared.

To the intrepid exertion of every branch of our forces the government of Bengal paid appropriate acknowledgments in a public order. The public thanks of the Court of Directors were given to the governor-general, Lord Amherst, to the governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro, to Sir Archibald Campbell, and Sir James Brisbane, and to the officers and men engaged in the war.* His majesty's government also signified their approbation of the conduct of the governor-general by elevating him in the peerage by the title of Earl Amherst of Arracan, and Viscount Holmesdale; and the thanks of both houses of parliament were voted to the officers and men of the army and navy, whether in his Majesty's or in the Company's service. But now, as at the end of every war, however necessary in its origin, and however successful in its termination, there was no lack of murmurers and critics, who complained that hostilities had been entered upon without any sufficient reason, and that they had been concluded without any solid advantage to our Indian possessions or to the

a similar period of the most severe service in the Peninsula.

"It seems essential to bring such facts as these prominently to notice, because there is no mode of estimating the severity of military service except by comparison, and it is of importance that the authorities, with whom rests the ultimate reward of the soldier, should have some means of knowing the risk of life and peril of constitution by which his pension has been earned."—*Id.*

* During the whole of the war, the Madras government, under the command of Sir Thomas Munro, had made great exertions and had given very efficient support. Sir Thomas Munro, whose health was declining through his long services in India, had tendered his resignation in 1823; but when he saw that the Burmese war must break out, he resolved to remain at his post so long as he could be useful. During the progress of the war he was incessantly engaged in discussions and inquiries and correspondence connected with its prosecution; and it has been not unreasonably concluded that this incessant toil shortened his valuable life; and that, if he had returned to England when he intended, he might have been still living.—*Auber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.*

Sir Thomas Munro died in 1827.

Lord Amherst and the rest of the Supreme Government at Calcutta most cordially thanked Sir Thomas Munro for his active co-operation, declaring that they were mainly indebted for the successful issue of the war to the extraordinary exertions of the Madras government.

mother-country. Bishop Heber could not perceive that anybody in the Indian government was to blame. "Everybody," he says, "cried out for war in the first instance, as necessary to the honour of the government, and murmured greatly against Lord Amherst at not being more ready than he was to commence it."* For ourselves, we believe the war to have been not only necessary, but unavoidable (the Burmese, in fact, began it, by invading our territories, with fixed plans of conquest); we admire with true English warmth and with national pride the valour, fortitude, and discipline of our troops, and the steady patience and perseverance of those who had the command of them; but we cannot help feeling and regretting that the original plan of the campaign was not well formed; that there was a scarcely pardonable negligence in collecting previous information concerning the country which was to be the seat of the war, and the character and habits of the people, who as yet were untried enemies; that little was done well in the campaigns except the sheer fighting; that many and costly errors—costly in human life as well as in pounds sterling—were committed by our commanding officers; and that the service was repeatedly and visibly impeded by the quarrels, the jealousies, and heart-burnings that prevailed between the officers of the army and the officers of the navy; between the King's officers and the Company's officers. But for these last causes the conveyance of the troops and stores up the Irawaddi would not have been half so difficult as it was rendered.†

* Letter to R. J. Wilmot Horton, in Letters written in India, forming the Appendix to the Indian Journal.

† The difficulty of obtaining information about the country and the people was indeed great, yet not altogether so great as has been represented. During the two years that the court of Ava was actually threatening us with war, the passage up the Irawaddi was open to English traders, and two or three able men, like those employed by Sir Stamford Raffles, might easily have gone up to Ava, and have acquired much knowledge of the country. Valuable information might also have been obtained from several British subjects who had been living at Ava for longer or shorter periods, as well as from the American missionaries, who appear to have had no great love for that half-savage court and no disinclination to serve the English. These persons were all well

Lord Amherst was less censurable for the neglect in obtaining information than

acquainted with the language of the country, which appears to have been utterly unknown to every person that accompanied Sir Archibald Campbell's expedition. Mr. Henry Gouger, an excellent observer, had been more than two years in the country when the war broke out, with the exception of two short visits to Calcutta, and had associated with individuals of all ranks. John Laird, the Scotch skipper, had been acquainted with the country for more than four years, and had made several journeys or voyages up and down the Irawaddi; and Mr. Judson, the American missionary, had been living for more than twenty years in the country. These individuals were all examined by our commissioners when the war was over; but no attempt was made to obtain information from them before the war began; and during the progress of the war they were all made fast in fetters. At the beginning, the war was not only a war of experiment, but an absolute leap in the dark. It would be hard to estimate what quantity of gunpowder was uselessly consumed by our artillery in firing at the loose earthen mounds which the Burmese threw up in making their covering-holes and entrenchments!

The writer in the 'Quarterly Review,' from whom we have already quoted, decidedly takes part with the officers of the flotilla against the officers of the army, with the king's naval officers against the officers of the Company's cruisers, whom he seems to consider as unworthy of the rank and honours of officers; and he writes with a warmth which betrays the vehemence of the quarrels that raged among men who ought to have worked together with heart and hand. He attributes a great deal of the delay and mischief to the governor-general and council having placed the entire command of the naval part of the expedition under the command of the quarter-master-general, who knew nothing of naval matters, and was probably seaisick the whole of the voyage. But, as Mr. Wilson has proved by official documents, the governor-general and council never did anything of the sort, but left the management of the naval part of the expedition to naval men, such as Commodore Grant, Captain Marryat, &c. But if the case had actually been as it was reported by this reviewer, and if mischiefs had arisen from placing the flotilla under the orders of the quarter-master-general or Sir Archibald Campbell's staff, it ought also to have been recollected what mischiefs and failures had arisen from a conflict of authorities, and from the old practice of leaving the entire command of the land part of an armament in the hands of one man and the entire command of the co-operating fleet, squadron, or flotilla in the hands of another man. In order to know that the operations of even the Duke of Wellington himself were often impeded at critical moments by his having no power to control the movements of the co-operating squadrons on the coasts of Portugal, Spain, and the south of France, we have only to read his grace's Despatches. Our whole hi-tory abounds with instances of disagreements and quarrels between the commanders of our land troops and the

the governors-general who preceded him; he had been but a very short time in India when hostilities commenced, and at the moment he arrived at Calcutta the campaigns in the Burmese dominions were unavoidable, unless the less honourable and far more dangerous alternative had been adopted of maintaining a defensive war on our own frontiers, with Bhurtpoor and the Jauts and other masses of turbulent or excited Indians in our rear. All the individuals who had been residing at Ava, whether British or American, positively and strongly deposed to the facts that the king, the chief queen's brother, the Maha Bandoola, and very nearly the whole court, were bent upon making the conquest of Bengal; that the chiefs and all the fighting part of the Burmese people entertained the most extravagant notions of their own prowess, and made quite sure of their armies reaching Calcutta. When Mr. Gouger translated to the *Saya Wongee* a conciliatory paragraph of a Calcutta newspaper respecting the original dispute about the island of Shapuree, the *Wongee* said that this was a proof of the timidity of the English; that he was of opinion the Birman were far superior to the British in military prowess; and that unless every demand made upon the British government were yielded, war would certainly ensue. When asked what, according to his opinion, led to the war, Mr. Gouger replied:—"In my opinion, it may be attributed primarily to a desire on the part of the Birman court to try its strength with the British. The counsels of Bandoola, on his return from the conquest of Asam to the capital, about the month of December, 1822, hastened the event, and I believe it is chiefly owing to Bandoola's advice that the war was so soon determined upon. . . . The Birman had no idea of our numbers and strength. When I mentioned the amount of our military force, they would never believe me. They, in fact, thought themselves in war the most courageous and cunning people in the world. They frequently talked of their skill in stratagem;

commanders of our fleets, and of the lamentable failures which have resulted from these disagreements.

they ridiculed the idea of soldiers advancing to battle with the noise of drums and music, and exposing their whole bodies. . . . I am distinctly of opinion that the war could not have been avoided on the part of the British government, except by concessions discreditable to its character and injurious to its interests." Among the concessions which would have been demanded was the cession of all that part of Bengal which lies eastward of Moorshedabad. To have yielded this territory would have been to establish the Burmese and their stockades on the very threshold of Calcutta, and to invite a universal insurrection in the rest of our Indian empire. And even this concession, as Mr. Gouger pointedly affirmed, would have satisfied the court of Ava *only for the time*. When asked whether he considered the character of the Burmese government to be faithless, he replied:—"Very faithless indeed—the Birman pride themselves upon this character." John Laird, the Scotch skipper, who had become agent for the Prince of Sarrawuddy for the sale of his teak timber, and who had even procured a title of honour from the court, declared it to be his opinion that, "from the king to the beggar, they were all hot for a war with the English;" that "they looked upon the English as a parcel of merchants, and considered the governor-general to be of no higher rank or consequence than their own governor of Rangoon." Laird was present at court when Bandoola returned with part of the plunder of Asam, and told the Golden Face that if he desired to have Bengal, he would conquer it for his Majesty, and would only require for the purpose the foreigners settled in his Majesty's dominions—Chinese Cassays, and Moham-medan and Hindu settlers from Western India—and not a single Burmese soldier. Judson, the American missionary, who had met Bandoola on his march towards Arracan at the beginning of 1824, deposed that he was told that the destination of that army was the British frontier; that no secret was made of it, and that all the people felt assured of an easy conquest, considering themselves a superior order of men, whom the British could not with-

stand in battle. Judson said he had frequently heard the Prince of Sarrawuddy expatiate for half an hour together upon this subject, in language to the following purport:—"The English are the inhabitants of a small and remote island. What business have they to come in ships from so great a distance to dethrone rajahs, and take possession of countries they have no right to? They contrive to conquer and govern the black strangers with caste (the Hindus), who have puny frames and no courage. They have never yet fought with so strong and brave a people as the Birman, skilled in the use of the sword and spear. If they once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting our bravery, it will be an example to the black nations, who are now slaves to the English, and encourage them to throw off their yoke." About a month before Sir Archibald Campbell landed his troops at Rangoon, the king's sister told Judson that it was obvious the English were afraid to fight; that their conduct on the frontier was mean and cowardly; that they were always disposed to treat and never to fight; that when the Burmese and British troops came near to each other, the British officers held up their hands to entreat the Burmese not to advance; and that the whole conduct of the British for some time past had indicated unequivocal symptoms of fear. She added—"We shall now certainly fight, and will no longer be dissuaded. The new governor-general acts foolishly; he is afraid of us, and attempts to coax us." Several officers about the court had consulted with Judson on the practicability of conquering Bengal. He had told them that it was as difficult for them to conquer Bengal as for the English to conquer Ava, which expression was viewed by the proud Burmese as affording as strong an affirmative of the impracticability of the scheme as words could convey. Their answer to the missionary was—"You do not believe just now; in a little while you will be convinced!" Judson also deposed that there was a common prediction or prophecy, firmly believed in by the people, that the Burmese were to rule over all the countries possessed by the English. Several witnesses deposed to the facts


that both before the war began and during the progress of the war the Burmese had contemplated forming alliances not only with the Cochin Chinese, but also with native states in Hindustan, and more particularly with the Rajpoots, the Seiks, and Jauts, and Runjeet Sing, who were said never to have been conquered by the English. When asked whether he had ever heard, while at the court of Ava, of any intrigue going on between the Burmese government and any of the native princes of Hindustan, the American missionary answered—"I heard on three or four occasions, that the late Bandoola boasted, that he maintained a secret correspondence with several native princes of Hindustan, who, according to him, would rise against the British, as soon as the Burmese would set them a good example. Reports of such insurrections were frequently propagated and received with avidity by the Burmese court."*

In the autumn of 1824, when the arduous Burmese war was but beginning, an alarming mutiny broke out among some of our Bengal sepoy who were under marching orders for Barrackpore, whence they were to proceed to the Burmese dominions. Although other Hindus had gone willingly enough, and by sea, these sepoys of the 47th native infantry pretended that they should lose caste if they went by sea, and swore by the holy water of the Ganges that they would never put their feet in a ship. It should appear that these men had, or thought they had, other grievances to complain of; and it is not improbable that the spirit of discontent had been promoted among them by secret agents of the crafty Burmese, or of others of our enemies. In the month of October, when the men were ordered to appear upon parade in marching-order, they appeared without their knapsacks, and openly manifested their contempt of order and their mutinous spirit. Their commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, ordered the men back to their quarters, and hurried to consult General Dalzell. General Dalzell hastened down to Calcutta to consult the commander-in-chief.

* Depositions taken by John Crawford, Esq., at Rangoon, in H. H. Wilson's 'Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.'

On his return, General Dalzell ordered a parade for the next day. The men appeared, but were more mutinous than ever, committing acts of violence, and utterly disregarding the voice of their officers and their non-commissioned officers, who all remained steady to their duty. In the ensuing night the mutineers slept upon their arms, appointing guards, picquets, patroles, &c. This brought Sir Edward Paget up from Calcutta. Finding that the two other native regiments at Barrackpore were suspected of being infected, Sir Edward called up two British regiments of the king's service (the 1st Royals, and the 47th), a battery of light artillery, and part of the governor-general's body-guard. The mutinous native 47th fell in on the parade-ground, but refused to obey orders, and turned a deaf ear to the explanations and the promises of pardon that were offered to them. This left Sir Edward Paget nothing to do but to order a round of grape-shot to be fired at them. Almost at the first discharge the fellows broke and fled in all directions, throwing away their arms and accoutrements. Only a few were killed, but a good many were taken prisoners, brought forthwith to trial by court-martial, and condemned to death. The number of executions was, however, but small, the far greater part of the mutineers having their sentence commuted to imprisonment and hard labour in irons. The regiment was disbanded, and its name erased from the list of the army. The mutiny spread no further.

In the early part of the year 1825, when but little progress had been made in the Burmese war, and when much exaggerated reports were circulating all through India of the difficulties, the checks, and reverses that Sir Archibald Campbell was encountering, the attention of Lord Amherst was demanded by certain proceedings at Bhurtpore, which did not terminate without causing great excitement and some alarm. On the 26th of February (1825), the Rajah of Bhurtpore, the ally of the Company, died, leaving his son, Bulwunt Sing, a boy of tender years, to succeed him. Knowing that the succession to the musnud could not fail of being disputed, the deceased



Rajpoots.

Rajah, our ally, had implored the protection of General Sir David Ochterlony for his young son; and Sir David had acknowledged the boy's right to the musnud, and had pledged his word to support him. The Rajah was scarcely cold when Doorjun Sal, cousin to Bulwunt Sing, having gained over part of the Bhurtpoor troops, murdered the uncle and guardian of the young nabob, and seized the person of the helpless boy. Sir David Ochterlony, who was at Delhi as commander of the forces and political resident, forthwith assembled troops and a battering-train, and put them in motion for Bhurtpoor, issuing at the same time a proclamation to the Jaut population of the Bhurtpoor country, in which he called upon them to rise in defence of their lawful rajah, and told them that the British troops were advancing to rescue Bulwunt Sing. Doorjun Sal now pretended that he had never had any intention of usurping the musnud or injuring his young cousin; that he had only taken him out of the hands of his maternal uncle, and dispatched that relative because he was a bad guardian and a minister odious to the Jaut people. It is not likely that these representations should have had much weight with the governor-general; but it is not unlikely that his lordship, seeing the unexpected duration and the great difficulty of the Burmese war, was desirous of finishing that conflict before entering upon another. Lord Amherst and the Supreme Council disapproved of all that Sir David Ochterlony had done, and sent him peremptory orders to recall the troops that were marching upon Bhurtpoor. Sir David, who was very severely rated in various dispatches and orders of the supreme government for having gone so far in defence of the legitimate rights of the minor Bulwunt Sing, was also commanded to recall his proclamation to the Jauts, and to tell them that an inquiry would be instituted by the British government into the transactions which had taken place in Bhurtpoor. Before these imperative instructions reached Delhi, Ochterlony had received a mission from Doorjun Sal, and had told the vakeels that their master must come to the British camp with the infant rajah in his hand,

and there deliver the boy up to the care of the British resident, and pledge himself to be faithful and obedient. A very curious and in part perplexing correspondence took place between the supreme government and Sir David, between Sir David and Doorjun Sal, and between that chief and the supreme government. It was clearly manifested that Lord Amherst and the council wished to avoid any final arrangement of the Bhurtpoor question, and preferred putting up with temporary inconvenience and even temporary disgrace to the rushing into a new campaign at an unpropitious season of the year, and at a time when so large a portion of the attention and resources of government were demanded by the war on the Irawaddi. The veteran Ochterlony was too brave a soldier to be startled by the strength of Bhurtpoor or by any other obstacle, and much too high-minded a man to undo what he had conscientiously done, or willingly to abandon the boy after promising his dying father that he would protect him. Sir David tendered his resignation as resident at Delhi, declaring that he should be guilty of falsehood if he acknowledged any conviction of having acted incorrectly or with impropriety. He added—and we cannot but re-echo the feeling—that every moment's delay in settling the question was submission to disgrace. In a later communication the veteran said—"I have ever considered that the hour of necessity or the call of honour fixed the time of military operations. It was on this principle that, in my youth, we kept the field for three years against Hyder, knowing no repose but in the rains, when the country was equally impassable to the enemy and to us. It was on this principle that Lord Lake took the field in the height of the rains of 1803, and remained during all the hot winds of 1804 under canvas in the hottest country in Hindustan. According to the new doctrine, the resentment of an insult and the punishment of crime are to be suspended from March to November. In many cases vengeance, though delayed, would not be less severe or less exemplary; but there are others, and particularly those where the eyes and

minds of men have been strongly and earnestly directed, where the general effort is lessened or lost by the least delay, quite independent of the consideration of affording time to strengthen that which was weak, and thereby adding to the difficulties and obstacles always opposed to attacks, and particularly to siege operations."* Sir David further represented that Calcutta was not exactly the place to form the best judgment about these matters, or about the injury our reputation would sustain in the eyes of the natives of India by equivocation and delay. "And," said he, "it might have been conjectured that, with *fifty years' experience*, I was not a very inadequate judge of the general impression delay would cause, and how far it was wise, politic, or imperative to remove certain prevalent opinions. As a soldier, too, I might have received credit for so much common sense and discretion as would enable me to appreciate whether my means were equal to the end (the siege of Bhurtpoor), provided my hopes were disappointed as a politician in producing such apprehensions as of themselves would prevent an appeal to arms, with an equal degree of éclat and honour almost as would have resulted from the capture of the place."† Lord Amherst accepted the tendered resignation. Sir David Ochterlony retired to Merut, with a mortified and wounded spirit, and there he died very soon after. The conqueror of the Gorkhas, the man who remedied the blunders of others in the Nepal war, the veteran who had served the Company for half a century, was honoured by the high functionaries at Calcutta with minute guns and a complimentary general order, loud sounding, but in part, at least, ridiculous; yet we cannot help thinking that the veteran was rather unhandsomely treated, and that the causes of his retirement were improperly and unfairly stated by the supreme government to the Court of Directors.‡

* Letter from Sir David Ochterlony to Secretary to Supreme Government, 11th of May, 1825, as quoted by Edward Thornton, Esq., History of the British Empire in India.

† Id. id.

‡ In the General Order issued at Calcutta,

Yet, after all, the Calcutta government were compelled to resort to the measures which Ochterlony had recommended, and to undertake the siege of Bhurtpoor before the war on the Irawaddi could be terminated. Doorjun Sal quarrelled with his own brother, who had hitherto acted in concert with him. This brother, after an unsuccessful attempt to make himself master of Bhurtpoor, raised an independent standard in the fortress of Deeg, subjected or plundered all the neighbouring country, and invited adventurers of all kinds to join in and share his fortunes. Doorjun Sal's troops were defeated in a battle near Deeg; the Company's frontiers were thrown into a ferment. Many of the Company's subjects took up arms, some to join one, and some the other of the two contending brothers; anarchy was threatening to return to the regions from which she had been expelled by the Marquess of Hastings's successful wars against the Mahrattas and the Pindarrees. And all the while the usurper was strengthening the always formidable fortress of Bhurtpoor, and the native princes most inimical to the English were inculcating the belief that that place could never be taken, and that the Jauts were destined to be the rallying-point of India.*

orders of knighthood are described as being "the dearest object of a soldier's ambition." We would not underrate the value of such distinctions; but God forbid that the British officer should ever consider them in this light!

The governor-general in council said of Sir David, "that his advanced age and continually increasing infirmities rendered his retirement from the active and laborious employment which he had so long filled with the highest distinction, a measure no less desirable on the public account than necessary for his own personal relief and recovery;" and that upon these grounds they had accepted his resignation. But it does not appear that Sir David ever pleaded old age or infirmity, or ever thought of resigning until called upon to do what his conscience and sense of honour and sense of the public interest condemned. He was in his 68th year; but it does not appear that, previously to his disagreement with the supreme government, he was considered by any one as an infirm old man incapable of doing business.

* Bhurtpoor was the only fortress and the Jauts the only people in India that boasted they had never been subdued either by the Mogul emperors or the English.

"The Jauts," adds Bishop Heber, "are the finest people in bodily advantages and apparent martial spirit whom I have seen in India, and

Three members of the Supreme Council, Mr. Fendall, Mr. Harrington, and Sir Edward Paget, earnestly recommended an active and an immediate interference; but Lord Amherst still recommended delay. At last, however, the governor-general yielded to the arguments contained in an admirable state-paper drawn up by Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was removed from the court of the Nizam to succeed Sir David Ochterlony as resident at Delhi. And, on the 18th of September, just two months and three days after the death of Sir David (which death we firmly believe to have been hastened by the opposite determination), the governor-general determined to support the minor Bulwunt Sing, and to send a British army to reduce Bhurtpoor, and put an end to disturbances which threatened to produce a general commotion and to revolutionize the whole of Upper India. It was not, however, until the 10th of December, 1825, that the new commander-in-chief, General Lord Combermere, who had gained such high distinction under the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War as Sir Stapleton Cotton,* sat down before Bhurtpoor with an army of upwards of 20,000 men and a field of more than a hundred pieces of artillery. The Jauts had cut the embankment of a lake, hoping to fill the broad and deep ditch, as they had done in 1805, at the time of Lord Lake's siege; but our troops arrived before much water had flowed into the ditch,

their country one of the most fertile and best cultivated. Having once beaten off Lord Lake from their city, they have ever since not only regarded themselves as invincible, but have been so esteemed by the greater part of the Mahrattas, Rajpoots, &c., who have always held up their example as the rallying point and main encouragement to resistance, inasmuch that even when I was passing through Malwah, 'gallantee-shows,' like those carried about by the Savoyards, were exhibited at the fairs and in the towns of that wild district, which displayed, among other patriotic and popular scenes, the red-coats driven back in dismay from the ramparts, and the victorious Jauts pursuing them sabre in hand."—*Letter to R. J. Wilmot Horton, Esq.*

Situated as we were in India, it was worth a war to put down that gallantee-show.

* Lord Combermere had quite recently succeeded Sir Edward Paget as commander-in-chief in India. He was brother to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who was at this time engaged in the Burmese war.

and instantly made themselves masters of the embankment and repaired the breach. When his battering-train was nearly ready and his bombs in their places, Lord Combermere, anxious to save the women and children, sent a letter to Doorjun Sal, requesting him to send them all out of the fort and promising them a safe-conduct through the British camp. His lordship allowed the garrison four-and-twenty hours for this purpose. Having received an evasive answer from the usurper, his lordship again sent to him, allowing him a further extension of the time for twelve hours. The humane offer was not accepted, and therefore, on the next day, the 23rd of December, the besiegers, under a heavy fire of the garrison, completed their first parallel; and on the morning of the 24th two heavy batteries opened upon the town. Other batteries opened in quick succession, and during the rest of the month of December a vast quantity of powder and ball were thrown away. Scarcely a roof in the town was left uninjured, but neither cannon-shot nor shells could make any impression on a tough mud wall from 50 to 60 feet thick. On the evening of the 6th of January, our engineers began to do what they ought to have done a fortnight earlier—they commenced a mine in the scarp of the ditch on the northern face of the work. This mine was sprung before it was sufficiently advanced to have any material effect upon the wall. In making a second attempt our miners were countermined by the garrison. The gallery of this mine was subsequently blown up, it being discovered that the enemy were keeping watch in it. It is very evident that our Indian armies were not yet sufficiently provided with sappers and miners and with other bodies of men properly trained to siege-work; and without these men the science and skill of our engineer and artillery officers could not have fair play, any more than they had had in the sieges undertaken during the Mahratta and Pindarree war. A shot fired by the enemy set fire to one of our tumbrils, and 20,000 lbs. weight of gunpowder blew up. On the 14th, another mine, under one of the bastions of Bhurtpoor, was exploded too precipitately, and

this did little more than make a great smoke and a loud noise. Two more mines were immediately driven into the same work, and these being sprung on the 16th, so far succeeded that, with the aid of another day's battering, the breach was reported to be practicable. On the 17th a mighty mine was dug and crammed with powder under another angle of the works; and the following day was fixed for the storm. Early in the morning of the 18th our storming-parties established themselves in the advanced trenches. The left breach, or that which was already practicable, was to be mounted by the brigade of General Nicolls, headed by his Majesty's 59th regiment; the breach on the right was to be mounted by General Reynell's brigade, headed by his Majesty's 14th regiment: the explosion of the mine under the north-east bastion was to be the signal for the attack. With the single exception, we believe, of the tremendous explosion made under the superintendence of General Pasley for clearing the obstructions to the line of the Dover railway and opening the road to the Shakspeare Cliff, no mine can bear comparison with this mine under the north-east angle of Bhurtpoor. It is lamentable to add that the construction of this Bhurtpoor mine was far from being so perfect as the explosion it made was terrible and sublime. At eight o'clock in the morning the match was applied to the train, and with terrific effect: the whole of the salient angle and part of the stone cavalier behind it were lifted into the air, which for some minutes was as dark and black as the darkest night; all the garrison there were blown to the winds or buried under the ruins. The breach was made, and more than breach enough, but, owing to the defective construction of the mine, many of the ejected stones and masses of earth fell upon the head of our column of attack, killing a number of men and severely wounding three officers. The stones fell so thickly about Lord Combermere himself, that Brigadier-General MacCombe was knocked down by his side, and two sepoys were killed on the spot within a few feet of his lordship. The troops, however, rushed on to the assault with admirable spirit and in good

order, ascended the breaches, and cleared them in the teeth of a very determined opposition. On the left, where the ascent was steep and difficult, our grenadiers moved up slowly and resolutely, without stopping to draw a trigger in return for the volleys of round shot, grape, and musketry which were fired upon them. Within two hours all the ramparts and the command of the gates of the citadel were in the possession of the besiegers, and early in the afternoon the citadel surrendered. Brigadier-General Sleigh, who commanded the cavalry, had taken excellent measures outside to prevent the escape of Doorjun Sal; and when that chief with 160 chosen horse attempted to force a passage, he was made prisoner by the 8th regiment of light horse. One of his wives and two of his sons were taken with him. They were all sent prisoners to Allahabad, to be supported by the Company. Our entire loss during the siege and storming amounted to 61 Europeans and 42 natives killed, and 283 Europeans and 183 natives wounded. The loss of the garrison was estimated at 4000 men, mostly killed, and for the most part killed by the awful explosion of the last mine. That explosion alone had demolished a capital part of the works of this far-famed fortress, which had been doubly considered as impregnable by the natives since the long and ruinous siege of 1805. After the ammunition, arms, stores, &c. had been removed to places of safety, the principal bastions, curtains, and other important parts of the fortification were blown into the air. "The Bastion of Victory," built, as the Jauts had boasted, with the bones and blood of the British soldiers who fell in the assaults under Lord Lake, was now laid low, and among its destroyers were some of those very soldiers who, twenty years before, "had been permitted to fly from its eternal walls." It was left to the monsoon rains to complete the ruin of Bhurtpoor. Deeg, Biana, Kama, and all the other fortresses within the Bhurtpoor Rajah's dominions surrendered immediately, and were occupied by British garrisons; the inhabitants returned quietly to their homes, and the young Rajah was reinstated under the protection of the British

government. Lord Combermere broke up his camp on the 20th of February, and returned to Calcutta. Thanks were voted by parliament and by the Company; and the prize-money, granted to the Company by the king, was ordered by the Court of Directors to be distributed among the army.

The attention of all India was fixed on the siege of Bhurtpoor, on the issue of which, far more than on anything which might happen in the Burmese empire, the renown of the British arms and the permanency of the British empire in Asia were felt to depend. Our officers rejoiced at the opportunity offered for effacing the very injurious impression which had been made by Lord Lake's failure; yet they admitted that should our army fail again, few events would go so near to fulfil the shout of a mob which had been heard in the streets of Delhi a few months before:—"The rule of the Company is at an end!" All the surrounding principalities were in a ferment, and most of them would have been up in arms if Lord Combermere had not succeeded or had not been rapid in his achievement. "Should he fail," wrote Bishop Heber, "it is unhappily but too true, that all northern and western India, every man who owns a sword, and can buy or steal a horse, from the Sutledge to the Nerbudda, will be up against us, less from disliking us than in the hope of booty. And, still more unfortunately, it is not easy to say where another army can be found to meet them, now that Bombay is fully occupied on the side of Sindé;* and the strength of British India is in Ava."† But Lord Comber-

mere's rapid triumph completely destroyed the prestige of the Jauts, overawed all the native chiefs, checked the disposition to revolt, and completely confirmed the supremacy of Britain over the whole of India. The fall of Bhurtpoor moreover carried dismay or discouragement to the court of Ava, and to many countries beyond the limits of India.

In the course of the following year Lord Amherst proceeded to the upper provinces. During his stay at Delhi, a final settlement took place of the relations in which the British government in India and the poor descendant of the Great Moguls stood towards each other. An end was now put to that prejudicial fiction—highly prejudicial to the English, and of no benefit to the King of Delhi or to any other party—that our governor-general was but the vassal of the Mogul Shah. Our sovereignty was now openly asserted, and an end was thus put to many causes of embarrassment and of false or anomalous positions. There was no lustre to be gained from borrowing the name or authority of so discredited a prince, and one so weak in intellect as the Shah, who gladly resigned a shadowy suzerainty for the sake of a little more hard cash. It is said that some of the Mogul family mourned over the loss of their nominal greatness, but the people evidently cared not one straw about the change, which was at most a change in phraseologies. The Duke of Wellington had said of the people of India long before this—"They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if indifference constitute that character."

Having returned to Calcutta, Lord Amherst resigned the provisional governments into the hands of W. B. Bayley, Esq., and embarked for England at the close of the month of March, 1827. His lordship, as well as the directors at home, had been sufficiently anxious for peace, yet nearly the whole of his administration had been occupied by wars. This was unavoidable, but the Burmese war might have been better managed. During a good part of this administration the army of India was kept up to the stupendous amount of an effective force of 274,000 men!

* The Ameers of Sindé were again becoming very troublesome. During the Burmese war, and just before the siege of Bhurtpoor, they invaded Cutch, throwing everything into confusion there, and menacing the territories of the Guicowar and the Bombay presidency. Bishop Heber thought that these incursions were mainly produced by the drought, famine, and universal distress then prevailing in the always turbulent country of Sindé; but it appears to be proved pretty satisfactorily that some of the Ameers were excited by the usurper of Bhurtpoor and by the court of Ava as well. See the depositions of Missionary Judson, and Agha Mohamed, the merchant of Ispahan, in 'Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War,' by H. H. Wilson, Esq.

† Letter to Richard Heber, Esq.

CHAPTER XVI.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

THE melancholy death of Lord Castlereagh, by bringing Mr. Canning into power at home, had led to his resignation of the office of Governor-general of India just as he was on the point of sailing for the East. The somewhat unfortunate ex-governor of Madras, Lord William Bentinck, then took the unusual step of offering himself as a candidate for the governor-generalship, which an unforeseen catastrophe had induced Mr. Canning to give up; but his lordship was still rather unpopular in Leadenhall-street, and he was not as yet backed in Downing-street; and Lord Amherst was sent out. Between that appointment in 1822 and the resignation of Lord Amherst in 1827, great political changes had taken place at home, and Mr. Canning, by a partial coalition with the Whigs, had reached the uneasy seat of premier. To Mr. Canning the support of the great Whig families was now altogether indispensable, and therefore it was that he supported Lord William Bentinck, who once more offered himself as a candidate for the governor-generalship. Five years could have changed nothing either in the character or capacity of a man of Lord William's age, or in the conduct and character of his Madras administration, which had been so severely censured by the Company; yet, nevertheless, the Court of Directors now readily gratified the long and ardent wish of his lordship's heart, and, yielding to Mr. Canning's very short prevalency, they nominated Lord William Bentinck in the month of July, 1827. His lordship was scarcely sworn in ere Mr. Canning's numerous vexations in parliament and his rapidly declining health seemed to threaten a dissolution of the ministry, or the mortal dissolution of that eloquent and accomplished states-

man—or, as happened, both these events. Mr. Canning died on the 8th of August; the mixed Goderich ministry which followed was broken up in less than six months; and in January, 1828, four days before the re-assembling of parliament, the Duke of Wellington's ministry was formed. Lord William Bentinck had not yet sailed for the East. It was expected by many that his appointment would now be annulled in order to make room for a nobleman of the Tory party, or, as Lord Minto expressed it, for a person in the entire confidence of government. But the Duke of Wellington did not advise the sovereign to exercise his revoking power; and in February, 1828, a few days after the accession of the new ministry, Lord William Bentinck, who had been kept so long in a state of doubt and suspense, took his departure for Bengal. His lordship landed at Calcutta on the 4th of July, when Mr. Bayley's provisional authority ceased.

The Burmese and Bhurtpoor wars had added more than 13,000,000*l.* sterling to the registered debt of India. Upon his lordship was therefore imposed the generally unpopular duty of carrying into effect measures of economy, retrenchment, and reduction. His instructions to this end were earnest and imperative. The reductions which Lord Amherst had commenced in the army were now continued with great alacrity; and a system of economy was introduced into various departments of the government, not much to the satisfaction of those who had profited by the former state of things. Murmurs were heard from all sides—a dislike, which seemed to be almost universal, was expressed; but his lordship pleaded his imperative instructions and orders from home, and consoled himself with the

conviction that he was doing his duty. "And this conviction," said he, "as I know from dreadfully dear-bought experience, is the only consolation that defies all contingencies." Several governors-general had been instructed by the Court of Directors to abolish sundry allowances made to the army under the name of *batta*, half-*batta*, &c.; but for fourteen years and more they had all shrunk from the odium and perhaps the danger attendant on this abolition. But Lord William resolved to obey his orders, and most of these allowances were abolished almost as soon as his lordship reached Bengal, much more to the dissatisfaction of the army than to the real benefit of the Company. The rupees saved were not worth the good spirit which was sacrificed, and which some men think has not yet been perfectly recovered. The conduct of his lordship was disapproved by two of the members of the Supreme Council, by Sir Charles T. Metcalfe and W. B. Bayley, Esq., both men of ability and of great experience in India, and both of opinion that the Company and the British empire in India were not to be served or saved by means of petty savings. To Lord Combermere, the commander-in-chief, this and other changes were so distasteful, that his lordship resigned and came home. The chief command of our Anglo-Indian forces afterwards devolved upon Major-General Sir Edward Barnes, who had proved himself to be an admirable soldier in Spain, in the south of France, and on the field of Waterloo, and an enlightened and excellent governor in the island of Ceylon; but in 1833, when Sir Edward resigned, and when the Whig government of Earl Grey seemed to be firmly established, Lord William Bentinck, who had been but an unlucky general on the eastern coast of Spain, added the functions of commander-in-chief to those of governor-general. His authority could not reach to the king's troops, but his lordship abolished flogging in the native part of the army, by a general order. This, however, he did not do until the very eve of his departure for Europe. Doubts are entertained even by those who are no advocates for corporal punishment, and who reprobate the excess

to which those punishments were once carried, whether the entire mass of the Indian army, European as well as native, has not been seriously injured by this regulation. The sepoy cares very little for confinement or the other punishments which have been substituted for the lash; and the British soldier feels himself doubly degraded by the lash, when he sees that while he is exposed to it the black soldier is not to be touched by it. The frequent acts of indiscipline which have broken out of late years among the sepoys—not without creating a painful alarm in England as well as in India—have been in good part attributed to this reform of Lord William Bentinck—a reform which other men (entirely, we believe, of his lordship's own political party) have held up to the admiration of the world not only as one of the most humane, but also as one of the wisest of measures.

The extremes of liberalism and the extremes of despotism often meet—the reformer that is eager and impatient in his vocation frequently adopts proceedings which look wonderfully like those of a jealous and absolute tyrant. In the civil service, every superior officer, court, or board was directed to report periodically on the character and conduct of every covenanted servant employed in a subordinate capacity. The late king of Naples, Francis I., a prince with whom, at one period of his life (in Sicily), Lord William was well acquainted, issued a similar mandate, his principal anxiety being to know from the heads of departments whether all their clerks went regularly to mass and confession. Lord William Bentinck's anxiety was to improve the morals of the civil service, and provide for the advancement of merit! But such a system was foreign to English habits, was odious to English natures—and long may it be so!—it could not be carried into execution, it fell to the ground, it was soon abolished altogether.

Happily for his fame there were other, nobler, and more enduring changes effected under this administration. From the time of Warren Hastings every governor-general, in common with every man possessing an English heart in India, had

deplored the revolting practices, the obscenity, and the cruelty appertaining to the corrupted and corrupting religion of the Hindus; and if our men in authority had somewhat overrated the difficulty of abolishing these practices, and had approached them with a timid hand, through the persuasion that any bolder attempt would lead to insurrection, universal rebellion, and carnage, in the course of half a century various experiments had been tried, and a good deal had been done, by slow degrees, towards a universal reformation. Lord Teignmouth, who was deeply impressed with religious feelings, had done much; and the Marquess Wellesley, who came after him—and *because* he did come after him—was enabled to do a good deal more. We repeat our own intimate conviction that if very much had been attempted at once, the experiment would have failed. Lord William Bentinck could do more than the Marquess Wellesley had done, *because* he came a quarter of a century after that illustrious man. The marquess had put down the horrible annual sacrifices of human life which had been celebrated for many ages on the Sagor Island; and he had laid down the principle that all such superstitious enormities were to be gradually and cautiously, yet resolutely checked.* The Suttee (*Sati*, from the Sanscrit *Sat*, good), or the act of self-immolation by Hindu widows, is described by Greek writers of the age of Alexander the Great, and it was in all probability an ancient custom in their time. Diodorus relates an instance of a Suttee which occurred in the army of Eumenes upwards of three hundred years before the Christian era; and he ascribes the zeal for this kind of self-sacrifice, in most instances, to the infamy which attached to those widows who refused to conform to the custom, or to burn themselves with the bodies of their deceased husbands. This is also the view taken of the custom by our missionaries; but Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone has observed, in the first volume of his admirable 'History of India,' that if the motive were one of so general an influence the practice would

scarcely be so rare.* In modern times at least it has been exceedingly rare. In

* It has been thought not improbable that the doctrine of transmigration, generally held throughout India, may have had some influence in the establishment of the Suttee. A widow, by burning herself with the corpse of her husband, was said to be immediately released from further migration and enter at once on the enjoyments of heaven, to which, by this act, she would also entitle her deceased husband. In the most ancient code of Manu the practice is not even alluded to. Many later, but still ancient Hindu authorities recommend the practice, but by no means command it. According to a summary of the law and custom of Hindu castes, compiled by the late Arthur Steele, Esq., and printed at Bombay in 1827, by order of the governor, the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, the most virtuous mode for a woman to become a Suttee is to die of affliction and grief on the death of her husband—not to burn herself with his body or to bury herself alive.

It has been supposed that there is a connexion between the worship of the goddess Kali and the practice of the burning Suttee, of which no mention is made in the most ancient of the Hindu holy books; and it has been observed that these Sutees were most frequent in the district of Calcutta, where the worship of Kali is more common than in any other part of India. Doctor Marshman, the learned Baptist missionary, assigned more homely and sordid reasons for the prevalence of the custom; and he is likely to be as near to the truth as those who have speculated about transmigration, the goddess Kali, &c. He told Bishop Heber that extravagance and poverty made many families anxious to get rid, by any means, of the necessity of supporting their mothers or the widows of their relations. He thought that another frequent cause was the jealousy of old men, who, having married young wives, still clung to their exclusive possession even in death, and left injunctions either with their wives themselves to make the burnt-offering, or with their heirs to urge them to it. Doctor Marshman was strongly of opinion that the practice might be forbidden in Bengal, where it was of most frequent occurrence, without exciting any serious murmurs. The women, he was convinced, would be all loud in their praises of such a measure. The Brahmins, he said, had no longer the power and popularity which they had when he first remembered India; and among the laity, many powerful and wealthy persons publicly expressed their agreement with Ramohun Roy in reprobating the custom. Some of the members of Lord Amherst's government, however, thought differently. They conceived that the likeliest method to make the custom more popular than it was, would be to forbid it and make it a point of honour with the natives.—*Bishop Heber, Indian Journal. Penny Cyclopædia, article Suttee. Arthur Steele, Summary of the Laws and Customs of Hindu Castes.* This last-named amiable and accomplished man returned from Bombay to Europe with his patron and friend Mr. Elphinstone in 1828. He was about returning to India when, in the summer of 1829, he paid a visit to

* Marquess Wellesley, Indian Dispatches, &c.



A Brahmin expounding the Veda.

Upper India, where the holiest of the cities of the Hindus abound, the practice is by no means common. Bishop Heber found it common nowhere except in Bengal and some parts of Bahar. In the year 1821, during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, a bold blow was aimed at the custom, by arresting a man who had assisted at a suttee, and by trying him for murder before an English court of justice. In 1826, during the administration of Lord Amherst, and nearly two years before Lord William Bentinck arrived at Calcutta, the evil practice was seriously circumscribed by legal enactments; the government declared the burning of a widow without the body of the deceased husband to be illegal; and all persons, whether relations or others, aiding or abetting in such an act, either before or after the death of the husband, were to be committed for trial at the circuit courts, to be made liable to the punishments inflicted for murder and homicide. Even before this time no woman was supposed to be burned without her own wish duly certified to a magistrate. And now the burning of a widow was declared to be illegal under various circumstances. In fact, only those suttees were to be considered lawful where the widow appeared in court, and solicited permission in person from the magistrate. At the same time all the property, real and personal, in actual possession of the deceased husband and widow who performed suttee (even though under the sanction of the proper authorities), was declared to be forfeited to government. Moreover, it was declared that no person should be eligible to any office or employment whatsoever under government, in whose family a suttee should take place from this time forward. All this legislation, which was quietly submitted to, and was productive of the desired effect, really left Lord William

some friends in Ireland, and got drowned while bathing in a little river, scarcely more than a brook. We knew him well, and still lament his loss. Young, active, enthusiastic in the pursuit of knowledge, and imbued with the soundest and best principles, he bade fair to be one of the foremost men in the Indian service—a service which requires eminent men as much as ever it did.

Bentinck very little to do, and rendered the execution of that little a safe and easy task. It is absolute nonsense and something worse to overlook everything that was done by his predecessors, and to attribute to his lordship the sole merit of putting down the suttees. On the 14th of December, 1829, Lord William Bentinck as governor-general, and Lord Combermere, W. B. Bayley, Esq., and Sir Charles T. Metcalfe, as members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, passed a regulation declaring the practice of suttee, or burning or burying alive the widows of Hindus, with, or without the bodies of their deceased husbands, to be abominable, illegal, and punishable by the criminal courts. We believe that between the year 1826, or the time when Lord Amherst's regulations were passed, and the end of 1829, hardly any suttees had been known to occur in Bengal.

If some of the Hindus feebly complained of infractions of their ancient rites and usages, and petitioned for a continuance of the enviable privilege of burning widows (especially old ones), other Hindus expressed their deep sense of gratitude to Lord William Bentinck for completing a good work. No irritated Hindu superstition or bigotry caused any danger or commotion; but, at the end of 1831, disturbances were created in the Baraset district in the neighbourhood of Calcutta by a body of fanatical and fantastical Mohammedans, under a leader called Tittoo Meer, who had been a wrestler, or a Sudra Decoit or river robber. These fellows, whose fury was directed not so much against the British government as against the Hindus, murdered a Brahmin, seized and killed a Brahmini bull or cow, sprinkled the blood over the walls of a Hindu temple, and hung up the carcass in front of that building, to the inconceivable horror of all the Hindu part of the population. Their only quarrel with the agents of government was about a tax or fine put upon their beards, in consequence of previous misconduct. After defeating with some loss a small body of police-officers and Calcutta militia, they were attacked, in the month of November, by a more adequate force sent by the government.

Tittoo Meer and 50 of his followers were killed, and 300 of them were taken prisoners.

Lord William Bentinck made the tour of the upper provinces. At Buxar the Rajah Gopaul Sing presented an address, thanking his lordship for having abolished suttee. Quitting Simla in the month of October, 1831, his lordship proceeded to the territories of the protected Seiks, and halted at Ruper, a town situated on the banks of the Sutledge, just where that river quits the mountains and enters the plains of Hindustan. Here he was met by that powerful Seik ruler, the Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, the lord and lion of Lahore, who made professions of the warmest friendship, having then a fresh and lively recollection of the great English dray-horse and the other presents which Lieut. Burnes had carried to him a short time before. The governor-general had seen this very adventurous and self-confident young officer (Burnes) during his recent stay at Simla; and this ill-omened meeting contributed not a little to those frightful catastrophes in Afghanistan with which the name of Burnes must be inseparably connected. Burnes had ascended the Indus from its mouth, between Cutch and Sinde, as far as Lahore, and thought he had ascertained that for the extent of a thousand miles, from the sea to Runjeet Sing's capital, there might be an uninterrupted navigation; and that by the agency of steam that famed river might be made a valuable commercial highway: *if* the fierce Ameers of Sinde, who exercised dominion or perpetuated an anarchy along its banks, could be reclaimed from their habits; and *if* the countries to which the Indus afforded access could speedily become (what they certainly had not been for many ages) the homes of a numerous, industrious, agricultural population, with wants to be supplied by European industry and ingenuity, and with the means in their hands of furnishing what Europeans want. The high road of trade lay across the Indus, and not up that river. Lieutenant Burnes, however, proud of the novel voyage he had made, seemed to think that merely by sending a few steam-boats up the river, or framing a treaty or two with

the beggarly barbarians dwelling on the banks, a great and profitable trade might be created forthwith, and that, rather than lose this chance, the Indian government ought to incur almost any expense or risk. And, far beyond the Indus and the Punjab, or the regions watered by the five rivers, in the country of the pastoral and warlike Afghans, and farther still in the wilds and deserts which lie between India and the Caspian Sea, Lieutenant Burnes had built up sundry little visions, besides the bright, innocent, and laudable one of making large additions to our geographical knowledge. His design, he says, received the most liberal encouragement from the governor-general, Lord William Bentinck—his lordship being of opinion that a knowledge of the general condition of the countries through which he meant to travel would be useful to the British government, *independent of other advantages which might be expected from such a journey*.* Encouraged and aided in various ways by his lordship, Burnes, with a small party, descended the Sutledge, crossed the Hyphasis, near to the spot where Lord Lake had encamped, and where Alexander the Great was supposed to have halted; and then went on by the town of Peshawer, and the pass of Luta-Bund, to the city of Cabul, where Dost Mohamed Khan then reigned almost without a competitor. This Dost Mohamed, whom it was afterwards Burnes's destiny to assist in deposing, received him with much friendship and hospitality; and it was during his stay at Cabul, and his travels through the rest of Afghanistan, that our countryman contracted his very unsound notions as to the facility of managing the Afghans, and establishing intimate connexions in their country. They were fierce, treacherous, sanguinary, and passionately attached to their rude, half-savage independence: all this Burnes saw and allowed; yet, nevertheless, he thought that to an adroit, knowing, clever person, like himself, it would be as easy to manage those precious mountain-chiefs, as to amuse and manage so many children.

* Lieutenant Alexander Burnes, F.R.S., &c., Preface to *Travels in Bokhara, &c.*, 3 vols. 8vo., London, 1834.

Continuing his journey, and traversing mountains, rivers, and deserts, and going through Kiz-Kooduk, Kurshee, Bokhara, Shuruks, and Astrabad, Burnes safely reached Teheran, the capital of Persia; and as he and his small party had succeeded—by means of the friendly assistance of the different rulers of the countries through which they passed, and by attaching themselves to different caravans—in crossing the hungry deserts of Tartary, and in overcoming other obstacles, he concluded that a Russian or a Russo-Persian army, strong enough to contend with the British for the dominion of India, and with all the attirail of artillery, stores, &c., might overcome those difficulties likewise; and might, possibly, by moving in the direction opposite to that which he took, reach and go through the mountain-passes of Afghanistan, cross the Punjab and the Sutledge, and deploy in the plains of Hindustan! Burnes did not create this bugbear—it existed long before he left school or put on the toga virilis; but he assuredly fed and crammed it until it became bigger and more terrible than it had been before; and hence, in good part, the tears of many hundreds of affectionate hearts, the destruction of many thousands of British and native troops, and the anguish of every Englishman capable of feeling the disgrace of his country's arms. The idle fear of a Russian invasion of India had been ably and repeatedly exposed; and, neither as a rapid talker, nor as a half-informed, self-sufficient writer, had Burnes done or said anything to entitle his opinions to be considered as oracles by cool and well-informed men. This was felt and expressed by not a few in 1834, when that unfortunate officer was lionizing in London—not without betraying that conceit and *suffisance* which led mainly, though not entirely (for others were far more culpable than he in the execution of our political and military measures), to the deplorable and humiliating reverses and massacres of 1841-2. Unhappily such opinions were not entertained by those who governed India; and Burnes, who would have been an active, an intelligent, and a valuable servant of the Company,

if kept in his proper sphere, succeeded in convincing those high functionaries that he was a great statesman.

In conformity with the opinions expressed to him at Simla by Burnes, Lord William Bentinck dispatched Colonel Pottinger, in the character of envoy from the supreme government, to effect a treaty with the Ameers of Sindé—another easily-to-be-managed set of men, according to our sanguine explorer of the Indus. These Ameers, who were only a little less lawless and rapacious than the Pindaree chiefs of former days, gladly accepted the presents and promises that were offered them, and concluded with Pottinger certain agreements for allowing the Indus to be opened and navigated by our trading-vessels—whose trade was to be found hereafter. Thus were we brought into correspondence and a sort of connexion with the Ameers of Sindé. The immediate consequence was a great jealousy and alarm on the part of that older ally, Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore. His highness was for the present quieted by another British ambassador, Captain Wade, who repaired to Lahore, under the orders of the governor-general, to remove all unfavourable impressions. Runjeet Sing even engaged to adhere to the agreements which had been made between the Sindé Ameers and Colonel Pottinger, and to co-operate zealously in opening to trade the other rivers of the Punjab. But it ought to have been easy to perceive, even at this early period, that there was no dependence to be put either upon the Lion of Lahore or upon the Ameers of Sindé; and that nothing but war, conquests, and a strong and permanent military occupation, could give us what we wanted on the Indus, and in the Punjab.

After his return from his tour in the upper provinces to Calcutta, the governor-general, whose intentions and instructions continued to be of the most pacific kind, and whose treasury, in spite of every reduction and saving, continued to be at a very low ebb, found himself under the necessity of equipping an armament and undertaking a war against the Rajah of Coorg, the brother and successor of that faithful ally who had rendered such valu-

able services to the British during the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, and the siege of Seringapatam.* That chief had died in 1808, leaving his dominions by will to his daughter, Dewa Amajee, then a child, to the prejudice of his brother, Linga Rajah, and contrary to the ancient usages of Coorg, where, it was said, no female had ever held the reins of sovereignty; although in the contiguous and ancient Hindu principality of Bednore, a female sovereign, or Rannee, had always ruled, in preference to a male prince. The infant princess, Dewa Amajee, was, however, placed on the throne of Coorg. In 1810, during the administration of Lord Minto, the Bengal government received a communication from Linga Rajah, the young Rannee's uncle, stating that she had voluntarily abdicated in favour of the said uncle, Linga Rajah. By order of Lord Minto, measures were taken to investigate the whole business. The resignation of a little girl could not be considered as entitled to much attention; but at the same time the British government could not be considered as bound to support a mere testamentary device of the deceased Rajah, or to uphold an order of succession said to be hostile to the laws, prejudices, and wishes of the Coorg people. The result of the investigation proved favourable to the claims of Linga Rajah; and the inhabitants being strongly inclined to the establishment of his pretensions, these were acquiesced in by the Bengal presidency, and a dispatch announced to the Rajah the determination of the British government to recognise his title to the sovereignty. Some large sums of money, vested by the late Rajah in the Bombay and Madras funds, were secured to the young Rannee, her little sisters, and some other members of the family, by the care of the British government.† Dewa Amajee, in process of time, was married to a Coorg chieftain, named Chinnah Buswa. She had grown up a beautiful woman—at least she appears to have been considered as beautiful by the Coorgs, and the black Nairs, and by her own uncle. Towards the end of 1832

she and her husband fled from Coorg into Mysore, to seek the protection of the British resident, Mr. Cassamajor. They alleged that the uncle had attempted to violate his niece—but, perhaps, he had only attempted to violate her money-chests. His character, however, was notoriously depraved, and his government had been a foul and cruel one. Our incredulity is excited when we are told that this miserable little potentate—whose subjects for the most part lived in woods and forests, like the Vedas, or wild men of Ceylon, and whose dominions contained only one or two places that could, by any courtesy of language, be called towns—entertained the idea of pursuing his niece and her husband into the British territories, and was actually beginning to raise an army for that purpose. Yet if the Rajah were mad (and the whole tenor of his conduct renders such a suspicion far from improbable) he might have been contemplating and doing all that was said of him. Mr. Cassamajor was instructed in January, 1833, to repair to Mercara, the so-called capital of Coorg, to seek a personal interview with the Rajah, and to endeavour to bring him to reason. On his return from this not very pleasant mission, Mr. Cassamajor reported that the Rajah's reign was a complete reign of terror; that his subjects were barbarously oppressed, and often savagely butchered; that he was notoriously disaffected to the Company, and in correspondence and league with some of the Company's turbulent subjects on the frontiers of Mysore. Shortly afterwards, the Polygar of Terrikerry, who had rebelled against the Rajah of Mysore—that is to say, against the Company—fled with his family into Coorg, and was there said to be received with great honour. When Mr. Cassamajor called upon the Rajah to give up this troublesome polygar, the Rajah replied by calling upon our resident to give up Dewa Amajee and her husband, and by complaining, in no very respectful language, of the refuge given by the English to the fugitives from his territories. Some disturbances broke out, and some robberies were committed near the frontiers of the two countries: all this induced Sir Frederick Adam, now governor of Madras, to

* See ante, pp. 47, 48.

† Walter Hamilton.

dispatch another envoy to the Coorg Rajah. In the month of September, Mr. Græme quitted the coast, and proceeded towards the woods and jungles of Coorg. He was the bearer of a letter from the governor-general, who was now hastening to Madras, and who announced to the Rajah his intention of proceeding to Mysore, for the purpose of conferring with his highness, and settling every point in dispute. The perverse Rajah returned no answer to his lordship's letter, and forcibly detained the agent of Mr. Græme who presented it. On arriving at Madras Lord William wrote another letter, which was treated with no more respect. Lord William went to Bangalore, expecting to find an answer there; but none came. His lordship's next message was delivered by the convincing mouths of muskets. On the 6th of April, 1834, the miserable little capital of Coorg surrendered to a small column under the command of Brigadier Lindsay, and the Rajah delivered himself up on the 10th. He had not shown the mercy for which he now implored—the most atrocious murders had been perpetrated under his orders—not one member of the family, save himself, had been left alive. His dewan, or chief minister, who was reported to have urged him on in his mad career, was found in the jungle, hanging on a tree; but whether he had hanged himself voluntarily, or the Rajah had hanged him—whether he had fallen a victim to the vengeance of some Coorg chief, or to the universal rage of the people, could not be ascertained, and did not excite much inquiry. All the Coorg territories were assumed by the Company, and placed under direct British rule, conformably with a minute drawn up by Lord William Bentinck, at Bangalore, in the month of March.

His lordship, whose health was failing, resigned the governor-generalship, and quitted Calcutta, in March 1835. Previously to his departure, he received several addresses expressed in warm and grateful language. The mercantile community declared that his lordship's object had been the general improvement of the country, the moral and social advancement of its vast and varied population, and the development of its commercial

and agricultural resources. They observed that his lordship's administration had necessarily been of a character widely different from those of his immediate predecessors. Theirs were days of war and diplomacy and profuse expenditure: to his lordship had fallen the more painful task of repairing the deep wounds inflicted in the public finances, of contending with an alarming deficit, and of enforcing the remedy of severe economy and retrenchment. This course was now as necessary as the opposite one had been in the days of Lord Amherst and the Marquess of Hastings. Some millions may have been spent through mismanagement and blunders; but if the Mahratta and Pindarree league had not been broken, and if the Nepaulese and the Burmese had not been chastised and thrown back from the Company's exposed frontiers, Lord William Bentinck, on arriving in India, would have been compelled to enter upon a series of wars which would have left a far greater deficit than that which he found; for Mahrattas, Pindarrees, Nepaulese, Burmese, together with all the turbulent wasteful tribes and communities dwelling in Central India, must all have gained strength with time, and thus have become the more difficult to subdue, while the wasted territories of the Company and its allies must have crippled our government, and have left it the less able to prosecute hostilities on so extensive a scale. The native population of Calcutta, meeting at the Hindu College, declared that his lordship had done everything kind for them; and that his only act of unkindness was parting from them. They expressed their veneration for his lordship's person and character, and their gratitude for the enlarged spirit of justice and benevolence with which the natives of India had been treated under his administration. At a public meeting at the Town-hall a resolution was passed, requesting his lordship to permit his statue to be erected in some conspicuous part of Calcutta, the statue to be of bronze, and equestrian, and to be executed by Chantrey. The Court of Directors treated him in a manner very different from that in which they had behaved on recalling him from the governorship of Madras.

They had resolved "that this Court deeply lament that the state of Lord William Beutinck's health should be such as to deprive the Company of his most valuable services; and this Court deem it proper to record, on the occasion of his lordship's resignation of the office of governor-general, their high sense of the

distinguished ability, energy, zeal, and integrity with which his lordship has discharged the arduous duties of his exalted station." His lordship arrived safely at Portsmouth on the 14th of July, 1833, but he did not long survive his return to England.

CHAPTER XVII.

HOME LEGISLATION.

It was felt very generally, even at the time of passing it, that the act of 1813, which made the first great inroad on the Company's exclusive commercial privileges, would be but the introduction to far more extensive changes in the Company's charter. From the year 1813 down to 1833, when the India trade was entirely thrown open, the advocate for free trade never rested, and there was a succession of enactments and regulations all subversive of the old monopoly. By the act of 1813, (or act 53 George III.,) power had been reserved to parliament to make further regulations for the direct and circuitous trade with places within the limits of the Company's charter. In virtue of this reservation, the Circuitous Trade Act was passed in 1814; and the Malta and Gibraltar Trade Act was passed in 1817. In 1820 committees of parliament were nominated to inquire into the foreign trade of the nation and to deliberate on the means of extending it. Among other branches of trade, that with India and China claimed a large portion of the attention of these committees. In both houses of parliament and in the country at large the notion had long prevailed that the monopoly the East India Company had of the trade of China was injurious to the interests of commerce in general. But many who entertained this notion felt at the same time that it would be difficult for any body of men less organized and experienced than the Company to carry on a trade with so strange a people as the Chinese, without being constantly involved in quarrels. In May, 1820, Mr. Canning, then president of the Board of Control, pressed on the attention of the Court of Directors the expediency of establishing an entrepôt in the Eastern Archipelago, where British ships might

take in tea for foreign Europe; and he pointed out the expediency of the Company's allotting a portion of their tonnage to China to the free use of the British public. The Court of Directors alleged that without the monopoly of the China trade they could neither preserve their territories in India nor pay their dividends in England—that in fact the China trade was the main prop of the Company's financial system. They declined being parties to any change in the China trade, and expressed a hope, or rather a wish, that it might be left as regulated by the act of 1813. The committee of the Commons, in their report of July, 1821, stated that they could not concur in *all* the apprehensions entertained by the Company of the consequences of even a partial relaxation of their monopoly; but at the same time they acknowledged that the Chinese monopoly was of the utmost importance to the prosperity of the Company and of all connected with it. It was, however, unavoidable that some concessions should be made to the loud demands of free trade and political economy; and in the course of the year 1821 British ships were permitted to carry on trade between all parts within the limits of the charter, and all ports, whether in Europe or elsewhere, belonging to countries in amity with Great Britain. The Company also consented to relinquish the restriction as to the tonnage of ships engaging in the India trade. From this time down to 1827 no legislative alterations were made; but the subjects of India and China trade were several times brought before parliament, and a warm discussion upon them was kept up by means of reviews, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers. In May, 1827, shortly after Mr. Canning had been gazetted as

first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Whitmore moved in the Commons for the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the trade between Great Britain and the East. Mr. Whitmore did not hesitate to recommend the entire dissolution of the "China monopoly." Mr. Canning was to a great extent a free trader; a large section of his present supporters were declared antagonists to monopolies and restrictions of all kinds; and Mr. Huskisson, his colonial secretary, was a leader and oracle of the free traders and political economists; nevertheless Mr. Whitmore's motion was opposed on the ground that the proper time was approaching for reconsidering the whole of the Company's charter and system of trade. Mr. Canning died in the month of August; the Goderich administration fell to pieces in a very few months; Mr. Huskisson and his friends of the free-trade school resigned; and in January, 1828, the Duke of Wellington became prime minister. In May, 1829, Mr. Huskisson presented a strong petition from the merchants of Liverpool, praying for the removal of all restrictions on the trade with India and China. He said it was humiliating to our pride and good sense that English ships should be excluded from traffic with the great and populous Chinese Empire, and that the East India Company should be allowed to monopolize the whole of that traffic. These sentiments were loudly re-echoed by a great portion of the house and by what seemed a majority of the public out of doors. Two days after this, Mr. Whitmore returned to the assault, reprobating the monopoly and insisting upon the necessity of a searching inquiry by parliament. The motion for a committee was, however, withdrawn at the instance of ministers, who urged its postponement until proper notice should have been given to the Company. But at the same time ministers spoke as if the last hour of monopoly was fast approaching. In the month of February, 1830, Lord Ellenborough moved for the appointment of a select committee of the House of Lords to inquire into the present state of the affairs of the East India Company, and the trade between Great Britain, the

East Indies, and China. His lordship said that the Company had afforded all the aid in their power to increase the facilities given to the external and internal trade of India; that the most important questions for parliament now to decide were—1. Whether it would be possible to conduct the government of India directly or indirectly without the assistance of the Company? 2. Whether the assistance of the Company should be afforded in the manner in which it had hitherto been afforded, or in some other way? On the same day Mr. Secretary Peel moved in the Commons for a committee for the same purpose, stating that he proposed its appointment with the plain and honest view of having a full and unreserved investigation of the affairs of the Company, and not for the purpose of ratifying any charter or engagement previously existing between the government and the Company.* Committees were appointed by both houses. Their reports were unfavourable to the Company, whose evidence had been taken.

The death of George IV., on the 26th of June, 1830, led to the prorogation of parliament on the 23rd of July, and to its dissolution on the day following. In the month of October, about a fortnight before the assembling of the new parliament of King William IV., the chairman and deputy-chairman of the Company had an interview at Apsley House with the Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough. His grace stated, that as the period had arrived for giving notice to the Company that their exclusive trade privileges would terminate in 1834, the government wished to ascertain what the views and intentions of the Company would be, in the event of its being con-

* No such engagement on the part of government had ever existed. But in a letter from Lord Ellenborough to Sir John Malcolm, his lordship was supposed to have written that government was prepared to *renew* the Company's charter. Mr. G. Banks declared in the House that the word was or ought to have been *revise*, and not *renew*. It appears to be quite certain that the Company never expected their Charter would be renewed without immense changes being made in it. Right or wrong, their arguments had all been overruled; and the free-trade current had set in so strong that no ministry could long have stood against it.

sidered expedient that the Court of Directors should continue to exercise functions similar to those now intrusted to them in the government of India, *but the Company no longer to possess the monopoly of the China trade.* The chairman, Mr. Astell, said that the Company would not be indisposed to continue their services to the public, provided the requisite means were ensured to them for administering the government consistently with their own character, and for the benefit of this country and of India; that financially speaking there was a large annual deficit, which was met principally through the profits of the Company's trade with China; that under the existing system the Indian territory had access to all the *commercial capital* of the Company, which assistance the Company had been willing to afford, so long as their trade had yielded a dividend of ten and a half per cent.; and finally that, under any contemplated change, the Court of Directors must feel it to be their first duty to secure the interests and property of their constituents, who could not be expected to consent that any portion of their capital should remain exposed to hazard, without ample guarantee and security. The Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough considered that the proprietors of East India stock had full security for their capital, and for their dividends, at the present rate, in the commercial assets, and in the fixed property in India, which might be judged to belong to the Company in its commercial capacity. The chairs laid the propositions before a secret committee of correspondence, who, in a few days, recorded a minute, declaring that they had no objection to an early consideration of the general question; but that they had not anticipated being called upon, within fourteen days of the meeting of parliament, to deliver an opinion upon the plan of ministers. The new parliament met on the 26th of October; on the 15th of November the ministry was broken up, and on the 22nd Earl Grey was gazetted as prime minister. The Right Hon. Charles Grant (now Lord Glenelg) succeeded Lord Ellenborough as head of the Board of Control. This gentleman and his family had been closely connected with the Com-

pany, and had owed much of their fortune and illustration to the Indian service; but these considerations did not prevent the newly-appointed president to the Board of Control from going along with his official colleagues. Under any government that it was possible to form, a sweeping change in the Company's charter was inevitable; but the Whig ministry of Earl Grey, perhaps, proceeded with more rapidity, and paid less attention to the representations of the Company, than the Duke of Wellington's cabinet would have done. Possibly the Whigs could not help this; for they came into power as reformers (and they could have obtained power in no other character), and they were bound by their previous and long-standing declarations to carry out, without loss of time, such a multiplicity of reforms or changes as had never been carried before, (except by the Long Parliament in the time of the Commonwealth,) in half a century. Even if the amount of ability, integrity, and good intention had been tenfold what it was, it would hardly have been possible for the ministry to do all this work well.

Mr. Grant, as president of the Board of Control, moved on the 4th of February, 1831, for the re-appointment of the committee on East India affairs. This committee, however, was scarcely appointed ere parliament was dissolved. The new parliament assembled on the 14th of June; and, losing no time, Mr. Grant, on the 28th, moved again for the renewal of the committee. This was readily voted. In the course of the debate, ministers complained that the Company had not petitioned for a renewal of their charter. The free-traders wanted the trade, but did not want the sovereignty of India; and the government had no wish to burden itself with the sole management of our Eastern empire. They and the public were, in fact, so intent upon the one great question of commerce, that they hardly thought of the political government of India at all, at this moment. The Court of Directors deemed it the most prudent course to abstain from petitioning parliament, and to leave it to the Company's adversaries to make out their case first. The chairs, in a con-

ference with the president of the Board of Control, on the 7th of July, urged the necessity of being put in possession of the views of his majesty's government at the earliest possible period. In the meantime the table of the House of Commons had been loaded with petitions from merchants and others, against the renewal of the Company's charter upon its former terms. Much time was occupied in debating whether the Company could not do very well with their territorial revenues, and without monopolising trade; and whether the Company's accounts, which showed how much they depended upon the profits of the China trade, were or were not correct. Mr. Langton, a merchant of Liverpool, decidedly impugned the general integrity of the Company's accounts. "This," adds an official of the Court of Directors, "was, in fact, the only remaining point; and had it been proved vulnerable, the public might have proposed their own terms, and have placed the Company at the entire mercy of parliament, without any apparent plea of justice to rest upon in support of the interests of the proprietors."* Mr. Langton failed in convincing the house that he had made out his case. It should appear that this gentleman was very insufficiently informed as to the very complicated and difficult history of Indian administration, and as to the various political causes which had produced the accumulation of political debt. The session terminated on the 20th of October. On the 27th of January, 1832, the president of the Board of Control—still the Right Hon. Charles Grant—moved for the re-appointment of the select committee, observing that the previous committee had collected a great mass of valuable information, but that this information had been put together in a confused manner, while many important points had not been touched upon. He said that when he proposed the committee, twelve months ago, he thought it was not desirable that the government should take any leading part; that at that time, as now, there were two parties—one approv-

ing the renewal of the commercial privileges of the Company, the other disapproving of such renewal;—that he had expected that the truth would be elicited by each party endeavouring to prove its own case; but that, unfortunately, the Court of Directors had not felt themselves called upon to enter into the examination of the question at all; and those who were opposed to them had been unable to do justice to their own case. A general committee on the affairs of the East India Company being appointed, it was divided into six sub-committees:—1. public; 2. finance, accounts, and trade; 3. revenue; 4. judicial; 5. military; 6. political. Their labours terminated in August, 1832, when the several reports were all laid before the house, and ordered to be printed.*

On the whole, the reports were highly honourable to the Company. It was admitted that the old system, which had united commerce with government, and allowed of the trade-monopoly, had not been unattended with advantages; that without that system our vast empire in the East could not have been created—could never have been enlarged, as it had been, during seasons of depression and disgrace, and bad or weak government at home; that the finances of India had derived advantage from their existing connexion with the commerce of the Company, through the direct application of surplus commercial profits, and by the rates of exchange, at which the Board of Control decided that the territorial advances from commerce in England should be repaid to commerce in India. But our empire in the East was formed, and seemed to be so firmly established as to defy every attack; and our free-traders and political economists, again forgetting that we must

* These Reports filled more than 8000 pages of close print. These, with the matter previously given to parliament, made an aggregate of about 14,000 closely printed folio pages!

The Public Report touched upon the important subjects of local government, law, police, patronage, education civil and military, education of natives, liberty of the press in India, settlement of Europeans in the country, &c.

The Judicial Report sufficiently showed in what an unsettled state was the administration of justice in India half a century after the time when Sir Elijah Impey presided over the Supreme Court of Calcutta.

* Peter Anber, Rise and Progress of the British Power in India.

have the one to secure the other—that without our sovereignty the wealth and resources of India would be absorbed in a maelstrom of anarchy—were incessantly declaring that free-trade with India and China was worth more than our empire. Upon better grounds than these declamations, a death-blow had been given to the spirit of monopoly. No longer able to stand aloof, or to decline entering into negotiation about the charter with his majesty's government, the Court of Directors sent their chairman and deputy-chairman to confer with Earl Grey and Mr. Grant. This interview was followed up by a long correspondence, and an interchange of propositions and counter-propositions, which must be read in full in order to be understood. The grand change proposed by government was simply this—that the East India Company should cease to trade, and devote its undivided attention to the arduous duties of governing, in conjunction with the Board of Control, our empire in the East. On the 12th of February, 1833, Mr. Grant, in a letter, stated it to be the conviction of his majesty's ministers that, notwithstanding past defects and errors, and in spite of much remaining imperfection, the political administration of India through the Company had secured to the inhabitants of that country so considerable a measure of the advantages which it was the proper object of a government to bestow, and had evinced so much susceptibility of receiving improvement, that ministers would not be justified in lightly proposing to disturb the system in its essential elements. But that, by a careful observation of the effects of the blended system of trade and government, the Company ought, as soon as possible, to be released from commercial dealings; and that the interests of the nation would be best consulted by no longer continuing the China trade as an exclusive privilege, though ministers would not deny the value attached by the Company to the China trade, in its having supplied the deficiency of revenue, &c. With respect to the competency of India to answer all the just demands on her exchequer, Mr. Grant said that no rational doubt could exist. A revenue which had been stea-

dily progressing during the last twenty years, which had now reached the annual amount of 22,000,000*l.* sterling, and which promised still to increase—a territory almost unlimited in extent—a soil rich and fertile, and suited to every kind of produce—great resources not yet explored—a people, generally speaking, patient, laborious, improving, and evincing both the desire and capacity of further improvement;—these, Mr. Grant thought, were sufficient pledges that our treasury in the East, under wise management, would be more than adequate to meet the current expenditure. It was admitted that “the propositions of his majesty's ministers involved a surrender,” but then, it was said, “it also involved an equivalent.” The Court of Directors were told, that to accept or reject the proposition rested with the East India Company. They were at the same time informed, that should the Company contemplate trading, *apart from the exercise of political functions, and on a footing of free competition*, such trade, in the opinion of his majesty's ministers, could not possibly be profitable. “Whatever may be the decision of the Company,” added the president of the Board of Control, “I must repeat that it is not the intention of the government to recommend to parliament the renewal of the Company's exclusive privilege of trade with China. . . . I am bound to state frankly, that his majesty's ministers being, on the fullest consideration, convinced of the justice and liberality of the terms now offered, will be prepared, in the event of a rejection of them, to propose to parliament a plan for the future government of India without the instrumentality of the Company.” Mr. Grant concluded by intimating that if no decision was communicated to him by the 23rd of March, he would feel himself compelled to consider that the proposal was *declined*. In a subsequent letter, however, dated the 14th of March, he stated that he had no desire to adhere to the period here specified as the limit of deliberation on the subject. The Court of Directors, after sundry murmurs, contended for a guarantee, or some collateral security, for the payment of the dividends, and ultimately (if necessary)

for the capital, to the holders of East India shares. The Duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough had told the chairman of the Court, in 1830, that the proprietors had full security for their dividends and capital in the commercial assets and in the fixed property in India, which might be deemed to appertain to the Company in its trading capacity. Now Mr. Grant assured the Court that his majesty's government was willing and anxious to fortify the interests of the proprietors by a collateral security, in the shape of a sinking fund, formed by the investment of a portion of the commercial assets in the national stocks. Mr. Grant proposed, as a sufficient sum, 1,200,000*l.* He told the Court that much time could not be allowed them for deliberation—that it would not be in the power of ministers to entertain the proposal of any additions or modifications in the conditions they offered, unless the Company first agreed to adopt the plan as the government presented it to them.

Nevertheless the Court asked for further explanations, and demanded that the sinking fund, or guarantee fund, should be at least 2,000,000*l.* sterling. The Court of Directors could not give their assent to the plan of ministers without the sanction of the Court of Proprietors. Two or three years earlier such a sanction could scarcely have been hoped for, and the motion for it would have called together all the proprietors that were not bed-ridden or out of the country; but now, on the 3rd of May, 1833, it was decided in a general Court, by 477 votes, against a poor minority of 52, that, provided the guarantee fund were raised to 2,000,000*l.*, and some other money conditions complied with, the plan of ministers should be accepted, and the Company cease to be a trading Company.* On the 27th of May Mr. Grant expressed the satisfaction with which his majesty's government had learned the termination

of the appeal to the ballot in Leadenhall-street. He stated it to be the anxious wish of ministers to accommodate themselves as far as possible to the views and feelings of the Company, and he agreed to increase the guarantee fund to 2,000,000*l.* Other minor points were yielded as requested by the Court of Directors or by the general Court. They had claimed to have the exercise of the same powers as the Company now possessed under their charter. To this Mr. Grant replied, that his majesty's ministers did not contemplate curtailing or impairing these powers; and that whatever changes parliament might, in its wisdom, see fit to adopt, could, he did not doubt, be made without detriment to the substantial authority of the Company. The Court of Directors had conceived that the government, through the Board of Control, intended to claim and exercise a veto on the recall of governors-general, &c. as exercised by the Court of Directors. On this point Mr. Grant said, "If the words have been inserted in consequence of the hint thrown out in the memorandum that the Board should have a veto on the recall of governors and military commanders in India, I must state that *it is not the intention of his majesty's ministers to insist on that suggestion.*" Thus the power of recall was left undisturbed in the hands of the Directors. The government also agreed that if, at the expiration of the fixed term of twenty years, or at any subsequent period, the Company should be deprived of the political government of India, it should have the option, at three years' notice, of being paid off at the rate of 100*l.* for every 5*l.* 5*s.* of annuity; and that the proprietors, whenever paid off, should be entitled to resume their undoubted right to trade, which was now to be placed in abeyance. The general Court of Proprietors had suggested that sufficient powers should be reserved to the Company to check, "*by a system of publicity to both houses of parliament, or by some other means,*" any acts of the Board of Control which might appear to the Court of Directors to be unconstitutional—to militate against the principles of good government—to interfere with substantial justice to

* The attendance in this general court was but thin, if we consider the magnitude of the question. Five hundred and twenty-nine votes were scarcely a fourth part of the proprietors, and little beyond a third part of the number who have attended to vote in favour of a candidate for the direction.—*Auber.*

our allies—or to invalidate or impair the security for the dividend. To this suggestion Mr. Grant answered that “ministers saw no plan which was not, on public grounds, liable to grave objection.” The Court of Directors, in expressing their great satisfaction at the rest of the provisions, clung to the suggestion of parliamentary publicity, and now contended that the guarantee fund ought to be 3,000,000*l.* The Court thought that the measure of publicity could be exercised as a rule, if not as a privilege; and they expressed a confident expectation that parliament, taking the same view, would make suitable provision. The resolution of the Court of Directors was adopted by the general Court of Proprietors on the 10th of June.

On the 13th of June Mr. Grant, in a committee of the whole house, brought before parliament the subject of the Company's charter, and explained the changes which were about to be made in it. The whole of the transaction was to be entirely free from the finances of this country. It was proposed to establish a fourth government in the western provinces of India; to extend considerably the powers of the governor-general; to appoint a Supreme Council of Legislature, with power to make laws and draw up a code for India; to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (a jurisdiction which required defining half a century after Sir Elijah Impey had vacated his office); to render the presidencies of Madras and Bombay still more subordinate to the governor-general, and to reduce the council of those two presidencies. Mr. W. Williams Wynne, who had filled the office of president of the Board of Control for a longer period than any other party living, sharply criticized the mode of electing the Directors, and contended that the common proprietors of East India stock were incompetent to judge of the requisite qualifications. The absence of responsibility was what he particularly objected to throughout the system. He also thought that twenty-four Directors were too many, and that the number ought to be reduced and the responsibility augmented. On the 29th of June a printed copy of the bill was submitted to

the Court of Directors. That Court concurred generally, but offered some particular objections. They complained that the bill “placed the whole control in the supreme government, thereby not only interfering with the control exercised by the home authorities, but investing the governor-general with a sway almost absolute, and rendering it scarcely possible always to select a fit person to be intrusted with authority of such magnitude.”

[The Directors were in the right: it should appear that the Bill gave too much power to governors-general, or did not sufficiently define what that power was; and that in some particulars it is now as difficult for a governor-general as it once was for a chief-justice to discover the proper limits of his authority.]

The Court thought that there was no necessity for incurring the charge of a fourth presidency; that the councils of Madras and Bombay ought not to be reduced; and that it would be very unwise to deprive the commanders-in-chief of the armies of those two presidencies of the seats in council which had been usually allotted to them. The Court expressed their satisfaction that the Bill reserved to them the necessary powers regarding the laws which the Supreme Council might enact affecting the natives, and likewise the provincial courts, which laws were also to be subject to the king's approbation.

[These enactments were the more valuable and necessary, as the first individual appointed by his majesty's government to be chief member of this Supreme Council of legislature, or council of law-givers and code-makers, has declared since his return from the East that he is no lawyer—an assertion which is said to be corroborated by all our Anglo-Indians that have paid the least attention to the result of the five years of easy and indolent codification for which the right honourable gentleman is said to have received 50,000*l.* of the Company's money.]

With reference to the contemplated alteration in the number of the Directors, the Court declared that the continuance of the number as fixed by previous charters was essential to their independence, and that a reduction would be an infraction of

the privileges which the proprietors exercised, and which his majesty's government had promised to continue. Upon the proposed extension of the ecclesiastical establishment for India, which had increased from 40,000*l.* to 100,000*l.* per annum, the Court addressed a separate letter to the Board of Control; and they suggested that as the means of obtaining instruction in the Oriental languages in this country were widely extended, and as disadvantages resulted from confining the associations of youth destined for the Indian service to companions all having the like destination, it was both unnecessary and inexpedient any longer to maintain the East India College at Haileybury. They thought it would be better to appoint a test by which the qualifications of all parties to be nominated writers in the Company's service should in future be governed. They had not the least doubt that a system of public examination, sufficiently high, might be provided to secure adequately qualified parties.* The Court of Proprietors, look-

* In support of the opinion that the East India College ought to be abolished, Mr. Auber, late secretary to the Court of Directors, thinks it is sufficient to quote the names of the following distinguished servants of the Company, who were all well versed in the Oriental languages, and who were all in the service before any East India College existed:—Sir George Barlow, Colonel Kirkpatrick, Mr. Webbe, the Hon. Mountsuarth Elphinstone, Colonel Wilks, Sir Thomas Munro, Sir Barry Close, Sir John Malcolm, Captain Sydenham, Mr. Lumsden, Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Adam, and Sir Charles Metcalfe. But if these truly distinguished men acquired a knowledge of the Oriental languages in the country without any aids from the Company, and in some cases in spite of numerous obstacles and difficulties, their case can scarcely be quoted as a reason for doing without a proper place of instruction for young men destined for the Company's service. Either in India or at home some such establishment or establishments ought surely to exist. The languages, no doubt, may be acquired more easily and readily in the country than at home; and if the Marquess Wellesley's lofty plan for the college of Fort William had been carried out, the other branches of learning might have been taught at Calcutta, as well as the native languages. It is to be doubted, however, whether, both as regards their mental and physical development, our young men had not better pass all their years of study in their native climate, than in the debilitating climate of Bengal.

To abolish the East India College in England, without increasing the establishments in India,

ing at the question, as holders of all stocks are apt to do, merely with reference to their own immediate dividends, vehemently re-echoed the sentiment of the Court of Directors about the college; and they even petitioned the House of Commons to alter the act, to abolish the college, and to save their suffering pockets. The act, however, was not changed in this particular, and the East India College remains. Some other points of small importance were modified. On the 23rd of July the bill as amended in committee having been considered by the Court of Directors, they requested from the president of the Board of Control that sufficient time might be allowed to enable the proprietors to petition parliament, should they see fit, against parts of the Bill. Mr. Grant declined interfering with the arrangement which had been made for the Bill being read a third time on the 26th. On the morning of that day the general Court of Proprietors agreed to a petition, praying that the House would make provision for reporting differences that might arise between the Board of Control and the Court of Directors to parliament, and representing that the bill as it now stood would place an excess of power in the hands of the governor-general. They also urged the appointment of a lieutenant-governor for the western provinces, in lieu of a fourth presidency, and stated that the proposal to vest the executive governments of Madras and Bombay in governors without councils was open to serious objections. Besides murmuring against "the needless charge" of Haileybury College, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal of increasing the ecclesiastical establish-

would have been both a pernicious and a disgraceful measure. Until our universities be very materially changed, we see little prospect of all the Oriental languages required in the Company's service being well taught in them. Besides, this great and wealthy country does not over-abound in academical institutions or in provisions for learned or ingenious laymen; and it assuredly consists with the dignity of our Indian empire to maintain some such establishments at home and on a liberal scale. If there be need for reform, let the Honourable Company reform both Haileybury and Addiscombe, but let them not abolish either.

ment in India. In the end the petitioners prayed to be heard by counsel at the bar of the House in support of this petition. A petition of precisely the same nature was presented to the House of Lords by the Earl of Shaftsbury. This appeal to the Commons had little or no effect. Various amendments were, however, made in the Lords. On the 9th of August, at the instance of the Marquess of Lansdowne, the fifth, or newly added member of the Supreme Council of Calcutta, who was to manage the law commission, was excluded from sitting or voting, except when the Council should be engaged in making laws or legislative regulations; thus removing the objection to this fifth or new member encumbering the Council in its executive capacity.

On the 12th of August the Court of Directors came to the following resolution:—That the East India Bill, having arrived at its last stage in the House of Lords, it became their duty to submit to their constituents, the proprietors, a final opinion regarding that bill:—that, although they were still impressed with the belief that the cessation of the Company's trade would greatly weaken its position at home, and consequently impair its efficiency in the administration of the government in India, and although they regarded with much anxiety the increase of powers given by the said bill to the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, and greatly regretted that parliament had not provided some rule of publicity to act as a salutary check both upon the said Board of Control and the Court of Directors; yet, reviewing all the correspondence which had passed with his majesty's ministers, trusting that the extensive powers of the Board would be exercised with moderation, and so as not to interfere with the independence of the Company as a body acting immediately between the king's government and the government of India (an independence all parties had admitted it to be of vital importance to maintain), and relying with confidence that parliament would interpose for the relief of any financial difficulties into which the Company might unavoidably be cast through the operation of such extensive changes,

—the Court of Directors felt they could not do otherwise than recommend the proprietors to defer to the pleasure expressed by both Houses of Parliament, and to consent to place their right to trade for their own profit in aleycance, in order that they might continue to exercise the government of India for the further term of twenty years, upon the conditions and under the arrangements embodied in the same bill. Both the chairman and deputy-chairman* dissented from this resolution. William Astell, Esq. and fourteen other directors addressed a letter to the proprietors, stating at greater length the grounds upon which they had been induced to recommend the acceptance of the bill. On the 16th of August the proprietors assembled in a very thin General Court, and resolved by ballot, and by 173 balls or votes against only 64, that the bill ought to be accepted. The bill was read a third time in the House of Lords on the evening of this same day; and on the 28th of August it became law, the royal assent being given to it by commission. The rapidity with which it was carried through parliament was thought as extraordinary as the change which it effected in the character of the Company was extensive. Much of the detail must necessarily be suppressed; but the following is a brief analysis of the principal clauses of the Act 3 & 4 William IV. c. 85.

Sec. 1. The government of the British territories in India is continued in the hands of the Company until 1854. The real and personal property of the Company to be held in trust for the crown, for the service of India.

2. The privileges and powers granted in 1813, and all other enactments concerning the Company not repugnant to this new act, are to continue in force until April, 1854.

3. From 32nd April, 1834, the China and tea trade of the Company to cease, and to be opened to all his majesty's subjects.

4. The Company to close its commercial concerns, and to sell all its pro-

* Campbell Majoribanks and William Wigram, Esquires.

perty not required for the purposes of government.

9. The debts and liabilities of the Company are charged on the revenues of India.

43. The governor-general in council is empowered to legislate for India, and for all persons, whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all courts of justice, and for all servants of the Company; but he is not to do anything to affect the Mutiny Acts, or the prerogative of the crown, or the authority of parliament, or the constitution or rights of the said Company, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom, whereon may depend the allegiance of any person, or the sovereignty or dominion of the crown over any part of India.

44. If the laws thus made by the governor-general are disallowed by the authorities in England, they shall be annulled by the governor-general.

46. The governor-general in council, without the previous sanction of the Court of Directors, must not make any law or regulation whereby power shall be given to any courts of justice, other than the courts of justice established by his majesty's charters, to sentence to the punishment of death any of his majesty's natural-born subjects born in Europe, or the children of such subjects, or which shall abolish any of the courts of justice established by his majesty's charters.

51. This bill not to affect the right of parliament to legislate in future for India.

53. A law commission to be appointed to inquire into the jurisdiction, &c. of existing courts of justice and police establishments, and the operation of the laws.

81. Any natural-born subject of England may proceed by sea to any part or place within the limit of the Company's Charter having a custom-house establishment, and may reside thereat, or pass through to other parts of the Company's territories to reside thereat.

86. Lands within the Company's territories may be purchased and held by any persons where they are resident.

87. No native, nor any natural-born subject of his majesty resident in India,

shall by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, be disabled from holding any office or employment under the government of the Company.

88. Slavery to be immediately mitigated, and abolished as soon as possible.

89. And as the present diocese is of too great an extent for the incumbent thereof to perform efficiently all the duties of the office without endangering his health and life, his majesty may found two bishoprics, one of Madras and the other of Bombay, with revenues respectively of 24,000 sicca rupees by the year.

94. The Bishop of Calcutta to be metropolitan in India.

112. The island of St. Helena to be taken from the Company and vested in the crown.

So long as the Company was allowed to unite commercial pursuits with its political character, its power, it was thought, might have been exercised in a manner ruinous to the private traders, whose very limited trade was allowed by the Court of Directors or (by appeal) by the Board of Control. It was said that the extensive scale upon which the Company's purchases were made tended to raise prices in the country of production and to lower them in Europe; and that as it was never known to the private traders in what articles the investments of the Company were to be made, those competitors were forced to act under apprehensions of interference, which set all their calculations at defiance. And it was argued that as soon as the trade was allowed to take a more natural course, we might confidently expect that the usual good result would attend upon the employment of individual skill and enterprise; that greater regularity of prices would be experienced, and that production would be stimulated until the prices of East India produce were brought within the compass of a much larger number of European consumers than formerly. Those Indian territories are productive of nearly every article which can conduce to the enjoyment of man; and it was thought that it only required skill, and ingenuity, and encouragement, as well to European settlers as to the natives, to select everything that could

possibly be desired. On the other hand, the luxuries and conveniences of European production, suited to the tastes of the natives of India, were equally varied and numerous, and experience warranted the belief that under a regular course of trade the circle of our customers would be continually enlarged. It was thought—perhaps rather too sanguinely—that this progress must be accelerated to a sudden and marvellous degree by the provisions contained in the 81st and 86th sections of the act, which authorize the settlement of Europeans and the purchase of lands by them. Previously to the passing of this act, the Company possessed the right of arbitrary deportation against Europeans without trial or reason assigned, and British-born subjects were not only restricted from purchasing lands, but were in most cases prohibited from even renting them.* It was also thought

* As early as the year 1766 the Court of Directors prohibited British-born subjects from renting lands. The prohibition was then directed against their own servants, who were in the practice of holding public lands, it being feared that these men might make their power and influence the means of oppressing the natives. It was in evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons that the prohibition was liable, at all times, to be rendered little more than nominal, since Europeans could and did hold lands in farm in the names of natives, and in their names, also, sued and were sued in the courts. The necessity for having recourse to this indirect mode of proceeding did not deter Europeans from embarking their capitals in the establishment of indigo-factories, which were said to have had a highly beneficial influence through the employment they provide for the native population. It was thought that the chief difficulty proposed to the free admission of Europeans arose out of the defective state of the judicial establishments, civil and criminal; and that if these establishments were improved, the difficulty would be removed. Facilities of intercourse had, of late years, been greatly increased. Licence to proceed to India was said to be now never withheld, if the applicant could show any reasonable motive for wishing to proceed to India. Formerly many instances had occurred in which a refusal on the part of the Directors had been superseded by the Board of Control. The total number of licences authorizing Europeans to reside in India, granted by the Court of Directors from 1814 to 1831, was 1253. The total number of licences refused by the court during that time was 294; and the total number of licences granted by the Board of Control was 71.

The severity of the old system of exclusion had been relaxed on many occasions, and not a few of the servants of the Company had endeavoured

that if the 87th section of the act were fairly carried into execution, a great inducement would be held out to the natives of India to qualify themselves for advancement in the social scale; and that the best moral effects upon their characters might be expected to result from their free admission into offices and employments.*

voured to demonstrate that there was nothing to fear, but a great deal to hope, from an extensive European colonization, and that all parties, the Company and the national government, the natives and the Europeans, would be benefited by allowing European settlers to employ their capital and skill on Indian lands, farms, &c. Permission had been given in 1824 to some Europeans to hold a limited quantity of land upon lease, for the purpose of making the experiment whether coffee could be advantageously cultivated in Bengal, and this concession had been afterwards sanctioned by the Directors. On the 17th of February, 1829, a similar permission was granted by the government of Bengal for lands to grow indigo and other agricultural produce; and Sir Charles Metcalfe and Lord William Bentinck reasoned upon the principle and recommended the carrying of it out, in some minutes which were drawn up after the resolution had been passed. The Court of Directors, however, were not convinced by this reasoning; they disapproved of the concession, and directed the Indian government "to retrace their steps in regard to it as far as practicable."

Even now certain restrictions were deemed essentially necessary. Persons not natives of the country on their arrival were bound to make known in writing to the chief officer of the customs their names, places of destination, and objects of pursuit in India. No person was to enter the country *by land* without licence from the Board of Control, the Court of Directors, or the governor of one of the presidencies.

It was reasoned that, from the nature of the case, the colonization of India by Englishmen could not take place at a rapid rate; nor was there, indeed, any reason to apprehend that the races by whom the country was at present inhabited would ever be displaced, or even disturbed in their occupation of the soil, by any influx of their European conquerors:—that from the low rate of wages in India, no considerable immigration thither of our labouring classes could ever take place:—that what India wanted, and what England would give, was not labour, but capital, together with the skill and enterprise necessary for its effective application:—that the resources of the country, which had hitherto lain in great part dormant, would thus be called into activity; the soil would be cultivated, the people would be employed, and the general wealth of the country and its capacity of absorbing foreign commodities would in this way be immensely increased without any addition to the numbers of the people.

* Penny Cyclopædia.—Article "East India Company."

The Court of Directors, whose number was continued at twenty-four, now ceased to be merchant-princes: giving up the trade of India and China to others, they retained only their governing faculties; and it was thought that these, as applied to so vast an empire, and although exercised partly in conjunction with and partly in subordination to the Board of Control or his majesty's government for the time being, were sufficient occupation for any twenty-four men. It was confidently hoped that when they ceased to trade, they would govern better. The great mansion in Leadenhall-street is no longer a mart or place for buying and selling; hence many of its offices are deserted and closed, and something resembling the tranquillity of the cloisters prevails throughout the edifice; but it is still the spot where the stupendous machinery of the Indian government is regulated, and where administrative details are considered;—it is still the crown of the arch which supports a mighty system, and most, though not quite all, the keys are kept there which open one of the noblest and most extensive fields for the display of British energy, ability, and enterprise.* Nor can we avoid feeling that it was a blessed chance which kept the patronage of India from being absorbed and monopolized by the ministers of the crown, and thereby made dependent upon mere parliamentary influences. And it is in this reflection that consolation must be found for the evils which have happened or which may happen hereafter from the curious division of authority between the Ministers appointed by the crown and the Directors elected by the holders of East India stock.

Some of the provisions of this great India Bill seem to have fallen already into a state of sleep, and others have not produced all the good that was expected

* "If the East India House only arrests the eye of the passenger, there is nothing in the building itself particularly calculated to make him pause in the midst of the busy thoroughfare of Leadenhall-street; but if he be gifted with the divine faculty of accurately delineating and colouring abstractions, then, indeed, it yields to none in the interest of the associations which cluster thick around it."—*London, edited by Charles Knight.*

from them, or so rapidly as was expected. The addition of the fifth member of council, who is not to be chosen from the servants of the Company, and whose appointment by the Court of Directors is subjected to the approbation of the crown, does not appear to have improved the machinery of government at Calcutta; and the law commission, which was to draw up a uniform code, seems to be universally admitted to have been (hitherto) a failure.* The notion of creating a fourth presidency at Agra for the western provinces was given up by the Whig ministry who framed the bill, soon after the bill was passed.†

During the parliamentary debates on the bill, some very bad rhetoric and some worse arithmetic were employed to discredit the Company and to reprobate all its past management of India as selfish, duplex, tricky, and low-minded. This was nonsense. It would be impossible to justify, it would be base to make the attempt of justifying, large portions of the directorial policy in earlier days; but it may be generally and fairly stated that,

* The first fifth councillor (who has since declared that he is not a lawyer) was Thomas Babington Macaulay, Esq. This brilliant rhetorician and reviewer was also a member of the law commission; and we are told that, in addition to his 10,000*l.* a year, as member of the Supreme Council, he received 5000*l.* a year as law commissioner. If this be the case, the Right Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay must have received not 50,000*l.*, but 75,000*l.*—A large sum this to be paid for nothing!

† The councils of the inferior presidencies of Madras and Bombay were not done away with. We know not what the Company's servant and historiographer, Edward Thornton, Esq., means by saying in the last volume of his 'History of the British Empire in India,' which was published only last year, that no council has been appointed for Bengal, and that the executive of that presidency is administered by the governor-general as governor, but without a council. Was not Mr. Macaulay made by the Whig government a fifth member of the Bengal or Calcutta Supreme Council? Did not Mr. Macaulay's successor claim the right of sitting in council on all occasions? And was it not one of Lord Ellenborough's first acts to quote the Act of 3 & 4 William IV. to that gentleman, and to tell him that he had no business to attend the council except when legislative matters were under discussion, when his attendance as a lawyer could not be dispensed with? Will Mr. Thornton inform us how all this could have happened if no council had been appointed for Bengal?

in proportion as the home national government became wiser and purer, and the mind of the people of England more enlightened, more humane, generous, and elevated, the policy of the directors assumed a purer and loftier character. Nay, in some very noticeable instances it may be said that the directorial policy was in advance of the national policy: but, it was not under such withering administrations as Lord North's, or the other sets of men that scuffled and shuffled for power in the days of Warren Hastings, that an immaculate spirit was to be expected in such a body as the Court of Directors. But during the same parliamentary debates many tributes of admiration were paid to the past conduct of the Honourable Court; and several assertions were made that it would be found impossible to govern India without the directors. Lord Ellenborough, who had devoted much of his time to the study of Indian affairs, who had been president of the Board of Control under the Duke of Wellington's recent administration, and who had pleaded warmly for the Company on nearly every important clause of the bill, censured the Whig government for attempting to do away with the restraint of councils and for striving to give the governor-general a too great and irresponsible power, and eulogized the system and practice of united trade and government as they had existed under the old charters. His lordship alluded to the great achievements of our predecessors in India, to the deeds they had done both in peace and in war, and doubted whether there was anything in the new theory that would produce such men or such deeds. The Duke of Wellington declared that, from what he saw during his long residence in the country, and from what he had seen since in other countries, he believed that the government of India was one of the best and most purely administered governments that ever existed, and one which had provided most effectually for the happiness of the people over which it was placed. After saying that he would not follow the Marquess of Lansdowne into the question whether a chartered company were or were not the best calculated to carry on the government or the trade of a great

empire like India, the Duke of Wellington added—"But whenever I hear a discussion like this, I recall to my memory what I have seen in that country. I recall to my memory the history of British India for the last fifty or sixty years. I remember its days of misfortune and its days of glory, and call to mind the proud situation in which it now stands! I remember that the Indian government has conducted the affairs of—I will not pretend to say how many millions of people, for they have been variously calculated at seventy, eighty, ninety, and even a hundred millions, but certainly of an immense population—a population returning an annual revenue of 22,000,000*l.* sterling; and that, notwithstanding all the wars in which that empire has been engaged, its debt at this moment amounts only to 40,000,000*l.*, being not more than two years' revenue. I do not say that such a debt is desirable, but I do contend that it is a delusion on the people of this country to tell them that it is a body unfit for government and unfit for trade which has administered the affairs of India with so much success for so many years!" After urging the necessity of supporting the power and influence of the Company, the duke said—"Depend upon it, my lords, that upon the basis of their authority rests the good government of India!"* The Court of Directors and the national government had been almost constantly contemplating the happy prospect of a time when war and its expenses should cease. Under the provisions of the act of 1793, by which the possession of the British territories in India, together with the right of exclusive trading, was continued to the Company for the further term of twenty years, the Company engaged to pay to the public the sum of 500,000*l.* annually, *unless prevented by war expenditure*. But it so happened that this period was one of continued hostilities, including the last war against Tippoo Sulatun, the Marquess Wellesley's wars against the Mahrattas, the campaign against Dhoondiah, the Anglo-Indian expedition to Egypt, the conquests in the Indian Archipelago, &c.,

* Debate in the Lords, on the 5th of July, 1833.

and the state of its finances was such that the Company did not find it convenient to make more than two payments of 250,000*l.* each in the years 1793-4 and 1794-5. And, on two occasions subsequently to 1793, the Company obtained pecuniary assistance from the public, under the authority of the legislature: once in 1810, when 1,500,000*l.* was ad-

vanced in Exchequer bills, and repaid soon after by advances made for the public service in India; and again in 1812, when a loan of 2,500,000*l.* was raised by government for the service of the Company. This last loan was liquidated by annual payments, and was finally discharged in 1822.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD AUCKLAND.

FOR nearly two years after the passing of the great India Bill, Lord William Bentinck, whose conduct had been highly applauded by the Whig ministers who framed that bill, remained at his post as governor-general, and thus superintended, or was at least present at the preparations for, the first working of the new charter. His lordship's love of innovation and change must have been extensively gratified.

But the first governor-general appointed under the new act was Lord Auckland, a very amiable nobleman, who, since the accession of the Whigs to power, had passed through the various offices of President of the Board of Trade and Master of the Mint, and First Lord of the Admiralty, but whose qualifications for the supreme post in the India government were not generally considered as being very obvious. If the desire of avoiding all wars and cultivating relations of amity and commerce with all the powers or peoples existing in India and its neighbourhood was to be taken as an entire qualification, then was his lordship admirably suited for the situation to which he was raised. By character, and by habits of life and of thought, Lord Auckland, it was supposed, would be sure to prefer the pacific and non-interfering system to every other. And yet, alas! his lordship had not been long in India ere he was dragged into an unnecessary war—a war attended not with conquest and aggrandisement, not with an increase of security to ourselves and to our allies and dependents, but with defeat, frightful disasters, and such an amount of disgrace as never fell upon our arms in any part of the world.

On the 5th of September the Directors of the East India Company gave a grand

dinner to Lord Auckland at the Albion Tavern, previously to his lordship's setting out for India. In the speeches delivered on that occasion there was little but prophesyings of prosperity and peace for India. Accompanied by his sisters, Lord Auckland arrived at Calcutta towards the close of the year 1835. His lordship appears to have immediately admitted into his entire confidence Captain Alexander Burnes and those other stirring officers of the Company who were impatient for opportunities of distinguishing themselves as soldiers or diplomatists, or as both, and who (principally, we believe, through this anxiety) had been induced to believe that our Indian empire was threatened by Russian intrigues and by Persian and Afghan arms. These stirring men succeeded in impressing the too facile mind of the new governor-general with a deep sense of their local knowledge and political talent and foresight, and eventually in making his lordship believe with them that the whole of our Indian empire was in a perilous condition, and that the black eagle of Russia, already perched on the Himalaya mountains, was looking down upon the Indus and upon all Hindustan with the confident hope of a carnage and confusion which would leave India her prey. It was, as we have already said, this Russian bugbear that was the primary cause of all the woe and of all the shame. As the Mahrattas had been thoroughly conquered, the Pindarrees extirpated, the Nepalese and Burmese checked, driven back, and reduced to order, and as even the Jauts and Bhutpoor had been disposed of, there was absolutely nothing to fear from any of our neighbours or old foes, and therefore it was that our unfledged Indian statesmen looked for possible foes 600, or 1200, or

more miles beyond our frontier—to the mountains of Afghanistan, the plains of Bokhara, the deserts, the frontiers of Persia, and the shores of the Caspian Sea.

For many years after the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone's mission the Afghans ceased to be an object of alarm to our Anglo-Indians. Since the days of Zemaun Shah that people had never been enabled to cross the Indus. Instead of descending towards the south, they had been driven back considerably towards the north by the Ameers of Sind and Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore. They had proved themselves incapable of contending with Runjeet Sing and his allies; the enmity between them and Runjeet Sing was fierce and irreconcilable, and, without traversing the regions held by the Lion, the Afghans could not approach our frontier. The same state of constant war and anarchy which Mr. Elphinstone saw in Afghanistan had continued ever since, or rather, it had become much worse than it was at the time of his visit. In fact the Afghan monarchy had been dismembered and almost completely broken up. After the flight of the Shah Shujah or Sujah in 1809,* the authority of the usurper Shah Mahmood was acknowledged in part of Afghanistan, the rest of the country submitting to the rule or misrule of divers chiefs or princes. After a brief alliance with Runjeet Sing, who helped him to recover Cashmere, Mahmood quarrelled with that potentate, and was defeated by him near the right bank of the Indus. After this disaster Mahmood, by means of treachery, obtained possession of Herat, one of the principal towns of Khorassan, the extensive regions of which had long been disputed by, and were now partially divided between, the Persians and different tribes of the Afghan race. Mahmood repulsed an attack made upon Herat by the Persians, and succeeded in maintaining himself in that city. Whatever success had attended his arms or his policy was owing to his able vizier Futteh Khan. In 1818 this vizier fell a victim to the jealousy of another chief and the ingratitude of Mahmood. His murder was the signal for the breaking up of the

monarchy. Mahmood's brothers revolted against him, and his authority was soon confined to Herat and its dependencies. Cabul, Candahar, and Peshawar were held by different brothers of Mahmood, who soon fell out among themselves. The Dooranees, or that tribe of the Afghans to which this unloving royal race belonged, shaped their allegiance according to the situation of their estates, those who had lands near Cabul recognising the brother that ruled there, and those whose lands lay near Herat obeying Mahmood, &c. This obedience, however, was but partial among the Dooranees; and as for the other tribes and clans (too many to be enumerated), they nearly all remained independent, paying allegiance neither to Mahmood nor to any one of his brothers. During this decay of the Dooranee monarchy Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, was rapidly improving the discipline of his army by means of European officers. The final downfall of Bonaparte in 1815 broke up the trade of war in Europe, and drove a considerable number of adventurers, Frenchmen and Italians, to the East—to Persia, and even into India. Some of these men found their way to Lahore, and under their care the troops of Runjeet Sing were trained. These circumstances would have made Runjeet formidable to the Afghans even if they had been united, but divided as those people were, the Lion became irresistible. He took Cashmere, Mooltan, Leia, Upper Sind, and the nearest part of Damaun, and reduced all the Afghan tribes south of Cashmere. After this, taking advantage of a quarrel and war between the Dooranee prince of Cabul and his brother at Peshawar, and of an expedition which he enabled the expelled Shah Sujah, who had long been his guest, to make against Candahar, Runjeet Sing succeeded in conquering Peshawar himself with all the level country which the Afghans had occupied between the mountains and the river Indus. The Ameers of Sind seized upon other territories which had belonged to the Dooranee monarchy; Balkh threw off its nominal dependence, and in other territories of vast extent and thin population which lie between India and Persia, and

* See ante, p. 174.



Agghaus.

which had all obeyed Zemaun Shah, various chiefs and princes asserted their independence. Dost Mohamed, however, maintained himself at Cabul, and his brother or half-brother, after a sharp contest with the Shah Sujah, remained master of Candahar. Their brother Mahmood died, or was secretly murdered, at Herat, and was succeeded by his son Khamran or Camraum, who appears to have made some fruitless attempts to recover from his uncle Dost Mohamed the dominion of Cabul. The unfortunate Shah Sujah, having failed in other expeditions and enterprises undertaken in concert with Runjeet Sing, was at one time perfidiously seized and barbarously treated by the ungenerous Lion of Lahore, whose main object was to extort from him the famous Afghan diamond called the *Cohi Noor*.^{*} He was delivered from his cruel captivity by the spirit and ability of his queen. After all these adventures Shah Sujah again found a safe asylum beyond the river Sutledge, in the British cantonment of Lodiana, where another ex-king of Cabul, his own brother, the once great Zemaun Shah, who had been dethroned and blinded by Mahmood, had long been residing as a pensioner of the British. A liberal pension was granted to Sujah, and the two exiles and ex-kings appear to have lived lovingly together in the same cantonments, making moral reflections on the instability of Eastern thrones and the uncertainty of all human greatness.[†]

Dost Mohamed Khan appears to have confirmed and enlarged his authority at

^{*} Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, *Sketch of Afghanistan History*, in Appendix to 'Account of the Kingdom of Cabul, &c.', new and revised edition, 1839. Alexander Burnes, *Travels*. Lieutenant Conolly, *Travels*.

[†] Burnes saw both the Shahs at Lodiana in 1830. The blind Shah had become very devout, and passed the greater part of his time in listening to the Koran and its commentaries. He, however, lamented that he could not pass the brief remainder of his days in his native land, where the heat was less oppressive. He was stone-blind and could not distinguish day from night; but he was very talkative, as was also his younger brother Shah Sujah. Burnes seems to have formed a correct opinion of the ineptitude of the latter prince. "From what I learn," said he, "I do not believe that Shah Sujah possesses sufficient energy to seat himself on the

Cabul about the year 1824. In 1834 he roused the whole Mohammedan population for an attack on the Seiks, for the propagation of the true faith, and for the recovery of Peshawar and the other Afghan dominions which had been lost. Runjeet Sing, who had then an army of 25,000 men, was determined not to let go his hold on the conquests he had made, while Dost Mohamed Khan seemed equally resolved to stake his political existence on the recovery of those conquests.* Until the month of April, 1835, nothing took place except some insignificant skirmishes; but, at the end of that month, Dost Mohamed joined his army and prepared to descend through the Khyber pass. Runjeet Sing advanced to meet him, and drew up his Seiks in battle array across the line of the advancing Afghans. Dost Mohamed, finding that several of his chiefs were in correspondence with the Lion of Lahore, and preparing to betray him and the Afghans, would not risk a battle. He retreated towards Cabul, and was followed for some distance up the Khyber pass by Runjeet Sing's Seiks. Upon his retreat the Afghan Sirdars, whose territories lay exposed, tendered their unconditional allegiance to Runjeet.[†] But other Afghan chiefs repaired to Cabul with their armed clans, and urged Dost Mohamed to make another forward movement, in order to drive back the infidel, unclean Seiks, who were keeping possession of Peshawar. Another Afghan army, 20,000 strong, assembled at Jellalabad. Descending the Khyber pass with about half of this number, Dost Mohamed's eldest son, Afzul Bey, fell upon a Seik army about 5000 strong, and completely defeated it, after an obstinate fight

throne of Cabul; and that if he did regain it, he has not the tact to discharge the duties of so difficult a situation."—*Travels into Bokhara, Voyage on the Indus, &c.*

^{*} Letter from Captain Wade, Political Resident at Lodiana.

[†] Outline of the Operations of the British troops in Scinde and Afghanistan, betwixt November, 1838, and November, 1841; with remarks on the Policy of the War. By Geo. Buist, LL.D., Editor of the 'Bombay Times,' Secretary to the Geographical and Agri-Horticultural Societies, and in charge of the Government Observatory, Bombay, 1843.

and a terrible slaughter. This was in the month of June, 1836. But the victory of the Afghans was thrown away through the feuds and jealousies of the chieftains, and Runjeet Sing, instead of losing territory, soon began to make new conquests. Ever since he became master of Cabul, Dost Mohamed Khan had been constantly seeking for the friendship of the British Government. But by the treaty made between Lord William Bentinck and Runjeet Sing, at Ruper, in 1831, Runjeet was allowed to do what he pleased in the country beyond the Sutledge, and all notion of succouring the crazy and distracted Afghan monarchy was given up. On the 31st of May, 1836, Dost Mohamed addressed a letter of compliment to Lord Auckland, the newly arrived governor-general. No answer was returned to this letter until the month of October. His lordship's letter, however, when it arrived, gave great satisfaction, as it stated that he intended to depute some gentlemen to the Court of Cabul, to discuss certain commercial topics with a view to mutual advantages, &c. It was not, however, until the 20th of September, 1837, that Captain A. Burnes reached Dost Mohamed's capital as envoy from the governor-general. In the meanwhile several fierce conflicts had taken place between the Afghans and the Seiks: the success had been various, but the celebrated Seik leader, Hurry Sing, had been defeated and slain in one of the battles. During the same interval Dost Mohamed had applied not only to the Persians and to the Tartars, but also to the *Russians*, for aid and assistance. Burnes represented to the Cabul court that the object of his mission was purely commercial.* Dost Mohamed wanted arms and ammunition and artillery wherewith to fight the Seiks, and not bales of manufactures. Nevertheless he received our

envoy in a very flattering manner, and impressed him with the notion that he was the best ruler that Cabul could possibly have, and the best ally the English could find anywhere beyond the Sutledge. The Khan assured Burnes that our Indian government might rely on his cordial co-operation in any measures which tended to promote our trade in Cabul, and through Afghanistan with Bokhara, Kurdistan, Khorassan, &c.—countries of sounding names and of great extent, but far too barbarous or thinly peopled, or anarchic, to promise any significant advantage to our commerce. Dost Mohamed complained that his hostilities with the Seiks narrowed his resources and compelled him to take up money from the merchants, and even to increase the duties on merchandise; but, at the same time, he displayed a very lively anxiety to get possession of Peshawar, which had been taken from one of his brothers by Runjeet Sing. The young Shah of Persia, who had succeeded his grandfather in October, 1834, had lost no time in responding to Dost Mohamed's desire for an alliance. The court of Teheran hoped that while Runjeet Sing and the Seiks were pressing upon Afghanistan on one side, a Persian army, favoured still further by the dissensions of the Afghan rulers and chiefs, might easily make conquests on the other, recover Herat, and establish the dominion of the young Shah at least over the whole of Khorassan and Candahar.* Khamran, the Afghan ruler of Herat, on the death of the old Shah of Persia, in 1834, had made a predatory incursion into the

* In his account of the mission, this unfortunate man says—"The objects of government were to work out its policy of opening the river Indus to commerce, and establishing on its banks, and in the countries beyond it, such relations as should contribute to the desired end."—"Cabool: being a personal narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that City, in the years 1836, 7, and 8," by Lieut.-Col. Sir Alexander Burnes, C.B., &c., London, 1842.

* Mr. Ellice, our resident minister at the Court of Teheran, had been instructed by Lord Palmerston to warn the Persian government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war with the Afghans. Mr. Ellice discovered that the young Shah had made up his mind to pursue the course which Lord Palmerston apprehended. As early as November, 1836, Mr. Ellice wrote to Downing-street:—"The Shah has very extensive schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan; and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that he has the right of sovereignty over Herat and Candahar. He proposes various expeditions for the spring of 1836—one against Herat—one against Candahar—and another against the Belooches: the minister states that the dominions of Persia properly extend as far as Ghuznee."—*Parliamentary Papers*.

Persian territories, in concert with Turcomans, Hazarees, and other robbers, and had captured some thousands of Persian subjects, for the purpose of selling them as slaves in Central Asia. Although this wholesale kidnapping was a very ancient practice, it certainly seemed, of itself, to justify the young Shah in marching an army against Herat and the Afghan ruler Khamran. At the same time he was invited and pressed to the enterprise by most of the Afghan sirdars of Candahar, who had long been engaged in a blood-feud with Khamran, and who, for the gratification of their vengeance, were willing to bring their old enemies the Persians even into the heart of Afghanistan Proper. But when it was found, or rather suspected, by our mission at Teheran, that the young Shah of Persia had been encouraged and promised pecuniary assistance by the Russians, who, it was reasoned, must know that the conquest of Herat and Candahar by the Persians would be in fact an advance gained for the Russians towards India, if not for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization, great alarm was felt by our mission, and was by them communicated from Teheran to Downing-street. In short our ministers at home and our diplomatists in Persia were suddenly excited by all that jealousy and dread of Russia which had been diffused through the greater part of our Indian government by Burnes and others. The cabinet of St. Petersburg must have laughed at this groundless panic; and it was quite in keeping with the crooked policy of that cabinet to resort to sundry paltry and secret measures in order to keep up the panic, while they were publicly assuring Lord Palmerston (and so far with perfect truth) that they entertained no designs of aggrandisement on the side of India. In spite of all the remonstrances of our ambassador, the young Shah, in July, 1837, put himself and an army of 40,000 men with 70 pieces of artillery on their march from Teheran to Herat. This, we believe, would not have been done if the private intercourse between Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador, and the Persian court, had corresponded with the declarations which Count Nesselrode was

making to Lord Palmerston, and which Count Simonich himself was making to Mr. Ellice and Mr. MacNeil at Teheran. Although the route of the Persian army lay almost entirely through their own country, they were unable to reach Herat before the end of November, 1837, or about two months after Burnes's arrival at Cabul. Owing to their empty treasury, defective commissariat, and want of discipline, this Persian army frequently threatened to melt away before they had seen an enemy, and when they approached Herat they were but a miserable and half-starved rabble. After some further delays they commenced what has been complementarily termed "the Siege of Herat." This miserable operation occupied them for more than nine months. Before it began, and while the Persians were slowly toiling towards that part of Khorassan, Dost Mohamed, who had promised the young Shah that he would assist him, told Burnes that a Persian Elchee, or ambassador, was then at Candahar, bringing him presents and a promise of a crore of rupees from his Persian majesty. The old Khan, however, added that he did not place much reliance on Persian promises, and was easily induced by Burnes to pledge his word (it was probably not worth much more than a Persian promise) to cease all further intercourse with the court of Teheran, and to use his best endeavours to make his brothers, and all the Afghan chiefs over whom he had any authority, engage to do the same. But on the 24th of December, 1837, just as the Persian army or rabble were encompassing Herat, Captain Burnes ascertained that a Russian agent had reached Cabul, and had been honourably received by Dost Mohamed. This individual appears to have been one of those obscure, questionable agents or spies which the Russian government employ *indirectly*, and cast off, repudiate, and destroy or cause to be destroyed whenever necessary. Such adventurers are said to abound in many countries, and much of the ingenuity of Russian diplomatists is supposed to go in the selection of them: they have no credentials, rank, station, or pay from the government at St. Petersburg; they are seldom admitted to the august presence of a

Russian ambassador, or so much as to the presence of a chargé d'affaires, or secretary, or attaché, or consul; they are hired by men as obscure and unaccredited as themselves; and, therefore, nothing is so easy as for the Russian minister for foreign affairs to deny all knowledge of them, or so difficult as for the minister of any other country to prove their connexion with him. If, on the other hand, circumstances occur which render it profitable or expedient to give these mysterious agents an accredited diplomatic character, then the Russian government steps forward and acknowledges them, or some Russian ambassador or other resident in foreign parts is ready with his credentials. The mysterious agent who appeared at Cabul, to the infinite amazement and consternation of Burnes, is styled Captain Vicovich. He is differently described as an officer of Cossacks, an engineer officer, a Pole who had fought with the Russians against his own countrymen, and as a half-Italian half-Dalmatian adventurer, from the Bocca di Cattaro or some other place on the Dalmatian coast—a coast inhabited by an offshoot of the great Slavonian family, to which Poles and Russians equally belong; and a country from which the Russians are said to have drawn many such agents. The truth appears to be that nobody either in India or in Afghanistan knew who or what the man was, or whether Vicovich were not a *nom de guerre*.* He had been sent from Herat

* The name is written in various ways. Burnes writes it Vilkievitch. He also seems to call him a Pole, and to quote the inscription on his visiting card.

"In the midst of these amusements (that is to say, dining and drinking with the Nabob and others) the arrival of a Russian officer produced a considerable sensation at Cabul. Almost immediately on his entering the city, 'le Lieutenant Vilkievitch, *Polonois*' paid me a visit, and on the day after his arrival, which happened to be Christmas-day, I invited him to dinner. He was a gentlemanly and agreeable man, of about thirty years of age, and spoke French, Turkish, and Persian fluently, and wore the uniform of an officer of Cossacks, which was a novelty in Cabul. He had been three times at Bokhara, and we had therefore a common subject to converse upon, without touching on politics. I found him intelligent and well informed on the subject of Northern Asia. He very frankly said that it was not the custom of Russia to publish to the world the result of its researches in foreign countries, as

by Count Simonich, the Russian ambassador, who had accompanied the Persian army to the siege of that place, as Mr. MacNeil had also done. He gave out that the objects of his mission were purely commercial, even like those of Burnes. Burnes wanted to find out new roads for English trade; Vicovich only wanted to ascertain the advantages and degree of security Russian merchants might expect in entering on commercial speculations with Cabul. It seems, however, to be quite certain that the new comer entertained the Afghans with surprising stories about the far-reaching power of the Czar, and at one time induced Dost Mohamed to expect Russian alliance and assistance, and, through the good offices of the Czar, a closer and more friendly connexion with the young Shah of Persia, who, as well as the Turkish sultan, was at this time united in the bonds of political connexion and dependency with the old enemies of his country, the Muscovites. The ruler of Cabul at first considered the fall of Herat and the advance of the Persians towards his own dominions as inevitable; and in this belief he was eager to secure a previous treaty with the conquerors. But he feared their success as much as he feared the success of his relative Khamran, who, if he repulsed the Persians, would gain a great accession of fame and strength, and, in all probability, turn his victorious arms in the direction of Cabul. It has been surmised that, in his doubts and perplexities, the offer of an English treaty and of some regiments of the Company's sepoys would have made Dost Mohamed break off all intercourse with the Russian agent and with the Persians; but this is but a conjecture, and it appears that he was much disquieted and indisposed towards us by the knowledge of the facts that a distinguished English officer had thrown himself into

was the case with France and England. I never again met Mr. Vilkievitch (or, as I see it written, Vicovich), although we exchanged sundry messages of 'high consideration;' for I regret to say that I found it to be impossible to follow the dictates of my personal feelings of friendship towards him, as the public service required the strictest watch, lest the relative positions of our nations should be misunderstood in this part of Asia."—*Cabool*.

Herat, and was assisting Khamran in the defence of that place, and that the British government was making preparations on an extensive scale for relieving the besieged city. But if Dost Mohamed hated and feared the ruler of Herat more than any of his enemies, and could contemplate with composure the triumph of the Persians—provided only he could make an advantageous arrangement with them—it was far otherwise with his subjects and the Afghan people generally of the Kuz-zilbash sect. These men described the Persians as infidels and heretics, and the Afghans of Herat as men true to God and the prophet; they triumphantly recited every discomfiture of the Persians, and offered up prayers for the entire destruction of the besiegers with their king and all. On the other hand, the Afghans of the Soonee sect prayed quite as fervently for the success of the Persian Shah. Amidst such contradictions and conflicting opinions, such violent passions and blood-feuds, a much abler man than Burnes might have been bewildered. The whole country was one vast Bedlam. But our confident envoy fancied that he could bring these madmen to reason by writing now and then what he called “a Junius.” When Dost Mohamed justified his negotiations with the Persians by pleading the necessity of making terms for himself beforehand, in case of the Shah advancing to Candahar, Burnes told him that there was no fear of any such advance, offered himself to serve with the troops of Candahar, and to assist the Sirdar with money; and he suggested to our Indian government an advance of 30,000*l*. But these proceedings were repudiated by Lord Auckland, who declared in a minute that he would not oppose the hostile advance of Persia either by arms or by money. His lordship must have known by this time that the Persians had no chance of making such advance, and that the operations contemplated by his government in the Persian Gulf would make the young Shah fly back towards his capital, even though he should have reduced Herat previously. Not being able to do more, Burnes dispatched a member of his mission, Lieutenant Leech, to Candahar, to ascertain how matters

stood in that quarter. The three brothers who ruled in that part of Afghanistan—Kohun Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, and Meer Dil Khan—were at this time actually in treaty with the Persians, with a view to their assisting in the attack on Herat, and in the subjugation of Khamran and their own countrymen. Here English money was again offered; but the three chiefs, jealous of Burnes’s connexion with the ruler of Cabul, declined the offer, and stated that the intent of their negotiations had been to keep off Persia, to ruin Khamran, and make themselves masters of Herat. Like Dost Mohamed, these three Khans had no settled line of policy: what they evidently wanted was, to play off England against Russia and Persia, and these two powers against England. The prospect of advantage to themselves which they believed to be opened by a competition between states so powerful and wealthy for their good graces or attachment, divested their communications of all sincerity, and enough transpired to destroy every feeling of confidence in their good faith. From this moment our English officers, who were dabbling in diplomacy, ought to have felt that no Afghan treaty could be worth the piece of paper or parchment on which it was written. Such must have been the fact even if the Afghan chiefs had entered into a treaty with good faith, as the wild anarchic state of the country, with its blood-feuds and intrigues, rendered the power of every Khan to the last degree precarious. But none of the chiefs knew what good faith meant—they were at one and the same time making professions of the most cordial attachment to the English on one side, and to the Persians and Russians on the other.*

After passing the winter of 1837-38 in Cabul, Captain Burnes, in the spring, prepared to depart. At this moment Dost Mohamed would very willingly have agreed to accept an English subsidy. But Burnes had no money to give him, and had been rather sharply censured for having offered any. Our envoy left Cabul on the 26th of April, 1838, carrying with him abundant professions of

* Quarterly Review.

personal friendship and regard from Dost Mohamed, who was at this time doubly disappointed and more than ever perplexed, as no money came to him from Russia, and as Khamran continued to be brilliantly successful in Herat. In our case the fault might lie with Burnes, who had not been authorized by his employers to make any offer of pecuniary aid; and in the case of Russia it is at least probable that Lieutenant Vicovich exceeded his instructions; but between them, the conduct of these two agents was calculated to make the Afghans believe that Feringees were just as double-dealing and insincere as they themselves. Vicovich on his arrival had announced splendid presents from the Czar and ample pecuniary assistance to Dost Mohamed: he also spread reports in all directions that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Astrabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Persian Shah's army against Herat. Now, neither presents nor money ever reached Cabul, and as for the army of Astrabad nothing could be heard of it. On the earnest, if not passionate, representations of Mr. Mac Neil, the Russian general and diplomatist Duhamel, who had superseded Count Simonich, and had journeyed to the Persian Shah's quarters before Herat, sent orders to Vicovich to quit Cabul forthwith. The Russian, Polish, or Dalmatian adventurer left the capital of Dost Mohamed a very few days after the departure of Burnes: he travelled from Cabul towards Candahar; he was traced to the neighbourhood of the latter city, but there he disappeared, and nothing more could ever be learned of him or of his mysterious mission. He is generally supposed to have been murdered; but whether he was cut off by some of the marauding Afghans, who were quite capable of killing a better man merely for the value of the gilded brass buttons on his coat, or whether he received his quietus and had his portmanteau and his pockets emptied for higher and political motives, remains matter of conjecture. It is, however, perfectly well known that the Russian government never made any stir about him, or expressed any interest as to his fate. The most probable conjectures

should seem to be these—Vicovich was murdered by some Afghan robbers,—and those who employed him and sent him to Cabul were not sorry that his living evidence should be suppressed in so effectual a manner. Yet, we confess, we should not be much surprised to learn that the adventurer was not murdered at all, but is still living in some remote part of the Russian empire, if not in some European capital, like Athens or Constantinople.* It appears, however, that after the departure of Burnes and Vicovich, and notwithstanding his disappointments as to Russian assistance, Dost Mohamed still leaned strongly towards a Russian and Persian connexion, being more than ever convinced that the English would not break their agreements with Runjeet Sing, or do anything to force the Seiks to give up the conquests they had made from the Afghans.

After visiting Runjeet Sing in the most friendly manner, and feasting with the French and Italian officers at Peshawer and Lahore, Captain Burnes, in the month of July, repaired to Simla to meet the governor-general, Lord Auckland, and to take a foremost part in a council of all our north-western frontier residents and diplomatists, whose previous differences of opinion as to the course to be pursued with regard to the Seiks and Afghans had become notorious. At these conferences, held in the cool and pleasant recesses of the Himalaya, it was fully determined in

* What with surmises and well-proved facts, there is a monstrous accumulation of treachery, depravity, secret assassination, and open murders and massacres in all this Afghan story! Vicovich is shrewdly suspected of having been a murderer before he was murdered. Dost Mohamed had secretly sent a messenger, one Hussein Ali, to Russia to negotiate for the Czar's assistance. The Russian government itself declared afterwards that Vicovich had been sent to Cabul in consequence of Hussein Ali's mission. It was known that Hussein Ali and Vicovich had travelled together, and it was expected by the Afghans that they would arrive together at Cabul. But Vicovich arrived without Hussein Ali, whose non-appearance was considered badly accounted for by the pretence stated by Vicovich, that he had fallen very sick and had been left behind at Moscow. In short, the general opinion among the Afghans of Cabul was that Vicovich had murdered Hussein Ali.—*Charles Masson, Esq., Narrative of a Journey in Beloochistan, Afghanistan, &c.*

a fatal moment, by the governor-general,* that as Dost Mohamed could not be trusted he ought to be dethroned; that the exiled king of Cabul, Shah Sujah, should be called from his easy retirement at Lodiana, and be sent with an English army to recover a throne which he had repeatedly proved himself to be incapable of keeping! Captain Burnes's opinions seem to have varied according to times and circumstances, and the opinions of other men higher in office than himself. At one period he represented Shah Sujah as an imbecile prince without a party in his own country, and at another period he represented his party as being so strong that the moving of a handful of our troops into Afghanistan would place him on the throne; at one time he represented Dost Mohamed as the best ally the governor-general could find: and, not long after, he describes Dost Mohamed as an irreconcilable enemy whose factious spirit ought to be broken. He now declared that Shah Sujah had more friends in the country through which the Khyber pass runs than in any other part of Afghanistan, that the distribution of a little money among the Khyberes would convert them all into warm friends of the English, and enable Shah Sujah to advance to Cabul in triumph and without bloodshed. Studying, as he did, the newspapers, magazines, and reviews of the day, much more than the older and standard works wherein the science of politics and diplomacy is to be learned, Burnes had caught all the newest and most current phraseologies. "For my own part," said he, "I have more faith in political agitation for the Shah's cause than in physical force." "I attach importance to the presence of a small portion of our troops only from the prestige it will exercise. . . . It is not essential to success, but, I think, would contribute to it." This doomed man also thought that it would be very possible to effect a reconciliation between Shah

Sujah and Dost Mohamed, by making the latter, who had so long sat upon the throne, if not vizier or prime minister to the former, then a governor of one of his provinces, and that it would be highly to the credit of the British government to aid in such a reconciliation and arrangement. He confidently pointed out the line of march and the line of conduct which Shah Sujah ought to follow; and finally, he thought that, with a few of our troops and not much of our money, the Shah might soon recover dominion over the whole of Afghanistan, and restore the glory of the Dooranee monarchy.*

* Opinions as to the mode of restoring Shah Sujah, submitted by Burnes, as quoted by Doctor Buist; 'Outline of the Operations of the British troops in Scinde and Afghanistan.'

These opinions, which are dated in June, 1838, seem to differ in almost every particular from the opinions which this unfortunate man had offered to the governor-general only a few months before. It is said that a sudden change had come over Lord Auckland's political vision; that his lordship, in 1837, thought that the Afghans might be left to themselves, and that Runjeet Sing was the party to be feared and to be attacked by the British, if any war was to be undertaken in India; and that his lordship's difference of opinion, in 1838, was induced not so much by the instructions he received from the Board of Control, as by sudden partialities and influences that were nearer to him. It is added that Lord Auckland hesitated and held back as the decisive moment approached, and that his secretaries and the war party were terrified lest the whisper of the possibility of pacific arrangements should reach his ear. Mr. Masson, whose authority is questioned, though it does not appear to us more questionable than that of several other agents of government whose contradictory statements cannot be reconciled or made consistent, says that he had previously learned a strange account of the mode in which the amiable Lord Auckland had been driven into measures which his better judgment disapproved, and how he had been obliged to yield to the assaults of certain female aides-de-camp, and secretaries; and that, upon questioning Burnes on the part he had taken, particularly as regarded the expedition to Afghanistan, Burnes replied that it was all arranged before he reached Simla, and that when he arrived there to meet his lordship, two of the secretaries came running to him, praying him to say nothing to unsettle his lordship, and telling him that they had taken all the trouble in the world to get him into the business, and that even now his lordship would be glad on any pretence to get out of it. But if this story told by Burnes be true, it does not tell much to the honour of that unfortunate man, as it was just before meeting Lord Auckland at Simla that he submitted the reasons we have quoted in the text for supporting Shah Sujah and embarking on

* "A most unwise provision in the Charter Act permits the governor-general to act alone, and on his own responsibility, when absent from Calcutta. The commander-in-chief (Sir H. Fane) is known to have been hostile to the war, and the Hon. Messrs. Prinsep and Bird (two other members of council) were universally believed to be the same: Three out of five."—*Buist*.

Two months before Burnes met the governor-general at Simla, a mission consisting of Mr. MacNaghten, the Hon. Captain Osborne, and others, had been sent to Lahore to cement our perpetual friendship with Runjeet Sing and the Seiks, to draw up with Runjeet a new treaty, in which Shah Sujah should be included, and to pave the way for the easy advance of a British army through the Seik country to Cabul. This mission—in whose deliberations Burnes had shared—had so far succeeded in its object, that a tripartite treaty had been settled and ratified, in which the dethroned, poor and helpless Shah of Cabul was included with the Governor-General of British India and the powerful ruler of Lahore and of all the Punjab.

Our warlike preparations, or what Burnes calls "the ulterior measures," which "could only be matured at Simla," went on the while (the governor-general and his numerous party enjoying the interval among the cool hills and green woods and the refreshing waters), but it was not until the 1st of October that his lordship issued his famous Simla proclamation. At this moment, if the governor-general did not know that

the whirlpool of Afghan politics and war. Those opinions were written at Lahore, where Burnes had been in constant communication with Mr. MacNaghten, who had recently been in the secretariat at Calcutta, who had been removed from that post to be made political resident and manager on the Indus, and who was well known to Burnes and to every one else to be one of the warmest and most impatient of the war-party. After submitting these said opinions at Lahore, Burnes could hardly have required any persuasion not to speak against the war to Lord Auckland at Simla. It appears, indeed, from Burnes's own showing, that almost everything was settled at Lahore by him, MacNaghten, and others, between the 17th of June and the 15th or 16th of July,—or several days before he reached Simla and met either the governor-general or his secretaries. He tells us that he joined the diplomatic party at Lahore on the 17th of June. He adds—"A short month's stay at Lahore served to accomplish the ends which government had then in view. The ulterior measures could only be matured at Simla, whither I proceeded by invitation to wait on Lord Auckland, to whom I paid my respects on the 20th of July."—*Cabool, &c.* Now, it was during this short month—or on the 26th of June—that the treaty, providing for war on the largest scale, was ratified between the British government, Runjeet Sing, and the Shah

the siege of Herat—the first alleged great cause of our inquietude—had been raised, and the reduced Persian army forced into a disgraceful and ruinous retreat, he might at least have known that the young Shah had no chance of success, and that the British expedition sent to the Persian Gulf could not fail in its proposed object. Persia had derived nothing but disaster and shame from the rashly undertaken expedition, and ill and pusillanimously conducted siege. Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who threw himself into the place, directed the defence. The ignorant besiegers could scarcely preserve so much as a blockade; they knew nothing about regular approaches, and in all their attempts to storm they were beaten back. In one assault the Shah lost 1800 men in killed and wounded, and altogether his casualties exceeded 3000. He was as remote from his object in September, 1838, as in November, 1837, when he first came in sight of Herat. His army was short of provisions, and without clothing or pay; and rather than have continued through another winter, before a fortress which had so repeatedly defeated them, the Persians would in all likelihood have dispersed of themselves, in spite of all their Shah could do to retain them.*

Our expedition from Bombay landed at Karrack in the Persian Gulf, in the middle of June, when MacNaghten and Burnes were preparing for the Afghanistan war by negotiating with Runjeet Sing at Lahore. The possession of Karrack, an island belonging to Persia, and in the centre of the Shah's dominions, showed him how completely those dominions were within our grasp, showed him that we could disembark any force we pleased at Bushire within a fortnight of its quitting Bombay, and possess ourselves of some of the chief towns of Persia before the people at large could be made aware that hostilities were intended. It had been pointed out by a foreign writer that if all the powers of the Russian empire were exerted in equipping an army for the invasion of India, and if

* Buist, 'Outline of the Operations of the British Troops in Scinde and Afghanistan.'

that mighty army, overcoming obstacles that were scarcely to be overcome by any army of any size, reached the western borders of Beloochistan in safety, with its complete materiel, a descent by the British on Bushire would put us in possession of all the communications of that army, compel Persia at her peril to act against it, and place the rear of that army and the line of its advance and relief completely at our mercy.* The descent on Karrack gave practical proof of the soundness of this speculation. Moreover it had been shown pretty clearly that for Russia to send an army as far as the eastern border of Persia was impossible, and our own experience has now convinced the most sceptical that were the Russians there, the mountain tribes, without our intervention, would cut off their supplies, destroy their cattle, and seize their baggage. We could, any day, cut an expedition from the westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire, where the coast country, with our commanding fleets and uninterrupted supplies, would furnish a base of operations from which Europe and Asia united together could not drive us. It has further been shown that a Russian army would take twice the time to march from their farthest to our nearest Indian frontier, that the armies of England would occupy in being wafted from the bank of the Thames to the banks of the Indus; and that, during the interval, our fleets might annihilate the navy of the Czar, or blockade it and render it utterly useless in the Baltic and in the Black Sea.† From the moment that our troops landed on his island of Karrack,

* The British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna, Translated by H. Evans Lloyd. London, 1840.

† George Buist.

All this was shown still more clearly in an excellent article in the 'Spectator' newspaper, published on the 27th of July, 1839.

"Herat is declared to be the key to the British dominions in India—the key which is to open the door to the Russians, and their allies the Persians, to Hindustan. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a vast distance from the door. Our own army (the unfortunate army employed in the Afghan war) has been already five months on its march from our frontier, backed by all the resources of India, and without firing a single shot, unless at a few freebooters; and there is no trustworthy intelligence that it has

the eyes of the Persian Shah were turned more anxiously in that direction than upon the siege of Herat; and, at the end of September, when he gave up that siege altogether, and put his diminished and rabble army in motion for a retreat into the heart of his own country, he declared that he did so in consequence of the presence of our armament, and that if Karrack had not been seized by us, Herat would have been taken by him. It is true that the possession of Karrack and the descent we might so easily have effected on Bushire were calculated to induce a rapid retreat, even if the Persians had been on the eve of victory and conquest; but it is not true that our menacing attitude at Karrack was the sole cause of the Shah's hasty retreat:—his army was not on the eve of victory, but on the very brink of dissolution; after many defeats, it was half famished and was

yet reached the first spot where there is any probability of its meeting with resistance, viz. Candahar. From Candahar to Herat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no interruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march. Thus, therefore, without meeting an enemy—and supposing the barren country which it had in its rear and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, populous, and peaceful India affords us—it would take a Russian army five months to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a key to get possession of, and many a door to unlock between; and, after that, there is a march of at least 1500 miles farther to the chief seat of our power and resources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta; which would take at least four months more, supposing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses offered no resistance, and that John Bull (who in one-half the whole time mentioned could send an army from the banks of the Thames) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket doing nothing. But to reach India is not to conquer India (never so powerful and united as under our own administration), as any one who will take the pains to read may learn from the history of its invaders from ALEXANDER to AHMED SHAH. Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who established themselves in the north-west took not months or years, but from one to two centuries, to conquer the east and the south. The truth is, that a Russian invasion and conquest of India is but the dream of a troubled conscience. No man in his waking moments and sober senses imagines the possibility of the thing, or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without the command of the sea and of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make the attempt."—*Spectator*.

wholly disheartened, and it could not by any possibility have continued its stupid operations round Herat through another winter, or so much as through another month.

Well ! Herat was safe—that key to the British dominions in India could not be given by Persia to Russia, for Persia could not get it. All the dispositions for a grand campaign beyond the Indus and in the heart of Afghanistan were made (badly enough, no doubt !), and marching orders were given ; but it appears that not a single regiment had yet begun to march when Lord Auckland received official intelligence of the retreat of the Persians from Herat. But this intelligence had no apparent effect on the counsels and conduct of men who had made up their minds for war, and who could not rest until the British flag should be carried over the snowy mountains and through the deep defiles of Afghanistan. These men did not see, or would not feel, what a perfect bulwark nature and fortune had opposed to the possibility of a successful invasion of British India from the westward ; and that they were going to weaken by their aggression the most formidable portion of this bulwark. Long before the fearful catastrophe in which all this blindness, or rashness and obstinacy, ended, and while unthinking people were shouting for the victories our arms were obtaining, a sensible writer at home said—"We are making the false movement of a general who, finding a broad marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss and inconvenience, posts himself on the opposite margin, and cutting himself off from his supplies, affords his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an opportunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him to surrender at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure, nor can we see any termination, utter discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate—contiguity and collision with the power of Russia in Persia." *

The day is not yet come for writing anything like a history of the Afghan war. Passions and prejudices must cool, and time must be allowed for the gradual collection of authentic and dispassionate materials. We feel that we could not venture upon details without occasionally expressing very strong opinions. It is indecorous, it is savage to yell over a newly-made grave. The promoters of, and the chief actors in the Afghan war, paid for their follies with their lives, dying most of them with the troops they led to death ; and their catastrophe is of so recent a date that scarcely an allusion can be made to it without wringing the hearts of numerous surviving friends and relatives. Therefore, referring our readers to *Gazettes* and *Dispatches*, and to the numerous books which have already been written by officers and others in India (the best of all these books being that of Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, late Deputy Commissary of Ordnance at Cabul), we shall pass rapidly over the disastrous campaigns, the management of which was, if possible, worse even than the original conception, or than the policy which recommended the war.

In the month of October, 1838, when Lord Auckland issued his warlike proclamation at Simla, the army of India was raised to 203,000 men. Sir Henry Fane was at this time commander-in-chief of all India. He disapproved both of the principles of policy and of the arrangement of the details of the expedition ; and viewed with alarm the prospect of having our armies so far removed from our own frontier. Sir Henry was besides in indifferent health when the first campaign was announced.* As a foretaste of what might be expected from him, Runjeet Sing, in despite of the recent treaty

* Colonel Fane, the son of Sir Henry Fane, said afterwards—"I am prepared to prove that the military head in India and second member of council of that country, did oppose, or perhaps rather, point out to the governor-general, the extreme danger of this wild and unmeasured expedition. . . . He ensured Lord Auckland of the success which did at first appear to attend us, but warned him that to maintain large bodies of troops in countries so distant, and which scarce produced food sufficient for the scanty population, was next to impossible."—Letter published in the '*Times*' of 5th June, 1842.

* *Spectator*, July 27th, 1839.


which had been drawn up at Lahore by Mac Naghten and Burnes, refused to allow our troops to cross the Punjab. Our principal rendezvous was therefore appointed to be Shikarpoor in Sindh; and thence our line of advance was to be by the Bolan Pass, Quetta, and Candahar. At the beginning of December, and not before, the force on the Bengal side was ready to proceed without delay to Sindh. It was 9500 strong. A larger number had been intended; but it was thought that the intelligence of the raising of the siege of Herat would lessen the exigencies of the service. A reserve division was stationed at Ferozepoor, under Major-General Duncan, and was 4250 strong. Runjeet Singh had engaged to maintain a Sikh army of observation of 15,000 men. Another Sikh contingent, about 6000 strong, was placed under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Wade, and was to move on Cabul by the eastern passes. A Bombay column, 5500 strong, under Sir John Keane, landed at Vikkur, on one of the mouths of the river Indus, and advanced into Sindh. The Ameers of Sindh had faithfully promised to provide supplies and the means of conveyance for our armies; but, on arriving at Kurrachee, about fifty miles from Vikkur, Sir John Keane found that they had provided nothing but jealousy, hatred, and enmity, and that the mass of the Sindh population were eager to attack his column. From 16,000 to 17,000 armed Beloochees occupied the Hydrabad side of the river; and so eager were these undisciplined hordes to attack us, that it was said that the Ameers in friendship and alliance with us, had to distribute from 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* among them to keep them quiet. It is very probable that these friendly Ameers kept the money themselves; but be that as it may, a beginning was made, thus early, to the unpromising practice of buying a passage through a country. As soon as the Bengal column reached Ferozepoor, an outstation on the banks of the Sutledge, about fifty miles from Lahore, Sir Henry Fane, whose health was growing worse, resigned the command; and boats being provided for himself and staff, he dropped down the Sutledge and Indus, with the intention of remaining at Bom-

bay and retaining the post of commander-in-chief in India until his successor should be appointed from home. Thus, at starting, and before the main body got beyond our frontier, our army was left without a commander-in-chief. Lord Auckland nominated Sir John Keane, a brave and experienced officer, but said to be headstrong, passionate, and domineering, to the direction of the whole force, and instructed him to send his own orders to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, as senior officer, had succeeded to the command of the Bengal column as a temporary measure until its junction with the Bombay troops. This also gave the temporary command of a division to Major-General Nott, and of a brigade to Colonel Dennie. We can trace, even at this moment, some of the jealousies and heartburnings which helped to destroy the discipline of the whole army.

Sir John Keane and his Bombay column, after numerous difficulties and delays, advanced towards Tatta on the 24th of December. Here the climate was very trying both for the European and the native troops; the days were excessively hot, the nights very cold; the thermometer, which rose to above 90° in the day, descended as low as 35° in the night. The granaries had all been plundered by the Beloochees, and, as was believed, with the sanction of the Ameers. When the Shah Sujah's contingent of 6000 men (bad troops, and paid entirely by us) moved down parallel to the line of Sir John Keane's advance, and occupied Larkhana, and the Bengal column moved upon their right, the Beloochees retreated and disbanded themselves, and then the Ameers, seeing Hydrabad, their capital, open to attack, made a new agreement with Sir John Keane, and fulfilled some few of its conditions. Sir Alexander Burnes (he had been made Knight Commander of the Bath and Lieutenant-Colonel for his previous services on the Indus, in Afghanistan, &c., and, perhaps, in part for his ample contribution to the unlucky scheme now in process of execution) had been employed to collect at Shikarpoor camels for the use of the whole army. The governor-general had calculated that

45,000 camels might be obtained ; and he had informed Sir John Keane that this number should be fairly and proportionately distributed among the Bengal troops, the Bombay troops, and Shah Sujah's contingent. But Burnes could never collect 20,000 camels at Shikarpoor, and the Bengal column which had just arrived took it for granted that all the camels were for them ; and thought it extremely hard that Sir John Keane should order any to be appropriated either by the Bombay troops or by the Shah's contingent. The Bengal commissariat officers left at Shikarpoor managed to evade every order sent to them to forward camels to Larkhana, until Captain Outram was sent back to them by Sir John Keane. There were clearly not camels enough for all, and Colonel Dennie and other officers of the Bengal army, who had always been accustomed to assert a superiority over the officers of the other presidencies, thought it hard that their troops should be left behind for want of the means of transport, and camels be given up for the raw levies of Shah Sujah, who were almost sure to run away from the first enemy they met. But the governor-general's instructions were very positive—Shah Sujah's contingent must be sent on entire, if possible—and accordingly camels were sent after them. This produced fresh murmurs and heartburnings. The cholera morbus broke out among the reserved force of 3000 men at Kurrachee, and carried off a great many of them. Colonel Thomas Powell of the 40th regiment, and an old and experienced Peninsular officer, died of the dreadful disease. Everywhere disasters and the forebodings of calamity thickened, and warned men—who would not be warned—to stop their advance and retrace their steps. There was no dependence to be placed either upon the Sinde Ameers or upon Runjeet Sing—there was little security for our communications and supplies, and such means as were adopted for the obtaining of some such security were inadequate to the end, were slovenly, unsystematic, unworthy of British officers at this time of day. The Bengal army, the Bombay army, Shah Sujah's rabble, and the other contingent forces went on,

each in its own way, and with little or no attention to the progress of all the rest ; and nearly every division was accompanied by an amazing number of camp-followers, who could not shift for themselves in the countries beyond the Indus. On the 20th of February 1839, when Sir Willoughby Cotton commenced his march towards the Bolan Pass with the Bengal army, he was attended by about 80,000 camp-followers, who were all to be fed from the commissariat. Crossing a broad and hungry desert, this Bengal column reached Dadur, at the foot of the mountains of Western Afghanistan, on the 6th of March. Here supplies began to run short, so that the non-combatants of the column were put on half-rations before entering the mountain country. Yet they had scarcely left the territories of professing friends and allies, and had performed no more than one half of the journey to Cabul : they had hitherto lost little or nothing by pillage, and had never encountered an enemy, and nevertheless they were already menaced with famine. The Bombay column was at this time 9 marches, or nearly 100 miles, behind. Close by Dadur is the mouth of the Bolan Pass—a terrible chasm nearly seventy miles long, tortuous, deep, and flanked by lofty rocks. This portion of the country is inhabited by the poorest and wildest of the Afghan tribes, who live almost entirely by plunder. Fortunately they offered no opposition to the passage of our troops until they were on the point of quitting the defile, when some skirmishing took place and a few of our people were wounded. But the excessive barrenness and steepness of this line of march caused the destruction of a vast number of horses and camels. On the 26th of March, Sir Willoughby Cotton reached Quettah, a town situated in a fertile valley, and containing a population of 5000 or 6000 souls. Here supplies and other good things were expected, but none were found. The place belonged to the Khan of Khelat, or Meerab Khan, with whom Burnes had negotiated a sort of treaty before our columns were put in motion. Now Burnes was sent again to Khelat, to endeavour to reason the Khan into terms, or into the fulfilment of the



treaty which he had concluded with him. The Khan, like most of the Afghan chiefs, seemed to entertain a morbid dread of Shah Sujah, whom the English were restoring to his throne; and Burnes could not induce him to make a short journey from Khelat to visit Shah Sujah. After a good deal of shuffling and evasion, which ought to have convinced Burnes that the treaty would be worth nothing, the Khan of Khelat agreed to receive a subsidy of 15,000*l.* a year during the continuance of our army in Afghanistan, and to supply provisions, carriage, and escorts to the extent of his ability: (but provisions, carriage, and escorts were all to be separately paid for). While they were discussing this precious treaty, the Khan of Khelat told Burnes that Dost Mohamed Khan, the ruler of Cabul, whom Lord Auckland had determined to dethrone, was a man of resource and ability, and that though we might put him down and thrust Shah Sujah in his place, we could never win over the Afghan nation.* "Wait," said he, "till sickness overtakes your troops—till they are exhausted with fatigue from long and harassing marches and the total want of supplies; wait till they have drunk of many waters, and wait too till they feel the sharpness of the Afghan swords!"† On another occasion the Khan used these words:—"You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it back again?"‡ This was the very expression which fell from the Duke of Wellington when the intimation of our advance into Afghanistan was made in parliament. It was a question which ought to have occurred to every officer in the army, and for which a response ought to have been provided by the commanding officers of that army, and by the government which sent them on their wild errand. But those officers and that government thought of nothing but how to advance; and therefore it could not but

happen that we should never get the army out of the country—that their bones should whiten in Afghanistan.*

Sir John Keane brought up the Bengal column, and established his headquarters at Quetta, on the 4th of April. So scarce and dear had grain already become, that his camp-followers greedily devoured the fried skins of sheep, coagulated blood, roots, or whatever else they could procure. With a march of 150 miles before them to Candahar, they were obliged to push on, upon half-rations for the men, and none at all for the cattle. All communication between the front and rear division, even now 100 miles apart from each other, was completely cut off by the fierce tribes in the Pass. An unlooked for spirit of discontent began to make its appearance amongst the Bengal troops; and a rumour was circulated throughout the camp that an immediate retreat upon Shikarpoor was intended. Sir John Keane thought to remedy this panic (for it already amounted to a panic with a large part of the army) by ordering a forced march forward for the next morning. The camp-followers were brought down to quarter-rations, or "famine allowance," as one of our officers calls it. On the first march towards Candahar, sixty of our artillery horses were shot, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy—no more food for them being procurable. In the course of a week, one hundred and sixteen cavalry horses died, and between the 6th of April and the middle of June this arm of the service was nearly disabled for want of food! Nine hundred camels had died since the column commenced their advance. The robbers of the Pass were incessantly harassing our soldiers and pouncing down from their rocks and hills upon the baggage. Savage and unwise orders were carried into execution by our harassed and exasperated troops: they pursued, and not unfrequently overtook the marauders; and whenever these Afghans were captured, they were shot or hanged—*no quarter being, on any occasion, given them.*† It was thus that our people prepared for

* Letter from Sir Alexander Burnes to Government, as quoted by Buist.

† Dr. Atkinson, Superintending Surgeon of the Bengal Division—Expedition into Afghanistan, &c.

‡ Major Hough—March and Operations of the Army of the Indus.

* Buist.

† Id.

their own destruction in the Mountain Passes—for their bloody exodus from Afghanistan! On the 26th of April the head-quarters of the army reached Candahar, the Bengal column having marched 1000 miles since quitting Firozpoor.

The Bombay column had so far gained on the advance as to be in the Kojuk Pass only sixty miles behind, when the head-quarters of the grand army arrived under the walls of Candahar. It had endured terrible fatigues and still more terrible privations, and was reduced to 3600 men before it came to the desert. It had been intended that it should move by the Gundava Pass and Khelat; but the road had not been previously examined, and when the column came to this Pass, it was reported to be impracticable. Nothing, therefore, was to be done but to march the column through the Bolan Pass, in the already impoverished track of the leading division. The Khan of Khelat proved his steadiness to the treaty which he had concluded with Burnes, by writing to the hill chiefs—"What is the use of treaties and arrangements? All child's play! There is no relief but in death! No cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, bodies, and goods must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy!" On the 12th of April this Bombay column entered the Bolan Pass: the thermometer was at 110°, but above the Pass there had recently been a heavy snow-storm, and the cold on those heights (5000 feet above the level of the plain) was excessive and destructive, if not to the life, to all the energy of our sepoys. In the Pass the column was annoyed by the stench of dead camels and of multitudes of unburied bodies of the enemy, which marked in horrible characters the line of the advance of our first division. Numerous executions swelled the number of these Afghan dead, for the army of Bombay, like the army of Bengal, gave no quarter to the hill people! Many of our camels loaded with grain were killed, and the greater part of the camel-drivers began to desert. Although General Nott had been left behind at Quettah to keep open the communica-

tions, all our letter-bags were seized and rifled, so that from the end of March to the beginning of August, when our troops reached Cabul, the safe arrival of a single packet could never be depended on. As the Bombay column reached the heights above the Pass, the men were attacked by dysentery. Making rapid marches, they, however, reached Candahar on the 4th of May, and there found the Bengal troops. Colonel Dennie, who had been left behind with the reserve stores and carriages, and with some of the Shah's raw contingents, and the 31st and 42nd Bengal native infantry, saved, by means of some extraordinary marches, Captain Stockley, of the Bombay commissariat, who, on his way to Dadur, with cattle, grain, and stores, had been surrounded, and shut up in a small fort, by the Beloochees; saved Captain Anderson, who was commanding two newly-raised troops of the Shah's horse artillery, with tumbrils, ammunition filling fifty carriages, &c.; fought his way nobly through the Bolan Pass, and reached Candahar; but many of his men had been killed and wounded, and many had died of apoplexy, or had gone mad from the excess of heat.

The army now assembled at Candahar, exclusive of the Shah's contingent, amounted to 10,400 fighting men. The camp-followers had dwindled away through death and sickness, and the dread of the Bolan Pass, but they still amounted to nearly 29,000, of whom more than half were dependent on our commissariat. The Shah's contingent, which was entirely paid and also officered by our Indian government, mustered about 13,000 men—but we cannot call them fighting men, for they were almost entirely raw levies. Sir John Keane strongly condemned the uniting of such a force as this to the two well-appointed armies of Bengal and Bombay. It appears that this was done in the vain hope of giving plausibility to the fiction that Shah Sujah was entering his dominions surrounded by *his own* troops—when, in fact, it was too notorious to escape exposure, that he had not a single subject or Afghan amongst them, his sham army being made up of camp-fol-

lowers from the Company's military stations.*

Candahar contained a population of from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. On the approach of our imposing force, the three brother Sirdars, who had held the city for about twelve years, fled with their families and some two hundred followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress 80 miles distant. They were pursued by Brigadier Sale, in the month of June, and they then continued their flight without interruption to Meshid, in Persia. Hajji Khan and some others of the chiefs had deserted to us, but only to desert from us and betray us at the first opportunity.

The populace of Candahar, and not a few chiefs and warriors, gave, or seemed to give, the warmest welcome to Shah Sujah; but the Shah had not been six months seated on his throne, when an insurrection commenced, which never was subdued in this quarter so long as we remained in the country. Populous as was the city of Candahar, neither money for bills upon India nor a sufficient supply of provisions could be procured for the army. By the 1st of July the whole army had quitted Candahar, and was in full march upon Ghuznee, the soldiers still continuing on half, and the camp-followers on quarter rations. The distance from Candahar to Ghuznee is about 230 miles; but on the 21st of July the army halted under the walls of Ghuznee, its wide-spread baggage covering an area of 16 square miles. The works of Ghuznee were found to be far stronger than Sir John Keane had been led to expect. The four heavy guns of our battering-train had been left behind at Candahar, in the belief that they could not be wanted. The result of a reconnaissance was a report to the commander-in-chief, that, if he decided upon an immediate attack on Ghuznee, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was to make a dash at the Cabul gateway (all the other gates had been built up)

and blow the gate open by powder-bags.* Sir John Keane resolved to take this advice, and the artillery were ordered to make the necessary preparations. On the following day—the 22nd of July—some of the Afghan tribes collected in great force on some neighbouring hills; but being encountered by Captain Outram, with only 150 infantry and match-lock men, they were beaten and put to flight: thirty or forty of them were killed and wounded, and thirty-eight were made prisoners. According to Sir Alexander Burnes, who, as well as Mr. Mac Naghten, was constantly with Shah Sujah, as soon as the thirty-eight prisoners were brought into his Majesty's presence, and questioned about their rebellion and treason, they said that they would glory in taking his Majesty's life; that he was an infidel, and had brought an army of infidels into the country, and that they would take his life whenever they could; and one of them, suiting the action to the word, plunged a dagger into the breast of one of the Shah's attendants;—upon which the King gave orders that they should all be beheaded. Nearly every part of this story has been doubted; but there is no doubt at all that 36 of these 38 captives were immediately put to death—and that, too, in the presence of at least one British field-officer.† When the massacre

* Report and Memoranda, by Captains Thomson and Peat of the Engineers.

† Letter from Sir William Mac Naghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, on the subject of the destruction of the thirty-six prisoners who were put to death at Ghuznee in the presence of Major Mac Sherry, on the evening of the 22nd of July, 1839, as quoted by Buist.

Among other startling things, this historian of the Afghan war quotes the following passage from Mac Naghten's letter, which was written about a year after the event. "Towards evening, a report was brought to me that the king's people had taken several prisoners, and that his majesty had determined upon the execution of them all. On the impulse of the moment, I suggested that a selection should be made of the offenders for execution, and immediately consulted Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, through Sir Alexander Burnes, who was in his excellency's camp; and his opinion was that 'the most summary example should be made of such dastardly ruffians.' In the meanwhile, I had received several messages from his majesty, expressing his determination to put the prisoners to death, as the only safe and proper course to be adopted in the exigency of

* Letter of Colonel Dennie, addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Mac Donald, military secretary to Sir John Keane, as quoted by Buist.

was over, Sir John Keane is said to have sent to inform the Shah that he must not do such deeds again within the limits of a British camp. But it is also said that there was no writing of any kind upon the subject; that the butchery was seldom or never afterwards talked of or condemned by our officers in the camp or field, and that our commander-in-chief exclaimed, "The murderous and treacherous rascals deserved it." Mac Naghten certainly attempted to justify the deed a year after its commission.

Between this night of murders and the following morning, the Cabul gate of Ghuznee was blown up by 300 lbs. of powder in twelve sand-bags, with a hose 72 feet long. If this operation had failed (and it never could have succeeded if the Afghans had possessed any military science) Sir John Keane must have retreated to Candahar, and thence, by the terrible Bolan Pass, towards our own frontiers. As soon as the gate was blown open, our storming party rushed in, and commenced a fierce hand to hand conflict with the Afghans. The fighting was long and desperate. At one time a rumour was raised that the attack had failed, and the reinforcing column had sounded a retreat, and was in the act of retiring, when the reiterated shout of their comrades within the works recalled them. Brigadier Sale, who commanded the supporting column, received a severe wound on the face from a sabre; when, closing with his antagonist, both lost their footing, and rolled over together. In this extremity the Brigadier recognised Captain Kershaw, of the 13th light infantry, who at that moment came up, and having made his situation known to

him, he was speedily relieved, by the Captain passing his sword through the body of the frantic Afghan, who, however, would not let go his hold until Sale cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. When the town was carried entirely, the strong fortress remained, and was expected to make a still more desperate resistance; but about five o'clock, A.M., or little more than three hours after the gate had been blown open, the British colours waved from the battlements of the citadel. Hyder Khan (one of the sons of Dost Mohamed), the governor, surrendered himself in the course of the morning, and was placed under the care of Sir Alexander Burnes, who had so recently figured at Cabul as the friend and guest of his father. Meer Khan, the eldest, and commonly known as "the fighting son" of Dost Mohamed, had come close upon our camp, early in the morning, with 5000 cavalry. He heard the firing, and only waited for daylight to discover how matters stood in the fortress. The dawn showed him the British flag on the ramparts: and he forthwith fled towards Cabul, leaving all his elephants and baggage behind him to be captured by our troops or by the Shah's contingent, who were as quick in plundering as they were slow in fighting. Brigadier Scott is said to have picked up in the fortress some cartridges of Russian manufacture, and one cartridge with the word "Paris" upon it.* In the assault about 170 of our people were wounded, but only 17 were killed: about 1000 Afghans were slain, about 1600 were taken prisoners, and the number of the wounded was estimated as about equal to that of the captives. To talk of the "genius and skill" with which the plan of the attack was conceived, is to be guilty of rhodomontade and nonsense; but the conduct of our soldiers, during the storm, and, still more, after the storm had succeeded, was rare, and in the highest degree admirable. No city taken by assault ever suffered so little as Ghuznee, and no men ever conducted themselves, under similar circumstances,

our situation. I replied that his majesty was supreme; but that I would at least strongly recommend him, if he thought a severe example necessary, to liberate some of the prisoners, in order that the retribution which had overtaken their comrades might be made known to the whole of these fanatic offenders. My recommendation was not concurred in by his majesty to the extent that I could have wished: of thirty-eight prisoners two only were released—the one on the ground of his being a Syud (a *Musliman Saint* or *holy man*, or *Emir*), and the other because he begged his life. The remainder, who obstinately persisted in exasperating his majesty, were executed."—*Buist*.

* Views in Afghanistan, &c., from Sketches taken during the Campaign of the Army of the Indus, by Sir Keith A. Jackson, Bart.

so temperately and moderately as its captors. On this point authorities and opinions are unanimous. With the close of the fighting all violence ceased, and not one female was exposed to insult or injury.* The fall of Ghuznee opened the way to Cabul, and opened more roads than one. Colonel (now Sir Claud Martin) Wade had assembled near Peshawer 6000 Seik contingents and more than 4000 of the Shah's levies. With this force he was to move upon Cabul, by Jellalabad. Wade forced his way through the Khyber Pass, the enemy flying from a fort which was considered as the key of that Pass. Jellalabad was defended by Mohamed Akbar Khan, second son of Dost Mohamed, and afterwards famous for the vengeance he took upon the invaders. This chief had 2500 men and 14 guns; but on the fall of Ghuznee he was hastily recalled for the defence of Cabul. This at once opened the way for Colonel Wade's forces through the rest of the Passes, and placed Jellalabad in our hands. Wade was so close upon Akbar Khan that he compelled him to abandon all his artillery and camp equipage, which, together with horses, bullocks, and 7000 rounds of ball-cartridge, fell into our hands. On the 30th of July Sir John Keane, with the main army, marched from Ghuznee to Cabul. He crossed the ridge of a mountain, said to be 9000 feet above the level of the sea, and went through another deep and narrow defile without encountering any resistance. Dost Mohamed was now almost entirely deserted by his chiefs and army: quarrels and jealousies had arisen among them, and old feuds and grudges were, as usual, freshened up at the moment they ought to have been forgotten. As Sir John Keane drew nigh, Dost Mohamed quitted his throne and his capital, and fled with 600 horsemen to seek a refuge in the wide country beyond the Oxus.

* Buist. This writer adds—"It may not be superfluous to add, that long before this, the commissariat store of intoxicating liquor had been exhausted, and Sir J. Keane commanded a temperance army. To the want of liquor is ascribed by the medical men the unprecedented celerity with which the injuries of our wounded were healed."

But nearly at the same time that this news was received at our head-quarters, Sir John Keane learned the death of Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, an event which materially and injuriously affected the triple alliance. Detaching a very inadequate party of cavalry in pursuit of the fugitive king, Sir John Keane and Shah Sujah marched leisurely on to Cabul, under the walls of which they encamped on the evening of the 6th of August. On the afternoon of the next day, Shah Sujah, Sir John Keane, the General officers of the army, Burnes, Mac Naghten, and other officers of the mission, or of the staff, made a pompous and triumphant entrance into the capital. The people were respectful and orderly, but cold; the chiefs were absent; there was no enthusiasm. Some of these vain-glorious Englishmen, not satisfied with riding in triumph, had put it into the restored Shah's head to create an order of knighthood, and to confer the first badges upon themselves! If this idea did not originate with poor Burnes, he certainly was a principal actor in the ridiculous scene of the investiture. On the 17th of September a Durbar was held at the dilapidated palace, wherein a dozen or two of bricklayers or plasterers were at work all the while, and never ceased their work to look at the farce. The Shah sat on a dirty old camp chair; and behind him stood two old fat eunuchs, each holding a dish, in which were deposited the crosses and ribands. The first of these senseless and unseemly baubles* was conferred upon Sir John Keane, who delivered a long speech, in which there was a great deal about hurling the usurper Dost Mohamed from the throne. This speech was made intelligible to Shah Sujah by Major Powell, Persian interpreter, who,

* The decoration of the order was a Maltese cross, a bad imitation of the Guelphic order of Hanover; and it was the more absurd to give a Christian's most sacred religious badge as an honour supposed to be conferred by the most bigoted petty Mohammedan government in the world; because the arabesque star of six points, which forms the ornament of the historic gates of the tomb of Mohammed of Ghuznee, would have been so peculiar and appropriate an emblem of a Douranee institution.—Kennedy.

not being accustomed to speak or translate in public, made but a bad job of it. The Shah grew impatient, and interrupted the interpreter; but Burnes, wishing the whole matter to be fairly driven through the imperial ears, whispered—"There is more of it," which silenced the Shah, and Major Powell went on: but, making a pause, to take breath, the Shah began again, and was again silenced: a third pause, and again the Shah commenced; and, by this time, Burnes seemed tired too, and the Shah had it all his own way, and all the talk to himself during the rest of the ceremony. Mr. Mac Naghten and Sir Willoughby Cotton were next invested; and then Burnes and Wade were told that they were created Knights Grand Crosses too, but that the goldsmith had not been able to make the decorations in time for them. A cry of disappointment and anger rose from sundry officers who were not included in the batch of Knights Grand Crosses, or in that of Knights Commanders, or in that of Companions.* While this foolery was in progress at Cabul, the Afghans were murdering every British officer or soldier that they could surprise outside of the camp.

Considering the work as done, Sir John Keane hurried back to India, and from thence to England, to be raised to the peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznee and Cappoquin (with a pension of 2000*l.* a year), and to receive the thanks of parliament and of the Court of Directors. The shouts of triumph and applause were, however, mingled with the expression of many doubts and some severe criticism: in the Lords the Duke of Wellington said that he had never doubted but that the valour and discipline of our troops would secure victory to our arms in Afghanistan; but that it was when we had completed our first conquests that our difficulties would begin: Lord Ellenborough declared the war to have been a folly, and said it remained to be seen whether it might not prove a crime. Lord Auckland, as governor-general, received his meed: he was

raised in the peerage to the rank of an earl; and the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors honoured him with their vote of thanks, "for the sagacity and promptitude with which he had planned the expedition, and the zeal and vigour he had displayed in preparing the troops to take the field."

The Bombay column quitted Cabul on the 18th of September; the Bengal troops remained for nearly a month longer, but by the 20th of October all the forces, returning for the present to India, had left Shah Sujah's capital. The cold was severe in the mountain passes, thick ice was found upon the roads, the bodies of dead camels and horses lay frozen all around, and, without having to encounter any enemy, our retiring columns suffered very severely.

Seldom have troops been left in a more uncertain or more hazardous predicament than the army which was left to secure Shah Sujah on his throne. This force was large, for the enmity of the majority of the Afghan chiefs to the restored Shah was already threatening and formidable. Independently of the Shah's contingent, paid and officered by the English, about 8000 men, British troops and sepoy, were left up the country, and were stationed in the Balla Hissar, at Cabul, in cantonments near to that city, in the fortress of Jellalabad, and in various other positions. They had with them from 70 to 80 guns. Burnes, deceived by the unusual mildness of the winter of the year that he was at Cabul, had represented the climate as much milder than had usually been reported. Now he discovered his mistake, and so did the troops, to their infinite cost. In the month of January there was a fall of snow nearly five feet deep, and the thermometer fell to 13°. This was at Cabul; at another post the thermometer sank to 10° below zero, or 42° under freezing. The poor sepoy suffered cruelly, and even the British soldiers, who were only indifferently provided with clothes and blankets, shivered on those Afghan mountains and table-lands. The most desperate of the Afghans remained inactive until the return of spring; but then the Ghilzies and other powerful tribes began

* Dr. Kennedy, Campaign of the Army of the Indus.

to unite their cavalry, and to attack our outposts. At the same time the people dwelling on the hills and in the glens not only refused to pay any taxes or tribute to Shah Sujah, but also refused to sell provisions to our commissariat. As the ice and snow melted, and left the roads and mountain paths passable, a fierce war of posts commenced. Except when surprised by vastly superior numbers in some coupe-gorge, our troops always defeated the enemy, though never without some loss to themselves. This warfare alone would have worn out our army. As the summer advanced it assumed a bolder character. Dost Mohamed, after a narrow escape from being betrayed and murdered by the king, or ruler, of Bokhara, received assistance in his extremity from the Khan of Kookan, on the Persian border, and in company with one of his sons, Afzul Khan, he proceeded to Afghanistan, to stir up the country to undertake a holy war for the expulsion of the unbelieving English. Some native Afghan troops, which Shah Sujah had raised, began to desert to the Dost, who had collected a great number of Usbeg Tartars. As the expelled ruler advanced upon Cabul several severe actions were fought, in which our fine artillery practice and our grape and shrapnel gave us the victory, and inflicted terrible losses on the enemy. At last, driven from post to post, and surrounded, Dost Mohamed made up his mind to surrender to Sir William Mac Naghten, or to Sir Alexander Burnes, who were both left at Cabul, the first as ambassador or envoy, and the second as assistant to the envoy. On the evening of the 3rd of November, 1840, as Mac Naghten was returning from his evening ride, and was within a few yards of his own residence in the Balla Hissar, or citadel of Cabul, a solitary horseman galloped up to him and told him that Dost Mohamed had arrived and sought his protection. The words were scarcely said ere the chief himself appeared; and, alighting from his horse, he presented his sword to the envoy, who returned the sword, and requested him to remount. The Dost had quitted the field of battle*

* The chief's last battle—the battle of Purwan

late the preceding evening, and had ridden straight into Cabul, a distance of sixty miles, having been twenty-four hours on horseback. Yet he showed few symptoms of fatigue, and his self-possession was remarkable. Shah Sujah, whom we had thrust into his place, could hardly have ridden twelve miles in twenty-four hours, and so far from being self-possessed, he was in a constant flurry and panic, even when far removed from any chances of danger. This was not a man to be king of Afghans. On the 12th of November Dost Mohamed was sent off for India under a strong escort. He waited at Peshawer till joined by his family, which consisted of nearly 700 persons, of whom about one-half were females. Fourteen of his sons surrendered, Akbar Khan alone holding out against us to the end. The Dost was allowed to visit Calcutta, where the governor-general received him with much respect and courtesy. Three lacs of rupees, or about 30,000*l.* a year (a sum not far short of half of his annual revenues as ruler of Cabul) were allotted to him; and he took up his residence at Mussooree, on our north-west frontier, where he remained till 1843. He told one of our officers that the majority of the Afghan tribes had never been accustomed to obey, and never would obey any prince; that we should be involved in perpetual embarrassments; that the cunning and the intriguing spirit of the chiefs would prove more dangerous than their arms, and that the very courtiers about Shah Sujah, who had been for years fattening on our bounty, would be the most forward in plotting against us. We need not say that the words of the Dost were more than verified. Shah Sujah made bad worse by selecting a low-born, rapacious old scoundrel to be his prime minister. This man's faculties were impaired by age and disease. He had grown grey with his majesty in exile, and having on some occasion incurred his majesty's displeasure, he had for-

Durrah—in which some of our sepoy regiments had behaved like downright cowards, and in which Dr. Lord, one of our numerous political agents in the country, Lieutenant Broadfoot, and Cornet Crispin were killed and cut to pieces.

feited his ears; a subject productive of many witticisms among the discontented about court, and little calculated to elevate a prime minister in popular opinion.* The surrender of Dost Mohamed, and the activity of our moveable columns under General Sale, Colonel Dennie, and other active and intelligent officers, brought the country all round Cabul to a tranquil state. But the calm was deceptive; it was but a lull in the storm; and although this was clearly seen and frankly stated by many of our officers, our infatuated envoy would not see it, and would not take warning.

Before the Bombay column cleared out of the country the celebrated fortress of Khelat was stormed and taken, and Meerab Khan, who had paid so little respect to the treaty which Burnes had concluded with him, and several other Beloochee chiefs, were slain. This was a brilliant operation, able to bear comparison with any exploit our troops ever performed in India: the fortifications were scarcely less formidable, and the garrison was scarcely less numerous than at Ghuznee, yet it was captured by a force (under Brigadier Baumgardt and Captain Outram) mustering little more than 1000 bayonets, without cavalry, and with only one light gun, whereas at Ghuznee Keane had had above 6000 fighting men and 40 pieces of light artillery. Little, however, was said about the reduction of Khelat, while the plaudits bestowed upon the capture of Ghuznee continued to make as great a noise as the explosion of gunpowder that blew open the gate. All through this campaign Captain Outram's conduct appears to have been most admirable.

While comparative tranquillity reigned in and round Cabul, insurrections broke out among the fierce tribes that inhabit the country to the east of the Bolan Pass. At the same time some of the Ameer's of Sinde called their followers to the field, united their bands, and threatened all our communications between Afghanistan and the Punjab. Several serious disasters were sustained by our troops, and more

than one of the small columns sent to put down these insurrections and combinations were absolutely beaten, if not by the arms of the enemy, by the natural difficulties of the country. Some uneasiness was felt lest the successor of Runjeet Sing should declare against us, and place his disciplined army, his numerous artillery, and his well-skilled French and Italian commanders between the Indus and our army in Afghanistan; but fortunately the new ruler of Lahore remained quiet.

Our army up the country was repeatedly reinforced. At the end of the year 1840 we had more than 16,000 men in Afghanistan; and at the first outbreak of the great insurrection in November, 1841, we had upwards of 14,000 men, besides the Shah's contingent. The number of our political agents scattered all about the country, as if it were conquered and submissive, and to be organized, like annexed provinces in Hindustan, by means of the pen, exceeded thirty. All these men (and not a few of them appear to have been young and inexperienced) were paid large salaries by the Company. Sir William MacNaghten, as envoy and minister, had 11,220*l.* per annum; his assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, 3000*l.* Among them they received more money than could be realized by taxes and duties in any one province of the Afghan empire. Everything was on a prodigious scale of expense. It was costing us more than 3,000,000*l.* a year to occupy a country for Shah Sujah, which never could render him 300,000*l.* a year. The Russo-mania had abated; we had obtained substantial proofs of the difficulty of any army traversing Afghanistan, even if it could get so far, and we ought by this time to have learned that the Afghan tribes were neither to be depended upon in their own country nor to be feared by us behind the Indus; but there our army was left, without any adequate arrangement either for its victualling or for its safe return, and there our money continued to be lavished, without any security for its repayment.* Omitting all notice of the clan feuds and

* Letter from Sir Alexander Burnes to Sir William MacNaghten, dated 7th August, 1840.

* Buist, and MS. Journal of a Young Officer on the Bengal Establishment.

our desultory warfare, we hasten at once to the foul catastrophe.

In May, 1841, Major Pottinger prognosticated the coming storm, representing to the envoy the insufficiency of our military force in some places and the badness of their cantonments in nearly all places. The major was looked upon as an alarmist. About the end of September the roads near Cabul swarmed with predatory bands, and three Ghilzie chiefs of note quitted Cabul after plundering a rich caravan, and took up a strong position in the defile of Khoord Cabul, only ten miles from the capital, thus blocking up the Pass and cutting off our communication with Hindustan. At the same time intelligence was received that Dost Mohamed's ablest and fiercest son, Akbar Khan, was collecting troops and raising the standard of his father in various parts of the country. General Sale cleared the Pass of Khoord Cabul, but not without hard fighting and considerable loss.* This was in the month of October, and all through this month our officers were insulted in their cantonments at Cabul, and many attempts were made to assassinate them. On the 2nd of November, at an early hour, intelligence was brought to cantonments that a popular outbreak had taken place in the city, and that a general attack had been made on the houses of all British officers residing in Cabul. The envoy Mac Naghten was in the cantonments, but Burnes was in the city. At about 8 A.M. a hurried note was received from Burnes, who stated that the minds of the people had been excited by some evil reports, but who expressed a hope that he should succeed in quelling

* After restoring Shah Sujah to his throne an agreement was entered into with the Ghilzie chiefs, that a certain sum of money should be paid to them yearly out of the Cabul treasury, if they would keep the Khoord Cabul Pass open, and offer no molestation to our troops on their passage between Cabul and Jellalabad. Little dependence could be placed on such a bargain; but it is said that the bargain was first broken by us or by our ally Shah Sujah, and that this provoking circumstance contributed in a great measure to the disasters which followed. The Shah could get very little money beyond what we gave him, and our political agents required so much cash for themselves that little was left for the feeing, or paying of black mail to, the hill-chiefs and the clans dwelling in the dangerous Passes.

the commotion. An hour after this it was reported in the cantonment that Burnes had been murdered, and that Captain Johnson's treasury had been plundered. Flames were now seen to issue from that part of the city where they dwelt, and an incessant report of fire-arms seemed to roll through the town from end to end. It was soon ascertained that the rabble who first commenced the attack did not exceed 300 men, and that with Sir Alexander were massacred his brother Lieutenant Burnes, Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, and every man, woman, and child found on the premises.* Our generals and superior officers were all so thunderstruck as to be incapable of adopting more than the most puerile of defensive measures. Coward as he was, Shah Sujah sent out one of his own sons

* The Military Operations at Cabul, &c., with a Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan, by Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, of Bengal Artillery, late Deputy-Commissary of Ordnance at Cabul.

Speaking charitably of his errors, and making no allusion to a very current report of gross and provoking misconduct, Lieutenant Eyre says—"No man, surely, in a highly responsible public situation—especially in such a one as that held by the late Sir Alexander Burnes—ought ever to indulge in a state of blind security, or to neglect salutary warnings however small. It is indubitable that such warnings had been given to him, especially by a respectable Afghan named Taj Mahomed, who, on the very previous night, went in person to Sir A. Burnes to put him on his guard, but returned disgusted by the incredulity with which his assertions were received."

Lady Sale says—"On the 20th of October the envoy wrote to Sir Alexander Burnes, in consequence of information he had received from Captain Trevor, which indicated an uneasy state of feeling among the people of Cabul. But Sir A. Burnes, on whom the intelligence department devolved, assured him that Trevor must be mistaken; as he knew nothing of any meditated rising of the people; and that all was as it ought to be. Notwithstanding this, Trevor assured the envoy that a number of Ghilzie chiefs had left Cabul for hostile purposes.

"On the 1st of November (the very day before the outbreak) Sir A. Burnes congratulated Sir William on the prospect of soon leaving Cabul in a perfect state of tranquillity. We might attribute his anxiety to calm the envoy's mind by assurances of the peaceful feeling of the people of the country, to an anxiety on his part to succeed to the situation to be vacated by Sir William; but it appeared questionable whether he would permanently have done so, as Colonel Sutcliffe had, it was said, been nominated for the appointment."—*Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan, by Lady Sale.*

with a number of his immediate Afghan retainers and two guns to restore order; but no support was rendered by our troops. Sir William Mac Naghten thought and said that the storm would soon blow over of itself. Instead of blowing over, it increased in violence. Every minute that was lost in inaction raised the numbers and the audacity of the insurgents. The chief command of our astounded and bewildered army (bewildered much more by the inactivity and stupor of their leaders than by the proceedings of the Afghans) was at this time held by Major-General Elphinstone, a most amiable and at one time a gallant officer, but who had been suffering a long and painful illness, which had affected his nerves, and worn out his mind as much as his body. He was utterly incapable of acting in this sudden emergency with the promptitude and vigour necessary for the preservation of his troops, and the officers next in command under him seem to have been—without the same physical and unavoidable causes—as incapable as himself, and to have shrunk from all responsibility. The cantonment occupied by the army for so many months was as bad as bad could be, and the magazine of provisions was placed in the most exposed and least defensible part of it, detached from our works of strength. All the calamities which befell our ill-starred force might be traced more or less to the defects of our position; and whether we look to its situation or to its construction, this cantonment at Cabul must ever be spoken of as a disgrace to our military skill and judgment.*

On the 3rd of November, the day after the outbreak, 3000 Ghilzies rushed through the Khoord Cabul Pass towards the capital, and other numerous bands began to collect on the hills. We cannot, and we need not, narrate what followed; the fearful story, with all its horrible and humiliating details, is fresh in the memory of every Englishman. Our commanding officers continued in their

imbecility until our troops were infected with downright cowardice: not merely the shivering half-starved sepoy, but our British-born soldiers cowered before a barbarous and stupid enemy whom they had so often beaten. Discipline disappeared, but never had discipline been put to a severer test! The brave soldier may be expected to bear everything except the self-evident imbecility and fatuity of his commanding officers. On the 4th of November our people ran away from the commissariat fort, and left all our stores, clothing, and provisions to the enemy, except two days' supply of provisions in cantonments. On the 5th an attack was made to recover possession of the commissariat fort; but our officers again behaved like fools and our men like cowards, and the enemy remained in possession of the rich prize they had procured. The object of the enemy was to starve the army out of its cantonment; and to this end the chiefs exerted all their influence to prevent our troops being supplied from any of the neighbouring forts. On the 9th General Elphinstone's weak state of health rendered the presence of a coadjutor absolutely necessary to relieve him from the command of the garrison; and Brigadier Shelton, the second in command, was, at the earnest request of Sir W. Mac Naghten, summoned in from the Balla Hissar, in the hope that he would rouse the sinking confidence of the troops. Shelton was scarcely in the cantonment ere a quarrel or a wide difference of opinion arose between him and Mac Naghten. The brigadier had from the first despaired of being able to hold out the winter at Cabul, and strenuously advocated an immediate retreat to Jellalabad. On the 13th Shelton made a tolerably spirited and successful sally upon some of the Afghan tribes that were now occupying all the hills which surrounded and commanded our cantonment, the said cantonment being a piece of low swampy ground: but the Afghans soon returned, and continued to annoy our troops with their unceasing fire of musketry. Major Pottinger, badly wounded, his assistant Mr. Houghton, who had lost a hand, and had been gashed on the neck, a sepoy of our Gorkha regiment, a moonshee, and

* Lieutenant Vincent Eyre. The cantonment had a low rampart and a narrow ditch; its form was a parallelogram: it had round flanking bastions at each corner, but every one of these bastions was commanded by some fort or hill.

another native, arrived on the 15th from a position at Charekar; and these were all that were left out of 100 men who had occupied the said post: all the rest, men and officers, had been butchered by the Afghans, who had surrounded Charekar with 4000 men. How provisions had been obtained we know not,* but our army was still motionless in its cantonment on the 22nd of November, when the terrible Akbar Khan arrived in Cabul with some hundreds of well-mounted warriors. His arrival was immediately followed by the defection of several chiefs who had hitherto professed great loyalty to Shah Sujah and much friendship to the English. On the 23rd Shelton sallied again in force in order to clear the way for our foraging parties, and was driven back with severe loss, after having committed in this one miserable, disastrous affair no fewer than six capital military errors. By this time our troops had lost all confidence in their officers; and they were starving with hunger as well as with cold. On the 26th a letter was received by Mac Naghten from Osman Khan, who proposed that the British should quietly evacuate the country, and leave the Afghans to govern it according to their own rules, and with a king of their own choice. General Elphinstone eagerly caught at this overture for retreating. On the 27th two deputies from the Afghan chiefs came into our cantonment to propose the terms. These were, that we should deliver up Shah Sujah and all his family, lay down our arms, and make an unconditional surrender; when they might perhaps be induced to spare our lives, and allow us to leave the country on condition of never returning! Mac Naghten replied that the terms were too dishonourable to be entertained for a moment; and that if they persisted in them, he must again appeal to arms. "Well," said the deputies, "we shall meet again in battle!" "We shall at all events meet at the day of judgment!" replied our doomed envoy. On the 8th of December Mac Naghten, in a public letter, requested the general to

state whether the only alternative left was not to negotiate for our safe retreat out of the country, on the most favourable terms possible? The despondent, dying Elphinstone gave a fatal response in the affirmative. On the 11th of December Mac Naghten, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, Mackenzie, and Trevor, went out to meet certain great khans and heads of tribes, who had intimated that they were desirous of concluding a treaty. Among these chiefs were some who had betrayed Dost Mohamed, and who had now betrayed Shah Sujah. The terrible Akbar Khan, who had never submitted to the English, was there: and he sternly negatived every proposition that our envoy advanced, demanding little short of an unconditional surrender. During this conference in the open plain a bullet whistled over the head of Sir William Mac Naghten; but his hour was not yet come. Akbar wanted to seize his person, but this was opposed by the other khans. At last it was agreed that the British should evacuate Afghanistan, including Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabul, Jellalabad, and all the other stations; that they should be permitted to return unmolested to India, and supplies of every description be afforded them in their road thither; that Dost Mohamed Khan and his family should be allowed to return to their country; that Shah Sujah and his family should be allowed the option of remaining at Cabul or proceeding with the British troops, in either case receiving from the Afghan government a pension of one lac of rupees per annum; that means of transport for the conveyance of our baggage, stores, &c. should be furnished; that all prisoners should be released; that no British force should ever again be sent into Afghanistan, unless called for by the Afghan government; that *perpetual friendship* should be established between the two nations, on the sure foundation of mutual *good offices*, &c.

The treaty which Major Davie had made with the king and savage chiefs of Kandy was not so monstrous a piece of folly as this; and for every man that Davie sacrificed in Ceylon, 60 or 70 lives were sacrificed here in Afghanistan! The Afghans never kept, and never

* It appears that for some time provisions were obtained from the contiguous village of Beymaroo, the proprietor of which was largely bribed by our envoy.

meant to keep, one of their engagements. But this was no novelty; all the semi-barbarous nations of the East had invariably acted in the like manner ever since we knew anything of their history. Instead of sending provisions and means of transport, these Afghans murdered all our sick and wounded men that they could lay their hands upon.

On the 14th of December was commenced the most disastrous and appalling retreat that has ever been recorded in authentic history. Making allowance for the difference of numbers, the retreat of the French from Moscow was less dreadful than this. In both cases, the ice and snow, and nakedness and famine, slew more than the sword. On the 20th of December, Sir William Mac Naghten had an interview with the chiefs, who now demanded that a portion of our guns and ammunition should be given up, and that Brigadier Shelton should be put into their hands as a hostage. Lieutenant Sturt, in whom the English spirit had not become extinct, proposed to the general to break off the treaty, and march forthwith to Jellalabad, where Sale was stoutly maintaining himself. But the General called a council of war,—and a council of war never fights. On the 22nd of December, as our troops were preparing to follow the van division, Akbar Khan sent to propose a new and much more favourable treaty than the one which he had already broken, and to invite our envoy to another conference. On the following day, Mac Naghten went to the place appointed, presented Akbar with a beautiful Arab horse,—and was barbarously murdered under the eyes of that Khan, and of other chiefs. It is even said that Akbar himself did the foul deed, shooting his victim through the body with a richly mounted pistol which Mac Naghten had sent him only a few hours before. The body was hacked to pieces by the armed fanatics, who carried the head into the city, and triumphantly exhibited it to Captain Conolly, one of the prisoners who had been taken. Not an arm was raised to avenge MacNaghten's fate—nothing could re-animate our troops, or the wretched men who commanded them. All went on, as if with one accord, to complete their

disgrace and seal their doom—all, except a few English hearts who murmured and remonstrated, but who had not moral courage sufficient to incur the heavy and awful responsibility of putting their commanding officers under arrest, appealing to the troops, and assuming the command themselves. There were more councils of war called, to end in more baseness and madness: it was agreed to leave behind all our guns except six; to give up all our treasure; to give up married men with their wives and families, as hostages; to pay Osman Khan, and some other treacherous villains, five lacs of rupees, in bills drawn upon India, but negotiated on the spot by a merchant of Cashmere and some Hindu bankers, the said Osman Khan engaging to escort the whole army in safety to Peshawer. In vain did Major Pottinger raise his manly voice against this useless debasement (and never were English soldiers so debased before as to buy a way out of an enemy's country!)—the rest of the officers composing the council declared, one and all, that the bargain must be struck. And, accordingly, the bills were given, and English ladies were delivered over as hostages, if not at this moment, a little later. Shah Sujah, who had remained within the strong walls of the Balla Hissar, into which the mass of our own force ought to have been thrown, showed more courage in his despair than these un-English members of councils of war. He asked Brigadier Anquetil, who had commanded his contingent, whether it were well to forsake him in the hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that force which he had hitherto been taught to consider as his own? Anquetil could only blush: the General and his councils of war had determined that the Shah we had reinstated should be abandoned, and that his contingent should go with the rest.

On the 6th of January, 1842, our headquarters and the rest of our army cleared out of the cantonments at Cabul, to march, in the depth of winter, through a country of perhaps unparalleled difficulty. The strength of our whole force was at this time estimated at about 4500 fighting men; the camp-followers, at a moderate computation, amounted to about 12,000

men, besides women and children. At the moment the rear-guard cleared out of the cantonments, the Afghans began to plunder the baggage, and to follow and fire upon our soldiers; and these operations can scarcely be said to have ceased until there was nothing left to plunder—or to kill. We will not follow this demoralized and degraded army through the horrors of the Passes of Khoord Cabul, Tezeen, and Gundamuk. General Elphinstone, almost at the point of death, gave himself up to one of the Khans. The ladies and wounded were given up; Dr. Brydon, who escaped by a miracle, was the only officer that reached the garrison of Jellalabad in safety, and a mere handful of sepoys and camp-followers entered the fortress, which Sale had held in spite of General Elphinstone's insane orders to him to evacuate.* Counting camp-followers, women and children, more than 26,000 human beings had perished on the retreat, through cold, famine, and the incessant attacks of a most faithless and ferocious enemy. A few hundreds—mostly native Indians—had been carried away captives, to be turned into slaves, or to be kept for the sake of ransoms. Woe to this Afghan war! and mercy to the souls of those who planned it, and who nearly all perished in it!

Our protégé Shah Sujah, though abandoned and left to his own resources, was not only able to maintain himself in the Balla Hissar, but also to acquire friends and allies. The Afghan chiefs, ever divided by jealousies, factions, and fends, began to intrigue against one another as soon as the English were gone, and some of these

sent open and some of them secret assistance to the Shah in the citadel, who intimidated by letter that he wanted no more English troops, that he wanted nothing but a few hundred thousands of pounds of our money to enable him to preserve his throne. In the city of Candahar General Nott gallantly maintained himself; and instead of waiting for the enemy behind the mud wall and ditch of the place, he sallied, on the 12th of January, with five and a half regiments of infantry, 1000 horse, and 16 pieces of artillery, attacked the enemy, about 5000 strong, and in a formidable position, and completely defeated and routed them. Ghuznee, famed for its gate and the powder-bags that had blown it open, was held by Colonel Palmer with one native regiment and some artillery. The veteran Sale added to his well-earned reputation by his defence of Jellalabad, on the retention of which nearly everything now depended.* The Afghans were completely balked in their plans by the refusal to vacate the place, a refusal on which they had by no means calculated, for they thought that Sale must obey the orders of his commander in chief, and they could not be persuaded that an order from Major Pottinger would not be obeyed by Captain MacGregor, the political agent at Jellalabad, although Pottinger constantly assured them that a prisoner, like himself, however exalted his rank, could not be considered a free agent, or exercise any power or control over any other public officer of Government, however inferior in rank and station. They had entertained no doubt that General Sale, yielding to the apparent necessities of the case, would have vacated upon summons, and have forthwith retreated to Peshawer, in which case they made sure that his whole force would be annihilated in the Khyber Pass. Finding that Sale would not yield to threatening messages, Ak-

* Well might Sir Robert Peel exclaim in the House of Commons—"When had you before, in the whole cycle of your history, any disaster like that which has befallen you in Afghanistan? a disaster which I admit is not irreparable—a disaster which I trust will be speedily repaired by the spirit and vigour of your councils, and by the gallant exertions of your armies; but when did you ever read in the history of England of such a wholesale slaughter as that which has befallen your forces, and which a private individual reports in every newspaper? Here is what that individual writes:—"My life has been saved in a most wonderful manner, and I am the only European who has escaped from the Cabul army. Two natives only have reached this place, making with myself three persons out of an army of 12,000!"

* Sale, after clearing the Khoord Cabul Pass, on the 12th of October, had fought on, for fifteen days, as far as Gundamuk, and had reached Jellalabad on the 12th of November, when Generals Elphinstone and Shelton, through their miserable indecision, were sacrificing the army in the Cabul cantonments.

bar Khan sent an army against him. By the 22nd of January the place was surrounded by a numerous but irregular army. The force varied, but at one time it consisted of about 8000 or 9000 men, including 2500 good cavalry. It was commanded for some time by Akbar Khan himself.* Fortunately Sale had provisions enough for three or four months, and his foraging parties were so well conducted, that they gathered grass for their horses and cattle in spite of the enemy, who neither knew how to blockade nor how to besiege a place. The courage of the garrison was further kept up by intelligence that a force under Colonel Wild was about to attempt marching to the relief of Jellalabad, and that General Pollock, with a fresh army from India, was crossing the Punjab. Wild could not get through the terrible Khyber Pass, either by force of arms or by force of money; but Pollock kept steadily advancing.† A long time must, however, elapse before Pollock could complete a march of 500 or 600 miles, and in the interim, Sale and his garrison must trust to their own resources—to their own artillery, muskets, and bayonets, and their own stout hearts. As the siege or blockade commenced, the old mud walls of Jellalabad were rent by a tremendous earthquake. All the parapets which Sale had built up with so much labour were shaken down, several of his bastions were injured, all his guard-houses were laid prostrate, a considerable breach was made in the rampart of a curtain in the Peshawer face, the Cabul gate of the town was reduced to a shapeless mass of ruins, and about one-third of the town itself was demolished. "By Allah and the Prophet," said the Afghans,

"this earthquake is sent to lay level the walls, in order that the great Akbar Khan and the true believers may enter into the city and slay the infidels!" Other shocks of the earthquake came in rapid succession. In the MS. Journal of an intelligent young officer, which is now before us, we see, for some time, two or three earthquakes noted nearly every day or night. Sale himself says, in one of his dispatches, that the city was kept in constant alarm, and that in little more than one month there were one hundred distinct shocks. Some of these were very violent. But good arrangements were adopted for securing the troops; and the injuries done to the walls and other parts of the works were speedily repaired. For many successive weeks all the men slept in their clothes and accoutrements, with their weapons by their sides, as the enemy were expected to make night attacks, and as it seemed not improbable that some awful earthquake would really lay level the defences, and either realize the expectations of the Mohammedan fanatics or swallow up the whole garrison. The Afghans, however, never had sufficient confidence to attempt a real assault on the crazy old place, and Sale frequently sent out small detachments which marched through and through the stupid ill-connected Afghan lines.

Nott still held out in Candahar, and was ready, on receiving some supplies and reinforcements, to co-operate with Pollock and Sale in an advance upon Cabul.*

* MS. Journal of a young Officer of the Bengal Establishment.


† All the hopes of our people at Jellalabad were fixed upon General Pollock; and every one there seems to have believed that he would retrieve the disgraces he had suffered.

"The address of General Pollock to his troops," says one who was with Sale, and who was at the moment looking with eager eyes for the relief, "has excited the praise and admiration of every one who has read it. Here we all hope to see better days and better doings than we have witnessed under our former commanding officers."

—MS. Journal of a young Officer. The date of the entry is the 14th of April.

* "It is on record," says Nott, "that I informed the Indian government that I could hold the country (Candahar and Lower Afghanistan) for any time; it is on record that I informed Lord Auckland, as far back as December, 1841, that I could, with permission, re-occupy Cabul with the force under my command; there was nothing to prevent it but the *unaccountable panic which prevailed at the seat of government*."—Letter from General Nott to General J. R. Lumley, Adjutant-General of the army; dated Lucknow, 4th April, 1843.

The Indian government, however, continued to despond. In a letter from the governor-general in council to the secret committee at home, dated February the 19th, 1842 (nine days before the arrival of Lord Ellenborough at Calcutta), it is written:—"On the 31st of January we expressly informed Major-General Pollock that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that, after securing Sir R. Sale's



[Jellalabad.]

The brave men were all eager to retrieve the honour of our arms and to rescue the English ladies and all the other surviving prisoners from the hands of the barbarians. Sale had a wife and daughter in captivity: it may therefore be conceived with what feeling he heard that the Indian government he was bound to obey, intended to recall all our forces, to evacuate every part of Afghanistan, and to trust to negotiation and money for the liberation of the prisoners, leaving our disgrace unremedied, our prestige broken. It is now no secret that an order to this effect was issued by Lord Auckland, who had been dragged into the war by the vanity and presumption of other men, and who was now listening to the counsels of desponding and timid men.

brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabul, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assembling of all his force at or near Peshawar." This letter is signed—Auckland—W. W. Bird—W. Casement—H. T. Prinsep.

In the meantime the Whig government which had procured the appointment of his lordship had been displaced, and succeeded (on the 30th of August, 1841) by the second and now existing administration of Sir Robert Peel. Although far from being satisfied either with the policy or the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, Sir Robert Peel did not immediately recall the governor-general who had been nominated by his predecessors. It was, however, impossible that Lord Auckland should long retain his place: Lord Ellenborough, who had been president of the Board of Control, and who had strongly denounced the impolicy of the war, was appointed on the 23rd of October, 1841, to succeed him.*

* Lord Ellenborough, it will be remembered, had been president of the Board of Control during the Duke of Wellington's administration. On the first formation of Sir Robert Peel's second administration, his lordship was destined for the same functions, being gazetted on the 4th of September, 1841, as "Her Majesty's Commissioner for the affairs of India."—*Gazette*.

CHAPTER XIX.

ADMINISTRATION OF LORD ELLENBOROUGH.

HIS Lordship arrived in India on the 28th of February, 1842. His earliest attention was claimed by the state of affairs on the Indus, where the Ameers of Sind continued in a doubtful attitude, and by the state of affairs in Afghanistan, where our troops were remaining in a state of uncertainty as to their future operations, and where our captives were putting up earnest, but at times almost hopeless, prayers for their liberation—a liberation which even the women of the party seem to have thought was not to be obtained by negotiation and ransom, but by hard fighting. At first his lordship adopted the notion of his predecessor; and it is said that positive orders were more than once drawn up for withdrawing all our troops, and commencing a treaty with men whom no treaty could bind.* But the clear head and high

heart of the Duke of Wellington revolted at this line of policy, and the English people and, assuredly, the majority of the cabinet felt with the duke. The indignation of the country would have broken up the new ministry if Lord Ellenborough had followed the plan which he had been induced to entertain, momentarily and reluctantly, by the advice of others whose seat of sensibility was mostly in the purse.* In a happy moment his lordship in council pronounced the word "Forward;" and from that moment our prestige began to

received orders to retreat simultaneously with him.

"Such was the state of utter hopelessness in which our affairs were plunged when Lord Ellenborough received an answer to those communications which had made England mourn 'like Rachel weeping for her children, and as one that would not be comforted.' That word of command, at whose sound the eagles of the empire had quailed, came booming over the ocean, and echoed through the mountains of Afghanistan. The vigour and confidence of the troops were instantaneously renewed."—*Westminster Review*, No. LXXXI.

The writer of this able article, who appears to have had good sources of information, states that previously to the arrival of Wellington's word of command, there was one high-minded and thoroughly-informed adviser of the governor-general that urged energetic measures by every argument in his power, offering at the same time to provide both stores and carriages, and suggesting other arrangements which would have ensured success. We have good reasons for believing that this high-minded and accomplished individual was Mr. Robertson, formerly governor at Agra.

* It does not appear that any member of the new administration ever contemplated the recall beyond the Indus of Pollock, Sale, or Nott. At the close of the following session of parliament Sir Robert Peel, in reply to the attacks of Lord Palmerston, exclaimed:—"The noble lord says, 'Who contemplated the abandonment of Afghanistan?' I could tell the noble lord! Beware! I say, let the noble lord beware of indiscriminate reflections upon those now in office."

* Some new failures and disasters contributed to depress the spirits of his lordship and his council. Ghuznee was recaptured by the Afghans: the poor sepoys left there were all frost-bitten and rendered spiritless and unfit for service; provisions were not to be obtained; relief was despaired of; and on the 6th of March Colonel Palmer evacuated the place in pursuance of a capitulation with some of the Afghan chiefs. The diminished force had scarcely marched out of the citadel ere it was attacked by the savage fanatic Ghazees. On one spot an English officer, his wife, their servants, and thirty sepoys were massacred. Native women and children, and sepoys as helpless as they—their powder being all consumed—were butchered by the Ghazee knives, or were knocked down in heaps by discharges of artillery. Colonel Palmer was put to the torture; and then he and his nine surviving British officers were thrown into a small and filthy dungeon. Nearly at the same time, General England, who was taking stores and reinforcements to Candahar, came upon the enemy in an unexpected position, and met with a reverse; and this, though trifling in its consequences and easy to be repaired, contributed to renew the panic of the Indian government. General Pollock was ordered to be ready to retreat, and Nott

brighten, our disgraces to be remedied. We speak not of vengeance for the past: this was not, or never ought to have been, a war of retaliation and revenge; it was a war of retrieval, a war of liberation—it was a war for retrieving all that was highest and most valuable to us, our national character, the honour of our arms and the spell of our prestige, wanting which we should have had not one, but many wars to undertake in the East:—it was a war for releasing, in the only becoming manner, the sons and daughters of Britain from a foul Afghan imprisonment.

In the meanwhile Sale, in spite of doubt and uncertainty as to the orders he might receive, and in spite of many other discouraging circumstances, had continued to hold out manfully behind the shattered walls of Jellalabad. His sorties had continued to be frequent and successful. Through these sorties many of Akbar Khan's people were killed and wounded, while many more were so disheartened that they quitted the camp, and turned their faces towards their own homes. On the morning of the 7th of April Sale defeated Akbar Khan in the open field, with only a part of the troops that chief boasted he had been blockading. The defeat was signal: two Afghan standards, four guns which had been lost by our Cabul army, and nearly all Akbar's ordnance, stores, tents, &c., were taken. Next to Sale himself, the heroes of this day were Lieutenant-Colonel Dennie, Colonel Monteith, Captains Broadfoot, Fenwick, Pattison, Oldfield, and Havelock, and Lieutenant Mayne. Unhappily the gallant Dennie was killed. But notwithstanding this victory, the situation of the brigade was still very precarious, for the provisions were almost all consumed. At last, on Friday, the 15th of April, Sale received the joyful intelligence that Pollock's camp was at Ali Boghan, only eight miles from Jellalabad, and that he would certainly be at Jellalabad in the course of the next morning. And accordingly, on Saturday morning, at about eight o'clock, General Pollock and his force arrived under a salute of seventeen guns.* On Sunday,

* "General Pollock," says our young officer, "is very much liked in camp, as being up to his

the day after this opportune arrival, there were three more distinct shocks of earthquake; but they did no harm, and passed almost unnoticed by our rejoicing soldiers. Pollock had soundly beaten the Afghans in the Khyber Pass and above it; and before he reached Jellalabad the beleaguering army had dissolved, or was in rapid flight, although, only a few days before, the Afghans, to deceive and distress some of their English captives, had been waving their hands, and shouting "Shabash! (Bravo!) All is over. The Feringee army has been cut up in the Khyber Pass, and all their guns taken by Sultan Jan!"

As soon as it was known that General Pollock intended to advance and not to retreat, the people of Cabul began to desert the city in great numbers, from dread of our army, and all efforts to induce the people to meet and oppose Pollock on his march were found to be fruitless. Many of the khans either struck away for their own mountains, or agreed that some one or two of the English prisoners should be released in order to open friendly negotiations with the victorious general. Just at this crisis Major-General Elphinstone breathed his last,—“a happy release for him,” says a fellow-prisoner, “from suffering of mind and body. Deeply he felt his humiliation, and bitterly regretted the day when he resigned the home-born pleasures of his native land, to hazard the high reputation of a proud name in a climate and station for which he was constitutionally unfit. . . . It is due no less to the memory of the dead than to the large circle of living friends and relatives who will mourn his loss, that I should record how, to the very last moment of his being, he exhibited a measure of Christian benevolence, patience, and high-souled fortitude, which gained him the affectionate regard and admiring esteem of all who witnessed his prolonged sufferings and his dying struggles, and who regarded him as the victim less of his own faults than of the errors of others.”* The sirdar

work, and not caring how the men dress, so long as they fight.”—*M.S. Journal.*

* Lieutenant Vincent Eyre, Journal of Imprisonment in Afghanistan, &c.

The monstrous mistake was in appointing an

agreed to send the general's body to Jellalabad for honourable interment; but a set of savages interrupted the escort near Jugdulluk, broke open the rude coffin which a Cabul carpenter had made, stripped the body of the general, pelted it with stones, and would have burned it but for the remonstrances of the sirdar's men, who threatened them with the vengeance of their master. The body was afterwards repacked and forwarded on its way to Jellalabad. By this time several of the Afghan chiefs were waging war upon one another in the neighbourhood of Cabul. It was difficult, even with the best management, to occupy the country—but happily there was no longer any intention of so doing—it was easy to regain possession of Cabul and to scatter the divided, distracted army of such an anarchic people. The sirdar now offered to release the English ladies and children unconditionally; but his dispatch was intercepted and destroyed by one of the khans. One security for the lives, at least, of these interesting prisoners was in the circumstance that the women and children of Akbar's own family and of some other chiefs were in our hands, and the barbarians thought that if they murdered their captives, we should retaliate by murdering ours. The Shah Sujah was treacherously assassinated by one Sujah Dowlah, "a handsome quiet-looking man," who now tried hard to persuade the English prisoners that the Shah

had played us false, and that he had committed a praiseworthy act in getting rid of him. The assassin's real motive was to avenge an attempt which had been made upon the life of Akbar by an agent of Shah Sujah; but many of these Afghan chiefs had become wonderfully anxious to prove that they had always been the friends of the English, and that it was the late Shah who made the insurrection and called upon all the mountain tribes to destroy our army on its retreat through the Passes.* Shah

* Strange as it may appear, it is positively asserted by various parties that Shah Sujah promoted, at least, the insurrection in the city, from feelings of personal enmity to Burnes.

"Captain Conolly had obtained convincing proof that Shah Sujah originated the rebellion with a view to get rid of Burnes, whom he detested, and of several chiefs, whom he hoped to see fall a sacrifice to our vengeance; *little anticipating the ruinous result to himself and to us.* Poor Burnes had made but few friends among the chiefs, who now never mention his name but in terms of the bitterest hatred and scorn. He seems to have kept too much aloof from them; thus they had no opportunity of appreciating his many valuable qualities, and saw in him only the traveller, who had come to spy the nakedness of the land, in order that he might betray it to his countrymen. The king considered him as a personal enemy, and dreaded his probable succession to the post of envoy on the departure of Sir W. MacNaghten."—*Eyre.*

At the same time several of the chiefs, and not a few of the people, who were attached to Dost Mohamed, could not forget that Burnes had been hospitably entertained by the Dost, whom he afterwards helped to pack off as a state prisoner for Hindustan. Had it only been for the varying parts which he had played at Cabul—now the friend and panegyrist of the Dost, and now the supporter of Shah Sujah—Burnes ought never to have been left in that city or in any part of Afghanistan. As matters went, he was always the most conspicuous and forward of all our functionaries; nearly everything was done through him, and while Sir William MacNaghten, the envoy, resided in the cantonment, he, the envoy's assistant, resided in the city, and was constantly reminding the people, by his presence, of his past history.

On the whole, we are much disposed to agree with Lord Ellenborough in the view he took of the Shah's conduct. In a dispatch addressed to General Sir Jasper Nicholls, his lordship in council says:—"The information received with respect to the conduct of the Shah Sujah during the late transactions is necessarily imperfect, and, moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is

officer so broken in health to such a command, in such a country; and Elphinstone's capital fault was in accepting the appointment. We have heard that his acceptance was doubtfully and reluctantly given, and that, before he left England, he expressed in a club, and in various other places, his wonder why the government should have selected him. It appears that he never had a day's health from his first arrival at Afghanistan, and that during all the Cabul cantonment affair he was suffering the agonies of cruel and complicated diseases. Such things have happened before, and will very probably happen again (unless our routine system of promotions be altered), but we hope and trust it will never happen again that a commanding officer shall be surrounded by so many imbecile inept men. Nothing short of the most positive evidence could have made us credit the fact, that such a number of British officers should have mustered among them so small an amount of energy and ability, and common attention to their routine duties.

Sujah's youngest son, Futtu Jung, was proclaimed king by one party, while the Barukzies formed another party and opposed him. From the close neighbourhood of Cabul, the civil or clan warfare was carried into the very heart of that city; and Futtu Jung, who hoped to retain the treasure, if not the throne of his father, the murdered Shah, was closely besieged in the Balla Hissar. On the 6th of June a mine was sprung under one of the towers of the Balla Hissar, but the storming party was driven back with loss. On the following day, however, Futtu Jung, finding his people disinclined to support him any longer, made terms with Akbar and the other chiefs, giving up a tower in the Balla Hissar to each of them, and retaining for himself possession of the royal residence. By this strange bargain the citadel was now divided between four rival tribes, the Dooranees, the Barukzies, the Ghilzies, and the Kuzilbashes, each being represented by its chiefs.

On the 2nd of June news was brought to Cabul that General Nott had gained a great victory under the walls of Candahar, and had killed 2000 of the Afghans. Nott also succeeded in seizing the person of Sufter Jung, a rebel son of Shah Sujah, who had fought against his own father, and had now been fighting against the English. The sirdar Akbar Khan now told the English prisoners at Cabul, that he intended shortly to march to Jellalabad, in order to pay his respects to General Pollock! But, from other quarters, the Englishmen heard that he meditated carrying them all off to the banks of the Oxus. This was the man who, after concluding the treaty with Mac Naghten, put on his boots and spurs on the morning of the departure of our army from Cabul, and told the assembled chiefs he was going to slay all the Feringee dogs: and this was the man who, on the passage of our troops through the Khoord Cabul Pass, followed with some chiefs in the rear, and in the same breath called to the Afghans in Persian (a language which many of our officers and people understood) to desist from firing, and in *Push-*

prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne."

too (a dialect of the country which none of our people understood) to continue firing at the infidel dogs. On the 29th of June there was a shock of an earthquake at Cabul, and Futtu Jung, the Dooranee chief, and youngest son of Shah Sujah, was proclaimed king by Akbar, who contented himself for the present with the title of Vizier. But it should appear that our Indian government had begun once more to lose heart and confidence, and to doubt whether the united forces should return at once to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or advance upon Cabul. As late as the 4th of July, Lord Ellenborough seemed to despond about the advance upon Cabul. Writing to General Nott from Allahabad, his lordship said that "failure in the attempt is certain and irretrievable ruin;" and that "the loss of another army, from whatever cause it might arise, might be fatal to our government in India." After his junction with Sale, Pollock halted more than four months at Jellalabad. During this long time the troops at Jellalabad were much afflicted by dysentery and other sicknesses, arising chiefly from bad food, improper or inadequate clothing, and the want of tents.* A great many died; and all the surviving soldiers were impatient to quit the place and march forward for the Afghan capital. If this long delay was partly owing to the difficulty of procuring cattle and forwarding supplies and reinforcements, it is

* The young officer, whose MS. Journal we have repeatedly quoted, mentions several facts which we have not seen noticed elsewhere.

On the 18th of April, owing to the great scarcity of forage and of provisions, the horses both of the cavalry and artillery were put upon short allowance, and the men upon half rations! "I think," says our young friend, "it is very plain that we shall soon be obliged either to go on towards Cabul or to go back to Peshawar."

A good many of the men died of apoplexy; and some of cholera, and some of the small-pox. He attributes some of the sickness to the quantity of unripe grapes which the country people brought in, and which the English soldiers ate voraciously. The thermometer was at 110°.

At the end of May everybody seemed to think that Pollock was about to retreat to India, and that government would have enough to do to protect India, as all the people of the independent states were said to be eager to invade our territories.—MS. Journal.

pretty clear that it was partly owing to the indecision of government and to the want of proper energy and ability in the commissariat, and (*perhaps*) in some other branches of the service. At length—about the middle of July—General Pollock received instructions to advance on Cabul as quickly as possible. Pollock, however, could not, or at least did not, move until the 20th of August.* Akbar Khan declared, with an expression of savage determination in his countenance, that so surely as Pollock advanced he would take all his English prisoners into Toorkistan and make presents of them to the different chiefs of that wild country. On the 15th of August, General Nott, at the head of about 7000 men, had left Candahar for Ghuznee and Cabul—a distance of about 300 miles. Sultan Jan started to meet Nott before he should reach Ghuznee; he fancied he was going to a certain victory, but he sustained a complete defeat, and Ghuznee being retaken,† Nott continued his advance. General Pollock was equally successful, and both armies were satisfactorily proving that our soldiers, both native and European, only required proper commanders to be invincible. It was now expected that General Nott would reach Cabul early in September; and that Pollock would be only a few days after him.

On the 25th of August, Akbar kept his threat by hurrying off his prisoners towards Toorkistan. On the 3rd of Sep-

* “We marched from that horrid stifling hole Jellalabad on the 20th (August).”—*MS. Journal*.

“We left Jellalabad with the intention of advancing on Cabul; but, what with the inefficiency of our commissariat, I think we shall never get there; supplies of every description are very scarce. I think it a great deal more likely that we shall make a strong demonstration on the Passes, and cover the retreat of the Candahar force, which must now be very near Ghuznee, equipped in every respect better than General Pollock’s.”—*Id.*

† Making every allowance for the situation in which she was placed, we cannot but hope that the following passage in Lady Sale’s Journal dropped from her pen in the hurry of the moment, and without due reflection:—

“We hear that General Nott has arrived at Ghuznee, has blown up the new burj in the city, and has put to death nearly every man, woman, and child found there. We cannot be surprised at the men taking signal vengeance; but we fear the news is too good to be true.”

tember the unhappy party reached Bameean, every indignity having been heaped upon them by the way. There they were halted under a fort, until fresh orders should be received from the terrible Akbar. On the 11th the Khan who had charge of them, and who was “a man that would do anything for money,” signed an agreement with five English officers, who promised to give him 20,000 rupees, and to ensure him 1000 rupees per month. After this, the Khan hoisted the flag of defiance on the walls of the fort, telling the prisoners that they had no longer anything to fear—that they should not be carried into Toorkistan—that they should remain where they were until General Pollock sent a detachment to convey them back to Cabul in honour and safety. He had told the prisoners that he had received Akbar’s orders to hurry them on their journey, and to butcher all the sick and all those for whom there was no conveyance. Several neighbouring chiefs, knowing how matters were going at Cabul, and hoping to obtain some English money, came over to the fort and tendered their allegiance to Major Pottinger. Some two or three of them with much form and ceremony swore on the Koran to be faithful to Major Pottinger and his companions, who appointed a commissariat officer, and resolved, in case Akbar should send troops against them, to hold out till they should receive assistance, even though they should be reduced to eat the rats and mice, of which they had a grand stock in the old fort.* On the 15th a letter was received at the fort, stating that all Cabul had risen against Akbar the new Vizier; that Nott’s and Pollock’s forces were coming up rapidly; that Akbar had fled to the Toba mountains, and that other chiefs, who dreaded alike the vengeance of the English soldiers and the vengeance of the people of Cabul, had fled in various directions and with only a few followers. It was also reported that a light English force had been sent to their aid, and was making forced marches towards the fort. Upon this Major Pottinger, no longer a prisoner, but acting

* Lady Sale, *Journal*.

as a viceroy and making grants of land and assigning revenues to the hill chiefs, to keep them in good humour, determined to quit the old fort, and return with the whole party along the road leading to Cabul. The party, attended by a number of chiefs, set out from the fort on the 16th, hoping to meet their English friends on the road, and at the same time fearing that they might encounter some of Akbar's desperate and vindictive people. As they encamped for the first evening, they received a letter stating that Pollock's force, after fighting from mid-day to midnight, had eventually forced the Khoord Cabul Pass, and had charged the enemy as far as the hills on the north side of the city of Cabul; that Nott had attacked and pursued them in another direction; that the Kuzzilbashes and adherents of the late Shah Sujah had made themselves completely masters of the city; and that Akbar Khan, Sultan Jan, Achmed Khan, and the other hostile Khans, who had all been defeated, were nowhere to be heard of. This was pleasant news; but at the same time our returning prisoners were alarmed by the report that 2000 horse were following them up to recapture them and to carry them into the deserts beyond the Oxus. But their last fears were soon removed: at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th they were roused from their slumber by the arrival of a horseman with a letter from Sir Richmond Shakespear, who was coming with 600 mounted Kuzzilbashes to meet them. The party set off early, and at mid-day reached some deserted forts at the foot of a mountain pass. They were sitting under the walls of one of these forts, sheltering themselves from the sun, when, at three o'clock, Sir Richmond arrived; and was received, with *one* exception, with heartfelt pleasure.* "Our gallant countryman,"

* "That one, General Shelton, could not forget the honour due to his rank as the senior military man; and was much offended at Sir Richmond not having called on him first, and reported his arrival in due form. Even were this a military duty, Sir R. was perfectly exonerated in its omission; for the greater part of the ladies, and some gentlemen, had seated themselves where he must pass, anxious to offer their acknowledgments to him for his prompt assistance."—*Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan*, by Lady Sale.

says one of the party, and one of the best among them, "was greeted on our side with no boisterous cheers of triumph; for all seemed alike conscious that the utterance of such sounds would but inaptly express the deep feelings of gratitude that agitated our inmost hearts. Our joy was too great, too overwhelming for the tongue to utter. That we should have escaped unhurt, with so many delicate women, young children, and tender infants, through such numerous perils, fatigues, and privations, and, above all, from the hands of such merciless enemies as Akbar Khan and his Ghilzie confederates, seemed at first too much for the senses to realize; nor could even the most thoughtless among us fail to recognise and acknowledge, in all that had befallen us, the distinguishing grace and protecting providence of a forbearing and merciful God. We now for the first time learned that General Pollock had reached Cabul on the 15th, where one of his first acts had been to hasten the departure of the Kuzzilbashes to our aid, by a donation of 10,000 rupees."* But the party had still a long march and a diffi-

This is precisely the sort of behaviour we should have expected from Shelton, who did little enough in the cantonments, and who appears to have done absolutely nothing during the march and counter-march of the prisoners, but to have left everything to be done by Major Pottinger and one or two of the ladies of the party.

* Lieutenant Eyre, Journal.

"The army as it advanced had some sharp work, first at the memorable Jugdulluk Pass, and afterwards a little beyond Tezeen, where they were opposed by some 10,000 or 12,000 men headed by Akbar Khan. At the two places we had on our side about 250 killed and wounded: one officer, Captain Nugent, of the commissariat department, was killed at Jugdulluk, and four or five officers were wounded. Altogether our loss was not great, as out of the whole army they had not so many killed and wounded as we had on our march down from Cabul for Jellalabad in October last; and then we had only 2500 men, and they had now about 7000. At Tezeen the enemy got a taste of the swords of her majesty's 3rd dragoons, which let them know of what sort of stuff a regiment of European cavalry is composed. The army, after having beaten Akbar's force, continued their march without the slightest molestation, and arriving at Cabul on the evening of the 15th of September, they planted the British colours on the highest peak of the Balla Hisaar on the morning of the 16th. The town, I believe, was almost totally deserted."—*MS. Journal of a Young Officer*.

cult country between them and Cabul, and were not without their apprehensions that Akbar might make some desperate effort to recover his lost prey. Sir R. Shakespear forwarded an earnest request to General Pollock that more troops might instantly be sent out to their support, as the pass of Suffed Khak, through which they must march, was reported to be occupied by a band of marauders. At the same time it was determined that the party should move forward by forced marches, for which every facility was afforded by the Kuzzilbash chiefs, in supplying them with fresh horses. On the dawn of the 18th the march was resumed. On the 20th they met an English officer, who gave them the welcome intelligence that General Sale's brigade was only a few miles distant on the road to meet them. A little farther on they saw a body of her Majesty's 3rd dragoons, with a squadron of Bengal cavalry, quietly picketed in some fields.

"All doubt was now at an end; we were once more under the safeguard of British troops. General Sale was there in person; and his happiness at regaining his long-lost wife and daughter may be imagined; the gallant veteran's countenance was an index of his feelings, and apathetic indeed must have been the heart that failed to sympathize with his holy joy. The camp was still a few miles farther on, and we formed a procession of glad spirits as we moved along towards the pass of Suffed Khak, whose heights we could discern crowned with British bayonets. This we found to be a part of the brave 13th light infantry (Sale's own regiment), who, as the ladies successively ascended the hill, raised three hearty cheers to each of them: sounds never to be forgotten, producing a thrill of ecstasy through the whole frame. The mountain-guns, under Captain Backhouse, wound up the scene with a royal salute."* It was a glorious rescue—it was a scene worthy of an epic, but, alas! that the number of the rescued should be so small!† On the 21st the happy party

marched with Sale's brigade to Killa-Kazee, a village close to Cabul. At 2 P.M. on the same day they started for General Pollock's camp on the plain east of Cabul. Near the tomb of the Emperor Baber they passed General Nott's camp. Thence their road lay through the city. The streets were almost empty, and an unnatural silence prevailed. A striking contrast to the noise and bustle of former days! They passed the spot where Burnes's house had stood. That house was now a heap of rubbish, and its pretty garden a desolate waste. It was here that the unfortunate man used to look forward with enthusiasm to the rapid amelioration of the country through the agency of British enterprise and skill.* An unreal, fatal vision, and awfully dissipated! The party entered General Pollock's camp at sunset. Again the artillery uttered its boisterous notes of welcome, and old friends crowded around with their hearty congratulations. For the present their cup of joy was full.† But when the first rapture was over, rest and reflection, and the scenes which surrounded them, must have brought to their recollection the thousands that had perished, and the many friends whose bones lay bleaching on the mountain-tops or in the dreadful Passes.‡

Victory was now perched upon the

Nott's and Pollock's brilliant advance to Cabul, and by Sale's forward movement from that place, was only 122. Of this number 9 were ladies and 3 the wives of non-commissioned officers or privates; 22 were children; 34 were officers, and the rest, with the exception of two or three regimental clerks, were British non-commissioned officers or privates.

* Eyre.

† Id.

‡ Some of the first sad occupations of our troops were to collect the bones of their slaughtered countrymen, and give them interment. Our young officer, whose regiment did not proceed to Cabul, but was halted near Gundamuck, has several entries in his journal about these melancholy operations.

"August 29th. The general went out this morning with 200 cavalry and two regiments of infantry to look at a hill where the remainder of the brave 44th, and the last survivors belonging to the ill-fated Cabul army, were said to have met their untimely end at the hand of the cruel and treacherous Afghans. On arriving at the hill where they expected to find the bleached bones of our people, they saw only about 100 of the

* Eyre.

† Major-General Shelton, of her Majesty's 44th Foot, stands at the head of the list. The total number of all that were released and recovered by

British standard wherever it was raised. One of the most confident predictions of those who had pleaded for the continuance of the Company's commercial character and monopoly of the China trade, had been verified: from the moment that that trade had been thrown open, there had been nothing but dissension and confusion at Canton, and the quarrel had led to war and to the invasion of the Celestial Empire by a British fleet and army. The victories obtained in the rivers and on the plains of China were rapidly rumoured throughout India, and produced a salutary impression among the mountains of Afghanistan, as well as in other neighbouring countries. They warned all our enemies that our enterprise, our strength, and resources were undiminished. On the 21st of September, Lord Ellenborough, being then at Simla, in the Himalaya mountains, issued an encouraging proclamation, in which he stated that he had that very day received the reports of three victories: one, obtained on the 30th of August, by Major-General Nott, over 12,000 Afghans, 38 miles to the south-west of Ghuznee; one, on the 8th of September, by Major-General Pollock, over the troops of Mohamed Akbar Khan and the Ghilzie chiefs at Jugdulluk; and one, on the 16th of June, by the expedition on the coast of China, within the mouth of the river Yang-tse-Kiang. Before the news of these victories reached them, our old foes in Nepal and some of the Rajpoot

enemy's cavalry, who presently wheeled round and fled along the Cabul road.

"8th September, Thursday. I went out with Oldfield and some others to the hills where part of the 44th were said to have perished. We found from 60 to 70 skeletons, all headless. Only a very few of the skulls were left on the spot, the Afghans having carried most of them off as trophies. Those that I saw had chiefly light hair on them. These skulls were all broken in pieces. It was altogether a most horrible sight.

"18th September, Sunday. A large party of officers and some Europeans of the horse-artillery went out to the hill where the 44th made their last stand, and buried a great many of the skeletons there, to the number of 162; and there were about 50 or 60 more left unburied. Some officers who knew poor Hamilton say that they saw his body and skull, and recognised them by some particular marks he had.

"19th, Monday. A party again went out to the hill to bury the bones that were left yesterday. They buried about 60 skeletons."—*M.S. Journal.*

tribes in Central India were in a state of violent excitement; and even the Burmese looked anxiously towards China, and seemed more than half determined to try again the fortune of war by invading Arracan and the Tenasserim provinces. But as soon as it was known that the Chinese were flying before our troops, that the Afghans had been beaten in every encounter, and that Cabul had been re-captured, both Burmese and Nepaulese, together with every independent state in Hindustan, gave up their warlike projects and hastened to make the most amicable professions to our India government.

We had, however, had quite enough of Afghan connexions and interferences; there was no longer a man that could be deluded by a vision like that of Burnes; we had released our captives, retrieved the honour of our arms, and by a series of well-ordered and gloriously-fought battles reduced the Afghan pride; and therefore it was felt that we had little else to do than to evacuate a country which we ought never to have entered, and leave the Khans and clans to their own anarchy. On the 1st of October Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation from Simla, the spot where Lord Auckland had declared the war, stating that the disasters in Afghanistan having been avenged upon every scene of past misfortune, the British army would be withdrawn to the Sutledge. And on the 12th of October, after destroying the fortifications, the Grand Bazaar, two mosques, and other buildings, the British troops evacuated Cabul, and marched off in three divisions for Jellalabad, where they arrived in the course of the 22nd and the two following days.*

* It has been said that nearly the whole of the city, with the exception of the Balla Hissar and the friendly Kuzilbash quarter, was laid in ruins. But the following is General Pollock's account of the extent of the destruction:—

"Previously to my departure from Cabul, I destroyed with gunpowder the Grand Bazar of that city, called the Chahar Chuttah, built in the reign of Aurungzebe by the celebrated Ali Merdun Khan, and which may be considered to have been the most frequented part of Cabul, and known as the grand emporium of this part of Central Asia. The remains of our late envoy and minister had been exposed to public insult in this bazar, and my motive in effecting its de-

From Jellalabad they continued their long march to Ferozepoor, where, as Lord

struction has been to impress upon the Afghans, that their atrocious conduct towards a British functionary has not been suffered to pass with impunity. A mosque also, at one end of the bazar, and another near the cantonment, and designated the Feringee Mosque, to commemorate the events of last year, have likewise been destroyed."—*Dispatches*.

The Afghan tribes occasionally harassed the rears of our retiring columns, and made attempts upon the baggage. Some few valued lives were lost in repelling these attacks. Their fate was the more deplored as they fell when the business was ended, and when all the real fighting was over. Almost the last shot fired by the fugitive marauders, who never stopped to fight, killed Lieutenant Walter Terry, of the Bombay artillery, a godson of Sir Walter Scott, and the son of that amiable man and prime favourite of our great novelist, the late Daniel Terry. There was not an officer in the whole Indian army more respected and generally beloved than this rising young man—the pride and hope of his mother, sisters, brother; and among all that fell in the foul Golgotha of Afghanistan, there was not one whose loss could be more deplored in his own home circle of family and friends.

"He had become well known to fame in India," says the valuable friend who attended him in his last moments, and read the prayers for the dead and shed tears over his grave, "from his gallant and adventurous journey, alone, in the disguise of a native doctor, to Candahar, which had excited universal praise and astonishment. We were drawn together by our mutual love for the pencil, and while I admired his talents and his rich fund of humour, I was still more attached to him through a kindness and consideration and delicacy, which, to a man of my profession, in a scene so unusual, was peculiarly valuable. When we went together on the campaign, I only shared the universal feeling in my admiration of his gallantry. A more gallant soldier certainly never fought his country's battles! . . . Amidst the sorrows of this severe affliction, you have, my dear madam, every consolation of which the case admits. If the patriotic sentiment be admitted that it is a happy and a noble thing for a man to die for his country, then your son's was a noble death, for he received his deathwound with his sword in his hand, gallantly rushing forward as the head of all in the path of glory."—MS. letter from the Rev. J. N. Allen, B.A., to Mr. Terry's afflicted mother.

Other particulars of the mournful event are before the world in Mr. Allen's 'Diary of a March through Afghanistan and Sindh,' London, 1843.


It appears that poor Terry, on account of his rare intelligence and intrepidity, had been selected for difficult rear-duty; that, seeing some of the savage Khyberites falling upon a few of our helpless stragglers, he rushed back to the rescue; and that the first, if not the only, shot the flying Afghans fired, hit him in the breast and mortally wounded him. This was on Sunday, the 6th of November. He lingered until the morning of

Ellenborough expressed it, they were "within our native boundaries." The governor-general was at Ferozepoor to receive and welcome them. Sale and his brigade met with the most flattering reception. They reached the right bank of the Sutledge, opposite Ferozepoor, on Saturday the 17th of December: they crossed the river by a bridge of boats which was trimmed with flags, bright-coloured cloths, and the colours of the ribbon of the Jellalabad medal, which had been liberally distributed among them. At the end of the bridge of boats, on the left bank of the river, stood the governor-general with all his staff, and a little beyond him were ladies and officers on elephants. The brigade then passed through a complete street of elephants, and came to an open space where all the troops at that station (about 12,000 men), and all in full dress, were drawn up in line, and presented arms as they passed. "It was a gay and gallant sight," says one of Sale's officers; "we were glad, and everybody seemed glad to see us back again!" Reviews, dinners, and balls ensued. In proposing the health of General Sale and the brave garrison of Jellalabad Lord Ellenborough said that it was they who had saved the name and fame of the British empire in India. At a grand review, on the 31st of December, 24,000 troops and 102 guns were mustered on this one spot.*

How, after his spirited and judicious conduct of this war, and its brilliant termination, Lord Ellenborough should have been so soon induced to enter upon another war with a people equally or more barbarous than the Afghans, and, though nearer neighbours, much less formidable, is a question not to be discussed until his lordship be heard in his own defence, and until many documents be

Wednesday the 9th, and then died like a Christian hero. They buried him on the evening of that same day at Koulshr near the camp, amidst a large assemblage of Queen's and Company's officers, "and the eyes of many were dim with tears at his grave, who had little need to fear the charge of weakness or unmanliness." The universal feeling there was that the service had lost one of its most gallant, zealous, and accomplished officers.

* MS. Journal of a young Officer.



The Ameers of Sindh.

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laid before the public. And even then, the discussion will more properly belong to political pamphlets and reviews than to an historical sketch like the present. Neither the war in Afghanistan nor that in Sindé will be a proper subject for history until one generation, at least, shall have passed away.

The Ameers of Sindé had behaved in a treacherous manner while our troops were engaged, and suffering their unspeakable disasters, in Afghanistan; and it might be deemed proper to curb their insolence, chastise their treachery, and make them feel and remember that the power of England had only slumbered for a while, and that its wrath was not to be braved by any power in the East. Moreover, Burnes's other dream about the navigation of the Indus, and the opening of a new highway to our commerce, may have had its influence; although that river, strictly speaking, is not navigable at all for ships or boats of any tonnage, and, if it were navigable, is not worth navigating for any purposes either of war or of trade. It flows, from Attock to the ocean, through a wild, sterile country, most thinly inhabited by a barbarous people. Above Attock there are rapids and whirlpools, which cannot, at any season of the year, be passed by any kind of boats or canoes. The line of commerce, as we have said, is *across* the Indus, and not up or down that river. Another imitative, pedantic notion,—borrowed from the French, who, apparently, will never cease talking of the Rhine as their natural limit,—had unluckily filled the heads of too many of our Anglo-Indians: this was, that the Indus was the natural or proper limit, on that side, of our Indian Empire. A river, running as the Indus does, may be a good line of demarcation, and a very clear line on a map; but a river is not a good defensive frontier. The Indus, with a wild country beyond it, and a broad, sandy desert between it and our own stations and cantonments, afforded a far better defence against invasion or incursion than what we shall find by including the unprofitable desert in our dominion and by advancing our frontier to the left bank of the river. Something

too may have been owing to the impetuosity of the general, who was sent with an army to bring the Ameers of Sindé to reason, and to negotiate a new treaty with them. The fierce Ameers, who knew little of treaties, except how to break them, and who had given such recent proofs that they were not to be bound by any such obligations, certainly believed at the first that Sir Charles Napier and his army were coming to conquer their country, and to attach it permanently to our empire.* They had suffered some pecuniary loss and they fancied they had suffered still more (besides a loss of honour) by the treaty into which they had been forced by Lord Auckland at the advice of Burnes. They had been obliged to renounce their transit duties on merchandise, and as yet they had seen nothing of that "hundred-fold benefit" which had been promised them in the treaty. Moreover only some of the chiefs had entered into this treaty; and all of them were excited by the apprehension that the English intended to dispossess them of their hunting-grounds which lie along the banks of the Indus, and which, besides being the source of their chief and almost only amusement, were far more profitable to them than any trade up and down the river was likely to be for many a year. Lieutenant Eastwick, assistant resident in Sindé, and one who appears to have been dazzled by Burnes's vision, said to Noor Mohamed, the most powerful of the Ameers, who complained that he saw no good to be derived by him and the other Ameers from the presence of a British army in Sindé:—"As to the benefits resulting from the introduction of a British force, they are clear and palpable: employment will be given to thousands, a vast influx of capital will encourage commerce and manufactures, and

* This impression was common to the Seika, and to all the peoples and tribes dwelling upon or beyond the Indus. As our army, on its return from Cabul, was passing through the Seik country, the people were constantly saying to our officers—"You call us your friends and allies: you tell us you want nothing from us but our friendship; you keep your own counsels; but we know very well that you intend to take our country and keep it!"—*M.S. Journal of a Young Officer.*

money will eventually find its way into the treasuries of your highnesses. The Indus, now so barren, will team with vessels, jungles will yield to the plough, and prosperity succeed to decay and depopulation." To these fine words Noor Mohamed replied:—"All this may be very true, but I do not understand how it concerns us. What benefit do we derive from these changes? On the contrary, we shall suffer injury; our hunting preserves will be destroyed, our enjoyments curtailed. You tell us that money will find its way into our treasury: it does not appear so; our contractors write to us that they are bankrupt, and have no means of fulfilling their contracts; goats, camels, are all absorbed by the English troops; trade is at a stand; pestilence has fallen on the land. You talk about the people: what are the people to us, poor or rich? What do we care, if they pay us our revenue? You tell me the country will flourish: it is quite good enough for us, and not so likely to tempt the cupidity of its neighbours. Hindustan was rich, and that is the reason it is under your subjection. No! give us our hunting preserves and our own enjoyments free from interference, and that is all we require."* This curious conversation took place in the Sindé Residency as far back as January, 1839, when our Indian diplomatists were endeavouring to conciliate the Ameers, in order to facilitate our operations in Afghanistan.

These chiefs were a brave and very vain set of men, almost as self-confident and presumptuous as the Burmese had been before the appearance of our army on the Irawaddi; and hence it was surmised that they would fly to arms rather than submit much longer even to the existing treaty.

"Delusion as to the circumstances under which we retired from Afghanistan," says Lord Ellenborough, "and ignorance of our real strength, which they never experienced, would have induced a brave and barbarous people of plunderers to avail themselves of the first occasion in which we might be involved in difficul-

ties, to endeavour to throw off engagements which they entered into with reluctance, and to compel our retirement from the Indus."*

It is said, too, that the Ameers could not restrain their own people, and much less the armed retainers of their neighbours; and it is pretty obvious that our India government preferred attacking and breaking their strength now, to waiting for a future collision when they might choose their own time and possibly take us by surprise. They signed a new treaty on the 14th of February, 1843, and broke it one day afterwards by attacking the residence of the British commissioners with a large force; but then, it is alleged, that though the treaty had been signed and everything conceded that we asked for, Sir Charles Napier continued to advance, being apparently resolved to conquer Hyderabad, their capital, in spite of the treaty. On the other hand, it is said that the Ameers were tempted by the smallness of Napier's force and the magnitude of their own to attack him; and that they never intended to abide by the concessions they had made. We can well believe the last of these two assertions, but in our view of the case the concessions, so far from being worth fighting for, were not worth asking for. On the 17th of February, three days after the signing of the treaty and two days after the foul attack on our commissioners, a severe battle was fought at a place about twenty miles from Hyderabad, where the Ameers brought every man into action that they could muster. The battle has been compared to the battle of Assaye, and Napier's conduct in it to that of the Duke of Wellington in the first of his great field-days, when victory alighted upon his crest never to desert it. The resistance of the enemy was of a most obstinate and determined character, and much, no doubt, was done by the general commanding. Our troops staggered more than once, and were rallied and led on by the brave fighting old Napier in person. In the end the victory was complete as victory could be. Our army marched on, and occupied Hyderabad on the 20th.

* Correspondence relative to Sindé, 1838-43. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1843.

* Correspondence relative to Sindé, 1838-43.

The result has been the annexation of the country to our vast possessions. In a few short sentences Lord Ellenborough appointed Sir Charles Napier governor of "the province of Sind," abolished slavery and all duties of transit in every part of Sind which now was or hereafter might be occupied by our army, and declared the navigation of the Indus free to all nations. It is said that, at present, an army of 16,000 men is required to keep the turbulent and *very unhealthy* country in order; and that this army costs us 1,000,000*l.* per annum, while our share of the revenue is not 250,000*l.*

Here, in order to avoid debatable ground, and for the motives which have been already stated, we conclude our narrative, which we have endeavoured to conduct throughout in a spirit of fairness and impartiality. We shall have done some good if we draw attention to a vast and most important subject, which has been too much neglected, notwithstanding the undeniable fact that every Englishman has an immediate interest in our Indian Empire. The generality of readers have been deterred by the bulk and number of the books written about India, by strange and constantly varying orthographies, and other affectations, and by the too frequently prolix, tedious style of our Anglo-Indian writers, who have made that "harsh and crabbed" which is not so intrinsically. But, as materials, these very books, or many of them, are truly excellent, having been written by men who were themselves

actors in the scenes and events they describe, or who passed their lives in a country which is scarcely to be understood without a long residence in it. To the excellence and authenticity of these materials is to be added the interest of a narrative or of a course of events full of the most startling, exciting, and romantic interest, and of the most varied character. One of the best interests of all, or that which arises out of our nationality, is assuredly not wanting: the way in which our empire in the East has been acquired, enlarged, and maintained—making allowance for every fault, blunder, or even crime—reflects the highest honour on the character, the steady perseverance, the policy, and the valour of Englishmen; and never, since the days of Clive down to those of Pollock and Napier, has a more brilliant valour been displayed in any part of the world by British troops than in our Indian Empire and the countries which border upon it. Let it never be forgotten that when our national greatness and our reputation seemed to be on the decline in Europe, and the glory of our arms was obscured in the West, that reputation and glory shone forth, through the genius of Warren Hastings and the ability and courage of the officers he employed, bright as the morning sun, in the East. And let it ever be remembered that India is the school which has produced some of our most eminent men, and which mainly helped to form the great Captain of the age, the illustrious Wellington.

CHAPTER XX.

CONTINUATION TO 1846,

AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE SIKH WAR.

THREE years have elapsed since the preceding chapter, with which we then concluded our narrative, was written. For the East these have been busy years. They have also afforded us more ample means of judging of the merits and advantages of the conquest of Sind, as well as the means of forming an opinion on other parts of Lord Ellenborough's energetic Indian policy; this policy, and his lordship's general conduct, being, in our apprehension, much improved by an attentive study of them. They come out the better from every light which has been thrown upon them. Writing while the events were so very recent, we spoke with hesitation on some matters; but we believe we committed no very serious error.

In part through want of room, and in part through want of information and proper materials, we were, in some measure, unjust towards that first-rate Indian officer, the late Major-General Sir William Nott. We gave him hearty praise, and we quoted passages to show the manner of man he was; but we did not praise him enough, or sufficiently show how much our second and glorious advance to Cabul depended upon his firmness and conduct. When other men were absolutely craven-hearted, Nott was full of courage and of hope. When the whole extent of our disasters at Cabul and in the passes became known to him at Candahar, he wrote to the governor-general, (Lord Auckland,) beseeching him not a moment to be disheartened, and cheerfully undertaking to march from Candahar to Cabul as soon as the roads were passable, and General England's outlying brigade could join him from Quetta.

During six months he reiterated his advice and his offers; in spite of repeated orders to retreat, he still maintained that there was no honour or even safety, in any course but the bold one. "He never," as he said himself, "*had contemplated falling back.*" In the early stages of our Afghan invasion, he had been disgusted at the arrogance, self-sufficiency, insolence, and—at times—cruelty, of the "young politicals," who were allowed to influence the movements of the army, to interfere in everything, and to insult and oppress the people. "If," said Nott, in one of his animated letters, "an officer is too stupid or too lazy to drill his company, he often turns sycophant, cringes to the heads of departments, and is often made a political—when he, of course, puts the government to an enormous expense, and disgraces the character of his country. *This has been the scene before my eyes many times since I left Hindustan.*" And he then proceeds to give an instance of ferocity in one of these pet-functionaries, which would startle our belief if it rested upon a less indisputable or perfect authority. "The day of retribution and deep revenge *will come*," added Nott. He saw, from the first, how the mad expedition would end. While others were singing lo Pœans, he declared that Shah Sujah's throne was not worth six months' purchase; that we had done nothing, or nothing well, and that discomfiture and annihilation awaited the ill-governed army up at Cabul. In August, 1841, he writes—"The conduct of the thousand-and-one 'politicals' has ruined our cause, and bared the throat of every European in the country to the sword and knife of the revengeful

Afghans and bloody Belooches; and, unless several regiments be quickly sent up, not a man will be left to tell the fate of his comrades."

But when this consummation—or the one so very like it—was over, Nott, never for one moment, would sink into womanly despondency and despair. "What are the people in Calcutta making such a foolish noise about?" said the veteran. "Stupid blunders caused disasters at Cabul. Is that a reason for the despair of a mighty empire? I do greatly wonder at such deep folly! I am ordered by government to withdraw the garrison from Khelat-i-Ghilzie. I suppose I shall be *abused by the press* for this, though it is not my act." At a later period he says—

"A dreadful panic had seized every man, and for six long months all I could do failed to make them act as Englishmen ought to do. I was sometimes obliged to be severe and harsh, and there are men who will not forget or forgive, and I have therefore been misrepresented and abused in the public press. If there is anything praiseworthy in having asserted the honour of dear old England in Afghanistan, and in making the British arms and character feared and respected throughout central Asia, the credit is mine, and mine alone; and history will do me justice. Had I not remained sternly determined, there would have been no advance on Ghuznee and Cabul, and we should have left Afghanistan in disgrace, been laughed at by the whole world, and all India would have been up in arms. I was obliged, more than once, to tell even my own officers, that I would save their honour and their lives in spite of themselves. Our sepoy always acted nobly, and I could have done anything with them; and at the very time that the press abused and calumniated these brave men, I would in perfect confidence have led 5000 sepoys against 20,000 Afghans. But when among our own countrymen all was panic and infatuation, from Lord Auckland down to the drum-boy, what could have been expected but disaster and disgrace? When I endeavoured to uphold the

honour of my country, and to save it from disgrace, I was told—mark this; it is on official record—I was told, 'Your conduct has been injudicious, and shows that you are unfit for any command.'"

But, very soon after his arrival in India, Lord Ellenborough learned to appreciate Nott, and his lordship was the first that ever did so. His long urged proposal for an advance was agreed to, and Nott put himself in motion, with the entire conviction that, "one thousand sepoys, *properly managed*, will always beat ten thousand Afghans." His was, indeed, an "ILLUSTRIOUS MARCH."

By quoting, in a foot note, in the preceding chapter, a strange passage from Lady Sale's Journal, we left, on some minds, an impression which it was never our intention to leave—that horrible massacres had been committed by General Nott's troops at the recapture of Ghuznee. On that place being re-entered by the British troops, there was not a single person in the city—no man, no woman, no child! The Afghans had all fled from it, after they had fought among themselves, and unroofed and destroyed the houses for the sake of the timber. Where there were people, Nott's army behaved with exemplary forbearance and humanity. Yet were these good soldiers scarcely back on the Indus ere the Indian newspapers began to fill their columns with horrible tales of their excesses and cruelties. Nott replied to these malignant libels with "words that burn." "I ordered the fortifications and citadel of Ghuznee to be destroyed," said he; "it had been the scene of treachery, mutilation, torture, starvation, and cruel murder, to our unresisting countrymen, (the brave little garrison of Colonel Palmer.) Look at the contrast! see the conduct of the noble British soldier on our return! And are calumny and gross falsehood to rob him of the honour? *They shall not*, while I have life

* Extracts from Sir W. Nott's Papers, as published in the "Quarterly Review," No. CLVI, October, 1846.

to defend his fame Am I to have my feelings outraged because a few people in India and in England have sent forth villainous falsehoods to the world? I will only further say, that never did an army march through a country with less marauding and less violence than that which I commanded."*

It was not to be expected that our remarks on the conduct of Sir Alexander Burnes would give satisfaction to his numerous relatives and friends settled in the different Presidencies, and exercising, wherever they are, a great influence over the Indian newspaper press. Yet of Burnes we said nothing harshly—nothing unfairly—nothing inconsiderately—nothing but what was justified by facts and sanctioned by the judgment of experienced men, who had lived long in the East, and had not wasted their time and their energy in writing newspaper articles, and in criticising the conduct, the system, and motives of those whom they were officially bound to obey. We had no prejudice against Sir Alexander Burnes, but we knew his vanity and self-sufficiency—the two rocks on which he split—and we had carefully perused his books and his varying reports on one and the same subject; and we could not but perceive that Lord Auckland was most unfortunate, if not imprudent, in trusting to so capricious a guide. We expressed our grief at the awful catastrophe in the City of Cabul, and suppressed, out of delicacy to other people's feelings, a good deal which we might have related of Burnes, upon excellent authority.

Towards Lord Ellenborough we were unwittingly guilty of some injustice. We attributed his decisive measures—his first determination to send Pollock, Sale, and Nott, back to Cabul, to the impulse given by the Duke of Wellington, and to orders sent from the Home Government; now, we are assured, upon the very best authority, that his lordship received orders from no one,

and that, at that critical moment, as all through his Indian administration, he acted upon his own judgment and responsibility.

The war in Sind, and the exploits of Sir Charles Napier, we were obliged to dismiss with the briefest notice. Without pretending to give a full account of those transactions, we will now say somewhat more about them. And, in the first place, we may say that the war in Sind was inevitable, and was especially rendered so by those who had rushed into the Afghan war. The calamities of Cabul and the mountain passes shook the reputation of British power throughout the neighbouring nations, disturbed all India, and induced the Ameers of Sind to form combinations against a government surrounded by enemies. They leagued themselves with the Sikh Chief of Moultan, and with other powerful leaders, and they impudently and insolently evaded the execution of positive treaties which they had entered into with us. This state of things was brought about under Lord Auckland's government; and when his lordship quitted India, he left it in confusion and dismay. We would not, in all matters, go along with the historian of the conquest of Sind; but we believe there is little exaggeration in the following striking passages of his history: "Lord Ellenborough arrived too late to prevent, but in time to remedy, the most dangerous evils menacing India from his predecessor's impolicy, which he denounced in a vigorous proclamation, designed as a warning to future governors. The beacon burned bright, but the flame spread too wide, and scorched many whose cries have never ceased, though few men, not personally interested, regard them. Previous to his coming, the ship was rocking in the shallows; but when his strong hand was felt, she reared to strike the sands, and, answering to the helm, was steered into deep water. Nevertheless, the very men whose political iniquity had brought India to the verge of ruin, are now, with incredible effrontery, imputing all their own crimes and absurdities to him, and most especially in what relates to Sind.

* Letter to Major-Gen. J. R. Lumley, Adjutant-General of the Army, dated Lucknow, April 4, 1843.

He found the finances embarrassed, the civil and political services infested with men greedy of gain, gorged with insolence, disdainng work, and *intimately connected with the infamous press of India*, which they supplied with official secrets, receiving in return shameful and shameless support; for, thus combining, they thought to control the governor-general, and turn the resources of the state to their own sordid profit. He found the military depressed in spirit, and deprived of their just allowances; the hard-working soldier oppressed, the idle vapourer encouraged; discipline attainted; and the military correspondents of the newspapers assuming, falsely it is to be hoped, the title of officers, constantly proclaiming sentiments cowardly and selfish, without any indication of honour or patriotism. . . . Lord Ellenborough, amidst these difficulties, steered the course becoming a brave man, conscious of danger and of his own resources to meet it.*

Our Indian empire was indisputably in danger, and it was the new governor-general's mission to put it in a situation of security; to rebuke the pride and insolence of the barbarians who had been victorious, and of the barbarians who hoped to be so. The obligation of security was a necessity paramount to all other considerations. As this was not to be obtained by treaty—as things had been allowed to come to that pass that our treaties were laughed at—there remained nothing but the ultima ratio, a stern recourse to arms.

"The Sindian war," says its historian, "was no isolated event. It was the tail of the Afghan storm." It was not entered upon precipitately. The governor-general sent a warning letter to the Ameers; and it was not until four months after sending the letter that he gave the following instructions to Sir Charles Napier:—"Should any Ameer, or Chief, with whom we have a treaty of alliance and friendship, have evinced hostile designs against us, during the late events, which may have induced them to doubt

the continuance of our power, it is the present intention of the governor-general to inflict upon the treachery of such ally and friend so signal a punishment as shall effectually deter others from similar conduct; but the governor-general would not proceed in this course without the most complete and convincing evidence of guilt in the person accused."

When all were found guilty, the punishment must reach all. The Ameers, faithless abroad, were tyrannical at home; they had no affection of the people to rely upon. Theirs was indeed "a government hated by its subjects, despotic, hostile alike to the interests of the English and of its own people; a government of low intrigue, and so constituted that it must in a few years have fallen to pieces by the vice of its construction."*

The required proofs of the treachery and hostility of the Ameers were soon obtained, yet by a most rigid process. The evidence which convinced Sir Charles Napier would have convinced any jury of sensible men—would have brought down sentence of *guilty*, not only in any court in Europe, but in any Oriental court. When war was imminent, Sir Charles, like an experienced soldier, applied himself to the organization and discipline of his troops, who were for the most part inexperienced. He drew them out frequently, and accustomed them to move in masses. He introduced several improvements. He exhorted them to a subordination of which too many of them had been allowed to lose sight, and he recommended a quiet and modest conduct towards the people of Sind. The quaintness of his humour amused and delighted the soldiery, and offended only the foppish part of the officers. Some silly young men having persisted in riding violently through the camp and the crowded bazaars, whereby accidents were rather frequently occasioned, Sir Charles issued the following amusing order:—"Gentlemen as well as beggars, if they

* The Conquest of Sind, &c., by Major-General W. F. P. Napier.

* Parliamentary Paper. Letter to Lord Ellenborough.

like, may ride to the devil when they get on horseback; but neither gentlemen nor beggars have a right to send other people to the devil, which will be the case if furious riding be allowed in the bazaar. The major-general has placed a detachment of horse at the disposal of Captain Pope, who will arrest offenders and punish them, as far as the regulations permit. And Captain Pope is not empowered to let any one escape punishment, because, when orders have been repeated and are not obeyed, it is time to enforce them: without obedience an army becomes a mob, and a cantonment a bear-garden; the enforcement of obedience is like physic, not agreeable, but necessary."

Meanwhile the agitation of the country increased, and the boastful Ameers were heard to say, "We have eaten and drunk well for many years, and we have enjoyed our ameerces; if it is the intention of the English to fight with us, without a doubt they shall find us ready for them."* One sanguinary monster among them advised that in case of the British advancing, the throats of all their wives and children should be cut.

The fighting veteran was in no hurry to begin: he hurried nothing. "Nothing," he wrote to the governor-general, "is lost by delay. We cannot be too cautious in securing firm moral ground on which to rest the defence of whatever events may arise. The Ameers grow weaker, delay exhausts their treasury, and then they cheat their soldiers, who, of course, leave them. This is also the season of fever on the banks of the Indus. Were hostilities to commence now, I should lose many men, and have a large hospital."

He was most careful of the health of his people, feeling that that was one of the most important duties of every commander-in-chief. "To move on Hyderabad," he continued, "I must go by the river or by the desert. To supply the sick by the last would be difficult, if not impossible. To go by the river would augment the hospital. The Indus is falling, and when it is at the lowest the

fevers will cease. Meanwhile I have a sickly camp, and I should have regretted if the Ameers had called me out before: *now they are welcome.*" He was too wise to trust to so uncertain and interrupted a navigation as that of the Indus—he saw that the line of war, like that of commerce, was rather across the river, than up it or down it. "If I am forced to take the field," said he, "I will cross the Indus, and march upon Hyderabad by land; for there are objections to dropping down the river. The water is low; boats go with difficulty when lightly laden; I cannot float more than a thousand men with guns and stores, and the vessels would even then be over laden and ground perhaps for days on the mud within reach of matchlocks. Nothing can be gained by rapidity. The enemy has no position to fortify, no works to strengthen, no stronger place to retire upon; three or thirteen days' movement will therefore be the same: but by land we go compact, to beat or be beaten all together; whereas crowded in boats straggling for miles along the river, and half of them grounded in the shallows under matchlock fire, would lead to disaster. Slow and sure is an adage suited to my position." But when a forward movement became immediately necessary, Sir Charles made it with the rapidity of lightning. The aged and often wounded soldier moved with all the alacrity of youth.

In February, 1843, he wrote to Major Outram, who was still negotiating—"This delay will not do. The governor-general's orders to disperse the armed bands belonging to the Ameers of Upper Sind are positive. I have now no time to lose; my own troops must soon disperse from the heat; I will not lose the cold weather. Say, then, to the Ameers of Qyrpoor thus—You were told in December, 1842, to disperse your armed bands, yet you have kept, and still keep them together. Disperse them instantly, or I will fall on them. To the Ameers of Hyderabad say thus—If you permit the bands of Upper Sind to assemble in your territory I will treat you also as enemies. And if you let them go to your fortress of

* Parliamentary Papers relative to Sind.

Omercote in the desert, I will first assault Hyderabad, and then Omercote. You may receive your relations of Upper Sinde as guests, but not as enemies of the British." The Ameers continued to bluster, and store Omercote with grain. At the same time the villages in the vicinity of the British camp were filled with armed men, who threatened and insulted our officers; hundreds of Belooch warriors were daily passing round the left flank of our army by the edge of the desert towards Hyderabad; and 30,000 armed men, who were said by the Ameers of Hyderabad to have been dispersed, were actually collected and occupying a position of battle at Meeanee, which they were entrenching in the expectation of being joined in eight days by 25,000 more warriors. These men were proud, fierce, haughty, courageous, resolute to fight a pitched battle, and trusting to their sharp swords and bold hearts for victory.*

The Indus was now crossed, and Sir Charles Napier threw himself between the northern and southern Ameers. The forces of the Hyderabad Ameers made a ferocious attack on the British residency outside their city. On striking away from the bank of the Indus, Sir Charles found that a great force of the enemy was gathering in his rear, while the rest kept their post at Meeanee, in his front. But he had read the Duke of Wellington's observations on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat before the Mahrattas, and he had drawn from it this conclusion—never to give way before barbarians. He said, "Let them be sixty or a hundred thousand, I will fight." He therefore rapidly advanced; and on the 17th of February, was fought the great battle of Meeanee. Our army was now reduced to 2,600 of all arms, including officers, fit for duty in the field. The enemy's positions were formidable: they had a natural ravine in their front; they had more than 30,000 infantry, with fifteen guns, and these were supported by 5000 cavalry. Their wings rested on large

woods or hunting grounds, which extended on each side of the plain in front for a considerable way, so as to flank the British lines on both sides when it should advance. These woods were very dense with jungle and trees. Yet Sir Charles Napier and his little force fell hardily upon the enemy by the front. The fighting was terrible, and as hard as fighting could be. The dead level of the plain was swept by the Belooch cannon and matchlocks; and when our troops got close up, when the ravine was crossed, our men had to ascend a high sloping bank. The following passage is equal to that in which the same eloquent writer has described the death-grip which took place on the heights of Albuera.

"The formation was still incomplete, when the voice of the general, shrill and clear, was heard along our line, commanding the charge. Then rose the British shout—the English guns were run forward into position—the infantry closed with a run, and rushed up the sloping bank. The Belooches, having their matchlocks laid ready in rest along the summit, waited until the assailants were within fifteen yards ere their volley was delivered; the rapid pace of the British, and the steepness of the slope deceived their aim, and the execution was not great; the next moment the 22nd were on the top of the bank, thinking to bear down all before them, but they staggered back in amazement at the forest of swords waving in their front. Thick as standing corn, and gorgeous as a field of flowers, stood the Belooches in their many-coloured garments and turbans; they filled the broad deep bed of the ravine, they clustered on both banks, and covered the plain beyond. Guarding their heads with their large dark shields, they shook their sharp swords, beaming in the sun, their shouts rolled like a peal of thunder, as with frantic gestures they rushed forward, and full against the front of the 22nd, dashed with demoniac strength and ferocity. But with shouts as loud, and shrieks as wild and fierce as theirs, and hearts as big, and arms as strong, the Irish soldiers met

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sinde, &c.

them with that queen of weapons, the musket, and sent their foremost masses rolling back in blood. Now the Belooches closed their dense masses, and again the shouts and the rolling fire of musquetry, and the dreadful rush of these swordsmen were heard and seen along the whole line; and such a fight ensued as has seldom been known or told of in the records of war. For ever these wild warriors came close up, sword and shield in advance, striving in all the fierceness of their valour to break into the opposing ranks; no fire of small arms, no push of bayonets, no sweeping discharges of grape from the guns, which were planted in one mass on the right, could drive the gallant fellows back; they gave their breasts to be shot, they leaped upon the guns by twenties at a time; their dead went down the steep slope by hundreds; but the gaps in their masses were continually filled up from the rear; the survivors of the front rank still pressed forward with unabated furor, and the bayonet and the sword clashed in full and frequent conflict.

"Thus they fought in this fearful struggle, never more than three yards apart, and often intermixed; and several times the different regiments, ay, even the Europeans, were violently forced backwards and pushed from the line, overborne and staggering under the might and passion of the barbarian swordsmen. But always their General was there to cheer and rally them. At his voice and intrepid demeanor their strength returned, and they recovered their ground, though nearly deprived of regimental leaders; for fast those leaders had gone down, dying as British officers should, and always will do, where they cannot win."*

Honour to the ancient and illustrious house of Napier, which in our own day can produce men that can thus fight, and that can write thus!

When nearly all the European officers had been killed or wounded, and when the sepoys, wanting leaders, had several

times slowly receded, a charge made on the enemy's right by our entire, but small, body of horse, under the command of Colonel Pattle, gave to Sir Charles all the glory of victory. They had kept their ground for more than three hours, but now the Belooches began to retreat in heavy masses, still keeping well together, with their broad shields slung over their backs, and their heads half turned towards their pursuers. "The victors followed closely, pouring in volley after volley until tired of slaughtering; yet those stern, implacable warriors preserved their habitual swinging stride, and would not quicken it to a run, though death was at their heels."*

Never had more personal courage been displayed by our officers and men. The greater part of the battle was a hand to hand fight. "The noble soldier Pennefather," as Sir Charles called him, fell on the top of the bank, to appearance, mortally wounded; and his place was instantly taken by Major Pool. Major Teesdale, animating his sepoy, rode violently over the ridge into the midst of the Belooches, and was instantly killed by shot and sabre. Major Jackson followed the heroic example of Teesdale, and met the same fate. Two brave havildars kept close to them, in advance of their regiment, and, like their leaders, they were killed after they had killed several of the fiercest of the enemy. Lieutenant M'Murdoch, of the General's staff, rode, like Teesdale and Jackson, into the very heart of a Belooch mass: his horse was killed under him, yet he rose instantly, and meeting Jehan Mohabad, one of the most warlike of the chiefs, slew him in the midst of his clan. Then, while engaged with several in front, one came behind and struck at him, but a serjeant of the 22nd killed this enemy so instantly, that his blow fell harmless. M'Murdoch turned, and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving the head of a Belooch, who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits.

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sind, &c.

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier.

Six European officers were killed, and fourteen wounded; sixty serjeants and privates were killed, and about 200 wounded. As the sepoy grenadiers had been but slightly engaged, this loss was nearly a sixth part of our fighting force. The loss of the Belooches was enormous: a careful computation gave it at 6000: a thousand bodies were heaped in the ravine alone. "Thus in four hours, 2000 men struck down six thousand! three to each man! At Salamanca, 100,000 men, with 130 pieces of artillery, were engaged for seven or eight hours, and the loss of the British scarcely exceeded 5000! Such and so terrible was the battle of Meeanee."*

On the following morning, at the break of day, Sir Charles Napier sent to tell the Ameers that he would immediately storm Hyderabad, if they did not surrender. Six of these sovereign princes presently entered his camp on horseback, and offered themselves as prisoners. They yielded their fortress, and laid their rich swords and other arms at the British general's feet. "Their misfortunes," said Sir Charles, "were of their own creation, but, as they were great, I gave them back their swords." The Ameers were cowards, but the conqueror, both in his public dispatches and in his private letters, gave full honour and praise to the brave Belooches. A few words must be said of the merits of the Ameers as rulers and sovereigns. They governed by the sword, and by no other law. The Belooches were their troops; the poor Sindians and Hindus their subjects and victims. Any Belooch might kill a Sindian or Hindu with impunity. There was no security of property to the industrious part of the community. Money was extracted from Hindu and other merchants by torture and mutilation, even as it was drawn from the poor Jews in England by King John. The Ameers also restricted commerce, and hated the presence of strangers, who might draw unfavourable comparisons between their rule and that of neigh-

bouring princes and powers. With a teeming soil, and a people willing to work, they had turned Sindé into the most wretched, poverty-stricken country in all Asia. In order to form their shikargahs, or hunting grounds, they had laid waste, in less than sixty years, a fourth part of the most fertile land of Sindé. The processes of William the Conqueror, in forming the New Forest in Hampshire, were gentle and diminutive, compared with their proceedings along the banks of the Indus. The only trade they really encouraged was that trade in human beings, which not only all Christendom, but also the present Sultan of the Turks, have reprobated; the Ameers dealt largely in the slave trade, and so did all their feudal chiefs, both as importers and exporters. Infanticide was systematized among them; the Ameers and Sirdars killed all their illegitimate children, and very commonly their *female* legitimate children, when they thought they had too many girls in their family. The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, whose opinion always carries the greatest weight, because he never hazards one without mature deliberation, and because his experience among the peoples and races of the East has been immense, had said long ago of these rulers, "They have all the vices of barbarians without their redeeming virtues."

No sincere grief can be felt at the subversion—however forcible and tragical—of a dominion like this. The expenses entailed on us by the occupancy of the country is another question. But, even here, it has been shown that if we had not conquered and annexed the country, we should have been obliged to keep, at an enormous expense, an army of observation and surveillance constantly on the frontier. By our occupancy, too, agriculture and commerce may rise from the abyss of depression in which they were kept, and, in the course of time, pour an abundant stream of revenue into the treasury of Hyderabad. As the dense woods are cleared away, or well opened to the breath of heaven, the climate will become salubrious. Care has been

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier, *Conquest of Sindé, &c.*

taken in selecting the sites for barracks and cantonments; and, according to the latest reports of our army-surgeons, the ratio of mortality and disease is already much diminished.

It took Sir Charles Napier another victory—that of Dubba, near Hyderabad, gained on the 24th of March, 1843—to annihilate the power of the Ameers. That over, he had nothing to do but to organize the country and clear it of the bands of robbers and murderers who infested it. But some of these bands, in the South of the Delta, were very numerous and very bold, and were not to be overtaken but by the most rapid movements, nor subdued and scattered without more hard fighting.

It is most frankly acknowledged by Sir Charles and his relative and historian, that no censure can attach to Lord Ellenborough for furnishing too few troops for this momentous conflict;—that Lord Ellenborough gave Sir Charles additional troops, offered him more, and extended his command to Cutch;—that the general refused the reinforcements, and did not even take with him to the field the Bengal Infantry when placed at his disposal, though he used them to occupy for a time the ceded districts;—that Lord Ellenborough did, nevertheless, send strong reinforcements to Sind, the moment he could furnish them, and that they arrived most opportunely;—that, therefore, the general alone is responsible for having so few men on the bloody field of Meeanee, and that the blame is his, if blame be merited.*

From the few words we have ventured of our own, and from those we have quoted, and will hereafter quote from others, it will be seen that we entertain no high respect for the Indian newspaper-press set up (unfortunately, as we consider) of late years, under the auspices of Lord William Bentinck and other Whigs, who never sufficiently reflected on the difference between England and India; who seem to have been

carried forward by that hunting after immediate popularity which has done so much mischief to the machine of government, and to have been laid upon the scent by the cry first loudly raised by that ingenious martyr to the liberty of the press in India, Mr. Silk Buckingham. A free press is a fine thing in its proper place—it may be the best and the most powerful of instruments among a united people who have morality enough to prevent its running into licentiousness, and general education and intellect enough to detect the true from the false, the declamatory and rhetorical from the real. But the best of things may become had in a wrong place. Who would have an unshackled newspaper press on board a fleet at sea, or on shore in a camp? and, say what we will, and do what we will, the English in Hindustan are, and will be, but as in a camp. It is a fact, notorious to all who are conversant with Indian affairs, that there has been a decline of discipline in the army, and of subordination in the civil service ever since the establishment of this newspaper press; that men have neglected their duty to find time for figuring in the columns of the journals; that our prestige among the natives (so many of whom now speak and read English with perfect ease) has been weakened; that Mahomedans and Hindoos have been brought to entertain something like a contempt of the supreme government, and to consider the British in India as a divided, distracted people, abounding in feuds, jealousies, and animosities, and involved in open quarrels which must eventually end in the entire subversion of our power. Surely these editors and scribblers ought to have looked around them, and to have seen that our empire there was but an empire of opinion; that we were numerically weak, and surrounded by countless millions who were only submissive and attached to our rule, from the conviction that it was the wisest, and, to themselves, the most beneficial that can be established. But stickit preachers of the Presbyterian Kirk, or ministers who have seceded, or been expelled from the kirk; broken

* Major-General W. F. P. Napier. *Conquest of Sind, &c.*

traders—men who have failed in every other pursuit and are desperate, are not likely when they take up the trade of newspaper editorship—with the thermometer at 105° in the shade—to be very cool, or circumspect, or moderate. Too many of these men have an inveterate hatred of all established institutions, of all systems of government and administration that are not of their own invention—of every man eminent in rank and station—of every man above them in society and in fortune. They ought to be sent to drive the democratic engine in the United States. They have thrown their papers open to the young, the inconsiderate, and the rash; they have courted contributions from inexperienced officers and civilians, who, covered by the incognito, have in too many cases revealed the secrets of their superiors, and, in still more cases, criticised and ridiculed the very orders they were bound to obey. Every young officer in India has a deal of leisure time on his hands; the excessive heat of the climate during a great part of the year prevents his killing his time in the sports and amusements to which young officers resort in England and in our cooler colonies; it is too hot for their even playing at billiards; and as the long hours must be got rid of, and as they are tempted by editorial flattery to scribble, they sit in their bungalows and write articles. And the effect of the climate on the brain, is but too visible in most of those precious productions. Youths fresh from Addiscombe, ignorant of the country, ignorant of the business of government or of the army, with everything to learn in their profession, have been known to figure as contributors to newspapers, and to have written, within three months after their arrival, the most bitter attacks on their commanding officers. These youths will never become good soldiers, and without good soldiers, and a perfect discipline in the army, and concord and due subordination in the civil service, India is not to be kept. In the same way, young men fresh from Haileybury, destined for the civil service, instead of studying their line of duty,

have thrown themselves into the angry, dirty field of newspaper controversy, making themselves critics of the conduct of their superiors. This was not the way in which the Barwells, the Barlows, the Twinings, the Prinseps, the Metcalfes, and all those excellent old civil-servants of the company trained themselves, on reaching India, and made themselves administrators and statesmen! These truths, we know, will not be palatable to those who are enamoured of the abstract idea of liberty of the press; but they are truths, nevertheless, and solemn ones. We are free to mention that precisely the same views as our own were entertained and expressed by the late excellent General Sir George Murray, who, as quarter-master-general to the Duke of Wellington, and a most experienced soldier, must be allowed to have understood something of the nature of an army and of the means by which discipline is strengthened or weakened. The most distinguished of our old East Indians were strongly opposed to the establishment of this newspaper press. No man in his senses who knows anything of that enlightened, high-minded statesman, will suspect Mountstuart Elphinstone of a want of liberality, or of a wish to curb the freedom of discussion; yet he objected to these Indian newspapers, as fraught with mischief. Sir John Malcolm did the same. Nearly every eminent man, who from boyhood to old age had spent his life in India, did the same. Yet now we have newspapers—Heaven knows how many, and how intemperate!—at Calcutta, Benares, Agra, Delhi, Madras, Bombay, &c. &c.; and if their progress be not checked, we shall soon have a journal issuing from every cantonment.

While the war was in progress in Sind, the *Bombay Times*, which had made itself the organ of a party among the civil servants of the company, who had long been in hostility with the military, continually published matter which might be considered as instigating the Belooches to prolong the struggle. Its articles teemed with abuse of Sir Charles Napier. For a time—we cannot say for a long time,

for he so rapidly solved the problem—they prognosticated nothing but defeat and ruin for him and his gallant little army. When victory—victory the most complete—was his, they spoke of the veteran general as a man that disgraced the name of Englishman, and the glorious age of Wellington. The Belooches could not read English, or perhaps any other language, but the Ameers had people about them who could read and translate; and on the field of battle, as well as in the towns of Sindé, copies of these un-English newspapers were found.

Incessant was the abuse lavished by these journals upon Lord Ellenborough, who had humbled the pride and reduced the emoluments of the aspiring civil servants, whose vanity and incapacity had contributed more than all other things to our recent misfortunes in Afghanistan; who had “put to flight the political agents and their assistants, who, numerous as locusts, had settled in the countries beyond the Indus.”*

“Wild was the uproar these reforms occasioned. All the rage of faction broke loose. No calumny that sordid falsehood could invent, or cowardly anger dictate, was spared; and when malice was at fault, folly stepped in with such charges as, that *the governor-general’s state harness was of red leather! He wore gold lace on his pantaloons!* But while such matters were dwelt upon, the incessant activity, the assiduity, the energy, the magnanimity of the man were overlooked. The moral courage and fortitude, which could, in the midst of disaster and abasement of public spirit, at once direct the armies to victory, and purify the administration, which could raise and confide in the military honour, opposing and defying the vituperation of the Indian press, re-echoed by the scarcely more scrupulous press of England; these great and generous qualities were overlooked or sneered at, as well as the complete success they procured for the country. But newspapers are not history, and Lord Ellenborough’s well-

earned reputation, as an able and victorious, and honest governor-general, will outlive faction and its falsehoods, and its malignant press.”*

When the Sikh Ameers, who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle of Meeanee, were conveyed to Bombay, which they reached on the 19th of April, they were received with the utmost kindness and attention consistent with their safe custody, by Sir George Arthur, the governor of that presidency. These “fallen princes” had been what we have represented; but they had been friends of all the political agents who preceded Sir Charles Napier, and the journalists and article-writers could let slip no opportunity of exciting hatred against the governor-general and the hero of Meeanee. Forthwith a flood of sham sympathy and tears was poured upon the Ameers. They were made as interesting as those robbers, the Rohillas, in the days when persecution and impeachment were levelled at the grey and now ever-honoured head of the great Warren Hastings. They were “illustrious victims,” “oppressed weeping sufferers,” “dignified in misfortune, domestic, and deeply attached to their relations.” And the strong arm which had struck them down was represented as the arm of a lawless ruffian. Lord Ellenborough, who came in for a large part of all this abuse, took, of course, a different view of the case from that of the *Bombay Times*. But so also did the Duke of Wellington, who had nothing to do with the Sindé War, and who was nauseously eulogized by these journalists and phrase-mongers.

Immediately after the Battle of Meeanee, the governor-general, in a proclamation, dated from the Palace of Agra, on the 5th March, 1843, announced that Sindé had become part of our eastern dominions; and on the 13th of March, he appointed Major-General Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., governor of the province he had conquered, directing in this second proclamation that all Acts of Parliament for the abo-

* Sir W. F. P. Napier.

* Sir W. F. P. Napier. Conquest of Sindé, &c.

lition of slavery, and for the suppression of the slave trade, should have full force and effect in every part of Sind; that the navigation of the Indus should be free to all nations, and that all duties of transit in every part of Sind should be immediately and totally abolished.

The Belooches, whose occupation was gone, kept sullenly aloof; but their sword was broken, and it was not apprehended that they could mend it very soon. The Sindian population everywhere expressed their satisfaction at the change of masters.

After Sir Charles' second great victory, the governor-general, being still at Agra, issued on the 11th of April another proclamation. "The major-general," said Lord Ellenborough, "directed his force with the same consummate ability which characterized his operations at Meeanee; and all the troops, worthy of being so commanded, executed their movements with a precision and steadiness which secured the victory to their impetuous valour. The army of Sind has twice beaten the bravest enemy in Asia, under circumstances which would equally have obtained for it the victory over the best troops of Europe. The governor-general regards with delight the new proofs which the army has given of its pre-eminent qualities in the field, and of its desire to mitigate the necessary calamities of war by mercy to the vanquished. The ordinary expression of thanks would ill convey the extent of the debt of gratitude which the governor-general feels to be due to his Excellency Major-General Sir Charles Napier, on the part of government, the army, and the people of Hindustan. To have punished the treachery of protected princes; to have liberated a nation from its oppressors; to have added a province, fertile as Egypt, to the British empire; and to have effected these great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in brilliancy, whereof a grateful army assigns the success to the ability and valour of its general; these are not ordinary achievements, nor can the ordinary language of praise convey their reward."

It was the Duke of Wellington who moved in the House of Lords the vote of thanks to Lord Ellenborough, and the officers and men who had finished with honour the Afghan war, which Lord Auckland had left in a dishonoured and seemingly hopeless condition. His grace, in his own concise manner, showed the state of the country shortly before the outbreak of the insurrection in Cabul, and detailed the unfortunate operations subsequent to that outbreak—the loss of the commissariat fort, the continued attacks on the cantonments, and the effects of harassing duty and insufficient food upon the spirits and health of the garrison. "It must always happen," said the great captain, "that soldiers badly fed become unhealthy, and lose their spirits and their energy.* The natural results of such a condition of the army was the breaking up of general subordination and obedience to orders. In fact, the discipline of the army was gone; the animals were famishing as well as the men; the

* We have shown in our preceding chapter how cruelly the troops suffered for want of food in their march from the Indus to Cabul. Some recently published letters of General Nott throw a fresh light on this subject. In a letter written at Candahar, in the month of March, 1842, Nott says that our advance in Cabul was as badly managed as it could be. "On that fine soldier, Sir Henry Fane, giving up the command, they omitted giving this beautiful force a competent commander. There was no arrangement, no foresight, a most woful want of military knowledge and information, a wild expenditure of the public money, and yet a reckless neglect and disregard of the comfort, and even the existence, of the troops. Well might the officers and men declare that the hand of Providence alone protected them. There was no forethought, no precaution, no military arrangement; and sure I am, that a talented soldier at the head of two thousand men, would have sent our troops back in disgrace, in spite of their unequalled bravery. But, fortunately, there was no opposition, no defence of this strong country, no union among its people; even their deadly hatred to Shah Soojah could not induce them to forget the quarrels among themselves. As to the political authorities, their weak and undecided conduct renders them unworthy of notice. If the government will employ their civil servants upon such occasions, they ought to precede or follow the army at a distance, but never be present or interfere in any way with its movements." See "Quarterly Review," No. CLVI., published in October, 1846.

soldiers were in almost a state of mutiny, and the followers of the army were in a condition of complete disorder. Never were men in a worse state than those men were in *before*, and for more than a month after, the attack upon Burnes' house." The duke highly commended the prompt decision of Lord Ellenborough, the wisdom of his instructions, and the gallant execution of them by General Nott and other officers. General Nott had succeeded in rescuing many British subjects from captivity and slavery. From the period, said his grace, at which the governor-general landed in India and gave his first orders, more was done to remedy the misfortunes which had taken place than the most sanguine minds could have anticipated.

It was a few nights before this debate that the Duke of Wellington, in defending Lord Ellenborough from the aspersions cast upon him about that truly insignificant affair, the restoration of the Gates of Somnaut, gave utterance to some other most important truths. "The difficulties in India," said he, "are greater now than they formerly were, because there is now what is called a 'free press,' but what I shall call a *licentious press*. With a British population in India of not more than 50,000 persons, including our 25,000 troops, how can the country be governed, if the people are to be excited, and stirred up against the government by this press?" In regard to the supposed mortal offence taken by some of the Indian army, on the matter of the gates, the Duke said, "He might be supposed to know pretty well the feeling of the Indian army; he knew its subordination and discipline to be such, that there was no feeling of distinction as concerns religion or caste, any more than in the British army. He did not mean to say that there might not be a Moslem feeling in India: such a feeling might be written up, and spoken up to any extent; and in that manner such mischief as the assailants of Lord Ellenborough anticipated, might be produced."

It was also the Duke of Wellington who warmly supported the vote of

thanks proposed by the Earl of Ripon to Sir Charles Napier and the army employed in Sind, a motion which had been generously seconded by the Earl of Auckland, the late unfortunate governor-general, who declared that more splendid victories had never been achieved in India—not even excepting Plassey and Assaye. The duke, a better judge of military operations, said he never knew an instance in which a general officer had shown, in a higher degree, all the qualifications which were necessary for enabling him to conduct great operations. One of Sir Charles Napier's marches was one of the most curious military feats which he had ever known to be performed, or had ever perused an account of, in his life. His grace was eloquent in praise of the general's second victory near Hyderabad. "He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up a reinforcement, and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations of war."

In the Commons Sir Robert Peel was equally warm and eloquent on the same vote. He said that the victories of Meeanee and Hyderabad were mainly to be ascribed to the example set by the personal intrepidity of the leader—that it was most fortunate that, at such a crisis, the command of the British army should be committed to one of three brothers, who had grafted on the stem of an ancient and honourable lineage, that personal nobility which is derived from unblemished private character, high honour, and repeated proofs of valour in the field. "Each of these three brothers learned the art of war under an illustrious commander, during the whole of those memorable campaigns in the Peninsula, of which one of them has been the elo-

quent historian. The exploits of those three brothers during the whole of those campaigns entitle them to the gratitude of their country. In almost every action of the Peninsular war they gave proofs of their military skill and valour. In the actions of Corunna, Busaco, Ciudad Rodrigo, and during the operations of the Pyrenees, they proved that there was no British officer more prodigal of his blood, in the cause of his country, than was each of those brothers. In the page which records a recent naval action, emulating, in the accomplishment of victory by most inadequate means, the glories of St. Vincent—a victory, by the moral effect of which a dynasty has been changed, we find that the name of the commander is ‘Napier.’ Even in a more circumscribed sphere of action, when last year it became important to vindicate the law before a misguided multitude, the man who at the head of six constables attacked hundreds of people, and made more prisoners than the numbers of his own men, also bore the name of ‘Napier.’ The motto on the family shield—‘Ready, aye ready’—was the characteristic of their conduct.”

When Sir Charles Napier was called upon to take the command of the British army in Sind, he was sixty-two years old; his body was shattered in the service of his country; he had never perfectly recovered from the five terrible wounds he had received at Corunna, and a most perilous bullet-shot at Busaco; but the spirit of the soldier was as brisk as ever in him, and this unwearied spirit, guided by military skill, had inspired unparalleled confidence in those whom he commanded.

“The actions which have been performed by members of the family of Napier,” continued Sir Robert Peel, “may appear to the pusillanimous to be foolhardy—to the superficial, the result of lucky accident; but, however desperate they may appear, they have been undertaken, and the difficulties surmounted, by a combination of skill, experience, and personal valour, that however desperate such actions may appear when undertaken by ordinary

minds, they are reconcilable with the coolest calculations of prudence when conducted by such men as Sir Charles Napier.”

Sir Robert plainly demonstrated that Sir Charles had not needlessly entered into hostile operations; and that for the moral courage with which he determined to act, in opposition to the advice of Major Outram, the political agent, who counselled him not to advance upon Hyderabad, he was pre-eminently entitled to praise. For the heroes who had fallen, no epitaph could be more honourable than the mention made of them in their general's dispatches.

Lord Howick, though opposing the vote of thanks, agreed with Sir Robert Peel, that had Sir Charles Napier followed the advice of Major Outram,* the most disastrous consequences must have ensued.

Commodore Charles Napier, one of this fighting family, told some amusing anecdotes to the House of Commons, in his own peculiar or sailor-like fashion. His cousin Charles had only 1700 bayonets at Meeanee. The nullah or ravine was forty feet wide and seventeen feet deep. His cousin, mounted on his horse Red Rover, was the second to ascend the steep bank—it was inconceivable how it could be done; the excitement in the men carried their very horses through—their exertions went even beyond hunting in Leicestershire! The Commodore preserved no measured terms with political and diplomatic agents. He repeated what Sir John Moore had said of them in Spain, when suffering from the awful blunders committed by our ambassador, the Right Hon. John Hookham Frere—“that they knew nothing, and did nothing but get the country into constant scrapes.”

The conquest of Sind did not terminate the warlike operations of Lord Ellenborough's most active and brilliant administration. The Mahrattas of

* This very gallant officer's apology or defence is before the public. See “The Conquest of Sind: a Commentary, by Lieut.-Col. Outram, C.B., Resident at Sattarah.” Parts I. and II. Edinburgh. 1846.

Gwalior had long been giving us great trouble, and had required a vigilant and expensive attention on the part of the Indian government. They had not been sufficiently beaten to be quiet; they were haunted with recollections of the once powerful Mahratta empire; and they made revolutions in defiance of our authority, and injurious to our interests. On the decease of the late Maharajah, Rao Scindia, the British government acknowledged as his successor the Maharajah Iyajee Rao Scindia, who was nearest in blood to the late Maharajah, and whose adoption by his highness's widow was approved by the chiefs. The widow was appointed regent during the minority of the new Maharajah, but she very wisely transferred the dignity to Mama Sahib, with the concurrence of the chiefs. The British government communicated to the Durbar of Gwalior its entire approval of this arrangement; and the British resident, in the presence of the assembled chiefs, explained to the regent that he was recognised as the responsible head of the state, and as such would receive the support of the British government. Yet after a short time, the regent, Mama Sahib, was violently compelled to quit the Gwalior state, in despite of the remonstrances of the British resident. Men inimical to our government, and to the tranquillity of India were thrust into office by the widow of the late Maharajah. Our resident was instructed to withdraw from Gwalior. The Dada Khan Walla, though opposed by many of the chiefs, virtually usurped the sovereign authority in the Gwalior state, which the British government was bound to maintain in the house of Scindia. The British government demanded that this Dada should be expelled, and delivered up to their charge, as a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the customary relations with Gwalior. After a long delay, the widow and her faction yielded this point; but, presently making a return to intrigue and cabal, the widow set up men who were still more turbulent. The country was rent to

pieces by insurrections, plots, widespread conspiracies, and assassinations. The British government could neither permit the existence of an unfriendly government in Gwalior, nor that those territories should be without a government capable of coercing its own subjects, and of maintaining everywhere the relations of good neighbourhood with the subjects of the British government and its allies. "The tender age and the helpless position of the present Maharajah rendered it impossible for him to address to the British government such formal requisitions for aid as circumstances would justify him in demanding, and compel him to demand, under the provisions of the treaty of Boorhampoor; but it would be inconsistent with the good faith, and injurious to the good name of the British government, were it to permit this inability to demand aid, which only gives the Maharajah new claims upon its protection, to deprive his highness of that friendly support in its utmost need which it was the intention of Maharajah Dowlat Rao Scindia to secure for ever, by that treaty, to himself, his heirs, and successors. The governor-general will, therefore, direct the immediate advance of forces amply sufficient to effect all the just purposes of the British government; to obtain guarantees for the future security of its own subjects on the common frontier of the two states; to protect the person of the Maharajah; to quell disturbances within his highness's territories; and to chastise all who shall remain in disobedience."^a

By the 25th of December, the British army had entered the country, not as an enemy, but as a friend to the Maharajah. The governor-general stated, by proclamation, that he had no object but that of restoring good government and tranquillity; and he warned the evil advisers of the perverse widow, that they would be held responsible for any resistance which might be offered to the measures deemed necessary for

^a Proclamation of Lord Ellenborough, dated the 18th of December, 1843.

the Maharajah's just authority, and for the security of his person and rights.* In another proclamation, issued two days after the preceding, the governor-general said that his object was to place upon firmer and permanent foundations that friendship between the two states which, for their mutual benefit, had existed so long, and which, not the British government, but the evil disposed advisers of the widow, had now interrupted; that the British army would regard and treat as friends all peaceful cultivators and traders; paying for all supplies brought to the camp, giving compensation for all injury unintentionally done to property, and injuring no one but such as acted hostilely; that so soon as a government capable of maintaining the Maharajah's authority, and willing as well as able to preserve tranquillity on the common frontier, should be established at Gwalior, the British forces would return to their own territory.

Lord Ellenborough had accompanied the troops, who were under the command of Sir Hugh Gough. These troops had moved from Agra early in December, and had crossed the Chumbul river on the 23rd of that month. At the same time, another division, under Major-General Grey, advanced upon Gwalior, from Baudelcund. On the 29th of December the main division crossed the Kohuree river. They found the Mahratta forces drawn up in front of the village of Maharajpooor, in a very strong position, which they had carefully intrenched. The British and native troops were about 14,000 strong, with forty pieces of artillery; the Mahrattas mustered 18,000 men, including 3,000 cavalry with 100 guns. The action commenced by the gallant advance of Major-General Littler's column upon the enemy in front. The Mahrattas received the shock without flinching, their guns doing severe execution as our attacking column advanced. But the British soldiers rushed

on. Her Majesty's 39th Foot, well supported by the 56th Native Infantry, soon drove the enemy from their guns, bayoneting the gunners at their posts. The Mahrattas rallied in the village; and here the most sanguinary conflict ensued: the Gwalior troops, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand with the most determined courage. But General Valiant's brigade took Maharajapoor in reverse; twenty-eight guns were captured at once, and after they had fought with frantic desperation, the Mahrattas being beaten at all points, and having lost their guns, and from 3,000 to 4,000 men in killed and wounded, broke away and fled. But the loss on our side was very severe: we had 106 killed, 684 wounded, and seven missing: seven officers were either killed on the field, or subsequently died of their wounds. Her Majesty's 40th regiment lost two successive commanding officers, Major Stopford and Captain Coddington, who fell at the very muzzles of the Mahratta guns.* The brave and able general bestowed warm praise upon Major-General Valiant, Brigadier Scott, Captain Grant, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, Major-General Littler, and Major Bray, and Major Dick, (these two last-named officers gave the decisive blow,) but all—officers and men, natives as well as Europeans—behaved admirably, feeling that they fought under the eye of a governor-general who could appreciate their services, and who had a large heart for rewarding them.†

* Sir Hugh Gough's Dispatch.

† Mounted on an elephant, his lordship watched the battle close at hand, and exposed himself frankly to cannon-ball and musket-bullet. As everything he did was censured, or indecently ridiculed, his conduct at Gwalior was made matter of censure and ridicule by the newspaper press. But it was not regarded in this light by our hard-fighting soldiers. Only the other day, a fine fellow, returned from India,—a private in that gallant and remarkably handsome regiment, the 16th Lancers,—said to us, in the streets of Canterbury, "Sir, it did our hearts good to see the governor-general on the field at Gwalior, and we fought all the better for it! He might have been hit as well as I was. For soldiers, there never was such a governor-general!"

* Lord Ellenborough's proclamation, dated Camp, Hingona, December 25, 1843.

On the same day another brilliant victory was obtained. On the 28th of December, when Major-General Grey and his column moved from Bundelcund, reached Punniar, about twelve miles from Gwalior, they found that a separate force was in that vicinity to stop their progress upon the capital. On the morrow morning from 10,000 to 12,000 Mahrattas showed themselves in a formidable position on some heights, near a fortified village. They were presently attacked, and driven from height to height by Major-General Grey's troops, who forgot the fatigues of their long march so soon as the fighting began.

The consequence of these two victories was the prompt submission of the Durbar to Lord Ellenborough's demands, and the unopposed entrance of the British into the capital. Colonel Stubbs was appointed governor of the Fort of Gwalior, which commands the city; the Mahratta troops were disbanded, and British troops—several regiments of infantry and two of cavalry—were to be maintained in the country at the cost of the Gwalior government. That government was also to pay forthwith the expenses of the campaign. On the 4th of January, 1844—so magically rapid were these operations—the governor-general, writing in the Gwalior residency, announced that this war was finished. He deeply lamented the severe loss in killed and wounded; but this loss had been sustained in a great and necessary service, and the victories of Maharajpoor and Punniar, while they shed new glory upon the British army, had restored the authority of the young prince, and had given new security to the British empire in India. In the same proclamation, Lord Ellenborough cordially congratulated the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, upon his able combinations, by which two victories had been obtained on the same day, and the two wings of the army, proceeding from different points, had been united under the walls of Gwalior.

These stormy events were followed by a perfect calm. The peace, internal and external, was favourable to the

finances of the country, which had, of course, suffered a severe drain ever since the commencement of the Afghan war. There was every prospect that the money difficulties would soon be over.

The feeling of the army towards Lord Ellenborough was one that fell little short of adoration; but the hatred and malice of the displaced "politicals" and of too many of the other classes of the civil service, were commensurate with it. The ministerial defence and support of the governor-general had been most triumphant in both houses of Parliament. He was, in a manner, the favourite of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel, the Premier; but the Court of Directors, taking umbrage and offence at some of his proceedings, and having, by their charter, the power so to do, recalled Lord Ellenborough from his eminent post towards the end of April, 1844, without asking the consent of her Majesty's ministers, and, apparently, without even consulting with them. This most unexpected event excited much interest, both in Parliament and in the country. On the 26th of April there was a debate upon the subject in the House of Lords. The Marquis of Normanby, who was ready with a criminatory motion respecting the war upon Gwalior, asked the President of the India Board whether it was true that the governor-general of India had been recalled. The Earl of Ripon replied that it was undoubtedly true that the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in the exercise of that power which the Act reserved to them, of removing any of their servants, had removed the governor-general from his situation. Lord Colchester then asked whether the act of the Court of Directors had met with the sanction and approbation of the government. The Earl of Ripon said, "In answer to that question I have only to say, that it *has not*!" The majority of the house cheered the last words. Lord Brougham observed, that there was one most important question which called for the attention of the legislature, and that was, that a perfectly anomalous and inconceivable law should be allowed to continue in force; that the Board of Control (part and parcel of

the government) should have the power of controlling every other act of the Court of Directors in their administration of Indian affairs; and yet that the most important of all acts—that upon which the safety of our Indian empire might depend—the continuance or the removal of the governor-general, should be left solely to the Court of Directors!

Yet so stood the charter! the bond was such! the recal stood as good. The displeasure of the Duke of Wellington, the discontentment of a great part of the public at home, and of the entire army in India, were moderated by the immediate appointment of the excellent Sir Henry Hardinge, the most fitting person to fill the high station so suddenly vacated.

At a farewell entertainment given to him by the military at Calcutta, Lord Ellenborough said, "The only regret I feel at leaving India is, that of being separated from the army. The most agreeable, the most interesting period of my life has been that which I have passed here in cantonments and in camps." These words have had a strained and a false meaning put upon them. The critics of his lordship's conduct, who were numerous, violent, unscrupulous, or very ignorant of the subject, interpreted them into a confession that his lordship was passionately fond of war, and cared nothing for civil affairs. The words, spoken at a festive meeting, simply meant that his lordship was well satisfied with the gallant army and the army with him, and that he recurred, with a natural and laudable pleasure, to the days when he had shared in their toils, and, to no inconsiderable extent, in their privations and dangers. He might be very careful of civil affairs, without entertaining any very warm affection for all the civil servants of the company, or for those "politicals" who had brought our empire to the verge of ruin under his predecessor, and who had on very many occasions embarrassed his own better policy. And, even personally, how had the majority of these men behaved towards the governor-general, from the moment of his arrival

in India, or, at the latest, from the moment in which he began to restrain their power and influence, and diminish their enormous emoluments? They banded themselves against him; they treated him with marked incivility and disrespect; they calumniated him as much in London as in Calcutta; they set nearly the whole of the press of India, and not a small portion of the newspaper press of England, upon him; they ridiculed him; they caricatured him; they resorted to every measure by which pride can be hurt, or self-respect irritated. Was it possible, then, for Lord Ellenborough to entertain any great affection for this branch of the service? And was it not fortunate that his lordship had a warm affection for the army, as the army had for him; that his lordship, at a terrible crisis, felt that the heart of a soldier swelled and bounded within him? Look back to the bones bleaching in the passes of Afghanistan—look to our captives on their way to slavery among the barbarians of Central Asia—look to the state of Sind, to the perilous state of all India, to our obscured prestige, to the want of heart, and notorious want of discipline among a great portion of our troops; and then let the foregoing question be answered.

For the present, we dismiss the subject with a few words, written by an excellent officer who served in India, and in the sense of which we entirely concur.

"We live in an age of faction; the time has not yet arrived when the acts of Lord Ellenborough's administration can be viewed calmly and dispassionately: but when the veil is withdrawn, which is now thrown over them by the prejudice or bitter animosity of party, they will elicit that universal admiration which their wisdom and beneficial results so justly merit; and Lord Ellenborough, the *regenerator of India*, will be classed among those distinguished men whose names are inseparably associated with the glory of our Eastern empire."*

* Captain J. Bladen Neill's Recollections of Four Years' Service in the East with H. M. 40th Regiment, &c. &c.

We would not have it understood that our severe censure of the "politicals," and of a portion of the civil servants of the company, is meant to apply to the whole of that very numerous and respectable class—the present civil service. A good many of the "politicals" were not civilians, but military men. A very great many of the civil servants behaved admirably through all these seasons of crisis, abstaining from criticism and controversy, and devoting themselves solely to their several duties. They still count among their ranks first-rate administrators and accomplished statesmen.

The chairman of the Court of Directors delivered a complimentary address to Sir Henry Hardinge upon his appointment. But in these compliments somewhat too much care was taken to impress upon the mind of the gallant soldier and experienced man of business the power and supremacy of the court in Leaden-hall-street. "It is unnecessary to assure you," said the chairman, "that you are in possession of their entire confidence, a confidence founded on the reputation you have established for yourself, *not only as a soldier, but as a statesman*. You are fully acquainted with the system which the wisdom of Parliament has devised and established for the administration of the vast territories which the East India Company has acquired for the British crown in India. To the Court of Directors, subject to the control of the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, is intrusted, as you are aware, the general administration of those territories. The orders which from time to time are transmitted to India, emanate from the Court, and, being confirmed by the Court are then issued, in the name of the Court, for the direction and guidance of the local authorities. You will perceive, therefore, that the maintenance of respect for the authority of the Court is demanded by the existing system of the Indian government; and we are persuaded that you will impress this feeling upon our servants abroad, not merely by precept, but by your example." Then followed an eulogium of the Company's civil servants. "You will not fail to recol-

lect," said the chairman, "that the members of the civil service are educated, not only with particular care, but with a special view to the important duties of civil administration, upon the upright and intelligent performance of which so much of the happiness of the people depends. I doubt not your experience will coincide with that of the great men who in former times have filled the office of governor-general, in enabling you justly to appreciate the eminent qualities of the civil servants in India." After a few sentences on the merits of the army and the native sepoys, the chairman said, "By our latest intelligence we are induced to hope that peace reigns throughout India. I need not say that it is our anxious desire that it should be preserved. You, sir, well know how great are the evils of war, and we feel confident that, whilst ever ready to maintain unimpaired the honour of our country and the supremacy of our arms, your policy will be essentially pacific. To the native states which still retain independence you will extend the shield of British protection. It has hitherto been considered a wise and just policy to uphold and support those states which are in alliance with us; and in dealing with those who are immediately dependent upon our government, we have, with a view to soothe the feelings and conciliate the attachment of both chiefs and people, permitted the former to retain the recognised emblems of authority, their titles, and other insignia of rank and station. Peace, apart from its other advantages, is desirable with a view to the prosperity of our finances and the development of the resources of the country. . . . I feel assured, therefore, that your early and anxious attention will be directed to the best means for averting financial embarrassment, and for placing the public finances on a sound and satisfactory footing. It has long been the desire of the Court to encourage education among the people of India, with a view of cultivating and enlarging their minds, of raising them in their own and our estimation, and of qualifying them for the more responsible offices under our government. It is, however, necessary, with reference to

the subject of education, to exercise great prudence and caution, in order to avoid even the appearance of an interference with their religious feelings and prejudices, and to *maintain on such points the strictest neutrality*. Finally, Sir Henry, I would earnestly recommend the whole body of the people of British India and its dependencies to your paternal care and protection. It has always been the earnest desire of the Court of Directors that the government of the East India Company should be eminently just, moderate, and conciliatory. The supremacy of our power must be maintained, when necessary, by the irresistible force of our arms; *but the empire of India cannot be upheld by the sword alone*. The attachment of the people, their confidence in our sense of justice, and in our desire to maintain the obligations of good faith, must ever be the essential elements of our strength. I beseech you, therefore, to keep these sacred principles habitually and permanently in view."

Little need be said of the services or of the character of a person so universally known and esteemed as Sir Henry Hardinge. Like Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sinde, he had fought heroically at Corunna: he was at Sir John Moore's side when that brave but ill-fated officer received his death wound. Dismounting, he raised Moore from the ground, and tried in vain to stop the effusion of blood with his sash, and with tears in his eyes he helped his beloved general to the rear. There was nowhere a better soldier or a truer man. He was received in India as he merited. He entered heart and soul into the pacific policy which had been recommended to him; and into every means of advancing the prosperity and enlightenment of the country. He at once recommended the construction of railroads in different parts of India, and showed that the valuable products of nature were in a great measure deprived of a profitable market by the want of cheap and expeditious means of transport. He paid all possible attention to the welfare of the natives, and to the important question of education. He promoted the new scheme

of government for the formation of barracks and regimental libraries for the benefit of non-commissioned officers and privates; and he most liberally contributed funds of his own to these and other objects connected with the too-long neglected education of the army. He put a new heart into the line by throwing more open the road to promotion. Non-commissioned officers who had distinguished themselves, and who had educated themselves, received commissions, and were treated by the governor-general and his staff as gentlemen—which they became on the moment they received her Majesty's commission. There was no petty parsimony; but where savings could be made, they were made. Gentle measures were adopted for reconciling her Majesty's officers with the officers of the Company, between whom there had almost always existed invidious distinctions and heart-burnings highly injurious to the service; and the same gentle measures were used for putting an end to the jealousy and rancour which had so mischievously existed between the military in general and the civil servants. Sir Henry Hardinge would have worn "Peace" as his badge and motto; yet had he been only a few months in the country when he found that he could no more be at peace than Lord Ellenborough had been. The web which we have woven over Hindustan is so extensive, and reaches into so many angles and corners, that it is a work of the greatest difficulty to watch and protect every part of it; yet no part can be touched without making the whole tremble in the breeze. The chances of hostilities are thus multitudinous. The chairman of the Court of Directors, in the act of recommending the most pacific policy, had told the governor-general that our dependents and allies must be protected; that the native states which still retained independence must be covered by the shield of British protection; that the supremacy of our power must be maintained by force of arms. Sir Henry Hardinge was therefore under the solemn obligation of girding on the sword whensoever it should become necessary. Shame, impeachment, utter ruin, would fall upon any governor-

general of India who failed so to do. But, in the present case the hostile attack was threatened and soon made, not upon an ally, a protected state, or an independent state, but upon the territory of the Company itself—not upon an angle or corner of the complicated, wide-spreading web, but upon its heart and centre.

Ever since the death of Runjeet Sing, the Lion of Lahore, the Sikhs, the country, and people, had been going through a succession of political convulsions and paroxysms. The reign of order and law had altogether ceased, as at Gwalior. Crimes, assassinations, wholesale massacres had been almost daily events in different parts of the Punjab. These convulsions could not but affect all the neighbouring countries; and, however disorganized, the Sikhs were excessively powerful in the possession of a numerous, well disciplined army, a tremendous artillery, excellent artillerymen, and skilful European officers.

The Lion of Lahore died on the 30th of June, 1839. His immediate successor was his eldest son, Khurruk Sing, who possessed none of his father's qualifications for rule. His first act was very unpopular; he removed the vizier or prime minister of his father—a man of experience and moderation—and raised a favourite of his own to that high appointment. The dismissed vizier lost his habitual moderation; he entered the Durbar, and slew the new prime minister before his master's eyes. The treasurer and some others shared the same fate. After these tragedies Khurruk Sing shut himself up among his women, rarely appearing in Durbar. His intellect, never strong, became impaired, and the management of public affairs fell into the hands of Nonehal Sing, who had always shown an antipathy to the British. After the mere semblance of a reign which lasted little more than twelve months, Khurruk Sing was reported to have died of a broken heart. Nonehal Sing, the favourite of the Sikhs, and the darling grandson of the old lion, Runjeet Sing, would have been called to the musnud—for he resembled the lion in features

and disposition; he was popular with the army, being brave, and having been a soldier from his boyhood; and he was believed, also, to possess the qualities of caution, discretion, and forethought—but, whether by accident or design we know not, Nonehal Sing, on returning from his father's funeral, was killed by a stone falling on his head from one of the gateways of Lahore. Dhyān Sing, Runjeet's vizier, and apparently, also his son or nephew, called up to Lahore Sheer Sing, who had been treated as a prince of the blood, although he had never been acknowledged by Runjeet Sing as his real son. Sheer Sing was to succeed to the musnud; and he, too, was extremely popular with the army. But the mother of the late Nonehal Sing was determined to frustrate the intention of the formidable vizier. And this woman, being aided by some of the most powerful sirdars in the Punjab, soon expelled Sheer Sing from Lahore. Then Dhyān Sing, the ex-vizier, to whom she refused employment, set himself to overthrow her government, persuading the sirdars and soldiers that it was shameful to submit to the rule of a female, and that they must have a man of energy and talent to govern them and keep together the conquests which the Lion of Lahore had made. Sheer Sing was presently recalled from his retirement. The Raneē, or mother of Nonehal Sing, ordered the gates of Lahore to be shut; but the gatekeepers joined the standard of Sheer Sing; and General Ventura, one of the skilful Italians who had disciplined the Punjab army, acknowledged him as king. The widow was left helpless and nearly deserted; and in 1841, Sheer Sing was seated on the throne of Lahore. He entrusted the management of affairs to Dhyān Sing, Runjeet's favourite vizier; and he gave himself up solely to hunting and drinking, and other pleasures and debaucheries. He became a complete drunkard. The vizier was speedily dissatisfied with the prince he had elevated to the musnud. Intriguers and plotters stepped in between the prince and the minister. In a fit of drunkenness, Sheer Sing, the

Maharajah, put his signature to an order for the execution of Dhyan Sing, the grand vizier; and the vizier, being duly warned of this proceeding, signed a death-warrant for the Maharajah. The sober man was quicker than the drunken one: Sheer Sing was shot in the heart by an English rifle, and had only time to exclaim, "What have you done, villain!" His head was separated from his body, and joyfully exhibited to the revolutionists. Pertaub Sing, the son of the murdered Maharajah, was despatched by another assassin while he was at his prayers. But the assassins could not agree with the vizier, Dhyan Sing, who had signed Sheer Sing's death-warrant, and so they shot him in the back, and he fell dead also. The report of the vizier's death quickly spread through the city of Lahore, and Mier Lal Sing, who afterwards made himself conspicuous in the war with the British, was despatched to bring into the fort Heera Sing, son of the murdered vizier. This young Rajah knew that the death of Sheer Sing had been determined on, but he little suspected that his own father would so soon share the same fate. He had purposely absented himself from the palace that morning, and had gone to the house of General Avitabili, another of the Italian officers who had formed the Punjaub army and artillery; and he was there found haranguing the troops, and telling them not to mind the death of Maharajah. Upon learning his father's death, Heera Sing ascended to the terrace or flat roof of Avitabili's house, and was for a short time very disconsolate, and very much terrified. He then dispatched a message to the several Sirdars who were in Lahore, requesting their immediate attendance. The chiefs soon arrived, when the young Rajah unbuckled his sword, laid it before them, and bared his neck. "The sword," said he, "has this day deprived my father of life. I am left alone and fatherless, and I now throw myself upon your protection. Kill me, or give me your support!" This appeal had the desired effect. Heera Sing next addressed the common soldiers, promis-

ing every man of them an advance of three rupees a month if they would obey him. The soldiers received the proposition with loud cheers. In the meantime, Adjeet Sing, whose followers had assassinated the Maharajah, and who had, with his own hand, shot the Vizier Dhyan Sing, had caused Dhuleep Sing to be proclaimed Maharajah by beat of drum, and himself vizier. But the son of the slain vizier put himself rapidly in motion; and both Ventura and Avitabili espoused his cause, and backed him with their well-served guns. During the night of this same bloody day, Heera Sing reached the Delhi gate, followed by the Sirdars and numerous troops. The gate, apparently, was blown open by the artillery, and then commenced a street fight in which heavy guns were used on both sides, and a great slaughter committed. But on the following morning victory declared for Heera Sing; Leena Sing, who had murdered at his prayers the son of the late Maharajah, was mortally wounded; Adjeet Sing, who had shot the late vizier, being driven out of the fort, was attempting to escape over a wall by means of a rope, when he was clutched by a soldier. He took off his golden bracelets and threw them at the man, imploring him to spare his life; but the soldier cut off his head and hurried with it, as with the most acceptable of presents, to Heera Sing. The sight of the ghastly head of his father's murderer only quickened the rage of the young Rajah. Every man that could not escape out of the fort and out of the city was butchered. The city was given up to plunder. The Ranee's house was ransacked. The merchants in the city and the helpless shop-keepers fled, leaving everything to the infuriated Sikhs, who committed all kinds of outrages, cutting off the noses of the poor women in the streets. Horrible cruelties were perpetrated upon the connexions and adherents of Adjeet Sing. Heera Sing set up no claim to the throne of Lahore; so soon as the fighting was over, he went and kissed the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing's feet, in token of submission; but,

Heera Sing became vizier or prime minister, as his murdered father had been before him.* This settlement was effected in 1843, while the British were in the field against Gwalior. It is confidently asserted that the Sikhs at this period intended to invade the British territories, and were only warned therefrom by a considerable force which Lord Ellenborough had kept on the watch at Loodiana and Feroz-poor, and by the signal overthrow of the Mahrattas on the fields of Maharajpoor and Punniar. Heera Sing, as grand vizier, found very great difficulty in keeping the soldiers steady to his interests, for the treasury was exhausted, and the troops expected a continuance of the guerdons which he had promised in his extreme peril. To keep matters quiet, he murdered his own uncle, a powerful Sirdar, and a favourite with the army. He was murdered himself shortly afterwards, together with his cunning Hindu Pundit.

The young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing was not much above four years old. He was chosen because there was no other lineal descendant of the great Runjeet left alive, if we except the children of Sheer Sing, whose eldest son, Pertaub Sing, had been murdered on the same morning as his father. On the death of Heera Sing, the mother of the young Maharajah appointed her brother Juwaheer Sing to the office of vizier. But the soldiers, not liking his rule, murdered Juwaheer before the eyes of the infant Maharajah and his mother! Ghoolab Sing refused to take upon himself the perilous office of vizier, which now seemed sure to lead to a bloody grave, except upon conditions which were not acceded to. The country, therefore, remained without a vizier, without a government! The "Punches" of the army became, in reality, the masters and mis-rulers of the Punjaub, and everything was decided by their passions, caprices, or supposed personal interests. These "Punches" were not

such pleasant humorists as our street drolls, or as the London Charivari Punch, or as the great Neapolitan Policinella, the prince, if not the father, of all Punches. They had no drollery in them; they were seldom seen to smile; and of late they had been as rarely seen without the red hand. They had been accustomed, under Runjeet Sing, to invasions and conquests, and to the profits derivable therefrom. They were elated by many years of success; they formed an immense force numerically; they possessed what seemed inexhaustible military stores; they knew themselves to be strong of arm and steady in battle; and they had confidence in the military skill and science of their French and Italian commanders. They wanted employment, and they fancied they could best seek it beyond the Sutledge, within the Company's territories. The Maharajah was in the nursery; his mother and guardian was helpless; and even the more prudent and pacific of the sirdars were whirled along by the war torrent, for the will of the soldiery, the dictation of the Punches, was not to be resisted without the risk of being murdered. An army was therefore ordered to assemble by the very individual—the widowed mother of the Maharajah—whose wishes were against the armament, and the sirdars were obliged to join it. The very cautious Ghoolab Sing, who had refused the post of vizier, and who was surrounded by a very strong and devoted party of his own, did, indeed, venture to demand the reason of the Sikhs breaking treaty with the British. He asked them what cause of offence the British had given them? To these questions no satisfactory reply could be given. Ghoolab Sing anticipated that the Sikhs must fail in their daring invasion; but instead of openly opposing their views, which would have drawn an attack upon himself, he promised his support, agreed to send up supplies to Lahore, and even promised to join the Khalsa troops. This conduct completely deceived the Sikhs, who, though unwilling to await his arrival, firmly believed that they might rely on his sup-

* History of the Sikhs, containing an account of the war between the Sikhs and the British in 1845-6, by W. L. Macgregor, M.D., Surgeon to the Hon. Company's 1st European Light Infantry.

port and presence. But even could Ghoolab Sing have believed that the Sikhs would be successful, it was evidently his interest to await the result of the struggle, knowing well, as he did, that, whatever result might follow, his position would be a safe one. "If, as he really thought, the Sikh army would be destroyed by their powerful opponent, then he could safely step in as a mediator between the British and the Sikhs, and while obtaining the credit of restoring peace, he would insure independence for himself. The Rajah had a difficult part to play, and the repeated demands of the Sikh army that he would join it, obliged him to leave Jummoo, and proceed to Lahore; but he had determined to keep clear of the struggle until the onset should show how he was to act.

"Had Ghoolab Sing succeeded Jawaheer Sing as prime minister, he would have used his best endeavours to prevent a collision between the Sikhs and the British; but he did not forget that a brother and nephew who had held that responsible post had both fallen victims to the sword, and a similar fate might befall him. From every consideration, therefore, the Rajah believed that a rupture with the British would most effectually accomplish his ambitious views; and he was resolved to act with great caution and avoid mixing himself up in the quarrel. Even when he reached Lahore, after the war had begun, and he was requested by the Ranees and the Panches of the army to join the latter, he availed himself of the excuse of wishing to act independently at the head of his own troops in any work she might assign to him."*

All that was passing at Lahore could not be unknown to Sir Henry Hardinge; but as his predecessor had been censured for precipitancy, the present governor-general was determined not to bring out his array until the last moment, or until the moment when there could be no possible mistake as to the intentions of the lawless soldiery, whose will was the only law in the country

beyond the Sutledge. The orders from the home authorities were so stringent not to interfere, unless aggression were first perpetrated by the Sikhs, that the Indian government was crippled. And it was further crippled by the short-sighted economy which had reduced our forces on the Panjaub frontier towards the Sutledge. That frontier was a very long one; and in a military sense, a winding river, or any river, is about the worst line for defence. Had Sir Henry Hardinge been left to himself, he might possibly have anticipated the movement of the Sikhs. He certainly would have had a greater force near the banks of the river; but in any case it would have been impossible to guard the whole of that lengthened and bad frontier. Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, did all that he could to prepare against the storm; his acts were under the control of the governor-general, so far as the organizing an army was concerned; but trusting to his own foresight and military experience, he gave early warning to the troops on the frontier, and to those at the important military station of Meerut, to be on the alert, and to hold themselves in readiness to move whithersoever their presence might be required.*

It must be borne in mind that the Sutledge was not strictly the boundary line between the Sikh country and British India. The Sikhs held territory on the inner or left bank of the river; but some portion of that territory was under our protection, and we possessed two advanced frontier posts—Loodiana and Ferozepoor.

On the 2nd of December, 1845, Sir Henry Hardinge arrived at Umballa. From this point we may take up his own words, as contained in a dispatch to the Secret Committee at the India House:—

"I had moved with my camp on the 6th of December from Umballa towards Loodiana, peaceably making my progress by the route I had announced, with the intention of visiting the Sikh protected states, according to

* Dr. McGregor's History of the Sikhs

* Dr. McGregor.

the usual custom of my predecessors. In common with the most experienced officers of the Indian government, I was not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutledge with its infantry and artillery. I considered it probable that some act of aggression would be committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling the British government to interfere, to which course the Sikh chiefs knew I was most averse; but I concurred with the commander-in-chief, and the chief secretary to the government, as well as my political agent, Major Broadfoot, that offensive operations, on a large scale, would not be resorted to. Exclusive of the political reasons which induced me to carry my forbearance as far as it was possible, I was confident, from the opinions given by the commander-in-chief and Major-General Sir John Littler, in command of the forces at Ferozepoor, that that post would resist any attack from the Sikh army as long as its provisions lasted; and that I could at any time relieve it, under the ordinary circumstances of an Asiatic army making an irruption into our territories, provided it had not the means of laying siege to the fort and the entrenched camp. Up to this period no act of aggression had been committed by the Sikh army. The Lahore government had as good a right to reinforce their bank of the river Sutledge, as we had to reinforce our posts on that river. The Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river from Lahore, and after remaining there encamped a few weeks, had returned to the capital. These reasons, and, above all, my extreme anxiety to avoid hostilities, induced me not to make any hasty movement with our army, which, when the two armies came into each other's presence, might bring about a collision. The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice; and on the 7th and 8th of December, when I heard from Lahore that preparations were making on a large scale for artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the commander-in-chief,

directing his excellency, on the 11th, to move up the force from Umballa, from Meerut, and some other stations in the rear. Up to this time no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutledge. Nevertheless, I considered it prudent no longer to delay the forward movement of our troops, having given to the Lahore government the most ample time for a reply to our remonstrance. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicolson, the assistant political agent at Ferozepoor, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the other hand, the information received by Major Broadfoot on that day from Lahore, was not of a character to make it probable that any Sikh movement on a large scale was meditated. On the 10th, no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicolson's report, and the usual opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutledge. The troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th, and 12th, in pursuance of the orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutledge were in full march on the 12th. I did not consider the force moving up from Umballa to be sufficient to force its way to relieve Ferozepoor, if a large Sikh army, with a numerous and well-served park of artillery, should attempt to intercept it in its approach to Ferozepoor, as, in such case, it could with difficulty receive any aid from that garrison. Being some days march in advance of the commander-in-chief, I rode over to Loodiana; and having inspected the fort, the cantonments, and the troops, it appeared to me most advisable that the whole of this force should be moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Loodiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the more infirm soldiers of the regiments at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency. The risk to be incurred of leaving the town and the cantonments liable to be plundered, was maturely considered,

and I had no hesitation in incurring that risk to insure the strength and sufficiency of the force which might separately be brought into action with the whole of the Sikh army. I therefore ordered Brigadier Wheeler to be prepared to march at the shortest notice. The Umballa force, in march, was 7500 men, and 36 guns; the Loodiana force amounted to 5000 men and 12 guns.

"The commander-in-chief concurred in these views; and this fine body of men, by a rapid march on Busseean, an important point, where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been laid in at Busseean. Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied; but by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river.

"On the 13th, I first received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutledge, and was concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river."

On that same day, the 13th, Sir Henry issued the following proclamation:—

"The British government has ever been on terms of friendship with that of the Punjaub.

"In the year 1809, a treaty of amity and concord was concluded between the British government and the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed by the British government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the late Maharajah.

"The same friendly relations have been maintained with the successors of Maharajah Runjeet Sing by the British government up to the present time.

"Since the death of the late Maharajah Sheer Sing, the disorganized state of the Lahore government has made it incumbent on the governor-general, in council, to adopt precautionary measures for the protection of the British frontier; the nature of these

measures, and the cause of their adoption, were at the time fully explained to the Lahore durbar.

"Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore government during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on the part of the durbar, the governor-general, in council, has continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord which had so long existed between the two States, for the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown on every occasion the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless state of the infant Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, whom the British government had recognised as the successor to the late Maharajah Shere Sing.

"The governor-general, in council, sincerely desired to see a strong Sikh government re-established in the Punjaub, able to control its army and to protect its subjects. He had not, up to the present moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected by the patriotic efforts of the Sikhs and people of that country.

"The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British frontier, as it was alleged by the orders of the durbar, for the purpose of invading the British territory.

"The governor-general's agent, by direction of the governor-general, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was repeated. The governor-general, unwilling to believe in the hostile intentions of the Sikh government, to which no provocation had been given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a tendency to embarrass the government of the Maharajah, or to induce collision between the two states.

"When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation, and while active military preparations were continued at Lahore, the governor-general considered it necessary to order the advance of troops towards the frontier, to reinforce the frontier posts.

"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

"The governor-general must, therefore, take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of public peace.

"The governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, on the left, or British banks of the Sutledge, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.

"The governor-general will respect the existing rights of all jagheerdars, zeminders, and tenants in the said possessions, who, by the course they now pursue, evince their fidelity to the British government.

"The governor-general hereby calls upon all the chiefs and sirdars in the protected territories to co-operate cordially with the British government for the punishment of the common enemy, and for the maintenance of order in these states. Those of the chiefs who show alacrity and fidelity in the discharge of this duty, which they owe to the protecting power, will find their interests promoted thereby; and those who take a contrary course will be treated as enemies to the British government, and will be punished accordingly.

"The inhabitants of all the territories on the left bank of the Sutledge are hereby directed to abide peaceably in their respective villages, where they will receive efficient protection by the British government. All parties of men found in armed bands, who can give no satisfactory account of their proceedings, will be treated as disturbers of the public peace.

"All subjects of the British government, and those who possess estates on both sides of the river Sutledge, who, by their faithful adherence to the British government may be liable to sustain loss, shall be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges.

"On the other hand, all subjects of the British government who shall con-

tinue in the service of the Lahore State, and who disobey this proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, will be liable to have their property on this side of the Sutledge confiscated, and declared to be aliens and enemies of the British government."

The time which had elapsed between the first hostile preparations at Lahore, and the actual crossing of the river by the Sikhs, was too short to allow of any extensive preparations being made by us. The crisis, however, demanded the utmost exertion on the part of the governor-general and commander-in-chief; and when it was known that a Sikh force was actually on the left bank of the Sutledge, Sir Henry, being no longer restricted by the home orders, lost no time in setting all the troops in our other provinces in motion towards the frontier. The celerity of the movement of some of these troops was admirable. Fortunately, and most providentially, Lord Ellenborough had established a large force at Umballa, which could be thus available at a moment's notice. The troops at this station were gathered round Sir Henry Hardinge at the time he issued his proclamation.

The Sikh army, under the command of the Sirdar Tej Sing, having crossed the Sutledge, invested Ferozepoor on one side, and took up an entrenched position at the village of Ferozeshuhur, or Ferozeshah, about ten miles in advance of Ferozepore, and nearly the same distance from the memorable village of Moodkee. Ferozepoor was garrisoned by a body of rather more than 5000 troops, with twenty-one guns, under the command of Major-General Sir John Littler. The head quarters of Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief, were nearly 150 miles from Ferozepoor. The great object, therefore, was to effect a junction between the separated portions of the Anglo-Indian army. For this purpose, the orders mentioned in the dispatch just quoted were issued by the governor-general to Sir Hugh Gough, to move up towards Ferozepoor by forced marches. And by the 18th of December these troops reached the

village of Moodkee, after traversing a desert of deep, heavy sand, and suffering severely from want of water as well as from fatigue. When they took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee, the men were in a state of great exhaustion. They had scarcely rested three hours, and they were cooking their dinners, when information was received that the Sikh army was advancing. The troops were hastily got under arms and moved to their positions. Sir Hugh Gough says—"I immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up this position, or were advancing in order of battle against us.

"To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flanks.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such undulations as the ground afforded; and, whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry

under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3d Light Dragoons, with the second brigade of cavalry, consisting of the body guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.

"This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far out-flanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster,

for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim star-light, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."

This victory, though glorious as a victory could be, was dearly purchased. Major-General Sir Robert Sale, the hero of Jellalabad, had his left thigh shattered by grape shot, and the wound proved mortal; Sir John M'Caskill was shot through the breast and died there; almost every officer attached to the governor-general as aide-de-camp was either killed or wounded; in all, 657 were wounded, and 215 slain. Many officers were shot by the Sikhs, who concealed themselves among the trees and jungle for this purpose, after their main body had fled, and the officers thus killed were returning to their camp, elated by victory, and unsuspicious of danger. In this way, Captain Jasper Trower, of the artillery, met his death; and his brave farrier Sergeant shared the same fate while attempting to avenge the death of his captain.*

The available force in European infantry was very small, consisting merely of her Majesty's 9th, 31st, 50th, and 80th regiments; the only European cavalry present was her Majesty's 3rd light dragoons. These dashing dragoons pursued the Sikhs, but the nature of the ground rendered the charge less effectual than it otherwise would have been. The sabres of the dragoons penetrated with difficulty the thick quilted clothes of the Sikhs, yet they slew many and overthrew all who attempted to resist their impetuous career. It was the first time the Sikhs had encountered European dragoons and infantry; they could compare them to nothing else but *demons*.†

Everybody was astonished at the precision and celerity of the Sikh artillery practice. The men had been long taught by Messrs. Allard and Court, and the Signors Ventura and Avitabili, and no expense had been spared on this arm. The old Maharajah, Runjeet Sing,

had devoted the greatest attention to his ordnance department, and had cast an immense number of guns in his arsenal at Lahore, under the superintendence of Monsieur Court, a very scientific French officer. But he had never entrusted any command in the artillery to Europeans, being of opinion that this powerful arm ought to be kept exclusively in the possession of his own people. "An estimate might have been formed of the number of guns possessed by Runjeet Sing, from the circumstance of his usually having one hundred pieces of ordnance at the celebration of the Dusserah festival, and which kept up an incessant fire with blank cartridges, while twenty thousand muskets responded with continued and unremitting roll. We have ourselves been present on such occasions, and the sound was perfectly deafening: the Maharajah used to remark, "That is the way I fire against my enemies in battle, only quicker, and with many more guns and muskets than are now present."* Since the death of Runjeet Sing, the Sikhs had not ceased to increase the number of their guns; and the events of this campaign proved, that they could bring nearly 500 guns into the field, independently of those employed in the forts of Lahore, Govind-gur, and Umritas, besides having numerous guns at Peshawur and Mooltan. Their artillery, previously to their crossing the Sutledge, may be safely estimated at 500 guns of all calibres. Since the death of Monsieur Allard, the discipline of their cavalry had been neglected. It had been supposed by too many, that the whole Sikh army had deteriorated so much since the days of Runjeet Sing, that they might be considered next to a rabble; but it ought not to have been forgotten, that the Sikh, by nature and institutions, is a soldier; he cares for no other employment than that of war; every other pursuit is interdicted by the tenets of his mixed but peculiar religion. Their fanaticism had cooled, but had not evaporated. They still fervently believed that the founder of their sect, Nabak Shah, who was born

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

† Ibid.

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

about the middle of the fifteenth century, had been sent from heaven to reconcile the jarring faiths of the Mahomedan and Hindu; that their commingled religion was perfect and divine; that Gura-Govind, who flourished at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and who, by the complete abolition of the system of castes, drew individuals of every caste to the profession of arms, had had a divine mission, and that the united Sikh warriors must ultimately occupy the whole of Hindustan, and establish in it their own faith: the profession of arms was therefore the religious duty of every man among them. Paradise awaited every Sikh warrior that fell in battle.* The men who had fought at Moodkee fully expected that their march would end at Calcutta.

Though beaten, the Sikhs were satisfied that, with an overwhelming number of guns strongly entrenched, they might safely await the attack of the British, who possessed at Moodkee but little strength in this important arm. No blame could be attached to our commander-in-chief, for he was obliged to fight with the means at his disposal. The heavy guns and mortars were not up, and his enemy must be beaten. If he had waited for his artillery, there was every likelihood that he would have had the whole Sikh army upon him.

On the 19th of December, our heavy guns reached Moodkee, escorted by her Majesty's 29th, the 1st European light infantry, and two regiments of native infantry.† Every possible care had been taken of these troops in their rapid advance by the governor-general and commander-in-chief. Elephants were dispatched to Churruk, seven and twenty miles from Moodkee, to carry those who might be unable to walk. When near Moodkee, and almost overcome by fatigue and the terrible desert thirst, water was distributed to them, which had been brought out on elephants from headquarters. Being thus refreshed,

the men marched vigorously into Moodkee, where the governor-general's band welcomed them with a joyous burst of music. The 20th was a day of rest. On the morning of the 21st, the commander-in-chief resolved to attack the Sikhs in their entrenchments at Ferozeshahur or Ferozeshah, about four miles distant from the point where our forces had united. Sir Hugh Gough could now count 16,700 men, and sixty-nine guns; but the latter were chiefly horse artillery.* The Sikh forces varied from 48,000 to 60,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, in fixed batteries. They had been crossing the Sutledge in great numbers; and only a few battalions, with fifty or sixty guns, had been left at Lahore. Tej Sing, their real commander-in-chief, had been informed that the only arm in which he could trust was his artillery, and that even his guns could not be considered safe, since the British at Moodkee, as previously at Maharajpore, had seized the guns at the point of the bayonet. But the Sirdar conceived that such desperate courage only belonged to the European portion of the army, and from the smallness of their number, he imagined, that, with upwards of 100 guns, he could defy their utmost efforts. He knew well that their guns of a large calibre were few in number, and could never silence his own, many of which were of battering calibre. In short, he came to the conclusion that his position was safe, and victory on the part of the British next to impossible.

Our army of the Sutledge began to move at three o'clock in the morning, leaving a detachment from each regiment, and a regiment and a half of native infantry, in the camp at Moodkee, to keep guard over the baggage and the wounded; and by daylight the several regiments had joined their several brigades. The whole marched onwards, making a long detour with a view of attacking the weakest points in the enemy's position, though, as matters

* Malcolm's Sketch of the Sikhs, in Asiatic Researches.

† The 11th and 41st.

* Governor-General's Dispatch to the Secret Committee, dated, Camp, Ferozepore, 31st December, 1845.

turned out, the attack was made on the strongest. Several halts were made, for the march was a fatiguing one of nearly sixteen miles. About two o'clock in the afternoon, Sir John Littler joined them. Our force was now raised to about 20,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, and 900 artillerymen. After passing a mud village, the troops were halted and formed into battle array, in sight of the Sikhs. When Tej Sing saw the British preparing for the contest after a long march, and without any chance of obtaining water or food, his hopes must have been raised to the highest pitch. In his entrenched camp, food and water had been stored up in abundance; his troops were quite fresh, and confident of victory.

When preparing for battle, our soldiers found that they were actually fronting the longest and strongest side of the entrenchment, which was in the form of a parallelogram, of about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area the strong village of Ferozeshah, the shorter sides looking towards the Sutledge and Moodkee, and the long one towards Ferozepoor and the open country.* But the Sikhs were fully prepared to place their guns in position on whatever side the attack should be made. They were thoroughly acquainted with the country; and knowing by what roads their enemy could advance, they readily prepared for their reception. Thus it mattered not much whether our approach was made on the longer or shorter side, though the preparations on the side fronting Ferozepoor showed that it was considered by the Sikhs as the proper front of their position. How the British officers were led to believe the contrary, appears a question only to be solved by supposing that the information given on native authority must have misled them.

"The ground in front, like that at Moodkee, was jungle; the three divisions of the British, under the command of Major-General Gilbert, Sir John Littler, and Brigadier Wallace, de-

ployed into line, with the whole of their artillery in their centre, except three troops of horse-artillery, one on either flank, and one in support. The reserve was under Sir Harry Smith, and the cavalry, small in number, formed the second line, with the brigade in reserve to cover each wing."[†] The artillery were ordered to the front, and the infantry wheeled into line. After a reasonable time had been allowed for the mortar practice, which it was speedily seen would never silence Tej Sing's guns, our artillery opened their fire to ascertain the position of the batteries; and the Sikhs then responded at somewhat less than a mile's distance—a distance which the calibre of our guns could not work at. Our artillery, therefore, made a nearer advance, protected by the whole of our infantry. When several hundred yards nearer, our guns were unlimbered, and several rounds of shot fired; this was repeated until they approached within three hundred yards of the batteries. Then, seeing that these Sikh guns could not be silenced, the infantry advanced amidst a murderous shower of shot and grape, and captured them with matchless gallantry.†

General Gilbert's division was completely successful in carrying these batteries, and entered the Sikh camp. But when all the batteries of the Sikhs seemed within the grasp of our infantry, a fire of musketry was opened upon them from behind the guns. The Sikh infantry were lying down, and, consequently, fired high, killing many mounted officers. Almost the whole of General Gilbert's division passed to the right of the village of Ferozeshah, which formed the centre of the enemy's position. On forcing the batteries, our infantry were exposed, not only to musketry, but to a terrific explosion from a mine, which blew up in the rear of the guns, and did much mischief among the advancing troops. Everything was blown into the air, and for a time there was nothing but confusion. After this, several smaller mines exploded, making a noise like an

* The Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Ibid.

† Ibid.

uninterrupted discharge of thunder-clouds, and filling the whole atmosphere above with smoke and murky flame. Sir Harry Smith drove on into the village of Ferozeshah, and cleared it. He then proceeded farther into the entrenched camp, but halted in consequence of the coming on of night. "In spite of the indomitable bravery of the British, a portion only of the Sikh entrenchment was carried. Night fell, but still the battle raged."* Throughout that dreadful night, the enemy's cavalry and infantry moved about, harassing and firing on the British who were bivouacked. A large Sikh gun was brought up close, and its contents discharged, but so near, that the grape could not spread itself, and the men and officers thus escaped. The chargers of some of the officers were, however, knocked over, while their masters, lying on the ground, were holding them by the rein. This was, indeed, a fearful position to be in. In some places, our troops were scattered far apart, in others they were mixed. From the intervals left between the European infantry regiments and the native brigades, there was no possibility of forming a line or acting in concert. In the darkness of the night the men that were mixed could not regain their proper positions. "If a regiment had attempted to move right or left in search of another, the Sikh guns were sure to be directed to the spot; and where the 50th bivouacked, Sir Harry Smith, with admirable prudence, forbade a shot to be fired in return for any that might be directed against his position. The white covers were taken off the caps, which served as marks for the enemy, and every means adopted for keeping the men out of the hostile fire. The gallant soldiers who had, at the point of the bayonet, captured the batteries of the Sikhs, were thus glad to actually conceal themselves under the darkness of night. It was not flight, but as near an approach to it as can be well conceived; and no wonder, if, at this time, the governor-general of India felt the precarious position of the troops. Never, in the annals

of warfare in India, had matters attained such a threatening crisis. The European Infantry alone could now support him, and he knew well what their daring bravery had accomplished at Plassy, Bhurtpoor, and Ghuznee."

In this action, "the reserve was brought up by Sir Harry Smith, and seized another portion of the position, while the 3rd Dragoons charged and took some batteries; yet the Sikhs remained in position, and in possession of a considerable portion of the quadrangle."

The attack on the left, where the Ferozepoor force was engaged under the command of Sir John Littler, had not been quite so successful. The fire there was terrific. There was a half-moon battery at a corner of the Sikh position, which played with such deadly effect on her Majesty's 62nd Regiment, that those brave men were checked, and then withdrawn.

On the morning of the 22nd, the battle was renewed by daylight. The British infantry formed into line, supported on either flank by the horse artillery, while the fire was opened from the centre by a few heavy guns and a few flights of rockets. But on these a masked battery of the Sikhs played with great effect, dismounting the British guns and blowing up their tumbrils.* "We were assured," says Dr. McGregor, "by the horse artillery men, that they had never witnessed anything so terrific as the effect of the Sikh guns on theirs, which they described as being blown into the air." The battle must clearly be won by the British infantry. The governor-general, who had offered to act as second in command, now placed himself at the head of the left, and the commander-in-chief took post on the right. The line advanced unchecked—for they would be checked by nothing—sweeping all before them; then changing front they swept the rest of the camp and dislodged the enemy from his last position. They captured seventy-eight pieces of cannon, and were masters of the field; but Tej Sing presently brought up fresh battalions

* The Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.
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* Ibid.

and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorchurras, or irregular horse, who had been kept in reserve near the river. The Sirdar "drove in the British cavalry, and made strenuous efforts to regain his original position, but was unable to effect his object. Still the Sirdar renewed the contest by a combined attack on the left of the British, which compelled them to change their whole front to the right; his guns played with great effect, while those of the British were rendered useless from want of ammunition, *the whole of which had been expended.*"* But soon an attack was made on the Sirdar by the whole mass of the British infantry, supported on their flanks by the cavalry; and then guns were captured and ranks broken, and the Sikhs ceased their firing and abandoned the field. Before this decisive moment, a panic had spread among our camp followers; the bearers of the doolies were throwing down our wounded men and the instruments and apparatus of our surgeons, and were running off for Ferozepoor. Fortunately that place was not more than eight or nine miles, by the direct road, from the scene of action, and the authorities there, in the commissariat and executive departments, used their utmost endeavours to bring in the wounded. The doolies were sent back for more; elephants, carts, &c., were put in requisition, and during the whole night of the 22d, the wounded were being brought in, or they found their way in on foot, in a state of dreadful exhaustion from pain, loss of blood, and want of food and water. "The writer of this narrative," says Dr. M'Gregor, "had an opportunity on the morning of the 23d, of witnessing the lamentable condition of the brave European soldier who had bled for his country's cause, now imploring in vain for a mouthful of water. . . . But by noon they were all in their own quarters; and quilts and cots were furnished in abundance. In fact, it was almost incredible how the commissariat and executive departments could supply so much comfort in such a short space of time. The wounded owe

much to the unwearied efforts of Captain W. B. Thomson and Lieutenant Goodwyn (who responded to every call) for their comparatively snug condition on the 23d and 24th, and it was a gratifying sight to the governor-general when he visited them, to find so much comfort where he anticipated so little. He generously gave strict orders, that everything required should be supplied, and without the usual formality of an indent. Sir Henry Hardinge visited all the wounded men and officers, and had a cheerful word for all. If a poor man had lost an arm, the governor-general consoled him by pointing to his own sleeve, and assuring him he would soon be all right. The men were delighted at the urbanity and kindness shown towards them by the governor of India, and for a time forgot their own sufferings in the admiration which his kindness elicited."* Sir Henry visited the poor sufferers again and again, and watched over their welfare with a solicitude that could not have been surpassed if they had been his own children. During the terrible night he had spent in the Sikh camp, he had shared the privations of the soldiers, and had suffered pangs unknown to them, for the fate of his whole army, the fate perhaps of all India, was hanging on a thread. Delivering his watch and star to his son's care, he showed that he was determined to leave the field a victor or die in the struggle. In the hard fight of the morrow he had escaped unhurt; but he had seen many who were very dear to him fall around him. Many upon whom he counted as the hope and future glory of his country went down under the Sikh guns. The commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, whose arduous military duties did not allow him to visit the wounded until some days later, did everything in his power to cheer the men, praising their undaunted bravery in one of the hardest battles ever fought in India. He spoke to all and listened to all, and did his utmost to gratify their every wish.

The British had lost upwards of 2000 in killed and wounded, including thirty-

* Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Dr. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs, &c.

seven officers among the slain, and double that number among the wounded, several of whom afterwards died. The loss on the part of the Sikhs was computed at 8000.

Major Somersset, military secretary to the governor-general, on the morning of the 22d, was borne to the rear mortally wounded, "while conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race."* Major Broadfoot, political agent, also fell: "he was brave as he was able in every branch of the political and military service."† Major Broadfoot was the last of three brave brothers, who held appointments in the Company's army and fell in battle. Captain P. Nicholson, assistant political agent from Ferozepoor, was also killed in the action of the 21st. With the exception of Captain Mills, who took the command of a troop of horse artillery, all the political agents were either killed or wounded in this fierce struggle. Among the other truly distinguished officers who perished were Colonel Wallace, Captain Thomas Box, "a soldier every inch of him," Captain d'Arcy Todd, Major Baldwin, a Peninsular officer, and Lieutenants Pollard and Bernard. Pollard had been wounded at Moodkee; but no persuasion could prevent his again joining his gallant regiment, her Majesty's 31st. The 3rd Dragoons suffered severely, having three officers killed, six officers wounded, and fifty-two rank and file killed. Among those who shared the dangers of this battle were Prince Waldemar of Prussia, and his staff, Counts Grueben and Oriolo, and Dr. Hoffmeister; the last officer was unfortunately killed by a grape shot. Prince Waldemar left the field at the request of the governor-general, who was unwilling that a foreign prince should be further subjected to the risk of losing his life. The issue of the battle was not then decided; but fortunately the prince returned to Ferozepoor, and had the satisfaction of knowing, that though the British had a fierce foe to contend with, victory had decided for them.‡

Fine phrases would be thrown away upon conduct and heroism such as were displayed at Ferozepoor. The plain professional dispatches of Sir Henry Hardinge and Sir Hugh Gough form the best eulogium. All behaved nobly. Unfortunately, in the hurry of the moment, Sir John Littler, in a private dispatch, used the words "panic struck" as applicable to her Majesty's 62nd regiment, and attributed some irresolution on the part of the native regiments in his division to the example of the 62nd. The charges were groundless. Before the 62nd fell back, it had seven officers killed and ten wounded, seventy-six rank and file killed and 154 wounded. The regiment was numerically weak; its loss was greater than that of any other European regiment present. Both the governor-general and commander-in-chief did all they could to remove the injurious impression; and at home, in the House of Lords, the Duke of Wellington stood manfully forward to vindicate the fame of the heroic band, and apply balm to their wounded pride. On the 2nd of March, during the debate on the vote of thanks to the army of the Sutledge, the great captain said:—"It is not generally known, my lords, but I know it, that the fortified position which has been referred to was closed in by intrenchments, and that it ought to be called a fortress, instead of a fortified position. Notwithstanding, also, the advantage which troops in India generally possess, of having water carried for every company, these troops laboured under the singular disadvantage of being deprived of water for nearly twenty-four hours, in consequence of the persons who were employed to get water not being able to procure it, and the troops consequently had not even that refreshment. Under these circumstances it was that the troops carried this position, not, certainly, without great loss, but a loss which I hope has not left them in a state otherwise than efficient, if their services should be required on a different occasion. I really must say, that I have not for a length of time heard of an action which has given me such unqualified satisfaction, except in one par-

* Sir Henry Hardinge's Dispatch.

† Ibid.

‡ Dr. Mc'Gregor.

ticular, for I have read with pain of one regiment to which the word 'panic' was attached. I have thought it my duty to inquire into the circumstances attending that regiment, and I find that it lost five-twelfths of its numbers in the engagement, and an immense number of officers and non-commissioned officers. I have seen an account which states, that in the first quarter of an hour, from the moment when the regiment was first engaged, one-third of its officers fell. I cannot question the accuracy of the report of the operations made by a general officer (Sir John Littler), but I wish that this officer, when he sat down to prepare an elaborate report of the conduct of the troops under his command, had referred to the number of killed and wounded, and had inquired what losses this regiment had sustained. If he had inquired, I believe he would have found, that when this regiment was compelled to pause, the men were actually mowed down by the severity of the fire under which they had advanced. I have inquired further into the case of that regiment, and I find that it has been sixteen years in the East Indies, and that in the course of the last forty years, it has served thirty-three years of that period abroad, passing only seven years in the United Kingdom. I find also that in the course of the sixteen years during which that regiment has served in the East Indies, it has been in all parts of India, and its ranks have been in fact recruited twice over; and, at this moment, I find that of the men who made the attack and suffered this loss, three-fourths of them had not been seven years in the service. I will not detain your lordships longer, but seeing that word 'panic,' I thought it my duty to inquire into all the circumstances connected with this regiment, and I have found a most extraordinary report of their good conduct made by the same general officer on a former occasion."

Great pains were taken by the Sikh army to conceal from the durbar the extent of their discomfiture; but much anxiety and irresolution were believed

to prevail at Lahore.* They believed that our army would follow up its advantages by crossing the river immediately and marching on the capital; but this was a movement not to be thought of without a powerful battering train, more European troops, and especially more cavalry. When our weak force in horse was driven in at Ferozeshah, Sir Henry Hardinge was reported to have said, "I would give half a lack of rupees if her Majesty's 16th Lancers were but here!" It was now wisely resolved to wait for the guns and mortars moving upwards with the 16th Lancers, the 9th Lancers, and her Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, which, with the 3rd Light Dragoons, and the 43rd and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry, had composed the Meerut force under Sir John Grey. The Sinda troops, under Sir Charles Napier, had also been ordered up, and their services were likely to be needed for checking the governor of Mooltan, who had already made several attacks on convoys of supplies, and on soldiers coming up the river.

Upon this seeming indecision of the British, the Sikhs resolved to make another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the Sutledge; and for this purpose, they began to construct a new bridge of boats, not very far from the spot where they crossed the river after having been driven from Ferozeshah. Our army of the Sutledge had retired somewhat from the river, and no opposition was offered by them. The bridge of boats was soon constructed, and a *tête de pont* thrown up in front of it, with much military skill, in a position very favourable to defence. The opposite banks were high, and the river, where the bridge was laid, made a slight curve inwards, so as to throw the opposite banks sufficiently forward to afford protection to both flanks of the advanced position from heavy artillery placed in battery. Above the bridge, and not far

* Note from the Governor-General to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, dated January 1, 1846.

from it, was a good ford, which facilitated the communication between the forces on the opposite bank. Advantage had also been taken of the paucity of our troops at Loodiana, to effect a passage for a force of about 10,000 men of all arms, in the neighbourhood of that town. No attack was made either on the town or cantonment of Loodiana; the object of this force appeared to be rather to entrench itself near the place at which it crossed, in order to obstruct our progress and to cut off the passage of supplies, *en route* to Ferozepoor, and to intercept the communication between the posts. As soon as the Meerut force joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp, immediate measures were taken to reinforce the Loodiana post, and the station at Busseean; some Native Infantry, some Light Cavalry, and some guns, were sent thither, and the sick, the women, and the children, were removed thence to Umballa. Meanwhile, Sir Harry Smith had been detached to reduce Dhurnkote, and keep open the communication for supplies and ammunition from our rear. Sir Harry was now reinforced, and having soon with him 7000 men and twenty-four guns, it was confidently believed that he could at one and the same time relieve Loodiana and protect the whole of our rear. Dhurnkote was evacuated at Sir Harry's approach. In marching from Dhurnkote, Sir Harry lost a good deal of his baggage, and sustained some heavy fusillades, which he did not wait to return. His troops were much harassed when he reached Loodiana. His presence put an end to the consternation which was becoming general in that part of the country. The Sirdar Runjoor Sing had strongly entrenched himself at Aliwal, about eight miles to the westward of Loodiana; he had 20,000 men and fifty-six guns, and on the evening of the 26th of January he received a reinforcement of twelve guns and 4000 regular troops. Sir Harry Smith most gallantly attacked the Sikhs on the 28th of January, with not more than 10,000 men in all. The right of the Sikh force rested on Roomaree, and their left on

Walleepoor, and they advanced some distance from their entrenched camp and cannonaded the British for half an hour, until our brave fellows stormed the village of Aliwal—the key of their position. The whole of the British line then began to advance upon different lines. Her Majesty's 16th Lancers charged in the most gallant style, but the Sikhs lay down on the ground, and the Lancers could not well reach them, while they either fired their muskets at the 16th, or cut desperately at men and horses with their keen swords. This distinguished cavalry regiment had upwards of 100 men killed and wounded. The great mass of Sikh infantry could be broken only by our artillery. One Sikh cannon after another was captured. So ably were the orders of attack conducted, each column and line arriving at its point of attack to the very moment, that the enemy were soon driven headlong back over the river; and all the Sikh guns were captured or destroyed. Only one gun was carried by the Sikhs to the opposite bank, and there it was spiked by Lieutenant Holmes of the Irregular Cavalry, and gunner Scott of the Horse Artillery, who forded the river in pursuit. The victory was so complete, and the confusion among the Sikhs so great, that, had Sir Harry Smith been in a condition to follow, he might have driven them before him to Lahore. Camp carriages, munitions of war, all things that Runjoor Sing had brought with him, were captured. These were indeed “glorious operations;” this was indeed a “complete and decisive victory.”* It cost us in all about 400 killed and wounded.

There was now for a short time a perfect lull in the campaign. The Sikhs at Sobraon went on strengthening their position, and adding to their guns on their *tête de pont*; and Sir Hugh Gough waited for his artillery and reinforcements. From the 14th of January till the beginning of February the enemy

* Dispatches of the Governor-General, Sir Harry Smith, and Sir Hugh Gough. M'Gregor's History of the Sikhs.

were industriously employed in building their defences, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer. On the 9th of February, when Major-General Sir Harry Smith had rejoined, when the siege-train and ammunition had arrived from Delhi, and when the governor-general had returned to camp, our army advanced on Sobraon, and the plan of attack on this formidable entrenchment was settled. Although, on the first intelligence of the battle of Aliwal, and at sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the neighbourhood of that battle field down to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, the Sikhs seemed much shaken and disheartened, they now appeared to be as confident as ever of being able to defy us in their entrenched position, and to prevent our passage of the river. The soldiers were chiefly those who had been trained by the French and Italian officers. They had strong walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, which afforded a secure protection for triple lines of musketry. In all they were 30,000 men, with seventy pieces of artillery; their position was united by a good bridge to a reserve on the opposite bank, on which was a considerable camp, and some artillery commanding and flanking the field works on the side of the British.*

Sir Hugh Gough ordered his whole army to march on Sobraon at half-past 3 o'clock on the morning of Tuesday, the 10th of February, when his men would be fresh, and there would be a certainty of many hours of daylight. To pass another night like that which had been spent within the enemy's camp at Ferozeshah, was by all means to be avoided. The troops began to move out of camp at the very moment appointed, and they marched in silence to their destination. Sir Hugh was now much stronger in cavalry, and very strong in artillery. He at once put his battering and disposable artillery in position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs. It had been intended that the

cannonade should have commenced at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river, that it became necessary to wait. It was half-past six before the whole of our artillery fire was developed. "Nothing could be conceived grander than the effect of the batteries when they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutledge to Little Sobraon, in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and anon, the rocket, like a spirit of fire, winged its rapid flight high above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchment. Well might the commander-in-chief call the opening of the cannonade "most spirited and well directed." The Sikh guns responded with shot and shells, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter was seen bursting in mid-air ere they reached the British batteries; while some of the shot passed over Rhodawala, and struck the ground in front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a certain degree of interest, somewhat allied, however, to vexation, lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves! The commander-in-chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm which he did not possess to an efficient extent in other hard-fought battles. It was reported, that the guns were to play for four hours at least; but there is some reason to believe, that the rapid firing had nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed; and it was once more to be proved, that the British infantry were not to remain mute spectators of a battle. "Notwithstanding," wrote the commander-in-chief, "the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces, behind well constructed batteries of earth, planks, and fascines,

* C ommander-in-Chief's Dispatch.

* Ibid.

or dislodge troops covered either by redoubt or epaulments, or within a treble line of trenches.”*

Compared with Ferozeshah, the works at Sobraon were regular fortifications, in the construction of which, no labour had been spared. The utmost ingenuity of the Sikhs and their European advisers had been exerted to render this, their last strong-hold, impregnable. A French officer is said to have assured Tej Singh that it was utterly impossible for the British to make good their entrance. The British were now about to try with the musket and the bayonet. “At nine o’clock, Brigadier Stacey’s brigade, supported on either flank by Captains Horford’s and Fordyce’s batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane’s troop of horse artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other correlatively. The former marched steadily on in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary; the latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until at length, they were within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs. But notwithstanding the regularity and coolness, and the scientific character of this assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, and zambooraks,† kept up by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchment could be won under it.”‡ There was a temporary check, or pause, “but soon persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction to see the gallant Brigadier Stacey’s soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their encampment.”§ Every impediment was cleared, the entrenchments were passed, and our matchless infantry stood erect and compact within the Sikh camp. “Her Majesty’s 10th, 53rd, and 80th regiments, with the 33rd, 43rd, 59th, and 63rd

native infantry, moving at a firm and steady pace, never fired a shot till they had passed the barriers opposed to them—a forbearance much to be commended, and most worthy of constant imitation, to which may be attributed the success of their first effort, and the small loss they sustained. This attack was crowned with all the success it deserved, and, led by its gallant commander, Major-General Sir Robert Dick, obtained the admiration of the army, which witnessed its disciplined valour. When checked by the formidable obstacles and superior numbers to which the attacking division was opposed, the second division, under Major-General Gilbert, afforded the most opportune assistance by rapidly advancing to the attack of the enemy’s batteries, entering their fortified position after a severe struggle, and sweeping through the interior of the camp. This division inflicted a very severe loss on the retreating enemy.”¶ “We happened to be with a portion of Gilbert’s division,” says Doctor M’Gregor, “when the order arrived from the governor-general, and the troops immediately advanced. Onward they went; but if intended to support Stacey on the right of the enemy’s position, they missed the object, for they unfortunately came in front of the centre and strongest portion of the encampment, unsupported either by artillery or cavalry. Her Majesty’s 29th, and the 1st European Light Infantry, with undaunted bravery rushed forward, crossed a dry nullah, and found themselves exposed to one of the hottest fires of musketry that can possibly be imagined; and what rendered it still more galling was, that the Sikhs were themselves concealed behind high walls, over which the European soldiers could not climb. To remain under such a fire without the power of returning it with any effect would have been madness; the men would have been annihilated. Thrice did her Majesty’s 29th regiment charge

* Dr. M’Gregor’s History of the Sikhs.

† Guns mounted on camels, and carrying a pound shot.

‡ The Commander-in-Chief’s Dispatches.

§ Ibid.

¶ General order by the Governor-General of India, dated, Camp, Keasoora, February 14th, 1846.

the works, and thrice were they obliged to retire, each time followed by the Sikhs, who spared none, and cut to pieces the wounded. Similar was the fate of the 1st European Light Infantry, who, in retiring, had their ranks thinned by musketry, and their wounded men and officers cut up by the savage Sikhs. To the latter, the nullah presented an admirable defence, for the slope was towards them, while the Europeans on the high bank were completely exposed. At length, the second division, which at Ferozeshah had driven the Sikhs before them, capturing their guns at the point of the bayonet, and entering their encampment, were led to the right of the entrenchment at Sobraon.* This second division was emulated by the 1st division under Sir Harry Smith, which dashed against the enemy's left. Yet was it not until the cavalry of the left, under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward and ridden through the openings of the entrenchments (made by our sappers) in single file, and re-formed as they passed them; and the third dragoons had galloped over and cut down the obstinate defenders of batteries and field-works; and the weight of three entire divisions of infantry, with every field artillery gun which could be sent to their aid;—it was not until all this had been cast into the scale, that victory finally declared for the British. The fire of the Sikhs slackened, then ceased nearly altogether; and the victors, pressing them on every side, swept them in masses over the bridge of boats, and into the Sutledge, which a sudden rise of seven inches had rendered scarcely fordable. In their efforts to reach the right bank through the deepened water, they suffered a terrible carnage from our horse artillery. Hundreds fell under this cannonade; hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous passage. This awful slaughter would have excited compassion, had they not, in the earlier part of the action, sullied their bravery by slaughtering and mangling every

wounded soldier whom the fortune of war left at their mercy. "The enemy's shattered forces," says the governor-general, "were driven into the river, with a loss which far exceeded that which the most experienced officers had ever witnessed. Thus terminated, in the brief space of two hours, this most remarkable conflict, in which the military combinations, of the commander-in-chief were fully and ably carried into effect. The enemy's select regiments of regular infantry have been dispersed, and a large proportion destroyed, with the loss, since the campaign began, of 220 pieces of artillery taken in action.**

Within the entrenchments above sixty-seven guns were captured, together with upwards of 200 camel swivels and numerous standards. Before the hour of noon this great battle was over. It might, indeed, be well termed a glorious fight, and complete in its results. The battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had weakened the power of the Sikhs, but the battle of Sobraon had completely broken it. It was, of course, bought at a dear price. It was the Waterloo of India, and bloody like that field. Her Majesty's 29th regiment alone exhibited a loss in killed and wounded of thirteen officers, eight, serjeants, and 167 rank and file. The loss of the 1st European Light Infantry was still heavier. Her Majesty's 31st, which had fought most nobly at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had seven officers and 147 rank and file killed and wounded at Sobraon. Her Majesty's 50th, or Queen's Own, had twelve officers and 227 rank and file killed and wounded. Her Majesty's 10th foot lost three officers, three serjeants, and 127 rank and file. These regiments suffered the most, but other regiments suffered severely. We have not yet seen any accurate list of the total loss. The brave Sir Robert Dick, who led the attack on the entrenchments, received a mortal wound after he had entered them; "thus fell, most gloriously, at the moment of victory,

* History of the Sikhs.

* General order.

this veteran officer, displaying the same energy and intrepidity as when, thirty-five years ago, in Spain, he was the distinguished leader of the 42nd Highlanders." Brigadier Charles Cyril Taylor, who commanded the third brigade of the second division, also fell. Brigadier MacLaren was borne off the field mortally wounded, while leading the 4th brigade of the centre division against the strongest part of the entrenchments. When put into his bed, he said he *must* cross the Sutledge with the gallant European Light Infantry, even though he were carried in a dooly. Major-General Gilbert was slightly wounded; and the gallant veteran Colonel Ryan, of the 50th, was severely wounded.

Fearful had been the loss of the Sikhs. Five days after the action, and when the walls of the entrenchment had been nearly levelled with the ground, the sand bank in the middle of the river was completely covered with their dead bodies, and the ground within their encampment thickly strewn with carcases of men and horses. With the permission of the commander-in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, they returned to carry off their dead; but the task was found too irksome, and many hundreds, not swept away by the river, were left as food for the jackal, the wild dog, and the vulture.

All was now dead silence in the valley of the Sutledge, which, during the mighty combat, had reverberated with full 120 pieces of ordnance. Praises and thanks were not spared by the governor-general and commander-in-chief. The list is too long to be given, but foremost on it appear the names of Sir Harry Smith, Major-General Gilbert, Brigadiers Penny, Hicks, Stacey, Wilkinson, and the Honorable T. Ashburnham, Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, Brigadiers Cureton, Scott, and Campbell, who had handled the cavalry so well; Lieutenant-Colonel White; Brigadier Smith, the commanding engineer; Major Abbott of the engineers; Brigadier Gowan, commanding the artillery; Major Grant, who managed the howitzer practice; and Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Barr, Acting Adjutant-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, Acting Quartermaster General, &c. &c. And of his own personal staff the governor-general had to thank and applaud, Lord Arthur Hay, Captain Peel, Captain Hardinge, Lieutenant-Colonel Benson, Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, Major Laurence, Captain Mills, and others. He also desired to record his obligations to Prince Waldemar of Prussia, and to the officers of his Royal Highness's staff, Count Oriola and Count Gruben. "This gallant and amiable prince," said his excellency, "with his brave associates of the Prussian army, has shared all the dangers, and secured for himself the respect and admiration, of the British army; and the governor-general begs to convey to his Royal Highness and to his staff his cordial thanks for the ready offers of their services on the field of battle."*

The evening after the battle of Sobraon six regiments of native infantry crossed the Sutledge, and on the following day the bridge of boats was nearly completed by the able and indefatigable Major Abbott, of the engineers. Had the British then followed up the Sikhs they might have made their way without resistance to Lahore, and have there renewed the conflict; but such was not the intention of our commanders, and the capital of the Punjab was destined to be occupied by the British without any repetition of the life-consuming struggles which had occurred on the left bank of the Sutledge. If pressed, they would have fought desperately in their despair; but the vaunted power of the Sikhs was in reality destroyed. Sham Sing, Dhubal Sing, Hera Sing, Kishen Sing, Mobaruck Ali, Newag Khan, all their bravest sirdars and leaders, had perished. The discomfited warriors who survived, being left to themselves, began to disperse. Our army quietly crossed the river and took undisputed possession of Kusoor, which in former times had twice defied the power of Runjeet Sing. On the 14th of February, the governor-

* General order, dated, Camp, Kusoor, February 14th, 1846.

general announced by proclamation, dated from Kusoor, that the British army had crossed the Sutledge and entered the Punjab, "in accordance with the intentions expressed in the proclamation of the 13th December last, as having been forced upon him, for the purpose of 'effectually protecting the British provinces, and vindicating the authority of the British government, and punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace.' Military operations against the government and army of the Lahore state, had not been undertaken by the government of India from any desire of territorial aggrandizement. "No extension of territory," said the proclamation, "was desired by the government of India; the measures necessary for providing indemnity for the past, and security for the future, will, however, involve the retention, by the British government, of a portion of the country hitherto under the government of the Lahore state. The government of India has frequently declared that it did not desire to subvert the Sikh government in the Punjab; and although the conduct of the Durbar has been such as to justify the most severe and extreme measures of retribution, (the infliction of which may yet be required by sound policy, if the recent acts of violence be not amply atoned for, and immediate submission tendered;) nevertheless, the governor-general is still willing that an opportunity should be given to the Durbar and to the chiefs, to submit themselves to the British government, and by a return to good faith and the observance of prudent counsels, enable the governor-general to organize a Sikh government, in the person of a descendant of its founder, the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the faithful ally of the British power. The governor-general, at this moment of a complete and decisive victory, cannot give a stronger proof of the forbearance and moderation of the British government, than by making this declaration of his intention: the terms and mode of arrangement remaining for further adjustment. The governor-general therefore calls upon all those chiefs who are

the well-wishers of the descendants of Runjeet Sing, and especially such chiefs as have not participated in the hostile proceedings against the British power, to act in concert with him, for carrying into effect such arrangement as shall maintain a Sikh government at Lahore, capable of controlling its army and protecting its subjects, and based upon principles that shall provide for the future tranquillity of the Sikh states, shall secure the British frontier from a repetition of acts of aggression, and shall prove to the whole world the moderation and justice of the paramount power in India. If this opportunity of rescuing the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected, and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the government of India will make such other arrangements for the future government of the Punjab, as the interests and security of the British power may render just and expedient.

The Ranee, or mother of the Maharajah, forthwith sent emissaries to the governor-general; and Ghoolab Sing, whose wily policy we have explained, and who was now determined to carry it through, at whatever sacrifice on the part of the Sikhs, became the mediator between the fallen state of Lahore and our victorious army. He proceeded with all expedition towards Kusoor, to endeavour, if possible, to arrest the progress of our troops; but his intentions and hopes were frustrated, for the governor-general indignantly refused to enter into any separate compact with him, or to listen to any arrangement which would prevent him from sealing any treaty that might be made under the walls of Lahore. Having failed in preventing the advance of the British, Ghoolab Sing changed his tactics, and determined on bringing the young Maharajah Dhuleep Sing into the governor-general's camp. The parties met at Lulleana. Out of respect for the late Runjeet Sing, and the tender years of his grandson, Sir Henry Hardinge received Dhuleep Sing with high honours, and with the utmost kindness. He repeated to the prince his earnest

wish that a wise and tranquil government should exist in the Punjaub under the descendant of the late Runjeet, who had preserved a strict alliance with the British for a period of thirty years.

The heads of a treaty were soon sketched and agreed to. The government of Lahore was to pay, as an indemnity for the expense of the war, a crore and a half of rupees, or about one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. All the guns we had taken were to be retained, and all those which the Sikhs had ever pointed against the British were to be given up. The troops and their turbulent leaders were to be disbanded for ever.

Our army had advanced to Kanwa Kutchwa on the 19th of February, the governor-general having first issued (from Lulleana on the 18th) to the chiefs, merchants, traders, ryots, and other inhabitants of Lahore and Umritsir, a proclamation, assuring them that the Maharajah and Durbar had acquiesced in all the terms proposed to them, as a means of reëstablishing friendly relations; that they, the chiefs, merchants, traders, peasants, &c., had nothing to fear from the British army; and that they might, in all confidence, pursue their ordinary occupations. On the morning of the 20th, the whole army marched to Lahore—a distance of fourteen miles—and encamped on the parade ground, about two and a half miles from the city gate; and, in the afternoon of that same day, the young Maharajah, Dhuleep Sing, was restored to the palace of the rulers of Lahore, in charge of the chief secretary of our government, escorted by British officers and troops in their best attire. On alighting from his elephant, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired by the horse artillery. The secretary of government, and the officers, took leave of the Maharajah at the palace gate, and then returned to the camp. On the 22nd, in fulfilment of one of Sir Henry Hardinge's conditions, Sir Hugh Gough, with a brigade, took formal and peaceful possession of the Padshahee-Musjid and Huzzoree-Bagh, which formed part of the citadel of Lahore. Supplies of all

sorts were willingly brought to this brigade as well as to the camp; and the observance of a strict discipline by all our troops entirely removed the apprehensions and doubts of the people.*

On the 8th of March, the following treaty was signed in the state tent of the governor-general:—

"ARTICLE I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part, and Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, his heirs and successors, on the other.

"ARTICLE II.—The Maharajah of Lahore renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connexion with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej, and engages never to have any concern with those territories or the inhabitants thereof.

"ARTICLE III.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights, in the Doab, or country, hill and plain, situated between the rivers Beas and Sutlej.

"ARTICLE IV.—The British Government having demanded from the Lahore State, as indemnification for the expenses of the war, in addition to the cession of territory described in Article III., payment of one and a half crore of rupees; and the Lahore Government being unable to pay the whole of this sum at this time, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government, for its eventual payment, the Maharajah cedes to the Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees, all his forts, territories, rights, and interests, in the hill countries which are situated between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere and Hazarah.

"ARTICLE V.—The Maharajah will pay to the British Government the sum of fifty lakhs of rupees on or before the ratification of this treaty.

"ARTICLE VI.—The Maharajah engages to disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them

* Dispatches of the governor-general and commander-in-chief.

their arms; and his Highness agrees to re-organize the Regular or Aeen regiments of infantry, upon the system, and according to the regulations, as to pay and allowances, observed in the time of the late Maharajah Runjeet Sing. The Maharajah further engages to pay up allowances to the soldiers that are discharged, under provisions of this article.

"ARTICLE VII.—The regular army of the Lahore state shall henceforth be limited to twenty-five battalions of infantry, consisting of 800 bayonets each, with 12,000 cavalry; this number at no time to be exceeded, without the concurrence of the British government; and should it be necessary at any time, for any special cause, that this force should be increased, the cause shall be fully explained to the British government; and when the especial necessity shall have passed, the regular troops shall be again reduced to the standard specified in the former clause of this article.

"ARTICLE VIII.—The Maharajah will surrender to the British government all the guns, thirty-six in number, which have been pointed against the British troops, and which, having been placed on the right bank of the river Sutlej, were not captured at the battle of Sobraon.

"ARTICLE IX.—The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuations of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Punjund, to the confluence of the Indus, at Mithunkote, and the control of the Indus from Mithunkote to the borders of Beeloochistan, shall, in respect to tolls and ferries, rest with the British government. The provisions of this article shall not interfere with the passage of boats belonging to the Lahore government, on the said rivers, for the purposes of traffic, or the conveyance of passengers up and down their course. Regarding the ferries between the two countries respectively, at the several ghats of the said river, it is agreed, that the British government, after defraying all the expenses of management and establishments, shall account to the Lahore government for one-half of the net profits of the ferry

collections. The provisions of this article have no reference to the ferries on that part of the river Sutlej which forms the boundary of Buhawalpore and Lahore respectively.

"ARTICLE X.—If the British government should, at any time, desire to pass troops through the territories of his Highness the Maharajah for the protection of the British territories, or those of their allies, the British troops shall, on such special occasions, due notice being given, be allowed to pass through the Lahore territories. In such case the officers of the Lahore state will afford facilities in providing supplies and boats for the passage of the rivers; and the British government will pay the full price of all such provisions and boats, and will make fair compensation for all private property that may be endangered. The British government will, moreover, observe all due consideration to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of those tracts through which the army may pass.

"ARTICLE XI.—The Maharajah engages never to take or retain in his service any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state, without the consent of the British government.

"ARTICLE XII.—In consideration of the services rendered by Rajah Goolab Sing, of Jummoo, to the Lahore state, towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British governments, the Maharajah hereby agrees to recognise the independent sovereignty of Rajah Goolab Sing in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Rajah Goolab Sing by separate agreement between himself and the British government, with the dependencies thereof which may have been in the Rajah's possession since the time of the late Maharajah Kurruk Sing; and the British government, in consideration of the good conduct of Rajah Goolab Sing, also agrees to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British government.

"ARTICLE XIII.—In the event of

any dispute or difference arising between the Lahore state and Rajah Goolab Sing, the same shall be referred to the arbitration of the British government, and by its decision the Maharsjah engages to abide.

"ARTICLE XIV.—The limits of the Lahore territories shall not be at any time changed, without the concurrence of the British government.

"ARTICLE XV.—The British government will not exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore states, but in all cases or questions which may be referred to the British government, the governor-general will give the aid of his advice and good offices for the furtherance of the interests of the Lahore government.

"ARTICLE XVI.—The subjects of either state shall, on visiting the territories of the other, be on the footing of the subjects of the most favoured nation."

We could not close our narrative at a more glorious period than this. Such a series of brilliant exploits has seldom occurred in the limited space of three

years. Ever since the conclusion of the treaty, the Punjaub has been perfectly tranquil; the robber bands have been put down, and an effective police established as well here as in Sind. All our Indian possessions have been restored to tranquillity, and a happy feeling of security; and the governor-general, who has been only slightly rewarded by being raised to the peerage as Lord Hardinge, is as careful and as successful in peace as he was glorious in war. A recent letter from India says—"Of wars and tumults there are none to record; the most profound peace prevails throughout the length and breadth of the land. Lord Hardinge is wholly occupied in improving the country, and assisting in the development of its immense resources."

The terrible Akbar Khan has gone to his account, having been poisoned by some of his own people; others of those murderous Afghan chiefs have fallen in battle, or under the dagger of the assassin. Fierce destructive wars still rage, both in Lower and in Upper Afghanistan, but scarcely a faint echo of them reaches the Indus.



