

ship would exert his good offices with his Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that, in the mean time, hostilities on his part should be suspended.

It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General, that a Persian army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Caubul, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandisement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Caubul without having effected any of the objects of his mission.

It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter chief showed too plainly that, so long as Caubul remained under his government, we could never

hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate.

The Governor-General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the mean time, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeill, her Majesty's Envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by a refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of her Majesty's Government.

The chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Caubul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat.

In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Caubul, the Governor-General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.

His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who,

when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions.

It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the British Government acknowledged and respected their authority; but a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement.

After serious and mature deliberation, the Governor-General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor-General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that his Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations.

Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of his Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a triplicate treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, whereby his Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all.

Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects

of discussion between the British Government and his Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding States. A guaranteed independence will, upon favorable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sindh, and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British Government will gain their proper footing among the nations of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.

His Majesty Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British Crown; but he rejoices that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By order of the Right Hon. Governor-General of India,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Secretary to the Government of India, with the
Governor-General.

NOTIFICATION.

With reference to the preceding Declaration, the following appointments are made:—Mr. W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to Government, will assume the functions of Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of India at the Court of Shah Soojahool-Moolk. Mr. Macnaghten will be assisted by the following officers:—Captain A. Burnes, of the Bombay establishment, who will be employed, under Mr. Macnaghten's directions, as Envoy to the Chief of Kelat, or other States; Lieutenant E. d'Arcy Todd, Bengal Artillery, to be Political Assistant and Military Secretary to the Envoy and Minister; Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Bombay Artillery; Lieutenant R. Leech, of the Bombay Engineers; Mr. P. B. Lord, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, to be Political Assistants to ditto, ditto; Lieutenant E. B. Conolly, 6th Bengal Cavalry, to command the escort of the Envoy and Minister, and to be Military Assistant to ditto, ditto; Mr. G. J. Berwick, of the Bengal Medical Establishment, to be Surgeon to ditto, ditto.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Secretary to the Government of India, with the
Governor-General.

It was not to be supposed that such a manifesto as this could be published in every newspaper in India and in Europe, and circulated, in an Oriental dress, throughout all the states of Hindostan and the adjoining countries, without provoking the keenest and the most searching criticism. In India there is, in reality, no public; but if such a name can be given to the handful of English gentlemen who discuss with little reserve the affairs of the government under which they live, the public looked askance at it—doubting and questioning its truth. The press seized upon it and tore it to pieces.* There was not a sentence in it that was not dissected with an unsparing hand. If it were not pronounced to be a collec-

* I do not mean that the entire press of India and England condemned it; but I believe that, at the time, it had very few genuine supporters; and I know that now it has fewer still.

tion of absolute falsehoods, it was described as a most disingenuous distortion of the truth. In India every war is more or less popular. The constitution of Anglo-Indian society renders it almost impossible that it should be otherwise. But many, who rejoiced in the prospect before them, wished that they were about to draw their swords in a better cause; and openly criticised the Governor-General's declaration, whilst they could not bring themselves to wish it unwritten.

Had the relief of Herat been the one avowed object of the expedition, a war now to be undertaken for that purpose would have had many more supporters. The movement might have been a wise, or it might have been an unwise one; but it would have been an intelligible, straightforward movement, with nothing equivocal about it. It would have been addressed to the counteraction of a real, or supposed danger, and would have been plainly justifiable as a measure of self-defence. But it was not equally clear that because Mahomed Shah made war upon Herat, England was justified in making war upon Dost Mahomed. The siege of Herat and the failure of the Caubul Mission were mixed up together in Lord Auckland's manifesto; but with all his own and his secretary's ingenuity, his Lordship could not contrive, any more than I have contrived in this narrative, to make the two events hang together by any other than the slenderest thread. It was believed at this time that Herat would fall; and that Candahar and Caubul would then make their obeisance to Mahomed Shah. But we had ourselves alienated the friendship of the Barukzye Sirdars. They had thrown themselves into the arms of the Persian King, only because we had thrust them off. We had forced them into an attitude of hostility which they were unwilling to assume; and had ourselves aggravated the dangers which we were now about to face

on the western frontier of Afghanistan. That in the summer of 1838, there existed a state of things calling for active measures on the part of the British Government is not to be denied; but I believe it to be equally undeniable that this state of things was mainly induced by the feebleness of our own policy towards the Barukzye Sirdars.

The comments which might be made in this place on Lord Auckland's Simlah manifesto have been, for the most part, anticipated. How far Dost Mahomed "persisted in using the most unreasonable pretensions," and "avowed schemes of aggrandisement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India," I have shown in a former chapter. I have shown, too, how far the best authorities were of opinion that the Barukzye Sirdars were "ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British."* Little comment is called for beyond that involved in the recital of these facts, the studious suppression of which by the government of the day is the best proof of the importance attached to them.†

* The facts may be briefly repeated in a note. M'Neill recommended the consolidation of Afghanistan under Dost Mahomed. Burnes recommended the same course. Wade recommended the government to rely upon the disunion of the Barukzye Sirdars, and was opposed to consolidation of any kind.

† The responsibility of this famous manifesto belongs to Lord Auckland, though some of his colleagues in the government at home have declared themselves willing to share it with him. Sir John Hobhouse, in 1850, told the Official Salaries Committee, in reply to a question on the subject of the Afghan war, that he "did it himself;" and so far as the announcement went entirely to acquit the East India Company of taking part in the

origination of the war, it is to be accepted as a laudable revelation of the truth; but although Lord Palmerston and Sir John Hobhouse saw the expediency of extricating the British Government from the difficulties into which the conduct of Mahomed Shah had thrown them, by encouraging a demonstration from the side of India, the expenses of which would be thrown upon the Indian exchequer, they are to be regarded rather as accessories after, than before, the fact. The truth is, that Lord Auckland had determined on the course of policy to be pursued, not before the India Board despatches were written, but before they were received. Sir John Hobhouse stated in the House of Commons (June 23, 1842) that Lord Auckland "must not

The oldest, the most experienced, and the most sagacious Indian politicians were of opinion that the expedition, though it might be attended at the outset with some delusive success, would close in disaster and disgrace. Among those who most emphatically disapproved of the movement and predicted its failure, were the Duke of Wellington, Lord Wellesley, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Mr. Edmonstone, and Sir Charles Metcalfe.* The Court

bear the blame of the measure; it was the policy of government; and he might mention that the despatch which he wrote, stating his opinion of the course that ought to be taken in order to meet expected emergencies, and that written by Lord Auckland, informing him that the expedition had already been undertaken, crossed each other on the way." When the Whig ministry went out of office in the spring of 1839, it was believed that the Peel cabinet would repudiate the Simlah manifesto, and direct a considerable modification of the measures which were to follow the declaration of war. The bedchamber *émeute* arrested the formation of the Peel ministry; and it was mainly to serve Lord Auckland, and to escape the disgrace of a public reversal of their Indian policy, that the Whigs again took the reins of government. After this, Sir John Hobhouse never neglected an opportunity of publicly identifying himself with Lord Auckland's policy, and was not deterred, even by the disastrous termination of the war, from boasting that he was the author of it.

* The Duke of Wellington said that our difficulties would commence where our military successes ended. Lord Wellesley always spoke contemptuously of the folly of occupying a land of "rocks, sands, deserts, ice and snow." Sir Charles Metcalfe from the first protested against Lord Auckland's measures with respect to the trade of the Indus; and in

1835-36, when Mr. Ellis's proposal to assist Dost Mahomed with British officers and drill-instructors to discipline his army (*ante*, page 156), came down to Calcutta, said, one day after council, "Depend upon it, the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves is for us to cross the Indus and meddle with the countries beyond it." Mr. Edmonstone always hung down his head, and almost groaned aloud, when the Afghan expedition was named; and Mr. Elphinstone wrote in a private letter: "You will guess what I think of affairs in Caubul. You remember when I used to dispute with you against having even an agent in Caubul, and now we have assumed the protection of the state, as much as if it were one of the subsidiary allies in India. If you send 27,000 men up the *Durra-i-Bolan* to Candahar (as we hear is intended), and can feed them, I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Caubul and set up Soojah; but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed, I fear you will weaken the position against Russia. The Afghans were neutral, and would have received your aid against invaders with gratitude—they will now be disaffected and glad to join any invader to drive you out. I never knew a close alliance between a civilised and an uncivilised state that did not end in mutual hatred in three years. If the restraint of a close connexion with us were not

of Directors of the East India Company were strongly opposed to the war, and had no part in its initiation beyond the performance of such mechanical duties as are prescribed by act of parliament. The members of the Secret Committee are compelled to sign the despatches laid before them by the Board of Control; and the President of the Board of Control has unreservedly admitted that, beyond the mere mechanical act of signing the papers laid before them, they had no part in the recommendation or authorisation of the war. The policy of the East India Company is a policy of non-interference. They had seldom lost an opportunity of inculcating upon their governors the expediency of refraining from intermeddling with the Trans-Indian states.* The temper, indeed, of this great body is essentially pacific; all the instructions which emanate from them have a tendency towards the preservation of peace and the non-extension of empire; and when the merits and demerits of their government come to be weighed in the balance, it can never be imputed to them that they have been eager to draw the sword from the scabbard, or have willingly squandered the resources of India upon unjust and unprofitable wars.

But it is stated in the manifesto itself that the war was undertaken "with the concurrence of the Supreme Council of India." It would be presumptuous to affirm the absolute untruth of a statement thus publicly made in the face of the world by a nobleman of Lord Auck-

enough to make us unpopular, the connexion with Runjeet and our guarantee of his conquests must make us detested. These opinions formed at a distance may seem absurd on the spot; but I still retain them notwithstanding all I have yet heard."—*[MS. Correspondence.]*

* In a despatch from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General,

dated September 20, 1837, there occurs this remarkable passage:—"With respect to the states west of the Indus, you have uniformly observed the proper course, which is to have no political connexion with any state or party in those regions, to take no part in their quarrels, but to maintain so far as possible a friendly connexion with all of them."

land's unquestionable integrity; but so certain is it that the manifesto was not issued with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, that when the document was sent down to Calcutta to take its place among the records of the empire, there issued from the Council-Chamber a respectful remonstrance against the consummation of a measure of such grave importance, without an opportunity being afforded to the counsellors of recording their opinions upon it. The remonstrance went to England, and elicited an assurance to the effect that the Governor-General could have intended no personal slight to the members of the Supreme Council; but those members were far too high-minded to have thought for a moment about the personalities of the case; they thought only of the great national interests at stake, and regretted that they should ever be jeopardised by such disregard of the opinions of the Governor-General's legitimate advisers. Such a manifesto as this would never have been cradled in Calcutta.

It would not be just, however, to scrutinise the policy of Lord Auckland at this time by the light of our after experience. We know now that before the Simlah manifesto was barely incubated, the Persians had raised the siege of Herat,—that, for all purposes of defence against encroachments from the westward, the expedition to Kur-rack, contemptible as it was in itself, had sufficed. We know that the handful of "rotten Hindoos," as Mahomed Shah subsequently designated them, magnified by report into an immense armament, had caused that monarch to strike his camp before Herat, and march back his baffled army to Teheran. But, on the 1st of October, 1838, Lord Auckland believed, and had good grounds for believing, that the fall of Herat was inevitable. At this time it may have been questioned whether the restoration of Shah Soojah to the sovereignty

of the Douranee Empire were the best means of resisting Persian aggression and combating Russian intrigue, but few doubted the propriety of doing something to meet the dangers that threatened us from these sources. Had Herat fallen to the Persian arms, the Barukzye Sirdars, without some intervention on our part, would have prostrated themselves at the feet of the Persian monarch; and Russia would have established an influence in Afghanistan which we should have striven in vain to counteract. There was a real danger, therefore, to be feared. Though the means employed were of doubtful justice and expediency, the end to be accomplished was one of legitimate attainment.

But before the Simlah proclamation had obtained general currency throughout India, authentic intelligence of the retrograde movement of the Persian army had reached the camp of the Governor-General. The tidings which arrived, in the first instance, from various native sources, and had been conveyed to Lord Auckland by the political officers on the frontier, were now officially confirmed. The siege of Herat had been raised. Mahomed Shah had "mounted his horse, Ameerj," and turned his face towards his own capital. The legitimate object of the expedition across the Indus was gone. All that remained was usurpation and aggression. It was believed, therefore, that the army assembling on the north-western frontier would be broken up; and Shah Soojah and Runjeet Singh left to pursue their own policy as might seem most expedient to them. The Simlah proclamation had placed the siege of Herat in the foreground as the main cause of the contemplated expedition; and now that the pretext for the invasion of Afghanistan was removed, political consistency seemed to require that the sword should be returned to the scabbard. With no common anxiety, therefore, was the

result of this unexpected intelligence from Herat awaited by the regiments which had been warned for active service, and were now in all the excitement of preparation for a long and adventurous march. The disappointment anticipated by many descended only upon a few. On the 8th of November, all doubts were set at rest, and all anxieties removed by the publication of an order by the Governor-General, setting forth that, although the siege of Herat had been raised, the expedition across the Indus would not be abandoned:

ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
OF INDIA. SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Camp de Buddee, 8th November.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General of India is pleased to publish, for general information, the subjoined extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart, dated Herat, the 10th September, 1838, and addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India.

"I have the honour, by direction of her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Hon. East India Company's Envoy at the Court of Persia, to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, that his Majesty the Shah of Persia yesterday raised the siege of this city, and with the whole of the royal camp marched to Sangbust, about twelve miles, on his return to his own dominions. His Majesty proceeds without delay, by Torrbut Sheki Jaum and Meshid, to Teheran.

"This is in fulfilment of his Majesty's compliance with the demands of the British Government, which I had the honour of delivering on the 12th inst., and of the whole of which his Majesty announced his acceptance on the 14th of August.

"His Majesty Shah Kamran and his Vuzeer, Yar Mahomed Khan, and the whole city, feel sensible of the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government, and Mr. Pottinger and myself fully participate in their gratitude to Providence for the happy event I have now the honour to report."

In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the Governor-

General deems it proper at the same time to notify, that while he regards the relinquishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat as a just cause of congratulation to the Government of British India and its allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General is pleased to appoint Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, to be Political Agent at Herat, subject to the orders of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. This appointment is to have effect from the 9th of September last, the date on which the siege of Herat was raised by the Shah of Persia.

In conferring the above appointment upon Lieutenant Pottinger, the Governor-General is glad of the opportunity afforded him of bestowing the high applause which is due to the signal merits of that officer, who was present in Herat during the whole period of its protracted siege, and who, under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty, has, by his fortitude, ability, and judgment, honourably sustained the reputation and interests of his country.

By order of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,

Secretary to the Government of India, with the
Governor-General.

When the Persian army was before Herat—when the Afghan garrison was on the eve of surrender—when the chiefs of Caubul and Candahar were prostrating themselves at the feet of Mahomed Shah, the expedition for the restoration of Shah Soojah was one of doubtful honesty and doubtful expediency. The retrogression of the Persian army removed it at once from the category of questionable acts. There was no longer any question about it. The failure of Mahomed Shah cut from under the feet of Lord Auckland all ground of justification, and rendered the expedition across the Indus at once a

folly and a crime. The tripartite treaty did not pledge the British Government to send a single soldier beyond the frontier. The despatch of a British army into the heart of Afghanistan was no part of the covenant either with Runjeet Singh or Shah Soojah. It was wholly an after-thought. When Macnaghten, after his conferences with the Maharajah of the Punjaub and the ex-King of Caubul, returned to Simlah to lay the result of his mission before the Governor-General, the British Government had pledged itself only to furnish a handful of European officers to raise and discipline the Shah's regiments; and so little had any obligation been imposed upon us to surround the ex-King with our battalions, on his restoration to his old dominions, that he himself expressed an eager hope that he would be suffered to advance as an independent prince, and not as a mere puppet in our hands.*

To march a British army into Afghanistan was not, therefore, an obligation upon the Indian Government; it was their deliberate choice. The avowed object of the expedition, as set forth in the November declaration, was the establishment of a friendly power in Afghanistan. But the subversion of an existing dynasty could only be justified on the ground that its hostility threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity of our own dominions. Whatever the hostility of the Barukzye Sirdars may have been when Mahomed Shah was before the gates of Herat, it had now ceased to be formidable. It was obvious that the chiefs of Caubul and Candahar were little likely to exaggerate the power of a Prince that had brought all his military resources to bear upon the reduction of a place of no reputed strength, and, after an

* A general assurance had been given to Runjeet Singh, in reply to a difficulty started by himself, that if the allies met with any reverses, the British Government would advance to their aid; but he had failed to elicit from Macnaghten any more specific promise of co-operation.

ineffectual struggle of nine months' duration, had retreated, either because he was unequal to the longer continuance of the contest, or because the British Government had landed 500 Sepoys on an island in the Persian Gulf. It was only in connexion with the Russo-Persian movement that an alliance with the rulers of Afghanistan had become a matter of concernment to the British Government. It was only by a reference to the crisis which had thus arisen that the Indian Government could in any way justify their departure from the course of non-interference laid down by the Court of Directors, and recognised by Lord Auckland and his predecessors. But now that the danger, to the counteraction of which the expedition across the Indus was directed, had passed away, the expedition was still to be undertaken. A measure so hazardous, and so costly, as the march of a British army to the foot of the Hindoo-Koosh, was only justifiable so long as it was absolutely indispensable to the defence of our Indian possessions; but if so extreme a measure had ever been, it was no longer necessary, to the security of India, now that the army of Mahomed Shah, defeated and disgraced, was on its way back to the capital of Persia. The expedition now to be undertaken had no longer any other ostensible object than the substitution of a monarch, whom the people of Afghanistan had repeatedly, in emphatic, scriptural language, spued out, for those Barukzye chiefs who, whatever may have been the defects of their government, had contrived to maintain themselves in security, and their country in peace, with a vigour and a constancy unknown to the luckless Suddozye Princes. Had we started with the certainty of establishing a friendly power and a strong government in Afghanistan, the importance of the end would have borne no just relation to the magnitude of the means to be employed for its accomplishment. But at the best it was

a mere experiment. There were more reasons why it should fail than why it should succeed.* It was commenced in defiance of every consideration of political and military expediency; and there were those who, arguing the matter on higher grounds than those of mere expediency, pronounced the certainty of its failure, because there was a canker of injustice at the core. It was, indeed, an experiment on the forbearance alike of God and of man; and therefore, though it might dawn in success and triumph, it was sure to set in failure and disgrace.

* Shah Soojah himself said that there would be little chance of his becoming popular in Afghanistan, if he returned to the country openly and avowedly supported, not by his own troops, but by those of the Feringhees. Even the less overt assistance of an infidel government was likely to cast discredit upon the undertaking in the eyes of "true believers." The Shah talked about the bigotry of the Mahomedans; but it was plain that he had his misgivings on the subject. "During a visit," says Captain Wade, "which I paid to the Shah, the day before yesterday, he informed me that some Mahomedans of Delhi had been writing to him, to inquire how he could reconcile it to his conscience, as a true believer in the Koran, to accept the assistance of a Christian people to recover his kingdom. The Shah said that he contemplated with pity the bigotry of these people, and

began to quote a passage of the Koran to prove their ignorance of its doctrines with reference to the subject on which they had presumed to address him. Having a day or two previously received information that the Newab of Bhopal had made a particular request of his Lordship to be permitted to place a party of his kinsmen and retainers at the service of the British Government, on the present occasion from the desire which he had to testify his deep sense of gratitude to it for the manner in which it had watched and protected the interests of their family in every necessitude of their political existence, I mentioned the circumstance to his Majesty, to show the different views that prevailed among the followers of the faith, both with regard to their duty to the state and to their religion."—[*Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten: October 5, 1838. MS. Records.*]

BOOK III.

[1838—1839.]

CHAPTER I.

The Army of the Indus—Gathering at Ferozepore—Resignation of Sir Henry Fane—Route of the Army—Passage through Bahwulpore—The Ameers of Sindh—The Hyderabad Question—Passage of the Bolan Pass—Arrival at Candahar.

THE army destined for the occupation of Afghanistan assembled at Ferozepore, on the north-western frontier of the British dominions, in the latter part of the month of November. It had been agreed that the expedition across the Indus should be inaugurated by a grand ceremonial meeting between Lord Auckland and Runjeet Singh;* and that the troops of the two nations should be paraded before the illustrious personages, there reciprocating hospitalities and interchanging other marks of friendship and respect.

The Governor-General reached Ferozepore on the 27th of November. The Commander-in-Chief and the infantry of the Army of the Indus had arrived a day or

* The meeting was agreed upon before the British Government had determined to cross the Indus; and Runjeet complained of its tardy accomplishment, on the ground of the expense that he was obliged to incur in keeping his troops together.

two before; and on the following day the main body of the cavalry and artillery took up their ground on the plain.* On the 29th,† the first meeting between Lord Auckland and Runjeet Singh took place amidst a scene of indescribable uproar and confusion. The camp of the Governor-General was pitched at the distance of some four miles from the river Gharra. In the centre of a wide street of tents were those set apart for the purposes of the Durbar. A noble guard of honour lined the way, as amidst the roar of artillery and the clang of military music, Runjeet Singh, escorted by the English secretaries and some of the principal political and military officers in camp, rode up, in the centre of a line of elephants, to the Durbar tent. The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief came forth to meet them. Then came the crush of the two lines of elephants, urged forward by the goads of their drivers, and meeting with a terrific shock—the clangour of a tumultuous crowd of Sikh horsemen and footmen—a rush of English officers eager to see the show; and, presently, amidst such tumult and such noise as had seldom before been seen or heard, the elephants of the Governor-General and the Maharajah were brought side by side, and Lord Auckland, in his uniform of diplomatic blue, was seen to take a bundle of crimson cloth out of the Sikh howdah, and it was known that the lion of the Punjaub was then seated on the elephant of the English ruler. In a minute the little, tottering, one-eyed man, who had founded a vast empire on the

* It is generally acknowledged that nothing could have been more orderly, or more creditable both to the regiments and their commanding officers, than the style in which all the components of the "Army of the Indus" made their way to Ferozepore. Captain Havelock, an excellent autho-

rity on such points, says: "A force has never been brought together in any country, in a manner more creditable and soldier-like than was the Bengal portion of the Army of the Indus."

† Captain Havelock says the 28th —Colonel Fane, the 29th.

banks of the fabulous rivers of the Macedonian conquests, was leaning over the side of the howdah shaking hands with the principal officers of the British camp as their elephants were wheeled up beside him. Then the huge phalanx of elephants was set in motion again. There was a rush towards the Durbar tent—the English and the Sikh *cortège* were mixed up together in one great mass of animal life. Such was the crush—such was the struggle—that many of the attendant Sikhs believed that there was a design to destroy their old decrepit chief, and “began to blow their matches and grasp their weapons with an air of mingled distrust and ferocity.”* But in time a passage was made, and the imbecile little old man was to be seen tottering into the Durbar tent, supported on one side by the Governor-General, and on the other by Sir Henry Fane, whose fine manly proportions and length of limb, as he forced his way through the crowd, presented a strange contrast to the puny dimensions of the Sikh chieftain who leant upon his arm.

In the tent the ladies of the Governor-General's family, and those of some of the principal military and political officers, were seated, ready to receive his Highness. The customary formalities were gone through, and civilities interchanged; and then the Maharajah was conducted into an inner chamber, where the presents intended for his reception were laid out in costly and curious array. Here, a picture of Queen Victoria, from the easel of Miss Eden, whose felicitous pencil has rendered the European eye familiar with the persons of many of the principal Sikh chieftains who graced the Ferozepore gathering, was presented to Runjeet Singh.

* Captain Havelock's *Narrative—Years in India*; and Mr. Stocqueler's *Memorials of Afghanistan* also contribute some details.

Sir Willoughby Cotton bore it, with becoming reverence, into the tent, and as he presented it to the Maharajah, who bowed before it, the guns of the camel battery roared forth a royal salute. Then Runjeet was escorted to another tent, where specimens of British ordnance, caparisoned elephants, and horses of noble figure, stood ready for his Highness's acceptance. All these were inspected with due expressions of admiration and a becoming interchange of courtesies, and then, amidst an uproar of hurras, a crash of military music, and another scene of indescribable confusion, Runjeet Singh ascended his elephant and turned his back upon the British camp.*

On the following day Lord Auckland returned the visit of Runjeet Singh. It was said by one present on this occasion, that the Sikhs "shone down the English."† The camp of the Maharajah was on the other side of the river; and there, amidst a scene of Oriental splendour, difficult to describe or imagine, the great Sikh chieftain received the representative of the British nation. The splendid costumes of the Sikh Sirdars—the gorgeous trappings of their horses—the glittering steel casques and corslets of chain armour—the scarlet and yellow dresses—the tents of crimson and gold—made up a show of Eastern magnificence equally grand and picturesque. As the Maharajah saluted the Governor-General, the familiar notes of the national anthem arose from the instruments of a Sikh band, and the guns of the Kalsa roared forth their expected wel-

* "It is worthy of notice that a strange accident befel the old Maharajah in the tent containing the larger gifts of the British Government. He was not very firm on his legs at any time, but here he had the misfortune to stumble over a pile of shells, and fell prostrate before the British guns."—[*Havelock's Narra-*

tive.] Remembering how the Sikh Empire fell before the British guns at Goojrat, we may at least observe that this was a curious type of the destiny then awaiting the great kingdom founded by Runjeet Singh.

† *Stocqueler's Memorials of Afghanistan.*

come. In the splendid Durbar tent of the ruler of the Punjab, the British Statesman and British General, after the due formalities had been observed and some conversation had been carried on through the medium of interpreters, were regaled with an unseemly display of dancing girls, and the antics of some male buffoons. The evening entertainments were still less decorous. It was a melancholy thing to see the open exhibition, even on this great public occasion, of all those low vices which were destroying the life, and damning the reputation, of one in whom were some of the elements of heroism—who, indeed, but for these degrading sensualities, would have been really one of the greatest, as he was one of the most remarkable, men of modern times.

Then came a grand display of the military resources of the two nations. On one day the British force was manœuvred by Sir Henry Fane, and on another the Sikh troops were exercised by the Sirdars. The consummate skill with which the British chief attacked an imaginary enemy was equalled by the gallantry with which he defeated it. He fought, indeed, a great battle on the plain, and only wanted another army in his front to render his victory a complete one. The Sikh Sirdars were contented with less elaborate movements; but what their troops were ordered to do they did readily and well, and military critics in the British camp admitted that their allies made no contemptible show of the tactics which they had learnt from their French instructors.*

Runjeet Singh returned to Lahore, and the Governor-General followed him, on a complimentary visit, to the Sikh capital; whilst the British troops prepared to cross

* For an account of the manœuvres both of the British and Sikh divisions, see Captain Havelock's *Narrative*.

the frontier in furtherance of the objects mapped out in the great Simlah manifesto. But there was no longer a Persian army to be encountered at Herat—no longer a Russian force in the background. The expedition had lost half its popularity with the army; and the force that was to take the field had been shorn of a portion of its original dimensions. On the 27th of November it had been publicly announced by the Commander-in-Chief, “that circumstances in the countries west of the Indus had so greatly changed since the assembly of the army for service, that the Governor-General had deemed that it was not requisite to send forward the whole force; but that a part only would be equal to effecting the future objects in view.” It had become the duty therefore of the Commander-in-Chief to determine what regiments should cross the Indus, and what should remain in Hindostan. Sir Henry Fane had selected for service the corps whose efficiency, on his recent tour of inspection, had been most clearly demonstrated; and now that it devolved upon him to dash the hopes of some of these regiments, unwilling to make an invidious choice, he had decided the difficult question by lot. Instead of two divisions, the Bengal army was now to consist of one, under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton. The brigades of infantry commanded by Colonels Denniss and Paul were to be left behind;* the

* These brigades consisted of the 3rd Buffs, the 2nd, 27th, 5th, 20th, and 53rd Regiments of Native Infantry. Captain Havelock and other military authorities have condemned this decision by lot. It is said that the principle of selection should have been adhered to on the reduction, as well as on the formation of the force. “Sir Henry Fane,” says Captain Havelock, “need not thus have distrusted or paid so poor a compliment to his own sagacity and impartiality;

the one had seldom been at fault in India or in Europe; the other was above suspicion. Sortilege, after all, did little for the army in one instance; for it sent forward to the labours of the campaign the 13th Light Infantry, then as ever zealous, indeed, and full of alacrity, but even at Ferozepore shattered by disease; the spirit of its soldiers willing, but unequal to the task; whilst it doomed to inactivity the Buffs, one of the most effective European corps in India.” This is

Irregular Cavalry, under that fine old veteran, Colonel Skinner, of the Local Horse, were to share the same fate; and the artillery force, greatly reduced in strength, now lost its Brigadier (Colonel Graham), and was ordered to go forward under Major Pew, who had organised the camel battery, and had joined the brigade in command of that experimental section of the ordnance corps. Nor were these the only changes which the intelligence of the defeat of Mahomed Shah had wrought upon the Bengal force. Sir Henry Fane, as Commander-in-Chief of the Indian army, had determined to take command in person of the forces assembled for the expedition across the frontier. The assemblage of regiments ordered upon this service was to be called "The Army of the Indus." Both the extent of the force, and the objects of the expedition, seemed to demand the supervision of the chief military authority in the country. But now that the force had been greatly reduced, and the objects of the campaign had dwindled down into a measure of interference with the internal government of an independent country, Sir Henry Fane had no ambition to command such a force, or to identify himself with such an expedition. There was no want of physical energy or mental vigour in the man, but his health was failing him at this time; and it was expedient that he should altogether escape from the fiery climate of the Eastern world. He determined, therefore, to resign the command of the expedition into other hands, and to set his face towards his native land.

Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, was coming round from the western pre-

the impartial testimony of an officer of the 13th Light Infantry. It was written immediately after the first campaign of the Army of the Indus. No writer would now regret the chance which sent Sale and Denniss into Afghanistan, and associated the name of the 13th Light Infantry with some of the most illustrious incidents of the war.

sidency, in command of the Bombay division, which was to be conveyed by water from that port to Kurra-chee. On the junction of the two divisions, the chief command would fall into his hands. In Sir Henry Fane the Bengal army had unbounded confidence. They knew him to be a strict, but a good officer. They may have thought that he made of too much account external forms and appearances, better suited to the mild, cloudy atmosphere of Great Britain than to the fiery skies of Hindostan. But they admired the energy of his character; the decision of his judgment; the promptitude of all his actions. The initial measures which had been entrusted to him had been carried out with remarkable ability. There was a coolness in all that he did; a clearness in all that he said; which inspired with unlimited confidence the officers with whom he was associated. They knew that he had the welfare of the army at heart;—that their safety and honour could not be confided to one less likely to abuse the trust. It was with no common regret, therefore, that they saw him yield into other hands the command of the Army of the Indus. Of Sir John Keane they knew little, and what little they did know did not fill them with any very eager desire to place themselves under his command.

Such was the position of affairs at the commencement of December. The Bengal army, then encamped at Ferozepore, consisted of about 9500 men of all arms. The levy that had been raised for the immediate service of Shah Soojah was then passing through Ferozepore. It comprised two regiments of cavalry; four regiments of infantry; and a troop of horse artillery—in all, about 6000 men. It had marched from Loodhianah on the 15th of November, under the command of Major-General Simpson; and was now about, on the 2nd of December, to commence its progress across the frontier. On the

10th of the same month the Bengal division was to break ground from Ferozepore.

The line of march to be followed by the invading army ran, in a south-westerly direction, through the territories of Bahwulpore, and thence crossed, near Subzulkote, the frontier of Sindh, striking down to the banks of the Indus, and crossing the river at Bukkur. It then took a north-westerly course, passing through Shikarpoor, Bhag, and Dadur to the mouth of the Bolan Pass; thence through the pass to Quettah, and from Quettah, through the Kojuck, to Candahar. A glance at any map of the countries on the two sides of the Indus will satisfy the reader at once that this was a strangely devious route from Ferozepore to Candahar. The army was about to traverse two sides of a triangle, instead of shaping its course along the third.

But it was hardly a subject for after-consideration, when the tripartite treaty had been signed, what route should be taken by the army destined for the restoration of Shah Soojah to his old dominions. It had from the first been intended that the Shah should proceed through the Sindh country, whilst Runjeet's troops were advancing through the Khybur Pass. It was not, indeed, a geographical but a political question. It was necessary that the army should proceed through Sindh, for the Ameers were to be coerced.

It had been determined, in the first instance, that twenty lakhs of rupees should be paid by the Ameers of Sindh, as ransom-money, for Shikarpoor. Runjeet, as has been seen, asked for more than a moiety of the money, which it was proposed to divide equally between him and Shah Soojah; and, as it was not deemed expedient by the British Government to gratify Runjeet's cupidity at the expense of the King, it was determined that the amount demanded from the Ameers should be

increased, and that Runjeet should receive fifteen instead of ten lakhs, without injury to the claims of his ally. But there seemed to be some doubt whether the Ameers would consent to pay the money thus appropriated to others' uses. The Shikarpoor question, indeed, required some definite settlement by Shah Soojah himself; and as Shah Soojah was to proceed through Sindh, for the purpose of bringing the Ameers to a proper understanding of their duties, it was necessary that the British army that escorted him should march by the same route.

That the Ameers should have demurred to the payment of the money claimed by an exile of thirty years' standing would, under any circumstances, have been a result of the demand exciting no surprise in the mind of any reasonable being on one side of the Indus or on the other. But that, having already received a formal release from the Shah, they should have objected to the revival of an abandoned claim, is something so natural and so intelligible that it would have been a miracle if they had not resisted the demand. Colonel Pottinger saw this at once: he saw the injustice of the whole proceeding; and he wrote to the Supreme Government: "The question of a money-payment by the Ameers of Sindh to Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk is, in my humble opinion, rendered very puzzling by two releases written in Korans, and sealed and signed by his Majesty, which they have produced. Their argument now is, that they are sure the Governor-General does not intend to make them pay again for what they have already bought and obtained, in the most binding way, a receipt in full."*

Injustice ever begets injustice. It was determined by the Simlah Council that Shah Soojah and the Army of

* Colonel H. Pottinger to Government: *Published Papers relating to Sindh.*

the Indus should be sent through the country of the Ameers. To accomplish this, it was necessary that, in the first instance, an existing treaty should be set aside. When the Ameers consented to open the navigation of the Indus, it was expressly stipulated that no military stores should be conveyed along the river. But as soon as ever Lord Auckland had resolved to erect a friendly power in Afghanistan, and to march a British army across the Indus, it became necessary to tear this prohibitory treaty to shreds, and to trample down the scruples of the Ameers. "Whilst the present exigency lasts," it was intimated to Colonel Pottinger, "you may apprise the Ameers that the article of the treaty with them, prohibiting the using of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores, must necessarily be suspended during the course of operations undertaken for the permanent establishment of security to all those who are a party to the treaty." And that there might be no miscomprehension of the general course of policy, which the Governor-General desired to pursue towards the Ameers, a letter was addressed to Colonel Pottinger, stating that "he (the Governor-General) deems it hardly necessary to remind you that in the important crisis at which we are arrived, we cannot permit our enemies to occupy the seat of power: the interests at stake are too great to admit of hesitation in our proceedings; and not only they who have shown a disposition to favour our adversaries, but they who display an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary* undertaking in which we are engaged, must be displaced, and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation we may

* "Just and necessary!"

——— Earth is sick,
And Heaven is weary of the hollow words
Which States and Kingdoms utter when they talk
Of truth and justice.

be able implicitly to rely." This was the dragooning system now to be carried out in Sindh. Sensible of the injustice of such proceedings, and the discreditable breach of faith that they involved, Colonel Pottinger did his best to soften down these intimations; but still the naked fact remained, that if the Ameers of Sindh displayed any unwillingness to co-operate with the parties to a treaty under which they were to be fined a quarter of a million of money, they were at once to be dragooned into submission and deprived of their possessions, at the point of our bayonets and the muzzles of our guns.*

The system now to be adopted was one of universal intimidation and coercion. Along the whole line of country which the armies were to traverse, the will and pleasure of the British Government was to be the only principle of action recognisable in all our transactions with the weaker States, which were now to be dragooned into prompt obedience. Their co-operation was not to be sought, but demanded. Anything short of hearty acquiescence was to be interpreted into a national offence. The Khan of Bahwulpore and the Ameers of Sindh were ordered not only to suffer the passage of our

* I do not intend to enter into the politics of Sindh more than is absolutely necessary to the elucidation of the history of the war in Afghanistan; but it ought to be mentioned here that the harsh and unjust treatment of the Ameers in 1838-39 has been defended or extenuated upon the grounds of an alleged traitorous correspondence with Mahomed Shah of Persia. A letter from one of the Ameers to the "King of Kings" was intercepted, but Colonel Pottinger declared that it was of no political importance, but simply an ebullition of Sheeahism, addressed to Mahomed Shah as Defender of the Faith.—*[Correspondence relating to Afghanis-*

tan.] A letter, also said to have been written by the Persian King to two of the Ameers (Mahomed Khan and Nussur Khan), acknowledging the receipt of letters from them and exhorting them to look to him for protection, was forwarded from Khelat to Runjeet Singh, who sent it in through Captain Wade to the Governor-General. But Major Todd, who by this time had joined Shah Soojah at Loodhianah, "did not hesitate to pronounce it, from its style and language, to be a palpable fabrication."—*[Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten: October 24, 1838. MS. Records.]*

troops through their dominions, but also to supply them on their way. The former had ever been regarded as one of the staunchest friends of the British Government; but when he was called upon to collect camels and to place supplies at the different stages for the use of the army, the work was carried on with obvious reluctance. It was found necessary to remind the Khan of his "obligations" and "responsibilities." The officers of the Khan affected to believe that the British force would not march, and, whilst laying in supplies for the Shah's troops, hesitated to make an effort in behalf of our supporting columns. The "obstinacy and perversity"—the "duplicity and equivocation"—the "neglectful, if not reckless conduct of the Bahwulpore authorities," was severely commented upon by our political officers;* and it was apprehended that the march of the army would be delayed by the misguided conduct of our respectable ally.

The reluctance of the Bahwulpore authorities was soon overcome; but the demands made upon the forbearance of the Ameers of Sindh were of a more oppressive and irritating character. The Bahwul Khan has ever been held up to admiration as the most consistently friendly of all the allies of the British Government; but the expedition was distasteful to him and his people, and the real feeling broke out in the beginning, though, after a while, it was suppressed. It is not strange, therefore, that the Talpoor Ameers, of whom so much more was demanded, should have co-operated somewhat unwillingly in a measure which had openly exacted from them a large amount of treasure, and was not unlikely in the end to deprive them of all that they possessed. Interpreted into

* *Captain Wade to Mr. Macnaghten: Nov. 8 and 9, 1838. MS. Records.*

homely English, the language now to be addressed to these unhappy Princes was simply, "Your money or your life." Colonel Pottinger was the agent employed, in the first instance, to dictate terms to the Court of Hyderabad; but he was too clear-headed and too high-minded a man not to perceive the injustice of the course prescribed by his government, and to feel painfully unwilling to pursue it. The instructions he had received, divested of the specious outside dress of diplomatic phraseology, and rendered in plain English by Colonel Pottinger himself, were truly of a startling character. The British agent was directed to tell the Ameers that "the day they connected themselves with any other power than England would be the last of their independence, if not of their rule." "Neither," it was added, "the ready power to crush and annihilate them, nor the will to call it into action, were wanting, if it appeared requisite, however remotely, for the safety or integrity of the Anglo-Indian Empire or frontier." The Ameers were known to be weak; and they were believed to be wealthy. Their money was to be taken; their country to be occupied; their treaties to be set aside at the point of the bayonet, but amidst a shower of hypocritical expressions of friendship and good-will.

Whilst Colonel Pottinger, not without some scruples, was enclosing the Ameers of Lower Sindh in the toils of his diplomacy, Captain Burnes, who by this time had reaped the reward of his services in knighthood and a lieutenant-colonelcy, was proceeding to operate upon the Princes of Beloochistan. Originally sent upon a mission to Mehrab Khan of Khelat, he had turned aside, however, to negotiate with the Ameers of Khyrpore, in Lower Sindh, and had found them more tractable than the Hyderabad Princes in Colonel Pottinger's hands. It was deemed expedient that the British troops should cross the Indus

at Bukkur, and Burnes was instructed to obtain the temporary cession of the island. The fortress stands on a rock, dividing the river into two channels. Apprehending that the incursion of British troops into their country would be followed by acts of territorial spoliation, the Ameers of Khyrpore, whilst expressing in general terms their willingness to co-operate with our government, expressly stipulated that the forts on either bank of the river were to be untouched. But as Bukkur stood on neither bank, but on an island, it appeared to the British diplomatist that the wording of the memorandum actually placed the fortress in his hands. Ashamed, however, of such an exhibition of legal acuteness, he declared that he had no intention to take advantage of such a reading of the document; he cited it merely as an instance of the manner in which very cunning people sometimes overreach themselves. There was no need, indeed, to look for flaws in a state paper, when the Army of the Indus was assembling to help itself to what it liked. The Ameers were told that, whatever might be their dislike to the march of our troops through Sindh, "the Sindhian who hoped to stop the approach of the British army might as well seek to dam up the Indus at Bukkur." The fiat had gone forth, an army was to march, and it was now on the road.

There was every reason why the restoration of Shah Soojah, who was famous for the extravagance of his pretensions in the direction of Sindh, should have been viewed with apprehension and alarm by the Talpoor Ameers. But the matter now began to wear a much more formidable aspect. The British Government had not only announced its intention to assist the long-exiled monarch in his attempt to regain his crown, but had encouraged him to assert long dormant claims, and had announced its intention to march an army into the

country of the Ameers, to plant a subsidiary force there, to compel the Princes of Sindh to pay for it, to knock down and set up the Princes themselves at discretion, to take possession of any part of the country that might be wanted for our own purposes—in fact, to treat Sindh and Beloochistan in all respects as though they were petty principalities of our own. That the Ameers thus struggling in our grasp, conscious of their inability openly to resist oppression, should have writhed and twisted, and endeavoured to extricate themselves by the guile which might succeed, rather than by the strength which could not, was only to follow the universal law of nature in all such contests between the weak and the strong. Macnaghten complained, some time afterwards, that no civilised beings had ever been treated so badly as were the British by the Princes of Sindh. If it were so, it was only because no civilised beings had ever before committed themselves to acts of such gross provocation. Throughout the entire period of British connexion with Afghanistan, a strange moral blindness clouded the visions of our statesmen: they saw only the natural, the inevitable results of their own measures, and forgot that those measures were the dragon's teeth from which sprung up the armed men. The Ameers of Sindh viewed all our proceedings at this time with mingled terror and indignation. Our conduct was calculated to alarm and incense them to the extremest point of fear and irritation; and yet we talked of their childish distrust and their unprovoked hostility.

The Ameers of Sindh were told that, whether they were friendly or unfriendly to the movement, the British army would cross the Indus when and where our government directed, and do whatsoever our government pleased—that resistance on their part would be not only useless, but insane, as it would bring down inevitable

destruction on the head of all who stood up to oppose us. From that time these unhappy Princes felt that they ruled only by sufferance of the British. They knew their helplessness, and if at any time they thought of open resistance, the idea was speedily abandoned. Two British armies were bearing down upon their dominions—the one from Upper India—the other from the Sea. Burnes and the Commissariat officers were in advance, laying in supplies for the consumption of the invading force, and threatening with heavy penalties all who refused to co-operate with them. It would be difficult to conceive anything more distressing and more irritating; and yet we expected the Ameers to open their arms and to lay down their treasures at our feet.

The Bengal army moved from Ferozepore on the 10th of December.* Availing themselves of the water-carriage, they moved down parallel to the river. The sick, the hospital stores, and a portion of our Commissariat supplies were forwarded on boats, which were subsequently to be used for the bridging of the Indus. The force consisted of about 9500 men and 38,000 camp-followers. Some 30,000 camels accompanied the army.† There was an immense assemblage of baggage. Sir Henry Fane had exhorted the officers of the Army of the Indus not to encumber themselves with large establishments and unnecessary equipages; but there is a natural disposition on the part of Englishmen, in all quarters of the globe, to carry their comforts with them. It requires

* Shah Soojah's force passed through Ferozepore on the 2nd. Major Todd accompanied the Shah. Macnaghten joined the royal camp at Shikarpoor.

† It had been no easy matter to provide carriage-cattle for that immense assemblage. The camels, which constituted the bulk of the beasts of

burden, had been mostly drawn on hire from Bekaneer, Jaysulmer, and the northern and north-western provinces of India; but the country had been so drained, that at last it became necessary to indent upon the brood-camels of the government stud at Hissar.

a vast deal of exhortation to induce officers to move lightly equipped. The more difficult the country into which they are sent—the more barbarous the inhabitants—the more trying the climate—the greater is their anxiety to surround themselves with the comforts which remote countries and uncivilised people cannot supply, and which ungenial climates render more indispensable. In the turmoil of actual war, all these light matters may be forgotten; but a long, a wearisome, and unexciting march through a difficult but uninteresting country, tries the patience even of the best of soldiers, and fills him with unappeasable yearnings after the comforts which make endurable the tedium of barrack or cantonment life. It is natural that with the prospect of a long and wearisome march before him, he should not be entirely forgetful of the pleasures of the mess-table, or regardless of the less social delights of the pleasant volume and the solacing pipe. Clean linen, too, is a luxury which a civilised man, without any imputation upon his soldierly qualities, may, in moderation, desire to enjoy. The rudeness and barrenness of the country compel him to supply himself at the commencement of his journey with everything that he will require in the course of it; and the exigencies of the climate necessarily increase the extent of these requirements. The expedition across the Indus had been prospectively described as a “grand military promenade;” and if such were the opinion of some of the highest authorities, it is not strange that officers of inferior rank should have endorsed it, and hastened to act upon the suggestion it conveyed. And so marched the Army of the Indus, accompanied by thousands upon thousands of baggage-laden camels and other beasts of burden, spreading themselves for miles and miles over the country, and making up with the multitudinous followers of the camp

one of those immense moving cities, which are only to be seen, when an Indian army takes the field, and streams into an enemy's country.

It was clear, bright, invigorating weather—the glorious cold season of Northern India—when the Army of the Indus entered the territories of Bahwul Khan. Nature seemed to smile on the expedition, and circumstance to favour its progress. There was a fine open country before them; they moved along a good road;* supplies were abundant everywhere. The coyness of the Bahwulpore authorities, which had threatened to delay the initial march of the army, had yielded in good time, and at every stage Mackeson and Gordon had laid up in depôt stores of grain, and fodder, and firewood, for the consumption of man and beast.† Officers and soldiers were in the highest spirits. “These,” it was said by one who accompanied the army on the staff of its commander, and has chronicled all its operations,‡ “were the halcyon days of the movements of this force.” To the greater number who now crossed the frontier this was their virgin campaign. The excitement was as novel as it was inspiring. They might be about to meet mighty armies and to subdue great principalities; or they might only be entering upon a “grand military promenade.” Still in that bright December weather the very march through a strange country, with all that

* This road, some 280 miles in length, had been prepared, under Mackeson's directions, to facilitate the march of our troops.

† As the army advanced, the Khan, to whose court Mackeson had been despatched to conclude a treaty of protective alliance, exerted himself to assist the enterprise, and exhibited the most friendly feeling towards Shah Soojah. He gave the Shah two guns—made him a present of money

—sent a party of irregular horse, under one of his chief officers, to escort him through the Bahwulpore dominions; and allowed the officers of the Shah's contingent to recruit their regiment from the ranks of his own regular infantry. The Shah's regiments were in this way raised to their full strength, six hundred men having been drawn from the Bahwulpore army.”—[*MS. Notes.*]

‡ Captain Havelock.

great and motley assemblage, was something joyous and animating. The army was in fine health, full of heart, and overflowing with spirits. It seemed as if an expedition so auspiciously commenced must be one great triumph to the end.

There was but one thing to detract from the general prosperity of the opening of the campaign. Desertion was going on a-pace—not from the ranks of the fighting men, but from the mass of officers' servants, camel-drivers, and camp-followers which streamed out from the rear of the army. The cattle, too, were falling sick and dying by the way-side. The provisions with which they were supplied were not good, and dysentery broke out among them. Many were carried off by their owners, who shrunk from the long and trying journey before them; and it soon became manifest that the most formidable enemy with which the advancing army would have to contend, would be a scarcity of carriage and supplies.

Even in those early days the voice of complaint was not wholly silent;* but when the army began to make its toilsome way through Sindh and Beloochistan, there were few in its ranks who did not look back with regret to the march through Bahwulpore, when all their wants had been supplied in a manner which they were little likely to see again. It was on the 29th of December that the head-quarters of the army reached the capital of Bahwul Khan's country. Sir Henry Fane, who had been proceeding down the river by water, landed from his boats, and held a Durbar on the following day; and on the 31st returned the visit of state which the Khan

* Some of the Shah's troops were very unreasonable in their expectations and their complaints. The raw levies of horse, just recruited from the grain districts of Upper India, made violent complaints because they found that to the westward barley was the food of horses.

had paid him.* On the first day of the new year the army broke ground again, and set out for the frontier of Sindh.

On the 14th of January, the head-quarters of the Army of the Indus entered the Sindh territory near Subzulkote. On the preceding day, Sir Alexander Burnes had joined the British camp; and though he had obtained by his negotiations the cession of Bukkur to the British Government,† for such time as it might seem ex-

* Sir Henry Fane was much pleased with the economy of Bahwul Khan's Court. Though not on an extensive scale, it was, perhaps, better ordered, on the whole, than that of any native potentate at the time.

† The manner in which Meer Roostum, the Ameer of Khyrpore, was dragooned out of Bukkur, is worth relating. It was at first intimated to Burnes that the Ameer objected to the British army passing the river at that point. Of this Burnes wrote: "As to Meer Mahomed Khan's message about this chief's (Meer Roostum's) objections to the Bengal army passing at Bukkur, the minister did speak of such a wish, when I first reached Rohree, which I treated with complete indifference, adding that the army would cross at the most convenient point."—[*Burnes to Pottinger: November 3, 1838.*] Burnes, however, at this time, was doubtful whether it were expedient that the Bengal column should cross the river at Bukkur at all. "I find," he wrote, "on minute inquiries, that if I suggest that the Bengal army should come to Bukkur at all, I shall bring them about fifty miles out of their road to Shikarpoor. Their most direct route is by Gotkee, and when I have seen the river there and the roads from it to Shikarpoor, I shall be able to say whether the army crosses at Gotkee or Bukkur." After a lapse of two or three weeks, † appeared to Burnes that the army

would more expediently cross the river at neither of these points. "The point at which the army would cross the Indus," he wrote to Macnaghten, on the 22nd of November, "has received the fullest consideration. It at first appeared to me that the ferry of Golkee, being on the most direct route to Shikarpoor from the frontiers of Sindh, it should be chosen; but an examination of the country between this and the river showed so much jungle, that I abandoned the intention and sought a ferry lower down, which was found at Azeezpore, east of Shikarpoor, and near the spot where Shah Soojah formerly crossed. By avoiding Rohree, three marches are thus saved."—[*Burnes to Macnaghten: November 22, 1838. MS. Records.*] But the possession of Bukkur itself was coveted by the Supreme Government; and four days afterwards Burnes wrote: "The resolution to fix a force permanently in this country certainly diminishes the value of Bukkur as a military position, since we can possess ourselves of it when we choose. . . . I will by no means lose sight of his Lordship's views on the subject of Bukkur; but if Hyderabad becomes the station of the subsidiary force, and Bukkur is demanded by us, men's eyes will see only that we have seized Sindh, and made no distinction between friend and foe."—[*Burnes to Macnaghten: November 26, 1838. MS. Records.*]

pedient to us to retain it, and had thus secured the peaceful passage of the Indus, the report which he made of the general feeling of the Sindhians was not very encouraging. It was plain that our armed passage

But the wishes of the Supreme Government were so distinctly expressed, that Burnes's reluctance was soon overcome. The course which was to be pursued towards the Hyderabad Ameers seemed to render less objectionable the demand to be made upon the Khyrpore Prince. But the cession of Bukkur was extremely distasteful to Meer Roostum. It was calculated to lower him in the eyes both of the other Ameers and of his own subjects; and Burnes, fearing that he would be dissuaded by his relatives, made the stipulation for the surrender of the place a separate article of the treaty, in order that the Ameer might conceal it from them if he feared that they would remonstrate against it. "I sent my Moonshee, Mohun Lal," wrote Burnes, "with the treaty, signed and sealed, to Khyrpore on the 11th instant, first directing him to give the document to the minister, and then wait on the chief if invited. After a delay of four days, it appeared that all would end well; but the minister was then directed to wait upon me at Shikarpoor, and he came full of grief and dismay at the demands made, and even stated that he had not shown the separate article to Meer Roostum Khan from downright shame."—[*Burnes to Government: Dec. 25, 1838.*] When Burnes, disbelieving the minister's story, despatched Mohun Lal to Khyrpore, to deliver the treaty and the separate article, "face to face," to the Ameer, and to demand his acceptance of its terms, "the consternation," says Burnes, "caused by this public declaration, was very great. The Ameer first offered another fort in its stead; next, to find security that our treasure and munitions were protected; but the Moon-

shee, as instructed, replied to all that nothing but the unqualified cession of the fortress of Bukkur, during the war, would satisfy me. He said it was the heart of his country, his honour was centred in keeping it, his family and children would have no confidence if it were given up, and that if I came to Khyrpore the Ameer could speak in person to me many things. To this I had instructed the Moonshee to say, that it was impossible till he signed the treaty, as I asked a plain question and wanted a plain answer."—[*Published Papers.*] Earnestly was Meer Roostum entreated by his family not to sign the treaty, but to determine to resist the unjust demand. Greatly perplexed and alarmed, he wrote a touching letter of entreaty to Burnes; but by this time his doom was sealed. It was useless for him any longer to struggle against his fate; so on the morning of the 24th of December he sent for Mohun Lal, told him that Burnes had been the first and best friend of the Khybur state, but that he had made an unexpected demand upon him, and that his good name would be irrecoverably lost if Lord Auckland did not seize upon Kurachee, or some other place from the Hyderabad family, who were our enemies, and now triumphing, whilst he, our dearest friend, was thus depressed. If they were suffered to escape, he said, that his only course would be to commit suicide. "With this," wrote Burnes to government, "and saying *Bismillah!* (in the name of God) he sealed the treaty and the separate article in the presence of Ali Morad Khan, Meer Zungee, Soolaman Abdur, and about twenty other people." A day or two afterwards, Burnes himself called on Meer Roostum and received his submission in

through the country of the Ameers was extremely distasteful to them; and that if they did not break out into acts of open hostility, their conduct towards us was likely to be marked by subterfuges, evasions, and deceit of every possible kind.

But it soon began to be suspected that the temper of at least some of the Talpoor Princes was such, that a hostile demonstration against them was little likely to be avoided. The Hyderabad Ameers had assumed an attitude of defiance. They had insulted and outraged Colonel Pottinger, and were now collecting troops for the defence of their capital. Sir John Keane, with the Bombay army, had landed at Vikkur at the end of November, and, after a long and mortifying delay, had made his way on to Tattah. Having come by sea, he was necessarily without carriage. He had relied upon the friendly feelings of the Sindh rulers; but the Sindh rulers were not disposed to do anything for him, but everything against him. They regarded the British General as an enemy, and threw every obstacle in his way. Sir John Keane was compelled, therefore, to remain in inactivity on the banks of the river until the 24th

person. The poor old man, declaring that he was irretrievably disgraced, asked what he could now do to prove the sincerity of his friendship for the British Government. "The answer to this declaration," wrote Burnes, "was plain—to give us orders for supplies, and to place all the country as far as he could at our command—and he has done so as far as he can."—[*Burnes to Government: Khyrpore, Dec. 28, 1838. Published Papers.*] A week after the treaty had been signed, Burnes received a letter from government, containing an allusion to the possibility of some other place being taken instead of Bukkur from the Khyrpore ruler. To which Burnes replied: "I beg to correct any

error in my own communication that may have led his Lordship to the belief that this place is not well adapted for a depôt. I look upon it as the most important military position on the Indus, and in this I am now joined by Major Leech, who has examined it professionally. It is quite a mistake to imagine that it is difficult of access, and that there is but one landing-place. There are two gates, and the ferry-boats can track all round the island. For three months during the swell, the water certainly runs with great velocity, but now the Indus is here as unruffled as a pond."—[*Burnes to Government: Uzeerpoor Ferry, December 31, 1838.*]

of December. A supply of carriage from Cutch, obtained by the energetic exertions of Captain Outram—a supply by no means adequate to the wants of the force, but most welcome at such a time—came opportunely to release Sir John Keane from this local bondage, and the Bombay column then commenced its march into Sindh. Proceeding up the right bank of the Indus to Tattah, and thence to Jerruk, he awaited at the latter place the result of the negotiations which were going on at Hyderabad. Captain Outram and Lieutenant Eastwick had been despatched to the Court of the Ameers with Lord Auckland's ultimatum; and Keane, with the Bombay column, was now, at the end of January, awaiting the result.

Surrounded by his own contingent, Shah Soojah had proceeded in advance of the Bengal column; and his force had crossed the Indus, in very creditable order, before the end of the third week of January. Shikarpoor had been fixed upon as the place of rendezvous. There the force was now encamped, and there the Envoy and Minister joined the suite of the Douranee monarch.

Cotton was to have crossed the Indus at Rohree, which lies opposite to the fort of Bukkur. Some delay had taken place in the cession of the fortress; for the Bengal column had arrived on the banks of the river before the treaty with the Ameer of Khyrpore, by which it was to be ceded, had arrived with the ratification of the Governor-General; and after its arrival, some further delay was occasioned, either by the mistrust or by the guile of the Sindh ruler. He was not ignorant of the state of affairs at Hyderabad. He knew, or suspected, that there was a likelihood of a large portion of the Bengal column being detached, and he was eager to temporise. Something might be written down in the chapter of accidents, that might enable him to retain possession of Bukkur; or something might be gained by

the detention of Cotton's troops. It was not, therefore, till the 29th of January that the British flag waved from the fort of Bukkur—and even when the detachment of troops, which was to receive possession, crossed the river, opposition seemed so probable, that some powder-bags, wherewith to blow in the gates of the fort, were stowed away in one of the boats.

The military authorities now determined to despatch the greater part of the Bengal column down the left bank of the Indus to co-operate with Sir John Keane against Hyderabad. Burnes entirely approved of the movement.* It does not appear that Keane had made any requisition for more troops.† The two columns, indeed, were entirely ignorant of each other's operations. Thus early the want of an intelligence-department was painfully apparent; but up to the last day of our connexion with Afghanistan nothing was done, nor has anything been done in more recent wars, to remedy the admitted evil. But down the left bank of the Indus went Cotton with his troops, glorying in the prospect before them. The treasures of Hyderabad seemed to lie at their feet. Never was there a more popular movement. The troops moved on in the highest spirits, eager for the affray—confident of success. Here was an unanticipated harvest of honour—an unexpected

* "The aspect of affairs to the south being anything but satisfactory, the Commander-in-Chief intimated to me, in the presence of General Cotton, that the passage of the army across the Indus, even had the bridge been ready, which it will not be for ten days, was inexpedient, whilst matters were unadjusted at Hyderabad—that it was further his decided opinion that a portion of the army should at once march down towards Hyderabad. Participating entirely in these views, as far as political matters

were concerned, I felt myself bound to give the fullest effect to the views of his Excellency, and notify the intended movement of the troops to the south to Meer Roostum Khan." — [Sir A. Burnes to Government: *Rohree, January, 28, 1839. MS. Records.*]

† Some days after Cotton's force had moved down the river, a requisition came for a troop of horse artillery, a detachment of cavalry, and a brigade of infantry.—[*Have-lock's Narrative.*]

promise of abundant prize-money—within their reach. A march of a few days would bring them under the walls of Hyderabad, to humble the pride of the Ameers, and to gather up their accumulated wealth.

But there was one man then on the borders of the Indus to whom this movement down the left bank of the river was a source of unmixed dissatisfaction. Mr. Macnaghten, who, under the title of Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Soojah, had been appointed political director of the campaign, viewed with alarm the departure of Sir Willoughby Cotton from Rohree, just as it was hoped that the Bengal column was about to cross to the right bank of the river. The Shah, with his contingent, was at Shikarpoor. Macnaghten had joined the royal camp. The King and the Envoy were alike eager to push on to Candahar; but, deserted by the Bengal troops, they were compelled to remain in a state of absolute paralysis. Seldom has any public functionary been surrounded by more embarrassing circumstances than those which, at this time, beset Macnaghten. At the very outset of the campaign there was a probability of the civil and military authorities being brought into perilous collision. The Envoy looked aghast at the movement upon Hyderabad, for he believed it involved an entire sacrifice of the legitimate objects of the campaign. It appeared to him, in this conjuncture, to be plainly his duty, as the representative of the British-Indian Government, to take upon himself the responsibility of preventing the march for the restoration of Shah Soojah from being converted into a campaign in Sindh. Yet to no man could the assertion of such authority be more painful than to one of Macnaghten's temper and habits. It was certain that the military chiefs would resent his interference, and that the whole army would be against him. But he turned his face

steadfastly towards Candahar; and determined to arrest the progress of the Bengal column on its march to the Sindh capital.

In what light this diversion was viewed by him, and for what reasons he deprecated it, Macnaghten's letters, written at this time, indicate with sufficient distinctness; and it is just, therefore, that in a matter which has entailed some odium upon him, he should be suffered to speak for himself:

"The Governor-General," he wrote to Burnes, "never seems to have contemplated the diversion of the army of the Indus from its original purpose, except on emergency. No such emergency appears to have arisen. We are utterly ignorant of the state of affairs below. It is hardly possible to conceive that matters should not have been settled, unless under the very improbable supposition that Sir J. Keane should be waiting for reinforcements, or that a suspension of hostilities may have been agreed upon, pending the receipt of further instructions from the Governor-General. In the first place, it may be presumed that the Bombay reserve will reach Sir John Keane long ere Sir Willoughby Cotton can do so. In the latter case, it is probable that the suggestions with which I have this day furnished Colonel Pottinger, will bring matters to an amicable conclusion. As far as I have learnt the motives of Sir W. C.'s movement down the left bank of the Indus, it was with a view of creating a diversion, and never with any intention of actually proceeding all the way to Hyderabad. The effect of the movement, whatever it may have been, must have been already produced. At all events, by crossing to this side of the river, the effect will rather be heightened than lessened; while, if the force should not be required further, it might be all ready to proceed at the proper season to its original destination in Afghanistan. I should hope in less than ten days from this date to receive a reply from Colonel Pottinger; and, in the mean time, the boats might be got ready to proceed with the troops downwards, should their services be required. Thus no time would be lost. But, as in that case there could be little hope of the return of the troops to proceed this season into Afghanistan, I would strongly urge that a force, to the extent specified in the second paragraph of

this letter (one European regiment, one Native cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, with a suitable battering train), with a sufficiency of carriage-cattle for itself and Shah Soojah's army, should be directed to proceed to Shikarpoor. With such a force I am clearly of opinion that the views of the Governor-General, in regard to Afghanistan, could be carried into effect during the present season. The consequences of losing a whole season are not to be foreseen."*

In another letter he wrote to the Governor-General—and the passage has an additional interest, as affording, for the first time, a glimpse of the unreasonable character of Shah Soojah, and the extent to which his Majesty's peculiarities heightened the difficulties of Macnaghten's position:

We should not, I think, on any account, lose the season for advancing upon Candahar. With our European regiment, some more artillery, a couple of Native regiments, and a small battering train, we might not only occupy Candahar, but relieve Herat; and by money, if we have no disposable troops, make Caubul too hot for Dost Mahomed.

The Shah is very solicitous about future operations, and, I am sorry to say, talks foolishly every time I see him on the subject of his confined territories that are to be—and frequently says it would be much better for him to have remained at Loodhianah. The next time he touches on the subject, I intend to remind him of the verse of Sadi, "If a king conquers seven regions he would still be hankering after another territory." I have little doubt of being able to bring him into a more reasonable temper of mind. He is much delighted with the four six-pounders presented to him by your Lordship. . . . I hardly think it probable that 50,000 rupees per mensem will suffice for the Shah's expenses, but on this point I will write to your Lordship more fully on another occasion.†

And again he wrote, soon afterwards, to Mr. Colvin:

I grieve to say that I have no consolation to afford you. Our accounts from every quarter as to what is really passing are most

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

† *Ibid.*

unsatisfactory, and Sir Willoughby Cotton is clearly going on a wild-goose chase. He cannot possibly, I think, be at Hyderabad under twenty-five days from this date, and he seems to be travelling by a route which has no road. He will soon, I fear, find himself in the jungle. If this goes on as it is now doing, what is to become of our Afghan expedition? Burnes's letters are most unsatisfactory.*

He had hardly despatched the letter from which this last passage is taken, when a communication from the Governor-General was put into his hands, and it became more than ever obvious from its contents, that Lord Auckland's first wish was, that the Bengal column should accompany Shah Soojah and his contingent as expeditiously as possible to Candahar. Fortified by these advices, Macnaghten, on the following day, wrote, in emphatic language to Sir Willoughby Cotton, in virtue of the power vested in him by the Governor-General, requiring that military chief to furnish him with a force sufficient to enable him to give effect to his Lordship's plans in Afghanistan:

"I have already urged," he added, "in the strongest terms, your crossing over to this side of the river with your whole force. Of Sir John Keane's army there can be no apprehension. His Excellency will always be able to keep up his communication with the sea, whilst your presence on this side would enable us to establish a strong post at the extremity of the Sindh territories, and ensure the safety of the supplies for the Army of the Indus in its advance into Afghanistan. The Ameers cannot for any length of time keep up an army—they must be reduced to act on the defensive, and then the result could hardly be doubtful. Dangerous as the experiment might be, it would, in my opinion, be infinitely better that we should let loose fifteen or twenty thousand of Runjeet Singh's troops (who would march down upon Hyderabad in a very short space of time), than that the grand enterprise of restoring Shah Soojah to the throne of

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten: Feb. 5, 1839.*

Caubul and Candahar should be postponed for an entire season. By such a postponement it might be frustrated altogether."

Thus were the military and political authorities brought into a state of undisguised antagonism. Circumstances, however, had already occurred to unravel the web of difficulty that had been cast around them. The progress of the Bengal column towards Hyderabad was arrested by the receipt of intelligence to the effect that the Ameers, awed by impending danger, had submitted to the demands of the British Government.*

* On the 20th of January, Outram and Eastwick had arrived opposite Hyderabad. A few passages from the journal of the former will best indicate the progress and result of their negotiations.

"January 21.—Waited till evening, in expectation of being summoned to the Durbar, but a frivolous excuse was sent for not seeing us this day, and our attendance was requested at 2 P.M. to-morrow.

"January 22.— . . . At 4 P.M. the Ameers sent for us, and received us with much affectation of cordiality. After the usual complimentary speeches, all excepting confidential attendants were directed to withdraw, when their Highnesses entered upon the subject of the treaty, a copy of which had been previously furnished to them, and every article of which was commented on; many objections being made and supported with much plausibility by the Ameers, especially by Noor Mahomed Khan. These matters were discussed until sunset, when we were dismissed with every assurance that 'the will of the British Government was law to that of Sindh,' but that a definite answer could not be given until next day.

"January 23.—The hostile intentions of the Ameers are hourly evinced; all supplies to and communication with our camp are prohibited, and we ascertain that it had even been proposed to attack our little party, and that an engagement had been solemnly

sworn to by all the Ameers and the chiefs to stand by each other in the approaching struggle. Under these circumstances . . . determined to demand either an acceptance of the treaty or an explicit avowal of their own intentions, together with our dismissal. . . . This message was accordingly sent in the evening, and an immediate answer demanded. None was, however, received. . . .

"January 24.— . . . Sent again to Noor Mahomed demanding an answer to our message of yesterday. . . The answer given was, that the treaty would be sent back, and that we might stay or go, as we pleased. At noon embarked, and steamed down the Indus to Jerruk.

"January 25.—The army (Sir John Keane's) arrived here.

"January 27.—The native agent at Hyderabad writes that two of the Ameers—viz., Noor Mahomed and Nufar Khan, are still wavering and inclined to yield, but that Meer Mahomed Khan and the Beloochees are determined not to submit.

"January 29.—A deputation from the Ameers arrived, but merely delivered letters to the Commander-in-Chief and the Resident.

"January 30.—The deputation delivered their messages, which were expressive of the kindly intentions of the Ameers, but required explanations on certain points of the treaty.

"January 31.—In the evening accounts brought from Hyderabad that

They had consented to pay the money which had been required from them, and it was believed that it would soon be paid.* They had submitted to the terms of a stringent treaty, which had been fastened upon them by the British authorities, and agreed to pay annually three lakhs of rupees for the support of a British subsidiary force in their dominions. Cotton was, therefore, instructed to halt his division; and on the very 7th of February on which Macnaghten had written and despatched the letter which I have above quoted, the hopes of the Bengal column were dashed by the announcement that Hyderabad and its treasures were no longer lying at their feet. The Ameers paid an instalment of the tribute-money, and Cotton, to the great joy of the Envoy, but to the extreme disappointment of his troops, retraced his steps to Rohree, and prepared to effect the passage of the river, whilst Keane, with the Bombay column, moved up along the right bank of the Indus, and saw, through the dusty atmosphere of Lower Sindh, the palace and the city where was stored the gathered wealth which was to have enriched his army.

Meer Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, had arrived at that city with his army, and had plundered our grain depôts!

"February 1.—Deputies from the Ameers arrived, to intimate that their Highnesses had resolved to submit to the treaty, adding that the plunder of the grain was in opposition to their authority, and that many persons had been killed in an attempt to prevent it. They further promised to repay the value of the grain, and requested a few verbal alterations in the treaty, with which their envoys returned to the capital.

"February 2.—Accounts from Hyderabad mention that the Ameers have ratified the treaty, returned into the fort from the camp they had occupied on the banks of the river, and ordered the dispersion of their army.

"February 4.— . . . The Ameers now express the utmost anxiety to fulfil the terms of the treaty, and immediately to make good Shah Soojah's tribute, together with the value of the grain lately plundered. This alacrity is caused by their having heard of the approach of the Bengal army down the opposite side of the river, and of Shah Soojah's on this—not to mention a report that the latter had plundered Larkhana."—[*Major Outram's Rough Notes of the Campaign in Sindh and Afghanistan.*]

* The amount was twenty lakhs of rupees, a moiety of which was paid down. The other seven lakhs, making up the gross amount to be paid by the Talpoor Princes, were paid by the Ameer of Khyrpore.

Halting for some days opposite Hyderabad,* the Bombay troops received intelligence to the effect that the Reserve which had been sent to their assistance from the Presidency had arrived at Kurachee, under Brigadier Valiant. The 40th Queen's Regiment formed a portion of this brigade. It had been brought from Bombay in a seventy-four gun-ship—the *Wellesley*—and Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland was on board. In the position which affairs had assumed in Lower Sindh, it seemed desirable that the English should possess themselves of the fort of Kurachee; so the Admiral summoned it to surrender. The answer of the Commandant was a gallant one. "I am a Beloochee," he said, "and I will die first." With characteristic mendacity the Sindhian boatmen in the harbour declared that the place was prepared to withstand a siege, and that one of the Ameers had come down with an army of 3000 men. The English sailor had now an answer to give as gallant as that of the Beloochee chief. "The more the better," he said; "we shall have the first trial of them." Everything was soon ready for the attack. But British humanity again interposed, and Maitland a second time summoned the garrison to surrender. The reply was a word of defiance, and a shot from the fort. Then was heard by the garrison that which had never been heard there before, and of which they had no conception—a broadside from an English man-of-war. The *Wellesley's* guns did their work in less than an hour, and the British colours soon floated over the place. The garrison had consisted of only some twenty men.†

* "The city of Hyderabad," says Dr. James Burnes, in his *Visit to the Court of Sindh*, an interesting and valuable work, "is a collection of wretched low mud hovels, as destitute of the means of defence as they are of external elegance or internal comfort; and even the boasted stronghold of

the Ameer, which surmounts their capital, is but a paltry erection of ill-burnt bricks, crumbling gradually to decay, and perfectly incapable of withstanding for an hour the attack of regular troops."

† Kennedy.

On the 20th of February, Sir Willoughby Cotton, with the head-quarters of his force, arrived at Shikarpoor. On the morning of that day the General and the Envoy were for some time in conference with each other. The discussion was a long and a stormy one. The General seems to have anticipated the interference of Macnaghten, and to have resented it before it took any really offensive shape. The two officers looked on each other with suspicion. The General leapt hastily to the conclusion that the civilian was determined to overrule his military authority; and the Envoy, on the other side, thought that the soldier regarded him, the King and the King's army, with something very like contempt. Macnaghten wanted carriage for the Shah's force, and asked for 1000 camels. Sir Willoughby resented this as an act of interference; accused the Envoy of wishing to assume the command of the army, and declared that he knew no superior authority but that of Sir John Keane. At this, and at subsequent meetings, the Envoy urged that he had no intention of interfering with the military movements of the General, but that if he thought it for the good of the service that Shah Soojah should be left behind, the matter must be referred for the decision of the Governor-General. In the evening they met at dinner in the Envoy's tent. The meal was not over when important despatches from the Governor-General were placed in Macnaghten's hands. In the Envoy's private tent they were read and discussed. Burnes and Todd were present at the conference. Late at night the General and the Envoy parted "very good friends."*

* "Sir Willoughby," wrote the Envoy to Mr. Colvin, on the 24th of February, "made his appearance in my tent yesterday morning. He is evidently disposed to look upon his military and his disciplined troops and himself as mere cyphers. Any hint

from me, however quietly and modestly given, was received with hauteur; and I was distinctly told that I wanted to assume the command of the army; that he, Sir Willoughby, knew no superior but Sir John Keane, and that he would not be interfered

It was decreed that the Bengal column should at once move in advance. On the following day it was manœuvred in presence of the King. The parching heats of Sindh, and the evil effects of a failing Commissariat, had not then begun to impair our army; and, in full health and fine condition, the troops moved before the well-pleased Shah. On the 23rd, Sir Willoughby Cotton began to put his force again in motion. But the Shah's contingent remained halted at Shikarpoor. There was not carriage sufficient for its advance.

The difficulties of the march now began to obtrude themselves. Between Sukkur and Shikarpoor the camels had dropped down dead by scores. But there was a worse tract of country in advance. The officers looked at their maps, and traced with dismay the vast expanse of sandy desert, where no green pasture met the eye, and no sound of water spoke to the ear. But the season was favorable. Escaping the arid and pestilential blasts of April and May, and the noxious exhalations of the four succeeding months, the column advanced into Cutch. The hard, salt-mixed sand, crackled under their horses' feet as the General and his staff crossed the desert, on a fine bright night of early March—so cool that only, when in a full gallop, the riders

with, &c., &c. All this arose out of my requesting 1000 camels for the use of the Shah and his force. Sir Willoughby was ably backed by the Commissariat officers. My arguments were urged throughout in the most mild and conciliatory tone. I was determined on no account to lose my temper; and we parted at a late hour last night very good friends. I told him I was the last man in the world who would presume to interfere with his military arrangements; but I found it requisite to tell him, during one of our conversations, that if he thought it for the good of the service

to leave Shah Soojah in the lurch, without the means of moving, I should esteem it my duty, as a political officer, to protest most strongly against the arrangement, and that the Governor-General would determine which of us was right. Sir Willoughby dined with me, and at dinner the important despatches from the Governor-General and yourself, dated the 5th instant, were put into my hands. We discussed their contents in my private tent afterwards—present Sir W. C., Todd, and Burnes.”—*[Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.]*

ceased to long for the warmth of their cloaks.* The distance from Shikarpoor to Dadur is 146 miles. It was accomplished by the Bengal column in sixteen painful marches. Water and forage were so scarce that the cattle suffered terribly on the way. The camels fell dead by scores on the desert; and further on the Beloochee robbers carried them off with appalling dexterity. When the column reached a cultivated tract of country, the green crops were used as forage for the horses. The *ryots* were liberally paid on the spot; but the agents of the Beloochee chiefs often plundered the unhappy cultivators of the money that had been paid to them even in front of the British camp.

It was on the 10th of March that the Bengal column reached Dadur, which lies at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. Whatever doubts may before have been entertained regarding the provisionary prospects of the Army of the Indus, they were now painfully set at rest. Major Leech had been long endeavouring to collect supplies for the army at this place; but, in spite of all his zeal and all his ability, he had signally failed. Mehrab Khan of Khelat, under whose dominion lay the provinces through which the army was now passing, had thrown every impediment in the way of the collection of grain for our advancing troops. The prospect, therefore, before them was anything but an encouraging one. At Dadur they found themselves, on the 10th of March, with a month's supplies on their beasts of burden. Cotton saw that there was little chance of collecting more; so he determined to push on with all possible despatch.

On the 16th he resumed his march; and entered the Bolan Pass. Burnes had gone on in advance with a party under Major Cureton, to secure a safe passage for the column; and had been completely successful. The

* Havelock.

Beloochee authorities rendered him all the aid in their power;* and when Cotton appeared with his troops on a clear, still morning, at the mouth of the defile, there was little likelihood of any obstacle being opposed to his free progress. But the baggage-cattle were falling dead by the wayside; the artillery horses were showing painful symptoms of distress. The stream of the Bolan river was tainted by the bodies of the camels that had sunk beneath their loads. The Beloochee freebooters were hovering about, cutting off our couriers, murdering stragglers, carrying off our baggage and our cattle. Among the rocks of this stupendous defile our men pitched their tents; and toiled on again day after day, over a wretched road covered with loose flint stones, surmounting, at first, by a scarcely perceptible ascent, and afterwards by a difficult acclivity, the great Brahoo chain of hills. The Bolan Pass is nearly sixty miles in length. The passage was accomplished in six days. They were days of drear discomfort, but not of danger. A resolute enemy might have wrought mighty havoc among Cotton's regiments; but the enemies with which now they had to contend were the sharp flint stones which lamed our cattle, the scanty pasturage which destroyed them, and the marauding tribes who carried them off. The way was strewn with baggage—with abandoned tents, and stores; and luxuries which, a few weeks afterwards, would have fetched their weight twice counted in rupees, were left to be trampled down by the

* "The conduct of the officers of the Khelat chief has been most creditable and praiseworthy. Syud Mahomed Sheriff, the Governor of Gundava, and Moolla Ramzan, a slave of the Khan, have attended me the whole way, procured a band of eighty of the natives to escort us, and they likewise addressed the Ameers and the neigh-

boursing Beloochee tribes to attempt at their peril to molest us. Such has been the confidence thus given, that a great body of the migratory inhabitants from Cutchee availed themselves of our escort to ascend into Afghanistan."—[*Burnes to Macnaghten: March 16, 1839. MS. Records.*]

cattle in the rear, or carried off by the plunderers about them.

Happy was every man in the force when the army again emerged into the open country. The valley of Shawl lay before them, a favoured spot in a country of little favour. The clear crisp climate braced the European frame; and over the wide plain, bounded by noble mountain-ranges, intersected by many sparkling streams, and dotted with orchards and vineyards, the eye ranged with delight; whilst the well-known carol of the lark, mounting up in the fresh morning air, broke with many home associations charmingly on the English ear.* On the 26th of March the Bengal column reached Quettah—"a most miserable mud town, with a small castle on a mound, on which there was a small gun on a rickety carriage.† Here Sir Willoughby Cotton was to halt until further orders. Starvation was beginning to stare his troops in the face.

Seldom has a military commander found himself in the midst of more painful perplexities than those which now surrounded Cotton. It seemed to be equally impossible to stand still or to move forward. His supplies were now so reduced, that even upon famine allowances his troops could not have reached Candahar with provisions for more than a few days in store; and to remain halted at Quettah would necessarily aggravate the evil. There appeared to be no possibility of obtaining supplies. All the provisions stored in Quettah and the surrounding villages would not have fed our army for many days. In this painful conjuncture, Cotton acted with becoming promptitude. He despatched his Adjutant-General to Sir John Keane for orders, whilst Burnes proceeded to Khelat to work upon the fears or the cupidity of

* See *Havelock's Narrative*.

† *Hough's Narrative of the Operations of the Army of the Indus.*

Mehrab Khan; and, in the mean while, reduced to the scantiest dole the daily supplies meted out to our unfortunate fighting men and our more miserable camp-followers.* These privations soon began to tell fearfully upon their health and their spirits. The sufferings of the present were aggravated by the dread of the future; and as men looked at the shrunk frames and sunken cheeks of each other, and in their own feebleness and exhaustion felt what wrecks they had become, their hearts died within them at the thought that a day was coming when even the little that was now doled out to them might be wholly denied.

Burnes hastened to Khelat. He was courteously received. He found Mehrab Khan an able and sagacious man. Suspicious of others, but with more frankness and unreserve in his character than is commonly found in suspicious men, the Khan commented freely on our policy—said, with prophetic truth, that we might restore Shah Soojah to Afghanistan, but that we should not carry the Afghan people with us, and that we should, therefore, fail in the end—and then, after launching into an indignant commentary on the ingratitude of Shah Soojah, for whom he had suffered much and reaped nothing in return, he proceeded to set forth the evils which had resulted to him and his people from the passage of the British army through his dominions.† “The English,”

* Captain Havelock says: “From the 28th of March, the loaf of the European soldiers was diminished in weight, the Native troops received only half instead of a full seer of *ottah* (that is a pound of flour) *per diem*, and the camp-followers, who had hitherto found it difficult to subsist on half a seer, were of necessity reduced to the famine allowance of a quarter of a seer.”

† “The Khan, with a good deal of earnestness, enlarged upon the un-

dertaking the British had embarked in—declared it to be one of vast magnitude and difficult accomplishment—that instead of relying on the Afghan nation, our government had cast them aside and inundated the country with foreign troops—that if it was our end to establish ourselves in Afghanistan, and give Shah Soojah the nominal sovereignty of Caubul and Candahar, we were pursuing an erroneous course—that all the Afghans were discontented with the Shah, and all

he said, "had now come, and by their march through his country, in different directions, destroyed the crops, poor as they were; helped themselves to the water which irrigated the lands, made doubly valuable in this year of scarcity;"—"but he had stood," he added, "quiescent, and hoped from the English justice, from the Shah justice; hoped that his claims might be regarded in a proper light, and he for ever relieved from the mastery of the Suddozye Kings." He then spoke freely and fluently of our policy in Central Asia, of the position in which we had placed ourselves at Herat by supporting such a miscreant as Yar Mahomed, and of the failure of our negotiations at Caubul and Candahar. "I might have allied myself," he said, "with Persia and Russia—but I have seen you safely through the great defile of the Bolan, and yet I am unrewarded."

Burnes had brought with him the draft of a treaty, which, on the following day, he sent to the Khan. He had made it a condition of all peaceable negotiation with the Beloochee Prince that he should wait upon Shah Soojah in his camp—a condition which Mehrab Khan disliked and resisted, but from which he could not extricate himself. The treaty, by which the supremacy of Shah Soojah was distinctly acknowledged, bound the British Government to pay Mehrab Khan a lakh and a half of rupees annually, in return for which the Khan engaged to "use his best endeavours to procure supplies, carriage, and guards to protect provisions and stores going and coming from Shikarpoor, by the route of

Mahomedans alarmed and excited at what was passing—that, day by day, men returned discontented, and we might find ourselves awkwardly situated if we did not point out to Shah Soojah his errors, if the fault originated with him, and alter them if they sprung from ourselves—that the

chief of Caubul was a man of ability and resource, and though we could easily put him down by Shah Soojah even in our present mode of procedure, we could never win over the Afghan nation by it."—[Burnes to Macnaghten: *Khelat*, March 30, 1839. *MS. Records*.]

Rozan, Dadur, the Pass of Bolan, through Shawl to Koochlak, from one frontier to another."

Mehrab Khan affixed his seal to the treaty. But he disliked the bargain he had made. He was altogether suspicious of Shah Soojah and the Suddozyes. He was by no means certain of the success of the present enterprise. He believed, that by paying homage to the Shah, he would raise up a host of powerful enemies, and plunge himself into a sea of ruin. Striving to allay the apprehensions of the Khan, Burnes made some trifling concessions, which were not without their effect; and then proceeded to press upon him the subject which at that moment was of most immediate importance to British interests—the matter of supplies; and earnestly pointed out the imperative necessity of every possible exertion being made by the Khan to provide them. But it was easier to suggest such provision than to make it. Mehrab Khan said that he would do his best—that he would place men at Burnes's disposal to proceed to Nooshky and other places, where the crops were nearly ripe ("and," said Burnes, parenthetically, "he has done so")—that he would "give grain in Gundava and Cutchee, and if we would send for our stores at Shikarpoor to Dadur, he would actively aid in passing them through the Bolan—that he might also aid us at Moostung in getting a small quantity of grain; but that there was really very little grain at Khelat, or in the country—that he had reduced his escort to wait on the Shah to 1000 men, on account of the scarcity—and that he could not then furnish the grain, but each man must bring his own." "This intelligence," wrote Burnes to Macnaghten, "is very distressing in our present position; but my inquiries serve to convince me that there is but a small supply of grain in this country, and none certainly to be given us, without aggravating the present distress of the in-

habitants—some of whom are feeding on herbs and grasses gathered in the jungle. It is with some difficulty we have supported ourselves, whilst the small quantities we have procured have been got by stealth. This scarcity is corroborated by a blight in last year's harvest. Under such circumstances, the only way of turning the Khan to account is in supplying sheep; and here he can and is willing to assist us to a great extent. Probably 10,000 or 15,000 may be procured; and arrangements are now being made for purchasing and sending them down to Shawl."*

In the mean while, the Shah's contingent and the Bombay division of the Army of the Indus were making their way through Sindh.† Greatly straitened for carriage, it had been for some time doubtful whether the whole of the Shah's army would be able to proceed to Candahar. There had been a disposition on the part of Sir Willoughby Cotton to look with contempt upon the Sud-dozye levies, and to make the King and his regiments play a part in the coming drama, by no means in accordance with the estimate which Macnaghten had formed of their importance. And now Sir John Keane seemed equally inclined to throw into the background the King, the Envoy, and the contingent. But Macnaghten had claimed for the Shah a prominent place in the coming operations,‡ and the military chief had yielded to his

* *Burnes to Macnaghten: Khelat, April 2, 1839.*

† The Shah and his contingent moved from Shikarpoor on the 7th of March.

‡ "His Majesty the Shah is naturally anxious to occupy a prominent position in our movements, and it is very desirable, on political grounds, that he should do so; I trust, therefore, that your Excellency will see fit to attend to his Majesty's wishes in this particular, and to authorise his

being in advance with at least a portion of his own troops after the junction of the several divisions shall have been effected, or rather after you have made your final arrangements for the order of our advance. This you will observe will be conformable to the wishes of the Governor-General, as expressed in the accompanying extracts. His Lordship never contemplated the leaving behind any portion of the Shah's force except in the case of opposition being shown by Sindh

representations, and even placed at his disposal a number of baggage-cattle which he greatly needed for his own force. Anxious to conciliate the commander of the army, and never unmindful of the public interests, the Envoy gratefully declined the offer.* Keane was "in a wretched plight for want of cattle," and Macnaghten, believing that the Bengal Commissariat had neglected the Bombay chief, did his best to enable him to move.

Sir Willoughby Cotton had suggested to Macnaghten the expediency of a movement upon Khelat; but the Envoy was then little inclined to take the same unfavorable view of the conduct of Mehrab Khan which Cotton, smarting under the privations to which his force had been subjected, was prone to encourage. "With regard to moving upon Khelat," he wrote on the 15th of March to the Bengal General, "I am not prepared at present to take upon myself the responsibility of that measure; and I am in great hopes that Sir Alexander Burnes will be able to arrange everything satisfactorily."† The further he advanced, indeed, the more obvious it became that the Khan of Khelat had just grounds of complaint against the English army. Everywhere traces of the devastation—much of it unavoidable devastation—which our advancing columns had left behind them, spoke out intelligibly to him; and he plainly saw how extremely distasteful both our officers and measures had become to the Beloochees. Pondering these things, he sate down and

and Khelat."—[*Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane: Shikarpoor, Feb. 27, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

* "I am exceedingly obliged to you for the attention you have paid to my suggestions regarding the Shah's troops; but your want of camels is so pressing, that I feel it impossible to retain the 1000 camels placed at my disposal. Deeply as I regret, on political grounds, the necessity of leav-

ing behind any portion of the troops of his Majesty, I feel that any scruples on this score must give way to the more urgent exigencies of the public service."—[*Mr. Macnaghten to Sir J. Keane: Shikarpoor, March 3, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

† *Mr. Macnaghten to Sir W. Cotton: March 15, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*

wrote the following letter to Lord Auckland—a significant letter, which shows how early had burst upon Macnaghten the truth, that only by a liberal expenditure of money was there any hope of reconciling to our operations the chiefs and people beyond the Indus :

Camp Bagh, March 19.

I found the Khelat authorities in the worst possible humour. Our enemies have evidently been tampering with them, and they had good cause for dissatisfaction with us; their crops have been destroyed, and the water intended for the irrigation of their fields has been diverted to the use of our armies. A great portion of these evils was perhaps unavoidable, but little or no effort seems to have been made either to mitigate the calamity or to appease the discontent which has been created by our proceedings. Our officers and our measures are alike unpopular in this country, and I very much fear that Sir A. Burnes may be led, by vague rumours of the Khan's unfriendly disposition, to recommend offensive operations against him. In what difficulties we might be involved by such a proceeding it would be impossible to foretell. My most strenuous efforts have been day and night directed towards reconciling all persons of influence to our operations; and in this I have been successful; but considerable sums must be expended, not only in remunerating the people for the severe losses they have sustained, but in bribing the authorities. Your Lordship may rely upon it, that I shall not expend one rupee of the public money more than I deem indispensably necessary; but here we are quite at the mercy of the Beloochees. This very day, had they been inimically inclined, they might with the greatest ease have turned an inundation into our camp, which would have swept away our entire force and everything belonging to us. The change in the demeanour of the authorities since yesterday is wonderful. They are now our devoted servants, and the Vizier has promised to write off instantly to his master at Khelat, advising him to give us his entire and unqualified friendship and support. Sir John Keane is in a wretched plight for want of cattle, and I cannot help thinking he has been neglected in a very unwarrantable manner by the Bengal authorities. . . . I went out myself this morning to see what damage had been

done to the crops. The devastation is grievous; but the interest which the people saw me take in their complaints has done more to pacify them than I ever expected. Another source of great dissatisfaction has been the seizure by our troops of different individuals, and even families, on the plea of being robbers. This I have done all in my power to remedy.*

More and more sensible, after every march, of the miserable country through which he was passing, and the difficulties which now beset the expedition, Macnaghten was anxious to push on with all possible expedition. But Sir John Keane, who was in the rear with the Bombay column, dreading the assemblage, on the same spot, of so large a body of troops as would be brought together by the junction of the three forces, urged upon him the expediency of halting, whilst his Excellency went forward to ascertain the chances of finding forage and provisions in the Bolan Pass.† So the Shah and his contingent halted for a few days at Bagh,‡ whilst Sir John Keane pushed on with his escort. On the 28th of March, the King, the Minister, and the Commander-in-Chief were all assembled together at Dadur. "Their united camps dis-

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

† "I have a letter from Todd, dated yesterday, from Gundava, giving a lamentable account of the Bombay force. They are nearly on the point of starvation. . . . Sir John starts to-morrow for Dadur with a small escort, and he has begged me to keep back the Shah with his troops and followers until he reaches that place, and is able to gain some information as to the state of forage and provisions there and in the pass. We have a wretched time of it here; and I am most anxious to push on, but I cannot venture to run counter to the wishes of his Excellency."—[*Mr. Macnaghten to Sir A. Burnes: Bagh, March 22, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

‡ From Bagh, Macnaghten wrote to the Governor-General's Private Secretary: "This is a wretched country in every respect. It may be said to produce little else but plunderers; but with the knowledge we now have of it, we may bid defiance to the Russian hordes as far as this route is concerned. Any army might be annihilated in an hour by giving it either too much or too little water. The few wells that exist might easily be rendered unavailable, and by just cutting the Sewee bund the whole country might be deluged."—[*Mr. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: Camp Bagh, March 22, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

played all the pomp and circumstances of a triple head-quarter." The passage of the Bolan was accomplished without difficulty, and on the 4th of April, Sir Willoughby Cotton, having ridden out with his staff from Quettah, greeted the General-in-Chief and his companions as they were resting at the entrance to the Shawl Valley, after the fatigues of the passage through the defile. The tidings which he had to communicate were of the gloomiest hue. He reported that his men were on quarter-rations, and that there was every prospect of the army, as it entered Afghanistan, being opposed at every step. Macnaghten, however, more sanguine, was already beginning to think and to write about the means of disposing of the Barukzye Sirdars. On that 4th of April he wrote to the Governor-General a letter, which indicates the tone of his own feelings and of those of the Afghan Prince:

April 4, 1831.

We are now encamped within ten miles of Shawl. Sir W. came in here this morning, and talks in a most gloomy strain of his prospects. He says he has but twelve days' supplies, and his men are already on quarter-rations. We cannot reckon on being at Candahar under a fortnight, and it will go hard with us if we cannot get supplied in the mean time from other quarters. Sir W. is a sad croaker; not content with telling me we must all inevitably be starved, he assures me that Shah Soojah is very unpopular in Afghanistan, and that we shall be opposed at every step of our progress. I think I know a little better than this. My accounts from Candahar lead me to believe that the religious excitement is subsiding, and that the Sirdars are only thinking how they can make good terms for themselves; or, failing that, how they may best contrive to effect their escape. It will be as well not to reduce them to desperation; for though they cannot oppose us in the field, yet they make sad havoc with our supplies. Large bands of camel-plunderers kept hovering over our line of march, and it certainly looks as if they had been incited by some one of

influence. The mistakes and contretemps which are constantly occurring in our motley camp, require the exercise of much patience and discrimination. The Shah is in good health and spirits; but says he never had so much trouble and bother in his lifetime as he has met with during this campaign. The reason is obvious; the people on former occasions helped themselves to everything they wanted, and no complaint was permitted to approach the sacred person of his Majesty. His opinion of the Afghans as a nation is, I regret to say, extremely low. He declares that they are a pack of dogs, one and all, and, as for the Barukzyes, it is utterly impossible that he can ever place the slightest confidence in any one of that accursed race. We must try and bring him gradually round to entertain a more favorable opinion of his subjects. I cannot yet say how the Barukzye chiefs shall be disposed of, but I am decidedly of opinion that it would be a wise measure to get them quietly out of Afghanistan and pension them, if we can do so at an expense not exceeding a lakh of rupees per annum. If they oppose us and are taken, the Shah must, I imagine, be permitted to do what he likes with them short of putting them to death; and his own humane nature is a sufficient security that he will not proceed to extremities.*

On the 6th of April, Sir John Keane fixed his headquarters at Quettah, and assumed the personal command of the army. Reviewing all the circumstances of his position, he came to the determination to push forward with all possible despatch to Candahar. There was no prospect of obtaining supplies through the agency of Mehrab Khan. Already was the Envoy convinced of the treachery of that Prince—already was he beginning to talk about dismembering the Khanate of Khelat, and annexing the provinces of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutchee to the Douranee Empire. On that day he wrote to the Private Secretary of the Governor-General:

Camp Quettah, April 6, 1839.

* * * Sir John Keane has represented to me in the strongest terms the necessity for moving on. The fact is, the troops and

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

followers are nearly in a state of mutiny for food, and the notion of waiting for such a person as Mehrab Khan, who has done his best to starve us, seems utterly preposterous. I trust the Governor-General will see fit to annex the provinces of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutchee to the Shah's dominions. This would be the place for cantoning a British regiment. It is so cold now that I can hardly hold my pen, and the climate is said to be delightful all the year round. I am certain the annexation could be made without the slightest difficulty . . . Now for Candahar. The game is clearly up with the Sirdars. I had a letter from the triumvirate yesterday, brought by Syud Muhun Shah, whom they have sent to treat, or rather to get the best terms for themselves they can. As to opposition, it is quite clear that they look upon that as hopeless, and they have not even the power to retreat. I am unwilling to reduce them to desperation, and shall try and get the Shah to make some provision for them; but he is very loth to do so. Their demands now are extravagant beyond measure; but I do not think that a lakh of rupees per annum distributed among the three brothers would be too much for the King to give, if they agreed upon that to sink into the retirement of private life. Notwithstanding all the croaking about Shah Soojah's want of popularity, I feel certain that my prediction will be verified, and that his Majesty will be cordially welcomed by all classes of the people.*

On the 7th of April the army resumed its march.† On the 9th it was at Hykulzye, a spot rendered famous in the later annals of the war. From this place Macnaghten wrote again to the same correspondent :

Camp Hykulzye, April 9.

* * * I have reason to believe that the Sirdars of Candahar are at their wit's end. They make resolutions one day and break

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

† The head-quarters of the 2nd brigade were left in garrison at Quetta, under General William Nott, of the Company's army, who, at a later period, so distinguished himself in command of the troops at Candahar. Whilst Sir Willoughby Cotton was commanding the Bengal army in chief, Nott had commanded a division; but

when Sir John Keane joined the Bengal column, Cotton fell back to the divisional command, and Nott returned to the brigade to which he had originally been posted. Out of this much controversy arose; the command of the other division of the "Army of the Indus" having been conferred on General Willshire, of the Queen's army, a junior major-general, but an older officer and lieutenant-colonel.

them the next. But all accounts concur in reporting that they are abandoned by the priesthood, and that if there is any religious feeling extant, it is all in favour of Shah Soojah. In a fit of desperation the last resolve of Kohun Dil Khan is stated to be, that he will make a night attack on our camp with about 2000 followers who are still attached to his person. This I fully believe to be fudge. The whole of the force, from Sir W. Cotton downwards, are infected with exaggerated fears relating to the character of the King and the prospects of the campaign. They fancy that they see an enemy in every bush. The Khan of Khelat is our implacable enemy, and Sir J. Keane is burning with revenge. There never was such treatment inflicted upon human beings as we have been subjected to on our progress through the Khan's country. I will say nothing of Burnes's negotiations. His instructions were to conciliate, but I think he has adhered too strictly to the letter of them. The Commander-in-Chief is very angry. I would give something to be in Candahar; and there, *Inshallah*, we shall be in about a week; but, in the mean time, this union of strictly disciplined troops with lawless soldiers is very trying to my patience. With a less tractable king than Shah Soojah the consequences might be fatal. I have references every minute of the day, and we are compelled to tell his Majesty's people that they must not touch the green crops of the country. This they think very hard, and so I believe does the King, but he has, nevertheless, forbidden them. Supplies are now coming in, but they are yet very dear—2½ seers of flour for a rupee! But this price will, no doubt, daily fall. The great thing is to give people confidence. All the villages in the Khan of Khelat's territory were deserted at our approach, and not a soul came near us, except with the view of plundering and murdering our followers. The instant we crossed the frontier the scene was entirely changed. The inhabitants remained in their villages, and have manifested the greatest possible confidence in our justice and good faith. Is it possible to conceive that the difference of feeling in the Khelat country has not been brought about by design? * * *

Macnaghten was naturally of a sanguine temperament. Civilians seldom estimate military difficulties aright. It is true that our political difficulties were melting away.

The Candahar Sirdars, deserted and betrayed, seemed to have given themselves up to despair, and there was little chance of the progress of our army being disputed by an Afghan force. But the scarcity, which had pressed so severely on our troops, and had nearly destroyed our horses, was not less a reality because no enemy appeared to educe all the disastrous results which were likely to flow from such deterioration of the *physique* of our army. The Army of the Indus surmounted the Kojuck Pass as safely as it had traversed the Bolan. The Shah, with his contingent, was now in advance, leading the way as it became him into his restored dominions; and many of the chiefs and people of Western Afghanistan were flocking to his standard.* There were not wanting those who said that, if there had been any prospect of opposition at Candahar, the King and his levies would not have been the first to appear under the walls of the city. But authentic intelligence had reached Macnaghten, to the effect that Kohun-dil-Khan and his brothers had fled from Candahar—that there was no union among the Barukzye brotherhood—and that, if a stand were to be made at all, the battle-field would be nearer the northern capital. The way, indeed, was clear for the entry of the Suddozye monarch; so he pushed on in advance of Sir John Keane and his army, to receive, it was said, the homage of his people. Money had been freely scattered about; and the people had already begun to discover that the gold of the Fer-inghees was as serviceable as other gold, and that there was an unfailing supply of it. Early in the campaign,

* Foremost among these was the notorious Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, whose sudden defection broke up the Barukzye camp, just as Rahun Dil Khan and Mehr Dil Khan were meditating a night attack on the Shah's

contingent. He joined the Shah on the 20th of April, and from this time the Sirdars saw that their cause was hopeless. Further mention of this chief will be found in a subsequent chapter.

Macnaghten had encouraged the conviction that the allegiance of the Afghans was to be bought—that Afghan cupidity would not be proof against British gold. So he opened the treasure-chest; scattered abroad its contents with an ungrudging hand; and commenced a system of corruption which, though seemingly successful at the outset, wrought, in the end, the utter ruin of the policy he had reared.*

* I have not attempted in this chapter to give a minute account of the march of the three columns of the invading army to Candahar. It is no part of my design to render this work conspicuous for the completeness of its military details. I do not underrate their importance; but the operations of the Army of the Indus have already been so minutely chronicled, that I have only to refer the reader to the works of Havelock, Kennedy, and Hough. The real history of the march is to be found in the records of the Commissariat department. The difficulty of obtaining carriage and supplies was almost unprecedented, and the expenditure incurred was enormous. There were two different Commissariat departments (the Bengal and the Shah's) sometimes to be

found bidding against one another. Everything was paid for at a ruinous price. The sums paid for the hire and purchase of carriage-cattle were preposterous; and the loss incurred by government from the deaths of the animals may be surmised, when it is stated that the number of deaths between Ferozepore and Candahar has been estimated at not less than 20,000. Large sums, too, were often paid for demurrage. For example, on one batch of camels hired from Bikanier and Jaysulmere, 44,000 rupees were paid for demurrage and remuneration for losses before they reached the place (Shikarpoor) at which their services were required, or were even seen by our Commissariat officers.—*[MS. Notes.]*

CHAPTER II.

[April—August : 1839.]

Arrival at Candahar—The Shah's Entry into the City—His Installation—Nature of his Reception—Behaviour of the Douranees—The English at Candahar—Mission to Herat—Difficulties of our Position—Advance to Ghuznee.

ON the 25th of April, Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk re-entered the chief city of Western Afghanistan. As he neared the walls of Candahar, riding in advance of his contingent, some Douranee horsemen had gone out to welcome him; and as the cavalcade moved forward, others met him with their salutations and obeisances, and swelled the number of his adherents. It is said that some fifteen hundred men, for the most part well dressed and well mounted, joined him before he reached the city.

Accompanied by the British Envoy, his staff, and the principal officers of his contingent, and followed by a crowd of Afghans, the Shah entered Candahar. There was a vast assemblage of gazers. The women clustered in the balconies of the houses, or gathered upon the roofs. The men thronged the public streets. It was a busy and an exciting scene. The curiosity was intense. The enthusiasm may have been the same. As the royal *cortége* advanced, the people strewed flowers be-

fore the horses' feet, and loaves of bread were scattered in their way. There were shouts, and the sound of music, and the noise of firing; and the faces of the crowd were bright with cheerful excitement. The popular exclamations which were flung into the air have been duly reported. The people shouted out, "Welcome to the son of Timour Shah!" "We look to you for protection!" "Candahar is rescued from the Barukzyes!" "May your enemies be destroyed!" It was said, by some who rode beside the Shah, to have been the most heart-stirring scene they ever witnessed in their lives. Thus greeted and thus attended, the King rode to the tomb of Ahmed Shah, and offered up thanksgivings and prayers. Then the procession returned again through the city, again to be greeted with joyous acclamations; and "the eventful day," as the Court chroniclers affirmed, "passed off without an accident."

The welcome thus given to the Shah on his public entry into his western capital, filled Macnaghten with delight. The future appeared before him bright with the promise of unclouded success. It seemed to him that the enthusiastic reception of the Shah would be a death-blow to the hopes of Dost Mahomed, and that in all probability the Ameer would fly before us like his brothers. It was encouraging intelligence to communicate to the Governor-General; so on his return from the royal progress through the city, Macnaghten sat down and wrote thus to Lord Auckland:

Candahar, April 25, 1839.

We have, I think, been most fortunate in every way. The Shah made a grand public entry in the city this morning, and was received with feelings nearly amounting to adoration. I shall report the particulars officially. I have already had more than one ebullition of petulance to contend with. The latest I send

herewith, and I trust that a soft answer will have the effect of turning away wrath. There are many things which I wish to mention, but I really have no leisure. Of this your Lordship may judge, when I state that for the last three days I have been out in the sun, and have not been able to get my breakfast before three in the afternoon. I think it would be in every way advantageous to the public interests if, after Shah Soojah gains possession of Caubul, I were to proceed across the Punjaub to Simlah, having an interview with Runjeet Singh, and giving him a detail of all our proceedings; perhaps getting him to modify the treaty in one or two respects. I have broached the subject of our new treaty to his Majesty, but my negotiations are in too imperfect a state to be detailed. Of one thing I am certain, that we must be prepared to look upon Afghanistan for some years as an outwork yielding nothing, but requiring much expenditure to keep it in repair. His Majesty has not yet nominated a Prime Minister, nor has he as yet, I believe, determined his form of administration. His new adherents are all hungry for place; and in answer to their premature solicitations, he tells me that he has informed them that, since it took God Almighty six days to make heaven and earth, it is very hard they will not allow him, a poor mortal, even the same time to settle the affairs of a kingdom. I am gratified at being able to assure your Lordship that the best feeling is manifested towards the British officers by the entire population here, and I devoutly hope that nothing may occur to disturb the present happy state of things. Dost Mahomed will, I doubt not, take himself off like his brothers, though not, perhaps, in quite so great a hurry, when the intelligence reaches him of the manner in which Shah Soojah has been received at Candahar. The Sirdars have carried off my elephants, and I am informed that the animals proved of the greatest service to them in crossing their ladies over a deep and rapid river not far from this. We have heard nothing since our arrival here of the embassy from Herat. If I go to Simlah from Caubul, Sir A. Burnes could be left to officiate for me, and in case of my return he might go to Candahar and relieve Major Leech, who might be left there in the first instance.

I remain, my Lord, yours, &c.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.*

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

Encouraged by the presumed "adoration" of the people, it was now determined to give them another opportunity of testifying the overflowing abundance of their loyalty and affection. So the 8th of May was fixed upon for a general public recognition of the restored sovereign, on the plains before Candahar. Both columns of the British army had now arrived. The troops were to pass in review order before the King; and other ceremonial observances were to give *éclat* to the inauguration. Upon a raised platform, under a showy canopy, sate the restored monarch of the Dou-ranee Empire. He had ridden out at sunrise under a royal salute. The troops had presented arms to him on his ascending the musnud, and a salute of a hundred and one guns had been fired in honour of the occasion. Around him were the chief military and political officers of the British Government. Everything went off as it had been ordered and arranged, and most imposing was the spectacle of the review-march of the British troops. But the King had then been a fortnight at Candahar, and the curiosity of the people had subsided. There was no popular enthusiasm.* The whole affair was a painful failure. The English officers saluted the King; and the King made a speech about the disinterested benevolence of the British Government. Greatly pleased was his Majesty with the exhibition; and when the troops had been dismissed, he said that its moral influence would be felt from Peking to Constantinople.†

* Captain Havelock, who is by no means disposed to take an unfavorable view of the policy out of which emanated the assembling of the Army of the Indus, says: "Unless I have been deceived, all the national enthusiasm of the scene was entirely confined to his Majesty's immediate retainers. The people of Candahar are said to have viewed the whole affair with the most mortifying indifference. Few of them quitted the

city to be present in the plains; and it was remarked with justice, that the passage in the diplomatic programme which presented a place behind the throne for 'the populace restrained by the Shah's troops,' became rather a bitter satire on the display of the morning." Compare Dr. Kennedy's version of these proceedings. All the private accounts I have received confirm the truth of the printed narratives. † Kennedy.

But the miserable paucity of Afghans who appeared to do homage to the King, must have warned Shah Soojah, with ominous significance, of the feebleness of his tenure upon the affections of the people, as it bitterly disappointed and dismayed his principal European supporters. Every effort had been made to give publicity to the programme of the ceremony; and yet it is said, by the most trustworthy witnesses, that barely a hundred Afghans had been attracted, either by curiosity or by loyalty, to the installation of the adored King.

Such were the mere outward facts of Shah Soojah's reception as recorded by the chroniclers of the day. It is certain that, surrounded by his own contingent, and supported by the British army, he advanced unopposed to Candahar. The brief local excitement which his entrance into the city had aroused, cannot be regarded as national enthusiasm. When the first outbreak of curiosity had subsided, the feeling which greeted the restored King was rather that of sullen indifference than of active devotion. In the vicinity of Candahar the Douranee tribes constituted the most influential section of the inhabitants. They had been oppressed and impoverished by the Barukzye Sirdars, and had longed to rid themselves of the yoke of their oppressors. But when the representative of the Suddozye dynasty, under which they had been pampered and protected, appeared at the gates of the Douranee Empire, they had neither spirit nor strength to make a strenuous effort either in support of, or in hostility to, the restored monarch. It is doubtful whether, in the conjuncture which had then arisen, the Douranees, had they possessed any military strength, would have openly arrayed themselves on the side of the Shah; for although they hated the Barukzyes who had oppressed them, there were the strongest national and religious feelings to excite them against a Prince who had brought an army of Franks to desolate their

country. Had they stood erect in the old pride of conscious power, a mighty conflict would have raged within them. The antagonism of personal and national interests would have rent and convulsed them; and it is not improbable that in the end, abhorring the thought of an infidel invasion, they would have determined to support the cause of the Sirdars. But when Shah Soojah was advancing upon Candahar, the Douranees were in a state of absolute feebleness and paralysis. They held aloof, for they had neither power nor inclination to take any conspicuous part in the revolution which was then brooding over the empire.

But when, supported by his Feringhee allies, the Shah had established himself in Candahar, the Douranees, offering their congratulations and tendering their allegiance, gathered round the restored monarch. The issue of the contest seemed no longer doubtful. The dominion of the Barukzye Sirdars had received its death-blow. The restoration of the Suddozye dynasty was certain; and with whatever feelings the Douranees may have inwardly regarded it, it was politic to make an outward show of satisfaction and delight. The change had been effected without their agency; but they might turn it to good account. So they clustered around the throne, and began to clamour for the wages of their pretended forbearance. They put forward the most extravagant claims and pretensions; bargained for the restoration of all the old privileges and immunities which they had enjoyed under Ahmed Shah and his successors; and would fain have swept the entire revenues of the state into their own hands.

It was plain that the King could not recognise the claims which were thus profusely asserted. But it would have been imprudent, at such a time, to have offended or disappointed these powerful tribes. The Shah

had established himself at Candahar. Kohun-dil-Khan and his brothers had fled for safety across the Helmund. But Dost Mahomed was still dominant at Caubul. There was work yet to be done. There were dangers yet to be encountered. It was necessary, therefore, to conciliate the Douranees. So steering, as well as he could, a middle course, the Shah granted much that was sought from him; but he did not grant all. He restored the Sirdars to the chieftainships of their clans, and to the offices which they had been wont to hold about the Court. He gave them back the lands of which they had been denuded, and granted them allowances consistent with the rank which they had been suffered to reassume. Some vexatious and oppressive imposts were removed, and a considerable remission of taxation was proclaimed. But the system of assessment which the Barukzye Sirdars had introduced was continued in operation; and the same revenue officers continued to collect the tax. These men were thoroughly hateful to the Douranees. They had been the willing instruments of Barukzye oppression, and had carried out the work of their masters with a ferocity, strengthened by the recollection of one of those old hereditary blood-feuds, which keep up from generation to generation a growth of unextinguishable hate.

If any feelings of delight at the thought of the restoration of the Suddozye dynasty welled up anywhere in the breasts of the people of Afghanistan, it was among these Douranee tribes. As the grandson of Ahmed Shah, they were prepared to welcome Shah Soojah. They were prepared to welcome him as the enemy of the Barukzye Sirdars. But the ugly array of foreign bayonets in the background effectually held in control all their feelings of national enthusiasm. They regarded the movement for the restoration of the Suddozye

Prince in the light of a foreign invasion; and chafed when they saw our English officers settling themselves in the palaces of their ancient Princes.

In the mean while, the Army of the Indus remained inactive at Candahar. The halt was a long and a weary one. Provisions were miserably scarce. It was necessary to remain under the city walls until a sufficiency could be obtained, and to obtain this sufficiency it was necessary to await the ripening of the crops. Every one was impatient to advance. The delay was simply painful and disheartening. There were no compensating advantages to be obtained from a halt under the walls of Candahar. Save a few who had the real artist's eye to appreciate the picturesque, the officers of the force were disappointed with the place. They had believed that they were advancing upon a splendid city; but they now found themselves before a walled town, presenting so few objects of interest that it was scarcely worth exploring. After the desolate tracts over which they had passed, the valley of Candahar appeared to the eye of our officers to be a pleasant and a favoured spot. There were green fields, and shady orchards, and running streams, to vary the surrounding landscape. But they found the city itself to be little better than a collection of mud-houses, forming very unimposing streets.* The citadel was in ruins. "The interior consisted only of

* As at Herat, the four principal streets meet in the centre of the city, and at their junction are covered over with a great dome. The picturesque accessories of Candahar are by no one so well described as by Lieutenant Rattray, in his letter-press accompaniments to his admirable series of "Views in Afghanistan." With true artistic feeling, he writes: "Viewing Candahar from without, or at a distance, there is no peculiarity in its structure to strike the eye, as nothing appears above the long, high walls but the top of Ahmed Shah's tomb, the summits of a few minarets, and the upper parapets of the citadel. But the interior, as seen from the battlements, cannot fail to delight. Its irregular mud-houses, partly in ruins, varied with trees and minarets; the square red-brick dwellings, with doors and windows of Turkish arches; the lofty habitations of the Hindoo; the tents pitched here and there on the flat

the relics of houses of forgotten Princes.”* There was altogether an air of dreariness and desolation about the place. Many of the houses had been thrown down by repeated shocks of earthquake, and had not been rebuilt. The public buildings were few; but conspicuous among them was the tomb of Ahmed Shah, whose white dome, seen from a distance, stood up above the houses of the city, whilst a spacious mosque, with its domes and minarets, seen also from afar, enshrined a relic of extraordinary sanctity—the shirt of the Prophet Mahomed.

When the British arrived before Candahar in April, 1839, it was said that the principal inhabitants had forsaken the place. But enough remained to give an animated and picturesque aspect to the city. The streets and bazaars were crowded with people of different castes and different costumes — Afghans, Persians, Oosbegs, Beloochees, Armenians, and Hindoos; whilst strings of laden camels everywhere passing and repassing, enhanced the picturesque liveliness of the scene.

There was little to break the monotony of the halt at Candahar. The movements of the enemy, and the probabilities of a stirring or a languid campaign, were discussed in our officers' tents; and when, on the 9th of May, a brigade under Colonel Sale—an officer who had

house-tops; the long terraces crowded with people, busied in their various callings in the open air; the dung and mud-plastered hut of the Khaukur, with his heavy, wild-looking buffaloes tethered round it; the high enclosures of the different tribes; the warlike castles of the chieftains; the gaily-decorated palace of some great Douranee Lord, with its fountains, squares, and court-yards; and the domed houses of the other inhabitants, the bazaars, mosques, turrets, and cupolas, rising up in the midst of

stupendous and inaccessible mountains, from the whole rise a panorama pleasing to look upon.”

* Kennedy. The author adds: “Shah Soojah had sheltered himself in one, Mr. Macnaghten in another, and Sir Alexander Burnes in a third. The latter had been rebuilt by one of the chiefs of Candahar for his favourite wife. It had an air of magnificence and grandeur where it stood; but in the Mogul Serai of Surat, or in Ahmedabad, it would be passed unobserved.”

already done much good service to his country, and was destined now to play a conspicuous part in the great Central-Asian drama—was despatched to Ghiresk, a place some seventy-five miles in a westerly direction from Candahar, in pursuit of the fugitive Sirdars, there were few officers in Keane's army who did not long to accompany it. But the campaign was a brief and an inglorious one—Sale marched to Ghiresk and returned to Candahar. The Sirdars had abandoned the place, and fled across the Persian frontier. They had but a handful of followers, and they were powerless to offer any resistance to our advancing troops. From Kohun-dil-Khan and his brothers nothing was to be apprehended. Their very names were soon almost forgotten by the Feringhees who had driven them from their homes. Candahar and the surrounding country was in possession of the restored Suddozye Princes. But Shah Soojah and his supporters still looked anxiously towards the north, where Dost Mahomed, the ablest and the most powerful of the Barukzye brotherhood, was still mustering his fighting men—still endeavouring to rouse the chiefs to aid him in the defence of his capital against the often-rejected King, who had now come back to them again, supported by the gold and bayonets of the infidels.

But the very circumstances which might be supposed to work to our disadvantage, and to give strength to the enemy, really favoured our cause. The protracted halt at Candahar gave Dost Mahomed and his adherents abundant time to mature their measures of defence. Whilst the British army was starving at Candahar, the Barukzyes at Caubul might have been collecting troops and strengthening their defences for a vigorous and well-organised opposition. But to Dost Mahomed this continued halt was altogether unintelligible. He could

not understand why, if they really purposed to advance upon Caubul, Macnaghten and Keane were wasting their strength in utter idleness at Candahar. It was the Ameer's belief that the British were projecting a movement upon Herat; that the Army of the Indus would branch off to the westward; and that its operations against Caubul would be deferred to the following year. Believing this, Dost Mahomed turned his thoughts rather to the defence of the eastern than of the western line of road. It had been arranged,* under the Tripartite treaty, that Prince Timour, the eldest son of Shah Soojah, accompanied by Captain Wade and a Sikh force, should penetrate the passes beyond Peshawur, and advance upon Caubul by the road of Jellalabad and Jugdulluck. This force was now advancing. Dost Mahomed sent out against it some of his best fighting men, under the command of his favourite son, Akbar Khan—the young chief who was destined to stand out with such terrible prominence from among the leading personages distinguished in the later history of the war.

No thought, however, of a movement upon Herat weighed at this time on Macnaghten's mind. It appeared to him little desirable to march a British army into the dominions of Shah Kamran, so long as there was a possibility of attaining the desired results by any means less costly and hazardous. There was little immediate prospect then of Mahomed Shah returning for the re-investment of Herat. There was no pressing danger to be combated. So Macnaghten determined to send, instead of a British army, a British mission to Herat, with a handful of engineer and artillery officers, and a few lakhs of rupees to be expended on the defences of the place.

It was in the month of September, 1838, that, after

* See *ante*, page 351.

a nine months' investment of Herat, Mahomed Shah struck his camp and turned his face towards his own capital. Eldred Pottinger had saved the city from the grasp of the Persians. But his work was not yet done. The wretched people were starving. The necessary evils of the protracted siege had been greatly enhanced by the grinding cruelty of Yar Mahomed. To have left Herat immediately on the departure of the Persian army would have been to have left the inhabitants to perish. Moreover, the accursed traffic in human flesh, which the Persian Prince had set forth as the just cause of his invasion of Herat, had not been suppressed. So Pottinger remained in Herat, and Stoddart, having witnessed the breaking up of the Persian camp, joined his brother-officer in the city, and then the two began to labour diligently together in the great cause of universal humanity.

But these labours were distasteful to the Wuzeer. Pottinger and Stoddart had done the work which Yar Mahomed required of them. The one had driven off, and the other had drawn off, the Persian army. He did not desire that they should interfere with his internal tyranny. To oppress the helpless people at his will seemed to be his rightful prerogative. The slave-trade, which he carried on with such barbarous activity, was the main source of the Heratee revenue. The English officers did not propose to effect its suppression without securing adequate compensation to the slave-dealing state. But Yar Mahomed viewed all their proceedings with jealousy and suspicion; and two months after the close of the siege of Herat, they were grossly insulted in the presence of the King, and ordered to withdraw themselves beyond the limits of the Heratee territory.

Stoddart had work to do in another quarter. He quitted Herat and made his way to Bokhara. But Pottinger was solicited to postpone his departure, and the dawn of the new year still found him at the Court of Herat. He only remained to be insulted. In January, 1839, another outrage was committed upon him. His house was attacked by the retainers of Yar Mahomed. One of his public servants was seized and mutilated. As the year advanced, the hostile temper of the Wuzeer became more and more apparent. Tidings of the advance of Shah Soojah and his British allies had reached Herat; and although the integrity of that state had been especially guaranteed by the Tripartite treaty, and British money was then maintaining both the government and the people of Herat, Yar Mahomed began to intrigue both with the Persian Court and the Candahar Sirdars, and endeavoured to form a confederacy for the expulsion of the Shah and his allies from Afghanistan.*

But the Persian Court was little inclined to commit itself to an act of such direct hostility against Great Britain. The Army of the Indus continued to advance; there was no prospect of any organised opposition. Our success was sufficiently intelligible to Yar Mahomed. He respected success. So, when Shah Soojah entered Candahar, and the British army encamped beneath its walls, he hastened to congratulate the Shah upon his restoration, and sent a friendly mission to the British camp. In return for this, Macnaghten now determined to despatch a British officer to Herat to negotiate a friendly treaty with Shah Kamran. His first thought

* "Facts regarding our Political Relations with Herat, and the Conduct of Yar Mahomed Khan, from November, 1837, to February, 1841," by Dr. J. S. Login, attached to the Heratee Mission.

was to entrust the duty to Burnes; but Burnes was disinclined to undertake it; and Sir John Keane was of opinion that he could not be spared.*

So the choice of the Envoy fell upon Major Todd, an officer of the Bengal Artillery, who had been for many years employed in Persia, instructing the artillerymen of Mahomed Shah in the mysteries of his profession, and assisting the British Mission in matters lying beyond the circle of mere military detail. Thoroughly acquainted with the languages and politics of Western Asia, a man of good capacity, good temper, and good principle, he appeared to be well fitted for the office which the Envoy now thought of delegating to him. He had been in the camp of Mahomed Shah during the siege of Herat, and had been employed in the negotiations which had arisen between the two contending states. He had subsequently travelled down through Afghanistan to India, charged with information for the Governor-General, and had then recommended himself, by the extent of his local knowledge and general acquirements, scarcely more than by the integrity of his character and the amiability of his disposition for employment, upon the Minister's staff. He was military secretary and political assistant to Mr. Macnaghten when the Envoy deputed him to Herat. There went at the same time other officers, whose names have since been honourably associated with the great events of the Central-Asian War—James Abbott and Richmond Shakespear, of the Bengal Artillery; and Sanders, of the Engineers, who fell nobly upon the field of Maharajhpore.† They went to

* "I think Sir A. Burnes is disinclined to go to Herat, and Sir J. Keane is averse to his going there. It is probable I may send Todd instead."—[*Mr. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland: Candahar, April 25, 1839. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

† Lieutenant North, of the Bombay Engineers, and Drs. Login and Ritchie, also accompanied them. The Mission left Candahar on the 21st of June, and reached Herat on the 25th of July.

strengthen the fortifications of the place, and they took with them guns and treasure.

A few days after the departure of the Mission to Herat, the army recommenced its march. It had been halted at Candahar from the 25th of April to the 27th of June. During this time the harvest had ripened; the carriage-cattle had gained strength; but sickness had broken out among our troops. The heat under canvas had been extreme. Fever, dysentery, and jaundice had been doing their work; and many a good soldier had been laid in a foreign grave. Money, too, had been painfully scarce. It had been scattered about so profusely on our first arrival at Candahar, that now an empty treasury stared Macnaghten in the face; and he tried in vain to negotiate a loan. All these were dispiriting circumstances; and there were others which pressed heavily upon the mind of the Envoy. It was becoming plainer and clearer to him every day, that the Afghans regarded the intrusion of the British into their dominions with the strongest feelings of national hatred and religious abhorrence. A different class of men from the Belooch marauders, who had carried off our cattle and plundered our stores in the southern country, were now surrounding our camp. If our people straggled far from their supports, they did it at the peril of their lives. "Remember, gentlemen, you are not now in Hindostan,"* was the significant warning which broke from Shah Soojah, when two young officers,† returning from a fishing excursion along the banks of the Urghundab, had been cut down by a party of assassins. It was plain, too, that the Ghilzyes of Western Afghanistan—the original lords of the land—were disinclined to bend their necks to the Suddozye yoke. They had

* Havelock.

† Inverarity and Wilmer. The

former was murdered; the latter escaped with his life.

rejected the overtures made to them. They were not to be bought by British gold, or deluded by British promises. Perhaps they may have doubted the sincerity of the latter. Already were Shah Soojah and Macnaghten scattering about those promises even more freely than their money; and already were they ceasing to respect the obligation of fulfilling them. The Ghilzyes now regarded us with unconquerable mistrust. There was every prospect of their long continuing to be a thorn in the flesh of the restored monarch and his supporters—a wild and lawless enemy, not to be reduced to loyalty by Douranee Kings, or to subjection by foreign bayonets.

This, at all events, had been learnt at Candahar during the two months' halt of our army, which, when everything has been said on the subject of supplies, seems still to demand from the pen of the historian something more in the way of explanation. The supplies had now come into camp. They might not be available for the troops on the line of march to Caubul,* but there was no longer any excuse for protracting the halt. So, on the 27th of June, as Runjeet Singh, the old Lion of Lahore, was wrestling with death at his own capital, the British army resumed its march; and on the 21st of July was before the famous fortress of Ghuznee.

* A convoy of camels laden with grain had been for some time expected from the southward, under the charge of a Lohanee merchant, named Surwar Khan. Some efforts had been made by the enemy to intercept this convoy, or to corrupt the Lohanee chief; and it is said that nothing but the determined fidelity of the leader of the Irregular Horse that accompanied it, saved the convoy from being carried off to the Barukzyes. It reached Candahar, but there a new difficulty presented itself. The camel-drivers refused to proceed.

There were 20,000 maunds of grain now at the disposal of our Commissariat officers; but the contumacy of these men was now likely to render it wholly useless. Suwar Khan had contracted to bring the convoy to Candahar; but the camel-drivers, afraid of the vengeance of Dost Mahomed, refused to proceed any further. There was no contending against this; so the supplies were made over to the Commissariat, and stored at Candahar, where a detachment of our troops was left.

CHAPTER III.

[June—August: 1839.]

The Disunion of the Barukzyes—Prospects of Dost Mahomed—Keane's Advance to Ghuznee—Massacre of the Prisoners—Fall of Ghuznee—Flight of Dost Mahomed—Hadjee Khan, Khaukur—Escape of Dost Mahomed.

THE disunion of the Barukzye brethren lost Afghanistan to the Sirdars. The bloodless fall of Candahar struck no astonishment into the soul of Dost Mahomed. He had long mistrusted his kinsmen. Candahar, too, was the home of the Douranees. He knew that the Barukzyes had nothing to expect from the allegiance of that powerful tribe. He knew that they were little inclined to strike a blow for the existing dynasty; but he knew, at the same time, that they were so prostrate and enfeebled, that the Suddozye Prince would derive no active assistance from them—that they would only throw into the scale the passive sullenness and harmless decrepitude of men broken down by a long course of oppression.

If Dost Mahomed and the Candahar Sirdars had leagued themselves firmly together, without jealousy and without suspicion—if they had declared a religious war, had appealed to the Mahomedan feelings of the people—if they had, by their own energy and activity, encouraged Mehrab Khan, of Khelat, to array himself against the invaders, and throwing themselves heart and soul into the cause, had opposed our passage through the Bolan and Kojuck Passes, they might have turned

to the best account the sufferings of our famine-stricken army, and have given us, at the outset of the campaign, a check from which we should not have speedily recovered. But it seems to have been the design of Providence to paralyse our enemies at this time, and so to lure us into greater dangers than any that could have beset us at the opening of the campaign.

But although with slight feelings of astonishment Dost Mahomed now contemplated the successful establishment of Shah Soojah at Candahar, it could not have been without emotions of bitterness and mortification that he beheld his countrymen either flying ignobly before the invaders, or bowing down without shame before the money-bags of the infidels. It was a sore trial to him to see how almost every chief in the country was now prepared to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage. He had not sufficient confidence in his own strength, or the loyalty of his people, to believe that he could offer any effectual resistance to the approach of the Suddozye King, supported as he was by British bayonets and British gold. His enemies were advancing upon Caubul, both along the eastern and western lines of approach; and he was necessitated to divide his strength. Nor could he even give his undivided attention to his foreign enemies. There were danger and disaffection at home. The Kohistan was in rebellion.* He could see plainly that the Kuzzilbashes were against him. Indeed, all the bulwarks of national defence which he could hope to oppose to the advancing enemy, were crumbling to pieces before his eyes. Believing that all nationality of feeling was utterly extinct in the souls of his brethren, it had, ever since he had established himself at Caubul, been his policy to place the least pos-

* The Kohistan is the hill country to the north of Caubul, lying between the capital and the Hindoo-Koosh.

sible amount of power in their hands, and to entrust all his delegated authority to the hands of his sons. His only trust now was in them. Akbar Khan had been despatched through the eastern passes to oppose the march of Wade and the Sikhs; Hyder Khan was in command of the garrison of Ghuznee; and Afzul Khan, with a body of horse, was in the neighbourhood of that fortress, instructed to operate against the flanks of our army in the open country. The Ameer himself was at the capital waiting the progress of events, and husbanding his strength for the final conflict.

In the Ameer's camp there seems to have been little knowledge of the movements and designs of the enemy. It had been for some time believed that it was the intention of the British chiefs to march upon Herat, and now again it was the opinion that they purposed to mask Ghuznee and move at once upon Caubul. It seems, therefore, to have been the design of Dost Mahomed that Afzul Khan and Hyder Khan, having suffered us to advance a march or two beyond Ghuznee, should fall upon our rear, whilst Dost Mahomed himself was to give us battle from the front.* But he had not measured aright the policy of the British Commander. It was not Sir John Keane's intention to mask Ghuznee, but to reduce it.

The strength of Ghuznee was the boast of the Afghans. They believed that it was not to be carried by assault. On the other hand, Sir John Keane, persuaded that it was not a place of any strength, had advanced upon Ghuznee without any siege guns. A battering train had been brought up, with great labour and at great expense, to Candahar, and now that it was likely to be

* This was the account of the Ameer's tactics given by Hyder Khan. Mohun Lal, upon whose authority I instance it, was in daily personal communication with the Prince after his capture, and ought to be well informed upon this point.

brought into use, and so to repay the labour and the expense, Sir John Keane dropped it by the way. He was nearing the strongest fortress in the country—he knew that it was garrisoned by the enemy, and that, if he advanced upon it, it would be vigorously defended. He determined to advance upon it; and yet, with an amount of infatuation which, although after-events have thrown it into the shade, at the time took the country by surprise, and was, perhaps, unexampled in Indian warfare, he left his heavy guns at Candahar, and advanced upon Ghuznee with nothing but light field-pieces. He had been told that it was a place of no considerable strength, and that it would give him no trouble to take it. Major Todd and Lieutenant Leech had seen Ghuznee, and their reports had dissipated the anxieties of the Commander-in-Chief. So he found himself before a place which he subsequently described as one of “great strength both by nature and by art,” without any means of effecting a breach in its walls.

The city of Ghuznee lies between Candahar and Caubul—about 230 miles distant from the former, and ninety miles from the latter place. The entire line of country from Candahar to Caubul is, in comparison with that which lies between Caubul and Peshawur, an open and a level tract, opposing no difficulties to the march of an army encumbered with artillery and baggage. As a city, it was of less importance than either Caubul or Candahar.* But the strength of the citadel

* “The town,” says Lieutenant Rattray, “stands on the extreme point of a range of hills, which slope upwards and command the north-east angle of the Balla Hissar, near which is perched the tomb of Belool the Wise, among ruined mosques and grave-stones. As a city, it will not bear comparison with Caubul or Candahar; and a previous visit to the bazaars of either would spoil

you for the darkened narrow streets and small charloo of Ghuznee. However, it possesses snug houses and capital stabling, sufficient for a cavalry brigade, within its walls; and in the citadel, particularly, the squares and residences of its former governors were in many instances spacious and even princely in their style and decorations.”

had been famous throughout many generations; and the first sight of the fortress, as it burst suddenly on the view of our advancing army, "with its fortifications rising up, as it were, on the side of a hill, which seemed to form the background to it," must have thrust upon every officer of the force the conviction that, at Candahar, they had all under-rated the strength of the place. It obviously was not a fortress to be breached by nine-pounder and six-pounder guns.

From the fortifications of the citadel Hyder Khan looked out through a telescope, and beheld our British columns advancing slowly and steadily across the plain. Some preparations had been made for external defence; but not on any extensive scale. Parties of the enemy were posted in the villages and gardens around the fort; but our light companies soon dislodged them. The morning was spent in brisk skirmishing;* the range of the enemy's guns was tried; the engineers reconnoitred the place; and then it was determined that the camp should be pitched upon the Caubul side of the city. It was reported that Dost Mahomed himself was advancing from the capital, and it was expedient to cut off his direct communication with the fort. Not without some confusion the camp was pitched. Had Afzul Khan descended with his cavalry upon us at this time, he might have wrought dire mischief amongst us.

Day had scarcely dawned on the 22nd, when Sir John Keane, accompanied by Sir Willoughby Cotton and the engineers, ascended the heights commanding the eastern face of the works, and reconnoitred the fortress. He had determined on carrying the place by assault. In ignorance of the means whereby this was to be accomplished, the

* The enemy, dislodged from the garden, retreated to an outwork, whence they directed a heavy fire upon our people, and did some mischief among them. Captain Graves, of the 16th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Homrigh, of the 48th, were wounded.

King had recommended that the army should leave Ghuznee to itself, and march on at once to Caubul. It was evident that the light field-pieces which Keane had brought up with him from Candahar could not breach the solid walls of Ghuznee. "If you once breach the place," said the Shah, "it is yours; but I cannot understand how you are to breach it—how you are to get into the fort." But Sir John Keane did understand this; for his engineers had taught him. He understood, though he had left his siege train behind, that there was still a resource remaining to him. Though the walls could not be breached, a gate, Captain Thomson assured him, might be blown in with gunpowder.

The gate to be blown in was the Caubul gate. All the others had been built up. The military historians leave it to be surmised by the reader that the knowledge of this important fact was derived from the *reconnaissances* of the British Commander and his engineers. The truth is, that the British had then in their camp a deserter from the Ghuznee garrison—a Barukzye of rank, who had been induced to turn his traitorous back upon his tribe. Abdool Rashed Khan was the nephew of Dost Mahomed. When the "Commercial Mission" was in Afghanistan, Mohun Lal had made the acquaintance of this man. The Moonshee seems to have been endowed with a genius for traitor-making, the lustre of which remained undimmed to the very end of the war. He now began to operate upon his friend; and he achieved a brilliant success. Abdool Rashed was not deaf to the voice of the charmer. Mohun Lal wrote him a seductive letter, and he determined to desert. As the British army approached Ghuznee he joined our camp. "I introduced him," says Mohun Lal, "to the Envoy, who placed him under the immediate disposal of Lord Keane. The information which he gave to Major Thomson, the chief engineer, relative to the

fortifications of Ghuznee, was so valuable and necessary, that my friend Abdool Rashed Khan was requested to attend upon him in all his reconnoitring expeditions." He was precisely the man we wanted. He gave us all the information we required. He taught us how to capture Ghuznee.

Having determined to enter Ghuznee through an entrance effected by an explosion of gunpowder, Keane began to issue his instructions for the assault, which was to take place before daybreak on the following morning. Every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken to ensure success. It was a day of expectation and anxiety, and not wholly uneventful. On that 22nd of July was made known to us, with fearful demonstrativeness, the character of those fanatic soldiers of Islam, who have since become so terribly familiar to us under the name of *Ghazees*. Incited by the priesthood, they flock to the green banner, eager to win Paradise by the destruction of their infidel foes, or to forestal the predestined bliss by dying the martyr's death in the attempt. A party of these fearless followers of the Prophet had assembled in the neighbourhood of Ghuznee, and now they were about to pour down upon the Shah's camp, and to rid the country of a King who had outraged Mahomedanism by returning to his people borne aloft on the shoulders of the infidels. A gallant charge of the Shah's Horse, led by Peter Nicolson, who took no undistinguished part in the after-events of the war, checked the onslaught of these desperate fanatics; and Outram, with a party of foot, followed them to the heights where the cavalry had driven them, and captured their holy standard. Some fifty prisoners were taken. It is painful to relate what followed. Conducted into the presence of Shah Soojah, they gloried in their high calling, and openly reviled their King. Some of them, more audacious than the rest, stabbed one

of the royal attendants. Upon this, orders were issued for the massacre of the whole.

The Shah ordered them to be beheaded, and they were hacked to death, with wanton barbarity, by the knives of his executioners. Coolly and deliberately the slaughter of these unhappy men proceeded, till the whole lay mangled and mutilated upon the blood-stained ground.* Macnaghten, a little time before, had been commending the humane instincts of the King. The humanity of Shah Soojah was nowhere to be found except in Macnaghten's letters. It is enough simply to recite the circumstances of a deed so terrible as this. It was an unhappy and an ominous commencement. The Shah had marched all the way from Loodhianah without encountering an enemy. And now the first men taken in arms against him were cruelly butchered in cold blood by the "humane" monarch. The act, impolitic as it was unrighteous, brought its own sure retribution. That "martyrdom" was never forgotten. The day of reckoning came at last; and when our unholy policy sunk unburied in blood and ashes, the shrill cry of the *Ghazee* sounded as its funeral wail.

* There has been so much bitter controversy on this unhappy subject, that I have not written this bare outline of the event without instituting inquiries among those who were most likely to have had some personal cognizance of it. That I have rightly characterised these murders I know, for I have the evidence of one who saw the butchery going on. An officer of the highest character writes, in reply to my inquiries: "As regards what is called the Ghuznee massacre, I was walking one day in camp, and came upon the King's tents, at the rear of which I saw a fearfully bloody sight. There were forty or fifty men, young and old. Many were dead; others at their last gasp; others with their hands tied behind them; some sitting, others standing, awaiting their doom; and the King's executioners

and other servants amusing themselves (for actually they were laughing and joking, and seemed to look upon the work as good fun) with hacking and maiming the poor wretches indiscriminately with their long swords and knives. I was so horrified at coming so suddenly on such a scene of blood, that I was for the instant, as it were, spell-bound. On inquiry, I ascertained that the King had ordered this wholesale murder in consequence of one of the number (they were, or were said to be, all *Ghazees*, who had shortly before been taken prisoners) having stabbed, in his Majesty's presence, a Pesh-Khidmut, or body-attendant of the King. My friend and I made our exit; and he went direct to the Envoy's tent and reported the circumstance."—[*MS. Correspondence.*]

A gusty night had heralded a gusty morn, when Keane, inwardly bemoaning the absence of his heavy guns, planted his light field-pieces on some commanding heights opposite the citadel, and filled the gardens near the city walls with his Sepoy musketeers. No sound issued from the fortress; nor was there any sign of life, whilst unseen under cover of the night, and unheard above the loud wailings of the wind, the storming column was gathering upon the Caubul road, and the engineers were carrying up their powder-bags to the gate. The advance was under Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry; and the main column under Brigadier Sale.* Captain Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers, directed the movements of the explosion party; and with him were his two subalterns, Durand and Macleod, and Captain Peat, of the Bombay corps. Three hours after midnight everything was ready for the assault.

Then Keane ordered the light batteries to open upon the works of Ghuznee. It was a demonstration—harmless but not useless; for it fixed the attention of the enemy, and called forth a responsive fire. A row of blue lights along the walls now suddenly broke through the darkness and illuminated the place. The enemy had been beguiled by the false attack, and were now looking out towards our batteries, eager to learn the nature of the operations commenced by the investing force. And whilst the Afghans were thus engaged, anticipating an escalade and manning their walls, the British engineers were quietly piling their powder-bags at the Caubul gate.

The work was done rapidly and well. The match

* The advance consisted of the light companies of the four European regiments; the remaining companies composed the other sections of the storming columns. The regiments were: the 2nd, the 13th, and 17th (Queen's), and the Company's European Regiment.

was applied to the hose. The powder exploded.* Above the roaring of the guns and the rushing of the wind, the noise of the explosion was barely audible.† But the effect was as mighty as it was sudden. A column of black smoke arose; and down with a crash came heavy masses of masonry and shivered beams in awful ruin and confusion. Then the bugle sounded the advance. Dennie, at the head of his stormers, pushed forward through the smoke and dust of the aperture; and soon the bayonets of his light companies were crossing the swords of the enemy who had rushed down to the point of attack. A few moments of darkness and confusion; and then the foremost soldiers caught a glimpse of the morning sky, and pushing gallantly on, were soon established in the fortress. Three hearty, animating cheers—so loud and clear that they were heard throughout the general camp‡—announced to their excited comrades below that Dennie and his stormers had entered Ghuznee.

Then Sale pressed on with the main column, eager to support the stormers in advance; and as he went he met an engineer officer of the explosion party, who had been thrown to the ground, shattered and bewildered by the concussion,§ and who now announced that the gate was choked up, and that Dennie could not force an entrance. So Sale sounded the retreat. The column halted. There was a pause of painful doubt and anxiety; and then the cheering notes of the bugle, sounding the advance, again stirred the hearts of our people. Another engineer officer had reported that, though the aperture was crowded with fallen rubbish, Dennie had made good

* Hough says: "Lieutenant Durand was obliged to scrape the hose with his finger-nails, finding the powder failed to ignite on the first application of the port-fire."

† Havelock. Hough says: "The explosion was heard by nearly all."

‡ Havelock.

§ Captain Peat.

his entrance. Onward, therefore, went Sale; but the enemy had profited by the brief pause. The opposition at the gateway now was more resolute than it would have been if there had been no check. The Afghans were crowding to the gate—some for purposes of defence, others to escape the fire which Dennie was pouring in upon them. Sale met them amidst the ruins—amidst the crumbled masonry and the fallen timbers. There was a sturdy conflict. The Brigadier himself was cut down;* but after a desperate struggle with his opponent, whose skull he clove with his sabre, he regained his feet, again issued his commands; and the main column was soon within the fortress. The support, under Colonel Croker, then pushed forward; the reserve in due course followed; the capture of Ghuznee was complete; and soon the colours of the 13th and 17th Regiments were flapping in the strong morning breeze on the ramparts of the Afghans' last stronghold.†

* I give the circumstances of Sale's escape in the words of Captain Havelock, who has detailed them with trustworthy minuteness. "One of their number rushing over the fallen timbers, brought down Brigadier Sale by a cut in the face with his sharp *shunsheer* (sabre). The Afghan repeated his blow as his opponent was falling; but the pummel, not the edge of his sword, this time took effect, though with stunning violence. He lost his footing, however, in the effort, and Briton and Afghan rolled together amongst the fractured timbers. Thus situated, the first care of the Brigadier was to master the weapon of his adversary. He snatched at it, but one of his fingers met the edge of the trenchant blade. He quickly withdrew his wounded hand, and adroitly replaced it over that of his adversary, so as to keep fast the hilt of his *shunsheer*. But he had an active and powerful

opponent, and was himself faint from the loss of blood. Captain Kershaw, of the 13th, aide-de-camp to Brigadier Baumgardt, happened in the *mêlée* to approach the scene of conflict; the wounded leader recognised and called to him for aid. Kershaw passed his drawn sabre through the body of the Afghan; but still the desperado continued to struggle with frantic violence. At length, in the fierce grapple, the Brigadier for a moment got uppermost. Still retaining the weapon of his enemy in his left hand, he dealt him with his right a cut from his own sabre, which cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows. The Mahomedan once shouted, '*Ne Ullah!*' (Oh! God!) and never moved or spoke again."—[*Captain Havelock's Narrative.*]

† Havelock. The colour of the 13th was the first planted by the hand of Ensign Frere—a nephew of the Hon. John Hookham Frere.

But there was much hard fighting within the walls. In the frenzy of despair the Afghans rushed out from their hiding-places, sword in hand, upon our stormers, and plied their sabres with terrible effect, but only to meet with fearful retribution from the musket-fire or the bayonets of the British infantry. There was horrible confusion and much carnage. Some, in their frantic efforts to escape by the gateway, stumbled over the burning timbers, wounded and exhausted, and were slowly burnt to death. Some were bayoneted on the ground. Others were pursued and hunted into corners like mad dogs, and shot down, with the curse and the prayer on their lips. But never, it is said by the historians of the war, after the garrison had ceased to fight, did the wrath of their assailants overtake them. Many an Afghan sold his life dearly, and, though wounded and stricken down, still cut out at the hated enemy; but when resistance was over, mercy smiled down upon him. The appeals of the helpless were never disregarded by the victors in their hour of triumph. The women, too, were honourably treated. Hyder Khan's Zenana was in the citadel; but not a woman was outraged by the captors.*

Resistance over, the Commander-in-Chief and the Envoy entered Ghuznee by the Caubul gate. Shah Soojah, before the contest was over, had ridden down to the point of attack, and watched the progress of events with the deepest interest, but with no apparent want of collectedness and nerve.† Keane and Mac-

* Havelock. The military historian attaches the forbearance of the soldiery to the fact, that no spirit rations had been served out to them during the preceding fortnight. "No candid man," he says, "of any military experience, will deny that the character of the scene, in the fortress and the citadel, would have been far

different if individual soldiers had entered the town primed with arrack, or if spirituous liquors had been discovered in the Afghan depôts."

† I have been assured by an officer on the staff of the Shah's army, that he was near his Majesty, at the taking of Ghuznee, when under fire, and that he exhibited great coolness

naghten now led him up to the citadel. The wife of Hyder Khan, and the other women of his Zenana, were conducted, under the orders of the political and military chiefs, by John Conolly, a cousin of the Envoy, to a house in the town, where they were placed under the charge of the Moonshee Mohun Lal.* But Hyder Khan himself had not yet been discovered. The Suddozye Prince and the British chiefs were inquiring after the commander of the garrison; but no tidings of him were to be obtained. He might have been concealed in the fortress, or he might have effected his escape. Accident only betrayed the position of the young Sirdar. He was found in a house near the Candahar gate, by an officer of the Company's European regiment.† At once acknowledging that he was the governor of Ghuznee, he threw himself upon the mercy of his captors. Conducted to Keane's tent, the Sirdar was guaranteed his personal safety, and placed under the charge of Sir Alexander Burnes.‡ He was unwilling at first to appear in the presence of Shah Soojah; but the assurances of

and courage. He is said by my informant, who was close beside him, to have sate "as firm as a rock, not showing the slightest alarm either by word or gesture, and seeming to think it derogatory to his kingly character to move an inch whilst the firing lasted."

—[*MS. Correspondence.*]

* Mohun Lal says: "Captain John Conolly conducted them, with every mark of deference, to a house in the town, where it fell to my lot to provide them with everything necessary which they wanted; and that responsible charge of them I had for a long time, and executed it to the satisfaction of the ladies, until they were sent India."—[*Life of Dost Mahomed.*]

† Captain Tayler, Brigade-Major 4th Brigade. Mohun Lal says Major Macgregor found him led with an armed party in the , waiting for the night." Mr.

Stocqueler (*Memorials of Afghanistan*) attributes the honour of the capture to Brigadier Roberts, who directed Captain Tayler to proceed to the house.

‡ "The Sirdar, mounted on a small horse, and accompanied by a few of his companions, was conducted by Major Macgregor to the tent of the Commander-in-Chief. Sir Alexander Burnes and myself were sent for, and as soon as the Sirdar saw him he felt a little easy in his mind; and discovering me with him, the expression of his countenance was at once changed, and he asked me for a glass of water. Lord Keane allowed him to remain in my tent, under the charge of Sir A. Burnes. I clothed him with my own clothes every day, and he partook of my meals."—[*Mohun Lal's Life of Dost Mahomed.*]

the Commander-in-Chief overcame his reluctance, and Keane conducted him both to the Mission and to the King. Instructed as to the reception he was to accord to the fallen Barukzye chief, the Suddozye monarch received him with an outward show of kindness, and, with the dignified courtesy which he so well knew how to assume, declared that he forgave the past, and told him to go in peace.

And so Ghuznee fell to the British army, and was made over to the Suddozye King. It cost the victors only seventeen killed and a hundred and sixty-five wounded. Of these last eighteen were officers. The carnage among the garrison was more fearful. Upwards of five hundred men were buried by the besiegers; and many more are supposed to have fallen beyond the walls, under the sabres of the British horsemen. Sixteen hundred prisoners were taken. Immense stores of grain and flour, sufficient for a protracted defence, fell into our hands; and a large number of horses and arms swelled the value of the captured property.

The fall of Ghuznee—a fortress hitherto deemed by the Afghans impregnable—astounded Dost Mahomed and his sons, and struck terror into their souls. Afzul Khan, who was hovering about the neighbourhood, prepared to fall upon our baffled army, found, to his wonderment, that the British colours were waving over the far-famed citadel of Ghuznee, and immediately sought safety in flight. Abandoning his elephants and the whole of his camp-equipage, which fell as booty into the hands of Shah Soojah, the Sirdar fled to Caubul. His father, greatly incensed, ordered him immediately to halt, and “peremptorily refused to receive him.”* He had expected something better from one who had done such good service on the boasted battle-field of Jumrood.

* Outram.

In little more than four-and-twenty hours after the fall of Ghuznee, intelligence of the event reached the camp of the Ameer. He at once assembled his chiefs, spoke of the defection of some of his people, expressed his apprehension that others were about to desert him, and declared his conviction that, without the aid of treachery, Ghuznee would not have fallen before the Feringhees. Then he called upon all present, who wavered in their loyalty, at once to withdraw from his presence, that he might know the extent of his resources, and not rely upon the false friendship of men who would forsake him in the crisis of his fate. All protested their fidelity. A council of war was held, and the Newab Jubbar Khan was despatched to the British camp* to treat with Shah Soojah and his allies.

The Newab mounted his horse and rode with unaccustomed rapidity to Ghuznee. Mohun Lal went out to meet him some miles beyond the camp; and Burnes received him at the piquets. A tent was pitched for his accommodation near the Envoy's; and he was well received by the British Mission. The King received him, too, with the same well-trained courtesy that he had bestowed on Hyder Khan—but the efforts of the Newab were fruitless. He tendered on the part of the Ameer submission to the Suddozye Prince; but claimed, on the part of the brother of Futteh Khan, the hereditary office of Wuzeer, which had been held so long and so ably by the Barukzyes. The claim was at once rejected, and the mockery of an "honourable asylum" in the British dominions offered in its stead. Jubbar Khan spoke out plainly and bluntly, like an honest man. His brother had no ambition to surrender his freedom and become a pensioner

* Whether this step was taken by Dost Mahomed on his own account, or whether it was recommended or agreed to by his principal partisans, does not very clearly appear.

on the bounty of the British Government. Had his cause been far more hopeless than it was, Dost Mahomed would have rather flung himself upon the British bayonets than upon the protection of the Feringhees. Jubbar Khan then frankly stating his own determination to follow the fortunes of his brother, requested and received his dismissal.*

The Newab returned to the Ameer's camp. All hope of negotiation was now at an end, and Dost Mahomed, with resolution worthy of a better fate, marched out to dispute the progress of the invaders. At the head of an army, in which the seeds of dissolution had already been sown, he moved down upon Urghundeh. There he drew up his troops and parked his guns. But it was not on this ground that he had determined to give the Feringhees battle. The last stand was to have been made at Maidan, on the Caubul river—a spot, the natural advantages of which would have been greatly in his favour. But the battle was never fought. At Urghundeh it became too manifest that there was treachery in his camp. The venal Kuzzilbashs were fast deserting his standard. There was scarcely a true man left in his ranks. Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, on whom he had placed great reliance, had gone over to the enemy, and others were fast following his example. This was the crisis of his fate. He looked around him and saw only perfidy on the right hand and on the left. Equal to

* Mohun Lal says that the Newab, who had acted with the greatest friendliness towards Burnes and his Mission, and was known to have been at the head of the English party in Caubul, begged that the wife of Hyder Khan might be given up to him; but preferred the request in vain. He sought an interview, too, with his nephew; and it would have been granted to him, but the official references caused delay, and the Ne-

wab took his departure without seeing the Sirdar. He said significantly to the Envoy, in the course of conversation, "If Shah Soojah is really a King, and come to the kingdom of his ancestors, what is the use of your army and name? You have brought him, by your money and arms, into Afghanistan. Leave him now with us Afghans, and let him rule us if he can."

the occasion, but basely deserted, what could the Ameer do? Never had the nobility of his nature shone forth more truly and more lustrously. In the hour of adversity, when all were false, he was true to his own manhood. Into the midst of his own perfidious troops he rode, with the Koran in his hand; and there called upon his followers, in the names of God and the Prophet, not to forget that they were true Mahomedans—not to disgrace their names and to dishonour their religion, by rushing into the arms of one who had filled the country with infidels and blasphemers. He besought them to make one stand, like brave men and true believers; to rally round the standard of the commander of the faithful; to beat back the invading Feringhees or die in the glorious attempt. He then reminded them of his own claims on their fidelity. "You have eaten my salt," he said, "these thirteen years. If, as is too plain, you are resolved to seek a new master, grant me but one favour in requital for that long period of maintenance and kindness—enable me to die with honour. Stand by the brother of Futteh Khan, whilst he executes one last charge against the cavalry of these Feringhee dogs; in that onset he will fall; then go and make your own terms with Shah Soojah."* The noble spirit-stirring appeal was vainly uttered; few responded to it. There was scarcely a true heart left. With despairing eyes he looked around upon his recreant followers. He saw that there was no hope of winning them back to their old allegiance; he felt that he was surrounded by traitors and cowards, who were willing to abandon him to his fate. It was idle to struggle against his destiny. The first bitter pang was over; he reassumed his serenity of demeanour, and, addressing himself to the Kuzzilbashes, formally gave them their discharge. He then

* Havelock.

dismissed all who were inclined to purchase safety by tendering allegiance to the Shah; and with a small handful of followers, leaving his guns still in position, turned his horse's head towards the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh.

It was on the evening of the 2nd of August that Dost Mahomed fled from Urghundeh. On the following day the British army, which had moved from Ghuznee on the 30th of July, received tidings of his flight. It was now determined to send a party in pursuit. It was mainly to consist of Afghan horsemen; but some details from our cavalry regiments were sent with them, and Captain Outram, ever ready for such service, volunteered for the command. Other officers—bold riders and dashing soldiers*—were eager to join in the pursuit; and a party of ten, with about five hundred mounted men, mustered that afternoon before the Mission tents, equipped for the raid.

If the success of this expedition had depended upon the zeal and activity of the officers, Dost Mahomed would have been brought back a prisoner to the British camp; for never did a finer set of men leap into their saddles, flushed with the thought of the stirring work before them. But when they set out in pursuit of the fallen Ameer, a traitor rode with them, intent on turning to very nothingness all their chivalry and devotion. There was an Afghan chief known as Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, of whom mention has been made. He was a man of mean extraction, the son of a goat-herd,† but from this low estate had risen into notice, and obtained service with Dost Mahomed. It was not in his nature to be faithful. He deserted Dost Mahomed, and attached

* The names of many of them were subsequently associated with the later incidents of the war. They were Captains Wheler, Troup, Lawrence, Backhouse, Christie, and Erskine; Lieutenants Broadfoot, Hogg, Ryves, and Dr. Worrall. Captains Tayler and Trevor joined them on the 8th.

† Outram says he was a melon-seller.

himself to the Candahar Sirdars. On the advance of the British army he deserted the Sirdars, and flung himself at the feet of the Suddozye. Delighted with such an accession to his strength, the King appointed him Nassur-ood-dowlah, or "Defender of the State," and conferred on him a Jaghire of the annual value of three lakhs of rupees.

At Candahar, whence the Sirdars had fled, the Hadjee, profoundly conscious of the hopelessness of their cause, broke out into loyalty and enthusiasm, and was, to all outward seeming, a faithful adherent of the Shah. But as he entered the principality of the Caubul Ameer, he seemed to stand upon more uncertain ground; the issue of the contest was yet doubtful. Dost Mahomed and his sons were in the field. So the Hadjee made many excuses; and fell in the rear of the British army. He was sick; it was necessary that he should march easily; he could not bear the bustle of the camp. Keeping, therefore, a few marches in the rear, he followed our advancing columns, with his retainers; and there, it is said, "enjoyed the congenial society of several discontented and intriguing noblemen."*

If Ghuznee had not fallen, Hadjee Khan and his friends would have gone over in a body to the Ameer,

* See the "Life of Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, the Talleyrand of the East," published originally in the *Delhi Gazette*. It is attributed to the pen of Arthur Conolly. The writer adds: "In the camp of those chiefs conspiracies against Shah Soojah and his allies were daily agitated. Their letters formed the pride, the comfort, the hope, and the amusement of the Caubul Court. . . . Sometimes it was proposed by the traitors to attack the English camp in concert with the Ghilzyes at night. Fear prevented this plot ripening; but had the army met with a repulse, it would undoubtedly have been attacked in rear. At last, at a full meeting—I

have it from the lips of one present at it—it was determined to join Dost Mahomed *en masse*. At this meeting were the Hadjee Khan, Hadjee Dost, Fyztullub Khan, Noorzye, and many others. They had been deceived by a false report of a partial action of cavalry the day before; the opportunity had arrived, they thought, for giving us the *coup de grace*. Hardly had the conclave separated, when intelligence was received of the capture of Ghuznee. It need hardly be said that, a few hours afterwards, Hadjee Khan and the rest were congratulating his Majesty on the splendid victory."

and on the slightest information of a reverse having befallen us, would have flung themselves on our rear. But the fall of this great Afghan stronghold brought the Hadjee again to the stirrup of the Shah; and he was again all loyalty and devotion. Confident of his fidelity, and perhaps anxious to establish it in the eyes of all who had viewed with suspicion the proceedings of the Hadjee, the King now put it to the proof. The man had once been Governor of Bameean. He knew the country along which the Dost had taken his flight. What could be better than to entrust the conduct of the expedition to the veteran chief? The King and Macnaghten were of the same mind; so Hadjee Khan, who had been for some time in treasonable correspondence with Dost Mahomed, was now despatched to overtake him and bring him back a prisoner to the camp of the Shah.

The result may be easily anticipated. Hadjee Khan cheerfully undertook the duty entrusted to him. The enterprise required the utmost possible amount of energy and promptitude to secure its success. The Ameer and his party were more than a day's journey in advance of his pursuers. Every hour's delay lessened the chance of overtaking the fugitive. So the Hadjee began at once to delay. The pursuers were to have started four hours after noon; Hadjee Khan was not ready till night-fall. Then he was eager to take the circuitous high road instead of dashing across the hills. His people lagged behind to plunder. He himself, when Outram was most eager to push on, always counselled a halt, and in the hour of need the guides deserted. The Ameer was now but little in advance; he was encumbered with women, and children, and much baggage. He had a sick son,* on whose account it was necessary to dimi-

* Akbar Khan, who had by this time been withdrawn from the defence of the Khybur line, and had joined his father's camp prostrated by sickness.

nish the speed of his flight. Outram seemed almost to have the Ameer in his grasp; when Hadjee Khan again counselled delay. It was necessary, he said, to wait for reinforcements. The Ameer had two thousand fighting men. The Afghans under Hadjee Khan were not to be relied upon. They had no food; their horses were knocked up; they were unwilling to advance. Angry and indignant, Outram broke from the Hadjee in the midst of his entreaties, and declared that he would push on with his own men. Again and again there was the same contention between the chivalrous earnestness of the British officer and the foul treachery of the Afghan chief. At last, on the 9th of August, they reached Bameean, where Hadjee Khan had repeatedly declared that Dost Mahomed would halt, only to learn that the fugitives were that morning to be at Syghan, nearly thirty miles in advance. The Ameer was pushing on with increased rapidity, for the sick Prince, who had been carried in a litter, was now transferred to the back of an elephant, and his escape was now almost certain. The treachery of Hadjee Khan had done its work. Outram had been restricted in his operations to the limits of the Shah's dominions; and the Ameer had now passed the borders. Further pursuit, indeed, would have been hopeless. The horses of our cavalry were exhausted by over-fatigue and want of food. They were unable any longer to continue their forced marches. The game, therefore, was up. Dost Mahomed had escaped. Hadjee Khan, Khaukur, had saved the Ameer; but he had sacrificed himself. He had over-reached himself in his career of treachery, and was now to pay the penalty of detection. Outram officially reported the circumstances of the Hadjee's conduct, which had baffled all his best efforts—efforts which, he believed, would have been crowned with suc-

cess*—and the traitor, on his return to Caubul, was arrested by orders of the Shah. Other proofs of his treason were readily found; and he was sentenced to end a life of adventurous vicissitude as a state prisoner in the provinces of Hindostan.†

So fled Dost Mahomed Khan across the frontier of Afghanistan. His guns were found in position at Urghundeh by a party of cavalry and horse artillery sent forward to capture them. They were mostly light pieces;‡ and neither the ordnance nor the position which had been taken up, could be considered of a very formidable character.§ It has been already said, however, that the Ameer had fixed upon another spot on which to meet the advancing armies of the Shah and his allies—a spot well calculated for defence, which, three years afterwards, Shumshoodeen Khan selected for his last

* Others, however, thought that his failure was fortunate, it being only too probable, in their opinion, that, if he had come up with the fugitive, his little party would have been overwhelmed by the followers of the Ameers and the traitorous Afghan horsemen whom Hadjee Khan had taken with him.

† He was confined at Chunar, where he seems to have borne his imprisonment with considerable philosophy.

‡ "With regard to the ordnance captured at Urghundeh, the guns were of all calibres, chiefly below 6-pounder—one a 17-pounder, and a few of different sizes, between 17 and 12-pounders. . . . The number of shot left at Urghundeh was 4270, of various sizes. . . . The shot is hammered iron, and so uneven, that, unless weighed, their weight could not be told. They are chiefly much under 6-pounder shot. . . . With regard to the other stores taken at Urghundeh, nothing was of the slightest service, except the old iron of the carriages, and the axletrees, also good as old iron only, and to which

purpose they have been appropriated." —[*Lieutenant Warburton to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: Caubul, August 16, 1841. MS. Records.*]

§ "Onward," says Captain Havelock, "moved the force, and an hour had not elapsed since the day broke when it came full upon the abandoned ordnance of the fallen Barukzye. Twenty-two pieces of various calibre, but generally good guns, on field carriages, superior to those generally seen in the armies of Asiatic Princes, were parked in a circle in the Ameer's late position. Two more were placed in battery in the village of Urghundeh, at the foot of the hills. . . . The route by which we had advanced was flanked by a deep, impracticable ravine, on which the Afghan left would have rested; there their artillery had been parked, and would probably from this point have swept the open plain, and searched the narrow defile by which we would have debouched upon. Their front was open for the exertions of a bold and active cavalry, and here the Ameer might at least have died with honour."

stand against the battalions of General Nott; but on which like his distinguished clansman, he never gave us battle.

On the 6th of August, Shah Soojah and the British army appeared before the walls of Caubul. On the following day the King entered the capital of Afghanistan. The exile of thirty years—the baffled and rejected representative of the legitimacy of the Douranee Empire, was now at the palace gates. The jingling of the money-bags, and the gleaming of the bayonets of the British, had restored him to the throne which, without these glittering aids, he had in vain striven to recover. The Balla Hissar of Caubul now reared its proud front before him. It was truly a great occasion. The King, gorgeous in regal apparel, and resplendent with jewels, rode a white charger, whose equipments sparkled with Asiatic gold.* It was a goodly sight to see the coronet, the girdle, and the bracelets which scintillated upon the person of the rider, and turned the fugitive and the outcast into a pageant and a show. There were those present to whom the absence of the *Koh-i-Noor*, which, caged in Hyde Park, has become so familiar to the sight-seers of Great Britain, suggested strange reminiscences of the King's eventful past. But the restored monarch, wanting the great diamond, still sparkled into royalty as he rode up to the Balla Hissar, with the white-faced Kings of Afghanistan beside him. In diplomatic costume, Macnaghten and Burnes accompanied the Suddozye puppet. The principal military officers of the British army rode with them. And Moonshee Mohun Lal, flaunting a majestic turban, and looking, in his spruceness, not at all as though his mission in Afghanistan were to do the dirty work of the British diplomatists, made a very conspicuous figure in the gay cavalcade.†

Havelock.

I am indebted for this, as for
h else, to Captain Havelock.
are is but little in the pages of

the military annalists to disturb the
gravity of the historical inquirer, but
it is impossible to restrain a smile at the
happy wording of the following: "Let

But never was there a duller procession. The King and his European supporters rode through the streets of Caubul to the palace in the citadel; but as they went there was no popular enthusiasm; the voice of welcome was still. The inhabitants came to the thresholds of the houses simply to look at the show. They stared at the European strangers more than at the King, who had been brought back to Caubul by the Feringhees; and scarcely even took the trouble to greet the Suddozye Prince with a common salaam. It was more like a funeral procession than the entry of a King into the capital of his restored dominions. But when Shah Soojah reached the palace from which he had so long been absent, he broke out into a paroxysm of childish delight—visited the gardens and apartments with eager activity—commented on the signs of neglect which everywhere presented themselves to his eyes—and received with feelings of genial pleasure the congratulations of the British officers, who soon left his Majesty to himself to enjoy the sweets of restored dominion.*

me not forget to record that Moonshee Mohun Lal, a traveller and an author, as well as his talented master, appeared on horseback on this occasion in a new upper garment of a very gay colour, and under a turban of very admirable fold and majestic dimensions, and was one of the gayest as well as the most sagacious and successful personages in the whole *cortège*."

* General Harlan, who was at Caubul at this time, has written an account of the desertion of Dost Mahomed by his followers at Urghundeh, which only wants a conviction of its entire truth to render it extremely interesting. According to this writer, the Ameer was not only deserted, but plundered by his followers at the last. "A crowd of

noisy disorganised troops," he says, "insolently pressed close up to the royal pavilion—the guards had disappeared—the groom holding the Prince's horse was unceremoniously pushed to and fro—a servant audaciously pulled away the pillow which sustained the Prince's arm—another commenced cutting a piece of the splendid Persian carpet—the beautiful praying rug of the Prince was seized on by a third. . . . 'Take all,' said he, 'that you find within, together with the tent.' In an instant the unruly crowd rushed upon the pavilion—swords gleamed in the air and descended upon the tent—the canvas, the ropes, the carpets, pillows, screens, &c., were seized and dispersed among the plunderers."

CHAPTER IV.

[August—December : 1839.]

Dawn of the Restoration—Difficulties of our Position—Proposed Withdrawal of the Army—Arrival of Colonel Wade—His Operations—Lord on the Hindoo-Koosh—Evils of our Policy—Defective Agency—Moollah Shikore—Our Political Agents—Operations in the Khybur Pass—The Fall of Khelat.

THE restoration of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk to the sovereignty of Afghanistan had now been outwardly accomplished. The Barukzye Sirdars had been expelled from their principalities; a British garrison had been planted in Candahar and in Ghuznee; and a British army was now encamping under the walls of Caubul. A great revolution had thus been perfected. The Douranee monarchy had been restored.

But Shah Soojah was not contented. Even during the excitement of the march he had complained of the narrow kingdom to which he was about to return; and now, as he looked out from the windows of his palace over the fair expanse of country beneath him, he sighed to think that the empire of Ahmed Shah had been so grievously curtailed.

Very different, indeed, was the Douranee Empire, over which the sceptre of Shah Soojah was now waved, from that which his father had handed down to Zemaun

Shah and his brothers, to be sacrificed by their weakness and disunion. The kingdom, which had once extended from Balkh to Shikarpoor, and from Herat to Cashmere, had now shrunk and collapsed. On every side its integrity had been invaded. Cashmere and Mooltan had fallen to the Sikhs; Peshawur had been wrested from the Afghans by the same unscrupulous neighbour; the independence of Herat had been guaranteed to a branch of the Royal family; the Beloochees had asserted pretensions unknown in the times of Ahmed Shah; the petty Princes on the northern hill frontier no longer acknowledged their allegiance to Caubul. In whichever direction he turned his eyes, he beheld the mutilations to which the old Douranee Empire had been subjected; and yearned to recover some of the provinces which had been severed from the domain of his fathers.

But already was the kingdom to which he had been restored more extensive than he could govern. There were many difficult questions now to be solved—the first and the most important of which related to the continuance of his connexion with his Feringhee allies. The British Government had now done all that it had undertaken to do. It had escorted Shah Soojah to his palace gates, and seated him upon the throne of his fathers. In accordance with Lord Auckland's manifesto, the time had now arrived for the withdrawal of the British army. But it was obvious that the British army could not yet be withdrawn. The Shah had no hold upon the affections of his people. He might sit in the Balla Hissar, but he could not govern the Afghans. Such, at least, was the conviction which by this time had forced itself upon Macnaghten's mind. If the British Minister had ever contemplated the early abandonment of the restored King, the idea had now passed away. The Shah himself felt no confidence in his own strength. He

did not believe that the power of Dost Mahomed was irretrievably broken; but still saw him, in imagination, flitting about the regions of the Hindoo-Koosh, raising the Oosbeg tribes, and pouring down for the recovery of Caubul. There were objections, many and weighty, to the continued occupation of Afghanistan by British troops—objections of one kind, which the Shah acknowledged and appreciated; and objections of another, which every statesman and soldier in India must have recognised with painful distinctness. But the experiment of leaving Shah Soojah to himself was too dangerous to be lightly tried. The Shah would fain have rid himself of British interference and control, if he could have maintained himself without British support; and the British Government would fain have withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan, if it could have relied upon the power of the Shah to maintain himself. But to leave the restored Suddozye to be dethroned and expelled, after the homeward march of the troops that had restored him, would have been to court an enormous failure, which would have overwhelmed our government with disgrace. Neither was the restoration sufficiently popular in itself, nor was there sufficient stability in the character of the King to warrant so hazardous an experiment. If the policy of the Afghan invasion had not been based upon error, the experiment would not have been a hazardous one. But the very acknowledgment of the Shah's inability to maintain himself after the departure of the British army, was a crushing commentary on the assertions put forth in the great October manifesto. The truth was not to be disguised. The "adoration" which had greeted the Shah on his return to his long-lost dominions, was found to be a delusion and a sham. The palace of his ers had received him again; but it was necessary still edge in the throne with a quickset of British bayonets.

So thought Lord Auckland.* He had given his mind long and painfully to the subject, and had written an elaborate minute, reviewing all the circumstances of our position in Afghanistan after the entry of the Shah into the country. Macnaghten had been settled little more than a month in Caubul, when a copy of this minute, dated Simlah, August 20, was put into his hands. There was nothing unintelligible in it. Ably written, clearly worded, it enunciated, in unmistakeable paragraphs, the views of the Governor-General, and left Macnaghten, even had he been disposed to follow an opposite course, which he was not, no alternative but to retain a portion of the troops, and himself to abide at Caubul as controller of the Shah. Lord Auckland saw plainly the advantages of withdrawing the Army of the Indus. India could ill afford the abstraction of so large a body of disciplined troops, and it was probable that their services might be required in less remote regions; but he could not purchase the advantages of their withdrawal at the price of the failure of the Afghan expedition.†

It was the opinion of the Governor-General at this time, that although the British army could not with

* As to whether the presence of the British did or did not increase the stability of the restored monarchy, different opinions are entertained. The matter will be subsequently discussed. It was calculated to give the King present support, but not permanently to rivet his hold of the empire.

† "I am anxiously desirous," wrote Lord Auckland, in the minute of August 20, "that the forces which compose the Army of the Indus should be once more stationed within our own provinces. The political effect of their return could not but be advantageous. It would put an end to the

injurious speculations which have been founded on their absence. It might check the restless and unfriendly spirit which has prevailed beyond our northern and eastern frontiers, and would give us disposable strength for the requisitions which it seems probable, in the present aspect of affairs, may, in more quarters than one, be made for military demonstration. Yet I need scarcely add, that even these objects, and the immediate reduction of expenditure, would be ill attained at the price of leaving unaccomplished the great purposes with which the expedition to Caubul was undertaken."—[*MS. Records.*]

safety be wholly withdrawn, a force consisting of some five or six regiments of all arms would be sufficient to keep Shah Soojah upon his throne.* The Bombay troops were to be withdrawn, *en masse*, by the Bolan Pass; and a portion of the Bengal army by the route of Jellalabad and the Khybur. The posts at which it was expedient to plant these troops were, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the two chief cities of Caubul and Candahar; and the principal posts on the main roads to Hindostan—Ghuznee and Quettah, on the West, and Jellalabad and Ali-Musjid on the East. The orders which Sir John Keane had issued, before the Governor-General's minute reached Caubul, anticipated with much exactness the instructions of the Governor-General.† A brigade under Colonel Sale was to remain in Afghanistan. Sir John Keane was to take the remainder of the Bengal troops back to India by the Khybur route; and General Willshire was to lead the Bombay column down by the western line of the Kojuck and the Bolan.

Such were the intentions both of the Supreme Government and the local authorities, when Prince Timour arrived at Caubul, accompanied by Captain, now Colonel Wade, and the little force that had made good his entry into Afghanistan by the eastern passes. It was

* "I certainly expect that a considerable portion of the force now in Afghanistan may be withdrawn in the ensuing autumn, and I indulge the hope that, unless new events should occur, all, or nearly all, of the remainder may be recalled to India when the routes shall be open in the next spring; but to enable us to do this with safety, the Shah's disciplined contingent must be made in all respects efficient, and its organisation must probably be essentially changed and improved. . . .

I should hope, that if of the force from Bengal, three regiments of Native Infantry, one regiment of European Infantry, and one of Native Cavalry, with a proper complement of Artillery and Irregular Horse, were left in Afghanistan, the whole of the remainder of the Army of the Indus (with the temporary exception of one Bombay Native corps, left for a while at Quettah) might be at once withdrawn."

† General orders: Camp near Caubul, August 27, 1839.

on the 3rd of September that Cotton, Burnes, and other British officers, with a guard of honour, went out to receive the Prince. With befitting pomp, the procession made its way through the narrow streets of Caubul to the Balla Hissar; and there were those who said that the gaiety of the heir-apparent and his *cortège* fairly shone down the King's.*

Wade had done his duty well. The magnitude of the operations to the westward has somewhat overlaid the more modest pretensions of the march through the eastern passes; and it may be doubted whether the merit of the achievement has ever been fully acknowledged. Viewed as the contribution of the Sikh Government towards the conquest of Afghanistan, it is absolutely contemptible.† But

* Shahamat Ali, Wade's Moon-shee, says: "As we entered the seat of empire the crowd increased more and more; the balconies and terraces of the houses were filled with women wrapped in *boorkas* or long veils to see their Prince. A man, on the part of the Shah, preceded him and cleared the way, which was necessary, as the streets were very narrow, and we advanced very slowly. The bustle was great; the spectators stood admiring the procession; they observed that his Majesty himself even did not make his entry in such majestic style."—[*The Sikhs and Afghans: by Shahamat Ali.*]

† Runjeet was dying when the troops were assembling; and his death was announced before they commenced their march. There was, at the outset, a liberal exhibition of the good intentions of the Durbar; but, before they were reduced to practice, they had dwindled down to a very small amount. There was a highly important gathering at Peshawur. The young Prince, Nao Nehal Singh, was there; Gholab Singh, the present Maharajah of Cashmere, was there; as were also Lena Singh, Majetia, and other principal Sirdars.

The death of Runjeet at this time greatly embarrassed Colonel Wade. There is a note on this subject in Shahamat Ali's book, which may be fairly attributed to a more important pen than the Moon-shee's. "Runjeet Singh being the only person in the Sikh nation who was well disposed towards his allies in the expedition, his death before that part of it was carried out which depended on their co-operation was a serious and embarrassing event, as it encouraged the hopes of the disaffected, both among Afghans and Sikhs, of our failure. Its first effect was to create a desire on the part of Nao Nihal Singh, and the Sirdars and troops with him, to hasten back to Lahore, where parties struggling for ascendancy were beginning to form their intrigues. They hesitated for a time between their inclination and duty, but the latter prevailed. No sooner, however, had the Shah-zadah advanced, than the whole of the Reserve broke up their camp at Attock, and marched in haste to Lahore; but the contingent, the command of which had now devolved on a Mahomedan officer—viz., Sheikh Bassawan, a Colonel and Brigadier in the French legion, remained faithful to its post."

the greater the inefficiency of the Sikh demonstration, the greater the praise that is due to the English officer who triumphed over the difficulties thrown in his way by the base infidelity of his allies. Wade found himself at Peshawur with a motley assemblage of Hindoos, Sikhs, and Afghans, on the fidelity of a considerable portion of which it was impossible to rely. The Prince himself was soon found to be an absolute cypher. His most remarkable characteristic was, to speak paradoxically, that he had no character at all. He was a harmless, respectable personage, with an amount of apathy in his constitution which was sometimes advantageous to those in whose hands he placed himself; but, at others, engendered an amount of impracticability that was very embarrassing and distressing. It was plain that, whatever was to be accomplished, must be accomplished by the energy of the British officers. Left to themselves, the Sikhs, aided by the Afghans who had joined the standard of the Prince, would never have forced the Khybur Pass. This formidable defile was supposed to be, if vigorously defended, impassable; and the long halt at Peshawur had given the Afreedis, if they were not inclined to sell the passage, abundant time to mature their defensive operations, and Akbar Khan, who had come down from Caubul to oppose the march of Wade and the Sikh auxiliaries, every opportunity of perfecting his plans. It was not until the 25th of July that Wade found himself before Ali-Musjid. The Afreedis, on that and the preceding day, had made some show of resistance; and our troops—the regulars under Captain Farmer, and the irregulars under Lieutenant Mackeson,* had done good service; whilst Colonel Sheikh Bassawan,

* Mackeson, after doing good service at Bahwulpore, to facilitate the march of the Bengal column of the Army of the Indus, had made his way to Peshawur, where he had joined Colonel Wade. He was, therefore, engaged both in the eastern and western operations.

with the Sikh auxiliaries, had exhibited an amount of zeal which had won the confidence of the British officers. But Akbar Khan himself had refused to come down to conduct in person the defence of Ali-Musjid. Dost Mahomed had by this time discovered that the greater danger was to be apprehended from the western line of attack, and had recalled his son to the capital. The Afghan troops had garrisoned Ali-Musjid; but so closely had Wade invested it, so determined was the attitude he had assumed, and so successful was now the play of his guns,* that on the night of the 26th they evacuated the fortress; and on the following morning Wade took possession of the place.

There was little more work for Wade and the auxiliaries. Akbar Khan, who had pitched his camp at Dakha—a place to the south of Jellalabad—had now broken it up, and retired to join his father at the capital. The Shah-zadah and his party, therefore, advanced without further opposition. Opposite Dakha, on the other side of the Caubul river, was the fort of Lalpoorah, where dwelt Sadut Khan, chief of the Momund tribe. His conduct had evinced strong feelings of hostility to the Suddozye Princes. He was now, therefore, to be reduced, and his chiefship conferred on another. Throughout our entire connexion with Afghanistan, it was seldom our good fortune to select fitting objects whereon to lavish our bounty. It was generally, indeed, our lot to set up the wrong man. But the case of Torabaz Khan, who was appointed to the chiefship of Lalpoorah, was one of the few fortunate exceptions to this calamitous rule. In this man we found a faithful ally; and when misfortunes overtook us, he was not unmindful of the benefits he had received at our hands.

* Under Lieutenant Barr, of the Bengal Artillery, who has written a Narrative of Colonel Wade's Operations, to which I would refer the reader for authentic details, conveyed in a pleasant, soldierly manner.

On the 3rd of September, Wade and the Shah-zadah reached Caubul. The operations of the motley force which they had led through the difficult passes of Eastern Afghanistan, have been dwarfed, as I have said, by the more ostentatious exploits of Sir John Keane's bulkier army; but it is not to be forgotten, that it was in no small measure owing to the operations of Wade's force that the resistance offered to Keane's army was so slight and so ill-matured. It was long before Dost Mahomed ceased to regard the movement through the Khybur with greater anxiety than that of the main army along the western route. Akbar Khan and his fighting men never met Wade in the field; but they were drawn away from the capital at a time when they might have done good service in the West; and it is in no small measure owing to this division of the Ameer's military strength, that he was unable to offer any effectual resistance to the march of the British army from Candahar. Nor, when we take account of the circumstances which facilitated our success at the outset of the war, ought it ever to be overlooked that Wade, from his forward position at Peshawur, was enabled to open a correspondence with parties at Caubul favorable to the restoration of the monarchy, and to win over many adherents to the Shah before he approached his capital. It was in no small measure owing to Wade's diplomacy, carried on mainly through the agency of Gholam Khan, Populzye, that the Kohistanees were induced to rise against the Ameer.* These were important services. Wade carried on the work with much address; and there were able men associated with him.† But the whole affair was a melancholy illustration of the lukewarmness, if not of the positive

* See Shahamat Ali's *Sikhs and Afghans*; also Mohun Lal's *Life of Dost Mahomed*. The authority of the former, who must have translated the letters into Persian, is all-sufficient on such a point as this.

† Mackeson, Lord, and Cunningham.

infidelity of our Sikh allies. It was plain that, henceforth, we were to expect little from their alliance but ill-concealed attempts to thwart and baffle the policy to which they were parties.

The month of September passed pleasantly over the heads of the officers of the Army of the Indus. The fine climate, the fair scenery, and the delicious fruits of Caubul, were all things to be enjoyed after the sufferings and privations of the long and toilsome march from Hindostan. Then there were shows, and spectacles, and amusements. The troops were reviewed; and the officers rode races; and the Shah, ever delighting in pageantry and parade, established an order of knight-hood, and held a grand Durbar, at which the ceremony of investiture was performed with becoming dignity and grace. And the officers, happy in the belief that they were soon about to turn their backs on Afghanistan for ever, went about purchasing memorials of their visit to Caubul, or presents to carry back to their friends.*

But the hopes of many were doomed to disappointment. On the 18th of September the Bombay column commenced its march to India by the route of the Kojuck and the Bolan; and it was believed that a large portion of the Bengal troops would soon be in motion towards the provinces along the eastern country just traversed by Colonel Wade. A country in which wine was selling at the price of 300 rupees a dozen, and cigars at a rupee a piece,* was not one in which the officers of the army were likely to desire to pitch their tents for a sojourn of any long continuance. When, therefore, it began to be reported among them that the original intentions of withdrawing the troops, with the exception of a single brigade, had been abandoned, there was a

* These were the prices fetched at the sale of the effects of Brigadier Arnold, who died at Caubul in the month of September.

general feeling of disappointment. The official order was looked for with anxiety; and on the 2nd of October it appeared.* The principal portion of the division was to be left in Afghanistan, under Sir Willoughby Cotton; and only a comparatively small detachment was to march to the provinces with Sir John Keane. A week afterwards, orders were issued for the disposition of the troops, and the military occupation of Afghanistan was complete.†

A change so great as this in the military arrangements, consequent on the restoration of Shah Soojah, could only have been brought about by a belief in the presence of some new and pressing danger. Dost Mahomed had been driven across the Hindoo-Koosh; but it was believed that he might there be hospitably received by some of the petty Oosbeg chiefs, between Bameean and Balkh; and that he might, united with them, gather sufficient strength to encourage him to turn his face again towards the South, and to sweep down

* I may as well append the most important portion of it:

"G. O. October 2.—The whole of the 1st (Bengal) Division of Infantry, the 2nd (Bengal) Cavalry, and No. 6 Light Field Battery, will continue in Afghanistan, and a detachment of 30 Sappers, under an Engineer officer. Major-General Sir W. Cotton will command the troops in Afghanistan, and all reports to be made to him after the 10th instant.

"The 2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, her Majesty's 16th Lancers, the 3rd Light Cavalry, 4th Local Horse, the remainder of the Sappers and Miners, a Company of 20th N.I., with Captain Farmer's Company 21st N.I., and the detachment now in progress headquarters, under Captain Hopwood 7th N.I., will move towards Peshawar on such day and order as hereafter issued."

† "G. O. October 9.—Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the 35th N.I., to remain at Caubul, and to be accommodated in the Balla Hissar.

"The 48th N.I., the 4th Brigade, and detachment of Sappers and Miners and 2nd Cavalry, with a Ressalah of Skinner's Horse, to be cantoned at Jellalabad.

"Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th N.I., a Ressalah of Skinner's Horse, and such details of his Majesty Shah Soojah's as are available. The whole to be under the command of Major M'Laren.

"Candahar will have for its garrison the 42nd, 43rd N.I., 4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery, a Ressalah of the 4th Local Horse, and such details of his Majesty Shah Soojah's troops as may be available. Major-General Nott will command."

upon the country which had been wrested from him. It had not, at first, been conceived that the prospect of the Ameer's recovery from the heavy blow which had descended upon him, was sufficiently imminent to indicate the necessity of making any preparations upon a large scale to arrest his return to Afghanistan. But it was considered expedient to send a detachment of the Shah's troops, with some field artillery, to Bameean, the extreme frontier station of the Shah's dominions. Accordingly, on the 12th of September, a detachment had marched for the Hindoo-Koosh. A troop of Native Horse Artillery, which had just come in from Candahar, formed the most remarkable portion of this little force. The difficulties of the road to be traversed were such as no European artillery had ever before encountered.* But, in spite of this, the 4th troop, 3rd Brigade of Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant Murray Mackenzie (leaving its captain dead at Caubul), made good its way to Bameean; and the Shah's Goorkha regiment, with other irregular details, accompanied it to its dreary winter-quarters, in the mountainous recesses of the great Caucasian range.

Upon the policy of this movement I cannot pause to speculate. I believe that the system of planting small detachments in isolated positions was one of the great errors which marked our military occupation of Afghanistan. But something more was designed than this. It was in contemplation to send a larger force to explore the mountains of the Hindoo-Koosh. Dr. Percival Lord,

* The Envoy said, that as Dost Mahomed had sent guns over the same road to Bameean, there was no reason why our guns should not go. The Doctor-General Harlan boasted that he had crossed the Hindoo-Koosh with artillery. But Macnaghten had not considered that the

guns which Dost Mahomed sent along these roads were three-pounders, whilst ours were six-pounders. The troop came along the wheel-track of the Ameer's guns, and reported "the breadth between the wheels less than half of that of ours."

who had been one of Burnes's companions on the "Commercial Mission" to Caubul, had just returned to the Afghan capital with the force under Colonel Wade; and now that it was considered desirable to despatch a political officer to the Oosbeg frontier, it was but natural that Lord, who had visited the neighbourhood of Koon-dooz in 1837-1838, should have been selected for the duty. Lord went; but had not been long absent from Caubul, when he returned with exaggerated stories of the success of Dost Mahomed among the petty chiefs of the Hindoo-Koosh, and of a great movement which was about to be made for the re-establishment of the supremacy of the Ameer.* Upon this, Macnaghten, who had begun to doubt the extreme popularity of Shah Soojah, and the safety of confiding his protection and support to the handful of British troops which it was originally intended to leave in Afghanistan, made a requisition to Sir John Keane for a stronger military force; and turned Dr. Lord's story to account in the furtherance of his own views.

It was easy to issue orders for the maintenance of a large body of British troops in Afghanistan; but it was not so easy to house the regiments thus maintained.

* A writer in the *Calcutta Review*, who was at Caubul at the time indicated, thus explains the manner in which Lord was beguiled: "It soon became known that Lord's sudden retreat to Caubul was the subject of merriment amongst the Afghans; who said, 'That it was in no way surprising for Shah Soojah to run away, that being his custom; but that it was not expected than an Englishman would run so soon, or so easily.' Snow had fallen on the mountains; and the sight of their white-capped heads disinclined the Afghans, who formed Lord's escort, to attempt the passage of the Hindoo-Koosh at a season when inclement weather and an early winter seemed setting in.

They therefore caused various reports of the occupation of Koondooz by Dost Mahomed to be brought, in order to try and deter Lord from prosecuting a disagreeable journey. Finding him hesitate upon these rumours whether or not to proceed, they were encouraged to dupe him still further by intelligence that a rebellion was raging around him; upon which, in hot haste, he rode back to Caubul. Macnaghten, after a few days, finding that the rebellion was a fiction, was not altogether pleased with his own participation in needless alarm, though well satisfied that the occasion had been afforded him of making the requisition with which Keane had complied."

The winter was before them. They could not remain encamped on the plain around Caubul. It became, therefore, matter of anxious consideration how accommodation was to be provided for so large a body of regular troops. The subject, indeed, had pressed upon the attention of the political and military chiefs before the brigade, which was originally to have been left in the country, had swelled into a division; and the engineer officers had been called into council, and had given the only advice that was likely to emanate from competent military authority. Lieutenant Durand—a gallant soldier and an able scientific officer—saw at once the importance of posting the troops in the Balla Hissar.* And there, in the winter of that year, they were posted, to be removed in the following autumn to the fatal cantonments which by that time had sprung up on the plain.

* The importance of this subject is so great when viewed in connexion with the melancholy history of our subsequent disasters, that I cannot do better than quote the following account of the difficulties thrown in the way of the engineers—an account, the authenticity of which is not to be questioned: "Occupied with the reception of Shah-zadah Timour, with the foregoing expeditions and detachments, and with the establishment of the Shah's Court and of his civil administration, Macnaghten for some time neglected to consider how the troops, which he kept at Caubul, were to be lodged. The question was one demanding instant decision, as the winter of 1839 was rapidly approaching, and there was no suitable cover for troops. Though pressed upon this subject, as soon as it was decided that a portion of the British army was to remain, it was not until the end of August that any steps were taken in this important matter; and then they consented in sending an engineer officer, Lieu-

tenant Durand, accompanied by Mohun Lal, to examine three small forts, which Burnes had reported as affording a suitable position for the troops. These diminutive forts were west of Caubul several miles; and having neither cover, space, water, nor in fact any other requisite for the convenience of the troops, and being, in a military point of view, ill placed as a position for the force, were at once rejected by the engineer, who considered that it was essential to have military possession of the Balla Hissar; and that it was the proper place, under every point of view, both with reference to the present and the future, for lodging the troops. The Shah, upon various pretences, opposed this measure of precaution, and Macnaghten yielded to objections which he felt and acknowledged to be ridiculous. Sale was to be left in command at Caubul; and he had therefore a voice in the selection of the locality for the cantonment of his force. The engineer, however, stated that it was impossible, before the win-

The city of Caubul* is situated between two ranges of lofty hills, along the ridges of which run lines of loop-

ter set in—that is, in the course of six weeks—to build barracks, hospitals, sheds and stables for a brigade and its attached cavalry and guns, outside the Balla Hissar—building material having as yet to be made and collected; whereas, inside the Balla Hissar, by taking advantage of what already existed, it was possible to obtain good and sufficient cover. Thus circumstanced, a reluctant consent was extracted from the Shah, and the pioneers of the force were immediately set to work with the view of rendering the citadel a strong work, with cover for its garrison, stores, and ammunition. The Shah no sooner learned that the work was seriously commenced, than he renewed strenuously his objections, urging that the citadel overlooked his own palace and the city; that its occupation would make him unpopular, as the feelings of the inhabitants would be hurt; and that he had already received strong remonstrances against the measure. Macnaghten, with fatal weakness, yielded; and peremptory orders were issued for the discontinuance of the work. Foiled in his avowed purpose of rendering the citadel a post, which, with a thousand men, a few guns, and proper provisions, might be held against all that Afghanistan could bring before it, the engineer was forced to content himself with keeping such hold of the Balla Hissar as admitted of its citadel being occupied at any moment, by lodging the troops in hastily-prepared accommodation at its base. It seemed, indeed, that the troops, being once in military possession of the Balla Hissar, the evacuation of that stronghold in future was an event as improbable as it would be impolitic, and that the occupation of the citadel and the repair of its works would in time inevitably follow. Macnaghten could not but coincide

with the engineer and those who succeeded him and held similar views; and, as the cost would have been trifling in comparison with the sums thrown away in Afghanistan upon objects to which political importance was attached, the Envoy for some time contemplated following up the project. But the Shah and the Kuz-zilbash party, as well as the Afghans, were very averse to a measure which, so long as the British troops remained in Afghanistan, would keep Caubul subject to their effectual control; and Macnaghten, being in the false position of having to reconcile the declared intention of the government to withdraw the army from Afghanistan with its present actual military occupation in force, wavered on the adoption of necessary measures of precaution, which might countenance the suspicion of a purpose on the part of the British Government permanently to hold the country; and, ultimately, in an evil hour for himself and his country's arms, not only entirely neglected such salutary precaution, but gave up the barracks constructed in the Balla Hissar to the Shah as accommodation for his Harem, evacuated the fort, and thought no more, until too late, of strengthening himself therein.”—[*Calcutta Review.*]

* The picturesque aspects of the town are well described by Lieutenant Rattray: “It is well-built and handsome, and is one mass of bazaars. Every street has a double row of houses of different heights, flat-roofed, and composed of mud in wooden frames. Here and there a larch porch of carved wood intervenes, giving entrance to the court-yard of the residences of the nobles, in the centre of which is a raised platform of mud, planted with fruit-trees, and spread with carpets. A fountain plays near; and here, during the heat of the day, loll the chiefs at ease, listening, as

holed walls, with here and there small obtruding towers or bastions, too weak and too extended to be serviceable for purposes of defence. It is said to be about three miles in circumference. The Balla Hissar stands on a hill, overlooking the city. There are, strictly speaking, two Balla Hissars; the lower of which, on our first entry into Caubul, was in a rickety and decayed state, and could not have stood for an hour against British artillery. Both were commanded by the walled hills above them. The upper Balla Hissar, or citadel, commands the whole of the city and the suburbs. The lower Balla Hissar, which is surrounded by a shallow but rather deep ditch, commands only part of one of the bazaars—the Shore bazaar, two large forts (Mahmoud Khan's and the Beenee Hissar), and the road to Jellalabad.* The houses of the town are mostly flat-roofed;

they smoke their pipes, to the sound of the 'saccringhi,' or guitar, the falling water, or the wonderful tales of the Persian story-teller. The houses overhang the narrow streets; their windows have no glass, but consist of lattice-work wooden shutters, which push up and down, and are often richly carved and otherwise ornamented. The shop windows are open to the sun, and the immense display of merchandise, fruits, game, armour, and cutlery, defies description. These articles are arranged in prodigious piles from floor to ceiling; in the front of each sits the artificer engaged in his calling, or from amidst the heaped-up profusion peeps out the trader at his visitors. The grand bazaar (Char Chouk, or Chutta) has a substantial roof built in four arcades, which are decorated with painted panels, now nearly indistinct, and originally watered by cisterns and fountains, which are neglected and dried up."

* "The Balla Hissar, particularly the citadel, completely commands the city: but the streets are so narrow

and winding, that from the summit of the fort an expanse of flat-roofed houses is alone seen, and the thoroughfares of the city are seldom to be traced. The houses, of unburnt brick walls and mud roofs, have as little timber as possible in their construction—this material being costly at Caubul; it follows, therefore, that they are not easily set on fire. From their irregularity of height and structure, and from the jealousy which guards each flat roof from the gaze of the curious by surrounding walls, communication from housetop to housetop would be very difficult, except in a few portions of the more regular parts of the city. The line of hill, between which and the river the city lies, is steep and difficult, but accessible; and its domineering aspect formerly led to its being included within the defences of Caubul; for a stone wall with a crenelated parapet runs along its summit, and dips down to the gorge, by which the Caubul river, breaking through the chain, enters the city. The ends of some of the streets, which cross the main

the streets for the most part narrow and tortuous. The most important feature of it is the great bazaar, built, or commenced, by Ali Murdan Khan—a mart for the produce of all the nations of the East.

The Bombay division of the Army of the Indus marched from Caubul on the 18th of September; and on the 15th of October, Sir John Keane, with the troops destined for Bengal, set out for the provinces by way of the eastern passes. The Shah had by this time begun to think of escaping from the severity of the Caubul winter, and reposing in the milder climate and more tranquil neighbourhood of Jellalabad. The sweets of restored dominion had not gratified him to the extent of his anticipations. He was, indeed, a disappointed man.* He felt himself only half a King; he was fettered, controlled. It was plain that, in the eyes of his subjects, his connexion with the Feringhees had greatly humiliated him. But he wanted the English money and the English bayonets, and was compelled to bear the burden.

Macnaghten was to accompany the King to Jellalabad; and, in the mean while, Burnes was to be left in political charge of Caubul and the neighbourhood. The people seemed to be settling down into something like quiescence. If there were little enthusiasm among them, they seemed at first to be outwardly contented with the

thoroughfares, about upon the foot of the hill, which thus looks into them: but, as the minor streets are still more tortuous than the main ones, such views along them are very partial.”—*[Calcutta Review.]*

* “The capital and the fort had disappointed his expectations. He often sat at a window of the palace, willing away time, his eye wandering over the different objects which the city and its plain offered. On one of these occasions, after a long silent pause, Shah Soojah made the remark

that ‘everything appeared to him shrunk small and miserable; and that the Caubul of his old age in no respect corresponded with the recollections of the Caubul of his youth.’ He was glad, therefore, to escape from the severity of the winter of a place, the ideal charms of which age and the experience of the reality had banished. Jellalabad, although a still more wretched town, enjoys, from its lower altitude above the sea-level, a warmer climate, and the winter is far less severe.”—*[Calcutta Review.]*

change. Cupidity is one of the strongest feelings that finds entrance into the Afghan breast. The boundless wealth of the English had been a tradition in Afghanistan ever since the golden days of Mountstuart Elphinstone's mission. Money had been freely scattered about at Candahar; and it was believed that with an equally profuse hand it would now be disbursed at Caubul. It is true that the military chest and the political treasury had been so indented upon, that when the army reached the capital there was a painful scarcity of coin.* But there were large supplies of treasure on the way. The jingling of the money-bag was already ravishing their ears and stirring their hearts. They did not love the Feringhees; but they delighted in Feringhee gold.

This was a miserable state of things—and even the influence of the gold was limited and short-lived. After the outbreak at Caubul, when Mohun Lal was secreted in the Kuzzilbash quarters, he heard the men and

* A passage in Lord Auckland's unpublished minute of August 20, 1839, to which allusion has already been made, contains a summary of the efforts of the Supreme Government to supply Macnaghten with funds. It exhibits the fearful manner in which already the war was beginning to tell upon the finances of India: "It has been a matter of concern and some disappointment to learn that the military chest and the political treasury was exceedingly low at the time of the departure of the army from Candahar, and that some embarrassment was in consequence apprehended. The difficulty has no doubt arisen from causes unforeseen: from a longer detention than was anticipated at Candahar, from the disasters which have delayed the arrival of Major Newport's convoy, and from an extent of expense far beyond what was expected in the purchase of grain and of camels, whilst the death of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh has made it difficult for me to apply so instantaneous a remedy as

I could have desired. But the 10 lakhs, under the charge of Major Newport, will in all probability have arrived at Candahar about the 26th of July. Thirteen lakhs are now traversing the Punjab under the care of Captain Nuthall, and should be at Peshawur in the first week of September; arrangements have been made by the political agent at Umballah, by bills on Peshawur, or by negotiations through the Sikh Governments, to have a further sum of 10 lakhs available at an early period across the Indus, and an additional amount of 7 or 8 lakhs will be soon ready for immediate transmission to the same quarter; 30 lakhs more will be ready for remittance in October; a further sum will be with the lapse of time at hand at Delhi; and besides all this, 21 lakhs of Company's rupees, with 5 or 6 lakhs of bullion, now at Shikarpoor, may be sent on to Candahar, as soon as the inundations subside." Here we have a *million of money* disposed of by a few strokes of the pen.

women talking among themselves, and saying that the English had enriched the grain-sellers, the grass-sellers, and others who dealt in provisions for man and beast, whilst they reduced the chiefs to poverty, and killed the poor by starvation.* The presence of the English soon raised the price of all the necessaries of life. This was no new thing. If a flight of Englishmen settle in a French or a Belgian town, it is not long before the price of provisions is raised. But here was a Commissariat department, with a mighty treasury at its command, buying up all the commodities of Caubul, and not only paying preposterous sums for everything they purchased, but holding out the strongest inducement to purveyors to keep back their supplies, in order to force a higher range of prices.

Even from this early date everything was working silently against us. The inherent vice of the course of policy which we had initiated was beginning to infect every branch of the administration. The double government which had been established was becoming a curse to the whole nation. The Shah and his officers ostensibly controlled all the departments of civil administration; but everywhere our English officers were at their elbow, to counsel and suggest; and when it was found necessary to coerce the disobedient or punish the rebellious, then it was British authority that drew the sword out of the scabbard, and hunted down offenders to the death. Bound by treaty not to interfere in the internal administration of the country, the British functionaries were compelled to permit the existence of much which they themselves would never have initiated or allowed in provinces subject to their rule; but they were often called upon to enforce measures, unpopular and perhaps unjust; and so brought down upon themselves opprobrium which was not always their due. It

* Mohun Lal's *Life of Dost Mahomed*.

could hardly be said that the King possessed a government of his own, when the control of the army and the exchequer was in the hands of others. England supplied the money and the bayonets; and claimed the right to employ them both according to her own pleasure. It would have been a miracle if such a system had not soon broken down with a desolating crash, and buried its authors in the ruins.

It was said prophetically by more than one statesman, that our difficulties would begin where our military successes ended. Englishmen and Afghans alike said that it was easy to restore Shah Soojah to the throne, but difficult to maintain him upon it. It was, from the first, only a question of time—only a question how long such a system could be propped up by the strong arm and the long purse of the King-makers. No amount of wisdom in the agents of such a policy could have saved it from ultimate ruin. Sooner or later it must have fallen. If there had been nothing else indeed to bring it to the ground, the utter exhaustion of the Indian treasury must have given it its death-blow.

To have placed Shah Soojah on the throne, and to have left him again to be driven back an outcast and a fugitive, to seek an asylum in the provinces of India, would have been a failure and a disgrace. It was the object of the British Government, therefore, to hedge him in a little longer with our authority, and to establish him more firmly on the throne. But so far from these being synonymous terms, and coexistent states of being, they were utterly antagonistic and irreconcilable. The more we surrounded the King with our authority, the less firmly he was fixed on the throne. It might have been sound policy to have continued the occupation of Afghanistan, if our continuance had tended to secure the supremacy of the Shah, and to establish him in the affec-

tions of the people; but it was not in the nature of things that the effect of the experiment should not have been diametrically the reverse.

So prodigious an anomaly was the system itself, that, except so far as it affected the period of its dissolution, retarding or expediting it by a few months or a few years, the agency employed in the vain attempt to uphold it was a matter of little moment. But that agency was assuredly not of a character to enhance the chances even of its temporary success. Shah Soojah had brought from Loodhianah one Moollah Shikore*—a man who had shared his exile, and acted as his confidential agent. He was old, and enfeebled by age. His memory was gone; so were his ears. For some offence against his Majesty in former days, he had forfeited those useful appendages. A happy faculty of remembering the persons and personal histories of men, is one of the most useful ingredients in the character of a statesman, and it is one which, in rare exuberance, some of our greatest statesmen have possessed. But it was said of this Moolah Shikore, that men whom he had seen on one day he forgot on the next.† The King had abundant faith in his loyalty, and confidence in his personal attachment. The man had managed the personal affairs of the royal exile with such address, that it was believed that he could now manage the affairs of his royal master's restored dominions. So the King made him minister of state. They called him Wuzeer. But his master did not acknowledge the title, and the British did not call

* Moollah Shikore came through the Khybur with Prince Timour and Colonel Wade.

† "So completely is this poor man's memory gone, that he never recognises a man he has once seen; that the commonest business requires half a dozen notes." — [Burnes to

Macnaghten: August 7, 1840. *Unpublished Correspondence.*] "He had lost his memory to such an extent that he could not recognise a person whom he had well known before, if he had not seen him even for a day." — [Mohun Lal's *Life of Dost Mahomed.*]

him by it. "Bad ministers," wrote Burnes, "are in every government solid grounds for unpopularity; and I doubt if ever a King had a worse set than Shah Soojah." The system itself was rotten to the very core; and the agency employed was, perhaps, the corruptest in the world. Had there been much more vitality and strength in the system, Moollah Shikore and his deputies would soon have given it its death-blow.

But though feeble in other respects, this Moollah Shikore was not feeble in his hatred of the British. The minister oppressed the people. The people appealed to the British functionaries. The British functionaries remonstrated with the minister. And the minister punished the people for appealing to the British functionaries.* The Shah and his minister chafed under the interference of the British. But they loved the British money; and they required the support of the British bayonets. And so bravely for a time worked the double government at Caubul.

Whilst such was the state of things at the supreme seat of government, there was little less to create dissatisfaction in the internal administration of Candahar. The principal revenue officers were two Sheeahs, the sons of that Hussein Khan, the obnoxious minister whom Shah Zemaun had put to death. Their names were Mahomed Takee Khan and Wulloo Mahomed Khan. Cradled in intense enmity to the Douranees, they had

* "Every day complaints were made to us, and we permitted ourselves to interfere, by giving notes to the complainants, requesting the Moollah to settle their cases; but this did no good, for, instead of having redress to their grievances, they were beaten, and sometimes confined, for coming and complaining to us against the Shah's authority. All the chiefs or heads of tribes received their allowances from certain villages, by obtain-

ing an order from Moollah Shikore. If there was any man among them known to us, and whom we would wish to favour, the Moollah took care to annoy and vex him, by giving him an order to a distant village for such sums, which he would likely spend during his journey; or else to poor villages, where there was very little chance of gaining anything."—[*Mohun Lal's Life of Dost Mahomed.*]

grown into unscrupulous persecutors of the tribes. Selected by the Barukzye Sirdars as willing agents of those humiliating and enfeebling measures by which they sought to extinguish the vitality of the Douranees, they entered upon their work in a ruthless and uncompromising spirit, and plied the instruments of their office with remarkable success for the persecution and degradation of their enemies. The hatred with which the Douranees regarded these men was too deep to suffer them to embrace with complacency any measures, however conciliatory in themselves, of which the old Barukzye tools were the executors. Such unpopular agents were enough to render distasteful the most popular measures. The Douranees were, indeed, greatly disappointed. Do what they would, they could not obtain a paramount influence in the state. The door was closed against them by the British janitors who kept watch around the palace; and the chiefs soon began to chafe under the foreign intrusion which deprived them of all ascendancy in the councils of the restored monarch, and prevented them from regaining the full extent of those financial privileges which they had enjoyed under his Suddoyze predecessors.*

* "Immediately consequent on his Majesty's accession, certain feelings began to take root among the Douranees, in connexion with the presence of British troops, which promised ill for the future tranquillity of the country. Several of the most influential chiefs accompanied the Court from Candahar to Caubul and Jellalabad; and although it must have been with feelings of gratified pride that they beheld the leader of their order—their *Shah Baba*, or father King, as he was familiarly named—seated upon the throne of his ancestors, yet it is also not unnecessary to suppose that their mortification must have been great at

finding that they no longer possessed a dominant voice in the royal councils, or the ability, as formerly, to render the sovereign the victim of their intrigues, and that this conviction of their political influence being for ever superseded, must have led them to value the many personal advantages they had gained by the restoration, and to regard with peculiar hostility the intruders upon their fancied rights. At Candahar the progress of events had the same tendency to render the Douranees discontented, if not actually inimical. The chiefs who had remained with the tribes were of inconsiderable influence; but they still looked, under

And so it happened that, from the very dawn of the restoration of the monarchy, unpopular and unscrupulous Afghan agents were employed to carry out a monstrous system. Of a very different character were the British agents upon whom now devolved the duty of watching the proceedings of the native executive, and, without any palpable acknowledged interference, virtually controlling it. The political agents scattered about Afghanistan have drawn down upon themselves a larger measure of vituperation than perhaps has ever descended upon any body of British functionaries. They were mixed up with an unholy and a disastrous policy, and perhaps some little of the evil that subsequently developed itself may be attributed to their personal defects; but, on the whole, they were not unwisely chosen, and it is doubtful if other men would have done better. At all events, when Burnes, Conolly, Leech, Pottinger, Todd, Lord, and others, who had previously made themselves acquainted with the country and the people of Afghanistan, were sent to overlook the progress of affairs in different parts of Afghanistan, it cannot be said that no care was taken to select our agents from among the officers who were most qualified by previous experience to perform the new duties devolving upon them. Macnaghten's assistants were, for the most part, men of local experience and proved activity. The Governor-General had imparted to the Envoy his ideas of the manner in which it would

the revived Suddozye monarchy, to be admitted to the share of power which they deemed their right, and from which they had been jealously excluded by the Sirdars. No such participation whatever was extended to them. The present governor of the province, being altogether disqualified by his youth and inexperience to take an active part in the administration, the executive power was

vested almost entirely in the hands of Wullee Mahomed Khan, the revenue manager, and the direction of the government was to the same extent dependent upon British guidance." —[*Major Rawlinson's Report on the Assessment of the Douranee Tribes. MS. Records.*] I have met with no abler official paper than this in the whole course of my inquiries.

be most expedient to employ them.* And it may be doubted whether, if the system itself had not been so radically defective, it would have ever broken down under the agency which was commissioned to carry it into effect.

Such, traced in dim outline, were some of the elements of decay planted deep in the constitution of the

* The Supreme Government were desirous to place Burnes at Candahar, with Leech as his assistant; but Burnes was disinclined to leave Caubul; and the charge of the agency was entrusted to Leech. In the August minute, already quoted, Lord Auckland thus sketches the proposed political arrangements:—"Mr. Macnaghten will himself be, of course, as much as possible near to the King. He has, in co-operation with Sir John Keane, conducted, with an ability and with a success that I shall always be forward to acknowledge on the part of both these officers, the extremely difficult duties of his present office. I should be sorry, indeed, to see committed to another the prosecution of the great work in which he has been engaged, and I trust that he may be induced to remain at Caubul until the power of the Shah shall appear to be thoroughly consolidated, the institutions of his kingdom placed on a satisfactory footing, and the salutary influence of the British name acknowledged there and in the countries beyond it. I think a political agency, subordinate to the Mission at Caubul, should be maintained at Candahar, and that it cannot be better entrusted than to the approved zeal and ability of Sir Alexander Burnes. Candahar, I presume, will be the seat of a Viceroy; and as for some period of the year all communication between that city and Caubul is, I believe, cut off, to the agent at Candahar may, I think, be delegated some control over the political agents at Herat and Khelat, and the correspondence which may be necessary with the political agents in Sindh. I would not disturb Lieute-

nant Pottinger at Herat. His name is attached to the establishment of British influence in that city. He has had a most difficult task to execute, and I would suspend all opinion on the instructions with which it may be determined to furnish him, until I have a report of the result of the mission of Major Todd. I think, also, that Captain Bean should certainly remain in charge of the political functions which have been committed to him at Quettah. I have had occasion to remark with unqualified approbation all the measures of that officer which have been brought before me; he has done much for the pacification of the wild country about him; his presence will be necessary for the protection of commerce in its transit through the one avenue which exists between Lower Afghanistan and the Indus, and I should be exceedingly sorry to see him moved to any other quarter. Under these general arrangements, Major Leech will render assistance at Candahar to Sir A. Burnes, and perhaps Dr. Login to Lieutenant Pottinger at Herat; and Mr. Macnaghten will report in detail upon the number of officers whose aid will be indispensably necessary, under his own personal superintendence. He will have with him Major Todd, Lieutenant Macgregor, and presently Messrs. Lord, Leech, and Arthur Conolly. I am aware that the duties of his office will be complicated and extensive. He may have missions to send to Bokhara and Koondooz, and to other neighbouring states, and I would not stint him in assistance."—[*Minute of Lord Auckland: Simlah, August 20, 1839. MS. Records.*]

political system which we were attempting to carry out in Afghanistan. Always of a sanguine temperament, and one whose wish was ever father of his thoughts, Macnaghten did not see that already the seeds of a great and sweeping revolution were being sown broadcast across the whole length and breadth of the land. He was prepared, and it was right that he should have been, for local and accidental outbreaks. The Afghans are a turbulent and lawless people—little inclined to succumb to authority; and have a rough way of demonstrating their dislikes. Had he expected the authority of the Shah to be universally established in a few weeks, the British Envoy would have manifested a deplorable ignorance of the national character; but little less was the ignorance which he manifested, when he believed that the system of government he was countenancing could ever establish the country in tranquillity, and the King in the affections of the people. There were others who saw clearly that such a system was doomed to set in disaster and disgrace;* but Macnaghten, when he accompanied the Court to Jellalabad, carried with him no forebodings of evil. He believed that the country was settling down into quietude under the restored monarchy; and so little, indeed, did he think that any danger was to be apprehended, that he encouraged his wife to join him in Afghanistan, and sent a party of irregular horsemen under Edward Conolly to escort her from the provinces of India.

But already was he beginning to have some experience of the turbulent elements of Afghan society, and

* Keane, immediately before his departure, remarked to an officer who was to accompany him: "I wished you to remain in Afghanistan for the good of the public service; but since circumstances have rendered that im-

possible, I cannot but congratulate you on quitting the country; for, mark my words, it will not be long before there is here some signal catastrophe."
—[*Calcutta Review.*]

the difficulty of controlling the tribes. In the West, the Ghilzyes had been demonstrating the unruliness of their nature ever since Shah Soojah re-entered Afghanistan, and, shortly after his restoration to the Balla Hissar of Caubul, Captain Outram had been sent out against them, and had achieved one of those temporary successes which, in a country like Afghanistan, where blood is ever crying aloud for blood, can only perpetuate the inquietude of a disaffected people—and now in the East, the passes of the Khybur were bristling with the hostile tribes. The Khybur chiefs had always turned to good account the difficulties of the passage through their terrible defiles. They opened the highway in consideration of certain money-payments from the Caubul rulers. The sums paid under the Suddozye Kings had been reduced by the Barukzye Sirdars; but on his restoration, Shah Soojah, who, in a day of difficulty, had sought and found a refuge among the Khyburees, now promised to restore to the tribes the privileges which they had enjoyed under his fathers. But the Shah had acted in this matter without the authority or the knowledge of Macnaghten, and the chiefs were little likely to receive the amount which the King had agreed to pay to them. Incensed by what they considered a breach of faith, they rose up against the small detached parties which Wade had left at different posts between Peshawur and Jellalabad.* Ali-Musjid was attacked—but not taken. Ferris, who commanded the garrison, repulsed them with heavy loss. But a battalion of Nujeebs, entrenched in the vicinity of the fort, was cut up by an incursion of the mountaineers.† The appearance of Sir John Keane,

* Some of these parties were detachments of Sikh troops.

† The Khyburees fell upon them in their stockaded position before attacking Jellalabad. The Nujeebs were

suffering severely from sickness at the time. One half of them, it is said, were ineffective when the Khyburees fell upon them.

with the residue of the Army of the Indus, quieted for a time the turbulent tribes. But when the column had cleared the pass, they harassed the detachments sent to the relief of Ali-Musjid,* and a force under Colonel Wheeler was therefore sent out from Jellalabad to overawe the refractory mountaineers, and support the negotiations in which Mackeson was engaged. The Khyburees attacked his baggage, hamstrung his camels, and thus contrived to sweep some booty into their hands. Wheeler's operations were for a time successful; but it was not until Macnaghten himself appeared on the scene, and recognised, in view of their formidable defiles, the expediency of conciliating by sufficient money-payments these troublesome clans, that they sunk into temporary quiescence.

It was at Avitabile's hospitable table in the Goorkhutra of Peshawur, that Macnaghten received intelligence of the fall of Khelat. The health of the victors was drunk with delighted enthusiasm, manifesting itself in the "three times three" of a good English cheer. All the circumstances of the capture of the stronghold were discussed with deepest interest to a late hour. It was told how, on the morning of the 13th of November, General Willshire, with the 2nd and 17th Queen's Regiments, the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, with two howitzers, four of the Shah's six-pounder guns, and a detachment of local horse, found himself before Khelat. It was plain that Mehrab Khan was in no mood

* Two companies of the 27th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Laing—a very gallant officer, who fell honourably at Caubul in the winter of 1841-42, were sent by Sir John Keane to reinforce Ferris at Ali-Musjid. Afterwards, two companies of the 21st, with one of sappers, were despatched to throw provisions into the fort. On their return they were

attacked by the Khyburees in great force, and worsted, with the loss of their cattle. Another party, sent by Sir John Keane to throw ammunition into Ali-Musjid, was also attacked; two officers were severely wounded, and some men killed; but the convoy ultimately reached its destination. M'Leod, with his sappers, did good service on this occasion.

to submit to the terms dictated to him. He had at first doubted the intentions of the British to move against his stronghold, and had been slow to adopt measures of defence. But when he knew that our troops were advancing upon Khelat, he prepared himself, like a brave man, to meet his fate, and flung defiance at the infidel invaders. Khelat is a place of commanding strength. The citadel rises high above the buildings of the town, and frowns menacingly at its assailants. On the north-west of the fort were three heights, which the Khan had covered with his infantry, supported by five guns in position. The engineer officers reported that, until these heights were carried, it would be impossible to proceed against the fortress. Orders were then given for the attack. It was Willshire's hope that the enemy might be driven down to the gates of the fortress, and that our stormers might rush in with them. Gallantly the hills were carried; gallantly the guns were captured. The infantry advanced under a heavy fire from the British artillery. The shrapnel shot from Stevenson's batteries fell with too deadly an aim among the Beloochee footmen for them to hold their position on the hills. They fled towards the walls of the fortress, and our infantry pushed hotly after them. But not in time were they to secure an entrance; the gates were closed against their advance.

The artillery was now brought into play. The infantry, compelled to protect themselves against the heavy fire poured in from the rocks, sheltered themselves behind some ruined buildings, whilst our batteries, planted on the heights, opened upon the gate and the neighbouring defences. Two of Cooper's guns were brought within a distance of 200 yards; and whilst the gunners fell under the matchlock fire of the enemy, played full upon the gate. At last it gave way. Pointing his hand towards the gate, Willshire rode down to show the infantry

that an entrance was ready for them. Rising at once from their cover, they rushed in with a loud hurrah. Pennycuick and his men were the first to enter. The other companies soon followed, until the whole of the storming column were within the walls of Khelat. Onward they struggled manfully towards the citadel. Every inch of ground was obstinately disputed. But at last the citadel was won. There was a desperate resistance. Sword in hand, Mehrab Khan and some of his principal chiefs stood there to give us battle. The Khan himself fell dead with a musket-ball through his breast. Eight of his principal ministers and Sirdars fell beside him. From some inner apartments, of difficult approach, a fire was still poured in upon our people; and it was not until Lieutenant Loveday, an assistant of the British agent, went up to them alone, that they were induced to surrender.* Loveday received them as prisoners; and then

* The private letters of Lieutenant Loveday (quoted in the *Asiatic Journal*) throw some light upon the incidents of the capture. "In one courtyard I saw a heap of their dead, some forty or fifty—some very fine handsome fellows—their shields shot through, and broken swords and matchlocks lying about in every direction, telling of the fierce fight. There was still, however, a small party who obstinately held out in an inner apartment; there was no going at them except by a narrow passage, which admitted but of one at a time; three or four attempted it, and were instantly shot dead. We offered them quarter, but they would not trust us. At last I was sent up alone, when they surrendered. . . . I then went to the mother of Shah Newaz, who is the new Khan, and who made his escape from prison seven years ago. This poor creature, with a few old women, had been shut up in a distant apartment ever since the flight of her son, miserably fed and miserably clothed. I explained in a few words what had taken place;

our capture of the fort, the death of Mehrab Khan, and the near approach of her son, whom our government had placed on the *Musnud*. You may readily fancy the scene; what with surprise and joy, she burst into tears, said she was my slave, and would have thrown herself at my feet if I had not prevented her. On the following day a few of Mehrab Khan's servants brought the body of their master for burial—a fine looking man. There was one little hole in his breast, which told of a musket-ball having passed through. He had no clothes on, except his silk *pyjammahs*. One of his slaves whispered me for a shawl; alas! I had nothing of the kind, but luckily remembered a brocade bed-cover, which I had bought in my days of folly and extravagance at Delhi. I called for it immediately, and gave it to the Khan's servants, who were delighted with this last mark of respect, and wrapping up the body in it, placed their deceased master on a *charpoy* and carried him to the grave."

proceeded to rescue from captivity the aged mother and other female dependents of an old rival, whose claims were to be no longer denied.

Nussur Khan, the chief's son, had fled. A considerable amount of prize property was collected; an old pretender to the throne, known as Shah Newaz, who had for some time been hanging on to the skirts of Shah Soojah and his allies, was set up in his place; and the provinces of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutchee, which had long been sentenced to spoliation, were stripped from the old dominions of the Khan of Khelat, and annexed to the territories of Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. The Shah had been hankering after an extension of empire; and it was determined that the much-coveted aggrandisement should be conceded to him in the direction of Upper Sindh.

It is possible that, whilst all these circumstances were being narrated and discussed at Avitabile's dinner-table, there may have been present one or two officers much troubled with self-questionings regarding the justice of these proceedings. But the general opinion, all throughout Afghanistan and India, was that this Mehrab Khan had been rightly punished for his offences. Few knew distinctly what these offences were. There was a general impression that he had been guilty of acts of indescribable treachery; and that during the passage of the British army through Beloochistan, he was continually molesting our advancing columns. It was the fashion to attribute to the wickedness of Mehrab Khan all the sufferings which afflicted the Army of the Indus on its march to Candahar, the scarcity which pressed so heavily upon man and beast, and the depredations of the marauding Beloochees. The very barrenness of the country, indeed, was by some laid at his door. It was not very clearly seen at this time that the Army of the Indus was at least as much the cause, as it was the victim of the scarcity in Beloochistan. When our troops

passed through the dominions of the Khan of Khelat, there was already, as has been shown by Burnes's admissions, a scarcity in the land; and now the army increased it.* The safe passage of the Bolan Pass was effected through the friendly agency of the Brahoo chief.† And we have it emphatically, upon the authority of Macnaghten, that the progress of the Army of the Indus through the country of Mehrab Khan was attended by much devastation—that a great injury was inflicted upon the people—and that nothing would have been easier than for the Khan to have destroyed our entire force.‡ Such was the language of our diplomatists up to the end of March; but in April, Burnes recommended the castigation of the Khan of Khelat; and Mehrab Khan was doomed to be stripped, on the first convenient opportunity, of his territory, and deprived either of his liberty or his life. The evidence of Mehrab Khan's treachery is not sufficiently strong to satisfy me that the British righteously confiscated his principality and sacrificed his life. He was surrounded by traitors. When his stronghold was entered, it was seen that the servants he had trusted had the means of betraying their master; and it was clear, to all who investigated the charges against him with judicial impartiality, that he had been betrayed. It was clear that many of the offences imputed to him were to be ascribed rather to the machinations of his secret enemies than to his own enmity and bad faith. But he had been early doomed to destruction. The recommendations of the British diplomatists in Afghanistan had been adopted by the Governor-General; and the deposition of Mehrab Khan and the annexation of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutchee, had been decreed in the Simlah Council Chamber.§ It

* *Ante*, page 411.

† *Ante*, page 407, note.

‡ *Ante*, page 414.

§ In his minute of August 20, Lord Auckland wrote on this subject:—
"Mr. Macnaghten has authority, as

was true that Shah Soojah had, in the hour of need, been succoured by Mehrab Khan. A statesman in whom the kindly instincts of humanity were so strong as in Lord Auckland, was not likely to forget the obligations which so essential a service at such a time imposed upon the restored monarch.* But the graceful suggestion of the Governor-General was lost; and the Khan lived just long enough to curse himself for his folly in having opened his arms to receive the Suddozye pretender, when he fled, baffled and beaten, from the battle-field of Candahar. For that act of hospitality he paid five years afterwards with his life.

Whether any thoughts of this kind arose to dash the pleasure of those who toasted the victors of Khelat at Avitabile's dinner-table, can only be conjectured; but all present acknowledged that the capture of Mehrab Khan's stronghold was a great military exploit. The native soldiery are said to have esteemed it more highly than the capture of Ghuznee. The native soldiery, too, had been allowed to participate in the honour of the exploit. Sir John Keane had been much censured for composing his storming column entirely of European companies. The exclusiveness of the act seemed to imply mistrust in his Sepoy regiments, and did not raise the

respects the Khelat territories, to declare the annexation of the provinces of Shawl, Moostung, and Cutch Gundava to the Afghan dominions; and I have but to add, that it is my strong opinion that no power should be left in the hands of Mehrab Khan, who has shown himself our bitter and deceitful enemy, wholly unworthy of our confidence. For this object, it will, I conceive, be sufficient to occupy Khelat itself, and to hold it and the districts adjacent, in addition to Moostung and Shawl, under our provisional management or superintendence, for the very short period that will elapse, until it may be seen what arrangement can be made re-

specting it, either by bringing it also under the direct rule of the Shah, or placing the claimant, Shah Newaz Khan (or any other Beloochee chief), in possession of it."—[*MS. Records.*]

* "As to Mehrab Khan himself, he may have claims upon Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, arising out of the important succour given to his Majesty in his expedition in 1834, and Mr. Macnaghten will naturally not fail to second any proposition of a liberal personal support to the chief which the Shah may be disposed to make, in generous acknowledgment of those services."—[*Lord Auckland's Minute: August 20, 1839. MS. Records.*]

General in the estimation of their officers. It was a subject, therefore, of general congratulation throughout the Company's army, that a Native regiment had shared with two of the Ghuznee storming corps the glory of the assault upon Khelat, and had proved themselves well worthy of the confidence that had been placed in them. And so Sir John Keane and General Willshire returned to India. The "Army of the Indus" was broken up; and soon there came from England the welcome announcement that the successes of the campaign had been duly appreciated by the Sovereign, and the chief actors duly rewarded. Lord Auckland was created an Earl; Sir John Keane rose up as Baron Keane of Ghuznee; Mr. Macnaghten took his place in history as Sir William Macnaghten, Baronet; Colonel Wade became thenceforth Sir Claude Wade, Knight; and a shower of lesser distinctions, of brevets and bath-honours, descended upon the working officers, whose gallantry had contributed so largely to the success of this memorable campaign.

BOOK IV.

[1840—1841.]

CHAPTER I.

[January—September: 1840.]

The Great Game in Central Asia—the Russian Expedition to Khiva—Apprehensions of Burnes—Colonel Stoddart—Affairs on the Hindoo-Koosh—Failure of the Russian Expedition—Conduct of the Sikhs—Herat and Yar Mahomed—Mission of Abbott and Shakespear—Disturbances in the Ghilzye Country—Fall of Khelat—Arthur Conolly.

THE King and the Envoy spent the winter at Jellalabad. There was something like a lull in Afghanistan. When the snow is on the ground the turbulence of the Afghans is wont to subside.* The time was favorable for the consideration of revenue matters, and Macnaghten began to inquire into the expenditure and the resources of the

* The winter, however, was not wholly unproductive of military events. A detachment was sent out under Colonel Orchard to reduce the fort of Pushoot, which lies some fifty miles to the north-east of Jellalabad, and to expel the "refractory chief" of the surrounding district. The affair was a successful failure. Repeated attempts were made by the Engineer Pigou to blow in the gate, after the Ghuznee fashion; but the heavy

rains had damaged the powder, which was naturally bad; and every effort was unsuccessful. As there was no hope of effecting an entrance in this manner; as Abbott and his artillery had vainly exhausted their ammunition, and a considerable number of our men had fallen under the fire of the fort, Orchard drew off the assailants. Soon after their withdrawal, however, the enemy evacuated the place.

kingdom. The inquiry was not a satisfactory one. It was obvious that the government could be carried on only by the extraction of large sums from the treasury of India; and Macnaghten was continually urging the Supreme Government to authorise the expenditure of these large sums of money, and continually exhorting the authorities in the north-western provinces to send him all the treasure they could spare.

But there was much in the state of our foreign relations at this time to distract the thoughts of the minister from the affairs of the home department. The Russian question was now forcing itself again upon our Indian statesmen. Even before the Court turned its back upon Caubul, tidings had been received, in the first instance from Pottinger at Herat, which left little room to doubt that a Russian force was about to set out from Orenburgh on an expedition into Central Asia. The immediate object of this movement was to threaten the state of Khiva, which had long been throwing obstacles in the way of Russian commerce, and carrying off Russian subjects into hopeless captivity. Russia had been carrying on an extensive trade with the countries of Central Asia; but the state of Khiva which borders on the country occupied by the Kerghiz Cossacks, was now declared by the Russian Government to be "daily harassing the wandering tribes that encamp on our frontiers, interrupting the intercourse the other states of Asia keep up with us, detaining the caravans of Bokhara on their way to and from Russia, obliging them to pay extravagant duties, and compelling them by main force to pass through its territory, and there seizing a considerable portion of their merchandise." "These insults to foreigners, holding commercial intercourse with Russia, are, however," continues the Russian state-paper—the manifesto of the Government of the Czar, declaring the

grounds of their expedition into Central Asia—"of less importance than the attacks which have been made on Russian caravans. Not one of these can now cross the desert without danger. It was in this manner that a Russian caravan from Orenburgh, with goods belonging to our merchants, was pillaged by the armed bands of Khiva. No Russian merchant can now venture into that country without running the risk of losing his life or being made a prisoner. The inhabitants of Khiva are constantly making incursions into that part of the country of the Kerghiz which is at a distance from our lines, . . . and to crown all these insults, they are detaining several thousand Russian subjects in slavery. The number of these unfortunate wretches increases daily, for the peaceful fishermen on the banks of the Caspian are continually attacked and carried off as slaves to Khiva."

Here were plainly and intelligibly set forth the injuries committed by the state of Khiva against the subjects of the Russian Government, and the grounds on which the latter called for redress. Every attempt, it was stated, to obtain satisfaction for these wrongs, by reason and persuasion, had failed. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to more decisive measures. "Every means of persuasion," continued the manifesto, "has now been exhausted. The rights of Russia, the security of her trade, the tranquillity of her subjects, and the dignity of the state, call for decisive measures; and the Emperor has judged it to be time to send a body of troops to Khiva, to put an end to robbery and exaction, to deliver those Russians who are detained in slavery, to make the inhabitants of Khiva esteem and respect the Russian name, and finally to strengthen in that part of Asia the lawful influence to which Russia has a right, and which alone can insure the maintenance of peace. This is the purpose of the present

expedition; and as soon as it shall be attained, and an order of things conformable to the interests of Russia and the neighbouring Asiatic states shall be established on a permanent footing, the body of troops which has received orders to march on Khiva will return to the frontiers of the empire."

The *casus belli* was here laid down with sufficient distinctness, and the facts stated in the manifesto were not to be denied. But it was believed that Russia had other objects in view than the liberation of her slaves and the safety of her commerce; and that if the British army had not occupied Afghanistan, this manifesto would not have been issued by the Czar. It was regarded, indeed, as a counter-movement called forth by our own advance; and candid men could allege nothing against it on the score of justice or expediency. There was something suspicious in the time and manner of its enunciation. But there was less of aggression and usurpation in it than in our own manifesto. The movement was justified by the law of nations. There was outwardly something, indeed, of positive righteousness in it, appealing to the best instincts of our nature. And, if there were behind all this outside show of humanity a politic desire to keep in check a rival power, that was now intruding in countries far beyond its own line of frontier, it can only be said that our own movement into Afghanistan was directed against a danger of the same kind, but of much less substantial proportions.

But the expedition of Russia into Central Asia excited the alarm of our statesmen in Afghanistan, though it did not rouse their indignation. There was, at all events, in it much food for anxious consideration. It was the one great subject of thought and topic of discussion in the winter of 1839-1840. Burnes, who was left in control at Caubul, whilst Macnaghten was with the Shah at

Jellalabad, now, with the snow around him, found himself in the enjoyment of a season of comparative leisure, able both to think and to write. "What a year has been the past," he wrote to a friend at Bombay, on the 19th of November—"not to me, I mean, but to our affairs in the East. Further submission to what was going on, and our days of supremacy in the East, were numbered. As it is, we have brought upon ourselves some additional half-million of annual expenditure, and, ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and those of Russia will touch—that is, the states dependent upon either of us will—and that is the same thing. . . . Every week brings fresh business; and all the world will now have it that Russia has advanced on Khiva. What of that? She has the right to relieve her enslaved countrymen; and if she have the power, why should she have so long hesitated? But the time she has chosen for this blow is an awkward one. I hold, however, that the man who recommends the cantonment of a British or an Indian soldier west of the Indus is an enemy to his country."*

After the lapse of a month, he wrote again to another correspondent, more emphatically, on the same subject:

But everything past and present has been cast into the shade by the expedition which the Russians have now pushed into Central Asia. I have known of it for eight weeks past, and had numerous and authentic reports concerning their waggons, their *matériel*, &c., &c., all of which are on a grand scale, giving rise to serious apprehensions that their plans are not confined to the chastisement of the petty Khan of Khiva; indeed, our policy at Herat is already out of joint, and we have reason to know that Russia from Khiva looks to that city. Her attack on Khiva is justified by all the laws of nations; and in a country like England, where slave-dealing is so odiously detested, ought to find favour in men's eyes rather than blame. Yet the time chosen wears a

* *MS. Correspondence.*

bad appearance, if it at once does not lead to the inference that Russia has put forth her forces merely to counteract our policy. This latter is my opinion; and by our advance on Caubul we have thus hastened the great crisis. England and Russia will divide Asia between them, and the two empires will enlarge like the circles in the water till they are lost in nothing; and future generations will search for both of us in these regions, as we now seek for the remains of Alexander and his Greeks.

While external affairs stand thus, internal matters are not free from anxiety. Dost Mahomed's power is nominally dissolved; but he has just been invited to Bokhara at the instigation of Russia, and he hopes to receive Balkh as a gift from the King there; but in May next we shall occupy Balkh, and if Russia advances beyond Khiva, be prepared to meet her. Troops are, indeed, warned; but as we cannot act till May, we shall have abundance of time. As for withdrawing our army, it is out of the question; for though I maintain that man to be an enemy to his country who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the Indus, what is to be done? Shah Soojah's contingent has been hitherto so mismanaged that it is fit for nothing; and till fit (supposing Russia not to have appeared), the Shah cannot rely on Afghans. So he says; but if he will but place British officers over them, pay them regularly, and not interfere with their republican ideas, they would alone keep this country in order. Now, there is a dose of politics for you, as verbose as I used to give you when we dined at the house in Waterloo-place, or when, over a lobster, after some of those brilliant society meetings in London. My present position is as follows: I drive the coach in Caubul while Macnaghten is with the King. On our arrival here, the Envoy made a bold push to get away, he being tired of his place; but the Governor-General beseeched him to stay a while longer, and appointed your humble servant Resident at Candahar; but this I declined, and I now get 2500 rupees for staying here, though I hope to receive my Resident's salary. The atrocious crime of being a young man is what I imagine keeps me *en second* so long; but I get on well with Macnaghten, and only want responsibility to be a happy man.

In the Punjaub, all is, I am glad to say, wrong. The son has usurped all real power, and Kuruk Singh is a cypher. I hope their strife will lead to the evacuation of Peshawur. Events bid

fair for our taking Herat; and then, and not till then, shall we have restored the Afghan monarchy.*

But far less heavily on Macnaghten's mind sate the thought of this Russian invasion. There were other sources of inquietude less dim and conjectural to trouble him at this time. In whatsoever direction he turned his eyes, he was glared at by some great trouble. Everything was going wrong. At Herat, Yar Mahomed was playing a game of unexampled treachery. In the remote regions of Central Asia, a British envoy was groaning under the tyranny of the unscrupulous Ameer of Bokhara. Nearer home, the measures of the double government in Afghanistan were beginning to bear their own bitter fruits. At Candahar, the Douranees were chafing under the exactions of unpopular revenue officers. In the Kohistan, already were those, who had revolted, in a critical hour, against Dost Mahomed, and contributed largely to his expulsion from Afghanistan, sighing for his return. And further down towards the South, the country which we had made the burial-place of Mehrab Khan, was breaking out into rebellion against the authority which we had attempted to establish; and the Sikhs, to whom we had conceded so much, our associates in the Tripartite treaty, were unscrupulously intriguing against us.

All these things were against him. It was plain that he was among a people of a very different stamp from those with whom he had been connected throughout the earlier years of his administrative career. There was much to disquiet his mind, to engage his thoughts, and to occupy his time. One after another he passed in review before him all the difficulties which beset his path; but there was nothing that pressed more heavily on his mind, or which seemed to arouse him into intenser action, than

* *MS. Correspondence.*

the outrages to which Colonel Stoddart had been subjected at Bokhara.

Stoddart had been at Bokhara ever since the close of the year 1838. He had been despatched by Mr. M'Neill to that Court, with instructions to obtain the liberation of all the Russian captives, and to conclude a friendly treaty with the Ameer. His reception, though marked by some caprice, was not altogether uncourteous. He was very ignorant of the customs of the country, and was inclined to resent as insults the exaction of formalities in accordance with the ordinary usages of Bokhara. He seems to have made no effort to win the favour of the barbarous monarch by the adoption of a conciliatory demeanour; but somehow or other he scrambled through the first ceremonials without giving the Commander of the Faithful very mortal offence.

But it would appear that he soon excited the bitter enmity of the Reiss, or minister. His letters had been addressed to the predecessor of this man. The old minister had been disgraced whilst Stoddart was on his way to Bokhara, and the new man was little inclined to regard with favour the Feringhee who had sought the protection of the old. In a very short time, Stoddart, having been invited to the residence of the Reiss, was suddenly seized, thrown to the ground, bound with cords, and threatened with death by the minister himself, who stood over him with a long knife. He was then carried out, on a dark rainy night, into the streets, hurried from place to place, by torchlight, and at last lowered down by ropes into a dark well, swarming with the most nauseous vermin, to be the companion of murderers and thieves. In this wretched dungeon, weakened both in body and in mind, by long-continued suffering, he consented outwardly to conform to the tenets of the Mahomedan faith.

After two months of extreme suffering, Stoddart was released from this dreadful dungeon. The chief officer of police then received him into his house; and from this time, throughout the year 1839, though subject to the caprices of a tyrannous monarch and an unscrupulous minister, and the insults of barbarians of less note, his condition, on the whole, was bettered. The success of the British in Afghanistan seemed for a time to awaken the Ameer to a just sense of the power of the British nation, and Stoddart rose into importance at the Bokhara Court, as the agent of a powerful state, capable of exercising a mighty influence over the destinies of Central Asia. But the caprices of this barbarous potentate were great. The smiles of to-day were followed by the cruelties of the morrow. Stoddart continued a prisoner at Bokhara; and Macnaghten, sympathising with the sufferings of a brave officer, and eager to chastise the insolent barbarity of the petty Central-Asian tyrant, again contemplated the despatch of a brigade across the mountains of the Hindoo-Koosh.

It was necessary, however, to tread cautiously on this ground. There were more reasons than one why Macnaghten, at this time, turned his thoughts towards Bokhara. Dost Mahomed had sought an asylum at the Ameer's Court.* The "Commander of the Faithful," as this rude Mussulman potentate ostentatiously termed himself, received the fugitive with open arms. For a little while he lavished upon the fallen Prince all the benignities

* Finding that he had little hope of so establishing his influence among the petty Oosbeg states as to enable him, with their assistance, to make an effort to regain his lost dominions, the Ameer had contemplated a flight into the Persian territories. But the Governor of Balkh intercepted the fugitive, and invited him to that country. Jubbar Khan went on the

part of the Ameer, and was detained until the arrival of Dost Mahomed himself. Then the Ameer was informed that the Khan of Bokhara desired the presence at his capital of the ex-ruler of Caubul. Sorely perplexed, and almost helpless, but without some misgivings, Dost Mahomed then went to Bokhara.

of his hospitality; and then laid his heavy hand upon him, and made him a prisoner.

"It seems certain that the Dost has got into bad odour at Bokhara," wrote Macnaghten to Burnes, on the 20th of February, "and it is very improbable that the two Ameers-ool-Moomuneen will ever act cordially together." It was the policy of our British diplomatists, at this time, to keep the two Ameers in a state of disunion and antagonism. But the very course which Macnaghten was disposed to pursue towards Bokhara, was that of all others which was most surely calculated to cement an alliance between them. A military expedition against Bokhara would, in all probability, have induced the Khan to release Dost Mahomed, and to supply him with the means of crossing the frontier at the head of an imposing body of fighting men, and, aided by the Wullees of Khooloom and other chiefs of the Oosbeg hill states, making an effort to regain his lost dominions. There was something, too, in the alleged cause of Dost Mahomed's confinement at Bokhara, which made Macnaghten waver still more in his determination to send an army across the Hindoo-Koosh, and suggested to him the expediency of devoting himself to the furtherance of objects of another kind. It was said that the Ameer of Bokhara was greatly incensed by Dost Mahomed's practical refusal to bring his family to Bokhara.* They had remained under

* The "Commander of the Faithful," as the Khan styles himself, received Dost Mahomed with cordiality, and pressed him to send for his family, to whom he promised every kindness. But the Dost knew the character of the Khan too well to place the objects of his affection within the reach of that Prince. He accordingly wrote a letter to his brother, which was shown to the Khan, requesting that they might be sent on to the friendly Court of Bokhara; at

the same time he wrote privately to authorise him rather to put them to death, than to allow them to set foot within the territories of Bokhara. Long and anxiously did the Commander of the Faithful look out for the Dost's Zenana and their jewels and ornaments, which he intended to transfer to his own treasures; but when he found that he was mocked by his guest, he cast both the Dost and his sons into prison, saying, "There shalt thou remain till thy

the charge of Jubbar Khan, in the hospitable territory of the Wullee of Khooloom; and it was said that the Khan of Bokhara had declared, that if they sought the protection of the British Government, he would destroy Dost Mahomed. But Jubbar Khan was well disposed at this time to seek from the British an honourable asylum for his brother's family; and the question of their reception was earnestly pondered by Macnaghten, and discussed with the Shah. In the middle of February, he wrote to Burnes, from Jellalabad:

I have just received your letter, with its enclosures from Lord. The question he puts as to the reception to be given to any offer that may be made for placing the Dost's family under our protection, is a very important one; and as he has expressed his anxiety for early instructions, I can have no hesitation in communicating to you my opinion for his guidance. Common hospitality requires that an asylum should not be refused to persons who are in so distressed a plight as the Dost's family; but, at the same time, common prudence requires that in the exercise of this office of humanity, we do not expose ourselves to the machinations of perfidious enemies. I think, therefore, that Lord should at once say, in reply to any request on the subject that may be made to him, that we are prepared to accord a safe and honourable asylum to the whole of Dost Mahomed's family, on the condition of their residing wherever our government may think proper. If they come in, they might, in the first instance, be sent down to Quettah or Cutch Gundava, and it would rest with the Governor-General to determine whether they should ultimately be sent to Loodhianah. I think it exceedingly probable that these terms will gladly be accepted. . . . Before giving any decided opinion as to our policy in Toorkistan, I wish to await Lord's promised official despatch; but I am strongly disposed to think that we had better

family is brought to Bokhara." Jubbar Khan was now at a loss to know how to act, as his own residence and that of his brother's family ceased to be safe in Khooloom, after the sentiments of the Bokhara chief were known. Negotiations were, there-

fore, opened with the Envoy, who was, above all things, anxious to obtain possession of the Dost's family, as, "in that case, the Khan of Bokhara could make no use of him."—*[Calcutta Review.]*

not advance beyond Syghan, unless we are bound in good faith to do so, of which I am not aware. Fears of our approach might prove an incentive to the Shah of Bokhara to set Dost Mahomed on his legs again.*

A few days afterwards, he wrote again to the same correspondent :

Jellalabad, February 23, 1840.

MY DEAR BURNES,

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have communicated with his Majesty on the subject of the Dost's family. He does not understand upon what principle he can be expected to grant them an asylum or a maintenance, and nothing can persuade him that he is called upon, either by humanity or policy, to do so. Against the Newab Jubbar Khan his Majesty's wrath is especially turned. He trusts that we are not to be gulled by his professions of friendship, whilst the whole tenor of his conduct towards us has been that of rancorous hostility. His Majesty will not object to our allowing them an asylum in Quettah or Cutch Gundava, until the pleasure of the Governor-General is known regarding the future disposal of the family; but nothing short of absolute force would induce him to contribute one rupee towards their support. Under present circumstances, the family cannot expect from us more than a general assurance of kind and honourable treatment, on condition of their living wherever we choose to locate them; and there must be no more waiting on events. If they wish for protection, they must seek it instantly. As to Jubbar Khan himself, I doubt whether his Majesty will do more than assign him a decent maintenance. If we get the Dost's family into our possession, our objection to the movement into Toorkistan will be obviated. In that case, the Shah of Bokhara could make no use of the Dost. Let us examine what we are to gain by such a movement, and upon what principles it should be conducted. The first thing to be gained is the punishment of the Shah of Bokhara, for his frequent and outrageous violation of the law of nations, and the release of our agent, Colonel Stoddart, who, without some exertion on our part, will, it is likely, be doomed to incarceration for life. I suppose the expedition to be conveniently feasible, if entered upon at the proper season of the

* *Unpublished Correspondence.*

year. What Timour Shah effected, we can do; and with proper arrangement we may either enlist on our side, or keep neutral, the chiefs between us and Bokhara. If we compelled the Shah of Bokhara to release Stoddart, to evacuate all the countries on this side of the Oxus, and to pay the expenses of the expedition, we should have achieved all that is desirable.

Believe me, yours, &c., &c.,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

The Court remained at Jellalabad up to the third week of April; and the excursive mind of the Envoy was still wandering out in the wild regions beyond the Hindoo-Koosh. It was certain that a Russian army was advancing upon Khiva. In the country about Khooloom the adherents of Dost Mahomed were exciting against us the hostility of the Oosbegs. Jubbar Khan, with the Ameer's family and a large party of retainers, were there. The petty chiefs beyond the mountains were in a state of doubtful vassalage, scarcely knowing whether they were subject to Herat or to Caubul; whether they would recognise the Khan of Bokhara or the Khan of Khiva as their suzerain; or whether they would be, in effect, independent of all.* It was desirable to annex these Cis-Oxus principalities to the territory of the Shah, to strengthen our frontier, and keep them out of the hands of the Bokhara ruler. Already was there a weak detachment wintering amid the inhospitable snows of Bameean. The despatch of a strong brigade to the country beyond was still among the cherished projects of the Envoy. Writing from Jellalabad, he turned his

* Mehrab Khan, the Wullee of Maimouna, said to Arthur Conolly, in the autumn of 1840, "My ancestors were content to serve the King of Caubul, and when members of that house fell into misfortune, they found hospitality here. Shah Soojah is again upon his throne at Caubul; but now another Suddozye King calls upon me to submit only to He-

rat, and your English agent advises me to send my son there. On the other hand, the Commander of the Faithful claims allegiance for Bokhara. The Khan Huzzrut desires me to put myself under him; and you know how I was forced to act when the Persian Asoph-ood-dowlah crossed the Moorghaub."

back upon the southern passes and looked out across the northern Caucasian mountains. To the Governor of Agra he thus addressed himself on the 1st of April; and the letter is curious, not only as developing his views with regard to the country on the south of the Oxus, but his opinions of the difficulties of forcing the Khybur Pass:

The sincerity of the wish professed by the Khybur chiefs to be on good terms with us has recently been put to a severe test, and they have come well out of the ordeal. We required them to deliver up the murderers of Sergeant Cameron, and they have actually seized and made over to us two of the ringleaders. But their power over their respective clans is more powerful to excite than to prevent mischief, and we must be prepared to hear of many outrages for some time to come. Only yesterday evening I received account of an attack upon some travellers in the pass. They were plundered of the whole of their property; two of the party were killed and several wounded. This occurrence has not altered my opinion as to the proper method of dealing with these savages, and hardly any provocation would induce me to send our own regular troops into their fastnesses.

Doubtless, it must have appeared to you an inconsistency that I should think of sending troops across the Hindoo-Koosh, while we are without the power of subjugating the Khyburees. But I regard the former undertaking as infinitely easier than the latter. We know tolerably well what we should have to contend with in Toorkistan, whereas we are utterly ignorant of the fastnesses of the Khyburees, and of the means of resistance possessed by their chiefs. All we know is, that the country is fearfully strong, and that each individual is a soldier and a good marksman behind his native rock. Besides, in sending a force into Toorkistan, we should be able to turn to account the strength of the Afghan nation, which consists in its cavalry, and which would be utterly useless in Khybur. A brigade of ours, with a due proportion of artillery, would, I think, from all I have heard, be fully competent to overcome any opposition that could be offered to us between this and Bokhara. But the question of advance beyond the mountains is one of great difficulty and delicacy. You will have seen all the *pros* and *cons* which occur

to me stated in my letter to Dr. Lord. I do not think that we should incur the risk of the movement solely for the purpose of reannexing the Cis-Oxus provinces to the dominions of his Majesty Shah Soojah; though if they are not so reannexed, Bokhara, at the instigation of Russia, will certainly assert a real supremacy. At present she has only Balkh and its dependencies, and her sway over that even is but nominal. But we cannot allow Dost Mahomed's family to occupy so commanding a position as Khooloom, close to the Afghan frontier. And may not the contingency upon which the home authorities direct an advance, be said to have arisen should the Russians establish themselves in force at Bokhara? I confess I am rather sceptical as to the power of the Autocrat to push anything in the shape of an army so far, in one, or even in two campaigns. Burnes, however, is alarmed. He says, we are altogether deceived as to the strength of the Russian army, that it is now actually in possession of Khiva, and will shortly be at Bokhara. In the mean time, you may imagine the anxiety with which I am looking for authentic intelligence from the North. This we must shortly get from Abbott.

I intend sending Arthur Conolly, who has joined me here, and Rawlinson on a mission to Kokan, with a view, if possible, to frustrate the knavish tricks of the *Russe log* in that quarter. Though there are doubtless many of the elements of mischief in this country, yet I should not apprehend any internal explosion, even if the greater portion of our troops were withdrawn. The Berowski mentioned in the Madras paper was killed at the siege of Herat. Perofsski, I think, is the name of the leader of the present expedition. Depend upon it we shall never be at our ease in India until we have subjugated the Punjaub and Nepal; and the sooner we can come to a reckoning with our faithful allies the Singhs, the better. They are doing all they can to injure us in this quarter, and are comforting all the rebels and parties disaffected to his Majesty Shah Soojah. We should here have no difficulty in dealing with them in this quarter, and I will venture to say there would not be a disciple of Nanuk on this side the Indus a week after the declaration of hostilities.*

* *MS. Correspondence.* In this letter the Envoy thus alludes to the system of secret writing which has now superseded the old plan of correspondence

by cypher; and as at a later period, during General Pollock's occupation of the passes between Peshawur and Caubul, it was found of the utmost

As the month advanced, the intelligence from the North was more and more calculated to rivet the opinion entertained by the Mission of the success of the Russian expedition. On the 21st of March, Macnaghten had written to the Agra Governor:

Lord Auckland tells me that the Russian force consists only of 3000 cavalry Cossacks, 800 mounted artillerymen, and twelve light field-pieces; but Burnes tells me that he knows, from good information, that the force is much larger. Let us hope the armada may be dispersed before it reaches Bokhara, whatever may be the strength of it. If the Russians are likely to establish themselves there, we had better be up and doing.*

But on the 15th of April he wrote from Jellalabad:

You will see from Captain Abbott's report how contemptible is the enemy with which the Russians have to contend, and I fear they will experience no obstacle to their progress all the way to Bokhara. Had we not been here, they would by this time next year have established themselves without the slightest opposition or difficulty in Afghanistan. They appear to have completely gained over (whether by promises or threats) the King of Bokhara, who turns a deaf ear to all our advances.†

On the 23rd, the Court having then commenced its progress to Caubul, the Envoy wrote in a still less confident strain:

service to our officers, it may be interesting to describe the method in the words of the Envoy: "Are you in possession of the *hikmut* of concealed writing, by means of conjee-water and a solution of iodine? This is much better than any cypher. The paper is to all appearance blank, but when rubbed over with the solution, the words written with conjee-water start into life, as it were, most miraculously. Something unimportant is generally written with common ink, and what is intended as secret is interlined with conjee-water. Try this some day. Any medical man in your neighbourhood will give the solution. The paper

intended to be used should first have a gentle coat of the solution passed over it, and suffered to dry."

In another letter to the same correspondent, the Envoy again adverts to this mode of cypher writing: "I find it is not necessary to prepare the paper in the first instance. You write on ordinary paper, and having spread a solution of iodine over it, the invisible writing becomes apparent. When there is any writing of this kind on my paper, I shall put the day of the month in letters, instead of figures. Perhaps you would adopt the same sign."

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† *Ibid.*

All accounts concur in stating that the Russians have reached Khiva, and I anticipate anything but a bed of roses unless something be done to distract people's attention from the intrigues a-head, by putting a stop to those in our rear. We are now on the field of battle on which Shah Soojah lost his throne in 1810. What must his Majesty's feelings be now?*

And in another letter, written a few days later, he expresses himself still more emphatically regarding the dangers of European intrigue:

I have at present my hands quite full of the affairs of this quarter, as you will see from my several official despatches. Unless Lord Auckland act with vigour and promptitude to secure and open our rear, we shall soon be between two fires—if not under them. France and Russia are advancing with only the remote contingency of profit to stimulate them. We are supine, whilst our inactivity will probably be the cause of our ruin. France gratuitously supplies Persia with 300,000 muskets, at a time when Persia may be said to be at war with us. I cannot, though I have repeatedly and earnestly pressed my request, obtain a single musket.†

A fortnight after this letter was written, the Envoy proposed to Burnes that he should proceed on a mission to the Russian camp. "He said, he would willingly go if ordered—but that," added Macnaghten, "is not the spirit which should animate our Elchee;" and the design was abandoned. It must have been very soon after this‡ that the glad tidings of the break-down of the Russian expedition reached the Court of Shah Soojah. The Envoy had spoken despondingly of the contemptible enemy which the Russian army had to encounter—but there was an enemy of which no account was taken—an enemy that had destroyed one of Napoleon's finest armies, and which was doomed to overthrow utterly our own policy in Central Asia—spreading its toils around Peroffski's advancing columns. The snow was doing its work.

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† *Ibid.*

‡ May 10, 1842.

On the 13th of March, the failure of the expedition was announced in the public journals of St. Petersburg, and Lord Clanricarde, on the same day, sent the intelligence to Lord Palmerston. The journals announced that the intense cold, the deep snow, and the inaccessibility of the country, had destroyed the camels, and compelled the army to retrace its steps. But the actual truth was worse than the newspaper history; for Peroffski's ill-fated army had been attacked by pestilence and famine.*

As the year advanced, Macnaghten's difficulties seemed to thicken around him. The failure of the Russian expedition removed one source of inquietude; but it was a remote one. And nearer home, many dangers were bristling up in his path. Immersed, however, in foreign politics, the Envoy gave little heed to the domestic troubles which were gathering around him. His thoughts were continually ranging beyond the limits of Shah Soojah's dominions; and whilst the edifice he had reared was falling to pieces by the force of its own innate corruptness, he was devising measures of external defence.

During the spring and the early summer months two subjects pressed greatly on his attention, and became the burdens of his discourse. The one was the conduct of the Sikhs; the other, the state of affairs at Herat. Ever since the death of Runjeet Singh, the temper of the

* "I am informed that the situation of General Peroffski and his army is more perilous than this account states, because, in consequence of the delays that had occurred, his stock of provisions is found to be insufficient, and he is not in a condition either to await the thaw and then to proceed to Khiva, or to return home without further aid."—[*Lord Clanricarde to Lord Palmerston. MS. Records.*]

"I had this day a letter from Todd,

dated 28th June. He confirms the retreat of the Russians, whose camp appears to have been attacked by a pestilence. The Khan of Khiva writes to Todd that the Russian forts and entrenchments have been destroyed, and that some guns and a quantity of stores belonging to them have been brought in triumph to Khiva."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson: July 15, 1841. MS. Correspondence.*]

Lahore Durbar had been such as to impress the Envoy strongly with the conviction that nothing but decisive measures would ever bring our allies to regard the terms of the Tripartite treaty. The real ruler of the Punjaub was the young and impetuous Prince, Nao Nehal Singh, who had almost set aside the authority of his imbecile father, and was longing for the day when he might take more openly and undisguisedly the sceptre into his hands. In every possible way our allies had evaded the stipulations of the treaty. They had rendered no effectual aid to the Prince Timour in the operations which, conjointly with Wade, he had undertaken for the recovery of his father's throne. They were making light of the obligation to support a contingent force of Sikh troops on the frontier, in return for the subsidy granted by the treaty; and proof had been afforded that they were engaged in treasonable correspondence with our enemies in Afghanistan. It is certain, at least, that they were harbouring at their frontier stations the rebel Ghilzye chiefs, who had been driven out of Shah Soojah's territory, and suffering them to return again to foment new disturbances. Sultan Mahomed Khan and his brothers at Peshawur were servants of the Maharajah, but they were Barukzyes still; and it was not strange that they regarded with undisguised satisfaction the clouds which were gathering over the restored Suddozye monarchy.

But more important still than the considerations involved in these questions, was the question which had now arisen regarding the free passage of our troops and convoys through the dominions of Lahore. It was obvious that we could not maintain our position in Afghanistan so long as the Punjaub stood impassable between that country and Hindostan. But Nao Nehal Singh and the Kalsa viewed with insurmountable jealousy the passage of our armaments through the Punjaub. They declared, that when Mr. Clerk negotiated for a passage for the troops return-

ing from the expedition into Afghanistan, the accorded permission was limited to that especial case, and was by no means intended to convey a general license for the repeated crossings and recrossings which now seemed to be in contemplation. But Macnaghten declared that it was absolutely necessary to "macadamise" the road through the Punjaub; and the authorities at Calcutta began to think that a war with the Sikhs was no improbable event.*

* "The plot is thickening," wrote Macnaghten, on the 10th of April, "and I have no hesitation in asserting my belief that we shall find ourselves in a very awkward predicament, unless we adopt measures for macadamising the road through the Punjaub." On the 15th of the same month he wrote: "It may not be the interest of our neighbours to give us offence; but it is their interest to do us injury, and in attempts to effect this, a certain good neighbour has certainly been most active and persevering. We have fresh instances and clear proof of this spirit daily. Nothing would give us a greater name in Central Asia than success in such a cause; but I need not dilate on the ten thousand advantages that would attend a vigorous policy in this direction."—[*MS. Correspondence.*] Avitabile's proceedings at this time were a source of extreme annoyance to Macnaghten. The General was interfering with the Khyburees. The Koochlee-Khail tribe of Afreedis, from whom he demanded revenue, went to Mackeson for protection, and said: "Formerly the Sikhs used to pay us 13,000 rupees a year to get water at Jumrood; and now, on the strength of their alliance with you, they ask us for revenue."—[*Lieutenant Mackeson: April 12, 1840, MS. Correspondence.*] The chief of the tribe said to Mackeson: "Why do you stay at Peshawur? You are powerless there, and you prevent us from injuring the Sikhs in return for the injuries they inflict upon us.

Come and tarry with us." Avitabile threatened to carry fire and sword among the Koochlee-Khail people; and Mackeson, to prevent the employment of force, went security for them. Besides this, he laid an embargo on all merchants and travellers, subjects of Shah Soojah, passing through Peshawur, and declared that not one of them should proceed until the Shah had given ample security against the commission of robberies in the pass.—[*Lieutenant Mackeson to Mr. Maddock: April 26. MS. Correspondence.*] These things greatly embarrassed our position, at a time when we especially desired to tranquillise the Khyburees. Macnaghten wrote urgently to government on the subject: "By this day's dawn I am sending to the Supreme Government," he wrote, in a private letter, on the 23rd of April, "a budget containing the proceedings of General Avitabile. These are calculated to do infinite mischief—so much so, indeed, that unless redress is afforded, I do not see how it is possible that a rupture with the Sikh Government can be avoided; it's a necessary consequence of such proceedings; all our ties must be renewed in the pass, and commerce by this route may be extinguished. Can the *Volpe* be acting without instructions? Why should he seek to exasperate us? But our convoy has got safely through, and we are on the best possible terms with the Khyburees, who detest our allies. *Hoc fonte derivata clades.*"

Parallel with these inquietudes arising out of the conduct of the Lahore Durbar and its agents, ran the troubles which weighed upon Macnaghten's mind in connexion with the ill-omened aspect of affairs at Herat. The insolent ingratitude of Yar Mahomed had reached a pitch of sublime daring. The British Government were lavishing their treasures upon Herat; and the chief minister of Herat, in return for this support, was insulting the British officers, and intriguing with the Persian Court. In the history of human infamy there is nothing more infamous than the conduct of this man. The treaty between the British Government and the state of Herat, by which the latter bound itself not to enter into negotiations with other states without the knowledge and consent of the British Resident, had only been signed a few weeks, when Yar Mahomed was detected in carrying on a correspondence with the Persian Asoof-ood-Dowlah at Meshed, offering to place himself and his country under the protection of the Persian Government, and inviting him to enter into a league for the expulsion of the infidel English from Afghanistan.*

Up to this time eight lakhs of rupees had been advanced to the Heratee Government. When the new year dawned upon Herat, twelve lakhs had been so advanced. The utmost benefits had been conferred upon the state. The measures of our British officers had rescued

* "The treaty with Shah Kamran had been signed but a few weeks; a treaty which secured to the authorities of Herat solid advantages, but prohibited them from negotiating with foreign states without the knowledge and consent of the British Resident Agent; when it was discovered that Yar Mahomed Khan, the *de facto* ruler of the country, had secretly made overtures to the Persian authorities at Meshed, expressing his hatred towards the English, and offering to place himself under the protection of the Persian

Government. In reporting this circumstance for your information, I expressed my opinion that the maintenance of friendly relations with a government that had proved itself insensible of benefits, and ignorant of the obligations of a treaty, seemed no longer possible; and that it would be found necessary, for the safety of our newly-acquired position beyond the Indus, to reannex the territory of Herat to the dominions of his Majesty Shah Soojah."—[Major Todd to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: *Gherish*, March 5, 1841. *MS. Records*.]

"King, chiefs, and people from starvation."* But at this very time a letter was addressed to Mahomed Shah of Persia, in the name of Shah Kamran, declaring the Heratee ruler to be the faithful servant of the Shah-in-Shah; and setting forth that he only tolerated the presence of the English because they were useful to him—that, in truth, they were not niggardly with their money; but that the hopes of his Majesty were in the asylum of Islam.

In explanation of such black-hearted treachery as this, it is said that the apprehensions of Yar Mahomed had been excited by the imposing attitude of Great Britain in Afghanistan—that he looked upon the danger to be apprehended from the contiguity of the British army as something less remote and more alarming than the return of Mahomed Shah; and that it was his policy at this time to play off one state against another, and to secure the good offices of Persia, whilst openly receiving the bounties of Great Britain. This is, doubtless, the view in which the matter is to be regarded with reference to the case of Yar Mahomed, the statesman. He was not incapable of taking a statesmanlike view of the position of his principality. He understood the interests of Herat. But better still did he understand the interest of Yar Mahomed. The presence of the English officers at Herat was a burden and a reproach to the Wuzeer. He hated their interference; he had no sympathy with their high-toned notions of humanity—with their horror of slavery—with their compassion for the weak and op-

* "The price of flour in the Herat bazaar was, about this time, one Company's rupee for less than four Hindostanee seers; and the whole supply from Toorkistan, the markets of which had been opened by our negotiations with Khiva. On our arrival at Herat, although the harvest had been reaped, five maunds of flour were with difficulty procured in the bazaar; and to meet the demand which the arrival of the Mission (consisting of about 120 persons) occasioned, we had immediately to send for supplies to Seistan."—[*Facts relating to Herat, by Dr. J. S. Logie.*]

pressed. He had thriven best in bad times; he had found the sufferings of the people serviceable to him. The *surveillance* of the British Mission impeded the exercise of his arbitrary desire to enrich himself at the expense of his poorer countrymen. So he hated Pottinger;* he hated Todd; he hated every high-minded Englishman. But he bore with them for their money. Todd's measures were especially distasteful to him. The effort which he was making to break down the accursed slave-trade of Central Asia, was more obnoxious than everything beside.

Associated with Todd—an artillery officer—were two other subalterns of Artillery—James Abbott and Richmond Shakespear. They were men of ability, of enthusiasm, and of high courage. Abbott's mind was of a more imaginative and romantic cast than that of his associate, who had qualities of a more serviceable kind, more practical, and more judicious. They were men sure to carry out any duty, however hazardous, entrusted to them, in a conscientious and intrepid manner. They were well inclined for any kind of personal adventure; and, ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, were eager to explore new countries, to mix with an unfamiliar people, and to visit uncivilised courts. When, therefore, Todd, acquainted with the menacing attitude which Russia had assumed towards the Court of Khiva, and the declared grounds of her Central-Asian expedition, recognised the expediency of despatching a British officer to the capital of the Khan Huzzrut, to mediate for the liberation of the Russian slaves in captivity there, he was fortunate in having at his elbow two men, to either of whom he might securely entrust the charge of a mission at once hazardous and delicate. In December, 1840, Abbott, who was the

* Pottinger did not remain long in Herat. Lord Auckland, it has been shown, desired to retain him there; and only looked upon Todd's mission

as a special one. But Pottinger soon made his way to Caubul, and subsequently proceeded to Calcutta.

senior of the two, was hastily despatched to the Court of Khiva.* The Khivan ruler, then awaiting in alarm the approach of the Muscovite battalions, but not altogether unsuspicious of the forward movements of the British, was well-inclined to receive the Mission; but Yar Mahomed had set at work the same dark intrigues which had caused Colonel Stoddart to be cast into captivity at Bokhara, and was doing his best to thwart the humane efforts of the British artilleryman. He seems to have had an instinctive hatred of men who were exerting themselves to sweep away the foul slave-marts of Central Asia.

With deep and painful interest Macnaghten watched the progress of events at Herat. The perfidy of Yar Mahomed was so glaring—so unblushing—that the Envoy had not hesitated to recommend offensive proceedings against the state of Herat, to be followed by its reannexation to the dominions of Shah Soojah. But Lord Auckland, when the proposal first came before him, was disinclined to embrace it. He thought it better to forgive Yar Maho-

* "When Major Todd, in June, 1839, arrived as envoy at Herat, he selected Moollah Hussan, a Mahomedan priest of great respectability, as bearer of a letter of friendship to the Khan Huzzrut (Supreme Lord) of Khiva, called also Khaurism Shah, or King of Khaurism. Moollah Hussan, arrived at Khiva when the state was threatened with a Russian invasion, was well received; and on his return was accompanied by an Oosbeg Lord, Shookkurroola Bre by name, as ambassador from the Khan Huzzrut to the Indian Government. The letter borne by this ambassador accepted of the tender of British friendship, and made several demands, which could not be complied with on the responsibility of Major Todd. It was in answer to this mission that the Envoy deputed me to visit the Court of Khiva."—

[*Captain Abbott's Narrative of a Journey from Herat to Khiva: Preliminary Remarks.*]

For an account of Captain Abbott's personal adventures, with a glimmering here and there of his political negotiations, I would refer the reader to these interesting volumes. Abbott says, at the commencement of his narrative: "We (Todd and Abbott) separate under circumstances sufficiently gloomy. I leave him in the very stronghold of robbers. I go myself as agent of the British Government to a Court, of the language and manners of which I am utterly ignorant, and to accomplish that of which the most sanguine have no hope. It is simply a matter of duty, and as such entered upon cheerfully, and with full determination to carry my efforts to the utmost."

med; and make a further experiment upon the gratitude of the Wuzeer. So, instead of an army, as Macnaghten eagerly recommended, a further supply of money was sent to Herat; and Yar Mahomed continued to intrigue with the Persian Government.*

It seemed to the Envoy, at this time, that there was no middle course to be pursued. All through our Central-Asian policy, indeed, there ran two substantive ideas. It was either the bayonet or the money-bag that was to settle everything for us. When Macnaghten found that the rulers of Herat were not to be dragooned into propriety, he declared that there was nothing left for us now but to bribe them. He proposed that a subsidy of two or three lakhs per annum should be granted to Herat; that guns, muskets, and ordnance stores in abundance should be furnished to the state; and in the mean while he continued to send up more treasure, with a profusion which startled the Calcutta Government, to be expended on the strengthening of its defences and the sustentation of the people.†

* "Your deputation of Abbott to Khiva will, I trust, be fully approved of in every quarter. I have told you more than once that the measure has my entire approbation, and you will have learnt that the Governor-General thinks well of it. You will also have learnt that the Governor-General inclines to your views, and that he is totally opposed to my recommendation of punishing the treachery of Yar Mahomed. In fact, he says the scheme is neither practicable nor politic. His Lordship is opposed also to the project of the contingent, though in this particular he may, and I think it likely he will, relent a little."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Todd: Jellalabad, March 2, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

† "As Herat is not to be treated as our enemy, and as a contingent is not to be given, the only course open to

us, I think, if we wish to secure the fidelity of Yar Mahomed Khan, is to give him a subsidy of two or three lakhs per annum, on condition of his being ready with a force at our command. Kamran cannot last much longer, and it would be well to determine beforehand what is to be done on his death. Should there be a struggle for the sovereignty among his sons, the country, now fast recovering, would be exposed to all the horrors of civil war. The best plan, perhaps, would be to let Yar Mahomed govern on the part of Shah Soojah, and pension off Kamran's family. This at least is the course into which I should wish events of themselves to slide."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland: April 11, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

"I trust that we shall not go to

But as the treachery of Yar Mahomed became more fully developed, the Governor-General began to mistrust the efficacy of the course of forbearance and conciliation which he had in the first instance recommended. He had authorised Major Todd to declare his forgiveness of all past offences, and was willing to enter upon a new covenant of friendship, *rasâ tabulâ*, with the offending state. But he was not then acquainted with the fact of the letter to Mahomed Shah, in which, with almost unexampled shamelessness, the writer boasted of the cajolery practised upon the English, who disbursed their money freely upon Herat, whilst its rulers were flinging themselves into the arms of Persia; for although that letter had been written in January, and came, therefore, within the margin of those offences for which forgiveness had been declared, it was not until some time afterwards that this crowning act of perfidy was discovered and laid bare before the Governor-General. Then it would seem that Lord Auckland began to waver in his resolution to maintain the independence of Herat. But

sleep whilst all the rest of the world are wide awake. Here are the French sending 30,000 muskets to Persia; whilst you will not furnish us with one. Just look to our relative stakes, and then say, is this economy prudent? I long ago recommended that some ordnance and ammunition stores should be sent to Herat, and I mentioned my belief that thousands of guns [muskets] were lying useless at Bombay. I would even now recommend that as many guns as carriage can be provided for, and as many muskets as can be spared, together with a due proportion of ammunition, be sent for the garrison of Herat. Sir James Carnac would, I doubt not, be happy to assist us in this matter."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: April 30, 1840.*]

"I am as sensible as any man can be of the necessity of economy, but

it is too soon, at the present crisis, to begin calculating the worth of every rupee that Todd may expend at Herat."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: Caubul, May 4, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

"I do trust that now you will have done something about Herat. If you neglect Yar Mahomed, how can you hope that he will not connect himself with some of the many intriguers by whom he is beset? As you declined to punish his perfidy by taking Herat, and as you object to giving a contingent, the only alternative left is to bribe him with money. Our front is sufficiently insecure, and if our rear is not made safe, our position will shortly be anything but enviable."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Colvin: May 9, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.*]

he was at this time resident at Calcutta. Sir Jasper Nicolls,* who had held the chief command at Madras, an old and distinguished officer, who had done good service in the Nepaul war, and was possessed of an amount of Indian experience almost unexampled in an Indian Commander-in-Chief, was now at the Presidency. The war in Afghanistan had been extremely distasteful to him from the beginning, and he now viewed with suspicion and alarm all the projects which were passing before him for the despatch of more troops and the diversion of more treasure from their legitimate purposes in Hindostan. No warlike promptings, therefore, from the military side of the Council Chamber, ever stimulated Lord Auckland to bury his legions in the inhospitable defiles of Afghanistan, or to waste the finances of India in insane attempts to change the nature of the chiefs and people of Central Asia, and to bribe them into quiescence and peace.

But ever was it the burden of Macnaghten's letters, that he could do nothing with Afghanistan until Yar Mahomed and the Sikhs had been chastised; and Herat on the one side, and Peshawur on the other, reannexed to the Douranee Empire. How strongly he felt on these points may be gathered both from the public and private

* In Council, the Commander-in-Chief was consistently opposed to the project of an advance on Herat or the countries beyond the Hindoo-Koosh. On the 25th of May he writes: "In a quiet way, without any formality, I placed in the Governor-General's hands to-day in Council a paper detailing the numbers of regiments and troops or companies of artillery now beyond our frontier. It is very great: 1 troop and 5 companies of Artillery; 1 regiment of Native Cavalry; 9 regiments of European and 15½ of Native Infantry; 2½ companies of Golundauze, and 2 companies of Sappers. I re-

marked at the foot that this aggregate exceeded, except in horse artillery and cavalry, the two armies which in 1803 beat down the great army of Scindiah, under Lake and Wellesley. I did this in the hope of inducing Lord Auckland to pause before he sanctioned any advance upon Balkh or to Herat, for we can ill afford any such extension of our force. In truth, we are much weaker now than in 1838, when the first augmentation was ordered in view to our later campaign."—[*MS. Journal of Sir Jasper Nicolls.*]

letters which, in the summer of 1840, he despatched from Caubul to his correspondents in different parts of India and Afghanistan. To the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces he wrote, on the 10th of July:

. . . . I urged the removal of the Sikhs to the east of the Indus as a matter for amicable negotiation, by purchase or otherwise, in the event of their acceding to our other just demands, and as a matter of coercion only in the event of their forcing us into actual hostilities. It is clear to me, however, that this country can never rise into prosperity while it is shorn of its two wings, Peshawur and Herat.

We have heard nothing lately regarding the Russians, and probably shall receive no accurate intelligence until the arrival of the overland mail. I participate in your fear that Arthur Conolly will not be permitted to proceed northwards. I regret this for the sake of the public interests, and on his private account, for the opportunity would have been a grand one to obtain distinction.

I am in daily expectation of hearing of the capture of Ghorian, but of the policy which directed this measure I confess myself unable to form a judgment.* It is apparently calculated to make an irreparable breach between us and the Kujjurs. We have patched up a sort of truce in the Ghilzye country, which may improve into a state of solid and permanent tranquillity if the Sikhs will only give us fair play. If we had the countries to the west of the Indus, I feel satisfied that you would never hear of an insurrection in Shah Soojah's dominions; but when I hint at this in higher quarters, I am charged with wishing to gain

* Ghorian, the frontier post of Herat, had been taken by the Persians in 1838.—[See *ante*, page 216.] When, in the spring of 1840, the perfidy of Yar Mahomed was discovered, the Wuzeer expressed some contrition, and an anxiety to prove his sincerity, by fitting out an expedition for the recovery of Herat. All that he wanted was money. If the British agent would advance him two lakhs of rupees, he would speedily recover Gho-

rian. The money was advanced; and of course Ghorian was not recovered. It was believed by the Mission that, whilst pretending to make his preparations for the expedition, the Wuzeer was sending messages to the Persian commandant at Ghorian, telling him not to be under any apprehensions, for that although the British desired him to recover the place, he had no intention of making the attempt.

popularity for the Shah, at the expense of faith and justice. *Liberavi animam meam.* All I can say is, that if affairs are allowed to remain on their present footing, I would rather that an abler man than myself were appointed to administer the affairs of the country.*

Ten days afterwards he wrote to the Governor-General:

This, if the means are available, appears to me the time for accomplishing the great work which your Lordship has commenced, and of effectually frustrating the designs of Russia. Herat should now be taken possession of in the name of Shah Soojah. To leave it in the hands of its present possessors, after the fresh proofs of treachery and enmity towards us which they have displayed, would, in my humble opinion, be most dangerous. Herat may be said to be the pivot of all operations affecting the safety of our possessions and our interests in the East, and thence Balkh and Bokhara would be at all times accessible. The Sikhs should no longer be suffered to throw unreasonable obstacles in the way of our just and necessary objects, and if they really feel (as they are bound by treaty to do) an interest in the success of our operations, they should not object to the passage of our troops, or even to their location in the Punjaub, should such a measure be deemed conducive to the welfare of us both. Your Lordship will, I feel assured, forgive the freedom of these remarks. I am convinced that one grand effort will place the safety of our interests on a firm and solid basis. . . . I shall only add, that should offensive operations against Herat be undertaken, I should not entertain the smallest doubt of their complete and speedy success, especially as we should have many friends in the country.†

And again, on the same day, writing to Major Todd at Herat, he said:

You are quite right in keeping on good terms with Yar Mahomed Khan; but this double-distilled treachery will, I think, prove rather too strong for the stomach of our government. If means exist, I cannot entertain doubt of our sending a force

MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

† *Ibid.*

to take Herat in the name of Shah Soojah, *quam celerrimè*. . . . From that vantage ground we might proceed to occupy Balkh, or even to attack Bokhara at any time, but I would not declare war against the Ameer just now.* Shah Soojah is about to send two Sahibzadahs to Bokhara with a view to effect the release of Colonel Stoddart. I have promised each of them ten thousand rupees if they succeed. The chief anxiety I have in the event of operations against Herat is, as to how you and your party are to get away. I should say, that when government resolve on sending a force, your plan would be to send Sheer Mohummud on his proposed embassy to India, with Sanders and North as escorts to Candahar. But a better scheme will probably occur to yourself.†

And again, with that activity of penmanship which was so conspicuous at this time, he wrote on the same day to Sir James Carnac, the Governor of Bombay. It should be premised that Shakespear had by this time followed Abbott across to the Oxus to the capital of the Khivan territories, and was busied in negotiations for the release of the Russian prisoners:

I presume you will have heard from Major Todd of all that has occurred in the direction of Khiva. Captain Abbott had been attacked and wounded by banditti—(he lost a finger of his right hand, but wrote a letter with his left)—but he had reached Dasht-Kullah, and, it was rumoured, had thence sailed for Russia. Shakespear had been well received by the Khan of Khiva; and he was about to attempt a mediation with the Russian authorities. This will, doubtless, fail; and now is our time to enter the field. If we do not avail ourselves of the opportunity now offered to get possession of Herat, I apprehend that what we have done will prove worse than useless. If the Governor-General should insist upon sincere co-operation from the ruler of the Punjaub, it is, I think, not impossible that the Sikhs will throw off the mask, in which case our communications with the Punjaub will for a short time be interrupted; and, under such circumstances, it might be

* As Todd recommended, to forestal any declaration by Russia of a treaty there. † MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

advisable that, in addition to any troops you can spare, you should supply us with fifteen or twenty lakhs of rupees each, in addition to the sum required for the Bombay troops. We have now a beautiful game on our hands, if we have the means and inclination to play it properly. Our advance upon Herat would go far to induce the Russian Government to attend to any reasonable overtures on the part of the Khan of Khiva.*

And so still was Macnaghten's cry ever for more money and more bayonets, that he might play the "beautiful game" of knocking down and setting up kingdoms and principalities, with which it became us not to interfere, to the waste of the resources, and the sacrifice of the interests of those which Providence had especially committed to our care.

In the mean while, in the dominions of Shah Soojah, everything was going wrong. Macnaghten still professed his belief in the popularity of the King, and was unwilling to acknowledge that the people were not in a state of repose. But every now and then, both in Afghanistan itself, and in the country that had been wrested from Mehrab Khan, awkward evidences of the unsettled state of the country rose up to proclaim far and wide the fact that there was little loyalty in men's minds towards the Shah, and little affection for ourselves. The Ghilzyes, whom in the preceding autumn Captain Outram had attacked, and, it was said, reduced, were now again rebelling in Western Afghanistan. The chiefs had fled to Peshawur, had been harboured there during the winter, and now, on the return of the spring, had been slipped from their retreat, strengthened, it

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.* I have taken this and the two preceding extracts from copies in Arthur Conolly's handwriting. Conolly himself writes: "We are on the eve of stirring times; but if we play the great game that is

before us, the results will be incalculably beneficial to us, and to the tribes whose destinies we may change from turmoil, violence, ignorance, and poverty, to peace, enlightenment, and varied happiness."

was believed, by Sikh gold. At all events, in the month of April they were actively employed raising the tribes and cutting off our communications between Candahar and Caubul. General Nott had by this time assumed the command of the troops at the former place—a place with which his name has since become imperishably associated. Under-rating the strength of the “rebels,” as all were called at this time who did not appreciate the new order of things which the British had established in Afghanistan, he sent out a party of 200 horsemen, under Captains Walker and Tayler, to clear the road. But the detachment was not strong enough for the purpose. It was necessary to reinforce them. Nott had some good officers about him, but he had not one better than Captain William Anderson, of the Bengal Artillery, commandant of the Shah's Horse Artillery at Candahar. So, on the 6th of May, the General sent for Anderson, and asked him whether he could prepare himself to march on the following morning, with a regiment of foot, four guns, and 300 horsemen. Anderson answered promptly that the artillery were always ready, and that he would do his best. By seven o'clock on the following morning the detachment was under arms and ready for the march. On the 14th they came up with Tayler and Walker, in the neighbourhood of the Turnuk river. The Ghilzyes were about eight miles distant, variously reported at from 600 to 3000 men. Anderson's cattle were exhausted; so he halted, and, to gain time, opened negotiations with the enemy. The answer sent back by the chiefs was a gallant one. They said, that they had 12,000 men—a firm faith in God and in the justice of their cause—and that they would fight. So Anderson prepared to attack them. Detaching his cavalry to the right and left, he moved down, on the 16th, with his infantry and his

guns, and, after a march of some five miles, found the enemy about 2000 strong, occupying some hills in his front. The action was a gallant one on both sides. Twice the enemy charged. The first charge was repulsed by a heavy fire from Turner's guns—the second was met at the point of the bayonet by Spence's infantry. Anderson, after the first march from Candahar, beguiled by some accounts of the retirement of the enemy, had sent back the greater part of the cavalry with which he had started; so that he was weak in that arm. But for this, he would have cut up the enemy with heavy slaughter. As it was, the victory was complete. The enemy fled and betook themselves to their mountain fastnesses, whilst Anderson re-formed column and marched on to take up a good position above Olan Robat. The country around was quieted for a time by this victory; but disaffection was not rooted out. Indeed, every action of this kind only increased the bitter animosity of the Ghilzyes, and established unappeasable blood-feuds between our people and the tribes.

But the money-bag was now brought in to complete what the bayonet had commenced. It was expedient to conciliate the Ghilzyes, who had at any time the power of cutting off our communications between Candahar and Caubul; and Macnaghten, therefore, recommended the payment of an annual stipend to the chiefs,* on condition that they would restrain their followers from infesting the highways. But neither the bayonet nor the money-bag could keep these turbulent tribes in a continued state of repose.†

* 30,000 rupees (or 3000*l.*) per annum.

† In connexion with the Ghilzye affairs at this time, comes in the unpleasant story of the surrender of

Wulloo Khan. I believe that the following account of the transaction, which appeared in a Calcutta journal, is substantially correct: "Wulloo Khan, after his beating, wished

At the same time, the state of the southern provinces was such as to excite painful disquietude in Macnaghten's mind. The tract of country which, after the capture of Khelat, had been annexed, by the fiat of the Indian Government, to the territory of Shah Soojah, was perpetually breaking out into fierce spasms of unrest. It had been almost entirely denuded of British troops; and small detachments were sent here and there, or solitary political agents sate themselves down, with only a handful of fighting men at command, as though all their paths were pleasantness and peace, and all their homes bowers of repose. But the Beloochees neither liked their new chief nor his European supporters. The blood of Mehrab Khan was continually crying out against the usurpation. Ever and anon opportunity offered, and it was not neglected. One officer,* on his way from the fort of Kahun with a convoy of camels, was overwhelmed and destroyed by the Beloochees. Kahun was invested by the Murrees. Quettah was besieged by the Khaukurs.† It was soon apparent that the whole country

to make terms. Anderson allowed him to go into Candahar to do so. He was successful, and received a dress of honour from Major Leech, and one from the Shah-zadah ruling Candahar. He declared he had been instigated to resistance by men in Candahar, and that he would show their letters. He returned to Anderson, and then to his home; when hearing that Lieutenant Nicolson and Shah-zadah Timour were near, relying on the pledged words of our political agent, Major Leech, and the Shah-zadah Futteh Jung, Wulloo Khan went to make his obedience, and was immediately seized and made prisoner. His letters and dress of honour, together with a strong protest against such proceedings from Anderson, may have saved his head,

but he is sent prisoner to Caubul." The writer adds, that "three of the prisoners made over to Lieutenant Nicolson and the Shah-zadah Timour had their heads struck off;" but I have before me a specific declaration, made by the Envoy in a letter to Lord Auckland, dated November 24, 1840, that "not a single political execution has taken place since his Majesty's accession to power."

* Lieutenant Walpole Clerk—a young officer of conspicuous gallantry and zeal.

† The defence of the former place by Captain Lewis Brown, and of the latter by Captain Bean, are among the most noticeable incidents of the war, and deserve more extended notice than I can give them in this

was in revolt. The youthful son of Mehrab Khan was in the field. The tribes were flocking around him. The chief who had been set up in his place was at Khelat. Lieutenant Loveday was with him. The defences of the place were miserably out of repair. The garrison mainly consisted of the chief's own people. There were scarcely any means of resistance at their command, when the wild tribes, headed by the family of Nussur Khan, came crowding around the walls of Khelat. The new chief was staunch and true. But there were traitors and evil counsellors in the fort, and Loveday listened to bad advice. No succours could be sent to his relief, for our other positions in Upper Sindh were threatened by the hostile tribes. And so it happened that, after some days of beleaguerment, Khelat fell to the Brahoo chiefs.* Newaz Khan abdicated in favour of the youthful son of the chief who had fallen in the defence of his stronghold; Loveday was made a prisoner; and when, some

place. I am compelled to leave it to others to chronicle more minutely the progress of events in Upper Sindh.

* Commenting on the neglect of all ordinary precautions, by which the insurrection had been suffered to make so much head in Upper Sindh, Burnes, on the 7th of August, wrote to Macnaghten: "In April, 1839, when called upon by you to state officially what should be done to chastise the treachery of the chief of Khelat, I recommended, in common with yourself and Lord Keane, his deposition; but I as plainly stated in my letter of the 10th of that month, 'that while our troops continued at Shawl, this may be an unnecessary arrangement (to raise national troops), but both at Moostung and Culchee very energetic measures will be required to these countries; and happily their resources are such, that this will amply repay the labour and expense.' Was this vigour displayed by his Majesty's Government on the spot,

or by our own authorities? One of his Majesty's governors has joined the insurgents, and the political agent was taken by surprise on an occasion which the slightest foresight might have anticipated. What right have we to expect that any chief placed in power shall flourish by us, unless his government is better than that which we have overthrown? Did Shah Newaz muster or even organise his troops? Did he point out the necessity for payment, or the means of making them superior to his adversaries? We advanced him a lakh of rupees, and allowed him to continue most at Caubul, while we withdrew all our troops. Khelat is the capital of Beloochistan—a poor but vast country, stretching from the mountains in sight of the Indus to the confines of Persia. Through this wide tract our discomfiture affects our reputation; the only solace in it will be found in our chief, not our troops being vanquished."—[*Papers privately printed.*]

months afterwards, a detachment of British troops advanced to the relief of Dadur, which had been attacked by the enemy, the unfortunate young officer was found in the deserted camp of the Brahoos, chained to a camel-pannier, half naked, emaciated, and dead. His throat had just been cut by the sabre of a Beloochee horseman.*

But in spite of all these indications of unrest—these signs of the desperate unpopularity of the restored monarchy—Macnaghten clung to the belief that the country was settling down under the rule of Shah Soojah, and never ceased to represent to Lord Auckland and his secretaries that there were no grounds for uneasiness or alarm. He was, indeed, most anxious to remove any impressions of an opposite character which may have forced themselves upon the minds of the Governor-General and his advisers. On the 8th of July, he wrote to Mr. Colvin:

. You tell me that my letter has left a very painful impression upon you, as manifesting my sense of the weakness of the royal cause. I fear I must have written my mind to very little purpose regarding the state of this country. You rightly conjecture that the Barukzyes have most "inflammable material to work upon." Of all moral qualities, avarice, credulity, and bigotry, are the most inflammable, and the Afghans have all these three in perfection. They will take Sikh gold, they will believe that Shah Soojah is nobody, and they will esteem it a merit to fight against us. When, in addition to these inducements, there has been positively no government in the country for the last thirty years, it will cease to be wondered at that commotion can easily be raised by intriguers possessing a long contiguity of frontier, and having, besides, all the means and appliances to ensure success. Though our presence here, doubtless, strengthens Shah Soojah, it must be remembered that in some sense it

* This, however, was not until the had then been for some months in beginning of November. Loveday captivity.

weakens him. There is no denying that he has been supported by infidels; and were we not here, he would adopt Afghan means of suppressing disturbances, such as we could not be a party to. To break faith with a rebel is not deemed a sin by the most moral Afghan; and assassination was an every-day occurrence. By the encouragement of blood-feuds, it is notorious that Dost Mahomed propped up the little power he had beyond the gates of Caubul.*

It vexed Macnaghten's spirit to think that he could not communicate to other British officers in Afghanistan his own overflowing faith in the popularity of the Shah, or his own respect for the royal person. From the very outset of the campaign the popular feeling throughout the army had been strong against Shah Soojah, and the conduct of his Majesty himself had not tended to lessen it.† And the worst of it was, that all kinds of stories about the haughty exclusiveness of the Shah, and the estimation in which he was held both by the British officers and by his own subjects, were perpetually making their way to Government House, and there

* *Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

† About this time Macnaghten had been much vexed by the conduct of General Nott, who, from first to last, treated the Royal Family of Caubul with the supremest contempt. Nothing could induce him to behave towards any one of them with ordinary respect. At last Macnaghten was compelled to lay his complaints before the Supreme Government. "It was with much regret," he wrote to Lord Auckland, "that I felt compelled to refer to government a difference of opinion between myself and Sir Willoughby, but if such an outrage as that committed by General Nott is to be tolerated and justified, there must be an end of our efforts to make it be believed that Shah Soojah is king of this country. I know how embarrassing these references are, and I should have been

happy to have saved government the trouble of passing orders on the question, had Sir Willoughby so far supported me as to have conveyed a censure to General Nott for the deliberate and gratuitous violence which he had committed. The *animus* by which he has been actuated is apparent throughout—he refused to pay the Prince the common compliment of calling upon him, although told that such a civility was expected. There is, I regret to say, a feeling too prevalent amongst the officers of the force against his Majesty, who is considered the sole cause of their detention here—and I hope that though they may not be compelled to treat the Royal Family with becoming respect, yet that they will not be permitted to offer them a direct insult with impunity."

finding ready acceptance. It irritated Macnaghten to receive letters from Colvin, commenting on failure, and hinting at mismanagement in Afghanistan. At last his patience gave way, and on the 4th of August he wrote to the Private Secretary:

It is painful to me that government pay any attention to the stories of persons who are afflicted with the "imposthume of too much leisure," and who are daily fabricating the grossest falsehoods against his Majesty and the authorities, who are supposed to be the cause of their detention in a land "not overflowing with beer and cheroots." The Shah is conciliating in the extreme to all his chiefs. He is too much so, in fact. He listens with the greatest patience to all their requests and representations, however unreasonable, and he cannot bear to give any of them a direct refusal on any occasion. You have been told that he is a ruler who seeks to get on "without trusting, rewarding, or punishing" any of his own people. It is nonsense upon the face of it, and is contradicted by every hour's experience. I have nothing more to say about his Majesty's character than I have already said. I believe him to be the best and ablest man in his kingdom. The history of the revenues of this poor country may be given in a few words. The whole is consumed in the pay of the priesthood, the soldiery, and the support of his Majesty's household. You shall have the particulars of these as soon as I can get half an hour's leisure. You know we are solemnly bound to refrain from interference in the internal administration; and, in my advice, I have been cautious to urge no innovations which could, at this early stage of our connexion with them, shock the prejudices of the people.

Burnes has had no special duties under me. He has cheerfully done everything that I have asked him to do, and has been of much assistance to me. I have stated, fully and officially, all the particulars regarding Nicolson and Wulloo Khan. I know that the case has been made the subject of much malicious misrepresentation.

And now, my dear Colvin, you must allow me to disburden my mind to you. I have perceived, or fancied I perceived, on several occasions lately, a want of confidence in my proceedings,

and a disposition to listen to every unfavorable report regarding affairs in this quarter; whilst I do not receive that support to which the overwhelming difficulties of my position entitle me. In deciding upon a controversy thrust upon me by Brigadier Roberts, the government convey to me an implied censure for not supporting his military position, though the justice of my views is admitted; and take that occasion of conveying a compliment to Brigadier Roberts, though he had written to me a most disrespectful letter. If no important operations should be contemplated for next year in this quarter, for the conduct of which it may be thought desirable that I should remain, some of the public money will be saved by the appointment of a less paid though equally qualified agent. I never yet have served in an office where I had not the confidence of my superiors, and my inclination to do so is by no means strengthened after a laborious public life of thirty-one years.*

But above all these petty cares and distractions rose the one dominant thought in Macnaghten's mind of the great and beautiful game that was to be played by the annexation of Herat and the coercion of the Sikhs; and still he continued to write to Lord Auckland that there was nothing else to be done. One letter of many will

* *Unpublished Correspondence.* In another letter to the same correspondent, he writes: "You observe, after the first expression of disorder, a conciliating policy is the only one that can be successful, or that we can countenance. Who is to judge as to whether the disorder is repressed or not; we here, or you at the Presidency? And why should you pre-judge us and suppose us guilty of wanton cruelty at the suggestion of a malevolent and interested faction? This treatment is anything but fair, and you will find that it is not the way to secure zealous and honest service." On the 20th of August, writing to another correspondent, he thus spoke of his contemplated resignation: "I am much obliged to you for the kind hint contained in your last. I should

never for a moment think of resigning my post from any difference of opinion between myself and my superiors as to the measures which should be adopted for the security of our interests in this quarter, but when a want of confidence is shown in myself personally, I would rather not wait till I get a less equivocal hint to move. Of late, I find that there has been kept up a system of espionage on my proceedings, and that the most ready credence has been afforded to the malevolent tales of every idle fellow about camp, to say nothing of newspaper fabrications, which are taken for gospel. I cannot well help myself as to my correspondents, for Colvin evidently writes to me with the sanction of the Governor-General."

suffice to show how this leading idea still overbore everything in his mind :

TO LORD AUCKLAND.

Caulbul, August 12th, 1840.

MY LORD,

We are now arrived at a crisis which calls for the most serious consideration. If such a course should suit the convenience of government, I should say that a vigorous policy now is that which ought to be pursued. It is, indeed, in my opinion, by such a course alone that our interests can be secured, and your Lordship's past policy justified. By annexing Herat to the crown of Caulbul, and by insisting upon the concession of our rights from the ruler of the Punjaub, your Lordship will at once provide for the consolidation of Shah Soojah's power, and show to the world that the attainment of all the advantages contemplated from the movement across the Indus, has been hitherto opposed only by the perfidious intrigues of the two powers professing to be our friends and allies. In addition to the demands already made upon the Sikhs, they should be required, I think, to admit unequivocally our right of way across the Punjaub, and in the event of their denying this right, they should be convinced that we can take it. I confess myself utterly ignorant of what political objections may exist to this course of proceeding, or of the military means that may be available; and I am much staggered at a paper which I have just seen from Captain Sanders, who talks of its being expedient to take 12,000 men against Herat. I believe, however, that military authorities seldom underrate the difficulties to be encountered. This paper will, I believe, be sent to your Lordship by Sir W. Cotton. I have a proposition from Captain Bean to recognise the right of Mehrab Khan's son to the musnud of Khelat. This I think might be done, if he would come and pay homage in person to Shah Soojah, as Shah Narwaz can never be reinstated. But I shall tell Captain Bean to keep the question open if possible, until I know your Lordship's views regarding Herat. If it be intended to send a large force into the country with a view of reducing Herat, the Khelat affair will afford an excellent screen to our intentions. I must beg your Lordship most earnestly, if possible, to relieve the two European and five Native regiments now

in this neighbourhood. They are inefficient and worn out, and both officers and men are grumbling and discontented. In the present state of affairs it would be very hazardous to admit of their return, unless their places were filled by fresh troops, and a relief would enable us to settle with promptitude the Bajor affairs, and to place our relations with the Khyburees on a firmer basis. Then, should Dost Mahomed come in, he will have to be sent to India, and in the present state of Sikh feeling, I doubt if it would be prudent to send him across the Punjaub with only a regiment for his escort. We have a rumour very generally credited that Colonel Stoddart has been poisoned by the Ameer of Bokhara, but I yet hope that it will prove incorrect. On the Ghilzye affairs alluded to in your Lordship's letter of the 16th, I have this day written to Mr. Colvin. In a day or two it is my intention to send up officially, with my comments, a paper handed to me by Sir A. Burnes, on the present state and future prospects of this country. I hope to show that, all things considered, we are in as prosperous a condition as could have been expected. Sir A. of course wishes to prove the contrary, since by doing so, when he succeeds me, his failures would thus find excuse and his success additional credit. This is all natural enough. I have been exposed to a thousand interruptions whilst writing this, and beg pardon if I have used too much freedom.

I remain, &c.,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.*

In a letter despatched a few days afterwards to Lord Auckland, Macnaghten wrote: "I trust the Russians may not come to Khiva this year, for we have quite enough on our hands without them. Captain Conolly starts in a few days. I trust your Lordship will have the goodness to direct that both he and Captain Abbott be gazetted as lieutenant-colonels whilst serving in Toorkistan." There had gone forth a Mission—and an ill-omened one, to Bokhara—there had gone forth two Missions to Khiva—and now one was to be despatched to the intervening state of Kokund.

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

Eagerly did Arthur Conolly grasp the idea of this Kokund Mission. He was a man of an earnest, impulsive nature, running over with the purest feelings of benevolence, and glowing with the most intense longings after the civilisation and evangelisation of the human race. He believed that the great Central-Asian movement was designed by Providence to break down the huge walls of Mahomedanism which begirt the shining East, and to substitute civilisation, liberty, and peace, for barbarism, slavery, and strife. He was a visionary; but one of the noblest order; and when he looked out beyond the great barrier of the Hindoo-Koosh, traversed in imagination the desert of Merve, and visited the barbarous Courts of the Khans of Khiva, Kokund, and Bokhara, he never doubted for a moment that the mission which he was about to undertake was one of the highest and holiest with which a Christian officer could be entrusted.*

Ever delighting in adventure, and prone to romance, he was at this time in a frame of mind which rendered him peculiarly greedy of excitement. A great sorrow was weighing heavily upon his heart. He sought relief in stirring occupation—in active adventure upon new scenes of enterprise; and when, for a time, it seemed that the unwillingness of the Supreme Government to

* "I feel very confident," he wrote to a friend, "about all our policy in Central Asia, for I think that the designs of our government there are honest, and that they will work with a blessing from God, who seems now to be breaking up all the barriers of the long-closed East, for the introduction of Christian knowledge and peace. It is deeply interesting to watch the effects that are being produced by the exertions of the European powers, some selfish and con-

trary, others still selfish, but qualified with peace and generosity, all made instrumental to good. See the French in Africa, the English, Austrians, and Russians on the Bosphorus, forcing the Turks to be European under a shadow of Mahomedanism; and providing for the peaceful settlement of the fairest and most sacred countries in the world."—[*MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly: Caubul, May 16, 1840.*]

sanction the Mission was not to be overcome, he gave vent to the liveliest feelings of disappointment.* Major Rawlinson and Captain Conolly were to have proceeded together to the camp of General Peroffski. But the Muscovite expedition to Khiva was brought by cold and want to a mournful end at Ak-boulak, and there was soon no Russian camp in Central Asia to which these enterprising officers could be despatched. But Conolly, believing in his inmost heart that there was a much grander game to be played in those remote regions than one suggested by the mere accidental circumstance of the Russian advance, still clung to his conviction of the policy of the contemplated Mission, and earnestly enforced his opinions upon his political chief. Macnaghten listened—yielded—and indulging rather the wishes of his friend than conforming to the dictates of his own judgment, recommended the enterprise to the favorable consideration of the Supreme Government; and acting upon certain passages in a letter from the Chief Secretary, which might be construed into an implied permission, of a general rather than a specific character, ordered Conolly to proceed to Khiva and Kokund.†

* “You will have seen Sir William’s flying seal despatch about our mission to the Russian camp, and on to Kokund, if permitted. I was greatly disappointed when Lord Auckland’s prohibitory letter arrived, for I had set my heart upon this nobly-stirring employment; and when the chance of it seemed removed, I felt the blank that a man must feel who has a heavy grief as the first thing to fall back upon.”—[*MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly: Caubul, May 30, 1840.*]

† The grounds upon which Macnaghten proceeded in this matter, as well as the recognised objects of the Mission, may be gathered from

the following passages of a letter to the Supreme Government: “Referring, therefore, to the general permission accorded in the Secretary’s letter of the 11th of May last, on the point of Captain Conolly’s mission to Kokund, I have come to the determination of at once sending off that officer to the Court in question by the route of Khiva, and in company with Yakoob Bai, the Khan Huzzrut’s envoy here, who is anxious to return home. Yakoob Bai will be a good escort for Captain Conolly through the whole of the desert country extending from the Hindoo-Koosh to Khiva, and thence, as shown by the memorandum of the envoy’s conversation

It was with feelings of irrepressible delight, that now, at the beginning of August,* Arthur Conolly found himself "fairly going" on his enterprising journey to the Courts of the Trans-Oxian Khans.† His heart was in

with me on the 13th of June last, his way will be safe and easy on to Kokund, the ruler of which place can be directly advised of his approach. His Lordship in Council has himself been pleased to express his sense of Captain Conolly's qualifications for the duty proposed to be entrusted to him, and I venture to hope that this Mission will give great support to our position in Afghanistan, besides being the means of obtaining other important advantages. I have so repeatedly had the honour of laying before the Right Honourable the Governor-General my opinions as to the affairs of Toorkistan, that I need not repeat them. I will do myself the honour of forwarding on another occasion my specific instructions to Captain Conolly for his journey, which will have for its chief object the establishment of a correct impression, at every place which he visits, of British policy and strength, as it bears upon Asia and on Europe, with reference especially to the late interference in Afghanistan—the strengthening of amicable relations with the chief Oosbeg powers, which have shown a friendly disposition towards us, and endeavouring to persuade them to help themselves, and enable us to help them, by doing present justice to their enemies, and forming an agreement with each other to prevent or to redress future injury done by any one party among them to Russia, so as to deprive the latter power of pretext for interference with their independence. Captain Conolly will either at Khiva or Kokund learn the result of the endeavour committed to the two deputies of Shah Soojah, mentioned in my letter of yesterday, to bring the Ameer of Bokhara to reason. If

by this influence, or by other means, the Ameer should promptly exhibit a decided disposition to atone for his past, and to be friends with us and the Afghan King, Captain Conolly can return to Afghanistan *via* Bokhara, otherwise his course must be regulated by circumstances."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Government: Caubul, August 2, 1842. MS. Correspondence.*] I have taken this from a copy in Arthur Conolly's handwriting.

* The Shah, it has been shown, at Macnaghten's request, had despatched two holy men to Bokhara, to endeavour to obtain Stoddart's liberation. "At last," wrote Conolly, "we have got the letter for the Ameer of Bokhara, through the Shah's Duffer, and the two Sahib-zadahs propose starting with it to-morrow, which their calendar shows to be a remarkably fortunate day. May their errand be successful! Poor Stoddart's health was drunk last night at the Ghuznee anniversary dinner, among absent English friends, after a briefly eloquent speech by Sir Alexander, who concluded by expressing a hope that, if the last of Sir W. Macnaghten's amicable endeavours to bring the Ameer to reason should fail, our gallant and unfortunate countrymen would be released by Baron Bokhara."—[*MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly: Caubul, July 24, 1840.*]

† *Caubul, August 4, 1840.*—"Hip, hip, hurrah! *Uz ikhbal-i-jenāb.* I do believe that I am fairly going now, so accept my best thanks for your congratulations. I receive them with a pang of real regret that you are not going with me; but Todd bids me be comforted with the thoughts of your realised important elevation; so I'll utter no vain sorrow. Nothing can

the cause. He was full of impetuous enthusiasm. He was eager that the British Government should play "the grand game" in Central Asia, and declared that a mission so righteous in its objects must prosper in his hands. His spirits rose, as he looked into the future; and, full of generous enthusiasm, he began to make preparations for his journey.* An ambassador from Shah Soojah was to accompany him. But it was long before the King could select from the people about his Court one to whom he could entrust so responsible a duty. At last, after much hesitation, his choice fell upon Allahdad Khan, Populzye—a little, scrubby-looking, sallow-faced man, with a busy look and a restless eye, believed to be skilful in political intrigue, and as little likely to betray his trust as any man about the Court. He left his family and his money behind him, and these, as the Shah significantly said, were the best guarantees for his good conduct.

be done a-head, unless Afghanistan is settled; and I have confident hope of your being highly instrumental to this desirable end."²—[*MS. Correspondence of Arthur Conolly.*]

* "*Caulbul, August 22.*—We are just on the wing; and I shall make the best of my way to the two capitals for which I carry credentials. Shakespear has really done wonders; and if we can follow up the good impressions which he and Abbott have made, and the British Government will give pecuniary aid, we may keep the Oroos (Russians) out of Toorkistan altogether; and bring about a fine order of things there for every party concerned. It is a work which must prosper; and I only wish again that you were to be of the party to accomplish it; but, as I said before, you occupy a high and useful station, and can't be at two places at once.

If the British Government would only play the grand game;—help Russia cordially to all that she has a right to expect—shake hands with Persia—get her all possible amends from the Oosbeks, and secure her such a frontier as would both keep these man-stealers and savages in wholesome check, and take away her pretext for pushing herself and letting herself be pushed on to the Oxus—force the Bokhara Ameer to be just to us, the Afghans, and the other Oosbek states, and his own kingdom—but why go on; you know my, at any rate in one sense, *enlarged* views. *Inshallah!* The expediency—nay, the necessity of them will be seen, and we shall play the noble part that the first Christian nation of the world ought to fill."³—[*Captain Conolly to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence.*]

Everything now was ready. Conolly, early in September, turned his face towards the Hindoo-Koosh. There was a Mission of another kind then setting towards those dreary regions. It was not a Mission of Peace. Colonel Dennie, who had distinguished himself at the head of the Ghuznee stormers, was about to march, with the 35th Sepoy Regiment, to reinforce the Bameean detachment, and to take the command of all the troops on the northern frontier.*

* In one of Macnaghten's letters, at page 534, there is an allusion to a controversy forced upon him by Brigadier Roberts. The Brigadier was in chief command of Shah Soojah's regular force. He complained that his position was not respected by the Envoy, and his authority reduced to a mere sham. In consequence of this representation, government addressed Macnaghten on the subject, in the following words :

"His Lordship in Council has a strong desire, in which he looks for your concurrence, to uphold the military position of Brigadier Roberts. whenever the regular troops shall be Withdrawn from Afghanistan, he will be your first military authority ; and every British officer employed in that country, should be led to look to him. His Lordship can only express his approbation of the care which is exhibited by the Brigadier for the force committed to his charge, and

he will be glad when circumstances will permit him to carry into effect his views for its discipline and comfort."

Fortified by this, the Brigadier pressed his opinions and his advice on the Envoy, in a manner which the latter resented. There was another controversy. The Brigadier wrote both to the Envoy and to the Governor-General. He insisted that the people of the country were hostile to us ; and that it was madness to post small detachments of troops in isolated fortresses. Macnaghten paid little attention to his representations, and never heeded his advice.—[*Brigadier Roberts to Lord Auckland, September 30th, 1840 ; and to Sir W. H. Macnaghten, same date. MS. Records.*]

The Brigadier was right ; but the collision cost him his appointment. Plain truths were not very palatable in those days.

CHAPTER II.

[June—November: 1840.]

The last Struggles of Dost Mahomed—The British in the Hindoo-Koosh—The Ameer's Family—Occupation of Bajgah—Disaster of Kamurd—Escape of Dost Mahomed—Feverish State of Caubul—Dennie's Brigade—Defeat of the Ameer—Sale in the Kohistan—The Battle of Purwandurrah—Surrender of Dost Mahomed.

It is time that to these regions of the Hindoo-Koosh attention should now again be directed. The little force which had been despatched thither in the autumn of 1839, and had wintered among the caves of Bameean, was, by the coming in of spring, released from its inactivity. It was not Lord's policy to be quiet. There was Jubbar Khan with the family of Dost Mahomed at Khooloom. Already it has been seen that the reception of these people had been the subject of correspondence between Lord and Macnaghten. But Jubbar Khan halted between two opinions. The winter passed away. The spring passed away. And still he remained with his brother's family at Khooloom. The Wullee, or chief of that place, was still true to the cause of the Ameer; and he permitted the Newab to maintain this numerous party by levying the transit duties of the place.

This was a state of things which, in Lord's and Macnaghten's opinions, had already lasted long enough. They were eager to bring the Newab to a decision. So, at the end of May, or the beginning of June, a party

was sent out under Captain Garbett, ostensibly for the purpose of reconnoitring the passes to the north of our position at Bameean. But there was, doubtless, another object in view. It was believed that such a demonstration would have the effect of quickening the movements of Jubbar Khan, who had more than once been on the point of starting for the British post, but, overcome by his irresolution, had struck his tents and returned. Already had some of the party of refugees left their asylum at Khooloom, and sought the hospitality of the British. Azim Khan, one of the Ameer's sons, had "come in;" and some of the women and children, too, had passed on towards Caubul. But the Newab himself still vacillated; and it was believed that a forward movement of our troops would stimulate him to come to a decision.

The movement had the desired effect. At all events, Jubbar Khan set out for Bameean. Nor was this the only noticeable result of the *reconnaissance*. Beyond the valley or glen of Kamurd, which stretches northward from Syghan across the great mountain-range, lay the isolated fortress of Bajgah. When our reconnoitring party came upon this place, to their surprise they found it deserted. It belonged to one Syud Mahomed, who now appeared, and declared that he had vacated it for the express purpose of making a tender of the fort to the British, as an outpost that might be of great service to them. A small party of infantry were accordingly placed in the fort, and the circumstance was immediately reported to Dr. Lord. Lord grasped at the offer; and in the strongest terms recommended both to Cotton and Macnaghten the permanent occupation of the post. His arguments prevailed; and on the 29th of June the Shah's 4th Regiment, under Captain Hay, was sent to garrison this isolated fort. On the 3rd of July, Jubbar Khan arrived at Bameean

with the remaining members of the Ameer's family, and a large party of retainers.

It soon became obvious that the occupation of Bajgah was a mistake. Sturt, the engineer, who had been sent up to survey the passes, pronounced upon its unfitness as a military post. It was plain, too, that the temper of the surrounding tribes was very different from that of the population about Bameean. At the latter place the soldiery and the peasantry were on the best possible terms. About Bajgah the people looked upon the new comers with a jealous eye. All the efforts of Captain Hay to establish a friendly intercourse between himself and the inhabitants failed. They would not bring in grain; they would not bring in forage. Soon their hostility began to evince itself in a more alarming manner. "On the extreme summits of the northern hills overlooking Bajgah, were frequently seen groups of horsemen, apparently watching the movements of the people in the deep glen below."*

Unfortunately, at this time Hay, the only officer at Bajgah, was incapacitated by sickness. So he sent to Syghan for Lieutenant Golding; and on the 2nd of August sent out a party of two companies, under Sergeant Douglas, to escort that officer to Bajgah. They performed their march without interruption, and at night bivouacked under the walls of a fort held by one Sula Beg. The chief received them with an outside show of friendliness; and then despatched a message to another chief, Baba Beg, of Ajur, saying—"See! I have the Feringhees in a *dieg* (caldron). They are ready to your hand. If you are not here by noontide to-morrow, I will yield up my fort to them."

Morning came. There was no appearance of the

* See "The British on the Hindoo-Koosh," an admirable series of papers published in more than one Indian periodical, and in *Stocqueler's Memo-*

rials of Afghanistan. In referring to these papers, I acknowledge, with pride, my obligations to a brother's pen.

party whom they had been sent to meet; so Douglas was preparing to return to Bajgah, when a heavy matchlock fire was opened on his men, from the fort and the surrounding orchards; and presently a party of Oosbeg horsemen appeared in sight, and charged down upon the little band, who met and repulsed the attack. It was a fine thing then to see the bold front which Douglas and his men showed to the enemy, at they made their way, exposed to a heavy matchlock fire, through the dense orchards and wilderness of gardens. But many fell on the retreat; and many more would have fallen, for their ammunition was well-nigh gone, when Sturt suddenly appeared with two more companies of the same sturdy Goorkha Regiment,* and rescued them from inevitable destruction. The enemy turned and fled; and Sturt and Douglas returned to Bajgah.

The evil tidings of this disaster soon reached Caubul. It was a time of deep anxiety. As this month of August advanced, the perplexities which distracted the mind of the Envoy gathered around him more closely and more tormentingly. A series of small but mortifying failures, of which this Bajgah affair was one, not without a significance of their own, kept him in a constant state of excitability, and left him neither rest of body nor serenity of mind. On the 12th of August, writing to Major Rawlinson, he said:

There has been an awkward business near Bajgah, owing to the incapacity of the officer in command of the 4th or Goorkha Regiment. He has allowed a company to lose thirty or forty men, killed and wounded. I think but little of this affair. Lord has gone off to put things to rights. Macgregor has failed also in his efforts to set matters to rights in Bajore. His invincibles have been vanquished, and he has lost a gun. All these little accidents

* He arrived at Bajgah on his way from Kooloom, and volunteered his services to Hay.

happening at once are enough to disgust one; but, *Inshallah!* the Company's Nusseeb will prove superior to them all.*

A week later, and it had become still more apparent that, even in the very neighbourhood of the capital, sedition was weaving plots for the subversion of the authority of the Shah; and that the Sikhs were intriguing from a distance for the restoration of Dost Mahomed. On the 19th of August, the Envoy wrote to the same correspondent:

We have intercepted a letter which, if genuine (as I have every reason to believe it to be), implicates many chiefs in this quarter as meditating an insurrection in favour of the Dost. It distinctly states that Nao Nahal Singh has promised pecuniary aid in furtherance of the design. I am now just going to his Majesty to consult as to what should be done.†

It was time, indeed, that the King and the Envoy should take counsel together. Dost Mahomed had escaped from Bokhara.

For a while, the fugitive Ameer had tasted the bitterness of close confinement in the city of Bokhara. Afzul Khan and Akbar Khan shared his captivity. We know how the Khan of this inhospitable place is wont to treat his Christian guests. His Mahomedan visitors, whom he at first received with an outside show of kindness, were dealt with somewhat more leniently. But the natural ferocity of the man was not to be kept down. Dost Mahomed nearly became the victim of a treacherous murder. Baffled in this attempt on the life of his prisoners, and not daring openly to slay them, he kept them for a time under strict surveillance, forbidding them even to repair to worship in the mosques. This inhospitable treatment seems to have called forth a remonstrance from the Shah of Persia, in consequence of which greater liberty was allowed to the unfortunate Princes. They made the

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† *Ibid.*

most of the relaxation, and effected their escape. Many romantic incidents are told about this flight from Bokhara. The horse on which the Ameer fled fell exhausted by the way-side. So he transferred himself to a caravan, which he chanced to overtake; and escaped detection only by dyeing his beard with ink. The Wullee of Khooloom, with unshaken fidelity, opened his arms to receive his old ally, and placed all his resources at his command.

It was not long before the Ameer again found himself at the head of a considerable force. His family, with the exception of the two sons, who had shared his captivity in Bokhara, were in the hands of the British. He knew the danger of his determined course; and, when reminded that his wives and children were in our power, sorrowfully replied, "I have no family; I have buried my wives and children." As the Oosbeg fighting men flocked to the standards of Dost Mahomed and the Wullee of Khooloom, the hopes of the former seemed to rise; and his determination to strike a vigorous blow for the recovery of his lost empire, gathered strength and consistency. To have cut up the Bameean detachment, and emerging from the Hindoo-Koosh, to have appeared on the plains below flushed with victory, raising the old war-cry in the name of the Prophet, and profiting by the unpopularity of Shah Soojah and his supporters, in that part of the country, would have been a mighty achievement—one which would have rendered easy his triumphant progress to the very walls of the capital. He determined to make the effort; and early in September advanced upon Bameean, with a force of six or eight thousand men.

The month of September brought with it no mitigation of the anxieties of the Envoy. From the country beyond the Hindoo-Koosh came exaggerated tidings of the successful progress of Dost Mahomed:

"It is reported to-day," wrote Macnaghten on the 3rd, "that all Toorkistan is in arms against the Feringhees, and the *Moof-sids* here are very hard at work. It is certain that Hybuk has fallen to the Dost, and it is probable that Codrington will have to retire on Syghan. I put the best face on matters, and a slight success which our troops had at Bajgah over a party of the enemy, furnishes me with the foundation of a good story."*

But this good story soon became a bad one. On the 30th of August the Oosbegs had attacked Bajgah; and the Goorkha regiment, aided by Rattray with a party of Afghan horse, had driven back the assailants. But it was plain that this isolated post, in the midst of a hostile population, was no longer tenable. It was expedient, therefore, to fall back upon Syghan. So Bajgah was evacuated. The Goorkhas commenced their retreat; and then it was pronounced that Syghan could not be held against a large body of hostile troops. So it was determined that they should fall back upon Bameean. They lost everything upon the retreat. We had pushed on our out-posts to these remote points, only to abandon them disactively on the first appearance of the enemy.

But there was something far worse than this. A regiment of Afghan infantry had been raised, and Captain Hopkins commanded it. It was the commencement of an attempt to establish a national army for the support of the throne. Its loyalty was now to be put to the proof, by placing it within the reach of all those sinister influences which were most likely to undermine it. The result may be readily anticipated. The atmosphere of the Hindoo-Koosh, and the contiguity of Dost Mahomed, were fatal to the fidelity of the corps. The Afghan soldiers, headed by their commandant, Saleh Mahomed,†

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† Saleh Mahomed, of whom mention will be made in a subsequent part of this narrative, told Captain

Johnson that the conduct of the European non-commissioned officers had disgusted him and his men, and moved them to desert.

deserted their colours; and a number of them joined the enemy.

On the 5th, the Envoy wrote to Lord Auckland:

We have just heard that the whole country between this and the Oxus is up in favour of Dost Mahomed Khan. Our troops have retired upon Bameean, and if the enemy attack them in that position, I should have little fear of the result; but their tactics will probably be different. The Kohistan is ready to rise, and the whole town is full of traitors and disaffected characters. Our attention will probably be distracted by risings in different directions at the same time.*

Again, on the following day, he wrote in the same strain to Major Rawlinson:

We are in a stew here—perhaps greater than the occasion warrants; but our situation is far from comfortable. It is reported that the whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of the Dost, who, with the Wullee, is certainly advancing in great strength; so much so that our troops have been obliged to fall back upon Bameean, whilst we have a formidable band of conspirators in the city, and the Kohistan is ripe for revolt. These matters of course engross my serious attention, and I have about fifty chits to answer every half hour. . . . We are wretchedly weak, having only three infantry regiments, including one of the Shah's. We have been compelled to send off the 35th to reinforce the garrison at Bameean, but still we are strong enough, I hope, in a fair field, to lick all the *Moofsids* that could be brought against us.†

Macnaghten's worst fears were confirmed. Caubul now seemed to be on the eve of an insurrection. On the 9th, the Envoy, in perturbation of mind, wrote again to Rawlinson at Candahar:

The town is in a very feverish state. Some people are shutting up their shops; others, sending their families away; and some active measures must soon be taken for stopping the panic. We have taken possession of the gate of the Balla Hissar by a guard from Craigie's regiment, and brought the mountain train inside

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† *Ibid.*

the citadel. The apparently insignificant fact of Mesdames Trevor and Marsh having come up from the Balla Hissar from the town, has created a great sensation. We are sending out a party to watch the Charekar Pass, and Sanders goes with them; so that between force and conciliation and intrigue (in which art, I am sorry to tell you, I have now taken my degree), I hope we shall be more than a match for the Dost. But I have an anxious time of it, as you may imagine.

I had a letter from Lord Auckland yesterday, and from that I gather that his Lordship's intentions are essentially pacific, both as regards Herat and the Punjaub. Oh! for a Wellesley or a Hastings at this juncture. By a most ingenious process, he has substituted the cause for the effect, or rather the effect for the cause. He says, so long as we are continually agitating the question of taking possession of Peshawur and Herat, we cannot expect honest co-operation from the powers owning those places; thus overlooking, or affecting to overlook, the fact, that but for the dishonesty of those powers the question would never have been contemplated by us. This drivelling is beneath contempt. I shall now send up the proofs I have obtained (and they are tolerably strong) of the perfidy of the Sikhs without note or comment, and leave the rest to Providence. I shall adopt the same course with regard to the intrigues of Yar Mahomed.

Day after day, the clouds gathering over Caubul grew denser and darker. On the 12th, Macnaghten wrote to the Governor-General:

Caubul, Sept. 12, 1840.

MY LORD,

I am much fatigued, having been severely worked the whole day; but I write these few lines just to apprise your Lordship that affairs in this quarter have the worst possible appearance. The whole Kohistan is reported to be ripe for revolt, though possibly in this there may be some exaggeration; and we hear of resolutions to rise in other parts of the country. But the worst news of all is that received from Dr. Lord this morning, to the effect that an entire company of Captain Hopkins's corps has gone off with its arms and accoutrements to join Dost Mahomed Khan, and it is fully expected that their example will be followed by the whole regiment. Dost Mahomed Khan is said to be advancing

with his entire force; but Dr. Lord's intelligence seems very defective. I have just had a note from Sir W. Cotton, in which he observes: "I really think the time has now arrived for you and I to tell Lord Auckland, *totidem verbis*, that circumstances have proved incontestibly that there is no Afghan army, and that unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengthened, we cannot hold the country." I have long since, and strongly and repeatedly, urged my opinion that another brigade should be sent to us. I have also pointed out that there is no such thing as an Afghan army, and I have incessantly urged my earnest opinion to the effect that our position here would be most perilous unless a stop were put to Sikh intrigues. They have now been allowed to go on till the country is thoroughly convulsed by them. Up to this moment Syud Mahomed Khan, one of the Barukzye triumvirate, is carrying into effect his iniquitous designs against his Majesty's Government. Caubul is full of Sikh emissaries, and letters were yesterday intercepted from the Sikh agent to the address, amongst others, of Nao Nehal Singh, which clearly shows the *animus* by which the Sikhs are actuated towards their allies of the Tripartite treaty. The Sikh agent acknowledged the letters were his own. He did not know they had been opened. Copies of these may, I hope, be sent down officially to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

The 18th of September was a memorable day. It was the turning-point of our fortunes in Afghanistan. On that day the anxieties of the British minister were at their height. Never was the aspect of affairs more threatening—never was there so little to cheer and encourage the perplexed political chief. The pale cast of despondency was over all his thoughts. His physical and mental energies were alike beginning to fail. "At no period of my life," he wrote on that 18th of September, "do I remember having been so much harassed in body and mind as during the past month. Nor is my uneasiness yet much lessened. The Afghans are gunpowder, and the Dost is a lighted match. Of his whereabouts we are wonderfully ignorant. I have no hope

that he will attack Bameean, and I have great fear that he will throw himself into the Kohistan, where, it is said, the whole country will rise in his favour. But I am weary of conjecture; and we must make the best preparation we can against every possible contingency. "Not the least of my vexations arises from our inability to depute Shah-zadah Timour at the present moment. But his presence in the Kohistan is indispensably necessary. He sets out this evening attended by all the chivalry of Caubul."

But upon that very 18th of September—perhaps whilst the British minister, in perturbation and despondency of mind, was tracing these very lines, and looking with painful forebodings of evil for intelligence from the Hindoo-Koosh, the detachment of troops, long shut up in those dreary mountain fastnesses, now reinforced from Caubul, were achieving a great and decisive victory over the forces of Dost Mahomed and the Wullee of Khooloom, and changing the entire aspect of affairs in those remote Caucasian regions.

On the 14th, the reinforcements under Brigadier Dennie had reached Bameean. It was currently reported that, on that day, Dost Mahomed would attack our position. Nothing, however, was seen of his army, and contradictory reports of his movements continued to pour into camp. From the stories which were circulated at Bameean, and the contents of the letters divulged by the neighbouring chiefs, it appeared that the Ameer had not yet fully determined whether to make a descent upon our detachment, or to avoid the contest. From Kamurd he wrote to one chief: "For God's sake, tell me the news! Will the Feringhees run or fight?" To the Sirdars of the Afghan corps that has just before deserted, he wrote that all Toorkistan had joined him, and that he had 40,000 men at his call. In all his letters he declared that he had taken up arms for the honour of his

religion, and called upon all true believers to flock to the holy standard of the faith.

Brigadier Dennie's first measure, upon reaching Bameean, was to disarm the apostate Afghan corps. He then began to bethink himself of marching upon Syghan to meet the advancing troops of the Ameer. But the enemy were then nearer than he anticipated. On the evening of the 17th, he obtained intelligence to the effect that some advanced bodies of cavalry were "entering the valley from the great defile in our front," six miles from Bameean; and on the following morning it was reported that they had attacked a friendly village which had claims to the protection of our troops. The Brigadier resolved, therefore, to expel them. It was believed that they constituted the advanced guard of the Ameer's army under his son Afzul Khan. On the morning of the 18th, a detachment was ordered out to drive the enemy from the valley. Soon after eight o'clock, two horse-artillery guns under Lieutenant Murray Mackenzie, two companies of the 35th Native Infantry, two companies of the Goorkha corps, and about 400 Afghan horse, marched out to meet the enemy. About half an hour afterwards, Dennie, with two more companies of the Native Infantry regiment, and two also of the Goorkha corps, followed in support of the advanced detachment. Instead of coming merely upon the advance of the enemy, the Brigadier found an army in his front. But, in spite of the slender force at his command, and the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, Dennie did not hesitate for a moment. His men were eager to advance; and he himself was full of confidence and courage. The enemy had got possession of a chain of forts reaching to the mouth of the defile, and were collected in bodies round the several forts, and upon the hills on either side of the valley. Mackenzie's guns began to play upon them. A little while the Oosbegs

stood the fire; but the guns were nobly served, and the shrapnel practice told with terrific effect on dense bodies of men who had nothing to give back in return. The Oosbegs fell back, and, as they retreated, the guns were pushed forward; and first from one distance, then from another, opened a destructive fire upon the wavering disconcerted enemy. The Oosbeg force was soon broken to pieces; and our cavalry were then let slip in pursuit. Following the disordered masses for some miles along the defile, they cut down large numbers of the enemy, and dispersed them in all directions. Dost Mahomed and his son are said to have owed their lives to the fleetness of their horses.

Intelligence of this victory soon reached Caubul, and was received with the liveliest emotions of joy by the British Resident. His spirits rose at once. Again he began to look at the present without alarm, and into the future without despondency. Never was a victory so much wanted as in that month of September. Writing to Major Rawlinson, on the 21st, he said :

Before I close this, I may be able to tell you of some of the consequences of this glorious success. It has enabled me, in the mean time, to breathe a little more freely. I can assure you I was beginning to be very nervous, and I entertained great apprehension that Afghanistan was about to be convulsed from one end to the other. Hardly an hour passed without bringing me some unpleasant intelligence, and the Mufsids in all quarters were becoming *Kummun basta*. The Dost had only one weapon—that was religion, and he certainly wielded it most skilfully. I think the Oosbegs will now abandon him. Lord has offered handsome terms to the Wullee, and should this fail, I am not without hope that Meer Mahomed Beg will seize the present opportunity of revenging himself on his old enemy. . . .

The attempt to detach the Wullee of Khooloom from his alliance with Dost Mahomed was crowned with complete success. Doubtless Mackenzie's guns were the great

suasive power. The battle of Bameean must have shown the Oosbeg chief the hopelessness of further resistance; and as Dennie was moving on to Syghan, it was prudent to come at once to terms. Lieutenant Rattray was sent forward to arrange a meeting between the Wullee and Dr. Lord; and on the 28th of September, on the summit of the Dundun-i-Shikun, the British political agent and the Oosbeg chief entered into engagements, by which the latter bound himself not to harbour or assist Dost Mahomed, or any member of his family. The country to the south of Syghan was yielded to Shah Soojah; that to the north of it to the Wullee; and a telescope, which he said had been promised, and which he was hurt at not having received before, was given to the latter in completion of the bargain.

"I am like a wooden spoon," said Dost Mahomed; "you may throw me hither and thither, but I shall not be hurt." Defeated on the Hindoo-Koosh, he reappeared in the Kohistan. Disaffection was rife throughout that part of the Douranee Empire. The chiefs had begun to feel the evils of the new revenue system, or rather the manner of its administration, which rendered the tax-gatherer something more than a name. Supported by British power, the executive officers of the Shah no longer stood in awe of the petty chieftains, who soon began to murmur against the change of government, and to lay all their grievances at the door of the Feringhees. Thus irritated and exasperated, they were in a temper to welcome back the Barukzye Sirdar. More than one fortress was in the hand of a recusant chief; and it was apprehended that the presence of Dost Mahomed would set the whole country in a blaze.*

* Major Pottinger, who was subsequently employed as Political Agent in this part of the country, thus describes the causes of the general disaffection:—"In the year 1839, on the

accession of Shah Soojah, he granted to the Kohistanee chiefs, who had embraced his cause and raised the insurrection (which so paralysed the movements of Dost Mahomed Khan);

In such a conjuncture it became necessary *to do something* in the Kohistan. But it was not easy to determine what. A blow was to be struck, and the chapter of accidents was to determine how and in what direction it should fall. Accordingly, in the last week of September, a force under Sir Robert Sale was ordered to take the field. Sir Alexander Burnes accompanied it,

an increase of wages, amounting to five hundred tomauns a year, which sum, however, was not payable in ready money, but by order on the land-tax of the chief himself, or on that of some turbulent district where regular payment was doubtful, and the influence of the chief necessary to secure any payment at all. The value of the sum thus given, might, therefore, in the government amount be rated at nothing. I may here mention that all the pay, as termed, of these chiefs, was of the same kind; and I am not aware of any instance in which the amount surpassed that of the land-tax payable by the chief, or, indeed, equalled it; and, in my opinion, it would have been better to have released the chiefs altogether then from the payment of that tax, for the manner of realising it was one of the greatest grievances, as our power rendered it unnecessary for the tax-gatherers to show the same consideration for these nobles which they had formerly been obliged to do. Our instructions not to interfere in these internal affairs, rendered us powerless to afford relief, though we saw discontent and disloyalty growing around us. During the year 1840 the chiefs in the different parts of the country found that the change of government was inimical to their interests and power, inasmuch that it had given them a master who was able to compel obedience, instead of one who was obliged to overlook their excesses in exchange for their support. They therefore gladly revolted to support the return of Dost Mahomed Khan. No doubt other causes largely combined to irritate them. Hatred of

foreign domination, fanaticism, the licentiousness of the troops, and especially the impunity with which women could be seduced and carried off in a country celebrated for the strictness of the late ruler on this point, and the extreme jealousy of the natives. The consequence of this revolt was the despatch of General Sale's force to the Kohistan in the autumn of that year. The force was too weak for the destruction of the rebels; and Sir A. Burnes, the Political Agent, with a force, found it necessary to temporise and treat with all who had not made themselves very remarkable in opposition; and of those who had, the most extreme step ventured upon was delivering over the possessions of the rebel to his cousin, or nearest of kin, who was of the royal party; and Sir A. Burnes (under the authority of Sir W. H. Macnaghten, afterwards sanctioned by the Governor-General in Council) promised to those persons, and the others who had remained neuter during the contest (joining us at the end), that they should enjoy the pay and advantages promised on the succession of Shah Soojah. It was also understood that no alteration would afterwards be made. These agreements were made by Prince Timour, who had plenary powers from his father, and the arrangements were finally approved of by the Shah himself; and under the feeling that the promises of the British Government would be sacredly observed, the discontented who remained untouched sate down and turned their attention to agriculture."—[*Major Pottinger's Report. MS. Records.*]

and directed its movements. At the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass was a fortified village, and a chain of detached forts, belonging to a hostile chief, who was known to be in league with the fugitive Ameer. The name of this place was Tootundurrah. On the 29th of September, Sale invested the enemy's position. The resistance was very slight. The fire of our guns and the advance of the infantry column soon compelled its evacuation, and the place was speedily in possession of the British troops. The success was complete, and would have been cheaply purchased; but one fell there, who, mourned in anguish of spirit by the Envoy, was lamented by the whole force. Edward Conolly, a lieutenant of cavalry, one of three accomplished and enterprising brothers who had followed the fortunes of their distinguished relative, Sir William Macnaghten, and obtained employment under the British Mission, had on that very morning joined Sale's force as a volunteer. He was acting as aide-de-camp to the General; when, as the column advanced, he was struck down by a shot from the enemy's position. The bullet entered his heart. "My mind was in too disturbed a state all day yesterday," wrote the Envoy on the 1st of October, "to admit of my writing to you. Poor Edward Conolly (Arthur's next brother) has been killed by a dubious hand at a petty fortress in Kohistan. Never did a nobler or a kinder spirit inhabit a human frame. Poor fellow! he was shot through the heart, and I believe he was the only individual on our side killed during the operations of the 29th, when three forts belonging to the chief rebel in the country were taken. The whole of the chiefs of the Kohistan have now taken to flight. This is a result I by no means anticipated; my wish was to punish some, and to conciliate others. As it is, I fear that Dost Mahomed Khan will now be received by them with

open arms. There never was such a set of villains. They came in here, and bound themselves to serve the Shah under the most solemn oaths conceivable, and yet they had not returned to their homes half an hour before they reopened their correspondence with Dost Mahomed. Their punishment became indispensable, for they would shortly have had Dost Mahomed amongst them; and now there is a possibility of their having imbibed so wholesome a terror of our arms, as to prevent their ever again assuming an offensive attitude.”*

Having destroyed the defences of Tootundurrah, Sale advanced on the 3rd of October to the attack of Joolgah—another fortified position held by the Kohistanee rebels. The walls of this place were too thick to be easily breached, and too high to be easily escaladed. The guns were light; the scaling ladders were short; and the enemy on the crest of the breach offered the most determined resistance. The storming party, led by Colonel Tronson, of the 13th Light Infantry, advanced to the attack with a desperate gallantry worthy of a more distinguished success. Many of the leading men were shot dead in the breach; the struggle to effect a lodgment was ineffectual; and the column was eventually withdrawn. Repulsed, but not disheartened by failure, the British troops were preparing to renew the

* Writing on the 1st of October, the Envoy thus sketched the aspect of affairs: “The result of the victory at Bameean has not been by any means such as I could have wished. Dost Mahomed will not come in, and the Wullee of Khooloom will not give him up. The latter has omitted to reply to Dr. Lord’s last overture, so I imagine we must retreat from Syghan, *re infectâ*. Two of the Dost’s sons have escaped from Ghizni, and they will no doubt endeavour, and probably with success, to raise a dis-

turbance in the Ghilzye country. In short, the aspect of affairs is by no means agreeable, and we shall have abundance of work on our hands for next season. Bajore, Khooloom, and divers other places it will be requisite to visit with our arms before the country can be called settled. Amongst a bigoted people accustomed to anarchy, it never can be difficult to scatter the seeds of rebellion.” —[*MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*]

attack, when the enemy, dreading the recommencement of hostilities, left the fort in the hands of the besiegers. The works were destroyed; and so far the movement was successful—but the failure of the assault deeply mortified the Envoy. “I have bad news to send you,” he wrote on the 4th of October; “our arms have met with a reverse at Joolgah in the Kohistan.* A storm and escalade was attempted, but it would not do. The enemy evacuated the place in the evening; but I fear that the whole of the Moofsids (rebels) have escaped. . . . Burnes represents the country as being in a very unsettled state; and I fear that it will be necessary for his Majesty to remain in Caubul this winter. I intend to write and tell Lord Auckland that he must send us reinforcements *vid* the Punjaub. The Dost was last heard of at Kanjau; but I have no doubt of his soon entering Nijrow. Would it be justifiable to set a price on this fellow’s head? We have intercepted several letters from him, from all of which it appears that he meditates fighting with us so long as the breath is in his body.”

During that month of October, to the annoyance and embarrassment of the political officers and the discomfort of the troops, Dost Mahomed was flitting about from place to place, with no intelligible plan of action to give it any shape and consistency to our countervailing movements. Various were the reports which reached the British camp—various the accounts of the nature of his movements and the number of his adherents. Many of these were of the most conflicting character;—and the best-informed officers in the British camp were beset

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.* The Envoy took a very gloomy view of this affair. In another letter, he says, “You will have heard of the disaster at Joolgah, which I think was a worse affair than that of Pushoot.”

with doubt and perplexity. On the 11th of October it was known that the Dost was in the valley of Ghorebund. "I believe that there can be little or no doubt," wrote Sir William Macnaghten to Lord Auckland, on the following day, "of Dost Mahomed's having entered Ghorebund, and of his being at this moment within forty or fifty miles distance from Caubul. It is impossible to say what may be the effect of his coming into this neighbourhood. But I apprehend very serious consequences, for both the town of Caubul and the country are ripe for revolt. Dr. Lord writes that, as soon as Dost Mahomed heard of Mr. Rattray's approach, he said he would not remain to be sold to the Feringhees, and immediately took the road to Ghorebund. I cannot ascertain how many men he has with him—some accounts say ten thousand, others, three hundred. The last is, I dare say, nearer the mark—but what I dread is, the effect of his incessant intrigues (whilst he is so near us) upon the minds of the population." Such, indeed, at this time, were the gloomy forebodings which overshadowed the minds of the political chiefs. that they predicted the necessity of concentrating the troops in the Balla Hissar of Caubul, and actually began to talk of making preparations for a siege. Guns were mounted on the citadel to overawe the town. The guards were everywhere increased. The Bameean detachment was ordered to return to the capital with all possible despatch. And Sir William Macnaghten began to talk about "submitting to the disgrace of being shut up in Caubul for a time." It was, indeed, a critical moment. It has been seen that the Envoy had begun to contemplate the expediency of setting a price on the Ameer's head. It is a proof alike of the dangers that beset our position in Afghanistan, and the disturbing effects they had wrought

upon the minds of our political ministers, that such was the exasperation produced by the apparent success of Dost Mahomed, even upon the kindly nature of the Envoy, that he talked about "showing no mercy to the man who was the author of all the evil now distracting the country." Shah Soojah had long been eager to "hang the dog;" and now, in conversation with Macnaghten, he taunted him with his mistaken leniency. "I suppose you would, even now," said the King, "if I were to catch the dog, prevent me from hanging him." "It will be time enough," said the Envoy, "to talk about that when your Majesty has caught him." The British minister was about to take his leave, when the Shah arrested him, and said: "You know I have from the first expressed to you a mean opinion of my own countrymen. If you want further proofs, look at *that* from my own brother." He then placed in the Envoy's hands an intercepted letter to the address of the Barukzye chief, Sultan Mahomed, proposing that, with his aid, and that of the Sikhs, Shah Zemaun should be placed on the throne, as Shah Soojah had made over the country to the dominion of infidels. The letter bore the seal of the old blind king himself. It was on the following day that the Envoy wrote to the Governor-General that no mercy should be shown to the Ameer; but he added, "should he be so fortunate as to secure the person of Dost Mahomed, I shall request his Majesty not to execute him till I can ascertain your Lordship's sentiments."*

In the mean while, the force under Sir Robert Sale had moved, in pursuit of the Dost, into the Nijrow country. On the 18th they were encamped near Kardurrah; and on the 20th were meditating an attack on the place.

* *Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Lord Auckland: October 31, 1840. Unpublished Correspondence.*

The Envoy, who watched their proceedings with extreme anxiety, was impatient of the seeming dilatoriness of their movements; and wrote to one of his colleagues: "Burnes and Sale, with nearly 2000 good infantry, are sitting down before a fortified position about twenty miles distant, and are afraid to attack it. The enemy made an attack upon them the night before last—killed and wounded some of our people, and got off unscathed. All this is very bad." But it was not in reality so bad as it seemed to the perplexed and anxious minister at Caubul. Whilst he was writing, preparations were in progress for an attack, on the following day. On the morning of the 21st the force was ready and eager for action. But, as the troops advanced, fresh and in good spirits, upon Kardurrah, a party of villagers met them with tidings to the effect that the enemy had abandoned their position, and that the place was without an inhabitant. If any feelings of mortification welled up on the discovery that the garrison had escaped our toils, they very quickly subsided. It was plain that the enemy had made a great mistake, and that the British force had providentially been delivered from a great danger. The position that the "rebels" had abandoned was one of uncommon strength, and had it been defended with any spirit, could only have been carried, if at all, after a large expenditure of life.

Dost Mahomed was now in the Nijrow country. His cause seemed to gather strength. Even some of Shah Soojah's soldiers deserted their British officers and flocked to the Ameer's standard. On the 27th of October he broke ground, and moved down towards the capital. On the 29th, intelligence of his movements having reached the British camp at Bhag-alum, the force marched out to intercept the enemy. The two following days were employed by the engineer officers in reconnoitring and sur-

veying the surrounding country ; and on the 1st of November the force encamped before Meer-Musjedee's fort. Here it was ascertained that they were in the neighbourhood of the enemy, and preparations were made to give battle to the Ameer and his adherents.

On the 2nd of November—a day which has obtained a melancholy celebrity in the annals of the English in Afghanistan—the British force came at last in sight of the enemy. The army of the Ameer was posted in the valley of Purwandurrah. The Nijrow hills were bristling with the armed population of a hostile country. Unprepared for the conflict, Dost Mahomed had no design on that November morning of giving battle to the Feringhees. An unexpected movement precipitated the collision. On the first appearance of the British troops the Ameer evacuated the village of Purwandurrah and the neighbouring forts ; and was moving off to a position on some elevated ground commanded by a steep hill to the rearward, when, at the suggestion of Dr. Lord, the British cavalry were moved forward to outflank the Afghan horse. What followed is one of the most exciting, as it is one of the most melancholy incidents of the Afghan war. It was a clear bright morning. The yellow foliage of autumn glittered like gold in the broad sunlight. The opposite hills were alive with the enemy. The crisp fresh air, so bracing and invigorating to the human frame, seemed to breathe confidence and courage. Dost Mahomed, who, since his defeat at Bameean, had been often heard of, but never seen, by the British troops, and who seemed to elude the grasp of the Army of Occupation like an *ignis fatuus*, was now actually within their reach. It ought to have been an hour of triumph. It was one of humiliation. The Afghans were on the hills skirting one side of the pass ; the British troops were on the opposite declivity.

Dost Mahomed saw our cavalry advancing, and from that moment cast behind him all thought of retreat. At the head of a small band of horsemen, strong, sturdy Afghans, but badly mounted, he prepared to meet his assailants. Beside him rode the bearer of the blue standard which marked his place in the battle. He pointed to it; reined in his horse; then snatching the white *lunghi* from his head, stood up in his stirrups uncovered before his followers, and called upon them, in the name of God and the Prophet, to drive the cursed Kaffirs from the country of the faithful. "Follow me," he cried aloud, "or I am a lost man." Slowly, but steadily, the Afghan horsemen advanced. The English officers, who led our cavalry to the attack, covered themselves with glory. The native troopers fled like sheep. Emboldened by the craven conduct of the British cavalry, the Afghan horsemen rode forward, driving their enemy before them, and charging right up to the position of the British, until almost within reach of our guns.* The Afghan sabres told, with cruel effect, upon our mounted men. Lieutenants Broadfoot and Crispin were cut to pieces. A treacherous shot from a neighbouring bastion brought Dr. Lord to the ground; and the dagger of the assassin completed the work of death. Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, whose gallantry has never been surpassed even in the annals of old Roman heroism, still live to show their honourable scars; and to tell, with mingled pride and humiliation, the story of that melancholy day.

In front of our columns, flaunting the national standard, the Afghans stood for some time masters of the field, and then quietly withdrew from the scene of battle. Sir Alexander Burnes, awed by this disaster,

* Some of the troopers were pursued for a considerable distance. "I learn," wrote the Envoy, on November 6, "that two squadrons of them were pursued for a mile or two by twenty Douranees."

wrote to Sir William Macnaghten that there was nothing left for the force but to fall back upon Caubul, and implored the Envoy there to concentrate all our troops. Sir William received the letter on the 3rd of November, as he was taking his evening ride in the outskirts of the city. His worst forebodings seemed to be confirmed. Little did he know what thoughts were stirring in the breast of the Ameer. Dost Mahomed, in the very hour of victory, felt that it was hopeless to contend against the power of the British Government. He had too much sagacity not to know that his success at Purwandurrah must eventually tend, by moving the British to redouble their exertions, rather to hasten than to retard the inevitable day of his final destruction. He quitted the field in no mood of exultation; with no bright visions of the future before him. He had won the last throw, but the final issue had ceased to be a matter of speculation. The hour in which, with dignity and grace, he might throw himself upon the protection of his enemies, now seemed to have arrived. He had met the British troops in the field, and, at the head of a little band of horsemen, had driven back the cavalry of the Feringhees. His last charge had been a noble one; he might now retire from the contest without a blot upon his name.

So thought the Ameer; as was his wont, taking counsel of his saddle. None knew in the British camp the direction he had taken; none guessed the character of his thoughts. On the day after the victory of Purwandurrah he was under the walls of Caubul. He had been four-and-twenty hours in the saddle; but betrayed little symptoms of fatigue. A single horseman attended him. As they approached the residence of the British Envoy, they saw an English gentleman returning from his evening ride. The attendant gal-

loped forward to satisfy himself of the identity of the rider, and being assured that the Envoy was before him, said that the Ameer was at hand. "What Ameer?" asked Macnaghten. "Dost Mahomed Khan," was the answer; and presently the Ameer himself stood before him. Throwing himself from his horse, Dost Mahomed saluted the Envoy, and said he was come to claim his protection. He surrendered his sword to the British chief; but Macnaghten returning it to him, desired the Ameer to remount. They then rode together into the Mission compound—Dost Mahomed asking many eager questions about his family as they went. A tent having been pitched for his accommodation, he wrote letters to his sons, exhorting them to follow his example and seek the protection of the British Government.

He seemed to have become reconciled to his fate. He had no wish, he said, to escape. Force, indeed, would not drive him to abandon the refuge he had voluntarily sought. With Macnaghten he conversed freely of his past history; and raised, by the recital alike of his doings and his sufferings, the strongest feelings of admiration and compassion in the Envoy's breast. Every effort was made to soothe the Ameer's feelings; and he soon became serene and cheerful. A report that it was the design of our government to banish him to London, disturbed his equanimity for a time; but he was soon reassured by the promises of the Envoy, and began to look forward with hopefulness to a life of repose and security in the British dominions.*

* "The Dost," wrote Sir W. Macnaghten, on the 6th of November, "occupies a tent in my compound; and he does not, I think, as yet, regret the step he has taken. He says, indeed, that there is no necessity for

my guarding him, as he would not go were I even to attempt his expulsion with blows of a stick. He is certainly a wonderful fellow." In a letter to another correspondent he says: "This morning I have passed a pleasant

A prisoner, but an honoured one, in the British camp, Dost Mahomed remained some ten days at Caubul, during which time all the leading officers of the garrison paid him the most marked attention. Men, who kept aloof from Shah Soojah, as one to be religiously avoided, were eager to present themselves before the unfortunate Ameer, and to show that they respected him in his fallen fortunes. He received his visitors with courtesy, and conversed with them with freedom. Seated on the ground, he desired them to be seated; and seemed to take pleasure in the society of the brave men who did him honour. Captain Nicolson, an officer of distinguished gallantry and great intelligence, whose early death on the banks of the Sutlej is to be deeply deplored, having been selected by Sir W. Macnaghten to fill the difficult and delicate office of custodian to the fallen prince, acted, on these occasions, as interpreter. It may be doubted whether a single officer quitted his presence without drawing a comparison between the

hour with the Dost. I went to see him in his tents, where he is very comfortable. He gave me the whole account of his wanderings, from the time of his flight at Urghundeh. Whatever else he may be, he is certainly a shrewd, clever fellow; and it is difficult to refrain from compassionating his fallen state. I hope he is tolerably reconciled now to his Indian destination. Mussoorie would be the best place for his location, and if you could give him a Zemundaree in the Dhoon, he might have some occupation for his restless mind." Three days afterwards, writing to Lord Auckland, the Envoy said: "I have the pleasure to announce the arrival this morning of Mahomed Afzul, the eldest son of Dost Mahomed Khan. We are doing all we can to soothe the ex-chief's feelings, and up to yesterday evening our efforts appear to have been attended with success. It

is necessary to restrict the number of his visitors, because Afghans are the most mischief-making people on the face of the earth. We could not deny him an interview with his mother; and yesterday evening, shortly after the old lady went away, Burnes went in to see him, and found him in a state of considerable affliction and excitement. It seems that some one had told him (and I have no doubt his mother, instigated by some mischievous people in the town, was his informant) that it was our intention to send him to London. I told him to make his mind at ease, for that without his consent we had no wish to send him beyond Loodhianah; and at his request I gave him a writing to this effect. He has since seemed perfectly well satisfied."—
[Unpublished Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.]

Ameer and the Shah, very much to the disadvantage of the latter. The King refused to see his prisoner, alleging that he would not be able to bring himself to show common civility to such a villain. "This is well," said the Envoy, writing to the Private Secretary of the Governor-General, "as the Dost must have suffered much humiliation in being subjected to such an ordeal." All the natural kindness of the Envoy now set in towards the fallen prince, and all the courtesies of the English gentleman were freely bestowed upon him.

On the 12th of November, 1840, Dost Mahomed Khan, under a strong escort,* commenced his journey towards the provinces of India; and two months afterwards Macnaghten wrote:

I trust that the Dost will be treated with liberality. His case has been compared to that of Shah Soojah; and I have seen it argued that he should not be treated more handsomely than his Majesty was; but surely the cases are not parallel. The Shah had no claim upon us. We had no hand in depriving him of his kingdom, whereas we ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim.†

And so Macnaghten, in a few lines of irrepressible truth and candour, denounced the injustice of the policy of which he himself had been one of the originators. It is possible, too, that Lord Auckland may have felt that Dost Mahomed "never offended us," but that we had victimised him; for he received the Prince he had deposed with becoming hospitality and respect, and burdened the revenues of India with a pension in his favour of two lakhs of rupees.

* A detachment of our troops was then returning to India. The Company's European regiment, and Captain Garbett's troop of Horse Artillery, marched from Caubul; and the 48th Native Infantry joined the escort at Jellalabad. At the same time, Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had

commanded the troops in Afghanistan, set his face towards India; and the command temporarily devolved on Sir R. Sale.

† Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Mr. Robertson: Jan. 12, 1841. *MS. Correspondence.*

CHAPTER III.

[November : 1840—September : 1841.]

Yar Mahomed and the Douranees—Season of Peace—Position of the Douranees—The Zemindawer Outbreak—Conduct of Yar Mahomed—Departure of Major Todd—Risings of the Douranees and Ghilzyes—Engagements with Aktur Khan and the Gooroo—Dispersion of the Insurgents.

THE remainder of the month of November passed away in peace and tranquillity. The Envoy began now for the first time to taste the blessings of repose, and to enjoy the advantages of leisure. But his active mind was soon again busily at work. Dost Mahomed had surrendered; but the Sikhs had not been coerced. The time for the “macadamisation” of the Punjaub seemed now to have arrived. To the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces of India, he wrote on the 24th of November:

Now that I have a little leisure to write, I have nothing to write about. These piping times of peace are unfavorable to the exercise of the epistolary art. I could, indeed, write a volume as to what I would do were I Governor-General. Never did cards play so beautifully into any man's hands. Now is the time for a subsidiary force in the Punjaub, and for the cession of the districts to the west of the Indus. We are clearly not bound any longer by the Tripartite treaty, and so I have told Lord Auckland; but I don't think his Lordship's ambition will aim at more than keeping matters on their present footing. The Dost is getting on

very well. He evidently sees that it is useless kicking against the pricks; and he wishes now to cultivate our friendship as eagerly as he before provoked our enmity. We start for Jellalabad in three or four days; and it is high time we should do so, as the weather is becoming bitterly cold here. We shall now have a little time to devote to the affairs of the country, and I trust its condition will be soon as flourishing as its poor resources will admit.*

And again, on the 9th of December, he wrote in the same cheerful strain of the tranquillity by which he was surrounded:

The surrender of the Dost has been productive of so much quiet that I have positively nothing to write about. The officers who, the other day, were grumbling audibly at being overworked, now complain that they are dying of *ennui*. By my last accounts, the Dost had reached Peshawur in safety, and his family had arrived at Jellalabad. They will start again to-day to join him. I see no reason to apprehend any obstacle in the passage of the Punjab.† The Royal Family will, I trust, be on the wing for Afghanistan before the Dost gets near Hindostan, in order that the apartments they occupied may be prepared for the illustrious Dost. He will, I have no doubt, petition for a more congenial climate by the time he has had one taste of the hot winds.‡ . . .

This was written from Gundamuck. The Court was on its way to its winter quarters at Jellalabad. On the morning of the 13th they reached that place. The Envoy found Sir Willoughby Cotton still there, but "anxious to get away;" and Captain Macgregor, the political agent in charge of the district, surrounded by a motley crew of the chiefs of the country, who seemed to

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† Kurruck Singh and Nao Nehal Singh had by this time been gathered to their fathers. They died a few days after the surrender of Dost Mahomed. When the Ameer and his escort passed through the Punjab, their march was a quiet one. "Although Shere Singh was then laying siege to the citadel of Lahore, the

original prudence of fixing a route for British troops clear of the Sikh capital, and the complete subjugation of the Mahomedan tribes, left the English commander unaware of the struggle going on, except from ordinary reports and news-writers."—*[Cunningham's History of the Sikhs.]*

‡ *MS. Correspondence.*

look up to him as their common father. In the enjoyment of a little rest from pressing anxieties, the Envoy began to turn his thoughts to the domestic administration of the country. "We have hitherto," he wrote to the Private Secretary of the Governor-General, "been struggling for existence, without any leisure to turn to the improvement of the administration."* And very little of this leisure was even now vouchsafed to him. Though Dost Mahomed was on his way to the provinces of India, and the winter snows had now set in, the struggle for existence was still going on, and more fiercely than ever. The Ghilzyes and Kohistanees had already risen up against the government of the Shah and his supporters; and now the Douranees were breaking out into revolt.

It has been shown, that on the appearance of Shah Soojah at Candahar, the Douranees, enfeebled and prostrated by their Barukzye oppressors, clustered around the throne, and sought from the restored monarch the privileges and immunities which had been wrested from them by the Sirdars. Uncertain, at that time, of the ultimate success of the expedition, and eager to swell the number of his adherents, the Shah was willing to grant, and more willing still to promise. He made certain remissions of taxation in favour of the tribes; but he entrusted the execution of these new popular measures to the old unpopular agency; and the Parsewan

* Writing to the same correspondent shortly afterwards, he cautioned him not to expect any very speedy or extensive reforms; and, above all, not to look for any favorable financial results. "By-and-by his Majesty," said the Envoy, "will, I hope, be able to make both ends meet. At present, pecuniary assistance to a considerable extent will be indispensable. As I said when we first reached Candahar, the country must be looked upon as an outwork, requiring large

expenditure to keep it in repair. You are a little too sanguine, I think, in your hope of a speedy and universal reform in this country. For thirty years the inhabitants of most of the districts have never paid a fraction of revenue, until they were coerced into payment by the presence of troops. The habit has grown into second nature with them, and we cannot expect them to subside at once into the condition of cheerful tax-payers."—[Unpublished Correspondence.]

revenue-collectors, who had oppressed the tribes during the reign of the Sirdars, were still left to exercise their hated calling under the King.

The experiment of giving is a dangerous one. In the ordinary concerns of human life, it is found that the shortcomings of those who give bring down upon them more hatred and more reproach than the withholdings of those who give not. It is perilous to raise hopes not to be fulfilled. The Douranees had looked for much from the restoration of the Shah; and they were disappointed. They had patiently submitted to the exactions and oppressions of the Barukzyes—but the imperfect liberality of the Suddoyze monarch irritated them past endurance. They looked upon the Barukzyes as their natural enemies, and they submitted when they knew that they had no power of resistance. But believing that it was the wish of the restored government of the Shah to conciliate and encourage them, they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a violent and offensive manner, with the strongest assurance in their mind that their grievances would be redressed. Under the Barukzyes such a course would have been worse than useless, for their spasms of painful unrest were pleasing to the Sirdars. But as it seemed that the Shah desired to please them, they strove to evince, by most unmistakeable signs, that they were not pleased; and broke out into rebellion.*

* "It is curious to observe the manner in which the Douranees have reasoned upon the liberality of his Majesty's Government, and the gradual modifications which we may suppose their feelings to have undergone, from the evidence of alterations in their tone and conduct. During the first year of his Majesty's restored government, they exhibited outwardly but little change from the same passive demeanour which had charac-

terised their submission to the Sirdars under the later periods of the Barukzye administration. No sooner, however, had the new order been issued for the remission of the land-tax, than with resuscitated hopes they began to remonstrate, to agitate, and ultimately to take up arms, when their means of intimidation failed them. I bring forward, by way of illustration, the example of the tribes in Zemindawer. They had been subjected,

In Zemindawer, a district which lies to the north-west of Candahar, symptoms of inquietude began to evince themselves at the end of 1840. At this time, the affairs of Candahar and its neighbourhood were, as regards all European superintendence, under the charge of Major Rawlinson. This officer, who had been employed for some years in Persia,* and on the rupture of our friendly

during the preceding year, to some severity of treatment by the financial arrangements of Wullee Mahomed Khan; but they had endured the yoke almost without a murmur. Since the arrival of the Wukeel at Candahar, they had been, on the contrary, entirely free from interference. Not a government agent of any class had appeared in Zemindawer, nor had a khurwar of grain been realised, yet the tribes of that district, on the first demand of revenue, took up arms to withstand, as they said, oppressive exactions; and whilst a party of horse were encamped upon this side of the Helmund, appointed to support the government officer in his collections, they crossed the river, and attacked them without the semblance of an excuse on the score of provocation or actual rapacity. The unpopularity of the agent deputed to realise the revenues, and the apprehension of a repetition of the exactions of the previous year, may have been instrumental in assembling the tribes in arms as a measure of defence; but surely such motives are insufficient to justify or explain a gratuitous attack before the collections of the present year had commenced; or, if the motives which the Zemindawarees assigned for their offensive hostility be admitted, surely some radical change of character must have taken place, to have emboldened to this act of aggressive rebellion tribes who had submitted passively to the most galling tyranny on the part of the Sirdars, and who had even yielded, since the accession of his Majesty, to the harshness of the collections of the

preceding year, without betraying any open signs of discontent. It appears to me that, had the land-tax on the *Tajul Kulbas* been continued, the tribes in Zemindawer, seeing no indication of a change in the policy of the government, and conscious that the power of coercion was stronger, at the present, than at any previous time, would have never dreamed of assembling in arms to resist the royal authority, and that we must consequently attribute to the exercise of his Majesty's clemency, and to the impression which had arisen from it, that it was the aim of the government to manage the Douranees through the agency of their hopes rather than of their fears, and that rebellion might thus be attempted with impunity, so sudden and unusual a display of boldness as could induce the tribes to rise in arms and attack a government agent, however, and perhaps deservedly, unpopular."—[*Major Rawlinson's Douranee Report. MS. Records.*]

* Major Rawlinson went out to India as a cadet on the Bombay Establishment in 1827. He was a fellow-passenger of Sir John Malcolm, from whom he imbibed his earliest taste for Oriental literature. In 1828, having passed, whilst yet a cadet, an examination in the Hindostanee language, he was posted to the 1st Grenadier Regiment, with which he served until 1833. In this interval he passed in two other languages, Mahratta and Persian. In 1833, when Lord William Bentinck despatched a party of officers to Persia to drill the army of Abba

relations with that state, necessarily remanded to India, had been so strongly recommended, for his intimate acquaintance with the languages, the people, and the politics of the East, as well as for his general aptitude and intelligence, by Sir John M'Neill to Lord Auckland, that the Governor-General ordered him to proceed to Caubul, to be employed under Macnaghten. In the early part of 1840 it had been proposed to despatch Rawlinson and Arthur Conolly on a mission to the camp of the Russian General Peroffski, but the breaking up of the Russian expedition caused this project to be abandoned; and another field of activity was opened out to Rawlinson in a region less inhospitable and remote. The supervision of affairs at Candahar had hitherto been entrusted to Major Leech; but Leech had given offence to the Envoy by the dilatoriness with which he had sent in his accounts, and it had seemed good to Macnaghten to remove him from his post.* He could not have appointed a better man than Rawlinson to fill it. So, on the 4th of July, he sent to that officer the Shah's official notification of his appointment as political agent at Candahar.

The command of the troops at Candahar was in the hands of Major-General Nott. He was an old Sepoy officer of good repute; a man of some talents, but blunt

Meerza, Rawlinson, still an ensign, was selected as adjutant of the detachment. In Persia he continued to serve until the rupture with that state. During a space of nearly three years he was in military command of the province of Kermanshab, living entirely among the Persians, and becoming as familiar with their language and literature as with their manners. He graduated in diplomacy under Sir John M'Neill, by whom he was trusted with various political duties, and strongly recommended to

Lord Auckland for employment in Afghanistan.

* Other grounds of complaint may have subsequently arisen, but this dilatoriness was the first offence. Leech pleaded in extenuation that he had been removed from one appointment to another, before he had had time to make up the financial statements of his last mission; and sent in a list of no less than eight different accounts of which he had to bring up the arrears.—[*Major Leech to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: June 30, 1840.*]

address — an honest, plain-spoken soldier, not always right, but always believing himself to be right—hearty, genuine, and sincere. His faults were chiefly those of temper. He had not been well used. Sir Henry Fane had recognised his merits; but Sir John Keane, who was accused of fostering a narrow-minded prejudice against the Company's service, had superseded him in a manner which had greatly incensed the General himself, and the army to which he belonged.* Labouring under a strong sense of the injustice that had been done him; feeling that his worth had not been duly appreciated, or his services duly rewarded; seeing much in the general management of the affairs of the distracted country in which his lot had been cast to excite his unqualified disapprobation; and being, moreover, constitutionally of an irritable temperament, he sometimes said and wrote what was calculated to offend others; and as the political officers were the especial objects of his dislike, he was in no favour at the Residency. Macnaghten declared that that general's conduct frequently embarrassed him, and recommended, therefore, his recall; but it was felt that Nott was a fine soldier; and, though the government eventually listened to the Envoy's counsel in this matter, they were slow to remove him from a sphere in which his energy and decision were likely to be so serviceable to the state. And, perhaps, it was felt that, in his political colleague at Candahar, Nott had a man of excellent temper, of great tact and forbearance, and

* It would be foreign to the objects of this work to discuss the question of Nott's supercession. It was at one time a fertile subject of discussion in India, involving, as it did, a general question of military rank in the higher grades. General Willshire was an older officer and an older lieutenant-

colonel than General Nott, and the Indian Commander-in-Chief had decreed that the relative ranks of the major-generals should be determined, not by the dates of their brevets as such, but by the dates of their lieutenant-colonels' commissions.

that the difficulty was much lessened by so fortunate an association.

Such were the men upon whom, at the beginning of 1841, devolved the duty of looking this Douranee outbreak fairly in the face. The task that fell to Nott's share was the easier of the two. He had simply to beat the enemy in the field. The insurgents of Zemindawer had risen up against a party of the Shah's horse, who had been sent out to support the revenue officers, and had defeated and dispersed them. A detachment, therefore, was ordered out against them, under Captain Farrington. On the morning of the 3rd of January they came up with the rebels. The Douranee horse, some 1200 or 1500 strong, showed a bold front; but the fire of Hawkins's guns was too hot for them, and they began to waver. The infantry well completed what the cavalry had well begun; the insurgents were driven from their position, and were soon broken and dispersed. And so, for the time, the military officer had done his work, and with good success. The political officer had a more difficult duty to perform. Rawlinson was called upon to elucidate the causes of the dissatisfaction of the Douranees, and to recommend the best means of quenching the dangerous spirit of revolt. On the 13th of January, Macnaghten wrote to him from Jellalabad; and the letter is curious, as it contains the earliest allusion to the suspicion which subsequently, in a more decided manner, attached itself to the fidelity of Shah Soojah:

* * * * *

I do not exactly know the drift of your observation as "to the tone ultimately to be given to our relations with this country." Nor am I aware of the true sentiments of government as applicable to such a case as that which we are now considering. The disaffection of Aktur Khan could not have been foreseen by them,

still less any general feeling of disaffection on the part of the Douranees. We must first ascertain, as clearly as possible, the causes of this feeling. If there is just ground of dislike to the Vakeel, we should persuade his Majesty to remove him, and at the same time adopt measures for keeping the Douranees in check, either by reverting to the old system of taxation, or requiring their presence and performance of duty. The Vakeel's assertion as to his Majesty's wish to support the Douranees in their unreasonable proceedings, and his motive for doing so, is ridiculous. But it is only one of the thousand and one calumnies that are daily propagated with the view (God only knows why) of injuring his Majesty's character. His Majesty, when I told him of the necessity of sending out a regiment against Aktur Khan, at once admitted the propriety of the move, but lamented that the Douranees were such donkeys as to require coercion. There is one point mentioned in your letter which I feel clear about. The domestic tranquillity of the country is an object far more important than the provision of a national force against Persian inroads. I have no notion how many Douranees would acquire the means of being formidable to his Majesty by his remission of the Roobbas; but I think every safe and fair opportunity should be taken of limiting their power (as it seems the indulgence already granted has had so baneful an effect) and of improving the revenues. I would commence with all those who have taken any part in this rebellion, and deprive them of any favour that may have been shown to them. What *honours* and *privileges* have recently been conferred upon the Douranees that they had not before? Let me know, in your official letter, whether you deem the removal of the Vakeel desirable, and how you would recommend his place to be supplied. I cannot help thinking that Yar Mahomed has more to do with this *émeute* than you ascribe to him.

I am aware that it is difficult for you to furnish correct notions of the feelings of the strange people amongst whom our lot is cast; but without some information of the kind, it must be impossible for me to form a correct judgment as to the course to be pursued. One would suppose it could not be a very difficult matter, with our invincible means, to keep in proper subjection people who trembled under the feeble sway of the Barukzyes. At the same time, their real grievances should be removed, and if the Vakeel is

a rapacious tyrant, as he is represented to be, he should certainly be ejected, and another arrangement made for next year.*

In another letter, written on the 5th of February, to Mr. Colvin, the Envoy again adverted to the subject of Douranee disaffection, which had now become, in reality, the most important to which the attention of the authorities could be addressed:

Aktur Khan was disappointed in not getting the chiefship of Zemindawer; and he found the people in a temper to aid his rebellious project, owing to the oppressions practised by the Vakeel. They submitted to these oppressions in the time of the Barukzye Sirdars, knowing that there was no remedy. But now, having their own King restored to them, they take their own rude way of having their grievances made known, in full confidence of their being redressed. Major Rawlinson observes, on the authority of the Sirdar, that the Douranees were elated beyond all bounds of dutiful service. I doubt much whether such an effect could be produced by such a cause; and I moreover much doubt whether the Douranees have any such real cause to be elated, for, according to the best information I can obtain, the royal bounty has been intercepted by the revenue managers. The whole question, however, of the Candahar revenue system requires very careful consideration. Our unpopularity is assigned as another reason for the *émeute*. With a certain class, the aristocracy attending the Court, whose consequence we have annihilated, we are, doubtless, unpopular; but I question whether there exists any bad feeling against us in the country generally. In support of my opinion, I may adduce the fact of Lieutenant Pattenson having recently made the tour of the disturbed districts with a small escort.

He was looked up to wherever he went as a deliverer, and heard nothing but universal execrations against the Vakeel and his clique. I am perfectly satisfied of the imperative necessity of at once removing these obnoxious individuals. They will be immediately summoned to Jellalabad, and a successor in every way competent will this day set out to succeed them. I shall suspend my judgment as to the supposed necessity of breaking the power

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

of the Douranees, until I get Major Rawlinson's promised *Kulba* report; but I shall desire Rawlinson at once to banish from his thoughts the wild project of seizing "at least fifty or sixty of the most powerful and turbulent of the Douranee Khans," and sending them to India. It is hard if we cannot find some means less stringent of restoring tranquillity. My own impression is, that matters will revert to a wholesome state, as soon as ever the incubus of apprehension is removed from the body of the people; and this will be effected by the simple recall of the obnoxious Parsewan managers. Our appearing in the field as their allies is the surest method of gaining for ourselves universal detestation. In the mean time, you may set your mind at ease whatever may happen. We have force enough at Candahar to crush any hostile combination against us, however extensive.*

It will have been gathered from these letters that Macnaghten was not altogether without a suspicion at this time that the disaffection of the Douranees had been fomented by the intrigues of Yar Mahomed. The suspicion soon rose into knowledge. There were undeniable proofs that the Heratee Wuzeer had been writing inflammatory letters to the Douranee chiefs. He had sent a delegate, named Nussur-ood-deen Khan, into the Zemindawer country, with letters to each of the principal Douranee chiefs, and one of them had forwarded to Lieutenant Elliot, Rawlinson's assistant, a copy of the seditious missive, which ran to the following effect:

Let each of you assemble his followers, and go in to Aktur Khan in Zemindawer, and be ready and prepared, for I have moved out of Herat; and from Meshed, troops 10,000 strong, with twelve guns and two lakhs of rupees, are marching to our assistance. At latest, I shall arrive at Bukhwa by the end of the month Mohurram. Let not any Douranee chief of those now assembled disperse his followers, for I am most assured of coming to join you.†

Unpublished Correspondence.

† *MS. Records.*

Upon the goodly tree of Lord Auckland's forbearance was now clustering, thick and ripe, the expected fruit.

But there was other intelligence than this to astound the Envoy, and make him cry out more and more bitterly against the authorities, who had thwarted his long-cherished desire to play the "great game." Suddenly there came upon him the intelligence that the outrages and the exactions—the treachery and the insolence—of Yar Mahomed had reached such a pitch, that Todd had broken up the British Mission, and set his face towards Candahar.

The first thought of Macnaghten on receiving this intelligence, was to muster all our available resources, especially the "big guns," and to commence another siege of Herat. On the 25th of February he wrote to Rawlinson:

This, indeed, is astounding intelligence, and there is no longer any necessity for delicacy as regards Herat. You can send over the big guns, therefore, and take any other precautions that may be deemed necessary for the safety of the frontier, without reference to anything I have said in former letters; and, moreover, a strong effort should be made to crush Aktur Khan without delay. I cannot tell what government *will* do, though I know what they ought to do. I have strongly recommended their sending as large a force as may be available, and as speedily as possible, to Candahar, even if an attack on Herat should not be meditated.*

And again, three days afterwards, he wrote to the same correspondent:

I shall be curious to know what his Lordship thinks of the present crisis. I presume that he will *wish* to proceed against Herat, but there may be doubts as to the means of our effectually doing so; and certainly we ought to run no risks. If we are compelled to postpone the operation for another season, it would be well, I think, to erect a strong post at Washeer, or some other

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

place on the frontier which may promise to be salubrious. A battering-train would, I imagine, be our chief want, and I rather think there is one at Sukkur, which was left there by Sir John Keane for want of carriage. I have written to Ross Bell on this subject, and begged him to send their heavy guns up to you as soon as practicable, with their material. I have further suggested to him to apply to Major Parsons at Ferozepore for draught bullocks, if he cannot get them more handily. Possibly you might supply them. What does Sanders think now of the means at our command for subduing Herat? We could easily co-operate *viâ* the Hazura route with a brigade, the mountain train, and a respectable body of horse.

I had written thus far, when I received your important letter of the 19th, with its inclosures. The rupture with Herat now seems to be complete, but the proximate cause of it is yet unknown to me. I trust that Todd and his party may have safely arrived at Candahar, and I wish him to remain there for the present. Is there any chance of our mustering heavy guns and force sufficient to attack the place this year? What does Todd say of the best season for operations, and what aid does he hope we might obtain from people in and around Herat? Our money ought now to fructify.

With regard to your opinions as to our policy in this country, I may say mine are diametrically opposed to them. I deny both your premises and conclusion. I deny that we are universally hated; if we were, I deny that such would be a sufficient reason for our returning and abandoning the fruits of our signal triumph, still less for taking the country to ourselves. This however, is no time for unprofitable argument. With the notions you entertain, you may be apt to be led into despondency; otherwise, the notions which you or I may entertain are of little consequence, as the determination of our superiors is fixed. It would be a rash attempt to send troops through the snow from Caubul to Mooltan; and besides, we have them not to spare at present.*

After another lapse of three days, he wrote again:

Jellalabad, March 2nd, 1841.

I have had a long conversation with his Majesty this morning, *de rebus omnibus*, but chiefly with regard to the state of

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

things at Candahar. His Majesty has just received a letter from the Vakeel which has convinced him of the Chaoos-Bashee's guilt. I told him that though the evidence from such a quarter might be exceptionable, there could be no doubt of the fact. His Majesty's rage knows no bounds. He swears that he will burn the Chaoos with excrement, and I feel certain that he will inflict upon him some grievous punishment such as we could not abet. Cutting out the tongue, the offending member, is the smallest penalty thought of, but I really think there would be no harm in depriving the rascal of his ears. Now touching the Vakeel.* His Majesty was a little impatient with me this morning. There is, he says, no stability in my counsels. I first recommend that he should be recalled instantly, then that he should be left at Candahar to give an account of his stewardship; but it is his wish to leave to you the final determination of the question. . . . You may imagine how anxious I am to hear of Todd's safety, and to learn the particulars of his departure from Herat, or the proximate cause of that important event, as well as his, and your, and Sanders's opinion as to the practicability of successful operations against Herat this season. I suppose if the force were to move from Candahar by the middle of May it would be time enough, but will the requisite battering-train be then forthcoming, and shall we have a *quantum suff.* of grain and camels? The Governor-General will, I fear, if possible, do nothing.†

The particulars of Todd's departure from Herat were these. Yar Mahomed had long been accommodating his demands to every change in the political barometer. Unfortunately, those changes had indicated little but the depressed circumstances of our position in Afghanistan. The fall of Khelat; the progress of Dost Mahomed on the Hindoo-Koosh; the insurrection in Zemin-dawer, were adverse circumstances which encouraged the Wuzeer to rise in his demands for more money, and even to meditate aggressive movements of a more palatable character than any which had yet been undertaken

* The Chaoos-Bashee had reported that the King had encouraged the revolt of the Douranees.

† *M.S. Correspondence.*

against the power of Shah Soojah and his supporters. At one time he contemplated an attack upon Candahar, and was anxious that his intentions should be known to the British Mission. But the surrender of Dost Mahomed had somewhat checked his presumption; and the descent upon Candahar was postponed. But the project was not wholly abandoned.*

The knowledge of the Zemindawer outbreak soon caused it to be revived. Yar Mahomed, it has been seen, despatched an emissary to the disaffected country to keep alive the spirit of revolt. At the same time he sent a deputation to the Persian chief at Meshed, urging him to unite in an attack on Candahar, whilst the communications between that place and Caubul were cut off by the snow.

This last glaring act of perfidy excited Todd to retaliate. He believed that there was a point of forbearance beyond which it would be disgraceful to his country

* "The continued forbearance and generosity of the British Government were, however, alike unappreciated by Yar Mahomed Khan. The circumstances detailed in my demi-official letter to your address of the 30th of September, will sufficiently prove this; and on the 30th of November last I had the honour to report as follows: 'During the past month, the most aggravated and absurd reports of the advantages gained by Dost Mahomed Khan, the Kohistanees, and Beloochees, over our troops, and of the weakness of our position in Afghanistan, had acquired ready credence in Herat. Urgent and repeated demands for extra assistance in money have been made by the Vizier and others, but without effect. The opportunity has been thought favorable for attempting to work upon our fears; and a foray on Candahar was seriously discussed, and, I believe, ultimately decided on, by the minister and his advisers, letters having been received by him from the

city dwelling on the weakness of its garrison, and inviting him to make the attempt.'

"The extravagance of the Vizier about this time involved him in debt to a considerable amount; and finding that I was not disposed to advance more money than had been sanctioned by government, he endeavoured to obtain my consent to his chapping the Persian territory. Failing in this, he proposed to foray some of the districts nominally subject to his own authority; and at length, discovering the futility of attempting to obtain money from me on these pretences, he thought that by giving publicity to his intention of attacking Candahar, he might intimidate me into purchasing his forbearance. The enterprise was, I believe, resolved on; and though the timely surrender of Dost Mahomed Khan caused this project to be laid aside for the time, it was not fully abandoned."—[Major Todd to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: Ghiesh, March 5, 1841. MS. Records.]

to descend; so he determined to suspend the payment of the allowance* which had been granted to the state; and, taking advantage of the presence of a large body of troops in Upper Sindh, announced, on the 1st of February, his intention to the Wuzeer. But Yar Mahomed, at this time, was intent on playing a "great game." He believed that his deputation had been favorably received at Meshed; he believed that the Douranees were again working themselves into rebellion; and he had abundant faith in the continued forbearance of the British Government. So he played, with his accustomed craft, for a large stake; and little heeded the consequences of failure. The one object of all his intrigues was to obtain money. Seeing that he could not any longer drive Todd to open the treasury, he determined to cajole him. He reminded the British agent of the desire he had long before expressed, to post a British contingent in the valley of Herat; and declared that, on the payment of two lakhs of rupees, he would give his assent to the measure. Never had he the shadow of an intention of fulfilling his part of the contract—but he wanted the money. His sincerity was soon tested. Todd demanded that the Wuzeer's son should be sent to Ghiresk, there to await an answer from the Government of India, and to escort, if the answer were in approbation of the measure, the British troops to Herat; and it was added, that on the Sirdar's arrival at that place the money demanded would be paid. But Yar Mahomed at once refused his assent to Todd's proposal. He required the immediate payment of the money or the departure of the Mission. So Todd chose the latter alternative, and turned his back upon Herat.†

Never before, perhaps, had the British Government

* 25,000 rupees (2500l.) *per mensem*.
† Dr. Login's "Statement of Facts relating to Herat." This document

was printed, some time ago, in the *Calcutta Review*, from a copy given me by Todd.

been so insulted and so outraged in the person of its representatives. Shah Kamran, at a private audience, told one of the officers of the Mission that, but for his protection, "not a Feringhee would have been left alive;" and asked if he did not deserve some credit for not acting towards Todd and his companions as the Ameer of Bokhara had acted towards Colonel Stoddart. Yar Mahomed had intercepted Todd's letters to Candahar. He had been for some time in an habitual state of intoxication. The seizure of the persons of the British officers, and the plunder of their property, had been openly discussed by the Wuzeer and his profligate friends, and there is little doubt that, if the Mission had remained longer at Herat, the members of it would have been subjected to indignities of the worst kind.*

The Mission left Herat, and halted for a time at Ghiresk. When the tidings of its abrupt departure reached Lord Auckland at Calcutta, he was roused into a state of very unwonted exacerbation. He was not a hasty man—he was not an unjust one. But on this occasion he committed an act both hasty and unjust. He at once repudiated the proceedings of Major Todd at Herat; and removed him from political employment. The first intelligence of Todd's suspension of the allowance was received from the Sindh agency. On the 11th of March, the Governor-General wrote to Macnaghten:

I will not pronounce upon Major Todd's proceedings until I

* "My departure from Herat may appear to you unnecessarily precipitate; and it is possible that I might have remained a few days longer. But, had I done so, I should have exposed the officers of the Mission to certain insult and danger, and thus have prevented the possibility of a future amicable adjustment of our differences with the Herat Government. The

Vizier had latterly been constantly in a state of intoxication; and the project of seizing us, and plundering our property, was seriously discussed by himself and his drunken associates, as the readiest mode of replenishing his coffers."—[*Major Todd to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: March 5, 1841. MS. Records.*]

have an account of them from him. Yet they are so contrary to the policy I have enjoined towards Herat—so regardless of consequences, and of all considerations of prudence and propriety, that I can hardly conceive how they may by possibility be attended with circumstances such as may relieve him from that extreme displeasure with which, upon a first impulse, I am disposed to visit him.*

But although Lord Auckland declared that he would not pronounce upon Todd's conduct until he had received that officer's explanations, he publicly remanded him to his regiment before those explanations were received.† How strongly he felt on the subject may be gathered from another letter, dated the 16th of March:

I am writhing in anger and in bitterness at Major Todd's conduct at Herat, and have seen no course open to me, in regard to it, but that of discarding and disavowing him; and we have directed his dismissal to the provinces. What we have wanted in Afghanistan has been repose under an exhibition of strength, and he has wantonly, and against all orders, done that which is most likely to produce general disquiet, and which may make our strength inadequate to the calls upon it. I look upon a march to Herat as perfectly impracticable; and if it were not so, I should look upon it, under present circumstances, as most inexpedient. We have taught Yar Mahomed to be more afraid of us than of the Persians. It is possible that, when he has been left a little time to himself, he will be more afraid of the Persians than of us—but, in the mean time, the state to which things have been brought is a cause of much anxiety and more apprehension to me.‡

Against an armed interference with the affairs of Herat, Lord Auckland had always steadfastly set his face. It was his belief that it was necessary to establish ourselves firmly in Afghanistan before operating upon

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† When, however, he declared his intention to wait for further information, he only knew that Todd had

suspended the allowance to Herat. He did not know that Todd had quitted Herat.

‡ *MS. Correspondence.*

Herat; but Macnaghten always declared that there was no possibility of achieving the former object until the latter had been accomplished. But his instructions were imperative. Even after the departure of the Mission, the Governor-General counselled a mild and forbearing course. On the 10th of April, he wrote to Macnaghten:

I cannot apprehend organised invasion from Herat, though there may be a foray on the frontier, which will not have the effect of making the advent of Yar Mahomed popular in Zemin-dawer. I think it, however, more likely that you will have to deal with letters and agents than with troops; and you ask me in what manner you are to receive overtures which may be made to you by Yar Mahomed. I would receive them calmly and coldly, but not repulsively. I would show no impatience to renew a Mission to Herat. I would have it to be understood that the stoppage of the allowances was unauthorised, and that the detachment of a brigade to the citadel of Herat was not desired, and would not have been acceded to by the British Government, but that the conduct of the Vizier has given great offence, and that we can regard Herat with no confidence or friendly feeling until there shall have been on the side of that state an entire change of policy. I can only repeat, therefore, what I have said very many times within the last two years: That you must be strong in Afghanistan before you can hope to exercise a wholesome influence upon Herat; and I am glad that you are giving your attention to the condition of the internal government of the country.*

* *MS. Correspondence.* Sir Jasper Nicolls, as Commander-in-Chief, had always consistently opposed the advance to Herat, on the grounds that we had not troops for the purpose, and, as a Member of Council, on the grounds that we had not money. On the 18th of August, 1840, on returning some papers to Lord Auckland, he wrote to the Governor-General: "I am glad that your Lordship has repressed the anxiety to annex Herat again to Caubul in the way hinted at. Were

Afghanistan ours, we should, perhaps, be compelled to make Herat our advanced post; it is really the gate of India. The problem is solved in a military sense; politically, it remains with your Lordship and the authorities at home, acting on your views. To show front at Herat, and at some selected point on or near the Oxus, we should be very strong in Afghanistan. The elements of stability are sadly deficient there, and two quicksands interpose between

Whilst Lord Auckland was thus writhing in anger and bitterness at the thought of Major Todd's departure

Candahar and Caubul and our own provinces. I mean the Punjaub and the Ameers' country. Being out of India, we cannot keep such establishments as will be required there without a large augmentation of our army, and this without any perceptible increase of revenue. I very much doubt that Shah Soojah will ever be able to support himself. With this opinion, and seeing here the relief is given up on account of six regiments only, we may feel some apprehension that our numbers are at this moment too low. Discontent may follow." "I wanted him," adds Sir Jasper Nicolls, in his private journal, "to feel that we cannot go further, or even retain seven regiments in Afghanistan without increase of force. We shall maintain ourselves there with difficulty. Yet all the young diplomatists want to aid Khiva—occupy Balkh—threaten Bokhara—and, lastly, to seize Herat before its traitor Vizier may give it up to Persia and Russia. We are beset with hollow friends in that quarter." "Lord Auckland said nothing of importance in reply, and did not allude to it next day in Council."

The only member who countenanced the proposed expedition was Mr. Prinsep. On the 15th of March (on which day intelligence of Todd's departure was received), Sir Jasper Nicolls wrote, after Council, in his journal: "Lord Auckland has prohibited any advance. This accorded with my often-expressed opinion that we are too much extended already; but when I signed my assent to-day in Council to his letters, I whispered to him, that if Herat was to be occupied by us against the will of the Vizier, the present circumstances were very propitious. We had a large body of troops at hand, and probably their plans were not matured." "On the 26th he wrote: 'Lord Auckland sent home a long note regarding Herat, which he

means to leave as it is, unless the Persians should show that they were anxious to lay hands upon it. He means to preserve our footing in Afghanistan.'"

In what manner the home authorities regarded the Herat question may be gathered from another passage in Sir Jasper Nicolls' journal: "August 19, 1841.—I wrote a hasty paper to-day, and a short one, against the occupation of Herat, if it can possibly be avoided. It was no sooner written than orders were received to seize it, if the Persians made any preparations to attach any part of Kamran's dominions to their own. I wrote in the way of warning. Lord A. also advised the government not to carry our arms further before this despatch was received. I only fully expressed my opinion that we are not justified in risking the revenues of India for anything external. As this subject may be brought unpleasantly forward, I shall just note that, by the June mail, we received a letter desiring us to take Herat. There was by the same mail a later despatch, not so anxious about it, or more cautious. I thought Lord Auckland's minute alluded to the June letter, and very desirous to damp our ardour in carrying on hostilities, and spending our money so far out of India, I wrote as I did. Two hours after my paper was sent in, I received for perusal the Secret Committee's despatch of July, enclosing Lord Palmerston's directions to check Persia in this object. They will not look for any difficulty to be started by me; but really I am most deeply impressed by a conviction that a continuance of so large a force, and of such expenditure beyond the Indus, will go far to break us down. I have no desire to embarrass the question, or to take a distorted view of it. We all concurred with Lord Auckland except Prinsep. He thinks that we must displace Yar Mahomed,

from Herat, the tribes on the Helmund, whom Yar Mahomed had endeavoured to excite, were collecting their strength for another struggle. In spite of all our conciliatory efforts, the Douranees had not been quieted. Aktur Khan had outwardly tendered his allegiance to the King, and had received a dress of honour, with an assurance from our political officers that the past would be forgotten.* The revenue officers, whom the Douranees detested, had been removed. The old earless minister, Moollah Shikore, had been replaced by Oosman Khan, a younger, an abler, and a more honest man; and Macnaghten was contemplating other fiscal reforms than

and he apprehends nothing from the distance or expenditure, in comparison with what must follow from his keeping Afghanistan in revolt. My argument as to the intolerable drain was taken from his minute of March." Again, on the 31st of August, Sir Jasper wrote: "Weekly we expend large sums upon the Shah and the country—not only in allowances, salaries, supplies, stores, pensions, compensations, and numberless contingencies; but barracks, stables, forts, magazines, and even a long causeway in Cutchee. Yet no return can ever be made. *To crown all—the blister Herat!*"—[*MS. Journal of Sir Jasper Nicolls.*]

* *Lieutenant Elliot to Major Rawlinson: MS. Correspondence.* Elliot went out into the Zemindawer country and met Aktur Khan in the camp of the Douranee Sirdar, Atta Mahomed Khan. He conducted his negotiations with some tact and address; but Major Rawlinson had little hope that these conciliatory efforts would have any permanent effect on the tribes. Forwarding a report of Elliot's proceedings, he wrote to Macnaghten: "I have reason to believe that a very bitter feeling of hostility to ourselves prevails amongst the Douranees generally; and this feeling, which could not but be highly dangerous to us in the

event of foreign invasion, would probably be confirmed and extended by any measures of coercion which fell short of extermination. At the present time, therefore, when the Government of Herat is threatening our western frontier, and endeavouring by inflammatory letters to excite opposition to his Majesty Shah Soojah's authority in all parts of the province, it would be, I think, particularly desirable to avoid any collision with the Douranee tribes which might add a further impetus to their inclination to join the ranks of our enemies. I do not anticipate, at the same time, that, by the conciliatory treatment recommended by Lieutenant Elliot, we gain any other advantage than that of temporary tranquillity; and however prudent, therefore, it may be at present to induce the rebel chief of Zemindawer to abstain from disorders, by the hope of obtaining through his forbearance substantial personal benefits, I still think that, when the danger of foreign aggression is removed, and efficient means are at our disposal, the rights of his Majesty's Government should be asserted in that strong and dignified manner which can alone ensure a due respect being paid to his authority."—[*March 11, 1841. MS. Records.*]

those which he had already sanctioned, and hoping to restore the tribes to their allegiance. But their disaffection was too deeply rooted to be operated upon by such measures. The entire system of government was offensive to them. The presence of the British was a perennial source of irritation. What they regarded as their legitimate influence had been usurped by the Feringhees; and they were soon ready again to appear in the field, and cross their sabres with the foreign bayonets.

And as the Douranees were mustering their men, the Ghilzyes also in Western Afghanistan were showing how little we had yet done, either to dragoon them or bribe them into quiescence. Early in the spring, without sufficient pretext for such a proceeding, a Ghilzye fort had been attacked, under the directions of Major Lynch, one of our political officers, by a party of the Shah's regular troops under Captain Macan, aided by Sanders, the engineer; and the chief, with fifteen of his men, had been killed by the assailants.* The act, which

* These proceedings in the Ghilzye country were greatly disapproved of both by the Envoy and the Governor-General; and Major Lynch, the political officer at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, subsequently forfeited his appointment. The Envoy wrote: "It is a great pity that our officers will thrust themselves and us into a dilemma before we are prepared for it. I foresaw the likelihood of the Ghilzyes resenting the erection of a fort in the heart of their country. But why should we go and knock our heads against mud forts? Why should we not have waited till the Ghilzyes chose to attack us?"—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson: May 5, 1841. MS. Correspondence.*]

The Governor-General thus conveyed his opinions on the subject: "I am looking with anxiety for further accounts from Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and the more so, as I must regard

with great mistrust the manner in which our affairs have been managed in that direction. It has seemed to all of us to be wise that a military post should be established of some strength between Candahar and Ghuznee. The steps towards its establishment should have been quietly and carefully taken, and at a time when we are strong, and without obstructions in other quarters. In this instance we have been weak at Candahar. We have had (I hope not up to this time) troops beyond the Helmund, and Major Lynch's proceedings have been marked by a vapouring and needless parade, such as has been most likely to provoke popular excitement. I hope by every despatch to learn that you have warned an officer of better qualifications to take his place."—[*Lord Auckland to Sir W. H. Macnaghten: June 5, 1842. MS. Correspondence.*]

in itself was a gallant military exploit, was looked upon as an unjustifiable aggression; and did much to keep alive the animosity which we had already contrived to excite. It soon began to bear the accustomed fruit. To assist us in keeping the Ghilzyes in check, it had been determined to restore the dismantled fort of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, which lies between Candahar and Caubul, and to occupy it as a military position. The tribes had witnessed with jealousy the restoration of the works, and clustered menacingly around the place. Their irritation was now increased. They assumed a more threatening attitude. So Nott sent out a force against them. Colonel Wymer, a good and successful officer, with 400 men of his own regiment, the 38th Sepoys, four horse-artillery guns, and a party of Christie's horse, took the field in the month of May. The Ghilzyes, eager for the conflict, moved down from Khelat-i-Ghilzye to meet our advancing troops; and, on the 19th, gave them battle. Night was beginning to fall when they came up with Wymer's camp at Assiai-Ilmee. A Ghilzye chief of high estate, named Gool Mahomed, known as the "Gooroo," who had threatened Keane's army nearly two years before, was at the head of the tribes. They came on with unwavering gallantry, but were met with a heavy fire from Hawkins's guns, which, served with equal rapidity and precision, committed mighty havoc in their ranks. Upon this, the Ghilzyes, resolutely intending to attack simultaneously both flanks and the centre of Wymer's force, divided themselves into three columns; and, coolly and deliberately, they came down sword in hand to the charge. Wymer had an extensive convoy to protect. His movements, therefore, were crippled; and he was compelled to stand on his defence. But the destroying grape from the guns, and the steady musketry fire of the Sepoys, sent back the

Ghilzye swordsmen again and again reeling under the iron shower. For five busy hours continued that mortal struggle; and then the Ghilzyes gave way. They had greatly outnumbered our party, and they left many dead on the field. All night long, too, the moving lights announced that many more, both of killed and wounded, were carried off to their camp.

This was a signal military success; and Wymer's Sepoys covered themselves with glory. But great was the shame of the political measures out of which the action had arisen. Lynch had irritated the Ghilzyes, whom he ought to have soothed. His conduct was viewed with general disapprobation. Lord Auckland's opinions have been recorded. Macnaghten virtually removed Major Lynch from his appointment. What Burnes thought of the matter, may be gathered from the following letter, which is distinguished equally by good feeling and good sense:

Caulbul, June 30, 1841.

MY DEAR LYNCH,

I have just got your letter, with the statement on Ghilzye affairs, and am concerned to find you are in trouble. I spoke to the Envoy about you; and, in fact, I showed to him the statement. But he tells me that you have resigned, and that he and you are altogether at variance on the mode of working out Ghilzye politics. I am not cognizant of all which you relate regarding affairs in your quarter; but I am sorry to tell you that I am one of those altogether opposed to any further fighting in this country; and that I consider we shall never settle Afghanistan at the point of the bayonet. And this opinion, which I have so long held, I am glad to see has been at length adopted in Calcutta, and will be our future guide. As regards the Ghilzyes, indeed, immense allowances ought to be made for them; they were, till within three generations, the Kings of Afghanistan, and carried their victorious arms to the capital of Persia. It is expecting too much, therefore, to hope for their being at once peaceful subjects; and as they exhibited so much indisposition to the King's Government, it

was, I think, right to build a fort at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and thus bridle them; thereby enabling us, in the heart of the Ghilzye country, to protect those who were disposed to join us, and gradually undermine our enemies.

Do not think you did wrong in writing to me. I was glad to hear from you; and, had it been in my power, would have been glad to assist you also. I think you have been unfortunately situated, and had a *questio vexata* at every step. Had I been by you, I would have said build Khelat-i-Ghilzye, and pardon all kinds of insolence, for those who laugh may win. From what I hear, and from what, indeed, you told me here, I rather suspect you will be glad to get to Old England, and have done with this kind of work. I have not heard who is to succeed you; but here again, had I power, I would send no one, for I would leave the Ghilzyes to themselves, and quarter our troops at Khelat with the new chief, and allow him to rally all parties around him; but, perhaps, you will think me very heterodox in all my views. . . .

Yours, very sincerely,

ALEXANDER BURNES.*

Whilst in this manner efforts were being made to tranquillise the Ghilzyes, the proceedings of Aktur Khan and the Douranees were again exciting the apprehensions of the Envoy. Unable to obtain all that he wanted for himself, the chief, who at one time had affected contrition, was now again breaking out into revolt. Irritated by this, Macnaghten wrote to Rawlinson (May 31) as he had before written in the case of Dost Mahomed, that if he could seize Aktur Khan, he would recommend his execution :

I think you should strain every nerve to lay hold of that indomitable Moofsid, Aktur Khan, and that if you can seize him, the Prince should be recommended to execute him. The five Khans whom you propose sending out will of course do their utmost to effect his capture, but it occurs to me that the services of Ibrahim Khan, the Tymunee chief, might be turned to some account on this occasion, and that the deputation of the Kazees son will afford an opportunity of urging him to assist us. I

* MS. Correspondence of Sir A. Burnes.

further think that a reward of 10,000 rupees should be offered for the apprehension of Aktur Khan. . . .

This moment I have received an express letter from Major Lynch, dated the 27th inst. He tells me that he is besieged by about 5000 Ghilzyes, who are within three miles of his position, but that he is prevented by my instructions from attacking them! Could any man in his senses have so construed those orders? The question to be asked in this case is, Why did the chief military authority at Khelat suffer the rebels to occupy a menacing position so close to him in force? If, as I suspect, it should turn out that Major Lynch has been interfering to prevent the military authorities from exercising their own discretion on the strength of my orders, his conduct will be so utterly indefensible, that I must request you at once to supersede him, and I shall tell him so. We cannot assist him from this place. Colonel Wymer must have reached him before to-day, and the rebels must have dispersed or been severely punished ere now. I shall desire John Conolly to remain with the Prince at Ghuznee till the road is clear.*

The Ghilzyes and the Douranees were both in arms against the authority of the Shah and his supporters. The whole country of Western Afghanistan was in a fearful state of unrest. Rawlinson, at Candahar, saw clearly at this time the frail tenure by which we held our position in Afghanistan, and was continually warning the Envoy of the dangers which loomed so largely before him. But Macnaghten only censured his correspondent for his "unwarrantably gloomy views," and denounced everything that was said about the unsettled state of the country as an "idle statement." How unwilling he was to believe that the clouds were gathering over his head, may be gleaned from the long letter which he wrote to Rawlinson on the 13th of June:

* * * * *

Your letter of the 7th arrived this morning. I don't like reverting to unpleasant discussions, but you know well that I have been frank with you from the beginning, and that I have

* *MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*

invariably told you of what I thought I had reason to complain. This may be confined to one topic—your taking an unwarrantably gloomy view of our position, and entertaining and disseminating rumours favorable to that view. We have enough of difficulties and enough of croakers without adding to the number needlessly. I have just seen a letter from Mr. Dallas to Captain Johnson, in which he says the state of the country is becoming worse and worse every day. These idle statements may cause much mischief, and, often repeated as they are, they neutralise my protestations to the contrary. I know them to be utterly false as regards this part of the country, and I have no reason to believe them to be true as regards your portion of the kingdom, merely because the Tokhees are indulging in their accustomed habits of rebellion, or because Aktur Khan has a pack of ragamuffins at his heels. As I have said before, there is nothing in these matters which might not have been foreseen, or which ought to cause us the slightest uneasiness. We will take such precautions as shall prevent the Ghilzyes from annoying us; and this is all that is requisite for the present. We may safely leave the rest to time. As to the documents protesting against the appointment of Sunnud, I look upon them as pure fudge. Send for the Janbaz. Let them make a forced march by night, and come in the rear of Aktur. Seize the villain, and hang him as high as Haman, and you will probably have no more disturbances. The Janbaz may remain out while the collections are going on, if necessary. I have already explained to you that I never intended offering a reward for Aktur's head, nor should I approve of encouraging the man who has a blood-feud with him to put him out of the way. This, besides being objectionable, would be superfluous, because his enemy must know that we could not be otherwise than gratified at the removal of so atrocious a traitor. With regard to the Tymunees, all I meant was, that they should be encouraged to seize Aktur if he attempted to take refuge in their territory, and I thought that a large pecuniary reward would be necessary to overcome their natural scruples to such a proceeding.*

But these Douranee children were now again to be corrected. "Though all was content and tranquillity

* *MS. Correspondence.*

from Mookoor to the Khybur," it was necessary that our troops should be continually in the field. And it was not always child's play in which they were summoned to engage. Aktur Khan, that "indomitable Moofsid," was now, at the beginning of July, still in arms before Ghiresk, with a body of three thousand men, and it was necessary to strike a blow at the rebel chief.* So

* Macnaghten's correspondence, during these months of June and July, afford many illustrations of his views with reference to the policy to be pursued towards the disaffected chiefs. They show that he had, as he sometimes mournfully acknowledged, become by this time an adept in intrigue. His natural humanity, too, seems to have been somewhat blunted :

"June 20.—I am out of all patience with Aktur Khan, but I feel satisfied that a judicious use of the Janbaz will extirpate the villain. If not, we must tolerate his audacity no longer ; and a regular force must be sent after him, to hunt him to the world's end.

"June 24.—You will never get any good out of your Douranee allies. I don't understand why you should wait until Ghiresk is taken, before you send out a force to quell this insurrection. Nothing is so catching in this country as the spirit of rebellion ; and if the insurgents should gain possession of Ghiresk, I apprehend a very general rising in favour of that contemptible rascal, Aktur Khan. . . . Our predicament as regards these Afghan chiefs is by no means an enviable one. They are such arrant blockheads, that any knave may in a day make a traitor of the most loyal of them. . . . This is my day for receiving natives, and I don't remember when I have been so bothered. Certes, reform is a troublesome thing to manage in any country."

On the 2nd of July, he wrote : "If the garrison of Ghiresk will only hold out a few days longer, and Aktur Khan will only have the goodness to remain until Hart gets in rear of him, I confidently hope that his carcass is ere now a prey to the vultures. Certes, he is a most impudent *sug*.

"July 16.—I had a visit from Atta Khan yesterday. I never beheld a more forbidding countenance than that which graces the shoulders of this worthy. The fool predominates over the villain ; but there is at the same time a vicious-looking obstinacy of purpose about the lips and features generally, which would lead me to suppose, that though the man had not intellect enough to discern his true interests, yet that he would be a most dangerous instrument in the hands of designing persons. . . .

What do you think of sending a secret and trustworthy emissary to Aktur Khan, and promising him protection in the event of his divulging the names of all those from whom he received assistance in Candahar ? Though a dishonest man, he is a contemptible fellow. Our object is not so much to punish him for his audacity, as to prevent future rebellions ; and this would be effectually done by making an example of those who, keeping in the background themselves, have instigated other poor devils to go to slaughter. If you communicate with Aktur, I would treat him as if we knew he was but an instrument in the hands of others. I do not at present know where I can obtain evidence to convict Sydul or Atta Khan, or even the Chaos-Bashee. Could you send me Meer Aulum's letter, and any witnesses to prove that the Chaos-Bashee made use of the treasonable language imputed to him on the road to Candahar ? Tej Khan accompanied him, and that scoundrel I believe to be at the bottom of the whole Fussad. If there are no strong political objections to the measure, pray lose no

Woodburn, a fine dashing officer, who commanded one of the Shah's regiments, was sent out against him, with his own corps (the 5th Infantry), two detachments of Janbaz, or Afghan Horse, under Hart and Golding, and some guns of the Shah's Horse Artillery, under Cooper. The enemy were posted on the other side of the river. Woodburn tried the fords, but they were impassable. Hart, however, had tried them at another point, but, finding himself unsupported, he returned. This was in early morning. Four hours after noon the enemy struck their camp, and soon afterwards commenced the

time in urging the Prince to seize and imprison him. In my letter of yesterday, I named four disaffected Mool-lahs, whom I suggested that the Prince should send for and rate soundly. This should be done in open Durbar; and I am not certain that it would not be advisable, '*pour encourager les autres*,' to hang up one or two of the rebels taken *flagrante delicto*. But this is a matter best left to your own discretion."

On the 19th, he wrote: "I saw his Majesty yesterday evening, when we had a good deal of conversation as to the expediency of seizing Atta Khan and Sydul Khan. One of his Majesty's arguments against the measure was to me convincing. He said, 'I sent an honourable invitation to these individuals and *sugs*, as they are. Who would ever believe my word again if I were now to seize them, in defiance of the implied pledge?' So they will remain at large, but be well looked after and deprived of power and money. His Majesty quaintly observed, 'If you wish to destroy a blind man, it is not necessary to kill him. Take away his stick.'

"July 26.—Sydul Khan and Atta Khan both deserve to be hung; but I have already told you that his Majesty is prevented from bringing these individuals to condign punishment by the consideration (and it is a weighty

one) of his having invited them to Caubul on a promise of honourable treatment. The same reason does not apply to the Chaoos-Bashee; and I hope, in the course of to-morrow, to request you to send evidence against him, or to tell you that he has expiated his offence on the gallows. You are the best judge of the expediency of arresting Taj Khan. . . . My own notion is, that this (the league between Persia and Herat) will not induce Lord Auckland to swerve from his pacific policy, and that he will rely on the return of our ambassador to Teheran for settling matters to rights. But, in the mean while, what will Yar Mahomed be about? I fear that he will be desperate, since we have told him distinctly that we will not tolerate a Persian ascendancy at Herat; and this seems to be already established by his submission. He may therefore imagine that he could not be worse off; and he may feel really inclined to invade Candahar. In this case, would it be prudent to leave one regular regiment in advance, far from support? But this is a consideration which will have suggested it to yourself. The rebels in the Kohistan are still giving us trouble; but I hope to arrange that affair without the employment of troops. Leech writes cheerfully of his prospects."—*MS, Correspondence.*

passage of the river. Woodburn made his arrangements for their reception. The Douranees made a spirited attack, but Woodburn's infantry, well supported by Cooper's guns, met them with too prompt and sure a fire to encourage them to greater boldness. The Janbaz, already graduating in treachery and cowardice, covered themselves with that peculiar kind of glory which clung to them to the end of the war. It was a busy night. The enemy far outnumbered Woodburn; but the steady gallantry of his gunners and his footmen achieved the success they deserved. Before daybreak the enemy had withdrawn. It would have been a great thing to have followed up and dispersed the rebels, but with all the country against him, and a body of horse at his back, on which no reliance could be placed, it would have been madness to make the attempt.

The month of August found the Envoy still cheerful and sanguine. The convulsions of the Douranees and the spasms of the Ghilzyes were regarded by him as the accompaniments only of those infantine fevers which were inseparable from the existence of the tribes. In vain Rawlinson, with steady eye watching those symptoms, and probing with deep sagacity the causes of the mortal ailments out of which arose all those fierce throes of anguish, protested that throughout Western Afghanistan there was a strong national feeling against us; and that difficulties and dangers were coiling their serpent folds around us with irresistible force. Macnaghten still asked what we had to fear, and thus, on the 2nd of August, addressed his less sanguine colleague:

I am not going to read you a lecture, first, because when you read your letter of the 28th ult. you pleaded guilty to the offence of bile; and secondly, because at the present writing I own the same impeachment; but I must pen a few remarks, in the hope of inducing you to regard matters a little more

"couleur de rose." You say, "The state of the country causes me many an anxious thought—we may thresh the Douranees over and over again, but this rather aggravates than obviates the difficulty of overcoming the national feeling against us—in fact, our tenure is positively that of military possession, and the French in Algiers, and the Russians in Circassia, afford us an example on a small scale of the difficulty of our position." Now upon what do you found your assertion that there is a national feeling against us, such as that against the French in Algiers or the Russians in Circassia? Solely, so far as I know, because the turbulent Douranees have risen in rebellion. From Mookoor to the Khybur Pass all is content and tranquillity, and wherever we Europeans go we are received with respect, and attention, and welcome. But the insurrection of the Douranees is no new occurrence. The history of the rule of the Barukzye Sirdars would show that they were engaged in one continuous struggle with their turbulent brethren. If they were able to reduce them to subjection with their contemptible means, what should we have to fear from them? We have given them something to lose which they had not before; and you may rely upon it that they will be quiet enough as soon as they are satisfied (which they ought to be pretty well by this time) of the futility of opposition, provided some means are adopted of preventing Yar Mahomed from carrying on his intrigues. Then, the Ghilzyes have been in arms. True. But it would have been unreasonable to suppose that they should surrender their independence without a struggle, and we have now put the bit in their mouths. I do not concur with you as to the difficulty of our position. On the contrary, I think our prospects are most cheering, and with the materials we have there ought to be little or no difficulty in the management of the country.

It is true the population is exclusively Mahomedan, but it is split into rival sects; and we all know that of all antipathies the sectarian is the most virulent. We have Hazaras, Ghilzyes, Douranees, and Kuzzilbashes, all at daggers drawn with each other, and in every family there are rivals and enemies. Some faults of management must necessarily be committed on the first assumption of the administration of a new country, and the Douranee outbreak may be partially attributed to such faults; but what, after all, do such outbreaks signify? The modern history of India teems with such instances. There is hardly a district in which

some desperate adventurer has not appeared at some time or other, and drawn the entire population after him. The whole province of Bareilly, in 1817, rose against us on a religious war-cry. The whole province of Cuttack, shortly afterwards, followed the standard of the rebel Jugbeneda, and we had infinite trouble in quelling the insurrection. Instances of this kind might be infinitely multiplied, and yet we find the effects of such outbreaks are very evanescent. The people of this country are very credulous. They believe any story invented to our prejudice; but they will very soon learn that we are not the cannibals we are painted. Mr. Gorman's fate was doubtless very melancholy; but are there no assassinations in other countries? I read in the *Bombay Times* only this morning an account of a cavalry officer being shot at in the open day in one of our villages. You say, "The infatuated town's-people are even beginning now to show their teeth; there have been three cases to-day of stones thrown from the tops of the houses on Sepoys' heads walking along the streets." Certainly our troops can be no great favourites in a town where they have turned out half the inhabitants for their own accommodation; but I will venture to say there is not a county town in England where soldiers are quartered in which similar excesses have not happened. European and Native soldiers have traversed the town of Candahar unarmed; and though it is to be apprehended that their conduct has been occasionally very aggravating, only two assaults have been committed upon them. When I went to Hyderabad in 1810, and for many years after, no European could venture to show himself in the city, such was the state of feeling against us. Look upon this picture and on that. Now I believe the lieges of Hyderabad look upon us as very innocent Kaffirs.

You are quite right, I think, in directing Pattinson to accept the submission of all the rebels, save Aktur, who may be desirous of coming in. They should be required to furnish security for appearance sake. But these people are perfect children, and should be treated as such. If we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be terrified. We have taken their plaything, power, out of the hands of the Douranee chiefs, and they are pouting a good deal in consequence. They did not know how to use it. In their hands it was useless and even hurtful to their master, and we were obliged to transfer it to scholars of our own. They instigate the Moollahs, and the Moollahs preach to the people; but

this will be very temporary. The evil of it we must have borne with, or abandoned all hope of forming a national army.* . . .

The Douranee children, however, required more chastisement. No man could have done more than Woodburn did with his means; but these means were insufficient. It was the custom then, both against the Ghilzyes and the Douranees, to send out detachments sufficiently large to accomplish, with the aid of their guns, small victories over the enemy, and so to increase the bitterness of their hostility, without breaking their strength. Aktur Khan was still in arms. Banded with him was Akrum Khan, another Douranee chief, inspired with like bitter hatred of the restored monarch and his Feringhee allies. A force under Captain Griffin was now sent out against them. It was strong in the mounted branch. Eight hundred sabres, three hundred and fifty bayonets, and four six-pounder guns, followed Griffin into the field of Zemindawer. On the 17th of August he came up with the insurgents. It was a moment of some anxiety. The *Janbaz* had not by their conduct under Woodburn won the confidence of the British officers. Nott always mistrusted them, and the feeling was, not unreasonably, shared by others.† But here they were associated with the men of the King's regular cavalry, and they may have felt the danger of defection. Be the cause what it may, they did not

* *MS. Correspondence.*

† Nott's disparagement of the *Janbaz* so irritated Macnaghten, and displeased Lord Auckland, that his removal from Candahar was contemplated. The following extracts from Macnaghten's correspondence show what was thought on the subject: "September 2.—Between you and me, Lord A. is much displeased with General Nott for his light and indiscriminate censure and disparagement of the *Janbaz*; and I think his displeasure will be increased when he

peruses the General's subsequent, and most uncandid despatch, in which he omitted all notice of the exemplary conduct of the *Janbaz* at Secunderabad.

"September 5.—You are not likely to have Nott with you much longer. His conduct in respect to the *Janbaz* has elicited the severest displeasure of government, by whom he has been declared disqualified for his present important command."—[*MS. Correspondence.*]

shrink from the encounter. The enemy were strongly posted in a succession of walled gardens and small forts, from which they opened a heavy matchlock fire upon our advancing troops; but the fire of our guns and musketry drove them from their enclosures, and then the cavalry, headed by the young Prince Sufder Jung, who had something more than the common energy of the royal race, charged with terrific effect, and utterly broke the discomfited mass of Douranees. The victory was a great one. Aktur Khan fled. The Douranees were disheartened; and for a time they sunk into the repose of feebleness and exhaustion.

The Ghilzyes, too, had received another check. Colonel Chambers, early in August, had been sent out against them, with a party of his own regiment, the 5th Light Cavalry, the 16th and 43rd Sepoy Regiments, and some details of Irregular Horse. He came up with the enemy on the morning of the 5th; but before he could bring the main body of his troops into action, a party of his cavalry had fallen upon them and scattered them in disastrous flight.

Under the influence of these victories, Macnaghten's confidence rose higher and higher. The Douranees were broken, and the Ghilzyes had submitted "almost without a blow." Aktur Khan had fled, and the "Gooroo" had surrendered. Now, indeed, the Envoy thought that he might report "all quiet from Dan to Beersheba." If anything caused him a moment's inquietude, it was the thought that Aktur Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mahomed, was still abroad, hovering about Khooloom. With something that now seems like a strange presentiment, he wrote that "the fellow would be after some mischief, should the opportunity present itself." It was on the 20th of August that, writing to Mr. Robertson, he thus expressed himself:

The victory of the Helmund was very complete. I believe the enemy on that occasion was as numerous a body as could ever be congregated in this country, consisting of some 4000 or 5000 men. The Douranees want one more threshing, and then they would be quite satisfied of the futility of opposing us; but my last letter from Rawlinson gave me no hope that they would collect again. The whole of the Ghilzye tribes have submitted almost without a blow; for the gallant little affair in which the 5th Cavalry redeemed the honour of that branch of the service, could hardly be dignified with the name of a fight. Those who knew this country when it was ruled by Barukzyes, are amazed at the metamorphosis it has undergone, and with so little bloodshed. The former rulers were eternally fighting with their subjects from one year's end to another. Now we cannot move a *naick* and four without having all the newspapers setting up a yell about the unpopularity of the Shah. The Shah is unpopular with the Douranee Khans, and we have made him so by supplanting them, and taking the military power which they were incompetent to use from their hands into our own. With all other classes his Majesty is decidedly, but deservedly, popular, and the Khans are too contemptible to be cared about. . . .

We have had very unpleasant intelligence from Bokhara, it being reported that Colonel Stoddart is again in disgrace and confinement; and I am the more alarmed about this, from thinking it probable that Arthur Conolly will return from Kokund *via* Bokhara. But the intelligence requires confirmation. Mahomed Aktur, the Dost's favourite son, is still at Khooloom, and has rejected my overture to come in. The fellow will be after some mischief, should the opportunity present itself. . . . You will see that Shah Soojah has most handsomely given back Cutchee and Moostung to the young Khan of Khelat. His Majesty's revenue is little more than fifteen lakhs per annum—hardly enough for the maintenance of his personal state—and yet the government below are perpetually writing to me that this charge and that charge is to be defrayed out of his "Majesty's resources!" God help the poor man and his resources!! The country is perfectly quiet from Dan to Beersheba.*

* *MS. Correspondence.*

But although all was quiet from Dan to Beersheba, there was a considerable force out in the Dehrawut, and a party of indomitable Douranees still defying the King and his allies. Akrum Khan refused to submit. It was determined, therefore, to make an attempt to seize him. It was not difficult to find one, willing for a few pieces of gold, to lead a small party of our people to the lair of the untamed chief. John Conolly, with a little band of horsemen, went out on this duty. It is said that the legs of the guide were tied under his horse's belly, that he might not treacherously escape. Akrum Khan was surprised, captured, and carried, a doomed captive, to Candahar, where, under the orders of Prince Timour, he was blown from a gun.

I cannot close this chapter without a few more words relating to Todd and the Herat Mission. That, in one sense, the Mission failed, is certain; but, there were some of Todd's measures which did not fail, and it is not to be forgotten that on his own responsibility he despatched Abbott and Shakespear to Khiva, and the good that was done by these Missions was often in the retrospect a solace to him in after days, when smarting under the injustice of his masters.* Lord Auckland never forgave

* I cannot refrain from quoting here a letter on this subject from Todd to Outram, written before his removal from political employment:

"Your kind letter of November 3rd reached me a few days ago. I would fain send you an adequate return, but I am out of sorts, and, besides, have but little to tell you. Shakespear's proceedings have been in all respects admirable. The zeal, perseverance, and judgment he has displayed throughout his arduous undertaking, entitle him to the highest praise; and I trust he will be rewarded as he deserves. The property restored by Russia is valued

at upwards of a crore of rupees; and the number of merchants and others released, exceeds 600. The news was received at Khiva with every demonstration of joy; and Shakespear's name has been inserted in the calendar of Oosbeg saints! The Russians, by liberating their captives immediately on the arrival of Shakespear and his 'company,' have given a strong proof that they are unwilling or unable to renew their attempt on Khiva; and I hope that they will now be prevented taking up that formidable position on the road to India. I cannot help congratulating myself on even the

him. His departure from Herat was inopportune; for, although Todd had no reason to believe the settlement of our differences with Persia was any nearer to its consummation than it had been for some time, they were then on the eve of adjustment. So Todd, remanded to his regiment, proceeded to join it at the head-quarters of the Artillery at Dum-Dum. "Equal to either fortune," he fell back upon the common routine of regimental service, and, in command of a company of Foot Artillery, devoted himself with as much earnest and assiduous zeal to the minutiae of military duty, as he had done, a year before, to the affairs of the Herat Mission. It has often been said that political employ unfits a man for regimental duty; but Major Todd, from the time that he first rejoined his regiment to the hour of his death, never slackened in his attention to his military duties; and, perhaps, in the whole range of the service, there was not a more zealous, a more assiduous—in other words, a more conscientious regimental officer than the old antagonist of Yar Mahomed. The trait of character here illustrated is a rarer one than many may suppose. Nothing in his political life became him like the leaving of it. There are few who know how, gracefully, to *descend*.

small share which I have had in these proceedings. Had I waited for orders, the Russians might have been within a few marches of Khiva; and had we been satisfied with the tales of Sir Alexander's agents, we should have now believed the Russians 300,000 strong, and to be within as short a distance of Caubul. The road between Teheran and this place is infested by roving bands of Toorkomans, who have been let loose on Persian Khorassan by the Khan of Khiva. His Highness thinks that he is thus doing us service; but I have written to undeceive him in this matter, and I have pointed out to him that the practice of man-stealing is abhorrent to us, whether the man be a Russian or a Persian. His conduct

on this occasion reminds me of an answer given to me by Mahomed Shah's Wuzeer, one Meerza Mahomed, a great oaf. I had been superintending some artillery practice at Teheran. A jackass having been placed as the target, I remonstrated against the cruelty of putting up one of God's creatures as a mark, when wood or canvas would answer every purpose. The Wuzeer replied, 'On my eyes be it, I will stick up a pony next time.' As if I had specially pleaded the case of jackasses.

"Sheil thinks that the prospect of a settlement of our differences with Persia is as distant as ever, and is strongly opposed to my plan of allowing the Shah to keep Ghorian, and retaining possession of Karrach."

It is not improbable that these years of regimental duty were the happiest period of his life. Shortly after his return to the Presidency, from which he had so long been absent, he married; and in the enjoyment of domestic happiness, such as has rarely been surpassed, he soon forgot the injustice that had been done to him. Cheerfully doing his duty in that state of life to which it had pleased God to call him, respected and beloved by all who had the means of appreciating the simplicity of his manners, the kindness of his heart, the soundness of his intelligence, and the integrity of his conduct, he found that, in exchanging the excitement of a semi-barbarous Court for the tranquillity of cantonment life and the companionship of a gentle and amiable wife, the barter, though not self-sought, had been greatly to his advantage.

Being appointed to the command of a horse-field battery, stationed at Delhi, he left Dum-Dum for the imperial city, where he continued to serve, until, shortly before the Sikh invasion, he attained that great object of regimental ambition, the command of a troop of horse-artillery. In the Upper Provinces, he had more than once been disquieted by the illness of his young and fondly-loved wife; but the heavy blow, which was to prostrate all his earthly happiness, did not descend upon him until within a few days of that memorable 18th of December, which saw the British army fling itself upon the Sikh batteries at Mudkhi. It was at Ferozshuhur that Todd, broken-hearted, with a strong presentiment of his approaching end, perhaps, in the extremity of his anguish, scarcely wishing to escape destruction, led his troop into action and perished in the unequal conflict,* and among the many who fell on that mournful day, there was not a braver soldier or a better man.

* *Calcutta Review*. A round shot from one of the Sikh batteries, I believe, carried off his head.

CHAPTER IV.

[September—October: 1841.]

Aspect of Affairs at Caubul—The King—The Envoy—Burnes—Elphinstone—The English at Caubul—Expenses of the War—Retrenchment of the Subsidies—Risings of the Ghilzyes—Sale's Brigade—Gatherings in the Kohistan.—Sale's Arrival at Gundamuck—The 1st of November.

TAKING advantage of the lull that followed the defeat of the Douranees and the Ghilzyes in Western Afghanistan, it is advisable that I should glance briefly at the general condition of things at the capital in this month of September.

The King was in the Balla Hissar. Discontented and unhappy, he complained that he had no real authority; that the English gentlemen were managing the affairs of his kingdom; and that he himself was a mere pageant and a show. He had watched with satisfaction the growth of the difficulties which were besetting the path of his allies, and was not without a hope that their further development would be attended by our withdrawal from so troubled a sphere. It was plain to him that, although deference was outwardly shown to his opinions, and a pretence of consulting his wishes was made by his British advisers, they really held all the power in their hands; and he said, complainingly, to one

of them,* for whom he entertained no little personal affection, that he "did not understand his position." The appointment of the new minister, Oosman Khan, in the place of his old and tried servant, Moollah Shikore, had been extremely distasteful to him; and it chafed him to think that a functionary so appointed must necessarily be less eager to fulfil his wishes than those of his European allies.†

* Captain Macgregor.—[See *Macgregor's Report on the Causes of the Caubul Outbreak.*]

† The King's health too, began to fail him about this time, and Macnaghten began to consider the expediency of sending for the heir apparent. On the 5th of September, he wrote to Rawlinson, complaining that his Majesty, since the return of his family, had been in a very nervous and irritable state :

"September 5.—I have lately had a great deal of trouble with our good old King, who, since the arrival of his family, seems to have lost all his nerve and temper. But I hope to bring him round again soon, for he has a large stock of sterling good sense."

By the beginning of the third week of September, the King had worked himself into a fever :

"September 21.—His Majesty is ill of fever, which has been hanging about him for some time; and, at his time of life, the issue, to say the least of it, is very doubtful. It seems to be in the highest degree desirable that Shah-zadah Timour should be here, in the event of a fatal termination of his Majesty's illness. The Nizam-ood-Dowlah and I have had a serious conversation this morning on the subject. He thinks, and I am disposed to agree with him, that it might be well if Shah-zadah Timour were to address an areeza to his Majesty, stating how much grieved he was to hear of his Majesty's illness—the intelligence of which had filled him with so much uneasiness as to

incapacitate him from the proper performance of the duties of government, and expressing an earnest desire to come and kiss his Majesty's feet, and thereby give relief to his mind."

Next day, however, the King was better, and Macnaghten wrote :

"September 22.—I am happy to tell you that his Majesty is very much better to-day—so much so, indeed, that if you have not spoken to the Shah-zadah on the subject of my yesterday's note, I think it unnecessary to do so."

Prince Timour was, at this time, governor of Candahar. Futteh Jung had, in the first instance, been stationed at the western capital; but the atrocities he had committed compelled his removal. One of Macnaghten's letters (*September 21, 1840*) contains an abominable story, which had travelled to Caubul, hardly fit for publication, but horribly illustrative of the cruelty of the Prince. He was subsequently removed, and his brother, a very moderate and respectable man, sent to Candahar in his place. Sir Jasper Nicolls' *Journal* contains a notice of the Prince's removal: "Futteh Jung has just been removed by force from Candahar, for tyranny, extortion, drunkenness, and all manner of crimes. His removal was skilfully performed by Major Rawlinson. The fellow loaded his double-barrelled pistols when he suspected all was not right; but his attached servants were one by one called away, and his younger brother also, and he feared to act alone."—[*MS. Journal.*]

Macnaghten, indeed, was paramount at Caubul. But the days of his Afghan sovereignty were numbered. He was about to receive the reward of a life of successful and appreciated service, and to end his official days in comparative quiet and repose. He was about to escape out of the cares and inquietudes—the difficulties and dangers—the incessant harassing turmoil and excitement of a life of responsibility among a turbulent and discontented people, and to commence a new career of useful and honoured public service, upon a less stormy and tumultuous scene. He had been appointed Governor of Bombay. The same recognition of approved zeal and capacity which had been extended to Malcolm and Elphinstone, had now come to testify the estimation in which Macnaghten's services were held by his employers. It was a high and a flattering mark of confidence, and it was doubly welcome after all the doubts and misgivings engendered in his mind by the implied censures of his immediate superior. The value of the gift, too, was enhanced by the seasonableness of the time at which it was received. Macnaghten looked around him, and saw that "everything was quiet from Dan to Beersheba;" and he rejoiced in the thought that he was about to quit Afghanistan for ever, and to carry with him no burden of anxiety and fear.

Burnes was also at Caubul. He had been there ever since the restoration of the Shah, in a strange unrecognised position, of which it is difficult to give any intelligible account. He used to say, that he was in the "most nondescript of situations." It appears to have been his mission in Afghanistan to draw a large salary every month, and to give advice that was never taken.* This

* On the 1st of April, 1841, Burnes to his brother: "I am now a highly described his position thus, in a letter paid idler, having no less than 3500

might have satisfied many men. It did not satisfy Burnes. He said that he wanted responsibility; and under Macnaghten he had none. He had no precise duties of any kind; but he watched all that was going on in Afghanistan with a comprehending eye and an understanding brain, and he wrote, in the shape of letters to Macnaghten, long and elaborate papers on the state and prospects of Afghanistan, which his official chief dismissed with a few pencil-notes, for the most part of contemptuous dissent. Burnes saw clearly that everything was going wrong. He probed, deeply and searchingly, the great wound of national discontent—a mighty sore that was ever running—and he felt in his inmost soul that the death-throes of such a system could not be very remote. But better days were now beginning to dawn upon him. He had been waiting for Macnaghten's office, and now, at last, it seemed to be within his reach. A few weeks, and he would be supreme at Caubul; and the great object of his ambition gained.

The command of the troops was in the hands of General Elphinstone—an old officer of the Queen's service, of good repute, gentlemanly manners, and aristocratic connexions. He had succeeded Sir Willoughby Cotton in the early part of the year. But it must have been a wonder to him, as it was to all who knew him, what business he had in such a place. He had no Indian experience of any kind, and he was pressed down by physical infirmities. When Sir Willoughby Cotton intimated his desire, on the plea of ill health, to be relieved from the command of the troops in Afghanistan,

rupees a month as Resident at Caubul, and being, as the lawyers call it, only counsel, and that, too, a dumb one—

by which I mean that I give paper opinions, but I do not work them out."

there was an officer already in the country to whom their charge might have been safely delegated. But he was not in favour either at the Mission or at the Calcutta Government House. Sir Jasper Nicolls would have placed Nott in command; but there were obstacles to his appointment, at which I have already hinted; and it was deemed expedient to send to Caubul a man of a more ductile nature, with as few opinions of his own as might be, to clash with those of the political chief. So Lord Auckland despatched General Elphinstone to Afghanistan—not in ignorance of his disqualifications, for they were pointed out to him by others—but in spite of a clear perception of them. Whether those who sent the brave old gentleman to India with all his infirmities thick upon him, recommended him for this especial field of service, or whether any notions of routine and the obligations of the roster pressed themselves upon Lord Auckland with irresistible force, I cannot confidently declare; but so inexplicable by any reference to intelligible human motives and actions is an appointment of this kind, that it is impossible not to recognise in such a dispensation a mightier agency than that of man, or to reject the belief that, when Elphinstone went to Caubul, the curse which sate upon our unholy policy was working onward for our overthrow.

Next in rank to General Elphinstone were Sir Robert Sale and Brigadier Shelton—both officers of the Queen's service, but soldiers of long Indian experience. Each had served with his regiment in the Burmese war; and each had acquired a reputation for the highest personal courage. Sale's regiment was the 13th Light Infantry. Shelton's was the 44th.* Both of these regiments were

* Shelton had come up from India. His brigade was employed against the refractory tribes of the Sunghoo-

now at Caubul. But the 13th was about to return to India, and soon afterwards to Great Britain. It had seen many years of Indian service, and had been in Afghanistan since Keane's army first entered the country. The 44th had come up early in the year, and had done some service in the Naziain valley, near Jellalabad, on the way.

The main body of the British troops were in the new cantonments. These works had been erected in the course of 1840. They were situated on a piece of low ground open to the Kohistan road. They were extensive and ill defended. They were nearly a mile in extent, and were surrounded by ramparts so little formidable that they might be ridden over.* Near the cantonments was the Mission compound, occupying an extensive space, and surrounded by a number of houses and buildings belonging to the officers and retainers of the Mission. There was here, also, a weak attempt at defence; but the walls were beyond measure contemptible; and the whole expanse of building, the entrenched camp and Mission compound together, were so planted, as to be swept on every side by hills, and forts, and villages, and whatever else in such a country could bristle with armed men. No such works were ever known—so wretched in themselves, and so doubly wretched by position. If the object of those who constructed them had been to place our troops at the mercy of an enemy, they could not have been devised more cunningly in furtherance of such an end. They were commanded on

Khal in the month of February, and reduced them to a fitting state of subjection; but not without the loss of two valuable officers. Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, was blown to pieces, whilst endeavouring to force in, with powder, the gates of

a fort; and Captain Douglas, Assistant-Adjutant-General, was shot dead by the side of the Brigadier.

* A small pony, says Lieutenant Rattray, was backed by an officer to scramble down the ditch and over the wall.

every side; and so surrounded with villages, forts, gardens, and other cover for an enemy, that our troops could neither enter nor leave the camp without exposing themselves to a raking fire from some one of these points of attack. And to crown the calamity of the whole, the Commissariat supplies, on which our army depended for its subsistence, were stored in a small fort, not within, but beyond, the cantonments. The communication between the two places was commanded by an empty fort, and by a walled garden, inviting the occupation of an enemy. Human folly seemed to have reached its height in the construction of these works. There stood these great, indefensible cantonments, overawed on every side, a monument of the madness which Providence, for its own ends, had permitted to cloud and bewilder the intelligence of the "greatest military nation of the world." There it stood, a humiliating spectacle; but except by new comers, who stood in amazement before the great folly, little account was taken of it. Men's eyes had become accustomed to the blot.*

The English had by this time begun to settle them-

* A writer already quoted, of high authority on this point, says: "It has been already noted, that the tenacity of purpose displayed by the engineer, Durand, had forced Macnaghten and the reluctant Shah into the precaution of constructing barracks and occupying with troops the Balla Hissar; also, it has been mentioned, that the Envoy subsequently gave up these barracks to the Shah for the use of the 160 ladies and women of the Harem, and threw up all military hold of this important post. Sturt, Durand's successor, was in nowise participant in this grievous error: for he too pertinaciously advocated placing the troops in the

Balla Hissar, clearing it of all private houses, and rendering it a good stronghold. It is bitter to think, that had the repair of the works and their improvement been commenced in 1839, when urged by the first engineer, or even later, when again pressed by the second engineer, a tithe of the sums thrown away at Herat would have rendered the Balla Hissar, by November, 1841, a fortress impregnable, when held by a British garrison, against all that the disaffected Afghans could have brought before its walls." The same writer adds: "These grave errors had been committed, it must be remembered, in justice to the memory

selves down in Caubul. Indeed, from the very commencement, they had done their best, as they ever do, to accommodate themselves to new localities and new circumstances, and had transplanted their habits, and, I fear it must be added, their vices, with great address, to the capital of the Douranee Empire. It was plain that they were making themselves at home in the chief city of the Afghans. There was no sign of an intended departure. They were building and furnishing houses for themselves—laying out gardens—surrounding themselves with the comforts and luxuries of European life. Some had sent for their wives and children. Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, and other English women, were domesticated in comfortable houses within the limits of the great folly we had erected on the plain. The English, indeed, had begun to find the place not wholly unendurable. The fine climate braced and exhilarated them. There was no lack of amusement. They rode races; they played at cricket. They got up dramatic entertainments. They went out fishing; they went out shooting. When winter fell upon them, and the heavy frosts covered the lakes with ice, to the infinite astonishment of the Afghans they skimmed over the smooth surface on their skates. There is no want of manliness among the Afghans; but the manliness of the Feringhee strangers quite put them to shame. They did not like us the less for that. The athletic amusements of our people only raised their admiration. But there was something else which filled them with intensest hate.*

of the gallant, but luckless Elphinstone, before his arrival at Caubul. He at once observed them and sought to have them remedied; but holding a secondary place, the safety of his troops and their magazines was made likewise of secondary consideration,

and sacrificed to a false show of security."—[*Calcutta Review*.]

* For a pleasant descriptive sketch of the amusements of the English at Caubul, see Mr. Gleig's account of the *Operations of Sale's Brigade in Afghanistan*.

I am not writing an apology. There are truths which must be spoken. The temptations which are most difficult to withstand, were not withstood by our English officers. The attractions of the women of Caubul they did not know how to resist. The Afghans are very jealous of the honour of their women; and there were things done in Caubul which covered them with shame and roused them to revenge. The inmate of the Mahomedan Zenana was not unwilling to visit the quarters of the Christian stranger. For two long years, now, had this shame been burning itself into the hearts of the Caubulees; and there were some men of note and influence among them who knew themselves to be thus wronged. Complaints were made; but they were made in vain. The scandal was open, undisguised, notorious. Redress was not to be obtained. The evil was not in course of suppression. It went on till it became intolerable; and the injured then began to see that the only remedy was in their own hands. It is enough to state broadly this painful fact. There are many who can fill in with vivid personality all the melancholy details of this chapter of human weakness, and supply a catalogue of the wrongs which were soon to be so fearfully redressed.

Such, dimly traced in their social aspects, was the general condition of things at Caubul in this month of September, 1841. Politically—such was Macnaghten's conviction—everything was quiet from Dan to Beer-sheba. The noses of the Douranee Khans had, he said, "been brought to the grindstone;"* and the Gooroo and

* Macnaghten had by this time arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to adopt towards the Douranees the same harsh policy which had been pursued by the Barukzye Sirdars. He had brought many of the principal chiefs to Caubul, and was now endeavouring to extract

their claws. His letters written at this time exhibit his feelings towards the "blackguard Douranees."

"August 29.—The Douranee chiefs who have been in rebellion must be effectually humbled. And we must put it out of their power to attempt any further mischief. The Barukzye

other Ghilzye chiefs were in his safe keeping at Caubul, seemingly contented with their lot. As the month advanced, our prospects seemed to brighten. The Envoy continued to write that everything was "*couleur de rose*."*

Sirdars took the only effectual method of keeping these gentry quiet. We must never dream of conciliation. Terror is the only instrument which they respect.

"August 31.—These fellows must be crushed, and our only refuge from constant intrigue and disaffection is to show the hopelessness of both. In short, we must treat the Douranees as the Barukzye Sirdars treated them. The difference in our favour is, that we have better means of humiliating them.

"September 2.—All that I would urge is, that you impose very stringent conditions on these blackguard Douranees, so as to take the conceit thoroughly out of them, and to prevent the possibility of their being again impertinent. I have at length prevailed upon his Majesty to exercise a little wholesome severity towards the Moofsids of that class in Caubul. They were, night and day, meditating mischief, and striving to create disunion between us and the Shah. His Majesty, yesterday morning, required them to execute a *moochulka* promising that they would be loyal and obedient for the future. This, methinks, was no very severe obligation; yet they one and all (six of them) point-blank refused. I then recommended his Majesty to give them five days' law to prepare and proceed with their families to Peshawur. This, if his Majesty continues firm, will very shortly bring them to their senses, and we shall enjoy much *aram* for a long time to come.

"September 4.—The noses of the Khawaneen have now, I am happy to say, been brought to the grindstone. Seeing that his Majesty was firmly resolved on their expatriation, they are now as humble as they were before insolent.

"September 5.—I am glad that no executions have taken place—not because I think they are not required, but because experience teaches me that detraction is at work with regard to all our proceedings—that malevolence will magnify an act of retributive justice into a cold-blooded murder; and, moreover, that we can expect no support from our own government. When tranquillity is restored, let a list be made of the chief offenders selected for punishment, with a statement of the offences of each, and then let his Majesty determine the penalty."—[MS. Correspondence.]

* See Macnaghten's letters *passim*:

"September 5.—Everything has a favorable aspect for us; and Tezeen and Dehrawut having been subdued, a more solid foundation will have been laid for the tranquillity of this country than ever was dreamt of.

"September 15.—Our prospects in this country are brightening in every direction, and the Dehrawut expedition once successfully terminated, we shall have no other enemy to oppose us. The *Gooroo* and the other Ghilzye chiefs are safely located in the city of Caubul, and are quite *Koosh*.

"September 17.—I have told Lord A. that affairs have assumed a much more cheerful appearance since the date of my letter of July 22. Whether or not we shall have another brigade in lieu of the returning troops, will depend upon circumstances. My own opinion is, that we could easily do without them, unless operations beyond our present boundary are contemplated.

"September 20.—We are all quiet here; and I am in great hopes that we shall be able to come to an arrangement with Nijrow—the only thorn in our side. The Zoormut revenue has been realised with unex-

It is true that Pottinger was not sending in very favorable reports from the Kohistan and the Nijrow country, which were now his new sphere of action;* but of these troubles Macnaghten made light account. He believed that Pottinger was an alarmist. It is true that an expedition was going out to Zao, to reduce some turbulent robber tribes; but this necessity he attributed to the indiscretion of one of our own officers, who had needlessly attacked the place with insufficient means, and been compelled to beat a retreat.† The expedition, too, as Macnaghten said, was only a "little go;" and immensely popular with our officers, who were zealously volunteering for the sport.‡

amplified facility, and everything is *couleur de rose*."—[*MS. Correspondence*.]

* After leaving Herat, Pottinger had gone down to Calcutta in 1840; but had returned to Afghanistan, and been appointed political agent in the Kohistan, in May, 1841.

† "September 22.—Hay's foolish attack upon the fort of Zao has entailed upon us the necessity of sending out a force in that direction. It will consist of two infantry regiments, with a *quantum sufficit* of artillery and cavalry. I have long been impressed with the necessity of sending an expedition against the Khowajahs and other robber tribes; but I had hoped to postpone it till next season. After the punishment inflicted upon them by Outram in 1839, they were for some time quiet; but now their audacity has become again conspicuous. They have incessantly fired into our camps, and plundered and murdered our defenceless camp-followers. Were we not to raze to the ground the fort that resisted the Shah's authority, and harboured the robber chiefs, we might expect to be hourly insulted, and to have our dawks with Candahar cut off during the winter."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence*.]

‡ "September 25.—Our little go against Zao is very popular. Half the officers here are volunteering for the fray. I hope the thing will be done cleverly and completely. Nijrow will then be the only thorn in our side. Pottinger has a project of subjugating these wild mountaineers, and of seizing or ejecting the Moofsids, who have taken refuge in their territory, by employing the Ooloos, and at the same time marching through it the troops returning to Hindostan and Jellalabad. This would certainly form an overwhelming force—eighteen guns of sorts, two regiments of cavalry, and six regiments of infantry. I have submitted the plan to the General, but I do not know what he will say to it. Were the rebel Kohistanee chiefs expelled from Nijrow, I should beg of government to send us no more troops."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence*.] Brigadier Roberts says, that when the Kohistanee expedition of 1840, which nearly had such a disastrous termination, was first projected, it was looked upon as a mere party of pleasure, and that ladies were talking of joining it. It does not appear whether they had any notion of participating in the pleasures of the popular expedition to Zao.

The popular expedition into the Zoormut country was completely successful. Macgregor, who accompanied the force in the character of political adviser, found the rebellious forts evacuated. He had only, therefore, to destroy them. The results, however, of the movement were not wholly pacificatory. Pottinger said that the feeling which it engendered in the Kohistan was extremely unfavorable to us. It confirmed, he said, in the minds of the malcontents, "the belief so industriously spread of our difficulties, whilst rumours from Herat and Candahar of invasion, renewed rebellion, and disturbances, were again spread abroad."*

During the early part of October the Kohistanees remained perfectly quiet. But every hour, said Pottinger, "brought rumours of the formation of an extensive conspiracy." These he at first doubted; but he reported them to the Envoy, and asked for information on the subject. The answer was, that neither Macnaghten nor Burnes could perceive any grounds for suspicion.

In the mean while, the Eastern Ghilzyes were breaking out into revolt.† They had the same cause of complaint as the Kohistanees. The money-bag, which had kept them in order, was beginning to fail. It is a moot point whether revenge or avarice is the stronger feeling in the Afghan breast. Both were now arrayed against us. The bayonet and the money-bag were failing to do their work.

The expenses of the occupation of Afghanistan had long been telling fearfully upon the revenues of India. Lord Auckland had been slow to look the intolerable evil of this exhausting drain fairly in the face. But the other members of the Supreme Council had been less

* *Major Pottinger's Budeenabad Report.*

† Pottinger was of opinion that the Ghilzyes, the Kohistanees, and

the Douranees, were all leagued together; and that the compact between them was formed about the end of September.

slow to address themselves fully to the subject; and the home authorities had written out urgent letters regarding the miserable results of the continued occupation of a country that yielded nothing but strife. Looking at the matter in the most favorable point of view, it was found that the support of Shah Soojah cost the treasury of India at least a million and a quarter a year. The Court of Directors and the Board of Control, or that fusion of the two authorities known as the Secret Committee, had taken, before the close of 1840, a correct and statesman-like view of the subject, and had written out that they could see nothing in the continued support of Shah Soojah, who, it was plain, had no hold upon the affections of the people, to compensate for this alarming exhaustion of the financial resources of India, and the necessary injuries inflicted upon the people by such a fearful waste of the revenues of the country. And, in the spring of 1841, it had become a matter for serious consideration whether the policy, which had proved so utterly disastrous, should not be openly and boldly abandoned. The question came before the Supreme Council at the end of March.* Either by some negli-

* *Sir Jasper Nicolls' MS. Journal*—some passages of which may be cited in illustration of this part of the inner history of the war :

" *March 12.*—My letter of the 10th of November will be found difficult to parry after all ; and I regret to say that the immense expenditure cannot long be borne. A million a year will not cover our charges ; and Lord Auckland's answers to the last week's applications prove to me that he begins to feel it.

" *March 21.*—We are called upon to make early and large remittances to the Upper Provinces ; and fifty lakhs have been ordered (their requisitions increased in a week to eighty lakhs). Thirty lakhs went last week to Bombay, and twenty-nine are now at

Ferozepore, waiting for transmission. This will never do. Even if we had a firmer hold of Afghanistan than we have, we should be compelled to give it up, for a drain of a million a year will infallibly swamp us. Even a good share of the Punjaub would not cover this great charge. Lord Auckland is not inclined to look this in the face, and acknowledge by a loan the unfortunate result of our successes.

" *March 26.*—Lord Auckland sent home a long minute regarding Herat. . . . He means to preserve our footing in Afghanistan. Mr. Bird and Mr. Prinsep approve of this, though the latter roundly and justly asserts that it cannot be done under a crore and a quarter (a million and a quarter) annually ; and that no present mode

gence, or by some juggle, the opinions of the military members of Council were not obtained; but Lord Auckland and the civilians decided in favour of the continued occupation of the country, though it was certain that it could only be done at the cost of a million and a quarter a year. But money had already become painfully scarce. It was necessary to recruit the exhausted treasury. There was no other mode of accomplishing this than by opening a new loan. Such a public declaration of the embarrassed condition of the government was distressing to Lord Auckland; but nothing else was to be done. So at the end of March he drew up an advertisement for a five per cent. loan.* It is a remarkable instance of that kind of monomaniac blindness which besets some men, under peculiar conditions of existence, that when Macnaghten learnt that a new loan had been opened, he asked, "What can this be for?" and spoke of the war—in *China*! †

of extending our receipts to that extent, is open to us. Lord Auckland wrote a note to ask our opinions on the subject. Mr. Maddock never circulated the note. Sir W. Case-ment and myself were therefore silent. We are clearly in a great scrape. That country drains us of a million a year and more; and we only in truth are certain of the allegiance of the people within range of our guns and cavalry. . . . One part of Lord Auckland's paper only will be received for a time. He states our resources to be only a crore less than when we crossed the Indus. The Accountant-General says, that on the 30th of April we may expect the reduction to amount to three crores and three-quarters. I told Prinsep that he had been very complaisant not to point this out."

* *Sir Jasper Nicolls' MS. Journal, March 29.*—"At last the advertisement for a loan is prepared, and will shortly appear. Though Lord

Auckland did not advert to a deficiency of three-and-a-half crores in his paper on Afghanistan, he now acts upon it. This will force on the Court a decision as to our maintaining our position in that quarter at such a price, for they will assuredly never pay even the charges of the Shah.

"May 12.—Before I close this book (volume of the Journal), I would record my opinion that the whole thing will break down. We cannot afford the heavy, yet increasing drain upon us. Nine thousand troops between Quettah and Kura-chee; at least 16,000 of our army and the Shah's to the north of Quettah. The King's expenses to bear in part—twenty-eight political officers to pay, besides Macnaghten—Dost Mahomed's allowance—barracks—a fort or two to build—loss by exchange, &c., &c. To me it is alarming. The silver does not return, and it is becoming scarce."

† "You will have seen that Govern-

But the call was responded to but slowly.* Money did not come in freely, though it was going out with a freedom perhaps unexampled in the history of Indian finance; and the Court of Directors still continued to write out, as Sir Jasper Nicolls and others in India were declaring, that it had become necessary either to withdraw altogether from Afghanistan, or to fall back upon the alternative of a large augmentation of the army. As the year advanced, too, other influences were at work to move the Indian Government to consider more and more intently the subject of the continued drain upon the resources of India. Great Britain was on the eve of a change of ministry, which would settle in Downing-street a party of Conservative statesmen, and send to Calcutta one of their number, known to be hostile to the whole policy of the expedition across the Indus; and Macnaghten was already beginning to tremble at the thought of what he called prospectively an "unparalleled atrocity"—but what many would have regarded as an act of wisdom and justice—the withdrawal of the British army from Afghanistan. How strongly Macnaghten felt upon this subject, and in what manner he argued against it, may be gathered from a letter which, on the 25th of September, he addressed to the Governor of Agra. Still he continued to report that the whole country was quiet, and insisted that the Shah's force, aided by one European

ment is opening a new five per cent. loan. What can this be for? I apprehend it augurs ill for the Chinese settlement, and that we shall have that work to do over again."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson: April 20, 1841. MS. Correspondence.*]

* *Sir Jasper Nicolls' MS. Journal, May 20.*—"Here is a very untoward account of the Afghan finances. It will never do to have India drained of a million and a quarter annually for a rocky frontier, requiring about

25,000 men and expensive establishments to hold it even by threats as at present. The specie, too, is drawn away not to return. Little comes from China. How is it to end? Money is not rapidly subscribed to the loan, because it gains twelve to eighteen per cent. for short periods elsewhere—amongst natives, twenty-four per cent. or more. Unless a large accession of Punjaub territory comes in to connect us safely with Caubul, and to aid our very heavy expenses, we must withdraw."

regiment at Caubul, and another at Candahar, would be sufficient to keep the whole country in order :

. Rumours are rife as to the intentions of the Tories towards this country, when they get into power. If they deprive the Shah altogether of our support, I have no hesitation in saying (and that is saying a great deal) they will commit an unparalleled political atrocity. The consequences would be frightful. The act would not only involve a positive breach of treaty, but it would be a cheat of the first magnitude. Had we left Shah Soojah alone, after seating him on the throne, the case would have been different. He would have adopted the Afghan method of securing his sovereignty. But we insisted upon his acting according to European notions of policy, and we have left all his enemies intact—powerless, only because we are here. In short, we should leave him with all the odium of having called in the aid of foreign infidel auxiliaries, and with none of those safeguards which he himself would have provided for his security. How could we expect him, under such circumstances, to maintain his power ? I know that he would not attempt it. He would pack up his all, and return to his asylum in India, the moment our resolution was imparted to him. We have effectually prevented his forming a party for himself. In a few years hence, when the present generation of turbulent intriguers shall have been swept away, the task will be comparatively easy. As it is, the progress we have made towards pacifying, or rather subjugating (for neither the Douranees nor the Ghilzyes were ever before *subject* to a monarchy), is perfectly wonderful. The Douranee Kings kept these unruly tribes in good humour by leading them to foreign conquest. The Barukzye rulers kept them down by sharing their power with some, and sowing dissensions amongst others, by the most paltry and unjustifiable shifts and expedients, to which the Shah could not, if it were in his nature even, have recourse. Now the whole country is as quiet as one of our Indian chiefships, and more so—but the reaction would be tremendous if the weight of our power was suddenly taken off. There are gangs of robbers here and there which it would be desirable to extirpate; and I had intended to postpone this job till a more favorable opportunity; but you will see, from my official letters, that it has been forced upon me, by Captain Hay's proceedings, at an earlier period than I anticipated. We are well prepared, however, and

the coercion of these brigands will have an excellent effect all over the country. Dost Mahomed not only tolerated them, but went snacks in their spoils. After their dispersion shall have been effected, there will be literally nothing to do except the subjugation of Nijrow. Pottinger has a project for effecting this, without trouble or expense, by marching through their country the troops returning to Hindostan and Jellalabad. I have submitted this to the General; and should it be carried into effect, I shall beg of government to send us no more troops, for they would only be an encumbrance. A million and a quarter per annum is certainly an awful outlay; but if the items were examined, you would find that a full moiety of this is to be laid to the account of Mr. Bell's proceedings in Upper Sindh, where they have had an army, *cui bono* ? larger than the Army of the Indus. All this profligate expenditure will now cease, and, barring Herat, I am quite certain that the Shah's force would be ample, with the addition of one European regiment at Caubul and another at Candahar, to keep the entire country in order. I am, too, making great reduction in our political expenditure; and I feel certain that, in a very short time, an outlay of thirty lakhs per annum will cover, and more than cover, all our expenses. The process of macadamization (which, notwithstanding the present lull, I cannot but consider as near at hand) would reduce our outlay to nothing. I should not be surprised to see Colonel Stoddart and Arthur Conolly walking in any fine morning. I am glad you approved of the wig I conveyed to the latter. I am satisfied it adverted from him worse consequences. His enthusiasm, which I found it impossible to repress, is continually leading him into scrapes.* . . .

Such, at the close of September, were Macnaghten's views of our continued occupation of Afghanistan. But, before this, the letters of the Court of Directors, the orders of the Supreme Government, and the portentous shadow of the coming Tory ministry, had roused Macnaghten to a sense of the great fact that it was necessary to do something to render less startlingly and offensively conspicuous the drain upon the resources of India, which was exhausting the country, and para-

* MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.

lysing the energies of its rulers. So it was determined to carry into effect a system of economy, to be applied wherever it could be applied, to the expenditure of Afghanistan; and, as ordinarily happens, both in the concerns of public and of private life, the retrenchments which were first instituted were those which ought to have been last. Acting in accordance with the known wishes of government, Macnaghten began to retrench the stipends, or subsidies, paid to the chiefs. He knew how distasteful the measure would be; he was apprehensive of its results. But money was wanted, and he was compelled to give it effect.*

The blow fell upon all the chiefs about the capital—upon the Ghilzyes, upon the Kohistanees, upon the Caubulees, upon the Momunds, even upon the Kuzzilbashes.† Peaceful remonstrance was in vain. So they held secret meetings, and entered into a confederacy to overawe the existing government, and to recover what they had lost. Foremost in this movement were the Eastern Ghilzyes. Affected by the general retrenchments, they had also particular grievances of their own.‡ They were the first, therefore, to throw off the mask. So they quitted Caubul—occupied the passes on the road to Jellalabad—plundered a valuable cafila—and

* The retrenchments, too, were to touch the Court. "I have suggested sundry retrenchments," he wrote to Rawlinson, "which, though necessary, will be most unpalatable to his Majesty and his myrmidons."

† "In carrying out the system of economy, the Kuzzilbashes, Caubulees, Kohistanees, Ghilzyes, and Momunds, were alike sufferers. Deputations were sent on their part to the Nizam-ood-Dowlah, to Sir William H. Macnaghten, and to the Shah, to seek redress; but their complaints being unattended to, they all united heartily to resist and upset, if possible, a measure so obnoxious to them. Secret meetings were held,

oaths were taken to support each other, and a plan of operations was formed."—[*Report of Captain Macgregor. MS. Records.*]

‡ "The Ghilzyes, however, had another grievance—viz., that during the rule of Ameer Mahomed Khan (Dost Mahomed's brother), who had managed partially to subdue this wild tribe, and had effected a reduction in their pay of 13,000 rupees, this was restored to them in 1839, on the return of the Shah; but it was again reduced on the present occasion. Further, they were held responsible for thefts committed beyond their respective boundaries."—[*Captain Macgregor's Report. MS. Records.*]

entirely cut off our communications with the provinces of Hindostan.

Upon this, Humza Khan, the governor of the Ghilzyes, was sent out to bring them back to their allegiance. "Humza Khan," wrote Macnaghten to Macgregor, on the 2nd of October, "who is at the bottom of the whole conspiracy, has been sent out by his Majesty to bring back the Ghilzye chiefs who have fled; but I have little hope of the success of his mission."* Humza Khan, whose own stipend was included in the general retrenchment, had been commissioned to carry the obnoxious measure into effect; and he had instigated the chiefs to resist it. He was now sent out to quell a disturbance of which he was himself the parent and the nurse.

These movements did not at first much alarm Macnaghten. He was intent upon his departure from Caubul; and he said that the outbreak had happened at a fortunate moment, as his own party and the troops proceeding to the provinces could take them *en route* to India.† But a few days afterwards he began to take a

* *MS. Records.* See the Duke of Wellington's Comments on this Subject in the Appendix.

† "October 3.—You will have heard ere now of my appointment to Bombay. I could wish that this most honourable distinction had been withheld a little longer, until I could have pronounced our relations in this country as being entirely satisfactory; but, thanks in a great measure to your zealous co-operation, I may even now say, that everything is rapidly verging to that happy consummation. No time is fixed for my departure. That will depend upon the instructions I receive from Lord Auckland. Should his Lordship direct me to deliver over my charge to Burnes, there is little or nothing, that I know of, to detain me, and I ought to be in Bombay by the

middle of December. I am suffering a little anxiety just now, as the Eastern Ghilzye chiefs have turned *Yaghee*, in consequence, I believe, of the reduction of their allowances, and their being required to sign an *itte-zain* against robberies. We have sent to bring them back to their allegiance, and I think there will be no difficulty about them, unless the root of the *Fussad* lies deeper, and they are, as some assert, in league with Mahomed Akbar. In that case, it will be necessary to undertake operations on a larger scale against Nijrow and Tugao, in the latter of which districts the Moofsids have taken refuge. They are very kind in breaking out just at the moment most opportune for our purposes. The troops will take them *en route* to India. To-

more serious view of the matter; and he urged Macgregor to return with all despatch to Caubul, that he might accompany the expedition he was about to send out against the rebels. But at the same time he wrote to Rawlinson, that he did not apprehend any open opposition; and he never seemed to doubt that the insurrectionary movement would promptly be put down.*

Sale's brigade, which was returning to the provinces, was, it has been seen, to stifle the insurrection *en route* to Jellalabad. Macnaghten, however, thought of strengthening the force, with a view to the operations against the Ghilzyes, and he wrote to Captain Trevor, who, pending the arrival of Macgregor, was holding the enemy in negotiation, that he believed the General would send out "two eight-inch mortars, two iron nine-pounder guns, Abbott's battery, the 5th Cavalry, the Sappers and Miners, and the 13th Queen's, with the 35th and 37th Native Infantry."† But he continued to talk of the "impudence of the rascals," and expressed his belief that, the insurrection put down, the country would be quieter than ever.‡ On the 9th of October, Colonel Monteith marched

morrow I hope our expedition will reach the refractory forts of Zao, and teach them a most salutary lesson."—[Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. *MS. Correspondence.*]

* "Oct. 7.—The Eastern Ghilzyes are kicking up a row about some deductions which have been made from their pay. The rascals have completely succeeded in cutting off our communications for the time being, which is very provoking to me at this juncture; but they will be well trounced for their pains. I have succeeded in sowing dissensions among them, which will, *Inshallah!* make some of them [*obscure in MS.*] A force will move out against them to-morrow or next day, but I do not apprehend any open opposition. . . .

"I hope to be off from this in eight

or ten days. I shall leave a paper of instructions with Burnes. The country, I trust, will be left in a state of tranquillity, with the exception of the Ghilzyes, between this and Jellalabad, and I hope to settle their hash on the road down, if not before."—[*Ibid.*]

† The 37th Native Infantry and the 5th Cavalry were not a part of the relieved brigade.

‡ "October 11.—One down, t'other come on, is the principle with these vagabonds; and lucky for us that it is so. No sooner have we put down one rebellion than another starts up. The Eastern Ghilzyes are now in an uproar, and our communications with Jellalabad are completely cut off. This state of things—*Inshallah!*—will not last long. Only imagine the impu-

from Caubul, with the 35th Native Infantry, a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, two guns of Abbott's battery under Dawes, and Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners. That night his camp was attacked at Bootkhak—the first march on the Jellalabad road. On the 10th, therefore, Sale received orders to march at once with the 13th, and on the following day he started to clear the passes. On the 12th, Sale entered the defile of Khoord-Caubul. The enemy occupied the heights in considerable force, and, in their own peculiar style of warfare, opened a galling fire upon our advancing column. Sale was wounded at the first onset, and Dennie took command of the troops. He spoke with admiration of "the fearless manner in which the men of the 13th, chiefly young soldiers, ascended heights nearly perpendicular under the sharp fire of the insurgents." And added, that the Sepoys of the 35th, who had fought under him at Bameean, "rivalled and equalled them in steadiness, activity, and intrepidity."* The pass was cleared, and then the 13th retraced its steps to Boot-

dence of the rascals in having taken up a position, with four or five hundred men, in the Khoord-Caubul Pass, not fifteen miles from the capital. I hope they will be driven out of that either to-day or to-morrow; but the pass is an ugly one to force. They fired last night upon the 35th Regiment, and succeeded in killing or wounding twenty-four Sepoys. Tugao has been the nursery, and Humza Khan the dry-nurse of this insurrection. Tugao will be visited, I hope, in a day or two, and I have solicited his Majesty to put Humza in durance vile, and to confiscate all his property. This *émule* of ours is particularly provoking just as I am about to quit Afghanistan. I had hoped to leave the country in perfect tranquillity; and I still think that it will be quieter

than ever it was, after the insurrection is put down. It is particularly provoking that Macgregor is absent with a large portion of our force at this juncture. My accounts from Burn at Gundamuck are very satisfactory. The efforts of the rebels to raise the tribes are as unavailing as incessant. His Majesty's name has been freely used, as usual; no wonder—it is a tower of strength; but never was a more foul calumny uttered than that which would associate his Majesty with our enemies." — [Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. *M.S. Correspondence*.

* Captain Younghusband, of the 35th, Captain Wade, the Brigade-Major of the force, and Lieutenants Mein and Oakes, of the 15th, were wounded in this affair.

khak, whilst Monteith, with the 35th and the other details, was left encamped in the Koord-Caubul valley.

In the mean while, Macgregor had returned from the Zoomut country. Macnaghten had known him long, and had abundant confidence in the man.* He had for some time been employed in political superintendence of the country between Caubul and Jellalabad, and by an admirable union of the vigorous and the conciliatory in his treatment of the tribes, had won both their respect and their affection. The Envoy now believed that Macgregor would soon restore the country to tranquillity, and was impatient until his return. Macgregor reached Caubul on the 11th of October, and soon started for Monteith's camp. Macnaghten, who believed that the outbreak was local and accidental, looked with eagerness to the result. He took little heed of what was going on in the Kohistan. Nor did he think that the Douranee Khans, whose "noses he had brought to the grindstone," were plotting their emancipation from the thralldom of the infidels.

But Pottinger, in the Kohistan, plainly saw the storm that was brewing—plainly saw the dangers and difficulties by which he was surrounded. As the month of October advanced, the attitude of the Kohistanees and the Nijrowees was more and more threatening. Meer Musjedee had been, some time before, described in the newspapers paragraphs of the day as stalking about the country, and sowing broad-cast the seeds of rebellion. The measures of the King's government had long before made these very people, who had risen up

* Macgregor, an officer of the Bengal Artillery, had been one of Lord Auckland's *aides-de-camp*, and had accompanied, as has been shown, the British Mission, despatched under

Macnaghten, to negotiate the Tripartite treaty. He subsequently accompanied the Envoy to Caubul, and was always in his confidence.

against the tyranny of Dost Mahomed, ripe for revolt against the more consummate tyranny of the Shah. And now, in the middle of October, Pottinger saw that the state of things was fast approaching a crisis; so he demanded hostages from the Kohistanee chiefs. To this the Envoy reluctantly consented. "And," wrote Pottinger, in his official account of these transactions, "I only succeeded in procuring them by the end of the month, when everything betokened a speedy rupture with the Nijrowees." By this time, indeed, Meer Musjedee had openly raised the standard of revolt, and the people were clustering around it.

Macnaghten thought very lightly of these movements in the Kohistan. Nothing disturbed his faith in the general tranquillity of the country, and the popularity of the double government. He greatly desired the settlement of the Ghilzye question, for there was something palpable and undeniable in such a movement; and he was anxious to set his face towards the provinces of Hindostan. Eagerly, therefore, he looked for intelligence from Macgregor. He had begun, however, to doubt whether so troublesome a business could be settled by peaceful negotiation. "We must thrash the rascals, I fear, after all," he wrote to Macgregor, on the 17th; "but I don't think that the troops will be under weigh until the 20th. Is not this provoking? Abbott has made some excuse about his guns being injured. Pray write a circumstantial plan of the best means of surrounding and preventing the escape of the villains."* Abbott was not a man to make excuses of any kind, but the Envoy was becoming impatient. On the 18th, he wrote again: "It has been determined that the Sappers and miners, the mountain train, and two companies of the

* *Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 17, 1841. MS. Records.*

37th Native Infantry, march out to join you to-morrow morning. They will make one march to Khoord-Caubul. The next day I hope you will be joined by the 13th, the 37th, and Abbott's battery. I hope you will arrange the plan of attack before Sale arrives."* But although Macnaghten was eager to "thrash the rascals," certain prudential considerations suggested to him that it would only be expedient to punish them as much as could "conveniently" be done. It would not be convenient, at such a time, to exasperate the insurgents too much, and drive them to block up the passes, and plunder everything that came in their way.†

In the mean while, Monteith, in his isolated post in the Khoord-Caubul valley, was exposed, if not to some danger, to considerable inconvenience, for the enemy made a night attack upon their camp, aided by the treachery of the Afghan horsemen,‡ who admitted them within their lines. One of our officers, Lieutenant Jenkins, and several Sepoys, were killed; and a number of camels carried off by the enemy. Monteith reported the treachery of his Afghan friends, and the Envoy resented his just suspicions.§ But he was now to be relieved.

* *Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 18, 1841. MS. Records.*

† "With regard to Tezeen, I wish to leave matters very much to your discretion. But the season is far advanced, and if the rebels are very humble, I would not be too hard unto them. But Gool Mahomed can have nothing but war, and the defences of Khoda Buxsh's fort must be demolished; he can only have the reduced Mowajib, and the plundered property must be restored. Hostages must be furnished by both; the more we can conveniently punish these rascals, the better; but I should be sorry to hear of their bolting, probably to enew their depredations; but you

must judge for the best on the spot—a thousand things may happen which I cannot foresee."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: October 19, 1841. MS. Records.*]

‡ The Shah's Hazir-bashi. There was no doubt of their treachery, and next day Macgregor sent them back to Caubul.

§ "Monteith's official letter is so full of the treachery of the whole party, I believe the General will send it back to him for reconsideration. If he had clear proof against the party, he should have summarily executed the whole of them. If his accusation rests on suspicion alone, he has acted most unwisely and most unjustly. It is a very convenient and a very com-

Sale appeared with two more infantry regiments, with more guns, and more sabres; and after a brief halt, for want of carriage, which much tried the patience of the Envoy,* the whole swept on to Tezeen. Here the force halted for some days, and Macgregor busied himself in negotiations with the enemy. Macnaghten had instructed him to accommodate matters, if it could be done without any loss of honour; and Macgregor was candid enough to acknowledge that the insurrection of the Ghilzyes had been brought about by "harsh and unjust" measures of our own; so he opened a communication with the rebel chiefs; and, being known to most of them, consented to a personal interview. So Macgregor met

mon process to ascribe to our Afghan allies every calamity that befalls us. But why were the camels committed to such custody? Their loss is very provoking in every way, but I trust they will soon be recovered. Sale will be with you to-morrow, and you will advance upon Tezeen the next day."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor: Oct. 19, 1841.*]

* "October 21.—Our troops have halted to-day at Khoord-Caubul for want of camels ! ! ! I had hoped, ere evening, to have announced to you the capture or dispersion of the Tezeen rebels; but of this there is no hope till to-morrow. Our people in this quarter have a happy knack of *bitching* matters. However, let that pass. All's well that ends well. In the mean time, it is very satisfactory to think that, notwithstanding we had rebellion at our very doors, not a single tribe has joined the rebels. The interruption of our communications is very provoking, but the road will soon be opened. . . . I do not think I can possibly get away from this before the 1st proximo. The storm will speedily subside; but there will be a heaving of the billows for some time, and I should like to see everything right and tight before I quit the helm.

Burnes is naturally in an agony of suspense about the succession to me. I think, and hope, he will get it. I know no one so fit for the office. *Quies non movere* is his motto; and, now that tranquillity is restored (or will be in a day or two), all that is required will be to preserve it. I hardly know how to answer your separate note of the 15th, received this morning; but I can assure you I feel exceedingly proud at having gained your good opinion. We have had a very trying time of it since we were first officially associated, and it was no wonder that you, occupying as you did the post of danger, should have occasionally yielded to despondency, especially when under the influence of severe illness. But in all other respects you have given me entire satisfaction, and I feel that we are mainly indebted to your temper, judgment, and energy, for overcoming the numerous difficulties by which we have been surrounded. Wherever I go, I shall carry with me a pleasing recollection of your friendship, and of the laborious and successful operations which have fallen to our joint lot."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence.*]

the chiefs. There was a long and animated discussion.* They demanded that their salaries should be restored to their former footing; and to this Macgregor consented. Other demands were made and resisted altogether, or conceded to with some qualification; and it was supposed that the Ghilzye affair had been "patched up after a fashion;" not, perhaps, without some loss of dignity, but with as much vigour as was convenient at the time. At all events, Macnaghten was able to report that the affair was settled.†

* "I met them according to their own desire, being accompanied by Captain James Paton (who wished to examine more closely the fort, in case we might find it necessary to proceed against it), my Persian writer, and an orderly Sowar, for I thought, by throwing myself completely on their mercy, I should be more likely to secure their protection. The chiefs demanded that their salaries should be placed on their former footing—that they should not be held responsible for thefts committed beyond their respective boundaries, and that Gool Mahomed Khan should be reinstated as their chief. To the two first-mentioned demands I agreed, but to the last I objected, for by displacing Burkutt Khan, who had been appointed to the chiefship (on Gool Mahomed having joined in the rebellion), the honour of the government would have been compromised. This led to a long and warm discussion; but the chiefs, finding that on this point I was firm, yielded to me, and I returned to camp. On the 25th they sent in their agents to remain with me, and to make arrangements for re-establishing the Thannahs and Dāk Chokies, &c. The next day we left Tezeen for Gundamuck. Although I felt a little doubtful in my own mind as to the good faith of the chiefs, Gool Mahomed and Mahomed Shah Khan (they not appearing to be satisfied), in the promised fulfilment of their engagements, still I saw no good reason why they

should not act up to them if they consulted their own interests; and any infraction of the treaty might be resented at Gundamuck, when the chiefs would be far more tangible than in their present position, from which to extricate the troops, in itself formed an object of much solicitude to me." —[*Captain Macgregor's Report. MS. Records.*]

† "October 26.—I am glad that affairs have been settled; and I conclude that you have got such assurances, whether by hostages of a sufficient description or otherwise, to satisfy you that there is no intention of breaking out again when they catch us off our guard. I have just got a note from Pottinger, who evidently writes in great trepidation. He says the Nijrowees are coming down to attack him. But I have no doubt that the storm will blow over, when they hear of the settlement of the Ghilzye question."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor. MS. Correspondence.*]

"October 26.—I have not much time to spare to-day, but I cannot resist writing, to tell you that our Ghilzye differences are brought to a settlement. I cannot say a most satisfactory one. But we are well out of the scrape, as we are positively unable to compete with these mountaineers and their jezails. . . . If we expect to keep the people of this country in order, we must get two or three regiments of moun-

He thought the terms granted to the rebels were too favorable; and the King was dissatisfied with them;* but the Envoy replied that it was the treachery of the Shah's own people that had paralysed the efforts of our negotiators. Indeed, it was known that people about the Court had left Caubul for the purpose of joining in a night attack upon our troops. Still Macnaghten could

taineers from different tribes, and arm them with the jezail of the country. In the mean time, we are lucky in having patched up this quarrel. The worst part of the transaction is our having conceded to Khoda Buksh, one of the chief rebels, his mowajib, on the old footing, without deductions. The best part of it is, our having persuaded the confederates to throw overboard Gool Mahomed, one of their number, and to recognise Burkutt Khan as the chief of Jubbar Kheil. They were very averse to this, and stood out against it for a long time. Pottinger writes as if he were about to be invaded by the Nijrowees, but I imagine there is little ground for this alarm, and that at all events the fellows will sneak into their holes again when they hear that the Ghilzies are quiet. If all is quiet, I intend being off on the 1st proximo.

" . . . There is no use in my saying anything about Akrum, as I presume he is past praying for. But if Futteh Khan put to death his renowned father, Meer Aulum, the Prince need have little hesitation about putting to death the son."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Major Rawlinson. MS. Correspondence.*]

* "October 27.—I do not entertain the smallest doubt of the policy of your proceedings, or of the wisdom of your granting such favorable terms to the rebels. His Majesty sent for me this morning before breakfast. He was evidently much dissatisfied; but I proved to him that, if the terms granted were less stringent than they should have been, the fault lay with his own traitorous servants, who con-

spired with the enemy and paralysed our troops. He promised to seize Mahomed Ali Meer Khan this day, and to make an example of him if his treason were proved. I am almost satisfied of the fellow's guilt, and think that Gool Mahomed's letter must have been intended for our perusal. His Majesty particularly dwelt upon the description of hostages. He said they were justens, &c. I explained to his Majesty that these people were not sent as hostages, but merely to assist our troops, and to be the medium of a friendly communication, until the chiefs acquired sufficient confidence to send their relatives. I wish you could prevail upon them to do this. You might say that, until this was done, his Majesty never could feel assured of their sincerity, and that consequently the door will always be open to future misunderstanding. I understand that four companies of the 54th, with the cavalry and artillery, march to-morrow morning as an escort to the sick, &c.

"I shall probably make a start on Monday morning, the 1st proximo, that is, if everything is quiet; but matters have still a threatening appearance in the direction of the Kohistan, and I dread to open the letters I receive from Pottinger, but I sincerely trust that the accommodation of our differences with the Ghilzies will have the effect of keeping quiet the Moofsids in that quarter. I am a good deal bothered, as you may imagine, just now. Now that my departure is so near, every fellow is having at me."—[*Sir W. H. Macnaghten to Captain Macgregor. MS. Correspondence.*]

not believe that there was any wide-spread feeling of disaffection among the chiefs and the people of Caubul; nor when Pottinger sent in gloomy reports from the Kohistan, could he bring himself to think that they were anything but the creations of a too excitable brain.*

Macgregor soon learnt the value of his treaty. From

* "Oct. 27.—The Eastern Ghilzye affair having been patched up after a fashion, our friends have condescended to open the road, and I have been very busy all day writing letters. . . I take my departure, barring any more rows, on the 1st proximo; but I shall retain charge of my office until I reach Ferozepore. I am trembling lest there should be a row in the Kohistan, which Pottinger constantly threatens, though, I believe, without sufficient reason. The settlement of the Ghilzye question will, I dare say, keep the Moofsids quiet in that quarter. Nothing, however, that has occurred in this country has annoyed me so much as the mode in which this settlement has been effected; but I have not yet got the particulars, and I have the fullest reliance on the judgment and discretion of Macgregor, by whom the negotiation was conducted.

"Oct. 29.—I am glad to find, from your letter of the 26th, which reached me this morning, that the execution of that incorrigible malefactor Akrum was conducted so quietly. It is as well, perhaps, that the Prince spared the ears of Yar Mahomed [Akrum's nephew], as these mutilations are very shocking; but does he not deserve perpetual imprisonment? Our affairs in this quarter are gradually settling down into tranquillity; but we have an ugly matter upon our hands. The Shah's Meer Akhor, who with eighty horse was in Monteith's camp on the night of the Shubkoom, is said to have dealt foully with us, and I fear, if his guilt is proved, that I shall have a great deal of difficulty in procuring his execution. His Majesty is naturally averse to believe that one of his

dependents could have behaved so treacherously, as he rightly conjectures that a large portion of the disgrace of such rascality will be reflected on himself. But I shall endeavour to persuade him that he will incur a still larger portion of it if he hesitate about inflicting the most signal punishment on the guilty individual. I tremble, indeed, to think of the consequences which must ensue if his Majesty fails in his duty in this respect. But his natural good sense and devotion to us will, I hope, come to his rescue. Macgregor's letters (his last was dated the day before yesterday, from Kutta Sung) lead me to hope that the few robbers, by whom alone the road is now infested, will speedily disperse. I trust I have at last got Pottinger into a pacific mood, though I tremble when I open any of his letters, lest I should find that he has got to loggerheads with some of his neighbours. In the present excited state of men's minds, a row in any quarter would be widely infectious, and we are not in a condition to stand much baiting. You may rely on hearing from me when anything of interest takes place. The rebels had very favorable terms given them by Macgregor. He acted wisely in acting leniently; and it is rather fortunate that they had a good grievance. They had been required to give an ittzaim for thefts by Ghilzyes whenever committed, and this was *jubbur* of the most intolerable kind. But the rascally Governor, Humz Khan, who excited the chiefs to rebellion, took care that I should know nothing of what was going on."—[*MS. Correspondence of Sir W. H. Macnaghten.*]

Tezeen to Gundamuck the agents of the Ghilzye chiefs were in our camp; but there was some hard fighting for the brigade. The enemy mustered in force, and attacked our column; and the old excuse was made, that it was owing to no faithlessness on the part of the chiefs, but to their inability to control the tribes. It was a terrible country for a baggage-encumbered force to toil through, in the face of an active enemy. Jugdulluck was gained with little opposition; but, on the next march, it was seen that the heights were bristling with armed men, and a heavy fire was poured in from all the salient points, on which, with the instincts of the mountaineer, they had posted themselves, with such terrible effect. Sale threw out his flanking parties, and the light troops, skirmishing well up the hill-sides, dislodged the enemy, whilst a party under Captain Wilkinson, pushing through the defile, found that the main outlet had not been guarded, and that the passage was clear. The march was resumed; but the enemy were not yet weary of the contest. Reappearing in great numbers, they fell furiously upon our rear-guard, and, for a time, our people, thus suddenly assailed, were in a state of terrible disorder. The energetic efforts of our officers brought back our men to a sense of their duty, and restored the confidence, which, for a little space, had forsaken the young soldiers. Broadfoot, Backhouse, and Fenwick, are said to have rallied and reanimated them. But the loss that fell upon them was heavy—more than a hundred men were killed and wounded; and among them was Captain Wyndham, of the 35th, who fell like a brave soldier in the unequal fight.*

* "The only officer killed, Wyndham, a captain of the 35th Native Infantry, fell nobly. Himself lame from a hurt, he had dismounted at that moment of peril to save the life of a wounded soldier, by bearing him from the combat on his charger. When the rear-guard broke before

Sale halted at Gundamuck. Macnaghten heard of the loss sustained between Jugdulluck and Soorkhab, but wrote to Macgregor, on the 1st of October, that he "hoped the business last reported was the expiring effort of the rebels;" and that the party would have dispersed, and thannahs been re-established.* To Major Rawlinson he wrote on the same day, and congratulated him on the tranquil appearance that affairs had assumed in the direction of Candahar. It was now the very day that he had fixed upon for his departure from Caubul; and still he did not doubt for a moment that his emancipation was close at hand.

the onset of the Ghilzyes, Wyndham, swords and knives of an unsparing
 unable to keep pace with the pur- foe."—[*Calcutta Review.*]
 sued, turned, fought, and, over- * *MS. Correspondence.*
 powered by numbers, fell beneath the

A P P E N D I X.

[Vol. I., Page 70.]

*Preliminary Treaty with Persia, concluded by Sir Harford Jones,
on the 12th of March, 1809.*

In the Name of Him who is ever necessary, who is all-sufficient,
who is everlasting, and who is the only Protector.

IN these times, distinguished by felicity, the excellent Ambassador, Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Member of the Honourable Imperial Ottoman Order of the Crescent, has arrived at the Royal City of Teheran, in quality of ambassador from his Majesty the King of England (titles), bearing his Majesty's credential letter, and charged with full powers munited with the great seal of England, empowering him to strengthen the friendship and consolidate the strict union subsisting between the high states of England and Persia. His Majesty the King of Persia (titles), therefore, by a special firmaun delivered to the said ambassador, has appointed the most excellent and noble Lords Meerza Mahomed Sheffeh, qualified with the title of Moatumed-ed-Dowlah, his first vizier, and Hajee Mahomed Hoossein Khan, qualified with the title of Ameen-ed-Dowlah, one of the ministers of record, to be his plenipotentiaries to confer and discuss with the aforesaid ambassador of his Britannic Majesty, all matters and affairs touching the formation and consolidation of friendship, alliance, and strict union between the two high states, and to arrange and finally conclude the same for the benefit and advantage of both kingdoms. In consequence whereof, after divers meetings and discussions, the aforesaid plenipotentiaries have resolved that the following articles are for the benefit and advantage of both the high states, and are hereafter to be accordingly for ever observed.

Art. I. That as some time will be required to arrange and

form a definitive treaty of alliance and friendship between the two high states, and as the circumstances of the world make it necessary for something to be done without loss of time, it is agreed these articles, which are to be regarded as preliminary, shall become a basis for establishing a sincere and everlasting definitive treaty of strict friendship and union; and it is agreed that the said definitive treaty, precisely expressing the wishes and obligations of each party, shall be signed and sealed by the said plenipotentiaries, and afterwards become binding on both the high contracting parties.

II. It is agreed that the preliminary articles, formed with the hand of truth and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered, but there shall arise from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever between the two most serene kings, their heirs, successors, their subjects, and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and countries.

III. His Majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that from the date of these preliminary articles, every treaty or agreement he may have made with any one of the powers of Europe becomes null and void, and that he will not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India, or towards the ports of that country.

IV. In case any European forces have invaded, or shall invade, the territories of his Majesty the King of Persia, his Britannic Majesty will afford to his Majesty the King of Persia, a force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy, with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, &c., and officers, to the amount that may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force so invading; and the number of these forces, or the amount of the subsidy, ammunition, &c., shall be hereafter regulated in the definitive treaty. In case his Majesty the King of England should make peace with such European power, his Britannic Majesty shall use his utmost endeavours to negotiate and procure a peace between his Persian Majesty and such power. But if (which God forbid) his Britannic Majesty's efforts for this purpose should fail of success, then the forces or subsidy, according to the amount mentioned in the definitive treaty, shall still continue in the service of the King of Persia as long as the said European forces shall remain in the territories of his Persian Majesty, or until peace is concluded between his Persian Majesty and the said

European power. And it is further agreed, that in case the dominions of his Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other power, his Majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force for the protection of the said dominions, according to the stipulations contained in the definitive treaty.

V. If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia, and, by the consent of his Persian Majesty, landed on the island of Karrak, or at any of the Persian ports, they shall not in any manner possess themselves of such places; and, from the date of these preliminary articles, the said detachment shall be at the disposal of his Majesty the King of Persia, except his Excellency the Governor-General of India judges such detachment necessary for the defence of India, in which case they shall be returned to India, and a subsidy, in lieu of the personal services of these troops, shall be paid to his Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be settled in the definitive treaty.

VI. But if the said troops remain, by the desire of his Majesty the King of Persia, either at Karrak, or any other port in the Gulf of Persia, they shall be treated by the governor there in the most friendly manner, and orders shall be given to all the governors of Farsistan, that whatever quantity of provisions, &c., may be necessary, shall, on being paid for, be furnished to the said troops at the fair prices of the day.

VII. In case war takes place between his Persian Majesty and the Afghans, his Majesty the King of Great Britain shall not take any part therein, unless it be at the desire of both parties, to afford his mediation for peace.

VIII. It is acknowledged the intent and meaning of these preliminary articles are defensive. And it is likewise agreed, that as long as these preliminary articles remain in force, his Majesty the King of Persia shall not enter into any engagements inimical to his Britannic Majesty, or pregnant with injury or disadvantage to the British territories in India.

This treaty is concluded by both parties in the hope of its being everlasting, and that it may be productive of the most beautiful fruits of friendship between the two most serene kings.

In witness whereof we, the said plenipotentiaries, have hereunto set our hands and seals in the royal city of Teheran, this twelfth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand

eight hundred and nine, answering to the twenty-fifth of Mohurru el Haram, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and twenty-four.

(L.S.)	HARFORD JONES.
(L.S.)	MAHOMED SHEFFEH.
(L.S.)	MAHOMED HOOSSEIN.

[Vol. I., page 83.]

Treaty with Runjeet Singh, the Rajah of Lahore, dated 25th April, 1809.

Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the British Government and the Rajah of Lahore have been happily and amicably adjusted; and both parties being anxious to maintain the relations of perfect amity and concord, the following articles of treaty, which shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the two parties, have been concluded by Rajah Runjeet Singh on his own part, and by the agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire, on the part of the British Government.

Art. I. Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the state of Lahore. The latter shall be considered, with respect to the former, to be on the footing of the most favoured powers; and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the River Sutlej.

II. The Rajah will never maintain, in the territory occupied by him and his dependents on the left bank of the River Sutlej, more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit, or suffer, any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity.

III. In the event of a violation of any of the preceding articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship, on the part of either state, this treaty shall be considered null and void.

IV. This treaty, consisting of four articles, having been settled and concluded at Umrutser, on the 25th day of April, 1809, Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe has delivered to the Rajah of Lahore a copy of the same in English and Persian, under his seal and

signature; and the said Rajah has delivered another copy of the same under his seal and signature; and Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe engages to procure, within the space of two months, a copy of the same, duly ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt of which by the Rajah the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on both parties, and the copy of it now delivered to the Rajah shall be restored.

[Vol. I., page 89.]

Treaty with the King of Caubul, dated 17th June, 1809.

Whereas, in consequence of the confederacy with the state of Persia, projected by the French for the purpose of invading the dominions of his Majesty the King of the Douranees, and, ultimately, those of the British Government in India, the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone was despatched to the Court of his Majesty, in quality of envoy plenipotentiary, on the part of the Right Honourable Lord Minto, Governor-General, exercising the supreme authority over all affairs, civil, political, and military, in the British possessions in the East Indies, for the purpose of concerting with his Majesty's ministers the means of mutual defence against the expected invasion of the French and Persians; and whereas the said ambassador, having had the honour of being presented to his Majesty, and of explaining the friendly and beneficial object of his mission, his Majesty, sensible of the advantages of alliance and co-operation between the two states for the purpose above described, directed his ministers to confer with the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, and, consulting the welfare of both states, to conclude a friendly alliance; and certain articles of treaty having accordingly been agreed to between his Majesty's ministers and the British ambassador, and confirmed by the royal signet, a copy of the treaty so framed has been transmitted by the ambassador for the ratification of the Governor-General, who, consenting to the stipulations therein contained, without variation, a copy of these articles, as hereunder written, is now returned, duly ratified by the seal and signature of the Governor-General, and the signatures of the members of the British Government in India. And the obligations upon both Governments, both now and for ever, shall be exclusively regulated and determined by the tenor of those articles, which are as follow:

ART. I. As the French and Persians have entered into a confederacy against the state of Caubul, if they should wish to pass through the King's dominions, the servants of the heavenly throne shall prevent their passage, and, exerting themselves to the extent of their power in making war on them and repelling them, shall not permit them to cross into British India.

II. If the French and Persians, in pursuance of their confederacy, should advance towards the King of Caubul's country in a hostile manner, the British state, endeavouring heartily to repel them, shall hold themselves liable to afford the expenses necessary for the above-mentioned service, to the extent of their ability. While the confederacy between the French and Persians continues in force, these articles shall be in force, and be acted on by both parties.

III. Friendship and union shall continue for ever between these two states. The veil of separation shall be lifted up from between them, and they shall in no manner interfere in each other's countries; and the King of Caubul shall permit no individual of the French to enter his territories.

The faithful servants of both states having agreed to this treaty, the conditions of confirmation and ratification have been performed, and this document has been sealed and signed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General, and the Honourable the Members of the Supreme British Government in India, this 17th day of June, 1809, answering to the 1224 of the Hegira.

[Vol., I., page 93.]

Treaty with the Ameers of Sindh, dated 22nd August, 1809.

ART. I. There shall be eternal friendship between the British Government and that of Sindh—namely, Meer Gholam Alee, Meer Kurreem Alee, and Meer Murad Alee.

II. Enmity shall never appear between the two states.

III. The mutual despatch of the vakeels of both Governments—namely, the British Government and Sindhian Government—shall always continue.

IV. The Government of Sindh will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sindh.

Written on the 10th of the month of Rujeeb-ool-Moorujub, in the year of the Hegira 1224, corresponding with the 22nd of August, 1809.

[Vol. I., page 139.]

Definitive Treaty with Persia, concluded at Teheran, by Messrs. Morier and Ellis, on the 25th November, 1814.

Praise be to God, the all-perfect and all-sufficient.

These happy leaves are a nosegay plucked from the thornless garden of Concord, and tied by the hands of the plenipotentiaries of the two great states in the form of a definitive treaty, in which the articles of friendship and amity are blended.

Previously to this period, the high in station, Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Envoy Extraordinary from the English Government, came to this Court to form an amicable alliance, and, in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of Persia, their Excellencies (titles) Meerza Mahomed Sheffeeh, and Hajee Mahomed Hussein Khan, concluded a preliminary treaty, the particulars of which were to be detailed and arranged in a definitive treaty; and the above-mentioned treaty, according to its articles, was ratified by the British Government.

Afterwards, when his Excellency Sir Gore Ouseley, Ambassador Extraordinary from his Britannic Majesty, arrived at this exalted and illustrious Court, for the purpose of completing the relations of amity between the two states, and was invested with full powers by his own Government to arrange all the important affairs of friendship, the ministers of this victorious state, with the advice and approbation of the above-mentioned ambassador, concluded a definitive treaty, consisting of fixed articles and stipulations.

That treaty having been submitted to the British Government, certain changes in its articles and provisions, consistent with friendship, appeared necessary; and Henry Ellis, Esquire, was accordingly despatched to this Court, in charge of a letter explanatory of the above-mentioned alterations. Therefore, their Excellencies Meerza Mahomed Sheffeeh, Prime Minister, Meerza Bozoork, Caimacan (titles), and Meerza Abdul Wahab, Principal Secretary of State (titles), were duly appointed, and invested with full powers to negotiate with the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty, James Morier, Esquire, recently appointed minister at this Court, and the above-mentioned Henry Ellis, Esquire. These plenipotentiaries having consulted on the terms most advisable for this alliance, have comprised them in eleven articles. What

relates to commerce, trade, and other affairs, will be drawn up and concluded in a separate commercial treaty.

ART. I. The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them, after the conclusion of this definitive treaty, to declare all alliances contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain null and void, and hold themselves bound not to allow any European army to enter the Persian territory, nor to proceed towards India, nor to any of the ports of that country; and also engage not to allow any individuals of such European nations, entertaining a design of invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain, whatever, to enter Persia. Should any European powers wish to invade India by the road of Kharazm, Tartaristan, Bokhara, Samarcand, or other routes, his Persian Majesty engages to induce the kings and governors of those countries to oppose such invasion, as much as is in his power, either by the fear of his arms, or by conciliatory measures.

II. It is agreed that these articles, formed with the hand of truth and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered; but there shall arise from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever, between the two most serene kings, their heirs, successors, their subjects, and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and countries. And his Britannic Majesty further engages not to interfere in any dispute which may hereafter arise between the princes, noblemen, and great chiefs of Persia; and if one of the contending parties should even offer a province of Persia, with view of obtaining assistance, the English Government shall not agree to such a proposal, nor, by adopting it, possess themselves of such part of Persia.

III. The purpose of this treaty is strictly defensive, and the object is that from their mutual assistance both states should derive stability and strength; and this treaty has only been concluded for the purpose of repelling the aggressions of enemies; and the purport of the word aggression in this treaty is an attack upon the territories of another state. The limits of the territory of the two states of Russia and Persia shall be determined according to the admission of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia.

IV. It having been agreed by an article in the preliminary treaty concluded between the high contracting parties, that in case of any European nation invading Persia, should the Persian Government require the assistance of the English, the Governor-

General of India, on the part of Great Britain, shall comply with the wish of the Persian Government, by sending from India the force required, with officers, ammunition, and warlike stores; or, in lieu thereof, the English Government shall pay an annual subsidy, the amount of which shall be regulated in a definitive treaty to be concluded between the high contracting parties; it is hereby provided that the amount of the said subsidy shall be two hundred thousand (200,000) tomauns annually. It is further agreed that the said subsidy shall not be paid in case the war with such European nation shall have been produced by an aggression on the part of Persia; and since the payment of the above subsidy will be made solely for the purpose of raising and disciplining an army, it is agreed that the English minister shall be satisfied of its being duly applied to the purpose for which it is assigned.

V. Should the Persian Government wish to introduce European discipline among their troops, they are at liberty to employ European officers for that purpose, provided the said officers do not belong to nations in a state of war or enmity with Great Britain.

VI. Should any European power be engaged in war with Persia when at peace with England, his Britannic Majesty engages to use his best endeavours to bring Persia and such European power to a friendly understanding. If, however, his Majesty's cordial interference should fail of success, England shall still, if required, in conformity with the stipulations in the preceding articles, send a force from India, or, in lieu thereof, pay an annual subsidy of two hundred thousand (200,000) tomauns for the support of a Persian army, so long as a war in the supposed case shall continue, and until Persia shall make peace with such nation.

VII. Since it is the custom of Persia to pay the troops six months in advance, the English minister at that court shall do all in his power to pay the subsidy in as early instalments as may be convenient.

VIII. Should the Afghans be at war with the British nation, his Persian Majesty engages to send an army against them in such manner and of such force as may be concerted with the English Government. The expenses of such an army shall be defrayed by the British Government, in such manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.

IX. If war should be declared between the Afghans and Persians, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.

X. Should any Persian subject of distinction, showing signs of hostility and rebellion, take refuge in the British dominions, the English Government shall, on intimation from the Persian Government, turn him out of their country, or, if he refuses to leave it, shall seize and send him to Persia.

Previously to the arrival of such fugitive in the English territory, should the governor of the district to which he may direct his flight receive intelligence of the wishes of the Persian Government respecting him, he shall refuse him admission. After such prohibition, should such person persist in his resolution, the said governor shall cause him to be seized and sent to Persia; it being understood that the aforesaid obligations are reciprocal between the contracting parties.

XI. Should his Persian Majesty require assistance from the English Government in the Persian Gulf, they shall, if convenient and practicable, assist him with ships of war and troops. The expenses of such expedition shall be accounted for and defrayed by the Persian Government, and the above ships shall anchor in such ports as shall be pointed out by the Persian Government, and not enter other harbours without permission, except from absolute necessity.

The articles are thus auspiciously concluded:

A definitive treaty between the two states having formerly been prepared, consisting of twelve articles, and certain changes, not inconsistent with friendship, having appeared necessary, we the plenipotentiaries of the two states, comprising the said treaty in eleven articles, have hereunto set our hands and seals, in the royal city of Teheran, this twenty-fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the twelfth Zealhajeh, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and twenty-nine.

(L.S.)	JAMES MORIER.
(L.S.)	HENRY ELLIS.
(L.S.)	MAHOMED SHEFFEEH.
(L.S.)	ABDUL WAHAB.
(L.S.)	ISAH (MEERZA BOZOORK).

[Vol. I., page 149.]

Bonds given by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, and by the Shah, cancelling the Subsidy Articles of the Treaty of 25th November, 1814.

Bond granted by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, to Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, British Envoy.

Be it known to Colonel Macdonald, British envoy at our Court, that we, the heir apparent to the Persian throne, in virtue of the full powers vested in us by the Shah, in all matters touching the foreign relations of this kingdom, do hereby pledge our solemn word and promise, that if the British Government will assist us with the sum of two hundred thousand tomauns (200,000), towards the liquidation of the indemnity, due by us to Russia, we will expunge, and hereafter consider as annulled, the IIIrd and IVth articles of the definitive treaty, between the two states, concluded by Mr. Ellis, and obtain the royal sanction to the same.

This paper bears the seal of his Royal Highness Abbas Meerza, and that of his Persian Majesty's Minister the Kaim-Mukam.

Dated in the month of Shaban, or March, 1828.

Ruckum of his Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, in ratification of the Annulment of the IIIrd and IVth Articles of the Treaty with England.

Relative to the articles III. and IV. of the propitious treaty between England and Persia, which was concluded by Mr. Ellis, in the month Zeekaud, A.H. 1229, agreeably to the engagements entered into with your Excellency, that, in consequence of the sum of 200,000 tomauns, the currency of the country, presented as an aid to Persia, in consideration of the losses she has sustained in the war with Russia, we, the heir apparent, vested with full powers in all matters connected with the politics of this nation, have agreed that the said two articles shall be expunged, and have delivered a bond to your Excellency, which is now in your hands.

In the month of Zikeyla, A.H. 1243, on our going to wait upon his Majesty at Teheran, in consistence with the note addressed to your Excellency by Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, we were appointed sole agent in this matter by his Majesty, with unlimited authority; therefore, as the Government of England, through the medium of Colonel Macdonald, have afforded us the assistance of 200,000 tomauns, we, the representative of his Majesty, have, on this day, the 14th of

the month Suffer, and the 24th of the Christian month August, annulled the two obnoxious articles of our propitious treaty. The envoy, considering this document as a ratification on the subject of the two articles, will know that it is liable to no further comment from the ministers of his Majesty's Court.

Sealed by

Month of Suffer, A.H. 1244. H.R.H. ABBAS MEERZA.

*Firmaun from his Majesty the Shah to Colonel Macdonald,
British Envoy in Persia.*

A.C.

Let it be known to Colonel Macdonald, the English envoy, exalted by our munificence, that, our noble son having represented to us his having recently come to an arrangement relative to the two articles of the treaty with England, we have ordered that what has been executed by our son, touching this transaction, in conformity with the firmaun of full powers granted to him by us, be confirmed by our royal ratification and consent; and we duly appreciate the exertions of your Excellency during the last year, which have obtained you the goodwill of the Shah.

Regarding the crore of tomauns required for the redemption of Khoe, agreeably to what has been laid before us, H.R.H. Abbas Meerza has directed the payment of 400,000 tomauns by Mohamed Meerza; and we have besides instructed the remaining 100,000 tomauns to be delivered to Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of being transmitted to you.

Your Excellency will, therefore, conceiving this firmaun as your security, become responsible for the payment of the above sum, which will be afterwards paid to you by the lord of exalted rank, Meerza Abul Hassan Khan. Also make known to us all your wishes.

Sealed by

HIS MAJESTY FUTTEH ALI SHAH.

[Vol. I., page 587.]

MINUTE OF SIR JASPER NICOLLS.

10th November, 1840.

The manner in which the affairs of Afghanistan have pressed the military resources of India are well known—upon they have borne so heavily, added to a prospect of a war

with Nepaul, that the annual and most necessary relief of the native troops has been in a great degree suspended.

Whilst we are very liberal in our care and payment of our army, it would be most imprudent to risk the loss of their attachment to the Company's government by denying them the periodical return to their homes, which they so much covet, and which is so necessary for their domestic comfort and respectability. As long as an expectation of being able to withdraw a portion of our troops from Caubul this year was entertained, or could be reasonably hoped for, I abstained from offering any remarks on the subject of relief; but instead of withdrawing regiments from Afghanistan and Sindh, we are now sending into those countries between six and eight thousand men to confirm, in some place to re-establish, *our* supremacy. I use these words, because it is now clear to me that Shah Soojah, even with a force commanded by European officers, most inconveniently spared to instruct the troops, and to lead them on, will never be the independent King of Afghanistan. The semi-barbarous tribes of that country, who have been freed from any well-established rule for centuries, will not submit to any settled form of government under a native of that land. They have shown us that they do not stand in much awe even of our power and resources.

From the advanced position which we have taken up, we cannot, perhaps, consistently withdraw; in good faith we cannot displace Shah Soojah; we have, therefore, to continue to rule, as we now do, in his name, which entails the expense of his establishments, personal, civil, and military, upon us, without any prospect of reimbursement. It is not, however, on financial grounds that I am anxious to lay my opinions before the Governor-General in Council—it is to recommend that the future may be considered, and that the Honourable Court may be solicited to authorise such addition to the Indian army as our present position seems to demand. Our occupation of Afghanistan draws a considerable portion of our troops entirely out of India, and the communication with them is always tedious—at times impracticable. We have at present five European regiments beyond the Indus, or proceeding thither, and I cannot, under existing circumstances, estimate our permanent European force at less than three regiments, two in the north and one in Sindh.

Our native troops have conducted themselves exceedingly well in Afghanistan; but it is to them a foreign country: the climate

is most uncongenial; to the Hindoos most injurious. We ought not, I think, to suffer any native corps to remain more than two years there. There are at this time nineteen regiments of native infantry beyond the Indus, or moving thither by various routes: of these it is possible, but not certain, that two may return to Bengal and four to Bombay before the end of March, leaving thirteen far beyond our frontier. I have little doubt that the imposing bodies of troops now proceeding to Sukkur and Caubul will place the Shah's government on a firmer footing than it has ever yet been. Allowing, however, the most perfect success to all our operations in the south, and fully expecting lasting benefit from the important advantages gained by Brigadier Dennie and Sir Robert Sale, I cannot think that less than ten regiments of native infantry can be considered sufficient to restrain the ferocity of the northern tribes, to curb the independence of the Beloochees, and to crush the propensity of both to eject us, by intrigue and a harassing war of details. The Shah's troops are not included. Taking, then, three European and ten native regiments as the force by which we may expect to hold the country, maintaining our communications of diplomacy: two and six would be the Bengal proportion—one and four the proportion of Bombay.

The augmentation ordered last year by the Honourable Court, when the three new European regiments are fit for service, will give the number desired; indeed, they were raised to meet the probable consequences of our advance beyond the Indus; but if other regiments melt away, as her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry and the 1st European Regiment have done, we shall feel the drain a very heavy one.

Madras is reduced to four Queen's regiments of infantry, one of which is at Moulmein, and therefore, at some seasons of the year, out of reach. We have drawn from that Presidency the largest number that it can safely spare, and no other source is open to us on this side of the Cape from which to strengthen the European portion of this army.

Recent events assure us that the Sikhs will not long quietly admit our establishment in Afghanistan: surrounded as they will be; humbled by the superiority which we claim when we require a passage for our troops and convoys through their territory; and elated by many years of successful encroachment on their neighbours, they will venture upon a trial of their strength.

Indian history proves that a sense of inferiority has not pre-

vented adjoining states from forcing the British Government into hostilities:—Tippoo in 1799, Nepaul, Ava, the Mahrattas in 1817, afford instances of this. The Sikhs will follow their examples, I have no doubt, whenever they have, or think they have, a favorable opportunity. Nepaul will urge them on continually to the contest, and will probably afford the opportunity alluded to.

We ought to be at all times strong enough to enter upon war simultaneously with these two states; and not entirely to forget that Ava still smarts under the loss of its territory. When compelled to enter into hostilities at the same time with the Sikhs and Nepaulese, it may be so arranged that we, at first, adopt a defensive line of proceeding towards one of them. If we can draw upon Madras for cavalry, there will be the means, in that arm, of meeting both contingencies. We ought, however, to have more than seven European regiments to give weight and effect to operations carried on in countries so far apart, that mutual support is impracticable. If I am not mistaken, the Marquis Wellesley desired that the establishment of her Majesty's troops should not be less than 25,000 men. Since his Lordship left India, great additions have been made to our territory, and we have been brought into contact with warlike tribes, inhabiting countries badly suited to the constitution of our native soldiery. When I state that we have at this time *ten and a half European regiments beyond the limits known in Lord Wellesley's time*, it may be granted that I cannot be very wrong in urging that the established number of her Majesty's troops to be employed in India shall be raised to 25,000 men. Bombay is undoubtedly overpressed at this moment. There are nine of her native infantry regiments in Sindh, or moving thither, of which four must soon return to be recruited and restored. To enable Bombay to do this, and to garrison Aden and Kharack, Madras has been resorted to; indeed, the other two Presidencies would now be crippled, were it not for the great assistance given by Fort St. George. To carry on happily through all we have undertaken, through contests which may be expected; to check the germs of disloyalty at home, should such arise; to give our native corps short periods of foreign service, and to carry on the reliefs; I recommend government seriously to consider whether it is not most necessary that an early augmentation of the army should take place.

I advise an *early* increase under certain knowledge of the difficulty of raising good men, and of the time required to train them,

and to establish confidence in their officers. Ten regiments appear to be sufficient to give us security in Afghanistan and Sindh. They should be effective corps. We have not only neighbours to overawe, but treacherous subjects to control, and doubtful friends to intimidate. Five for Bengal, three for Madras, and two for Bombay, seem to be the due proportions, the addition to Madras being given on the acknowledged condition that she must be ever ready to take some of the southern stations of Bengal and Bombay, as at present. I very much prefer augmentation by regiments to numerical increase by companies, though well aware of the additional expense, and that for some years (five at least) we shall not have our regiments well officered.

Again, I assure his Lordship and my colleagues, that my sole object in drawing their attention to this subject is my anxiety to provide for the future. We well know the difficulties experienced from the monsoons and seasons, in drawing troops together; we must be convinced that we have force and stability in every quarter, and that our power is felt and acknowledged. When we require an instance of the difficulties alluded to, let us remember that Brigadier Shelton's column will not reach Jellalabad until four months after it was urgently applied for, and that it cannot proceed to Caubul till the roads are free from snow. Afghanistan not being well suited to cavalry operations, and the difficult passes compelling us to narrow the artillery branch of our equipment, I do not see that we are likely to meet any impediment in increasing these portions of our force when it may be necessary.

I have carefully avoided all reference to Herat, or to any employment of troops beyond the Hindoo-Koosh. If hostilities should be undertaken in either, the case I have attempted to establish will even more urgently require consideration and forethought.

J. NICOLLS.

[Vol. I., page 588.]

MINUTE OF SIR JASPER NICOLLS, 19TH AUGUST, 1841.

When the opinions of the members of government were last given on the affairs of Afghanistan, I did not offer mine, because there was very little time for doing so before the despatch of the mail—and further, because I had partly recorded my sentiments on the 10th of November, 1840, when advising an in-

crease of the army, to meet the demand our new conquest called for. The surrender of Dost Mahomed, a few days before, was given as a proof that no such increase was required, and the serious increase of expense was another ground for setting aside the recommendation. I was well disposed to yield assent to both; but I observe by the activity with which our reinforcements have since been sent, that there is a conviction at home that our European troops should be kept on a high establishment. I cordially join in the Governor-General's opinion now recorded, that we should not advance upon Herat, if it can possibly be avoided. We experience anxiety and difficulty in keeping Shah Soojah upon his throne, without extending his kingdom at the risk of our own power and security. The military base on which our positions in Afghanistan are now supported, is very objectionable on account of distance; difficulty of communication; foreign interposition. The seasons control and cramp every movement, and the proceedings and policy of the Sikhs cannot be anticipated. To advance beyond the Helmund would greatly increase our difficulties. A corps at Herat could not be easily reinforced, and, as a bridle upon Persia, Russia, and the Turcomans, it should contain, at least, the power of protracted self-defence. We should be called upon, probably at no distant time, to take the field in its support. To do this safely, we should be strong on our whole line from Caubul to Khelat, for Afghan intrigue would undoubtedly be actively employed to disturb the district from which the troops were drawn. Yar Mahomed is certainly a very insidious enemy, but if ejected from Herat he would not be less so. The Douranees and Ghilzyes are stimulated by him no doubt, and perhaps other tribes may be so; they do not however receive either money or aid from him, and they will tire of advice which only leads to their discomfiture.

Although Dost Mahomed is now residing amongst us, I do not perceive that the Shah's government is much more at ease than it was at this time last year; though our military force beyond the Indus has been much increased. The hope of leaving the Shah's dominions to his own force and government seems more distant than it then was.

My former proposal was met by an assertion (a very just one) that the heavy drain upon the finances would not admit an increase of establishment. I was not then aware of the full extent of that drain—it is now rated so high as to create a deficit of a

million and a quarter annually, and I think we should not venture to send a second army beyond the Indus, to destroy the resources of India; for such a consequence may be apprehended from such a heavy annual exportation of the necessary funds. Again, when our jealous and intriguing neighbours observe our forces spreading to the east and west, so far beyond our former limits, and learn that our finances are decreasing annually, will they not be tempted to encourage each other to regain what we have wrested from them, and to unite the turbulent spirits within our provinces to rebellion.

I offer these opinions with hesitation and regret—but I lost the opportunity of stating them some months since, and am fearful that similar silence at this time might be misconstrued.

J. NICOLLS.

[Vol. I., page 619.]

COPY OF A MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, ON
SIR W. MACNAGHTEN'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 26, 1841.

January 29th, 1842. At night.

It is impossible to read the letter from Mr. Macnaghten to the Secretary to the Government in India, without being sensible of the precarious and dangerous position of our affairs in Central Asia.

Mr. Macnaghten complains of reports against the King Shah Soojah Khan and his government, as libels.

Of these we can know nothing; but I am convinced that no complaints or libels can be so strong as the facts stated by Mr. Macnaghten in this letter.

It appears that when Mr. Macnaghten heard of the first symptoms and first acts of this rebellion, he prevailed upon the king to send a message to the rebels, inviting them to return to their allegiance.

The selection of the person sent is curious—Humza Khan, the Governor of Caubul. His mission failed, of course, says Mr. Macnaghten, because Humza Khan was the chief instigator of the rebellion!

We know in this country something of the customs of those countries—of the meaning of some of the native expressions in this letter. It appears that there are four thanahs, or posts, between Caubul and Gundamuck. A thanah is either a permanent or a temporary post, to guard a road or district of

importance. We have seen who the person was selected to induce the rebels to submit; let us now see who were the persons appointed to take charge of these thanahs or posts in the disturbed country—those named in the subsequent part of the despatch as the very men who were the leaders in the rebellion, in the attack, and destruction, and murder, of the East India Company's officers and troops!

No libels can state facts against the Afghan Government stronger than these.

But Mr. Macnaghten has discovered that the Company's troops are not sufficiently active personally, nor are they sufficiently well armed for the warfare in Afghanistan. Very possibly an Afghan will run over his native hills faster than an Englishman or a Hindoo. But we have carried on war in hill countries, as well in Hindostan and the Deccan as in the Spanish Peninsula; and I never heard that our troops were not equal, as well in personal activity as by their arms, to contend with and overcome any natives of hills whatever. Mr. Macnaghten ought to have learnt by this time that hill countries are not conquered, and their inhabitants kept in subjection, solely by running up the hills and firing at long distances. The whole of a hill country of which it is necessary to keep possession, particularly for the communications of the army, should be occupied by sufficient bodies of troops, well supplied, and capable of maintaining themselves; and not only not a Ghilzye or insurgent should be able to run up and down hills, but not a cat or a goat, except under the fire of those occupying the hills. This is the mode of carrying on the war, and not by hiring Afghans with long matchlocks to protect and defend the communications of the British army.

Shah Soojah Khan may have in his service any troops that he and Mr. Macnaghten please.

But if the troops in the service of the East India Company are not able, armed and equipped as they are, to perform the service required of them in Central Asia, I protest against their being left in Afghanistan. It will not do to raise, pay, and discipline matchlock-men, in order to protect the British troops and their communications, discovered by Mr. Macnaghten to be no longer able to protect themselves.

WELLINGTON.

[MS. Records]

[The following is the letter from Sir A. Burnes referred to at page 342, and omitted from its proper place in the Appendix.]

Husn Abdul, 2nd June, 1838.

MY DEAR MR. MACNAGHTEN,

Just as I was entering this place, I had the pleasure to receive your letter of the 23rd, requesting me to state my views on the means of counteraction which should be presented to Dost Mahomed Khan, in the policy that he is pursuing. I should have liked to have conversed with you on this important subject, for it has so many bearings, and involves so many conflicting interests, that it is impossible to do it justice; but I do not delay a moment in meeting your wishes, as far as can be done in a letter.

It is clear that the British Government cannot, with any credit or justice to itself, permit the present state of affairs at Caubul to continue. The counteraction applied must, however, extend beyond Dost Mahomed Khan, and to both Persia and Russia. A demand of explanation from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would, I conceive, be met by an evasive answer, and gain for us no end; besides, the policy of Russia is now fairly developed, and requires no explanation, for it explains itself, since that government is clearly resolved upon using the influence she possesses in Persia (which is as great there as what the British command in India) to extend her power eastward. It had better, therefore, be assumed at once that such are her plans, and remonstrate accordingly. If we can do but little with Russia, the cause is widely different with Persia. She should at once be warned off Afghanistan, and our continuance of an alliance with her should depend upon her compliance. I believe that a letter from the Governor-General of India, sent to the Shah of Persia at Herat, would gain our end, and this effected, there is nothing to fear from the proceedings of Dost Mahomed Khan, or any other of the Afghan chiefs. If this be left undone, they will succumb to Persia and Russia, and become the instruments for whatever those powers desire. I therefore distinctly state my conviction that the evil lies beyond Afghanistan itself, and must be dealt with accordingly.

If it is the object of government to destroy the power of the present chief of Caubul, it may be effected by the agency of his brother, Sultan Mahomed Khan, or of Soojah-ool-Moolk; but to ensure complete success to the plan, the British Government must act directly in it; that is, it must not be left to the Sikhs

themselves. Let us discuss the merits of these two plans; but first I must speak on the establishment of Sikh power in Afghanistan, to which you refer as a general question.

No one entertains a more exalted opinion than I do of the Maharajah's head to plan, and ability to achieve; but I look upon the power of the Sikhs beyond the Indus to be dependent on his life alone. It is mere temporising, therefore, to seek to follow up any such plan; and were this of itself not conclusive against it, the fact of its alienating the Afghan people, who are cordially disposed as a nation to join us, would be a sufficiently valid objection for not persevering in it. I conclude always that our object is to make the Afghans our own, and to guide Afghanistan by Afghans, not by foreigners. It is, I assure you, a mere visionary delusion to hope for establishing Sikh ascendancy in Caubul. For argument's sake, I will admit that the Maharajah may take it; but how is it to be retained? Why, he cannot keep his ground with credit in Peshawur, and the Sikhs themselves are averse to service beyond the Indus. But facts are more illustrative than arguments; the French officers could not with safety leave their homes to an evening dinner while we were at Peshawur, and our intercourse was confined to breakfasts. I saw this morning two tumbrils of money, the followers of dozens of others, on their way to Peshawur to pay the troops, and the Maharajah only wishes a road of honour to retreat from it. If you use him, therefore, as an agent to go further a-head, the first request he will make of the British will be for money, and we shall waste our treasure without gaining our ends, which, as I understand them, are an influence in Caubul, to exclude all intrigues from the West.

Of Sultan Mahomed Khan, the first instrument at command, you will remember that his brother, Dost Mahomed, plainly confessed his dread of him if guided by Sikh gold, and with such aid the ruler of Caubul may be readily destroyed; but Sultan Mahomed has not the ability to rule Caubul; he is a very good man, but incapable of acting for himself; and, though fit as an instrument in getting rid of a present evil, he would still leave affairs as unsettled as ever when fixed in Caubul, and he is consequently a very questionable agent to be used at all.

As for Soojah-ool-Moolk personally,* the British Government

* Here Sir A. Burnes had inserted the words, "I have—that is, as ex-King of the Afghans, no very high opinion;" and had drawn his pen through them. He had also originally written the word "Of" to begin the sentence, instead of "As for."

have only to send him to Peshawur with an agent, and two of its own regiments as an honorary escort, and an avowal to the Afghans that we have taken up his cause, to ensure his being fixed for ever on his throne. The present time is, perhaps, better than any previous to it, for the Afghans as a nation detest Persia, and Dost Mahomed having gone over to the Court of Teheran, though he believes it to be from dire necessity, converts many a doubting Afghan into a bitter enemy.

The Maharajah's permission has only, therefore, to be asked for the ex-King's advance on Peshawur, granting him at the same time some four or five of the regiments which have no Sikhs in their ranks, and Soojah becomes king. He need not remove from Peshawur, but address the Khyburees, Kohistanees of Caubul, and all the Afghans from that city, that he has the co-operation of the British and the Maharajah, and with but a little distribution of ready money—say two or three lakhs of rupees—he will find himself the real King of the Afghans in a couple of months. It is, however, to be remembered always that we must appear directly, for the Afghans are a superstitious people, and believe Soojah to have no fortune (*bukht*); but our name will invest him with it. You will also have a good argument with the Maharajah in the honour of "Taj Bukhshie;" but still his Highness will be more disposed to use Sultan Mahomed Khan as an instrument than Soojah, for he will, perhaps, have exaggerated notions of Afghan power in prospect; but our security must be given to him, and we must identify ourselves with all the proceedings to make arrangements durable.

I have thus pointed out to you how the chief of Caubul is to be destroyed, and the best means which have occurred to me for effecting it; but I am necessarily ignorant of the Governor-General's views on what his Lordship considers the best mode of hereafter managing Afghanistan. It has been notified to me in various despatches, that this end may best be gained by using one small state to balance another to keep all at peace, and thus prevent any great Mahomedan power growing up beyond the Indus, which might cause future inconvenience. It is with every respect that I differ; but these are not my sentiments; and though in theory nothing may appear more just and beneficial, I doubt the possibility of putting the theory into practice, and more than doubt the practice producing the benefit expected from it; for while you were trying to bring it about, another power steps in,

paves the way for destroying the chiefships in detail, and the policy along with it. Our fears of a powerful Mahomedan neighbour are quickened by what we read of Ahmed Shah's wars in India, and the alarms spread even by Shah Zemaun, so late as the days of Lord Wellesley; but our knowledge of these countries has wondrously improved since that time; and though the noble Marquis, in his splendid administration, made the Afghans feel our weight through Persia, and arrested the evil, we should have had none of these present vexations if we had dealt with the Afghans themselves. We then counteracted them through Persia. We now wish to do it through the Sikhs. But as things stand, I maintain it is the best of all policy to make Caubul *in itself as strong as we can make it*, and not weaken it by divided power: it has already been too long divided. Caubul owed its strength in bygone days to the tribute of Cashmere and Sindh. Both are irrecoverably gone; and while we do all we can to keep up the Sikhs as a power east of the Indus during the Maharajah's life, or afterwards, we should consolidate Afghan power west of the Indus, and have a King and not a collection of chiefs. *Divide et impera* is a temporising creed at any time, and if the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia, and instead of distant relations, we have everything under our eye, and a steadily progressing influence all along the Indus.

I have before said, that we cannot with justice to our position in India allow things to continue as at present in Caubul; and I have already, in my despatch of the 30th April, suggested a prompt and active counteraction of Dost Mahomed Khan, since we cannot act with him. But it remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahomed. He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart a high opinion of the British nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and Russia to-morrow. It may be said that that opportunity has been given to him, but I would rather discuss this in person with you, for I think there is much to be said for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a choice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing, and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. I am not now viewing the question in the light of what

is to be said to the rejection of our good offices as far as they went, or to his doing so in the face of a threat held out to him; but these facts show the man has something in him; and if Afghans are proverbially not to be trusted, I see no reason for having greater mistrust of him than of others. My opinion of Asiatics is, that you can only rely upon them when their interests are identified with the line of procedure marked out to them; and this seems now to be a doctrine pretty general in all politics.

I shall say no more at present. It will give me great pleasure again to meet you. I shall be on the banks of the Jhelam on the 7th or 8th, and my progress beyond that depends on the dawk being laid; but if that goes right, I ought to join you in ten days at the furthest.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Macnaghten,

Yours sincerely,

ALEXANDER BURNES.

P.S.—I have thought it advisable to send a duplicate of this letter, which Mr. Lord has been so good as to copy for me, by the Maharajah's dawk, as it prevents accidents, and may reach you sooner.

[This letter was accidentally omitted, to my great regret, from a portion of the present edition.—*Author.*]

END OF VOL. I.



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