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SKETCH

OF

THE POLITICAL HISTORY

OF

I N D I A,

FROM THE INTRODUCTION

OF

MR. PITT'S BILL, A. D. 1784,

TO THE PRESENT DATE.

BY JOHN MALCOLM,

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IN THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S
MADRAS ARMY, RESIDENT AT MYSORE, AND LATE
ENVOY TO THE COURT OF PERSIA.

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P R E F A C E.

THE Author of the following Sketch has passed twenty-five years in India ; during a great part of which time he has filled stations, which gave him a near and full view of the Political Administration of that Country. He conceives, that to lay before the Public the opinions which he has formed, and the arguments which have produced them, on some parts of this extensive subject, is a continuation of that public service, to which his life has been devoted : he therefore steals a short time, for that purpose, from the occupations of a busy and hurried life. At a time, when discussions have commenced in England, likely to terminate in fixing for a long time the political constitution of British India,

he hopes that he shall be able to furnish some materials, which may assist the judgment of those, who are to pronounce on some of the most momentous questions of policy, which have ever employed the attention of a Government.

The relations of the Indian Government to the Constitution of Great Britain; the influence of the present system of conducting the Indian trade, on the prosperity of the Company, of Great Britain, and of British India; are extensive and important branches of the subject, which the Author leaves to those, who, from their habits of life, are more familiarly conversant with them. He has been chiefly employed in the political service of the Supreme Government of India, and principally in its negotiations with native States.

His great object will be, to illustrate, by an appeal to experience, the nature of the powers, which the condition of India re-

quires to be vested in the Supreme Government; and of those general maxims of policy, which seem to him prescribed, by the nature of things, in their intercourse with neighbouring States.

Other subjects of great importance, both civil and military, will be considered; but the chief object of the Author, is to discuss those subjects on which his own experience is the most extensive.

The situation of a dependent State, with a population of fifty millions, at the distance of ten thousand miles from the principal State, and surrounded by Governments without faith, or even long-sighted prudence, is unparalleled in the History of the World; and the application of the common maxims of political morality to the management of such a dependance, is, from the very singularity of the case, likely to require much caution, and to be subject to considerable mistake.

The opinions of the Author are likely to be so different from those of many, perhaps of most, of his readers, that he is under the necessity of bespeaking their candour, and of requesting, that no man will reject his opinions without a calm consideration of his reasons. He will probably be charged with Indian prejudices ; and, as he does not pretend to any exemption from the common frailties of human nature, he willingly admits, that he must be prepossessed, in favour of measures, which he has contributed to carry into execution.

The merely English reader will, however, do well to recollect, that there are also English prejudices : and that those, who never saw a Country so distant, and so unlike every thing in Europe, as India, must acknowledge at least one great inferiority in such discussions.

From all the partialities of the internal politics of England the Author must neces-

sarily be exempt. His life has been passed at too vast a distance to be reached by their influence. He cannot therefore write with any view to gratify resentments, or to advance himself, or to exalt or depress any English Statesman, or Parties. He may be prejudiced or mistaken ; but he can have no other object, than that of contributing towards a right judgment on the Government of India.

The most valuable authorities, for the greater part of what follows, are the records of the several Governments of India ; which the constitution of these Governments render the depositaries of the reasons for and against every public measure. Most of them have already been published in Europe : perhaps many more than the Author is aware of. At this distance he finds it difficult to ascertain what paper may remain unpublished. If, in consequence of his ignorance, he should have made extracts from

any hitherto unpublished documents, he trusts, that he may be excused for employing, for merely public purposes, records, which, from the liberal access allowed to them, may almost be considered as, after a certain time, becoming virtually public.

Since this volume has been printed, an error of some consequence has been discovered at page 422.—In the 1st declaratory Article in the Treaty with Scindiah, read as follows:—" 1st. That Scindiah ceded to the " Honourable Company all the territory north of the " river Chumbul, which was ceded him by the 7th " Article of the Treaty of Serjee Angengaum;" that is to say, &c.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

CONTENTS.

General Preliminary Observations on the Acquisition of British India.—Errors in the Theory of its Government.—Reflections on that Subject.—Probable Changes.—Principles upon which they should be made.—Object of the Author of this Work, to furnish Information.—Concise Abstract of the History of the Company, from their Origin in 1600, till the Failure of Mr. Fox's Indian Bills in 1783.

THE great Empire, which England has established in the East, will be the theme of wonder to succeeding ages. That a small Island in the Atlantic should have conquered, and held the vast Continent of India as a subject Province, is in itself a fact, which can never be stated without exciting astonishment. But the surprise will be increased, when it is added, that this great Conquest was made, not by the collective force of the Nation, but by a Company of Merchants, who, originally vested with a

charter of exclusive commerce, and with the privilege and right to protect their property, and to retaliate attack, were in a few years hurried, by the enterprise and ambition of their agents; the hostile and rival spirit of the other nations of Europe; and the weakness and perfidy of the Princes of Asia, to whom they became, from their encroachments or their riches, an object of jealousy or plunder; into the possession of Royal power; and actually found themselves called upon to act in the character of Sovereigns over extended kingdoms, before they had ceased to be the mercantile directors of petty factories.

Those, who look deep into the causes of great revolutions, and find them, not in the successful issue of the complex schemes of ambitious Statesmen, but in the simple operation of natural and obvious causes, will perhaps discover, that the means by which India was rendered subject to England (however inadequate they might at first glance appear), were of all others the best calculated to effect that great object. Force, and power, could not have approached the shores of India, without meeting with resistance; but to the unpretending merchant every encouragement was offered: and when the spirit with which the early settlers defended their property from spoliation showed they were

as superior in their military as their commercial character, they became more an object of admiration than of jealousy to the principal Powers of India ; who in process of time courted their alliance and aid against each other.

For the agents of the Company to have refused such aid, was perhaps in many cases impossible, or at least would have been dangerous to their immediate security ; and by granting it, additional immunities and privileges, calculated to benefit and increase their trade, were often obtained ; and thus the desire of promoting the security, and improving the prosperity, of their commercial establishments, first led them to political connexions. From that moment, the substance, though not the form, of their Government was altered : and they were involved, beyond the power of retreating, in all the complicated relations of a Political State. This important change was reluctantly admitted by the managers of the Company's concerns in England, as the advantages, which had attended the early commerce with India, made the proprietors of that capital by which it was carried on, view with anxiety and alarm a revolution, which they thought increased their risk, without a prospect of adequate return ; they consequently denounced, at every step, that progress, which their agents made to territorial power in India ;

and, with a view of checking this spirit of aggrandizement, they at last called for the aid of the legislative power of the Kingdom, which readily seconded their efforts, and gave the authority of law to their orders. But had those proprietors, or the administration of the Government of England, been more fully informed, or had they drawn their conclusions more from plain practical reasoning, combined with a correct view of human nature (as it existed in the Country for which they legislated), than from abstract principles of general policy, they might, perhaps, have been more moderate, and less dogmatical in their efforts to correct the system; and they might have discovered, that, though they might regulate, it was a vain attempt to endeavour to stop altogether the career of a State, which was rising rapidly into greatness, under the influence of causes, that were irresistible in their force, and which it was not possible to control. The truth is, that from the day on which the Company's troops marched one mile from their factories, the increase of their territories and their armies became a principle of self-preservation; and at the end of every one of those numerous contests, in which they were involved by the jealousy, avarice or ambition, of their neighbours, or the rapacity and ambition of their own servants, they were forced to

adopt measures for improving their strength ; which soon appeared to be the only mode by which they could avert the occurrence of similar danger.

Such, in a few words, is the History of the Progress of the East India Company to power in India : but in the separation of that body of merchants from the Nation of Great Britain, we may discover many other causes, which, while they gave a peculiar character to their system of Government, tended greatly to promote that general success, which has raised this Company to such an eminence of political power.

The servants of the Company had a great field open for the exercise of their talents in India ; and, in the early part of their History, the advancement of individuals to wealth and authority, depended in a great degree upon the advancement of the Government which they served. Under such circumstances, and acting in a scene too distant to admit of much check or control, it was natural that they should apply all the knowledge and ability, which they possessed, toward the latter object, with that ardour, which such a combination of personal interest and patriotic pride was likely to produce : and there cannot be a doubt, but that the comparative smallness of their numbers contributed more than any other cause, or perhaps

than all others put together, to their success. For that circumstance, while it lulled the jealousy of the different States in their vicinity, forced them to the adoption of the only means by which such a revolution could have been effected. It made them bend their superior and commanding knowledge to the conciliation and management of the natives of India, whom they literally employed to conquer each other. The actual condition of that vast continent greatly facilitated the execution of this plan.

The East India Company began to rise into political power and consequence, as a State, about the period of the downfall of the Imperial House of Timour; when the different Princes of India were contending for the fragments of the broken Empire, every province of which was distracted by their petty wars, or groaning under their temporary oppression. It cannot be a matter of surprise, that, at such a period, the inhabitants of that country rejoiced at the introduction of a Government, which gave toleration to their religion, security to their property, and which, from its character, promised to them and their descendants a durable tranquillity beyond what they had ever enjoyed.

To men tired out as they were with wars and contentions, and who had long (from the re-

peated conquests to which they had been subjected) been lost to all feeling of national pride, the very permanency of usurpation was a blessing; and it was natural for them to forget their prejudices against their European masters, in a contemplation of that superior regard to justice, good faith, and civilization, by which they saw their rule accompanied.

The Princes and Chiefs of India, who have been the great, and indeed the only sufferers by the rise of the East India Company, saw too late the error which they had committed, in allowing it to attain a strength, which they could not shake; and had the mortification to find that their efforts for its destruction tended but to confirm and enlarge its power; which they not only saw improve by success, but rise still higher from misfortune. And this latter circumstance made a deeper impression, as it was effected through the means of resources which were drawn from a distant land, which were unseen, and therefore conceived by the nations of India to be inexhaustible. "I am not alarmed at what I see of the force and resources of the Company, but at what is unseen,"* was the emphatic speech of one of

* This observation of Hyder Ally Khan was repeated to me by Purneah, the present Dewan of Mysore.

their most able, powerful, and inveterate enemies; and it faithfully represents the impression, which was made upon ignorant nations, of the power of a State, which they observed to draw support at pleasure from a country with whose means they were unacquainted, and whose power they had only been able to judge of by its effects; which in India have been of a nature calculated to make them form the most exaggerated opinion of its magnitude.

These general reflections upon the causes of our rise to power in India, have been suggested by a sense of their importance. It is only by continually reverting to the past, that we can hope for success in the future. For if, in the pride of power, we ever forget the means by which it has been attained; and, casting away all our harvest of experience, are betrayed by a rash confidence in what we may deem our intrinsic strength, to neglect those collateral means by which the great fabric of our power in India has hitherto been supported, we shall with our own hands precipitate the downfall of our authority. But that event is still more likely to be accelerated by the opposite error, which should lead us to disown our greatness, and, under an affected and unwise humility, (ill suited to our condition,) to pursue a policy, calculated to discourage friends, and give confi-

dence to our enemies, and in it's consequences to involve us in those very wars and conquests, which it pretends to disclaim.

There is a mean between these extremes, which we must follow, if we desire that our Empire in India should be durable; and that mean must combine the unshaken firmness and dignified spirit of an absolute, but tempered rule, with the most unceasing attention to the religious prejudices and civil rights of our Indian subjects; whose condition it must be our continual study to improve, in the conviction; that our Government, on the great scale upon which it is now established, cannot be permanent, but by their means; and that it is not in nature, that they should contribute their efforts to it's support, unless they are, by a constantly recurring sense of benefit, made to feel a lively and warm interest in it's prosperity and duration.

The British Legislature has hitherto but slowly followed the progress of the power of the Company in India. It had legislated for factories on a foreign shore, when that Corporation was in the possession of provinces; and when the laws were completed to govern those, it had obtained kingdoms. That the present system of Government is inadequate, and the laws, under which it exists, defective, and not

calculated for the greatness of the Empire, every one acquainted with the subject must acknowledge; and the time probably approaches, when some great change must take place. But, at all events, our interests in India have become at this moment an object of the most serious consideration : and whether the present constitution of Government be confirmed or changed, it is of importance to examine all those facts, which can enable us to judge of it's merits and defects; as such alone can qualify those, on whom that duty must devolve, to form plans for it's future security and improvement.

What appears the most prominent error in all the laws and regulations, which have been passed in England relative to the political government of India, is, that dogmatical principle on which they proceed, in the endeavour to fix that, which is constantly changing. This principle is perhaps too natural to those by whom these laws and regulations must be framed, ever to be wholly eradicated. It arises out of a warm interest in what immediately affects the mother country, and a feeling, which approaches to indifference toward our distant possessions. This produces a continual desire to mould the latter into that shape and character, which will best suit the former; but, unfortunately, empire is a substance, which cannot

be shaped and moulded. It is by the laws of Nature mutable; and this character, which our Empire in the East has in common with all Empires in the world, has hitherto, and must always continue to disappoint those expectations, which are formed, of limiting the precise extent of the dominions, or of fixing the exact power, of the British Government in Asia,

That this consideration renders our connexion with India as awful as it is important, no person can deny. Human wisdom cannot foresee the consequences, which the possession of such an extended Empire may produce; but we must not allow our plans of amendment to be arrested, because we are threatened with distant and uncertain evils. We should rather appreciate justly the great advantages which Great Britain has already derived from her Indian possessions, and the benefits which may be anticipated from their preservation and improvement, while we reflect most seriously on the dangers which would result from those possessions being lost, or passing into the hands of an European rival.

Reflections of this nature ought to dispose the legislative wisdom of our country to adopt measures for placing the administration of British India upon the basis, which it judges best calculated to preserve that country to Great

Britain; and, in the accomplishment of this purpose, while it respects just and established rights, and rejects every crude and hasty plan of rash innovation, it will no doubt proceed, on the most enlarged and enlightened principles, to fix the Government of our Empire in India on a foundation, which is commensurate with it's present magnitude; and which reconciles, as far as the two objects can be reconciled, the most vigorous and efficient system of local Government for India, with an observation of those important principles of check and control, which form the soul and essence of the Government of England.

It has been observed by one of our great Statesmen,* that any plan, which could be suggested for the Government of a country so situated as the British Empire in the East, must be inadequate; that in such a case no theoretical perfection could be imagined, much less executed; and that the option of a form of Government was only a choice of inconveniencies. But a conviction of the truth of this general observation should rouse, instead of discouraging, the minds of those to whom this great and difficult work is assigned; and while it reconciles them to the necessity of changes in a

* Mr. Pitt.

system, which was declaredly* deemed by those even by whom it was established, as an experiment, it ought to elevate them to efforts proportionate to the performance of the most arduous task, which has perhaps ever been attempted by human wisdom.

It is the object of this work to afford information to those upon whom this important labour must devolve, and to elucidate (as well as the author can) the political principles upon which the Government of British India has been conducted since the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill in 1784. But it will be necessary to preface this account with a general and concise view of the proceedings of the Company, from the first date of their union as a Corporation, to that, on which the more detailed history of their progress commences.

Though the merchants of Great Britain, after the discovery of the passage to India by the Cape of Good Hope (A. D. 1497), made early efforts to share with the Portuguese in the rich trade, which was carried on by the newly discovered channel between Europe and that quarter of the globe, more than a century elapsed before they were in any degree successful. Individual capital, after several attempts,

* Vide 'Plans for British India.'

was found too limited for a trade, which, however lucrative, was attended with great risk, and required force to protect it.

It is to these causes, that we must trace the original association of that body of wealthy merchants, who petitioned Queen Elizabeth to grant them encouragement, and exclusive privileges, for the purpose of carrying on the trade with India. That Princess, alive to every project which promised to increase the wealth and greatness of her country, sent an Embassy to the Emperor of Dehly (Ahbar), to solicit him to extend his favor and protection to her subjects, trading with his dominions. Elizabeth, however, when she adopted this measure, did not wait for it's result, which was not very successful, but granted a Charter on the 31st of December 1600, which erected the Merchants,* who had petitioned her, into a Body or Corporation, under the title of "*Governors and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies.*" By this Charter they were vested with the power of purchasing lands without any limitation ; their commerce was to be directed by a Governor and twenty-four persons in committees. Their first Governor, Sir

* The Petition was signed by the Earl of Cumberland, and two hundred and fifteen persons. The Earl's name is specified in the Grant.

Thomas Knight, was named in the act. The Company, their sons when of age, their apprentices, servants and factors in India, were vested, for a period of fifteen years, with the privilege, to use the words of the Charter, of an exclusive trade "into the countries and parts of Asia and "Africa, and into and from all the islands, "ports, towns, and places of Asia, Africa and "America, or any of them, beyond the Cape of "Bona Esperanza, or the Straits of Magellán, "where any traffic may be used, and to and "from every of them."

The General Assemblies of the Company were vested with the power of making any laws and regulations for the conduct of their concerns, which were not at variance with the laws of the realm ; and their exports were made free of custom for a term of four years. They were empowered to fit out and send six good ships and six pinnaces annually to India ; and to export, under some restrictions, thirty thousand pounds in foreign coin or bullion.

This Charter concludes with a proviso, by which the Crown, in the event of it's operation not being profitable to the State, had the right, upon giving two years' warning, to resume the Grant, which in the same clause it pledged itself to prolong for fifteen years beyond the first

period, in the event of it's proving advantageous to the country.

Such was the first Charter under which the merchants of England commenced their commerce with India. Their original capital was seventy-two thousand pounds, divided into shares, each of which was fifty pounds.

The first fleets which the Company sent to India were successful, but particularly the third, which was commanded by Captain Keeling, who returned to England in 1610, after a prosperous though long voyage, with his ships richly laden, and without the loss of a man in his fleet.

Notwithstanding these successes, the trade to India was inconsiderable and uncertain. It's prosperity depended upon the good-will and honesty of the natives of the countries to which the Company traded, and the address of the local agents by whom their concerns in India were managed.

Destitute of settlements or forts, they had neither accommodation nor security for their servants or property; and were consequently subject to every insult or injury, which the jealousy or hatred of European rivals could stimulate the inhabitants of the ports, which they frequented, to offer; and they had early to

encounter the full force of that active and implacable hostility, which characterizes disputes that involve questions of commercial interest; but the checks which those disputes gave to their success, appear only to have excited their spirit of enterprise.

In the year 1609 they obtained a second Charter, by which this right of exclusive trade was made perpetual; with a proviso, however, like the former, by which the Crown was declared to have the power of resuming the Grant (giving three years' warning), "if it was not found to promote the interests of the realm."

Though the Company had received the permission of the Emperor of Dehly to form considerable settlements, and establish factories upon the shores of the Empire, they had been hitherto prevented from taking advantage of this indulgence by the intrigues of the Portuguese, and they were ultimately obliged to have recourse to force, to obtain justice from that nation, which claimed, on the ground of prior possession, an exclusive right to the commerce of the Indian seas.

The vessels of the Company were armed, to oppose this arrogant pretension; and in the year 1612, a fleet of them, under Captain Best, defeated the Portuguese in two actions. These

victories not only raised the reputation of the English, but enabled them to establish a factory at Surat, under circumstances every way propitious to their success. Anxious to confirm the advantages which they had obtained, the Company solicited the King of England to send an Embassy to the Court of the Emperor Jehaungier, to settle their commerce upon a more secure and liberal basis. King James complied with their request; and Sir Thomas Roe proceeded in the year 1614 to the Imperial Court, which was then residing at Ajmere.

He was received with every honour by Jehaungier, who seemed disposed to accede to all his requests: but the caution of his son and ministers, and the intrigues of the Portuguese missionaries, prevented that success which had been expected.

A confirmation of former grants, and an extended privilege of having resident agents at some of the principal towns in the Empire; were, however, obtained; and having finished this arrangement, the Ambassadors returned to Surat, where he passed some time in settling the new factories at that place, and Baroach, and then sailed for Persia, where he was equally, if not more, successful with Shah Abbas the reigning Sovereign of that nation;

from whose friendship he obtained every privilege which could promote the commerce of the Company with the Persian Gulf.

The effort which the Portuguese had made to check the progress of the English on the continent of India, was feeble, and perhaps accelerated their success, by stimulating them to active and decided measures; but it in some degree deranged their finances, as it forced them to the expense of military equipments. Their pecuniary embarrassments were greatly increased by the unfortunate result of an endeavour, which was made at this period, to share with the Dutch in the lucrative trade carried on by that nation with the Spice Islands; where, though the superiority of the English character at first gave them success, and enabled them to conciliate some of the Malay Princes, and to obtain the cession of several valuable settlements, their factories were ultimately destroyed. This was effected by a course of policy, which a sordid cruelty could alone have generated, and a spirit of unfeeling avarice executed; and which, though it attained its immediate object, has excited lasting feelings of resentment in the British Nation, and left an indelible stain upon the fame of that Country by whom it was adopted.

The Massacre of Amboyna (for such the event, which closed this scene, must ever be termed) had the effect, which the cold calculating foresight of it's perpetrators had anticipated; and from it's occurrence, in 1622, the English may be said to have abandoned the commerce of the Eastern Islands to their rivals.

This catastrophe, some radical defects in the constitution of the Company in England, the smallness of their capital, and their increased expenditure, added to their want of forts, and their consequent reliance on the precarious protection of the native Governments, appear at this period to have brought the affairs of the Company into great distress. Their commerce, which had from the first depended upon lucky adventures, began rapidly to decline; and their history, for a long period, offers nothing but a detail of misfortunes in trade, connected with a series of spirited actions, particularly at sea, where the English invariably asserted their character, and revenged themselves upon the Dutch and Portuguese for the injuries which they suffered on shore.

It was during this moment of distress, that an accident led to the formation of that Settlement in Bengal, which has since proved the source of all their prosperity. The Company

were indebted to the professional skill of a physician for this origin of their power and greatness.

This gentleman, whose name was Boughton, had proceeded from Surat to Agrah, and had the good fortune to cure the daughter of the Emperor Shah Jehaun of a severe illness; for which, among other rewards, he received the privilege of carrying on a free trade. He went to Bengal, and there his abilities obtained him equal favour from the Nabob of that Country, who extended the privilege, which had been given to him personally by the Emperor, to all his Nation, and in the year 1636 the Company's servants at Surat built a factory at Hoogley, about one hundred miles from the mouth of the branch of the Ganges, which takes it's name from that town.

But this event, though it opened a new and rich channel of commerce, was not sufficient to arrest the decline of the Company's affairs; and the very existence of that body, as a corporation, would appear to have been nearly annihilated during the civil wars in England.

The trade to India was indeed thrown open from the year 1652 to 1657, on which year Cromwell renewed the privileges of the Company. Nothing can be more opposite, than the accounts given by different authors of the

result of this short suspension of the Company's monopoly. One, who wrote in 1681, asserts, that the Nation had nearly lost, during this period, all its privileges in India; that the value of English commodities was lessened; and that those of India were advanced; while another, whose work appears in 1680, declares, that when the East India trade was laid open, the English merchants afforded the Indian commodities so cheap, as to supply most parts of Europe, and even Amsterdam itself. And the last fact would appear to be confirmed by that passage in the letters of Thurloe, the Secretary to Cromwell, which states, that the merchants of Amsterdam "having heard that the Lord Protector would dissolve the East India Company at London, and declare the navigation and commerce to the Indies to be free, and open, were greatly alarmed; as they considered such a measure would be ruinous to their own East India Company."*

The death of Cromwell disappointed those expectations, which the Company had latterly cherished, from the support of his Government: but these were more than fulfilled by a new

* These two statements are not at such variance as they may at first sight appear. A sudden and great competition of our merchants in India would produce the effects stated by both writers.

Charter, which they obtained from Charles the Second, dated April 1661.

The Charter of Queen Elizabeth had invested the Company with an exclusive right of commerce for fifteen years; and that Corporation was declared a perpetual body politic by a Charter of James the First: but in that obtained from Charles the Second, the old privileges were not only confirmed, but new ones of great importance added. They were vested with a right of exercising civil jurisdiction and military authority; and with the power of making war or concluding peace with the "Infidels of India;" the State reserving to itself, by this distinction, those prerogatives with respect to European Governments. The clause in the Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth, which stated, that it should become null and void after three years' warning, if the privileges granted proved in any way detrimental to the general interests of the Nation, was, however, inserted in all those subsequently granted.

Charles the Second having married the Infanta of Portugal in 1662, obtained the Island of Bombay, in 1663, as a part of the portion of that Princess; but finding the expense of supporting that possession greater than its revenue, he ceded it to the Company, in the twentieth year of his reign. Five years afterward he

granted to them the Island of St. Helena; and in the same spirit which dictated these important sessions, the whole aid of his Government was applied to promote their interests and prosperity.

This encouragement and protection, combined with the active exertions of the Company, raised them to an apparent state of affluence; which, though it excited attack, gave them great means of resisting it. The Charter granted in 1661, was confirmed by Charles the Second in the twenty-eighth year of his reign, and their privileges were extended by an act passed in the thirty-fifth. But they were still more indebted to James the Second, whose influence had been their chief support during his brother's life, and who, when he ascended the throne, granted them increased immunities, and a still larger portion of the royal power. He authorized them to build fortresses, to levy troops, to determine causes by Courts Martial, and to coin money. By these privileges he raised them into a Power, which they disgraced by a thousand acts of corruption, violence, and tyrannical oppression.

It has been well observed by an able anonymous author, who has written a History of the early period of the East India Company, that "unlimited power in the hands of a single

“ person, may be prevented from degenerating
“ into acts of tyranny, by the terrors of igno-
“ miny, or by personal fears. But a body of men
“ vested with authority, is seldom swayed by
“ restraint of either kind : as they derive, indi-
“ vidually, but little applause from their best
“ measures ; so the portion of infamy, which
“ may fall from each for the worst public ac-
“ tions, is too small to affect personal character.
“ Having, therefore, no generous inducement to
“ follow virtue, the most sordid passions fre-
“ quently lead them into vice. It is from this
“ circumstance, that the decisions of public
“ bodies* sometimes partake of that mortifying
“ species of tyranny, which is incapable of re-
“ dress, and yet is beyond revenge. These ob-
“ servations may be applied, without the least
“ injustice, to the actions of the Indian Com-
“ pany both at home and abroad. Avarice, the
“ most obstinate and hardened passion of the
“ human mind, being the first principle of com-
“ merce, was the original bond of their union ;
“ and humanity, justice, and even policy, gave
“ way to the prospect or love of gain.”

* Those republics, whose conduct would appear an exception to this rule, have acted under the influence of motives, which could not exist in the minds of men, who had no national feeling for the country they ruled, and only viewed their possessions and power as sources of commercial advantage.

“ Besides that want of generous principle,” the same author adds in a note upon the above paragraph, “ which seems excluded from the “ very constitution of a sovereign corporation “ of commerce, the great distance of their administration in India secured the Company “ from a general inspection into their conduct, “ and consequently furnished ample opportunities for a wanton and uncontrolled exercise of “ power. All resistance, therefore, to their arbitrary edicts, whether they regarded their “ own servants or the natives of the country, “ was considered as treason, and punished with “ severity. The rulers at home had their favourites abroad, whom they protected in the “ most cruel and oppressive measures by their “ authority. Hence it happened, that private “ resentments and selfish views were too frequently the only rules of their conduct; and “ that their administration had scarce any other “ principle of union, than a mutual permission “ to commit injustice. Even the exclusive privilege, which was thought necessary for the “ prosperity of their commerce, became an “ engine of tyranny against all those whom “ they considered as interlopers; and such instances of their barbarity might be produced, “ supported by facts, as would excite horror.”

This author, who, though neither moderate

nor impartial, is very able, and argumentative, supports this general reasoning with some strong facts. Of these, such only will be adduced, as appear to rest on credible authority. The Company had for a period thrown a veil of secrecy over their affairs, under which those who managed them had no doubt practised many frauds. Though they had doubled their capital in the year 1682, they had not taken in more than one half of the sum at first subscribed: and at the moment they were endeavouring to support an appearance of health in a declining body, by making extravagant dividends to the proprietors of stock, they had incurred a debt of two millions; and, instead of answering the legal demands against them, had affixed a paper to the treasury door, declaring they would pay no more till a certain date, though they pretended at the same time that their affairs were in the most flourishing condition.*

These deceptions at home were supported by iniquities abroad; where the Company's factors, in obedience to the instructions of their employers, first borrowed large sums, and then quarrelled with their creditors.† Sir John Child, one of the most notorious of their Governors, is repre-

* White's 'Account of Indian Trade.'

† Hamilton, Vol. I. page 187. Harris, Vol. II.

sented to have gone still further, and to have seized thirteen large ships at Surat, the property of the merchants of that place, and to have retired with his shameful spoil to Bombay.*

Though the Company had obtained a new Charter from Queen Mary in 1694, several flagrant abuses in the conduct of their affairs were detected by Parliament, in 1695. Their home expenses, it was found, had rapidly increased from the sum of £1200 per annum to that of £90,000; and their Governor, Sir Thomas Cooke, on whose notes this money had been lent, was terrified, by a Bill of Pains and Penalties, to make a discovery, from which it appeared that ten thousand pounds of this cash had gone to the King himself, and other sums to his Ministers and principal servants.† The Duke of Leeds, who was the most obnoxious offender, was impeached for receiving five thousand pounds; but King William put a sudden end to the session; and by that act not only quashed the impeachment, but checked all further inquiry.

The principal, and indeed natural, enemies

* As afterwards appeared on oath, in the Court of Exchequer. The value of £300,000 of this spoil was sent home to the Committee of the Court of Directors, who gave the orders.—White's

‘Account of Indian Trade.’

† Journals, April 1695.

of the Company, against whom all their violence both at home and abroad was directed, were those English merchants, who wished to interfere with their monopoly, and who were termed, in the language of the day, interlopers. Their endeavours to check and destroy these, led, no doubt, to many acts of oppression, which have been exaggerated, by the writers of the suffering party, into deeds of the most barbarous tyranny. The interlopers, however, in spite of that violence of which they complained, continued to gain strength; and in 1698 they were able to bring under the cognizance of Parliament the Charter granted to the Company in 1694; and having outbid that Corporation, by offering an advance of two millions* sterling at eight per cent, in consideration of an exclusive right of commerce with the East being vested in the subscribers, a Bill was passed in their favour. But their triumph did not last long, for the old Company obtained a confirmation of their Charter in the ensuing season. On the adoption of this measure, the Nation had two East India Companies by parliamentary authority, instead of one by prerogative.† Nothing could be more violent, than the contests of these Com-

* The old Company offered £700,000, at 4 per cent.

† Ralph, Vol. II. page 845.

panies during the short period that they continued separate. The great efforts of both were directed to the object of gaining power in the House of Commons; and in the general elections of 1700 each was detected in bribery and corruption. The old Company corrupted members, and purchased voices; the other, seats. Thus the one bribed the representatives, the other the constituents. But, tired out at length with a struggle which threatened ruin to both, they united their stock under the Charter which had been granted to the old Company, bearing date the 5th of September 1698; and assumed that name under which they have ever since been incorporated, *The United East India Company*.

During such contentions at home, the state of the Company's affairs abroad may be imagined. The spirit of the principles upon which these were regulated, will be collected from an extract of a letter from their Governor at home to an Officer, who had been appointed Judge for civil affairs in India. "I expect," says this commercial despot, "my will and orders shall be your rule, and not the laws of England, which are a heap of nonsense, compiled by a number of country gentlemen, who hardly know how to govern their own families, much less the regulating Companies, and fo-

“ reign Commerce. Having now the power
“ of condemning the Company’s enemies, or
“ such as shall be deemed so, particularly those
“ that shall question the Company’s power over
“ all the British subjects in India, I expect my
“ orders from time to time shall be obeyed, and
“ received as Statute Laws.”

The union of the two Companies in England had not an immediate effect in reconciling their servants either at home or abroad; and it was some period before their rooted animosities gave way to a feeling of common interest. It did, at last; and in the year 1708 the united Corporation obtained a Bill most favourable to their commerce and privileges, which was granted, on condition of their lending to Government the sum of £120,000, over and above the two millions which had been lent when the new Company was first established.

That tranquillity, and consequent commercial prosperity, which the Peace of Utrecht brought to Europe, was felt by the British Settlements in the East; and these were about this period (1713) under the rule of men of prudence and ability. But success created enemies. A very general clamour was raised against their monopoly, which was stated to be adverse to the general commercial interests of the Kingdom; and they were obliged to agree to an arrangement,

which was considered advantageous to the State, in order to maintain their right of exclusive trade to India.

The affairs of the united Company continued in the same prosperous condition, both at home and abroad, till war was declared between France and England in the year 1744. The French, who had failed for nearly eighty years in all their attempts to erect and support an East India Company, had succeeded in accomplishing this object about the year 1720; and the regular returns made by this Company from the period of their establishment in India, had been so considerable, that the jealousy of the British Company was raised, and the Government entering with some degree of warmth into that jealousy, turned their attention toward the East, when war was likely to arise between the two Nations. The French, anxious to promote a commerce, still in it's infancy, had proposed a neutrality between the two Companies as early as the year 1742, which the Court of Directors at first accepted, and then rejected. When, therefore, war commenced in Europe in 1744, the flame soon spread to Asia. Their respective Sovereigns assisted each Company. The pursuits of commerce yielded to the occupation of arms; and the strange spectacle was presented, of two European Nations combating

with each other on the shores of India, aided by different Native Princes of the Country. These Chiefs, impelled by a short-sighted policy, thus sacrificed their permanent independence, for the attainment of momentary objects of hatred and ambition. For it was early in this contest very obvious, that whether the troops of England or France prevailed, the native allies must become dependent on the Conqueror.

What has been said of the History of the Company, shows in a very strong light, not only the origin, but the character, of their early power; and proves the urgent necessity, which existed, from the earliest period of their association, for the strict and constant interference of the Legislature of the Country, to check excesses, by which the national character of England was so exposed to injury. The Company, or rather the individuals of the Direction by whom the Corporation was governed, were in a great degree dead, as has been shown, to those feelings which urge the mind to good and great actions. They, in fact, recognised no motive, but a desire to enrich themselves, their relations and dependents. Their strength as a community, which was the natural consequence of this system, increased with their means of corruption and oppression: and such was the

venality of the times, that it appears that hardly any, however high their station, escaped the contamination.

The occurrence of war, in 1744, between England and France, was the commencement of a new era to British India. The same system of Government remained; but the scene was changed. It had gained importance, from becoming one of national contest, and from the new actors who were introduced. These were no longer unobserved factors, and agents of a trading company, whose obscurity left them without an incentive to virtue, or a dread of shame; but officers of distinction, who not only acted under the control of honourable superiors, but under the observation of their Country, which now began to take a warm interest in Indian affairs.

Though it cannot be supposed that the desire of fame, thus excited, could, by its operation on the minds of a few individuals, effect a complete change in a system, which was radically bad; it must be acknowledged to have had a wonderful effect. India became a scene, in which character and reputation, as well as wealth, were to be acquired; and many of those, who were employed in distinguished stations in that Country, attained the highest honours, which respect and approbation can

bestow, or courage and talents command. The names of Lawrence and Clive (both of whom commenced their career about this period of the History of the Company) will live as long as the annals of England; and be regarded as glorious examples, until the qualities of valour, military skill and elevated genius, shall cease to receive the applause and admiration of mankind.

The Peace of Aix la Chapelle, which was concluded in 1748, terminated those direct hostilities which the French and English nations had carried on in India; but the armies, which both States maintained at that period on the coast of Coromandel, continued to assist different native Princes, with the object on each side of obtaining, through such policy, a strength that would make their power, at the renewal of a contest, paramount to the other.

Both the English and French had proceeded in this course for some years, with fluctuating success; when the embarrassment, to which it led, induced the Directors of each Company to apply to their Sovereigns, to interpose their power to mediate their differences: and the terms of accommodation were actually agreed upon, when the war of 1756 broke out between the two Nations, and caused their armies in India to enter upon a more extended field of contest than ever. This contest was marked

by a series of unparalleled success on the part of the English, who remained, at the peace of 1763, Sovereigns of the rich Provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, of the Northern Circars, of part of the Carnatic, and of all their old possessions on the Malabar Coast.

In addition to the strength, which these possessions gave to the Government of the English Company, we may add the resources of it's Allies, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the Vizier of Oude, whose power it had supported, and over both of whose Courts the English influence was so completely established, that that Nation might be said to command the resources of their dominions.

The rapid aggrandizement of the Company naturally called the observation of the Administration in England to their affairs; and in the year 1767, the House of Commons appointed a Committee to investigate the nature of the Company's Charters, to consider their Treaties and Grants, and to calculate all expenses, civil, naval, and military, which had been incurred by Government on their account.

Their right to any territorial acquisition, was at this period boldly questioned, and their monopoly was a subject of very free discussion; but they found means, as they had on former occasions, to silence opposition from those quarters

where they thought it might be dangerous. Their personal and political influence in the State had increased with their fortune and patronage; and too many had become interested in the golden harvest, which about this period opened in the East, to make it easy to control, much less to subvert, a body so strong and so united. The result of this inquiry, therefore, was a compromise between the Company and the Ministers, by which the possessions of the former were confirmed to them for the term of two years, on condition of their paying the public £400,000 per annum. A new engagement, very nearly similar to the former, took place in 1769; but the period of its duration was extended for five years.

Before this agreement expired, the Company's affairs fell into considerable embarrassment: and in 1773 they petitioned Government for pecuniary aid, which was granted; but the inquiry, that the House of Commons made upon this occasion into their affairs, was followed by an act of the Legislature, which made many important changes in their Government both at home and abroad. The principal of these were:

- 1st. That the Court of Directors should in future, instead of being chosen annually, be elected for four years; six members annually;

but none to hold their seat for longer than four years.

2d. That the qualification stock should be £1000 instead of £500: £3000, two votes; and £6000, three votes.

3d. That in lieu of the Mayor's Court, the jurisdiction of which was limited to small mercantile causes, a Supreme Court of Judicature, consisting of a Chief Judge and three Puisne Judges, should be appointed by the Crown, with great and extended powers of cognizance over the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the subjects of England, their servants and dependents, residing within the Company's territories in Bengal.

4th. A Governor General, with four Counsellors, were appointed to Fort William, and vested with full powers over the other Presidencies. When any differences occurred, the opinion of the majority was to be decisive; and this Board was directed by the act to transmit regular reports of its proceedings to the Directors, who were, within fourteen days of the receipt of their despatches, to furnish copies of them to one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State, to whom they were also to send copies of any rules and ordinations which they made; and these were, if disapproved by his Majesty, to become null and void.

This act appointed Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor General of India ; and John Clavering, Esquire, the Honourable George Monson, Richard Barwell, and Phillip Francis, Esquires, the four first Counsellors.

It would be foreign to the intent of this work, to enter into a narrative of Mr. Hastings's Government. It was, from it's commencement till it's termination, marked by events of uncommon magnitude, which ultimately gave rise to a discussion, which not only diffused a more general knowledge of Indian affairs, but awakened the British Nation to a more just sense of the importance of it's interests in India.

Whatever may have been the opinion of contending parties and factions at this period, there are some leading facts relating to this part of the History of British India, upon which all dispassionate minds are now agreed. It is admitted, even by those who condemned part of his conduct, that Mr. Hastings, during a time of unexampled public embarrassment, and at a moment when he had to contend against those from whom he should have derived support, showed all the active energy of a great Statesman ; and, by his spirited and extraordinary exertions, saved the interests of his Country in India from that ruin with which they were threatened ; and in which they

undoubtedly would have been involved, had a man of less resolution, fortitude and genius, held the reigns of Government. This is his praise; and no man could wish higher: but the most strenuous advocates of this distinguished person, while they defend his personal integrity, are forced to acknowledge, that the whole system of the Government over which he presided was corrupt, and full of abuses. The control, or rather right of superintendence, given by the act of 1774 to his Majesty's Ministers, had tended more to increase, than diminish the radical defects of the system. The Ministers were vested with a right of interference, but had little, if any, responsibility with respect to the conduct of the Indian Government. Their favour and aid were indispensable to the Governor General; and, to secure it's continuance, it became necessary, that, in addition to the friends of the Directors of the Company, those of the Ministers of the Crown should be served. Thus the exercise of his patronage in India became the chief, if not the only means, through which the Governor General could expect support in England; and the canvassing nature of the constitution of that Country made it unlikely, that any Minister would cast away such a source of strength as a share in the rich appointments of the East. Consequently, this

system, corrupt and inefficient as it was, might have long continued, had not an unwearied spirit of investigation dragged the voluminous records of the Company into light, with the view of criminating their principal agents. The first or Secret Committee of the House of Commons, of which Mr. Dundas was President, commenced the attack; and its reports were soon followed by those of the Select Committee, which acting under the direction and guidance of Mr. Burke, one of the wisest men and greatest orators England ever boasted, disseminated among all classes a general knowledge of the affairs of the Company.

There can be no doubt, that the promoters of these inquiries (however mixed their motives might have been) became entitled to the gratitude of their Country; as, unless such knowledge had been made general, every attempt to ameliorate and improve a Government, where the temptations to continue a corrupt system were so strong, must have proved vain and abortive.

The extended jurisdiction, given by the act of 1773 to the Supreme Court of Judicature established at Fort William, was found in its operations so hostile to the prejudices of the Natives of the Company's Provinces, and so likely to destroy that authority, which it was meant to support, that it was limited by a subsequent act,

passed in 1781, to the Town and Suburbs of Calcutta.

From the year 1779, when an act was passed, by which the right of the Company to territorial possessions was only extended for one year, till the year 1783 a continual conflict existed between the Directors and his Majesty's Ministers, respecting the terms on which the Company's Charter and exclusive privileges should be prolonged and supported. It is not necessary to dwell upon the various offers, which were made, during this contest, by that Corporation, or to particularize those which were rejected or accepted by his Majesty's Ministers: the great measures, by which this period was followed, have condemned them to oblivion; nor had they any pretensions (for they were avowedly temporary expedients) to escape the fate which they have experienced.

The most serious discussions, regarding Indian affairs, took place in 1783. Mr. Dundas, who had been Chairman of one of the Committees of Inquiry, brought forward in the beginning of this year a Bill, which proposed few great changes, except that of appointing a person, who, under the high title of Governor General and Captain General, should exercise in his own person (under certain checks) complete authority and control over British India.

This high public Officer was to be approved, but not nominated, by the Crown, by whom alone he could be removed. It was proposed by this Bill, that his Majesty's principal Secretary of State should receive copies of all despatches: and to these provisions were added some good general rules with regard to the preservation of the laws, religion and usages, of the Natives. The principle of this Bill, which was the introduction, during the remainder of the Charter, of a more active interference on the part of the executive Government in the administration of the affairs of the Company, was generally approved. It was allowed, that a more efficient and energetic local Government was required; and that a responsibility more defined and more operative on all parties, than that established by the act of 1773, was indispensable to correct the gross abuses of the existing system; but there was a wide difference of opinion in the House of Commons regarding the nature of those checks, which it might be expedient to fix over the controlling powers, which it went to establish; and it was on this ground, that its utility was chiefly combated. Though this Bill for the Government of India did not succeed, it gave birth to one of a nearly similar character, which was introduced and carried by Mr. Pitt in the next

sessions. But as that great measure chiefly owed its success to the feelings created in the minds of the Directors and Proprietors by the agitation of the plan brought forward by his political rival Mr. Fox, it will be first necessary to take a short view of that measure.

In 1783, Mr. Fox brought forward his celebrated Bills for the better regulation and government of the British possessions in India. These Bills* proceeded on a principle, stated in their preamble, that disorders of an alarming nature and magnitude had long prevailed in the administration of the territorial possessions, revenue and commerce, of British India: that the Natives were reduced to distress, and the public interests in danger of being ruined; a remedy was in consequence become necessary, and the following was proposed:

That the whole power, now vested in the Court of Directors and Proprietors, should be for the space of four years transferred to seven Directors or Commissioners, named in the act; to aid whom, nine Assistant Directors, named also in the act, were selected from Proprietors holding at least £2000 stock each. These, however, were entirely placed under the orders

* They were two; one meant to regulate the home, or, as the Bill termed them, the *domestic* affairs of the Company; the other, their foreign Government.

of the former. On the occurrence of the death, resignation, or removal, (on charges substantiated before the House of Commons,) of one of the seven principal Directors, the vacancy was to be supplied by the King; if one happened among the nine Assistant Directors, the Proprietors of stock (as qualified by the act of 1773) were to elect another.

The principle of these Bills, in regard to the power to be given to the Governor General, was directly opposite to that of Mr. Dundas. It was declared, that the powers of the Governor General in Council should on no occasion be delegated to such Governor alone, or to any person or persons whatever; and the Governor General and Council were restricted in all cases as much as it seemed practicable, but particularly in that of making war. The Governor General was declared not to have the power of entering, or invading with an armed force, the dominion of any Prince of India, except upon intelligence, the credibility of which was to be admitted, and individually recorded by the majority of the Members of his Council, that such Prince was about to make war on the Company or their Allies. The Governor General and Council were not permitted, without orders from the Commissioners, to enter into any offensive alliance for the sharing any Country

between the Company and a Native Prince; nor were they to hire out any troops (European or Native) in the territories of any Indian State.

These were the leading provisions of these celebrated Bills, which, though passed with a great majority in the House of Commons, were thrown out by the Lords, and terminated in the expulsion from office of the Statesman by whom they were framed, and the party by whom they were supported. Mr. Fox's measure was declaredly temporary, and adopted as an expedient for the moment. The seven Commissioners, whom he proposed, were to act like Trustees to a Bankrupt House of Commerce, and were to manage the affairs of the East India Company until it was determined what was best and wisest for the future regulation of their concerns. What would have been the ultimate arrangement for the Government of India, had this plan been carried into execution, cannot be known; but it is not probable that the Company would ever have regained their power. It is not, however, intended to enter in this place into any discussion regarding the merits or defects of Mr. Fox's Bills. The wisdom and foresight, which these in some parts displayed, were certainly clouded by strong party spirit and prejudice; and, from the want of correct

and complete information, many of his leading principles were every way inapplicable to the actual state of the Country for which they were framed by that great Statesman.

This scheme, though it was an improvement upon the former administration of India, would probably have been found erroneous in some of its most fundamental principles; but particularly in that, by which, instead of giving confidence to the ruling authority of India under great and direct responsibility, it multiplied checks upon the local Government; and thus, by the diminution of its power, lowered and weakened its means of action; and rendered it more incompetent, than it had been before, to those great, and indeed sovereign, functions, which it has to perform. The clamour against Mr. Fox's Bill was excessive. His scheme of seven Commissioners was represented as a means, which he had devised to perpetuate his own power. His measures went, it was said, to establish an influence in the hands of Ministers, unknown to the Constitution of the Country: and the East India Company, who had been before hated and abused on account of their monopoly and imputed crimes, became the object of pity and commiseration; and were represented by the writers of the day, as an injured and unprotected Body, who were likely

to have their privileges violated, and their rights invaded, by a rash and ambitious Minister.

From this violence of party rage, the right of regulating the Company's affairs became a political conflict between two great and nearly equally balanced parties; and the scale was turned by a coalition between Mr. Pitt and the Court of Directors, or rather the great majority of the Proprietors of India Stock; who, though originally adverse to any interference in their concerns, when they found they could not avert that event, naturally chose that side which was least unfavourable to what they considered as their established rights and privileges.

CHAPTER II.

ADMINISTRATION

OF

LORD CORNWALLIS.

CONTENTS.

Mr. Pitt's Bill for the better Administration of India.—Observations upon that Bill.—Lord Cornwallis appointed Governor General.—Account of the Engagements entered into with the Nizam.—Treaty concluded with that Prince.—Treaty with the Mahratta State.—Causes of the War with Tippoo.—Consequences of that War.—Considerations upon the Policy of Lord Cornwallis in commencing War, and concluding Peace.—Connexion between the Nizam and the British Government becomes more intimate.—Consequent Jealousy of the Court of Poonah.—Great Increase of Scindiah's Power.—View of the Affairs of the Carnatic—of Oude.—Lord Cornwallis returns to Europe.—General Reflections upon the State of India at that Time.

It will be useful, in this place, not only to take a view of Mr. Pitt's Bill of 1784, but of the explanatory Act of 1786, and of such Acts as have been subsequently passed; as they col-

lectively form the basis of the present constitution of our Indian Government, the nature of which will be best elucidated by a concise statement of their principal provisions; and this statement will prevent the necessity of interrupting the narrative with any repetitions on this branch of the subject.

Mr. Pitt's Bill of 1784, appointed six Privy Counsellors to be Commissioners for the affairs of India; of whom, one of the Secretaries of State for the time being was President. These Commissioners, who were appointed by his Majesty, and removable at his pleasure, were vested with a control and superintendence over all civil, military and revenue, Officers of the Company; and the Directors of that Corporation were obliged to lay before them all papers relative to the management of their possessions; and to obey all orders which they received from them, on points connected with their civil or military government, or the revenues of their territories.

The Commissioners were obliged to return the copies of papers, which they received from the Directors, in fourteen days, with their approbation; or to state at large their reasons for disapproving of them; and their despatches, so approved or amended, were to be sent to India, unless the Commissioners should attend to any

representations of the Court of Directors, respecting further alterations in them.

The Court of Directors had no power to send any orders regarding their civil or military government, without the sanction of the Commissioners; but these might (if the Directors neglected to send true copies of their intended despatches, upon any subject, within fourteen days) send from themselves orders and instructions relative to the civil or military concerns of the Company, to any of the Presidencies of India; and these instructions the Court of Directors were, in such case, bound to forward.

If the Commissioners forwarded any orders to the Court of Directors on points not relating to the civil or military government, or to the revenues of the territorial possessions of the Company, the Directors might appeal to the King and Council.

In all cases of secrecy, and particularly such as related to war or peace with the Native Powers of India, the Commissioners had the power of sending their orders to the local Government of India, through a Secret Committee of the Court of Directors; which Committee, by the act, could in this case only be considered as the vehicle of the instructions to the local authorities in India.

The chief Government in India was by this

act to consist of a Governor General and three Counsellors; and the Commander-in-Chief of the forces for the time being had a voice and precedence next after the Governor General; but was not to succeed, in the event of a vacancy, unless by special appointment of the Directors.

The constitution of the Government of the subordinate Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, was the same as Bengal; and at both, the Governor had, like the Governor General, a casting vote in Council.

These Settlements were by this act placed completely under the rule of the Governor General in Council, on all points connected with negotiations with the Country Powers, peace or war, and the application of their revenues and forces.

The King had a right, by this act, to recall the Governor General, or any Officer of the Company, from India: and if the Court of Directors did not within two months nominate some person to a vacancy, which occurred in any of the principal stations, such as Governor General, Governor, Commander-in-Chief, or Counsellors, to which it was their duty to appoint, the Crown became possessed of the right to make such nomination.

It was declared by this act, that as the pur-

suit of schemes of conquest was repugnant to the wish, to the honour and the policy, of the British Nation, that it was not lawful for the Governor General in Council of Fort William, without the express authority and concord of the Court of Directors, or of the Secret Committee, either to declare or commence hostilities, or to enter into any treaty for making war against any of the Native Princes or States in India, or any treaty guaranteeing the dominions of such Princes or States, except when hostilities have been commenced, or preparations actually made for the attack of the British Nation in India, or of some of the States and Princes, whose dominions it shall be engaged by subsisting treaties to defend.

The subordinate Presidencies were prohibited by this act from making war or peace, without orders from Fort William, the Court of Directors, or the Secret Committee; except in cases of sudden emergency or imminent danger, when it would be ruinous or unsafe to postpone such hostilities or treaty. The Supreme Government had the power given them of suspending any of the Governors of the subordinate Settlements, who disobeyed their orders.

A new and extraordinary Court was constituted by this act, for the trial of Indian delinquents. It was formed of a specified number

of Members of the House of Lords and House of Commons ; and had great powers given to it, for the purpose of bringing to justice persons whom it was stated, that common Courts could not reach. But it is needless to dwell upon this part of the Bill, as it was, in consequence of representations from the British subjects in India, completely new-modelled and changed.

An act was passed in 1786, by which several parts of the act of 1784 were explained and amended. The power of appointing a civil servant, of twelve years' standing, on the occurrence of a vacancy, to Councils, was given to the local Governments of India.

The appointment of a Commander-in-Chief to Councils was made an act of option, not of necessity. The Directors were vested with the power of appointing the Commander-in-Chief in India Governor General, &c. of making the Commander-in-Chief at Madras and Bombay President of those Settlements ; and, what was more important, the Governor General, and the Governors of Madras and Bombay, were vested by this act with a discretionary right of acting, in extraordinary cases, without the concurrence of their Councils, being held solely and personally responsible for any consequences, which might ensue from the measures adopted under such circumstances.

This great power was only given to such Governor General or Governors, as were specifically appointed to those stations, and did not devolve to their casual successors; and it did not extend to cases of a judicial nature, or to the alteration of any established regulations for the civil government of the British Settlements in India.

In 1797, an act was passed, by which Courts were established at Madras and Bombay with powers nearly similar to those which had been before given to the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bengal. These Courts were made altogether independent of the Company's Governments in India; but they were not competent to try informations against the Governor or Council, unless in cases of felony or treason. The regulations of these Courts were in some respect altered, by an act passed in 1800, when a Chief Judge, and two Puisne Judges, were appointed to the Court of Judicature at Madras.

The intention of Mr. Pitt's Bill for the better administration of Indian affairs, was avowedly more that of temporary reform, than of final establishment. Its object was rather directed to a correction of abuses, and to a control of power, than to the complete removal of admitted evils, or the actual introduction of an efficient system: More could not have been expected, and per-

haps was not intended. As his plan proceeded on the avowed ground of maintaining, instead of demolishing, the established constitution of the Company's Government, a great part of the efficiency of the new system was sacrificed to the forms of the old; and much of that embarrassment, which has attended the operation of this measure, may be traced to that spirit of conciliation in which it was originally framed.

The circumstances under which this system commenced, were particularly favourable to its success and popularity. The admitted abuses which it corrected, the great strength of the Administration in England at the time when it was introduced, the ability and influence of the President of the Board of Control, and the firmness and integrity of the nobleman who was first invested with the high powers, which the amended Bill of 1786 so wisely gave to the Governor General of India; all contributed to cover its defects, and to bring its merits into the most prominent point of view. But subsequent events have shown, that it required all these aids to render it successful, and that the failure of any one of them would have had the most serious effect upon its operation.

In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the eagerness with which the Court of Directors have seized every opportunity,

which the casual weakness or changes in the Administration of the Country has afforded them, to regain that influence and authority, which they had lost. Since the dissolution of Mr. Pitt's first Administration in 1801, they have been engaged in continual contentions with the Board of Control. During almost the whole period that Lord Dartmouth presided at that Board, these contentions literally prevented the necessary orders being sent to India; and it may be doubted whether the conciliatory policy, which his immediate successor (under nearly similar circumstances) thought it expedient to pursue, was not attended with equally bad effects to the public interests.

The Court of Directors are a highly respectable body of men; and they have acted under this Bill, as all men in their situation would have acted. They have regretted the loss of power, and have desired to regain it. They have been placed in a situation, where they had two interests to promote, which were generally, if not always, opposite in their nature. The one, the general interests of the Nation; the other, the particular interests of the Corporation. Can it be either a subject of surprise or reproach, that the Directors have generally proved true to the latter? or, in other words,

that they have supported an interest, which supported them; that they have been faithful to their constituents, and to the vital principles of their constitution, which, though well adapted to the administration of those commercial interests for which it was first framed, was unsuited to the Political Government of a large Empire. This fact, indeed, was admitted by all, that from the theory of Mr. Pitt's Bill the power of the Court of Directors, as a Political Body, should be extinct; but the result has proved otherwise. The influence of the Company in the House of Commons has supported their authority in Leadenhall Street; and when the Administration has not been strong, the control over them has been almost nugatory. There certainly can be no reasonable objection to the Court of Directors, considered as a body of liberal and well-informed men, being intrusted with the administration of the Government of India; but there is an objection, and a strong one, grounded on the nature of their constitution, as the Directors of a commercial company. In the present great scale of our Indian Empire, those intrusted with it's Government should be suited, from their habits and objects in life, to the arduous duties which they have to fulfil: their views should be extended to the general prosperity of the Empire

which they rule; and not confined, or rather directed, to a particular branch of it: and they should (into whatever shape the nature of the Government of England required them to be formed) be constituted upon principles, which, while they subjected them to a severe and direct responsibility to their Country, left their exertions in the execution of the great trust committed to them free and unembarrassed.

The failure of Mr. Pitt's Bill in it's operation in this essential point, was foretold by Mr. Burke. "The scheme of reconciling a Direction really and truly deliberative" (said that great Orator and Statesman) "with an office really and substantially controlling, is a sort of machinery, that can be kept in order only a short time. Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, or the Secretary of State, as has hitherto been the case, will leave every thing to them, often through design, and often through neglect. If both should affect activity; collision, procrastination, delay, and in the end utter confusion, must ensue."

The best mode of judging every system of this nature, is by it's practical result; and a cursory view of the principal political events, which have occurred in the Government of India since the introduction of Mr. Pitt's Bill,

will be the best comment upon the merits and defects of a measure, which, it never must be forgotten, was deemed, as I have before stated, by its great author, as an experiment; and one in which, from the difficulty of the task, human wisdom could hardly venture to anticipate success.

The first person to whom the great powers, vested in the Governor General of India by the act of Parliament passed in 1786, were intrusted, was Marquis Cornwallis; and the character of that nobleman was suited to the high charge. Firm in his purposes, possessing unwearied zeal, and unsullied honour, he proceeded toward the objects which he had in view, with a vigour and decision which commanded success. The great reforms and changes, which he effected in the military and civil establishments of India, and the system of internal rule that he introduced into the Provinces of Bengal and Bahar, will ever reflect the highest honour on his name.

The consideration he enjoyed in England greatly promoted that success which attended him in India. His rank and character, while it placed him above the influence of the Ministers of the Crown, or the fear of the Court of Directors, commanded a respect from the civil and military servants of the Company, which, added

to the increased powers with which he was vested, freed him from every shadow of opposition. He was enabled, from the same causes, to stimulate to exertion, by the distinction which his personal favour bestowed, the first talents in India; and to combine the efforts of every ambitious and honourable mind in the support of the measures of his Administration.

It is not necessary to enter into any detailed history of Lord Cornwallis's Government. A concise review of the prominent political events, which marked his Administration; and of those principles, which guided his conduct under them; will sufficiently elucidate the subject, and answer the object of this Sketch.

The principal event, which occurred during his Administration, was the war with Tippoo Sultaun. This had its origin in a violent aggression of that Prince, who, on the 29th of December 1789, stormed the lines of the Rajah of Travancore, a Prince who was acknowledged under the protection of the English Government, by the stipulations of a treaty, which had been concluded with Tippoo in 1784.

To understand the nature and extent of the great political changes which were the consequences of this event, it will be necessary, before I detail the causes of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, to trace, in a succinct manner, the

history of the alliances which Lord Cornwallis thought it his duty, on this important occasion, to form with the States of Hyderabad and Poonah.

By a treaty, concluded between the Nizam and the Company in 1766, the latter engaged to furnish that Prince with a subsidiary force, when it was required, to settle the affairs of his Government; with a provision, however, that they should be at liberty to withdraw either a part or the whole of such force, whenever the safety of their own Settlements, or the territories of the Carnatic, rendered such a measure necessary; and by a subsequent article of the same treaty, the Nizam engaged (with a similar provision) to afford the Company, when required, the aid of his troops.

A corps of two battalions joined the Nizam's army under this treaty; but were soon obliged, by the treachery of that Prince, who formed a connexion with Hyder, to return to the Company's territories.

The rupture, which this conduct on the part of the Nizam caused with the Company's Government, terminated in 1768 in another treaty, by which that Prince not only agreed to consider Hyder Naigue as an usurper, and to revoke all sunnuds, or distinctions, which that Chief had received from him or any former Soubahdar

of the Deckan; but to aid the Company in obtaining possession of the Dewanee of the Carnatic Balaghaut (or the Country of Hyder); on the condition of their paying him a peishcush of seven lacks of rupees for that Country.

The cession of the Circar of Guntoor to the Company, on the death or misconduct of the Nizam's brother, was an express stipulation of this treaty; and it was also agreed, that the English should furnish the Nizam, on requisition, with a subsidiary corps of two battalions of Sepoys, with guns; on the condition, however, of his defraying the actual expense of such corps, while it remained in his service.

This corps had never been required by the Nizam: and the connexion between that Prince and the Company was, notwithstanding this treaty, of a general and unsettled nature, till the year 1788; when Lord Cornwallis, with a view to obtain the Guntoor Circars, and to effect a settlement of the arrears of peishcush due for the Circars, deputed a British Resident (Sir John Kennaway) to Hyderabad.

The demand of the cession of Guntoor, agreeably to the condition of the treaty of 1768, was accompanied with military preparations, which secured a prompt compliance on the part of the Nizam; who, from the unfortunate issue of a recent contest with Tippoo Sultaun, appeared

to be, at the moment when it was made, most anxious for the alliance of the British Government; and, with a view to this object, he had deputed Meer Abdool Cassim to Calcutta, for the purpose of conveying fully his sentiments and wishes to the Governor General.

The mission of Meer Abdool Cassim* was productive of a new engagement, (explanatory of the treaty of 1768,) conveyed in the form of a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Nizam; but declared by the former to be equally binding upon the British Nation as a regular treaty, which, Lord Cornwallis informed the Nizam, he was prevented entering into (unless just cause should be given) by the laws of his Country, and the injunctions of the King and Company of England.

This public instrument, which was dated the 1st of July 1789, after stating the motives, which regulated the conduct of the English Government in insisting on the cession of the Guntoor Circars, and the objections which existed to giving any further security, than the pledge of national faith, for the regular payment of the peishcush, (the arrears of which had been settled in a manner satisfactory to both parties,)

* This able man was afterwards better known under his title Meer Alam. He died Prime Minister at Hyderabad in Nov. 1808.

proceeds to explain the 6th article of the treaty of 1768, which, it states, shall be agreed to mean, "That the force engaged for by this article, (two battalions of Sepoys, and six pieces of cannon manned by Europeans,) shall be granted, whenever the Nizam shall apply for it; making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any Powers in alliance with the Company; viz. Pundit Purdhaun, Madhajee Scindiah, Madhajee Ragojee Bhonslah, and other Mahratta Chiefs, the Nabob of Arcot, Nabob Vizier, or the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore."

This explanation altered one very material part of the alliance. The right, which the Company had, under the treaty of 1768, to withhold or withdraw the subsidiary force with which it was bound to aid the Nizam, was abrogated; and the right of that Prince to keep and employ that force in any manner he chose, so long as it was not employed against the above specified Princes and Chiefs in alliance with the Company, was fully recognised and established.

It would appear from subsequent parts of this letter, that Meer Abdool Cassim must have been directed to use his endeavours to persuade the Governor General to adopt measures for the fulfilment of those articles in the treaty of 1768, which related to the vesting of the Dewanee of

the Carnatic Balaghaut in the Company, on the condition of paying a sum of seven lacks of rupees annually to the Nizam for that Country; or, in other words, to proceed, on the grounds of the treaty of 1768, to dispossess Tippoo Sultaun of his territories.

The Governor General rejected those propositions, as inadmissible, from the lapse of time which had occurred, and the relations of general amity in which the British Government then stood to the Prince, whose possessions such an engagement would affect.

But, though Tippoo Sultaun had not shown any open indication of hostility against the English Government, or it's Allies, at the period to which we allude, his conduct must have been such, as to make Lord Cornwallis believe, that he cherished hostile projects against the British Government; or his Lordship would hardly, in consequence of the above propositions of the Nizam, have entered into a political engagement with that Prince, which might justly be deemed more than merely defensive against Tippoo Sultaun.

The desire, indeed, of not offending against the letter of the Act of Parliament, would appear on this occasion to have led to a trespass on it's spirit, by the revival of an offensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun; for such the treaty

of 1768 undoubtedly was; because, though Lord Cornwallis, in his letter of the 1st of July 1789, declares, that circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles in the treaty of 1768, which go to vest the Company with the Dewannee of the Carnatic Ballaghaut; yet he adds, "Should it hereafter happen, that
" the Company should obtain possession of the
" Country mentioned in those articles with
" your Highness's assistance, they (the Com-
" pany) will strictly perform the stipulations
" in favour of your Highness and the Mah-
" rattas."

It is necessary to remark in this place, that two treaties had been concluded, subsequently to the treaty of 1768, between Hyder Ally Khan and the British Government; and the latter State had concluded a treaty of peace with his son Tippoo Sultaun in 1784, by which it had fully recognised his right of sovereignty to the territories which he possessed: and assuredly, under such circumstances, the revival, with any modification, of an offensive alliance against his power, could not but alarm that Prince. Nor was his alarm likely to be dispelled by that qualification in the engagement, which provided, that no immediate operation should be undertaken against his dominions; as the expression, by which that qualification was fol-

lowed, showed, that the eventual execution of those articles, which went to divest him of his territories, was not deemed an improbable, or, at least, an impossible occurrence by the contracting Powers.

Another part of this engagement, which appeared calculated to excite apprehension in the mind of Tippoo, was, the stipulations which regarded the employment of the subsidiary force granted to the Nizam; which was made discretionary, with the exception of not acting against some specified Prince and Chiefs, Allies of the British Government; among whom he was not included.

That such ideas were entertained by Tippoo, from the moment he heard of the conclusion of this engagement, there cannot be a doubt. It would indeed appear, by a letter from the Resident at Poonah, that the Minister of that Court considered this engagement as one of an offensive nature against Tippoo Sultaun.

There is no person acquainted with the nature of the times in which this engagement was formed, but must be sensible that every measure of precautionary policy was then necessary, on the part of the British Government, to counteract and frustrate the ambitious designs of Tippoo Sultaun: but what has been stated will show, that the literal construction of the restric-

tions of the Act of Parliament had, upon this occasion, the effect of making the Governor General pursue a course, which was perhaps not only questionable in point of faith; but which must have been more offensive to Tippoo Sul-taun, and more calculated to produce a war with that Prince, than an avowed contract of a de-fensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition.

As soon as the actual hostile aggressions of Tippoo Sul-taun relieved Lord Cornwallis from the restraints under which he considered himself placed by the letter of the Act of Parliament, he hastened to secure, by every effort within his power, the hearty co-operation of the Nizam, in the war in which that aggression had involved the Company. In his instructions to the Resi-dent at the Court of that Chief, under date the 28th of January 1790, he directs him to inform the Court of Hyderabad of the infraction, by Tippoo, of the treaty of peace between him and the Company; to take every opportunity in his power to expose in it's proper colours the faith-less character of that Prince, and to explain to the Nizam and his Ministers the great advan-tages, which they may derive from forming a close connexion with the British Government.

The Governor General also authorized the

Resident to assure the Nizam, (as an inducement to bring him to an early declaration in favour of the British Government,) that no peace would be concluded with Tippoo, without securing to him a full participation of the advantages which might be obtained by the war; and that as the conduct of Tippoo had placed the English Government at liberty, it was ready to enter into a defensive alliance with the Nizam, for the mutual guarantee against Tippoo of the territories, which might be possessed by the respective parties, when the war should be terminated.

The Governor General, in the same instructions, vested the Resident of Hyderabad with the fullest power to encourage every advance, which might be made by Tippoo Suldaun's tributaries, or subjects, toward forming a connexion with the Company; and directed him to employ persons of rank in obtaining information of Tippoo's designs; or in persuading any of his Ministers or principal Officers to abandon him, and to act under the direction of the English Government in their endeavour to overturn his power; and the Resident was assured, that whatever engagements he might contract with persons of that description, should be punctually fulfilled by Government.

A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance

was, in conformity to these instructions, concluded with the Nizam on the 4th of July 1790, and ratified by the Governor General in Council on the 29th of the same month.

The provisions of this treaty were, that measures should be immediately taken to punish Tippoo Sultaun, and to deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity. That the Nizam and Paishwah should both vigorously prosecute the war; that the former should send a contingent of ten thousand horse to act with the Company's army, which body were to be paid by the Company; that an equal division of conquests between the contracting parties, was to be made, at the conclusion of the peace, with the exception of such forts and territories as the Honourable Company might take previously to the commencement of hostilities by the other parties.

That particular Zemindars and Polygars, who were specified, having been formerly dependent upon the Nizam and Mahrattas, should (if their forts and territories were taken) be placed upon the same footing, in relation to these Powers, as formerly. That in the event of a peace becoming expedient, it should be settled by mutual consent; and that, after it's conclusion, any attack by Tippoo on one of the parties, was to be punished by all, in the mode, and on

the conditions, which the contracting parties might hereafter settle.

It appears from the correspondence of the Resident, that the Nizam throughout this negotiation testified the greatest suspicion of the Mahrattas; and at one conference he asked the British Resident, What this Government would do, if, during the absence of his army, while assisting the Company, the Paishwah, invited by Tippoo, should invade his dominions? "The Company ought to sacrifice them all in your Highness's defence," replied the Resident, with an honourable warmth, which gave confidence to that Prince; who, however, continued to use his earnest endeavours, during the negotiation of this treaty, to induce the English Government to make, by a specific article, the guarantee of his dominions. And though the Governor General, from a just apprehension of giving offence to the Paishwah, and of losing the benefit of his co-operation in the war, evaded a compliance with his request, he nevertheless authorized the Resident to give the Nizam assurances, which were calculated to confirm his hope of accomplishing this object at a more favourable juncture.

The principle on which Lord Cornwallis resisted the solicitations of the Nizam on this point, is distinctly expressed in his despatch

to the Resident, of the 12th April 1790. " I
" trust," he states, " that the more that his
" Highness reflects upon the nature of his pro-
" position, that I should engage to interfere, in
" case the Mahrattas should at any time make
" unreasonable demands upon him; he will
" more clearly see, that as the Mahrattas have
" acceded heartily and cordially to the con-
" federacy, it would be highly improper in me
" to suppose that they would be inclined to
" treat one of their own Allies with injustice;
" and consequently, that such an assurance
" must appear to them in a light highly injuri-
" ous and offensive.

" But in order," his Lordship continues,
" to prove to his Highness how anxious I am
" to go every justifiable length to show my re-
" gard to his interests, and to gratify him in his
" wishes, you may inform him, that, provided
" the Mahrattas do not positively object to it,
" I will agree to it's becoming an additional ar-
" ticle in the present treaty; that should dif-
" ferences arise between any two of the Con-
" federates, the third party shall be bound to
" interpose his good offices, and to take every
" means in his power to bring those differen-
" ces to a just and amicable settlement."

The Resident was, in the same despatch, au-
thorized to inform the Nizam and his Minis-

ters, that, should an article to the above effect be assented to by the Poonah Government, and any case should arise, in which Lord Cornwallis's interference should be called upon, in consequence of it, they should always find him in the best disposition to endeavour to save his Highness from the necessity of submitting to mortification or injury.

These assurances appear to have had the effect of giving confidence to the Nizam, and of reconciling him to the treaty in the shape in which it was concluded; and in a despatch to the Resident, under date the 29th July, which accompanied the treaty, Lord Cornwallis confirmed the hopes which his former assurances had led that Prince to entertain upon this point.

" I am perfectly convinced," he informs the Resident in a paragraph of his despatch, " that
" you will spare no pains to show the Nizam
" how much he is called upon, by considerations of honour and interest, to fulfil his engagements with the strictest punctuality, and
" to exert the whole power of his Government
" in the most vigorous prosecution of the war :
" and although it will be necessary for you to
" be constantly upon your guard against encouraging his Highness and his Ministers in
" too sanguine hopes respecting the value of

“ the future connexion, which they may expect to form with this Government, and to avoid making use of any expressions of attention to the Nizam’s interests, which could furnish ground for jealousy to the Mahrattas; yet you may constantly assure the Nizam and his Ministers, that they may depend upon receiving the most unequivocal marks of cordiality and friendship from the Company, in return for whatever proofs they shall give of their attention to our interests and wishes in the prosecution of the present war; and that they will find us well disposed, when a proper opportunity offers, to take such further steps for drawing the connexion closer between the two Governments, as may be consistent with good faith and a due attention to subsisting engagements with our other Allies.”

Such was the policy, which the Marquis Cornwallis pursued on this critical occasion with the Nizam. He afforded to that Prince immediate security, by the aid of a subsidiary force; he held out prospects to him of great and permanent advantages, by the favourable conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun; and by the assurances conveyed to him through the British Resident at his Court, he taught him

to expect, in the further happy cultivation and improvement of the alliance, which had been contracted, a complete security, at a more convenient opportunity, against that most serious of all dangers which threatened his power, the restless and insatiable ambition of his Mahratta neighbours.

The wisdom of this policy was seen in it's result. The Nizam co-operated with perfect sincerity in the war against the Sultaun; and though the character of his troops and the habits of his Government, prevented that benefit from his aid, which might have been expected from the numbers of his army, and the extent of his resources, there cannot be a doubt, but that his exertions, however ill conducted, contributed in a considerable degree to the happy termination of a war, which indeed could never have been carried on upon such a scale without his assistance.

The connexion of the British Government with the Court of Poonah subsequent to the treaty of Salbhye, had been of a general though friendly nature. Lord Cornwallis had, on the first appearance of a rupture with Tippoo, directed his attention to an alliance with the Paishwah; and when the conduct of the Sultaun made war unavoidable, he transmitted instructions to the Resident at Poonah, Sir Charles

Mallet, of nearly similar import to those despatched on the same occurrence to the Resident at Hyderabad. There existed no subsidiary engagements with the Court of Poonah: and in these instructions, which were dated the 27th of January 1790, his Lordship expressed a hope, that the Mahrattas would act by themselves in the war, as he apprehended risk, from the composition of their army, (being almost all cavalry,) to any small body of English infantry: he, however, informed the Resident, that if they could not be induced to take an active part without the aid of a British corps, measures should be taken to afford it.

The Poonah State appears to have been, from a variety of causes, perfectly inclined to the proposed alliance: but the emergency of the period made those delays, which are habitual to a Mahratta State, a subject of the most serious anxiety; and it would appear from a despatch from Lord Cornwallis to Sir Charles Mallet, under date the 28th of February, that he felt strongly at this moment the injurious operation of those restrictions, which had prevented his cultivating, at a less urgent and more favourable period, the alliance of the Paishwah.

“ Some considerable advantages have, no doubt, been experienced,” his Lordship states, “ by the system of neutrality, which the Legis-

“ lature required of the Governments in this
“ Country ; but it has at the same time been
“ attended with the unavoidable inconvenience
“ of our being constantly exposed to the
“ necessity of commencing a war, without hav-
“ ing previously secured the assistance of effi-
“ cient Allies.”

“ The late outrageous infraction of the treaty
“ of peace by Tippoo Sultaun,” his Lordship
adds, “ furnishes a case in point. We could
“ not suffer the dominions of the Rajah of Tra-
“ vancore, who was included by name, as our
“ Ally in that treaty, to be ravaged or insulted,
“ without being justly charged with pusillani-
“ mity, or a flagrant breach of faith, and with-
“ out dishonouring ourselves, by that means, in
“ the view of all the Powers in India ; and as
“ we have been almost daily obliged, for several
“ years past, to declare to the Mahrattas, and
“ to the Nizam, that we were precluded from
“ contracting any new engagements with them
“ for affording them aid against the injustice or
“ ambition of Tippoo, I must acknowledge,
“ that we cannot claim, as a right, the perform-
“ ance of these promises which the Mahrattas
“ have repeatedly made, to co-operate with us
“ whenever we should be forced into a war
“ with that Prince.”

His Lordship repeats his intention in this

despatch, to offer the Mahrattas a defensive alliance against Tippoo; to which they would, he states, “ in reason and equity have a good
“ title, if they were to take a part with us,
“ without having made such a previous engagement.”

In a despatch to the Resident at Poona, under date the 22d of March, Lord Cornwallis authorizes the Resident to declare to the Court the objects, which he has in view in the war; the first of which he states to be an indemnification for the expenses and losses sustained by the Company, either in preparations or in military operations. In the event of the Nizam and the Mahrattas joining, Lord Cornwallis declares his next object will be to oblige Tippoo to restore all, which he or his father have usurped or retained from either of these Powers; as well as to force him to surrender that part of the Carnatic, Payen Ghaut, which he now possesses; and, on account of the shocking barbarity with which he treated the Nairs on the Coast of Malabar, he declares it to be his intention, “ to
“ insist upon his setting those people free from
“ all future dependence upon him.”

After some delay, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, was concluded between the English Government and

the Paishwah on the 1st of June, and ratified on the 5th of July, 1790.

The conditions of this treaty were in substance little different from that concluded with the Nizam. It was stipulated, that the Paishwah should have an option, during the war with Tippoo, of the aid of an equal English force to that serving with the Nizam; and that he should, jointly with that Prince, furnish cavalry to serve with the English army, if such aid was required.

The Court of Dowlut Row Scindiah, and of Ragoojee Bhonslah, were solicited by the Governor General to exert their influence to promote the success of this important negotiation: but their efforts, if they even used them, would never have prevailed upon the wary Nanah Furnavese, who then presided over the Paishwah's councils, to adopt such a line of policy, had he and the military Chieftains of the Poonah State not been stimulated by stronger motives; among which may be included, a deep sense of recent injuries sustained from Tippoo Sultaun, an apprehension of the future violence of that Prince, and an expectation of regaining the fine Provinces, which had been wrested from them by him and his father Hyder Ally Khan.

Similar motives had operated on the mind of

the Nizam: And Lord Cornwallis, though he left no expedient untried, which promised to promote the alliance with both that Prince and the Paishwah, was fully sensible that his hopes of success rested entirely upon the grounds which I have stated. His Lordship indeed observes, in his letter to Sir Charles Mallet, under date the 28th of February 1790, " My dependence upon the support of both those Powers (the Paishwah and the Nizam), upon the present occasion, is grounded solely upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions, and by considerations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity with eagerness, to reduce the power of a Prince, whose ambition knows no bounds, and from whom both of them have suffered."

It will be now necessary to recur to those events, which immediately produced the war with Tippoo; the conduct observed at the period of their occurrence by the Government of Fort St. George; and the measures which that conduct led Lord Cornwallis to adopt.

The pretext upon which Tippoo Sultaun approached the Country of Travancore, was to recover two places, Cranganore and Jaycotta, which the Rajah had purchased from the Dutch; but which Tippoo alleged were dependent upon

him, as forming part of the possessions of his tributary the Rajah of Cochin. The Rajah of Travancore had been desired by the Madras Government (acting under instructions from Bengal) to annul this arrangement; but had remonstrated, on the grounds of Tippoo's assertion being false, the places in question having, he alleged, been obtained by the Dutch from the Portuguese, to whom they had belonged long before the Rajah of Cochin became tributary to the Mysore Government.

In consequence of this remonstrance, which was forwarded to Bengal, the Supreme Government sent detailed instructions to the Government of Fort St. George.

The purport of these instructions, which were dated the 13th of November 1789, was, that if the places in question were found, on full investigation, to have belonged to the Rajah of Cochin subsequently to that Chief's having become a tributary of Mysore, the Rajah of Travancore must be obliged to restore them to the former possessor: If, on the contrary, they had not belonged to the Rajah of Cochin subsequently to the period stated, the claims of Tippoo Sultaun were to be resisted, and the legitimately acquired right of the Rajah of Travancore to these possessions was to be supported. In the event of Tippoo's having obtained pos-

session of them previously to the arrival of the instructions, the Madras Government was directed to open a negotiation with him, with a view to effect, if possible, an amicable adjustment of the point on the above principles. "Of whatever importance" (the Supreme Government observes in a paragraph of this despatch) "the two places in question may appear to the defence of the territories of the Rajah of Travancore, it cannot be opposed to the serious consequences of a war: but we are equally convinced, that a tame submission to insult or injury would, in its effects, prove the most fatal policy."

The Supreme Government further directed the Government of Fort St. George to take no measures, without its previous sanction, for dispossessing Tippoo Sultaun of Cranganore and Jaycotta, if he was in actual possession of those places, unless he attacked the other territories of the Rajah of Travancore: but, on such an attack being made, they positively ordered the Government of Fort St. George to deem it an act of hostility, and the commencement of a war, which they were to prosecute with all possible vigour and decision.

These instructions do not appear to have been fully attended to by the Government of Fort St. George; who, indeed, in their letter of the

3d of January; arraigned the reasoning upon which they were grounded, and state their opinion, that the proceeding of the Rajah of Travancore, in purchasing the forts of Cranganore and Jaycotta from the Dutch, was unwarrantable on every principle of policy and justice; and therefore not entitled to the support of the British Government.

Under these impressions, they do not, in the letter they addressed to Tippoo, inform him, agreeably to the instructions of the Supreme Government, that it was the intention of the English Government (if the right of the Dutch to sell these places was established) to resist any attack, which he made upon them; and the letter, which they addressed to the Rajah of Travancore on the same occasion, was not only silent on this point, but, in it's general tenour, calculated to discourage that Prince from entertaining any expectation of support or assistance.

The Government of Fort St. George had also been directed to assemble the army, to suspend the investment, to stop all payments to the Nabob's creditors, and to make no disbursement, which could be avoided, in order that the whole resources of the State might be applied to military preparations; but these instructions seem to have been in a great degree evaded, if not

neglected. The military preparations were made in a tardy manner, and on a limited scale, for the declared purpose of saving expense; and the provision of a large proportion of the investment was continued.

These proceedings were early marked by the strongest censure of the Supreme Government; who, in a despatch under date the 8th of February, commented on them with great severity, and demanded, in the most categorical terms, an explanation of the causes, which had, upon this critical occasion, led the Government of Madras to disregard, in the manner in which it had done, their positive and repeated orders and instructions.

After Tippoo was repulsed from the lines of Travancore, he had addressed two letters (under date the 24th of December and 1st of January) to the Government of Fort St. George; in which he attempted to palliate his conduct upon that occasion, and to attribute the attack to the sudden impulse of revenge, which his army felt at the conduct of some of the troops of the Rajah of Travancore. These letters were full of extravagant professions of friendship to the English Government. These professions, though contradicted by the whole tenour of Tippoo's conduct, seem to have been received by the Government of Fort St. George, as strong pre-

sumptive proof of the peaceable intentions of that Prince; and in a letter from Mr. John Holland, Governor of Fort St. George, to Lord Cornwallis, under date the 13th of February, in which he advises his Lordship of his intention to proceed to England, he makes use of the following expressions: "As far as I am able to judge, it is not Tippoo's intention to break with the Company; he probably feels himself injured by the conduct of our tributary, the Rajah of Travancore; and it rests with your Lordship to consider how far such conduct may have been consistent with the respect which he owed this Government, or with the laws of Nations. I confess it appears to me a very important question; and from the late letters received from Tippoo Sultaun, there is every reason to think that he will be disposed to enter into negotiations for the adjustment of the points in dispute."

The indignation, which the whole tenour of the conduct of the Government of Fort St. George, upon this occasion, had excited in the mind of Lord Cornwallis, was forcibly expressed in his Lordship's letter to Mr. E. J. Holland, the acting Governor of that Presidency, under date the 30th of March 1790; which he concludes with the following passage:

“ So far am I from giving credit to the late
“ Government for economy, in not making the
“ necessary preparations for war, according to
“ the positive orders of the Supreme Govern-
“ ment, after having received the most gross
“ insults that could be offered to any Nation;
“ I think it very possible that every cash of that
“ ill-judged saving may cost to the Company a
“ crore of rupees: besides which, I still more
“ sincerely lament the disgraceful sacrifice
“ which you made, by that delay, of the honour
“ of your Country, by tamely suffering an inso-
“ lent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the do-
“ minions of the Rajah of Travancore which
“ we were bound by the most sacred ties of
“ friendship and good faith to defend.”

Lord Cornwallis had determined to proceed immediately to Fort St. George, to prevent the serious dangers, which appeared to him to threaten the public interests from the conduct of the local authority at that Presidency; but the arrival of General Meadows, who was appointed to succeed Mr. Holland, led him to change his resolution, and to entrust to that Officer the conduct of a war, which in a despatch to his address, under date the 8th of March, he describes, as “ a measure not less necessary to
“ vindicate the insulted honour of the Nation,
“ than to provide for it's future security, by ac-

“ completing, at a favourable moment, the reduction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun.” The Government of Fort St. George, in a despatch, under date the 8th of March, subsequent to the arrival of General Meadows, transmitted to the Supreme Government a letter, which had been received from Tippoo Sultaun, in reply to the letter addressed to him by Mr. Holland. In this letter Tippoo entered into a long defence of his conduct, both as that related to the Rajah of Travancore, and to the Nabob of the Carnatic; and assented to the suggestion, which had been made by Mr. Holland, of appointing Commissioners, whom, however, he requested might be sent to his Court. No answer was made to his communication by the Government of Fort St. George, who expressed (in this despatch to Bengal) an opinion, that a compliance with his wishes of sending Commissioners to his Court, would be highly derogatory to the dignity of the English Government.

The Supreme Government, in their reply to this communication, stated their having before directed, that the attack of the lines of the Rajah of Travancore should be considered a declaration of war; and they had, they said, concluded, that the Government of Fort St. George were, in obedience to their repeated orders, either busy in making the necessary preparations,

or in carrying on the war with vigour; nor did they see how any negotiation could commence with honour, till full reparation was made by Tippoo Sultaun for the outrages which he had already committed.

In concluding this letter they direct, that the Presidency of Fort St. George " should, in
" answer to all Tippoo's letters, explicitly in-
" form him, that it had incontrovertibly
" appeared, that Cranganore and Jaycotta
" were held by the Dutch as independent
" possessions, and never paid tribute to the
" Rajah of Cochin; and therefore that the
" Dutch had an undoubted right to dispose
" of them to the Rajah of Travancore, or to
" any other Power, whom they might think
" proper; that they cannot look upon the
" attack which Tippoo made upon the Rajah
" of Travancore's lines to have happened by
" accident, as he was upon the spot, and
" conducted it in person; and as the Rajah
" has been in possession of those lines upwards
" of twenty years, and they were consequently
" guaranteed to him by the late treaty of peace;
" so violent an act of hostility can be seen in
" no other light, than as an infraction of the
" treaty with the Company."

General Meadows, on the receipt of these final instructions, proceeded from Madras to join

the army, which was assembled on Trichinopoly plain, and reached the camp on the 24th of May. He had informed Tippoo Sultaun of his arrival; and after he had joined the army he received a letter from that Prince, remonstrating against the assembly of troops, which had taken place on the frontier of the Company's dominions, and requesting to be allowed to send a person of rank to make such explanations, as were necessary to restore confidence and friendship between the two States. To this letter General Meadows returned the following short and dignified answer:

“ I received yours, and I understand it's contents. You are a great Prince; and, but for your cruelty to your prisoners, I should add, an enlightened one. The English, equally incapable of offering an insult, as of submitting to one, have always looked upon war as declared from the moment you attacked their Ally, the King of Travancore. God does not always give the battle to the strong, nor the race to the swift; but generally success to those, whose cause is just: upon that we depend.”

On the 12th of June, and a few days subsequent to the despatch of this letter, General Meadows entered the territories of the Sultaun; and commenced a war, which was terminated

by Lord Cornwallis in person, on the 23d of February 1792, in a manner most glorious to the British Government, and it's Allies: Tippoo Sultaun having, by the preliminary treaty, which was concluded on the 22d of February 1792, agreed to cede half his territories, and to pay, as a compensation for the expenses incurred by the allied Powers in carrying on the war, the sum of three crores and thirty lacks of rupees.*

It is foreign to my purpose to detail the events of this war, which are indeed sufficiently public; I shall proceed, therefore, to a consideration of the leading features of that Policy, which induced Lord Cornwallis to commence the war; and to conclude, at the period when he did, a peace with Tippoo Sultaun.

After the conduct of that Prince showed that he was decidedly hostile to the British Government and it's Allies, the policy of Lord Cornwallis was neither directed to obtain a delay of hostilities; nor limited to the object of repelling the immediate danger with which the State, over whose councils he presided, was threatened. When fully satisfied of the designs of Tippoo, he hastened to attack him. He saw the great advantages which were likely to result from early active offensive operations; and the mo-

* Considerably upwards of three millions sterling.

ment he resolved on war, he contemplated (as appears from the whole tenour of his correspondence previous to the commencement of hostilities) the increase of the Company's territories in the quarters of the Carnatic, and Malabar, as a desirable object of policy; both as it added to the power and resources of the British Government, and as it reduced those of one of it's most formidable rivals. Acting upon the same principles, he held out conquest and increased resources, as incentives to the ambition of the Nizam and the Paishwah in the contest, in which he solicited them to engage, as Allies of the British Government.

The promptness and spirit with which Lord Cornwallis entered into a war, to vindicate the honour of the Company's Government from the insult, which had been offered to it by the attacks on one of it's Allies, raised the reputation of that State for strict adherence to it's engagements.

An event also occurred at the close of the war, which was calculated to improve that impression, and to establish on the strongest grounds the superior firmness, good faith and power, of the British Government.

The Rajah of Coorgh, who bore a hereditary hatred to the family of Tippoo, had during the war with that Prince been most active and

zealous in aiding the English Government; and in reward for his faithful services, as well as with a view of placing his Country as a barrier between the dominions of Tippoo and the Company's possessions on the coast of Malabar, Lord Cornwallis included the tribute of Coorgh among the cessions, which were to be made to the English Government, agreeably to the preliminary treaty.

It is difficult to state how far the personal resentment, which the Sultaun entertained against the Rajah, and the importance which he attached to the local position of his territories, might have led him to resist the cession of the tribute of Coorgh, if it had been demanded as an express stipulation of the preliminary treaty. It is evident, that this demand, in the shape it came, was very unexpected, and was considered by the Sultaun as a departure from his preliminary engagement. He argued, and not without the appearance of reason, that the stipulation by which he agreed to cede half of his dominions to the Allies from the Countries adjacent to their own, could never be applied to the cession of this tribute, or of his right as Lord Paramount over a Prince, whose territories were situated within a short distance of his capital, and unconnected (from their being above the Ghauts) with the other cessions made to the

Company. The irritation of the Sultaun upon this question was excessive; and, in his endeavours to carry this point, he was equally impelled by motives of personal resentment against the Rajah, and a just appretiation of the value, from local position, of the Country of Coorgh, which commanded the best approach to his capital, and consequently the best road to Malabar. The same considerations, however, which led him to desire to retain the superiority of Coorgh, determined Lord Cornwallis not to grant it; and the whole settlement, which had been concluded, was brought to issue upon this question: but Lord Cornwallis, though he might have regretted not having earlier made a specific demand of the Coorgh tribute, was too sensible of the degree in which this question involved the national character, to agree to sacrifice to the vengeance of the Sultaun, a Chief, who had been so forward to assist us in the operations of the war. He was not even shaken by the immediate prospect of renewed hostilities, which at one period threatened to be the inevitable result of this difference; and his ultimate success, in obliging Tippoo to resign all claims upon the Country in dispute, not only established the superiority of the British arms, increased the respect and admiration of the Allies; but confirmed in the strongest manner those

impressions, which had been made by the grounds on which this war had been undertaken.

The desire of not destroying what has been termed the balance of power in India, is generally stated to have been one of the principal causes, which prevented Lord Cornwallis from prosecuting the war to the total annihilation of Tippoo; which, it is always assumed by those who assert this, he had it completely in his power to do. Without intending to deny that Lord Cornwallis might have destroyed the power of Tippoo, I certainly believe, that he must have been influenced to the line of policy he pursued by more powerful and more proximate causes, than that speculative apprehension of danger from the increase of the dominions of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, which has been so often ascribed as his motive for concluding the peace. It must be remembered, that a division of the territories of Tippoo, though it would have added greatly to the dominions of these States, would have been attended with a more than proportionate increase to the power and resources of the British Government, who, after the destruction of so formidable and inveterate an enemy, would have had less cause than before to dread their hostility. This policy might be disputed, if either the conduct or the

character of the Sultan had justified a hope; that the reduction of his power, by the alienation of half his territories, would have changed his sentiments; or, if the British Government could have placed a reasonable reliance on his good faith or friendship: but it is evident no such expectations were indulged by Lord Cornwallis at the period when he made the peace; for that nobleman, in his letter to the Court of Directors, which accompanied the definitive treaty, describes Tippoo as "a faithless and violent character, upon whom no dependence could be placed." With this just impression of his character, added to his knowledge of his ambition, his military habits, and his connexion with the French, Lord Cornwallis must have considered him, even in his reduced state, as much more likely to disturb the tranquillity of the Company's possessions, than either the Nizam or Mahrattas.

The conduct of Lord Cornwallis upon this important occasion, was undoubtedly influenced by more obvious and stronger reasons. The finances of Government were in a very embarrassed state: The general sentiment in England was adverse to any war whatever in India: The Court of Directors had, in several of their despatches, and particularly that under date the 21st of September 1791, which reached his

Lordship previously to the conclusion of the definitive treaty, earnestly called his attention to the conclusion of an early peace, as alike essential to the finances and the interests of the Company: and they declare, in that despatch, their readiness to sacrifice some portion of the advantages, which they might justly expect from the success of the war, rather than risk its continuance. To these causes may be added the jealousy, which subsisted between the Nizam and the Mahrattas; the difficulty of managing the unwieldy force of the former, and the serious apprehensions which were entertained of the treachery of the latter. These apprehensions were greatly increased at the time when the army was at Seringapatam, by the approach of Madhaje Scindiah towards Poonah, with the rumoured intention of establishing his influence over the Paishwah, and of mixing in the war with no favourable disposition to the interests of the Company's Government.

The accounts, which had arrived in India previously to the conclusion of this peace, of the prospect of an immediate war with Spain, and the probability that such event would involve Great Britain with France, was another strong inducement for Lord Cornwallis to

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bring the war with Tippoo to a termination; that he might be prepared to repel any attacks of the latter Nation, or to direct the efforts of our arms against it's Settlements in India.

These plain and strong reasons will, without seeking for a general and speculative ground of action, sufficiently account for Lord Cornwallis having concluded a peace with Tippoo at the period he did; as well as for that anxiety and uneasiness with which, from his letter, which accompanied the treaty of peace, he appears to have contemplated the probable renewal of hostilities. He had accomplished all those objects, which he had in view at the commencement of the war; and, under the circumstances in which he was placed, he could not think himself justified in exposing to any hazard, by it's continuance, the great advantages which he had obtained.

The conduct of Lord Cornwallis to Tippoo Sultaun, after the peace, was honourable and dignified; and the affectionate manner in which he treated the hostage Princes, would probably have made an impression on any other Prince. But Tippoo appears to have received such marks of kindness, more as insults to his wounded pride, than as proofs of friendship; and no part of his subsequent conduct gave

cause to hope, that he was sincere in his professions of amity; or that the peace, which had been concluded, would be permanent.

Though no specific change was made, after the termination of the war, in the conditions of the alliance with the Nizam; the relations of friendship between that Prince and the Company became more intimate, from the sense of the mutual benefit, which had attended the alliance; and the subsidiary force continued in his service. A contrary feeling, however, appears to have been produced about this period in the Court of Poonah; the causes of which it may not be unuseful to state. A general proposition was made, after the peace with Tippoo Sultaun, to Lord Cornwallis, by Hurry Punt, the Commander of the army of the Paishwah, for eventually subsidizing a British detachment, of the same force and on the same terms as that with the Nizam, to aid the Paishwah; and it was declared, that the purpose for which this force was required, was that of enabling the Paishwah to reduce to obedience any dependent, which might prove refractory. This proposition was rejected by his Lordship on general grounds; but he states in a despatch upon the subject, that the principal cause of objection to the measure, was his conviction, that it was meant to obtain the

countenance and support of the British Government against Madhjee Scindiah; of whose design of establishing his influence at Poonah, Nanah Furnavese then entertained the most serious apprehensions.

This occurrence, no doubt, added to that jealousy, which the Poonah State had from the first entertained of our more intimate connexion with the Nizam; and laid the foundation of that contest, which so soon afterwards ensued between those States.

The independent power of Madhjee Scindiah, which was first recognised by the British Government in the treaty of Salbhye, was matured during the Government of Lord Cornwallis; who declaredly governed by that system of neutrality, which the Legislature had so rigidly prescribed, and does not appear to have thought himself at liberty to make even a political effort to prevent that Chief's aggrandizement. The consequence was, the complete establishment of Scindiah's power over the northern parts of Hindoostan; the possession, by that Chief, of the person of the Emperor of Delhi; the formation of a large and formidable corps of regular infantry under European Officers, chiefly French; the erection of founderies and arsenals: in short, the accumulation of those vast military powers and resources, which

enabled his immediate successor to carry on a war at the same moment in the Deckan and Hindoostan against the British Government and its Allies.

Previous to the commencement of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, Scindiah had made overtures to become a party in the confederacy against that Prince, on the condition of an improved alliance with the British Government, of whom he solicited two battalions, to remain with the army with which he at that period proposed to march to Poonah. He also expressed an expectation, that the British Government would engage to defend his possessions in Hindoostan during his absence. In addition to these specific requests, he demanded the general aid of the Company against the Rajpoot Chiefs in Hindoostan, who continued to resist his authority. These conditions were, for a variety of obvious causes, deemed inadmissible; and no alliance of the nature which he wished, was formed. Hence the councils of this Chief were, as I have before stated, suspected, towards the close of the war with Tippoo, of being more of a hostile, than a friendly nature to the British Nation.

The conduct of Madhajee Scindiah, subsequent to the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, appears to have been viewed with consi-

derable jealousy by Lord Cornwallis; and upon receiving a paper of intelligence, transmitted by the public news writer of Dehly in July 1792, which stated, that the Emperor of Delhi had written to the Paishwah, and to Scindiah, informing them, that he hoped, through their exertions, to obtain some tribute from Bengal; that nobleman furnished the British Resident at Scindiah's Court with particular instructions upon the subject. In these instructions, which were dated the 9th of August 1792, he states, that though the want of authenticity of the paper of intelligence received from Delhi prevents his making a formal representation upon this point, he is very desirous that his sentiments should be conveyed to Scindiah and his Ministers in the most explicit manner; and he desires the Resident (should he not be able to discover the truth of the statement in a manner that would justify a public representation) to take advantage of any opening, which occurs, to deliver his sentiments. "You will," he observes, "inform Scindiah, that, in the present situation of the King, I consider all letters written upon political points in his name to be by his (Scindiah's) sanction and authority only; and that you are instructed by me to add, that an attempt to establish principles of the above description, by any

“ Power whatever, will be warmly resented by
“ this Government.

“ You will,” he continues, “ in the course of
“ any conversation or correspondence, which
“ you may hold with Scindiah upon this point,
“ take care to recall, in the most forcible
“ manner, to his recollection, the spirit of
“ moderation and forbearance, that has been
“ manifested by the Government during the
“ long period in which he has been employed
“ in extending his conquests in the northern
“ parts of Hindoostan; and that it would give
“ us pain to be forced to depart from the neu-
“ tral and pacific system, that we have hitherto
“ observed in that quarter. You will, at the
“ same time, inform him, that it is by my
“ particular directions that you say, that we
“ have no desire to make any new acquisi-
“ tions; nor even to interfere in the internal
“ affairs of the Empire, if we can avoid it with
“ honour and safety; but that if any of our
“ neighbours should be rash enough to insult
“ us by unjust demands, or in any other shape
“ whatever, we feel ourselves both able and
“ resolved to exact ample satisfaction.”

These instructions were grounded on that
proud but just sense of national honour, which
will not suffer itself to be approached by the
breath of insult, and which keeps danger at a

distance by its alacrity to meet it. They appear to have had at the moment the best effects; Scindiah's Minister having assured the British Resident, that the use which his master wished to make of the Emperor's favour, was to establish his authority over the territories which he held, not to subdue or invade those of others.

No political connexion of any intimacy had ever subsisted between the British Government and Ragojee Bhonslah. The personal character of that Chief, and the local situation of his territories, made it unlikely, that any efficient aid could be obtained from his co-operation in the war with Tippoo. But Lord Cornwallis nevertheless neglected no means to conciliate him to an acquiescence in the justice and policy of that measure, and even invited him to join the confederacy. With a view to those objects, he deputed a Resident to his Court, who was entrusted also with the negotiation of some minor points, connected with the commercial intercourse between the two States; and directed to convey a just impression to the Rajah's mind of the imperious causes, which had obliged the Governor General to march a body of troops through the Province of Cuttack, before he could obtain the Rajah's approbation of that measure.

In order to complete this general view of the political administration of Lord Cornwallis, I shall here shortly refer to those principles of policy, which regulated the conduct of that nobleman in the cultivation of the more intimate alliances, which subsisted between the Company and those native Princes, whom a course of events had rendered immediately dependent upon its support and protection ; and whose interests were, from the nature of their political relation, identified with those of the English Government.

The chief of those Princes, are the Nabob of the Carnatic and the Vizier of Oude. A brief statement of the leading measures, which Lord Cornwallis adopted with these two Princes, will be sufficient to throw every light, which is required, upon this part of the subject.

Subsequently to the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in India, Sir Archibald Campbell (then Governor of Fort St. George) negotiated a treaty with the Nabob of the Carnatic. This treaty, which was concluded on the 24th of February 1787, was framed upon the principle of providing, by an arrangement founded on just and equitable grounds, for the defence of the possessions of the Nabob and the Company in the Carnatic, and Northern Circars.

The principal of its conditions were, that the

Nabob should contribute an amount of nine lacks of star pagodas annually toward the support of the military peace establishment, which was to be maintained by the Company, for the security of the dominions of the two contracting parties; that, in the event of a failure on the part of the Nabob in the punctual payment of this sum, the Company was to possess a right to appoint it's own Officers, with adequate authority to superintend and receive from the Nabob's Aumildars or Managers, the revenue of certain districts, which were specified, and, by an article of this treaty, made answerable for the regular payment of the annual amount above mentioned. It was further stipulated, that after the amount of the deficiency had been realized, the Officers appointed by the Company were instantly to be recalled. These provisions, however, were only for a state of peace. In the event of war occurring, it was agreed, that the Company should charge themselves with it's conduct, and that four-fifths of the revenue of their possessions in the Carnatic and Circars should be applied to it's prosecution; and by another article the Nabob agreed, that four-fifths of his revenue should be applied to the same purpose; and that his proportion of the debt of the war should be settled at twenty-five fifty-one parts. In the event of the above four-fifths, or any part of it, being

diverted from the current expenses of the war, or the debts and expenses incurred thereby, the Company was vested by the treaty with a right of appointing receivers and superintendants, to receive the revenues of all the Nabob's Country from the Nabob's Officers, in the same mode, and upon the same conditions, as had been fixed in the case of districts mortgaged for the security of the annual payment of nine lacks of pagodas, the amount fixed for the military peace establishment.

Such were the leading conditions of an alliance, which, at the period at which it was concluded, was considered as a great improvement of the political relations, which subsisted between the Company and the Nabob of the Carnatic; and such it certainly was in one essential view. It vested the sole military power in the Company; and thereby gave security to the Empire, which had been before exposed to the most serious danger, from its resources being applied to the support of two armies formed upon opposite principles, and acting under distinct and often distracted opposite authorities.

This was, however, the only view in which this arrangement could be considered beneficial: in every other, it evidently carried the seeds of its own destruction. The sword was placed in one hand, the purse in another; and to combine

both, in order to produce that efficient exertion, which the contracting parties were aware might be required for their mutual safety, it became necessary, unless the Nabob altered the whole principles of his Government, to introduce a complete change into the administration of those Provinces, from which their resources were to be drawn, during the actual existence of a war with a foreign State. In addition to this inconvenience, or rather danger, it must be evident, that the constant changes of authority, to which the territories of the Nabob were by this treaty made eventually subject, were likely to be destructive to every hope of improvement in the Country, or of permanent comfort and prosperity to it's unfortunate inhabitants.

The early result of this treaty, was a failure on the part of the Nabob in the most essential of it's conditions; and when the war occurred with Tippoo Sultaun in 1790, Lord Cornwallis found himself obliged to take possession of all his Highness's Country, to secure the two States against the dangers to which he thought them exposed, from the mismanagement of the Nabob's Officers. This consideration made him direct the actual appointment of the Company's Officers to collect the revenue; contrary to the stipulations of Sir A. Campbell's treaty, which left the collections to be made by the Nabob's

Officers, under the superintendence and authority of the Company's Officers. The Governor General, however, directed that the Nabob might be permitted to appoint Officers to observe the conduct, and inspect the accounts, of the servants of the Company, in order that a satisfactory settlement of accounts, upon the principles prescribed by the alliance, might hereafter be made between his Highness and the British Government.

In a letter, under date the 21st of June 1790, in which Lord Cornwallis directs the Government of Fort St. George to adopt this measure, he states most forcibly the causes, which have led to it's necessity; and gives positive orders for it's immediate execution. He expresses in this despatch great regret, that the Nabob has not been prevailed upon to give his assent to it's adoption. The Government cannot, however, he states, gratify the Nabob's private sensations, by forbearing to take efficient steps to exact the performance of his engagements to the Company, without being guilty of a flagrant neglect of the attention, which was due to the honour and interests of their Country, and to the security of his Highness's own dominions.

Lord Cornwallis also expresses in these instructions his expectation, that the Nabob would ere long become sensible of the interested and

criminal motives of those advisers, who had influenced him to resist the solicitations of the Madras Government; and that he would soon see, that while his people were treated with justice and humanity, a liberal fund would be secured for the support of his own dignity, and that of his family; and the remainder of the revenues (to use Lord Cornwallis's own words) "would be rescued from the hands of extortioners and usurers, and honourably applied to the defence and protection of his subjects and dominions."

The assumption of the Country of the Nabob facilitated greatly the operations of the war; not only from its placing the resources of the Carnatic in the hands of the British Government, but from giving that State the undivided power of drawing forth, in the most prompt manner, every military supply, which the Country possessed, to the aid of the public service.

When Lord Cornwallis returned to Fort St. George, after the termination of the war with Tippoo, he opened a negotiation with the Nabob of the Carnatic, which terminated in the conclusion of a new treaty with that Prince on the 12th of July 1792.

The preamble of this engagement annulled the treaty of 1787, concluded by Sir A. Campbell, on the grounds of a representation received

from the Nabob under date the 9th of June 1792, addressed to Marquis Cornwallis, which stated, that the resources of the Carnatic were not competent to enable him to perform the stipulations of the above engagement; and that the security which the Nabob had agreed to give to the Company for the regular discharge of the stipulated sums (which he had to pay under that engagement), was not equal to the ends intended: The engagement also, into which the Nabob had entered with the Company for the liquidation of debts due by him to private persons, was annulled; and the treaty entered into by Lord Cornwallis was declared to provide for all cases stated in either of the engagements, which it annulled.

By this treaty, the defence of the territories of both States was (as fixed by Sir A. Campbell's treaty) intrusted to the Company, who were, in the event of war, to assume the management of the Carnatic; which was to remain in their hands during the continuance of such war, and to be returned to the Nabob at it's termination; unless in cases, which were particularly specified. It was also a stipulation of this engagement, that, as long as the Company remained in possession of the Carnatic, they should pay to the Nabob one fifth part of it's revenue.

The Nabob, by an article of this treaty, agreed

to pay nine lacks of pagodas annually, on account of the expenses of the military establishment of the Company during peace; and further to pay the sum of six lacks twenty-one thousand one hundred and five pagodas annually for the liquidation of the debts due by him to his private creditors.

The Company were to be put in possession of the Poligar tribute, as part payment of these sums; and the Nabob was to receive credit for the sum of two lacks sixty-four thousand seven hundred and four pagodas on this account, without the Company's having a right to make any deduction for charges of collection. The amount remaining after this deduction, which the Nabob was to pay annually on account of military expenses, and the liquidation of his private debts, viz. twelve lacks fifty-six thousand and four hundred pagodas, was to be paid in regular instalments; and in the event of any failure on his part, specified districts, yielding revenue to the amount stated, were, under the conditions of this treaty, to be assumed by the Company; and the Nabob was, on this event occurring, to recall all his Officers from the above districts, except one in each, who was to remain, and annually to receive from the Company's Officers attested statements of its gross revenue and nett receipts.

The revenue of these Countries, when assumed, was to be deducted from the sum to be paid by the Nabob; and they were to remain in the possession of the Company until the arrears due on the instalments were cleared, and the debts due by the Nabob to his private creditors were fully liquidated; after which, those districts were to be restored to his authority. It was, however, stipulated, that on his failure in the regular payment of any of the instalments of the amount of six lacks thirty-five thousand two hundred and ninety-five pagodas, which would remain to be paid annually on account of military expenses exclusively of the paish-cush or tribute, the Company possessed a right to reassume such one or more of the specified districts, the revenue of which was equal in value to the amount of the instalments, which had fallen in arrear; and, on such event occurring, the district or districts so reassumed were never to be again restored to the Nabob.

Besides these regular and stipulated payments, the Nabob agreed to defray such additional charges, as were incurred in granting him the occasional aid of the Company's troops to support his authority, or preserve internal order in his dominions.

These were the principal conditions of the treaty, which Lord Cornwallis made with the

Nabob of the Carnatic, to whom he restored his Country soon after it's conclusion. Though there can be no doubt this engagement simplified in some points, and greatly ameliorated in others, that which Sir A. Campbell had contracted; it corrected none of it's radical defects. The most material point in which this treaty differed from the one which had been before concluded, was, in that stipulation, which provided for the complete introduction of a new authority in the Government of the Carnatic, on the occurrence of war with any foreign Power. This change of authority, which was conditional in the treaty of 1787, was rendered absolute by that of 1792. By this essential alteration, those faint hopes, which might before have existed, of benefit to the contracting parties from the operation of an efficient administration of the affairs of the Nabob, or any of his successors, were altogether extinguished. This treaty also left the Nabob as much exposed, as the former one, to the destructive intrigues of interested and bad advisers; and to the ruinous arts of usurers and extortioners, who, it was evident, would continue, as they had done before, to stimulate him, by every effort in their power, to the baneful resource of anticipating his revenues, for the purpose of avoiding, or at least protracting, the diminution of his personal

authority, by the alienation of any part of his territories.

Lord Cornwallis, however, appears, from the general tenour of his despatches, written at the moment, to have entertained strong hopes of the happy operation of this treaty. But the authorities in England did not partake of this impression, and they early directed an endeavour to modify the whole arrangement, which they apprehended (and, the event proved, with justice) would never yield those advantages, which had been expected from it's conclusion.

It will be necessary, in order to understand the nature of the arrangement which Lord Cornwallis made with the Vizier of Oude, to take a short general view of the connexion, which previously subsisted between the Company and that Prince.

By the treaty of Fyzabad, which was concluded with the Nabob Vizier Asuph ud Dowlah, in the beginning of the year 1775, soon after the accession of that Prince to the Musnud, the Company came into possession of Benares, Ghazipore and Chunar; and it was stipulated, that a regular brigade of the Company's troops should be stationed in the territories of the Nabob for the defence of the Subah of Oude, Corah and Allahabad. The Nabob agreed to pay the monthly amount of two lacks and sixty thou-

sand rupees for the services of this corps, as long as it was stationed with him; and it was also agreed, that if he required further aid to defend other countries than those specified, a sum should be fixed, at the period of the requisition, proportioned to the service.

A few months after this treaty was concluded, Asuph ud Dowlah, in consequence of the great disorders which prevailed in his Country, and the want of discipline and irregularity of his army, applied to the Governor General for the aid of a body of English Officers sufficient for six battalions of Sepoys, a corps of artillery, and a proportion of cavalry. This corps would, he stated in his application, be a complete check upon the remainder of his army, and greatly strengthen his Government. He left the formation entirely to the English Government, engaging, that he would make arrangements, by which it's pay should be regularly discharged.

The corps, which was thus formed, was in 1777 incorporated with the army of the Company, and stationed at Furruckabad. It was termed the temporary brigade, in distinction from the regular brigade in the Nabob's service, which was fixed at Cawnpore. The annual charge to the Vizier for the temporary brigade, was about twenty-three lacks of rupees.

The Vizier was informed by the Governor

General, at the period when the temporary brigade was formed, that it should remain a fixed charge to him for so long a time as he should require it for his service. The Court of Directors, however, appear to have disapproved of this stipulation. "If by this proposition," they state in a despatch upon the subject, "it is intended to leave the Vizier at liberty to discharge the troops at his pleasure, we think such a stipulation dangerous, and likely to operate to our very great inconvenience; and if more be meant than is expressed, and you intend to exert your influence, first to reduce the Vizier to acquiesce in your proposal, and afterwards to compel him to keep the troops in his pay during your pleasure, your intentions are unjust, and a correspondent conduct would reflect great dishonour on the Company."

The embarrassment, which the Court of Directors anticipated from this arrangement, soon arose. In the year 1779, (two years after the measure had been adopted,) the Vizier, on the ground of a great defalcation of his revenue, caused by a failure of rain, declared his inability to make the advances necessary for the payment of the brigades, and the satisfaction of the other claims of the Company: and, though the estimate of the whole demand of the Company on

him for the year was 13,612,188 rupees, he refused to grant orders to the Resident for more than 6,882,000. The Resident, when he reported this proceeding, transmitted a letter from the Vizier, under date the 19th of November 1779, in which he professed his attachment to the Company; but earnestly solicited, that a consideration of his distress might lead the English Government to relieve him from the burden of maintaining the new brigade stationed at Futtý Ghur, which he declared was not only useless to his Government, but the cause of great loss in his revenues and customs. He also required the sanction of the Government to the dismissal of some other corps in his service, which were commanded by European Officers; and, according to his statement, attended with great expense, and very little utility.

The Government of Bengal considered, that a compliance with the Vizier's wishes would expose both his interests and those of the Company to the greatest danger; as it was evident, that he possessed no immediate means of preserving the internal tranquillity of his own territories, much less of protecting them from the danger with which they were actually threatened by the Mahrattas, with whom a war was at the moment deemed unavoidable. Under this im-

pression, they directed the Resident not only to insist upon a full and prompt performance of his pecuniary engagements to the Company ; but to declare to him, that he stood pledged to maintain the armies, which had been formed for his protection ; and that in the present circumstances of his Government, and that of the Company, (threatened with immediate war,) to disband any part of those troops which were maintained for his service, was a measure no less improper for him to suggest, than it was for the English Government to adopt.

A letter was written at the same time by the Governor General to the Vizier, in which the dangerous consequences, which were likely to result from a compliance with his requests, were most forcibly stated. It never could have been supposed, the Governor General informed him, that, when he applied for the new brigade, the Company would have been at the pains to raise and discipline so large a body of men, and to augment their establishment by the addition of such an extraordinary number of Officers, as were necessary to command them ; if they were liable to be burthened with the sole weight and expense of maintaining these Officers, by a sudden resolution on the part of the Nabob to discharge them, without previous and timely notice,

and without their consent. He explicitly informed the Nabob in this letter, that, if he was determined to withdraw himself from the alliance and assistance of the Company, he must give sufficient time and notice of his resolution, in order to prevent the interests of the Company suffering from a hasty execution of it: that he could not consent to the Vizier dismissing the Company's troops at such a distance from home, at such a crisis: and he expected as much time would be given to dispose of the force, when the Vizier had no occasion for it's services, as there had been for raising it. Mr. Hastings concluded this letter, by expressing his conviction, that, notwithstanding the unfortunate failure of the harvest, his Highness's funds were still sufficient to pay a force, which seemed so indispensable for the security of his Country. He therefore insisted on his making good his payment to the Company, even if he was obliged to leave in arrears, or disband, part of his own troops in order to effect that necessary object.

No doubt appeared to have been entertained, at the period of this occurrence, of the imperious necessity, which compelled the British Government to refuse compliance with the requests of the Vizier, but the evils of a subsidiary engagement, the stipulations of which were not

absolute, and the dissolution of which depended to a great degree upon the caprice of a native Prince, were never more forcibly experienced; and it perhaps required all that wisdom, firmness, and decision, which marked the character of Mr. Hastings, to save the public interests from the great danger, to which they were on this occasion exposed by the conduct of a weak and profligate Prince; who, acting under the influence of wicked and designing men, would have sacrificed, for the gratification of his pleasures, or the attainment of a temporary object, the permanent interests and security of his own Country, and the interests and security of that State with which he had, from a course of events, become completely identified.

Though the Nabob Vizier was obliged to acquiesce, for the moment, in the urgency of the reasons stated by the Governor General, he took the first favourable opportunity of renewing his solicitations upon the subject: and when he had proved his attachment to the British Government in a very unequivocal manner, by his conduct during the rebellion of Cheyt Sing, Rajah of Benares, he again earnestly requested the attention of Mr. Hastings, who, under a more favourable impression of his designs, than he had before entertained, concluded an engagement with him upon the 19th

of September, 1781. By this engagement it was agreed, that the temporary brigade should be recalled within the limits of the Company's possessions, that the different corps of Sebundy* in his service under English Officers, should be reduced, and that he should only be charged with the expense of the original brigade, which had been fixed at the rate of 260,000 rupees per month, and one battalion of Sepoys to be stationed with the Resident at Lucknow; the expense of which was fixed at the rate of 25,000 rupees per month.

In the event, however, of the Vizier even requiring a further aid of troops, he was, by the terms of this engagement, to be charged with their actual pay, and allowances, from the date on which they crossed the Carumnassa river.

All the conditions of this engagement appear to have been carried into execution except the most essential, that which related to the recall of the temporary brigade, which Mr. Hastings states (in a general account of his proceedings, published in England), that he was prevented from fulfilling by some political causes, to which the nature of the times obliged him to pay attention. He further states in the same document, that by a subsequent accom-

* Troops employed exclusively in the collection of revenue.

modation, into which he entered with Asuph ud Dowlah in 1784, when he visited Lucknow, he again positively agreed to withdraw the detachment from Furruckabad, and actually left orders with the Resident at Lucknow to that effect; but that, on his return to Calcutta, he found this measure completely at variance with the opinions of the other Members of the Board; and he thought it his duty, from a consideration of his situation, (being on the eve of resigning the Government,) not only to give up all idea of carrying this arrangement into effect: but to make the repeal of his former resolution, upon this subject, an act of his own authority; that it might not appear the effect of opposition; and thereby produce a dangerous influence on the credit of the succeeding Administration.

No material changes in the connexion between the Company and the Vizier occurred during the short Government of Sir John Macpherson; but these delays made the Vizier more anxious for the accomplishment of his object; and immediately after the arrival of Marquis Cornwallis in India, Asuph ud Dowlah deputed his ablest and most confidential Minister, Hyder Beg Khan, to Fort William, with a view of explaining his situation to that nobleman, and of effecting an arrangement, which

would relieve him from some part of the existing burden on his finances.

The nature and result of this negotiation were fully stated by Lord Cornwallis in a minute, which he recorded upon the 20th of April; which document elucidates, in the clearest manner, the principles which regulated the conduct of that nobleman in the final settlement of this difficult and important question.

The Vizier had expressed, through Hyder Beg Khan, his expectations that the English Government would recall the brigade from Furruckabad, agreeably to the stipulations entered into by Mr. Hastings when at Lucknow; but Lord Cornwallis expressed his opinion, that the continuance of that force in the dominions of the Vizier was equally essential to the interest of the Vizier and the Company. His Lordship stated in a letter, which he addressed to the Vizier upon this occasion, the motives which made him desire the continuance of this force in his dominions; and in the minute, which he recorded upon the subject, he sums up the arguments, which had induced him to this line of conduct, by the following remarks: "I shall only observe," he states in that document, "that I by no means considered a single brigade stationed at Cawnpore, as adequate to the defence of the

“ Vizier’s frontiers ; that although it did not
“ appear to me that there was reason to ap-
“ prehend any immediate attack upon them,
“ the recall of so considerable a part of our
“ force, as the Futtý Ghur brigade, might
“ have precipitated that event ; that it is well
“ known, that the forces in the service of the
“ Nabob Vizier are under no discipline, and
“ barely sufficient to preserve the internal
“ peace of his dominions ; that his own imme-
“ diate subjects are retained within the bounds
“ of duty and allegiance by the respect inspired
“ by the Company’s troops ; that the character
“ of the Vizier, his inconsiderate profusion in
“ his expenses, his inattention to provide for
“ them, and his total disregard to every thing
“ but momentary gratifications, rendered it
“ impossible to depend upon his care, either
“ for the protection of his Country from fo-
“ reign invasions, or internal commotion ; and
“ that although the charges attending the con-
“ tinuance of the brigade at Futtý Ghur exceed
“ the sum we are authorized to claim from him,
“ under the orders of the Court of Directors,
“ the arrangements made by this negotiation
“ render the additional charge of little im-
“ portance, when the magnitude of the objects
“ is considered.”

Lord Cornwallis also observes in this mi-

nute, that from a general statement of the payments, which the Nabob Vizier had made under different heads to the Company for a period of nine years, those amounted to the average of eighty-four lacks per annum; though, by the treaties of 1775 and 1781, the Nabob had only bound himself to pay to the English Government the sum of 3,121,000 rupees, and 3,420,000 rupees per annum.

His Lordship adds in this document, that by the engagement which he had concluded with Hyder Beg Khan, the annual amount of the Vizier's payment was permanently fixed at fifty lacks of rupees per annum; and he expressed his conviction, that this amount would fully indemnify the Company for all expenses to which they might be exposed from their connexion with the Vizier; and that Prince had, he was assured, perfect ability to make this annual disbursement, without suffering in either his convenience or dignity.

Hyder Beg Khan acquiesced in this arrangement; with a declaration, however, that he relied upon the justice of Government, and it's regard for the interests of his master, to diminish the expenses for the maintenance of the Company's troops in his dominions by a recall of part of them, whenever policy or convenience should warrant such a measure.

Lord Cornwallis, in his letter to the Vizier, made a promise to the effect of the expectation expressed by Hyder Beg Khan ; but, in his minute on this subject, his Lordship acknowledges, that he could not foresee a period when such a measure could with prudence be accomplished.

His Lordship in this very able minute took a view of the nature of the connexion between the Company and the Vizier ; and the line of conduct, which it was, in his opinion, the duty of the English Government to pursue toward that Prince, with the object of improving and preserving the alliance.

“ The connexion,” he observes, “ between him” (the Vizier) “ and the Company now stands “ upon the only basis calculated to render it “ permanent. We undertake the defence of his “ Country ; and in return he agrees to defray “ the real expenses incurred by an engagement “ of so much value to himself. The internal ad- “ ministration of his affairs is left to his exclu- “ sive management ; and my attention will be “ constantly directed to the preservation of this “ system, whilst the Vizier continues to fulfil “ the stipulations into which he has entered.

“ By this declaration of a noninterference in “ the detail of the Vizier’s Government, I do “ not mean to preclude myself, or this Board,

“ from making representations to him on the
“ subject of his administration, whenever it
“ may be essentially necessary ; or of proposing
“ to the Vizier any general arrangement, of im-
“ portance to the interests of both Govern-
“ ments : mutual convenience may render such
“ propositions expedient ; and on these grounds
“ only they ought to be made. The Board will
“ also, I imagine, see a necessity of giving their
“ countenance to the Nabob Hyder Beg Khan,
“ or whoever may be the acting Minister of the
“ Vizier. At present he possesses the entire
“ confidence of his master, who is anxious to
“ procure for him the avowed protection of this
“ Government. I made no difficulty in assur-
“ ing the Nabob Hyder Beg Khan, that he
“ might depend upon the support of this Go-
“ vernment whilst he served his master with
“ fidelity ; governed the Country with justice
“ and humanity ; and strictly adhered to the
“ engagements formed with the Honourable
“ Company.”

Lord Cornwallis was too well aware, from the information which he had obtained, of the private character of the Vizier, not to be sensible of the indispensable necessity, which existed, for his giving a decided support to the Minister Hyder Beg Khan, and to those, who were like him favourable to the friendship, which had been

established between the two States: and the sentiments he recorded upon this point, prove in the fullest manner, that, if an emergency had happened, he would not have been deterred by any apprehension of the great responsibility, which he incurred, (by a departure from the prescribed system of noninterference and neutrality,) from the adoption of those decided measures of practical policy, which he might have deemed, under the actual condition of affairs at the moment, best calculated to promote the interests and security of the Empire committed to his charge.

His intentions, indeed, upon this point, as well as the reasons upon which they were founded, are explicitly stated in the able minute to which I have before alluded.

“ The Board are well informed,” he observes,
“ that the administration of affairs in the Oude
“ Government depends entirely upon the Mi-
“ nister; that the Vizier himself takes no far-
“ ther concern in it, than to give the sanction
“ of his name and authority to the acts of his
“ servants; and that such is his disinclination
“ to every thing that has the appearance of
“ business, that even this formality is not com-
“ plied with, on his part, without reluctance.
“ The Vizier himself being profuse to an ex-
“ treme, and little solicitous concerning the

“ mode of obtaining funds to supply his habits
“ of dissipation ; the Company must rather look
“ to the Minister, than to him, for the punctual
“ performance of his engagement. Exposed as
“ he is to the effects of caprice and intrigue, it
“ is impossible to determine how long the
“ Nabob Hyder Beg Khan may continue to
“ possess the confidence of the Vizier.

“ The embarrassments attending his situation
“ are many ; as he will find it difficult, if the
“ idea which I have formed of his master’s cha-
“ racter is just, to combine the two objects, of
“ conciliating the esteem and affection of the
“ Nabob, and establishing a system of Govern-
“ ment calculated to promote his true interests.
“ I forbear to expatiate further on this subject,
“ and only hope, that no occurrence will ever
“ happen to compel this Government to inter-
“ fere between the Vizier and his acting Minis-
“ ter ; or to give countenance to the latter
“ against the approbation of the former.”

These were the principal features of the only arrangement of political importance, which took place with the Vizier of Oude during Lord Cornwallis’s administration of the Company’s affairs in India. It’s operation was perhaps as happy, as the personal character of Asuph u Dowlah admitted of it’s being ; but the indolence, dissipation, and extravagance of that

Prince, created a constant embarrassment in his affairs, and rendered it often difficult for him to fulfil his engagements with the Company; of the value of whose aid and protection he appears always to have become least sensible, when the tranquil state of his dominions proved most forcibly the benefits of the alliance.

Until the last year of Lord Cornwallis's administration, a peace existed between Great Britain and France, which enabled his Lordship to employ the whole of the British force in India against Tippoo Sultaun, during the war with that Prince; and to avoid that increase of military establishment, which must have been made, if it had been requisite to provide for the defence of the exposed parts of our possessions against the possible attacks of France, or to have equipped armaments against the colonies and possessions of that State, or it's Allies.

When the account of war between France and England reached India, Pondicherry was immediately attacked, and taken, by an army from Fort St. George, under the Commander of the forces of that Presidency, Major General Sir John Brathwaite. Lord Cornwallis had hastened from Fort William, to take the direction of this service; but did not reach the coast till it was accomplished. He did not

return to Bengal, but sailed for England in the month of August 1793.

The extraordinary success, which attended Lord Cornwallis's administration of the affairs of British India, is no doubt in a considerable degree to be attributed to the manly spirit, sound judgment, and unshaken firmness, which distinguished the character of that respectable nobleman. But a retrospect to the former history of India will enable us to discover a still more powerful cause of that success, in the exercise of those great civil and military powers, which were, by the confidence of his King and Country, vested in his person. It was the possession of these powers, which enabled him to unite, with such effect to the promotion of every object in his administration, the hitherto divided and distracted local authorities of British India; and the active control, and direction, which he assumed over the subordinate Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, during the whole of his Government, placed their means and resources as much at his immediate command as those of Bengal.

The impression originally made upon the minds of the native Princes of India by the rank and character of Lord Cornwallis, was confirmed by their observation of his extended powers.

Their attention was directed to the supreme authority of the British Nation in India with an awe and respect, which they had never before paid it. The manner in which Lord Cornwallis drew forth the strength and resources of the British Government to the reduction of Tippoo Sultaun, excited sentiments of equal astonishment and alarm; and the success of that war, combined with the great addition of strength, of territory, and of reputation, which its termination brought to the English Government, while it extorted the admiration of all the native Powers of India, raised their fears; nor was it possible that these, which were the result of actual events, could be removed by any display of moderation, which in itself implied a sense of that superiority, which formed the just ground of all their apprehensions.

The Indian Government in England could not be insensible to the probable effects of the great changes, which had taken place in the state of British India. They had seen (perhaps with regret), that events, which they had no power of controlling, had forced Lord Cornwallis to an actual departure from that pacific system of forbearance and neutrality, which they had believed practicable, and which they had so earnestly recommended to his attention; and that in opposition to those views, which

they had taken of their interests, their territories had been greatly increased, and their political relations much extended, during his administration.

The admission of that necessity, which forced Lord Cornwallis into a course of measures so contrary to their wishes and policy, does not appear to have been followed by a conclusion, that the same causes might again produce the same effect; and a general impression would appear at this period to have been received in England, that the exertions of that nobleman had placed the affairs of the Company on the true footing of security and strength, which had been so long desired; and that nothing was requisite, but mild, moderate, and conciliatory councils, in the local authorities, to secure the lasting tranquillity and prosperity of the British possessions in India. And this error seems more extraordinary, when we consider the actual state of every native Power in India, as represented in those authentic public documents, which have been referred to in this concise narrative of Lord Cornwallis's Administration.

CHAPTER III.

ADMINISTRATION

OF

SIR JOHN SHORE,

CONTENTS.

State of Affairs favourable to the Security of the British Government.—Great political Changes during this Administration.—Retrospect of the Guarantee Treaty proposed by Marquis Cornwallis.—Court of Poonah refuses to accede to this.—The Nizam anxious for a separate Treaty of Guarantee.—Reasons of Sir John Shore against this.—Hostile Disposition of the Court of Poonah.—Causes of the Quarrel between that Court and the Nizam.—Tippoo threatens to attack the Nizam.—The Governor General resolves not to assist this Prince.—View of the Policy pursued by him on this Occasion.—Convention of Kurdlah.—British Influence at the Court of Hyderabad greatly impaired.—Rebellion of the Son of the Nizam.—French Corps in the Nizam's Service much encouraged at this Time.—Death of the Paishwah.—Consequences of this Event.—Failure of the Treaty with the Nabob of the Carnatic.—Proposed Modification of that Treaty rejected by the Nabob.—View of the Affairs of Oude.—New Treaty with the Vizier.—Invasion of Zemaun Shah.—Consi-

derations upon the Probability and Danger of Invasion from the Northern Tribes.—Concluding Remarks on the System of Policy pursued by the British Government during this Administration.

SIR JOHN SHORE, a most respectable civil servant of the Company, who had, by a series of important services in India, recommended himself to the favour and notice of the Court of Directors, was appointed to succeed the Marquis Cornwallis as Governor General of India ; and it appears to have been expected by the authorities in England, that all those great advantages, which Lord Cornwallis had obtained, would be confirmed and improved by the ability, local knowledge, and industry, of his successor.

The state of the different native Powers of India at the period when Sir John Shore took charge of the Supreme Government, has been described. The condition of affairs certainly did not promise a very long exemption from hostilities ; but it was, on the other hand, in every respect free from danger. The English Government had at no period been so strong in actual military force and resources. It's principal enemy, Tippoo, was much reduced. The Subahdar of the Deckan, the most important of all it's Allies, was firm to his engagements, and disposed to the cultivation and improvement of the friendship which had been established be-

tween him and the Company : and the Mahrattas, though their jealousy had evidently been greatly excited by the success of it's arms, and the extension of it's territories and political relations, regarded that State with a respect and apprehension, which was likely to make them cautious how they offended it.

In taking a general view of the leading political transactions of Sir John Shore's Government, it appears of great consequence to observe, how far that course of policy, which he thought it his duty to pursue, affected this state of affairs ; and to what extent those favourable impressions, which I have described, as existing among the native Powers, and which, in an Empire like that of British India, have a value beyond force, were changed by the measures of his Administration.

Though no war with a foreign Power occurred during the Administration of Sir John Shore, that period was marked by political changes in the state of India of great importance ; and these merit particular attention, as it is impossible to form any just opinion of the events, which have since happened, without a clear and distinct knowledge of those occurrences by which they were immediately preceded and produced.

The political event of most consequence, which happened during his Administration, was

the rupture, which took place between the Nizam and Mahrattas. In order to understand the causes of this rupture, and the nature of that interference by which the British Government attempted to prevent its occurrence, it will be necessary to trace in a cursory manner the changes, which took place in the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah, from the period of the conclusion of the peace at Seringapatam, till the period of the disgraceful convention of Kurdlah, which may be considered as having annihilated, for the moment, the independence of the Nizam Government.

The Marquis Cornwallis, soon after the conclusion of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, made an endeavour, in fulfilment of the 10th and 13th articles of the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam and Paishwah, to reduce into the form of an explicit and definite treaty of guarantee, those articles in the subsisting treaties, by which it was generally agreed, that the contracting Powers should guarantee to each other, against any future attacks of the Sultaun, those territories, which they actually possessed at the termination of the war with that Prince.

His Lordship, in his letter under date the 7th of August 1792, to the Resident at Poonah, states his opinion respecting the great import-

ance of this arrangement, for the common security of the respective parties; and he also defines, in that despatch, the principle upon which he conceives this treaty should be framed.

“ The Allies,” he observes, “ are bound to
“ guarantee against Tippoo the territories that
“ each of them might possess at the conclusion
“ of the war; but it must always be adverted
“ to, that the stipulation is merely defensive,
“ and cannot operate unless Tippoo should at-
“ tack either of them without just provoca-
“ tion.

“ It must therefore be clearly expressed in
“ the treaty of guarantee, that in case any dif-
“ ference should arise between one of the latter
“ and Tippoo, the other Allies are to have a
“ right to expect that the nature and circum-
“ stances of such difference shall be fully
“ communicated to them, in order that they
“ may give their opinion and advice, and en-
“ deavour to settle it by a temperate negotia-
“ tion, and that they shall not be considered as
“ bound to take up arms in his favour, until
“ they are convinced that he has justice on his
“ side, and all measures of conciliation shall
“ have proved fruitless.

“ Should a rupture become unavoidable, the
“ interest and safety of the contracting Powers

“ will be so evidently and deeply involved in
“ the event, that it would be highly injudi-
“ cious in them to limit their exertions in
“ endeavouring to bring it to a speedy and
“ honourable conclusion; and it must, con-
“ sequently, be stipulated, that the whole
“ force of each State is to be employed for
“ that purpose.

“ The distress and danger of the party, that
“ may be attacked, being entitled to the great-
“ est attention from the other members of the
“ alliance; it ought to be understood and
“ settled, that, whilst no time should be lost
“ in preparing their whole force to take the
“ field, every immediate assistance, that may
“ be practicable, should be afforded with such
“ troops as may be in actual readiness for
“ service.”

Lord Cornwallis subsequently framed a schedule of a treaty upon these principles, which he transmitted to the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah. It is not necessary to detail the articles of this schedule, as the treaty was never concluded; but it is of importance to notice those general causes, which led to the defect of an arrangement, which was stipulated by prior engagements; and which was in every respect so essential to the real interests and security of the British Government and it's Allies.

At the period when this proposition was first made to the Court of Hyderabad, a reference had been made by it to the British Government, relative to a dispute, which had occurred between the Nizam and Tippoo, about some claims advanced by the latter on the Nabob of Kernoul; and the Government of Hyderabad, with that puerility and petulance which too often characterize a native Court, demanded as the condition of it's consent to the proposition of Lord Cornwallis, the interference and support of the English Government in it's dispute with Tippoo Sultaun. The Nizam was, however, soon made sensible of the folly and unreasonableness of such a demand; and he made every reparation in his power for the errour, which he had committed, by a full and unqualified assent to the guarantee treaty proposed by the Marquis Cornwallis.

The conduct of the Court of Poonah was very different: it treated the guarantee proposed by the English Government with a delay and evasion, which clearly proved a desire of being relieved altogether from engagements, which might have the future effect of limiting or counteracting the designs, which it cherished against Tippoo and the Nizam. Acting upon these principles, a counter proposition for

a guarantee treaty was given in by Nanah Furnavese, the Minister of the Poonah State, to the British Resident; which was, after some discussion, deemed altogether inadmissible, and rejected. This engagement included, among other articles, a recognition, on the part of the Allies, of claims of the Poonah Government on Tippoo for Chout, which was not authorized by the stipulations of the treaty of Seringapatam; and the Nizam, while he declared his perfect readiness to consent to the proposition made by Lord Cornwallis, was positive in the refusal of his acquiescence to the engagement proposed by the Paishwah.

After a vexatious and procrastinated negotiation, of considerably more than a year, this point was altogether abandoned; and the British Government contented itself with a declaration, that it was satisfied with the verbal acquiescence of the Nizam; and a vague promise, which had been made during the negotiation by the Poonah State, which conveyed no more than that it would always be ready to act agreeably to existing treaties. The Nizam, throughout the latter part of this negotiation, showed great anxiety for the conclusion of a separate treaty of guarantee. He argued, with much apparent justice, that the failure of one of three parties in the fulfilment of it's engagements,

was no reason why the other two should neglect their faith; or sacrifice those advantages, which had been proposed in the union of their interests. It was also urged, that the conclusion of the treaty of guarantee, proposed by Lord Cornwallis with the Nizam, would be the most certain mode of bringing the Court of Poonah to give it's consent to that necessary measure.

These arguments, however, had no weight with Sir John Shore; who thought it more prudent to lose the benefits of an arrangement, which had appeared to his predecessor essential to the security and tranquillity of the possessions of the Allies, than to incur any hazard of giving offence to the Mahrattas, whose jealousy he conceived would be further excited by the formation of any new engagement, which improved or consolidated the alliance between the English Government and the Nizam.

Before I proceed to state those causes, which produced a war between the Nizam and Mahrattas, it will be necessary to take a short view of the temper of those States, towards the British Government, previous to it's commencement. That of the Nizam's Court is fully described in a despatch under date the 1st of January 1794, which Sir John Kennaway, Resident at Hyderabad, addressed to the Governor

General. In this the Resident states his conviction, that the circumstances in which the Court of Hyderabad was then placed, and the character of those by whom it was ruled, were such, as gave us an opportunity, which it was wise and politic to use, to establish an influence and power in it's councils, which would enable us to command it's future exertions, and benefit from it's recourses under any events that could occur.

“ Should, however,” Sir John Kennaway observes in this despatch, “ such an alliance, and “ the kind of interference above alluded to, be “ deemed improper, and the limits to which “ it is at present confined be considered as sufficient; the friendship and confidence in us, “ which has been so happily established in his “ Government, and the reliance which the “ Nizam must ultimately place on the Company, for checking any hostile league, which “ the Mahrattas may form against the rights or “ dignity of his Government, will, I imagine, “ prevent his engaging in any measures to our “ prejudice; and induce him even to be “ guarded in adopting any, of which our very “ marked and pointed disapprobation may be “ expressed.”

The whole of the last political despatch of this distinguished public Officer is conclusive,

as to the temper of the Nizam towards the British Government at this period; and shows in the clearest manner the nature of those expectations of aid and support, which he had been led by the whole tenour of Lord Cornwallis's policy to expect from the British Government, in the event of his being exposed to the risk of destruction from an attack of the Mahratta States.

The temper of the Court of Poonah towards the British Government, was not more strongly marked by its refusal to conclude the guarantee treaty, than by the extreme jealousy, which it showed, of the connexion between the English Government and the Nizam; and the resentment, which it in consequence openly entertained against the latter. The councils of the Paishwah were at this period much swayed by Madhajee Scindiah, who was known to cherish views hostile to the general peace of India, over which it was his avowed ambition to re-establish the Mahratta authority. In a conference, which that Chief had with the agent of the Nizam at Poonah, he did not hesitate to state, in the most public manner, his dislike to the guarantee treaty; and to advise the Nizam not to enter into any such engagement with the British Government; of whose intentions, he said, he entertained the greatest suspicions.

Sir Charles Mallet, in his despatch to the Governor General, under date the 24th of July 1794, states the endeavours which Madhajee Scindiah had made to defeat the negotiations respecting the guarantee engagements. In the same letter he represents Nanah Furnavese to be very averse to the violent councils and language of Scindiah; who (Sir Charles observes) the Minister thinks is desirous of subverting his authority, and establishing his own, as more equal to the task of counteracting the dangerous increase of our power.

Sir Charles states, in a despatch under date the 14th of October 1794, his conviction, that no possible opening should be given to the encroaching spirit of the Court of Poonah; "which," he observes, "notwithstanding our uniform firmness and candour, throughout my whole Ministry, continues to contemplate the mightiness of our power with a jealousy unwarrantable, but in the consciousness of it's own principles, and it's inability to give others the credit due to purer motives."

This opinion respecting the temper of the Court of Poonah, was fully corroborated by every measure adopted by that Government; as well as by the language of those, who influenced it's councils, which is described in

several despatches from the Resident, written about this period, to have been of a nature very inimical to the British Government. Madhajee Scindiah is indeed particularly stated to have avowed openly his reliance on Tippoo, as a counterpoise to our increased power.

What I have stated fully proves, that immediately before the occurrence of the rupture between the Nizam and the Mahrattas, the former entertained the most friendly disposition towards the British Government, on the good faith and sincerity of which he was disposed to place every reliance; and that he consequently rejoiced at those events, which had established its great ascendancy in the political scale of the Peninsula of India. Whereas the latter had reviewed the success of the English with alarm; and contemplated the actual state of their power with a degree of jealousy which approximated to hostility.

Under the influence of such feelings the Mahratta States were likely to seek every opportunity of diminishing our power; and there can be no doubt, that while they saw, in the reduction of the Nizam, an increase to their own power, they contemplated this, as one mode of injuring the British Government, by depriving it of the benefit and strength

which it might derive from its political connexion with that Prince.

It is not necessary to enter into any detail of those grounds in which the quarrel between the Nizam and the Mahrattas originated. The seeds of rupture existed in the nature of their political relations. An unsettled account was always pending between them: the Nizam owed arrears of choute, the amount of which was exaggerated by one party, and perhaps under-estimated by the other. But this was not the only claim to be adjusted. The artful policy of the Mahrattas had taught them to subdue the other Nations of India in the mode best suited to their habits and genius. They did not, like other conquerors, endeavour to establish their authority in an open manner; but commenced by obtaining a cession of a part of the annual revenue of particular provinces; which the indolent and distracted Mahomedan Governments of India were glad to grant to these active freebooters, in the hope of obtaining, by such a concession, an exemption to Countries exposed to their inroads, from their ruinous depredations. But these concessions only generated further demands, and the establishment of other claims on the part of the Mahrattas. They proceeded to assert their right to collect, through their own Officers,

an equal share of the produce of some Provinces, and a duty upon the revenue of others. This vexatious right of interference gave them an influence in the internal management of the Country, supported by the aid of a large and corrupt body of revenue officers.

The mixed nature of this connexion was particularly suited to the character of the Mah-ratta Nation, which subsisted, as a confederacy of military States, almost entirely by plunder; and as they were, from their constitution, constantly liable to changes of fortune, it became important that they should be able to abandon, at a period of weakness, without any resignation of right, those advantages, which their predecessors had obtained. Hence they have often been known to unite, to enforce the payment of large arrears of claims, which their internal divisions had caused to lie dormant for years.

The Government of the Subahdar of the Deckan had been a short time completely under their influence. The Nizam's former Minister, Rukeen ud Dowlah, had at one period acted more at their command, than at that of his master;* and the whole adminis-

* The subserviency of that Minister to the views of the Mah-rattas, has generally been considered one of the chief causes that induced the Nizam to put him to death.

tration of his successor, Azeem ul Omrah, had been a struggle to emancipate his Government from this thralldom. Events had favoured his endeavours; and before the revival of the alliance with the English Government in 1788, he had succeeded to a considerable extent. But there can be no doubt, that the expectation of accomplishing this favourite object, was one of the principal motives, which led him to advise the Nizam to abandon all those alarms and prejudices, which that Prince had ever entertained of the designs of the British Government; and to seek in it's good faith, and friendship, that powerful aid and support, which, in the actual state of India, was necessary to the security, tranquillity, and independence, of his Government.

Directed by the same principles, which had led him to form the alliance with Marquis Cornwallis, the Nizam most earnestly solicited the interference of the English Government, to prevent those extremities, which he apprehended from the conduct and military preparations of the Mahrattas; and though the chief Officers of his Court acted, upon this occasion, in that weak and undecided manner, which is natural to almost all the natives, there cannot exist a doubt, from the evidence of all that passed upon this subject, that the Nizam would

readily have pledged himself to have abided by the decision of the British Government on the dispute between him and the Paishwah ; provided he had been assured that State would have adopted measures to make it's decision respected.

The Mahrattas, on the other hand, received the proffered mediation of the English Government from the first with evasion and inattention ; and from the moment they were fully satisfied that we had no intention of aiding the Nizam, further than by the interposition of our friendly offices, and the expression of our earnest solicitude for an amicable accommodation between the two parties, they treated our interference with a neglect that approached insult.

The Governor General was fully sensible of the serious injury which the interests of the British Government were likely to sustain from a rupture, which might be said to commence in the annihilation of the most important of the political relations, which his predecessor had established, for the security of the British interests in India. He was also aware, that the disputes, which were made the pretext of this rupture, were easy of settlement ; and were only a cover to the actual designs of the Mahrattas, which went to the annihilation

of the power of the Nizam. " If" (Sir John Shore observed, in a letter under date the 1st of October 1794, to the Resident at Hyderabad) " the Mahrattas should proceed to extremities " against the Nizam, it can only be, I think, " with a resolution to annihilate the independ- " ency of his authority; for, notwithstanding " the sense which they may entertain of their " superiority in the field, I see nothing in the " articles disputed between the two States, as " far as they have appeared, that does not ad- " mit of adjustment; or of sufficient magnitude " to induce them to maintain the rumours of a " war. The preparations of the Nizam are " necessary for his own safety, and may contri- " bute to suspend the Paishwah's resolution."

The death of Madhajee Scindiah, which occurred during this negotiation, was an event most favourable to the effectual interference of the British Government; and the Resident at Poonah expressed his opinion, that advantage might be taken with success of an occasion so propitious to the accomplishment of the object in view. The Governor General was not, however, of opinion, that the smallest risk should be incurred of offending the Poonah State, by any alteration in the course of policy, which had been pursued; and Doulut Row Scindiah, who succeeded his uncle, hastened to assemble

his army from the remotest quarters of Hindoostan; equally with a view of strengthening his personal authority, and of giving him an ascendancy in the confederacy forming against the Nizam.

Immediately before the occurrence of hostilities between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, an alarm of a very serious nature attracted the attention of the British Government. Tippoo Suldaun, whose active spirit of hostility against that State had led him to commence intrigues with the French Government, the Court of Hyderabad, and the Court of Poonah, almost at the same moment that the peace of Seringapatam was concluded, had assembled an army; and threatened to come forward, as an Ally of the Mahrattas, against the Nizam, in the quarrel between those States.

It became, under such circumstances, a question, What part the British Government was to act, in the event of this extraordinary occurrence? and the subject was fully considered by the Governor General, who resolved, on the occurrence of such event, not to aid the Nizam. The leading arguments, which influenced Sir John Shore's mind upon this occasion, merit notice; as they elucidate very fully those principles, by which he judged it his duty to regulate his conduct, in the administration of the

political affairs of the great Empire committed to his charge.

It had been before decided, that we should take no part in the existing quarrel between the Nizam and the Mahrattas; as the act of the Legislature prohibited an interference, which would necessarily involve us in hostilities : but, when it appeared probable that Tippoo would act against the Nizam, another question arose ; in considering which, the Governor General not only took a view of our engagements, but of the peculiar claims which the Nizam appeared to have on our friendship and protection.

That Prince might urge, he thought, that he was by treaty entitled to the aid of the Company, as well as the Mahrattas, if Tippoo attacked him without just cause or provocation ; that the defection of one party could not exonerate the other ; and that, so far from being justified in refusing him aid against Tippoo, it was incumbent on us to stand forth, to compel the third party to perform it's stipulations.

The Nizam would, the Governor General knew, assert, that the obligation of assistance, as stated in the treaty, was clear, and admitted of no evasion ; that his reliance, in making the treaty, was upon our good faith, not upon that of the Mahrattas, whose treachery he well knew, and of whom he had intimated his suspi-

cions during the preliminary negotiations ; that at the period we sought his alliance the connexion was so essential to our interests, that we must, if he had insisted upon it, have entered into an offensive and defensive engagement in general terms ; and that if we considered ourselves at liberty to renounce the performance of our stipulations, because the Mahrattas had violated their engagements, or for other reasons of convenience or policy ; there was an end to that faith, which is the basis of treaties, as such pretext could never be wanting, to authorize a departure from the most solemn obligations.

Tippoo's aggression, the Nizam would state, must be with or without the concurrence of the Mahrattas ; and in either case we ought to oppose it ; but more particularly if that Prince took the field as the Ally of the Paishwah ; as that would be a direct and insulting violation of the treaty, which we were bound by every consideration of duty and honour to resent.

The Governor General, on the other hand, conceived that the treaty, on which the Nizam's claims to aid were grounded, was a tripartite engagement, which supposed a continued union between the three allied Powers : that such union was essential to its continuance in any shape, because it was essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by it ; and

a war between two of the parties, therefore, totally changed the relations of all.

A junction between Tippoo and one of the two parties to the treaty, was, Sir John Shore thought, to be judged with reference to the causes of hostilities between the two parties; and supposing that the injustice of the war between the Mahrattas and the Nizam was decidedly on one side, and that the other was compelled by unprovoked aggression, self-preservation would justify an alliance between the aggrieved party and Tippoo; but a confederacy between him and one of the parties to the triple alliance, grounded on ambitious motives against another party, would no doubt be a gross infraction of the treaty by that State confederating with Tippoo. The inference from this reasoning, the Governor General thought, was rather against the Nizam, whose advance to Beder was, if not an aggression, certainly with a view of interfering in the internal affairs of the Mahratta Government; all the bad consequences of which had been repeatedly, though ineffectually, stated by the British Resident to the Minister at the Court of Hyderabad.

Should the English Government support the Nizam against Tippoo, if the latter seized the opportunity of a war between the former and the Mahrattas, to attack his Country without

provocation; that Nation would necessarily be involved in a war with the Mahrattas: a predicament never supposed in the triple alliance. The stipulations of that alliance, which bound the English Government not to aid the enemies of either State, seemed to impose a strict neutrality on that Government, when these Powers were at war with each other; as such war was in fact a temporary subversion of the principles of the alliance. The arguments, which represented the treaty of Paungul as a separate treaty; or that the secession of one party did not release the other, because it is not so expressed in that treaty, were, Sir John Shore thought, quite inadmissible. The alliance was, he conceived, one formed by three parties, not two; and to be maintained by their joint efforts; and not to admit, that the secession of one party released the whole, required, in his opinion, more than ever the treaty intended, as it involved the necessity, or, at all events, the risk of a war with one of the parties to it; a case, which the treaty never supposed; and which is, indeed, contrary to that presumption upon which all its stipulations are founded.

Though the occurrence of war had suspended the operation of this alliance; the return of peace would, in the Governor General's opinion, restore it to its former footing; and it was his

intention, if Tippoo attacked either the Nizam or the Mahrattas, while at war with each other, to call upon the third party to perform his stipulations. Such a call might, he conceived, induce the two parties at war to make peace; or, at all events, would show whether Tippoo's attack was in concert with one of the Allies, and establish a direct breach of the treaty against that Ally, who refused his aid in defence of the party attacked, and leave the English Government at liberty to act as it thought proper. But the Governor General did not conceive that State bound to assist either party, unless peace was previously concluded between the Mahrattas and the Nizam.

The Governor General did not expect the Nizam would ever yield his conviction to those arguments, which had satisfied his own mind upon this question. That Prince would, on the contrary, he thought, be inclined to view our neutrality as a desertion of his cause, which ill repayed his co-operation with us, and his anxiety to unite with us by the closest ties: and he concluded, from the above impression being made upon the mind of the Nizam, and from his political character, that, on the occurrence of the event alluded to, he would be likely to become in future an enemy to the British Government.

It was obvious to the Governor General at this period, that the Nizam, unsupported by the English Government, must sink under the combined attack of the Mahrattas and Tippoo, who would become more dangerous than ever to that State by this change. But when he contemplated the difficulties, which presented themselves, from the vices of the Nizam's Administration; the impossibility of directing his politics, without usurping his Government; the difficulty of making any impression upon the Mahrattas; the comparative facility with which they could injure the British Government; the magnitude of the resources and number of troops necessary to oppose the Mahrattas and Tippoo; and the inevitable ruin of a long protracted war; he thought the inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard of such impending consequences, ought to be much stronger, than the apprehension of future evils, from the subversion of his power.

In the event, however, of the Nizam's power being annihilated, by a combination of Tippoo and the Mahrattas, the Governor General thought there was as great a probability of their attacking each other, as of their uniting in an invasion of the frontiers of the Company. Our political consequence might, he conceived, lose something of it's importance in the estimate

of the native Powers, by leaving the Nizam to his fate; but, although fully aware of the great value of opinion to the British Government in India, he did not think it was on this occasion to be put in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tippoo and the Mahrattas, which he believed would be the certain consequence of supporting singly the Nizam against Tippoo, if that Prince should attack him, whilst engaged in hostility with the Paishwah.

The Governor General appears to have been very sensible to the loss of reputation at this moment; as he justly conceived that the conduct of the British Government, in resenting the attack upon it's Ally, the Rajah of Travancore, and the character of the negotiation, by which the war with Tippoo was terminated, had gained us the confidence of our Allies, and established the British reputation throughout India, for good faith, firmness, and moderation. But while Sir John Shore acknowledged the advantage of such impression, he conceived it more necessary to attend to considerations of self-preservation.

Such is a short statement of that reasoning, on which the Governor General concluded, that the British Government was neither bound by obligations of faith, nor considerations of political expediency, to support and defend it's Ally,

the Soubahdar of the Deckan, in the event of his being attacked by Tippoo during the period when he was engaged in a war with the Mahrattas. Fortunately for the English Government, the speedy termination of the war between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and the occupation of the Sultaun in his own Country, prevented the occurrence of the event, which was dreaded; and saved the British Nation from that great loss of reputation, and the many alarming evils, to which the Governor General foresaw it would be exposed; but which he deemed it better to incur, than to encounter the numerous difficulties, which he thought would attend a different line of action. Among these he considered a war as one, that was inevitable. But it may be doubted whether a war would have been the inevitable result of a more spirited and manly course of policy. There indeed appears every ground to conclude, that while those impressions, which had been made on all the native Powers of India, by the wise councils and military success of the Marquis Cornwallis, were yet in full force, the decided interference of the British Government would have deterred either the Mahrattas, or the Sultaun from an attack upon the Nizam.

The Governor General thought, at this period, that whether the disputes between the

Nizam and Mahrattas were terminated by war or negotiation, they would end in the subjection of the power of the former to the latter; and, consequently, bring a great accession of strength to the Mahrattas, whose power he thought even then exorbitant. The Nizam must, he conceived, when he despaired of the support of the British Government, court the alliance of Tippoo; but their union he deemed impracticable: and he thought, that if the Sultaun attacked the Nizam without previous concert with the Mahrattas, that the latter would make their own terms with the Court of Hyderabad, and then unite with the English Government, to defend it's territories from the attack of Tippoo.

Though the weakness of the Nizam might offer a temptation to Tippoo, the subversion of the British Power, the Governor General concluded, was the great object of that Prince: and as he conceived the aid of the Nizam would not enable us to hold the balance of India, he thought the confirmation of our alliance with the Mahrattas was an object of the first importance; as, with their aid, we might always oppose Tippoo, or any European Power.

Sir John Shore expressed, at this period, his full conviction, that the only means of maintaining tranquillity, was to have our military establishment on so respectable a footing, as to

impose peace upon our neighbours. This was, he thought, the wisest as well as most economical system. He appears also to have strongly felt (as Lord Cornwallis had done before) the injury and danger to which our interests might eventually be exposed, from the operation of the restrictions of the act of 1793, with regard to our alliances with the native States of India.

The clause of that act, which forbids us from declaring war, or commencing hostilities; except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations made for their commencement, against the British Government; was, the Governor General conceived, in its literal construction, decisive against any interference on our part, in favour of the Nizam, if attacked by Tippoo without the co-operation of the Mahrattas; and the circumstances of the case confirmed, he thought, this construction, in point of expediency. But he considered it very possible, without any view to the extension of our dominions, that a case might arise, in which the security of our possessions might be best consulted, at the risk and even certainty of hostilities, by taking part with one State against another: and the question was, Whether we should be justified in such a determination, where we are not bound by treaty to defend or

guarantee a State, which it might, under such circumstances, be expedient to assist?

From the above short abstract of Sir John Shore's recorded sentiments upon this important question, it appears, that he had resolved to abandon the Nizam to the resentment of Tippoo Sultaun, on the ground of such a measure being, in his opinion, defensible in point of faith; expedient in point of policy; and conformable to the letter of the Act of the Legislature, for the better government of our possessions in India. He conceived, that the English Government would be fully justified in their abandonment of the cause of that Prince, as long as he was involved in a war with the Mahrattas; because the latter State was one of the parties to the triple alliance: or, in other words, that if Tippoo succeeded in the hostile design, which the Governor General believed him to entertain, of fomenting a disunion among the Allies; and entered into a league with the Mahrattas, (which formed on their part a complete breach of the triple alliance,) the English Government was thereby emancipated from all obligation to fulfil its treaty with the Nizam, who had faithfully performed the conditions of an alliance, which had been negotiated (as stated by the Governor General) upon the admitted principle

of his entire reliance on the good faith of the British Nation, and of his expressed conviction of the treachery of the Mahrattas.

The Governor General appears also to have been contented to sacrifice, upon this occasion, part of that high reputation and character, which the conduct of his immediate predecessor had obtained to the British Government in India; provided he could, by such sacrifice, secure immediate exemption from the difficulties and dangers to which, he thought, the State might be exposed by a more spirited and decided course of action.

One of the chief causes, which made the Governor General determine not to aid the Nizam, was the existence of that weakness in his Administration, and need of support, which three years before had been considered as the just and legitimate motive, which induced that Prince to seek and cultivate the connexion with the British Government.

The Governor General appears also to have been swayed by a hope, that he should in some degree disarm the hostile jealousy of the Mahrattas, by not supporting the Nizam, against whom it was obvious their resentment had been particularly excited, by the relations of friendship which that Prince had recently contracted with the English Government; and under the

great and alarming political changes, which he foresaw would result from the destruction of the Nizam's power, he found a consolation in the possibility of a subsequent rupture between Tippoo and the Mahrattas, and in the hope that the latter (whose power he states to be already exorbitant) would find an occupation more immediately inviting, than an attack upon the British territories, in the consolidation of their vast power by the final subjection and reduction of the few petty States, which continued to resist their authority in Hindoostan.

He conceived that the literal construction of the Act of Parliament was, under his interpretation of the guarantee treaty, decidedly against the British Government aiding the Nizam, if attacked by Tippoo, while at war with the Mahrattas; and that the circumstances of the case were such, as to confirm the construction in point of expediency.

This conclusion, it is to be observed, was formed, after assuming that defection of one party from a triple offensive and defensive alliance, and its actual union with that very Power against whom the alliance was originally formed, for the purpose of attacking one of the other parties of the alliance, cancelled the obligation of the remaining party, and gave it a right to remain neuter. But allowing this general posi-

tion to be correct, it was hardly applicable to the particular case under discussion. For the Nizam, the party with whom it was argued, that the engagements of the English Government had become invalid, or rather dormant, by the secession of the Mahrattas, had (as I have before mentioned) concluded the treaty, which bound him to the triple alliance; on the declared principle of placing his sole dependence upon the faith of the British Government. He both entertained and expressed fears, at the very moment of signing the treaty, of the hostile and treacherous designs of the Mahrattas: and these fears were only removed by repeated and solemn assurances of the permanent friendship of the British Government.

Marquis Cornwallis declared, in his letter under date the 28th of February 1790, to the Resident at Poonah, that the Mahratta State, by acting against Tippoo in concert with the British Government, became entitled, in reason and equity, to a defensive alliance against that Prince, even though no previous engagement existed. This declaration sufficiently showed the sense, which that nobleman entertained of the obligations, which the mere act of aid, during hostilities, (independent of formal engagement,) imposed upon the British Government. He was fully sensible, that we owed

our power in India to that reputation, which led the most perfidious Nations to rely with confidence upon the verbal assurances of our Representatives; and to consider, that in espousing our cause in any war in which we were engaged, they established a right, that nothing but their own misconduct could ever forfeit, to our future friendship, and to our protection against any Power whom they had offended by their exertions in our favour.

Sir John Shore, however, was fully aware of the reproaches which the line of conduct, that he proposed to pursue, might draw upon the British Government; and the loss of reputation and political consequence, which that State would sustain, by abandoning the Nizam. But though he declared himself fully sensible of the value of opinion in India, he did not "think it could be placed" (on this occasion) "in competition with the greater evils, which he thought likely to attend a war with the Mah-rattas and Tippoo Sultaun." It may appear difficult to fix the nature or extent of the exertions, which a State would be warranted in making upon any occasion, to maintain its reputation and character; because those are qualities, of which the precise value can never be ascertained; but the history of every Nation in the Universe sufficiently proves that they have

been always most cherished by States, which were rising, or in the zenith of their power; and only neglected by those which were on their decline, or on the eve of dissolution. If this rule be just, with regard to States in general, how much more must it apply to that extraordinary Empire, which the British Nation has founded in the East! For there can be no doubt that Empire is held solely by opinion; or, in other words, by that respect and awe with which the comparative superiority of our knowledge, justice, and system of rule, have inspired the inhabitants of our own territories; and that confidence in our truth, reliance on our faith, and dread of our arms, which is impressed on every Nation in India.

These feelings are in the first place to be ascribed to that wretched and oppressive rule, from which the introduction of our power relieved our present subjects; and to the comparative tranquillity and happiness, which they enjoy under our dominion: and, in the second, to those principles of falsehood and treachery, which mark the intercourse of the native States of India with each other, and which make each of these, in their turn, anxious to cultivate the friendship of a Nation, which, though different in religion, in usages and in language, has

maintained a character for faith and courage, which gives the highest value to it's friendship.

Assuredly, if this view of our situation be just, we can contemplate no danger so great, as that, which hazards the smallest diminution of that reputation, upon which the British Empire in the East is grounded.

The best criterion, however, of every system of policy, is it's result : and I shall now proceed to examine those events, which were produced by the course, which the British Government on this occasion adopted towards the Government of Hyderabad.

In February 1795, a war between the Mah-rattas and the Nizam became certain ; and the advanced corps of the army of the former, under the command of Dowlut Row Scindiah, marched towards the Nizam ; and on the 11th of March attacked that Prince, who had advanced from Beder (where he had been long encamped) to meet him. After a general action, in which both parties were thrown into some confusion, and neither obtained any decided advantage ; the Nizam, carried away by the fears of his women, who attended him in the action, retreated during the night of the 11th, and took shelter in the small fort of Kurdlah. This fort is completely surrounded with hills, except on

one part, which the Mahrattias immediately occupied; and by that means completely hemmed in his army, and cut it off from all supplies.

After remaining for some weeks in this situation, the Nizam was obliged to conclude a peace, the exact particulars of which were not known; but, independently of the full admission of all the former claims of the Mahrattas, as established by the treaty of Edghire, it was understood, that the Nizam agreed, by the convention of Khurdlah, to cede to his enemies a Country of about thirty-five lacks of rupees in annual revenue, including the fort and district of Doulutabad, and to pay them three crores of rupees, one-third paid immediately, and the remainder of this amount in annual instalments of twenty-five lacks. To these conditions were added one still more disgraceful, the delivery of his Prime Minister, Azeem ul Omrah, into the hands of the Mahrattas, as a hostage for the faithful performance of his engagements.

After the convention of Kurdlah was settled, the Nizam returned to Hyderabad; and the Mahratta confederates marched toward their respective countries; which they had hardly reached, when two unexpected events occur-

red—the sudden death of the young Paishwah, Madhoo Row, and the rebellion of Ally Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam. These two events conspired, in their effects, to revive the lost influence of the British Government at the Court of Hyderabad, and to restore the Nizam to his former consequence among the Powers of the Peninsula.

It is only necessary to my object to take a very cursory and general view of these events. I shall commence with that, which was of most consequence to the British Government, as it prevented the entire dissolution of the connexion established between that State and the Court of the Soubahdar of the Deckan.

The Nizam, when encamped at Beder, had shown great anxiety, that the two battalions, which he subsidized from the English Government, should join his camp. But a compliance with this wish was evaded; as it was thought their junction would give offence to the Mahrattas. It was, however, afterwards so arranged, that while the Nizam continued at war with the Mahrattas, the English battalions should be employed in preserving the tranquillity of his dominions.

After the Nizam returned to Hyderabad, he intimated his desire to dispense with the ser-

vice of the two English battalions; and that corps, in consequence, marched to the territories of the Company.

The same feeling of resentment towards the British Nation, which dictated this measure, also led him to pay the greatest attention at this period to the increase and improvement of the large body of regular infantry in his service, which was commanded by French Officers. Their representations (it is stated in several of the despatches from the Resident) were at this time artfully directed to impress the Nizam with an exaggerated belief of the successes, which had attended the French arms in Europe. This corps, commanded by Monsieur Raymond, which had only consisted of two battalions in 1792, was augmented after the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam; and no less a body, than twenty-three battalions, with twelve field-pieces, is stated by the Resident to have accompanied the Nizam in the campaign against the Mahrattas. After the return of that Prince to his capital, he not only ordered considerable new levies for this corps; but gave great power into the hands of its Commander, by a large grant of territory for its regular payment.

The British Resident endeavoured to make the Court of Hydrabad sensible of the dangers,

which might eventually result from this measure; but little attention was given to him: and his remonstrances against the measure of sending a considerable part of this force to occupy the districts of Kurpah and Cummum, which were immediately upon the frontier of the Company's possessions, were equally disregarded.

This last measure appears to have occasioned much uneasiness to the Governor General, whose apprehensions of its possible consequences were strongly stated in his minute upon the subject, under date the 15th of June 1795.

“ The determination of the Nizam,” he observes, “ to depute a part of Monsieur Raymond’s corps towards Kurpah, near the frontiers of the British possessions, requires, in my opinion, more serious opposition, than has been made to it by the Resident at Hyderabad. The measure itself has a suspicious, not to say criminal appearance: and although we may acquit the Nizam of any hostile designs against the Company, and should certainly avoid imputing them to him, I can entertain little doubt of the disposition of Monsieur Raymond and the Officers of his corps, to co-operate with the French in any attempts upon the Northern Sircars. Such an attempt may not be pro-

“ bable ; but as it would, if carried into execu-
“ tion, be attended with very serious conse-
“ quences to the British possessions in India,
“ the strongest representations ought to be
“ made, to induce the Nizam to recall the de-
“ tachment of Monsieur Raymond.”

In a letter to the Nizam upon this subject, Sir John Shore adverted in a general manner to the consequences, which might result from placing a force in such a position, under the command of men, who were the declared enemies of the British Government, and requested him to withdraw them. But in the instructions to the Resident, he directed a more decided language to be used to that Prince. After stating the arguments, which the Resident was to use to endeavour to prevail upon the Nizam to recall the detachment of Raymond's corps, he concluded by the following instructions :

“ These arguments urged in firm, but mode-
“ rate and conciliatory language, will, I hope,
“ prevail on the Nizam to comply with my
“ wishes and request, in the recall of the
“ detachment. I deem this a point of the
“ first importance ; but, if he should still per-
“ sist in his determination to continue it at
“ Kurpah, you will adopt the language of re-
“ monstrance ; and ultimately acquaint him,

“ that I shall in this event be compelled, with
“ whatever reluctance, to advance a body of
“ troops towards our frontier.”

A correspondence appears at this time to have been established between Raymond and several of the French Officers (prisoners of war) at Pondicherry; and nothing but the great vigilance of Lord Hobart, who then presided over the Madras Government, prevented his being joined by a number of them, who were apprehended at the moment when they meant to effect their escape.

The dismissal of the English subsidiary force; the increase of Raymond's corps; the detachment of a part of that corps to the frontier of the Company, in opposition to the remonstrance of the British Representative; combined to prove, that the influence, which had been established in the Nizam's councils by the wise and spirited policy of Lord Cornwallis, was entirely lost; and that the English Government not only could place no dependence upon the aid of that Prince; but had just reason to apprehend, that his resources might be early directed against the Company's possessions, either from the prevailing power of a French faction, the complete subjection of his Country to the Mah-rattas, or his throwing himself, to escape that extreme, into the hands of the irreconcilable

enemy of the English, Tippoo Sultaun, who was most active at this period in his intrigues to effect this object, which too well combined with the obvious views of the rising French interest in the Deckan.

These consequences, which threatened to be the inevitable result of the policy, which had been pursued, were fortunately averted by one of the events to which I have before alluded, the rebellion of Ally Jah. The flight of that Prince, which took place on the 28th of June, may be truly said to have saved the British Government from the serious evils to which it was on this occasion exposed.

The Nizam, alarmed by the flight and rebellion of his son, pressed the instant return of the English subsidiary force to Hyderabad; agreed to the recall of the detachment of Raymond's corps from Kurpah; and took every step, which could obtain him, at so critical a moment, the aid and support of a Nation, whose friendship he had so recently slighted.

The English Government had become, from a very short experience, fully sensible of the importance of this accident to its interests. The battalions were directed to march to the Nizam's territory with every possible expedition; and they were already advancing to join the army acting against Ally Jah, when ac-

counts were received of the defeat and capture of that Prince ; whose death, soon after he was made prisoner, relieved the Nizam from those fears, which this rebellion had excited.

The advantage derived on this occasion from the countenance and support of the British Government, was fully recognised by the Nizam ; and that Prince must have become more convinced of the value of the aid of the subsidiary force, from the activity and gallantry which it displayed, in March 1796, under it's able Commander, Captain James Dalrymple, in the reduction of the fort of Rachore ; and the defeat of a large body of troops, who had, under the banners of the son of Darah Jah (the nephew of the Nizam), rebelled against the authority of that Prince.

But, however satisfied the Nizam might have been of the utility of the English force, in preserving the internal tranquillity of his Country, he had learnt from experience, that he could not hope for their support, in the case of any attack being made upon his dominions by those enemies, whose aggressions and rapacity he most dreaded ; and his chief attention was in consequence bestowed on a rival corps, on whom he thought he could on such an occurrence depend. The battalions under Monsieur Raymond had acquired increased reputation by

the active part, which they took in the reduction of Ally Jah. Their numbers and appointments were increased: additional lands were given over to their Commander, to insure their regular payment; arsenals and founderies were formed for their equipment; and, in short, every effort was made, which could add to the strength and stability of this favourite body of troops.

The ability of M. Raymond took advantage of this favourable disposition in the Prince, whom he served. He made every effort to improve the discipline of his corps, and to strengthen himself by connexions with the chief Officers of the Court. This hostile spirit, and that of all his Officers, against the English Government, was displayed on every occasion. His battalions carried the colours of the French republic (then at war with England); and the cap of liberty was engraven on the buttons of their clothing: he encouraged desertion from the native corps in the English service; and, through the intrigues of his Officers, who commanded the detachment of his corps, which was stationed for a period on the British frontier, a partial mutiny was excited in a battalion of Sepoys on the Madras Establishment; and two native commissioned Officers, accompanied by a number of men, went over to the French party.

From this statement it is evident, even after the return of the English battalions, and the apparent re-establishment of confidence between the Company's Government and the Nizam, that the English corps was only retained for a period in the Deckan, from considerations of convenience; while the actual power and resources of the Nizam's Government were passing rapidly into the hands of a French faction, whose views (which it took no pains to conceal) were decidedly hostile to the British Government.

The Nizam was not insensible to the danger, which might result from the power, which necessity had forced him to place in the hands of this French party; and he continued to solicit that the British Government would enter into such engagements with him, as would prevent the necessity of his having recourse to such dangerous means of defence. To obtain this object, he offered to dismiss the French corps as soon as the British detachment in his service was increased. But the conditions on which he wished to make this arrangement, were thought by Sir John Shore to be incompatible with our engagements with the Mahrattas; and no decisive steps were taken.

The expedient of introducing English adventurers into the service of the Nizam, was tried

at this period : but these, though indirectly supported by the British Resident, made little progress ; and their corps never obtained a footing which afforded the least prospect of their rivalling that of Raymond ; whose activity, and spirit of hostility, were naturally excited, by these inefficient attempts, on the part of the English Government, to reduce his power and influence.

The death of the young Paishwah, Madhoo Row, which I have before mentioned, contributed to restore to the Nizam, beyond every hope that could have been indulged, a part of that power and rank among the States of India, which he had lost by the disgraceful convention of Kurdlah.

This event, which occurred on the 27th of October 1795, occasioned the most serious divisions among the Mahratta Chiefs, whose interests were deeply involved in the succession. Nanah Furnavese, the principal Minister at Poonah, desired to place an infant, remotely connected with the family of the Paishwah, upon the Musnud, to the exclusion of the legitimate heir, Badjerow, the son of Ragobah, who was the paternal uncle of the deceased Paishwah. This plan was opposed by the agent of Doulut Row Scindiah : and that Chief, on receiving the account of the death of

the Paishwah, prepared to march to Poonah, to support the cause of Badjerow, which he had determined to espouse. Under such circumstances, Nanah Furnavese endeavoured to add to his strength, by gaining the support of the Government of the Nizam; and for this purpose he released Azeem ul Omrah, and entered into a negotiation with that Minister, which terminated in a treaty, by which Nanah Furnavese resigned, on the part of the Poonah State, all those great cessions, which had been obtained from the Nizam by the convention of Kurdlah.

Azeem ul Omrah had artfully managed, at different periods during the course of this negotiation, to draw large bodies of troops from the Nizam's territories, to support the influence which he had established at Poonah; and to enable him to return to Hyderabad. But his views were in some degree frustrated by the arrival of Doulut Row Scindiah with a force, which gave him a decided ascendancy; and enabled him to place Badjerow, whose just claim he supported, upon the vacant throne.

This change occasioned a new negotiation with Azeem ul Omrah, which terminated in his agreeing, on the part of the Nizam, to cede one-fourth of the territory, and to pay one-fourth part of the amount, fixed by the con-

vention of Kurdlah. After this settlement was concluded, which, though much less favourable than that made with Nanah, was still highly advantageous to the Nizam, he obtained permission to return to Hyderabad; where he reassumed, upon his arrival, his office of Prime Minister.

The success, which attended Doulut Row Scindiah upon this occasion, established his ascendancy in the Mahratta Empire. He soon afterwards made Nanah Furnavese prisoner; and the Minister only regained his liberty by the payment of a large sum, and an acquiescence in every measure which Scindiah thought necessary to establish his power. This was greatly augmented at this period by the death of the rival of his family, Tuckojee Holkar, most of whose possessions he usurped, after putting to death his eldest son, and making prisoners the other members of his family.

In addition to these usurpations, Doulut Row forced the Paishwah to cede to him the important fortress of Ahmednuggur and its surrounding district; by which cession he not only obtained the command of the city of Poonah, but the best entrance into either the territories of the Paishwah, or the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

The extraordinary power, which Doulut Row Scindiah had obtained at this period, was rendered more alarming to the British Government, from the nature and constitution of that force of regular infantry by which it had been raised and established.

The command of that large corps, which General Deboigne had originally formed for Madhajee Scindiah, had devolved upon General Perron. The youthful ambition of Doulut Row Scindiah led him to take every step to render more efficient a force, which gave him so decided a superiority over the other native Powers of India. The principal European Officers were stimulated to exertion by every motive which could awaken avarice or excite ambition. The Officers of subordinate rank had adequate allowances regularly paid: and the men were not only well paid, but by an arrangement, which had been effected by the influence and power of their European Commanders, they became entitled, when disabled by wounds or length of service, to retire on a pension establishment, formed on principles every way congenial to their habits.

Almost the whole of that part of Hindoostan, which had been subdued by Scindiah, as well as the realization of his claims upon the Raj-

poot States, was intrusted by that Chief to the management of the French General, who commanded his infantry.

This corps, independently of several separate bodies of infantry, that acted with it, already amounted to several regular brigades. It was chiefly recruited from the Company's Provinces; clothed and armed like English Sepoys; had a numerous train of artillery, admirably equipped, and a considerable body of cavalry attached to them.

They were, from their strength, discipline and union, decidedly superior to all the rest of Scindiah's army; and their leader had become, in a great degree, independent of the authority of that Chief. There was therefore just reason to apprehend that Scindiah might be obliged (even if his avowed jealousy of the English should not incline him) to adopt, at a future period, any hostile projects, which this French party might cherish against the prosperity of the British Government.

There was, during the Administration of Sir John Shore, but little intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun. The two sons of that Prince, who had been given as hostages for the faithful performance of the treaty of Seringapatam, were conducted to Mysore, when that engagement was fulfilled. Tippoo received the Offi-

cer by whom they were conducted, with cold and constrained civility; and gave him no encouragement to make those overtures towards a more cordial union, which he had been authorized to do, if he found that Prince disposed to cultivate the friendship of the British Nation.

Tippoo Sultaun acted upon this occasion (as on every other) in a manner, which showed that he entertained the most hostile sentiments towards the English Government; and that he only waited for a favourable opportunity of attacking it's power, which he thought he should be best able to do, by previously possessing himself, either by negotiation or war, of the resources of the Deckan.

To this object, his readiness to unite with the Mahrattas; his threatened attack of Karnoul; his assembling of a large force at Gooty in 1796; his intrigues with the nephew of the Nizam, Imteaz u Dowlah, when Azeem ul Omrah was confined at Poonah; and his active correspondence with Monsieur Raymond at the same period; may be all ascribed. Fortunately the revolution at Poonah, and the rebellion of Ally Jah, by restoring Azeem ul Omrah to power, and reviving the English connexion at Hyderabad, frustrated his designs.

Before I conclude this Sketch of the Political Administration of Sir John Shore, it will be necessary to refer to the principal events, which took place, during the period of his Government, at the Courts of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the Vizier of Oude; at both of which, changes of some importance occurred.

The unhappy operation of the treaty concluded by Lord Cornwallis with the Nabob of the Carnatic, has been already stated. No attempt was made, during the life of his Highness Mahomed Ally Khan, with whom it had been concluded, to modify this treaty. Upon his death, however, which happened on the 13th of October 1795, Lord Hobart, Governor of Fort St. George, thought it his duty to endeavour to effect a modification of the treaty of 1792, with his successor Omdut ul Omrah. His Lordship states, in his letter of the 25th of October to the Governor General in Council, that he had opened a negotiation for that purpose, in consequence of several communications, which he had with Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Dundas, previously to his leaving England, upon the subject of the advantages, which must arise from an alteration of the treaty of 1792: and he states, in the same despatch, as his reason for not delaying this negotiation till

he heard from the Supreme Government, the active intrigues of those, who from motives of personal interest endeavoured to persuade Omdut ul Omrah to make no change whatever in the treaty. His Lordship concludes this letter by stating his concern, that his efforts have been unsuccessful; but he expresses his hope, that the representations, which he has made to England, will produce instructions, to put an end to a system (which he considers) “destructive to the resources of the Carnatic, and “which” (he thinks) “in some degree reflects “disgrace upon the British Government.”

The modifications of the treaty of 1792, which Lord Hobart wished to effect with Omdut ul Omrah, were the entire cession to the Company of the Countries mortgaged for the regular payment of the pecuniary instalments: the cession of the right of sovereignty over the Poligars, which the Nabob retained, though the collection of the tribute from these Poligars had been made over to the Company: and the cession of some of the forts in the Carnatic.

The first of those conditions, his Lordship conceived, would be attended with equal benefit to the Nabob and the Company, as it would effectually release the former from the necessity of applying to those usurers, by whom his Country had been ruined. It was also likely

to prevent every future subject of irritation between the two States; and, finally, to save the Countries ceded from a system of oppression and extortion, which had already greatly diminished their population; and which threatened to make them at a very early period inadequate, from their decrease of value, to that security for which they had been originally pledged.

The second condition required the cession of little more than a nominal power on the part of the Nabob; but it was essential to the Company, the exercise of whose authority over the turbulent Poligars had been much thwarted and obstructed by the name of sovereignty ever remaining with the Nabob. The third condition required the cession to the Company of some forts, the possession of which was at that period judged essential, to place the Carnatic in a proper state of defence; and the suspicious conduct of Tippoo Sultaun rendered this requisition, at the moment it was made, an object of some importance.

Lord Hobart offered considerable sacrifices to the Nabob, with a view to prevail upon him to acquiesce in this arrangement; but in vain. Omdut ul Omrah gave an unqualified refusal to all his propositions; and, in answer to the numerous arguments by which they were recommended to his attention, he only stated his im-

movable determination to abide by Lord Cornwallis's treaty, which he declared he had been directed to do by the most sacred of all commands, "the dying injunctions of his father."

Lord Hobart, in his minute under date the 4th of December 1795, conveys in very strong language his opinion of the total failure of the treaty of 1792. "If we look back," his Lordship observes, "to the origin of the treaty of 1792, we shall find that it arose from the representations of the Nabob Wallajah; that without imposing burthens upon his people, which they were not able to bear, he could not make the payments to the Company stipulated for in the treaty of 1787; but he had no sooner prevailed upon the Government to acquiesce in a reduction of those payments, which he effected by the treaty of 1792; than, by the manner in which he carried the provisions of it into execution, he increased the miseries of his people tenfold, and defeated every humane and salutary object it was intended to attain.

"Under existing circumstances, the Company sustain no loss, except in the extinction of the inhabitants of the Carnatic; but in the arduous season of war they must experience the most fatal defalcations.

"It has been," his Lordship adds, "with the

“ deepest regret, that I have found the Nabob
“ unmoved by my entreaties and remonstrances
“ upon this subject: not that he has been insensible
“ to the justice and expediency of what I have
“ proposed, but; as he has candidly confessed at
“ several interviews with me, that he has not the
“ resolution to comply; informing me, that
“ his native Ministers, and European advisers,
“ so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him,
“ that he could not venture upon this measure,
“ notwithstanding his conviction that he ought
“ to do so.”

The Supreme Government, as soon as they received accounts of the death of the Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan, and before the receipt of Lord Hobart's letter, had sent instructions to the Government of Fort St. George, under date the 28th of October 1795, to endeavour to obtain the acquiescence of Omdut ul Omrah to the complete cession of all his territories to the Company.

They state in this despatch, that their sentiments entirely correspond with those, which had been expressed by Lord Cornwallis in his letter to the Court of Directors of the 9th of July 1793, in which his Lordship declares his conviction, that the disadvantage and danger arising from the separation of the internal

Government and management of the revenue of the Country, from the responsibility for it's defence, was so obvious, that, could he have indulged the slightest hope of the Nabob's consent, he would have proposed to him an arrangement, which would have vested the Company with the entire management of the Carnatic; under a condition to pay to the Nabob a liberal portion of it's revenues: and this plan, Lord Cornwallis had stated his full belief, was the one best calculated to promote the real interests of the Nabob, and the comfort and happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic.

The Supreme Government concluded this despatch by an expression of their own opinion of the great importance of this object. "Whether the difficulties stated by Lord Cornwallis," they observe, "still exist in a degree to preclude any negotiation for accomplishing the arrangement pointed out, your Lordship in Council must determine; but if there can be any probability of obtaining the Nabob's acquiescence to it, we have only to express our wishes, that it may be attempted; and our fullest conviction of the acknowledgments, which will be due to your Lordship's ability and address, in effecting an arrangement of so much importance to the prospe-

“ rity of the Country; the interests of the
“ Company; and the real happiness of the
“ Nabob.”

When the Supreme Government received information of the steps taken by Lord Hobart, they approved fully of the modifications of the treaty of 1792, which that nobleman had proposed to Omdut ul Omrah, which were indeed of a much more limited nature, than the arrangement which they had recommended; and they directed in their letter to Fort St. George, under date the 30th of November 1795, that the modifications should be again offered to his Highness's consideration, as they thought it possible he might be more inclined to comply with them, from observing so complete a concurrence of sentiment upon this subject between the two Governments.

The Supreme Government, in a subsequent part of this despatch, state their opinion, that the assumption of the district of Tinnevely for the liquidation of a debt (termed the *cavalry loan*) due by the Nabob to the Company, and the requisition of the forts in the Carnatic, both of which measures had been suggested by the Government of Fort St. George, would be considered by the Nabob as an indirect mode of compelling his consent to the modifications of the treaty of 1792, and consequently an infrac-

tion of that engagement: and as they did not consider the English Government had any right, under the treaty of 1792, to assume any of the Nabob's territory on account of the above loan, which was not mentioned in that treaty; and as the case had not occurred, in which the forts in question, as specified in Lord Cornwallis's letter, were to be garrisoned by the Company's troops; it was their opinion neither of these measures should be attempted.

Sir John Shore addressed Omdut ul Omrah upon this occasion; and pointed out to that Prince how much he would promote his own interests, and those of the Company, by a compliance with the propositions, which had been made to him by Lord Hobart.

The exertions of the Governor General upon this occasion were, however, altogether unsuccessful. The Nabob persisted in refusing his consent to any modification whatever of the treaty of 1792; and he continued, under that treaty, to deliver over one district after another of his unhappy Country, into the hands of those usurers and extortioners, who excited him to this opposition to the wishes of the English Government, while they supplied him at an enormous interest with those sums, which were necessary to fulfil punctually his pecuniary engagements with that State.

The tranquillity of the possessions of the Nabob, Vizier Asuph u Dowlah, was disturbed, in the year 1794, by a very serious rebellion of the turbulent tribe of Affghans, settled in Rohilcund. This was occasioned by the death of Fyzullah Khan, the Chief of the Rohillas and Jagheerdar of Rampoorah. The sons of the deceased disputed the succession: and Mahomed Ally Khan, the eldest, was killed by his brother, Gholam Mahomed Khan, who usurped the Jagheer, and made every endeavour to obtain the sanction of the Vizier to his usurpation. That Prince appeared at first to listen to his overtures; but after some communication with the English Government, whose interests were to a certain degree involved in this question, from its having guaranteed Rampoorah to the Affghan family, by whom it was held under the Vizier, it was determined to punish the rebels: and the Governor General, after the army had marched, under the command of General Sir Robert Abercromby, for that purpose, resolved to carry this punishment to the extent of depriving the family of Fyzullah Khan of their Jagheer.

Previously, however, to the arrival of these instructions, an action had been fought, in which the Rohillas, after making a partial impression upon the British line, had been de-

feated; and their complete submission, after this action, had induced the Commander-in-Chief, with the acquiescence of the Nabob Vizier, to restore the inheritance of the family, under the guarantee of the Company, to Ahmed Ally Khan, the infant son of Mahomed Ally Khan, who had been slain by Gholam Mahomed. The latter Chief, with several others, who had aided him, were pardoned on their coming into the British camp. This settlement restored complete tranquillity; and the Supreme Government subsequently expressed their acquiescence in the arrangement; which considerations of policy and of humanity had induced Sir R. Abercromby to adopt.

The death of Hyder Beg appears to have put an end to those prospects of reform, which, Lord Cornwallis had indulged a hope, the energy and ability of that Minister might have effected in the Administration of the Vizier. A nominal successor was appointed to Hyder Beg; but the real power of the State passed into the hands of a few personal favourites of the Vizier, who were most abandoned characters; and some of them known to entertain sentiments hostile to the connexion with the British Government.

Sir John Shore was fully sensible of the injury and danger to which the interests of the Com-

pany were upon this occasion exposed. He had, indeed, expressed a decided opinion, when speaking of the Vizier's dominions, that, whilst his Administration continued on it's present footing, we should derive no effective assistance from his troops, and that we must rather expect to find enemies, than friends, in his dominions.

This view of the actual state of the affairs of the Vizier does not, however, appear to have satisfied Sir John Shore of the necessity of taking any decisive measures to remedy those abuses ; or to save the State from that great danger, to which he saw it might be eventually exposed, from the affairs of that Prince remaining in the condition which he described : nor does it appear, that any effectual remedy whatever was applied to this evil, before the death of Asuph u Dowlah. Asuph u Dowlah was succeeded by his presumptive heir, Vizier Ally, who had been acknowledged as his son by the deceased Prince ; though generally known to have been of spurious birth, and consequently to have no claim to the vacant Musnud. He was, however, supported by several persons of rank and influence at Lucknow ; and his right was formally acknowledged by the British Government ; to whose justice, Saadut Ally, the eldest surviving brother of Asuph u Dowlah, had on this occasion appealed.

Sir John Shore, in a minute of the 3d of January 1798, states, that he had decided against the claim of Saadut Ally, after great hesitation; and that he found it impossible to divest himself of the impression excited by universal belief and assertion, of the spurious origin of Vizier Ally; and of the apprehension, connected with it, that the justice and the reputation of the Company might suffer an imputation by a decision in his favour.

With such sentiments upon his mind, Sir John Shore proceeded to Lucknow: but he declares in the same minute, that the arrangements he had in view at that moment, had no reference whatever to the alteration of the succession; though he conceived it possible, that the repugnance of the people to the new Vizier might force him to a further consideration of the subject.

On the approach of Sir John Shore to Lucknow he was met by the Minister (Tuffiezel Hussein Khan), who informed him, that there was not a shadow of doubt, but that Vizier Ally, as well as the other reputed sons of Asuph u Dowlah, were spurious; and that the right of succession belonged to Saadut Ally Khan. The Minister added to this communication, that, though no objection was made at the moment to the elevation of Vizier Ally, it had since be-

come a subject of astonishment and disappointment: that it was the general opinion, that the act of raising him to the Musnud had been hasty, and inconsiderate; but that few were disposed to declare their real sentiments, in opposition to the acknowledgment of his title by the English Government.

These accounts appear to have excited still stronger doubts in the Governor General's mind, with respect to the propriety of the steps which he had taken; and led him to make further, and more minute inquiries, respecting the legitimacy of Vizier Ally: the result of which, was a full conviction of his spurious origin.

The Governor General, in his minute upon this subject, enters into an examination of the conduct of Vizier Ally, since his elevation; and draws an inference from this examination, that he is a violent, unsteady, and sanguinary character, and already cherishes the most hostile designs against the interests of the Company; from an open opposition to whom, he considers him only to be restrained by a want of power.

Sir John Shore, after stating the general sentiments, which prevailed respecting the conduct of Vizier Ally, adverts to the opinion, which the natives of Oude entertain respecting the nature of the political relations between the Vizier and the Company: and also to that, which

foreign States have formed of the right of the latter, to decide upon the question of succession to the dominions of Oude.

“ The Government of Oude,” he observes, “ both in the opinions of the natives, as well as “ externally, is considered a dependency upon “ the English, whatever it’s relations under “ treaties may be. Scindiah refers the investiture of Vizier Ally Khan by his Majesty “ (Shah Allum) to the Governor General; and “ there are many respectable families in Lucknow, who live under the protection of the “ British influence. In the estimate of the “ natives of India, the Kingdom of Oude is “ held as a gift from the Company to Shujah u “ Dowlah; and as a dependent Chief. By “ these remarks, I mean only to contrast the “ behaviour of Vizier Ally Khan with the popular sentiments, and the conduct of his predecessor; and to point out the political discredit attending the subversion of our influence “ in Oude.”

He next states, “ that he had the mortification to find, that the reputation of the Company had suffered by an act, which, in the opinion of all reputable people, had been no less disgraceful than unjust. It was impossible,” he continues, “ to silence these impressions by arguing, that the Government

“ had not directly interfered in deciding upon
“ the succession; since, in the opinion of all,
“ Vizier Ally’s elevation was considered an act
“ of the English Government; and it is cer-
“ tain, that, without their acknowledgment and
“ support, he could not have maintained his
“ situation.”

Sir John Shore observes, that he was aware, that the case had been materially altered by the formal acknowledgment of Vizier Ally in the first instance; and by the amicable correspondence and personal communication, which he had subsequently maintained with him. But he considered that the first objection was answered by the precedent of the Tanjore succession, which, he affirms, though the sovereignty had been possessed eleven years by Omer Sing, was at that moment, by the sanction of the Directors, open to investigation and decision; and, with respect to the second, he thought, however unpleasant it might be, that he was bound to prefer justice, and the public interests, to a consideration of his own feelings.

Sir John Shore, after expressing, in very strong language, the great difficulties by which he had been embarrassed, and the agitation of his mind upon the question, adds, that, on a full view of the case, he had come to the following conclusion. “ First : That Vizier Ally is

“ undoubtedly the son of a Furraush; has no
“ title to the Musnud; and, from his character,
“ is unworthy of it. This decision is supported
“ by evidence, as to his real birth, by the
“ sanction of the public opinion, by facts and
“ information. Secondly: That to support
“ him on the Musnud, would not only be an
“ indelible disgrace to the reputation of the
“ Company, but, in all probability, would prove
“ the ruin of the Country, and the destruction
“ of the British interests in Oude. Thirdly:
“ That the justice and reputation of the Com-
“ pany, as well as their political interests,
“ require the establishment of the rightful
“ successor. Fourthly: That as all the reputed
“ sons of Asuph u Dowlah are undoubtedly
“ spurious, the line of succession should be
“ transferred to that of Shujah u Dowlah.
“ Fifthly: That Vizier Ally ought to be de-
“ posed, and Saadut Ally be placed on the
“ Musnud.”

Acting upon these conclusions, the Governor General immediately adopted measures for eventually placing Saadut Ally Khan upon the Musnud, and for deposing Vizier Ally: and from the strength of the British force, which was collected, and the unpopularity of the latter Prince, this measure was likely to be easily effected.

Sir John Shore transmitted a treaty to Mr. Cherry, at Benares, with instructions to offer it to the acceptance of Saadut Ally Khan, who resided at that city. But from these instructions, which were dated the 4th of January 1798, he does not appear at that period even to have finally resolved upon the line, which he would pursue; as he states, that measures may still occur to frustrate his present intentions in favour of Saadut Ally Khan, whose acquiescence in, or refusal of, the treaty proposed, he requested to be immediately given, without qualification or reserve. With this view he directed the Nabob to be informed, that the engagement had been transmitted in the form in which it was, for execution; because the actual state of affairs would not admit of either delay or discussion.

Saadut Ally Khan did not hesitate to give a ready assent to the treaty dictated by the Governor General; and expressed to Mr. Cherry his determination (if raised to the Musnud) to fulfil all its stipulations in the most faithful manner.

This treaty consisted of twenty-three articles. It vested the Company with the defence of the Vizier's dominions: and the annual subsidy, to be paid by Saadut Ally Khan, was increased to the amount of seventy-six lacks of rupees;

and, in the event of the failure of any of the instalments, the Company were to be put in possession of Country in Oude, of the annual value of ten lacks of rupees, which they were to retain till the amount due was fully liquidated.

By one of it's articles Saadut Ally Khan stipulated to pay the amount of any expense, which the Company might incur in placing him upon the throne. He also agreed to cede the important fortress of Allahabad to the Company, and to pay the amount of eight lacks of rupees to put it into a state of repair; and to give three lacks of rupees to repair the fort of Futty Ghur. It was agreed by this treaty, that as the Country of Oude was henceforward to be considered entirely under the protection of the Company, and the Nabob relied upon them for it's defence, he was not to maintain a larger force for the internal police of the Country, than 35,000 men, ten thousand of whom were to be cavalry. The Company was vested with a right to change the stations of their troops in the Vizier's dominions, if such measure was deemed necessary for the better protection of the Country; and, in the event of such change of cantonments, all expense attending it was to be defrayed by the Nabob. It was also stipulated, that the force of British troops, to be stationed in the Vizier's dominions, should be afterwards

specified ; but that if at any time the troops, employed for the defence of the Country, should exceed the number of 12,000 men, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, Europeans and natives, the Nabob was to pay the amount of the actual expense month by month.

These were the principal conditions of this treaty, which altered in some very essential points the political relations between the Vizier and the Company. The latter State became, by this engagement, exclusively charged with the defence of the territories of the former ; the number of whose troops was limited, and, by the expression of the treaty, only to be employed in maintaining the internal police. The increase of subsidy, it is to be concluded, was judged sufficient to defray the charge of the force stationed in Oude, in ordinary times ; and, when necessity required an addition to this force, for the defence of the Country, the Nabob was bound, by a specific article of the treaty, to defray any actual increase of expense with which such measure might be attended.

This article, though indefinite, was evidently meant to provide against the Company suffering a loss by the general engagement which they had contracted, of defending in future,

with their own troops, the Nabob's dominions. The conditions of this article were absolute; and, by the principle of the treaty, the English Government was left the sole judge of the necessity, that existed for an increase of the troops requisite to the protection of the Nabob's territories from external enemies. This principle was virtually confirmed by those stipulations, which restricted the Nabob from all negotiations with foreign States; and, indeed, from having communications of any nature with such, except with the previous knowledge and consent of the British Government; as this restriction must obviously deprive the Vizier of the means of forming a judgment upon such affairs.

Before the Governor General received accounts of Saadut Ally Khan's accession to the treaty, which he had proposed, he wrote to Mr. Cherry, to desire that he would inform the Nabob, if he had acquiesced in the arrangement, that he must proceed to Cawnpore instantly, where measures would be taken to place him on the Musnud; and, in the event of his having withheld his acquiescence, he was to be informed, that although the Governor General admitted his right to the Musnud of Oude, he did not think himself bound to run

the risk of hostilities, in supporting it, but under conditions, which equally provided for the political interests of the Company.

Mr. Cherry communicated the wishes of the Governor General to Saadut Ally Khan, who immediately went to Cawnpore, and from that was escorted by a large body of European troops to Lucknow, where he was proclaimed Vizier upon the 21st of January 1798.

After the elevation of Saadut Ally Khan, another treaty was concluded between him and the British Government, which differed in few material points from the preliminary engagement, which that Prince had been required to sign before he left Benares. The most essential of the articles, which related to the future defence of the Country by the Company, and the subsidy to be paid by the Nabob, remained the same in both principle and substance; though they differed somewhat in the terms. It was by the last treaty stipulated, that the force to be maintained by the Company in Oude was never to be less than ten thousand men, including cavalry, infantry, artillery, &c.

If at any time it became necessary to augment this force beyond thirteen thousand, the Nabob agreed to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above that number;

and if the troops of the Company should, from any necessity, be less than eight thousand men, the Nabob Saadut Ally Khan became entitled to a deduction from the annual stipend of seventy-six lacks of rupees, (which he had agreed to pay the Company,) equal to the actual difference of men below the specified number.

By this treaty, the Nabob agreed to pay the sum of twelve lacks of rupees to the Company, as a reimbursement for the expenses incurred in placing him upon the throne; and, instead of the article in the preliminary engagement, which gave the Company a right to take possession of part of his Country on his failure in the regular payment of any of the instalments, and that which limited to a specific number the troops which he was to maintain by the treaty concluded at Lucknow, it was generally stipulated, that on a failure in the regular discharge of any instalment, the Vizier was to give such security for the payment of existing arrears, and future regularity, as should be deemed satisfactory by the English Government: and that he should, on a consideration of the increased subsidy, and other permanent charges upon his revenue, make such reductions in superfluous charges of his public establishments, servants, &c. as were

necessary to prevent his disbursements exceeding his assets. It was further agreed, by the same article, that he was on this point to consult the Company's Government; and to devise, in concert with them, the proper objects of reductions, and the best means of effecting them.

The meaning of these alterations is obvious. The Vizier himself had probably no strong objections, either to the stipulations for the eventual cessions of districts, to make good any failure of his instalments, or to the numbers of the troops, which he was to maintain, being limited; but the insertion of such articles in a specific form, was likely to hurt and degrade him with his subjects; and it was therefore an object of policy to have the terms, if not the spirit, of this article altered.

By this treaty Saadut Ally Khan agreed to make an annual allowance of one lack and a half of rupees, for the support of Vizier Ally, who, overawed by the force which the Governor General had collected, and deserted by all parties, had not ventured to make any opposition to the arrangement; and who, after it was concluded, was conducted to Benares, where Sir John Shore had determined that he should reside, in the enjoyment of the stipend allotted for his personal support, which was secured to

him by the guarantee of the Company, through whom it was to be paid.

It appears here necessary to advert to a danger of some magnitude, which threatened to disturb, during the Administration of Sir John Shore, the tranquillity of Hindoostan, particularly the dominions of the Vizier; and which may be supposed to have considerably influenced those arrangements, which the Governor General made with that Prince.

Zemaun Shah, King of Kabul, the son of Timour Shah, and the grandson of the celebrated Abdallee, advanced in 1796 to Lahore, and threatened to visit Dehly, from which Lahore is not more than twenty marches to a light army. The accounts of his approach appear to have excited the greatest hope among the more turbulent Mahomedans of Hindoostan. The supposed design of the Shah to restore the fallen dignity of the imperial house of Timour, to which he was nearly allied by blood, gave popularity to his cause with almost all that tribe; while it created great consternation to the Mahrattas, who were at that period ill prepared to resist so formidable an invasion.

The movements of the Affghan Monarch, and the local weakness of the Mahrattas, induced the English Government to make some preparations against a danger, which, though

uncertain, was of too serious a nature to be altogether neglected. The troops at the cantonments of Cawnpore and Futty Ghur, were ordered to encamp; and every arrangement was made, to enable them to move to any quarter where their services might be required.

The alarm, which had been excited upon this occasion, was dispelled by the retreat of Zemaun Shah to his own dominions, the tranquillity of which had been disturbed by the rebellion of one of his brothers: but the facility with which he had advanced to Lahore, showed that no confidence could be placed upon the union or resistance of the Seikhs. From every account, indeed, as well as from actual occurrences, it appeared that this Nation was so much distracted by the violence of its own internal divisions, as to be incapable of acting with concert; and of course, that it was no longer to be considered as a barrier against the Affghans; whose invasion of India became, from this circumstance, more probable than it ever was before.

Sir John Shore, in a minute under date the 4th of July 1797, enters into a full consideration of this subject. In this document he states the force, which the Shah brought to Lahore, not to have exceeded thirty-three thousand men, which were almost all cavalry: and from

this fact he appears inclined to conclude, that the Affghan Monarch did not at that period contemplate the invasion of Hindoostan ; but that his expedition to Lahore was experimental, with an ultimate view to that object.

The Governor General, however, observes ; that there was no doubt, if Zemaun Shah had advanced, he must have reached Dehly, as the Mahrattas were not prepared to oppose him, and were greatly alarmed. They afterwards, he states, assembled a respectable army, and made overtures to the Company to unite in repelling him : but, though these preparations might have enabled them to dispute the possession of Dehly, or to molest his retreat, he is convinced they would not have been able to have prevented his advance. Under this impression, he proceeded to consider the probable consequences of his advance, and particularly, as those would have affected the tranquillity of the territories of the Nabob Vizier.

“ In this case,” he observes, “ the numerous
“ adventurers in Hindoostan, always ready to
“ enlist for plunder, would either have joined
“ his army, or have availed themselves of the
“ protection afforded by it's advance, to com-
“ mit depredations. Bumbhoo Khan, the bro-
“ ther of Gholam Kader Khan, had assembled

“ a considerable force, near Broreea Ghaut,
“ and pretended, that he had received orders
“ from Zemaun Shah for this purpose; and
“ wrote letters of invitation to several of the
“ Rohillah Chiefs at Rampore to join him;
“ which, with a single exception, were concealed from Nusser Ulla Khan.”

“ Without dwelling on the presumption,” Sir John Shore continues, “ arising from this circumstance, we are sufficiently apprised of
“ the disposition of the Rohillas, to be assured
“ that they would seize the first favourable opportunity for rebellion; and that they would
“ have considered the arrival of Zemaun Shah at Delhy, as furnishing it. The Patans in the
“ district of Furruckabad, though less independent, are equally disposed to disaffection and
“ plunder; and nothing but the protection of
“ the Company’s arms would have prevented
“ the greatest disorders in the Vizier’s dominions, if Zemaun Shah had approached them.
“ My opinion is, that they would have been
“ overrun with marauders; that a total temporary stoppage of the collections would have
“ ensued; and that these disorders, if not
“ speedily quelled, would have ended in general
“ insurrection.

“ On this occasion,” he adds, “ we had
“ fresh experience of the imbecility of the

“ Vizier’s Government, and of the insufficiency
“ of his military establishment. The troops
“ under Almas were respectable. The other
“ troops of the Vizier, with little exception,
“ would rather have proved an encumbrance,
“ than an assistance to the British forces ;
“ and nothing but the most urgent remon-
“ strances would have insured the exertions or
“ supplies of the Vizier.”

From these circumstances, Sir John Shore justly concluded, that the future designs of the Affghan Monarch must always be an object of great interest to the British Government ; and, under this view of the subject, he entered into a consideration of the likelihood of his invasion of Hindoostan. It was not, he thought, very probable that Zemaun Shah would undertake such an expedition ; but there were, he was aware, many motives, which might impel him to it’s adoption. It was possible that an ambition, stimulated by the entreaties and misrepresentations of the Court of Dehly, might lead the Shah to aspire to the character of the deliverer of India from the dominion of infidels, in emulation of his grandfather the Aballee ; and a desire of effacing the disgrace of his late ineffectual attempt, and of revenging the defeat of a body of his troops, which the Seikhs had attacked after his retreat, might lead him

again to carry his arms eastward. The Governor General stated in this minute, that by all the accounts, which he had received, a general opinion prevailed, that Zemaun Shah would advance at once to Hindoostan, without previously establishing his authority in the Punjab; and this opinion, however contrary to probability, was of a nature that should not, in his judgment, be altogether neglected.

Sir John Shore professed himself averse from the adoption of any expensive measures of preparation against Zemaun Shah's designs. The Mahrattas had, he states, from a dread of his power, made proposals to the British Government for uniting their forces to oppose it: but he was not decided in his own mind upon the policy of that measure; nor, indeed, whether it was most for the interests of the Company, and their Ally the Vizier, to support the Mahrattas, or to leave them to their fate. That the power of that Nation in Hindoostan should be diminished, the Governor General thought highly desirable; but he doubted, whether the substitution of that of Zemaun Shah would not be more dangerous: and it was his opinion, that, if that Monarch should ever advance to Dehly, the danger would be very alarming to the Vizier; and that it would require the greatest vigour and exertion to pre-

serve peace in his dominions, even though the Affghans should not invade them. The Rohillas appear to have been upon this occasion one of the chief objects of the Governor General's apprehensions; and he stated it as his opinion, that it might be found prudent to require or compel the principal persons of that tribe to deliver themselves up as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest.

That there were just grounds for these apprehensions cannot be denied. The invasion of India had always been too favourite a project among the northern tribes of Kabul, and Candahar, to leave a hope, that it would be relinquished from any cause, but from their want of power, arising from internal dissension, to carry it into execution. The state of the whole country, from the Attock to the Jumnah, was such, as opposed no obstacle whatever to their advance: and these barbarians, impressed with an exaggerated opinion of their own valour, and with a hereditary contempt for the natives of India, were not likely to be deterred from it's invasion, by a contemplation of difficulties, which their forefathers had so often encountered and overcome. Nor was it more probable, that they would be guided by a consideration of the actual strength of the Power, which possessed Hindoostan. It was indeed unlikely, that they

should possess correct intelligence upon that point; or, if they did, that their rude understandings, and savage pride, would permit them to estimate justly the efficiency of armies, which were constituted on different principles from their own.

The occurrence of such an invasion was likely, as Sir John Shore observed, to excite many of the chief Mahomedans to rebellion; and their junction with the Affghans would have made it difficult for the Mahrattas to have repelled them; particularly as that Nation must, on such an occasion, have placed its chief reliance upon its regular brigades, of which all the men were natives of Hindoostan, and most of the Officers French. They had consequently no tie or attachment to the Mahratta State, but that of temporary interest; and there was, perhaps, good ground to believe, that under the establishment of a Mahomedan Empire in Hindoostan, which must have been the object of Zemaun Shah's policy, there would have been little difficulty in corrupting the fidelity of this corps; as the men of whom it was composed, would have lost nothing by a change of masters: and the Officers might, under such circumstances, not only expect to improve their condition, but to obtain better means of accomplishing their ambitious de-

signs; and above all, those which were directed against the prosperity of the British Government.

Upon the whole, it was obvious, on this occasion, that no dependence could be placed upon the Mahrattas, as an efficient barrier to the territories of the English Government, and it's Allies, against those dangers to which they might be eventually exposed, from any future invasion of the Affghan Monarch: and it appeared not improbable, that the schemes of the invader might have ultimately coalesced with the views and interests of the French corps in the service of Doulut Row Scindiah, to whom the defence of Hindoostan must have been entrusted; and if they had not, and the French Commander had, by his ability and courage, and the skilful application of the great military resources which he had accumulated, defeated Zemaun Shah, he and his party would have acquired an increase of fame, influence, and power, which would have rendered them much more dangerous neighbours, than either the Mahrattas or Affghans.

Several expeditions against the Eastern Settlements of the European enemies of Great Britain took place during the period in which Sir John Shore was Governor General of India; but these were all fitted out from Madras: and to

the eminent ability and energy of Lord Hobart, the Governor of that Presidency, aided by the cordial and zealous co-operation of his Majesty's naval Commander, Admiral Rainier, the British Government was indebted for the complete reduction of the Dutch Settlements upon the Island of Ceylon, and of Malacca, and the valuable Islands of Banda and Amboyna. More important expeditions were prepared against the French Settlement of the Mauritius, and the Spanish possessions of Manilla; neither of which, however, were carried into execution. The first division of the armament for the latter, which took place in 1797, had actually sailed to Penang, the port of rendezvous: but the complexion of the accounts received from Europe, combined with the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun, and the general state of the native Powers in India, obliged the Government of Fort St. George to abandon this expedition; which, from the nature of the equipment, there can be no doubt would, if it had proceeded, have been crowned with complete success.

Sir John Shore, who had been raised to the peerage, by the title of Lord Teignmouth, sailed for England in the beginning of the year 1798. The situation of the different native Powers, at the period of his taking charge of

the administration of the affairs of British India has been already described. It may be useful to take a short view of their condition at the period of his departure; and to examine the causes of those great changes, which had occurred during his Government.

Tippoo Suldaun, whose spirit of hostility continued always the same, had greatly recruited his resources, and continued most active in his intrigues with the French, the Mahrattas, and with the discontented party at the Court of Hyderabad. The Nizam, greatly reduced in reputation, as well as in real strength, no longer placed that confidence, which he had done, in the British Government, whose friendship he had before sought, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, not more with a view of immediate benefit, than of securing, by the improvement of those relations, upon which his connexion with the English Government was established, the permanent welfare and prosperity of his dominions. This great object he had been led to expect by the assurances of Lord Cornwallis: but his hopes were completely frustrated; and he had, in despair, thrown himself into the hands of a French faction, of a nature the most dangerous, that could be imagined, to the British Government.

The power of Doulut Row Scindiah had arrived, at this period, at a most alarming eminence ; and was indeed acknowledged paramount over almost the whole of the Mahratta Empire. It had completely annihilated the independence of the Paishwah's Government ; and that Prince only exercised a nominal rule in the city of Poonah, under the immediate control and direction of a subordinate Officer of Scindiah's Court. By this revolution in the Deckan, the triple alliance, and that balance of power, which had existed at the departure of Lord Cornwallis from India, were destroyed. The strength and resources of the Poonah State were at the disposal of a Chief, who was known to be unfriendly to the English Government ; and it appeared almost certain, from the ambition of Scindiah, the local position of his territories, the constitution of his regular brigades, and the principles of those by whom they were commanded, that this Nation must become the ultimate object of his attack.

Several opportunities had occurred, of which the British Government might have taken advantage, (probably without any danger of hostilities,) of checking the growth of the enormous power of the House of Scindiah ; or, if it had been preferred, of securing an alliance with that family, which would have prevented it's

resources being ever directed against the British possessions in India.

Nanah Furnavese was very jealous of the rising power of Scindiah, long before the influence of that Chief was established over the Poonah Government; and this jealousy had led to that indirect overture, which was made to Lord Cornwallis, through Hurry Punt, to induce that nobleman to form a subsidiary alliance with the Paishwah; but the approach of Doulut Row Scindiah to Poonah, after the death of the Paishwah, Madhoo Row, changed this feeling into that of alarm; and Nanah would, at that moment, have most willingly entered into any improved alliance with the English Government, which secured the independence of the Poonah branch of the Mahratta Empire. Nor can there be a doubt, that the interposition of the British Nation, at this remarkable crisis, would have effected that object; and the exertion of our power and influence, on that occasion, would, in all human probability, have enabled us to dictate to the contending parties an amicable adjustment of the disputes regarding the succession to the office of Paishwah: and not only have secured our interests from the dangers to which they were exposed by our neutrality, but have added in the greatest degree to our reputation..

Madhajee Scindiah had repeatedly solicited the aid of the English Government; and had been desirous, at one period, of subsidizing a force from that State. His successor, Doulut Row, had evinced on several occasions a similar disposition; and it would probably have been easy, either at his elevation, or when he returned to Poonah to support Badjerow, or at the period he was under so great an alarm of an intended attack on his possessions in Hindoostan by the Affghans, to have negotiated an alliance, which might have effected the removal of the French party, which was daily gaining strength.

But that system of neutral policy, which had been prescribed by the authorities in England, and which was closely followed by the Governor General, prevented any attempt being made to avert, or influence, the changes at Poonah; or to improve our alliance with the family of Scindiah, although it was conjectured at the moment, that our noninterference might be pregnant with the worst consequences to the interests of the British Government.

Those who support this system, have constantly asserted, that it is the only one, consistent with the intention of the Act of Parliament, relative to the administration of the affairs of India. But it appears difficult, if not

impossible, to imagine, that the wisdom of the British Legislature, when it imposed restrictions upon ambition, and prohibited a policy, which had for it's object conquest and extension of territory, could ever mean (whatever may be the literal construction of the legal terms by which it's intentions are expressed) to deprive the local Government of India of the power of adopting preventive measures, against dangers, which it saw in progress; and to prescribe, as a positive maxim of policy to a great State, a disregard to the concerns of it's neighbours: or, in other words, to deny to a Nation the exercise of that influence and power, which it's former wisdom and courage had acquired; and which is, in fact, one of the principal and most legitimate means, which it can possess, of maintaining peace and tranquillity.

This system, however, while it might have in some degree the effect of promoting wars among other States, did not seem likely to secure the exemption of the Nation, by which it was followed, from that evil. It was, in fact, one State withdrawing, as much as circumstances would permit, from any concern in the interests of that commonwealth of Nations, among whom it was placed: and that secession not only deprived it of the exercise of all those means by which Governments preserve their security, but

exposed it to all the dangers of the aggrandizement of a rival State, or the confederacy among numbers against its power; events, which became more probable, from that decrease of fame and estimation, which was the obvious and inevitable result of the policy pursued.

The merits of this system, however, were fully tried during the Administration of Sir John Shore, who appears to have been uniformly actuated by a sincere and conscientious desire to govern India agreeably to the strict and literal sense of the Act of the Legislature, and to the wishes of his superiors in England; to the implicit execution of whose orders, his great ability and experience were on all occasions most zealously applied. The result of this experiment offers an important lesson to those, who are intrusted with the Administration of British India. It was proved from the events of this Administration, that no ground of political advantage could be abandoned, without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and that to resign influence, was not merely to resign power, but to allow that to pass into hands hostile to the British Government. The consequence of political inaction was equally obvious. No one measure of importance was taken, except the elevation of Saadut Ally to the Musnud of Oude; which the Governor General

states, in express terms, was forced upon his adoption. But this inactive system of policy, so far from attaining it's object, which was to preserve affairs upon the footing in which it had found them, had only the effect of making the British Government stationary, while all around it advanced; and of exposing it to those dangers, which resulted from the revolutions of it's neighbours, while it was even denied the power of adopting it's policy to the change of circumstances. The ultimate consequences were such, as might have been expected. A period of six years' peace, so far from having added to the strength, or improved the security of the British dominions in India, had placed them in a situation of comparative danger. Though the British strength was not lessened, the power and resources of the other States of India had increased. The confidence and attachment of our Allies were much shaken, if not destroyed; and the presumption and hostile disposition of the principal native Powers in India too clearly showed, that it was to a principle of weakness, or of selfish policy, and not of moderation, that they ascribed the course, which had been pursued by the British Government.

The extent of the danger to which our possessions in India had been exposed by this neutral system of policy, and the encourage-

ment, which the enemies of that Nation had derived from our inaction, were not fully known, till some time had elapsed ; but the period at which Sir John Shore left India, though a season of peace, was regarded by no person in India, who had the slightest knowledge of the subject, as one of security : and the authorities in England had felt, and expressed, considerable alarm at the numerous dangers, which they saw collected ; and which threatened early to disturb the tranquillity of the British possessions in that quarter of the globe.

CHAPTER IV.

ADMINISTRATION

OF

MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

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in the Carnatic.—Treaty with the Nabob, vesting the civil and military Government of the Carnatic in the Company.
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LORD TEIGNMOUTH was succeeded in the Government of British India by the Marquis Wellesley ; a nobleman, whose rank and talents enabled him to enter upon the great duties, committed to his charge, with every advantage. The period at which Lord Wellesley reached India, (26th April, 1798,) was one of a most critical nature for the British interests in that quarter of the globe. The hostile designs of Tippoo Sultaun were ripe for execution. A French party was paramount at the Courts both of the Nizam and of Scindiah. The Court of Poonah was at the mercy of the latter chief; and that of Berar was known to be adverse to the English, on whose progress to power it had long looked with peculiar jealousy.

The Country of Oude, still agitated by the recent change which had been made in it's Government, was not likely to be kept in a state of tranquillity by it's new ruler Saadut Ally, who continued openly to proclaim his alarms, and to call upon the British Government to protect him in the exercise of that

power, to which he had, by their interference, been raised.

The state of the Carnatic was little better. Omdut ul Omrah, who had been only irritated by the ineffectual attempts made to induce him to a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, continued to deliver over his Country to the gripe of usurers, in order to anticipate his revenue; and it's resources were rapidly declining, at a period when it was obvious they must soon be urgently required to aid in the general defence of the Empire.

To add to these difficulties, the finances were much exhausted, by the equipment of large, but necessary armaments, which had been sent to reduce the Settlements of the Dutch to the eastward, and the Island of Ceylon; and a considerable part of the army of the coast of Coromandel was also sent on those expeditions.

Lord Wellesley had hardly arrived in Bengal, when the occurrence of an overt act of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, and the active intrigues of the French party at Hyderabad, demanded all his exertion. But the suddenness with which these circumstances were forced upon his decision, did not lead him to resort to any of those delusive political expedients, by which a momentary and partial exemp-

tion from danger is so dearly purchased at the price of future security. His mind embraced the whole scheme; and at the time he deliberated upon the measures, which the emergencies of the moment required him to adopt, he took an extended view of the general condition of the British dominions in India; and having fixed in his mind those principles of policy which appeared to him best calculated to lead to a state of permanent peace and prosperity, he proceeded to combine the introduction of those principles into every branch of his Administration, with the adoption of the means requisite for the defeat of immediate danger.

Before I enter upon the narrative of Lord Wellesley's Government, it appears of importance to notice in a cursory manner those general considerations, which induced him to resolve upon that system, which he pursued. This is the more essential, as all political measures must be judged with constant reference to the actual circumstances of the period under which they were first adopted. Their wisdom, moderation, or justice, can be decided by no other criterion; for when in progress they became subject to the influence of an infinity of events, some of which may be of a nature, that could neither be foreseen nor controlled, and against

the effects of which no human wisdom could have guarded.

The designs of Tippoo Sultaun against the English Government had been fully developed. Those of the French were known at this period to be directed with more than usual activity to the object of subverting the British power in India; and the means, which they possessed for the accomplishment of such views, though irregular and difficult of combination, were far from contemptible. Tippoo Sultaun, from a similarity of sentiments, was disposed to join with zeal in every effort, that had for it's object the attack of the British power: and the influence, which individuals of the French Nation had established at the Courts of the Nizam, and Scindiah, by obtaining the command of the principal military resources of both these Princes, afforded a just ground of belief, that any plan, which was formed, might eventually receive the greatest aid from their efforts. Of the dispositions of these individuals to promote the success of their Country, there could be no doubt; and their power and influence were of a nature, which gave every reason to conclude, that they might possess ample means of acting agreeably to the dictates of that disposition.

Other circumstances were favourable to the

designs of Tippoo Sultaun, and the French. The triple alliance, which had been formed by Lord Cornwallis, as a defence against the future ambition of the former, had, from the neutral policy of the British Government, been annihilated; and the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah seemed more likely, from causes before stated, to act against, than with the British Government, in the event of a rupture with Tippoo Sultaun.

The absence of Doulut Row Scindiah from Hindoostan was, at this period, as injurious to the British interests, as his presence at Poonah. For while he staid in the Deckan, the power of the Paishwah was dormant, if not extinct; and a large corps of infantry, commanded by French Officers, was kept in a situation, where it was likely that it might, either from the operation of the national spirit of it's Officers, or the ambition of Scindiah, be led by events to act against the British Government. On the other hand, the absence of Scindiah from Hindoostan threw almost the whole defence of that quarter of India, against the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, upon the British Government; and that invasion was rendered more probable from the defenceless state in which the possessions of this Chief were left.

Under these circumstances, Lord Wellesley

resolved upon the adoption of those political measures, which appeared calculated, in the first instance, to check and frustrate the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, and the French; and, in the second, to promote the permanent security of the British Government in India. The means, which he took to effect these purposes, while they afforded a reasonable hope of obtaining security against the designs of the Sultaun, and the French, without the extremity of a war with the former, gave the surest promise of war being successful, in the event of its proving inevitable.

The disposition of Azeem ul Omrah, the Prime Minister at Hyderabad, who had returned from Poonah, was favourable to the English Government; but that Minister, however secretly adverse to the French party in the army of the Nizam, had not the power of dismissing it, without the active aid of the British Government; nor could he, with common attention to the security of his master, advise him to disband that corps, until assured of the aid of a large body of English troops, and of eventual protection against any unjust aggression of the Mahrattas.

The young Paishwah Badjerow, was at this moment anxious to be released from the thralldom in which he was kept by Douliut Row

Scindiah ; and earnestly solicited the interference of the British Government. The Resident* at his Court, in a letter under date the 1st of June, states, that “ the authority of that Prince would be restored by the appearance of a strong British force at Poonah ; and that Scindiah, under the circumstance of Tippoo’s recent aggression, could on no just pretence object to such a movement of our troops ; nor, in his present condition, be able to oppose it.”

This was the actual state of affairs when the Marquis Wellesley resolved to endeavour, through the means of improved defensive engagements, to reobtain the efficient aid of the Government of Hyderabad and Poonah ; or, rather, to prevent the power and resources of those States being employed against the British Government. While endeavouring, through the means of negotiation, to effect these objects, he resolved to adopt the most moderate course towards Tippoo Sultaun, which attention to the security and dignity of the Government under his charge, would admit. Nor was he without a sanguine hope, that the complete success of the negotiations, which he had commenced at the Courts of Poonah and Hydera-

* Colonel Palmer.

bad, would place the English Government upon such a footing, as would satisfy, even that Prince, of the inutility of any farther attempt against it's power; and ultimately induce him to change his principles; to abandon his French Allies; to rest satisfied with his own dominions; and to cultivate (as his true interests dictated) a good understanding with the British Nation and it's Allies.

From what has been stated it will appear, that the views, which led to the adoption of this system of policy, were as moderate and just, as they were wise and enlarged: that it's end was altogether defensive, and that it was dictated by a desire of security and peace, not a spirit of ambition or aggrandizement. This will be more clearly shewn in the course of the narrative of the leading political events, that occurred during Lord Wellesley's Administration, to the relation of which I now proceed.

The state of the Court of Hyderabad at the period of that nobleman's arrival in India, has been described in the preceding chapter. Though that was, in the actual condition in which affairs stood, very unfavourable to the British interests, some circumstances had occurred, which promised success to measures of so decided a nature, as those which Lord Wellesley had resolved to pursue. The chief Minis-

ter, Azeem ul Omrah, enjoyed a plenitude of power; and was prepared (as has been before stated) to agree to any treaty which secured the Government of the Nizam against the future aggression and excesses of the Mahrattas, by whom his power had been so recently reduced. This Minister was led, about this period, to entertain the greatest jealousy and alarm at the designs of the Sultaun, with whom his enemies at Hyderabad had, during his absence, carried on the most active intrigues. He was sensible, from experience, that however the corps under French Officers might add to the military strength of the Nizam, it was not in it's actual state equal to the protection of his dominions from the attack with which these were threatened; and he could not be ignorant that any addition to it's numbers, or improvement of it's equipment, would be likely to excite a jealousy in the British Government, which might terminate in an open separation of interests, and perhaps in a war between the Court of Hyderabad and the only State in India, which could efficiently protect and support it's tottering power.

Under these impressions, Azeem ul Omrah was fully disposed to receive the overtures of the English Government for an improved connexion; and was solicitous to engage that

State to enter into engagements of a more intimate nature, as the best means of preserving the Government of Hyderabad from the ruin with which it was threatened. He had, however, no easy task to conquer the prejudices of his Sovereign, the Nizam, against such an alliance, which that Monarch argued, would, from the inequality of the parties, early terminate in rendering his dominions virtually dependent, for their future security, upon the British Government. This the Minister admitted; but he contended, that it was better to be dependent upon a State, whose regard to good faith was acknowledged, and whose power to protect was evident, than to continue exposed to the treacherous intrigues and unlimited demands of the Mahrattas, or the more daring and ambitious projects of the Sultaun: that, as it was clear that the situation of the State of Hyderabad was such as to make it impossible for it to remain without the alliance of some one of those Powers, it was assuredly wise to prefer a connexion with a Government, which brought with it's protection the substantial blessings of security and peace; to the nominal friendship of Powers, whose professed objects were plunder and conquest; and who had repeatedly shown, that they held in contempt, even the forms of public faith. The

Nizam's prejudices and fears were at last subdued by this reasoning ; and he gave his assent to the negotiation for the dismissal of the French corps, and the increase of the English subsidiary force, provided these objects could be connected with a pledge on the part of the British Government, to protect his dominions from any future unjust demands on the part of the Mahrattas.

The causes, which had led the Governor General to seek an improved alliance with the Court of Hyderabad, were of too urgent a nature, and too much connected with the immediate security of the British territories, to admit of his being influenced by a consideration of the effect, which the line of policy that he pursued might have upon the Court of Poonah. That consideration, indeed, could not, in the actual condition of affairs, be for one moment put in competition with the advantages to be gained by the dismissal of the French corps, and the complete introduction of the English influence at the Court of the Nizam. These points were of the highest importance ; as they not only removed, at a period of actual danger, every apprehension for the safety of the Company's territories, but placed the power of that State upon so commanding a ground, as to

make it probable, that the hostile designs of Tippoo Sultaun would be abandoned, and that he would purchase, by early concessions, an exemption from that punishment, which his conduct had provoked.

When mutual interests so strongly recommended an alliance, serious difficulties were not to be expected in it's negotiation. A treaty was accordingly concluded on the 1st of September 1798, by which the subsidiary detachment of British troops with the Nizam was made permanent; and an addition of four battalions was made to the two fixed by the former treaty. The subsidy to be paid by the Nizam, for the support of the whole, was increased from 57,713 rupees per month, to 201,425 rupees per month, or 2,417,100 rupees per annum. The Nizam also engaged by this treaty to disband the French corps in his service, and to deliver over it's Officers to the British Government, whenever the whole of the English force, to be stationed in his dominions, reached his capital. The British Government became, on it's part, pledged to arbitrate, on principles of impartiality and justice, the points in dispute between him and the Poonah Government, and to obtain the consent of the Poonah State to that arbitration; or, in the

event of that being withheld, to protect the Nizam from any unjust or unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas.

The strength of the French corps, which was about fourteen thousand men, with a large train of artillery, rendered the execution of that part of the treaty, which stipulated for its dismissal, a more arduous undertaking than its negotiation; but the internal state of the corps at the moment, was favourable to the accomplishment of this difficult object. Raymond, by whom it was originally formed, and who was an able man, and possessed of much influence, had died some months previous to the conclusion of the treaty; and disputes, respecting the succession to the command, had introduced much disunion into the corps; and though these were apparently settled, and General Perron had succeeded to that station, his character and influence were not such, as to enable him to take, with any prospect of success, those decided steps, which, under other circumstances, a Commander of this corps might have adopted, to have prevented its destruction.

The measures, however, directed by the Governor General for the full execution of the treaty, were, from their celerity and vigour, calculated to ensure success. A corps of four

battalions, with their guns, which had been collected on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions pending the negotiation, immediately marched to Hyderabad, where it joined the two battalions formerly stationed there, on the 10th of October. The moment this detachment arrived, the full execution of the treaty, as far as it related to the French corps, was demanded by the British Resident (Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick); but the Nizam, either from the influence of intrigue, or alarm, appeared at one time to hesitate how he should act; and even Azeem ul Omrah, whose character was very timid, shrunk from the fulfilment of his own plans, and expressed a desire to avoid, or at least to delay, extremities. The Nizam and his Minister were, however, soon brought to a just sense of the attention due to public faith, by the representations of the British Resident, who informed them in the most express terms, that, under the orders of the Governor General, he could, at that advanced stage of affairs, admit of nothing short of the complete execution of the engagements, into which the Court of Hyderabad had entered with the British Government; whose interests would, he stated, be exposed to the most serious danger, by allowing the French party to exist, for any period however short, after the resolution to disband it

had been made public. It was therefore, he added, his determination, if the Nizam should persevere in his wavering conduct, to authorize an attack upon the French camp by the British forces; and the Hyderabad Court would become responsible for all the consequences of an event, which must ever be deemed the result of its weakness and want of faith. To this communication, which was made on the 21st of October, was added a movement of the British troops to the ground, that commanded the French lines, which sufficiently evinced the resolution to attack them, in the event of further delay; but the impression made by this determined course of proceeding put an end to all evasion. A proclamation was issued, a few hours after the message from the Resident was received, and sent to the French camp, by which the troops were informed, that the Nizam had dismissed their European Officers from his service; that they were released from their obedience to these Officers; and that, if they supported them, they should be considered and punished as traitors. This proclamation, aided by the menacing position of the British troops, and the internal divisions in the French party, produced a violent mutiny in their lines, of which immediate advantage was taken. A strong body of horse belonging to

the Nizam, and the whole of the British detachment, surrounded the cantonments at daylight, on the 22d of October. The men of the French corps, who continued in a state of mutiny, were promised a liquidation of their pay, and future service, if they laid down their arms; to which, after some discussion, they consented; and in a few hours, a corps, whose numbers were nearly fourteen thousand men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed, without one life having been lost.

Such is the short history of this great political measure. The wisdom with which it was planned, and the promptness and vigour displayed in the execution, gave alarm to the enemies of the British Government, and diffused joy and confidence among the subjects and Allies of that State; and these impressions, no doubt, greatly promoted its future success.

Negotiations for an improved defensive alliance were carried on at Poonah at the same time, and with the same activity, as at Hyderabad; but with very different success. The measures taken at Hyderabad were regularly communicated to the Paishwah: but that Prince, either influenced by his weak Counsel-

lors, or acting under the control of Doulut Row Scindiah, obstinately continued to withhold his formal consent to any acknowledgment of the right of the British Government to arbitrate in his disputes with the Court of Hyderabad.

The double injury which the interests of the British Government sustained from the absence of Scindiah from his northern possessions, and his presence in the Deckan, gave that Government the justest grounds to use every endeavour to oblige him to leave Poonah: and, as it was evident from the state of the English army in Hindoostan, and the weakness of Scindiah in that quarter, that we had the power, if ever actuated by ambition, of seizing his most valuable possessions; the urgent solicitude, which we showed upon this occasion, could not be misinterpreted, or ascribed to any cause but that by which it was really produced.

A change occurred in the Councils of Doulut Row Scindiah in the month of August 1799, which, from its nature, gave, at one period, cause to hope a successful termination to the discussions at Poonah. That, however, was disappointed; and, after a negotiation, marked by weakness and evasion on the part of the Paishwah, and by intrigue and duplicity

on that of Scindiah, the British Government was forced to proceed in it's operations against the Sultaun, without any satisfactory settlement with either of these Chiefs, who were strongly suspected (particularly the latter) to be at this period much more inclined to take part with our enemy.

I shall now proceed to an examination of those causes, which led to the war with Tippoo Sultaun ; and the conduct pursued by the Marquis Wellesley, previously to that event, and on it's occurrence.

The whole tenour of Tippoo Sultaun's proceedings, subsequent to the peace concluded by Lord Cornwallis, had shown the implacable spirit of revenge which that Prince cherished towards the British Government. This appeared to have been more inflamed, than mitigated, by those unremitting endeavours, which we made to conciliate his friendship. His intrigues at Hyderabad, his embassies to Poonah, to the Mauritius, to Kabul, Persia, and Turkey, were all the result of the same spirit of hostility ; and the destruction of the British power in India continued to be the sole and constant object of his contemplation. Though this disposition of the Sultaun had been long evident, and had produced more than once considerable danger to our interests, it had not (previously

to the arrival of Lord Wellesley) shown itself in any direct act of hostility. Immediately after that period, a communication had taken place, respecting a boundary dispute in Wynaud: on which occasion, that nobleman, overlooking the impropriety of Tippoo's moving a body of troops towards the districts in dispute, had made a proposition for an amicable adjustment of the difference, in the most mild and conciliatory terms. The Sultaun, therefore, had not the slightest pretext to complain of the English Government: he had, indeed, never alleged any; and his letters had uniformly expressed his satisfaction with it's conduct, and the firmest reliance upon it's continued friendship.

Under such circumstances, it was with some astonishment that the Governor General received, upon the 18th of June 1798, accounts of the arrival of the ambassadours of the Sultaun at the Isle of France; and of the proclamation issued at that Island, with their participation and sanction, inviting volunteers to enter into the service of Tippoo, who was represented in this document to be on the eve of commencing an attack upon the English, in concert with the French Government.

This public avowal of hostility appeared so imprudent and precipitate, that the account of it was at first received with great caution; and

the Governor General deemed it his duty to substantiate its authenticity, by the most patient inquiry, before he made it the ground of any measures of even defensive precaution.

The result of these inquiries are fully stated by Lord Wellesley in his minute under date the 12th of August 1798; in which his Lordship gives an account of the arrival of the ambassadours of the Sultaun at the Isle of France, and their proceedings there, in the following words :

“ Tippoo despatched two ambassadours, who
“ embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France,
“ and arrived there at the close of the month
“ of January 1798. They hoisted Tippoo’s
“ colours, upon entering the harbour of Port
“ Nordouest; were received publicly and formally by the French Government, with every
“ circumstance of distinction and respect; and
“ were entertained during their continuance in
“ the Island at the public expense. Previously
“ to their arrival, no idea, or rumour, existed in
“ the Island of any aid to be furnished by the
“ French, or of any prospect of a war between
“ him and the Company.

“ The second day after the arrival of the ambassadours, an advertisement was published,
“ of the same purport as the proclamation; and
“ immediately afterwards the proclamation was

“ fixed up in the most public places, and circu-
“ lated through the town. One of the ambas-
“ sadours was said to be conversant with the
“ French language. A person accompanied the
“ Embassy from Mangalore, who was habited
“ in the Turkish dress ; who spoke French and
“ English with uncommon correctness and
“ fluency ; and who appeared to possess consi-
“ derable knowledge and talents, and to be well
“ acquainted with most of the country lan-
“ guages of India. This person had been
“ known at Bussorah by the name of Abdool-
“ lah ; at Surat, by that of Dervish ; and in the
“ Isle of France passed under that of Talomash,
“ under which last name he had also passed in
“ Bengal, where he resided for some years.
“ The ambassadours, far from protesting against
“ the matter or style of the proclamation, held
“ without reserve, in the most open and public
“ manner, the same language, which it contains,
“ with respect to the offensive war to be com-
“ menced against the British possessions in India:
“ they even suffered the proclamation to be pub-
“ licly distributed at their own house. Talo-
“ mash’s conversation, though with more caution,
“ and mystery, corresponded in substance with
“ theirs. In consequence of these circumstances,
“ an universal belief prevailed in the Island,
“ that Tippoo would make an immediate attack

“ on the British possessions in India; which opi-
“ nion had gained so much force, that the per-
“ sons who gave this evidence, and all those who
“ arrived at that period in India from the Isle
“ of France, expected to find us at war with
“ Tippoo: but they all concurred in declaring,
“ that the temerity of Tippoo’s designs had ex-
“ cited general ridicule in that Island. The
“ ambassadours were present in the Island,
“ when the French Government proceeded to
“ act under the proclamation in question; and
“ they aided and assisted the execution of it,
“ by making promises in the name of Tippoo,
“ for the purpose of enticing recruits to enlist.
“ They proposed to levy men to any practica-
“ ble extent, stating their powers to be un-
“ limited with respect to the number of the
“ force to be raised.

“ The ambassadours aided and assisted in a
“ levy of an hundred Officers, and fifty privates,
“ for the service of Tippoo, under the terms,
“ and for the purposes, stated in the proclama-
“ tion. Few of the officers are of any experi-
“ ence or skill; and the privates are the refuse
“ of the lowest class of the democratic rabble
“ of the Island: some of them are volunteers:
“ others were taken from the prisons, and com-
“ pelled to embark: several of them are Cafrées,
“ and people of half cast. With such of these

“ troops, as were volunteers, the ambassadours
 “ entered into several stipulations and engage-
 “ ments in the name of Tippoo.

“ On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassa-
 “ dours embarked on board the French frigate
 “ Preneuse, together with the force thus raised ;
 “ and they publicly declared an intention of
 “ proceeding to the Isle of Bourbon, with
 “ the hope of obtaining more recruits for the
 “ same service.

“ The proclamation therefore originated,” his
 Lordship adds, “ in the arrival of the ambassa-
 “ dours at the Isle of France, and was distri-
 “ buted by their agents ; was avowed in every
 “ part by their own public declaration ; and
 “ finally was executed, according to it’s tenour,
 “ by their personal assistance and co-opera-
 “ tion.

“ The proclamation itself furnishes the most
 “ powerful internal evidence of the concurrence
 “ of the ambassadours in all it’s essential parts.
 “ The principal facts stated therein are :

“ That Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambas-
 “ sadours, despatched for the purpose to the
 “ Isle of France, had addressed letters to the
 “ Colonial Assembly of the Isle of France ; to
 “ all the Generals employed there ; and to the
 “ Executive Directory of France ; and had made
 “ the following propositions :

“ 1st, That he desired to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France; and offered to maintain at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever troops should be furnished by the French; and to supply (with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for carrying on the war.

“ 2dly, That he had given assurances, that all his preparations were already completed; and that the Generals and Officers would find every thing necessary for carrying on a species of war to which Europeans have not been accustomed in their contests with the native Powers in India.

“ 3dly, That he only waited for the succour of France, to declare war against the English; and that it was his ardent desire to expel the English from India.

“ Upon the ground of these facts, the proclamation recommends a general levy of men for the service of Tippoo; and it concludes, by assuring all the citizens, who shall enlist, that Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of pay, and allowances, which will be fixed by his ambassadours, who will also engage, in the name of their Sovereign, that the Frenchmen, who shall have enlisted in his army, shall never be detained there, after they

“ shall have expressed a desire of returning to
“ their native country.”

Lord Wellesley, after some comments upon the avowed purpose of this proclamation, draws such a series of conclusions from the facts adduced, and the arguments used, as established on the most incontrovertible grounds the hostile nature of Tippoo's proceedings, throughout the whole of this negotiation with the French Government of the Isle of France ; the character of which was, he justly observes, strongly corroborated by the conduct of that Prince in his communications with other Powers ; and the Governor General concludes these observations by recording his opinion, that the motive of Tippoo Sultaun, in sending an embassy to the Isle of France, “ was no other, than that avowed
“ in his correspondence with the enemy, and
“ published under the eyes of his own ambassadors : *An ardent desire to expel the British
“ Nation from India.*”

From a conviction of such being his intentions, the Governor General was fully satisfied, (as he stated in a letter to the Court of Directors under [date the 13th of September 1799,)
“ that an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sul-
“ taun, for the purpose of frustrating the exe-
“ cution of his unprovoked and unwarrantable

“ projects of ambition and revenge, appeared to
“ be demanded by the soundest maxims of jus-
“ tice and policy.

“ The act” (his Lordship adds in the same
despatch) “ of Tippoo Sultaun’s ambassadours,
“ ratified by himself, and followed by the ad-
“ mission of a French force into his army, was
“ equivalent to a public, unqualified, and un-
“ ambiguous declaration of war : but, while his
“ hostile purpose had been clearly manifested,
“ the immediate means of accomplishing it
“ had happily disappointed the ardour of his
“ hopes.”

The immaturity, however, of the Sultaun’s plans formed, in Lord Wellesley’s opinion, the strongest reason for an immediate attack upon his possessions; and such was his Lordship’s original intention; but the delay, which was likely to occur in assembling the army on the coast of Coromandel, which had been reduced to a very low establishment, and was in a very divided and unequipped state, obliged him to alter it; and he made no communication whatever to Tippoo Sultaun on the subject of his proceedings, till the military preparations, both at Madras and Bombay, were complete; and the alliance with the Nizam had, by the course of the events, which I have described, not merely

been restored, but rendered so efficient, as to secure the full application of the resources of that Prince in aid of the common cause.

When these essential measures of precautionary policy were accomplished, Lord Wellesley addressed a letter to the Sultaun, under date the 8th of November 1798, in which, after replying in a most moderate and conciliatory manner to a letter from that Prince, respecting some villages in the possession of the Rajah of Coorg, to the revenues of which Tippoo laid claim, his Lordship proceeded to expostulate with him upon the nature of the connexion, which he had recently formed with the French Government; and pointed out, in the most explicit and strongest terms, the consequences, which were likely to result from it. "This connexion" (Lord Wellesley observes) "not only threatens to subvert the foundations of friendship between you and the Company, but to introduce into the heart of your kingdom the principles of anarchy and confusion; to shake your own authority; to weaken the obedience of your subjects; and to destroy the religion, which you revere."

His Lordship, in this letter, after adverting to the amicable professions of Tippoo, and the proofs, which the Company's Government had

given of it's sincere disposition to maintain the relations of peace and friendship with that Prince, states the causes, which had obliged that Government and it's Allies to adopt measures of precaution and defence : but those, his Lordship added, were not connected with any views incompatible with their respective engagements, and were directed to no object, but that of maintaining the permanent security and tranquillity of the dominions and subjects of the British Government and it's Allies. He earnestly recommended this letter to the serious consideration of the Sultaun ; whom he informed, that it was his intention to depute Major Doveton, (an Officer well known to him,) to explain, in a full manner, those means which appeared most likely to banish all distrust and suspicion, and to establish peace and good understanding on durable foundations.

“ I shall expect your answer,” said Lord Wellesley, “ to this letter, with an earnest hope, that it may correspond with the pacific views and wishes of the Allies ; and, that you may be convinced, that you cannot in any manner better consult your true interests, than by meeting, with cordiality, the present friendly and moderate advance to a satisfactory and amicable settlement of all points, on

“ which any doubt or anxiety may have arisen
“ in the minds either of yourself or of the
“ Allies.”

The accounts, which had been received of the landing of the French army in Egypt; and the immediate or remote connexion, which it was concluded that expedition had with an attempt upon India, had confirmed Lord Wellesley in the absolute necessity of either compelling Tippoo Sultaun to detach himself from the interests of France, or of depriving him of the means of co-operating with that Nation in any project hostile to the British Government. The great victory gained over the French fleet by Lord Nelson, intelligence of which had reached Bengal on the 21st of October; the extraordinary success, which had attended the measures adopted at Hyderabad; and the complete state of the preparation of the armies at Madras and Bombay, made Lord Wellesley, when he wrote to the Sultaun under date the 8th of November, expect that Prince would accede to the proposal, which he had made for a pacific negotiation, and that the terror of the British arms would render their actual employment unnecessary. But, notwithstanding this hope, he resolved to be prepared for every event; and, with this view, he proceeded in person to Madras, that he might, by being near the scene of

negotiation or military operations, avoid the incalculable evils of delay; and give to the public service the advantage of a prompt decision upon every question, military or political, which could arise. He informed Tippoo Sul-taun of his having taken this resolution, in a letter under date the 10th of December; and at the same time urged that Prince to give the earliest and most serious consideration to the communication, which he had made to him, under date the 8th of November.

Lord Wellesley reached Madras on the 31st of December, and found, on his arrival there, a reply had been received from the Sul-taun to the letter which he had written to that Prince before he left Calcutta.

In this reply, Tippoo repeated his former professions of unalterable friendship to the English; expressed his bad opinion of the French; and asserted, that the reputed embassy to the Mauritius was merely a mercantile speculation of some of his subjects, and its destination to the French Islands altogether accidental. Forty persons, he stated, among whom were twelve artificers, had returned in the vessel sent there; and to some of these he had given service, and others had departed from his dominions. "But the French," he observes in this letter, "who are full of vice and deceit, have perhaps taken

“ advantage of the departure of the ship, to
“ put about reports, with a view to ruffle the
“ minds of both Governments.”

Tippoo expressed, in this communication, great surprise at the allusion to war in the Governor General's letter ; and, on this ground, he evaded an assent to the proposition made of deputing Colonel Doveton, as he conceived no further means, than those already taken, could be necessary to give strength and stability to a friendship, which rested upon such firm foundations, as that, which then existed between him, the British Government, and it's Allies.

In his answer to this evasive letter, Lord Wellesley stated in the fullest manner the grounds of the measures which he had adopted. All the proceedings of the embassy to the Mauritius were recapitulated ; and the Sultaun was farther informed, that he had, by his conduct, compelled the Allies to seek relief from the ambiguous and anxious state in which they had been placed for years past ; and that they could no longer suffer those constant preparations for war, and hostile negotiations with their enemies, which exposed them, during a period of supposed peace, to all the solicitude, and hazard, and much of the expense, of war. In reply to that part of Tippoo's letter, in which he evaded our negotiation, Lord Wellesley observed,

“ That a new arrangement had become indispensable, in consequence of that Prince’s new engagements with the common enemy of the Allies;” and, after repeating his entreaties to the Sultaun to meet with cordiality this moderate and sincere advance to an amicable explanation, he plainly informed him, that no further delays could be admitted; and required an answer to the letter then sent, a day after it’s receipt.

This letter was dated the 9th of January, and it reached the Sultaun about the 15th of that month. No reply, however, was received to it until the 13th of February, when a short letter was received, which took a very cursory notice of Lord Wellesley’s proposition in the following terms: “ Being frequently disposed to make excursions, and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to despatch Major Doughton, (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written,) slightly attended.”

The delay, which the Sultaun had made in his reply to the letter of the 9th of January, had been considered as a rejection of the proposition for an amicable settlement, combined with a design on the part of that Prince to procrastinate, till the favourable season for the attack of his capital was past. Under such impressions,

which were greatly strengthened by his having at this period deputed another embassy to the Isle of France, the British army under General Harris, and the Nizam's army under Meer Alum, had been directed, on the 3d of February, to advance against his dominions.

Lord Wellesley, however, in a letter under date the 22d of February, acknowledged the receipt of the Sultaun's last short letter; and informed that Prince, that his long silence on so important and pressing an occasion, had compelled him to the measures which he had adopted. The deputation of Major Doveton, his Lordship stated, under actual circumstances, could be productive of no advantage; but that as the Allies still retained a desire to effect a settlement, General Harris had been instructed to receive any embassy, which Tippoo might send; and he was empowered to enter into a new treaty of friendship with him, founded upon such conditions as should appear to the Allies to be indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and permanent peace.

It will be useful, before I touch on the events of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, to advert to the nature of those terms, on which the Governor General was disposed, at different periods, to come to an amicable settlement with that Prince; as a reference to them will best show

those principles of policy, by which Lord Wellesley's conduct was governed throughout the whole of this arduous and difficult proceeding.

From his Lordship's letter to the Court of Directors, under date the 3d of August 1799, it appears, that when he discovered the inadequacy of the requisite means to reduce the Sultaun's power and resources by a sudden and unexpected attack, that his views were limited to the object of detaching that Prince from his friendship with the French Nation; and that he would have been contented with any adjustment, which offered a reasonable prospect of securing that object. This he judged might be effected by the establishment of a permanent Resident at Seringapatam; the dismissal of all the French in the Sultaun's service; and the perpetual exclusion of the French from his armies and dominions.

The invasion of Egypt by the French, which, if it had not been originally planned with a view to the assistance of Tippoo, might, the Governor General thought, be converted to that purpose, rendered the reduction of that Prince's power more urgent than before; while the success at Hyderabad, and the forward state of the military preparations at Madras and Bombay, made the accomplishment of that object less difficult. These combined considera-

tions caused Lord Wellesley to extend his views ; and, at the period when he addressed the letter under date the 8th of November, to the Sultaun, he was resolved, in addition to the terms before specified, to insist upon Tippoo's agreeing to exchange the Province of Canara (the only line of sea-coast in his possession) for an equal extent of territory in some other quarter : for he conceived such an adjustment was then requisite, to afford complete security against any designs, which the Sultaun might have in combination with the French, whose intercourse with Mysore would by this arrangement have been completely cut off. No opportunity, however, was offered of discussing these terms ; and the perseverance of the Sultaun in the cultivation of a connexion with the French, and his neglect of every advance to an amicable settlement, combined with the concentrated state of the forces of the British Government and the Nizam, made the Governor General, after his arrival at Madras, resolve to add to the other demands, the payment of a considerable sum of money, as an indemnification for the expense to which the hostile and treacherous conduct of Tippoo had exposed the Allies.

It was not till the month of February 1799, that the Governor General found himself compelled to abandon all hopes of effecting any

amicable settlement with Tippoo ; and he then directed the British armies to advance against that Prince ; empowering, however, the Commander-in-Chief, General Harris, to treat with the Sultaun, if he showed a sincere desire for peace. The terms upon which this was to be concluded, were, of course, to depend upon the stage of the war at which negotiations commenced ; but in the event of any decided victory, or of the batteries against his capital having been opened, the demands were to be extended to the cession (by the Sultaun) of one half of his dominions, and the payment to the Allies of two crore of rupees ; and he was to be required to give four of his sons, and four of his principal officers, as hostages, for the faithful performance of these conditions.

The army under General Harris, after having been joined by that of the Nizam, had entered the territories of Mysore on the 3d of March, unopposed by the Sultaun ; who had, when he saw the advanced state of the preparations of the Allies, hastened to attack the Bombay army under General Stuart, which was posted in Coorgah, and ready to co-operate in the reduction of his capital. When repulsed in this attack, which was with great loss, his next object was to obstruct the march of General Harris's army, which he met between Sultanpet

and Malavelly, on the 27th of March, where a partial action took place, which terminated in the Sultaun's defeat, and instant retreat to Seringapatam; and that fortress was a few days afterwards regularly invested by the combined armies of the British Government and the Nizam.

The Sultaun, who had hitherto made no communication whatever to General Harris, addressed a short note to that officer on the 9th of April, in which he required to know the cause of the hostile advance of the British army. In reply to this demand, he was referred to the letters, which he had before received from the Governor General; which, he was informed, were fully explanatory upon that subject. The Sultaun returned no answer to this letter till the 20th of April, when the operations of the siege were far advanced. On that date he again addressed General Harris, desiring that he would appoint a person to conduct a conference for the purpose of restoring peace. To this communication the General replied by sending him the draft of the treaty, which he had been instructed, under such circumstances of advantage, to conclude.

To this communication he made no reply; and the siege continued till the 4th of May, when the fort was taken by assault, Tippoo

Sultaun slain, and the Empire of the House of Hyder subverted.

Such was the termination of a war, which, whether we consider the temper and wisdom, that marked the negotiations by which it was preceded, the ability and courage with which it was prosecuted, or the important political consequences by which it was attended, will be found unparalleled in the annals of British India. In the short period of a few months a rival Power was destroyed ; which, from the first day of it's existence, till that of it's dissolution, (a period of thirty-eight years,) might be said to have directed all it's efforts against the English power in India.

Important as the conquest of Mysore was to the British interests in India, the solid and permanent advantages to be derived from that great event, depended chiefly upon the settlement of the territories which had been subdued. The justice and success of the war had given to the Company, and the Nizam, an undoubted right to dispose of these territories as they judged proper ; but on the manner in which they exercised this right, not only the reputation of those States, but the future tranquillity of the southern part of the Peninsula of India, in a great degree depended.

The Nizam, who had given the Governor

General, at the commencement of the war, full powers to negotiate a peace, directed, after the fall of Seringapatam, the Commander of his forces to acquiesce in any plan of settlement upon which Lord Wellesley should decide, respecting the disposal of the territories of the Sultaun. From this act of honourable confidence, the Governor General was left free to make such a settlement of the conquered kingdom of Mysore, as should, in his opinion, be consistent with those principles of moderation and justice upon which the war was undertaken.

It will only be necessary to take a short general view of the character of the arrangement which Lord Wellesley made; and of the leading considerations, which governed his conduct upon this important occasion. But, in doing this, it is impossible to refrain from giving occasional extracts from those clear and luminous despatches, in which that nobleman reported to his superiors in England the motives of his proceedings. "In regulating "the exercise of our right of conquest," Lord Wellesley observes in his letter to the Directors, under date the 3d of August 1799, "It appeared to me, that no principle could "more justly be assumed, than that the original objects of the war should constitute the

“ basis of the peace, and of the general settle-
“ ment of our territorial acquisitions. These
“ objects had been repeatedly declared by the
“ Allies to be a reasonable indemnification of
“ our expense in the war, and an adequate
“ security against the return of that danger,
“ which originally provoked us to arms.

“ With a view,” he continues, “ to each of
“ these just and necessary objects, it was re-
“ quisite that the Company, and the Nizam,
“ should retain a large portion of the con-
“ quered territory ; but it required much con-
“ sideration to determine the precise extent of
“ that portion, as well as the just rule of par-
“ tition. The war had not been undertaken in
“ pursuit of schemes of conquest, aggrandize-
“ ment of territory, or augmentation of revenue.
“ In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of
“ our success, it became a more urgent duty to
“ remember, that a peace, founded in the
“ gratification of any ambitious or inordinate
“ view, could neither be advantageous, honour-
“ able, nor secure.

“ The approved policy, interests and honour,
“ of the British Nation required that the settle-
“ ment of the extensive Kingdom subjected to
“ our disposal, should be formed on principles
“ acceptable to the inhabitants of the con-
“ quered territories ; just and conciliatory

“ towards the contiguous native States; and
“ indulgent to every party, in any degree
“ affected by the consequences of our suc-
“ cess.

“ To have divided the whole territory
“ equally between the Company and the Ni-
“ zam, to the exclusion of any other State,
“ would have afforded strong grounds of jea-
“ lousy to the Mahrattas, and aggrandized
“ Nizam Ally's power beyond all bounds of
“ discretion. Under whatever form such a
“ partition could have been made, it must
“ have placed in the hands of the Nizam many
“ of the strong fortresses on the northern fron-
“ tiers of Mysore, and exposed our frontier, in
“ that quarter, to every predatory incursion.
“ Such a partition would have laid the
“ foundation of perpetual differences, not
“ only between the Mahrattas and the Ni-
“ zam, but between the Company and both
“ those Powers.

“ To have divided the Country into three
“ equal portions; allowing the Mahrattas
“ (who had borne no part in the expense or
“ hazard of the war) an equal share with the
“ other two branches of the triple alliance, in
“ the advantages of the peace, would have
“ been unjust towards the Nizam, and towards
“ the Company impolitic, as furnishing an

“ evil example to our other Allies in India;
“ and dangerous, as effecting a considerable
“ aggrandizement of the Mahratta Empire, at
“ the expense of the Company and the Nizam.
“ This mode of partition also must have
“ placed Chittledroog, and some of the most
“ important northern fortresses, in the hands
“ of the Mahrattas; while the remainder of
“ the fortresses, in the same line, would have
“ been occupied by the Nizam; and our un-
“ fortified and open frontier in Mysore would
“ have been exposed to the excesses of the un-
“ disciplined troops of both Powers.

“ The Mahrattas, unquestionably, had no
“ claim to any portion of the conquered terri-
“ tory; and any considerable extension of
“ their Empire was objectionable, especially
“ when accompanied by the possession of
“ strong fortresses bordering on the line of
“ our frontier. It was, however, desirable to
“ conciliate their good will, and to offer to
“ them such a portion of territory as might
“ give them an interest in the new settlement,
“ without offence or injury to the Nizam, and
“ without danger to the frontier of the Com-
“ pany’s possessions. On the other hand, it
“ was prudent to limit the territory retained in
“ the hands of the Company and of the Ni-
“ zam, within such bounds of moderation as

“ should bear a due proportion to their respective expenses in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the future safety of their respective dominions.”

After these observations, his Lordship concludes this part of the subject by stating, that an attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions had terminated in his deciding ; “ that the establishment of a central and separate Government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties ; to secure to the Company a less invidious, and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commerce, advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power ; and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India.”

His Lordship next explains, in this despatch, the considerations which had regulated the partition of the Country. The districts of Canara, including all the sea-coast of Mysore, and the Provinces immediately contiguous to the possessions of the Company on the coast of