

Malabar, and the Carnatic, were of course assigned to the English Government; to which were added the forts and posts at the heads of the different passes into Mysore, and the fortress and island of Seringapatam, which was deemed essential, to secure the communication between the possessions of the Company on the coast of Coromandel, and that of Malabar, and to connect the different lines of defence.

The districts of Goorum Condah, Gooty, and others contiguous to his dominions, were assigned to the Nizam: and though that Prince had no claim, from the letter of his engagements, which could entitle him to a share in the advantages of the settlement, beyond his relative proportion in the expenses and exertions of the allied forces during the war, Lord Wellesley thought it desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company, after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to tenure, should not exceed that assigned to the Nizam; "reserving, however," (as his Lordship states in his letter to the Directors,) "to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expenses and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore."

The share of territory reserved, as an eventual cession to the Poonah Government, Lord Wellesley resolved should be of an amount which did not exceed in value two thirds, or was not below one half, of the portion allotted to the Company and Nizam Ally Khan; and this share composed the Harponelly, Soondah, Annagoondy, and other districts contiguous to the possessions of the Paishwah. But as this cession could only be considered as a favour, the Government of Poonah having taken no share in the war, Lord Wellesley determined it should not be made unconditionally; but should form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta Empire.

This cession amounted in annual revenue to upwards of two lacks and sixty-three thousand Canterai pagodas; while that, reserved for the establishment of the Government of Mysore, was in value upwards of thirteen lacks of pagodas; and comprised more than the ancient possessions of Mysore, previously to the usurpation of Hyder Ally Khan.

The reasons, which led Lord Wellesley to determine upon restoring the ancient Hindoo family of Mysore, are very fully stated in his letter, to which I have before referred. The strongest considerations of policy forbade the re-elevation of the family of Tippoo. They

had been brought up in hereditary hatred of the English Government; and could not, under any arrangement, which it was possible to make, be expected to forget the great powers and independence from which they had fallen. The sentiments of Lord Wellesley upon this subject are forcibly expressed in the following passage :

“ The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have
“ been educated in the same principles, encouraged to indulge the same prejudices and
“ passions, and instructed to form the same
“ views of the interests and honour of the
“ throne of Mysore. These sentiments would
“ necessarily acquire additional force in his
“ mind, from the issue of the late war. But un-
“ exampled success had subverted the founda-
“ tions of his father’s Empire, and transferred
“ to our possession every source of the civil
“ or military power of Mysore; and placed on
“ the throne by our favour, and limited by our
“ control, he must have felt himself degraded
“ to a state of humiliation and weakness so
“ abject, as no Prince of spirit will brook.
“ Under such an arrangement, our safety
“ would have required us to retain at least all
“ the territory which we now hold by the par-
“ tition treaty of Mysore. Whatever we re-
“ tained must have been considered by this

“ Prince, as a new usurpation upon his royal
“ inheritance, and an additional pledge of his
“ degradation and disgrace. In proportion to
“ the reduction of his territory and resources,
“ he would have had less to lose, and more to
“ regain, in any struggle for the recovery of
“ his father's Empire; nor does it seem unrea-
“ sonable to suppose, that the heir of Hyder
“ Ally and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the
“ implacable spirit and bold example of his
“ parents, and accustomed to the commanding
“ prospect of independent sovereignty, and to
“ the splendour of military glory, might deli-
“ berately hazard the remnant of his hereditary
“ possessions in pursuit of so proud an object,
“ as the recovery of that vast and powerful
“ Empire, which for many years had rendered
“ his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic,
“ and the terror of this quarter of India.

“ In the most narrow view,” his Lordship
adds, “ of the subject, it must be admitted,
“ that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have
“ felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of
“ any settlement of Mysore, founded on a par-
“ tition of his father's dominions, and a limita-
“ tion of his own independence. If, therefore,
“ a Prince of this race had been placed on the
“ throne of Mysore, the foundation of the new
“ settlement would have been laid in the very

“ principle of it's own dissolution. With such
“ a Prince, no sincere alliance, no concord of
“ sentiment nor union of views, could ever have
“ been established : the appearance of amity or
“ attachment must have been delusive ; even
“ his submission must have been reluctant, if
“ not treacherous ; while all his interests, his
“ habits, prejudices and passions, his views,
“ and even his virtues, must have concurred to
“ cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our
“ name and power, and an eager desire to abet
“ the cause, and to exasperate the animosity,
“ and to receive the aid of every enemy of the
“ British Nation. Whatever degree of influ-
“ ence or strength might have been left to the
“ native Government of Mysore, in such hands
“ would always have been thrown into the scale
“ opposed to their interests. The hostile Power
“ of Mysore would have been weakened, but
“ not destroyed : an enemy would have still
“ remained in the centre of your possessions,
“ watching every occasion to repair the mis-
“ fortunes of his family at their expense, and
“ forming a point of union for the machina-
“ tions of every discontented faction in India,
“ and for the intrigues of every emissary of the
“ French.”

Under these impressions, he resolved to ex-
clude this family from all power, and to raise

the ancient House of Mysore to the Government of that Country; a measure, which was recommended by every consideration of policy, humanity, and justice.

“ The indignities” (Lord Wellesley states in his letter to the Directors upon this subject) “ which the family of Mysore had suffered, “ especially during the cruel and tyrannical “ reign of Tippoo Sultaun, and the state of de- “ gradation and misery to which they had “ been reduced, must naturally excite a senti- “ ment of gratitude and attachment in their “ minds towards that Power, which should not “ only deliver them from oppression; but raise “ them to a state of considerable affluence and “ distinction. Between the British Govern- “ ment and this family, an intercourse of “ friendship and kindness had subsisted: in the “ most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune “ they had formed no connexion with your “ enemies: their elevation would be the spon- “ taneous act of your generosity; and from “ your support alone could they ever hope to “ be maintained upon the throne, either against “ the family of Tippoo Sultaun, or against any “ other claimant. They must naturally view “ with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the “ usurping family, and consequently be adverse “ to the French, or to any State connected.

“ with that family in it's hereditary hatred of
“ the British Government. The heir of the
“ Rajah of Mysore, if placed on the throne,
“ must feel that his continuance in that sta-
“ tion depended on the stability of the new
“ settlement in all it's parts; it must therefore
“ be his interest to unite, with cordiality and
“ zeal, in every effort necessary to it's har-
“ mony, efficiency and vigour. The effect of
“ such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore
“ would not be limited to the mere destruction
“ of the hostile Power, which menaced our
“ safety : in the place of that Power would be
“ substituted one, whose interest and re-
“ sources might be absolutely identified with
“ our own; and the kingdom of Mysore, so
“ long the source of calamity or alarm to the
“ Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our
“ defence, and might supply fresh means of
“ wealth and strength to the Company, their
“ subjects, and Allies.”

Having resolved upon these measures, orders were given for their immediate execution. The descendants of the Sultaun were removed to Vellore; where excellent accommodations were prepared for their reception; liberal pensions assigned for their support; and every attention and indulgence shown, which were due to their rank and situation, and could be

rendered compatible with the object of preventing their escape from that fortress. The chief Mahomedan Sirdars of the Sultaun were also provided for by liberal pensions : and every step was taken, which could tend to reconcile the family, adherents and servants, of the late Sultaun, to the arrangement which was intended.

Immediately after the departure of the sons of Tippoo Sultaun from Seringapatam, Kistna Raji Oudawer, a child of three years of age, the lineal descendant of the ancient family of Mysore, whose power Hyder Ally Khan had usurped in the year 1761, was raised to the throne of his ancestors ; and Purneah, a Bramin of great ability and reputation, who had been the chief financial Minister of Tippoo, was appointed Dewan or Minister to the young Prince. Two treaties were formed with this Prince ; one termed the partition treaty, under date the 22d of June 1799 ; and the latter, the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, under date the 8th of July 1799.

The first of these treaties was contracted between the English Government, that of the Soubah of the Deckan, and the new State of Mysore. The exact amount of the territories to be kept by the British Government, and that of Hyderabad, was settled in this treaty ;

and the amount and mode of payment of the pensions allotted for the support of the family and chief Officers of the Sultaun, was also fixed. The territory, which it had been resolved to secure for the State of Poonah, was, by the conditions of this treaty, to be given to the Paishwah; provided that Prince acceded to it within a month from the day on which it was communicated to him; and provided he gave satisfaction to the English Government, and that of Hyderabad, respecting some points, which were pending between these Courts and that of Poonah. In the event of the Paishwah not acceding to the treaty, which it was meant to offer to his acceptance, the territories, reserved for the Paishwah, were to be divided between the Nizam and the Company; but a proportion of two thirds was to be given to the former.

To the subsidiary treaty of Mysore the Soubahdar of the Deckan was not a party. It was an engagement, formed to settle the relations between the new State of Mysore and the British Government; and, from its stipulations, the former became in a great degree dependent upon the latter for its political existence.

By this treaty it was stipulated, that the Company should maintain a military force for the defence of the kingdom of Mysore against all external enemies; and that the Rajah should

pay an annual subsidy of seven lacks of pagodas for the support of this force. It was further agreed, that in the event of extraordinary expenses being incurred for the defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or in preparations for hostilities against any enemy of the two States, the Rajah of Mysore was to contribute towards such expenditure in such a proportion, as should appear to the Governor General of India, after an attentive consideration of his means, just and reasonable.

Under the declared resolution of providing against the possibility of the Company's Government suffering by any future failure of the funds appropriated for the support of the forces, which it was bound to maintain for the defence of Mysore; it was stipulated, that, on such event appearing probable, the English Government possessed a right, either to introduce such regulations and ordinances in the internal management of the revenues, or to assume, and bring under it's direct management, such part or parts of the Country of Mysore, as appeared necessary to render the funds fixed for the maintenance of the troops, efficient and available. The British Government agreed, on it's part, to render the Rajah a true and faithful account of the revenues so assumed; and it was stipulated, that the actual receipts of the Rajah, under no

possible circumstances or arrangement, were to be less than one lack of pagodas territorial revenue, and one fifth of the produce of the Countries ceded to him by the treaty of Mysore.

The Rajah of Mysore agreed, in this treaty, to refrain from all communication or correspondence with any foreign State, and to admit no European foreigners into his Country or service. He also agreed to permit the British Government to garrison with it's own troops such fortresses in the Country of Mysore, as it might think necessary to enable it to fulfil it's engagements, of protecting and defending that kingdom.

These were the principal conditions of the treaty, which fixed the relations between the new State of Mysore and the British Government. I shall hereafter speak of the operation of this arrangement. It will now be necessary to treat of those important political events, by which the conquest of Mysore was immediately followed.

The jealous, and almost hostile, spirit with which the Mahrattas regarded our operations against Tippoo; and the conflicts with which the southern part of the Peninsula was threatened, from the weak and distracted condition of the Paishwah's Government, pointed out the urgent necessity of adding, by every practicable

means, to the efficiency of the alliance with the Nizam; as that became the chief, and, after the defection of the Paishwah, the only means of protecting the British possessions, and those of it's Allies, in a state of peace and tranquillity.

For the attainment of this object, it was necessary to add to the strength of the subsidiary force with the Nizam; and to adopt measures, that would secure the English Government against those risks, to which it was probable this connexion would be early exposed, from the weak and fluctuating councils of that Prince.

To effect this important point, nothing seemed so desirable, as to commute the monthly pecuniary payment of subsidy for a cession of territory. The advantages of such an arrangement were manifold, and obvious. An end would undoubtedly be put, by it's adoption, to that constant recurrence of irritation, which must always be expected to attend large pecuniary payments, from sordid or extravagant Courts. The resources upon which the support of a large English force must depend, would be placed in the hands of the British Government, instead of being in those of another State, whose imprudence, distress, or treachery, might, at any critical moment, endanger the general safety. And the wish, which, it was possible, a

future weak or fickle Administration at Hyderabad might entertain, of freeing that State from a connexion, from which it might think it had derived all the benefit that it could expect, and the expense of which continued a burden upon it's finances, would cease to operate; when it had, by a cession of territory, paid in perpetuity, and by advance, for the services of the corps by which it's dominions were protected. These were among the leading considerations, which induced Lord Wellesley to enter into the negotiation with the Nizam; which terminated in the conclusion of a new treaty with that Prince, bearing date the 12th of October 1800.

By this treaty, the British Government engaged to permit no Power nor State whatever to commit, with impunity, any act of unprovoked aggression or hostility upon the territories of the Nizam; and to enable the Company to fulfil this engagement in an efficient manner, two battalions of Sepoys, and a regiment of native cavalry, were permanently added to the subsidiary force, to be maintained by the State of Hyderabad. To secure the constant and regular payment of this augmented force, the Nizam ceded in perpetuity to the Company all the territories, which he had acquired by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, and the treaty of Mysore in 1799. With a view of preserving a well defined

boundary, some changes were made in this cession; the Nizam retaining Kupoor, Gujunder, Ghur, &c. and giving Adone, &c. in their lieu, Countries situated to the south of the river Toombuddrah, which, by this settlement, formed the boundary between the two States.

In the event of war taking place between the contracting parties and a third State, the Nizam agreed, that the whole of the subsidiary force, except two battalions, which were to be kept near his person, were to be employed against the enemy; and that the force was, on such event, to be immediately joined by six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of his own troops.

The Nizam also agreed to enter into no negotiation with other States, without informing and consulting the Company's Government; and the latter agreed, that it would in no instance interfere with the Nizam's children, relations, or subjects, with respect to whom it would always consider him absolute.

The Nizam engaged not to commit hostilities against any other State; and, in the event of differences arising between him and another Power, it was stipulated, that they were to be adjusted by the Company's Government, and that the Nizam was to acquiesce in the justice of its decision.

It was stipulated, that in the event of either the Paishwah, Ragojee Bhonslah, or Doulut Row Scindiah, desiring to be a party in this treaty, they should be admitted to all its advantages.

The revenue of the territories ceded to the Company by this treaty was about 1,758,000 of pagodas: but their importance, in a political and military point of view, was still greater than their pecuniary value: For this cession, while it terminated, as has been shown, those constant recurring causes of irritation, to which we were subject as long as this payment was made in monthly instalments, added, from the local situation of the districts, to the security of the former possessions of the Company on the coast of Coromandel, and to those of the new State of Mysore; to both of which they formed a defined and good military barrier.

It has been before stated, that the British Government had reserved a considerable portion of the conquered territories of Tippoo Sultaun, to be given to the Paishwah, on the condition of that Prince acceding to an alliance, calculated to preserve the general tranquillity. Badjerow, however, acting under the control of Doulut Row Scindiah, who continued with a large army, and almost the whole of his French brigades, at Poonah, rejected this equitable pro-

posal; and the reserved territory was shared agreeably to the stipulations of the partition treaty between the English Government and that of Hyderabad.

In the beginning of the year 1801, the occurrence of war between Jeswunt Row Holkar and Scindiah had forced the latter to move from Poonah; and the distraction, which this event had created among the Mahratta States, appeared to Lord Wellesley to constitute a most favourable crisis, for effecting the complete establishment of the British interests at the Court of Poonah. This he desired to do upon a basis, that while it secured the stability and efficiency of the Paishwah's authority, interfered with none of the real rights or possessions of the great Feudatories in the Mahratta State; and consequently could only be opposed by them, on the grounds of it's defeating their plans of encroachment and aggrandizement, which it had become the imperious policy of the British Government to check, as their prosecution was altogether incompatible with the maintenance of that system, which it had been compelled to adopt, for it's own safety, and that of it's Allies.

The Paishwah had himself made a general proposition for entering into a defensive alliance with the British Government; but the nature of the conditions of the treaty, which he pro-

posed, and the actual state of his power, made the Governor General deem it advisable to reject his proposition; which he thought was merely calculated to give the Paishwah the assistance of the British power, to re-establish and support his personal authority, without admitting it to the exercise of that influence, which it appeared necessary the English Government should possess, in order to maintain it's own security, and that of it's Allies.

Before June 1802, the date on which Lord Wellesley received the negotiations at Poonah, accounts had been received of the peace of Amiens. The scene was consequently open to French intrigue; and if Scindiah regained, by the defeat of Holkar, an event then probable, the complete ascendancy over the Paishwah, and the entire control of the Mahratta Empire, from the banks of the Ganges to the sea of Malabar; there could not be a doubt in the mind of any man in the least degree acquainted with the constitution of the army of that Chief, and the influence and authority of the French Officers, by whom it was then commanded, that the French Nation might, in a very few years, without violating one article of the treaty of peace, have aided him to the consolidation of a military power, which would have struck at the very existence of the British Government in India. It

did not appear likely, that the execution of such a plan would meet with any serious obstacle in the jealousy of Scindiah, who had become familiar with the system, which it was the policy of the French to pursue. To it both his predecessor and himself had owed their power; and he was consequently disposed to pursue it.

The territories of the Paishwah had been the scene of continual conflict, from the death of Madhoo Row; and were not able, in their exhausted state, to support, even for a few months, the hordes of banditti, which were daily pouring in from Malwah and Hindoostan, to contend at Poonah for the Sovereignty of the Mahratta Empire.

This fact, which cannot be disputed, made it evident, that, if the armies of Scindiah, Holkar, and Ragojee Bhonslah, were permitted to make the Provinces of the Poonah State their theatre of warfare, the armies of these Chiefs must be early forced by want, if not invited by policy, to invade the territories of the British Government, or it's Allies: and this circumstance formed in itself a strong proof, not merely of the expediency, but of the necessity of the measures pursued on this occasion by Lord Wellesley.

In the contest, which took place in 1802, between Doulut Row Scindiah and Holkar, the

Paishwah joined with the former, whose force at Poonah sustained a signal defeat near that city on the 25th of October. Badjerow, who had moved out of his capital before the action commenced, immediately fled towards the sea-coast, having previously sent his Minister to the British Resident,* with a writing, sealed with his own seal, containing his consent to receive a subsidiary force, and to cede, for their subsistence, territory, either in Guzerat, or in his southern territories, producing an annual revenue of twenty-six lacks of rupees. The Minister, at the same time that he made this proposition, assured the Resident in the most positive manner, that it was the intention of his master to conclude a defensive alliance with the Honourable Company, on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad.

The Governor General confirmed the preliminary engagement, which the Paishwah had offered to his acceptance, as soon as he received it; and desired that Prince should be informed, that all the resources of the British Government should be employed for the re-establishment of his authority. The Resident was also directed to give to the preliminaries the form of a defensive treaty, and to obtain the Paishwah's con-

* Colonel Close.

sent to such articles, as were necessary to give the British Government all those advantages which it expected from this alliance.

The Paishwah, when near the sea-coast, demanded the aid of a vessel, and eventual protection, from the Government of Bombay, which was complied with; and, as Jeswunt Row Holkar continued at Poonah, he lost all hopes of being able to return to that city, and embarked on board the *Herculean*, an English vessel, sent for his accommodation, and proceeded to Bassein, where he arrived on the 16th of December. He was joined at that place by the British Resident; and, after a short negotiation, a definitive treaty of defensive alliance was concluded on the 31st of December, and ratified by the Governor General in Council on the 28th day of January 1803, the date on which it reached Calcutta.

By this treaty, the English Government bound itself to furnish to the Paishwah a subsidiary force of six battalions of native infantry, with a compliment of field-pieces and European artillery-men; for the payment of which force, the Paishwah agreed to make over territory to an amount of twenty-six lacks of rupees. All claims of the Paishwah, and his family, on Surat, and the districts under the English Government in Guzerat, were finally adjusted; and

that Prince agreed to abide by the arbitration of the Company in all his unsettled disputes with the Soubahdar of the Deckan; and in the adjustment of some unsettled accounts with the family of the Guickwar in Guzerat, whose previous engagements with the Company he fully recognised. The Paishwah also engaged to discharge any Europeans from his service, that belonged to Nations hostile to the English, or were discovered meditating injury, or carrying on intrigues, injurious to the interests of that Nation.

Such were the principal conditions of this treaty. It will be next necessary to state the *méasures*, that were adopted, to facilitate its complete execution, and to secure to the British Government all those advantages, that were expected from this important measure.

The army of Fort Saint George, under the command of General Stuart, had advanced to the bank of the Toombuddra, to support this treaty, which included the restoration of the Paishwah to his throne at Poonah. General Wellesley was detached in front, with a select corps, to effect this object: and advancing in co-operation with the subsidiary force in the Deckan, commanded by Colonel Stevenson, through the southern parts of the Paishwah's territories, he reached Poonah on the 20th of

April. The troops of Holkar fled at his approach; and Badjerow, who had left Bassein, when he learnt that the British forces were coming to his aid, entered Poonah; and was reseated on his Musnud, in that capital, on the 13th of May.

This great measure was effected without any opposition: and all the principal southern Mahratta Jagheerdars (who are considered as the more immediate Feudatories and dependents of the Paishwah) gave, by their actions as well as expressions, a full assent to this connexion. Appah Saheb, the son of Purseram Bhow, his brother Chumajee Goklah Appah Depaye, and several others, joined their troops to those of General Wellesley, and advanced with him to the capital of the Mahratta Empire, where they paid their obeisance to the Paishwah, whose Court several of them had not visited for many years before.

The first fruits of the alliance, which were, the flight of Holkar, and the cheerful and dutiful obedience of some of his chief Feudatories, gave great satisfaction to the Paishwah, and afforded to the English Government a momentary hope, that this great measure of policy would be effected without a war. These hopes were, however, early disappointed, by the advance of Doulut Row Scindiah, and the Bhon-

slah, towards the frontier of our Ally the Nizam; and the delays and evasions with which these Chiefs treated the different propositions offered to their consideration by the British Resident* at the Court of Scindiah.

Doulut Row Scindiah had, after several communications with the Resident, acknowledged, that he could have no right, from his being guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, (the ground of objection he had first taken,) to oppose any treaty between the British Government and the Paishwah; and after admitting, that his interest had been advanced by the expulsion of Jeswunt Row Holkar from Poonah, and the re-establishment of Badjerow, he declared in explicit terms, "That he had no intention to
"impede the performance of the arrangements
"lately concluded between the Paishwah and
"the British Government; but that he should,
"on the contrary, desire to perfect the amity,
"which then existed between the Paishwah,
"the British Government, and his own States."

Five days after this declaration, Scindiah's Ministers remonstrated with the Resident against the advance of the British troops to Poonah; which, however, they were informed, could not be prevented, as it was a condition of

* Colonel Collins.

the engagement into which we had entered with the Paishwah; and of which, they were reminded, Scindiah had expressed his full approbation.

About the period at which the Resident reached Scindiah's camp at Burhanpore (February 27th), he received secret information of a league between the principal Mahratta Chiefs, with objects hostile to the British Government, being in agitation; and the advance of the army of the Rajah of Berar to join Scindiah, combined with the active negotiations, which the latter Chief carried on with Holkar, gave some credibility to this information. But there appeared on the other hand, when the nature of their respective Governments was considered, every cause to doubt their power of combination; and it was quite evident, that if such a league was even formed, their rooted animosities, and clashing interests, would prevent it's being attended with any serious danger.

Scindiah had, in fact, no objection to the interference of the British Government for the restoration of the power of the Paishwah, as long as he saw a prospect of that being usurped by Jeswunt Row Holkar; and he thought, that, by acting in aid of this project, he should come into the chief direction of the affairs of the Empire, and be enabled to destroy his

rival, who had, from his success at Poonah, obtained great power and reputation; but the moment he found that the British Government had by its energy, and the great celerity of its operations, obliged Holkar to fly, and established the Paishwah at Poonah without his aid, his plans changed; and he resolved to oppose the treaty, to which he had given, at one period, the most unqualified assent.

To effect this, his first object was to reach Poonah. But as his presence at that capital could have no effect, but that of disturbing, if it did not altogether annul, the recent engagements concluded with the Paishwah, the Governor General determined on not permitting it; and he directed the Resident at his Court to insist upon Scindiah either retreating from the threatening position he then occupied upon the Nizam's frontier, across the Nerbuddah; or, that he should give some unequivocal proof of his intention, in nowise to seek to derange the engagements concluded between the British Government and the Paishwah.

As, however, there were grounds of apprehension, that Scindiah would not relinquish his schemes without a contest, orders were at the same time given to Major General Wellesley, to be prepared to act; and that Officer, with a view of eventually co-operating with the subsi-

diary force in the Nizam's territories, advanced a few marches to the northward of Poonah; where he established a constant, and almost daily, intercourse with the British Resident in Doulut Row Scindiah's camp.

The Resident, at an interview with that Chief, on the 27th of May, communicated the treaty of Bassein; and, after a careful perusal of every article, Scindiah and his Minister declared, that it contained nothing in the slightest degree injurious to his legitimate authority. But, though he made this declaration, he would not explain to the Resident what were his intentions; and on being much pressed at this conference for an explanation, Scindiah broke it up with saying; "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed, whether we will have war or peace."

This extraordinary menace, which placed the question of war or peace, between the English Government and Doulut Row Scindiah, upon the result of a conference with the Rajah of Berar; and which was, in itself, a direct insult to the former State; lessened those hopes, that had been entertained, of an amicable termination to this negotiation. The Bhonslah, on whose decision it was likely to turn, had never been on a cordial footing with the Eng-

lish Government; and there was reason to think that he would view any measures, which strengthened the power of the Paishwah, with particular jealousy, as he was known to cherish hopes of obtaining for himself the first dignity in the Mahratta Empire, to which he had some claims, from birth. The Governor General, aware of these sentiments, had taken every means within his power to conciliate this Chief; and had addressed a letter to him explanatory of the scope and intention of his proceedings at Poonah. But the manner in which this communication was received, did not afford any sanguine hope of his being an advocate for peace: on the contrary, there was just ground to believe, that the Bhonslah would, upon this occasion, stimulate Scindiah, and every Chief over whom he had influence, to attack the British Government; and, though his character was the opposite of warlike, he, like almost all the Mahrattas, anticipated success in such a contest; as it was evident, both from their expressions and correspondence, that they drew all their conclusions from the events of the former war, which they had carried on against the English. They seemed, indeed, at this moment to have forgotten the changes, which a period of twenty-two years had effected; and it was early obvious to all persons

near the scene of negotiation, that the constant recurrence of the Mahrattas to the success, which had formerly attended the combination against us, and the obstacles which their ignorance and pride opposed to their taking a just view of the increase of our power, subsequently to that date, would make them precipitate a war, in spite of every effort, which could be used to prevent that extremity.

Lord Wellesley, as soon as he received an account of the unfavourable state of the negotiations with Scindiah, vested the Officers in command of the armies in Hindoostan and the Deckan, with the completest civil, military, and political powers in those quarters. Major General Wellesley was specifically authorized, at this early stage, to negotiate arrangements or treaties, either by himself, or through Residents or Agents, with Scindiah, Holkar, or the Rajah of Berar; with a view of prevailing upon those Chiefs to retire with their armies within the boundaries of their own States, or to give some sufficient pledge of their pacific disposition towards the British Government and its Allies.

General Wellesley was charged, in these instructions, to demand of Scindiah a peremptory declaration of his intentions, and to insist upon his giving that in a certain number of

days, which were to be settled at the discretion of the Major General; but reasonably fixed with reference to the season, and to the possible opening of the campaign in an advantageous manner to the British Government. If the explanation given by Scindiah was not full, and satisfactory, the General was instructed to recall the Resident from his camp; and directed, if war became inevitable, to carry it on in the most active manner, and to follow up his success, without listening to any proposal for peace, until the power of the Chiefs, against whom the war was made, should be totally annihilated. If circumstances required it, General Wellesley had authority given him to conclude a peace with Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar, conjointly, or separately, as might appear to him most advisable.

In the instructions to Lord Lake, who was at the head of a large army in Hindoostan, the objects to be accomplished, if a war occurred, were fully pointed out. These were, in the first place, the complete reduction of that independent and formidable French authority, which had been established in Hindoostan. His Lordship was directed to occupy the whole space of the Country, forming the Duab, between the Jumnah and the Ganges to the mountains of Cumaoun, and also to possess

himself of Dehli, Agra, and a chain of posts on the right banks of the Jumnah, from the mountains of Cumaoun, to the Province of Bundelcund. It was not, the Governor General informed Lord Lake in these instructions, his intention to extend the Company's possessions beyond the line of the Jumnah, Agra and Dehli included, and a chain of posts to protect the navigation of the river. All the connexions, which might be formed to the south and west of the Jumnah, beyond this line, he desired to have upon the principles of defensive alliance, or tributary dependence, so as to leave existing between the British possessions and the Mahratta Empire a barrier formed by petty States freely exercising the rights of independent Government, each in their respective limits, in alliance with the Company, and under the protection of the British Government.

The Governor General, in these instructions, placed great importance in the early rescue of the person and titular authority of the Moghul from the French party. He also signified his intention of subduing Bundelcund, as the vicinity of that Province to Benares, and several of the richest and most valuable possessions of the Company, made it dangerous to leave it in the hands of the enemy.

The detailed opinion of the Governor Gene-

ral, respecting the best mode of carrying every part of his instructions into execution, was conveyed to Lord Lake; but that Officer was intrusted with the fullest power of altering or modifying every part of his orders, as circumstances might demand; and the commencement of his operations was of course to depend upon the result of the negotiation, then pending, between General Wellesley and Doulut Row Scindiah.

Major General Wellesley, in conformity with the instructions which he had received, addressed a letter to Doulut Row Scindiah, under date the 14th of July; wherein, after stating the amicable objects of the treaty of Bassein, and remarking upon the hostile spirit of the measures adopted by the confederate Chiefs, since the conclusion of that treaty, he demanded the separation of the army of Scindiah from that of the Rajah of Berar, and the retreat of the former across the Nerbuddah; and stated his intention, in this letter, of making the British troops resume their ordinary stations, as soon as the Mahratta Chiefs had complied with this requisition.

On the 18th of July, when General Wellesley received the instructions of the Governor General, dated the 26th of June, he addressed another letter to Scindiah, informing him of the

full and extensive powers with which he was vested; and he directed the Resident with that Chief, to demand of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, their separation, and the return of their armies to their usual stations; and instructed him, if these demands were not complied with, to withdraw himself instantly from the Mah-ratta camp.

Doulut Row Scindiah seemed at first inclined to comply with General Wellesley's requisition; but, after a consultation with the Rajah of Berar, and a delay of several days, it was at last stated to the Resident, at a conference which he had with both Chiefs on the 25th of July, that their troops were within their own territories, that they would promise not to pass the Adjunttee hills, nor to march to Poonah; and that they had given written assurances to the Governor General, that they would never attempt to overthrow the treaty of Bassein.

In reply to these assurances, the Resident repeated Major General Wellesley's observation, that it was altogether impossible to confide in their professions while they continued to occupy a position which was not necessary for their security, and which threatened the frontier of our Ally the Nizam. After hearing these, and similar arguments, the Chiefs re-

quested a further delay, till the 28th of July, when they promised a definitive answer; and the Resident was induced, by his knowledge of the anxious desire of the Governor General to avoid, if possible, the occurrence of war, to depart from the positive instructions of General Wellesley, and grant a further delay.

On the 28th the Resident sent to require the final answer, which he had been promised. He received a message, in reply, that Doulut Row Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar meant to have a conference that day, at which it would not be proper for him to assist; "but that he should be informed of the time, which should be fixed to receive him."

The Resident replied to this communication, by accusing Doulut Row Scindiah of having violated his promise. He would, he informed that Chief, wait till next day at noon for an answer; and, if he did not then receive one, that was satisfactory, he would send off his tents towards Aurungabad, and follow himself next day.

After several further evasions, the Resident agreed to meet Doulut Row Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, once more, on the 31st of July; and at this conference he received from those Chiefs several propositions for an amicable adjustment. They proposed to retire to Boor-

hanpore (a town upon the Taptie, a few marches from their position), provided General Wellesley would agree to march his troops to their ordinary stations: but, on being told this proposition was altogether inadmissible, as it would leave them in a situation to pursue any measures which they chose, while it deprived the Company's Government of the means which it then possessed of opposing their designs; they suggested, that the Resident should appoint a day for the march of the respective forces of these Chieftains from the place of their encampment, and that he should pledge the faith of the British Government for the retreat of the army under General Wellesley, on the day on which the armies of the Confederates should return to their usual stations.

Though the acceptance of this proposition was in opposition to his instructions from General Wellesley, his ardent desire for an amicable result to the negotiation which he had so ably conducted, led Colonel Collins to consent to forward the letter, containing this offer of adjustment, to General Wellesley, and to remain in camp till he received an answer. But that spirit of evasion, deceit, and falsehood, which had marked every stage of this negotiation, was conspicuously shown at it's close. The letters of

Doulut Row Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, to General Wellesley, were sent to the Resident; but, instead of this proposition, which he had consented to forward, they contained no more than the offer to retreat with their combined armies to Boorhanpore; while they required General Wellesley to return with his troops to their ordinary stations. As the Resident had before given the most formal and positive refusal to this proposition, he could not but consider this conduct on the part of the Chiefs, as equally insulting and faithless; and he was confirmed by it in a belief, which he had been reluctant to entertain, of their unalterable resolution to endeavour to reduce, if they could not destroy, the strength of the British Government, by an attack upon that State and its Allies, which they were only delaying till they had collected all their means; and increased, by their negotiations and intrigues, the strength of that combination, which they desired to form against its power.

Colonel Collins left the camp of Doulut Row Scindiah on the 3d of August; and the war was commenced by Major General Wellesley, by an attack of the fortress of Amednaghur, on the 8th of that month.

Such were the negotiations, which immediately preceded a war, the justice and actual

necessity of which can only be denied by those, who refuse their assent to the wisdom of the policy, which ensured the destruction of that inveterate enemy to our name, Tippoo Sultaun. It was altogether impracticable for us to fulfil, without constant recourse to arms, those engagements, which we had been compelled to contract with the Nizam, to induce him to aid us in the accomplishment of that first object of Lord Wellesley's policy; unless we succeeded in establishing a commanding influence in the Councils of the Poonah State; and, after that had been effected, it would have been a base abandonment of those, whom we had become pledged to support, if we had been induced, by any circumstances, to hazard their interests or security, for the sake of obtaining to ourselves a short exemption from the evils of war.

It is foreign from the object of this sketch to enter into any detail of the military operations of the war between the British Government and the Mahratta Chiefs, Doulut Row Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, which only continued five months; but was marked by a series of the most brilliant and decisive victories. The battles of Dehli and Laswaree, of Assye and Arghaum, and the reduction of the strong forts of Allyghur, Agra, and Gwalier, of

Ahmednughur, Asseerghur, Gawilghur, and Cuttack, and a number of inferior conquests, were crowded into this short but eventful period. The confederate Chiefs were compelled to sue separately for peace, after the annihilation of their infantry and cannon, and the loss of their finest Provinces, and a number of fortresses, which they had deemed impregnable. The complete destruction of the regular brigades in the service of Scindiah, was certainly one of the most important events of this war. These brigades formed, all together, a body of nearly forty thousand well disciplined men, with a very large train of artillery, acting entirely under the control of a French Commander, and supported by the revenues of the finest Provinces in India, under his management; and having every military resource within itself. It was the early extinction of this force, which obliged Scindiah to abandon all thoughts of a further prosecution of hostilities, and to throw himself completely upon the generosity of the British Government.

He was anticipated, however, in this design by the Rajah of Berar; who immediately, after the fall of his principal fortress, Gawilghur, entered into a treaty with General Wellesley, by which he agreed to give up the Province of Cuttack (an acquisition of the greatest value to

the Company), and all his share of the Provinces of Berar westward of the Wurdah, of which he had before collected the revenues in participation with the Soubahdar of the Deckan, to whom this cession was not of more importance, as it added to his revenue, than as it strengthened his frontier, and freed him from those continued contests, that naturally attended the existence of a double authority collecting the revenues of the same Country.

The Company engaged, by this treaty, to arbitrate all differences, which might henceforward arise between the Rajah of Berar, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, and the Paishwah; and the Rajah agreed, that he would never admit any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American Power, which might be at war with England, into his service. It was stipulated, that each of the contracting States should keep a resident Minister at the Court of the other.

These were the principal conditions of this treaty of peace, which was concluded on the 17th of December 1803. It was immediately followed by the treaty with Scindiah, of which the following were the leading articles:—Scindiah ceded to the Company all the territories he possessed in Hindoostan to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jypore, Jodepore, and

the Ranah of Gohud. The fort and territory of Baroach. He ceded also all lands to the south of Adjunttee, and all claims of every description upon the British Government and its Allies, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, the Paishwah, and the Guickwar family in Guzerat.

It was a condition of this treaty, that if Scindiah should hereafter enter into a defensive treaty with the British Government, the pay of any English corps, fixed in his service, should be defrayed from the revenues of the territories ceded in the treaty of peace.

The Company agreed by this treaty, in consideration of the great losses sustained by the principal Officers of Scindiah's court and army, from the cession of the Provinces of Hindoostan, to grant pensions to them, agreeably to a list given in by Scindiah, to an annual amount of fifteen lacks of rupees.

These were the leading articles of this treaty, which was negotiated by General Wellesley upon the admitted principle of Scindiah's being completely subdued ; and which, under the circumstances in which he was then placed, was, as his Ministers acknowledged, more favourable, than he could have expected. It contained many small recessions of Provinces and villages, which had been hereditary in his

family; and the grant of which was intended, and had in a great degree the effect of reconciling him to the great losses, which he had sustained.

By one article in this treaty, Scindiah agreed to resign, with some modifications, all claims upon Rajahs, and others of his former Feudatories, with whom the English Government had made treaties or alliances. This engagement gave rise to a dispute, concerning the fortress of Gwalier and the territories of Gohud, which had, for the moment, the effect of disturbing the harmony, that would otherwise have immediately followed the peace between the two States. In this dispute justice was, no doubt, on the side of the British Government; but that did not prevent Scindiah and his Ministers from endeavouring to obtain their object, by a constant and vexatious agitation of the subject; and, though they were compelled to admit, that strict justice was against them, they continued to entertain hopes of success, declaredly grounded on that liberal and conciliating spirit with which the English Government had used its great victories. Even the formal renunciation of this claim did not prevent their reurging it, the moment an occasion appeared the least favourable to their wishes.

This treaty of peace was concluded on the

30th of December 1803; and the connexion with Scindiah was further cemented by a treaty of defensive alliance, concluded by the acting Resident* at his Court, on the 27th of February 1804.

By this treaty, Scindiah became entitled to the assistance of a corps of six battalions of Sepoys, which were either to be stationed within his territories, or at a convenient frontier post in the Honourable Company's territories, (as Scindiah preferred); and this corps was to be paid out of the revenues of those Countries, which Scindiah had ceded to the Company.

The other articles of this defensive alliance were nearly the same, as those formerly concluded between the Company and the Courts of Hyderabad and Poonah.

The conduct pursued by Jeswunt Row Holkar, during the war between the British Government, Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, was in conformity to the most characteristic features of a Mahratta Chieftain. He had not only promised to join the confederacy against the British Government, but had concluded, through the medium of the Rajah of Berar, a treaty with Scindiah, in which great cessions were made by Doulut Row, to induce him to

* Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.

enter into their plans. But, though he promised every thing, he showed no inclination, after hostilities were commenced, to assist the Confederates. There is, indeed, ground to believe, that he rejoiced in the first reverses, which his rival Scindiah sustained: and if this sentiment underwent a change, as has been supposed, when he saw the ruin of that Chief, the course of action was too rapid and too decisive to give him time for interference; though, before the treaties of peace were concluded, he had advanced towards Hindoostan, as far as the frontier of the Rajah of Jypore, who was then under the British protection.

Though Jeswunt Row Holkar continued to profess his friendship for the British Government, his conduct at this period indicated other designs; and the Governor General instructed Lord Lake to enter into a negotiation with that Chief, that would lead to an early and full explanation of his views, and relieve the Company's Government from the expense and alarm, to which it's Provinces must be subject, while such a horde of freebooters, as the army under Holkar's command, were assembled on it's frontier, or that of it's Allies.

Lord Lake addressed a letter to Jeswunt Row Holkar, dated the 29th of January 1804, stating generally the terms on which the British Go-

vernment was disposed to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority; but requiring, as a proof of the sincerity of the amicable professions which he had made, that he should withdraw his army from the threatening position it then occupied, retire within his own territories, and abstain from the exaction of any tribute from the Allies of the British Government.

Holkar, after some delay, sent Vakeels (or Agents) to wait upon the Commander-in-Chief; to whom they made, on the part of their master, the following propositions:

1st. That Holkar should be permitted to collect the choute, agreeably to the custom of his ancestors.

2d. That the ancient possessions formerly held by his family (twelve of the finest districts in the Duab, and a district in Bundelcund), should be given to him.

3d. That the Country of Humanah, which was formerly in the possession of the Holkar family, should be ceded to him.

4th. That his Country should be guaranteed to him, and a treaty concluded with him on the same terms as we had done with Scindiah.

These extravagant demands were of course rejected; and their nature, as well as the manner in which they were made, satisfied Lord

Lake of the real designs of Jeswunt Row; which were soon afterwards more fully developed by the contents of several letters, which he wrote to the tributaries and dependents of the British Government in Hindoostan; whom he excited, by every argument which he could use, to revolt against that State; whose territories, he informed them, it was his immediate intention to ravage and destroy. Lord Lake also obtained about this period a copy of a letter from Jeswunt Row Holkar to General Wellesley (supposed to be written early in February), in which he had demanded the cession of several Provinces of the Deckan, which he affirmed were originally the property of the Holkar family. This letter concluded with this remarkable expression:

“ Countries of many hundred coss shall be
“ overrun, and plundered. Lord Lake shall
“ not have leisure to breathe for a moment;
“ and calamities will fall on lacks of human
“ beings, in continual war, by the attacks of
“ my army, which overwhelms like the waves
“ of the sea.”

These insulting menaces were followed by acts of more positive aggression: Holkar sent an Agent to Scindiah's camp, and solicited openly the aid of that Chief in an attack upon the British possessions; and at the same time com-

menced the plunder of the territories of the Rajah of Jypore. The Commander-in-Chief, who could not but consider these proceedings as the commencement of hostilities, advanced against Holkar, who retreated from the position which he had occupied, and was pursued to some distance by a British force.

Thus commenced a war ; the great successes of which were checkered by some remarkable failures. But, though the circumstances, which attended the retreat of Colonel Monson's corps, and the very severe loss of Officers and men at the siege of Bhurrutpore, must be deemed serious reverses, they did not prevent the destruction of Holkar's power being effected, before the close of Lord Wellesley's Administration. The battle of Deeg was fatal to his regular infantry and artillery ; and the action at Futtyghur broke altogether the spirit of his cavalry. The fortresses of Chandore and Gaulnah, which were the strong holds of the family, were also taken ; and in April 1805, this boasting freebooter retreated across the Chumbul with an army, reduced from forty thousand cavalry, twenty thousand infantry, and upwards of a hundred pieces of cannon ; to a wretched body of about eight or ten thousand horse, four or five thousand infantry, and between twenty and thirty guns : and, though peace with this Chief

was not immediately concluded, all his future efforts served only to show how completely he had been subdued.

In the years 1799 and 1800, Hindoostan was threatened with an invasion by Zemaun Shah; and, among other means adopted by Lord Wellesley to avert this danger, was an Embassy to Persia, to which Country he had before sent a native agent, who had been received with honour, and had succeeded in the limited objects of his mission. The Embassy deputed to the Court of Teheraun was in a style of splendour corresponding to the character of the Monarchy, and the manners of the Nation, to whom it was sent, and to the wealth and power of that State from whom it proceeded. It was completely successful in all its objects. The King of Persia was not only induced by the British Envoy* to renew his attack upon Khorassan, which had the effect of withdrawing Zemaun Shah from his designs upon India; but entered into treaties† of political and commercial alliance with the British Government; which, while they completely excluded the French from Persia, gave the English every benefit, which they could derive from this connexion: nor can there be a

* Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.

† See a copy of this treaty in the Appendix.

doubt, that, if this alliance had been cultivated with the same active spirit of foresight and penetration with which it was commenced, it would have secured the influence of the British Government in that quarter, from many of those attacks to which it has subsequently been exposed.

Lord Wellesley, in the year 1800, equipped an Expedition to Egypt: and a considerable force from India, under the Command of Sir David Baird, marched from Suez to Alexandria: presenting the extraordinary spectacle of a British army, chiefly composed of the Natives of India, on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The political Administration of the Marquis Wellesley was marked by a number of lesser measures, undertaken and executed on the same principles, and with the same spirit and success, as those which I have described.* On these, however deserving of notice, it is impossible to dwell, without swelling this Sketch to a size beyond what is intended. I shall therefore

* The flight of Vizier Ally from Benares, after the atrocious murder of Mr. Cherry the Resident, when he was on a friendly visit to that gentleman, called forth all the vigour and resolution of Lord Wellesley's character; and he obliged the Rajah of Jypore, who had afforded him protection, to give up the just object of the vengeance of the British Government, who has ever since been kept a close prisoner at Fort-William.

proceed to give as concise a statement, as the subject will permit, of those radical changes, which he effected in the connexion between the British Government and the dependent States of Oude and the Carnatic.

When Lord Wellesley returned to Bengal from Madras, after the reduction of Tippoo Sultaun, one of the most important objects, which occupied his attention, was the reduction of a part of the mutinous and useless military establishment of the Nabob Vizier: and at the same time increasing the efficient force, which the Company maintained to defend that Prince's dominions. He was urged to the immediate adoption of this measure, as well as to the general improvement of the principles of our alliance with the Vizier, by a strong sense of the dangers to which the territories of that Prince were exposed from internal tumult, or foreign attack.

The Vizier at first concurred in the expediency of reducing his troops, and of increasing those subsidized from the English Government for the defence of his dominions; but, repenting of this assent, as he found the operation of such an arrangement tended to lessen his consequence with his immediate adherents, he endeavoured, by every evasion, to frustrate the execution of a measure, the necessity of which he had first admitted.

This Prince had, in the year 1799, proposed to abdicate his throne, and persisted for some time in this resolution, in spite of every argument which the British Resident could offer against it. The reasons, which he gave for this extraordinary measure, were,—the state of the Country, his inefficiency to rule, and the rooted and reciprocal aversion, that subsisted between him and his subjects, which had, he stated, on his part grown into absolute disgust. The notoriety of the truth of all he advanced led the Governor General to believe him perfectly sincere in his proposition; and Lord Wellesley was confirmed in this belief from Saadut Ally having intimated a desire to retire with the treasures, which he had amassed, as this wish was quite consistent with his weak and avaricious character.

There was, subsequently, reason to believe, that this proposition of the Vizier was only illusory, and meant to delay the execution of the plan for reforming his military establishment. But the grounds for proceeding in that reform were too urgent, and too much connected with the general security of the interests of the British Empire in India, for Lord Wellesley to allow it's progress to be arrested by such weak and puerile evasions. He, indeed, considered the Vizier's conduct on this

remarkable occasion, to furnish another ground for the necessity of that final arrangement, which it was his object to accomplish.

The Company were, agreeably to the 7th article of the treaty concluded by Sir John Shore with the Vizier at his accession, at liberty to increase the force serving in Oude, if they deemed such increase requisite for the security of the two States; and the most irrefragable proofs of that necessity had occurred within the last two years.

Lord Wellesley resolved, therefore, to send an additional force, the annual expense of which amounted to fifty lacks of rupees; which, with the former fixed subsidy* of seventy-six lacks,

* Besides the fixed subsidy paid by the Vizier of Oude, there had formerly been a charge for extraordinaries. The fixed subsidy of Asoph u Dowlah was fifty lacks; but Lord Cornwallis states, that that Prince had paid, previous to the year 1787, an average of thirty-four lacks per annum extraordinaries. By Lord Teignmouth's treaty, the increase of our force in Oude was to be at the discretion of the British Government. It has been argued, that the Vizier's consent was necessary to this increase, even under the construction of the treaty: but if this assertion had not been refuted by the evidence of the respectable nobleman who framed the treaty, it must have been by its own absurdity; for the cause of the increase is stated to be the existence of external danger; of which one party, the English Government, can alone be the judge; as the other (the Vizier) is precluded by one of the articles of this treaty from all intercourse or communication whatever with foreign States.

made a total of one crore and twenty-six lacks of rupees.

The Governor General, when he directed this increase to the force of Oude, desired to combine it with reductions of the Vizier's useless, and indeed dangerous troops. This arrangement would have prevented that Prince from feeling any burthen upon his finances, by the execution of a measure, which so greatly contributed to his security. But Saadut Ally was led, either from weakness, or the wicked designs of the interested rabble, by whom he was surrounded, to offer the most serious obstacles to the accomplishment of this measure: his open opposition to which, combined with the whole of his former conduct, and the progressive ruin with which his mismanagement threatened his Country, led Lord Wellesley to resolve upon the conclusion of a final arrangement; which, while it placed those resources, that were to maintain the Company's troops on the frontier of Oude, beyond the reach of the Vizier, should free both the Company and that Prince from a constant and increasing source of irritation—the monthly payment of a heavy pecuniary subsidy.

Lord Wellesley conceived, that the whole conduct of the Vizier;—his proffered abdication, his professed inability to rule, the light in

which he considered his own troops when an invasion of his Country was apprehended,* his consent to reduce them, his subsequent efforts to counteract, by the most unjustifiable means, an arrangement to which he had agreed, and the ruin, which his system of mismanagement was bringing upon his Country;—fully warranted his insisting upon the Vizier entering into an engagement, that would at once settle every cause of contest; and provide, as completely as it was possible, for the security of his dominions; as well as for the regular and permanent support of those troops by whom they were protected. Acting upon these considerations, Lord Wellesley instructed his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, whom he deputed to Lucknow, to conclude a treaty, by which a territorial cession should be made to the British Government, equal to the payment of the increased subsidiary force stationed within the territories of Oude.

The Vizier entered into this engagement with

* The Vizier had declared that they would only be useful to the enemy, and required that a detachment of the British army should be sent to guard his person. His statements were fully confirmed by the letters of Sir A. Clarke and Sir James Craig, who described them as a rabble, who would, in the event of service, require part of the army to watch and keep them in awe, instead of affording any aid.

an extreme degree of reluctance ; which, however, from his character, was perhaps in some measure assumed, to prevent that unpopularity,* which would have attached to an appearance of satisfaction with an arrangement, which deprived so many of his dependents of that annual plunder, which they had been accustomed to derive from the Provinces, which he was required to cede.

The principal article of this treaty, which was settled by Mr. Henry Wellesley, and Colonel Scott, Resident at Lucknow, stipulated for the immediate cession of all the frontier Provinces of Oude to the Company. These were estimated at the gross revenue of one crore, thirty-five lacks, twenty-three thousand four hundred and seventy-four rupees, eight anas, and three pice ; which was received for the payment of the troops (whatever were their number) maintained by the British Government for the defence of Oude.

By this cession, the territories of the Company were interposed, as a barrier, between the dominions of the Vizier and any foreign enemy. The actual nett receipts of that Prince's trea-

* This is a motive in every way consistent with the character of the Vizier, and is greatly confirmed by his subsequent conduct.

sury from these districts, was not more than the amount which he had before paid as a fixed subsidy, and far less than he had become liable to pay under the 7th article of the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth; as the Company's troops in Oude had been necessarily increased to a number exceeding thirteen thousand men, whose actual pay (which the Vizier would have been obliged to pay) exceeded the fixed subsidy by more than fifty lacks of rupees per annum.

The Company obtained an ample remuneration for this temporary pecuniary loss, in the happy settlement of it's continual and irritating disputes with the Court of Lucknow; in the prospect of an augmented revenue, under an ameliorated system of management, from Provinces, which had been ruined by misrule and oppression; and in the substitution of it's own troops and resources for those of the Vizier, on a frontier from which the only danger that could affect the two States was to be apprehended.

The other articles of this treaty were of minor consideration. They stipulated, that the Vizier should dismiss all his troops, except a certain number; and that he should be entitled to the service of British troops, on all occasions, and under all circumstances, without ever being

subject to further charge or demand for such aid.*

The Vizier agreed to introduce (under his own Officers) into the territories, which remained to him, such a system of Administration, as should be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and to the security of the lives and property of the inhabitants. He also agreed always to advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of, the Officers of the Company's Government.

Several subordinate, and comparatively unimportant, arrangements were subsequently made with the Vizier, who became soon reconciled to a treaty, which, however much its first proposal might have wounded his feelings, had so happy an operation on his own comfort, and that of his subjects; and he took every future opportunity that offered, of proving, both by his professions and actions, his attachment to the British Government.

* The Vizier cannot be said to have shown any unconquerable aversion to the principles of this treaty, as he at one period offered to cede territory to the amount of one crore and twenty lacks of rupees per annum; provided an abatement was made, on account of arrears. This was rejected, and the cession of one crore and thirty-five lacks of rupees, gross revenue, insisted upon.

When the war with the Mahrattas commenced, Lord Wellesley had the satisfaction of receiving the cheerful and voluntary aid of this Prince towards its prosecution. He not only sent a present of a number of fine horses from his stud, sufficient to mount a regiment of dragoons, but contributed, by large voluntary loans from his treasury, to the general success of the war. The manner, as well as substance, of the Vizier's conduct on this occasion, afforded to all, the least acquainted with his character, a convincing proof of the nature of those impressions, which the whole of the proceedings pursued by the Governor General had made upon his mind; and of that relief, and happiness, which had been extended both to him and his Country, by an arrangement, that was final; that closed all irritating questions between the two States; and provided, under every contingency, for the permanent support of the British troops employed in the defence of the territories of Oude.

Lord Wellesley received from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors an early expression of their approbation of the measures, which he had taken to reduce the military establishment of the Nabob Vizier. In their letter, which is dated the 4th of December 1800, the Secret Committee observe, that they entertain a due

sense of the high services of the Governor General in effecting that reform, which, they state, was "a measure not less contributing to the
" preservation of his Excellency's dominions,
" than to the relief of the Company's finances,
" by furnishing a large additional subsidy to
" the amount of fifty-lacks per annum, to
" reimburse the charges of the late augmentation of our troops in that quarter, so necessary to be made, with a view to the ultimate
" security of our own possessions against the
" invasion of Zemaun Shah, or of any other
" Power hostile to the British interests."

The treaty with the Vizier, dated November 1801, received an equally full approbation from the same authority; which was not, however, given till two years after it's conclusion, and until the Court of Directors were in complete possession of all the circumstances connected with the negotiation, which had preceded it. The commendation of this measure was conveyed to the Governor General in a letter, dated the 19th of November 1803, from the Secret Committee of the Directors, who gave a greater value to their approbation, by the just and clear view, which they, upon this occasion, took of those grounds, that gave importance to the arrangement.

" Having taken" (the Secret Committee

observe) “ into our consideration the treaty
“ lately concluded between the Governor Ge-
“ neral and the Nabob Vizier, and ratified by
“ his Lordship on the 10th of November 1801,
“ we have now to signify our approbation of
“ the provisions of that treaty.

“ We consider the stipulations therein con-
“ tained, as calculated to improve and secure
“ the interests of the Vizier, as well as those of
“ the Company; and to provide more effectually
“ hereafter for the good Government and
“ prosperity of Oude ; and, consequently, for
“ the happiness of it's native inhabitants.

“ Although the revenue of the territory
“ ceded, according to it's produce, when in the
“ hands of the Vizier, does not exceed the sub-
“ sidy payable by his Highness for the number
“ of troops which it appeared expedient perma-
“ nently to station in Oude, together with a
“ reasonable charge for the civil Administration
“ of the same : we, nevertheless, do not disap-
“ prove of the Governor General, in considera-
“ tion of the cession, having liberated his High-
“ ness from all extraordinary charges, which
“ may hereafter be incurred by the Company,
“ in providing for the internal as well as
“ the external security of Oude ; to which
“ charges his Highness would have been liable
“ under the treaty of 1798 : we are satisfied to

“ accept, as compensation for such extraordinary expenses, the increased revenue, which
“ may reasonably be expected to arise from the
“ superior Administration of the ceded districts
“ under the Company’s management. And we
“ feel the more satisfaction in such an indemnity, as, whilst it can alone arise out of the
“ improvement and prosperity of the Country,
“ it will be unattended by any sacrifice on the
“ part of the Vizier, under whose ruinous and
“ oppressive system of collection the produce
“ of those districts was likely annually to decline, as it had hitherto done.

“ We also entertain a sanguine hope, that
“ the Vizier, relieved from the embarrassment,
“ as well as the charge, of a licentious, and
“ worse than useless army ; and rescued, by the
“ dissolution of the great proportion of that
“ force, from the most abject dependence on
“ his own powerful subjects, at whose disposal
“ those mutinous and disaffected troops chiefly
“ were ; will now, supported and defended by
“ a disciplined and orderly force, apply himself
“ with energy to the internal Administration of
“ his affairs.”

In this letter, a just compliment was paid to the great merits of Mr. Henry Wellesley, the brother of the Governor General, who, after the conclusion of the treaty of Lucknow, had

proceeded to take charge of the ceded Provinces, as Lieutenant Governor, in order to effect a settlement of their revenues. An arduous labour, which he performed in a manner as honourable to his own character, as it was advantageous to the public interests.

This account of the proceedings at Lucknow has been more prolix, than was originally intended; but it was impossible to abridge it, without an omission of essential facts; and the same reasons oblige me to enter into some detail on the subject of the transactions, which took place, during Lord Wellesley's Administration, with the Nabobs of the Carnatic; as my object is to explain, as clearly as I am able, the motives and principles by which that nobleman was governed, in the conduct which he pursued towards those dependent Princes.

Omdut-ul-Omrah, the late Nabob of the Carnatic, succeeded his father on the 16th of October, 1795. He took possession of the Musnud, under the conditions of the treaty concluded between his father and the Marquis Cornwallis in 1792. This Prince was specifically named in the preamble to that treaty, as the successor and eldest son of the Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan; and, under that designation, he is made a party in the engagement.

The treaty of 1792 was soon found, both by

the Administration at home and by Government abroad, to have produced few of those salutary effects, which were anticipated. Mahomed Ally Khan, after its conclusion,* pursued a conduct not more at variance with his own interests, and with those of the Company, than destructive of the happiness of his subjects, and the prosperity of his Country.

I have already stated, that when Lord Hobart was appointed Governor of Fort St. George, in 1794, he was instructed by the Court of Directors to endeavour to negotiate a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, on principles, which were calculated to secure the interests of the Company, to improve the condition of the inhabitants of the Carnatic; or, rather, to save that Country from ruin, and to put an end to those vexatious disputes, which, from the character of the Nabob and his principal servants, were found to attend the fulfilment of several of the most important stipulations of the treaty of 1792.

The obstinate and intemperate resistance, which the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah (who succeeded his father, soon after Lord Hobart's arrival) opposed to all his Lordship's endeavours

* The state of the Carnatic, and the operation of this treaty, are very fully shown in Lord Hobart's minutes, under date the 24th of November, 1795.

to negotiate a modification of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, appeared, at the moment, inexplicable. And the influence attributed to some low and interested counsellors, seemed insufficient to account for his steady refusal to listen to any arrangement, which was so eagerly pressed upon his acceptance by his Majesty's Ministers, the Court of Directors, and the Government of Fort St. George; and which could not, under any construction, be judged injurious to his personal interests, or his power, as long as he stood in the relation he then bore to the Company.

When the Marquis Wellesley arrived at Madras in 1798, he employed the few days he remained at that Presidency (previously to embarking for Calcutta) in fruitless attempts to effect the same object. The impression made upon his Lordship's mind, by the mode in which the Nabob treated his proposal, was, that farther negotiation was useless; though he at the same time felt and expressed a conviction, that every moment tended more to prove the indispensable necessity of some arrangement, to save the Company from loss, the Nabob from ruin, and the inhabitants from misery; all which he considered the inevitable consequences of permitting affairs to remain in the state in which they were placed by the treaty of 1792.

When Lord Wellesley returned to Fort St.

George, to prosecute the war against Tippoo Sultraun, in 1799, he became still more sensible of the inconveniencies of the existing engagements with the Nabob, which were aggravated by the conduct of that Prince, who, on that critical occasion, acted more like an enemy than a friend:

The want of exertion of his Officers in every part of his Government, when supplies were collecting for the army, and the manner in which some of them obstructed that service, gave rise to suspicions in the mind of the Governor General, which were much confirmed by a personal act of the Nabob, which had nearly defeated every object of the war. His Highness agreed, on certain conditions, to advance three lacks of pagodas for the immediate use of the army; then on the eve of marching into Mysore. All the conditions, which he proposed regarding this advance, were agreed to by the Governor General; and the Nabob succeeded so fully in establishing a belief of his sincerity respecting this important supply, (the promise of which he reiterated, in the most positive manner, the very day the army moved,) that the whole of the cash in the treasury was appropriated, in the confidence of it's receipt; and it is not easy to calculate the evils, which might have been the result of his failing in the fulfil-

ment of his solemn promise on this critical occasion, had not treasure arrived from Bengal. Lord Clive concludes a paper on the Nabob's conduct, in this transaction, with the following remarkable words:—" I am unwilling to attribute systematic treachery to the Nabob; but " I have looked in vain for another motive to " account for his extraordinary conduct."

Soon after the capture of Seringapatam, documents were discovered among the secret records of the Sultaun, containing the most conclusive evidence of a secret intercourse having been carried on between the Nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and Tippoo Sultaun, which had objects hostile to the interests of the Company.

These documents were carefully examined, and reported upon, under the orders of the Governor General, by Mr. Edmonstone, the Persian translator; and the evidence drawn from them appeared to establish the following conclusions in the most satisfactory manner.

1st. That, in violation of an express article of the treaty of 1792, the Nabob Mahomed Ally Khan, by the agency and with the concurrence of his eldest son, Omdut-ul-Omrah, maintained a secret intercourse with Tippoo Sultaun, through the medium of Gholaum Ally Khan, and Ally Reza, Vakeels of that Prince; that

this secret intercourse was directed to objects hostile to the interests of the Company; and was, consequently, subversive of the fundamental principles of his alliance with the Company.

2d. That the Nabobs, Mahomed Ally Khan, and Omdut-ul-Omrah, had made communications to Tippoo Sultaun, on political subjects, of a nature calculated to promote the interests of that Prince, and eventually to injure those of the Company.

3d. That the Nabob had, both by communication from himself personally, and through Omdut-ul-Omrah, to Gholaum Ally Khan and Ally Reza, manifested his marked disapprobation of the triple alliance, (of the English, Nizam, and Mahrattas,) which had reduced the power of the Sultaun; and that he had on such occasions stigmatized the Nizam, as having acted contrary to the dictates of religion, which required that all true believers should join in support of that cause, of which, he repeatedly stated, he considered Tippoo Sultaun as the chief pillar.

4th. That the evidence contained in the communications made to Tippoo Sultaun by his Vakeels, of the treacherous nature of the intercourse subsisting between the Nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and Tippoo Sultaun,

was confirmed by the discovery of a cipher, the key to which was found among the Sultaun's secret records; and which was not only written in the same hand in which all the letters of the Nabobs, Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah, to the English Government are written, but noted at the bottom by Tippoo's head Moonshee, as a paper from Omdut-ul-Omrah: and several of the fictitious designations in this cipher were found to have been used in the correspondence. If the very circumstance of Omdut-ul-Omrah's having transmitted a cipher to Tippoo Sultaun was not of itself sufficient to establish the treacherous nature of his views, the names which, it was discovered by the key to the cipher, were used to signify the English and their Allies, removed all doubts upon this subject. The English were designated by the name of *Taza Wareeds*, or *new comers*; the Nizam by that of *Fleech*, or *nothing*; and the Mahrattas, by that of *Poesh*, or *contemptible*.

5th. That Omdut-ul-Omrah continued this secret intercourse as late as the year 1796, as appears by a letter found in the Sultaun's records; which, though it has neither seal nor signature, is written by the person who wrote all the Nabob's letters to the British Government, and has the name of Ghiolaum Hoossain upon the cover; which, it is established by incontro-

vertible documents, was the fictitious name under which the Nabob corresponded in his own hand-writing with Gholaum Ally Khan in 1794. The authenticity of this letter is also proved by it's being found in the Sultaun's records, along with the other correspondence of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and it's evident connexion with those letters, in subject.

These were the principal points, which appeared to be established by the documents found in Tippoo's palace. They were not only in violation of the spirit of the whole treaty of 1792, but in direct breach of the letter of one of it's most important articles, the 10th, which expressly stipulates, " that the Nabob shall not enter into any negotiations, or political correspondence, with any European or native Power whatever, without the consent of the Company."

That this article (which every person who consults the treaty of 1792 must consider as the most essential of the whole treaty, as it relates to the security of the British Government,) was completely violated, there could not remain a doubt; and as it is established, by the law of Nations, that the violation of any one article, but more particularly of a fundamental one, of a treaty, overthrows the whole; the treaty of 1792 was of course to be considered as dissolved;

and the line to be pursued by the injured party was that, which a due regard for its own safety and interests, combined with a respect for the law of Nations, demanded.

The relations in which the Nabob stood to the British Government, was that of a dependent Ally, whose rank and power had been preserved from motives of justice, not of policy; and who owed his accession to the Musnad (upon the same conditions which his father enjoyed it) to the honourable adherence of the English Nation to its engagements; even when they were evidently in opposition to its interests.

The conduct, which the Nabob had pursued from the commencement of his reign, has been already stated; and proves what sacrifices the English Government made, rather than violate in the slightest degree their good faith with his Highness. To preserve that faith, the Company had, indeed, been exposed to great loss; and the Nabob had been permitted to destroy those resources, on which not only his own safety, but that of the Company, might eventually depend; and to impoverish and render miserable, by his mismanagement, the Country and inhabitants subject to his authority.

The conduct of Omdut-ul-Omrah, in several instances, previous to the discovery of his trea-

chery, though not of a nature to absolve the Company from the obligation of an engagement, into which they had deliberately entered, could not but operate unfavourably for him, in the situation in which his own perfidy had placed him; by diminishing his claim to a confidence, and generosity, which he had so systematically abused.

The light in which the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors had viewed the conduct of the Nabob, previously to the discovery of his treachery, appears from their despatch to Lord Wellesley under date the 18th of June 1799, in which they express themselves as follows:

“ In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultaun,
 “ the respective Countries of the Nabob of
 “ Arcot, and the Rajah of Tanjore, will of
 “ course come under the Company’s manage-
 “ ment; and we direct, that they be not relin-
 “ quished without special orders from us, or
 “ from the Court of Directors, for that purpose,
 “ in order to afford sufficient time for the for-
 “ mation of arrangements for relieving those
 “ respective Princes from all encumbrances on
 “ their revenues.”

This order from the Secret Committee showed, that the Indian Government in England considered the general conduct of Omdul-ul-Omdah, previously to the discovery of his treachery, of

a nature to warrant their directing a departure from the stipulations of the treaty of 1792, of which the restoration of the Nabob's Country, *at the conclusion of the war*, unless in certain cases, (which are afterwards specified, and which had not occurred at the date of the Committee's order,) is an express condition.

This instruction, though it did not directly apply to the precise case under the consideration of the Governor General, was conclusive as to the principle upon which the Court of Directors desired, that all transactions with the Nabob should be regulated.

Lord Wellesley, though aware of the risk, which might attend any delay in a case of so delicate and dangerous a nature; a risk, which was rendered more serious by the disturbed state of most of the territories under Fort St. George, preferred incurring that danger to the adoption of any measures, which might be deemed precipitate, in an affair where the honour of the British Nation was so much concerned. Acting upon that principle, he contented himself, in the first instance, with writing to the Government of Madras to prosecute their inquiry into the Nabob's conduct, by a personal examination of the Vakeels, Gholaum Ally and Ally Reza Khan, and some other Officers of the late Tip-poo Sultan. He transmitted at the same time

to England all the documents, which had been discovered at Seringapatam, with the Persian translator's report: and stated his opinion, that though the proofs obtained were, no doubt, sufficient to justify the British Government in immediately depriving the Nabob of the means of abusing the protection of the Company; yet he had judged a cautious and moderate proceeding to be more consistent with the character and reputation of the British Government.

Lord Wellesley had directed, that the Government of Madras should take no decisive steps in this affair, unless the Nabob died, (an event rendered probable from the bad state of his Highness's health); in which case, the Madras Government was directed to raise one of two persons to the Musnud; either Hoossain Ally, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah; or Azem u Dowlah, the acknowledged son of Ameer-ul-Omrah, under the previous condition, of their resigning to the Company, on consideration of receiving an annual stipend for the support of their rank, the civil and military Administration of the Carnatic.

The elevation of either of these Princes was, agreeably to his instructions, to be considered as a measure of expediency, not of right, the Governor General considering the right of the family as forfeited by the conduct of Omdut-ul-

Omrah. The Government of Madras was directed to make the first offer to the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah; and in the event of his refusing to subscribe to those conditions, which were thought indispensably necessary, to make a similar proposition to Azeem u Dowlah; and if that Prince rejected the offer, the Madras Government was to refer for farther orders to the Governor General.

A remarkable fact is proved by this letter of instructions to the Government of Fort St. George, which is dated the 28th of March 1800, long before any question of the respective claims to the succession was agitated. It appears from the contents of this document, that the impression upon the Governor General's mind then was, that the right of inheritance (if any such had existed) belonged to Azeem u Dowlah, and that the elevation of Ally Hoossain, the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omrah, would probably give great disgust to the Mahomedans, and induce efforts to defeat the succession.

The Governor General's reasons for directing the first option to be given to Ally Hoossain, are expressly stated in this letter to proceed from causes unconnected with any admission of his claim or title to the Musnud.

The result of the inquiry, which Lord Clive instituted in consequence of the Governor

General's orders, went to establish the principal facts of the treachery both of Wallajah and Omdut-ul-Omrah. The evidences examined, were Gholaum Ally Khan, and Ally Reza; and though some parts of the former proofs were invalidated, all the chief points, upon which the proof of the Nabob's violation of the treaty of 1792 rested, were fully confirmed by their depositions.

The whole of these voluminous examinations, accompanied by a report from Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe (the gentlemen who conducted the inquiry), were transmitted to the Governor General by Lord Clive; with a letter from himself, under date the 23d of May. The impressions, which this farther prosecution of the inquiry into the conduct of the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah, made upon Lord Clive's mind, will be best judged from the two following paragraphs, which concluded his Lordship's official address upon this occasion.

"With this strong evidence of internal treachery, and of open opposition to our interests in the Carnatic, established by treaty, it is my deliberate opinion, that a farther adherence to the letter of the treaty of 1792, while the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah has been, and now is, perfidiously betraying the spirit and substance of the alliance between him and the

“Company, would be as inconsistent with the
“true principles of public faith, as it would be
“obviously incompatible with the preservation
“of our just rights and interests.

“On these grounds, I have no hesitation in
“recommending to your Lordship the imme-
“diate assumption of the civil and military
“Government of the Carnatic, under such pro-
“visions as your Lordship may be pleased to
“authorize for his Highness the Nabob, his
“Highness’s family, and the principal Officers
“of his Government.”

Upon the receipt of this despatch, the Governor General resolved to proceed to Fort St. George, as soon as the season permitted; for the purpose of settling in person an arrangement, which should effectually secure the interests of the Company in the Carnatic. In consequence of this determination, he gave no farther instructions to Lord Clive upon the subject, until the month of March 1801; when finding that the state of affairs in Oude, combined with other circumstances relative to the general Government of India, made it impossible for him to leave Fort William; he directed Lord Clive to send Mr. Webbe, the chief executive Officer of the Madras Government, to Bengal, in order to have the fullest communications with that Officer previously to issuing his final instruc-

tions for the settlement of the Carnatic, and several other important points intimately connected with that arrangement.

When Mr. Webbe was at Fort William, to which he had proceeded, in consequence of the above orders; the alarming state of the Nabob's health induced Lord Clive to address a letter to Lord Wellesley, stating the conduct, which he had resolved to pursue, if the Nabob died previously to his receiving final instructions.

In this letter, which is dated the 21st of May 1801, Lord Clive states, that though the Governor General's letter of the 26th of March 1800, prescribes the line of conduct which he is to follow, if the event apprehended should occur previously to his receiving farther orders, he cannot but think that the circumstances, which have occurred since that letter was written, may so materially have altered the whole case under consideration, as to render it probable, that any measures grounded upon the Governor General's instructions of that date, would be more likely to defeat than promote the objects which he might contemplate, in consequence of the full information, that he had subsequently obtained. Lord Clive in the same letter stated, that if the Nabob should die previously to the arrival of further instructions, he should not follow the instructions, which he had

before received, but assume the civil and military Government of the Carnatic, in the name of the Company, until a plan for it's Government should be finally arranged.

Lord Wellesley was, at the period of receiving this despatch from Lord Clive, in possession of every information, and of every opinion, which could guide or influence his judgment on the decision of this important and delicate question.

A letter had reached him from the President of the Board of Control, who fully coincided in the conclusions which he had drawn from the documents found in Seringapatam, and in the measures which he had declared it was his intention to adopt; and a despatch from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 4th of December 1800, expressed their entire approbation of the resolution, which the Governor General informed them (in a letter dated the 9th of June) he had taken, of demanding some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut-ul-Omrab, than the Company then possessed. The Secret Committee distinctly state in this despatch, that many other circumstances might, in their opinion, be urged, besides those adduced by Lord Wellesley, to strengthen the doubts of the Nabob's fidelity to the fundamental principles of his engagements with the

Company: and they particularly instance the mode in which he evacuated the Fort of Chaudagerry in 1796, on which they remark; "that a more decided instance of disaffection to the Company can scarcely be imagined."

In the full possession of the general sentiments of his superiors in England, and with an improved knowledge of every particular which had attended this important affair, Lord Wellesley sent his final instructions with respect to the measures, which were to be pursued by Lord Clive.

These instructions, which were dated the 28th of May, after taking a complete review of the whole affair, and showing in the most incontrovertible manner, that his Highness the Nabob was reduced by his own conduct to the condition of a public enemy, that he had forfeited every claim to the confidence of the Company, and that it was neither conformable to the dictates of wisdom or prudence, nor reconcileable to justice or policy, to permit him to retain the possession of actual resources, greater than were requisite for the support of the rank, which it should be judged proper to permit him to hold in the Carnatic; directed Lord Clive to stipulate with his Highness for the complete resignation of the civil and military Government of that Province, and to grant him (upon his agreeing

to that and some other conditions) a stipend not exceeding three, and not under two, lacks of pagodas annually; independent of a provision for the other branches of the family, and for his principal Officers, which was to be made from the revenues of the Carnatic.

Upon this basis Lord Clive was instructed to negotiate a treaty with the Nabob; and he was authorized, for the purpose of obtaining his Highness's consent to the terms proposed, to make him acquainted with the proofs of his treachery, which were in the possession of the British Government.

Lord Wellesley expressly stated, that the proposition of forming a treaty on this occasion, was dictated by a desire to consult the dignity of the British Government, and not from any disposition to admit the claims of the Nabob, Mahomed Ally Khan and Omdut-ul-Omrab, to either forbearance or generosity; though, he confessed, it would be painful to be compelled to expose the humiliating proofs of the ingratitude and treachery with which these infatuated Princes had acted towards that Power, which had uniformly proved their guardian and protector.

In the event of the Nabob's refusal of the treaty offered, Lord Clive was directed to assume the Country under a proclamation, which ac-

accompanied the letter of instructions, and which
 fully exhibited the causes of that measure. If
 matters came to this extremity, his Lordship
 was instructed to pay no attention to any appeal,
 which the Nabob might desire to make to the
 Court of Directors, as it was both injudicious
 and unnecessary to listen to such ; more particu-
 larly as the Governor General was in possession
 of the sentiments of the Secret. Committee,
 founded on the discovery of the Nabob's faith-
 less conduct. The admission of any such ap-
 peal, the Governor General stated, would be
 entering upon a formal trial of the Nabob's
 criminality ; whereas the case was one, which
 demanded an immediate exercise of those rights
 and privileges, which every Power possesses, by
 the law of Nations, to secure itself against the
 proved machinations of a faithless Ally. Lord
 Clive was, however, directed, even under the
 extremity of assuming the civil and military
 Government of the Carnatic, to provide for the
 Nabob's support in a liberal manner ; and also
 to make a suitable provision for the different
 branches of his family, and the various Officers
 of his State.

At the period when Lord Wellesley's instruc-
 tions, bearing date the 28th of May, reached
 Madras, the state of the Nabob's health was so
 bad, as to prevent Lord Clive taking any

immediate measures on their receipt. When his Highness's malady had attained a height, that left no hopes of his recovery, intrigues were commenced among the different branches of his family, which disturbed the tranquillity of his palace; and a body of men were secretly introduced into it, by his brother Hissam ul Mulk, who was loud in asserting his pretensions to the succession. These circumstances obliged Lord Clive to send a detachment of the Company's troops, to occupy the chief entrance into the palace, and to preserve order and tranquillity within it's walls; as also to guard against the seizure of any treasure, or the dilapidation of any property, belonging to the Nabob; both of which, it was thought, would probably be attempted at the moment of his death.

This step was taken with a degree of delicacy and precaution, which perfectly reconciled it to the Nabob, who was fully satisfied, by the explanation made to him by Lord Clive, and by the conduct of the troops, that the object of this measure was no more, than what was professed. Indeed it's expediency and necessity could only be arraigned by those, whose sinister views were defeated by it's adoption.

On the 10th of July 1801, the Nabob expired, and the dangerous intrigues, which had been carried on in his palace; the state of several

Provinces* under the Government of Fort St. George, and a variety of other urgent reasons, forbade (in Lord Clive's opinion) a moment's delay in effecting a settlement of the Country. He, in consequence, a few hours after he heard of his Highness's death, deputed Mr. Webb, and Lieut. Colonel Close, to confer with the principal Officers of the Court, in order to effect an immediate arrangement for the Administration of the Carnatic.

These gentlemen had an immediate conference with the two guardians of the young Prince Ally Hoossain. But, though their negotiation was continued several days, and was conducted with the greatest temper and judgment, it entirely failed; and they found themselves obliged, after the guardians had formally refused their assent to enter into any treaty, which was grounded on the basis of the civil and military Government of the Carnatic being vested in the Company, to express their desire to see Ally Hoossain, and to receive from him in person the final answer to a proposal, in which his interests were so deeply concerned.

To their request for this interview, the Khans made many objections, grounded on the alleged

* A very serious civil war at this period existed in the southern Provinces of Fort St. George.

incapacity and inexperience of the young man; but, these being overruled, they were at last obliged to give a reluctant consent to the meeting.

On the 19th, Colonel Close and Mr. Webb were introduced to Ally Hoossain, the reputed son of the Nabob (a youth of 18 years of age), and stated to him, in a summary manner, all that had passed with his guardians; adding, that on a point, which so materially involved his interests, they were naturally desirous of hearing his own sentiments, and resolution, before they terminated a negotiation, with which all his prospects of elevation must close. The young man answered (the guardians being present); that he considered the Khans to have been appointed by his father, for the purpose of assisting him with advice; and that the object of his councils, and theirs, could never be separated.

On receiving this answer, Colonel Close and Mr. Webb informed the Khans, that Lord Clive had resolved, previously to the adoption of final measures on a subject of such importance, to have a personal interview with Ally Hoossain; and that his Lordship would come to the tent of the Officer commanding the troops stationed at the palace, for that purpose. This proposal was unexpected; and the Khans

endeavoured to evade it, by objections similar to those which they had before urged relative to the incapacity and inexperience of the young man: but finding their arguments of no avail, they consented; and both went to prepare Ally Hoossain's equipage and retinue. The young man, taking advantage of their momentary absence, whispered, with much apparent anxiety, to Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe, that he had been deceived by his guardians; and, after this communication, he proceeded, without attending to the Khans, to the tent where it was fixed he should have an interview with Lord Clive.

When the ceremony of his introduction to his Lordship was over, Ally Hoossain's attendants (including the guardians) being desired to withdraw, Lord Clive, after adverting to the whole of the negotiation, which had passed, informed him of the serious consequences of any resolution he might take; and stated the personal anxiety, which he felt, that Ally Hoossain should be clearly apprized of his situation; and determine with caution, on a point of such importance to his individual interests and reputation, as well as to those of his family.

Ally Hoossain, without hesitation, declared in the most explicit manner, that the conferences had been conducted by the Khans without his participation, and that he much disap-

proved of the termination to which they had been brought.

Upon this declaration, it was judged proper to recapitulate, in the most distinct manner, every part of the transaction; and, after the fullest comprehension of the whole subject, the young man declared his readiness to enter into an arrangement, grounded upon the basis of the Company exercising the civil and military Government of the Carnatic.

He was very particular as to the secondary parts of the arrangement; such as the provision for his personal expenses, and the extent of his power over the treasure of the late Nabob, which he evidently considered to be large.

This conference, which was frequently interrupted by the importunity of Nejeeb Khan, terminated by the young man's desiring, that a treaty should be made out, resting upon a basis, which vested the entire civil and military Government of the Carnatic in the Honourable Company; which, he said, a conviction, that it was for his benefit, and that of his family, would lead him to execute with, or without the consent of his guardians.

On the 20th, Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe again went to the palace, where they were met by the two Khans, and Ally Hoossain. The latter began the conference, by retracing every

thing, which he said to Lord Clive at the private interview, and declaring his fixed resolution to abide by the opinion of his guardians.

This extraordinary change was supposed, at first, to have proceeded from fear; and an adjournment to the tent, to meet Lord Clive, was proposed, and carried into execution. On their arrival there, the young man's attendants and guardians were dismissed, and he was left in private with his Lordship. He there repeated, in the most firm tone, his resolution to abide by the advice of the Khans, and his unalterable determination to accept of no engagement, which had for its basis the cession of the civil and military Government of the Carnatic. He had spoken the day before, he said, under the impression of the moment; but he had since received full information, and he now acted agreeably to his own sentiments, and to those of the whole family, who had been convened for the purpose of assisting his judgment. He was fully convinced, he added, of the risks he encountered, having received communications, the truth of which he could not doubt, respecting the Governor General's orders. But he was prepared to meet every danger, rather than subscribe to the conditions proposed.

No argument was left untried by Lord Clive, which could persuade or convince this young

Prince, that he was misled to his ruin, and that his prosperity depended upon a compliance with the demands of the Company's Government. It was in vain, that his Lordship pointed out, in the most clear manner, the situation in which he stood; the motives which influenced his adherents in persuading him to a course incompatible with his true interests; and the certain distress into which he must inevitably bring himself, and all those dependent upon him, by a perseverance in his refusal of the terms proposed.

Ally Hoossain remained unmoved; and Lord Clive was at length reluctantly obliged to inform him, that he had forfeited all claim to consideration, and must await the extreme measures, which his conduct had rendered unavoidable.

All hopes of concluding a treaty with the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Ömrah were now at an end; that young Prince had, in the most deliberate manner, terminated a negotiation, which had been conducted throughout with a degree of temper and moderation, that reflected the highest credit upon those to whom it was intrusted; and which had been marked, at its most important stages, by the extreme of kindness and humanity, on the part of Lord Clive; by refusing his assent to any engagement founded upon the principles, which had been

stated from the first, as indispensable: viz. "The Company being vested with the civil and military Government of the Carnatic."

The situation of the territories under Fort St. George (part of which were in rebellion), was unfavourable to any measure, however grounded on justice, that excluded the family of Mahomed Ally Khan altogether from the dignity of Nabob; and the Governor therefore resolved on raising Azeem u Dowlah to the Musnud.

The right of this Prince to the succession (if all rights had not been forfeited) was perhaps stronger than that of the reputed son of Qindut ul Omrah. But this was not investigated; the act being declared one of expediency and grace, not of right or of justice. His claims were only to be considered of consequence, as they served to reconcile the great body of the Mahomedan inhabitants of the English territories, and the Mahomedan Rulers of neighbouring States, to the measure.

When Lord Clive adopted this resolution, he deputed Colonel Close and Mr. Webb to negotiate with the Prince Azeem u Dowlah; a treaty founded on the same basis, as that which they had been directed to propose to Ally Hoossein. Difficulties of a serious nature occurred, as to their seeing this Prince, as he was kept in a most rigorous confinement; and it was feared,

that, should any idea be entertained of his intended elevation, it might prove dangerous to his life. The difficulties, however, were removed by an occurrence, which evinced a contempt for the Company's authority, that required immediate check and interference. The guardians of Ally Hoossain, impatient of the delays which had occurred, privately placed that Prince upon the Musnud; and it was reported to Lord Clive, that they proposed performing that ceremony publicly next day. As there was no calculating the confusion which such a proceeding might occasion, his Lordship gave immediate orders for the Company's troops to take possession of the whole palace, and to remove all the Nabob's guards.

One effect of this measure, was to bring Azeem u Dowlah under the protection of the English troops; and on the 23d and 24th he had interviews with Colonel Close, and Mr. Webbe, at which he settled with those gentlemen the basis of a treaty, which was finally concluded on the 25th of July: and on the 26th this Prince was introduced to Lord Clive, and conducted to the palace of Ameer Bagh, the former residence of his father.

In the course of the interview, which Azeem u Dowlah had with Colonel Close and Mr.

Webbe, a good deal of discussion took place on the subordinate articles of the treaty; and the Prince showed, on this occasion, that he was neither deficient in quickness nor good sense; and that he was fully equal, as far as depended on personal qualifications, to the support of the rank to which he had been elevated.

This treaty, which vested the whole civil and military Government of the Carnatic in the Company provided for the Nabob's enjoyment of a clear revenue of from two to three lacks of pagodas annually,* unencumbered by any charge; and also for the liberal support of all the different branches of the family of Mahomed Ally Khan. It also settled for a gradual liquidation of such, as were deemed just, of those large debts, with which a long system of usury, extravagance, and oppression, had encumbered the revenues of the Carnatic; and which was rapidly involving this Country in ruin.

Lord Wellesley left India on the 20th of August 1805, soon after the Marquis Corn-

* The sum fixed for the support of the Nabob was one fifth of the revenues of the Carnatic: and the Company agreed, that he should, under all circumstances, receive, in advance of the fifth to which he was entitled, twelve thousand pagodas per month for his personal expenses.

wallis, who had been appointed to succeed him, had reached Fort William. I shall conclude the narrative which I have given of this Nobleman's Administration, with some general observations upon the leading political measures which he adopted; the impressions they made; and the general result of his Government to the British interests in India.

The state of India, at the period of Lord Wellesley's arrival, compelled him (as has been before shown) to the immediate employment of all the resources of the great Empire committed to his charge. The restoration of the alliance with the Nizam, and the complete destruction of the formidable French party at his Court, were objects, the necessity as well as policy of which have never been denied. Their accomplishment was necessary, not only to enable us to engage in a war, which we could not avert, with Tippoo Sultaun; but to crush a rising danger of perhaps the most serious magnitude that ever threatened our dominions in India.

The most serious alarm had arisen in England, respecting the intentions, which the French were supposed at this period to cherish against our Eastern possessions; and the connexion of their efforts in India with their invasion of Egypt, was doubted by none. Buonaparte's

letter to Tippoo Sultaun* was of itself conclusive evidence on this point; and it was evident that the French had, at the commencement of Lord Wellesley's Administration, those means, which were of all others the best calculated to give success to the designs, which they were known to cherish against the British Government. Their influence at the Court of Tippoo was decided. His union with them was grounded upon a congenial feeling of hatred to the English name. At the Court of Scindiah, who was still more powerful than the Sultaun, the French had more than influence: they had power. They had founded an Empire of their

This letter, which was dated Head Quarters at Cairo the 7th of Pluviose, and 7th year of the Republic, was as follows:

"You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, full of the desire of releasing, and relieving you from the iron yoke of England.

"I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the pleasure I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

"I could even wish you could send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer. May the Almighty increase your power, and destroy your enemies!

"Yours, &c. &c.
"BUONAPARTE."

own within the dominions of that Prince. The whole of Hindoostan, from the River Sultage to the borders of the unsettled Country of the Vizier of Oude, was in possession of an army of nearly forty thousand infantry, with an immense train of artillery, and every military resource; commanded by a body of about three hundred European Officers, of which not more than forty were British subjects; and these (who were for the most part in subordinate stations), it was the evident object of their French superiors to disgust, that they might make way for others, on whom they could better depend, when that crisis, which they always contemplated, arrived.

At Hyderabad the power of the French was considerable, as they had an army of fourteen thousand disciplined troops, with a large and well appointed train of cannon at their devotion; but their influence had not yet conquered that of the English at the Court of the Nizam. That Prince had too just a dread of Tippoo Sultan, and the Mahrattas, to listen readily to councils, which were calculated to involve him with the only State, that had the power of protecting him from such enemies: and, though he was too wise to resign those means of defence, to which the neutral policy of the British Government had compelled him to resort, without

an adequate security against danger, he did not hesitate to make every sacrifice, which was required of him, the moment he received a decided pledge of protection against the Mahrattas. It must here be recollected, that it was impossible for Lord Wellesley either to engage in that war with Tippoo, which was then inevitable, or to expel the French from the Deekan (which was an act of equal, if not greater necessity), without agreeing to give the Nizam that promise of protection against the future unprovoked aggressions of the Mahrattas, which he had constantly solicited from the first hour of his intimate alliance with the English in 1788, and which Lord Cornwallis had only declined on the ground, that such a measure would be offensive to the Mahrattas, who were at that moment as cordial in their alliance with the English Government against Tippoo, as the Nizam was. The consideration, which had chiefly influenced Lord Cornwallis's determination, no longer existed; the power of the Poonah State, with whom the triple alliance had been formed, was almost extinct; and its resources were at the direction of a Chief (Doulut Row Scindiah), who was more likely to join in a combination against the British Government, than to aid it to repel the attack, or frustrate the plans, of its enemies.

Under such circumstances, Lord Wellesley could not have rejected the just demand of the Nizam, without incurring the most serious dangers; and, indeed, exposing the Empire under his charge to all the consequences of meeting, without Allies, a war with Tippoo Sultaun; and a combination of all the means, which France could bring in aid of that attack upon our power. He was compelled, therefore, by attention to the safety of the British territories, to conclude the treaty of Hyderabad. This measure gave rise to a series of events, which completely changed the condition of the British Government in India. It's first consequence, was the overthrow of Tippoo Sultaun, and the establishment of the Government of Mysore; and it's second, was to effect such a complete alteration of our political relations with the Mahratta States, that it was early evident, we must either retract the engagement which we had formed, and abandon the territories we had acquired; or endeavour, by negotiation, to make the principal Mahratta Chiefs modify their policy, and habits of rule, to the altered situation of the political state of the Peninsula.

The Mahrattas, it is true, had, from the period of the conclusion of the treaty of Salbhye, respected our territories, and those of the Allies which we were bound to protect: but these, it

is to be observed, had before only joined theirs in one quarter, that of Oude; and, from the date of the treaty of Salbhye, both Madhaje Scindiah, and his successor Doulut Row, had been too intently fixed upon consolidating a power in Hindoostan, which would make them masters of the Mahratta Empire, to think of offending the British Government by any predatory attack upon the territories of it's Ally, the Vizier of Oude. But the causes of this forbearance were hourly generating a more serious evil to the British power: and that neutrality, which we thought recompensed, by this temporary exemption from attack, left us, in it's result, exposed to a more imminent danger than the British arms in India have ever had to encounter.

In other quarters of India, our territories were remote from those of the Mahrattas. We had interposed the Countries of the Nizam, and those of Tippoo Sultaun, between us and those freebooters. But, when a course of policy, the expediency, justice and necessity of which have never been questioned, led us to form an intimate alliance with the Nizam, by which we became bound to defend his territories as we would our own; when a Government was established in Mysore, under our immediate guarantee and protection; we of course virtually suc-

ceeded to all the local and political relations, which subsisted between the Mahrattas and those States.

The previous history of these Countries will show, that a year had hardly ever passed without some dispute arising between them and the Mahrattas; and, as the causes of such quarrels were interwoven in the system of the Mahratta Government, we could only hope for exemption from the constant disputes and wars with which we were threatened, by the adoption of one of the courses, which I have before stated. The first was: to retract our pledged faith to the Nizam, and the Government of Mysore, and to abandon our conquests. The second: to endeavour to effect, by negotiation, a change in the constitution of the Mahratta Government, and to render that more favourable to the maintenance of the general peace and tranquillity.

To adopt the first of those measures would have been as disgraceful, as it was ruinous; and it could not, therefore, under any modifications, have been attempted. The second, was the safest, as well as the most moderate course; and the divided state of the Mahratta Empire gave some reason to hope, that it might be accomplished without the extreme of war. But as that, at an early period of our negotiations, appeared almost unavoidable; and as it was evident

nothing but their fears could prevent the Mahratta Chiefs from immediately commencing hostilities, it seemed wise to seize every political advantage, which was likely either to add to their motives for avoiding a contest, or to increase our means of making that successful, if it became inevitable. These were the grounds of our negotiations with the Court of Poona; without an alliance with which, it was evident, from the state of India at the moment, we could not maintain our engagements with the Court of Hyderabad or the Rajah of Mysore; unless we had resolved on assembling an army on the frontier, to secure the system of neutrality, which we had adopted, being respected: and as we could place no reliance on their faith, this expensive precaution against the designs of the Mahrattas must have been repeated, whenever the armies of that Nation were in the field; or, in other words, every year. We should, in short, have had to preserve an armed neutrality, when the Mahratta Chiefs were contending with each other, and to have made still greater preparations against danger, when those contentions were ended, either by their union,* or by the establishment of the paramount power of

* Their attack of the Nizam, in 1795, affords a remarkable instance of their uniting, when an object of plunder was in view.

one Chieftain. Our finances must have sunk under this ruinous system; and we could have indulged no hopes of it's termination, as our views, and those of the Mahrattas, were irreconcilable. They desired power, for no object but that of extending their depredations: we, for that of maintaining tranquillity. Under such circumstances, it appeared alike indispensable for the safety of our own territories, and those of our Allies, to conclude an alliance with the Paishwah, which should not only secure him in the enjoyment of his hereditary possessions, but give him an interest in the preservation of the peace of the Deckan.

From these observations it will appear, that Lord Wellesley was more governed by considerations of necessity, than of choice, in his anxious pursuit of an alliance with the Court of Poonah. It was a desire to avoid, not to provoke war, which stimulated him to the efforts which he made. His policy in this instance, as in all others, was directed to the permanent security of the State he ruled; and though most solicitous for an amicable termination of the different negotiations, which that course led him into, he accounted no measure worthy of his adoption, which obtained a temporary exemption from danger, at any hazard to the fame

or future tranquillity of the British Government.

The ultimate success, in forming a defensive alliance with the Paishwah, and the glorious termination of the war with the Mahratta Chiefs, have been already related. The actual result of those events soon refuted all those prognostications, which men, who took a limited or prejudiced view of this great question, had hazarded respecting its consequences: and Lord Wellesley had the gratification to see, before he left India, almost every hope, which he had formed, from the wise and enlarged measures that he had adopted, completely accomplished.

To show this in a more clear point of view, it will be necessary to glance at the actual state of India at the period of his departure.

The designs of the French against the British Government, as far as those depended upon the great aid, which that Nation might have expected from its subjects in India,* were com-

* The nature and extent of these designs are now generally understood. The quality and numbers of the military staff sent to Pondicherry with General De Caen, was of itself conclusive as to the hopes which the French Government entertained from adding to the strength and efficiency of this means of attacking our power.

pletely frustrated. The old and venerable Emperor of Dehli, who had been in the hands of the Mahrattas, and latterly of the French party established in Hindoostan, was relieved from all his distress, and enjoyed, under the protection of the British Government, an affluent repose.

Secunder Jah,* the Soubahdar of the Deckan, who had succeeded his father in the year 1803, was completely confirmed in his alliance with the Company; and maintained permanently, within his territories, a subsidiary force of one regiment of Europeans, two corps of native cavalry, six battalions of Sepoys, and a proportionate train of artillery; and the expense of this large field force was defrayed by a territorial cession, which consisted of Provinces, which had been conquered from Tippoo, and ceded to this Prince; whose revenues had, subsequently to the last treaty, received a considerable accession, from the conquest of Berar, and the

* The British Resident at Hyderabad was directed to give this Prince, who was the eldest son of the Nizam, the full and unconditional support of the British Government. Secunder Jah, in gratitude for this aid, made a cession of an annual tribute of seven lacks of rupees, which the Company have long paid the Soubahdar of the Deckan for the Northern Circars. This cession was not received by Lord Wellesley, who considered it at variance with those principles of disinterested policy, on which it had been resolved to support Secunder Jah, in his succession to the throne of his father.

cession to him of the share held by the Rajah of Berar in that rich Province.

The complete reduction of the Mahratta Chiefs,—Scindiah, Ragojee Bhonslah, and Holkar,—had freed the Soubahdar of the Deckan from every alarm respecting his future safety; and had given to his subjects a tranquillity, which they had never before enjoyed.

The Government of Tippoo Sultaun was annihilated; and the family of the former Rajahs of Mysore were raised, by the magnanimity of the British Government, to that throne, of which they had been thirty-eight years deprived; by the usurpation of Hyder Ally Khan and his son. The considerations, which led Lord Wellesley to make this arrangement, have been noticed; but it will be useful to say a few words on it's operation.

The general theory of this Government is, that of a Prince exercising an independent authority over his own Country, and maintaining sufficient force to preserve it's internal quiet, and to contribute eventually to the aid of an Ally, which charges itself with the defence of his territories from all foreign attack; and which, to enable it to fulfil this stipulation, has a large body of subsidized troops stationed within his territories, and is vested with the

sole and exclusive conduct of all foreign relations.

The success of reducing this theory into practice, would evidently depend upon the care and wisdom with which the connexion was watched in it's infancy; and this point received, as it merited, all Lord Wellesley's attention. The example of the Courts of Lucknow, of Chepauk,* and Tanjore, furnished an ample chart to show the rocks, which were to be avoided on this occasion: and, though the origin of our connexion with Mysore differed widely from that which we had formed with those Princes; as our task with the former was establishment, with the latter reform; there was still cause to fear, that, if the greatest caution was not used, the young Rajah of Mysore, and his Ministers, would soon fall into a course of intrigue and corruption, which would bring ruin on his Country and it's inhabitants, and consequently defeat all those objects which had been expected from the establishment of this Government.

There appeared another obstacle of still greater magnitude to the happy operation of this arrangement. The State of Mysore was so really dependent upon the British Government,

* Nabobs of the Carnatic.

that it appeared difficult, if not impossible, consistently with the check, which it was necessary to maintain over it's Councils, to raise those, by whom it was ruled, into that estimation and rank, with themselves and others, which was necessary to enable them to perform the important functions with which they were trusted. This condition of the young State required, that the first public Officers of the Power by whom it had been created, should, while they exercised a firm but delicate, and, as far as possible, unseen control, make it their particular duty to support, in the most public and decided manner, it's power; and to raise, by every effort, it's consequence and reputation, as an efficient and separate State.

The early and successful accomplishment of all the objects, which the establishment of this Government was meant to effect, "is," (as Major Wilkes observes, in his clear and able report on the affairs of Mysore,) "next to those measures of a general nature, which directed the great arrangements of that period, to be attributed to the energy, the talents, and cordial co-operation, of the uncommon men,"*

* The name of the able writer of this report must ever occupy a distinguished place among those, who have contributed, by their integrity and talents, to the happy operation of this great arrangement.

“ who were selected for the execution of the
“ civil and military duties; and to the fortunate
“ choice of a Dewan,* who, to a mind of
“ singular vigour, added an extensive acquaintance
“ with the resources of the Country, and
“ an intimate knowledge of characters; and
“ was thus capable of collecting and combining,
“ at once, all that had been useful in the establishment
“ of the late Government.”

Our relations with the Government of Mysore, though admirable, are of that delicate texture, which must make them require constant attention. The smallest departure from any of those fundamental principles upon which they are grounded, will infallibly lead to their ultimate dissolution: but, while those are respected, this connexion will form the bulwark of our strength in the south of India; and it may, in the course of events, be a consideration of policy to increase, instead of diminishing, the wealth and limits of a State, which, while it affords us resources fully equal to the same extent of our own dominions, is exempt from some of the objections of rule to which those are subject; and particularly to that popular,

* Poorneah, a Brahmin, who was Minister of finance under Tippoo Sultaun, and was selected by Lord Wellesley as the fittest person to fill the office of Prime Minister to the young Rajah of Mysore.

and, to a certain degree, true one, of not giving sufficient employment to the different classes of military inhabitants.

Superficial observers have been too ready to compare our connexion with Mysore, to that with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, and the Rajah of Tanjore; and to conclude on general, but erroneous principles, that it would soon run it's course; as it carried, like them, the seeds of it's own destruction, and was (from it's very nature) at variance with duration. But a very little reflection will show the radical difference, which subsists in those connexions. Our relations with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, and the Rajah of Tanjore, were gradual in their formation; and they were, from their origin, marked by intrigue and corruption. The revenues of those States were anticipated by usurious loans; and individuals (often high in rank in the English Government) benefited too largely by this usage, to attend to those dictates of public virtue, which must, if they had been attended to, have taught them, that such a system must not only prevent the State, by which it was followed, from ever being an useful Ally, but accelerate it's destruction. And when at last this obvious result was forced upon our observation, it was too late for remedy. The deep-rooted evil could not be eradicated;

and the Governments above mentioned have, from the occurrence of different emergencies, naturally sunk into that condition of complete dependence on the British Government, in which (considering the vitious principles of their constitution) they could alone be allowed to exist.

It is also of importance to remark, that these Governments have, from the causes stated, progressively declined in power and splendour from the period of their connexion with the English; and though there can be little doubt but they would, if that connexion had not been formed, have long ago been subdued by their powerful neighbours, the probability of that event has in all likelihood seldom entered their imagination. It was indeed natural, that the minds of the Nabobs of Arcot, the Viziers of Oude, and Rajahs of Tanjore, and their dependents, should have dwelt chiefly upon their past glory; and the sentiments they have entertained of the English Government have been such, as were likely to arise from a comparison of that, with their actual condition; and a conviction as strong, as it was erroneous, that the great reverse was solely produced by their connexion with that State.

The Mysore Government presents a perfect contrast to this picture. It has been created

by the generosity of the British Government; and that weight of original obligation must long operate, and attach * it to the State to which it owes its existence. It must also give popularity, and the appearance, as well as the reality, of justice to that right, which the English Government has acquired (and which is sanctioned by the form of treaty), of exercising a liberal control over the Administration of the affairs of Mysore; and of directing, in a general way, the disposal of its revenue, the organization of its army, and the employment of its resources. Hitherto that right has been exercised in a manner, that has added to the wealth, population and prosperity, of Mysore. The attachment of that State has been tried, and it has exceeded expectation. Throughout the whole of the Mahratta war, no part of the Company's territories, of the same extent, afforded such resources in men, money and grain, as Mysore; and these were supplied with a voluntary and forward zeal, which stamped practically, and

* During the late mutiny at Vellore, though the name of the family of Tippoo Sultaun was the watchword of revolt, not a man in the army of Mysore (upwards of 10,000 in number), not an inhabitant of that country, was convicted of either mutiny or treason.—a proof (beyond all opinion) of the vigilance, vigour, and excellence of the existing Government, as well as of the general attachment of its subjects.

therefore incontrovertibly, the happy operation of the alliance.

This Government has, no doubt, it's defects: but it is as good, I believe, as it is possible for a native Government to be: and it is, as far as we are yet concerned with it's Administration, pure. There have hitherto been no intrigues at the Rajah's Court, no clashing of authorities, no corruption, no usurious loans; and consequently no anticipation of revenue, that fruitful source of ruin and oppression.

These are the great, and radical points, on which this connexion differs from those we have formed with the Nabob of Arcot, the Vizier of Oude, the Rajah of Tanjore, and many of the inferior States in India. And, if we have wisdom, and courage to defend those principles of purity from every attack, we may promise ourselves a continued source of improving strength from our alliance with Mysore. It is, however, the misfortune of this connexion (as I before stated), that it's nature, though excellent, is so delicate, that it is perhaps more liable to injury from inattention, or from a cessation of active and spirited support, than it is from a bold and unblushing attack. The Mysore State is, in fact, so actually dependent upon us; and that dependence is so marked by the number of British troops stationed in it's territories, that

nothing but the English Government being constantly alive to the character and value of the connexion, can keep it in that state of elevation and respectability, which appear to be absolutely necessary for its existence.

As the revenues of Mysore have greatly increased, from its ameliorated system of management, and the internal tranquillity, which it has enjoyed; that State has had, after the payment of the Company's subsidy, and of its own civil and military establishments, a considerable surplus revenue; part of which has been annually employed in great and useful works. Its canals, public roads, and bridges, already surpass those of any Province in India; and will (if the same active spirit of improvement continues) soon rival those of the most civilized parts of Europe.

Such was the change which Lord Wellesley, on his departure for England, had to contemplate in a Country, which, when he arrived in India, was in possession of a tyrant, who had no object but that of collecting means to annihilate the British power in India.

The authority of the Company had, as I have before stated, been completely introduced into the Carnatic; and that fine Country, no longer a prey to a system of usury and oppression, was rising rapidly into prosperity. Even those,

who questioned the justice of the arrangement with the Nabob, could not deny the great amelioration of the condition of the inhabitants, and the Country.

The conquest of Cuttack had connected the territories of Madras and Bengal; and, combined with the important cessions we had before obtained in Guzerat, Malabar, and Canara, gave the Company the possession of almost the whole line of sea-coast, from the mouths of the Ganges to those of the Indus.

The subordinate Government of Bombay had obtained, during the Administration of Lord Wellesley, a great and essential addition to its resources, by the territories in Guzerat ceded by the Paishwah and Scindiah, and by the Guickwar, with whom the Government of Bombay, acting under that nobleman's orders, had formed a subsidiary alliance: and this important Presidency had become, from this acquisition, more equal to answer those calls, which it appeared likely, from the state of Europe, might be eventually made on its military resources.

The Paishwah, whose natural weakness of character had led him to hesitate at entering into a defensive treaty with the British Government, had proved a most faithful and useful Ally. Early sensible of the advantages, which

the connexion brought to him and his subjects, he endeavoured, by every means within his power, to evince his fidelity to the engagements that he had formed : and his territories, which had been, from the day of his accession, till that on which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, annually wasted by his rebellious Feudatories, had enjoyed from that date uninterrupted tranquillity. The subsidiary corps, in the territories of this Prince, was stationed forty miles to the northward of Poonah ; and formed, with the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, a complete chain of defence against any possible attack, which could be made ; and not only covered the frontiers of the Paishwah and Nizam, and secured the internal tranquillity of the Countries of these Princes ; but gave permanent security and peace to all the southern parts of the Peninsula.

The power of Doulut Row Scindiah had been completely reduced ; and at the period of Lord Wellesley's departure, though that Prince continued discontented at the alienation of Gohud and Gwalier, which he continued to hope he might regain through the liberality of that State by which he had been vanquished, he was nowise inclined to a renewal of hostilities. He had, indeed, shown a decided aversion to the violent councils of his Minister and father-in-

law, Surjee Row Gautka, who had endeavoured, by every means, to involve him with the British Government; and, among others, had recourse to the disgraceful and cowardly expedient, of attacking the escort, and plundering the baggage, of the acting British Resident with Scindiah's camp.

Jeswunt Row Holkar was at this period reduced from the condition, which he had once enjoyed, of a Chief at the head of a State with regular resources, to that of a freebooter commanding a body of dispirited troops, who had nothing but plunder to depend upon; but whom, it was evident, he never could again persuade to meet the British armies in the field, or indeed to trust themselves within fifty miles of an English force.*

In the quarter of Hindoostan, all those great prospects, which Lord Wellesley had contemplated at the commencement of the war, had been completely realized. The French party had been annihilated, the Mahrattas expelled, the British Government established over the whole of the Duab, and along the right banks of the Jumnah, and a line of petty States, from

* The last campaign this Chief made, was literally a rapid flight before the British troops, from the day he entered their territories to the westward of Dehli, to that of his arrival at Amratsir, in the Punjaub, where he concluded a treaty with Lord Lake.

the mountains of Cumaoun to Bundelcund, under the protection of the British Government; were established as a barrier between its most fruitful Provinces, and the future predatory encroachments of the Mahrattas. The rich Province of Bundelcund was subdued, and occupied by British troops; and the Countries, ceded by the Vizier in 1801, were completely settled, and greatly improved in revenue; while that Prince was not only reconciled, but happy, under a change, which left him undisturbed, and in perfect security to pursue his favourite pleasures, and to amass treasure.

It would be endless to attempt to take a view of the minor arrangements of Lord Wellesley's Government: it will be sufficient to observe, that they were all made in the same spirit of radical and substantial improvement, as those which have been described; and were all equally attended with permanent benefit to the public interests. The general result of his Administration changed the face of India: and a course of events, as extraordinary, as they were important, gave an entire new character to the British power in that quarter of the globe; which, at the close of this nobleman's Government, was completely paramount to that of all the States in India; and at liberty to choose, as its wisdom should direct, that course of policy;

which seemed best suited to it's new condition. It had, from the nature of the events which had occurred, and the manner in which it's power was established, no danger to fear, either from the efforts of any one State, or a confederacy. The discontent of Scindiah, and the continued hostility of Holkar, at the period at which I write, cannot affect this conclusion; as it has been shown, that the condition of these Chiefs was such, as to prevent the apprehension of any evil from their attack, beyond a short continuation of that embarrassment in our finances, which had been the unavoidable consequence of the great exertions which had been made, but which it is evident was of a very temporary nature; as the improvement of our own revenues, the receipts from the conquered Countries, and those reductions, which Lord Wellesley had commenced before he left India, not only promised a speedy relief to this pressure, but gave a prospect of an early and large surplus revenue from our possessions in India.

The great success, which attended Lord Wellesley's Administration of British India, is, on a general view, calculated to excite astonishment: nor will that be diminished by a nearer contemplation of the manner in which he ruled the large Empire committed to his charge. His great mind pervaded the whole; and a por-

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tion of his spirit was infused into every agent, whom he employed; his authority was as fully recognised in the remotest parts of British India, as in Fort William; all sought his praise; all dreaded his censure; his confidence in those he employed was unlimited; and they were urged to exertion by every motive that can stimulate a good or proud mind to action. He was as eager to applaud, as he was reluctant to condemn, those whom he believed conscientious in the discharge of their public duty. It was the habit of his mind to be slow in council, but rapid in action; and he expected the greatest efforts from those he employed in the execution of his measures, whom he always relieved from every species of vexatious counteraction and delay, which could arise from the untimely intrusion of official forms, or the unreasonable pretensions of lesser authorities. It was, indeed, with him a principle, to clothe them with all the power they could require, to effect those objects, which they were instructed to attain; and, though there can be no doubt of the great and extraordinary merit of the distinguished Officers, who commanded the British armies during his Administration, it is to that liberal confidence, which gave them all the impression of the fullest power, and the most complete scope for the exercise of their judgment, that

their unparalleled success is chiefly to be ascribed.

It could not be a matter of surprise to those, the least acquainted with the clashing of opinions, that prevailed in England, with regard to the Government of British India, and knew the various interests which are affected by the changes in that Country, to find that a strong and violent prejudice had been excited against Lord Wellesley ; and that numbers were for a moment led, by partial and distorted statements of his Administration, to conceive that it had been as ruinous, as it was in fact glorious, to the British Government. Truth has already obtained a victory ; and that nobleman now enjoys, in the just admiration of his Country, the highest reward that can attend eminent public service.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND ADMINISTRATION
OF
MARQUIS CORNWALLIS;
AND
ADMINISTRATION
OF
SIR GEORGE BARLOW,
Till the Conclusion of Peace with
JESWUNT ROW HOLKAR.

CONTENTS.

Observations upon the Public Feeling in England respecting Lord Wellesley's Administration.—Marquis Cornwallis succeeds him.—Account of the Negotiations with Scindiah.—British Resident released from the Camp of that Chief.—Instructions from the Governor General respecting the Treaty to be concluded with Scindiah.—Observations of Lord Lake upon the Policy of these Instructions.—View of the Connexion of the Company with the Rajah of Jypore.—Death of Lord

Cornwallis.—Character of that Nobleman.—Succeeded by Sir George Barlow.—Treaty concluded with Scindiah.—Correspondence respecting some Articles in it.—Treaty of Peace with Holkar.—Despatch from Lord Lake respecting the Rajah of Jypore.—Dissolution of the Alliance with that Prince.—General Reflections arising from a View of the Line of Policy pursued in these Transactions.

THE nature of the public feeling in England has been noticed in the last Chapter. Much alarm was excited by an indistinct and exaggerated apprehension of the evils, which it was imagined would result from the system of policy pursued by Lord Wellesley, and the ruinous wars in which the Government of India was thought to be involved. This feeling was rendered more general and popular among all persons in England, connected with the Company, from the increase of the Indian debt; the interest of which, combined with the want of sales for their accumulated investments, threatened that body with immediate distress, which many were desirous of exclusively ascribing to the political measures of the Governor General of India; and not, in any degree, to that immense loss, to which, from the nature of the war in Europe, the commerce of the Company was at this period subject. The little knowledge, which many of the most liberal and best informed persons in England have of the detail of Indian

politics, added to the remoteness of the scene, and the general nature of the accounts from that quarter, gave the greatest advantage to those, who desired at this period to make impressions upon the public mind unfavourable to the Administration of Lord Wellesley. But it is only just to observe, that many, who were most violent against that Nobleman's measures, were perfectly conscientious in the sentiments which they entertained, and expressed on this subject; for it required the most complete, and indeed minute information, with respect to the changes which had occurred, before even men of enlarged and liberal minds (who had to view this question at a distance) could be competent to pronounce with justice, on a revolution so great and extraordinary, and so inconsistent with established opinions and rooted prejudices, as that, which had taken place within the few years during which Lord Wellesley presided over the British interests in the East.

To minds acting under the influence of such feelings as those I have described, it was natural to look round for a remedy for those great evils, which they apprehended; and no one can be astonished, that the choice of Lord Cornwallis, as a successor to Lord Wellesley, was a measure, which met, at such a moment, with almost general approbation in England: and to those

acquainted with that venerable nobleman's character, it will be a subject of still less surprise, that his accumulated years and infirmities did not render him insensible to such a call. Though his health was in a most declining state, he caught, with that enthusiasm which belongs only to good and great minds, at the prospect of performing one more important service to his Country, before he died; and he listened, as was natural, with avidity to those who, desirous of the authority of his great name to their plans, represented to him, that his presence alone could save from inevitable ruin that Empire, which he had before ruled with such glory. It is to the impression made upon his mind by such representations, and to the infirm state of this nobleman's health, which could not but in some degree impair the strength and vigour of his mind, that we must ascribe the difference in character of those few political measures, which he adopted, during his last short Administration of the affairs of British India, from those which distinguished his first Government.

The Marquis Cornwallis arrived at Fort William in July 1805. The state of all the native Powers, at this period, has already been minutely described. It is only necessary to add,

that the acting Resident* at the Court of Daulat Row Scindiah was still detained in the camp of that Chief, though Lord Lake had not only required his release, but had informed Scindiah, that a recommencement of hostilities would be the certain consequence of his non-compliance with this demand. As this communication had produced no effect, Lord Lake, in a letter to that Chief, dated the 18th of July, informed him, that he had, by his conduct in this instance, not only dissolved the treaty of peace, and of subsidiary alliance; but violated, in the grossest manner, the law of Nations; and that he considered the British Government was at liberty to act towards him in such manner as it's interests and security might dictate. Lord Lake concluded this letter by remarking, that the release and safe conduct of the British Residency to his camp, was an indispensable preliminary to any renewal of amity or intercourse between the two States.

The proceedings of Lord Lake upon this occasion had been confirmed by Lord Wellesley, in a despatch, dated the 25th of July, which gave cover to a letter to Scindiah, signifying the complete acquiescence of the Governor General

* Mr. Jenkins.

in all the measures which Lord Lake had taken; and informing him, that that nobleman was vested with the fullest military and political powers; and that his acts were as valid, as if they proceeded direct from the Supreme Government.

In this stage of the proceeding Lord Cornwallis arrived; and immediately addressed a letter to Scindiah, in which he stated, that it had not been his intention to write to him, before he heard of his compliance with the request which Lord Lake had made, respecting the release of the acting Resident; but, wishing to manifest an inclination for peace, he had been induced to address him, in consequence of a letter from the acting Resident, which stated, that his Highness had declared his intention to permit him, accompanied by two confidential agents, to join the camp of Lord Lake. That Officer, Lord Cornwallis observed, was fully authorized to communicate with these agents, on all points connected with the welfare of both States.

A letter from the acting Resident at the Court of Scindiah, under date the 11th of September, stated, that that Chief, though he had received the letter of Marquis Cornwallis, still hesitated in granting him permission to leave camp; and, in a letter dated the 16th of the same month, he transmitted a reply from Dou-

but Row Scindiah to Lord Cornwallis's letter; in which, after many professions of friendship, Scindiah observed, that the dismissal of the acting Resident was, agreeably to usage, delayed until a successor arrived in his camp.

Though Lord Cornwallis continued for some time to think, that the release of the Residency with Daulat Row Scindiah was, after the great insult which the English Nation had received from it's being plundered and forcibly detained, an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation with that Chief; his anxious desire for peace subsequently led him, first to a modification, and ultimately to a complete alteration, of this sentiment. In a letter, addressed to Scindiah, he informed that Chief, at the same time that he urged him to allow the acting Resident to depart, that Lord Lake had been authorized to enter into a negotiation with him, on the basis of restoring the fortress of Gwalier, and the territories of Gohud; and in his despatch to Lord Lake, under date the 19th of September, which accompanied the letter to Scindiah, Lord Cornwallis expressly states, that though aware of the disadvantages of immediately relinquishing, or even compromising the demand, so repeatedly made for the release of the British Resident; yet, that as he considered it a mere point of honour, he would certainly be disposed

to do so, should it ultimately prove to be the only obstacle to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs with that Chieftain. No opportunity was afforded of judging of the impression, which this extreme solicitude for peace would have had upon Doulut Row Scindiah; as a measure adopted by Lord Lake had effected the release of the acting Resident, before these instructions from Lord Cornwallis, upon this point, were received.

Lord Lake had authorized the political Agent* of the Governor General, in his camp, to send for Moonshee Kavel Nyne from Dehli. That respectable native had long been one of Doulut Row Scindiah's favourite and confidential servants; but had fled from the temporary tyranny of that Chief's father-in-law, Surjee Row Guatka, into Hindoostan. When he arrived in Lord Lake's camp, he was instructed to depute one of his relations to Scindiah, to explain to that Chief the manner in which he could best open a negotiation for an amicable adjustment of differences between him and the British Government; and Scindiah, as had been expected, caught at this new and unexpected channel of communication; and sent proposals for a settlement to be laid before the Commander-in-Chief, by Kavel Nyne. In answer to this overture,

* Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm.

Lord Lake observed, that he could not attend to any proposition whatever, till the British Residency was released. The consequence was, the immediate accomplishment of that object; and Mr. Jenkins was on his march to the British territories, before the last letter of Lord Cornwallis to Scindiah, upon that subject, reached the British camp; and it was, in consequence, not forwarded.

Lord Cornwallis gave Lord Lake the fullest instructions, with respect to the treaty which he wished to be concluded with Doulut Row Scindiah, in his despatch dated the 19th of September.

In this letter, Lord Cornwallis stated his decided opinion, that it was desirable to abandon the possession of Gwalier and Gohud, independently of any reference to the settlement of differences with Scindiah; and that he consequently had no hesitation in transferring these possessions to Scindiah, after having secured a suitable provision for the Ranah of Gohud. The Governor General, however, stated, that he did not wish to make an unconditional surrender of these Countries, but was desirous that Scindiah should be induced, by this measure, to relieve the Company from the burden of the Jagheers and pensions granted by the treaty of peace; to bear the charge of a suitable

establishment for the Ranah of Gobud, and to reimburse the public and private losses occasioned by the plunder of the British Residency. It would, the Governor General stated in this letter, be in the option of the British Government, to augment the cession to Scindiah by a portion of the territory in our possession to the westward and southward of Dehli. The expediency of this measure must, he observed, be determined by political considerations; and, if circumstances would admit of it, he added, the dissolution of our alliance with the Rajah of Jypore, and the amount of tribute, which Scindiah would then be at liberty to demand of that Chief, might be considered as an additional benefit, which he would derive from the general arrangement.

Lord Cornwallis, who had appeared from the first resolved upon making the Jumnah the boundary * of the Company's possessions, stated

* Retaining Dehli and Agra, and a small district near the latter fortress; but, as his Lordship was anxious to remove the old Emperor from his capital, he probably contemplated, at one period, the eventual abandonment of Dehli. An erroneous idea had been entertained, that the Jumnah river was in itself a strong barrier. This Lord Lake corrected in a communication to Lord Cornwallis, in which he transmitted the most particular information upon this subject; the result of which was, that the Jumnah was only useful as a barrier during the rainy season, when military operations were, from the gene-

in this letter his opinion, that though it would be advisable to establish any other, than a Mahratta Power to the westward and southward of Dehli; yet he should consider even that arrangement more expedient, than our maintaining any further connexion with the territories in question ourselves. The following is the basis upon which Lord Cornwallis desired this treaty with Scindiah to be concluded.

“ 1st. To make over to Scindiah the possessions of Gwalier and Gohud.

“ 2d. To transfer to him, according to the provisions of the treaty of peace, the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah; and to account to Scindiah for the collections from those districts, since the peace. I am aware, Lord Cornwallis states, that this is not to be considered in the light of a concession; but I am willing to relinquish that stipulation of the treaty, which prohibits Scindiah from stationing a force in those districts; an object, which I should suppose to be highly desirable to that Chieftain.

ral state of the Country, almost impracticable. It was fordable in several places above Agra, even before the 1st of October; and could not be looked upon as a boundary of any strength, at any place above it's junction with the Chumbul, for more than a few weeks of the wet season.

“ 3d. The eventual restoration of the Jynegur
“ tribute, amounting to the annual sum of
“ three lacks of rupees.

“ 4th. To require from Scindiah his consent
“ to the abrogation of the pensions, and to the
“ resumption of the Jagheers in the Duab, esta-
“ blished by the treaty of peace.

“ 5th. To require from Scindiah the relin-
“ quishment of his claim to the arrears of the
“ pension.

“ 6th. To demand a compensation for the
“ public and private losses sustained by the
“ plunder of the Residency.

“ 7th. To require Scindiah to make a pro-
“ vision for the Ranah of Gohud, to the
“ extent of two and a half, or three lacks
“ of rupees per annum.”

But although Lord Cornwallis desired the negotiations should be commenced upon this basis, he declared his intention of relaxing in some of the demands in favour of the Company, rather than delay the conclusion of peace; and, to attain that object, he was, he said, ready to extend the cessions to Scindiah, should such appear necessary for the satisfactory adjustment of affairs between the two States.

It was not, he observed in this communication, his intention to renew our defensive engagements with Scindiah, though he was ready to

act in concert with that Chief, as an Ally against Holkar, until the latter should be brought to reasonable terms. He stated, in these instructions, the grounds upon which he was disposed to make that arrangement, which annulled the alliance with the Ranah of Gohud. These were, the utter incapacity of that Chief to rule, and his inability to perform the engagements, which he had contracted with the Company: but he, at the same time, conceived it just, to make a suitable provision for the future liberal support of this inefficient Prince.

Lord Cornwallis also communicated to Lord Lake, in this letter, the plan which he had contemplated for disposing of the conquered Countries southward and westward of Dehli, which was; to give part of them to the several Chieftains,* for whom we were bound to provide, on condition of their not claiming our protection; and dividing the remainder between the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtpore, on their agreeing to relinquish the alliances, which they had formed with the British Government.

The territories of these Chieftains would, his Lordship thought, so extended, constitute the desired barrier between the possessions of Scin-

* Commanders of corps of native horse, and others, who had, by their defection from our enemies, or by their services during the war, entitled themselves to reward.

diah in Hindoostan, and those of the Company in the Duab; and, in the reduced state of Scindiah's power, he thought it not improbable, that these Rajahs might be able to oppose him; particularly if aided by the independent Jagheerdars. At all events, his Lordship declared, that he was satisfied of the expediency of even admitting the power of Dowlut Row Scindiah into the territories in question; rather than that we should preserve any control over, or connexion with, them. "But Scindiah's endeavours," his Lordship adds, "to wrest those territories from the hands of the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtpore, may be expected to lay the foundation of interminable contests; which will afford ample and permanent employment to Scindiah: and, under any circumstances, I cannot," he adds, "admit the apprehension of any hostile attempts on the part of Scindiah against the British possessions in the Duab; still less should I deem it probable, in the event of his rendering the Chiefs of Macherry and Bhurtpore his perpetual enemies, which must be the consequence of his endeavours to deprive them of a portion of their dominions."

Lord Lake, in his reply to these instructions, referred to a letter which he had before written to Lord Cornwallis, on the subject of the great

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benefits, which must result to the Company's territories from the complete expulsion of the Mahrattas from Hindoostan : and stated his perfect conviction, (founded upon his local experience,) that the maintenance of the strong boundary, which we possessed, would soon cause the Mahrattas to abandon every idea of attacking our Provinces in that quarter ; which he was fully persuaded they never would do, if permitted to possess territory in Hindoostan, or to employ their armies against the petty States or Jagheerdars immediately west of the Jumnah. Lord Lake, in this despatch, stated the numerous reasons, which convinced his judgment, that, if the British protection was withdrawn from those petty States, they would either be subdued by Doulut Row Scindiah, or some other Chief ; who would found on their ruins a Power, formidable, from it's strength and local situation, to the British Government.

Lord Lake observed in this letter, that the armies of Scindiah and Holkar had comparatively few Mahrattas* in them, and were mostly

* This extraordinary composition of the armies of the different Mahratta Chiefs, while it led to very false conclusions respecting the actual military strength of that Nation, was one, among many other causes, which prevented their combination. It was, indeed, a radical cause of their division and ruin : for the fact was, that the Mahrattas, originally inhabitants of one of the

composed of Rajpoots and Mahomedans, natives of Hindoostan; most of whom had returned to their homes, or entered into the service of the British Government: and he was satisfied, that they might, by a liberal line of policy, be, within a very short period, detached from their habits, and rendered useful subjects. But every plan of this nature would, he conceived, be completely frustrated, if the territories west of the Jumnah were permitted to become a scene of perpetual warfare and contest; or if they fell under the dominion of any one native Prince, whose views were directed to plunder and conquest. In either of those cases, the habits of this tribe of men would be perpetuated, and hordes of plunderers would be formed, ready to join the first bold adventurer, who offered to lead them from the Countries, which their ex-

divisions of India, taking advantage of the decline of the Moghul Empire, had spread their power over the greatest part of that vast Peninsula; but, like every barbarous Nation, which carries with it nothing but force to effect conquest, it was weakened by extension; and the descendants of those Chiefs, who first led Mahratta armies into distant Countries, have of late led bands of foreigners, to plunder and desolate the Provinces of their ancestors: and all the ravages, which this race formerly committed on other parts of India, have, within these few years, been amply revenged upon their own Country by armies of Mussulmans, and Rajpoots, led by Mahratta Chiefs.

cesses had wasted, into the neighbouring rich and fertile Provinces of the Company.

These, Lord Lake observed in this letter, were his sentiments upon this subject, in a political point of view. He next proceeded to consider it's practicability, and whether it could be carried into execution, without a violation of the faith of the English Nation, and the deepest injury to the honour and reputation of that State. After a full explanation of the grounds upon which his opinions on this head were founded, he stated his conviction, that the plan, which Lord Cornwallis had in contemplation, was impracticable, by other means than that of loading the revenues of the Company's territories to a great amount, with the compensations which must be made to those, from whom considerations of policy had made that Government to withdraw it's protection.

" I am fully satisfied," Lord Lake remarks in this letter, " that no inducement whatever " would make the lesser Rajahs in this quarter " renounce the benefit of the protection of the " British Government : such a proposition, " even, would excite in their minds the utmost " alarm ; they would, I fear, consider it as a " prelude to their being sacrificed to the object " of obtaining a peace with the Mahrattas ; nor

“ would it, as far as I can judge, be possible, by
“ any explanation, to remove from their minds
“ an impression so injurious to the honour and
“ reputation of the British Government.

“ Not one of the Chiefs,” his Lordship adds,
“ who have claims upon the British Govern-
“ ment, and whom it appears to be your Lord-
“ ship’s intention to settle to the west of the
“ Jumnah, would ever consent to be provided
“ for in the Country of any of the Rajahs, ex-
“ cept under a guarantee, that would prove a
“ thousand times more embarrassing, than their
“ settlement under the direct authority of the
“ British Government: and, on the other hand,
“ I do not believe that any of those Chiefs
“ would be able to maintain themselves, for
“ even a short period, against the more estab-
“ lished local authorities, if the protection of
“ the British Government was withdrawn.”

Lord Lake, in this letter, reported the progress made in the negotiation with Scindiah; and expressed his regret, that the personal incapacity of the Ranah of Gohud should have defeated all the objects, which were anticipated from the arrangement made regarding him; and fully concurred with the Marquis Cornwallis in the opinion, that, though just grounds existed for the abrogation of that alliance, it was better to obtain the consent of that Chief to a change

of his condition, from a power he was unequal to exercise, to one more suited to his weak and inefficient character.

As some serious discussions took place, at this period, respecting our connexion with the Rajah of Jypore ; it will be necessary to trace, in a few words, the rise and nature of that alliance.

The Rajah of Jypore, who is one of the principal Rajpoot Chiefs, who possess that tract of Country which divides Malwah from Hindoostan, entered very early in the war with Scindiah into an alliance with the English Government. The general conditions of this alliance have been described. The Rajah had certainly on many occasions deviated from both the letter and spirit of this engagement. But, at the moment when both Scindiah and Holkar were on the frontiers of Jypore, and the Bombay army had marched to Tonk Rampoorah, a place immediately in the vicinity of the capital of the Rajah, from whose territories it drew most of its supplies, Lord Lake conceived it consistent with good policy to relieve the solicitude, which the agent of the Rajah of Jypore, residing in his camp, expressed, respecting the consequences, which might attend the wavering part that his master had pursued ; and he directed him to inform the Rajah, that he had now an

opportunity, which he hoped he would not neglect, of proving himself worthy of the friendship and support of the British Government.

After Lord Lake had made this communication to the agent of the Rajah of Jypore, he received a letter from Lord Cornwallis, under date the 3d. of August, on the subject of this alliance. Lord Cornwallis stated in this despatch his opinion, that the Rajah of Jypore, so far from performing his engagements with the Company, had favoured the cause of the enemy; and he, therefore, considered the alliance dissolved: and as he saw nothing but inconvenience and embarrassment from the connexion, it had, he observed, been resolved by Government, not to repel any aggression, that Scindiah or Holkar might make on the territories of Jypore.

Lord Lake was instructed to transmit orders to Major General Jones, who commanded the Bombay army, (then cantoned on the frontiers of the Jypore State,) not to give the Rajah any aid, in the event of an attack from the Mahrattas; as the Governor General in Council had resolved to abandon the connexion. But Lord Cornwallis stated in these instructions, that it was thought impolitic to declare to the Court of Jypore the dissolution of the subsisting engagements, as such a declaration might, under the actual situation of affairs, be productive of

great disadvantage to the interests of the British Government. The Resident at the Court of the Rajah of Jypore was therefore to be informed of the resolution, which the Governor General in Council had taken, respecting the alliance, and desired to make no communication whatever upon the subject; but he was instructed not to give the Rajah of Jypore any promise of aid from British troops, in the event of his territories being invaded by Scindiah, Holkar, or any other Chief.

Lord Lake, after the measures which he had adopted, felt the greatest embarrassment on receiving these orders; and immediately communicated to Lord Cornwallis the nature of those assurances of continued support and friendship, which circumstances had induced him to make to the Rajah of Jypore; on the condition of that Prince meriting, by his future conduct, the protection of the British Government.

When Lord Lake, subsequently to this communication, received information, in a letter dated the 1st of October, from the Resident at Jypore, that Holkar was advancing through the territories of Jypore towards the Company's frontier; and that the Rajah did not seem inclined to oppose him, but was employing the principal part of his army towards effecting the subordinate object, of his marriage with the

daughter of the Rajah of Oudepore; he addressed a letter to the Rajah, in which, after recapitulating the various instances in which he had violated his engagements, and informing him, that it was probable the Governor General would issue immediate orders for the abandonment of such an useless and burthensome connexion, he stated, that it was probable General Jones's army would soon move against Holkar; in which case the Rajah might yet retrieve his credit, by a hearty co-operation with that Officer; and by adopting the most active and efficient measures for securing him those supplies, which were necessary to his army.

This measure was not only in consistency with the line of proceeding, which Lord Lake had adopted towards the Rajah of Jypore; but was, from the actual situation of the enemy, and of our forces, quite essential to the success of the opening campaign; and it was attended with the completest effect. The Resident at the Court of Jypore informed Lord Lake, in a despatch, under date the 16th of October, that the Rajah, as soon as he received his Lordship's letter, had abandoned his favourite project of marching a force towards Oudepore, and prepared a detachment to join General Jones's army, with which he co-operated in the most

zealous and decided manner during the remainder of the war with Holkar.

Lord Cornwallis had, upon Lord Lake's report, suspended the execution of the measures, which he had taken regarding the dissolution of this connexion. It was concluded, therefore, by Lord Lake, that the Rajah of Jypore had, by his complete fulfilment of the conditions proposed to him, fully entitled himself to the rank, which he before held, of an intimate and faithful Ally of the British Government.

Lord Cornwallis took, during his last Administration of British India, no measures of any importance with the Courts of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Berar. He addressed, on his arrival at Fort William, letters to each of these Rulers, reminding them of the principles of his former Government; professing the greatest moderation, and a desire to remove from their minds those impressions, which late events might have produced. The general tenor of these letters was no doubt calculated to convey a belief, that the measures of Lord Wellesley had been condemned, and that another system was to be pursued: and in one instance, at the Court of Berar, this proceeding gave rise to a long and vexatious discussion, between the Rajah and the British Resident; the former contending,

that it was evidently Lord Cornwallis's intention, from the expression of his letter, to restore affairs in India to that posture in which he had left them in 1793,* which included the restoration of Berar, Cuttack, and all the possessions which this Chief had lost since that period.

No negotiation was carried on with Jeswunt Row Holkar while Lord Cornwallis lived; but that nobleman gave general instructions to Lord Lake respecting the conduct of any settlement with that Chief, which he desired should be made upon the general basis of leaving him in possession of the territories of the Holkar family, on his affording the British Government reasonable security for his future conduct. But no opportunity occurred, even of making any proposition to this Chief; who, accompanied by a comparatively small number of distressed and disheartened adherents, advanced through the barren Provinces to the north west of Dehli, into

* The Rajah of Berar, in speaking upon this subject, distinctly stated, that when Lord Cornwallis had, of his own free will, written to him, expressing great grief at his reduced condition, and a desire to renew the ties of friendship with him on the ancient footing, and a determination to make restitution to the utmost extent, which good faith would permit, that he had, on the strength of this declaration, expected the restoration of all his lost territories.

the Provinces of the Punjaub,* about the period of Lord Cornwallis's death.

Lord Cornwallis appears, from his first despatches to the Court of Directors, to have been very anxious to adopt such measures as he deemed calculated to relieve the finances of the Company from that embarrassment, which was the inevitable consequence of the wars in which we had been, and were engaged; but it was of course impossible to make any reductions of consequence in our military establishments † before the war was completely at an end, as it's suc-

* This extensive and fertile Country is inhabited by Siekha, an extraordinary race; of whom a very full account is given in the eleventh volume of the Asiatic Researches.

† Much has been said respecting the enormous expense of the irregular horse with Lord Lake's army; and this large item in the military disbursements attracted the early attention of Lord Cornwallis: but it is to be recollected, that it only began to be heavy, when the retreat of Holkar from Hindoostan occasioned the defection of almost all the Chiefs belonging to that Country: who, with their numerous followers, joined the British army. The heaviest amount of this temporary disbursement was five lacks and eighty-three thousand six hundred and sixty-nine rupees four anas and three pice per month, which did not continue for more than three months. It's reduction was in progress before Lord Cornwallis's arrival: and this charge was, in September 1806, reduced to three lacks and ninety-thousand four hundred and fifty-five rupees nine anas; in December, to two lacks nineteen thousand six hundred and

cessful termination depended upon the efficiency of the army, and it's equipments.

The health of Lord Cornwallis, which was in a declining state when he left England, became worse from the period he left Fort William to join the army in the upper Provinces,* and his existence terminated at Gazeepore, near Benares, on the 5th of October 1805.

Thus closed the life of this distinguished nobleman; whose memory will be revered as long as the sacred attributes of virtue and patriotism shall command the approbation of mankind. To a dignified simplicity of character, he added a soundness of understanding and a strength of judgment, which admirably fitted him for the exercise of both civil and military power; and his first Administration of the British Empire in India must ever be a theme of just and unqualified applause. His second was of too short a

sixty-seven rupees and ten anas; and in February, 1807, to a sum under one lack of rupees.

* In the weak state in which he was during the last month of his existence, it is hardly possible to conceive how he was able to transact any business of importance. He continued the greatest part of the morning in a condition of weakness approaching to insensibility: towards the evening he revived so much, as to be dressed, to hear the despatches which had been received, and to give instructions respecting such as were to be written; and his mind is stated, by those who attended him, to have retained, even in this state, much of it's wonted force.

duration to make it possible to judge of the consequences with which it would have been attended ; and it is perhaps probable, that the evil effects of those concessions, which he seemed disposed to make, would have been corrected by his great personal reputation ; as every State in India was aware of his character, and of that spirit and promptness with which he had formerly asserted the honour and interests of the British Government. But however much many may question the policy of some of the last acts of this nobleman, or speculate upon the causes which produced such an apparent deviation from the high and unyielding spirit of his former Administration ; no man can doubt the exalted purity of the motive, which led him to revisit that Country. Loaded with years, as he was with honour, he desired that his life should terminate, as it had commenced ; and he died, as he had lived, in the active service of his Country.

After the death of Lord Cornwallis, Sir George Barlow * succeeded, by a provisional

* Sir George Barlow is a civil servant of the Honourable Company. He recommended himself to the notice of his superiors, by an able and honourable discharge of the various subordinate offices, which he filled before he reached the high station of Governor General. He was actively employed, under Lord Cornwallis, in introducing the code of regulations for the civil

appointment, to the Administration of the affairs of British India. It is not intended to give a narrative of his Government further than to the termination of the treaties of peace with Doulut Row Scindiah and Jeswunt Row Holkar; which engagements I shall proceed to notice; stating, at the same time, such facts, as are calculated to elucidate the principles upon which they were formed; and the general condition of India at this epoch.*

The instructions which Sir George Barlow gave to Lord Lake, for the conclusion of the treaty with Scindiah, in no respect differed in principle from those given upon the same points by Lord Cornwallis. He indeed expressed, in his first communication to the Commander-in-Chief, his resolution to follow the steps of that nobleman; and his conviction, that the public interests would be best promoted, by our throwing off, at the earliest practicable period, all connexion with the petty States west

Administration of the territories of Bengal; and filled the office of Chief Secretary to Government under Lord Teignmouth and Lord Wellesley, before he was raised to the Supreme Council, of which he was a member during the four last years of the Administration of the latter nobleman.

* Almost the whole of the public correspondence down to this date, is, I imagine, in one shape or another, already before the public.

of the Jumnah, limiting our boundary to that river, and a line of territory not exceeding eight or ten miles in breadth on it's right bank; and trusting, in a great degree, for our future security, to the contests of our neighbours. Upon this principle, while he desired to be free of all defensive engagements with Scindiah, he expressed himself more desirous of a peace with Holkar, than of the complete reduction of that Chief.

On the 23d of November, a treaty was concluded by the political Agent * of the Governor General (acting under the authority of Lord Lake), and Moonshee Kavel Nyne, whom Daulat Row Scindiah had appointed his Agent, and vested with full powers; of which the following are the heads:—

Every part of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, except what might be altered by this treaty, was to remain in force.

Although the Honourable Company did not acknowledge that Scindiah possessed any claim to Gohud and Gwalier, under the above-mentioned treaty; yet, from considerations of friendship, they agreed to cede to him Gwalier, and such parts of the territories of Gohud, as were described in an accompanying schedule.

* Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm.

Scindiah relinquished all claim to the pensions granted to different Officers of his Court by the original treaty of peace, to the amount of fifteen lacks annually.

The Company agreed to pay the arrears of those pensions up to the 31st of December 1805; and the balance due upon the revenues of Dhoolpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah, up to the same date; making deductions on the following heads:—

1st. Pensions forfeited by Bappoo Scindiah, and Sudashes Row, by acts of hostility towards the British Government, to be stopped from the date of their hostility.

2d. Plunder of the British Residency.

3d. Cash advanced by Mr. Jenkins to parties of the Maharajah's horse.

4th. Charges of collection, &c. for the Provinces of Dhoolpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah.

The River Chumbul* was to form the

* The Chumbul was not taken as a boundary from it's being of any use as a barrier, but as a distinct line of demarcation; an object of the greatest consequence, to prevent future discussions with a Power of the nature of that of a Mahratta Chief. This article was considered by Lord Lake to be more essential, at the time when this treaty was concluded, from his conceiving that the maintenance of our alliance with the State of Jypore was, under the conduct which the Rajah had lately pursued, a matter of course.

boundary between the two States, from the city of Kottah to the west, to the limits of the territories of Gohud to the east; Doulut Row Scindiah was to have no claims whatever to the northward of that river; and the Honourable Company, in like manner, to have no claims to the southward of that extent of it's course. The Talook of Bhadek * and Sooseperarah, which are on the banks of the Jumnah, to remain, notwithstanding, in the possession of the Honourable Company.

By the preceding articles, Scindiah resigned all claims and pretensions on the Countries of Boondee, Sumedee, Dhoolpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah.

The Company granted to the Maharajah, personally and exclusively, the sum of four lacks of rupees annually; and assigned within their territories in Hindoostan, a Jagheer, to the amount of two lacks of rupees per annum, to Baezah Bhye, wife to Doulut Row Scindiah; and another, of one lack per annum, to Chumnah Bhye, daughter of that Chief.

The Company also engaged to enter into no

* The small and unproductive districts of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, though to the northward of the Chumbul, were granted to the Company, as being on the banks of the Jumnah, and preserving the communication from the Province of Agra to Bundelcund.

treaties with the Rajahs of Oudepore and Joudpore, and Kottah, or other Chiefs tributaries to Doulut Row Scindiah in Malwah, Mewar, or Merwar; and in no shape to interfere with the settlement, which Scindiah may make with those Chiefs.

In the event of the conclusion of a peace with Jeswunt Row Holkar, the Company engaged not to restore to him, or desire to be restored to him, any of the possessions of the Holkar family in the Province of Malwah, lying between the rivers Taptie and Chumbul, which may have been taken by Doulut Row Scindiah; nor to interfere in the disposal of those Provinces: and consider Scindiah at liberty to make what arrangement he pleases with Jeswunt Row Holkar, or any branch of the family, respecting its claims to any tribute or territorial possessions north of the river Taptie, and south of the river Chumbul: but it was clearly to be understood, that the British Government would not take any part in any dispute or war, which may be the consequence of such arrangement.

A stipulation was made in this treaty, by which Scindiah agreed never to admit Surjee*

* This atrocious character had been declared a public enemy by the British Government: and this article, which was a complete vindication of our insulted honour, was confirmed, and one of a similar nature was inserted in the treaty concluded with

Row Ghautka to share in his councils, or to hold any public employment under his Government.

In addition to the Jagheers given to Scindiah and his family by this treaty, estates to an amount of upwards of three lacks of rupees were given to the chief Officers of his Court: but, calculating the cessions to the northward of the Chumbul, which Scindiah had made by this treaty, at seven lacks of rupees, and the Jagheer or pension which was to be assigned to the Ranah of Gohud, at three lacks, the Company gained by the treaty, in lieu of the cession of Gwalier and Gohud, a revenue of upwards of eight lacks of rupees per annum, which was nearly the amount of the subsidy settled in the treaty with the Ranah of Gohud.

Sir George Barlow did not altogether approve this treaty; and though he expressed his high satisfaction at the readiness with which Doulut Row Scindiah had consented to withdraw from any concern in the affairs of Hindoostan to the northward of the Chumbul, he stated in the most decided manner his conviction, that the

Holkar: but a few months afterwards, on a report that Surjee Row Ghautka was about to join Holkar, the abrogation of these articles was directed, as it was feared they might lead to an embarrassment, which it was deemed (agreeably to the policy of the day) prudent to avoid.

actual condition of our affairs confirmed the policy and expediency of the principles upon which he had it in contemplation to effect a final arrangement, with respect to the Chieftains and territories west of the Jumnah. He was fully satisfied, he informed Lord Lake, that, when these arrangements were carried into execution, they would constitute a degree of security against all hostile attempts, which could not be augmented, though it might be impaired, by the preservation of our alliances with the petty States west of the Jumnah.

Sir George Barlow thought, that, with the exception of the defensive alliances subsisting between the British Government and the great Powers of India, it was for the interest and security of the Company to limit all relations with the surrounding States, to those of general amity and friendship; and to trust the safety of its territorial possessions to the supremacy of our power, a well regulated system of defence, and a revival of those contests and commotions which formerly prevailed among the States of Hindoostan.

Under such circumstances, the Governor General conceived that the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty might preclude the accomplishment of this general system, as they imposed upon us an obligation to pro-

tect from Scindiah's encroachments, all the States and Chieftains to the north of the Chumbul, from Kottah to the Jumnah.

In order to remedy the inconvenience, which the Governor General apprehended from this arrangement, he transmitted, to be annexed to the treaty, declaratory articles to the following purport:—

1st. That Scindiah ceded to the Honourable Company all the territory north of the river Chumbul; that is to say, the whole of the districts of Dhoolpoor, Barree, and Rajah Kerrah; and the Company gave up all claim to any rule, tribute, or possessions, on the south bank of that river. The Talooks, however, of Bhadek and Sooseperarah, on the banks of the Jumnah, remained in possession of the Company.

2d. That the Company, from friendship to Scindiah, agreed to pay to him the annual sum of four lacks of rupees.—Also, that they assigned, within their territories in Hindoostan, a Jagheer, amounting to a revenue of two lacks of rupees per annum, to Baezah Bhye, the wife of Scindiah; and a Jagheer, amounting to one lack of rupees per annum, to Chummah Bhye, the daughter of that Chief.

The intention of these articles was, as has been stated, to supersede the operation of the fifth, sixth, and seventh articles of the treaty:

and they were to be delivered to Moonshee Kavel Nyne with the ratified treaty of peace.

The Governor General was also desirous of ceding the districts of Tonk Rampoorah to Scindiah, in lieu of the four lacks of rupees per annum, to which that Chief became personally entitled by the treaty; and he conceived this cession more desirable, as the territory in question was formerly possessed by Holkar; and it's cession to Scindiah would tend to confirm and perpetuate an opposition of interests between those Chieftains.

The remaining parts of the treaty were entirely approved by the Governor General; who stated in this despatch, that he was, after the maturest deliberation, satisfied of the policy and expediency of dissolving the alliance with the State of Jypore; but would defer, to a subsequent despatch, the communication of the line and mode in which this arrangement ought to be carried into execution.

Lord Lake immediately communicated the declaratory articles to Moonshee Kavel Nyne; and proposed the exchange of Tonk Rampoorah for the pecuniary stipend of four lacks per annum, which it was agreed by that treaty to pay Scindiah. To this proposition, however, Kavel Nyne said his master would not agree; and he added his conviction, that he would not.

accept the districts of Tonk Rampoorah, if given gratis; as such an act would form an insurmountable bar to any reconciliation between him and Holkar. Kavel Nyne earnestly recommended, that the declaratory articles should not be sent to Doulut Row Scindiah till a British Resident had reached the Court of that Chief, who could furnish the requisite explanations respecting them, and satisfy Scindiah's mind with regard to the meaning and intent of that policy by which they had been dictated. As there appeared much good sense in this opinion, Lord Lake informed the Governor General, that he had delayed their transmission; and took this opportunity of again urging to Sir George Barlow, the necessity of some modification of the general principles, which he had laid down for his guidance. Lord Lake, in this letter, dwelt upon the grounds, which had led him to insist upon the Chumbul being the line of demarcation between the two States; and observed, that the territories of the Boondee Rajah, which were immediately to the northward of the Chumbul (opposite to Kottah), though small, both in revenue and extent, were very important, as they commanded a principal pass into Hindoostan; and that the Company was, in his opinion, bound to defend and protect that Rajah for his uniform friendly conduct; and par-

ticularly for the great aid, which he had the courage to give Colonel Monson, during his retreat; by which conduct he had exposed himself to the vengeance of Jeswunt Row Holkar, who was known to cherish the most inveterate hostility against this petty Chief. From this fact, Lord Lake observed, that he had always imagined, that under any arrangement, which might eventually be made with Jeswunt Row Holkar, it would be difficult, consistently with a due regard for the honour and reputation of the British Government, to give the Boondee Rajah over to the rage of that Chief; and he had therefore thought it would be desirable to release him altogether from Mahratta power and influence.

Lord Lake stated in this despatch, that he had viewed the assent given by Scindiah, to retire altogether from Hindoostan northward of the Chumbul, as an unequivocal and complete acknowledgment of our established power and superiority; and gave it as his opinion, that no secure or honourable peace could be concluded with Holkar, which did not contain a similar concession. For, though (his Lordship remarked in this communication) it was possible that the British territories might experience an increased security from the remote contests of the principal Mahratta Chiefs, he was satisfied, that if

Scindiah and Holkar were allowed to renew their claims upon any of the States immediately west of the Jumnah, and to mix in their disputes, there would be a serious danger of reviving ambitious hopes, which were now completely extinguished, and of causing another contest for that supremacy, which was now so fully acknowledged.

These opinions had no effect whatever in changing, or even modifying, the resolutions of the Governor-General; who, though he admitted the great attention, which was due to the local experience of Lord Lake, deemed it his duty to adhere to those general principles by which he had determined to regulate his conduct in this proceeding; and the declaratory articles were forwarded to Doulut Row Scindiah, with a letter from Sir George Barlow to that Chief, explanatory of their nature and object.

Lord Lake was, during the period of these discussions, in pursuit of Jeswunt Row Holkar, whose last campaign was only a flight before the British army; which, leaving our own Provinces, pursued him as far as the banks of the Beeah* (or Hyphases); where Holkar, reduced to the extreme of distress, sent agents to Lord

* One of the five rivers which run through the Country of the Panjaub.

Lake, to solicit peace. The following is an abstract of the conditions, which were offered for his acceptance:—

That he should renounce all right to the districts of Tonk Rampoorah, Boondee, &c., and places north of the Chumbul.

The Company would agree not to interfere with any Rajahs, or other dependants of the Holkar family, south of the Chumbul; and to restore, eighteen months after the conclusion of the treaty, Chandore, Gaulnah, and other forts and districts south of the Taptie and Goudavery, belonging to the Holkar family, which we had conquered and occupied, provided the conduct of Jeswunt Row Holkar was such as to satisfy the English Government of his amicable intentions towards us and our Allies.

Holkar was to renounce all claims upon Koonah and Bundlecund; and all claims whatever upon the British Government and its Allies.

He also engaged to entertain no Europeans in his service, without the consent of the British Government.

Surjee Row Ghautka was never to be admitted into his councils or service.

Jeswunt Row Holkar was, on these conditions, to be allowed to return to Hindoostan; but a route was prescribed, by which he was to

avoid injuring the territory of the British Government, and its Allies.

These articles were, with a very few and unessential modifications, after a short negotiation between the Agent* of the Governor General, and the Vakeels of Holkar, reduced into a treaty of peace, which was confirmed on the 7th of January by that Chief; to whom, in fact, the Commander-in-Chief dictated this peace, which was of course formed agreeably to the general tenor of the instructions of the Governor General.

Sir George Barlow considered this treaty as highly honourable and advantageous to the British Government; but, though he had before instructed the Commander-in-Chief to insist upon the cession of the Provinces of Ponk Rampoorah, he stated in his communication upon this subject, that a resolution had been taken, with a view to an arrangement with Scindiah, respecting these Provinces; but, as he found that impossible, and that no State or Chief would venture to take them without a guarantee, we were, he conceived, reduced to the necessity of either guaranteeing these districts, or keeping them ourselves; and, as neither of these measures were consistent with

* Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm.

those general principles of policy, which he had resolved to pursue, he determined to annul the provisions of the second article of the treaty, and restore them to Holkar: and for that purpose he returned the treaty, with a declaratory article annexed, by which a recession of these valuable Provinces was made to Jeswunt Row Holkar; and the Boondée Rajah was also abandoned. Lord Lake endeavoured, but in vain, to alter the sentiments of the Governor General relative to this principle of concession to Scindiah and Holkar; and to prevail upon him not to withdraw our protection from those petty Chiefs, whom he thought entitled to it by their conduct and attachment. He was particularly desirous, for reasons before stated, to obtain protection for the Rajah of Boondée: but Sir George Barlow was inflexible in the course he had adopted; and considered any deviation from it would be not only inconsistent with that system of policy, which he judged it his duty to pursue, but could not fail of producing at an early period the most serious political embarrassment.

It has been before stated, that the Governor General had signified his intention of dissolving the alliance with the Rajah of Jypore. The moment Lord Lake received this intimation, he represented to Sir George Barlow; that, though

the Rajah's former conduct had been directly contrary to good faith, and though that Prince had acted, upon the occasion of Holkar's advancing into Hindoostan, in a manner which was at variance with his engagement, the importance of his co-operation in the approaching campaign had appeared so great, that he had been induced not only to promise, that he would entirely pass over the former conduct of the Rajah; but had, by continued assurances of friendship and protection, endeavoured to excite him to a zealous fulfilment of his engagements. In the accomplishment of this object, Lord Lake observed, he had fully succeeded; and the consequence was, that a British army, under Major General Jones, was, by the Rajah of Jypore's aid, and the ample supplies which his Country furnished, enabled to maintain a position of the greatest consequence to the success of the general operations of the war: and he had no doubt, from the communications which he had received from General Jones, that had Holkar attempted to retreat, as was expected, in the direction of the position which that Officer's army occupied, the co-operation of the Rajah's troops, who had joined his camp, would have been efficient. The sincerity and good faith with which the State of Jypore had acted at this crisis, was, Lord Lake stated, most strongly

corroborated by the letters received from General Jones, which had led to his addressing the Rajah in a style, which he never would have used, had he not conceived that the circumstances he had mentioned would have changed those intentions which Government previously entertained of dissolving the alliance.

Lord Lake stated his opinion, that, although there might be sufficient grounds for opening a negotiation for new-modelling the alliance with the Jypore State, or even for effecting a dissolution of all engagements between the two States, he doubted how far the British Government had a right, after what had passed, to dissolve it in a peremptory manner: because, as such a proceeding would expose the Rajah of Jypore to an instant attack from both Scindiah and Holkar, it would, unless it rested upon clear and undisputed grounds, make an impression among the States of India highly unfavourable to the reputation of the British Government. Lord Lake, in this communication, referred the Governor General to the conferences * between his

* Holkar's Vakeels demanded, with no slight degree of pertinacity, the cession of the Jypore and Boondee tributes; and one of them, speaking of the former, stated, that he no doubt would continue to enjoy the friendship of the English, as he had disgraced himself, to please that Nation, by giving up the unfortunate Vizier Ally (who had sought his protection) to their

Agent * and the Vakeels of Holkar, regarding the tribute, which their master claimed from the Rajahs of Boondee and Jypore; and stated his expectation, that Sir George Barlow would agree with him, (after he had seen the report of these conferences,) that neither of these points could have been conceded to that Chief in the negotiation, without injury to the character of the British Government. His Lordship concluded this despatch by expressing his earnest hope, that, if the Governor General was ultimately resolved upon the dissolution of the alliance with the Jypore State, he would defer the execution of that measure till Holkar had passed the territories of the Rajah, and reached his own dominions in Malwah; to which he was, by the treaty, pledged instantly to return.

Lord Lake had before communicated his sentiments respecting the policy of this measure; but, as his opinions differed from those of Sir George Barlow, he confined himself upon this occasion to the question of faith, which, he conceived, it involved. His arguments, how-

vengeance. The Vakeel was very severely rebuked by the Agent of the Governor General for this insolent reflection on the conduct of an Ally of the British Government, who had, upon the occasion to which he alluded, delivered up a murderer, whom it would have been infamy to shelter.

* Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm.

ever, made no impression upon the mind of the Governor General, who continued to think, after the receipt of this communication, as he had done before, that we had, from the former conduct of the Rajah of Jypore, obtained a right to dissolve the alliance, which was not at all invalidated by his subsequent adoption of measures, which were more forcibly recommended to him by considerations of his own safety and convenience, than by any returning sense of good faith: and considering the question of faith in this view, he could not, he observed, hesitate in dissolving an alliance, which was likely to include much future inconvenience and embarrassment.

The English Government had given, the Governor General thought, a proof of its liberality towards the Jypore State, in not dissolving its alliance pending the negotiation with Scindiah, when it might have derived advantage from the cession of the tribute of Jypore to that Chief; and with respect to the period of adopting this act, he conceived the Company at liberty to choose that which was most convenient; and he had resolved upon its instant dissolution, from an apprehension that Holkar, upon his return, might, as he passed the territories of Jypore, commit some excesses,

which we would be obliged to notice, if the alliance was not previously dissolved.

Sir George Barlow, in conformity with this resolution, directed the Resident at Jypore to announce the dissolution of the defensive alliance; informing the Rajah at the same time, that the English Government would be most happy to maintain with him general relations of friendship and amity. The Resident was at the same time desired to deliver to the Rajah a letter from the Governor General, explanatory of the grounds upon which this measure had been adopted. The justice of these grounds, however, was warmly disputed by the Court of Jypore, which, under a lively sense of that imminent danger to which it became exposed from this measure, almost forgot, for a moment, that temper and respect which it owed to the character of the English Nation. In a conference which one of the principal Agents of the Rajah of Jypore had with Lord Lake at Dehli, he had the boldness to observe, after stating all which his Prince had desired him to say upon the occasion, that this was the first time, since the English Government was established in India, "that it had been known to "make it's faith subservient to it's convenience."

Sir George Barlow was equally anxious to dissolve the defensive alliances, which we had contracted with the lesser States of Bhurtpore and Macherry, as he was that with Jypore. But as those Rajahs had given no pretext for adopting this measure, without their assent, he directed a negotiation to be opened with them for the purpose of effecting this object; and he authorized Lord Lake to make them a considerable cession of territory, as a means of prevailing upon them to give up that right, which they had acquired by treaty, to the protection of the British Government.

Lord Lake, however, was induced, by a variety of urgent considerations, to defer any mention of such an intention on the part of Government to these Rajahs; and he stated in the most forcible manner his fears, that the very rumour of such a measure being in the contemplation of the English Government, would again involve Countries, which had been settled at such an expense of blood and treasure, in a state of anarchy and confusion. Though the Governor General continued to declare, that he was quite resolved upon the adoption of this measure, he did not desire it should be precipitated. He was induced, by subsequent communications which he received, to suspend its execution; and, fortunately, as it would appear, for the

public interests, this question has never since been agitated ; and the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtpore, with other Chiefs settled in their vicinity, continue, in the faithful fulfilment of their engagements, to form an essential part of that strength which we derive from the maintenance of the territories to the west of the Jumnah.

It will be useful, before this chapter is closed, to make some observations upon that neutral and selfish policy, which, after all the evils that had before resulted from its pursuit, appears to have been again prescribed by the Authorities in England, to the observation of the Supreme Government in India.

This system had been tried upon a large scale, during the Government of Lord Teignmouth. It was then applied to almost all the principal States of India. A course of events had rendered an exact repetition of this experiment impossible ; but it was desired to do it in as great a degree, as the actual situation of affairs would admit ; and Sir George Barlow endeavoured to carry the wishes of his superiors into execution with a zeal and ability, which was well calculated to have attained success, if that had been practicable.

The events, which I have related, show the

result with which his efforts were attended. And it is only necessary to add, that the Siekh Chiefs to the north-west of the Jumnah, and the southward of the Sutledge, who had received and merited our protection by their services during the war; but from whom it was afterwards, in pursuance of this policy, withdrawn, have, under the wise, moderate, and firm Government of Lord Minto, been saved from that destruction to which they were exposed by the ambition of the Rajah of Lahore; and now form, with other Chiefs, in dependence on the British Government, a strong frontier to it's territories in Hindoostan. It would also appear, from the manner in which Lord Minto has lately employed the British arms to protect the Rajah of Berar from the attack of that celebrated freebooter Meer Khan,* that he is satisfied, that the security of our possessions is more likely to be maintained by using the great and commanding power which we have acquired, to preserve the general peace and tranquillity of India; than by a policy, which declaredly looks to the

* This Chief is the principal Mahomedan leader with Jeswunt Row Holkar: but he appears, on this occasion, to have acted independently, and in combination with some tribes of pundaries, or freebooters, of which there are several in Malwah.

disputes and wars of it's neighbours, as one of the chief sources of it's security ; and which, if it does not directly excite such wars, shapes it's political relations with inferior States in a manner calculated to create and continue them.

The professed object of this system, is to avoid, by contracting our political relations, that continual embarrassment, to which, it is argued, we must otherwise be subject ; and all measures pursued are to be conformable to certain general principles, which, like a broad shield, are to save us from every injury ; and simplify the whole scheme of our Government in India.

If such a result was really attainable, the task of rule would become easy, and the whole machine of Government might be kept in order by a very moderate share of attention and understanding ; but, unfortunately, all experience is against such a conclusion, which is indeed contrary to the nature of man. We must, if we endeavour to fly from those political embarrassments and complex relations, which have been in all ages the conditions of extended power and dominion, always meet with much greater evils than those from which we try to escape. With regard to all general principles of rule, we should recollect, that their

value is not in their abstract excellence, but in their seasonable and just application; for it is the great and sole art of Government to adapt principles to the continual changes of human affairs, not to force human affairs into a shape that suits principles. This observation applies with peculiar force to our Empire in India; which, from it's foundation, the nature of it's Government, and the various tribes and nations which it includes, demands more wisdom and more modification of system in it's Government, than perhaps any that ever was established in the universe.

This Empire, though raised by the operation of many and various causes, has been chiefly established, and must be constantly maintained, by the sword. But though we must continue to govern as conquerors, it is our duty to make our rule a benefit to mankind; and to carry among those whom we have subdued, the blessings of peace, knowledge, and improvement in all the arts of civilized life. And at that stage which our power in India has attained, we will probably find the accomplishment of such an object easier, and more conducive to our security, than all the wars and contests in which a selfish and neutral policy can ever involve our neighbours.

The system of trusting, in a great degree,

for our security, to the wars and contentions of the other States in India, has received great strength from a general but erroneous impression, respecting the unalterable and hereditary habits of the military tribes of India; who, it is contended, can never be converted to the usages of civil life. The temporary disturbances, which have been created by the discontented of this class, when any great political changes have deprived them of the means of immediate subsistence, have been given as instances of the truth of this assertion; but it has been forgotten, that the Countries of Bengal, Behar, and the Carnatic, abounded a few years ago with hordes of armed men, whose descendants now find a livelihood in cultivating some peaceable occupation; and that the Kingdoms of Mysore, Oude, and the Deckan, are now gradually undergoing the same change. The period of change is certainly one of some danger; but that danger only requires to be watched with vigilance and care; and may be easily averted by measures of large and liberal policy.

To conclude. There would hardly appear to be a greater, and more noble object for the exercise of human wisdom; or one more worthy of all the attention of a great State, than that of establishing and maintaining, through the action of its influence and power, union and tranquil-

lity over a considerable portion of the globe; and of bringing to nations, whom it found involved in continual discord and war, the blessings of harmony and peace. This we may never be able completely to effect; but there is no danger in a course of prudent policy, which keeps so great an object in view: and a state of perfect security against external attack would be the reward of it's accomplishment. When the unparalleled successes, which attended Lord Wellesley's Administration of India, placed the British power upon so commanding an eminence, his ardent mind naturally contemplated the attainment of this great end.

" In the termination of hostilities," that nobleman observed, " my solicitude has been " directed to the important purpose of effecting " a general pacification of India on principles " of reciprocal justice and moderation. The " power, reputation and dignity, of the British " Empire in India, will derive additional security and lustre from the establishment of " peace and good order among the native " States. In the decline of intrinsic strength, " inferior States may perhaps have gained a " temporary safety by fomenting the discord of " contiguous Powers. In any extremity, such " a policy is unwarrantable and disgraceful; " nor can permanent repose be secured upon

“ such precarious foundations in the actual condition of this Empire. I am happy to declare, that the concord of the established native States, the independence of their separate authorities, the internal peace of their respective dominions, and the tranquillity and happiness of their respective subjects, will tend to confirm and to fortify the power and resources of the British Government, and must constitute the most desirable objects of the British policy in India.”*

* Vide Reply to the Address of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta, on the 29th of Feb. 1804.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS

ON

THE POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND MILITARY,

GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA.

CONTENTS.

Difficulty of this Part of the Subject.—Observations on the Constitution of the Court of Directors, and Board of Control.—Office of Governor General considered.—Political Administration of India.—Improvement in the Civil Government, by the Introduction of the Judicial System, and the permanent Settlement of the Revenue.—Remarks on the Question of converting the Natives to Christianity.—Half-casts; their Condition an important Object of Attention to Government.—Importance of every Question connected with our Military Establishment in India.—Condition of the Company's European Officers.—Improvement suggested.—Importance of this Body of Men to the Safety of the Empire.—View of the Rise and Progress of the native Army.—Observations on the Re-

gulations introduced in 1796.—Discipline of the Native Army.—Condition and Consequence of the Native Officer—Measures suggested for the Improvement of the Condition of this Class; and also of the Native Soldier.—Conclusion.

THE reflections, which it is meant to offer upon the political, civil, and military, Government of British India, are submitted with a deference, which proceeds equally from a want of complete knowledge of some parts of the subject, and a sense of it's general magnitude and importance. The considerations, indeed, to which this Chapter is exclusively devoted, are in themselves of so large and complicated a nature, that no person can expect to treat them without falling into frequent error: but the apprehension of this danger is not sufficient to deter me from contributing as much as I can to the elucidation of questions of such vast national importance; and the character of the object, which I have in view, will, I trust, plead for any failure in it's accomplishment.

The present constitution of those Authorities in England, which direct and control the political Government of British India, has been already described. It has been stated, that the political authority of the Court of Directors should, by the theory of Mr. Pitt's Bill of 1784, be extinct; but, that the fact is otherwise;

which has been accounted for on the grounds of that Court maintaining, by its influence in the Country and in the House of Commons, a check upon his Majesty's Ministers, which generally compels them to seek the acquiescence, if they are not guided by the opinions, of the leading Directors; and the operation of this cause must often create delays, if it does not produce contest and collision.

The Court of Directors are the only public body in England, who can be supposed to have any detailed intelligence of the politics of India; and, as they possess copies of the records of that Empire; with the Governors of which they maintain, under the direction of the Board of Control, all political correspondence, their knowledge of it is presumed to be drawn from the most authentic sources: and it is further concluded, that this Corporation is formed of men, who, generally speaking, have spent most of their lives in India; or else have devoted themselves to a study of the British interests in that quarter.

From such circumstances, the complete exclusion of the Court of Directors from a share in the political Administration of British India, while that body continues to govern and regulate the commercial branch of that Empire, is a measure, which would appear almost impracti-

cable; as hardly any political act of consequence can be adopted, without affecting, in some degree, either the finances or trade of our possessions in India; and of course giving them a pretext, if not a right, of interference.

What has been stated on this head is sufficient to show, that, in considering the Authorities in England, by which the political Administration of our Empire in India is directed and controlled, the Court of Directors must be deemed (in spite of the intent or expression of the act of the Legislature) to be one of the principal: because their influence, and the duties they have to perform, give them a power of interference, which enables them, if they are so inclined, to oppose with effect any political acts, which the Board of Control may desire to carry into execution.

The constitution of the Board of Control is such, that its President and principal Members must be his Majesty's Ministers. The junior members have been occasionally selected from persons, who have been in India; but no instance has occurred of any such members being actively employed at this Board; the duties of which, indeed, appear to be chiefly performed by its President, who becomes conversant with the political interests of India from a perusal of the records of the Company, and from that

constant communication with persons of some experience in that quarter, which the duties of his station oblige him to maintain.

The station of President of the Board of Control is one, which cannot be held by any Minister who has not both talents and reputation: and, supposing this public Officer to be even tolerably able, with a mind liberal and free from prejudice, he becomes an instrument every way calculated to perform the duties of his office in a manner suited to the constitution of the Country, and to the act of the Legislature for the better Administration of India. But it is evident, from what has been stated; that he must, under the operation of that act, obtain the consent and approbation of the Court of Directors to those political measures, which he sanctions or suggests; or enter into a contest with that body, which would tend to embarrass the Authorities at home, weaken the Administration abroad, and create delays and confusion in the whole system of the Indian Government.

The opposite causes of action, which influence those two Authorities, must often make it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile them to the same course of action. His Majesty's Ministers will naturally view every political measure adopted in India, as it appears likely to promote the general interests of the Nation;

more than as it immediately affects the separate interests of the Company: to which the attention of the Directors will, on the other hand, be almost exclusively turned: and it must be difficult to conciliate their approbation to any political measure, which has the least injurious operation of even a temporary nature upon their commerce or finances.

The Court of Directors must, from it's constitution, always be composed of liberal and respectable persons; but that body can seldom have any Members, who have a large and detailed knowledge of the political interests of the Company. The motives, which lead men to seek a place in the Direction, and the duties which they have to perform as Directors, are chiefly suited to those, whose lives have passed in the commercial service of the Company, or in commerce at home. The general exceptions to this rule, are Officers, or civil servants, who have acquired some fortune and reputation in the service of the Company; and who desire to obtain a place in the Direction, on account of it's patronage; and, from a feeling as natural as it is laudable, are ready to enter into active life again, with the object of providing for their families.

That a body so constituted and composed, and which always acts in a great degree under

the check and control of its constituents, the proprietors of India stock; should often take a very limited and partial view of large political questions, cannot be a matter of surprise. The fact is, that very few of the Directors have had the slightest opportunity of studying the political affairs of the Company before they entered the Direction. The complete occupation of every civil, as well as every military servant* of the

* Those few servants of the Company, who have been employed in any distinguished manner in the conduct of political affairs, are, from nearly the same causes, probably ignorant of the commercial interests of the Company. This unfits them, in a certain degree, for the Direction; and their minds are, from acquired habits, unsuited to the bustle and occupations of such a life. When they return to England, they have no public employment before them, and they retire to private life. Some years afterwards, perhaps, when embarrassing questions occur relative to India, a President of the Board of Control, or a Chairman of the Court of Directors, seeks them out, as having a high and a just reputation for their political knowledge of India: but changes have occurred, since the persons applied to were in employ; their minds have not gradually gone along with those changes; they cannot alter opinions, of which they are tenacious, in a moment; and their respectable names are often thus obtained to the side of error. To give the State, in some shape or another, the advantage at home of those talents, and that experience, which has benefited its interests abroad, would appear a great object; but it is one, which, under the present form of the Indian Government in England, would seem difficult, if not impracticable, to attain.

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Company in his particular line of service, combined with the secrecy observed in all political transactions in India, is such ; that a most able and respectable public Officer may pass the greater part of his life in the commercial or military line in that Country, and return to England with as little, or less knowledge of the real state of it's political affairs, than an Under-Secretary at the India House.

From what has been stated, regarding the character of the Board of Control, and the Court of Directors, and from all experience, since the first introduction of this form of Government, it appears unlikely that these public bodies should ever cordially agree, regarding the political Administration of India ; and as their frequent disagreement must produce the worst of consequences, some means will probably be devised, of making the authority, which is actually to direct and control the political affairs of India, more efficient to it's large functions ; and of avoiding a collision, at the very source of authority, which must, while it continues, spread weakness and distraction among all, who are subject to it ; and the effect of which will be always more dangerous, from the character of party-spirit in England, and the distance and nature of the Indian Government.

It is a principle of the British Constitution,

to leave the executive Administration of the Country free, and unembarrassed, in the employment of its principal Officers; and the execution of those measures, which it may deem wise and advantageous to the State; for which, however, the Administration of the day become strictly responsible to the public. Its applause, or condemnation, determines their title to fame, and the period of their power: and this forms, perhaps, as great a check, as it is possible to have upon human action. This check has been found sufficient to the management of the affairs of the Empire of Great Britain; and would appear equal to the conduct of the political Government of the possessions of that Power in India. It may be questioned, therefore, how far it is either wise, or consistent with the constitutional principle here stated, to fetter and embarrass the Administration in the execution of every measure, which they adopt respecting that Country. It will be said, that, under the act of Parliament, the Board of Control have the power, and that they must ultimately prevail in any contests, which they have with the Court of Directors, of a political nature: but the very privilege of an official expression of contrary opinion, which the form of the act warrants, has the effect of throwing these questions into discussion; and that effect produces

delays, destroys confidence in the local Government of India, and renders the whole system of our rule in that quarter, weak, wavering, and distracted.

The Court of Directors cannot claim, under the act, political power in the Administration of British India, as a matter of right; but they should be debarred from seeking it through the means of their influence or patronage; and that can never be done, unless by some modification of the present system, which, by a strange contradiction, often compels, as a matter of form, a Committee of this body to an official expression of sentiments upon a political subject, which have afterwards been declared to be at complete variance with the judgment of those by whom they were officially stated.

This apparently prominent defect in the political Administration of British India, has been shortly noticed: but it is not meant to go further into a subject, which involves so many intricate and important questions, and with which I am only acquainted through an observation of it's effects in India. With regard to the exact nature and shape of that Government in England, which may be found best calculated to promote the prosperity of our Eastern possessions, I cannot presume to speak. It appears of little consequence what men, or body of men,

are the instruments through which Great Britain rules India, provided the medium, used for that purpose, is shaped and constituted for the object; and that care is taken, that the public should neither suffer from incompetency, nor a continual clashing of opposite and unequal interests.

Though the general pursuits and habits of the Court of Directors, and the strange anomaly of their constitution, may be urged, and with reason, against their competency, as a body, to the exercise, in any shape or mode whatever, of political power; it would appear, that, as long as it is judged wise to continue the monopoly of the Company, the patronage of the Indian Empire could not be in safer or more honourable hands,* than those of that respectable Corporation; who, though they may not be equal to exercise the functions of Sovereignty † over

* The description of persons selected as Writers and Cadets, is the best proof of the just manner in which this patronage is exercised; and the late public inquiries into its abuses have had a result very honourable to the Directors.

† The Company's Government in India has a serious disadvantage, from not, in itself, inspiring that awe and respect, which makes such impression upon mankind. It is, of course, no more, than a body through which the Government of England rules India: but all its liberality (and no Government was ever more liberal) cannot make amends to its servants for those wounds, which their pride suffers, by even a supposed inferiority

an extended Empire, must, from the greatness of their concerns, the liberality upon which those are conducted, and the general characters of the individuals elected to the Direction, be always deemed the first mercantile body in the world.

There can be no doubt, but that Mr. Pitt's Bill for the better Administration of India, which, from the regard it paid to established form, weakened (as has been before stated) it's own principle; and left the power in England, which was to direct and control the political Administration of India, shackled and embarrassed; gave ample powers to the Governor General of India, who was by it clothed with all the authority, which the execution of his large duties could require, subject to a direct personal responsibility for the exercise of the great trust committed to his charge.

It has been ascertained, from the whole experience of this system, that the internal security of our possessions in India, as well as their

in rank and consideration to persons of the same class in life, who more immediately serve the King; and in being (from the character of the Indian Government) almost virtually debarred from all hope of those honours and rewards, which they see showered upon others, whose rank in life, or whose zeal and success in the service of their common Sovereign and Country, they cannot think greater than their own.

defence against external attack, has been in the greatest degree promoted by a measure, which, by giving one head to our wide territories in that quarter, has assimilated them in the same system of rule and management; subdued all contentions of subordinate authorities; and given a combination to the distant resources of our Indian Empire, which has made them easily applicable to every object of general interest.

There, perhaps, never was any public measure, which remedied more real evils, than the change of system with respect to the powers lodged in the Governor General of India; and its beneficial effects have been universally acknowledged. It would be a further improvement upon this system, if it was possible to make an arrangement, by which this high public Officer could be relieved from that load of business, with which he is now oppressed, in consequence of having charge of the details of one of the separate Governments of British India; which not only occupies his time with matter of inferior consideration, but makes it more difficult for him, than it otherwise would be, to visit* the different parts of the Empire under his charge. It might, however, be difficult to make such a

* A point of essential importance to their good government and general improvement.

change in this part of the system, without affecting the influence or patronage of the Governor General: and the efficiency and consideration of his high station can never be touched in the slightest manner, without serious danger to the public interests: for the subject, who is raised to an office, where he has sovereign functions to perform, requires, while he enjoys it, regal powers. He represents, in his person, the Government of his Country; and he receives from other States that rank and character which are naturally associated, in the estimation of the world, with the possession of extensive power, and ascendancy in the scale of political influence: that respect, which belongs to the real supremacy of the British dominions in India, is necessarily transferred to the person exercising its authority; and to weaken his influence, or degrade his dignity, is to diminish the consequence, and impair the power, of the Government.

The same political causes, which dictated these great powers being vested in the Governor General, do not apply, with equal force, to the Governors of the inferior Settlements of Madras and Bombay; who have, in fact, under the present constitution of the Indian Government, few, if any, political duties of importance to perform; all points of a political nature being

subject to the immediate direction and control of the Supreme Government. These powers are useful, however, as they add to the consideration of these high public Officers, and free them, in a certain degree, from the embarrassment and opposition to which they might otherwise frequently be subject.

The limits of the territories of the local Governments of India have undergone great changes since the act of 1784 was passed. These may make some modifications in the shape of the system advisable; and if such are made upon principles, which simplify the forms of Government, and which, without withdrawing necessary checks, add to the strength and efficiency of the local authorities, they will prove beneficial.

The former parts of this work have sufficiently elucidated the nature of those political principles upon which our territories in India have been hitherto governed. I shall now venture to give some opinions, respecting those leading principles, which should form the object of our rule of this Empire in it's present extended state.

However opinions may differ with regard to the advantages, which Great Britain has derived, or may derive, from it's possessions in India, there can be no doubt in the breast of any man,

that, if we mean to retain our Empire in that quarter, it is equally our duty and our interest to govern it in a manner, which will promote the prosperity of the Country, and the happiness of it's inhabitants. To effect this, no laws, no established principles of policy, or regulations for internal rule, will ever be sufficient, unless those authorities, by which these edicts, precepts and rules, are to be carried into execution, are in every respect competent and efficient to their great duties. This fact makes the selection of persons to fill the Governments of India, and particularly the great station of Governor General, an object, beyond all others, of importance in the future Government of British India.

The power exercised by the Governor General has none of that impression in it's favour, which often supports, even at a period of decline, hereditary Monarchies, and national Governments. It can only obtain respect by the intrinsic qualities of the person by whom this high station is filled. Great talents and virtues, and the able and active exercise of them, will always obtain the suffrage of both the European and native subjects of our Indian Empire; and, in all human probability, preserve that in peace; or, at all events, suppress danger: but moderate abilities, however combined with information,

will be found unequal to the great task in any times : and, if the Supreme Government of India ever passes into weak, or unequal hands, the high station will fall into disrepute ; and all the dangers, that flow from the contempt of a governing authority, will be generated.

It appears quite impossible ever to introduce any system of Government into our possessions in India, which will render them secure for a day, except under the management of an able and firm Ruler ;* and, if this is admitted, there is no part of the duty of Government in England so important, as the selection of a person to fill that high office. If a succession of men of great talents and virtues cannot be found, or if the operation of any party-principles prevents their being chosen, we must reconcile ourselves to the most serious hazard of the early decline, if not the loss, of the great Empire, which we have founded in India.

These observations apply to other stations, besides that of Governor General (though with a lesser degree of force); but particu-

* The only safe view that Great Britain can take of it's Empire in India, is to consider it (as it really is) always in a state of danger, and to nominate persons to rule it, calculated, from their superior energy of character, to meet every emergency that can arise.

larly to the high offices of Governor of Fort St. George, and Bombay.

There has been much speculative opinion on the subject of such selections. Some have conceived that military men were best qualified for these stations; others, that they should be exclusively filled by those, who had risen in civil life. It has been argued, that noblemen (who carried with them the impression of high rank and birth) should alone be appointed to them: while many believed they would be best filled by servants of the Company, who had local knowledge, and a large and detailed acquaintance with their affairs.

Any principle, which excludes distinguished talent and eminent virtue, in whatever rank or condition of life these qualities are found, from such fair and legitimate objects of honourable ambition, must have an operation unfavourable to that competition which is necessary to form men for such elevated stations as the Governments of British India. Whether these be filled by a military or a civil character, provided such be qualified for the great task, appears to be a matter of indifference. Perhaps there is an advantage, (as was experienced in the case of Lord Cornwallis,) when that rare mixture of talent for civil rule, and military command, can

be found in one person. That the rank and birth of the person employed, as it gives in some degree that impression, which these high stations require, is of great consequence, cannot be denied: but that consequence can never be sufficient to supersede the claims of superior talent, or to remedy the defects of inefficiency; and as to the servants of the Company, their local experience, and knowledge of details, is, unless attended with higher qualifications, but a poor recommendation to stations, which do not so much require that the person holding them should have that description of information, which is to be obtained from many subordinate Officers of the State; as that they should possess that large knowledge of human nature, active energy of character, and that commanding talent for rule, which has in all ages distinguished those, who have exercised power in a manner calculated to benefit their Country, and mankind.

Whatever person is nominated to either the high station of Governor General, or to the Governments of Madras or Bombay, should receive a full and liberal confidence from the authority by which he is appointed: nor should he be continued in station one moment after that is withdrawn. The dangers, which assail our Empire in India from internal weakness, are much

greater than we can ever apprehend from external attack; and these will always increase in an alarming degree, when the Administration abroad has not the decided support of the Government at home. That period is past, at which it might have been safe to have fettered the local Governments of India with jealous restraints; and to lessen their power, by a petty and vexatious interference with their exercise of it. Our Empire in that quarter is now too large, and too complicated, to be exposed to the operation of a system of mistrust. The reliance placed on those, to whom it is confided, must be of that complete nature, which will enable them to fulfil so great a duty.

On the political principles, which should regulate our future intercourse with the native Powers in India, I have before stated an opinion, to which I can only add, that such intercourse is likely to be marked by events and contingencies, which will disappoint, as has been the case heretofore, all hopes, that we can ever form of the local Government in India being able to follow any exact rules, which are laid down for its guidance. The neutral system of noninterference, and of trusting in a great degree for our security to the contests of our neighbours, has been proved, by experience, to

be equally unwise and impracticable. We shall therefore best maintain the peace and prosperity of our own territories, by using our established influence and power towards the great object of preserving, as far as we have the means, the general tranquillity of India. It will not, perhaps, be easy to effect the complete accomplishment of this object; nor are we called upon to interfere in every case of quarrel between States with whom we have no engagements; but, if we shape our general policy towards this end, we shall, from the commanding state of our power, gradually promote peace, without much danger of involving ourselves; and we shall receive our share of those benefits, which this system will bring to others.

It is, however, certain, that with whatever care we cultivate our external relations, and however much we endeavour to avoid future wars, we cannot expect to escape altogether an evil, which is among those conditions on which human dominion is enjoyed. But, as we can only hope for a comparative exemption from this evil, by the complete efficiency of our military force; that will always, in the reduced state of the present Powers of India, enable us to defeat it; and we can, on its occurrence, if circumstances connected with the local situation of the Countries which

we conquer, or any other consideration, forbid us annexing conquests to our own territories, confer them upon some of our Allies on such terms as we deem proper: and every such act of liberal policy will give life and strength to the exercise of that large influence, and power, through which we may hope to establish the permanent tranquillity of India.

It is not meant to notice any of those distant political relations, which it appears wise to improve, with a view to our permanent security against the attack of an European Power. This is a subject not immediately connected with the political Government of India: and, if that is administered upon wise and enlarged principles, our strength will be too much consolidated, to admit of our having any alarm at invasion.

The question of our political Administration of India, is not of more importance, than the civil Government of our possessions in that quarter. For there can be no doubt, that the real and intrinsic strength of a State depends chiefly on the loyalty and attachment of it's subjects: and there is no means of creating or securing the continuance of that attachment, but by the action of a just and steady rule, which rests upon established principles, and gives security to the lives and properties of

those, who are under it; and grants to them the enjoyment of as much personal liberty as is consistent with their habits, and the character of the Government established over them.

The greatest effort, which has been made towards the improvement of the civil Government of British India, is the permanent settlement of the revenues; and the introduction of that judicial system,* which is now general throughout all our territories. Though the success of these measures has not perhaps been so complete, as enthusiasts might have expected, it has been sufficient to prevent disappointment to those who take a rational and comparative view of that good, which can be produced by any human institution.

It is an acknowledged truth, that there is no branch of Government, which requires such attention to fixed principles, and will less admit of alteration, than a code of laws, or civil regulations. These it will always require labour to understand; and, if they were constantly changing, a knowledge of them would never be

* I have not entered into any discussion of those principles upon which his Majesty's Courts in India are established, as it is a subject to which I do not conceive myself competent.

attained. It is also to be observed, that they acquire respect with age: and our veneration, at last, almost extends to their defects, which we are often more willing to tolerate, than to incur the hazard of alteration. It must, from these causes, be the most arduous task, which human wisdom can attempt, to form laws; and very hazardous to change them, when formed: and this difficulty must be greatly increased, when the Empire, for which we legislate, is one of so various and extraordinary a nature, as that we have founded in the East.

Whoever, therefore, takes a large view of this subject, will find greater reason for surprise at the success, than regret at the failure of the system, which we have adopted. It is true, that it has in it's operation given a shock to the authority of military Officers, and, to a certain degree, weakened the impression of a character, which it is politic to hold high, among the natives of India. It has been hastily introduced into Countries neither calculated to estimate it's benefits, nor understand it's object. It has effected a revolution in the state of society, by raising the lower orders into an independence of their superiors, in a manner inconsistent with the established usages of the Country; and it's delays have been so intolerable in many instances, as to leave to the inhabitants little but

the name of justice. But it must, on the other hand, be remembered, that this system, at it's introduction, superseded another, under which the happiness of the community was guarded by few general regulations and laws; and consequently exposed to all the changes and hazards incident to a rule, which required, that great, and almost uncontrolled, power should be vested in an individual during the period of his temporary authority. That the evils, which have arisen from it's precipitate introduction into Countries unprepared for it's reception, can but be of short duration; that the revolution, which it has effected in society, though of a nature calculated to excite, during the operation of change, great discontent, if not disturbance, has the ulterior effect of giving that society a shape more congenial to our Government; and is, perhaps, necessary to it's security: and, with regard to the great delays, which have been found to attend the administration of this system, it is an evil, which certainly requires a remedy; but, if it is capable of being remedied, it never can be adduced as a proof against the excellence of the system itself.

There can, I imagine, be no doubt in the mind of any man, who reflects seriously on the subject, but that the permanent settlement of the revenues, and the introduction of the judi-

cial regulations, have already been attended with great benefit; and that the character of this system is progressive improvement. Many objections may be urged against it; and it has, no doubt, many defects; but it appears better than any other yet tried. Its principles are such, as will admit of gradual amelioration. We should apply ourselves, therefore, with ardour, to that purpose; and if we can either alter, abridge or simplify, the regulations and forms of our Courts in a manner that will accelerate the trial of causes, and defeat, to a certain degree, that artful chicanery, and litigious disposition, which characterize a great proportion of our subjects in India, we shall attain a great end. Every advance towards so desirable an object, will be an additional security for the permanence of our Empire in India; which rests chiefly upon the allegiance and attachment of our native subjects; which nothing can secure but their feeling a constantly recurring sense of benefit from our rule.

If we examine the history of the English Government in India, we shall discover, that it has been founded in a spirit of attention and respect to the usages and religion of the different tribes in India; nor can it ever be maintained upon any other principles. It has been recently urged, and by some, whose characters

entitle their opinions to great regard; that the introduction of the Christian religion, through the means of its influence and power, was not only a sacred duty, but an object of policy to the British Nation. This is a delicate question to discuss; but it is one I cannot evade. With respect to that part of it, which relates to the duty of a Christian to convert others to his faith, I am too ignorant to presume to offer an opinion. The few remarks I shall make upon this subject, will be confined, therefore, to a consideration of the manner in which such a proceeding would affect our political interests.

The experience we have of those converts to Christianity, which have been made, since the first intercourse between Europe and India, does not afford much encouragement to make us persevere in this design. These converts are but little acquainted with the purity of the faith, which they profess; and so far from being that example in their lives, which, if they were sincere and enlightened followers of our religion, they ought to be; they would appear to a common observer (who was uninformed of their conversion) to be a set of men, who had agreed to separate themselves from the other natives of India, in order that they might be freed from a number of restraints, with regard to diet and morality, by which the different tribes of both

Hindoos and Mahomedans are bound. There are, no doubt, exceptions to this observation; but it is applicable to the great mass of Christians in India, who are, in consequence, the very dregs of the community; not only from their station in life, but their morals and conduct. Under such circumstances, it must occur, that knowledge should precede Christianity; and, if we were at liberty, from our political obligations to those, whom we govern, to give the authority of Government in support of the attempts made to convert our Indian subjects; and at the same time perfectly secure, that those attempts would not endanger our safety, we are not yet arrived at the point where our labours ought to commence. But there would appear objections to our adopting this measure, connected with the very constitution of our Empire in that quarter, which it is at least necessary to examine.

The Portuguese, who were the first European settlers in India, hastened, if they did not cause, their downfall by that bigoted spirit with which they endeavoured to introduce their religion. They surrounded themselves in their towns and settlements with native Christians: but, by doing so, they drew a line of separation between those natives, who adhered to them, and all others; and thereby deprived themselves of

that aid, which they might otherwise have received ; and rendered themselves an object of general dread to all the natives of India out of the pale of their church ; who opposed their advancement in power, not only with a view of preserving their independence, but their religion. The French, though neither so bigoted nor so superstitious as the Portuguese, adhered in some degree to their unwise policy in this respect ; and the native inhabitants of their settlements, and the servants in whom the principal Officers of Government reposed trust, were almost all Christians : and it was remarked, that when their power was at the highest (in the days of Dupleix and Lally), they were so far from showing a scrupulous attention to the prejudices and religious usages of the Hindoos, that the most sacred of those were sometimes violated.* From the career of the English in India, a person would suppose, that, at every stage of their progress, they had looked for

* It must have been this abuse of power, connected with the conduct of the French adventurers in the service of native Princes, that gave an impression of the character of that Nation, which I have repeatedly heard expressed by one of the most intelligent natives that I have ever known, Meer Allum, the late Prime Minister at the Court of Hyderabad ; who used to say : “ That the French were bad masters, but good servants ; intolerant and tyrannical in the exercise of power ; but cheerful, mild, and obedient, when under authority.”

success, from avoiding the great errors of their rivals. The Government, and all it's servants, have not only withheld their aid from the efforts made to convert the natives of India ; but have, as far as depended upon their measures and conduct, discouraged it ; upon a principle, no doubt, of inspiring confidence ; in which they have succeeded in a degree which cannot be calculated ; and the extent of which may never be discovered, till the charm is broken by which this great Empire is held. In proof of the systematic discouragement, which the English Government has ever given to the conversion of it's native subjects, it will suffice to mention a few facts, which will fully illustrate the principle. It has always shown the most marked indulgence and attention to the civil habits, and religious prejudices and usages of it's Indian subjects ; and, in conformity with this fundamental principle, Government has not only contributed to the support of their different religious establishments ; but has regulated itself, in the employment of the natives under it's rule, with attention to the different pretensions, which they derived from the rank they held under those religious institutions, which they venerate ; and has abstained, in so cautious a manner, from giving any alarm to the natives of India, by encouraging or even countenancing

any attempt to convert them, that there is hardly one instance of any native (among the many who have become Christians) being employed in a situation of trust or responsibility, by any one of the public servants of the Company in India.

When we add to this, that the English Government have, in the introduction of that judicial system, by which it is fixed, that their different native subjects shall have the same laws, which were established by their former rulers; improved, ameliorated, and tempered by the mild spirit of English jurisprudence, but unaltered and untouched on every point connected with their religious usages; it may be assumed, that State has given every pledge, by which a Nation can be bound, not only to withhold every active interference of authority for the conversion of it's native subjects; but not to give the weight of it's influence, or the support of it's encouragement, towards that object. Should the dictates of a conscientious, but heated zeal, ever lead it to break this pledge; the alarm among it's subjects will be great; the consequences may be fatal to it's power; and a good Christian would regret to see an effort made to promote his religion, by means so unsuited to it's character and divine origin; and would deprecate the exercise of an influence and autho-

city for that object, which had been obtained on a confidence, which had been studiously inspired, of it's never being so used.

Under such circumstances, it is to be hoped, that the British Government will never be so deluded by well-meant but misguided representations; as to adopt measures, which are likely to fail in effecting the object of promoting the Christian religion; but will be certain to destroy our reputation, and probably our power, in India. Let every proper attention be paid to our church establishment in that Country: let the clergymen sent thither be men of exemplary conduct, and character; and let their numbers be sufficient to secure to the European part of the community, the means of learning and practising the duties of their religion; but the clergymen in the employ of Government, whether as Ministers of religion, or head Professors of Colleges, should be prohibited from using their efforts to make converts; which task might be left, as it hitherto has been, to the labours of the humble missionary; whose habits and zeal give him more prospect of success, and whose unnoticed and unsupported efforts will prevent his exciting any alarm; and consequently not expose Government to those seditious tempests, which, if they pursued another course, would, in all human

probability, be raised against them by an artful and bigoted priesthood; whose fear, at the progress of Christianity, is equally grounded on the love of spiritual and temporal power.

Colonization seems one of the most likely means by which knowledge of the Christian religion and civilization may be hereafter disseminated throughout India; but that appears to be so much dreaded, from the political consequences by which it is thought likely to be attended, that a long period must elapse before it's operation can be seen. It is not meant to discuss the policy of this question. The example of America, by which it is often tried, cannot, it is presumed, be a correct criterion for deciding it: but there is, no doubt, great force in many of those reasons, which have led the Legislature to adopt every measure, which was calculated to discourage the settlement of Europeans in India. Notwithstanding these, the cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and the fertile Provinces of Bengal and Bahar, contain a number of English mechanics, tradesmen, and planters, who may be almost considered as colonists; and who have, by their industry and skill, taught many of the inhabitants of India the improved arts of civil life.

The advance of the natives of India in every branch of useful knowledge, will be exactly pro-

portionate to the means and examples which we afford them : and this consideration gives a great value to that class of industrious British subjects, who are willing to pass the greatest part, if not the whole, of their lives in India, subject to those strict restraints and limitations, which the peculiar constitution of the Government of that Country renders necessary.

The half-casts (as they are generally termed), or children of Europeans by native women, form a considerable class of British subjects in India, who certainly merit more of the attention of Government, than they have hitherto received. They may be considered a distinct class; and one which is gradually rising into importance, from it's increasing numbers. They have not the robust frame of their fathers; but they are in general equal, if not superior, in strength to the natives of those parts of India where they are born. They are remarkable for their docility and intelligence; and only require the care of the State, to become valuable subjects. This race are at present considered as inferior to the European part of the community, and do not enjoy that consideration, to which their qualities are often entitled, from the natives. Yet, under these circumstances of depression and discouragement, they lose few opportunities of making themselves useful and

respectable in the various walks of life to which their pursuit is directed; and all the seminaries, which have been founded for their education and improvement, have fully succeeded. This class have, in short, been found, from all the experiments yet made, to possess a disposition and talents suited to all the occupations of civil life; and there can be no doubt, that, under a proper system of encouragement, they might be employed in our army. They would form a distinct corps, on whose fidelity and attachment every reliance might be placed; and, if military feelings and habits were early inculcated, there can be no ground to conclude, that they would prove deficient either in courage or hardihood. As it is impossible to adopt any measures, which will prevent the rapid increase of this part of the population of our Indian territories, it becomes our duty to try every means of rendering them useful. They are a distinct, but that is no cause why they should be a depressed, class in the community; and it appears both humane and politic to take every step, which will raise them in their own estimation, and that of others. We should cultivate their moral and religious principles; and while we instituted and encouraged seminaries for their instruction upon an extended scale, we should provide the means for their future employment in the conditions

of life best suited to their respective situations and qualifications.

If the justice of this proposition is admitted, the means of carrying it into execution will not be found difficult. These require no change in those salutary restraints, on which the constitutional principles of both the civil and military services in India are now grounded. The object is not to impair our present, but to lay the foundations of future strength; and to render, by the care which we bestow upon them, a numerous and increasing class of our population, useful and attached subjects.

It would appear necessary, if we contemplate any serious and great improvements in the condition of our possessions in India, that we should dismiss that principle, which requires that these should be ruled with an exclusive view to the immediate profit and advantage of England. A more liberal exercise of the great power, which we have acquired, while it advances the happiness of our Indian subjects, and promotes the prosperity of our dominions, will tend ultimately much more, than the pursuit of this limited system, to the permanent benefit and strength of Great Britain. In introducing civilization by the promulgation of knowledge, the cultivation of the liberal arts, and by the construction of such public works, as are necessary to the real

and essential improvement of our eastern territories, we shall find an occupation worthy of a great Nation; and calculated to establish our power over India on the firmest basis. The arts of peace cannot be carried too far. On the natives of India acquiring a love for them depends, in no slight degree, the future tranquillity of that Country.

It will, however, be vain to contemplate those great objects, unless we maintain that commanding military power, which we now enjoy. The British Government in India has been established, and must be supported, by the sword: and this consideration gives the utmost importance to every question connected with our military establishment in that Country; which, though the only means by which we can preserve India, is too likely, if mismanaged, to prove our ruin. This is a position, which has been too fully elucidated by events, to require support from either evidence or argument.

It will not be necessary to make any remarks upon the constitution of his Majesty's troops employed in India, as that force is solely composed of Europeans, and differs in no respect from the British army, of which they are a detachment. I shall therefore proceed to examine the organization and principles of the Company's army, which consists (besides three

regiments of European infantry, and five battalions of artillery) of one hundred and eighteen battalions of native infantry, and sixteen regiments of cavalry;* making, in all, an effective army of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men.

I shall first offer a few general observations on the subject of the European Officers, by whom this large body is commanded; and next enter into a consideration of the rise and progress of the native part of our army; and of the means best calculated to secure the lasting fidelity and attachment of the men, of whom this branch of our force is composed.

Many beneficial changes have been made in the condition of the Company's Officers: but radical defects still remain in the constitution of that body; and these must be altered; or that, which forms the strength of the British Government in India, will become it's weakness, if not it's danger.

The Officers of the native army in India should have their attention uniformly directed to the study of that service to which they are attached; and should (not as a matter of choice, but as an obligation of duty) be compelled to

* Several corps of horse artillery, gun lascars, and pioneers, are not included; and a very large invalid establishment.

learn the language, and make themselves acquainted with the customs and prejudices of the men, whom they command. Their promotion should depend upon their possessing these indispensable qualifications: and it should, upon the same principle, be made as impossible for a man to attain any rank or charge in the native army, without a knowledge of the vernacular dialect of his men, as it is for an Officer to be placed in the command of a vessel, who is ignorant of navigation.

There is, perhaps, no service in the world, where so much is required from Officers, as in the native army of India; or one, in which it is of such importance, that they should possess military qualifications, combined with a correct and just sense of the particular nature of their situation; as a small body of Officers in an army of foreign troops, whom it is not more their duty to discipline, than to attach to their Country, by every attention to their civil and religious usages.

There never was a period, at which this subject required more consideration. On the efforts of the European Officers in the native army, the permanent fidelity and excellence of that corps must depend: and if this is admitted, can there be a question of more importance, than the future constitution of that part of the establish-

ment of our Indian army? It involves, if I am not greatly mistaken, the very existence of our Empire in India, and with it the greatness of England.

This branch of the service no longer enjoys those pecuniary advantages, which formerly made it so desirable to the European Officer; and it is fortunate for the honour, as well as the real interest of the service, that it does not. Emolument from an indirect and unavowed (though, perhaps, not a corrupt) source, must have a progress towards abuse, and should never be allowed to exist: but, when the operation of a just and necessary reform demanded that a powerful motive to action, which had existed for a long period, should be withdrawn, another should have been substituted; and a body of men, on whose talents, temper, and courage, the safety of the British Empire in India must always, in a very great degree, depend, should be stimulated to exertion by every means within the power of the State, which they served. If it cannot afford to give high pecuniary rewards, it should purchase the services of men of birth and education; and remunerate the great sacrifices, which they make in entering the native army of India, by approbation, rank, and honours; and, instead of leaving them in a state of comparative obscurity, depressed by the con-

sideration, that they are in an inferior service, and that military fame, and the applause of their King and Country, are objects placed almost beyond their hopes; their minds should be studiously elevated to these objects; and they should be put upon a footing, which would make them have an honourable pride in the service to which they belong. This they never can have, (such is the nature of military feeling,) while they consider themselves, one shade even, below another army, with which they are constantly associated.

There is, perhaps, no other efficient remedy for this great evil, than the adoption of a measure, by which the whole of that army, which Great Britain employs in India, should be consolidated into one. The distinctions, which now exist, are pregnant with every mischief to our rule. They are the source of constant irritation, and are calculated to produce an opposition of feeling among those, whose complete union is the pillar of strength on which Great Britain must depend for the safety of her possessions in India. It has been suggested, that such divisions might be useful, as they maintained a salutary check: but this limited and unwise suggestion can never merit a moment's attention. It is founded on a distrust of ourselves, which is quite incompatible with the

permanent preservation of our eastern possessions. Besides, this opinion has it's only grounds on the occurrence of events,* chiefly caused by the very evils, which those invidious distinctions, and clashing feelings and interests, have produced.

It is in this place worthy of remark, that in no stage of those unwarrantable proceedings, to which a part of the Officers of the Company's army have at different periods resorted, has there been the most remote suspicion entertained of their loyalty to the King, and attachment to their Country; and it is evident, that the existence of such a doubt could alone justify the policy or necessity of maintaining any check upon their future conduct. All military bodies require to be raised, and made important, in their own estimation. In no situation will they bear depression or degradation; and certainly not in one like India, where their minds require the utmost spring to bear up against the influence of the climate, and the killing reflection of being banished, almost for life, from their native Country. It is from this cause clear, that no measure can be successful in removing the evils of the present system; but one, which

* Commotions in the army of Bengal in 1794, and in the coast army in 1809.

makes it as proud a distinction for a British Officer to serve his Country in India, as in England, or in any other quarter. It is not sufficient, that a small increase of pay should enable him to live apparently better in a Country, where the climate makes what are termed luxuries, necessities of life; but the feelings of his mind must be, that the service in which he is employed is as honourable as it is arduous; and that he will receive, in the respect and admiration of his countrymen, a just reward for the sacrifices, which he has made to support the fame and interests of his Country, in a distant and ungenial climate.

If the leading principles of this great change are once fixed, its execution will not be difficult; but, upon the principles on which it rests, the fate of India may depend. The strictest regulations will be required, with regard to the promotion of Officers of the native infantry. No step above the rank of Ensign ought to be attainable, without qualifications as to period of service in that branch of the army, and knowledge of the language of the troops; and the road to employment in the staff of the army of India should be the same. The regulations meant to protect this branch of the service, should be made permanent, and be defended by an act of the Legislature. This arrangement, if

ever it be made, should be grounded on the most enlarged and liberal principles; and must reject those limited considerations of party-views and personal interest; which, from the operation of one of the chief defects of our admirable constitution, too often supersede the public good. If it does not, it will bring injury, instead of relief; and ruin that service, which it proposes to improve.

Among the many political considerations, which are likely to affect the future prosperity and security of that Empire, which Great Britain has established in India, there appears hardly one of such magnitude, as that of improving and maintaining the attachment of the native army, on whose fidelity the existence of our power must always depend. For the population of England (supposing the revenues of India would bear the load of expense) cannot afford an army of sufficient numbers to protect it's extended territories in this quarter of the globe.

The most sanguine admirer of that civil code of regulations, which has been lately introduced over all the possessions of the Company, cannot expect, that it will do more in it's immediate operation, than attach to our rule those classes of our subjects, who are, from their civil and religious institutions, devoted to peaceful

occupations; and consequently to a certain degree unable, if they were willing, to defend that Government, to which they may have become, from a sincere and strong sense of benefit, well affected. That our laws may ultimately change the habits of even the military classes of India, is to be expected. But this change must be gradual; and, before it is completed, we must lay our account with some of those convulsions, which are the too frequent attendants on all great changes in the condition and character of large classes of society. Against those convulsions it is our particular duty to provide; otherwise we may (such is the peculiar nature of the constitution of our power in India) lose our dominions, before we have laid those deep foundations of equity and justice, upon which it is our wise and liberal intention, that our rule should rest. If this conclusion be just, it must follow, that the realization of those great hopes of permanent dominion, which we have allowed ourselves to indulge, as the certain consequence of the wisdom and justice of our liberal policy, and civil institutions, must greatly, if not solely, depend upon our success in obviating one of the greatest dangers to which our Empire is exposed, "the disaffection of our native army:" and if this be admitted, that object of our atten-

tion must become paramount to all others. Should any plan be suggested, by the action of which we can promise ourselves to improve and confirm the attachment of the military classes in India, and particularly of those employed in our ranks (at the same time that we accelerate the period at which they shall occupy themselves in peaceful pursuits, and become good, instead of dangerous subjects,) we ought to hasten it's adoption. Both the rigid principles of economy, and the usual forms of our civil rule, should yield to the establishment of this corner stone of our strength; as, without it, the vast fabric, which has been raised with such pains, must totter to it's base at every tempest with which it is assailed.

Before we examine the nature of those causes, which appear in their operation likely to weaken, and perhaps altogether to alienate, the attachment of our native troops; and to state those principles, upon which we ought to adopt remedies of a preventive nature against this great evil; it will be necessary to take a short and general view of the history of the native army; as it would appear indispensable to bear in mind it's progress, and the various changes which it has undergone, from it's first origin, to the present moment, before we can come to any

just conclusions on those measures which are essential to maintain and improve it's fidelity and attachment.

When the British Government first established itself in India, military tactics in Europe were in a comparatively rude state; and the caution with which a few Europeans, endeavouring to conciliate the natives of India to fight their battles on a foreign shore, were obliged to act, prevented the introduction of any part of those tactics (imperfect as they were), which could in the least interfere with the prejudices, habits, or religion, of the natives. A jacket of English broad cloth, made up in the shape of his own dress, the knowledge of his manual exercise, and a few military evolutions, constituted the original sepoy: and with this art, and his English fire-arms, he was found to possess an incalculable superiority over the other natives of India, who, ignorant of the first principles of discipline, (which enable men to act in body), were easily defeated, however great their numbers, by a small corps of their brothers, armed, disciplined, and directed, by the art, intelligence, and spirit, of their European leaders.

It was natural, that the early sepoy should share in that feeling of pride, which his superi-

ority in discipline obtained him over his countrymen; and the native Officers in the employment of the Company, were gratified not only by the opportunities which they had of acquiring military distinction, but of improving their fortunes. There were in the first sepoy battalions but few European Officers. A Captain, an Adjutant, with a Serjeant to each Company, was the original establishment. Commands frequently fell to Soubahdars and Jemadars: and the comparative laxity of discipline, as well as the general corruption of the times, enabled the whole of the native army, from the Soubahdar to the sepoy, to derive pecuniary benefit from the nature of those services on which they were occasionally employed. To this advantage, which rendered the service of the Company desirable, and often lucrative, was added a still more powerful attraction, in the kind treatment which they generally received from the European Officers; the number of whom to each battalion was so small, that they, from necessity, if not from inclination, acted as much upon principles of conciliation, as of coercion; and their authority in their corps rested more on affection, than fear. They were most particular in their conduct to the native Officers, towards whom they behaved with a regard and

respect proportionate to the responsibility of their situations. One of those native Officers, who held the rank of native Commandant, often possessed an influence in the corps nearly equal to the European Commander. As a strong and convincing proof of this fact, it is only necessary to mention, that many of the oldest battalions, in the native army of the coast, are known to this day by the name of one of their former native Commandants.

This system, which had undoubtedly many defects, had also much to recommend it. For, though the European commanding Officer, who acted without check in the exercise of a great trust, generally made his corps a source of pecuniary advantage, in which he was aided by the native Commandant, (to whose principles such a practice was congenial, and who, in his turn, no doubt derived every advantage from his power and influence); yet both had a strong interest in the character and conduct of the corps, to the men of which they were almost always kind and generous. It is to this disposition, to the respectability and advantage, which attached to the rank of native Officers, and the comparative relaxation in their military duties, to which we must ascribe the native corps having been, during the continuance of this system, filled by men of the highest

cast, and of the best families of the military classes, in those Countries in which they were raised.*

The first material changes, which took place in the constitution of the native corps, was an increase of the European Officers, a great alteration in their dress, and improvement in their discipline. This was occasioned by several causes. The native Princes had trained sepoys in European tactics; and, to maintain a superiority over them, it became necessary, that the native army of the Company's Government should make further advances in the military art; which they were not only enabled to do, from the great improvements which had taken place in that science in Europe, and from the example that they had in some regiments of Europeans, which had been sent to India; but from the number of Officers of liberal education, and respectable character, whom a prospect of advantage had at this period drawn to the service of the Company.

It is the opinion of many able Officers, that it was under this system that the native army attained the greatest state of efficiency which it has yet known. The Captains were selected

* This remark applies more to Madras, than Bengal; where the sepoys have always been of the same class as they now are.

to the command of battalions ;* and that command was an object of sufficient emolument, to limit the views of Officers of that rank (which was then one of the highest in the service) to it's attainment. These Officers were almost invariably selected from their reputation as sepoy Officers ; that is, Officers who united to all the military qualifications of a soldier, a particular knowledge of the prejudices, habits, and characters, of the men whom they were appointed to command. It was remarked, under this system, that though many of the corps were brought to a great perfection of dress and discipline, there was hardly an instance, in which this was done at the expense of the temper of the men : on the contrary, those corps, which were most remarkable for their discipline, were almost uniformly most attached to their commanding Officers, whom they found as liberal to their wants, and attentive to their prejudices, as they were anxious

* These selections were made from the Captains in the regiments of Europeans in the service of the Company ; and it often happened that Officers, who had neglected to attain the Country languages, and who, from violence of temper, were judged unfit to command natives, remained subordinate in an European corps, till they reached the rank of Field-Officers. Ten subaltern Officers were, under this system, attached to every battalion.

for that superiority and excellence in their appearance, discipline, and attachment, upon which they grounded all their hopes of reputation and preferment in the service to which they belonged.

The native Officers continued, under this system, to enjoy great respect and regard. This circumstance, which was chiefly owing to the European commanding Officer, who, from his superior rank, and the emoluments of his station,* enjoyed a consideration and consequence, which enabled him not only to confer distinction by his personal favour and regard; but to keep in complete check and control the younger Officers of the service; and to direct their minds to a moderate and indulgent conduct towards all the natives; but particularly to those, who, from their gallantry or long services, were entitled to respect and attention, and to whom it was proper, on every ground of policy, as well as of generosity, to show it.

In the year 1796 the native service underwent a great change; when those new regulations were introduced; which a train of events, connected with the comparative rank of the Company's Officers with those of his Majesty

* He had the off-reckonings of his corps, and in general the advantage of the command of a station.

serving in India, had rendered indispensably necessary. By these regulations, two battalions of native infantry were formed into one regiment; to which the same number of Officers* were allowed as to a regiment in the King's service. Regimental rise to the rank of Major was introduced at the same time: and this, by attaching the Officers to corps, would, it was hoped, confirm and strengthen that reciprocal confidence and connexion between the European Officers and the sepoys, which had ever been deemed the most essential principle in the constitution of the native army. It was also expected,† that the increased number of Euro-

* One Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors, seven Captains, one Captain-Lieutenant, twenty-two Lieutenants, and eight Ensigns.

† On the establishment of Madras, with which I am best acquainted, the result of this great change has not been so favourable as was expected. The conduct of the sepoys has, no doubt, been very distinguished during the late wars with Tippoo Sultaun and the Mahrattas; but not more so, than it was on former occasions: and that good understanding and confidence, which before subsisted between the European Officers and their men, and which was the acknowledged basis of our strength in India, has been recently much shaken, and in some instances almost wholly destroyed.

The mutiny at Vellore gave a shock to that complete reliance on the attachment and fidelity of the native troops, from which it will be long before the Officers of the coast army perfectly recover. There can be no doubt but that horrid event was the

pean Officers would greatly add to the efficiency of the native corps, as the smallest parties that could be detached would be commanded by an

result of treason and intrigue, which artfully took advantage of other circumstances to forward it's daring designs; and found in the minute improvements of dress, (which, though long in progress, had at that moment been carried by an unfortunate zeal to an extreme,) the means by which it was able to inflame the ignorant multitude, and to excite them to excesses of the most violent nature. We must not, however, deceive ourselves so far as to ascribe this melancholy event solely to those causes. Had those ties, which ought to unite the European Officers and native troops under their command, existed in full force, such an event could hardly have occurred. Had there been one of those native Officers, who were concerned, or who knew what was going on, whose mind had been alive to a sense of gratitude for the distinction with which he was treated, or the favour and respect which was shown him by the Government which he served, or who could have looked with confidence to further honours and advancement, he would either have exercised his influence to the total suppression of the desperate designs of his countrymen, or have informed his European Commander of their plots. But that no such sentiments existed, is proved not only by what happened at Vellore, but by the conduct of the native Officers in almost all the corps, which were suspected of disaffection about that period. These became the general objects of the suspicion of their superiors; and, if guilt was not fixed upon them, they were often convicted of a sullen indifference of conduct, which seemed to proceed from a feeling of disgust, which was produced by such a stagnation of their views, as left them almost without a motive of action. In attempting to check a spirit of turbulence, they saw some danger; and they were not encouraged to meet it by any certain hopes of reward

European Officer, and have the advantage of his knowledge and example.

The first effect of the regulations of 1796, was a great and sudden promotion of all the older Officers of the Company's service; and the arrival of a vast number of young Officers from England, to complete the establishment.

By those changes, a great proportion of the old Officers of the service were at once promoted to a rank, which removed them from regimental charge, and enabled them to return to England by the provision made for them; while the native corps were suddenly filled with young Officers; and as the command of a corps had ceased, about this period, to be attended with either advantage or distinction, it bestowed but little influence and consideration on those by whom it was held. It was, in fact, no longer an object of military ambition, as it had been formerly. It had become a station of

and preferment. They had attained all they could look to; and that all was but a comfortable subsistence during their lives. Their families were left in penury. They had therefore little to lose by a change, and some prospect of gain; and their behaviour under these feelings was, I believe, in general shaped with a view of saving themselves from personal risk in the event of the failure of the designs of the discontented, and of having some merit in having been passive on that of their success.

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trouble, without adequate emolument; and every Officer of interest or reputation in the service exerted himself to avoid it; and to obtain a Government command, or a situation on the general staff. From these causes it has often happened, since the introduction of the new regulations, that the native corps have been commanded for a period by young Captains and subaltern Officers; who, from their rank, condition and age, could not inspire that awe and respect, which is indispensable to keep in order the junior European Officers of a sepoy corps.

The German school of tactics has, for more than twenty years, been the favourite model of the English; and many Officers of rank,* who have been sent to India within that period, have been deeply imbued with the principles of that school: and these have, of course, endeavoured to introduce them into that service, which they conceived themselves specially deputed to improve; and much has, no doubt, been effected by these zealous endeavours. The

* The Generals sent to India, whether to the stations of chief command, or on the staff, should invariably be Officers of talent and reputation. Their charge is always great; and may often, from accident, become very important; and the evils which must be produced in India, by the inefficiency of those, who exercise high military command in periods of difficulty, are not to be calculated.

appearance of the native army has been greatly altered for the better; they look more like soldiers, and are perhaps more precise in their exercise and movements; but it may be questioned whether those advantages will counterbalance the bad consequences of too exclusive an attention having been given to these points. The European Officers of the native infantry, who have naturally been led to study the disposition of the head-quarters, have, in their anxiety to merit that praise and distinction, which they saw bestowed on those, who succeeded in these points, not only neglected many more essential duties; but, in some instances, practised a severity and harshness * altogether unsuited to the character of the men under their command.

I entertain the highest regard and respect for both the public and private characters of several of those distinguished Officers, who have fallen into this error; and am sensible, that it was hardly possible for them to avoid it. Their knowledge was limited to his Majesty's service,

* I never knew an instance of unkind and gross behaviour to the natives of India in a person acquainted with their language and manners: and it would appear, from this fact, that, to secure their being treated with that indulgence and regard, which both humanity and policy require, we have only to take care that those placed over them have that knowledge which is indispensable for such a charge.

to the usage of which they were naturally attached; and when they arrived in India they were surrounded by Officers in the Company's army, who, however high their reputations, were too desirous that the service, to which they belonged, should emulate in appearance and discipline the troops of his Majesty, to offer objections to this system of improvement in the external appearance of the native troops; * and, for a period, all those qualities, such as a knowledge of the languages and customs of the men under their command, a kindness of manner, and solicitude for their comfort, and a frequent and intimate intercourse with the native Officers, appeared to be in a great degree forgotten, or neglected. The minds of the most enlightened were perhaps never fully sensible of the importance of that chain of confidence, which had been allowed to rust, till it was nearly broken. They then discovered, that, heated by a spirit of emulation, they had concurred in attempts to imitate too closely a service, opposite in it's very nature to that to which they belonged; and had lost sight, for a moment, of those principles on which the native army was formed; and by attention to which,

* These remarks apply chiefly to the native establishment of Madras.

it's fidelity and efficiency can alone be preserved.

The Officers enjoying chief command in India, should direct their attention to the solid, instead of the superficial improvement of the native army. They ought to look more to the internal economy, than to the external appearance of the different sepoy corps; and instead of lavishing praises on those Officers, whose only merit consists in a skill in dress, and a minute knowledge of drill, they must exclusively distinguish, by their approbation and reward, those who are acquainted with the language and customs, and preserve the temper and attachment of their men, at the same time that they maintain their discipline.

The condition of the native Officers of our sepoy corps has often been the subject of the most serious attention of Government: but, though their allowances have been at times a little increased,* no measures have yet been taken, on which we could ground a just and well-founded reliance on their continued fidelity and attachment. In an army of nearly one

* The most beneficial measures of this nature was that adopted by the Government of Fort St. George, which gave an increase of pay to Soubahdars, in classes formed according to length of service: but though this regulation was good, it was too limited to have much effect.

hundred and fifty thousand natives, the highest pay, which a Soubahdar of infantry can attain, is twenty pagodas (under one hundred rupees) per month; and he enjoys no consideration, after attaining that rank, which can save him from the harshness of an European Officer; a boy, who has just joined that corps, to which he has perhaps belonged for forty years. He has, in barracks and in camp, no other accommodation, than that provided for the sepoy; and, on his retiring to the invalid list, he has his pay; but that is become, from habit, necessary for his support: and his children, whom a sense of personal honour, and a fear of that indiscriminate severity lately introduced, has prevented him from bringing up in the army, are generally left poor, proud, and discontented.

There are, no doubt, a few instances in the army, where a small pension has been given to a native Officer; and part of it has, in some very rare cases, been continued to his family. But such instances have seldom occurred; and only when the person, to whom the reward was granted, had an opportunity of distinguishing himself beyond all the common chances of the service; and, even then, it has not been bestowed without the greatest exertion of all the interest and influence of those Officers under whom the fortunate native Officer had acted. Under such

circumstances of difficulty and discouragement, others have looked with despair for similar distinction.

It has been the opinion of many individuals, that it would be an act of wisdom to abolish the rank of native Officers altogether in the native army of the Company; and this measure was, I believe, actually recommended by the Officers of the Bengal establishment, at the period when the regulations of 1796 were under discussion.

The arguments used in support of this opinion, by its advocates, were as follow :—

First. That since the appointment of so many European Officers to sepoy corps, the native Officers were not required to command those detachments, which had been formerly intrusted to their charge; as all parties, above a Havildar's guard, would be under an European Officer: and that, in consequence, a native Officer had no duty.

Secondly. That having no duty to perform, he was of course unnecessary in a mere military point of view; and therefore the pay to this class was a great and useless expenditure of the public money.

Thirdly. That the native Officers, from having little or no duty, generally become idle and indifferent, and were alone anxious (particularly

after they attained the rank of Soubahdar) to get invalided, and enjoy their full pay in perfect ease, during the remainder of their lives.

Fourthly. That, from having commissions, they were, to a certain degree, independent of the regimental commanding Officer; and, in consequence, often showed little regard to his authority, contenting themselves with a mere cold discharge of their duty, in a manner, which put it out of his power to bring them to a General Court Martial.

Fifthly. That the native Officers possessed a great, and in some respects a dangerous, influence; and that, elevated to a condition in life, which, from their birth, they had no right to expect, they were apt to adopt new sentiments in their promotion; and we might find, that we had not only given men a power, but infused into their minds an ambition, which they might be tempted to turn against us.

Sixthly, and lastly. It is argued, that on the abolition of the native commissioned Officers, there would be no danger from the non-commissioned, as these were too near the sepoys ever to possess any great influence over their minds. That their zeal in the performance of their duty, and their obedience to their immediate commanding Officer, would be completely secured by the authority, which he possessed of

reducing them on the instant to the ranks ; and that this system would be more approximated to that of the army of England, in which no man, who enlisted as a private, could indulge a rational hope of raising himself to any rank higher than that of a non-commissioned Officer.

The objections, which must appear to every reflecting mind, to the measure of abolishing the rank of native commissioned Officers, are so numerous, so strong, and so founded upon the result of experience, the peculiar constitution of the native army, the character of the men of whom it is formed, and upon every consideration, which refers to the feelings of a large mass of society ; that the very mention of such an idea having been contemplated, must excite surprise and astonishment. But as this idea has been often urged, and has had the countenance of some respectable names ; it will be proper to offer a few observations in answer to those, which are adduced by the advocates of this measure. It may be assumed as a fact of general experience, that in no Country has an army ever been improved by the adoption of a principle, which limited the action of emulation, and repressed that military fire and ambition, which has ever been deemed the greatest essential of a soldier ; and least of all would such a

rule appear applicable in a case, where it was admitted by those who wished to adopt it, that the rank they desired to abolish, was an object, from it's consequence, and the influence which it gave, of universal ambition from the youngest recruit to the oldest non-commissioned Officer in the corps.

They say, a native Officer has little or no duty: but is he not one of the chief links between the European Officer and the sepoy? And when it is considered, that he has been promoted to the rank he holds, in consequence of long and approved services, what man can be a more proper object of trust?

They state, that the native commissioned Officers become indifferent to their duty, and anxious alone to retire on their pay, the moment they reach the rank of Soubahdar: but does it never occur, that this desire proceeds more from a stagnation of hope, than a spirit of discontent? Are we not to consider, that the same spirit of emulation, which has actuated the native Officer's breast, till his exertions under it's impulse have raised him to that rank, would continue to operate, if he could look to further reward or distinction? And would not his increased rank and consequence, and the enjoyment of that very influence which is dreaded,

be in such case actively employed, to recommend himself to those superiors from whom he expected notice or preferment.

If the limited allowance given to native Officers, and the stagnation of their hopes, be the causes of that apathy and discontent, which is remarked among them; would these causes cease to operate in a sepoy corps when those ranks were abolished? Would not the Havildars and Naigues then become the principal natives in the corps, with a pay smaller and with hopes still more limited. But these, it is supposed, would not entertain the same sentiments, because they would move in a more subordinate rank, have consequently less influence, and be more dependent upon the regimental commanding Officer. Such reasoners forget, that the great existing cause of their present zeal and activity, that of recommending themselves for promotion to the rank of commissioned Officers, would be gone. They assuredly cannot expect any reflecting man to think, that because they had reduced the pay of the principal natives in a corps of sepoys, and rendered their situation more precarious, by withdrawing from them the protection of Government, placed them at the mercy of every European commanding Officer, whom chance put for a few days at the head of their corps, that they had, by such

means, taken a securer pledge for their increased fidelity and attachment. Such a conclusion is contrary to all experience of the human character. The more men have to lose, the greater disinclination they will ever have to change : and the more limited and uncertain their means of subsistence and rank in life, the less they will hesitate in exposing themselves to those hazards by which they may lose both.

It cannot be intended by those, who advocate this change of system, that the pay of the Havildars and Naigues should be increased ; as such a measure would tend to give them that consequence, which it is their wish to depress. Could it then be expected, when five pagodas a month become the highest pay, which a sepoy could attain, after the longest and most meritorious course of service ; and when that, even, unaccompanied by either the name or the reality of rank, was, in fact, a most precarious tenure, dependent in a great degree upon the caprice and temper of every commanding Officer to whom he was subject ; that any man, who, from his appearance or character, could obtain a pay nearly equal, the moment he entered the public service under a civil Officer, or embraced menial employment under an European gentleman, would ever think of entering the regular army ?

We are also to consider, that the different native Powers will always maintain sepoys ; and these men will rise to the rank of Soubahdars and Jemadars with more authority, and often with more pecuniary perquisites, if not higher fixed pay, than in the Company's service : and we are mistaken, if we conceive, that the solid advantages of our native army, such as regularity of payment, and the invalid and pension lists, would counterbalance such allurements. Benefits, when made too general, often cease to have a strong effect in exciting emulation. The best recruits who enter our service, are young men of spirit and ambition, whose chief view, in entering as soldiers, is to rise to the highest ranks. Abolish those, or strip them of their advantages and respectability, and men of high cast and proud feelings will turn with disgust from our army ; and, if determined upon a military life, will enter into that of some other State, however unstable, which continues to hold out a hope of their attaining those objects by which their imaginations have been captivated.

There can be no analogy between the native corps of India, and regiments of Europeans. In the former there must ever be a strong line of separation, marked by difference of habits, of language, of Country, and of religion, between the Officers and men ; and their feelings,

interests, motives of action, and rewards, must consequently always be considered on distinct grounds. In the latter, they have common Country language and religion: and the Officers are, from birth or merit, of a higher class in that society to which they both belong; and have, in consequence, a kind of prescriptive right to the respect, obedience, and attachment of those whom they command.

In estimating the consequence of the native commissioned Officers of it's army to the English Government, it seems first necessary to state, that the existence of this rank is coeval with the establishment of that Government in India. The first sepoys of the Company were raised and commanded by native Officers, acting under the authority and direction of an European Officer; but still exercising great influence and power over their men, whom they brought to the service. Those Officers long continued to be the medium on which we relied for the fidelity and attachment of the sepoys, who saw in them men of high cast and superior character, of their own Country, at whose call they had embraced the service of strangers. Even since the original consequence of this class of men has been diminished, the sepoys have continued to regard them as the most distinguished of their own body; and

have given them a ready respect and obedience, not only from a feeling of what was due to their stations; but from a dutiful concurrence in the judgment of their European Commander, by whom the native commissioned Officers had been elevated to that rank, which all were anxiously struggling to attain. But supposing that the State derived no benefit, in a military point of view, from the existence of the rank of native commissioned Officers; it is of the greatest importance to have in our native army a class of men, (comparatively few in number,) by our attention to whom we can stimulate and attach the whole mass; and whose merit and valour we can reward with an assurance, that we will excite, by so doing, throughout all ranks, that spirit of hope and emulation, which is the vital principle of every military body.

In the native army, as it is at present constituted, no native can rise to the enjoyment of any military command: that is, he cannot, unless in extraordinary cases, when the European Officers are sick, or absent, expect to have under his orders a body of more than thirty or forty men; and he cannot attain a pay beyond twenty pagodas per month: and no rank which he obtains, gives him any particular privilege or consequence in that civil community, from which he came, and to which he in general

returns, when disabled by age, wounds, or infirmity, from continuing the active duties of a soldier.

The nature of our power in India requires this exclusion of the native Officer from the exercise of military command, which should, no doubt, be always kept in the hands of Europeans. But if that gate is barred by policy, others should be opened. In the strictest conformity to those principles upon which the native army is formed, we might lead the minds of those troops to expect comfort and distinction in civil life, as the reward of approved military service: and by directing their ambition to the natural and seductive object of acquiring importance in their own tribe, and enjoying some privileges, however trivial, which might (under certain regulations) descend to their children; we should not only discover a motive sufficiently powerful to supply the place of that which a jealous, but wise policy obliges us to withhold; but place their fidelity beyond the power of corruption.

The native service would become, if such measures were adopted, popular and respected; and would be embraced with eagerness by members of the first families in the Country; * and, in

* It has been suggested, that we might enlist men for limited service in India: and this practice, which in some degree strains

the course of years, we might expect, that the attachment of our subjects would be greatly improved by that spirit of active allegiance, which would be generally diffused by veterans and their descendants, whose claim to their rank or land was founded in the gratitude of a State, whom they had served with fidelity and distinction.

The men, who form the native army of the Company, are almost all sober, and of good conduct in private life. Drunkenness, as a general vice, is indeed unknown: and notorious immorality is rare. But their virtues are more of a passive, than an active nature. They consist more in forbearance, from fear of offending against their civil institutions, and the rigid tenets of their religion; than from any sense of the beauty of virtue, or the deformity of vice. These men would appear hardly to consider themselves as free moral agents, and blindly resign their judgment, in almost all cases, to the law of usage, the dictates of their priest, or the influence of their superiors in cast or station. And it is from these causes, that we observe them in an instant change their mild, inoffensive, and indolent character, for that of the most savage obstinacy, and active ferocity.

in Bengal, might perhaps be adopted with great advantage. It is, at all events, a subject that merits consideration.

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All the natives of India, but particularly those of military classes, are fond of show, and of high titles; and they often seem to prize the external, beyond the reality of power. It is, indeed, surprising to see the consequence which they attach to every mark of outward respect, particularly when bestowed by their superiors: and, partaking of the character of his countryman, the native soldier of the Company, intelligent and quick in his conception, full of vanity and a love of pre-eminence, if not of glory, is of all men the most sensible to the effect of attention, or neglect. Though the climate disposes him to inertness, and his frame is seldom very robust,* he may be flattered and encouraged to make the most extraordinary exertions; while harshness or cruelty serves only to subdue his spirit, and sink him into apathy, if it does not rouse him to resentment, which is too often the case. It may be adduced in proof of this, that there never has been (as far as I am informed) a mutiny in the native army, in which the men did not pursue, as an object of their marked vengeance, some particular European Officer, who had treated them with injustice or severity.

An army so constituted, and formed of men

* The Bengal native soldier is an exception.

of such tempers, may appear very susceptible of being corrupted, and made instrumental to the destruction of that Power, which it is employed to protect; but of this there is no danger, unless in the improbable case of our becoming too presumptuous in what we may deem our intrinsic strength; confiding too exclusively on our European troops, and altogether undervaluing and neglecting our native army. From the day of that fatal error we may date the downfall of our Eastern Empire.

It will be useful in this place to enter into a short recapitulation of what has been stated; and to advert to that description of measures, which would appear best calculated to preserve and maintain the native army in it's full efficiency, and to secure it's fidelity under all emergencies. This, for the sake of perspicuity, will be best divided under different heads.

First. We should watch, with incessant vigilance, the sentiments and disposition of this great body, which will of course be liable to fluctuation and change: and, while we temper the strictness of discipline with those indulgencies, which the climate, and the habits and character of the native soldier, may require; we should be most careful to remove, by a preventive policy, every cause of complaint. For, in all instances, (but particularly one like the pre-

sent,) the difference between a wise foresight, which prevents demand, and that weakness which meets it with concession, is immense. The former is the characteristic of a rising, and vigorous; the latter, of a fallen, and expiring Government.

Secondly. The Officers, who are intrusted with the general command in India, should be made minutely attentive to the manner in which discipline is carried on in the native corps; and they ought particularly to discountenance and discourage that rudeness of language to the native Officers, and that harsh severity to the sepoys, which, experience has shown, is not at all necessary to their perfection in discipline; on the contrary, that it retards that object, by making them disgusted and discontented with the service.

Thirdly. Arrangements should be made, either by striking the staff off the strength of the army, or by adding more Officers to a sepoy battalion, to secure it's being always complete with European Officers.

Fourthly. It appears of the last importance to the efficiency of this branch of the army, that the native corps should be always commanded by Officers of rank and experience. Every measure should be adopted, which can promote the accomplishment of this essential point;

which never can be effected, till the command of a native battalion is made an object of ambition to the best qualified Officers in the service.

Fifthly. Every means should be adopted, which can have a tendency to raise the pride, stimulate the zeal, or improve the minds of the European Officers of the sepoy corps. It is upon their conduct that Government must place its chief reliance for the continued discipline and fidelity of the native army; and their distinction, as a body of Officers, should be suited to the great national trust reposed in them. No Officer of this class, as I before stated, should be permitted to rise to rank, or charge, in this branch of the service, without an adequate knowledge of the customs and language of the men whom he commands. And both the Commanders-in-Chief and the Governor in India should be restricted, by law, from giving an appointment, or staff situation,* to any Officer in India, who had not acquired a competent knowledge of the native language. These regulations might be considered by some, as too severe; but they are indispensable for the public good: and, after all, where is the hardship in insisting upon

* If such a regulation existed, Officers of European corps, as well as of native, would early qualify themselves for such situations.

Officers possessing themselves of qualifications, without which they can never perform their duty in an efficient manner?

Sixthly. As there can be no doubt, that the most serious danger is likely to occur from any spirit of discontent among the native commissioned Officers; and as this can only arise from the stagnation of all hope in the minds of men, who, whether we consider their services, or the influence which they exercise over the sepoys, appear proper objects of the attention of Government: We should endeavour to keep alive the zeal and attachment of this valuable class; and, through them, to give life and animation to the whole of our native army, whose minds should be studiously directed to the object of attaining civil privileges, through the medium of military service. We may pursue this object with a confidence, that, if we succeed in its attainment, we may defy all those attempts, which can be hereafter made, either by rival European, or native Powers, to corrupt the fidelity of our troops in India.

In concluding this important subject, it will be necessary to state in a general manner those means, which would meet this great object. They will be found such, as will neither violate the principles of our civil or military rule, nor cause any serious increase to our disbursements.

When a native Officer has obtained a commission, he ought, upon principle, to be treated with the most marked respect by the European Officer; who should, from that instant, consider him as a person, who has, from merit and long services, stepped from the rank, which he before held, to one more permanent and dignified; and to have received, with his commission, a sacred pledge of the favour and protection of the Government he serves, which nothing, but established crime or misconduct, can forfeit.

There can be no motive to action more powerful in the breast of a soldier, than a conviction, that his superiors will never pass without notice any remarkable act of gallantry or good conduct. The commanding Officers of all native corps, employed on service, should be required to report such, as soon as they occur, to the head-quarters of the army; and medals, of a value suited to the rank of the person, and the nature of the action, should be immediately given. These medals should entitle the man (if not a Soubahdar) on whom they were bestowed, to the first vacancy in his corps in the rank above that which he held; and they should also increase his general claims upon the service. If to a Soubahdar, his claims to those rewards, which were instituted for the most

meritorious of that rank, should be greatly strengthened.

There is no subject of more common, or of more reasonable complaint among the native commissioned Officers, than that their pay is never sufficient to allow them to make a provision for their families; and that no action, which they can perform, entitles their sons to any consideration in that service to which their fathers' lives have been devoted: and it is chiefly on this account, that they seldom allow their sons to be sepoy. Among other expedients, which have been suggested with a view of remedying this evil, and of restoring to the service a race of men, who ought to have an hereditary attachment to our Government, it has been proposed to allow the sons of native Officers to enter as volunteers, and to rise to the rank of commissioned Officers, when vacancies occurred. Such a regulation would strike at the root of the constitution of the native service, and is therefore altogether inadmissible: but there is no objection whatever to our giving some distinction, in their course through the service, to the sons of veterans, who have, from their valour or good conduct, attained a rank, which it is the policy of the Government he serves, to render as valuable as possible; but which those

holding it must think of little use, if it only raises them to a station, such, that they cannot, without suffering some degradation in general opinion, place their sons in that army, in which they have passed their lives; and yet does not enable them to save any thing for their future support.

The sons* of native commissioned Officers ought, when boys of the specified age, to be received in the corps, to which their fathers belonged, on the full pay of a sepoy;† and, when of an age and stature to carry arms, they should be made sepoy, with one pagoda a month more than regular pay: and this increase should be given, till they attain, by their services, the rank of a commissioned Officer. It should be a regulation of the service, that they were, on account of their fathers, to be treated with consideration by the European Officers: and should not suffer corporal punishment, unless in cases of great enormity: and when their conduct was generally bad, or they committed any crime, which called for notice, they should be discharged the service; which, considering

* This regulation should, of course, be made with some limitation to numbers.

† The sons of an invalid Officer should be entitled to this indulgence, as well as of those who were effective.

the indulgence with which they are treated, would be itself a sufficient punishment. Such attention to the sons of commissioned Officers, while it affected no principle of the service, would gratify all ranks of the army: and the sepoy would see with satisfaction, instead of jealousy, the sons of men, whom they had so long obeyed and respected, enjoying advantage from their birth, which, while it gave increased value to the object of all their ambition, did not interfere with them in its attainment; as the sons of commissioned Officers would depend, like every man in the corps, upon their own merit for promotion.

Though this regulation would, no doubt, be of great benefit to the service; yet that powerful principle of action, which is so essential to fix the allegiance, and excite a proper feeling in the higher ranks of the native army, can only be produced by more liberal arrangements, which, suited to the constitution of the army, and the character of those of whom it is composed, should lead the veteran from the hardships of a long and active military life, to the enjoyment of that ease and distinction on his native soil, which is in all Countries the noblest reward for the declining age of those, whose youth and manhood have been devoted to the defence of the State. These rewards

should be calculated on a higher scale, than would appear, on a consideration of the actual pay or duties of those to whom they were allotted, to be necessary; because they are not only meant to compensate to the minds of distinguished individuals, for being cut short in those hopes of military distinction in which they were educated; but to strengthen the attachment of a numerous army to the Government which it serves.

As one great measure for effecting this desirable purpose, an arrangement* might be made, by which a certain number of the most meritorious Soubahdars should be advanced to the rank of Commandants (as a general, not regimental rank), and made Killadars, or Governors of petty posts or dismantled forts; and they might, in rare cases, be gratified with such titles as were suited to their merits, and the tribe or religion to which they belonged. This would gain them the respect of the community among whom they lived; and to secure it from possible injury, as well as to save men, who had done their duty faithfully to the State, from the control of those, who from their habits must be unacquainted with mili-

* A plan of this nature was proposed by Sir John Craddock, but not adopted.

tary rules, they should not be required (as a matter of course) to perform any particular duties under the civil Magistrate; but be allowed to reside in their native district, or where they chose, and not to have any station, military or civil, unless they desired it, and were thought by Government peculiarly fitted for the discharge of its duties.

The salaries attached to such stations should be liberal, as they are meant to place those by whom they are enjoyed, in the first rank of that community in which they live: and, by doing so, to give popularity and respectability to the native service. A greater and better effect would be produced upon the feelings of the whole army by a few distinguished rewards, than by a small increase of pay to a number. We might also expect, that the efforts made by native Officers to attain such rewards, would be in proportion to the magnitude of their value: and when a native Officer of superior character could raise himself so high, in point both of comfort and respectability, under the Government which he served, it would hardly be possible to tempt him from his allegiance.

The most particular respect should be paid by Government to the few native commanding Officers, whom it distinguishes by such marked

favour. They should receive the grant, which was made to them, with every form and ceremony that could add to its value; and it should be accompanied with a rich medal; and, to the first class, with an honorary dress. The European civil and military Officers in the Country where they settled, should treat them with particular respect and attention. This, indeed, is quite indispensable to give effect to the measure recommended.

By such an institution of honourable rewards, the native service would be greatly elevated; men of the best families in the military class would enter it, in the hope of attaining distinction; * and, by their employment, the Government would be freed from the most dangerous of its discontented subjects.

In addition to such distinguished rewards, which, though calculated to have an effect on all, could only reach a few; it would appear of great importance to adopt some plan, which would lead the veteran from the camp to the

* Native Officers of distinction might be employed as native aides-de-camp to General Officers on the staff. Generals Floyd, Campbell, and Wellesley, had native Officers in their suit, and found them very useful. If an increase of pay was attached to native Officers so employed, it would operate in some degree as a stimulus to exertion to men of that class: and might in many other respects be attended with beneficial effects.

soil; and give him not only an object to support him through the hardships of a military life, and to fix his attachment to his foreign masters; but a deep interest in the permanency of the Government which he served: and such can only be done by giving him lands on terms of an advantageous nature.

The Tannah Establishment in Bengal is a noble instance of what may be done in this way. It's constitution has been greatly altered from the original plan; but it's history must furnish a volume of experience. Many objections have been made to this Establishment; but these have always referred to the difficulty of managing it; the interference with the civil regulations; and a small temporary loss of revenue; and must sink to nothing, when we contemplate the happy and important results of this great national measure. I have beheld with more patriotic pride, than has ever been excited in my mind by any other act of British policy in India, a tract of Country more than an hundred miles in length, upon the banks of the Ganges, which had a few years before been a complete jungle, (abandoned for ages to tigers and robbers,) covered with cultivated fields and villages; the latter of which were filled with old soldiers and their families, who spoke of that State, which had rewarded their services, in a manner

which showed their deep gratitude and attachment* for the comfort and happiness they enjoyed.

When we consider the immeasurable quantity of waste land in the dominions of the Company, it appears extraordinary, that this plan has not been adopted, in every part of British India, upon a more liberal and enlarged scale. The fact is, that we have hitherto been startled at a few practical difficulties, which would yield, the moment they were met with spirit and resolution. It must be evident to every man, who reflects upon the subject, that the accomplishment of this object will add, in an incalculable degree, to the ties, which we have upon the permanent fidelity of those by whom our

* The native soldiers of Bengal are almost all cultivators; and a reward of this nature was peculiarly calculated to attach them. General Perron, in Scindiah's service, had established one of very nearly a similar nature, which the liberality of the English Government (when the Duab was conquered) directed to be kept up; and it fell to my lot to adjust the claims of most of the men, who were entitled to its benefit. From what I at that time observed, I am convinced that the Establishment for a few old and wounded soldiers (for it was then in its infancy, and on a limited scale) was one of the great causes of that extraordinary fidelity, and attachment, which Scindiah's sepoys showed to their Government, even after they were deserted by their Officers.

dominion in India is likely to be preserved or lost.

It appears that we might also connect with such a plan the employment of some of the most meritorious commissioned and non-commissioned Officers, who had been invalidated (but were still capable of exertion) in the higher stations of the Police Establishment. The additional pay, which a veteran would receive upon this account, while it rewarded his services, and gave encouragement to the whole army, would not put Government to any expense whatever; as it would only be a disbursement of the same, or probably a less pay, than that which is given, under the present system, to some inhabitant of the Country, who has little or no claim to the favour of Government; and the rewarding of whom only makes men of the military class, fitted for soldiers, withhold themselves from the army, in the hopes of attaining, in the police of their native district, a station of nearly as great pay, and of as much respectability, as they could expect to reach by twenty years' service in the regular army.

It is, in short, necessary, if we desire to attach the native troops to our Government in such a manner, as will defy all corruption, to

place them on a higher and more favoured footing, than any part of the population. It is sufficiently obvious, that while we are secure of their attachment we have nothing to dread from others: and we should, from this consideration, make it a fundamental principle of our rule, that all employments and situations of profit and honour in the civil Administration, which were filled by natives of the military class, should only be attainable through the means of approved service in the regular army. The number of men qualified for such employment by their character and services, would be always sufficiently great to secure an ample field for the choice of effective instruments to the Magistrate, who would probably soon discover, that the habits of the soldier peculiarly fitted him for the duties of an Officer of police.

We should, on the same principle, grant civil privileges to the commissioned Officers, and those non-commissioned Officers and privates, who had obtained medals, and were retired from the service. They should have a right, when they were complainants in a civil suit,* to have their cause put first on the file. They should also have precedence in their ceremonies;

* This is, I believe, a regulation in Bengal.

and remissions of particular small duties; or, in short, any thing which marked that attention, which Government paid to those, who had served it with valour and fidelity; and which separated them, by distinctions, that gratified their feelings, from the mass of the population.

No part of those arrangements, which have been suggested, would interfere with the fundamental principles of that judicial system, which has been introduced into our territories; but they might, from many causes, be found, at their first introduction, repugnant to the feelings and wishes of those by whom that system is carried into execution. The patronage of individuals would be in some degree affected; usages infringed; and, for a period, some inconvenience might be experienced. But if the truth of what has been urged is granted; if the operation of this plan is likely to prove an essential and permanent source of strength and security; all petty difficulties ought to be surmounted. Less considerations must give way; and the civil Officers of Government must be taught to consider the promotion of the full success of this measure, as one of the most important branches of their public duty.

The subject of the native army of India has been treated in more detail, than the general character of this Sketch perhaps warranted: but

it is one of deep interest to the State; and the observations made upon it, are the result of long experience, and mature reflection; and, as such, they cannot be deemed altogether unappropriate, at the close of a work, in which the author has anxiously endeavoured to contribute all he was able towards that fuller knowledge of the real interests of the British Government in India, which seems requisite for the information of those, on whose virtue and wisdom the future fate of that great Empire must depend.

APPENDIX.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF
HAROLD GODWINSON
AND
THE
NORMAN CONQUEST
OF ENGLAND
IN THE
ELEVENTH CENTURY
BY
J. H. M. J. VAN DER HAEGHE
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF GENT
AND
OF THE
ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
OF BRUSSELS
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APPENDIX.

TRANSLATION of a FIRMAUN from FUTTEH ALI SHAUH, King of Persia; and of an annexed Treaty concluded by HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN, Prime Minister, on the Part of the King of Persia, by whom he was fully empowered: and by Captain JOHN MALCOLM, on the Part of the English Government; by virtue of Powers delegated to him for that Purpose by the Most Noble the Marquis WELLESLEY, K. P., Governor General of India, &c. &c. &c.

FIRMAUN.

In the name of the beloved and great God.



The Earth is the Lord's.

Our august commands are issued, that the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great Rulers, Officers, and Writers of the ports, sea-coasts and islands of the

Province of Fars, and Khoozistaun, do consider themselves as particularly honoured and advanced by the royal favour. And whereas, at this period, the foundations of union and friendship have been cemented, and the habits of amity and intercourse have been increased between the Ministers of the (Persian) State of eternal duration : and the ~~Ministers of the~~ high Government of the refulgent sun of the sky of royalty, greatness, and eminence, the Sovereign of the Countries of England and India ; and as various engagements and treaties, calculated for duration and permanence, and for mutual good understanding, have been contracted ; therefore, this command from the palace of glory, requiring obedience, has been proclaimed ; that you, high in rank, do cheerfully comply, and execute the clear sense and meaning of what has been established. And should ever any person of the French Nation attempt to pass your ports, or boundaries ; or desire to establish themselves either on the shores, or frontiers, you are to take means to expel and extirpate them, and never to allow them to obtain a footing in any place ; and you are at full liberty, and authorized, to disgrace and slay them. You are to look upon it as your duty, to aid and act in a friendly manner to all traders, merchants, and men of rank of the English Nation. All such you are to consider as possessing the favour of the King ; and you must act in conformity to the conditions of the annexed treaty, that has been concluded between the trust worthy of the high State, the bracelet of the graceful Government, Haujy Ibrahim Khan ; and the high in rank, Captain John Malcolm. View this as obligation. Dated the 19th of Shaubaun, in the year of the Hejree 1215 ; corre-

sponding with the month of January, anno Domini 1801.

Sealed, in the usual form, on the back of the Firman, by the following Ministers:—

Seal of  HAUJI IBRAHIM KHAN.

 MEERZA SHUFFEE.

 MEERZA REZA KOULI.

 MEERZA ASSUD OOLLAH.

 MEERZA REZY.

 MEERZA AHMUD.

 MEERZA MOORTIZA KOULI.

 MEERZA TAFULLAH.

 MEERZA YOOBUP.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be unto God, who said, "Oh you, who believe, perform your contracts, perform your covenant with God; when you enter into covenant with him, and violate not your engagements after the ratification thereof." After the voice is raised to the praise and glory of the God of the world, and the brain is perfumed with the scent of the saints and prophets, to whom be health and glory! whose rare perfections

are perpetually chaunted by birds of melodious notes,* furnished with two, three, and four pair of wings, and to the Highest seated in the Heavens, for whom good has been predestinated, and the perfume mixed with musk; which scenteth the celestial mansions of those that sing hymns in the ethereal sphere; and to the light of the flame of the Most High, which gives radiant splendour to the collected view of those who dwell in the heavenly regions; the clear meaning of the treaty, which has been established on a solid basis, is fully explained in this page, and is fixed as a prescription of law, that in this world of existence and trouble, in this universe of creation and concord, there is no action among those of mankind, that tends more to the perfection of the human race, or to answer the end of their being and existence, than that of cementing friendship, and of establishing intercourse, communication, and connexion, betwixt each other. The image reflected from the mirror of accomplishment is a tree fruitful and abundant, and one that produces good, both now and hereafter. To illustrate the allusions that it has been proper to make, and explain these metaphors, worthy of exposition at this happy period of auspicious aspect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune, of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high Viziers, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory, splendour and fortune, Haujy Ibrahim Khan, on being granted leave, and vested with authority from the Port of the High King, whose Court

* Metaphorically, Angels.

is like that of Solomon, the Asylum of the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of Kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal Empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the King of the universe, like Caherman, the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never-fading prosperity, the King powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the Princes exalted to Majesty by the Heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the Most High, a Khoosroo whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a Prince of great rank, before whom the sun is concealed.

ARABIC VERSE.

Thy benevolence is universally dispersed; every where drops are scattered. Thy kindness shadows cities; may God fix firm the basis of thy dominion, and may God fix and extend thy power over the servants of the Almighty! And the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorer of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and Empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, Lord of the Countries of England and India; may God strengthen his territories, and establish his glory and commands upon the seas! in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the

seal of the most powerful and most glorious, possessing fortune, the origin of rank, splendour and nobility, the ornament of the world, the accomplisher of the works of mankind, the Governor General of India.

This treaty between these two great States shall be binding on race after race; and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

ARTICLE I.

As long as the sun illuminating the circle of the two great contracting parties shines on their sovereign dominions, and bestows light on the whole world, the beautiful image of excellent union shall remain fixed on the mirror of duration and perpetuity. The thread of shameful enmity and distance shall be cut, conditions of mutual aid and assistance between the two States shall be instituted, and all causes of hatred and hostility shall be banished.

ARTICLE II.

If the King of the Afghauns should ever show a resolution to invade India, which is subject to the Government of the Monarch (above mentioned), the Prince of high rank, the King of England; an army, overthrowing mountains, furnished with all warlike stores, shall be appointed from the State of the conspicuous and exalted, high and fixed in power, (the King of Persia,) to lay waste and desolate the Afghaun dominions, and every exertion shall be employed to ruin and humble the above-mentioned Nation.

ARTICLE III.

Should it happen, that the King of the Afghaun Nation ever becomes desirous of opening the gates of peace and friendship with the Government of the King (of Persia), who is in rank like Solomon, in dignity like Jamsheed, the shade of God! who has bestowed his mercy and kindness on the earth; when negotiations are opened for an amicable adjustment, it shall be stipulated in the peace concluded, that the King of the Afghauns, or his armies, shall abandon all design of attack on the territories subject to the Government of the King above mentioned, who is worthy of royalty, the King of England.

ARTICLE IV.

Should ever any King of the Afghauns, or any person of the French Nation, commence war and hostilities with the powerful of the ever-enduring State (of the King of Persia), the Rulers of the Government of the King (of England), whose Court is like Heaven, and who has been before mentioned, shall (on such event) send as many cannon and warlike stores as possible, with necessary apparatus, attendants, and inspectors, and such (supply) shall be delivered over at one of the ports of Persia, whose boundaries are conspicuous, to the Officers of the high in dignity, the King of Persia.

ARTICLE V.

Should it ever occur, that an army of the French Nation, actuated by design and deceit, attempts to settle with a view of establishing themselves on any of

the islands or shores of Persia, a conjunct force shall be appointed by the two high contracting States, to ~~act in co-operation~~ for their expulsion and extirpation, and to destroy and put an end to the foundations of their treason. It is a condition, if such event happens, and the conquering troops (of Persia) march, that the Officers of the Government of the King (of England), who is powerful as the Heavens, and has been before mentioned, shall load, transport, and deliver (for their service), as great a quantity of necessaries, stores, and provisions, as they possibly can; and if ever any of the great men of the French Nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence, or dwelling, on any of the islands or shores of the Kingdom of Persia, that they may there raise the standard of abode or settlement, such request or representation shall not be consented unto by the high in rank of the State encompassed with justice (the Government of Persia); and leave for their residing in such place shall not be granted.

While time endures, and while the world exists, the contents of this exalted treaty shall remain an admired picture in the mirror of duration and perpetuity; and submission to the fair image on this conspicuous page shall be everlasting.

Seal of  HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN.

 Captain JOHN MALCOLM.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

A true translation.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

TRANSLATION of a FIRMAUN from FUTTEH ALI SHAUH, King of Persia; and of an annexed Treaty concluded by HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN, Prime Minister, on the Part of the King of Persia, by whom he was fully empowered: and by Captain JOHN MALCOLM, on the Part of the English Government; by virtue of Powers delegated to him for that Purpose by the Most Noble the Marquis WELLESLEY, K. P., Governor General of India, &c. &c. &c.

FIRMAUN.

In the name of the beloved and great God!



The Earth is the Lord's.

Our august commands are issued, that the high indignity, the exalted in station, the refuge of power and glory, the noble and great in authority, the chiefs of high nobles, the Beglerbega, the Haukims, the Naibs, and Mootsuddies of the Kingdom under our protection (who are raised by our royal favour), become acquainted; that, at this period, the dignified and eminent in station, the prudent, able, and penetrating, the greatest of the exalted followers of the

Messiah, Captain John Malcolm, deputed from a glorious quarter, (from the Government of the King of England, whose Court resembles the Firmament, an Emperor in dignity like Alexander, possessing the power of the globe, and from the repository of glory, greatness, and ability, endowed with nobility, power, and justice, the Governor General of the Kingdom of Hindoostan,) for the purpose of establishing union and friendship between the two great States, has arrived at our threshold, founded on justice, and has been honoured by admission to our royal presence of conspicuous splendour, and has expressed a desire, that the foundations of amity and union should be laid between the two States, that they should be connected together in the bonds of friendship and harmony, and that a constant union, and reciprocal good understanding, should exist : We, from our august selves, have given our consent, and have granted the requests and desires of the high in rank above mentioned; and a treaty, sealed with the seal of the Minister* of our ever-enduring Government, has been given to him : and you, exalted in station, are positively enjoined of the necessity (after you become informed of our royal and august order) for all of you acting in strict conformity with the conditions of the treaty concluded and exchanged between the high in rank, the exalted in station, the great and glorious in power, near to the throne, in whom the royal confidence is placed, Haujy Ibrahim Khan; and the high in rank, the Envoy (Captain John Malcolm), whose titles have

* Literally, one in whom confidence is placed.

been before enumerated. Let no one act contrary to this high command, or to the contents of the annexed treaty: and should it ever be represented to us, that any of the great nobles conduct themselves in opposition to the stipulations of this treaty, or are in this respect either guilty, or negligent, such will incur our displeasure, and punishment, and be exposed to our royal anger, which is like fire: and let them view this as an obligation.

Dated in the month of Shaubaun, in the year of the Hejree 1215; corresponding with the month of January, anno Domini 1801. Sealed in the usual form on the back of the Firmaun, by the following Ministers:—

Seal of  HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN.

 MEERZA SHUFFEE.

 MEERZA REZA KOULI.

 MEERZA ASSUD OÖLLAH.

 MEERZA REZY.

 MEERZA AHMUD.

 MEERZA MOORTIZA KOULI.

 MEERZA TAZULLAH.

 MEERZA YÖÖSTUF.

TREATY ANNEXED.

PREAMBLE.

Praise be to God, who has said, "Perform your covenant, for the performance of your covenant shall be inquired into hereafter." As establishing the obligations of friendship between all mankind, is a charge from the Almighty, and is a most laudable and excellent institution; and as the Creator is pleased, and the happiness and tranquillity of his subjects consulted by it; therefore, at this happy period of auspicious aspect, a treaty has been concluded between the high in dignity, the exalted in station, attended by fortune, of great and splendid power, the greatest among the high Viziers, in whom confidence is placed, the faithful of the powerful Government, the adorned with greatness, power, glory, splendour, and fortune, Haujy Ibrahim Khan, on being granted leave, and vested with authority from the Port of the high King, whose Court is like that of Solomon, the asylum of the world, the sign of the power of God, the jewel in the ring of Kings, the ornament in the cheek of eternal Empire, the grace of the beauty of sovereignty and royalty, the King of the universe, like Caherman, the mansion of mercy and justice, the phoenix of good fortune, the eminence of never-fading prosperity, the King powerful as Alexander, who has no equal among the Princes exalted to Majesty by the Heavens in this globe, a shade from the shade of the Most High, a

Khoosroo whose saddle is the moon, and whose stirrup is the new moon, a Prince of great rank, before whom the sun is concealed.

ARABIC VERSE.

Thy benevolence is universally dispersed; every where drops are scattered. Thy kindness shadows cities: may God fix firm the basis of thy dominion! And the high in dignity, the great and able in power, the adorer of those acquainted with manners, Captain John Malcolm, delegated from the sublime quarter of the high in power, (seated on a throne, the asylum of the world, the chief jewel in the crown of royalty and sovereignty, the anchor of the vessel of victory and fortune, the ship on the sea of glory and empire, the blazing sun in the sky of greatness and glory, Lord of the Countries of England and India, may God strengthen his territories and establish his glory and commands upon the seas!) in the manner explained in his credentials, which are sealed with the seal of the most powerful and most glorious, possessing fortune, the origin of rank, splendour and nobility, the ornament of the world, the accomplisher of the works of mankind, the Governor General of India. This treaty between these two great Powers shall be binding on race after race; and the two Governments must ever, while the world exists, act in conformity to what is now settled.

ARTICLE I.

The merchants of the high contracting States are to travel, and carry on their affairs in the territories of

N N

both Nations, in full security and confidence; and the Rulers and Governors of all cities are to consider it their duty to protect from injury their cattle and goods.

ARTICLE II.

The traders and merchants of the Kingdom of England or Hindoostan, that are in the service of the English Government, shall be permitted to settle in any of the sea-ports or cities of the boundless Empire of Persia (which may God preserve from calamity) that they prefer; and no Government duties, taxes, or requisitions, shall ever be collected on any goods that are the actual property of the Governments; the usual duties on such to be taken from purchasers.

ARTICLE III.

Should it happen, that either the persons or property (of merchants) are injured, or lost, by thieves or robbers, the utmost exertions shall be made to punish the delinquents, and recover the property: and if any merchant or trader of Persia evades, or delays, the payment of a debt to the English Government, the latter are authorized to use every possible mode for the recovery of their demands, taking care to do so in communication and with the knowledge of the Ruler or Governor of the place; who is to consider it as his duty to grant, on such occasion, every aid in his power. And, should any merchant of Persia be in India attending to their mercantile concerns, the Officers of the English Government are not to prevent them carrying on their affairs, but to aid and

favour them: and the above-mentioned merchants are to recover their debts and demands in the mode prescribed by the customs and laws of the English Government.

ARTICLE IV.

If any person in the Empire of Persia die indebted to the English Government, the Ruler of the place must exert his power to have such demand satisfied before those of any other creditor whatever. The servants of the English Government resident in Persia, are permitted to hire as many domestics, natives of that Country, as are necessary for the transaction of their affairs; and they are authorized to punish such, in cases of misconduct, in the manner they judge most expedient, provided such punishment does not extend to life, or limb: in such cases the punishment to be inflicted by the Ruler or Governor of the place.

ARTICLE V.

The English are at liberty to build houses and mansions in any of the ports or cities of Persia, that they choose; and they may sell, or rent, all such houses or mansions at pleasure. And should ever a ship belonging to the English Government be in a damaged state in any of the ports of Persia; or one of Persia be in that condition in an English harbour, the Chiefs and Rulers of the ports and harbours of the respective Nations are to consider it as their duty, to give every aid to refit and repair vessels so situated: and if it hap-

pens, that any of the vessels of either Nation are sunk, or shipwrecked, in or near the ports or shores of either Country; on such occasions, whatever part of the property is recovered shall be restored to their owners or their heirs, and a just hire is to be allowed by the owners to those who recover it.

FINAL ARTICLE.

Whenever any native of England or India, in the service of the English Government, resident in Persia, wishes to leave that Country, he is to suffer obstruction from no person, but to be at full liberty to do so, and to carry with him his property.

The articles of the treaty between the two States, are fixed and determined. That person who turns from God turns from his own soul.

Seal of  HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN.

 Captain JOHN MALCOLM.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

It is further written in sincerity, that, on iron, lead, steel, broad cloth, and purpetts, that are exclusively the property of the English Government, no duties whatever shall be taken from the sellers, a duty not exceeding one per cent to be levied upon the purchase

ers; and the duties, imports, and customs, which are at this period established in Persia and India (on other goods), are to remain fixed, and not to be increased.

The high in rank Haujy Khutteel Khan, Malick or Tijjar, is charged and intrusted with the arrangement and settlement of the remaining points relative to commerce.

Seal of  HAUJY IBRAHIM KHAN.

 Captain JOHN MALCOLM.

(Signed JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

A true translation.

(True Copy.) (Signed) JOHN MALCOLM, Envoy.

F I N I S.

J. MOYES, PRINTER,
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