

so much to do with this body of functionaries in the course of the following narrative, that we here give a list of their names, and statement of their incomes, as contained in the Bengal Almanac for 1841. (1)

Sir W. H. Macnaghten, Bart., Envoy and Minister,.....	£11,220
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, at Cabool,.....	3,000
Major E. Pottinger, Resident, Toorkistan,.....	1,440
Lieutenant P. Lynch, do., Ghilzie country,	1,200
Captain A. Conolly, Envoy to Khiva,	1,440
Lieutenant P. Nicholson, in charge of Dost Mahomed,	1,080
Lieutenant C. Rattray, Political Assistant, Kohistan,	840
Captain G. F. P. Lawrence, Military Secretary to the Envoy,.....	1,440
Lieutenant J. B. Conolly, Military Assistant to the Envoy,.....	840
Lieutenant Rawlinson, Political Agent, Candahar, ..	1,440
Lieutenant C. A. Jackson, Assistant to ditto,.....	1,080
Lieutenant G. H. Macgregor, Political Agent, Jellalabad,.....	1,440
Lieutenant C. Burnes, Political Agent, Ghuznie,	720
Captain F. Mackeson, Political Agent, Peshawur,	1,800
Captain Colin Mackenzie, Political Agent,.....	840
Captain J. D. Bean, Political Agent, Quetta,	1,440
Lieutenant W. F. Hammersley, Assistant,	840
Mr Ross Bell, Political Agent, Upper Scinde,	3,900
Lieutenant E. B. Eastwick, Assistant,	840
Captain W. J. B. Knyvett, ditto,	840
Lieutenant E. J. Brown, ditto,	840
Lieutenant Sinclair, ditto,	720
Lieutenant W. Brown,.....	840
Lieutenant W. Young, ditto,	720
Lieutenant W. Broadfoot, Assistant, Toorkistan Frontier,	840
Captain J. Nash, in charge of State Prisoners, Cabool,	960
Captain E. Sanders, attached to the Herat Agency,	1,968
Captain J. Abbott, Political Agent, Herat,.....	840
Major D'Arcy Todd, Herat,	1,440
Lieutenant R. Leech, Political Assistant,.....	840
Lieutenant R. C. Shakespear, Political Agent, Herat,.....	840
Lieutenant E. K. Elliot, Political Assistant, Candahar,	720

Being just £49,248 annually—exclusive of Major Outram's establishment in Lower Scinde, and without making any mention of the array of native attendants. Mr Bell used to employ 750 camels for the transport of his private baggage; which, at £1 10s. per month each, makes the very respectable item of £13,500.

Before the winter had set in, our people had had a brush with the refractory

1. The Bengal and Agra Annual Guide and Gazetteer for 1841. Rushton : Calcutta. 2 vols. 8vo.—a very valuable work.

Kohistanes. In the end of September the Ghoorka corps, a troop of horse artillery, three mortars, 1,000 Affghan cavalry, and 600 infantry, marched for Bameean; these were afterwards ordered to wait the junction of additional troops. Dr Lord, political agent in that district, reported that Dost Mahomed (2) had allied himself by marriage to the chiefs of Khooloom and Khoondooz, and was rapidly gaining influence in Toorkistan. (3) His intrigues were said to have been so far matured, that his son Ukhbar Khan was reported to have reached the Ghorebund Pass, 60 miles north of Cabool, in the end of September. The 4th brigade and the local horse, a company of sappers and miners, and the 35th and 37th N. I., left in the beginning of October for the northward, with supplies for six weeks. Having joined the force previously dispatched for Bameean, they were directed to cross the pass and make a dash into Tartary—a measure afterwards abandoned. On the 31st October a small party of horse artillery acting as cavalry, with some infantry and Affghan horse, having come up with from 600 to 700 Uzbegs, near Syghan, thirty miles beyond Bameean, defeated and dispersed them. Syghan was thus re-annexed to the Shah's dominions; a worthless possession like the rest, imposing on us the necessity of maintaining it, without the possibility of its conferring benefit in return. (4) The king of Bokhara, it was said, had offered the Dost a strong force to enable him to cut off the party at Bameean, now greatly reduced:—if his Majesty ever made such a proposal he must very quickly have altered his intentions: as in December he seized on the Dost, after having invited him to his court on promise of assistance, or according to another account, when making his way towards Persia, and in violation of all the rules of hospitality, so strictly attended to in Central Asia, kept him in confinement till the following August. The force maintained at Bameean throughout the winter consisted of 600 infantry, with six guns and two mortars, the heavier detachment above mentioned having returned to Cabool. The month of December passed quietly over, though threats of insurrection in every quarter led us to look for a turbulent spring and summer: an anticipation more than realized. The Shah and the Envoy continued at Jellalabad throughout the winter. The first of the operations of any magnitude in which we were engaged, was unsuccessful. Colonel Orchard, in the beginning of January, was dispatched against the fort of Peshoot, in the mountain country to the eastward of Jellalabad, in command of a force about 2,000 strong, consisting of three 9-prs., 1 troop 2d cavalry, 1 wing 37th N. I.,

2. The Ameer is described by Wood as about 45 years of age (in 1838): according to Dr Atkinson, Prince Timor, the Shah Soojah's eldest son, who has since retired to India, was at that time 40: the Shah himself about 60.

3. *Englishman* newspaper, October 25, 1839.

4. Atkinson's Expedition into Afghanistan, p. 327.

80 of the 1st European Regt., 20 Sappers, 3d Regt. Shah's infantry, 1st Shah's cavalry, 700 strong. Severe and continued rains had for some time prevailed; but on the 17th, the weather having cleared up, the guns were placed in battery, and after two hours firing, practicable breaches were made on both sides of the principal gate. Lieutenant Pigou (afterwards blown up and killed when engaged in a similar operation about a year after), with a party of 40 Europeans and sepoys, pushed down the outer gate, and proceeded to examine the inner one, which was found to be still entire. A bugler, by mistake, on seeing this party enter the breach, sounded the advance, and the whole column began to move forwards. They were quickly made aware of the blunder, and directed to shelter themselves from the enemy's fire in a ravine close by. Two attempts were made to blow open the gates by means of gunpowder bags; but both of them, in consequence of the rain which had begun to fall again, proved failures. It having been found impossible to scale the walls, or storm the fort, in its present condition, and the troops having been for five hours drenched with rain, and exposed to a severe fire from the fortress, it was resolved to retire about noon. The enemy, perceiving that eventually we should succeed, retreated shortly afterwards with the *éclat* of victory, carrying with them all their valuables, and leaving us in possession of their naked hold. Our loss was severe, consisting of about 69 killed and wounded; Lieutenant Collinson and Ensign Hicks were severely, the former, as it proved, mortally wounded. We afterwards took possession of Khathe, on the opposite side of the river, (5) and attempted to pursue the chiefs, but found this last impossible at such a season. In January, a fall of snow, said to have been nearly five feet deep, occurred at Cabool, while the thermometer fell to 13—at one time it was 5; at Bameean it sunk to 10 below zero, or 42 under freezing, the first week of the year. Ghuznie also was for some time snowed up, the cold being very severe, the snow lying a foot thick for weeks on end. The spirit of resistance which everywhere made its appearance amongst the tribes on the return of spring, was as obstinate as it was universal. About seven miles from Bameean stood a number of mud forts, belonging to the tribe called Hazarabs, on the tableland at the foot of the mountains which form a valley stretching away to the south-west. Meer Moheb and Shah Nusseer Beg were the ruling chiefs, of whom the former was supreme; the valley was populous and well cultivated, and the people had, up to the beginning of March, shown every disposition to supply our wants. On the 13th, the Hazarabs not only refused to sell forage to the commissariat officers, but, having assembled in considerable numbers, insulted and stoned the troops sent in quest of it. To a threat from one of our people, it was replied that we were Kaffirs, and

might bring our guns against them if we pleased. All attempts at conciliation having failed, a detachment was despatched under Captain Garbett, consisting of two 6-pr. guns under Lieut. M'Kenzie, 25 Horse Artillery Troopers as Cavalry, 50 Affghan Horsemen, and 4 Companies of the 4th Light Infantry under Captain Hay, to reduce them to order. The first fort arrived at was a strong one; the occupants refused all terms, and shut their gates against us. The heights in front, which had been covered with Hazarabs, were quickly carried. The artillery played briskly on the fort at a distance of 400 yards, and in less than an hour it was in our possession. The garrison retired to an inner tower and refused to yield. Hay and straw were piled up and set fire to in the lower part of their retreat; they still continued resolute; and, when the fire had burned out, not a man of them was found alive. The women and children (18 in number), who had sought refuge with the men, had scrambled to the top of the tower as the flames advanced, and from this, after all the garrison had been destroyed, they were rescued with difficulty; a trooper having contrived to carry up a rope through the burning building, by which they were let down.(6) Our casualties amounted to 16 killed and wounded; the enemy lost about 50 killed.(7) The value of the whole property found within the fort was about £40; no satisfactory explanation is given of the cause of the enemy's recusancy, or the fatal obstinacy of their resistance. A fine was subsequently levied on the tribe. Considerable sickness had prevailed amongst our troops, and great inconvenience been experienced by them, in the course of the winter, from the effects of a climate so entirely new to them, and for which they had been so imperfectly prepared. The King and Envoy, with their escort and suite, returned from their winter quarters at Jellalabad, and reached Cabool the first week of April. The arrival, on the 9th May, of the grand convoy, as it was called, from India, helped, to remove, or to enable them to meet, those sources of discomfort arising from climate, already described. The convoy referred to consisted of the 2d N. I., six depot companies of native regiments, with drafts of H. M.'s 13th and 1st European regiment, and the mountain train, amounting in all to 2,000 fighting men, 200 remount horses, with 800 camels for the use of the troops, commanded by Brigadier Wallace, who had in charge £210,000 in treasure, and a vast quantity of public and private stores. About 4,000 camp followers, and 2,000 camels, attended it.(8) It left Ferozepore in the beginning of February, and proceeded in quiet, and without annoyance, through the Punjaub. The Khyberies having threatened to attack them, General Sale, with the 37th and 48th

6. *Bengal Hurkaru*.

7. *Bombay Times*, May 6,—gives the same account as the *Hurkaru*.

8. *Hurkaru*, March 5. *Delhi Gazette*, March 4.

N. I., moved down from Jellalabad to Jumrood to escort them through the Passes. They reached the former place in safety on the 16th of April, and thereafter proceeded without interruption to Cabool. As spring advanced it became apparent that so far from our being able to withdraw any portion of the large force we had left in the country, and to which 2,000 men had just been added, that a very considerable increase of their numbers would speedily be requisite.(9) It was said that, at this time, the Shah could not have taken with him a hundred of his own subjects into the field unless bribed by British treasure to attend him. Around Candahar the people were in the same condition of discontent and disturbance as they were in Cabool and Kohistan. In April, the whole Ghilzie country having for some time been in a state of insurrection, cutting off the dakhs, and robbing every kafilā betwixt Candahar and Cabool, a small party of cavalry, under Captain Tayler of the European regiment, and Captain Walker of the 4th Local Horse, pushed into the centre of the enemy's fastnesses, and endeavoured to seize Sultan Mahomed and the Gooroo—chiefs who had been removed by Captain Outram the previous autumn, and who now headed the rebels. Having received notice of our approach, they retired to the mountains, but speedily returned in such force as to compel the cavalry to fall back on Khelat-i-Ghilzie. Here they were reinforced by 200 infantry and 150 cavalry proceeding to Cabool, under Captain Codrington. General Nott having received intelligence that a still larger body of Ghilzies was about to attack them, prepared a stronger force for their assistance.(10) On the 7th May, an expedition, consisting of 46 of the 4th Local Horse, detachments of the Shah's 1st and 2d Cavalry, four 6-pr. guns of the Horse Artillery, the 5th regiment of the Shah's Infantry, and another detachment—amounting to 1,200 in all, of whom 336 were cavalry—commanded by Captain W. Anderson, was dispatched from Candahar to attack a body of insurgent Ghilzies, and form a junction, if possible, with Captains Walker and Tayler; this last was effected on the 14th. At Tazee, near Khelat-i-Ghilzie, it was reported by the spies that the enemy, about 2000 strong, had determined to give battle. On the following day (*i. e.* the 16th) Captain Anderson advanced upon them in column, the artillery leading, flanked by two companies of the 5th Infantry, the main body of which immediately followed. Captain Codrington closed the rear and covered the baggage. The Cavalry having been divided into two wings, were directed to take a wide sweep to the right and left, and so endeavour to cut off the retreat of the enemy, on whom they were to close in so soon as the fire indicated that the action had begun. In this order the detachment marched for about five miles, when the enemy were overtaken, and

9. *Delhi Gazette*, June 13, 1840.

10. *Delhi Gazette*. The *Gazette* account is given by an officer with the force.

after a sharp action were defeated and dispersed. Our casualties amounted to 10 men killed and 30 wounded; the enemy had about 100 killed.(11) The fight lasted for about an hour, after which our men continued their march till obliged to halt at Tazee, in consequence of want of carriage for the wounded. Preparations were meanwhile made to despatch a force from Cabool to co-operate with the troops under General Nott's command, the success of a portion of which has just been related. Colonel Wallace marched from the capital on the 22d of May with the 2d N. I., two troops of the 2nd Light Cavalry under his command, three 9 prs. and 2 mortars. He reached Ghuznie in safety, and having been reinforced by the addition of two companies of the recruit depot, the 1st Light cavalry, and two 6-prs., he left on the 31st, and proceeded westward. By a sudden move, Mhookah, the fort of the principal rebel chief, was surprised, and taken without resistance, and afterwards blown up. Our arrival had been wholly unexpected, and the women and families of the chiefs were almost the only persons found in the stronghold. Mhookah is 7000 feet above the level of the sea, and in the beginning of June, quilts and blankets were required over night. Colonel Wallace after this returned to camp, directing Captain Anderson, now in his neighbourhood, to join him.(12)

The combined force, now nearly 3000 strong, proceeded to destroy the forts of the malcontents in the neighbourhood. They experienced no further resistance for the present. Wholloo Khan and Marroo Khan, as well as a Vizier of the latter, remained in our hands as prisoners: several of the others were beheaded.(13) Colonel Wallace shortly afterwards returned to Ghuznie, when the 2d N. I., a squadron of the 2d Cavalry, half Abbott's Battery, and 2 mortars, were directed to remain at the disposal of General Nott. Kelat-i-Ghilzie, 80 miles eastward from Candahar, was occupied by Captain Woodburn's corps, the Shah's 5th Regiment, 4 guns, and 300 of Christie's Horse, who were directed to remain till the beginning of winter. The consideration of the affairs of Scinde and Beloochistan—where insurrection showed a still more formidable front than to the eastward of Quettah—is postponed till afterwards: it forms a perfectly independent episode, which will be taken up when the present act of the Affghan drama is closed by the surrender of Dost Mahomed.

On the 3d of July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, with Mahommed Akram Khan,

11. Captain Anderson's despatch, *Bombay Times*, 17th May 1841; also *Agra Ukhbar*; *Hurkaru*, 12th, and *Englishman* 25th, June 1840.

12. *Delhi Gazette*.

13. An anonymous writer in the *Agra Ukhbar*, dated 23d June, states, that "three of the chiefs who made themselves over to Lieutenant Nicholson and Shahzada Timour, had their heads struck off; and now," says he, "the country is deserted and the crops standing: but worse than all, the *British Word*, which was heretofore sacred everywhere, is defiled and rotted in the dust."

and Sheik Ali Khan, sons of the Dost : together with the most of the other members of the Ex-Ameer's family, arrived at Bameean, and placed themselves under our protection. The old Chief himself, and his sons Afzul and Ukhbar, were still confined at Bokhara ; Azim Khan, a younger son, had joined us some time before. The family, amounting at this time to 250, including attendants, were directed to proceed to Ghuznie : it was understood that Quettah was meant to have been their place of destination. On the surrender of the Dost three months afterwards, they accompanied him to India, where they remained from Christmas 1840 till Christmas 1842, when they were released from captivity. The Wullee of Khooloom sent an ambassador tendering friendship to the Shah Soojah. Jubbar Khan, on his arrival at Cabool, was very kindly received by the envoy and minister, who offered him the same terms as those originally proposed : that is, that he should have his estates restored to him and dwell in Affghanistan, provided he remained faithful to us. From this date, up to the present time, he continued to reside at his fort of Killa Cazeer, near the capital,—never throughout all the troubles in which his country was involved, when scarcely an Affghan failed to take advantage of our difficulties, forfeiting the character by which he had been known from the period of our earliest acquaintance with him, of "The Good Nawab—the Feringees' Friend."

We must now return to the personal adventures of Dost Mahomed, whose flight from Urgundah, and escape across the Hindoo Koosh, has been described in a previous chapter. On his arrival at Khooloom, he was handsomely received and hospitably entertained by the chief. Except the threatened incursion on Bameean by the Uzbegs, and the discontented spirit manifested by the Hazarahs, no demonstration was made for a period in his favour to the northward. Winter was too close at hand indeed ; and the consternation which our apparently irresistible success had occasioned, too general to permit any military operation to be thought of by the Ex-Ameer before the return of spring. He wrote, in the mean time, to the King of Bokhara, inviting him, as one of the Lights of Islam, to assist in expelling the accursed Kaffirs. They were to share the spoil betwixt them ; and it was urged that the Shah Shoojah and the Feringees, unless routed, would not fail to overrun the countries on the Oxus.⁽¹⁴⁾ The King replied in very cordial terms, directing a vakeel or ambassador to be sent to him. Mirza Sami Khan having been deputed in this capacity, was directed to write Dost Mahomed, giving him the warmest assurances of sympathy and assistance. Troops and

14. These statements are given on the authority of Dr Atkinson : who, without any appearance of dishonesty, is prejudiced against the Barukzyes—credulous and careless in his statements to a degree.—Expedition, p. 329. Other accounts, referred to above, state that the Dost was on his way to Persia when arrested. Dr Atkinson, however, is in this likely to be correct.

money were to be supplied him so soon as a personal interview, to conclude arrangements, could be obtained. Dost Mahomed on receipt of this, set out for Bokhara in the end of Nov. 1839, with his sons Ukhbar, Afzul, and Sum-munder Khan. On their arrival at Bokhara the King was profuse in his professions of friendship,—entreating that the Dost should send for his family, that their alliance might be still more closely and firmly cemented : he wrote at the same time to the Wullee of Khooloom, requesting him to forward them by force or fraud, without respect to their wishes. It had by this time become apparent that the professions of the Bokhara chief were hollow and delusive : that he wished to get his old enemy into his hands, partly with a view to revenge—chiefly from a desire to plunder him of his last remaining property. The Dost wrote an open letter to Jubbar Khan, directing arrangements to be made to have the wishes of the King complied with : he sent a secret order at the same time, telling his brother to put every member of the family to death rather than entrust them to the tender mercies of the Bokhara chief ! The Nawab, uncertain how to act, and dis-trusting the Wullee, thought it better to enter into a correspondence with the British Government than to remain for an indefinite period in the dangerous position in which he now stood. Negotiations were in progress in March, and ended, as already mentioned, in the surrender of his brother's family early in July. So soon as the King of Bokhara became aware that the fraud intended to have been practised by him had been discovered, and in some measure frustrated, he laid aside the mask of friendship, and threw the Ex-Ameer and his sons into prison. The Dost, meanwhile, applied for and received assistance in his extremity from the Khan of Kookan on the Persian border ; who having first used remonstrances and entreaties, afterwards resorted to arms,—captured some forts, and was in full march towards Bokhara, when the King pretended to relent :—he promised to release his prisoner on condition of hostilities being suspended, but at the same time retained him in close confinement, threatening his life should he attempt to get away. Early in July, he succeeded in making his escape under circumstances of great difficulty and danger.(15) Directing his course towards Khooloom, assisted by his son Afzul Khan, he proceeded to stir up the country to undertake a holy war against us, promising that the Wullee should be his vizier could he succeed in recovering Cabool.

Between Bameean and Cabool lie the districts of Koh-i-Damun and Kohistan. There were at this time no parts of the Dooraunes empire more hostile than those to the authority of the Shah Soojah. Yet, on our arrival in the country in July 1839, it was here the King found his stoutest

15. Dr Atkinson's Expedition, &c., p. 337. The whole of the adventures connected with the escape, which are too long for quotation, will be found in Dr Atkinson's Work.

friends. "It was in those districts that Dost Mahomed ruled with a rod of iron. He put to death most of the Chiefs; he quadrupled the revenues drawn from them. His policy was to sow dissension amongst them, and he succeeded: it was the only district of the country where the name of the ex-ruler was execrated when the Shah Soojah ascended the throne. One would have supposed that here, at least, his Majesty's Government would have found favour; and the more so, as the Kohistanees flocked in numbers to welcome him on his original entrance into Cabool—expressing the strongest feelings of loyalty and devotion. By the month of May, 1840, a miserable change had been produced in their sentiments. The Governors appointed under the Suddoyze rule demanded duties which were unusual and exorbitant, and exacted taxes the king had just declared to have become obsolete. The population of whole districts had fled to the hills to avoid oppression. When complaints were preferred, the complainants were thrown into prison; and when temporary redress was forced by the direct interposition of our authority, all the acts of petty tyranny which had for a time been interrupted were again renewed. At the time of the escape of Dost Mahomed, the feeling throughout these extensive districts was feverish in the extreme; and the Envoy was warned, by Sir A. Burnes, that an insurrection might break out any day in that part of the country where circumstances had originally given his Majesty the most trusty portion of his subjects." (16) It was here, then, that Dost Mahomed looked for assistance; and no sooner was it known that he was mustering troops to the northward than the whole country prepared itself to rise in his favour. The Chiefs of Khoondooz and Khoooloom, who had just before sent Ambassadors proffering friendship to us, altered their views, and allied themselves to the fortunes of the Ameer. Besides our mishaps in Scinde and Beloochistan, various misadventures at this time befel us, calculated to excite or embolden sedition. A fort, commanding one of the principal passes into Toorkistan, had been quietly given up to Captain Garbett, then on an exploring expedition, and was deemed of importance enough by the politicals to be permanently retained. Captain Hay was directed to occupy it with five companies of the Shah's infantry, one company of which was stationed at Bameean, the others at Syghan. He arrived on the 4th of July, and took charge without the assistance of any other European officer. Matters at first went on quietly, but shortly afterwards, disaffection making its appearance, a reinforcement was sent for to Syghan, where Lient. Golding commanded. Captain Hay, meanwhile, fell sick; and

16. The portion of the text marked by inverted commas is taken, with slight abridgment, from a memorial by Sir A. Burnes, dated Aug. 7, 1840, addressed to the Envoy. We shall have frequent occasion to quote this very remarkable paper.

judging, from his information, that Lieut. Golding would be on his way with assistance crossing the Dundan Shekan Pass on the 1st inst., despatched two companies, about 100 in all, under a serjeant, to meet him. They halted during the night opposite a fort, which they supposed to be friendly ; at day-dawn the occupants of the hold, probably mistaking the unexpected visitors for assailants, fired upon them. The serjeant and his little band returned the fire and retired, but had, unfortunately, to pass through a narrow defile where the enemy crowded the heights to the amount of about 300. Our men kept steadily together and retired in perfect order, but this was all they could effect. They had 13 killed, and 27 wounded ; when a detachment being sent out by Capt. Hay to their assistance they returned without further obstruction. A couple of mortars, and as many 6-pounders, left Bameean on the 1st inst. to reinforce Syghan. But the quarrel just described was settled by conference—the Chiefs agreeing to cede one of their forts to us,—so no further hostilities took place. The whole of our outposts in this quarter were shortly afterwards abandoned. About this time, Captain M'Gregor having sent 1,500 of the Shah's Affghans against a place north of Jellalabad, they were defeated, lost their guns and 100 of their men—200 going over to the enemy. So insecure did the Shah himself feel, that having prepared to start on a trip into Koh-i-Damun, thirty miles from his capital, the Chiefs objected, and he was obliged to abandon his purpose, and return his tents into store.(17) The Seikhs who had been detected giving harbourage to the Ghilzie refugees some months before, were now proved by intercepted letters to have promised or forwarded supplies of money to Dost Mahomed ; while a conspiracy was discovered in Cabool by Sir A. Burnes, implicating almost all the first men in the city and surrounding countries in a plot to subvert the Suddoyze dynasty, and drive us from the country.(18) Arms and ammunition were purchased up in great quantities in Cabool, and forwarded to the Camp of the ex-Ameer, while large bodies of the citizens and fighting men in the neighbourhood joined the insurgent standard. The Envoy was so greatly alarmed that he retired with his family and suite into the Bala Hissar or citadel, where mortars and howitzers were placed in a position to command the town in case of emergency. At one time it was believed that we should require to abandon all our outposts and concentrate on the capital till assistance should reach us. At Gluzuie, the guns in the citadel were loaded, and kept pointed in the direction whence approach of danger was apprehended. The European regiment and 48th N. I., stationed at Jellalabad, were ordered up to Cabool. Cap-

17. Private note by Sir A. Burnes, dated 22d Aug., written on a copy of the report sent up to the Envoy, found amongst his posthumous papers.

18. *Ibid*, *ut supra*.

tain McGregor's mishap was speedily retrieved. Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler, in conjunction with Captain McGregor, marched on the 19th against the refractory Kudjah chiefs. His force consisted of 340 of the 1st European regiment, and 90 of the 48th N. I., with one 6-pounder of the Shah's artillery. There was much difficulty and delay in bringing the gun to the scene of action. A fort situated on their flank greatly annoyed them by its fire. Another, which stood right in the line of their operations, was carried in brilliant style by the Grenadiers of the 48th under Lieutenant Paterson. The gun was now run up to the gate of the largest fort, which was instantly blown open; the enemy flying, panic struck, through every aperture by which they could make their escape. The fort first mentioned as annoying the left flank in its advance, next fell into our hands, and so on till five of these strong-holds were in our possession. Our casualties amounted to 3 killed and 16 wounded. The enemy, finding resistance hopeless, sued for terms,—which were conceded them on hostages being granted;—they were said to have lost 80 men in the defence, including two chiefs. On the 20th of August, Afzul Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, came down on Bajgah with about 500 horse. Captain Codrington had command of this advanced post, which was occupied by 200 of the newly raised Janbaz or Affghan levies, with the Ghoorkas or sepoy from Nepaul already referred to. The Janbaz horsemen being without European officers, were headed by Lieutenant Rattray, political assistant to Dr Lord. The enemy were twice charged and driven off the field. (19.) A hazardous advance in pursuit of the Uzbeks had at first been determined on, but intelligence having reached, in the course of the evening, that Heibuk, the stronghold of a friendly chief in our front, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, it was resolved to commence a retreat on Syghan during the night, and unite with Captain Hopkins, commanding the Affghan regiment, and Captain Garbett's horse artillery; the whole of Dost Mahomed's troops being now at liberty to attack our outposts. From Syghan, having saved the public baggage and treasure, but having sacrificed a large quantity of private property on the way, they returned on Bameean and proceeded to fortify themselves for immediate defence till assistance should reach them from Cabool. The force amounted to 2000 men, with 12 guns; but of these one half were Affghans ready to join the Dost the moment he came sufficiently near to permit desertion. (20) On the way from Syghan their con-

19. *Delhi Gazette*, September 23.

20. Letter of Sir Alexander Burnes, Cabool, September 7.—Fourth troop 3rd Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery, four of the Shah's guns, two mortars, and 460 Affghan horse, with the force fell back from the outposts mentioned in the text.—*Bombay Times*, 14th October, 1840.

duct was in the last degree mutinous and disorderly; and on their arrival at Bameean one company marched out with their arms and accoutrements and went over to the camp of the enemy; the remainder, to the amount of 500 or 600, were disarmed and ordered to return to Cabool. On the 7th September, Colonel Dennie, with the 35th N. I., the Shah's 4th regiment, and 160 of Anderson's horse, left Cabool to reinforce Bameean. On the 11th, while on his march, he received an express from Dr Lord apprising him of the desertion of Captain Hopkins's Affghans, and intimating that Dost Mahomed, with his son Afzul Khan, the Wullees of Khooloom, and some thousands of the tribes, had advanced to and captured Syghan immediately on its abandonment by us, and that the enemy were within 30 miles of Bameean. Having pressed through the Gurdan Dewal defile, a second despatch of still greater urgency was received, intimating that the ex-Ameer had resolved to return to Bameean and occupy the passes, so as to prevent the junction of our troops. In order to frustrate this, Colonel Dennie resolved to occupy the Irack pass, and the same day the crest of the mountain, 13,000 feet above the sea, was gained, and both its sides carefully guarded. Bameean was now safe, and only twenty miles off, the troops being on the same side with it of this vast unbroken chain of mountains. Here they remained just long enough to collect their supplies, left somewhat behind them by the rapidity of their movements, and the difficulty of the ground they required to traverse. Fresh entreaties for advance induced Col. Dennie to press on by forced marches to Bameean, where he arrived on the 14th. Having drawn out the Ghoorkas, he disarmed Captain Hopkins's regiment, who, although loaded, offered no resistance. This has been referred to above. Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, he proceeded to make arrangements for an advance upon Syghan. This turned out unnecessary, the Uzbegs being now close at hand. On the evening of the 17th, information was received that Dost Mahomed and his Uzbeg allies, under the Wullees of Khooloom, were entering the valley from the great defile seven miles in front of Bameean. They were not discouraged in their approach, in order that they might be drawn well up the valley, into a position favourable for our operations. On the morning of the 18th, a fortified village which had claims on our protection having been attacked by them, it became imperative on us to drive them off. It was reported that the Dost's troops amounted only to a few hundreds—it turned out that they numbered from six to ten thousand fighting men. Relying on the correctness of the understatement, one-third of the force, with a 6-pr. gun and howitzer, was all that were taken out. These consisted of 230 of the 25th N. I., 270 Ghoorkas, 80 of Anderson's Horse, and 200 Janbazes—800 in all. The enemy had got possession of the chain of forts in front, and Colonel Dennie was not a little surprised to find them ten times as numerous as had been represented. To have retired,

or waited for reinforcements, would have been fatal, so they were immediately charged and driven from their position. The artillery practice was beautiful, and our grape and shrapnell told fearfully on their crowded masses. They rallied four or five times, but seeing our steady and rapid advance, they lost heart, broke, and fled pell-mell towards the pass.

The cavalry, consisting of 80 of Anderson's Horse, 200 Janbazes, and 40 or 50 of Dr Lord's and Captain Conolly's escort—about 330 in all—were now let slip, and cut up vast numbers of the flying Uzbegs. The deserters from Captain Hopkins's regiment were drawn up as light infantry—no mercy was shewn them by their former comrades. The allied troops dispersed themselves in all directions over the hills—the pursuit continued for four miles, and when Dost Mahomed was last seen, he was wounded in the thigh, and had not more than 200 horsemen along with him. The ex-Ameer and his son, with the Wullee of Khooloom, owed their escape, which was a narrow one, entirely to the fleetness of their horses. Their only gun, kettle-drums, tents, standards, and baggage fell into our hands. The casualties of the enemy are said to have exceeded 500 killed and wounded. Our loss amounted to 50, of whom six only were killed. For more than a week no tidings could be obtained of the Dost or Wullee, but apprehensions being entertained that they might be endeavouring to re-assemble their scattered forces at Syghan, 37 miles from Bameean, Colonel Dennie made preparations to move out and disperse them. On the morning of the 22d, he marched with 3 6-pr. guns, and 1 12-pr. howitzer, six companies of the 35th N. I., six more of the Ghoorka battalion, 100 of Anderson's Horse, 200 Janbazes, and 100 Hazarah pioneers—1500 in all.⁽²¹⁾ On reaching Akurabad at the end of the first day's march, he learned that the allies had passed that place after their defeat, and pushed forward without halt to Hyatoo, where a garrison was left, and continued their onward flight. The following afternoon he reached Hyatoo, and finding it abandoned, set fire to it:—here he learned that the fugitives had pushed on past Syghan, and that the garrison they had left behind them had fled. This fort was next approached and occupied; it was found most difficult of access, and capable of maintaining a determined and protracted defence. So precipitate had been the retreat of the Uzbegs on hearing of our approach, that they had left behind them the whole of the stores, tents, and arms, property, public and private, which had been abandoned by our troops, on their retreat

21. The details of the above operations are taken from Colonel Dennie's despatches. He dates from Syghan the 27th, mentioning that it had taken him two days to reach this from Bameean. He states that he left on the 27th; the two are irreconcilable, so the date of his despatch has been altered to the 25th. He was back at Bameean again on the 1st Oct.; private letters state that he reached on the 24th. He says, "Syghan was stronger than Ghuznie."

towards Bameean, three weeks before. On the 23th, an ambassador from the Wullees waited on Dr Lord with overtures of peace, and Colonel Dennie resolved to remain where he was till negotiations were completed. Dost Mahomed appeared to have been for the time cast off from the Uzbegs, of whom there were 5500 in a valley 30 miles from Syghan. On the 29th September our army returned to Bameean, the terms proposed to the Wullees having been conceded him. The Dost having made his appearance at Heibuk, was refused all further assistance, and no course appeared to be left to him but to surrender himself into our hands. The duty on which Colonel Dennie and his gallant little band had been dispatched having been thus gloriously executed, they returned to Cabool on the 18th October. This series of operations betwixt the 11th and 30th September, was one of the most important, and by far the most brilliant, which had yet occupied our troops in Afghanistan. From circumstances never satisfactorily explained, the whole of the despatches of Colonel Dennie relating to them, excepting that giving an account of the battle of Bameean, were excluded from the *Gazette*. It was the custom with Lord Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton to avenge themselves on officers out of favour with them, by passing them over in the *Gazette* or suppressing their despatches—a system subsequently practised by General Nott, and permitted to pass uncensured. Col. Dennie was offered the second class Dooranee Order for the most brilliant exploit performed during the war: he declined it. (22) He had before declined the offer of the third class Order, with which he had been insulted for the storming of Ghuznie. Meanwhile, operations equally active, but in all respects widely different in their results, had been in progress to the westward. On the 29th September Sir R. Sale marched at daylight from his camp at Robat to attack the fort of Tootundurra, at the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. His force consisted of Her Majesty's 18th, two companies 27th, and flank companies 37th N. I., two squadrons of the 2d Bengal Cavalry, and the Shah's 2d cavalry, which joined at Charekar, five miles in advance, a couple of 6-prs., and three 9-prs. The cavalry were in advance. On arriving at Tootundurrah the enemy were found very strongly posted. A village, surrounded by garden walls, and defended by a small fort, with several detached towers, commanded the uneven ground from which the steeps ascend which wall in the pass. A chain of detached forts, within musket shot of each other, and of the village respectively, extended to the eastward. One of the forts was peculiarly strong. The rear or northward of this position was protected by a deep canal along the high ground, the valley beyond being covered with gardens. A party of the

22. Colonel Dennie's letter to Sir W. Cotton, dated Cabool, 23d October; also private letters.—*Fraser's Magazine*, and *Bombay Times*.

enemy was drawn up in front, protected by a mound; a second party occupied the face of the hill to the west. The forts were all garrisoned by matchlock men, which maintained a hot fire upon us as we advanced. Strong parties, with artillery, were detached to clear the hills, and take the enemy in flank, and to get possession of two detached forts on the right. These having been completely successful, the principal column moved down upon the village. (23) The enemy were defeated, and compelled to retire from all their positions, and by 11 o'clock the whole of their strongholds were in our possession. The artillery, as usual, rained destruction on our opponents, and left them without means of resistance or hope of success. We had six privates killed,—the only officer who fell was Captain Edward Conolly. Three brothers of this talented family lost their lives during the Affghan war—Captain John died at Cabool in July 1842, and Captain Arthur, the traveller, was shortly after murdered at Bokhara along with Colonel Stoddart. The whole of the Tootundurrah forts were, at the suggestion of Sir Alexander Burnes, who accompanied the force, destroyed. Sir R. Sale having been informed by the Political Agent that a number of the rebel chieftains had taken refuge at the fort of Jugla, 16 miles from his camp at Chareekar, Captain Anderson, with two squadrons of the Shah's cavalry, the janbazes, and 500 Dooranee horse—about 1000 cavalry in all, were despatched under Captain Sanders with a view to surround and prevent the escape of the chiefs until the slower moving infantry and artillery should be able to get up and attack the place. They marched soon after midnight, and by sunrise of the 3d of October the fort was completely invested. By ten A.M., the General with Her Majesty's 13th, two companies of the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, two squadrons of the 2d cavalry, arrived, and in two hours more one 24-pr. howitzer, three 9 and two 6-prs. had joined: the mortars, which had been detained by the badness of the roads, did not get into position till late in the afternoon. A severe cannonade was maintained betwixt one and three P.M., when the breach being considered practicable they proceeded to storm. Four officers of H.M.'s 13th for some time maintained themselves on the summit of the wall with such determined gallantry as to call forth the cheers of all their comrades in the thickest of the fight. (24) The enemy crowned the crest of the shattered wall, and poured in so hot a fire, and offered such stout resistance, that the storming party was compelled to retire with loss,—the breach being quite impracticable, as was afterwards ascertained fully. They took refuge in the adjoining ravine until recalled to camp. The

23. Sir R. Sales's despatch of 29th September, 1840.

24. These were Brevet-Major Kershaw (killed on retreat from Cabool), Lieutenant and Adjutant Wood, Lieutenant Edward King (who afterwards fell gloriously at Tezeen), and Lieutenant G. Wade.

garrison, notwithstanding all the precautions made use of to secure them, made good their retreat; and the fort having thus been evacuated, was taken possession of by our men a little after dusk—7 P. M. Our casualties amounted to 50 in killed and wounded. On the morning of the 13th, information was received that Dost Mahomed had come through the Ghorebund Pass at Too-tundurrah, and taken up his quarters 15 miles from our camp: his cattle were described as so entirely knocked up, that it was supposed a squadron of cavalry might intercept and cut off his retreat. Lieutenant Dowson, with 500 Afghan horse, was immediately despatched on this duty, but found he was too late, the ex-Ameer having, a few hours before, left for Nijrow, 20 miles east of Chareekar. Next morning a whole company of Lieut. Maule's Kohistanes went over to their old ruler, and fears were entertained that the rest would follow. Our troops were encamped at Chareekar when information was received that the Dost had crossed the valley, apparently intending to move on Cabool, whose safety, considering the temper of the people in and around it, began to occasion serious uneasiness. A position was accordingly taken up by our troops on the 16th at Karabagh, with a view of covering and protecting the capital. On the 17th, they proceeded to attack the fort of Derveesh Khan, one of the most respectable and consistent of the friends of the late ruler. A long detour was made to avoid some difficult marching ground, and when the fort was attained, it was found empty. The walls and bastions were blown up and the stronghold destroyed. On the night of the 18th, the enemy assembled after dark within 120 yards of our camp, and continued for three hours to pour in upon us a close but ill-directed fire, which could not be replied to, but from which little damage was sustained. (25) On the 19th, the remainder of the 37th N. I. and three 9-pounders joined. On the 20th, preparations were made to attack the strong village of Kandarra, occupied as was understood by from 600 to 1000 of the insurgents. It was situated close under the inferior range of the Lughman mountains by which Koh-i-Damun is bounded on the west. Immediately to the south is the village of Beydack, and the groves, vineyards, and gardens of the two places cover a portion of the hill side, measuring about two miles north and south, and half as much from east to west. The gardens are, as usual, cultivated in terraces like a flight of gigantic steps: each house was a distinct little fort, loopholed and garrisoned; while numerous towers of great strength were scattered about: the place, in fact, was of very great strength, and if ordinarily well defended, could only have been captured at a heavy sacrifice of life. Fortunately, while we were encamped within sight of them, the people took to quarrelling amongst themselves. The warrior portion of the inhabitants refused to fight, and on the night of the 20th moved off; the

25. *Englishman*, 9th December.

rest felt so alarmed and dispirited that they all dispersed, and on the forenoon of the 21st we set fire to the houses, destroyed the gardens, and levelled the villages; and on the 22d moved to the north of Ak Serai to resume the observation of the Cabool road. At this time a force of the 3d Shah's Khelat-i-Ghilzie Corps, and two Shah's guns, marched from Cabool and surprised Istalif by a night march. The 3rd Shah's joined us from Purwan shortly afterwards. In this position our troops remained for about a week, when they advanced towards Nijrow on hearing that the Dost had come out of the valley with a small force which was hourly increasing. On the 1st November they reached the fort of Meer Musjedee, where more exact intelligence than had hitherto been obtained of the movements of the ex-Ameer was procured. He had advanced towards Purwan Durrah, a small valley traversed by a clear rapid stream, and sprinkled over with orchards and numerous forts. Hitherward the following morning moved our troops. The advanced guard consisted of 2 6-pr guns under Lieutenant Warburton, four companies of H.M.'s 13th under Major Kershaw, the two flank companies of the 37th, and one company of the 27th N. I., under Lieutenant Rhind of the former corps; two squadrons of the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry, and 200 of the Shah's 2d Horse, under Captain Anderson,—the whole being under the command of Colonel Salter. The troops moved at daybreak on the 2d Nov.: the morning was serene and beautiful, the country in the highest degree picturesque; but the road was intersected with cuts, canals, and water courses, and was difficult in the extreme. Between eight and nine, the Gorabund river was crossed, the guns having been got over with great difficulty. On ascending the hills beyond, a fort opened fire on the advance, and compelled them to form line. By this time the villagers were flocking in from every quarter, intreating protection from the army of Dost Mahomed, said to be plundering them in all directions and preparing to decamp. (26) The forts and villages as we advanced were rapidly evacuated by the enemy, who were seen retreating towards the hills. Their numbers were computed at 3500 foot and 500 horse. (27) Dr Lord, who accompanied Col. Salter, having intimated that the cavalry, by proceeding in advance, would be able to cut off a portion of the fugitives, the 2d cavalry were ordered to skirt the hill on the right, while the left of the pass was occupied by Anderson's horse. The infantry followed, but were greatly retarded in their movements by the guns, which were impeded by the water courses. The cavalry, having got a mile or so ahead of the main body, were attacked by a detachment of about 200 Afghan horse, believed to be headed by the ex-Ameer in person. Line having been formed, Capt. Fraser, who commanded the right, ordered the troopers to

26. Correspondent in the *Delhi Gazette*, November 22.

27. General Sale's despatch, 2d November.—*Government Gazette*.

draw and charge. The first troop hesitated, and the men began to fall back by eights or tens. The officers were so completely occupied by the enemy advancing at a slow but determined pace, and now close upon them, that they merely called out to the men to come on, little anticipating that they were to have all the battle to themselves. Observing, when too late, that they were about to be left without support from their men, who had now begun to move off by threes and fours, and scamper like a flock of sheep before a force not superior to them in numbers, Captains Fraser and Ponsonby in vain used every effort to bring them on to the charge; in vain they exhorted, intreated, and implored them during the few moments permitted them. Captain Fraser at length exclaimed, "I never saw such cowards, we must go alone." The Affghian horse were now amongst our wavering or retiring ranks. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill, calling "In the name of God and the prophet, fight and drive the Feringee Caffirs from the land, or I am gone." The European officers already named, together with Lieut. Crispin, Cornet Moffat, Assist.-Surg. Eddy, Mr Boulton, the riding master, and Mr M'Dermot, the veterinary surgeon, with some 15 or 20 men, were left fighting desperately in the midst of the enemy. Dr Lord had been killed on the advance by a shot from one of the posts. Lieutenant Broadfoot of the Engineers had followed in the rear of the cavalry, and was ridden down by them while endeavouring to prevail upon them to return to the field. His body was afterwards found mutilated by the enemy. The infantry column had observed with admiration the gallant bearing and steady advance of the Affghans, conceiving that they would be as steadily met and still more gallantly repelled; the hot charge and flashing sabres conveying for a moment the impression that all had gone well, when the enemy's high red banner dispelled the illusion. To their dismay the next moment they perceived the cavalry in full retreat flying at speed before the Affghans. Capt. Fraser arrived shortly after in camp on horseback, severely wounded in the back, and with his right hand nearly cut off. The advanced guard was now formed in line to receive the enemy, and the guns placed in position; but the horsemen were probably satisfied with their success, and were, at all events, too weak to attempt more than they had accomplished. They passed on beyond range of our artillery. Three companies of the 37th N. I., with the 2d Bengal Light Cavalry which had been sent back, were ordered to move round to the right in quest of the missing officers, while three companies, under Lieutenant Rhind, with two of Abbott's guns, proceeded towards the left to attack the enemy now accumulating in masses on a rocky eminence on the flank. Some delay occurred in these arrangements: as the second-mentioned party advanced, Lieutenant Dawes, who was in charge of the guns, opened fire with admirable precision on the Affghans. The red standard of the enemy was now placed on the top of the hill, and a detach-

ment, under Lieutenant Rhind, after experiencing the greatest difficulty in the ascent, obtained possession of the height just before occupied. This position having been maintained for about half an hour, was abandoned, the enemy having been driven off. (28) The troops had now been nine hours under arms; it would have taken them three hours more to have reached the principal portion of the enemy; who still remained in the field, so we returned to the camp for the night. (29) A new attack was arranged for next day, and the soldiers slept accoutred for the fight. When morning dawned, the Affghans were found to have fled towards Chareekar: not a shot had been fired, nor was an enemy to be seen. The loss at Purwan Durrah fell entirely on the officers. Dr Lord, the Political Agent in Kohistan, fell on the advance; Lieut. Broadfoot was killed as the cavalry began to retire, and Cornet Crispin was shot dead upon the field, and was afterwards cut to pieces. The condition in which Captain Fraser returned to camp has already been referred to; (30) the escape of Captain Ponsonby was almost miraculous. He was mounted on a magnificent Ghuznie charger, who, finding himself hemmed in on all sides, lashed furiously out and dismounted three of the Affghans. The gallant officer himself had a ball through his left arm; the top of his left thumb was cut off, with a severe sabre wound dividing his nose and laying open his cheek to the bone. His reins were severed across; his horse had lost his ears, and had a shot through his neck. Such was the battle of Purwan Durrah, which closed the career of Dost Mahomed Khan; and presented the first example of misconduct on the part of the Sepoy soldier since the commencement of the war. Of this no adequate explanation has ever been obtained; but so infamous was it regarded that the regiment was degraded and disbanded, and its number erased from the army list. The heroic conduct of the British officers met with the applause that it deserved; the Native officers and troops who had not been engaged, or were guiltless of misconduct, were drafted into other corps. Bameean had, in reality, sealed the fate of the insurgent party, who were now unable to bring into the field half the force that Colonel Dennie had defeated. Having staked his all upon this cast without further hope of success, Dost Mahomed found himself on the eve of being abandoned to his fate. He disappeared from the field of battle, no one knew how or where. On the evening of the 3d November, as Sir W. Macnaghten was returning from his evening ride, and was within

28. *Delhi Gazette*, *ut sup.*

29. Colonel Dennie's letters, Cabool, 18th April, 1841, and *India Gazette* therein referred to.

30. This officer formed one of Sir R. Sale's garrison at Jellalabad, when they were blockaded betwixt November 1841 and April 1842. In March 1843, he went home in charge of presents from the Maharajah Shere Singh to the Queen of England. His hand had not been amputated, but was at this time wholly useless.

a few yards of his own residence in the citadel of Cabool, a single horseman galloped up to him, and having satisfied himself that he was the Envoy and Minister, told him that Dost Mahomed had arrived, and sought his protection. The ex-Ameer immediately appeared; he alighted from his horse, and presented his sword.⁽³¹⁾ His sword was returned him, and he himself requested to remount. He had quitted the field of battle late the preceding evening, and rode straight into Cabool, a distance of 60 miles, having been 24 hours on horseback. His finances were exhausted; his allies were deserting him; and the Seikhs, who had heretofore promised him all sorts of support, had consented to open their country for the march of additional troops, to reinforce the British army in Afghanistan. It had become obvious, that however he might protract the struggle it could have but one issue. With a pride peculiar to himself, he carefully eschewed our army close to⁽³²⁾ him, whom he considered he had foiled, and rode in straight to give himself up with flying colours. He shewed few symptoms of fatigue, and his self-possession was remarkable. He wrote to his eldest son Mahomed Afzul, the sharer of his captivity and toils, and to two of his other sons who had escaped from Ghuznie, desiring them to come in immediately, as he had already surrendered himself and been honourably treated. He left Cabool for India under escort on the 12th November, and waited at Peshawur till joined by his family. They had resided at Ghuznie since their surrender in July; they consisted of nearly 700 persons, of whom one half were females. Fourteen sons surrendered themselves; Ukhbar Khan alone having declined our hospitalities to the end. Hyder Khan, who became prisoner on the fall of Ghuznie, at this time a prisoner at large at Bombay, afterwards joined them. The ex-Ameer was permitted at his own request to visit Calcutta, where he was received with the utmost respect by Lord Auckland, and became for a time the great Lion of the City of Palaces. He was allowed an income of three lakhs of Rupees,—£30,000 a-year. He was assigned a residence first at Loodianah and afterwards at Mussooree on our north-west frontiers, where the climate was more congenial to his constitution than that of lower Bengal. He appears to have created a strong and favourable impression on all with whom he came in contact; and though watching, of course with deep interest, the struggles of his country, he was never on any occasion detected interfering with its affairs, or even during the time of our troubles, which he appeared to deplore, corresponding with the insurgents. He quitted India in January 1843, and after a sojourn of some weeks at Lahore, returned to Cabool. This, however, is greatly in anticipation of the regular course of our narrative. The surrender of Dost Mahomed reduced the country around Cabool

31. Sir W. Macnaghten's Despatches, November 4.

32. Colonel Dennie's Letters, December 27. We have borrowed in part the words of both the papers referred to.

to a state of temporary tranquillity.(33) There was no further head or definite object for combination, and though the elements of insurrection were every where abundant, and instances of individual resistance to the tax-gatherer not unfrequent, there was no hope to be indulged in, or object to be advanced, by a combined or extensive outbreak. The embers of discontent smouldered in Kohistan, but were not extinguished; a communication is said to have been intercepted, bearing the seal of the blinded Zemaun Shah, brother of the Shah Soojah, addressed to the Sultan Mahmoud Khan Barukzye, Sirdar of Kohat, urging a combination with the Seikhs to restore him to authority; a proof of the conviction of this member of the royal family, that the question was less betwixt the Suddozye and Barukzye races than the anxiety to get rid of the present ruler and his allies.(34) Winter was now at hand:—the Affghans had not as yet discovered the weak points in the position we had taken up;—and warlike operations were not thought of with the ground covered with snow, and the thermometer considerably below zero. Before directing attention to the affairs of Scinde and Beloochistan, where insurrection was rife, and rebellion had assumed a more formidable front than in any of the tramontane parts of the Dooranee empire, it will be expedient briefly to examine the causes of the unexpected continuance of hostilities, and our extreme want of success in reducing the country to obedience. The papers of Sir Alexander Burnes fortunately furnish abundant materiel for an enquiry as important in its nature as unsatisfactory in its results. The history of the operations in the countries southwest of Candahar forming an episode of themselves, will be narrated in the following chapters.

Dr Atkinson relates that, in December 1840, when accompanying Dost Mahomed on his way to India, the ex-Ameer recommended strongly the policy of taking the dominion of the country into our own hands. "The Suddozyes," he said, "had never been accustomed to obey, and never would obey; and, by their intrigues, under the anomalous sovereignty of the Shah Shoojah, we should be involved in perpetual embarrassment." The only effectual mode of crushing them was to govern them in our own way. "You will also find," he observed, "the very courtiers about the Shah who have for years been fattening on your bounty, the most forward in plotting against you." There is no doubt that the observation of the Affghan ruler fully explained our difficulties, arising, as they did, from the anomalous nature of our position. It is true that the habits of the population of Afghanistan bore scarcely any resemblance to those of the countries

33. "The surrender of Dost Mahomed has made the country as tranquil as Vesuvius after an irruption; how long it will continue it is impossible to say."
 --*Letter of Sir A. Burnes, Cabool, Nov. 13, 1840.*

34. Atkinson's Expedition into Afghanistan, p. 368.

with which, in India, we had hitherto been accustomed to deal:—countries which lay on the borders of our dominions, and were accessible to our armies along the whole line of their frontiers: which were familiar with the aspect, as well as with the resistless power of our authority, before they felt its influence. The Affghans had at no time for any lengthened period, submitted to a regular government of their own: they were divided into a hundred petty clans, each professing allegiance to individual chiefs, who made no ceremony in disputing the authority of the Sovereign when his behests discorded with their views. Imbued with more than the usual impatience of taxation, almost the only aid they could be induced to contribute to the state was in the shape of a contingent of men in the case of war. Difficult as it was, however, to fuse these hot, fiery, and refractory, subjects into the form of a quiet, well-ordered, and submissive tribute-paying-population; the source of all our troubles lay in the anomaly of our own position. Had we taken possession of the country for ourselves, it would not only have been totally useless to us, but would have cost some millions sterling a-year for the maintenance of from 12,000 to 15,000 regular troops to keep up the show of sovereignty. But so long as we asked no tribute, and left the tribes to themselves, it is probable they would have learned to leave us alone when they discovered how much more satisfactory was the silver and gold we scattered than the steel and lead we might have required to use amongst them. This, certainly, was the most we could ever at any time have hoped, from the entire occupation of Affghanistan.

In maintaining the Shah Soojah by force of arms on the throne in the shape of an independent sovereign, we enabled him to do as he thought fit, while we relieved him from the fear of consequences. The capricious tyranny he exercised over his subjects was carried into effect, and he protected from the results—by British bayonets! Rights long dormant or forgotten, and which in many cases had never been admitted, were resuscitated; claims were renewed on tribute for half a century fallen aside; and the whole country harrassed and annoyed by the political agent, the spy, and the tax-gatherer,—creatures equally new and unwelcome in the recesses of the Doorannee empire.

No better explanation can be given of the sources of our difficulties than that contained in the representation of Sir Alexander Burnes, laid before the Envoy on the 7th of August 1840, on the anniversary of our entrance into Cabool; with a long extract from which able, but unfortunately unheeded, document, the present chapter may be concluded:—

So much for the state of affairs in the kingdom of Cabool on this day, the anniversary of our entrance into its capital. At Court I fear we shall not find matters in a better state; much is said of the King's popularity: this is a subject I feel anxious to grapple with thoroughly. To me it would be very astonishing if any Af-

ghan King who had allied himself to the Sikhs, and the English, could be popular ; *it is not in the nature of things*. His Majesty's successor may hope for a better share of the public favor, but Shah Shoojah must I fear get on without it. I would not however dwell much on the abstract question of unpopularity, I would rather enquire into the causes for it, if they exist, or are only imaginary. Bad ministers are in every Government, solid grounds for unpopularity, *and I doubt if ever a King had a worse set than Shah Shooja*. His principal adviser is an old servant by name Moolah Shikore, who has grown grey with His Majesty in exile, where he distributed, in some hundred fractional parts, the Pension which the Shah received from the Company. He is not a man of family, but a Moolah ; his faculties are impaired by age and disease ; he once incurred His Majesty's displeasure for which he forfeited his ears, a subject fruitful in witticism to the discontented about court, and little calculated to elevate the representative of Majesty. So completely is this poor man's memory gone that he never recognizes a man he has once seen ; that the commonest business requires half a dozen of notes,—in fact, of him it might be said that his whole business is to gather money, and to this one end his remaining faculties are applied. Moolah Shikore passes by the name of Vazeer or minister, but His Majesty gets offended at his being so called, so we may presume he thinks it possible to get on without any minister. By facts that have come under my own knowledge, I shall depict the Vizier's character, and *all of them can be tested by yourself*. In the last winter, his notions of Political economy led him to seize all the granaries around Cabool, on which he put his seal, and from which he drew forth the grain, and had it exposed for sale in the Bazaar by his own officers, and at a price fixed by himself. When spring arrived, he conceived it would please His Majesty to adorn the royal Gardens which have been long neglected, a measure most laudable to a people so fond of gardens as the Caboolies, highly popular, but this was to be done *gratis*, and by conscription on all around this district. The poor peasantry were dragged in hundreds from their homes at seed time, when their lands required their care, and compelled to labor without any reward. Discontent rose to such a height that I sent to the minister and plainly told him that he was disgracing his King and himself ; and that I would no longer stand silent, as policy dictated I should on all occasions, unless he at least gave the poor wretches bread, and if he would not do it, I would from next day open my own treasury and supply it. After this the workmen got two pice worth of bread per diem, while our Engineer officers were paying seven times that in the adjoining garden, where our Cantonments were erecting. The next freak of this minister was to reduce the number of Butchers' shops in this populous City, and to compel these to sell at his own price, thereby ensuring a monopoly of meat to a few, and injuring many. For days the loudest complaints were uttered, till free trade was at last established. As I write, the shops in which flour is sold are now shut, the minister having turned his views from meat to bread ; and it is painful to pass through the Bazaar in consequence. *With such an adviser, can His Majesty be popular*—do he, and his minister deserve it ?

You have frequently pointed out to the King, in which I have humbly seconded

you, the utter worthlessness of such a man as an adviser, and His Majesty has promised more than once a remedy to an evil so pressing. You are aware that he has appointed within this past month a man of family and character to take a share in public matters by the title of Nizam-oo-dowla, his own name being Oosman Khan Buddoosye. This, however, I regret to say is a pure fiction, the man exercises no authority in the state. His Majesty has given to him the old revenue accounts to examine, and he is to find out such defalcations as he can, a task imperiously necessary I admit, but one by no means furnishing a remedy to the grievances above enumerated. These grievances relate to Cabeol, but the surrounding country equally suffers under others. Those in the Kohistan I have described, those elsewhere are fully as common. Besides Oosman Khan, of whom I am bound to speak with favor, His Majesty tells us there is no man fit for trust; I will only say that he deceives himself, but if unworthy of trust, we shall then suppose the Shah carries on this Government himself: not at all he has surrounded himself with four or five advisers, who were with him at Loodiana, who are engaged entirely in filling their purses, and who from long absence in Hindoostan, are quite unfit for the responsible duty which they are called on to perform. To reward old servants is noble and magnanimous, but other employments may be found for such, than those which taint the ends of justice, and with them, His Majesty's reputation.

I have spoken of the duties assigned to Oosman Khan connected with the revenue, and this brings me to that very important subject, and the system on which His Majesty conducts it, if system it can be called, and *which calls loudly for reform*. The Collectors of the revenue are the soldiers; they receive assignments on certain districts for their pay, and they proceed there, living at free quarters on the community till the peasant pays the amount of the assignment, causing thus a more fruitful harvest of dispute than any other human invention could have devised. Distant from the capital the subject refuses to submit to such oppression, and before the snow falls expeditions are sent forth to levy His Majesty's rights; if the snow does fall the people defy the officers of the Crown, and escape for the year. By one of these expeditions the system will be explained. Khan Shereen Khan, the head of the Persian faction, was dispatched in the fall of the year to the countries of Koorum and Koost, south of Suffaid Koh: he levied His Majesty's dues, *and lived for five months with 1800 men at free quarters in the country*. As he is a good man, he did his duty with more mildness than an Affghan, but to continue such a system, must clearly alienate all the people of this country from Shah Soojah and from us, *for the force we give him ensures what, if left to himself, he could not otherwise command*. It is therefore incumbent on us by sending religious men, or by demanding hostages to live at the capital, as security, to see that some other revenue arrangements be adopted; by the present we can neither govern on the Affghan system, nor on our own, for the former implied that if a subject paid his duties one year he was to be called out to plunder the Punjab or Hindoostan the next.

After adjusting revenue arrangements, the admitted end of Shah Shooja's Government is to make his Troops fit for service, to raise in fact a national force.

The Jan Baz corps are assuredly a step towards this, and a very important one, and these with the Affghan Infantry, now being raised, promise well, but it is the object of many to destroy His Majesty's interest in them, and as they are not constantly under the King's eye, his attention is bestowed on other things, his own Irregular Cavalry, his own guns, his own Orderly Regiment, his Nujeebs, and his Sikh body guard. I would not advocate the dismissal of the Affghan Horse, because, I believe, if paid, they will do good service, but it will be seen that all the really serviceable portion of the army, the Jan Baz, and the Affghan Infantry, are paid by us, or have our security, and that His Majesty *plays at soldiers* with the other branches, which would be well enough were they not a burden on the finances of the State, (or rather *our State*,) for this country more than others cannot afford to support useless Troops, and it is not difficult to shew not only how useless are these Troops but *how dangerous they are* in this country. Of the Irregular Horse I shall not speak; of the household Artillery, however, you are aware that His Majesty left them in Cabool in the winter without pay; they pledged their swords and clothes, then mutinied, collared their native officer, and were ultimately paid by your orders out of our money left in deposit here. The King has a mountain train and two Troops of Horse Artillery in his service, besides an Artillery Officer to look after his guns. Of what use are these men? Next come the Orderly Regiment, a body of Hindoostanees some six or eight hundred strong, *who run before the King and keep his subjects at a distance with the butt ends of their muskets*, with little or no discipline though good looking men, and capable of it, and to which His Majesty has rejected all your entreaties to appoint an European officer. The result is to be expected. Six weeks ago they mutinied. You were apprehensive that the regular army would be required, but the orderly Regiment had only repaired to Moolah Shikore, His Majesty's minister; blockaded the entrance to his house, and told him, which I repeat on the Shah's own authority, that if he did not pay them, they would have his nose, his ears being already gone. The men were paid. His Majesty sought to punish this serious breach of discipline and respect, and had the offenders confined; the men laid down their arms before the King, and only took them up from there on General Cotton's approach, and from whom I heard it. With so many fine promising regiments, regular and irregular, of what use can this Orderly Regiment be, or what use the Nujeebs? One of H. M.'s regiments of the contingent would with pride discharge the duties of the Palace, and mutiny and disrespect would disappear. But if these sentiments apply to such Troops, what is to be said to a body of Sikhs in the costume of their country as the King's guard in this Mahomedan capital? A few evenings ago I was saluted by several of them with the Wagerojee ka Futteh, (the Sikh war cry,) in the very streets of Cabool. I assert without fear of contradiction that no Sikh (Khulsa) ever durst in the time of the Affghan monarchy appear thus in this city; and I further assert that their presence here is *odious to the people, and to the last degree injurious*. These then are the Troops kept up by His Majesty from our coffers, for his own treasure cannot defray the charge. Are there not two parties to a bargain, and is not Shah Shooja bound to attend to our wishes in discharging useless muti-

neus men, some of whom are offensive to the people, and all of whom add to the enormous expense of our occupation of this country ? A few of those men were old servants of the Shah when at Loodiana, but any one who has seen His Majesty's establishment there, knows how few these are. To use a homely simile, we by keeping up such people, are burning the family candle at both ends, and I cannot but doubt that a demonstration to His Majesty of our inability to support such people would readily rid us of such a nuisance. We all know that panic and mutiny are very infectious among soldiers. If Hindoostanees successfully demand their pay with arms in their hands, what will prevent Affghan Horse and Foot acting likewise : and where men are so irregularly paid, what so probable ; and if it occurs, are we to bayonet, and slay His Majesty's subjects, because it pleased His Majesty to live beyond his means ? Place these facts before any soldier, and I shall retract all these opinions if he deems them unsound or unprofessional. *

CHAPTER IV.

SCINDE AND BELOOCHISTAN.

Mr Ross Bell, Political Agent for Scinde—State of Kelat—Expedition under Major Billamore to Kahun and Deyrah—Attacks the Bhooqties—Captures the chief Beebruck—Sacks the village—Retires by Kahun and Nufoosk to the plains—Futility of the expedition—Detachment dispatched under Captain Brown and Lieut. Clarke to occupy Kahun—March from Poolajee—Difficulties of the way—Arrive at Kahun, and find it empty—Clarke's party, and that of a Subedar, attacked and cut to pieces on their return—Captain Brown shut up in Kahun—Puts the men on half-rations on the 24th May—Patience and skill of the defence—Offers of assistance from Quettah—Hear of Major Clibborn's convoy—Are informed of its destruction—State of garrison in the end of August—Detachment under Major Clibborn dispatched from Sukkur on 12th August—Reach Poolajee—Enter the hills—Arrive at Surtof—Examine the ground where Clarke's party were cut to pieces—Difficulties of the way—Reach Nufoosk—Want of water—Dreadful heat—Attempt to storm the Pass unsuccessful—Storming party driven back, four officers killed—Main body keep their ground till 10 P.M.—Parties sent out for water—Return unsuccessful—Part of them cut up—Clibborn retires on Surtof—Attacked during the night—Lose all their baggage—Return to Poolajee—Total loss of convoy generally overstated—Court of Inquiry upon—Extraordinary proceedings of—Premature publication of their report—Observations on—General Brooks and Col. Valiant recalled—Reflections.

THE Political Agent to whom the charge of Scinde and Beloochistan was, in the end of 1839, committed, was a man in every respect as unlike the Envoy at Cabool as could well be imagined. Mr Ross Bell, by whose individual management so many of the untoward events about to be described were brought around, was, at the time of his appointment, scarce thirty years of age; yet, before this, he had distinguished himself in the Secretariat, as a Persian scholar, and had been employed with high credit at the Courts of Nepaul and Lahore, and in an important political situation at Delhi. He had charge of the districts from Dadur to Kurrachee, and from the Indus to the westernmost borders of Beloochistan—the ruler of Kelat being regarded as only a tributary of higher grade than the other chieftains of the Doorannee Empire. Mr Bell was a man of great vigour, and activity of understanding, and of the most determined and reckless daring of purpose: but he was one of those who seemed to think the rules of general morality inapplicable in government, and that the maxims of common honesty essential to be observed in the intercourse of private life, might wisely be disregarded by political authorities: a frailty with which too large a portion of our statesmen in India of recent years appear to have been affected. While the Envoy and Minister clung to the last to the fond dream of the restoration, under British auspices, of the Doorannee Empire in its former extent and splendour, the Political Agent of Scinde had sagacity enough early to become satisfied of the mischievousness and untenability of our policy, and of the impossibility of long maintaining the sovereign

on the throne, or ourselves in the country. His representations to Government, like those of Sir Alexander Burnes to this effect, appear to have been utterly unheeded.

At the close of a former chapter the arrangements which took place at Kelat were adverted to. Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having fallen on the capture of the town, his widow, with her step-son Nusseer Khan, a boy about fourteen years of age, betook themselves to the hills.

Newaz Khan, a relative of the deceased chief, descended by a collateral branch from Abdoolah Khan, the founder of the dynasty, was placed upon the throne. It seems to have been most unaccountably assumed, that we had no more to do than to set up a ruler amongst the democratic tribes of Central Asia, to ensure the permanence of his authority. No means of maintaining our proteges in the perilous position in which we had placed him appear to have been thought of. He was to collect tribute, not for himself only, but for his superior, the Dooranee sovereign, and procure military service from fierce and lawless races, who ill brooked the exercise of hereditary authority, scarcely of that which they themselves had conferred on an elected chief. Lieutenant Loveday was appointed Resident at his half formed and unsupported court: and a guard of honour of thirty sepoy was all that was considered necessary to make our authority known and respected throughout Beloochistan.

In the middle of December, a force, consisting of the head-quarters of the 1st Grenadiers, 150 strong, with 60 Irregular Horse, under Captain Raitt, was despatched from Lheree to take possession of Kahun, the capital of the Murrees, a fierce and warlike but chivalrous clan, occupying a portion of the mountain country which sweeps to the eastward of the Bolan Pass. Another party, acting in conjunction with this, and consisting of the light company of the 5th N.I., 50 men of the Grenadiers, and 40 Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, with Lieutenant Jacob's Battery, proceeded to Deyrah, the head-quarters of the neighbouring tribe of the Bhoogties. The whole force was commanded by Major Billamore. These tribes were to be compelled to pay tribute to Newaz Khan or his superior the Shah Soojah. The chieftains had been persuaded to permit military posts to be established within their country: on what express understanding does not quite appear. (1) On Captain Raitt's arrival at Kahun, he found that, besides its inhabitants, there were about 400 warriors in the town: there were at least 2000 fighting men collected around. On the chief enquiring whether he came for peace or war, he was answered, that we expected to be received

1. *Bombay Times*, January 6 and March 6. Our authorities on Scinde matters are chiefly to be found in the *Bombay Times*. The writers are perfectly known to us, though we regret that we are not authorised to refer to them by name.

as friends, and he was accordingly permitted peaceably to encamp close to the walls. It had been proposed to occupy the fort, when the old chief Dodah learning this, came in person to Captain Raitt, and entreated that this intention should not be persisted in, else bloodshed would ensue, as the fury of the people was already nearly uncontrollable. The Murrees were still wholly ignorant of the object of our people having been sent amongst them; having never before seen regular troops within their hills they considered that our presence boded any thing but good; and observing the weakness of the force, they began to pelt and insult the sepoys in a way sufficiently indicative of the feelings of the tribe, though the chief excused himself by the plea of want of control over his people. Captain Raitt not thinking himself sufficiently strong to resent these insults, left a detachment of one hundred men strongly posted within a mile of Kahun, and himself returned to join Major Billamore. The part of the force under this last-named officer's command reached Deyrah without symptoms of hostility (2) further than an occasional shot from the high grounds adjoining. They were constantly watched by hundreds of eyes from the summit of the hills, and every day when the rear-guard left the camp, large bodies of men showed themselves in all directions, and signals were fired and repeated at immense distances along the mountains to give notice of our movements. On arriving within twenty miles of Deyrah, Major Billamore was met by Islam Khan, the eldest son of the Bhoogtie chief, with a few followers: he was profuse in his professions of friendship, and conducted the detachment with every demonstration of politeness to the town. Here the old chief received them with the same cordiality and attention as had marked the demeanour of his son. He expressed his astonishment at the smallness of our numbers: he had himself twice as many warriors in Deyrah, with two thousand more at his command amongst the adjoining highlands. The other chiefs had hardly left Major Billamore's tent when they showed their contempt for the weakness of our force. The town was full of all sorts of supplies, but the most exorbitant demands were made for every thing required by the detachment: forage and firewood, then plentiful in the country, being at first absolutely refused. The Bhoogtie warriors began now to remove from Deyrah, so that in a few days there was scarcely an armed man to be found within the walls. At last Islam Khan secretly departed, taking with him his harem and household: he had, a few hours before, visited Major Billamore, and made the most unbounded professions of eternal friendship. Before this, private information had been received that the whole tribes were

2. We have adhered closely to the statements, and in many cases to the words, of the letter of an officer belonging to Major Billamore's party, which appears in the *Bombay Times*, March 6, under the signature "Nuroosk." Afterwards acknowledged to be Captain Jacob.

collecting in the neighbouring hills to attack our troops : it was stated, that Islam Khan would first quit Deyrah, and when all was prepared, his father, the chief Beebruck, would follow, and that the circumstance of the latter joining his tribe would be the signal for them to fall upon us and destroy us by night. The camp was originally pitched a mile from the town, and a guard was placed at the gate to prevent soldiers from entering, as complaints had been made of their committing irregularities in the bazaar. On receipt of the intelligence just referred to, the camp was moved up to the walls of the town on the 3d January; and the guard was directed to prevent Beebruck's departure: this they effected first civilly as he proceeded through the gate, and afterwards by force as he attempted to make his way over the wall. Captain Raitt at this time arrived from Kahun. From the time the expedition approached the hill country, which they entered on the 25th Dec., the men had slept fully clothed and accoutred, with their loaded arms in their hands. On the night betwixt the 3d and 4th January none of the officers laid themselves down to rest. All was quiet till daybreak, when the videttes gave information that from seven to eight hundred men were within half a mile of our cantonments, flourishing their swords, and firing their matchlocks, in the most approved style of defiance. The country around was covered with brushwood and jungle, and intersected with nullahs (water courses,) and while the officers and men were intently observing the main body of the enemy, three horsemen penetrated a ravine unnoticed, and made a rush to carry off Beebruck, who had just before been allowed to proceed a short distance from the gateway of the town under charge of a dozen of sepoys. So sudden was this movement that there was not an instant left for preparation to resist it. Lieutenant Clarke saw the advancing party, he sprang upon his horse, dashed at them alone, and not only secured the old chief and brought him back again, but captured one of the adventurous horsemen, and dragged him off a prisoner, horse and all. The main body of the Bhoogties took alarm at our artillery, and swerved off to the right before coming within musket shot. A shell, dexterously thrown in the midst of them, killed or wounded thirty men and horse, and struck such terror into the remainder, that no man present that day ever afterwards dared to join battle with the infidel. Major Billamore now quartered his force within the walls of Deyrah. The place was about one hundred and forty paces square, with strong corner bastions; the walls, which were thin at the top, but broad at the base, being about twenty-five feet high. (3) A few days afterwards, they received information from their brethren within the town, that a foraging party was about to be dispatched to bring in provi-

3. Letters from camp at Deyrah, 15th January.—*Bombay Times*, 22d Feb., 1840.

sions from a distance of ten or twelve miles: it was intimated that not more than a single gun, with some 50 men, would be left behind; so that were the Bhoohties to divide their strength, keeping the foragers in play on one hand, and attacking the little garrison on the other, they could scarcely fail to rescue their chief and recover the fortress, which they might maintain in defiance of us. Major Billamore having become aware of this, left his guns, with about twenty or thirty men, within the walls, and sent out a party, commanded by Capt. Raitt, consisting of about 120 foot and 40 horse under Clarke—rightly judging that this party would be the first object of assault, and that, unless they were beaten, no attempt would be made upon the other. The conclusion was correct: the foragers were permitted to load their came's without molestation; but so soon as they began to move on their return, about 300 Beloochee footmen rushed down upon them sword in hand, and notwithstanding the steadiness of the fire poured in upon them by our infantry, approached within fifteen yards of our ranks, when the cavalry charged them and dispersed them in an instant. Lieut. Clarke, at the head of these, cut down four with his own hand: one-fourth of the enemy's force must have been killed or wounded. Had the orders against pursuit not been most imperative, few indeed would have escaped. The detachment left by Captain Raitt, under Lieut. Peacock, at Kahun, joined head-quarters at Deyrah about the 10th or 12th, (4) the Murrees having quitted their habitations, and retired to the hills with their families and property, leaving the town empty, and the garrison, now of no farther use, in danger of starvation. On the 15th, the chief Beebruck was dispatched under a guard to Scinde. Before he left, notice was sent to the people that he was about to start; as it was impossible to detach many men as an escort, the tribe was warned that, if any attempt at rescue was made, the first step would be to shoot Beebruck, and then fight it out: this had the desired effect, and rather than risk the life of their Chief, they allowed the party, consisting of only about 60 horse, to pass unmolested. He was imprisoned for eight months in the fortress at Bukkur, without reason or precedent being assigned: and was liberated after the affair of Nufoosk, in the end of August, in order to enable us to make terms with the hill men. He himself had not even been in arms against us!—his tribe had given us no worse reception than such intruders into their country were entitled to expect; their retirement to the hills is said to have been occasioned by the apprehension of an attack from us: it is asserted that their subsequent demonstration on our camp was made with a view of rescuing their chief. A double treason by the guide in whom we

4. The dates are not given in any of the communications we have seen: they require to be conjectured from the general tenor of the narrative. They cannot any where be more than two or three days wrong; and these errors, if they be any, are quite immaterial.

trusted is affirmed to have been practised,—each of the contending parties having been informed that his opponent meant to assail him. Beeja Khan and Janee, two of the chiefs who surrendered on faith of honourable treatment, were, in violation of all the practices of war, kept in irons and dealt with as felons. It was with utter amazement that the Beloochees witnessed this on the part of a nation famous all over the world for the stern unimpeachability of its honour. Our officers were soon and frequently afterwards condemned to witness the ridicule heaped upon our professions of integrity. The village of Deyrah was sacked—grain, cloth, arms, every thing, down to the humblest donkey, becoming prize property.(5) Major Billamore determined to leave the Grenadiers in possession of Deyrah, and to retire to the plains *via* Kahun, taking with him the artillery. This route had been represented as absolutely impassable: but it was considered of so much importance to shew the Murrees that we could penetrate their fastnesses at our pleasure, through the most difficult of their defiles, that an attempt by Nufoosk, which saved forty miles in distance to Pooljee, was thought well worthy of encountering the danger and difficulty attending it. The route betwixt Deyrah and Kahun was fearfully difficult, and to be overcome only by the most determined perseverance and indefatigable exertions.(6) Two forced marches—one of twenty, and another of twenty-seven miles—brought the detachment to Kahun, which they found entirely abandoned. Messages were sent to the old chief Dodah Murree, to which insolent answers alone were returned. A foot path across the mountains indicated the line of march to Pooljee desired to be pursued. It was surveyed by Lieut. Jacob of the Artillery, to whom was committed the Herculean task of cutting a path through the Nufoosk hills fit for the transport of guns and baggage. It was a grim looking place: the mountains were about 3000 feet in height, and four miles across, and the narrow path, all which then existed, found its difficult way through tremendous rocks, precipices, and ravines. The work was not only attempted but completed, and a few days afterwards the astonished mountaineers saw our troops, horse and foot, with their guns, on their way through the Nufoosk and Surtof passes,—a few months after rendered so

5. There is nothing more humbling in the study of the large collection of letters of officers with the force, published and unpublished, from which the above narrative is compiled, than the constant recurrence to this most mortifying topic. The taunts that they could not believe us, were everywhere cast in our teeth by the tribes with whom we desired to treat. Such was the result of the political management of Scinde within six months of Mr Bell's appointment!

6. The reader will do well to keep these facts in special recollection when he comes to the report of the Nufoosk commission, where great fault is found with Major Clibborn that he did not select the Deyrah route instead of that by Nufoosk—the former being forty miles longer, and only a few shades less difficult than the latter: the garrison of Kahun being, meanwhile, in extremity for want of provisions.

unhappily memorable. They arrived safe at Poolajee on the plains, while Captain Raitt and his detachment retired from Deyrah shortly afterwards.

The details of this gallantly conducted, but useless expedition, have been more fully given than its magnitude might appear to warrant, because of its bearing on a series of most important, but unfortunate operations which ensued. It has been so generally overlooked, that in that invaluable repository of eastern intelligence, the *Asiatic Journal*, no notice of it is to be found. The materials at the disposal of the present writer have been supplied by some of the most talented officers of the force, and are of unquestionable authority. Here was a body of 300 gallant men sent roving amongst fearful mountains utterly unknown to us, to encounter tribes of whom we knew no more than that they were poor and warlike—to collect tribute not acknowledged or shewn to be due, and obtain professions of allegiance to a sovereign whose ancestors appear never to have been recognised by them! The information subsequently obtained from the *minister* at Kelat, after all the mischief had been done, proved that never had tribute been claimed by his master, or paid by either Murree or Bhoogtie, and that nothing could be more indefinite than their ideas of so much as an acknowledgment of sovereignty or superiority being due. These circumstances were notorious to the whole population of the countries around. But in 1839 we were too busy in overturning dynasties, and remodelling chiefships, to think of enquiring whether or not there were grounds of expediency or justice for what we were engaged with. (7) The expedition proved worthless: it made us acquainted with roads into a country where we had no business, and whose difficulties were shortly afterwards taught us to our cost. The occupation of Deyrah and Kahun ended in nothing, and in our subsequent attempts to treat with Dodah Murree, a twelvemonth afterwards, we appeared rather as supplicants for his friendship than as allies of his sovereign demanding his allegiance and support. Enough has been stated to shew the skill and bravery with which the military portion of the arrangement was carried out, and the wretchedness of the policy which ever called this into operation. To consummate its absurdity, neither engineering officer nor political agent accompanied the detachment; so that while it was rendered as useless as possible when in the country for the time, it was left without the means of having the routes surveyed, to ascertain their military capabilities in case it was found requisite for us to return. The system of dispersing handfuls of men up and down through the country had, the previous autumn, been objected to by Brigadier Gordon, who absolutely refused to send out detachments to be isolated in the mountains, for no end but to gratify a political whim, and give colour to

7. A very admirable series, under the title of "Cutchee Letters," on this subject appears in the *Bombay Times* betwixt April and July 1841, from the pen of an officer then in a very important position in Scinde.

the fiction that the country was every where kept in subjection to us.(8) Col. Gordon had resisted the dispatch of Major Billamore's expedition, but was overruled by the civil authorities. A quarrel and correspondence so violent had, in 1839, arisen betwixt the political and military chiefs, that the latter felt himself constrained to resign his command. Mr Bell had at this time quitted his post and retired to Simla, to pass the hot season in the bosom of the Himalayas—a month's journey from the troubled region committed to his charge. Lieut. Postans, his principal assistant, held supreme authority under the instructions and in the absence of the chief. Kahun was ordered once more to be occupied: for what end cannot be divined. We still maintained our claim to tribute and submission, and a Naib (a native tax-gatherer), accompanied Captain Brown to collect money. The previous enquiry as to whether any was due was considered entirely superfluous; of course none was ever paid us. The charge of the troops destined for this service was entrusted to two of the officers who had accompanied the expedition under Major Billamore—Captain Brown and Lieutenant Clarke—both men of the utmost courage, coolness and judgment. Captain Brown joined the detachment then assembled at Poolajee, on the 8th April. It consisted of 300 bayonets of the 5th regiment, under Ensign Taylor; two 12-pr howitzers, under Lieutenant D. Erskine; with 50 Poonah horsemen and 50 of the Scinde Irregular Horse, under Lieutenant Clarke, already named. He was directed to occupy the petty fort of Kahun, and was provided with supplies for four months. His convoy consisted of 600 camels besides bullocks. The empty camels were to be returned under charge of Lieutenant Clarke, with 80 infantry and 50 horse. About the 15th, the weather was extremely hot, the thermometer rising to 112° in the shade; fever became prevalent, and one native officer died from a stroke of the sun. At the request of the political agent, Lieut. Clarke with his horsemen were, on the 20th, dispatched in the direction of Shapoor, where they were to be joined by 100 men of the Belooch levy, under Lieutenant Vardon. The combined detachment was to proceed to the south-east, with a view of surprising a party of Culpore Bhoogties. In this they were unsuccessful, by reason of the treachery of their guide: the sufferings of the party from heat in crossing the desert were inconceivably severe: the Belooch levy alone left 25 men behind them, of whom three died. The guns were ordered back to Lheree on the 27th, in consequence of the sickness of Lieutenant Erskine

8. Statement of Colonel Gordon in the *Bombay Times*. The letters referred to in this were published in the *Bombay Times*, May 1841: as extraordinary a series as ever appeared in print. They extend from July to September 1839, and might have served to convince Lord Auckland that Mr Bell had been mistaken, and that he was unqualified for the important office to which he had been appointed. He was at this time about to have resigned: it would have been fortunate for his fame had he carried his resolution into effect.

—one only being restored to the custody of Captain Brown, who knew, from his experience with Major Billamore, how impossible it was to proceed without artillery. Lieutenant Erskine soon after so far recovered as to be able to take charge of the gun, the howitzers being left. On the 3d May the detachment entered the hills, leaving 50 horse behind who could not be relied on. The road was so heavy and difficult that a mile an hour was all the advance that could be made: water, luckily, was plentiful. Ensign Taylor became so sick on the first march that he had to return, leaving two European officers in charge of three companies of Sepoys! The heat was intolerable: the thermometer was 116°, and the wind came down the gorges like the breath of a furnace.(9) Arriving on the 7th at the spot where the road round by Deyrah, a detour of 74 miles, divides itself from the short cut of 20 miles to Kahun through the mountains, by which Major Billamore had descended a few months before, Captain Brown selected the latter; having in this matter been left, as Major Clibborn was afterwards, to judge for himself. On the 10th they reached the celebrated Pass of Nufoosk, through which Lieutenant Jacob had cut a track for artillery, *ut supra*. A hundred men ascended the acclivity in the morning; the breast works erected by the enemy were destroyed, and the cuts, three of which had been made across the road by them, were repaired. From 6 in the morning till 4 in the afternoon was occupied in getting the gun up the steep, though the distance was little more than a quarter of a mile; and it was 3 next morning before the convoy was got to the summit of the gorge. The heat was dreadful, and water extremely scarce; the camels dropped down by dozens from fatigue. A few Beloochees followed in the rear, and some shots were exchanged, but no formidable annoyance was experienced; the troops required to be kept three nights on end under arms. On the 11th they obtained a sight of Kahun from the top of the Pass; the descent from their lofty bivouack was, for a mile, so extremely steep, that their progress was difficult and tardy: it was 2 P.M. before the gun was got down. The heat continued as intense as ever, and water was extremely scarce. By 5 P.M. they reached their destination; the whole march had been as arduous as it was skilfully conducted. The convoy often stretched a distance of 2 miles, so that to guard it properly was impossible: through the exertions of the officers and men scarcely anything was lost. Kahun is a small, irregular, hexangular town, 900 yards in circumference: it is surrounded by a rugged and imperfect wall 25 feet high, with six bastions. It has no ditch, but a large tank opposite the gateway serves as a reservoir for water. It was found abandoned, the gates having been carried off and buried; they were discovered hid in the ground ad-

9. This part of the Narrative is chiefly an abridgement of Captain Brown's Journal, published by Government: a most interesting little brochure.

joining, and replaced a few days after our arrival. The fort is chiefly used as a place of retreat, its only regular inhabitants being the chief and a few followers,—the Banians or Hindoo merchants, though numerous, themselves living in huts on the plains which extend for fifteen miles around. So soon as the troops were housed, every effort was made to put the works in a state of repair; the wells were cleared, the bastions strengthened,—the detachment having apparently been dispatched to be placed in a state of siege when no succour could be sent them! The cavalry discovered some grain in the fields, and 50 camel loads of wheat, in stalk, were sent in; a second supply of similar amount was shortly afterwards met in with; the Murrees discovering this set fire to the rest.

On the 16th, the return convoy under Lieutenant Clarke, started for Poolajee at 2 in the morning. Capt. Brown, availing himself of the permission to increase the detachment originally destined to escort the returning camels, in consideration of the difficulty about to be encountered, accordingly augmented it by the addition of a subedar's party, consisting of 5 havildars and 80 rank and file. Finding no opposition in crossing the first hill, Lieutenant Clarke appears to have directed their return to Kahun. They were attacked on their way by a body of about 2000 of the enemy, and cut off to a man; one dhoolie-bearer alone escaping to tell the tale. The escort party having got so far, were enabled to proceed towards the bottom of the Surtof mountain, 13 miles from Kahun, with apparently but little molestation. The string of camels extended to a length of two miles; these had yet forty miles before them of grim passes, rugged rocks, and river beds.(10) Clarke had got his convoy safe through the ghaut and assembled in the plain, when, seeing a strong body of Beloochees following down the mountain, he left the camels in charge of the Irregular horse, while he went back a mile with the infantry, and took up a position on the crest of the hill overhanging and completely commanding the road. He appears to have thought that, considering the distance he had yet to march, a timeous check would have saved him from all further annoyance. The motive on which he acted appears not only to have been a brave, but a wise one, and would most likely have proved successful, but for one of those untoward accidents which no man could have foreseen. From the post he had taken up he could easily have kept the enemy at bay. Having sent for a supply of ammunition the messenger unhappily was killed before reaching his destination. The Beloochees, seeing that our fire had begun to slacken, crept up a shallow cut on the flank of the sepoy party and then darted on them with the utmost fury, when, after a two hours' fight, every man of them was slain. The horsemen fled to Poolajee

10. The particulars of this melancholy catastrophe are derived in part from Captain Brown's narrative, partly from a letter of an officer with Major Clibborn's force.

at speed: the whole of the baggage fell into the enemy's hands. One havildar and ten privates alone escaped: thus, in a single day, did the 5th Bombay N. I. lose 148 men—Lieutenant Clarke was the pride and ornament of his profession. To this day the Murrees speak of his bravery, calling him “Burra Bahadoor.”

The departure and entire destruction of both portions of the escort party had reduced the strength of the garrison at Kahun to 140 bayonets, with a single gun—who amongst them had to watch 900 yards of wall against the assaults of a brave and indefatigable enemy. One hundred and fifty rupees (£.15) was offered to get a messenger to carry intelligence to the plains of the state of affairs: but none would undertake the task. On the 21st, a despatch was sent, intimating to Brigadier Gordon, that there were still four months' supplies in store, and that every exertion would be made to hold the fort. The old chief Dodah had tried every means in his power to prevent the attack on our relieving convoy, and when the tribes would no longer be gainsaid, he exclaimed to those who were leaving—“there you go, selling our country for five hundred camels.” (11) The full fatuity of the expedition had at length become apparent—the garrison had been only twelve days in the country, from which they came to enforce tribute and allegiance, and they were now beleaguered in the capital, and barely able to hold their own. A strict account of stores was taken and the troops put on half rations on the 24th May, while every tree and shrub within 200 yards was cut down. To have moved one step beyond the walls would have involved certain destruction. Lieutenant Loch having intimated his intention of endeavouring to join them with 200 horse, was warned of the utter hopelessness of penetrating Nufosk with such a force. The idea of forwarding reinforcements from Sukkur having for a time been abandoned, Captain Bean at Quettah was written to, to see whether he could not get the Kakur tribe to attack the Murrees, with whom they were at enmity, and so produce a diversion in our favour. By the end of June, the wells had all been cleared, and the inner fort, adequate to contain all their scanty provisions, strengthened as a last place of retreat in case of emergency. Clubs from the adjoining bushes were cut for the use of the camp-followers, who could not otherwise be got armed; and the empty grain bags were filled with sand to make up a show to deceive the spies occasionally known to find their way into the fortress. On the morning of the 29th June, a party of 150 Beloochees came sweeping round the fort and managed to cut off the retreat of 20 bullock-drivers, who contrary to express instructions had gone about a mile beyond the walls. The work of slaughter had commenced, when a shell dexterously

11. Captain Brown's Journal, para. 3d.

thrown amongst the assailants, of whom 6 were killed by it, caused them to give way ; while a party of 40 men thrown out in that direction, and flanked by a couple of bastions, afforded a retiring post for the survivors, of whom 10 were by this means saved. About the same time some 8 or 10 camel men were attacked while out foraging, by 20 Beloochees, who rushed on them at speed, and would have inevitably cut them to pieces, but for the courageous conduct of two sepoy, who coolly waited till the assailants were close at hand, and then fired in their faces, wounding one of them and compelling them to return. The only sheep remaining were grazing hard by, when the attention of the enemy, luckily for the garrison, was too intently directed to the destruction of the camel-men to observe the plunder, otherwise the loss would have been serious. On the 3d July Shere Beg, a Bhoogtie, to whom Captain Brown had the previous year been of service, and who from the time our troops entered the Murree hills, clung to him like a shadow, brought in 45 sheep and goats in evidence of his gratitude: a most welcome supply, the troops being reduced to their last goat. This man often visited the garrison, bringing with him small supplies of vegetables and condiments—his approach was always hailed with delight. He was the only source of intelligence or stranger who visited them, and his name as he approached was passed from bastion to bastion as that of a friend. He was believed to act the part of a spy in a small way, while the prices he obtained for his commodities, relieved our people of any alarm for excess of obligation obtained at his hands. Offers of assistance were received from Captain Bean on the 7th July, but the proffered aid never reached: while the political agent at Shikarpore wrote that it was intended to act on the defensive till the heats were over. Lieut. Erskine one day killed 3 out of 50 Beloochee horsemen who had been watching for some mischief in the dell adjoining: after this the enemy kept at a respectful distance, and heaped abuse on us beyond the range of the artillery. The same routine of disheartening duties continued throughout the month of July: the camels were getting into poor condition from the badness or scarcity of food, and many of the gun bullocks had to be shot on the advance of disease. Intelligence was received that the Kojjucks, instead of coming to our assistance, had joined the Murrees against us: the Kakurs whom Captain Bean was to send for our relief had turned to attack himself in Quettah. The men suffered severely from ulcers, upwards of 90 of all ranks being laid up with them by the middle of July: while by the 6th of August, 33 men were in hospital from fever. The camp followers were subjected to drill, and had become able to take a share of military duty. Dr. Glasse himself became sick, and the medicine chest being exhausted, hot water was resorted to and found effectual as a substitute for purgatives. A tremendous storm of wind and rain filled all the tanks and inundated the country around: and the

sight of the cultivators every where engaged in the labours of the field, exhibited to the beleaguered soldiers a scene of as much cheerfulness as could be witnessed from such a prison. By the beginning of August the Beloochees had begun to approach closer and closer every day to the fort. Their matchlocks could carry twice as far as our muskets; while little parties like picquets appeared seated round in every direction. A set of men who were watching in a ravine close by, fired on the officers while walking near the gate. A few sepoy were sent out to entice them on, when 50 Murrees immediately sprung up, and the sepoy having got out of the way, a shell was fired which killed 15 of the enemy. The following extract gives so graphic an account of the incidents at this period of the siege, that it is given without abridgment (12):—

“10th Aug.—For the last 4 or 5 days the flocks had been coming closer and closer to the walls, eating up what little grass there was left. I had warned Hybutt Khan of this 3 or 4 times, and had also offered to purchase 100 at his own price, but he declared I should not have one. Erskine and myself had finished the last but one, of those we procured from old Sheer Bheg. We have both excellent appetites, although shut up in a fort. To-day, 2 large flocks of sheep and goats came most temptingly near, and the sepoy earnestly entreated for some fresh meat; watching our opportunity (no Beloochees being then in sight) we slipped out about 30 sepoy, flanking them with 2 bastions filled with men, and Erskine got the gun round to bear in the direction. There were only 3 Beloochees just then in charge; they immediately ran off for their lives, and the goats, by some instinct, and to our great annoyance, followed them at speed, like dogs. Two horsemen then came up looking very fierce, but soon rode off on getting a shot. To describe the delight of all on getting this flock inside the fort is impossible; there was a perfect uproar; on counting our plunder we found we had secured 300 sheep* and 57 goats; most of the latter were milk goats, so that the highest castes shared the enjoyment; we immediately made a division of the whole, charging $\frac{1}{4}$ Rupee on the head of each, for the benefit of the widows of those who fell on the 16th May. That evening the fort became one large cook-shop.

“11th.—Hybutt Khan came to-day to try and recover his sheep; told us Nusseer Khan had driven all our detachments in to Sukkur; also brought a note from Dodah, the Chief, desiring us to leave his fort forthwith, and that he and his army would escort us down to the plains! When Hybutt found he could not get back his sheep, being told that most of them were already killed, he flew into a great rage, and declared he would come and attack the fort, for which threat I told the sentry to give him a shot, when he quickly departed.

12. The whole of the narrative of the siege of Kahun is abridged from Captain Brown's journal. The entries from the 10th to the 16th are given entire. The capture of the sheep is too graphic an incident to admit of abridgment.

* These sheep were a great addition to the half rations; the latter alone being but poor food for men working all day and on guard every night.

" 15th.—A cossid, to our great joy, came in this morning after a lapse of 20 days ; could have hugged the old rascal, although I knew him to be the greatest of spies. A letter arrived by him from the Political Agent saying, it was contemplated to try and throw in supplies, through the agency of Jeytt Sing, * and Meer Hussain, to save moving the troops up with a convoy.

" 16th.—Another cossid this morning. The system mentioned yesterday of throwing in supplies discarded, being found impracticable ; and the welcome, most welcome intelligence of the following detachment leaving Sukkur for our relief ;

Detachment of H. M. 40th Regiment,

1st Grenadiers, 4 Guns,

2nd ditto, 200 Horse,

under the command of Major Clibborn, 1st grenadiers ; received intimation that it was arranged between Hybutt Khan and the rest of the chiefs, that the former, in making a truce, should encourage us to go out foraging, and then cut us up."

Old Dodah Murree had first sent a message, stating that if the detachment would retire, he and his chiefs would escort them to the plains ; and then intimated, through his brother, that the whole tribe would assemble on the 31st of August, and put the garrison to the sword. Assemble they did—for another, but not less fatal purpose. From the 10th of August, the stir and activity in the direction of Nufoosk indicated that some evil was afoot. A fortnight afterwards, Captain Brown was informed by Hybutt Khan, the friendly chief to whom the flocks around belonged, that the Murrees, mustering 3,000 strong, had resolved to intercept the convoy if possible. They had determined to have three fights should they at first prove unsuccessful: one at Nufoosk—one somewhat nearer Kahun—and the third at a fort still farther in the rear, where they had vowed to stand to the last. We must once more borrow the words of the gallant commander of the fortress:—

" 31st Aug.—A day of great and almost overpowering excitement. It commenced about 5 o'clock last evening, when the plains and hills became alive with Beloochees, and at dark, large signal fires on the tops of all the hills. At day-break, large parties of horse and foot were seen hurrying across the plain to the Nufoosk pass, on the opposite side of which, we soon learnt of the arrival of our convoy, from the report of one of their guns, a signal agreed upon between us ; about sun-rise, we saw collected on the very top of the pass about 2000 Beloochees, and others prowling about in all directions ; the distance, as the crow flies from the fort to the

* Jeytt Sing is a Shikarpore merchant, immensely rich, and has great sway with all the Beloochees around ; our loss is always his certain gain ; he buys back our stolen camels for 15 or 20 rupees, and sells them again to our commissariate for 50 or 60 Rs ! a positive fact. Meer Hussain I am almost positive, was the cause of poor Clarke being attacked, and it is fully proved it was he who led Major Clibborn's watering party into the ambushade. I hope he will yet meet with the punishment he deserves.

pass, is about 4 miles ; in fact, we were completely behind the scenes, and saw all that the Beloochees were at, and fully expecting to see our comrades crown the top every hour, we were highly amused and excited—2 P.M. no sight of convoy coming over pass, they must be repairing the road up—3 *P. M. saw the shrapnells flying over the hill, and bursting in the midst of the enemy with the most beautiful effect—5 P. M. still no sight of convoy. Beloochees still crossing the plains towards the seat of action. Erskine scattered a small body of them with a shell—8 P. M. heavy firing of guns and musketry for 10 minutes, when all was silent for the rest of the night. I should be very sorry to pass many days of my life like this—I would ten thousand times sooner have been in the thick of it ; the excitement and suspense was beyond any thing I ever felt before ; knowing the difficulty of the pass, and not seeing our people crown the top, I felt certain there must be much bloodshed going on.†

“Sept. 1st.—Not a single Beloochee to be seen on the top of the hill at day-light but several passing across the plain in that direction. No sight or sound of convoy all day ! Sadly perplexed to know what has become of them ; conclude that finding the pass too strongly defended yesterday, that they had fallen back to go round by the Deyrah road, as I first recommended.

“2d.—Beloochees in all directions, and busy as bees—Another day of suspense and excitement ; after 11 o'clock they pitched one of our sepoy's tents about half way up the hill, up and down which, batches of loaded and unloaded camels are going ; suppose the convoy must have dropped some of their baggage and stores in the hurry of their departure. About 12 o'clock much firing commenced and continued with intervals until 2 P. M. ; from the sound, it would appear the convoy had fallen back in the direction of the Deyrah road, some 20 miles ; cannot now expect to see them for the next 6 or 7 days ; tantalizing, when they were so close : not a drop of spirits, a cheroot or a cup of tea left, or have we indeed tasted any for some time ; sepoys very weak from short rations, only 6 bags of flour left, a bad look-out ; cannot help thinking of our having got our convoy over so snugly in May, when we had only a third of the number of the present convoy.

“3rd.—Still in suspense ; no communication from out-side ; all on the look-out, particularly at night ; upwards of 100 loaded camels going across the plain, being

* Between 2 and 3 o'clock the fight of Nuffoosk commenced.

† I have since heard some surprise has been expressed that we could see and hear Clibborn's shells, and not rush out to his succour ! Had we done so the labor and perseverance of 4 months would have been thrown away in an hour, and the Beloochees would have gained the *very* object they had been trying for without effect, since the day we entered the fort, namely to entice us out : but the thing was out of the question. Between us and the pass were 4 miles of plain, ‡ of a mile one of the most dangerous ravines I ever passed thro' : a mountain a mile in extent, and last tho' not least, 2000 Beloochees ! I might perhaps have mustered 100 bayonets, but must have left some 40 sick behind ; but the best reason of all is, that it was not until the 7th September (8 days afterwards) when we first saw the guns in the enemy's hand, that we had the slightest idea of the disaster that had taken place. Up to that date we anxiously looked out to see the convoy coming round the Deyrah road, thinking they had found the Nuffoosk pass too difficult.

some distance off, whether these are horses or camels cannot be clearly ascertained without a glass, persuaded the people in the fort that they were the former, altho' the sepoy's made the shrewd remark, that they never saw horsemen look so large, or go along one after the other so regularly. About 20 horsemen with 8 or 10 spare horses came down from the hill to water near the fort, looks as if the owners of the latter had been killed—2 bodies carried across the plain *on charpoy's*, with a kind of funeral party following them; suppose they are two chiefs. At 3 P. M. saw a large body of Beloochees pitching a sort of camp within $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile of the fort, no mistaking our sepoy's tents, also one officer's tent, 5 of the former and 1 of the latter, exactly the number they took from Clarke's party, trust they are those only, but appearances are very suspicious. Just as it was getting dark, saw the whole body assembled in one dense mass, in front of their tents; warned all hands to keep a bright look-out when the moon goes down.

"4th.—To-day some horsemen came and informed us 'that they had cut up our convoy, taken the guns and all the stores and supplies, and had killed all the ' sahib log except 3, who were prisoners in their camp'"—in proof of which assertion they offered to show the guns to any person I chose to send, who could also bring a chit from the prisoners—This offer however I refused, firmly believing the report to be altogether untrue, and made with a view of getting hold of one of my people for information. They also said, that if I would leave the fort and go to the plains, they would not molest me—we had a very heavy fall of rain about 4 P. M.—More tents springing up in the Murree camp, about 300 Beloochees seated on a rising ground on one flank—great amusement in watching their movements; having a good glass, we could almost see into their very tents.

"5th.—A person came under the fort calling out, wishing to give us the news; had had already quite enough of these people's stories, so sent a bullet or two after him, to hurry his departure—all in the fort sadly perplexed to know what to think of affairs—Beloochees on the move in every direction—100 passed this morning in the Deyrah direction, the road from which we are expecting the convoy—the Beloochees do not seem in good spirits, not like men who have destroyed a large convoy—there has evidently been mischief some where—a storm occurred about 4 o'clock, which to our great delight blew down all the Beloochee tents; they however soon had them up again.

"6th.—No grain left for camels or bullocks, and little or no forage—they must take their chance, poor creatures; nothing now left but a few bags of rice and 3 or 4 of flour—10 bags of the latter, which were thrown aside as being half sand, now came into use, and were greedily devoured by the sepoy's—a camel-man shot himself, being detected in a theft.

"7th.—Half expected, on taking a look at the Beloochee camp this morning, to find them all decamped; but a sad reverse met our sight—The three guns belonging to the convoy staring us in the face! they are placed on a piece of rising ground on one flank of their camp, their muzzles pointed towards the fort. What can have become of Major Clibborn and his convoy? Many officers and men must have lost their lives before they gave up the guns! There is no doubt now that something most disastrous must have occurred, and we must prepare for the

worst. Sepoys keep up their spirits amazingly well, not the slightest sign of flinching, altho' they seem to be aware that their situation is rather perilous: luckily they cannot see the guns with the naked eye, on account of the jungle. There are chances in our favor yet, and that the guns will not be of much use to them. 1st, they may be spiked, 2ndly, they may have no ammunition, and lastly, they know not how to load or fire them; luckily they are howitzers instead of field pieces; 10 A. M. all the Beloochees are assembled round the guns, and peeping into their muzzles, quite playthings to them.

"8th.—Small parties of horsemen prowling all round the fort, watching us I suppose, knowing we must soon take to flight for want of provisions; they need not be in such a hurry, as we have still some rice and gun bullocks left.

"9th.—Loaded camels still going across the plain, 2 Beloochees mounted on artillery horses; no mistaking them from their size and their having blinkers on, which they were determined should not escape our sight, as they galloped up and down in front of the fort for an hour.

"10th.—Our old friend Sheer Bheg came in this morning, but in such a suspicious manner, that I put him prisoner; he tells us, the Beloochees' report of having destroyed our convoy is all true; he mentions poor Raitt and Moore as being two of the killed.

"11th.—Made some horsemen, who were grazing their horses rather too close, scamper off, and received much abuse from them for my pains. The Murrees acknowledge to their having had 80 killed and 80 wounded in the fight. Our old acquaintance Hybutt Khan and his son are, it is stated, both killed, also Kurreem Khan, who superintended the slaughter on the 29th June."

We must now leave off for a little the narrative of the heroic defence of Kahun till some account be given of the unsuccessful attempts for its relief, terminating in the bloody action at Nufoosk.

A force consisting of 1,000 bayonets, with artillery and irregular horse, had early in August been warned, by Brigadier Stevenson, for service amongst the hills. The lamented death of that able and amiable officer transferred to the hands of Major Forbes the crude and incomplete arrangements so imperiously required to be put into effect without a moment's delay. Major Forbes, a man of prudence, spirit, and activity, reached Sukkur on the 6th August, a complete stranger to the country; and on the 9th, by the casualty just alluded to, found himself senior officer in Upper Scinde. (13) The first step he took was to recommend that the garrison should not be relieved, but withdrawn. Having been informed by Lieut. Postans, Assistant Political Agent at Shikarpore, that Mr. Ross Bell had given the most positive orders for the maintenance of the Murree fort, he had no alternative left him but to use all dispatch in preparing a force for its succour. The detachment, which was allowed no more than 36 hours for preparation, consisted

13. Letter of Mr. Secretary Willoughby, 2d June 1841, in reference to the Minute of the Clibborn Commission.

of the 1st Grenadiers and flank company of the 2d, mustering altogether about 600 bayonets, with three 12-pounder howitzers,—this being the utmost number of fighting men which could be equipped at Sukkur at the time; with a convoy of 1,200 camels and 600 bullocks under their charge. This large train of animals, stretching over a space of four miles, where the Passes compelled them to move in single file, was considered no more than necessary for maintaining the garrison reinforced by the escorting party for the space of two months which they had been commanded to remain. The detachment and convoy left Sukkur on the 12th, and reached Poolajee on the 20th. Here they were joined by 200 of the Scinde and Poonah Horse, under charge of Lieutenants Loch and Malcolm. This raised the force to a strength of 850 fighting men. The heat across the desert was in the last degree oppressive; but as the marches were accomplished under night, the encamping ground being taken up by sunrise, no accident of note occurred on the first part of the way. On the 24th August they left Poolajee, and for the next six marches traversed a wild and mountainous country, abounding with water and forage, but where no human habitation was observable. (14) The march before reaching Surtof, 20 or 30 Beloochees who followed them with a view to plunder, were surprised by Lieut. Loch, and eight of them killed. On arriving at the scene of Lieut. Clarke's disaster, they found the bleaching bodies of the dead Sepoys scattered everywhere around; the guide giving a very clear account of the manner in which the sad mishap occurred. (15) A heap of stones was shown them under which poor Clarke had been buried by Meer Hussein, the guide now in attendance. Fragments of his dress were recognized scattered amongst the accoutrements and bodies of the brave men who had fallen around him. The 30th of August was occupied in getting the convoy and guns up the ghaut,—the latter had to be dragged by the men, suffering from the excessive heat of an August sun reflected from the rocks around,—the laborious task was completed by 6 P.M. At night they slept on the table-land which stretches from the top of the Surtof to the bottom of the Nufosk Pass six miles beyond. No water was to be found nearer than the bottom of the ghaut, which it had taken them all day to ascend. The men were under arms a great part of the night, the Beloochees keeping up a fire on the camp and picquets from the opposite side of an impassable ravine. The march towards the Kahun hills was commenced at two in the morning. As they approached Nufosk the heights were seen covered thickly with the enemy, who shouted and

14. The description of the march is taken from a letter of a very accomplished officer of the force. It appeared in the *Bombay Times* of September:—of the engagement, from this, and from Major Clibborn's despatch.

15. See above, where the guide's account is embodied in the narrative, along with that of Captain Brown's Journal.

flourished their swords in defiance as we came on, while a beacon fire, lighted up on the highest summit, called the scattered Murrees to the slaughter. The road lay along the base of the precipice, over ground intersected with ravines and nullahs, in one of which a gun which overset caused considerable delay. A heavy fire was meanwhile maintained from the hills, where the enemy were screened by the shelter and within the crevices of the rocks. On arriving at the bottom of the Pass, they found the zigzag road, formerly made by Lieut. Jacob up the steep, and by which Capt. Brown had ascended with so much difficulty, cut across and blocked up—unfit for the advance of camels, much more of guns, and only admitting men in single file. The ascent, half a mile in length, was abrupt in the extreme. Worst of all, their apprehensions of want of water, which the late rains half led them to expect, were realized. Captain Brown had written on the 27th, that owing to the recent fall, water was likely to be plentiful: a single pool, which could only be approached under the enemy's fire, was all that could be found—and this was speedily exhausted; and the pukkals, or skins, they had brought along with them had leaked or dried up, and were now empty. It was ten o'clock A.M.—the heat was becoming dreadful, and it was obvious that some immediate and decisive step must be attempted, or the troops would speedily perish of thirst. It was half-past one before the rear-guard, consisting of a company of the 2d Grenadiers, one howitzer, and the Poonah Horse, came up. The guns had been placed in position to enfilade the summit of the Pass in front, and immediately on the arrival of the rear-guard, the storming party, consisting of the left and flank companies of the 1st and 2d grenadiers, were told off. These moved up the hill in beautiful order, headed by Capt. Raitt, and supported by 100 dismounted irregular horsemen: a heavy fire of shell and shrapnell being meanwhile maintained on the crest and gorge at the summit of the pass. A strong flanking party of 317 was posted at the foot of the ghaut on the right, who maintained a steady fire on the enemy, while the remainder of the regiment was drawn up on the plain facing the acclivity, and protecting the guns. The storming party gallantly overcame every difficulty, having forced their way over three tiers of breast-works, topped with thorns and bushes, built across their path. They had nearly reached the last turn in the ascent, and were just entering the gorge at its summit, when they were assailed on every side by a deadly fire from the enemy, and overwhelmed with showers of stones hurled down from the precipices on all around. One sepoy reached the gap and was seen to fire through it, when the Beloochees gave a shout and rushed down sword in hand. Captain Raitt had been shot through the thigh, half way up the mountain, and asked Lieutenant Franklin to lead the advance; but seeing this officer supporting Lieut. Williams, who had just been shot through the heart, he bound his limb with his handkerchief, and nobly took his place at the head of his men. He and Lieut. Williams were both killed fighting desperately when the furious rush was

made on them. Lieut. More received two shot wounds in the body, and was afterwards cut down. Lieut. Loch, who led the dismounted horsemen, was severely wounded: he had received a bad sword cut, with numerous bruises from stones, and was forced down the hill by his orderly, reaching the guns in a fainting state. Out of the 100 men he led, 47 were left dead upon the hill. The Beloochees and sepoys were now mingled together fighting hand to hand in wild confusion. All the officers, and nearly half of the men had fallen, when the remainder were borne by main force down the hill—hundreds of the enemy leaping from every nook and overpowering them. Seeing the impossibility of making a stand on the face of the hill, the flanking party fell back upon the main body of the regiment, firing on the enemy as they retired. An attempt was made to get into square, but from the unsteadiness of the many recruits which formed the line, the movement ended in a rally round the guns, now sweeping the plains with grape shot. The Beloochees, about 800 strong, now came rushing down on all sides, pouring on our ranks showers of heavy stones, with which the place abounded, and charging sword in hand up to the muzzles of the cannon, which carried destruction amongst them. The fire at length became too hot for them, and they were repulsed with great slaughter, and fled in all directions, leaving about 200 dead on the plain. There had been in all upwards of 150 killed and wounded, including the four officers who had fallen. The scorching heat of the day continued unabated, the wind from the rocks was like the breath of a furnace, and the excessive thirst experienced was intolerable. The piteous and incessant cries of the wounded for "water, water," were heart rending. Water there was none, yet all were clamorous for drink, and the small supply of beer belonging to the officers was served out to the most necessitous of all castes, who grasped at it with frantic eagerness. Parties with camels and waterskins were sent to seek for water in the adjoining nullahs, where the guides reported that it was to be found within a mile of the pass. The artillery horses, which were in their present exhausted state unfit to draw the guns, were dispatched on a similar duty, under an escort of 50 of the Scinde irregular horse. The evening was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded; shells were occasionally thrown on the enemy, who still kept up a straggling fire from the hills. Party after party returned with the dismal intelligence that no water was any where to be found; and to complete their apprehensions, they quickly learned that the Sowars, who had been sent with the gun horses, had been surrounded in a nullah, attacked, and cut up; through the treachery, as was believed, of Meer Hussein, a Bhoogtie chief, who acted as guide. The horses had been carried off: and the camel men and dhoolie-bearers had by this time nearly all absconded. To make a second attempt on the pass was, under present circumstances, considered hopeless; had the enemy indeed at this

time attacked them, the men were so helpless from extreme exhaustion, that they must have been cut up without resistance. They had now been under arms and without food for 16 hours; and it was resolved, that if no supplies of water made their appearance before 10 at night, the troops should retreat. Fifty pounds were offered to any one who would carry a letter to Kahun, only 14 miles off, advising Captain Brown to cut his way through and join Clibborn's detachment in the course of the night, so that the whole might retire to the plains together. No one would undertake the task,—and the garrison now believed to be almost without provisions was necessarily left to its fate: a fate which the providential supply of sheep already alluded to luckily prevented from being disastrous. At 11 A. M. this brave but exhausted band moved silently off the ground, carrying with them as many of the wounded and as much baggage and convoy as could be collected and transported. Fortunately no obstruction was experienced; on reaching the top of the Surtof Pass, 7 miles in the rear of the scene of action, all discipline was at an end. The sepoys were frantic with thirst, and rushed furiously down the hill, leaping like madmen into the pools at the bottom. At this time the rear was attacked by a large body of Beloochees, who appeared no one knew how or from whence. The flash of musketry was seen along the whole face of the hill, and the slaughter amongst the followers was severe. The men recovered themselves the moment their thirst was slaked, and, having formed a hollow square, waited till day-break should afford them a sight of the enemy. These, however, disappeared before dawn, carrying with them the whole of the remainder of the convoy which had fallen into their hands in the confusion of the night. The sepoys, before leaving Nufoosk, had been directed to put three or four days' supply of flour into their haversacks, but most of them had been too tired to do so, and they now found themselves absolutely in want of food. The tents, treasure, guns, and ammunition, every thing in short which constitutes the materiel of an army, had been lost. The men only escaped. Fortunately there were still a few camels remaining, and a number more joined on the road, as did also 35 gun-horses believed to have been destroyed. With such scanty means as these a forced march of 54 miles to Poolajee was before them. They started at seven, and sheltered themselves under some tamarisk trees during the heat of the day. Still occasionally fired at by the enemy, and seeking refuge behind rocks and banks from the fierce rays of the sun, they arrived at their destination on the night of the 2d September, having accomplished a march of betwixt 60 and 70 miles in the course of 48 hours. Four sepoys died of heat on the way, and Capt. Heighington was, from the same cause, afterwards struck with apoplexy, which proved fatal. The total loss in killed was 177—72 were wounded. The casualties amongst the camp followers is not known, they must have been numerous. The loss

of baggage was estimated at £15,000. (16) The enemy lost 350 of their bravest warriors, and amongst them were several chiefs. After a short rest the detachment returned to Shikarpore, 50 miles off, a week afterwards, where they joined head-quarters at Sukkur without further accident.

Returning to Kahun, where we left Captain Brown and his gallant party, grieved and disappointed, but not dismayed by the blight their hopes of relief had sustained, we find them making the most of the live stock they had obtained possession of so unexpectedly, and still on the alert—cheerfully waiting for what might befall. On the 12th the Murrees began to move away the captured guns, which till then had remained in position in sight of the fort; and the day after the warriors themselves dispersed. On the 17th official intelligence of the full extent of Major Clibborn's disaster was received from the Brigade Major (Forbes) at Sukkur, who intimated to Captain Brown, that he might use his own discretion as to abandoning

16. The loss was estimated by the *Agra Ukhbar* at six lakhs (60,000L.) and as a considerable show of details was then given, this has generally passed current as correct. The following is from an official statement in the hands of government: its accuracy may be relied upon; its amount, as given in the text, being about one quarter that of the *Ukhbar's* estimate.

Dholl.....	8,000 lbs. at	16 lbs. $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. per	Rupee.....	Rs. 494	3	3
Rice	80,480 ..	29 ..	do	2,793	3	6
Flour.....	82,200 ..	33 .. $\frac{1}{4}$..	do	2,446	6	9
Ghee.....	5,761 ..	4 $\frac{1}{2}$..	do	1,200	3	4
Salt	3,250 ..	200 ..	do	16	1	10
Gram	40,600 ..	33 $\frac{1}{2}$..	do	1,208	5	0
Jowarree	77,840 ..	43 ..	do	1,801	13	0

Total 9,960 4 8

From this should be deducted six days' rations of troops, followers, and cattle, paid daily into the commissariat treasure chest.

The camels taken into the hills were—

Commissariat.....	978
Sick from Lheree.....	150
Private camels	50

1178

Died on the road above	130	}	330
Brought off carrying wounded ...	200		

Estimated loss at Nufoosk—

848

Grain.....	Rs. 10,000
Camels 848, at 75 Rs. a camel	63,600
Bullocks 600, at 8 Rs. each	4,800
Gun Horses 25, at Rs. 300 each	7,500
Irregular do 30, at 120 each.....	3,600
Routies old 40, at Rs. 50 each	2,000
Three Guns, at Rs. 1000 each.....	3,000
Private baggage and miscellaneous items.....	34,000

Total Rs. 1,50,000

the fort. It was ascertained, that by reducing the men to quarter rations and eating up the gun bullocks, they might contrive to subsist on this famine fare till the 15th October; and so it was determined that the fort should be maintained, unless honourable terms were offered. The old chief Dodah sent a message through Shere Beg, intimating that he had twice before, just after the fight, offered to grant any terms we should desire, provided we would quit the country; but that we drove his emissaries away, and that he was now ready to agree to the arrangement suggested. This was no offer of our seeking: the opening was fair: and our position not likely to improve by delay. Captain Brown therefore wrote in reply, "Dodah Murree, I'll give you back your fort, on conditions, viz.—that you give me personal security for my safe arrival in the plains: if not, I will remain here two months longer, having provisions for that time." On receiving this, the whole of the chiefs assembled, and, after consultation, took an oath on the Koran that, if he would leave the fort in three days, they would protect him to the plains: they wrote to this effect immediately, concluding that "whatever Captain Brown's wishes were, should to them be law." Immediately after the arrival of this, a letter was brought from Dodah himself, in answer to that which had been written to him, containing an agreement on oath, and promising to send his nephew to pay his respects, and see that the terms were observed by the people of the tribe. From this to the conclusion of Captain Brown's adventures, we must draw on his journal, which no longer admits of abridgment.

"25th Sept.—Replied to Dodah's letter, to the effect, that I would give up the fort 3 days hence, on the above terms. Surprized at their letting us off so easily, viz. simply to return to the plains without let or hindrance from his people, on condition of giving up the fort, which Dodah must well know we cannot hold a month longer; plenty of room to suspect treachery, but we must run the risk. This evening Guamaul Khan came near the fort, and sent a message to say, that he feared to venture inside, but that if I would meet him outside without my troops, he would ratify the agreement. Wishing at once to see whether it was to be 'treachery, or no treachery,' I agreed, and with Erakine and 4 native officers, met him about a mile from the fort. I never saw a man in such a fright in my life. Altho' he had 30 horsemen, armed to the teeth, and there were only 6 of us, he retreated twice before he would venture near us! He thought from our coming alone, there must be treachery; that some men were hidden somewhere: even after we had met, he had his horse all ready close by for a start. Down we all sat in a circle. A wild scene; his followers appeared to be exceedingly well armed and all fine stout built men. After compliments, &c. the nephew began to talk very reasonably. He expressed a kope that 'there would now be a lasting peace between his tribe and the British: that they had only fought at the Nuffoosk pass to save their country, and their lives; that it was the least they could do, when they had

the fate of Bejahkhan staring them in the face. That they had never killed any of our people after the fight, and that all the prisoners had been fed, clothed, and set free.' He concluded by saying that 'he should remain near the fort until we left, to prevent any disturbances between his people and mine; and that he would furnish me with trustworthy guides down.' There was not the slightest appearance of treachery. Thus ended this most interesting conference. It will not, I think, be easily forgotten by either Erskine or myself. So much depended on it, the fate of ourselves and the whole of the detachment. We found these Beloochees the most civil and polite of men! The confidence we placed in their word, by meeting them in the way we did, seemed to please them much, and from having been deadly enemies for 5 long months, became in one hour the best of friends; no doubt their joy was just as great in getting rid of us, as our's was in obtaining our freedom.

"26th and 27th.—Most delightfully employed in preparing for a start; only 10 public camels left, and those as thin as rats; none here procurable—the number of sick amounts to 40, and these require 20! Then there are the rations, ammunition, both guns and musket, water and tents. In fact, I found I could not move without sacrificing *all* private property and half the ammunition and tents; obliged to call on officers and men to give up what private camels they had—this was most willingly agreed to; and all kit, even to our bedding, was left behind—the gun ammunition I was obliged to take, as I rather expected opposition from the Bhoogties, through whose country we had 40 miles to go. At first we were almost afraid we should not be able to bring down the gun from the wretched state of the bullocks, and weakness of the men—however we determined to try, and leaving the waggon and forge-cart behind, picked out 30 of the best for the gun alone—the sepoys thinking we were going to leave it behind, came and begged me not, as they themselves would drag it down and defend it with their lives! When Erskine was burning the forge-cart and waggon, the Beloochees outside thought we were setting fire to the fort, and sent to beg us to spare it.

"28th.—Turned our backs on Kahun this morning at 2 o'clock. Much trouble in getting off, in consequence of the number of sick; obliged to tie some of the poor fellows on the camels—commenced the ascent of the big hill at 6, and after immense fatigue and labour, got the gun to the top by 2 P. M. The sepoys were regularly overpowered with fatigue half way up—the call for water now was dreadful, all that I had brought with me in the mussucks being expended. About 9 o'clock about 300 Beloochees had assembled in our front, rear and right flank, perched on the top of the hills; they seemed highly amused at our getting the gun up: but when they saw the sepoys completely done up with thirst and fatigue, they called out; 'ah! you will never get the gun down to the plains, you had better give it to old Dodah.'—I offered them money to show us some water, they said they would for 1,000 Rupees! After some talk they agreed to show us some for 100 Rupees, which was immediately given them,—there was just enough to give each man a handful or so

and then they set to, and got the gun up. I really thought at one time we must have left it behind. At the very top of the pass were about 50 of Hybutt Khan's followers; these men swore we should not go any further until we had paid for the flock of sheep we captured on the 13th August; however, when it came to the point, and seeing the gun too close to be pleasant, they thought better of it, and begged a few rupees for Hybutt Khan's family, who they said, were very poor; it was as much as I could do to restrain myself from giving this party a round of grape. It's well I did not perhaps, as it would most likely have embroiled me with the rest of the tribe, and my detachment was not in much of a fighting condition! It was now 4 p. m. and we had still to descend the Nuffoosk pass to some water, which our Murree guide reported was in abundance 3 miles from the bottom, in consequence of much rain having fallen. (17) Commenced descending, when a spectacle, the most horrible to be conceived, met our sight: the bodies of all our poor fellows, both officers and men, who fell on the 31st August, lying * unburied with all their clothes on! having been merely dragged off the road—Raitt's body was the first, being almost on the top of the pass; through this dreadful scene, we had to lower our gun down the hill, inch by inch—I would have given worlds to have buried the poor fellows, but this was out of the question; we had then been 14 hours under arms, and had still to seek for water, besides which, we had no intrenching tools. The bodies were lying on heaps, which shows what a bitter fight it must have been. The Murrees spoke highly of poor Raitt's bravery in being at the head of all; they had buried all their own dead at the bottom of the hill, but although I offered them any money they choose to ask, they refused to bury our's in consequence of the state of decomposition they were then in. After much labour, got the gun down the hill and proceeded on along the table land until 7 o'clock, when we found water in abundance, in a deep water course, on the bank of which we bivouacked for the night. Altho' the men had had no food all day, they all (save the pickets) immediately fell asleep, without tasting a bit: they had been 19 hours under arms, the 1st bugle having been sounded at 12 last night. Had this water been found when the fight of the 31st took place, what a different tale would have been told!

17. This appears to have been the passage seized upon by the Court of Enquiry for the famous deliverance which amounted to this—that Major Clibborn was culpable for not keeping a sharper look out for water: the men who were perishing with thirst might, according to the report, have found water within 300 yards of them if they had looked for it! There is no doubt of the fact, if they had just remained where they were 28 days longer, till after the rains had fallen! This entry of Captain Brown, together with that of the 9th, 10th and 11th May, will give some idea of the difficulty of forcing the pass of Nuffoosk!

* Since writing this, I am happy to say I have succeeded in getting all our poor comrades buried—their remains now lie in one large grave in the ground on which they fought so gallantly—Mundoo Khan, the nephew of Beejah Khan, accomplished this desired object for me, in which he was assisted by some of the Murrees engaged in the fight.

" 29th.—Marched this morning to the top of the Surtoff Mountain, 4 miles descended hill, lowering gun down with drag ropes; reached bottom at 10 o'clock; on examining one of the gun wheels, found the iron work of the axle-tree box split in several places; to all appearance it seemed impossible to repair it, or that the gun could travel any further; but Erskine by great exertions, got it bound up, and on we went again, starting at 2 p. m., but did not reach our ground until 10, having lost the road, got jammed in between ravines—I should have wished to have made only one march a day, in consequence of the weak state of the men, but there was no help for it, on we must go, night as well as day, having only 2 days provisions with us. Here no water was procurable; luckily the sepoys were so done up, that they soon fell asleep, and forgot all about their thirst. Received an express from the Assistant Political Agent, warning us to expect opposition from the Bhoogties, whose country we are now in; not in much of a fighting train, half the men being on camels, but with the gun I think we have not much to fear from them.

" 30th.—Started at 5 a. m. and arrived at 10 at a beautiful stream of water—on this march I was obliged to throw away all the ammunition, save a few rounds of grape, otherwise I must have left 8 or 10 sick behind—men and camels regularly gave in during this march, and how we got all safe up, I hardly know—Remaining with the rear-guard, I cheered them on as well as I could—one poor fellow died on the camel's back. Our Murree guide, who had behaved as yet very well, did an act of extraordinary kindness for a Beloochee: hearing that one of our people was left behind for want of carriage to bring him on, he went back of his own accord, mounted him on his horse, and brought him into camp, walking himself by his side. From this ground, sent off an express by our Murree guide, (the only man who would venture) to Poolajee, for some spare camels and gun bullocks, and we proceeded on another 8 miles at 4 a. m., getting to some water about 10 o'clock.

" October 1st.—Started at 3 a. m. and marched on 8 miles—soon after our arrival, to our great delight, up came our Murree guide, with some Scinde horse, spare camels and gun bullocks—proceeded on to Poolajee at 4 p. m., reaching that post at 12, distance 14 miles; on coming out of the hills into the plain, fired off our howitzer to give notice to our friends at Lheree, the head quarters of the 5th Regiment, of our safe arrival.

" Thus after a detention of 5 months in the fort of Kahun, was our escape from that position and the Murree hills, accomplished. The [hardships and privations circumstances forced on us, were most cheerfully borne with by all. After the attack on Major Clibborn's party, it often appeared impossible to expect a release, yet not a murmur was heard. On no one occasion had I to find fault with the men, and the alacrity and cheerfulness with which they performed the exceedingly onerous duties which I was forced to exact, reflects, in my humble opinion, great credit on the Kalee (5th) Pultan and small detachment of Artillery. Of the constant aid afforded me on every occasion by Lieut. Erskine and Dr. Glasse, I note nothing; it can never cease to be

fresh in my memory; and their rank is too near my own to admit of my saying all I could wish or they deserve, even in this my private Journal."

The admirable conduct of Captain Brown earned for him the thanks of Government and the cordial applause of India at large: and he was immediately created Brigade Major, in Scinde, in room of Major Boscawen just then promoted; he was afterwards raised to the rank of Major by Brevet, and appointed to the command of the Bheel corps in Guzerat. Nor amidst the obloquy endeavoured to be heaped by a section of the admirers of Lord Auckland's policy on the Affghan tribes, who dared to resist the invasion of their country, did the generosity and honour of the Murrees, and their aged chief, wholly pass unpraised.

Though Dodah the Murree chief, and Beebruck the leader of the Bhoogties, had been induced to allow military posts to be established in their respective holds of Kahun and Deyrah, neither of them had ever made submission or acknowledged supremacy. (18) With our retirement from the country, the objects for which our troops were sent there—if indeed these had ever been understood—appear to have been entirely forgotten. We had taught the hill tribes two lessons, which were new to them and fatal to us;—they had learned that representatives of the British government could tamper with truth, and give justice to the winds; that we could break our pledges, and press demands, at the bayonet's point, of tribute which had never been our due; and that if they took advantage of the natural strength of their fastnesses for the purposes of mountain warfare, they could compel us on any occasion to capitulate, or turn us back upon our path of conquest. The nation which, throughout the East, had hitherto been known as "immutable in faith, invincible in arms," was found failing in both beyond the Indus!

The capture and imprisonment of the Deyrah chief Beebruck has already been referred to: in the instructions furnished to Major Billamore, it was stated that the Bhoogties and Murrees not only plundered in the plains, but gave shelter to robbers, and received stolen property. They were believed to have robbed us of as many as 5000 camels (!!) and they had given refuge to Beejah Khan, a notorious freebooter. (19) This man was a chief of the Doomkees, and in consequence of his power and activity he had been for some time acknowledged head of the tribe. It was said he could muster

18. We once more draw for our facts on the admirable store supplied by the Cutchee letters already repeatedly referred to. The writer subscribing himself "Nufosk," (*Times*, 19th June, 1841,) states that "the placing of military posts within the hills was not thought of till after Major Billamore's return to the plains."

19. Cutchee Letters, No. I.; for the most part greatly abridged—in part, however, copied *verbatim*.

200 followers for a foray into the plains. Various attempts had in vain been made to capture him. At last he was induced to submit; but fearing treachery, he stipulated that Umeer Shaw, a renowned Syud (holy man) should accompany him to an interview with the British authorities. Conceiving that, with a companion the sacredness of whose person assured him of protection, he was safe, he proceeded to Shikarpore with his nephews and a few followers. He was received as became the head of a warlike clan, and for four days was treated with all honour by Lieut. Postans, the Assistant Political Agent, whom he visited daily. On the fourth day, while paying his respects to the resident as usual, he and his attendants were seized, without reason or warning given, and thrown into the prison at Bukkur, where they were detained for many months,—their horses, arms, and ornaments being sold by public auction! The order for this was given by Mr Bell, then at Sukkur, 25 miles off. The whole of the tribes regarded it as a direct breach of promise towards a man who defied us to capture him; and who, on stipulations being granted, voluntarily came into our camp. The same view was taken by the officers of the force; and if we are to judge from results, perhaps at last by the chief political himself. The money arising from the sale of the horses and other property was at Lheree paid over to the chiefs some time after their liberation! (20) This much of explanation

20. This is the version of the Cutcheo letter-writer, whose narrative has throughout been very closely adhered to. The subjoined passage is a correction on this by one of the Assistant Political Agents formerly in Scinde:—

“ In June 1839, Major Clibborn moved, intending to proceed to the Hills, but was unable from climate to proceed farther than Shikarpoor from Sukkur, losing on the way 1 officer, and 14 men. Beja Khan Doomkie was the most noted freebooter of the plains, and was the object of the movement, as he alone caused us a loss of about 2 Lacs of rupees. He was offered by Government Rs. 3000 a month to leave his nefarious practices and engage to protect the road between Shikarpoor and Dadur. Beja refused to do so by letter, and accompanied his refusal with *insult*! As soon as the cold season however set in, Beja sent earnest petitions to be allowed to come in, which was refused unless with conditions. The 1st Assistant then, with three or four of the Khyeeri tribe proceeded to the haunts of the Doomkie, who fled. The Khyeeries afterwards fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by Beja, and were defeated. The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert, *accompanied by the 1st Assistant*; and the Jekranee chiefs, after several encounters with our Horse, and being pushed to desperation for want of food, surrendered themselves to *the Political Authorities*, and Beja Khan, the Doomkie chief, after a pledge sent to him verbally through Ameer Shan the Syud, to the effect that his *life should be spared*, but without other conditions, also surrendered himself to the same authority, in his own country at Shapoor. At this time he was in open hostility with us, and had been warned, that if he persisted in his freebooting practices, a price would be set on his head—Beja Khan was sent in a Prisoner to Sukkur under a strong guard commanded by Captain Erskine, and he was followed, as speedily as possible, by the Assistant Political Agent. Previous to Beja's surrender, Major Billamore marched into the Hills, and as the most important object was then considered to be the negotiations with the Doomkie and Jekranee tribes, the Political Assistant did not consider himself authorized to leave the plains until this duty was per-

in reference to these chiefs is necessary, because their case was repeatedly referred to by the Murrees in their negotiations with Captain Brown; and

formed. The want of 'Judgment' of Major B. at Deyrah in departing from his orders, which were specific to use the most *conciliatory* measures only, was the sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued."—*Bombay Times*, May 26, 1841.

This letter elicited the following reply from Lieut. (now Major) Jacob :—

"SIR,—In your paper of the 26th May, which I have just received, I perceive an assertion, given on the authority of a correspondent on whom you say you can place very implicit reliance, that 'The want of judgment of Major Billamore at Deyrah, in departing from his orders, which were specific, to use the most conciliatory measures only, was the sole cause of the catastrophe which ensued.'

"Attacks on the dead are seldom creditable, and at least should be founded on truth. In this instance your correspondent is altogether mistaken; and I beg leave to contradict his assertions most emphatically. I was on very intimate terms with Major Billamore during the whole time he was employed on the service in question, and well acquainted with the instructions received from the political authorities; I can positively assert that he neither 'departed from his orders' or displayed 'any want of judgment.' His instructions were 'to use conciliatory measures, but to resist insult or aggression to the utmost.' The latter words are not alluded to by your correspondent—for reasons best known to himself; but I can distinctly declare, that the most conciliatory measures were used by Major Billamore until the attack made on him at Deyrah by the whole Bhoogtie tribe. An imperfect account of Major Billamore's proceedings in the Hills was given some time since in your paper in a letter signed '*Nufosk*;' that account is correct as far as it goes, and was written by me; and the circumstances described in it will shew, not only that Major Billamore did not act with want of judgment, but that any other line of conduct but the one he pursued would, in all probability, have ensured the loss of his little detachment.

"Very many members of our little party in the hills alas! are dead, but there are enough left to bear witness to the truth of what I have said above, and I trust they will do so.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"Quetta, 18th June, 1841."

"J. JACOB, Artillery Lieut."

"SIR,—In continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, I beg leave to point out other inaccuracies in the letter of your correspondent therein alluded to. Your correspondent says 'The first assistant then, with three of the Khyeeree tribe, proceeded to the haunts of the Doomkee, who fled. The Khyeerees afterwards fell into an ambuscade prepared for them by Beejah, and were defeated. The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert accompanied by the first assistant, &c. &c.'

"On this I must remark, that the *haunts* of the Doomkees extended over the whole plain of Upper Scinde, so that it is probable 'the first assistant' did visit some of them. But the Head Quarters of the tribe, and Beejah Khan himself, were at Poolajee, and did not fly until the very day before Major Billamore reached the place; when they set fire to the town, went into the hills, and encamped in a ravine some twelve miles distant, which camp was visited some days afterwards by Capt. Brown and myself. It was after this that the 'first assistant' first visited Poolajee. The Khyeerees were put to flight by Beejah Khan many days after the arrival of Major Billamore at Poolajee, and the Major was actually present under arms in the field at the time with his whole force, yet your correspondent gravely writes, after mentioning the defeat, 'The detachments under Major Billamore were then pushed across the desert.' There are other inaccuracies in your correspondent's letter, but I have mentioned only those of which

will indirectly fall to be spoken of in another point of view. The distrust occasioned by these disingenuous proceedings was one great source of our difficulties throughout the next twelvemonth of almost incessant fighting. The secret of the almost instant pacification which ensued on the resignation of Mr Bell, and continued to the close of our connection with the country, arose from the thorough restoration of confidence by the appointment of Major Outram. This officer was well known to them; they placed the most implicit reliance on his assurances—whether promises or threats,—and they found that in this they had acted right.

In December, Captain Brown, who had been placed in political employ by Mr Bell, was sent on a mission into the Murree hills to negotiate terms of friendship, on condition of their returning to us the guns captured at Nufoosk. Mr Bell himself took up his quarters for a time at Lheree, and expected that the Chiefs of the hill tribes would come in and render submission, as a considerable force was collecting in the neighbourhood for the purpose of coercion, if necessary. Beebruck was not yet at liberty, though now present with the Chief Political Agent, and so great was the distrust of his neighbours and friends, that they, anxious to see him, could in nowise be induced to come within four miles of the Residency, though Captain Brown had gone out almost unattended on purpose to induce them. This

I was an eye witness, and in which I was a party concerned. Verily your correspondent's facts appear to be of equal value with his opinion of Major Billamore's judgment at Deyrah. But perhaps no one but a Political officer is, in Upper Scinde, allowed to possess the faculty of judgment!

"The cause of our reverses was at one time Walpole Clarke's rashness, now it is Major Billamore's want of judgment which caused the 'catastrophe'! Why these repeated accusations against dead men? the answer is obvious,—they tell no tales. Poor Clarke had been concerned in many a dangerous adventure before he ever saw Upper Scinde: his daring was so different from rashness that I doubt if many cooler or more far-seeing soldiers of his age ever existed. Major Billamore judged wrong in not allowing himself to be destroyed without resistance at Deyrah! But where was the judgment (setting aside the question of breach of faith) displayed in the imprisonment of Beejah Khan and Janee, or in writing submissive letters, in the name of the British Government, to Dodah Murree after the affair at Nufoosk, or in many other instances I could mention? Had these efforts of wisdom no influence in bringing about the 'catastrophe'? Your correspondent is apparently a political officer, and perhaps not unacquainted with 'the first assistant' of whom he writes. Let him make himself acquainted with the opinion of the Home Government with regard to the 'Judgment' of the statesmen of Upper Scinde before he presumes to lay the blame of their acts on the memory of gallant soldiers now deceased—Let your correspondent also appear in his real name.

"Anonymous accusations are in general little attended to; and nothing but your grave Editorial remark 'that your correspondent's communication is a valuable fragment of history,—' together with my own personal knowledge of its calumnious nature, would have induced me to come forward in this instance to defend the character of deceased friends.

I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

"J. JACOB, *Artillery Lieut.*"

officer proceeded about 20 miles into the hills nearly alone, and then at length a secondary Murree Chief was prevailed on to visit the British Resident. To urge the return of trophies taken in fair stand-up fight seemed unreasonable—our guns could never be used against us; they had been placed in a mosque as trophies, and were valued by them and worthless to us. This point, therefore, was abandoned. Two Chiefs at length visited Mr Bell in January 1841; they pledged themselves on the Koran that they and their respective tribes would abstain from plundering on the plains, and questions of tribute and allegiance were carefully avoided. This was called submission; and so the curtain drops on the affairs of the Murrees, with which we found that we had no further occasion to interfere.

The Governor-General, it is said, was never officially informed of the intention to demand tribute from the Murrees, and he is believed to have been greatly offended with the whole proceedings. These events occurred simultaneously with those terminating with the surrender of Dost Mahomed, narrated in the previous chapter, and with the occurrences about to be enumerated in connection with the affairs of Nusseer Khan of Khelat, which for a twelvemonth kept Scinde and Shawl in a state of incessant conflict. The Deyrah and Kahun episode stands by itself, and apart from the rest: it would be incomplete without a short notice of the proceedings of the Court of Enquiry appointed to investigate the causes of the loss of the convoy at Nufoosk. Major Clibborn, in closing his despatch, earnestly solicited that a rigid enquiry should be instituted in regard to his conduct as the unfortunate commander of the convoy: and the solicitation was immediately complied with by the Supreme Government. Not that there was any charge or suspicion of culpability or mismanagement, but with a view of silencing obloquy where it was unmerited, and of bringing to light the sources of misarrangements somewhere supposed to exist. Major-General Brooks, commanding the field-force in Upper Scinde, was instructed to nominate the officers required to constitute the court, over which he himself was appointed to preside, and to proceed with the investigation without delay. (21) From the tenor of what has already been stated, it will appear that the party whose character was chiefly implicated throughout for the primary occupation of Kahun, the determination to provision and reinforce the garrison when the military authorities were of opinion that it ought to have been withdrawn, and others of the unwise measures which led to the result of its final abandonment, was none other than the chief political agent himself. It has been repeatedly stated that Mr Bell was an able man: he had a singular facility of gaining

21. The Members of the Court were Lieut.-Colonel (now Major-General) Valiant, H.M.'s 40th; Lieut.-Colonel Wymer, 30th Bengal N.I.; Major Farrel, 6th Bombay N.I.; and Major Lloyd, of the Artillery.

the mastery over weaker minds with whom he came in contact, when he conceived it to be his interest to bend them to his wishes. The use made by him of the influence thus obtained was, on the present occasion, in the last degree unjustifiable. The Chief Political, who was one of the most vindictive of men, had special grounds of grudge against Major Clibborn, on whom he appears to have determined now to be avenged for the share taken by him in the most indecent controversy betwixt the political and military chiefs the preceding year. Captain Clibborn was, in 1839, Brigade-Major to Colonel Gordon, and gave some of the most important evidence before the Court of Enquiry in refutation of Mr Bell's charges against that officer. (22) General Brooks was at this time understood to be entirely under the thumb of the political agent; and three out of the five officers, who constituted the commission, were at the date of the enquiry residing under his roof. The court having adjusted preliminaries, Major Clibborn read over a statement of the case, the correctness of the whole of which was deposed to by every one of the surviving officers who had been present with him at Nufoosk. These gentlemen were afterwards examined, but that apparently with the view to inculpation rather than for the eliciting of truth. Major Forbes, then commanding at the station, and Lieutenant Postans, the chief political assistant at Shikarpore, also at hand, the conduct of both of whom became the object of special observation, were called on for no explanations, although it afterwards became apparent that they could fully exonerate themselves of the charges brought against them. Dr Kirk, (23) who had accompanied the detachment, had made numerous and valuable sketches of the scenery, and these, when produced in court, were considered evidence of the existence of water, against the testimony of the living witnesses who deposed that there was none. By a singular fatality the report of the Commission found its way into the newspapers before it had reached the hands of Government. This of itself immediately demanded investigation. The matter was involved in mystery, and clouded with a grievous amount of mis-statements, (24) and though the manner in which it obtained premature publicity was never officially accounted for, it was perfectly well understood by the public.

22. The whole correspondence on this subject, together with the evidence referred to, was published in the *Bombay Times*, May, 1841.

23. This very talented officer was sent on mission to the Court of Shoa in Abyssinia along with Major Harris, &c. in May 1841.

24. The sensation this matter created for many months warrants us in enlarging on it more than its importance demands, as connected with the Affghan war. The report was dated 20th Nov. 1840, and it appeared in the *Bombay Courier* newspaper of the 19th Dec.:—the post occupying 15 days from Sukkur to Bombay. It appears as if the copy meant for Government had been kept back on purpose until the public should have seen the newspaper account. It was known to have been handed about for some days at Poona before being sent to Bombay.

The Court having closed its enquiries, met after a few days' adjournment to report proceedings, when the President, on taking his place, produced a paper which he said embodied his opinion, and that if the members approved it would be adopted as the report of the Commission; or, if it was not so adopted, each member should give his opinion in writing. The document in question, the same as was afterwards published, having been read, and the members having been called upon, beginning with the youngest, each gave his assent without commentary. Colonel Valiant was the last called upon to vote. He declined adopting the report, pointing out its irrelevancy, and calling attention to the numerous points which appeared wholly unsupported by evidence. The President replied that some of the matters objected to were notorious throughout India, and being irritated at the objections being pressed, Brigadier Valiant having remarked that were the report forwarded to Government in its present form, it was sure to be returned disapproved of—General Brooks replied that in this case he should himself be answerable for it,—so the objections were no longer persisted in. (25)

The commissioners were required to meet again and reconsider various points in their original report, which appeared to be set forth, on some occasions, without any evidence whatever, and on others, in the teeth of that which had been laid before them. Their revised finding was much the same as the first report, and on the parts on which they offered explanations or attempted to adduce evidence, matters were made worse. The whole was ultimately laid before the public in an admirably written *Government Gazette* of the 8th of May, 1841. It were too tedious to go over the whole entire, and the notice of a few isolated points will sufficiently indicate the character of the paper. Lord Keane's conduct in supplying the commissariat the year before, was declared to be the origin of the whole mischief. This assertion was made, without an attempt at proof, in reference to the character of a party already beyond the cognizance or jurisdiction of the court, and who had quitted India five months before the Kahun expedition was undertaken. Col. Stevenson, whose lamented death on the 9th August, before the army started, might have saved his memory from aspersion, was blamed for sending Captain Brown into the hills, although it subsequently appeared in evidence that this was done by order of Mr Ross Ball. (26) Brigadier Stevenson and Major Forbes were both blamed for not having made Captain Brown aware of the difficulties of sending him supplies, so that he might have put his men on half or quarter rations early in August. From Captain

25. General Valiant's report, dated 18th June 1841—Government Archives.

26. Mr. Secretary Willoughby's letter in reference to the report of Major Forbes.

Brown's journal, so often quoted, and then at the command of the commission, had they desired it, it appeared that it had been intimated, so early as the 4th June, that no assistance could be sent from Sukkur, and that he, of his own accord, and in consideration of the extreme isolation of his position, had put his people on half rations on the 24th of May ! The court, in its original finding, declared that Major Clibborn, in his choice of the Nufoosk instead of the Deyrah route, placed too implicit reliance on the guide, Meer Hussain,—it was subsequently shewn that Meer Hussain joined the party two marches from Nufoosk : in their revised finding, they state that it was not this man but another named Buchan Shaw : Government declared this wholly unsupported by evidence ; other things were declared on equally or still more questionable grounds, of which government afterwards stated, that " they deeply regretted to find this court, composed of five field-officers of rank and experience, could, on such grounds, have recorded as a fact that which was not a fact, &c." (27) The court blamed Major Clibborn for not having been guided by the drawings of Dr Kirk, by which the difficulties of the passes were manifested,—the drawings having in fact been made on the advance ; Dr Kirk never having traversed this route until with Major Clibborn's party. The court, in their first finding, observed that Major Clibborn, before entering the Murree hills, had been warned by Captain Brown that the Murrees were assembling : in their second, they admit that they came to this conclusion from the circumstance that a rumour to that effect prevailed at Hyderabad, 250 miles off, in the end of August. Captain Brown declared, that not only had no such warning as that referred to by the court ever been given by him, but that, on the contrary, he had written to Major Clibborn on the 27th August, that he had *heard* that the road had *not* been destroyed, and that the Murrees were *not* assembling, and that water might be expected, as heavy rain had recently fallen. Captain Brown was present in court, and had been examined as a witness. Major Forbes was censured for having sent out a force, under half the size of that ordered by Brigadier Stevenson, and without consulting the political authorities ; as also, for the cumbrous magnitude of the convoy, as 200 camels would have been sufficient to provision the fort of Kahun for three months. Major Forbes proved that instead of a force of 1200 bayonets, six guns, and some irregular horse, having, as stated by the court of enquiry, been actually equipped by his predecessor in command, that no arrangement up to the 10th of August had been made for its equipment ; that the number of bayonets *warned* was 1033, and not 1200 : and that the amount of stores and camels was no more than was essential to relieve and provision Kahun, and subsist the escorting party. (28) Lieut. Postans had named a much smaller force, to which

27. Governor in Council's Minute, 7th May, 1841.

28. Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter.

Major Forbes, of his own accord, had added one third. These explanations on the part of Major Forbes,—who, till he received the commission's report, never suspected that he could have been condemned unheard, when on the spot to offer explanations, if required,—were not sent in till afterwards, Gen. Brooks having declined to receive or forward them to government. (29)

These most extraordinary proceedings were clearly exposed, and most severely and justly censured, by a very clear and able minute of the Bombay Government, which, while passing high and merited eulogiums on Major Clibborn and the officers and men under his charge, directed the immediate removal of General Brooks from his command, and the return of Colonel Vallant to the Presidency. The conduct of Government was greatly approved of by the Governor-General in Council, the Court of Directors, and the Horse Guards, and was as decided as it was upright and energetic. General Vallant had been on the point of protesting against the whole proceedings, when unhappily he permitted himself to be concussed into acquiescence by some inaccurate and confused ideas of the duties of the members of a court of enquiry; he conceiving it to be essential that an apparent unanimity should exist. The junior members of the court appear to have homologated the report as drawn up without their assistance, and presented to them by the President, who took on himself the responsibility of its accuracy, without giving themselves the trouble of examining into its contents, or reflecting on the monstrous nature of the proceedings to which they were making themselves parties. This, at all events, was believed to be the only explanation of the conduct of Colonel Wymer, Majors Farrel and Lloyd, officers of sound judgment and unimpeachable integrity, and who, had they been unprincipled enough to have made the judgment of a court of inquiry the means of indulging personal animosity—misconduct of which no one suspected them—it did not appear that in this case there existed any such feelings as those towards the parties concerned, to gratify. Of course, what has just been stated is no sort of excuse for the solemn duties of a court of inquiry having been trifled with—the ends of truth and justice perverted, and the character and prospects of officers, as honorable as themselves, destroyed by the fiat of a military commission. The report to whose accuracy they solemnly deposed was, from beginning to end, a tissue of malignant falsehoods, and which, if uttered by the humblest subaltern, would, if enquired into, have occasioned his dismissal from the service. Had the whole of the officers who constituted the Nufoosk commission been removed from the service, the punishment for so grave and mischievous an offence could not have been considered too severe. That General Brooks was, at this time, a tool in the hands of Mr Bell, is sufficiently notorious; but his conduct

29. Mr Secretary Willoughby's letter.

notwithstanding this, is far more reprehensible than that of the other members. As the President of the court, and the party who was entrusted with the selection of its members, and the guidance of the forms of its procedure, he was peculiarly bound to be circumspect. He, at all events, must have known that much of what was charged against the parties inculpated was unsupported by, much more in the direct teeth of, the evidence adduced ; and that, instead of searching for information, or desiring to discover truth, the parties who could have assisted them in attaining these were avoided to be inquired after. Mr Bell was the only man connected with the affairs of Scinde who escaped all notice—a circumstance in itself sufficient to have awakened suspicion. Though afterwards brought, in the most irregular manner, into the field as the voluntary accuser of Lord Keane and Sir T. Willshire, it does not appear that he ever experienced a frown from his superiors, and, at all events, he was maintained in high and confidential employ as if no suspicion had ever been entertained of his unfitness for service.

General Brooks returned to Bombay along with Colonel Valiant in Feb. 1842, and left for Europe on the 1st May, having completely lost the confidence of Government. Colonel Valiant, as a Queen's-officer, received a reprimand from the Horse Guards. He was Commander of the garrison of Bombay from February 1842 to March 1843. He had been raised to the rank of Major-General on the brevet which occurred on the birth of the Prince of Wales. This is, however, anticipating in point of time : in the next chapter we shall have occasion to mention the names of both officers in connection with the affairs of Scinde.

CHAPTER V.

Genealogy of the Khans of Kelat—Doubtful extent of Mehrab Khan's treachery in 1839—His preparations for defence sudden and imperfect—His death—Escape of his Widow and Son—Unsuitableness of Newaz Khan to rule over the Brahooes—Lieut. Loveday appointed Envoy—Dismemberment of the Khanate—Sharawan and Cutchee made over to the Shah Shoojah—Cutchee given to the Indian Government by the Shah—Rent exacted from the free Jagheers—Resistance the consequence—Bad selection of our Native agents—Mahomed Sherreef, villain of—Revocation of jagheers—The Chiefs left in ignorance of the change in their condition—Customs of the port of Las ceded by Newaz Khan to the British Government—Claims are abandoned—Nusseer Khan pursued—Vengeance inflicted on those who protected him—Unhappy proceedings of Lieut. Loveday—Kakurs threaten Quetta—Reinforcements arrive from Candahar—Insurgents retire from Quetta and invest Kelat—Fusillanimity of the Envoy—Lieut. Hammersley defeats the insurgents at Moostung—Attempts at negotiation with Captain Bean—Lieut. Loveday and Mr Masson put in close confinement—Insurgents proceed to Moostung—Misunderstandings in negotiating with Captain Bean—Depute Mr Masson as Ambassador—He is placed under arrest on suspicion of being a Russian spy—Proceedings connected therewith—His release—Combination of mishaps—Large reinforcements sent to Scinde—Brahooes attacked and defeated at Kundah—Lieut. Vardon attacks and defeats them near Bhag and captures 1100 camels—Expertness of the Enemy in seizing camels experienced by Major Boscawen—Sack of Gundava—Three days' fighting round Dadur—The enemy on each occasion defeated—Loss estimated at from 300 to 400—Murder of Lieut. Loveday—The insurgents disperse—Nusseer Khan left a wanderer—General Nott recaptures Kelat—General Brooks, Brigadier Valiant, and Major Holland, leave Bombay and join the force—Views of the Politicals towards Herat—Colonel Marshall takes command of the Kotra Brigade—Negotiates with the enemy—Nusseer Khan makes submission—Receives pecuniary assistance—Ordered by General Brooks, who was ignorant of pending negotiations, to be attacked—Brilliant victory at Kotra—Entire dispersion of the insurgents—A large reinforcement moves towards the Bolan Pass—Colonel Stacey improves the aspect of affairs at Kelat—Cutchee affairs—Seebee tribute—Detachment advances on Kojuck—Misunderstandings, and attack on the town unsuccessful—Inhabitants abandon it—Occupied by our troops—Reinforcements arrive—Kojuck sacked and burnt—Submission of the Beebee Gunjani—Herat affairs—Troops ascend the Bolan Pass—Expedition to Noosky—Accident in the Bolan to Captain Haldane's Irregulars—Similar accident in the Khyber Pass—General Brooks and Colonel Valiant deprived of their command—Surrender of Nusseer Khan—Death of Mr R. Bull—Major Outram takes political charge—Restoration of Nusseer Khan—Coronation at Kelat—General state of Affairs—Memoir of Major Outram.

SINCE the earlier portion of the present narrative was issued, the valuable work of Mr Masson, entitled "A Journey to Kelat, &c.," has been published. By this, many important facts have been disclosed, of which the public were previously ignorant. These have been taken advantage of at the risk of some repetition; and where present statements differ from those formerly given,—as, on one or two points, chiefly of amplification, they may chance to do,—the newer is to be regarded as the more correct version of the matter. The Cutchee letters have been consulted with more care and minuteness than formerly, and the information supplied by them, which may hitherto have been overlooked, has been embodied in the present Chapter. The first few pages of the following chapter, in consequence of these things, are in part retrospective, and ought perhaps to have taken their place in that part of the narrative where the earlier portion of the affairs of Kelat are discussed. (1) The following genealogical table of the rulers of Kelat, copied from the work of Mr Masson, will save the trouble of much explanation and reference :—

1. These letters have been referred to in a previous chapter, in connection with the proceedings in the Murree country. They are of unquestionable authority, and their writer now holds a high appointment: the revelations they make are most mournful and disheartening; yet their accuracy will, we doubt not, be amply borne out by the papers in the archives of the Board of Control, as we are sure they will be by every officer in the Scinde field force who had the means of making himself acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE,

SHOWING THE DESCENT, ON THE MALE SIDE, OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF KELAT, FROM ABDULAH KHAN.

Abdulah Khan; slain in battle at Jandrir.

Mohabat Khan, reigned some time at Kalat; superseded by his brother, Nasir Khan, and died, a hostage, at Kandahar.	Eltarz Khan, slain accidentally by his brother, Nasir Khan, when both were hostages at Kandahar; from him descend the Eltarz Zai families of Baghwan and Kotru.	Nasir Khan, originally a hostage at Kandahar, superseded his brother, Mohabat Khan, and ruled about forty years.
Haji Khan, died, a hostage, at Kandahar.	Mahmud Khan ruled at Kalat.	Mahomed Rehim Khan, slain by his brother, Mastapha Khan, then, Mahomed Rehim Khan.
Barham Khan, originally a hostage at Kandahar, unsuccessfully asserted his claims to the government with Nasir Khan and his son, Mahmud Khan. Died at Kalat.	Mehrab Khan,* slain on the capture of his capital by the British.	Sirafraz Khan, slain by Mehrab Khan, at the same time with Ahmed Yar Khan.
Ahmed Yar Khan, slain by Mehrab Khan the second year after his accession.	Hassan Khan, present chief of Kalat, with the assumed name of Mir Nasir Khan.	

Shah Nawaz Khan. Fati Khan.

Retained in captivity by Mehrab Khan, from which they escaped; temporarily placed in power by the British.

* Mehrab Khan had four wives. 1. A daughter of Mastapha Khan, the Beebee Ganjani. 2. A daughter of Jam Ali, late ruler of Las. 3. A daughter of Eltarz Khan, Ahmed Zai of Kotru, and mother of his son, Nusseer Khan, the present khan. 4. A daughter of Assil Khan, Shirwani, now a cripple.

From this, it appears that Mehrab Khan was descended from the younger branch of the family, and his successor on the throne from the elder, yet the ancestor of the latter had been set aside by the progenitor of the former, four generations back, and the legitimacy of the succession had never, since the reign of Nusseer Khan, been called in question.

At the time the British army crossed the Indus (Dec. 1838) the Kelat durbar was filled with councillors hostile to their own ruler, and anxious for an opportunity to betray him into any difficulty which might redound to their profit or advantage. The incessant misunderstandings which arose in our attempts at negotiation seem in a considerable measure to be accounted for by this, without imputing to the Khan a greater amount of duplicity and cunning than might have been expected and excused in an Asiatic chief under the circumstances. (2)

When Mehrab Khan heard of the intention of our march upon Kelat, he sent his son to collect troops. This step was opposed by his councillors, but the chief replied, that though he had given no cause for enmity, as we proposed attacking him he would defend his throne. Kelat had fallen before the desired levies could be brought into the field, and on becoming aware of this they departed without coming into action. (3)

The women of the harem had made their escape before the fall of the fortress:—the Beebee Gunjani, one of the widows, shortly after claimed the protection of the Scinde politicals, and for a time resided in Cutchee on a pension allowed her by government. She joined the followers of her stepson, Nusseer Khan, when the insurrection broke out in June, 1840. The young Khan, a spirited and intelligent boy of fourteen years of age, sought refuge amongst the chiefs who had been his father's friends, and who speedily became the objects of our vengeance in consequence of the hospitality exercised by them towards the fallen prince. Newaz Khan, the destined successor to the throne, quickly joined the army, and was duly invested ruler of Kelat, and vassal to the Dooranee empire. This man, who was one of the few of our proteges who did not requite our kindness with ingratitude, was ill suited for sovereignty over a people so fierce and unruly as the Brahoes, who, though aware of his being of the royal line, could in no shape recognise his claim of right. The bad odour attached to him of being our protegee, and the suspicion of his having made over to Shah Soojah the more valuable portions of the sovereignty: besides, he himself was unwarlike; he had acquired no name or position, and had no respect amongst the chiefs. The territory we committed to him was not only poor and sterile, but eminently hostile. A loan of £5000 was considered sufficient to enable him to set up a royal es-

2. Masson, p. 383.

3. Cutchee Letters, No. 3,—*Bombay Times*, May.

tablishment. The jewels which belonged to the women of his predecessor, which were secured by us as prize property, had brought us more than this. For repayment of the sum just named he was to make over to us the rights of the customs along the sea-coast, which had been abandoned by the sovereign half a century before; but of this more hereafter. It was a part of our agreement with him that he was to expect no assistance from us to maintain him on his throne. Lieutenant Loveday, a young Bengal officer of some distinction as a Persian scholar, but beyond this eminently ill qualified for the post assigned him, was appointed political agent to reside at the Kelat court; he was supplied with 60 sepoy as a guard of honour, and this, with the terror supposed to invest our name, was all that was considered necessary for securing the stability of the new dynasty, and to ensure the tranquillity of eastern Beloochistan under all the changes to which we had subjected, or were about to subject it.

Lord Auckland is understood to have been from the beginning averse to the deposition of Mehrab Khan: he left, however, an amount of power in the hands of the politicals which was taken advantage of. Mr Bell pointed out with fatal acceprocy the mischief, which he himself afterwards hastened and aggravated, sure to ensue from the dismemberment of the empire just about to be noticed. (4)

The valuable provinces of Sharawan, Cutchee, Harand and Dajil had been conferred by Ahmed Shah, on the first Nusseer Khan, for service performed during his wars with Persia. These were to be held by him as feudatory on the usual terms of furnishing a military contingent to the Doorannee sovereign, when required. While the monarchy remained entire, there was a force of 1000 Belooch horse furnished for the protection of Cashmeer; and the Kelat princes had ever been remarkable for the fidelity with which they fulfilled their obligations to the sovereign. When the Doorannee empire fell to pieces all semblance of allegiance disappeared. (5) Sharawan contains a population of about 150,000 souls: it was placed under charge of Captain Bean, assistant to the envoy, and chief political in Shawl. Quettah, its principal town, containing about 4,000 people, was maintained as a strong military post from the commencement to the conclusion of our connection with the country. Cutchee was taken charge of by Mr Bell; it contains about 150,000 people, and is so rich and fertile that it has always been considered the granary of Upper Scinde. Both were transferred to the Doorannee empire in lieu of a tribute alleged but not admitted to be due. They were nominally made over to us by Shah Soojah, and retained by

4. Letters in *Bombay Times*, February 13, 1841: also Cutchee Letters, ditto May.

5. Journeys in Beloochistan and Afghanistan, &c., by Chas. Masson, vol. ii. page 101—quoted, *supra* page 88, chap. ii.

us for the liquidation of a portion of his majesty's debts.(6) Like our other legacies of the kind they proved unprofitable bequests, having cost us in the course of the next twelvemonth, an outlay of some £300,000 to keep them in order.(7) The dismemberment of states is not without example in Europe ; but the precedents which history supply are not such as moralists refer to with approbation, or as England would often desire to copy. The fact of the transfer, bad as it was, was matter of small account in comparison to the manner of its accomplishment.

In the large province of Shawl, Jagheers (feudal estates) had been held for many generations by influential families on military tenure. The principal chiefs so situated at the period of the fall of Kelat, were Assur Khan, Rysannee ; Mahommed Khan, Shewannee ; Mahommed Shye, Rhodeynees ; Bungoolzyrees, &c. These men had made submission to Mr Bell at Bagh, and proceeded to their estates on the understanding, that they were to hold them on the same tenure as heretofore. Their surprise and indignation may be imagined when they were called upon by Captain Bean to pay rent for their hitherto rent-free jagheers. This demand was said to have greatly incensed the Governor-General, who reproved it as at variance both with the spirit and tenor of his instructions ; but the mischief was done, the mandate had gone forth, and the appearance of the revenue moonshee sent out to collect the tribute, called down on himself and his escort immediate and condign punishment : they were attacked by Mahommed Khan Sheewannee, near Moostung, and slaughtered to a man.(8) A less barbarous and martial race would have remonstrated and petitioned against the violation of the pledge made at Bagh ; but of orderly and deliberate proceedings such as these the fiery chiefs of Shawl knew nothing : and with arms in their hands they sought, after the

6. Cutchee Letters.

7. *Friend of India*.

8. Cutchee Letters, No. 5, given *verbatim*. Masson speaks of a party of 25 Sepoys being cut off at Moostung, but says they were a portion of Lieut. Loveday's guard going on business to Quettah. We think the two narratives must relate to the same thing, and though we have referred to the other, the Cutchee writer is likely to be correct. The party accompanied Captain Bean's Moonshree to Moostung to collect revenue. On arrival at the place, the Moonshree sent in and ordered the chiefs to come out and make salaam to him ; this they refused to do, justly saying *he* was not their ruler. On this the Moonshree sent the sepoy to bring the chiefs out : an engagement took place, and the sepoy was driven back to the house where the Moonshree lived, which they gallantly defended until destroyed : this was told by a native who was present. The continuance of Captain Bean in office, and the obtaining for him a badge of the Doorannee empire,—the last that was conferred,—is, after the repeated disapproval of his acts, and proofs of his incompetency, one of the numberless illustrations of Lord Auckland's character. He in general judged rightly, but wanted the decision or nerve to put his purposes into effect. Captain Bean had friends in the Secretariate, and Beloochistan was kept twelve months at war on this account.

fashion of their race, that redress which the justice of their cause deserved, but of which under their new rulers, it did not, or could not, assure them. They flew to arms, joined their banished chief Nusseer Khan : their cause and his became identified ; and they quickly avenged their grievances, by besieging their oppressor in his stronghold. The particulars of this fall afterwards to be detailed. A process very similar to this was meanwhile being pursued in Cutchee. No intimation whatever was in the first place given to the chiefs that Cutchee had been disjoined from Kelat and annexed to the Dooranee empire, or that it had been made over by the Shah Soojah to the Government of India. Not only were the people never consulted ; they were not so much as informed on these points. It was left to their own sagacity to discover that it was a Briton and not a Brahoe who now ruled over them. These omissions were trifling compared to the fatal mistakes which followed. " It was peculiarly unfortunate," observes Mr Masson, " and what might and ought to have been avoided, that both in Beloochistan and Affghanistan the traitors to the old order of things became the favoured and trusted adherents of the new : as might have been expected, the confidence so unwisely reposed in them was uniformly betrayed." Syud Mahomed himself had been appointed (by Mehrab Khan) Naib of Dajil and Hurrand, two provinces beyond the Murree Hills, and east of them. These provinces he sold to the Seikhs, and became a traitor to his master. Had it not been for his being a Syud, Mehrab Khan would have executed him. He was known to all as the greatest scoundrel in the country.

The treason and perfidy of the Syud Mahomed Sherreef to his late masters, was, as usual, recommendation enough to ensure him especial marks of our favour : and we met with the requital which those who patronize scoundrels are entitled to look for from their protegees. This man was appointed, by Mr Bell, Naib or collector of Cutchee, and in a country not famed for honesty, he could scarcely have found a more dishonest or thoroughbred rascal.(9) The territory whose supervision was committed to his hands occupied a space of from 5000 to 6000 square miles ; and over this the Syud held absolute charge without the controul of a single European assistant. Within a few months of the fall of Kelat, which occurred November 1839, a letter was addressed to this man by Mr Bell, directing him to inform the chiefs that all the jagheers were attached, but that they would be restored to the lawful claimants on their appearing personally or by vakeel at Sukkur, and proving the validity of their sunnuds or charters of gift from the Crown.(10) It does not appear that Mr Bell was authorized by his superiors, without investi-

9. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, *verbatim*.

10. Cutchee Letters, No. 3, abridged.

gation, to deprive the whole proprietors of a province of hereditary estates even until their titles should be proved. When the measure was resolved upon, the best thing that could have been done was to make it known by proclamation, or in any other way which might render it most public and notorious. It is more than doubtful whether the Naib ever communicated to the parties most concerned the instructions he received from his superior. A few of the smaller landholders did appear at Sukkur, and had the proper seal attached to their title deeds; the rest, irritated by having rights questioned by intruders which had been held undoubted under their native sovereign, and maddened by the exactions and insolence of Mahomed Sherreef, shared in the discontent, and joined in the insurrection beginning in June to make its appearance everywhere throughout the country. The revenue from this unjust source which reached the treasury, was insignificant even at its best; the frauds and extortions by the Naib were boundless; and in a country where Syuds are almost worshipped, he alone of his class was subject of universal execration. Charges preferred against him by Europeans were not so much as listened to; his knavery was in the mouth of every native; his accounts, when called for at length, had to be drawn out afresh before they could be presented; like all the others in Cutchee, they remained for a twelvemonth, if they remain not still, unaudited. Yet no such thing was ever broached as the threat of his removal from office. Six months afterwards, when the chiefs had been driven to rebellion, and 2000 of the people slain in battle, an order was issued, though only partially carried into effect, that all the rights which had been held valid during the late reign should be so still; the whole question in dispute being, like that of the Murree tribute, abandoned after we had had our fill of fighting. But we are not yet done with the schemes which would almost seem to have been purposely contrived to drive the country to arms. The customs of Beila have already just been referred to. This province is governed by the Jam or chief, on a military tenure under Kelat. From the seaport of Sonmeanee the Khan, some generations back, had received as revenue half the duties collected—amounting to about £700 annually; these had, in consequence of an intermarriage with the Kelat family, been made over to the Jam in perpetuity: his other income derived from his jagheer amounted to about as much more. So soon as Newaz Khan was placed in power, the grant of the port duties was declared to be resumed; and they were made over to us for the liquidation of the sum of £5000 received in loan by the Khan. A British officer, who was directed not to acknowledge the local authority of the Jam, was appointed to make the collection. The chief appealed to the Bombay government, and thus managed to have his case brought to the notice of Lord Auckland, who censured and reversed every thing that had been done. Infinite alarm and irritation had been at first occasioned; but this act of the Government was

luckily in time to save the Jam and his tribe from joining the other insurgents against us.

When Nusseer Khan escaped from Kelat, on the capture of that fort by Sir T. Willshire, he sought refuge amongst the chiefs in Panjore: Newaz Khan soon afterwards set out on an expedition to expel or capture him; but though this was well planned, the youth had friends who made him aware of his danger, and so enabled him to escape: so that the first expedition in the new reign was unsuccessful. Enraged at his disappointment, the intrusive ruler avenged himself by plundering the tribes which had afforded his enemy shelter. A large amount of spoil was obtained, and the cruelties exercised were spoken of with horror long after. (11) A second expedition for a similar purpose, attended by the like results, and conducted in the same unhappy manner, was shortly afterwards made to Noosky. The allegiance of some disaffected chiefs was compelled before returning to the capital. On these occasions Lieutenant Loveday most unwisely accompanied the Khan—thus mixing himself and his government up with intestine broils in a manner said to have been highly displeasing to the Envoy and Minister. Directions to desist from these things for the future, alone prevented further expeditions from being engaged in. It did not seem that the son of Mehrab Khan had any idea of appearing for the present in arms, or that the chiefs intended to do any thing more in his favour than to afford him a place of refuge. Such was the state of matters betwixt November 1839 and June 1840. Lieut. Loveday appears to have occasionally suffered from an unsettled condition of mind: he lived in a state of the utmost seclusion, entertaining constant apprehensions of intruders upon his premises. He seems to have been a dog-fancier, and to have had with him a number of specimens of the fierce bull and mastiff races. These he is said occasionally to have hounded upon the populace, some of whom were worried to death. (12) To have ferocious beasts set loose upon them, was sufficient to exasperate people any where: it was amongst Mussulmans a heavy aggravation of the offence, that these were dogs held specially unclean by the prophet. The conduct of the Resident appears to have been such as to have occasioned excessive discontent: and the evil deeds of himself and the chief, to whose court he had been deputed, caused hatred and scorn to be mutually reflected on each of them. The garrison of Quettah had in May consisted of the Shah's 1st or Royal Regi-

11. Masson, p. 112.

12. Masson, p. 119. Masson's authority on this point we understand to be confirmed by at least one of the political agents who had the best means of being informed. We are bound to state, at the same time, that much of what is alleged against Lieutenant Loveday is believed to have had its origin amongst the Brahoes, who were glad to propagate every variety of calumny against him, to excuse their own cruel treatment of him. A camel man who had been in the employment of Lieutenant Loveday, stated at Lheree that the dogs destroyed one man: this was afterwards confirmed by a native of Moostung.

ment, commanded by Captain Griffin, the 1st Troop of the Cabool H. A. under Lieut. Cooper, and the Bolan Rangers. These were shortly reduced by dispatch of troops to Candahar, so that by the middle of July, the force was diminished to 250 infantry, 80 horse, and 3 guns. The young prince Nusseer Khan was immediately summoned from his retreat to head the malcontents, and form a rallying point for the tribes. The Moostung insurgents moved straight upon the capital. Newaz Khan was not slow or indolent in endeavouring to collect troops from amongst the villages. Personally he was unpopular, doubly so as having been forced upon the country by infidels and foreigners, the conduct of whose representative was enough to cause general dissatisfaction. His treasury was empty, and his success in procuring succour commensurate with what might have been looked for under a combination of circumstances so eminently inauspicious. The insurgents meanwhile considering Kelat a secure prize at any time when they might find it most convenient to seize upon it, resolved to direct their efforts against Quettah, which had been nearly stripped of troops; its entire garrison mustering as already stated, under 400 men. Here a large quantity of treasure was believed to be kept, and the weakness of the force tempted to assault. It has already been mentioned that when it was found impossible to send Captain Brown relief from Seinde, that Captain Bean had promised him the assistance of the Kakur tribes, which had been taken into our pay; but that this scheme had been frustrated by these very stipendiaries turning their arms against us. (13) The Kakurs had been at the same time engaged in double treaty—they were in terms with Captain Bean to assist in relieving the garrison at Kahun, and on treaty with the Murrees to secure its destruction. True to the latter and more congenial alliance, the first proof they appeared to have intended of their sincerity was the attack on Quettah, where they hoped to monopolize the spoil. The earliest assault occurred on the 22d of June, when the insurgents were repelled with considerable loss. They had taken up their quarters in a deep and narrow gorge nine or ten miles from the British camp, into which several of them had introduced themselves, pretending to be friends. These were detained, and in the course of the night the whole Kakur force, amounting to about 1000 men, advanced towards the town. They came on quickly, expecting to take the garrison by surprise, but were received with a discharge of grape, followed by a brisk fire of musquetry, which dispersed them at once. They fled towards the hills, pursued by the irregular horse, who cut up a few of them. The enemy had 20 killed, with 100 wounded and 3 prisoners: we had two sepoys killed, with 1 gunner wounded. It was considered expedient, however, to abandon the lines and place the troops within the walls until succour should

13. Vide ante, p. 180.

reach from Candahar. (14) Shortly after this, a reinforcement arrived from the eastward, consisting of the left wing of the Shah's regiment, which had been detached on duty, and a detachment from Killa Abdoola, under Lieut. Bosanquet. Thus reinforced, a party was sent out to reconnoitre the enemy at Moostung; and the result was that they were considered too formidable in point of strength to be attacked by the garrison. In this state matters continued for some time: the garrison at Quettah actually cooped up within the walls of that town for several weeks together. The assistance of Salu Khan, a Pesheen chief, is said to have been purchased for £2,000: he forced his way through the insurgent host, and brought the effective aid of 600 horsemen to the relief of the garrison. The tribes still pressed the investment, and had actually prepared ladders for escalade, when disputes arose amongst them as to the points which each individual tribe should assail. (15) Captain Bean afterwards discovered the ladders in camp. Lieut. Cooper was dispatched from Candahar with a troop of horse artillery to assist Captain Bean. The insurgents now perceived that all hope of a successful attack on Quettah had vanished, and about the third week of July they accordingly broke up and decamped. Lieut. Jackson, with 200 Afghan horse sent to keep open the passes, had just before cut his way through their camp; he had arrived in 8 days from Candahar, 13 being in general allowed for the march. (16) When the tidings reached Kelat that the tribes had retired from Quettah, it was at first conjectured that having been foiled, they would for the present return to their homes, and defer the execution of any purposes against the capital which they might have formed. This conjecture proved erroneous. About the 22d July the insurgent host directed their steps to the southward. About the 25th, they appear to have presented themselves before the walls of Kelat. The unwillingness to assist Newaz Khan, was on the part of two important Chiefs aggravated when their cordial aid was most to be desired. It now for the first time transpired that the customs of Soumeanee had been made over to the English, and that the estates in Cutchee, had, without any reason assigned, been confiscated. These things have elsewhere been stated in detail. Lieut. Loveday in this extremity undertook to interpose his authority, so as to

14. On reference to previous chapters, it will be found that this untoward event was nearly simultaneous with the general risings betwixt Ghuznie and Candahar, and with the earlier hostilities of the Murrees against Captain Brown: so that at Midsummer 1840, when at home Afghanistan was represented as in a state of universal tranquillity, we had three little wars raging in different portions of the Doorannee empire, on the results of two of which we had no grounds of felicitation.

15. Masson, p. 126—*Delhi Gazette, Bombay Times*, Sept. 5.

16. We have found much difficulty in making out the precise dates when those events occurred. Masson never gives one. The circumstance just mentioned is taken from the *Delhi Gazette* of the 26th Aug.

have matters settled according to the wishes of the malcontents, who were in this way for the time pacified.

All diligence was used to place the garrison in a state of defence; arms and ammunition were plentiful, but provisions unfortunately scarce. The assailants mustered from ten to twelve hundred strong, but had probably not more than five hundred matchlockmen at arms, while the garrison mustered about a similar number. This is Mr Masson's estimate, other writers uniformly guess them higher—at from six to eight thousand. The artillery on the walls unhappily proved nearly unserviceable. For three days irregular and desultory firing was kept up, when, on the fourth night, an escalade, which had proved all but successful, fifty of the insurgents having entered the town, was prevented by the bravery of the resistance of Lieut. Loveday's sepoy escort. Fear and treachery had now made their appearance amongst the garrison. Some days were spent in fruitless, and, as it appears, pusillanimous and discreditable negotiation by the British resident, who by no persuasion could be induced to support Newaz Khan in his more courageous determination to resist to the last. At length, money and provisions having, bit by bit, been given over to the enemy, the town was taken possession of by permission of the rabble. Shah Newaz, indeed, had acted with zeal, determination, and perfect fidelity to us throughout. (17) The communication with Captain Bean had given them no reason to hope that assistance could be spared them, otherwise the defence might have been protracted till this arrived. Yet the town had hardly been surrendered when information was received that Lieutenant Hammersley, with fifty of Christie's Horse, and about four hundred horsemen under Salu Khan, had sallied out from Quettah, in the direction of Moostung. (18) They came up with a party of about four hundred of the insurgents, when nearly the whole of his cavalry refused to charge. The Afghan chief, and British officer, with a handful of the men, dashed in amongst the enemy, and killed great numbers: the whole would have been cut up had the troops proved stanch. Letters had been written by Lieutenant Loveday to Captain Bean, at the entreaty of the chiefs, offering to make submission, and to continue at peace with the British Government, provided the removal of Shah

17. For the whole of this we are indebted to Mr Masson's work. His account of the matter is unusually obscure. Lieutenant Loveday's servant stated that his master became a prisoner on the 20th August, and that the Brahoos immediately marched to Moostung, which they reached in three days: this man estimates the enemy at eight thousand strong.—*Bombay Gaz.*, Nov. 30.

18. *Delhi Gazette*, September 2d. There cannot have been two similar sallies by Lieutenant Hammersley. The *Delhi Gazette's* information seems derived from a Quettah correspondent, and appears to be correct. Yet Masson speaks of Hammersley having 1500 or 1600 infantry and cavalry, with horse artillery guns. This would have nearly exhausted the whole Quettah garrison, which, at this time, contained only two weak regiments, with Cooper's guns and some irregulars.

Newaz, and the restoration of the son of Mehrab, was conceded to them. To this Captain Bean replied by expressing his willingness to receive an Envoy from the insurgents, and his intention to recommend that the son of Mehrab should be acknowledged, but insisting that a letter of submissive allegiance should be written to Shah Soojah. This was the rock on which we invariably split. The Affghan tribes would have submitted to our direct and immediate rule with comparative willingness: their repugnance to the Government, and their aversion to the person, of Shah Soojah, nothing could overcome. The chiefs, on receiving this, expressed their willingness to make submission to the Lord Sahib, as they denominated the Envoy: he was, they said, the real Sovereign of the Empire, and to him they would pay homage in any form that might be desired of them, however humble: but the Shah's conduct to their late ruler had been so base and ungrateful that to him they would make no submission. (19) Though Kelat had for some time been in the hands of the insurgents, Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson were left at liberty, though closely watched, and their departure prevented. The Resident at this juncture unfortunately wrote to Captain Bean, recommending him to send four hundred horse to their relief, and instructing them in what manner their services would be most effective. The messenger proved treacherous, and the imprudent note was at once conveyed to the chiefs, who next night required Loveday to repair to the citadel to pay his respects to the young ruler. No escort was sent to conduct him, and it was impossible for him to have made his way through the infuriated multitude without danger, so the request was not complied with. Next night a sharp fire was opened on the residency, which was returned with interest by the sepoy guard, three of whose number unhappily fell. The musquetry speedily silenced the matchlocks of the enemy, and probably did considerable execution. The sepoys at length began to desert, and the Brahoes making their way into the building, longer resistance became futile. Lieutenant Loveday and Mr Masson being conducted to the durbar, were severely reproached by the Darogah, Ghool Mahommed; by the others they were received more civilly; but were speedily after placed in close confinement in a very loathsome apartment. The residency was completely plundered, and the whole property it contained appropriated by the multitude. From this till about the 20th of August, (20) various unsatisfactory interviews appear to have taken place betwixt the prisoners and insurgent

19. Masson, p 192.

20. Masson as usual leaves us entirely in the dark as to dates. From other sources it appears that Kelat was taken possession of on the 29th July, and that the insurgents reached Moostung, a distance of 90 miles, about the 22d August. Lieut. Loveday's servant declared the 20th August was the day on which his master became prisoner: he had been requested to recollect it.

leaders, chiefly with a view of arranging negotiations for peace with the political agent for Shawl. It was at length resolved that they should move in a body to Moostung, 25 miles from Quettah, with a view of endeavouring to promote peaceful negotiations, by being in the neighbourhood of Captain Bean. From this they were earnestly, but in vain, warned by Mr Masson; fresh troops were known to be on their way from Candahar; the insurgent followers were disorderly and intractable, and the villages sure to suffer at their hands; and the approach to the British camp seemed now the most likely thing that could be devised to provoke collision. Towards the conclusion of the march, letters were received from Capt. Bean, and the Brahoes fearing that Lieut. Loveday might attempt to make his escape, had him loaded with fetters and chained to a tent pole. Arriving at Moostung, Mr Masson and he were placed in close confinement, with a numerous guard set to watch over them. Negotiation was again renewed, and it is said that Captain Bean promised to procure the restoration of the young chief to his father's throne; he was to hold under the Shah Soojah; and though Sharawan and Cutchee were not immediately to be restored, composition was spoken of. (21) These were as conciliatory and reasonable terms as could have been desired—more so than might have been expected. A private letter to Nusseer Khan himself, accompanying this, is said to have occasioned great indignation amongst the insurgent leaders. By this it was insisted that the Khan should immediately surrender Kelat—that he should proceed to Candahar to make his obeisance to the Shah—and that after that he should do whatever was required of him. On such conditions were his claims to acknowledgment to meet with consideration. On these points Mr Masson is our sole authority; and incredible as his statements may appear, the most extraordinary nature of the proceedings was in no shape out of keeping with most of our political transactions beyond the Indus in the years 1840 and 1841. It was at length determined that a messenger should be sent with powers to see what could be effected in the way of personal treaty, and Mr Masson was selected as the party best suited for this purpose. The negotiations appear to have occupied about three weeks in all; and about the 21st of September the traveller was dispatched, at the request of Lieutenant Loveday, as ambassador to Quettah, to arrange the terms of peace, when he was immediately placed under arrest by Captain Bean, on suspicion of BEING A RUSSIAN SPY! (22)

It must here be remarked in passing, that the Russophobia which two years before appeared to have blinded the understandings of the Teheran and Cabool missions, had not wholly, though it had in a considerable mea-

21. Masson, p. 244.

22. In a letter from Mr Masson in the *Bombay Times* of 14th Nov. 1840, we find copies of letters betwixt him and Captain Bean of the 25th and 26th September. These seem to have been written a few days after his arrival, which probably was about the 21st, as mentioned in the text.

sure, passed away. Even the better-informed and more able of the politicals, who in 1837 and 1838 actually raved about Russia, and saw an emissary or a spy in every ragamuffian who did not choose to give an account of himself, or who desired to play upon their fears, still wrote of the advance on Khiva, and of the dangers of intrigue at Herat, as things for which the British empire had cause to tremble. The printed papers on these subjects betray much futile fear and anxiety, totally unwarranted by any thing set forth by those affected by it.

The disease which had nearly exhausted itself in the quarter where it first broke out, now made its appearance and spread amongst the weaker minded of the politicals scattered everywhere over the country. That which in 1837 and 1838 affected the solid and clear understandings of such men as Sir John McNeil and Sir Alexander Burnes, in 1840 totally upset the addled brains of such weak-minded persons as Lieutenant Loveday and Captain Bean, who seemed to imagine that there was something in discovering, or even in suspecting, Russian intrigue, which allied them, if only in their frailties, with the more eminent individuals with whom they were now associated.

The possession of the most unlimited amount of absolute and irresponsible power in an enemy's country seems besides to have turned the heads of many of the younger politicals, whose freaks and caprices in the tyrannous exercise of the authority so unwisely committed to them might readily seem incredible, were our information on the subject one whit less copious or authentic than it really is. These matters will develop themselves by and bye; what has been said may be enough to assist us at all events, in accounting for the conduct of Captain Bean—a singularly weak-minded, confused, willful, and capricious man, who appeared to the end incapable of comprehending the absurdity he had committed.

The grounds on which Mr Masson was put under restraint were some mysterious and discreditable letters written by Lieutenant Loveday—but afterwards explained away by the writer,—who stated that the conduct of the imagined spy during the siege had been “noble,” and that no suspicion any longer attached to him;—and a letter from Major Outram, intimating that 200 Brahohes had assembled in Kej in favour of Nusseer Khan, with whom Capt. Bean had most unaccountably suspected Mr Masson of being connected. Major Outram, the moment he discovered the use that had been made of his letter, hastened to disclaim all suspicion—declaring that nothing was farther from his thoughts than to dream of Russian emissaries. Notwithstanding this the captive was detained for a period of four months in durance, until repeated references had been made, first to the Envoy, and finally to the Governor-General.

No more unpardonable sin could in those days be committed than for a stranger—who might, perhaps, make disclosures of mismanagement—to in-

trude himself into the region of the misrule of the young politicals. Sir W. Macnaghten had too recently been a close correspondent with Mr Masson (July 1838), and knew his character too well to sympathise with the suspicions of Captain Bean,—while, at Calcutta, the whole affair must have seemed absolutely ludicrous. His answer to Mr Masson (10th Oct. 1840) is as absurd an one as could well be supposed. He stated that he did authorize Captain Bean to detain him until the pleasure of the Governor-General should be ascertained as to his being permitted to prosecute his travels in countries subject to the crown of Cabool, seeing that he was without permission to do so, either from the Shah Soojah or the British government ! The Envoy had all along insisted, when any particular act of wrong was perpetrated by the Shah on his subjects, that he was an independent prince with whom we had no right to interfere :—yet here it is assumed that no traveller could enter the states subsidiary to the Dooranee empire without permission of the British government ! Ahmed Shah himself would never have dreamt that he had power to exclude travellers from Cabool in the most palmy days of his authority—much more from distant subsidiary states, which scarcely acknowledged allegiance to him. The arrogance, as well as the absurdity, of the Envoy's claim, was characteristic of the politicals of the time. The infirmity of Lord Auckland—which was the bane of his foreign policy throughout—was his want of decision of character and determination immediately to put down what was wrong in the conduct of a public servant. Instead of pursuing the dignified course of censuring the Shahl political, and ordering the immediate liberation of the wrongfully suspected spy, the matter was referred to Mr Ross Bell,—who, whatever might be his other frailties, was neither chargeable with fear of responsibility, want of talent, nor deficiency in decision : Mr Bell, on examining into the facts, saw at once the enormity of the blunder that had been committed, and the ridicule to which it exposed its authors and abettors. Mr Masson was so perfectly well known to the leading politicals and literary men who had been in any way concerned in the affairs of Affghanistan, his habits and pursuits so familiar to the literary world, and his journey from Kurrachee to Kelat in April and May so absolutely void of mystery or suspicion, that it required an amount of perverseness of perception to extort from it a charge, such as was scarcely credible even in the political agent of Shahl. The traveller was ordered to be liberated without delay, and to be permitted to proceed on his way wherever he thought fit : a guard being furnished him should he desire to proceed to Kelat or Scinde. He chose the latter route, and pursued his journey to Bombay, where he resided for many months, and thence departed for England. On the 15th September, the following reinforcements reached Quettah from Candahar—the Shah's 2d infantry, the 43d Bengal N. I., 100 Sowars of the 1st cavalry, and two of the Shah's guns : a few days afterwards General

Nott joined with the light company of the Bengal 42d N. I., and 80 of the 4th local horse, raising the force to nearly 3000 men of all arms. The Beloochees having waited for a considerable time in expectation of the arrival of their messenger, at length to their astonishment discovered the mishap that had so unexpectedly befallen him. A letter received from Capt. Bean so incensed the chiefs that they resolved at first to kill Lieut. Loveday on the spot; but speedily changed their purpose, determining instead to be revenged on us by plundering Cutchee, and attacking our troops whenever they could be taken at a disadvantage: they moved their camp from Moostung, and proceeded through the Bolan Pass, determined to inflict as much injury upon us as they were able.

These mishaps at Kelat and at Kahun occurring almost simultaneously, convinced the authorities of the necessity of immediately dispatching large reinforcements to Scinde. The 6th N. I. was ordered to start from Deesa and march by Nugger Parkur, through the sands to Omercote. Captain Del Hoste was directed to take charge of this regiment in its journey across the desert. He was left without any directions, save that he should take his own way and conduct the march with as much speed and as little risk as possible: government felt the fullest confidence in his competence for the task. The country was then almost entirely unknown; for nearly 100 miles neither villages nor inhabitants were to be found. The heat was most intense, the road difficult, and water there was none. With all these obstacles to contend with, they reached Sukkur in safety under the able pilotage of the gallant and distinguished officer who had undertaken to guide them. The 8th, 21st, and 25th were dispatched from Bombay. Betwixt the 27th January and 19th December 1840, in fact, a force of nearly 6,000 men left the Western Presidency for Kurrachee, in addition to those moved from the upper provinces; so that a larger *regular* army was found essential to keep the peace betwixt Quettah and Kurrachee, within a twelve-month of Lord Keane's return through the Punjaub, than had been thought necessary for the capture of Candahar, Ghuznie, and Cabool. (23) At this

23. The following abstract of the number of troops dispatched from Bombay within the period referred to, is from the returns of the Commissary General's Office:—

<i>Date of Departure.</i>	<i>Names of Vessels.</i>	<i>Officers.</i>		<i>Troops:</i>	
		<i>Eur.</i>	<i>Nat.</i>	<i>E.</i>	<i>& N.</i>
1840					
27th Jan'y.	Ship Hannah.....	10	0		176
1st March	Ditto.....	4	1		273
24th ditto	Ship Resolution.....	1	0		72
18th Augt.	Steamer Berenice.....	4	3		227
Ditto	Cleopatra.....	3	3		226
Ditto	Barque Benares.....	2	2		36
22nd Augt.	Brig Palinurus.....	0	2		68
29th ditto	Steamer Berenice.....	6	4		272
2nd Sept.	Cleopatra.....	8	6		338
10th ditto	Barque Benares.....	3	3		164
11th ditto	Ship Charles Forbes.....	13	7		492
21st ditto	Steamer Hugh Lindsay.....	4	0		158

time, 10,000 camels, at the cost of upwards of £80,000, were ordered to be purchased for the use of the army in Scinde.

The insurgents had threatened Lheree, then very weakly garrisoned. In the 2d week of October they had assembled in some force at Khunda.

On the 14th October a detachment, consisting of Captain Curtis's Irregular Horse, with a wing of H. M.'s 40th, reached Kundah. Information having been received immediately on their arrival, that the Brahoes were approaching with the view of plundering the town, accompanied by a large number of camels to carry away the spoil, the horse were instantly sent upon their track. But though on foot and carefully guarding their camels, the insurgents for some time succeeded in keeping the sowars at bay, amongst some close thick jowarree jungle, from which they fired their matchlocks on scouts and reconnoiterers. The Irregular Horse were led on by Captain Curtis and Lieut. Postans, assistant Political Agent in Scinde, but the enemy retired too rapidly to permit the infantry to overtake them in the tangled ground they had now reached. Our horsemen behaved most gallantly, and the enemy defended themselves with desperation as they retired. One hundred and forty are said to have been killed, and 84 camels were captured from them. Our casualties amounted to two killed and three wounded. (24) Around Bagh, where a detachment of the 5th N.I. was stationed, the same system of universal plunder appeared to have been practised. Early in October the Head-quarters of the 23d N. I. were ordered to proceed as a reinforcement from Shikarpore. About the 24th, Lieut. Vardon having been out with a party of Beloochee auxiliary horse, met a strong detachment of Brahoes about 20 miles from Bagh: he immediately attacked, and, after a sharp encounter, defeated them, capturing 1100 head of cattle, and leaving 25 of their people dead upon the field. Reinforcements in light detachments were now pressing upwards with all dispatch from Sukkur to the disturbed regions along the base of the mountains. Major Boscawen with a wing of H.M.'s 40th, the whole of the Ben-

27th Sept.	Steamer Sesostris.....	3	} 12	897
Ditto	" Cleopatra.....	5		
6th Oct.	" Zenobia.....	0	1	40
10th ditto	" Cleopatra.....	14	0	355
15th ditto	" Hugh Lindsay.....	12	1	90
23rd ditto	" Zenobia.....	7	0	47
25th Oct.	" Cleopatra.....	16	0	321
1st Nov.	" Hugh Lindsay.....	0	4	250
4th Nov.	" Zenobia.....	11	5	550
24th ditto	" Zenobia.....	4	0	125
19th Dec.	" Sesostris.....	10	2	307
		Total	140 56	5568

24. *Bombay Gazette*, Nov. 9; *Bombay Times*, Dec. 2. The latter paper states that this occurred at Kotrah, and the detachment was that of Major Boscawen, i. e. wing of H.M.'s 40th, Bengal 38th, and Poonah Horse; and that the action occurred on the 18th. The two are agreed as to the general results, casualties, &c.

gal 33th, and some guns and irregular horse, left Shikarpore on the 15th October, and directed his march towards Kotra; while the Bombay 25th N. I. were sent to watch the opening of the Moolah Pass to prevent the Brahoes from plundering the country. The latter regiment was on its way from Kurrachee, and was joined by the right wing at Laikhana, and thence proceeded across the desert in the direction of Gundava. On its march the 25th experienced proofs, which they were scarcely prepared for, of the audacity and expertness in the art of thieving of the people into whose country they were advancing. One night about 11 o'clock, a party of marauders came quickly down on the advancing force, under cover of some jungle, and mixing themselves up amongst the baggage-camels in the rear, succeeded in carrying off six of them with their loads before anything wrong was suspected. A cry from the camel men made the officer aware of the accident, when the Grenadier company, under Lieuts. Jackson and Phayre, were ordered back to search the jungle. Their efforts were in vain: they recovered nothing, and only exposed themselves to further risk in the darkness and confusion. (25) About 10 o'clock in the morning, shortly after this, a party of 30 horsemen galloped at speed upon a number of camels feeding about a mile from camp, and, before any alarm could be given, or assistance afforded, they hamstrung six and carried off two of them, and then made good their retreat. They were pursued three or four miles but in vain; a sepoy managed to shoot one of the horses, but the rider escaped. The detachment joined Major Boscawen on the 31st October. The enemy continued to ravage the country and sack and burn the villages on the whole line of the advance. Concealing themselves from our troops during the day, they prowled abroad so soon as darkness set in, and spread devastation everywhere.

The detachment already detailed had reached Gundava under the above officer a week before (23d October,) but unfortunately too late to save it from total sack, and the demolition of all the property contained in it. "The most determined desire of destruction," says an officer of the force, writing from the spot (26) "seems to have influenced the rebels in their attack; they levelled and burnt that which they could not carry away; the value of the property destroyed is about 3½ lakhs (£35,000 Sterling). The houses of the Hindoos had been fired, and the rich and thriving Gundava presented a general scene of misery and desolation." The advance of our troops was a signal for the enemy to retire; they fell back on Kotra, which they threatened with a similar fate to that which they had inflicted on Gundava; but, fortunately, it was saved. This was the natural but fierce vengeance the Brahoes took on the estates of which they had just before been so iniqui-

25. Letter from an officer of the 25th N.I.; *Bombay Times*, Nov. 21.

26. Letter from upper Scinde; *Bombay Times*, Nov. 11.

tously deprived by us. We had stripped them of their heritage without cause, and they resolved our plunder should not profit us.

On the 28th October, the Brahoes, amounting to betwixt 4000 and 5000 men, emerged from the Bolan Pass under Nusseer Khan, and took up a position two miles to the south of the mouth of the defile, near the entrenched camp at Dadur. The force in camp numbered about 575—200 of the 5th, and 225 of the 23d N.I., commanded by Captain Watkins of the latter corps, and 120 of the Bengal Local Horse. On the 29th, they advanced to the attack at first steadily and slowly, increasing their speed as they drew near, and raising a shout as they prepared to charge. A fire of round shot and shrapnell was opened upon them from the guns on the entrenchments so soon as they got within range. Undaunted by the destruction this caused amongst their ranks, they divided their force into two parties—one advancing along the front, the other moving to the right and rear of the breast-work. The first of the attacking parties proceeded to a position where the whole detachment of Local Horse was stationed: they were gallantly charged and repulsed by the Sowars, leaving about 40 dead upon the field. Lieut. M'Pherson, 43d Regt. B.N.I., who headed the charge, was wounded, as also were 20 of his men—one only was killed. While this was passing, Captain Heath of the 5th plied the enemy so hotly with grape that they retired beyond range, ensconcing themselves in a mud village about half a mile off. About sunset, however, they again formed and advanced, taking up a position on the left of the Sower lines, from which they could not be dislodged. From this they kept up a desultory fire of matchlocks, which was replied to during the earlier portion of the night from the breast-works and fortified summit of the commissariat store room. About 2 P. M., they once more advanced in line to attack the breast-work, but were repulsed with heavy loss—one of their chiefs having fallen. Nothing daunted by these successive checks, and once more reinforced to a strength of full 5000, they, on the 31st October, advanced on the breast-work, about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. They pressed on in two divisions, the one headed by the young Khan with his standard displayed: and took up a position about 200 yards from the breast-work. Having been compelled by the fire of grape and shrapnell to retire from this, about 1000 of them made for the town of Dadur, where they were at once admitted by the Beloochee inhabitants. The population of the town, which is surrounded by a thick mud wall, and surmounted by a strong citadel, amounts to about 2000. The Hindoo, that is the wealthier, portion of them, were plundered and maltreated, and the part of the town which they occupied sacked before our eyes. The fortified camp had been constructed two miles from the fort to prevent collision with the inhabitants, and avoid the filth and annoyance from which, in the neighbourhood of Indian

towns, our troops suffer. The remainder of the enemy having, about 6 p. m., taken up a position in the compound where the Bengal Horse were posted, were driven from this by our artillery, and as night drew on retired towards Dadur. Lieutenants M^cPherson and Cartwright were wounded, 3 men were killed, and 30 wounded. (27) The fighting seems to have been very severe, and 150 of the enemy are said to have fallen. Scarcely had the above gallant series of encounters closed, when a wing of H. M.'s 40th and the Bengal 38th N. I. arrived at Dadur. It has been mentioned that Nusseer Khan, with the force of the strength formerly noticed, was encamped near the mouth of the Bolan Pass, four miles off, determined, apparently, to make another attack on the town or field works. Every preparation was made for their reception—but as they did not seem disposed to attack us with so much alacrity as was desired, on the 3d November Major Boscawen, with the whole of the reinforcement just named, two guns, and the regular cavalry, proceeded in quest of them. The Brahoes hearing of his approach, retired rapidly up the Pass, leaving their camp standing. Owing to the extreme difficulty of the road, pursuit was impossible, so that they escaped for the present. Their camp, containing the jewels of the young chief, with property of the value of £1000, was taken possession of. Lieutenant Loveday was found murdered, as was supposed by some of the chiefs: the crime appeared to have been perpetrated by a horse-keeper, who, when he found that the poor prisoner who had for two months been dragged along with them must be left behind and fall into the hands of friends, returned and nearly severed his head from his body. He was found heavily ironed, and nearly naked, chained to a kajawa or camel chair. His body seemed much bruised; and it is to be feared that, from the time the tribes left Quettah, his sufferings must have been extreme. The loss of the enemy in these various encounters is estimated at from 150 to 400 men—authorities writing from the spot being in the last degree discrepant on this point—300 may perhaps be pretty near the mark: 70 are said to have fallen on the 29th, 150 on the 31st Oct., and 30 on the 1st Nov.: the casualties on the other days not being mentioned.

The Brahoes, immediately after this, appear, for a time, to have despaired; and Nusseer Khan, with his step-dame, and several of the chiefs, having separated themselves from the rest, were left to wander in the Bolan Pass almost without a follower.

Meanwhile General Nott started from Quettah with a strong detachment to recover Kelat: he encountered no resistance, and, when he arrived under the walls, found that the town had been vacated four days before. He accordingly took possession on the 2d November, and left Lieut.-Colonel Stacy, with the Bengal 43d, to maintain the now tenantless

27. Letter from an officer at Dadur; *Bombay Times*, Dec. 5, 1840.

garrison. Mr Bell was understood to have been dissatisfied with General Nott's advance, wishing probably to let the affairs of Kelat settle down of themselves, and desirous to observe the effect of a little quiescence and non-interference. At this time a strong and general disposition began to be expressed to make peace with the Brahoe chief. The various charges against his father began to be proved unfounded : and even had they been otherwise, his life had paid the penalty of his errors. Neither Nusseer Khan, nor his stepmother, the life and soul of the insurrection, were in any way implicated in the more violent proceedings of the tribes. The facility with which Newaz Khan, who had now passed through Scinde towards Hydrabad, had been discarded, clearly proved that he had no hold on the affections of the people ; while it was equally apparent that no advantage whatever was to be gained by maintaining a detested ruler amongst a race at once needy, warlike, and revengeful. The Vuzeer of Kelat, who had been detained since its capture the preceding November, a prisoner at Bukkur, was set at liberty, and it was understood to be the wish of Shah Soojah himself, as well as the Envoy, and Governor-General, that submission should first be obtained, when the Khanite would be restored to the rightful heir. These humane and prudent wishes appear to have been marred by the mismanagement of the political agents ; and the Brahoes had now no longer any faith in our professions of friendship and forbearance.

On the death of Brigadier Stevenson on the 9th of August, Genl. Brooks had been nominated to the command in Scinde ; and Colonel Valiant, K.H., of Her Majesty's 40th, tendered his services to Government, which were accepted of, and he appointed to the command of a brigade. These officers, together with Major Holland, deputy quarter-master-general, left Bombay on the 15th of October, as soon as the state of the weather would permit, and, having reached Kurrachee by sea, arrived at Sukkur on the 1st November. The force in the field between Kurrachee and Quettah at this time amounted to nearly 10,000 men, and immediate preparations were made for moving a very strong detachment towards Quettah. It was said that the intelligence from Herat was such that the Scinde politicals were determined to march a force towards the Persian frontier. This, as it appears from the papers published by Parliament in 1843, was without the cognizance of the Bengal government, whose severe displeasure was expressed as soon as they became aware of what was intended to be attempted. The posts along the foot of the mountains had all been strengthened, the villages were mostly destroyed, and the efforts of the enemy to annoy us seemed to have slackened, partly from having suffered so severely at our hands, and in part because they had already accomplished nearly all the mischief they could inflict upon us.

Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall having taken command of the Brigade now assembled near Kotra, consisting of the 25th N. I., with detachments of the 2nd Grenadiers and 21st N. I., with details of the 5th and 6th companies of light artillery and irregular horse, on the 26th Nov. proceeded without delay to take active measures against the insurgents. Having learnt that Nusseer Khan was in strong force within six miles of his camp, he went out with a reconnoitering party to satisfy himself on the subject. He started at 3 in the morning with 250 men under Capt. Teasdale, a company of the 2nd Grenadiers 100 strong, under Capt. Boyd, 1 gun, and 20 irregular horse. (28) One of their objects was to occupy the pass, and prevent the insurgents from escaping in that direction. Having by 6 o'clock threaded the gerge and ascended the hill, with 1 gun and 250 irregulars, he at 9 discovered the enemy in great strength, occupying a difficult position commanding the entrance into the body of the hills. Our troops took up a station 300 yards from them, when Nusseer Khan sent a message expressive of his anxiety for peace. "I gave him," says Colonel Marshall, from whose despatch our extract is taken, "one hour to decide finally [the gallant officer does not state what he was to decide upon; he had before expressed his anxiety for peace without condition] before I opened fire; at the same time I immediately sent and ordered Capt. Teasdale to join us with his horse as quickly as possible, as I saw I was too weak to dislodge them should the Khan decide on fighting. The rascals opened fire on us from the hills for more than three-quarters of an hour, but did no harm. I would not allow a shot to be fired in return until the hour had expired, as I thought it might defeat the object Mr. Bell had in view of the Khan coming into camp to make terms of peace." At the expiration of the hour the Khan sent by his Vizier a letter with his seal affixed, stating that within a few days he would disband his followers, and proceed to Mr. Bell to make submission, with an assurance that he would not again be cut off from Col. Marshall's camp. On receipt of this Col. Marshall withdrew his troops and returned to camp. Mahomed Hussein, a native in our employ as a spy, having next day (Nov. 27) stated that the Khan was destitute of provisions and of the means of making his way to Shikarpore, Col. Marshall advanced him rupees 2000 (£200) to overcome the difficulty. This man had been the minister of Mehrab Khan, and was taken prisoner by us and detained at Bukkur; he was now deputed as ambassador from Mr. Bell, in negotiating a treaty not meant to be fulfilled! The letters detailing these things are dated the 27th and 28th, and could not have reached General Brooks before the 31st November. While arrangements for peace were thus being proceeded with between the

28. Colonel Marshall's letter to General Brooks, November 27th and 28th, and P. S.

British commander and insurgent force, a peremptory order was forwarded by General Brooks from Sukkur to attack the enemy without delay. The letter is dated the 27th, and must have been written without cognizance of the requests of the Khan, Colonel Marshall being then 150 miles from Sukkur.(29)

29. The letter is from Major Holland, Deputy Quarter-Master General, and is of sufficient importance to be subjoined entire :—

Deputy Quarter-Master General's Office, Camp Sukkur, 27th November, 1840.

SIR,—I am directed by Major-General Brooks, commanding the Field Army, to acquaint you that, by information received from Sehun Lal, the native agent at Kotria, it appears that a body of insurgent Brahoes, amounting to about 1200 men, located at the entrance of this Pass not more than 8 miles from your post, have been lulled into fancied security by our apparent inactivity.

2. This state of affairs leads the Major-General, in communication with the Political Agent, to consider that an attack judiciously planned, and with the utmost secrecy and caution, will enable you, without fail, to cut up and destroy this body ; and with this view I am to give you the following information.

3. The enclosed Persian letter from Mr. Ross Bell to Sehun Lal, contains that gentleman's instructions to him to place himself under your orders, for the purpose above mentioned, to furnish you with guides, to accompany you in person, and to procure and furnish you the most specific information as to the position occupied by the Brahoes,—whether on the height, in the hollow, or in the defile, and their state and numbers ; in order to enable you to concoct your plans for surprising them.

4. You will send for Sehun Lal, and deliver the enclosed letter to him—no other person being present, directing him, after he has read and made known its contents to you, to deliver it into your keeping : you will then arrange your plans with him—placing the most implicit reliance on his good faith.

5. You are not to communicate the subject of this letter to any one, as the whole success of the plan depends on the most profound secrecy being observed ; and you will endeavour, in preparing your troops, to do so in such manner as to give rise to no suspicions of your objects.

6. You will leave 200 men, under the command of a steady intelligent officer, in your camp ; and you will take with you the remainder of your infantry, and all your cavalry ; and so arrange your march as to fall on the enemy at day-break.

7. You will take *no tents or baggage* of any kind ; the men to carry one meal in their havresacks, and to fill their canteens ; their pouches are to be well supplied with cartridges.

8. You are on no account to advance more than one day's march from your camp : you will pay particular attention to the guides ; they are to be well treated, but closely watched, and in case of treachery put to death on the spot ; and you will take care that, if there is the least cause for suspicion, they shall not escape you.

9. In conclusion, I am directed to repeat, that nothing but the most complete secrecy, as to your plans and intentions, can give you success,—and the Major-General enjoins this above all things : even your officers should not know your intentions till you are close to the Pass. You will, of course, grant quarter to those who surrender.

(Signed) JAMES HOLLAND, Major,
Dep. Qr.-Mr. Genl. of the Army.

P. S.—Nusseeer Khan's position is stated by Sehun Lal to be on the Kotria side of Peer Chutta. The latter place is $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Kotria, and the road to it is good. The next march within the hills is Kuttur Kahun, distant 8 miles, and the road to it leads through a defile, and is very difficult the whole way ; I would

When the order to attack the insurgents reached Col. Marshall, he was no longer at war with the Brahoes, who had sued for peace on certain terms, which, so far as was known to the contrary, they intended faithfully to fulfil. The days granted to Nusseer Khan to disperse his followers, and proceed to surrender himself to Mr. Bell, had not yet expired; and there is nothing anywhere set down which authorises the belief that the chief designed to break his word. A new attack by Col. Marshall after he had drawn off his troops on the 26th, and advanced money for friendly purposes to the Khan on the 27th, without additional provocation or grounds for the suspicion of bad faith, was as distinct a breach of truce, and as flagrant a violation of the spirit of the treaty just entered on, as was the attack of the Affghans on the retiring army of General Elphinstone in January 1842. These were points, however, on which the Scinde politicals of 1840 felt no hesitation; in reference to which after they were over they appear neither to have experienced compunction or drawn down censure from their superiors. It was said that information had been received that strong reinforcements were expected by the insurgents,—three parties of Brahoes, one of 3000, one of 5000, and one of 2000 men! Had such a force as this been in existence, the defeat of 3000 at Kotra was unlikely to have ensured us peace from so determined a foe. The rumour was probably got up by a native spy with a view of bringing on an action. These gentry thrive well on their country's disorders.

Agreeably to the instructions contained in the despatch of General Brooks, which had been forwarded express by his aide-de-camp, Capt. Smith, (30) Col. Marshall with the main body of the force, consisting of 900 men, of the 2nd Grenadiers, the 21st and 25th N. I., with 60 irregular horse and two guns, started shortly after midnight, and proceeded straight for the enemy's camp, a distance of about six miles. The Brahoes, apparently confiding in the truce entered on two days before, were taken completely by

therefore advise, that should Nusseer Khan's position have been changed since last accounts, and he be on the Kahon or Kuttur side of Peer Chuttah, although only a mile, the movement of the detachment should be suspended.

(Signed) G. BROOKS.
J. HOLLAND.

Mahomed Hussein, stated in the text as a spy, was no other than the ex-prime minister of Kelat, who had just before been released from prison by Mr Bell, and sent as an ambassador to Nusseer Khan, to treat with him for surrender! The order directing Colonel Marshall to attack the Brahoes was approved of by Mr Bell, and written in his house!

30. Lieutenant Smith of the Bengal 16th N. I.—This zealous and active officer left Sukkur at 2 o'clock on the 28th of December, and although his progress was greatly impeded by falling in with a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who followed and fired on him for several miles, he reached Colonel Marshall's camp on the morning of the 30th; completing a journey of 150 miles in 38 hours. The accounts of the whole of this affair are taken almost unaltered from the despatches.

surprise. Capt. Teasdale of the 25th, made a detour of 21 miles by Peer Chutta, with 500 men, and so took the enemy in the rear and cut off his retreat. Capt. Ennis with 200 men pushed over a portion of extremely difficult ground, and so outflanked them and drove them back upon our guns; by which means many were slain, and 180 were taken prisoners.

The resistance of the insurgents was most determined: they numbered betwixt 3000 and 4000 men: their position was strong, and they disputed every inch of ground. Nothing could have exceeded the courage and conduct of the sepoys that day; excited by the constant fighting and marauding which had occurred all around for six weeks anterior to this, when the enemy in general contrived to elude them before any serious damage had been done, they determined to pay off old scores. The death of Lieutenant Loveday had excited them to a pitch of fury, and as some charge more destructive than the rest was made, or deadly volley thrown in, the cry was "remember Loveday Sahib—let us revenge him;" and fearfully were they avenged that day. After three hours hard fighting the Brahoes were totally defeated, and made their way through the unoccupied ravines, or up the mountains the best way they could. Nusseer Khan, attended, as was believed, by Gool Mahomed, was seen crossing the heights on horseback, almost alone. Betwixt 400 and 500 of the enemy were left dead upon the field. Four of the principal chiefs were taken. The kettle-drums, standards, and camp furniture fell into our hands, together with carpets, wearing apparel, and a great number of beautifully illuminated copies of the Koran.(31) Our loss amounted to 4 killed and 30 wounded. Amongst the former was Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Lodge, 25th Regt. N.I., who was shot through the thigh, and almost immediately bled to death.

The prisoners were dispatched for Sukkur under charge of Captain Smith, aide-de-camp to General Brooks, who was directed to shoot them in case their rescue should be attempted.(32)

This victory was so complete—the battle so unexpected and so disastrous to the enemy, that for the present they dispersed and left us without annoyance. They had, since they deputed Mr Masson to treat with Captain

31. *Asiatic Journal*, April 1841, p. 303.

32. Colonel Marshall's words are—"I have directed Captain Smith, in the event of any attempt being made to rescue the prisoners in his charge, or any attempt being made by them to escape, to shoot them on the spot."—Letter to General Brooks, 3d December. We believe there is nothing unusual in this. When a report got abroad that Ukhbar Khan had directed our prisoners to be killed, should any attempt be made to rescue them, the cry was raised that he had done the most atrocious and fiend-like thing on earth. Captain Johnston, who had been the party to disseminate this rumour, found that it was untrue, and that Saleh Khan had misled him. He took every means in his power to obtain for it a contradiction, but not one in ten of the journals which propagated the error had the honesty to correct it!

Bean, lost upwards of 2000 men out of a force which at no time seems to have exceeded 7000 at the uttermost, if ever it was higher than five. The only fruits of the victory were, that any little confidence the Brahoes might before have entertained of British faith was dissipated: they fled to the mountains to bide their time, having no longer any wish or heart to treat with us. Singularly enough, the ordinary official reports of this action were not forwarded to the Governor-General, who, so late as the 29th March, remarks on this unexplained fact, and then for the first time publishes in the *Gazette*, extracts of the field orders of Colonel Marshall and General Brooks, from which this part of the narrative is chiefly abridged.

The excellent conduct of the sepoys at Kotra has just been mentioned: the whole of the correspondence from Scinde at this period bears unvarying and enthusiastic testimony to the admirable patience, courage, and spirit with which they conducted themselves throughout this harrassing campaign. Though fighting in a country which was new, and with an enemy not only strange to them, but surpassing in strength, courage, and determination, as well as arms and appointments, any they had before encountered, no Europeans could have done better service to the state. To this there had not as yet occurred a single case of exception.

Meanwhile, though the Murrees and Bhoogties had been pacified, and the Brahoes disabled, there were rumours of formidable disturbances above the pass, both to the east and west, around Candahar, and on the Persian frontier, which caused a general movement to be hastened of the principal body of the troops in Scinde.

The 1st Light Cavalry, and Irregular Horse, left Shikarpore for Dadur on the 5th January; the 4th troop Horse Artillery, and right wing of the Bombay 20th N.I. started on the 12th from the same place for Quettah; and the 1st troop H. A. and left wing of the 20th N.I. marched for Bhag on the 14th. Previously, the 2d Grenadiers, with some Irregular Horse, marched from Sukkur with a convoy of 3000 camels and 200 carts. The stores were left at Bhag; the Regt. proceeded to Dadur in order to relieve the Bengal 38th N.I., which left for Quettah on New-year's-day. The head quarter wing of H.M. 40th, which had shortly before arrived from Kurachee, the 21st N.I., with a body of Irregular Horse, left for Bhag on the 15th. The cavalry, the 41st, and Capt. Pontardent's artillery, followed a few days afterwards. (33) General Brooks with a strong force reached Shikarpore on the 5th, and Mr Bell joined him on the 7th. (34)

The confidence of the people in our protection had been so far restored that they returned to their villages and commenced the cultivation of their fields. Nusseer Khan still kept the hills, his step-dame found shelter amongst

33. *Bombay Times*, Jan. 30. 34. *Ibid*, Feb. 27.

the Dodah Murrees. The country throughout the month of January kept tranquil: it was gorged with troops, occasioning an expenditure amongst the people of many times the amount of the revenue of the whole region we occupied. Mr Bell meanwhile directed the chiefs taken at Kotra to be liberated unconditionally and sent to their own country loaded with presents. (35) The ejected Shah Newaz was now at Larkhana, Government having allowed him a pension of £1200 a year. (36) This was afterwards reduced a half, and finally altogether withdrawn by Sir C. Napier in 1843. Colonel Stacy continued to conduct matters with much prudence at Kelat, where the people returned to their homes, and the bazaar once more became occupied by nearly 1000 residents. (37) So much confidence had this inspired that it was expected Nusseer Khan would give himself up. But though he must by this time have been repeatedly apprised of our friendly intentions towards him, he would not trust us: he had seen other chiefs who came into our power relying on friendly treatment, thrown into the dungeons of Bukkur. The broken truce of Kotra was not to be forgotten. At this time the sepoys in Scinde suffered from the cold of the nights, where ice constantly made its appearance.

We come now to the most unsatisfactory portion of the history of the management of the affairs of Scinde—to a portion which, whether in a political or a military point of view, no Englishman can read without a blush. The chief part of our knowledge on the first division of the subject is derived from the often-quoted Cutchee letters, and a better authority could not be desired; fortunately, indeed, there is no conflicting information to be dealt with—the intelligence from the spot was at the time copious, varied, and perfectly harmonious, and not one particle of its truth was ever called in question.

When the Army of the Indus passed through Cutchee in 1839, Major Leech wrote and sent a moonshee (interpreter) to the people of Kujjuck, to beg that they would break their bunds (weirs or dams) which retained for the irrigation of their fields the water flowing from the hills, and let it off for the use of our troops. The request was complied with, but the money offered for a piece of such valuable service, attended with much damage to the cultivators, was declined. The fields suffered from deficient irrigation, but to this they submitted without complaint. The following year Yoosiff Khan Rysannee was Naib of the Seebee country, and the Kujjuks requested he would make the battai or division of grain, on which the Government share or tything is allotted, the crops being ready for it. The revenue is paid in kind; and the corn

35. Letters from Shikarpore, 27th Jan., *B. Times*, Feb.

36. Cutchee Letters, No. 5.

37. *Times*, Feb.; letter from Camp, near Kotra, 22d Jan.

cannot be housed till the Government's quota has been determined on. The Naib of Seebee stated that he could not act in this matter without the directions of Mahomed Sherreef. What piece of roguery this worthy had in view in delaying the order, does not appear : but so it was, the time passed away, the rainy season approached, and the Kujjucks housed their grain to save it from destruction. When all this labour had been incurred, and the cultivators were led, from the delay which had been occasioned, to believe that the tax was for that season to be remitted, Mahomed Sherreef ordered the battai or division to be made. The cultivators were now loath to part with that which they had begun to regard and deal with as their own ; and they urged as a plea for exemption, the service they had performed, and sacrifice they had incurred at Major Leech's request ; stating what was admitted to be true, that they almost alone, of all the tribes, had abstained from plundering our baggage or convoys. They expressed a hope that these considerations would weigh with Mr Bell in obtaining for them exemption from payment for the present. The district is very productive, the utmost attention to irrigation being paid. It contains about thirty villages, each under its particular hakim or chief. The adult male population amounts to about 6000, of whom only one thousand are reckoned warriors : they are mostly infantry, and have no guns. The town where all the principal chiefs reside is Kujjuck. It contains a population of about 4000. The annual revenue of the district amounts to about £3600 ; the arrears now stated to be due, to £4400—of this we demanded immediate payment of the half. In this state matters were, when the chief political proceeded to Cutchee, and had, in the beginning of February 1841, an interview at Lheree with some of the chiefs. They pleaded poverty in addition to the other reasons already adduced, on which they claimed exemption : this was known to have been a mere pretence, for they were not poor : and the hardship of claiming afterwards that which was not received at the time when it was offered, was, owing to the representations of Mahomed Sherreef, not held entitled to consideration. At Munghul Keshehur, 4 miles from Bhag, eight of the chiefs had a second interview with Mr Bell, when, on the 7th Feb., a paper was drawn up by them, in conjunction with Lieut. Brown, Mr Bell's assistant, and others, guaranteeing that the revenue claim should be satisfied in full on or before the 19th of the month. (38) Not observing that any measures were taken to have this agreement fulfilled, a demonstration was directed to be made before the time fixed for payment had expired, and on the 18th February our troops arrived before the town—the people having not the most remote idea that hostilities

38. Cutchee Letters, No. 3.—Much of this letter has been taken *verbatim*, and incorporated with the text.

were intended: the same having been the impression of General Brooks when the dispatch of the force was arranged. They had not so much as provided themselves with ammunition, nor had they cut the bunds, though their unfailing practice in case of attack was to lay the country under water and render it impassable. They invariably maintained that they never thought of being attacked, or of attacking us: nor have we any grounds for believing that in this they misrepresented their apprehensions or intentions.

The troops sent, consisted of the 3d cavalry, Leslie's horse artillery, some of Skinner's and of Curtis's irregular horse, and a wing of the 20th N. I.; these were afterwards joined by 200 of the 2d Grenadiers, with Lieutenants Hogg, Falconer, and Morrison. The whole was commanded by Colonel Wilson of the cavalry. The distance they had to march from quarters, was about 40 miles: a detachment worse suited for the attack of a fortified town, could not be imagined; especially when the General had every variety of troops in such abundance at command.(39) So late as the 17th, after the troops were on their way certain of the Kojuck chiefs had an interview with Mr. Bell:—some misunderstanding appears to have arisen; Mr. Bell stated that he was left under the impression that the chiefs wished to evade payment altogether, though admitting it was due; and some of the natives on whom *he* so often so unworthily relied, assured him that the Kojucks were arming and preparing for resistance. The groundlessness of this last became obvious when our troops arrived near the fort, and the populace appeared never to dream of hostilities. Lieutenant Brown, A.P.A., was sent to join the force in consequence of Lieut. Col. Wilson reporting that the people were hostile, and *that our camel-men had been detained in the town, &c.*, which he deemed it imperative to make known! He proceeds to say—"but little forage had been promised, and the people who went for it were treated with ill-concealed ill-will. I am positively informed that an attack on our camp will be made should a favourable opportunity of doing so occur. I respectfully solicit the Major-general granting further and more explicit instructions." It was at this time that the Assistant-political Agent was ordered to proceed to Col. Wilson's camp in case of difficulty, that the commanding officer might be fully aware

39. We have heard General Brooks declare that he never in the course of 40 years service, experienced any thing so intensely mortifying as the failure at Sebee. He sent out a light detachment on the assurance of Mr. Bell that by no possibility could there be fighting,—that a mere demonstration was all that was desired. The neighbourhood of Kujjuck had been recommended as a station for part of the mounted force, and the cavalry and horse artillery were ordered there in the first instance without any idea of warfare, but simply for the benefit of forage, which was hardly procurable at Mungul-ke-Shuher."

how matters were to be managed. On the day of the fight, 20th February, a deputation of the chief men had an interview with Lieutenant Brown : they declared their readiness to pay the sum required, but requested twelve hours to make the collection. This was refused, and they were informed that unless within two hours they should produce £2,200, their town would be attacked by the troops. The attempt was made—the collection was commenced on the instant; and rupees, gold and silver ornaments were gathered in the utmost haste, in amount equal to our demands. A Moonshee with some attendants, who had been sent to the town when the two hours' leave which had been given were expired, met the chiefs bearing the treasure to our camp. Before they arrived there, however, they observed the guns getting into position, and the troops being drawn out in order of battle. Supposing some trick or delusion to be intended, that we meant both to take the money and attack the town besides, they retired within the walls, and charged the Moonshee with endeavouring to practise a fraud upon them. The fight immediately began. The fort, which contained about 4,000 people, of whom 1,200 were women, was not a strong one. It was situated in a level plain, which afforded no cover for ordnance, and surrounded with a ditch and mud wall, varying from 12 to 20 feet in height, with four open gateways respectively of 9, 10, 12, and 20 feet in width. The ditch surrounding the fortress at 12 feet distance from the wall was 25 feet broad and 4 feet deep; it was encircled on three sides by marshes and water-courses. About two o'clock P. M. the guns opened with round-shot and spherical case, at the distance of two hundred yards; after a fire of nearly half an hour's duration, they were removed to within one hundred yards of the mud wall. The defences were so thick, and numerous, that even at this distance our shot scarcely told upon the town. The enemy had kept up a brisk and galling fire upon us from the moment our artillery were in position. Colonel Wilson was wounded through the thigh, the femoral bone being badly splintered by one of the first shots. The command, in consequence, devolved on Major Rollings of the 2d Grenadiers. The storming party, consisting of two companies of the regiment just named, supported by the left wing of the 20th N.L., proceeded to a place where the men were able easily to cross, the ditch having been left unfinished, and advanced by the pathway 12 feet wide, which intervened betwixt the edge of this and the base of the wall. Captain Walter, with a troop of the 3d cavalry, proceeded round to the other side of the town to cut off the enemy's retreat. The rest of the troops remained to support Captain Leslie with his guns, and act as circumstances might require. The enemy were six or eight hundred strong just within the gate,—there being about twelve hundred fighting men in the town altogether: the guns, which otherwise kept the gate clear, required to suspend their

fire as the storming party advanced. So soon as the head of the column got near the gate, the enemy rushed out and cut down the leading men, who were unfortunately very indifferently supported, as no effort on the part of the officers could induce the Grenadiers to move forward. Lieut. Falconer was killed, and Lieut. Shaw, sub-assistant commissary general, who volunteered his services on the occasion, severely wounded in leading the assailants on. On seeing the check of the storming party, the intrepid Lieut. Creed, H.A., requested permission to take some dismounted artillerymen to head the column, and endeavour to recover the fortunes of the day. This gallant band of about 20 horse artillerymen at once advanced and endeavoured to force their way into the town. Lieut. Creed and some few got within the gateway: but here the heroic officer and five of his men were immediately cut down, and the remainder, most of whom were severely wounded, driven back by force of numbers, were compelled to retire, being unsupported. At this time some women came out with korans on their heads entreating for peace. The enemy began to flag; and had the attack been persisted in the fort must have fallen. Evening was now rapidly advancing: it was obviously in vain to maintain the struggle, so our troops retired to a distance of 1000 yards, and proceeded to encamp for the night with a view of next morning renewing operations.

The casualties in this unfortunate affair amounted to 15 killed and 25 wounded; Lieuts. Falconer and Creed were amongst the former, Col. Wilson and Lieut. Shaw amongst the latter. Colonel Wilson died in a few days afterwards from the effects of his wound. The enemy's loss is said to have amounted to about 60 killed.

A report was spread that the Kojjucks intended to attack us at night, so that the troops slept under arms. The rumour proved groundless: about 11 o'clock P.M. a Banyan arrived in camp from the fort, intimating that the chiefs had fled,—the whole of the occupants of the town, save the aged and bedridden, made their escape to the hills—so that, when morning dawned, it was tenantless. Kujjuck was taken possession of, and all the moveables contained in it declared prize property. This amounted to about £2000 in value: this, as will by and bye be seen, had afterwards to be restored by order of government.

The tidings of this mishap reached General Brooks at Mungel-ke-shuher about noon on the 21st; and he immediately ordered out a detachment to join Capt. Rollings with the utmost expedition. This consisted of the head-quarters of the 4th troop horse brigade, H. M.'s 40th, and the 21st N. I., with the sappers and miners; they marched about 5 P.M. the same afternoon. These were to proceed by forced marches without a moment's delay, as the extent of the mischance was believed to be much more serious than it turned out. But on the march the Major-General receiving authentic intelligence that

the Kojjucks had evacuated their fort, directed the infantry to remain that night at Mitree, and proceeded only with the head-quarters and 4th troop Horse Artillery to Kujjuck. The infantry recommenced their march the following afternoon :—before they had proceeded far rain began to fall in torrents, and from the night being pitchy dark, the troops remained for some time in a perfect slough of mud and water, and did not reach the camp till mid-day. The whole were detained before Kujjuck till the middle of March by the heavy rains, which caused great destruction amongst the camels of the force.

After the town had fallen into our hands, but before it was destroyed, some of the people, who were starving on the hills, returned with a view of recovering their lost property : they were driven back, some perishing in the ditch, and orders were given to fire on any one who should approach the town. Foiled in avenging our mischances on the Kojjuck warriors, Mr Bell resolved that the property of the inhabitants should suffer. An order was fulminated, directing the place to be destroyed and the country desolated. On the 6th March, accordingly, the aged, sick, and bedridden having been carried beyond the walls, the clothes on them being the only property they were allowed to retain, the fort was set fire to, and laid in ruins. The houses that could not easily be pulled down were mined and blown up,—the timbers that could not be otherwise destroyed were burnt,—the devastation was complete : the fire raged for several days—and the property accumulated, and buildings erected, through the space of seven generations, during which the place had flourished in the hands of the Kojjucks, was appropriated or destroyed by us. The crops were eaten up or trampled under foot by the horses, the camels, and the baggage-cattle of the army : the desire appearing to be to do as much wanton mischief as possible. An edict was issued when the work of ravage had been completed, that no part of the town should be rebuilt or re-occupied.(40) Shortly after this, some

40. The account of the action is chiefly given from an unpublished copy of the official despatch, with some incidents from private letters. We have been favoured with divers valuable notes from officers of the force, to whom the proofs have been submitted, and the following is one :—“ Mr Bell’s first letter to General Brooks was such as to lead the General to expect opposition ; the second was merely saying the troops should take up a position convenient for water and forage—this was received late at night. The force was framed on the first letter, and nothing could be more injudicious than its selection. General B. knew nothing of Kujjuck, nor did Mr Bell—a fact fully proved, for had they known what the place was, Europeans would have been sent. Well might General Brooks feel unsatisfied, not only in this instance, but in having remained from *October until January* at Sukkur, instead of being in the field with his troops. Had he been stationed at Bhag, and Mr Bell with him, the country would have had a better chance of becoming quiet and settled. How could General Brooks say he did not expect resistance, when his orders to Lieut.Col. Wilson were—‘ Your detachment is to march to Kujjuck, in order

Brahoes, who must have otherwise starved in the hills, came down, and were quietly feeding their flocks at Mitree, when our troops observing them mistook them for Kojjucks, and actually attacked them, dispersing them in every direction, and seizing on the women's ornaments and property left behind. The mistake was soon discovered, and every effort made to remedy it; but the mischief was done, and this untoward accident was added to the list of acts of supposed perfidy and wrong—for too few of which we could plead any excuse or extenuation.

The Cutchee letter-writer, who learned the facts on the spot, and was most familiar with every feature of the case, and with all the parties concerned, says, "We all know that Asiatics invariably plead poverty and procrastination to contribution of revenue to their despotic governments, in the hope of obtaining some remission; and that where they can, they resist with force the payment altogether, as the Kojjucks have often done. That the Kojjucks hoped, by an excuse of poverty and procrastination, to get some remission, is, I conceive, beyond doubt. It is the opinion of all the natives of Cutchee that I have seen: of our habits they knew little, what they did know was not likely to have produced the most favourable impression. A forcible resistance of our demands they knew to be useless, and accordingly

to coerce some refractory tribes in that district, in case of their refusing compliance with the demands of the political agent.' The detachment marched on the 17th, and on the 18th General Brooks writes to Mr Bell—'I have no information who are the parties to be acted against,' &c. Why not have made due inquiry on the subject before sending the force? The Kujjuck force was as follows:—

2d Grenadier Regt.—1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 native officers, 12 havildars, 200 rank and file; killed—1 lieut. (Falconer), 8 men; wounded 20.

Scinde Horse.—1 captain, 4 native officers, 2 duffadars, 66 sowars; killed—1 sowar.

1st Troop H. A.—1 captain, 2 lieuts., 98 men; killed—5, and 1 officer, (Lieut. Creed); wounded—6, and 1 officer (Capt. Blood).

3d Lt. Cav.—1 col., 1 capt., 6 lieuts. and cornets, 201 troopers; killed—1 trooper.

Rt. Wing 20th.—2 captains, 2 lieuts., 2 ensigns, 381 men; killed—1 private, 10 ditto wounded.

Total force	.	.	.	Cavalry	.	.	.	266
				Infantry	.	.	.	581

847

Deduct sick and guards	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	182
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665

Present in action	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	665
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Killed—1 lieut.-col., 2 lieutenants, and 12 men.

Wounded, 2 lieuts., and 45 men."—*Note by an Officer of the Force.*

Another officer belonging to the Staff states that there were not above 300 warriors in the town: that so ill-defended and weak a place was unworthy of the name of fort; and that the whole affair was one of the most miserably mismanaged during the war.

they not only avoided plundering the country, but even neglected providing themselves with ammunition, trusting to procrastination as the safest diplomacy. From the fact of their having gathered in valuables in amount equal to our demand, and with which they were about to present themselves in our camp when they saw our troops advancing on the town, and from that of no earthly provision having been made for defence, does it not appear that, instead of opening our guns at two in the afternoon against the fort, if we had thrown a cordon around it, that the people would at once have seen how unlike we were to former rulers, even had they not gathered together in money and ornaments the amount we demanded." (41)

Well might Sir Alex. Burnes, in remonstrating with the Envoy shortly after this on our deplorable and calamitous mismanagement of the country, exclaim, "It seems to me that wherever our political officers are, collision forthwith follows. A native temporizes, a European officer fights; we are thus on the high road to denationalize Afghanistan instead of contributing to its stability as a kingdom; we shall subvert all its institutions, and not succeed in fixing our own in their stead, for we are not labouring to do so." * * * "That regular troops should be employed in enforcing revenue, is at all times doubtful, unless refusal to pay ends in rebellion; but it is more than ever questionable, when there is injustice on the side of the collector. A postponement to pay is at once in our notions converted into a refusal, and that which a parley and explanation between Affghans would terminate in a day or two amicably, ends with us in a battle and loss of life on both sides. But the lives are not the greatest loss: respect for us, and influence with them, go with them. When once regular troops appear, hesitation is deemed pusillanimity, they cannot stand still, they must act, and thus every trifling outbreak endangers the character not only of the English but of the whole frame of government." (42) The reader will excuse the interruption of the narrative which the introduction of those passages occasions, proving, as they do, how early and distinctly the more sagacious portion of the political authorities saw and appreciated the mischiefs we were inflicting, and the direction whitherward they were tending. Unhappily, those in whose hands the amendment of this system lay, would not, or could not, see its error.

The details of these proceedings appear to have given the greatest offence to the Governor-General: it is doubtful whether the despatches afforded him a sufficiency of particulars; but the facts in which they were defective

41. *Cutchee Letters*, No. 4.

42. Notes on the consolidation of Afghanistan, by Sir Alexander Burnes, dated April 19, 1841. A copy of these was found amongst his posthumous papers, with notes by the Envoy. Frequent occasions of referring to them will by and bye present themselves.

were amply supplied by the letters to which we have had such frequent occasion to refer, and which bore with them so much of the stamp of authority that they could not be overlooked. Early in August an order was received rescinding the edict against the re-construction of Kujjuck, and ordering the payment of the value of the property which had previously been declared prize,—abandoning all claims of arrears, and explaining as the reason, that though our troops had for a time required to occupy the country, the Kojjucks were considered our friends! We are, however, breaking through the chronological order in which events ought to be related.

A few weeks before this, the Beebee Gunjani, widow of Mehrab Khan, had made submission: she was kindly received, and seemed gratified with the attention that was paid her; she was a sprightly, pleasing, intelligent looking lady, whose influence with the chiefs friendly to her husband, as well as with her step-son, seemed to be very great. She received as a gift, the Naibship of Kotra, worth about £1200 a year, and with this she seemed contented. About 1000 of her followers shortly afterwards made submission.

Alarming reports were meanwhile gaining currency as to the state of affairs at Herat and along the Persian frontier. It may be recollected that in July 1839, Major D'Arcy Tod, with a deputation of British officers, had been dispatched from Candahar to the court of the worthless prince who was the legitimate representative of the Suddozye dynasty. After an expenditure of £300,000 in endeavours to purchase a friendship, the free gift of which was not worth our acceptance, the Governor-General resolved, that before more advances should be made, the expediency of moving a garrison of British troops into Herat should be broached to Kamran Shah. This became the source of immediate misunderstanding; and Major Tod discovered, that not only was this as unpalatable as might be, but that Yar Mahomed the Vizier, known at all times to be in his heart unfriendly to us, had usurped the actual power of the Shah, and was caballing amongst the chiefs with a view to an advance on Candahar. It was said, indeed, that it was the intention to proclaim Kamran Shah head of the Doorannee empire, and to endeavour, through the assistance of the Affghan malcontents, to place him on the throne. Major Tod had been guilty of the offence of endeavouring to put a stop to the plunder of caravans and the sale of the persons captured along with them as slaves. The English mission left on the 10th, and arrived at Ghirisk on the 21st Feb., having encountered some narrow risks but experienced no injury. This post is on the river Helmund, about 80 miles north-west from Candahar: it had been weakly garrisoned since our original invasion, and was now about to be reinforced by the

Shah's 5th Native Infantry under Captain Woodburn, and 500 of Christie's Horse. The country everywhere in fact shewed symptoms of that unquiet and uneasy state of feeling which, six months afterwards, broke out into such fearful and successful insurrection.

Preparations were on these grounds made once more to draw our troops together near Dadur, and to move a heavy force up the Bolan Pass so early as the season would permit, to await at Quettah the determination of the Governor-General. Luckily this was peaceful; though the Envoy was urgent to stretch the limits of the Dooranee empire to their proper extent, which he conceived to be Herat on the west, and Attock on the south-east.

From the scarcity which prevailed in Cutchee and Beloochistan, it was necessary that the whole of the troops, followers, and cattle, attached to the force, should be rationed by the Commissariat; and to enable that department to do so, the following enormous amount of animals was required during the campaign for the transport of the Commissariat supplies, baggage, guns, ammunition, camp-equipage, &c. of the army:—

12,000 Government Camels, valued at £8 each	£96,000
4000 Hired Camels, from Sukkur to Quettah, at £1, 10s. per month	6,000
2000 Hired Draught and Pack Bullocks,—5000 more were expected from Forozepore, but never joined.	(43)

The 20th N. I. entered the pass about the 10th October, and betwixt the 16th and 20th March a large portion of the army, under General Brooks, had commenced moving through the Bolan. The General arrived at Quettah on the 3d April; his command having been extended so as to include Kelat, Moostung, and Quettah, as well as Scinde: Mr Bell had preceded him by a few days only. The first brigade suffered severely from storms in the pass: their tents having been blown down and property destroyed. It was believed that General Valiant's brigade would proceed to Candahar,—a determination which, if ever made, was speedily altered. Having already done nearly all we could in the way of irritation and annoyance, our policy now appeared to be to make every effort at conciliation. Colonel Stacy had, in a brief space, produced a very important alteration in the feelings of the people of Kelat. He sought communion with the chiefs, and mingled freely with the people, and his sympathy with their sufferings, and still more, his apparent confidence in them, and the fearless want of suspicion with which he alone dared to move amongst them, won sympathy and confidence in return. In the course of the month of April he set out to the Brahoe camp almost unattended, though he had to travel nearly 60 miles through a wild, turbulent, and disaffected country. He had an interview

with the young Khan and his chiefs, and seemed to consider that everything was settled, when some fresh source of misunderstanding broke out, and Nusseer Khan again sought refuge in the remote hills. Colonel Stacy had just before this advanced a considerable sum of money to the Khan. On the present occasion something occurred during his residence in camp, which so offended the chiefs that his life was in peril. The Khan warned him of his danger, and entreated that he would retire as speedily as possible, offering him a safe conduct to Kelat. Of this he accepted, and after a ride of nearly 60 miles in length, returned in safety with the utmost speed to the Brahoe capital. The Bombay 25th N. I. was about this time dispatched to Kelat. The Beebee Gunjani having occasional interviews with Mr Bell, promised him that she would speedily prevail upon the young prince to come in if made sure of being restored to his father's throne. The assurance was given, but he would not trust us, nor could he be prevailed upon to see any political save Colonel Stacy till Mr Bell was no more. Meantime an order was promulgated, that unless he surrendered himself before the 4th May, he would be put to the ban, and chased wherever he might seek refuge.

The force now at Quettah amounted to above 8000 men. No instructions had been received, nor did any definite idea seem, in any quarter, to be entertained as to their destination. The Herat panic was now well nigh over : the idea of advancing thitherwards, broached, and so far acted on by the Scinde politicals, was discountenanced by Government ; and the country around Candahar was considerably less turbulent than it shortly before had been.

A petty chief called Fazel Khan had been giving some annoyance in the Noosky country, and as we had soldiers on the spot, it seemed to be thought a pity we should not keep fighting. An expedition accordingly was ordered for Noosky, consisting of the 4th Troop H.A., a squadron of the 3d Light Cavalry, 2 companies of the 41st, and the 20th N.I. They were commanded by Colonel Soppitt, an officer of conduct and experience. They left Quettah on the 3d of May, and having reached Noosky by a forced night-march of 40 miles, found that the offending chief, with his principal people, had fled. It was said they had taken the route of Kelat to render submission to Colonel Stacy. Two companies of Europeans, mounted on camels, were dispatched with the cavalry in pursuit of him, but without effect. The force returned to Quettah after incurring much hardship and fatigue, and losing many camels,—having effected nothing.

An accident as singular in its nature as unfortunate in its consequences, at this time befel a party of Skinner's horse in ascending the Bolan Pass. Capt. Haldane had been left at Dadur with orders to escort the battering-train to Quettah. When the plan was altered, and orders given that the heavy

guns should be allowed to remain at Sukkur, this officer, with the horse under his command, was ordered to join his brigade, which had just reached Shawl. Having experienced much difficulty in obtaining a sufficiency of baggage-cattle, he was at length enabled to start on the 23rd of April. Having got to within ten miles of the end of the pass, a night was passed at Sir-i-Bolan (44), and the cattle being still very much knocked up, they were allowed to rest till the afternoon to recruit. It rained very much on reaching the narrowest part of the pass, which was no more than from 30 to 40 yards wide, and Capt. Haldane having sent on the camel-men with all the baggage and 100 troopers, ordering them to keep close together, was bringing up the rear with about 80 men, when just as he entered the narrow gorge, and came to a sharp turn in the way, he saw a body of water, about a foot deep, rushing on with tremendous speed round a turn of the rock a little way ahead of him; this was immediately followed by a second, more than three feet in depth, thundering on with still greater fury than that which preceded it. On the right and left there were no means of escape, the rocks being nearly perpendicular; so they galloped back, reaching a place which enabled them to retire on one side a little way out of the reach of the torrent just as its waters were upon them. The cataract, now increased to ten feet in depth, rushed past the rock with awful fury. Then came a scene terrible to contemplate,—men, horses, and camels were swept past, and dashed to pieces against projecting rocks, against which the water flew to the height of twenty feet. No assistance could be rendered, for the stream ran faster than any horse could gallop. "I stood upon the bank," says Capt. Haldane, "quite horror-struck, for I believed that every one ahead of us had perished. In a few moments the destruction was complete, and we felt like men cast upon a desert plain, without a particle of food, wet to the skin, a cold and cutting wind blowing on us, and no means, from the nature of the country, of ascertaining the extent of our loss; as, until the water went down, all communication with any party who might have been saved was completely cut off. About sunset the stream had nearly subsided, and I perceived how matters stood. The loss of life was 33 men and 101 animals. We passed a miserable night, and next day pushed on to one of our outposts, eight miles from Dusht-i-Bedowlut. We trusted to recover some of our property in the morning before starting, but found very little: for such was the force of the stream, that the matchlocks belonging

44. Sir-i-Bolan, head of the Bolan;—a powerful spring here forms the source of the Bolan river. The ascent betwixt Abi Goom and Sir-i-Bolan in the course of $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles is 1954 feet, giving a rise of about 1 foot in 25; this is the steepest acclivity in the pass. A mass of water pouring down this must rush with the rapidity of a cataract.—*Major Hough*, pp. 53 and 427.

‘o men drowned had their barrels broken in two, and some of the bodies were found at Bebee Nanee, 20 miles below where the accident occurred. The property lost was estimated at £1200.” (45)

An accident of a precisely similar nature occurred to Sir Alex. Burnes and his party in ascending the Khyber Pass in September 1838, when a thunder shower overtook them, and the brooks swelled so rapidly, that it was with much difficulty they saved their baggage: the party was for a short while divided in two, without the power of communicating with each other. (46) So that, besides the incidents liable to occur in those defiles from the opposition of hostile tribes, which in its most formidable shape British troops have overcome—there are storms of wind and snow, with the swelling of torrents by the sudden burst of thunder storms, to be encountered, sufficient for the destruction of any army. These appear to be of by no means unfrequent occurrence, and the only wonder is that we suffered from them so little: that just detailed, and the snow-storm which overtook Colonel Wallace’s party in February 1842, being the only serious accidents which really from these causes befel our troops.

Affairs in Upper Scinde and around Quettah from this time forward to the surrender of Nusseer Khan, continued in a state of tranquillity and insipid inaction. About the beginning of June, the notification issued by the Bombay Government, that General Brooks and Brigadier Valiant had been recalled—the former to be temporarily succeeded by Colonel England of H. M. 41st, the latter by the senior Brigadier at the station,—reached camp, and occasioned no small astonishment. The causes of this have already been minutely explained; (47) but the authors of the Clibborn commission never, up to the close, seem to have suspected the serious offence of which alike in a military or in a moral point of view they had been guilty. Mr. Bell was at this time suffering from a severe indisposition, which caused him to tender his resignation—and Major Outram was already understood to be assured of succeeding him; the charge devolved on the latter earlier than was anticipated, by the demise of the former on the 1st of Aug. Captain Bean also had solicited leave to retire, on the plea of ill health. The great schemes to be accomplished by the army under General Brooks, in which all of the gentlemen just named, more or less shared, one by one fell to the ground. The Candahar force proved adequate for the work assigned to it: strong bodies were posted at Ghirisk, Moostung and Kelat,

45. Letter of Capt. Haldane, given in *Asiatic Journal*, Sept. 1841; part II. p. 32. It appears as a quotation, but it is not stated where it was first published.

46. Wood’s *Journey to the source of the River Oxus*, p. 163. Burnes’s *Cabool*, p. 129.

47. See conclusion of preceding chapter, p. 202.

ready to act if required; there appeared no source of alarm of serious mischief from Herat, and no intention of proceeding against it for the present; and as the Brahoes no longer showed themselves in the field, there really seemed nothing for our troops to effect beyond watching the current of events.

Nusseer Khan had meanwhile fallen sick and become tired of remaining a fugitive: he had received the fullest assurance that no more evil was intended him than that of reinstating him on his father's throne—our purpose being now to add Cutchee to Kelat, from which it had been so unwisely disjoined. About the 20th July, Colonel Stacy was written to, intimating that the Khan and his chiefs were in the neighbourhood, and expressive of a wish to see that officer in camp. This was immediately complied with: the boy had been suffering severely from intermittent fever, which the treatment of one of our medical officers speedily relieved. He came into camp without conditions on the 25th July—and Colonel Stacy immediately made preparations to proceed with him to Quettah.

A general order was published on the 9th August at Sukkur, intimating that Nusseer Khan and his adherents were no longer enemies to the British; while the intimation from Lord Auckland already referred to was at the same time circulated, to the effect that the property taken at Kujjuck could not be considered as prize, in consequence of its having been captured in a town of a friendly power, though it was found necessary as a temporary measure to occupy it with British troops. (48)

By the time the Khan and his party reached Moostung, intimation had been received of the demise of Mr Bell, which took place at Quettah on the 1st of August; and it was resolved to remain there until Major Outram's arrival, or until the purposes of government should be definitively made known.

Major Outram, after hearing of the death of Mr Bell, having been detained for a short time at Hyderabad, bringing some political arrangements there in progress to a close, left with a view of taking charge of the affairs of his new appointment, on the 18th of August. The unostentatious celerity of his progress contrasted as much with the pomp and circumstance with which his predecessor moved as did the other portions of the career of the two differ from each other. Mr Bell's escort consisted of 150 horsemen—his rate of travelling was about 10 miles a day. The appointments of Major Outram consisted of one palanquin, with 16 bearers for exchanging, one attendant, four troopers of the irregular horse, and three riding camels.

48. *Bombay Courier*, August 31. No allusion in this order was made to the total destruction of the town: the occupation might have been necessary, but to blow up the walls and burn the bazaars of our friends was a curious mode of manifesting amity!

The distance from Hydrabad to Quettah is 400 miles, including 96 miles of desert and 70 miles of the Bolan Pass: this was traversed in 16 days, the new political agent having arrived at Quettah on the 3d of September.

Sir W. Macnaghten, for what reason does not appear, seemed anxious to take into his own hands the task of closing an arrangement with Nusseer Khan. About the 25th of August a draft of a treaty was forwarded to Moostung, for his subscription, by the Envoy, just before Major Outram's arrival, and when he was known to be on the way. This would have seemed alike strange and inexplicable, but for the passion for diplomacy with which the leading politicals were then afflicted: they seemed never so happy as when endeavouring to over-reach the rude and semi-barbarous tribes, who understood the spirit of treaties, but were totally bewildered and misled by the complex technicalities with which they were crammed; and who, when any of them were neglected, and punishment followed the oversight, always conceived that we had misled them or dealt with them unfaithfully.

After a delay there of a month, the young Khan and his attendants left Moostung immediately on hearing of Major Outram's arrival; he reached Quettah on the 6th Sept. He was received with that kind and frank cordiality which distinguished the manners of the new resident, and he seemed delighted with his reception. Affairs of state are easily arranged when one party is disposed to concede whatever the other can desire: and so it was agreed that they should set out all together as speedily as possible for Kelat, to invest the young sovereign with regal power, and place him with becoming pomp upon the throne of his fathers. About the middle of the month they started, and on the 6th October the Khan was duly invested, the chief Sirdars being previously invited to be present at the ceremony. The following is a short notice by an officer who was present on the occasion:—

"At 2 P. M. the Khan, with his Sirdars and Officers of State, proceeded to the Durbar Tent of the Agency, where the Treaty was ready for signature—it was read by the young Khan himself, and by the Wuzzeer Meolla Mahomed Hussein. The Khan, Sirdars and all were most grateful for the liberal terms on which the British gave him back the country of his ancestors. The Treaty being approved of, it was signed on the spot, and after some quarter of an hour's conversation, the Khan took leave.

"At 4 P. M. Major Outram ascended to the citadel. A circular had been sent round in the morning, notifying that the investiture would take place at 4 P. M. The young Khan, who has ingratiated himself with every body, was ready at the hour appointed—every Officer in Camp paid the Khan the compliment of attending.

"After Major Outram, assisted by Brigadier England and Col. Stacey, had invested him with his complete Khanate Dress, he was seated between the two former, and a Royal Salute announced the completion of the Treaty between the Honorable Company and the Khan of Kelat."

The country as usual was infested with robbers. Dr Owen and Lieut. Mac-

kenzie, 3rd Cavalry, were, in the middle of September, waylaid and robbed, and narrowly escaped murder in the Koochlak Pass, 7 miles north of Quettah; while General Brooks and his party were fired upon in descending the Bolan Pass; but from the time of Nusseer Khan's surrender, there was no hostile movement in Beloochistan of any considerable magnitude against us.

In taking a cursory review of the contents of this and the preceding chapter, which refer exclusively to the affairs of Beloochistan, it will be found that, from the time Sir T. Willshire returned to the plains, when everything was considered to have been settled, our troops in numbers varying from 50 to 2000, had been 15 times engaged with the enemy (49) and four times unsuccessfully. (50) The loss of the enemy on these various occasions must, so near as can be estimated, amount to not much under 2500; our own casualties to about 300 men slain. We lost no fewer than 12 European officers, viz. Col. Wilson, Capts. Rait and Heighington, Lieuts Clarke, Franklin, Williams, Moore, Loveday, Lodge, Falconer, and Creed. All these, save two, had fallen in action, or died of their wounds. Captain Heighington had died from the fatigue of the fight and retreat of Nufoosk; and Lieut. Loveday was murdered. The climate of the countries in which these unhappy operations had been carried on, had among our officers been still more destructive of life than the sword of the enemy. There had died, chiefly from climatic causes within the period under review, Brigadier Stevenson, Major Billamore, Major Liddel, Captains Sutherland, Rebenack, Jones, Beddingfield, and Lewis; Lieuts. Revelly, Hunt, Valiant, Cuerton, Shubrick, and Oliphant, with Drs Carlow and Baines; 16 in all. The death of Mr Bell was not perhaps altogether attributable to the effects of climate.

The destruction of beasts of burthen had during this short but unhappy campaign exceeded the worst apprehensions our most disastrous experience could have led us to form. Of the twelve thousand camels which were collected at Sukkur in August 1841, scarce 3000 could be produced in October 1842: the loss occasioned by this sacrifice of animal life must alone have exceeded £80,000. The total outlay occasioned by the campaign was

49. These "affairs" took place at Deyrah 4th and 12th January (p. 172). Native officer's party of 80 men slaughtered to a man in returning to Kahun, 16th May, (p. 178.) Destruction of Lieut Clarke and convoy, 16th June, (p. 179). Repulse at Nufoosk, (p. 189). Destruction of 25 sepoy, the escort of Captain Bean's revenue moonshee. Attack of the Kakurs on Quettah. Attack on the Brahoes by Lieut. Hammersley at Moostung. Three days' fighting round Dadur. Destruction of Ihaug and Gundava. Attack on the enemy at Kundah. First fighting near Kotra. Affair of Lieut. Vardon in capturing 1100 bullocks. Battle of Kotra. Capture of Kujjuck. Attack on the Brahoes at Mitree.

50. The unsuccessful affairs were Surtol, Nufoosk, Quettah (where the troops, though not beaten, had to retreat into the fort), and Kujjuck.

estimated by the *Friend of India* at £300,000, and no one was less likely to exaggerate in this.

The results were as extraordinary, and still more mortifying, than the expenditure of men and money by which they were achieved. Our rule seems to have been to fight first, and when we became tired of this, to enquire into what we were fighting about. By a strange fatality, every quarrel in which Mr. Bell engaged us, we were compelled to proclaim by our abandonment, unwise, unjust, or oppressive. The system was one of continual doing and undoing, of which the only memorials that were left were the heaps of slain who fell in battle, and the delapidation of a heretofore flourishing treasury.

A slight reference to what has been already related at large and in detail, will illustrate this statement.

In seeking tribute for Kelat, we attacked Deyrah, and slew some 60 of its inhabitants, carrying away the chiefs as captives: we subsequently released the chiefs and solicited their friendship, abandoning all claims of tribute,—it being admitted that none was due. On the same grounds Kahun was taken possession of, and our troops shut up for six months in the fort, one detachment having meanwhile been destroyed, and another defeated by the Murrees. We then left the country, abandoning all our claims against it, granting a free pardon to those who had handled us so roughly, and entreating the friendship of the chiefs on their own terms. Cutchee and Shawl were in 1839 detached from Kelat; the one was re-annexed to it in 1841, the other in 1842. We stripped the chiefs of the former province of their hereditary estates, because they had not made up their title-deeds according to our pleasure; and after six months' fighting with them, we restored the disputed property without making any questions about titles at all. We claimed the customs of Las, which had long before been made over to the chief of Beila, and when an armed resistance was threatened we withdrew our claim. We attacked and destroyed Kujjuck, and then proclaimed that all the property which had been captured would be restored; their town being that of a friendly power whose dominions it had become necessary for a time to occupy. Finally, we expelled Nusseer Khan from the throne of his father in November 1839, and restored him in October 1842; his claims on our gratitude being founded on the two years of war he had carried on against us; Major Outram having afterwards recommended, that, in the event of our retiring from Candahar, we should grant him a subsidy of £15,000 a year (51) instead of assisting him with troops.

The casualties we have already detailed are far from light, but they are trivial in comparison to the damage we sustained from loss of character for truth,

51. Blue Book of 1843, p. 286.

consistency, justice, and integrity. Of unhappy violations of all these we stood self-convicted by the repeated reversals of our policy, which we felt ourselves compelled to resort to.

Just at the very time when the tranquillization of Beloochistan was considered to have been completed, an insurrection broke out at the other extremity of the Doorannee empire, more frightfully momentous and tragical in its results than any recorded in modern history. On the 6th October, the coronation of the young prince was celebrated at Kelat: three days after, General Sale was attacked in the passes near Cabool, and after nearly a month's incessant fighting, found shelter in the fort of Jellalabad, where he was shut up for six months. The general rising which occasioned the destruction of the Cabool garrison, took place a few weeks afterwards. This, however, opens a new chapter in history, on which it is not at present proposed to enter.

This narrative would be incomplete without a short sketch of the history of Major Outram, whose management of Scinde betwixt August 1841, and November 1843, merits the lasting gratitude of his country, and reflects the highest honour on one who has well been termed the Bayard of the Indian Army.⁽⁵²⁾ Major Outram, in requital for services the most meritorious and successful, has experienced nothing but injury and insult from Lord Ellenborough: he has been stripped of office without cause, and remanded to his regiment, when his exertions as an envoy at the court of Hyderabad might have spared us the most discreditable war in which we were ever engaged.

MAJOR OUTRAM.

MR JAMES OUTRAM arrived at Bombay as a gentleman cadet in the Hon. Company's Service on the 15th of August 1819, and very shortly after having joined was appointed adjutant of a newly raised Sepoy regiment, now the Bombay 23d L.I. In those days of military activity, when every month had its conflict or scene of adventure to record, an appointment such as that with which Lieut. Outram was entrusted, was one of the most honourable and responsible so young an officer could have conferred upon him: and no man could have filled it with more credit to himself, or benefit to the army, than the subject of our narrative.

In 1824 the fort of Kittoor, in the Southern Mahratta country, was garrisoned by a party of troops much too weak to withstand severe assault, but unsuspecting, at the same time, of the approach of hostilities. On the 23d of October an insurrection broke out; the resident, Mr Thackeray, with Captains Black and Deighton, were killed, and the whole of the troops were surrounded and taken prisoners. A large force having been dispatched to

52. Speech of Sir C. Napier at a dinner given by the whole of the Officers of the force, at Sukkur, subsequent to Major Outram's loss of office, and prior to his quitting Scinde.

chastise the insurgents, and recover our captive soldiers, Kittoor was taken on the 6th December, with a loss on our side of six only: 1000 of the enemy were believed to have fallen. It was at one time supposed that it would have been necessary to storm the fort, and, at his own request, Lieut. Outram was appointed to lead the forlorn hope. This operation was afterwards found unnecessary, the place having been surrendered without assault; but in the dispatch of Col. Deacon, Lieut. Outram is particularly mentioned, as having, along with Captain Pouget and Lieut. Lawrie, been of the greatest use in the dangerous service of reconnoitering. In 1825 a rebellion having broken out in the western part of Candeish, headed, as was believed, by Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah of Nagpore, the standard of the Peishwa was raised, and the fort of Moolair taken possession of by the rebels. Troops were ordered to advance with the utmost expedition from all the posts around; and reinforcements were summoned from stations so remote as Jaulna and Surat. Lieut. Outram was then at Malligaum. A detachment of 200 men was entrusted to his charge to relieve Meolair, not then known to have fallen. Purposely passing the fort, which he ascertained to have been captured, he pushed on by a rapid and brilliantly-executed night march till he overtook the rebels: completely taken by surprise, and without the remotest idea that an enemy was near, they were attacked, defeated, and dispersed in an inconceivably short space of time. One of the leaders of the insurrection was killed: the fort was retaken, and the first overpowering success followed up with such celerity and vigour, that the whole were reduced to submission before the other detachments, which had been put in orders, were able to reach the scene of action. About this time, Lieut. Outram was appointed to raise a Bheel corps in Candeish, and the countries of the barbarous tribes adjoining. In these remote and savage regions, he, for twelve years, laboured without intermission, laying the foundations of peace and tranquillity in quarters long a refuge for the robber, and converting the ferocious and untutored Bheel into a defender of the peasant and a cultivator of the soil. These people have, till of late, been considered the most barbarous and unteachable of any of the natives of India. They in general go about almost entirely naked; they make no attempt at manufactures, even of the rudest sort, and have scarcely any agriculture; they are all but ignorant of peaceful industry, and live almost entirely by plundering neighbouring tribes. The ruder portions of them are armed with bows and arrows,—in their hands not unformidable weapons. They pay no tax or tribute, and acknowledge no allegiance to any one. They are said to be one of the original races of Central Hindustan. Scarcely a trace of any species of religion is to be found amongst them; they are nominally of the Brahminical faith, but pay no heed to the observances considered essential to this form of belief. Whole brigades had,

year after year, been employed to no purpose to suppress or chastise the outrages committed by these barbarians on the adjoining frontier. To deal with them from within : to convert the disturbers of the peace into its preservers, appeared never to have been thought of ; and indeed with such materials the task seemed hopeless and chimerical enough. Lieut. Outram, at the hourly peril of his life ; proceeded at once and almost alone into the jungle, bent on the execution of his dangerous and all but desperate mission. The nature of the difficulties encountered may be gathered from the means taken to overcome them. It was at first found impossible to make the Bheels comprehend what was desired of them ; and when this had been got over, it was most difficult to find any stimulant or motive adequate to induce them to comply with our wishes. The great seducer of civilised, as of savage men—intoxicating liquor—was at length resorted to. And for months and months together he managed to keep first some hundreds and then several thousands of those speedily destined to become temperate and orderly soldiers, around him by the mere influence of arrack. The men and their future officer began at length to understand each other. They had now been for a time at least detached from their kindred, as well as from their habits of depredation and pillage, and the next thing was to wean them from the excesses by the indulgence in which these things had been effected. It is needless to go into the details of the tedious and dangerous measures by which the drunken savage was converted into the sober, orderly, and steady soldier : it is enough to state, that in five years' time the Bheel corps, if not so temperate or manageable as a sepoy regiment, was equal in sobriety to any English force, and so thoroughly to be depended on, that they were employed with perfect success in the escort of treasure through the very country which so shortly before had furnished the scenes of their own most lawless acts. Succeeding officers have ably and faithfully carried into execution the system thus begun ; but for its plan, and for surmounting the fearful difficulties presenting themselves at its commencement, we are entirely indebted to Major Outram. In 1830 this officer, still a subaltern, was entrusted with the command of a very important expedition, undertaken expressly on his own urgent recommendation, into the countries bordering on the scenes of his recent operations. The force committed to his charge consisted of detachments from regiments of the line, the Bheel corps, the Poonah horse, and other native auxiliaries ; and its object was the invasion of Daung, a strong, jungly, robber country, dividing Candeish from Surat. Sir John Malcolm, then governor of the Western Presidency, doubted the practicability, and feared the results, of such an undertaking, even if set about with double the force which could then be spared : and he yielded only to the urgent entreaties of the officer who recommended it, and who pledged him-

self for its perfect success. Mr Outram's character and thorough knowledge of the neighbouring country and the people around, afforded assurance that any pledge he made on such a subject was likely to be redeemed. Within one month of our advance the entire tribes of a territory till now completely unknown to us, and whose jungles had never been penetrated till entered by our troops, were completely subdued, and the whole of their chiefs and rajahs, amounting to seven in number, were prisoners in Lieutenant Outram's hands. This, considering its magnitude, was one of the most brilliant and successful feats of arms from the time of the Mahratta war.

From Candeish Captain Outram was, in 1833, transferred by the sagacity of the late Sir R. Grant, Governor of Bombay, to the Mahee Cauntz in Guzerat. Inhabited by turbulent and warlike predatory tribes, this country had been for years, almost for ages, a scene of desolation, pillage, and slaughter. Might constituted right, security for life and property was unknown, and year after year military operations, with their attendant evils and transient or doubtful success, became necessary for the protection of our subjects. Within the short space of three years, Captain Outram, by the strength of his intellect, and fertility of his resources, by his unwearied industry and conciliating spirit, brought peace and order where such blessings had before been unknown. This was effected without his having ever, with one single exception, had occasion to resort to arms. The experiment tried with such admirable results in Candeish was here repeated with renewed success: and so stable have these arrangements proved, that for the past seven years tranquillity has scarcely ever been interrupted. Here was organized the Coolie Police corps,—composed, as its name denotes, from the predatory races.

In December, 1838, he joined the army of the Indus, acting as extra A.D.C. to Lord Keane. We had scarcely touched the shores of Scinde when the zeal, promptitude, and indomitable activity of Capt. Outram were of the utmost service to the army. It was not very wonderful that the Ameers of Hyderabad should not be over-zealous in promoting the success of an expedition, one of the objects of which was to render them tributaries to a sovereign whose rule they had renounced, and mulct them at starting of £300,000. The carriage-cattle they had promised had not made their appearance on the arrival of our army at Vikkur, and nothing but the efforts of Capt. Outram in procuring camels from Cutch enabled them to advance at the time they did. His adventures on the expedition of Lord Keane are so fully given in the First Chapter of this narrative that they may here be safely omitted. Though he lost the favour of the Commander-in-Chief he was repeatedly thanked by the Supreme Government, as well as the Shah Soojah, for his exertions. In 1840 he was appointed Resident at Hyderabad,

d Political Agent for Lower Scinde, and as has just been seen, he, in August 1841, was promoted to the charge of the whole country from Quettah to Kurrachee.

We have had repeated occasion to refer to the sad disrepute into which our hitherto unimpeachable character for good faith and veracity had fallen under the administration of Mr Ross Bell. The bitter stigma which the order of an advance on Cabool occasioned, after the Sirdars had agreed to every proposition we had made to them, was infinitely more merited in western than in eastern Afghanistan—where we were said “to have taught every chief to lie and cheat by our example.” (53) Major Outram’s two years’ residence at Hyderabad had made the natives well aware of his character as a soldier and politician. Intimately acquainted with the principles, prejudices, manners, and feelings of the semi-barbarians with whom he had to deal; he was by nature eminently fitted to command their respect and esteem. Brave, determined, prompt and decided in all his proceedings; he was forbearing, frank, and forgiving. He was as destitute as any man alive of those jesuitical qualities which appear occasionally to be considered essential to good statesmanship amongst the class of diplomists who appear to think that no negotiation can claim the character of skill which is not marked by dissimulation, disingenuousness, and concealment, or which would not readily avail itself of direct fraud could its objects be forwarded thereby. In Mr Bell’s time, the chiefs never appear to have treated with us without a suspicion that, in some way or other, they were meant to be overreached. In that of his successor they were told at once what was desired of them; their expostulations, if they had any to offer, were duly considered and yielded to at *first*, if found reasonable; and they knew that whatever Major Outram said, whether as threat or promise, would be made good whatever might be the consequences. He permitted his intercourse with them to be interrupted by no parade of ceremony—to be perverted by the intervention of no third parties. On all occasions they found access to him personally, and at once had their case listened to with patience, and decided on with justice and moderation without a moment’s delay. Where any thing was suspected of being wrong, Major Outram was on the spot to examine and inquire for himself, and that with a rapidity of movement which cast the celerity of their own wild forays into the shade. Before he had been three months in power, he found that distrust had vanished: that he had done as much as mortal man could accomplish in

53. Ukhbar Khan’s remark to Captain Troup on his having returned from Jellalabad with the treaty unratified. Unhappily, the charge of the Sirdar against our Government is fully borne out by the evidence of the Blue Book! Surely impeachment is barely enough for those who have done so much to defile the fair and unsullied fame of England in the East.

remedying the injury his predecessor had inflicted on our character. We once more became trusted: the veracity of the political agent, instead of being a subject of mockery and derision, was looked upon as inviolable—as it was wont throughout the east to have been, till these unhappy wars began.

The result was even more auspicious than could have been anticipated; showing what deep cause we have for grief, that the system which led to it was not earlier resorted to and practised over a far wider field.

From October 1841, when our misfortunes began, till November 1842, when they had been fully and finally retrieved, and the policy which led to them was for a time abandoned and repudiated, there occurred not betwixt Quettah and the sea, either in Scinde or Beloochistan, a single exhibition of hostility or distrust towards us: though at this time there was not one solitary tribe from Pesheen to Peshawur, including the districts around Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabool, and Jellalabad, which had not attacked us. The invaluable services of Major Outram in collecting baggage-cattle, forwarding treasure, and hastening and facilitating the advance of troops, in a great measure contributed to our ultimate success. His conduct in this respect appears at the time to have been appreciated both by the late and the present Governor-General. In the despatches published in the Blue Book it is repeatedly mentioned in terms of the greatest approbation; and Lord Auckland, since his return to England, has, in Parliament, bestowed on it the highest commendations. There were few who could be persuaded of the desperate position to which the Dooranee alliance had reduced the finances of India by the end of 1841; a position which, if no insurrection had occurred, would, before the close of 1842, have compelled us, under any circumstances, to have retired from the country; and Major Outram appeared for a time to believe, notwithstanding the assurances of Government to the contrary, that so soon as the insurrection was subdued we should resume the place we held before it began. No man more deeply deplored the resolution for a time adopted by the Government, of retiring from the country before any attempt to retrieve our reverses had been made. He recommended that Candahar and Jellalabad should, at all events, be held as outposts for the year 1842, (54) and deprecating in the strongest manner the withdrawal of the garrison of Sir R. Sale, he stated, that he did not conceive that a measure more injurious to our interests in Afghanistan, or one more likely to endanger our character there and in India, could have been devised by our bitterest enemy. These views were fully concurred in by Mr Clerk and Major Rawlinson, who proposed a formal invasion of the country for next year. Farther on, when

54. Blue Book, p. 197. Sir J. Nicolls' letter to the Governor in Council, March 30, 1842; given *verbatim*.

General Nott had been reinforced by the brigade of General England, and fully supplied with carriage, Major Outram recommended that a direct movement should be made from Candahar on Cabool, without waiting for General Pollock, whose force was unable to proceed for want of carriage, and was, besides, not necessary,—the Candahar army being strong enough to accomplish every object the government had in view. (55) Had this advice been followed, the achievements undertaken at such enormous hazard in September and October, might have been accomplished in June—the troops retiring by Jellalabad, without General Pollock incurring the cost, risk, and tremendous labour and loss of money, in penetrating the defiles beyond Gundamuck. It is not exactly known from what cause Major Outram incurred the displeasure, and drew down the manifestations of spite so meanly vented on him shortly afterwards by the Governor-General. He remained in full favour up to the beginning of May, at which time it was intimated to him that he was to be appointed Envoy at the court of Hyderabad—hostilities against the Ameers not having at this period been dreamt of. The source of offence is said to have been the friendly interest taken by him in Lieutenant Hammersley, assistant political at Quettah. General England, with a reinforcement of 1200 men, and convoy of 1500 camels, and £45,000 of treasure, while on his way to Candahar, where the troops were suffering extremely for want of medicine, and were disabled for field service from deficiency of cash and carriage, was met at Hykulzye by a force of the enemy said to have been nearly 800 strong. An ill-advised attempt to storm *in line*! a hillock which might easily have been turned or commanded, occasioned the repulse of the storming party of 180, when, to the astonishment of every officer in the force, the whole brigade was ordered to retreat a distance of 25 miles, and immediately on arriving at Quettah, commenced entrenching themselves as if for a siege, leaving the troops of General Nott to their fate. For a much more venial error Admiral Byng had been tried and shot. A despatch, making a fearful parade of dangers and difficulties, in reference to which no information had been provided by the political agent, was forwarded to the Supreme Government, and Lieutenant Hammersley was dismissed. Major Outram wrote to Lord Ellenborough entreating him to suspend judgment on this point, until enquiry had been made as to the nature of the Hykulzye defences, and the time occupied in their construction, both of which were represented by General England in such a formidable light that the political agent ought to have been informed of the matter. The officers

55. This was exactly the doctrine laid down by the *Bombay Times* so far back as March, and insisted on so long as there appeared to be any intention of advancing at all—that if a demonstration on Cabool was to be made, General Nott might advance with a brigade of 5000, leaving 5000 at Candahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and level every town in Affghanistan if deemed expedient.

of General England's army were almost unanimously of opinion that the Hykulzye despatch was a tissue of the most grievous mis-statements. To the recommendation for inquiry the Governor-General did not think fit to accede.(56) The perfect facility with which the same ground was gone over by the same detachment exactly a month afterwards, shewed that it was neither the existence of defences nor the want of information, but the gross mismanagement of the commanding officer, which occasioned the retreat from Hykulzye before an inferior force: the only disgraceful military measure (those at Cabool excepted) which occurred during the war. Lieut. Hammersley's health had suffered from the extent of his exertions and the insalubrity of the climate; and this harsh, ungenerous, and unjust decision, proved fatal to him.

Major Outram had now committed an unpardonable offence in interposing in behalf of his friend; and he also must be victimized. From the 2d of May, when the intention of appointing him envoy to the court of Hydrabad was announced to him, on to the 19th of October, he heard no more on the subject; but had no reason to suppose the resolution of the Governor-General in his favour altered. A notification in the *Gazette* of the latter date intimated his summary removal from all political employ, placing his services at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief for regimental duty; his salary and allowances to cease from the 15th November, the duties of political agent hereafter to be discharged by the extra Aides-de-Camp of General Napier.(57) On the 4th of November he received a public dinner at Sukkur previously to his departure for Bombay. General Napier presided, and except those who were detained by indisposition, of the officers belonging to an army of nearly 10,000 men scarcely one was absent. The gallant chairman wisely avoided all allusion to public affairs, especially to the treatment their guest had recently experienced. He proposed his health as the "Bayard of the Indian army—the *Chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*." On his arrival at Bombay a similar testimony of public regard awaited him: he was entertained on the 13th December by a party of upwards of 100, including the Secretaries and Aides-de-Camp of the Governor, the Secretaries of Government, heads of all the departments, the Judges, senior Civil Servants and Staff Officers, and the whole elite of the Presidency. Had he gone the round of India he would probably have met with compliments similarly gratifying at every mi-

56 Blue Book, p. 267, Lord Ellenborough's letter to the Secret Committee, 8th June; the wording of this letter has, in the text, been pretty closely adhered to.

57. It must be kept in view, that the order applied to all the *Scinde* politicals; Major Outram was included amongst the common herd; not the slightest notice being now taken of his services. The conduct of the Governor-General has been apologized for on the plea that a functionary such as Major Outram was no longer required in *Scinde*. The appointment of Lieut. Brown as commissioner, shews that this excuse is baseless.

litary station in the Company's territories. He at this time proposed to proceed to England on furlough. No sooner had Sir C. Napier taken in hand to unravel the tangled skein of Scindian politics, than he found that a task had been imposed on him which he was wholly unable to execute. He applied to the Supreme Government for assistance, and was permitted to request the services of Major Outram; the Governor-General had not the courtesy to make the nomination direct,—it was done by Sir C. Napier. After slights and insults such as these, Major Outram might readily have excused himself from assuming a subordinate appointment where he had, three months before, been supreme, on the plea that he had made arrangements for immediate return to England; he never thought of this; he had for twenty years devoted his life to the service of his Government without the most remote idea of indulging in personal feeling; and now, when required to resume the duties of an office from which he had been so lately and summarily discarded, he set private arrangements and personal considerations at naught, and started at once for Kurrachee. His appearance on the 4th January in Sir C. Napier's camp, and subsequent interview with the Ameers, made almost an instantaneous change in the aspect of affairs—it inspired confidence of our peaceful and honest intentions in the bosoms of the Chiefs, who were at once willing to accept Major Outram as a referee, and to be guided by his decisions on any question of misunderstanding betwixt them and the Supreme Government. The Governor-General had by this time resolved to have terms proposed to the Ameers so injurious and insulting; that compliance with them could never have been expected. The object was to bring them into such total subjection that their independence would hereafter be virtually annihilated: or to force a quarrel on them which might compel conflict and afford us a pretence for conquering the country. Having succeeded in inducing them to subscribe the treaty: there were certain secret and most exorbitant stipulations contained in separate instructions, which he was directed to insist upon, but which the Ameers could not be prevailed on to comply with. While yet at court, and in hopes that he might induce them to concede even these, General Napier continued to advance steadily on Hyderabad with a force of 2,700 men. The Ameers intimated to Major Outram, that unless the army halted until negotiations had finally been broken off or concluded, they would be compelled to move out and protect their capital, from which our troops, whose object could no longer be mistaken, were now only 30 miles off: and they fully warned the Commissioner, that unless he retired, they could not further be answerable for his safety. Anxious to avert a conflict which he clearly foresaw would be a desperate and bloody one, and in expectation that he might still be enabled to obtain by persuasion that which Sir C. Napier was prepared to extort by force; he remained after he had received a first, and then a second formal warning to

depart, or until he and his escort of 100 men were attacked by 8000 of the enraged Beloochees now on the eve of marching forth to the fatal field of Meeanee. Above 90 of the enemy were killed in the defence, and Major Outram expressed a fervent but not sanguine hope, "that their deaths might not be charged on him as murders." He considered the attack on himself as perfectly justifiable by the laws even of Christian war; and conceived, that so far were the Ameers from being chargeable with the treachery imputed to them by the Governor-General, that they had acted a thoroughly candid, friendly, and generous part, till forced to betake themselves to arms. Major Outram joined Sir C. Napier on the eve of the battle of Meeanee, at which he was not, however, present, having been directed to take in hand the dangerous and troublesome service of destroying by fire the Shikargurs which protected the enemy. He returned to Bombay immediately after the victory, having left Hyderabad on the 21st, and reached the presidency on the 26th February. It was resolved that on this occasion a Sword, to the value of 300 guineas, should be presented to him by his friends: the subscription list was filled up with the utmost celerity; and had it been extended to the services throughout India at large, £3000 would, in all likelihood, have been got as readily as £300. The following inscription was desired to be engraven on the blade:—"Presented to Major James Outram, 23d Regt. Bombay Native Light Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the British residency at Hyderabad in Scinde, on the 15th February 1843, against an army of 8000 Beloochees, with six guns;" on the opposite side were the words—"sans peur et sans reproche." He sailed for England on the 1st April. The stand made at the residency was considered so admirable, that Sir C. Napier made it a subject of separate memorial for the Governor-General, as an example of the defence of a military post. (58) No notice was ever taken of this by government, and Major Outram now remains the only officer who did duty near Hyderabad whose services have not been publicly noticed in any way by Government. His brethren in arms who could appreciate his heroic virtues, were not slow in expressing their sentiments on the subject: the rulers he served alone remained silent! It may be added, in conclusion, that when he temporarily resumed his political duties, he declined to accept of any remuneration; and that while acting as Com-

58. This is in part an assumption; Sir Charles, at the close of his despatch of the 18th February, promises to send this, and there is no reason to doubt that the promise was fulfilled: the text gives nearly the words of the despatch—proceeding thus far on the hypothesis as to the paper having been forwarded.

missioner in Scinde, betwixt the 19th December and 20th February, he was only in the receipt of the pay and allowances of a Captain of the 23d N.L.I. He proposes to remain two years in Europe; by the time of his return it is to be hoped that the Government of India will be in the hands of some one capable of appreciating the worth of services such as his.

CHAPTER VI.

Events near Cabool in the beginning of 1841—Brigading of the Troops in Affghanistan—Shelton's Brigade leaves Ferozepore—Alleged reduction of the Army—Expedition into the Naxian valley in February—Lieut. Figon killed by an explosion—Captain Douglas shot—Arrival of the 3d Convoy at Cabool—Return of the Shah and Envoy to the Capital—Arrogance of the Shah—Selkh affairs—Death of Kurruck Sing—Of Nao Nehal Sing—Shere Sing proclaimed King—Dissipated habits of—His coronation—Queen Dowager declared pregnant—Shere Sing withdraws himself—A revolution in the Army—He is restored to the throne—Tranquillity of the Punjab—Captain Broadfoot's convoy—Death of one of the Royal Ladies—Danger of the Convoy—Coolness and good conduct of Captain Broadfoot—Arrives at Peshawur—Scene of Narrative changes—Suftur Jung Governor of Candahar—His misconduct and dissipation—Discontents in the Ghilzie country—Expedition to Ghirisk—Detachments of the Shah's troops destroyed—Captain Farrington sets out—Pursues Ukhtar Khan and defeats him on the Helmund—Major Tod's arrival from Herat—Reinforcements sent to Ghirisk—Major Lynch's management of the Ghilzie country—Resolves to fortify Kelat-i-Ghilzie—Unhappy affair at Kulla i-Ingoz—General rising of the country—Colonel Wymer's reinforcement from Candahar—Defeats the enemy—Detachment from Ghuznie quartered at Mookloor—Colonel Chambers's expedition—Success of Captain Walker and Lieut. Bassett—Captain Woodburn's Detachment sent to Ghirisk—Battle with Ukhtar Khan on the Helmund—Misconduct of the Janbaz Horse—Brilliant victory Expedition under Captain Griffin—Battle with Ukhtar Khan's troops—Great slaughter of the enemy—Expedition under Colonel Wymer into the Teeree country—Capture of Akram Khan—His execution—Colonel Maclaren's Brigade leaves for India—Directed to return and proceed to Cabool—Advance found impossible—Posts in Western Affghanistan in October 1841—Affairs at Cabool—Expedition into the Zoomut Valley—Strength of Army in Eastern Affghanistan—Ghilzie insurrection occasioned by stoppage of tribute—Conclusion—Loss of life during the Affghan war—Loss of Treasure—Sir W. Macnaghten's letter on presenting Sir Alexander Burnes's memorial—Apathy of the people at home—Lord Palmerston's Tiverton speech—Proposed continuation and subsequent abandonment of our Affghan policy—Reflections on the conduct of the Political Agents—Noble conduct of the Army—Conclusion.

THE history of the events in Beloochistan and Scinde arising out of our connection with the Doorannee sovereign has, in last chapter, been brought down to the commencement of the Ghilzie insurrection, when our alliance may be said to have terminated, the whole of its objects having been frustrated : from this time we remained in the country, in the first place until we could find the means of retiring from it ; and afterwards, on second thoughts, till some signal mark of our vengeance had been inflicted on the Affghans for daring to dispute our right to make a causeless invasion into their territories,—and for having conducted that dispute with the falsehood, perfidy, and vindictiveness characteristic of the quarter of the globe to which they belonged.

The thread of the narrative, in order of time running parallel with this, requires now to be resumed at Cabool, where it was broken off at the close of the third chapter, with the account of the surrender of Dost Mahomed in

November 1840, and the temporary and partial tranquillity which immediately thereafter ensued. This auspicious state of repose was of short duration; so soon as the season for active operations opened, one general ferment of discontent and insurrection made its appearance from Ghirisk to Jellalabad: a condition of matters which was never remedied or allayed during the period of our continuance in the country.

The following order was issued on the 28th of January, for the brigading of the troops in Affghanistan: (1) the first brigade of infantry, stationed at Cabool, and consisting of H. M.'s 13th, the 16th, 35th, and 37th Bengal N. I., to be under the command of Sir Robert Sale; Capt. Wade, of H. M.'s 13th, acting as major of brigade. The Candahar, or second brigade, under the charge of General Nott, was to consist of the 2d, 42d, and 43d N. I. The third brigade, consisting of H. M.'s 44th, the 27th and 54th N. I., was to be commanded by Colonel Shelton: it was at this time at Jellalabad. These three brigades comprised nine regiments of the line, of which two were Queen's and seven Company's, and contained probably about 7,500 men. This was exclusive of the Bombay troops at Quetta in Beloochistan, and Scinde,—as well as of cavalry, artillery, the Shah's contingent, and all irregulars,—which brought up the strength of the army required to be paid by the East India Company for the maintenance of the Dooranee alliance, to betwixt 25,000 and 30,000 men. Loose as the statement appears, it is difficult to make it more specific, from the fluctuating strength of the irregulars, which constituted nearly one half of the contingent.

When these arrangements were made, Colonel Shelton was still on his march. He left Ferozepore on the 8th December, 1840, reached Peshawur in the beginning of January, and arrived at Jellalabad about the 25th of that month. He crossed the convoy accompanying Dost Mahomed to Hindostan, at Rawul Pindee, on the 6th January. The Kaffila escorted by Colonel Shelton's troops is commonly known as the second convoy of the season; the first having been that under Colonel Wallace, mentioned in a previous chapter, and usually termed the grand convoy. The third convoy left Ferozepore on the 31st January: it was escorted by a wing of the 5th N. I., a detachment of H. M.'s troops (details of the 13th and 44th) under Captain Havelock, and a detachment of the Company's under Captain Manning and Lieut. Pottinger, some artillery drafts under Lieut. Brougham, and a Goorkah detachment under Lieut. Crawford; the whole was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Oliver. (2) General Elphinstone and Brigadier Anquetil accompanied this force, together with Major Thane and Lieut. Eyre—all names of men speedily destined to occupy a conspicu-

1. *Calcutta Government Gazette*, January 28.

2. *Delhi Gazette*, February 3.

ous place amongst the fearful events which followed ten months afterwards. Sir Willoughby Cotton crossed them on his return three marches on their way : he reached Ferozepore on the 6th February.

The 1st Bengal European regiment, and two companies of the 27th N. I., which had accompanied the grand convoy, under Colonel Wallace, were sent back to India under command of Colonel Wheeler, as an escort to Sir W. Cotton. These were replaced by Shelton's brigade, and the troops attending the second and third convoys, about 4000 in all, as a substitute for 1100 withdrawn. These changes were afterwards censured as premature withdrawals of the troops from Afghanistan,—three men being sent where one was intended to be taken away !

The most continuous and uninterrupted series of disorders requiring to be enumerated occurred in 1841 near Candahar ; and that the narrative of these may be left unbroken, a slight departure from strict chronological order will permit the expedition of Colonel Shelton into the Nazian valley to be noticed without breaking in upon the history of the squabbles with the Western Ghilzies : those to the east and south of Cabool having given little trouble from the month of February till the great and disastrous outbreak of October.

Colonel Shelton, when on his way from Ferozepore, was directed by the Envoy to proceed from Jellalabad to chastise a refractory tribe called the Sungoo Kail, inhabiting the Nazian valley. For this purpose, a strong force marched from Jellalabad on the 21st February, consisting of a detachment of Sappers and Miners, and a troop of Horse Artillery with four guns, H. M.'s 44th, and the 27th N. I. Troops of the Shah Soojah consisting of a detachment of the mountain train, 1 squadron of the 2d Cavalry, 3d Infantry Regiment, and 1st corps of Janbaz Cavalry. This force arrived at Pesh Bolack, a distance of about twenty-three miles, on the 23d, and was joined by Captain Ferris's corps of Jezailchies, and the 3d Regiment of Janbaz. Quitting this post on the morning of the 24th,⁽³⁾ the Nazian valley was entered by the Sarobi Pass soon after daybreak. The force having been divided, Colonel Shelton advanced up the centre of the valley with six companies of H. M.'s 44th under Colonel Mackerell, a similar number of the 27th N. I. under Col. Palmer, (4) and two guns under Capt. Nicholl: The 1st Shah's Janbaz regiment, the 2d cavalry, and two hundred Jezailchees, under Hyder Alli, a native commandant, proceeded from the left flank along the high ground, closing the valley on the east side : the remainder of this corps, moving from the extreme right of the detachment, under Captain Ferris, were to attack the enemy on the left : two companies of

3. Brigadier Shelton's Despatch.

4. This officer with his regiment (27th N. I.) was shut up in Ghuznie in the following November, and became a prisoner in March 1842, remaining in the hands of the enemy till September.

H.M.'s 44th, and two of the 27th N.I., supported by detachments from the same regiments, with two six-pounder guns, under Captains Scott and Swayne, moved along the heights on the west of the valley. A strong body of regulars and irregulars made a considerable detour so as to enter by the eastern pass the dell, which was thus hemmed in on all sides, Captain Ferris came in almost immediate contact with the enemy: he attacked them with great spirit, pursuing them with the most determined gallantry over almost inaccessible heights, and driving them before him under a galling fire. The Jezailchees suffered severely in the performance of this service. The insurgents were retiring with their women and children, and driving off their flocks, inclining the line of their retreat so as to get out of reach of our fire with all convenient speed, when Hyder Ali, with his two hundred Jezailchees, met them and captured most of their cattle: Lieutenant Golding, with his Janbaz, made a successful charge upon the fugitives, and destroyed a considerable number in their attempts to escape. Some skirmishing had, meanwhile, occurred up and down the valley, where the conduct of the troops was excellent, and their success complete. A few men still held out in two of the forts, till the gates were blown open by powder-bags. The explosion on the second occasion proved fatal to Lieutenant Pigou of the Engineers, who, with the utmost coolness and gallantry, conducted the operations. He was blown up and killed: his body falling at a distance of about eighty yards from the place of explosion. The Nazian valley is about eight miles in length, studded from end to end, on both sides, with forts. Nearly the whole were in our possession by a little after noon, the advance of the troops having been one continued course of success. Our casualties amounted to eighteen killed, and thirty-four wounded: those of the enemy were estimated at from forty to fifty killed and wounded. The following day the same force proceeded into a secluded valley adjoining, similarly defended, and sprinkled with forts, but of which scarcely any thing was known: they continued as formerly to carry every thing before them. The ground over which the march had to be performed was difficult: the defiles were deep, narrow, and appalling; the heights requiring to be crowned by the flanking parties rugged and precipitous. The loss of Captain Douglas, who was shot dead by the side of his commander, was the only casualty which occurred, and by the evening of the 25th, eighty-two forts had been captured. (5) The force returned to camp, having fulfilled the objects of the expedition in devastating a valley whose inhabitants had proved refractory on the usual subject of tribute, it is presumed: though the occasion or manner in which the insubordination for which they were chastised manifested itself, is not stated. The third convoy of the season, which, as already noticed,

5. Colonel Shelton's Despatch, 25th February.

commenced its march on the 1st February, was now well on its way towards the Attock, and Captain Broadfoot, escorting a portion of the Shah's family, had just entered, or was about to enter, the Seikh territory, where the dispute for the succession betwixt the Dowager Princess and Shere Singh was threatening disorder.

The third brigade, in consequence of the disturbances apprehended in the Punjaub, was meanwhile ordered to stand fast at Jellalabad, to watch the progress of events. The third convoy arrived in safety on the 4th April: General Elphinstone having preceded them by four days. The 54th N. I. and a squadron of the Light Cavalry were ordered to proceed to Gunda-muck on the 8th to keep open the way for the convoy itself, which, accompanied by its former escort, marched on the 9th. The Shah Soojah, attended by the Envoy and court, who had, as in the first year of the new reign, taken up his winter quarters at Jellalabad, was enabled by the guard of the convoy to return to Cabool on the 30th of April, accompanied by General Elphinstone, who, as already mentioned, took the place of Sir Willoughby Cotton in the command of the forces in Affghanistan—a brief, troubled, and disastrous charge. The arrogance of the weak and unhappy monarch had grown upon him, as might have been expected, by the adulation which was paid to him, and the actual power which our friendship had enabled him to exercise compared to the mere nominal authority he had formerly possessed when on the throne. Punctilious at all times, he now gave full rein to that small-minded and miserable selfishness which furnished the most prominent feature in his character; insisting on the minutest observance of etiquette and ceremony. (6)

6. The following extract of a letter of Sir William Macnaghten's, accompanying the report of Sir A. Burnes on the Consolidation of Affghanistan, to which we have already had occasion to refer, sufficiently indicates the excessively exaggerated view taken of his majesty's excellences by the envoy in August 1840:—"His Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should be done to all his subjects. His Majesty sits in durbar every morning, except Thursday, for about two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to the representations of his chiefs. One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of all those who may allege that they have not received redress from the authorities to whom their cases have been referred.—Though stern in the execution of justice (as was exemplified only the other day in the case of the murderer in whose pardon so much influence was exerted) yet His Majesty is morciful and kind-hearted in the extreme; and if the personal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity, Shah Soojah could not fail to obtain it. My longer experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly convinces me of the truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler or a better man than himself in all his dominions."—The subjoined extract from a private journal kept by Sir Alexander Burnes up to the day before his murder, and preserved by Mohun Lal, will show how completely the opinions of Sir W. Macnaghten were shortly afterwards changed:—

"Cabool, 1st September, 1841. * * * An expression from Mao-

The Envoy, who continued to profess the highest opinion of the excellences of the Shah's character and of his capacity for government, indulged him in the silliest whims, and most absurd and troublesome caprices. On his return to the capital an order was issued that no officer should ride through, or even enter, the Bala Hissar, unless required so to do as a matter of duty. A fort which Captain Mainwaring had purchased at a large price, as a residence, as well as one of the commissariat stores, were directed to be abandoned or removed as being too near the royal gardens!

The history of Seikh affairs, from the death of Runjeet Sing, in July 1839, to the accession of Shere Sing, is well worthy of a separate chapter: it may be sufficient here to remark, that the Lion of the Punjaub having been quietly succeeded by his son, the weak and imbecile Kurruck Sing, this prince was cut off on the 5th November after a lingering and painful illness, aggravated by the prescriptions of native physicians, which alone he could be persuaded to attend to. His body was burned, and one of his wives with three or four of her hand-maidens, were immolated on the funeral pyre. His only son and heir, Nao Nehal Sing, was killed the same day by the falling of a beam in one of the city gates on returning from his father's obsequies.

Two days after this Shere Sing, Governor of Cashmere, was proclaimed Sovereign. This prince was the son of one of the wives of Runjeet Sing, but born on an occasion when her husband had been so long absent from home, as to leave little doubt as to his illegitimacy. He was, however, treated as a prince of the blood, though not considered heir to the throne. He was made governor of Cashmere: was a man of both energy and ability, but of habits so extremely dissipated, that he was much estranged from the old Lion himself, whose own manner of life should have made him in the last degree forbearing towards the frailties of his imputed son. Shere Sing hastened to Lahore and was duly installed on the musnud. Meanwhile one of the wives of Kurruck Sing was declared pregnant, and shut up in the zenana;—a large party, including the European officers taken into pay by Runjeet Sing, being attached to her cause. This looked formidable, and though the people clung to the prince, the strength of his party continued for a time to decline, when at length he professed to have abdicated and retired from power. This was merely a ruse to enable him to visit those districts where he was popular, and to raise and collect his friends for a further effort. A revolution took place early in January, the

nighten to-day that 'the Shah Soojah was an old woman not fit to rule his people, with divers other condemnations.'—Aye, see my Travels so far back as 1831."

prince returned towards the city, the leading men joined him on the way, and the army went over to his standard under the walls of Lahore. Generals Court, Ventura, and Avitabile had been brought over, and before the end of the month, the new ruler was seated on the throne; the princess having been persuaded to abandon further claims for the present but not till after offering a stout defence, in which 2000 of her followers are said to have fallen. These events occasioned much commotion through the country, the troops becoming mutinous and disorderly, and acting as brigands on the chief lines of route. No serious mischiefs, luckily, arose out of these disorders, whose aspect at one time had been so alarming. By the commencement of the hot season matters were so far tranquillized that the Sikh troops were entrusted with the conveyance of treasure for our armies.

About the end of March, Captain Broadfoot left Ferozepore with a weak detachment of sepoys, a small body of Ghoorkas, and a detachment of Alexander's horse—in all about 1000 strong, one half only being regular infantry,—in charge of a portion of the family of the Shah Soojah, including about 100 ladies, who had not till now rejoined him. Soon after he entered the Punjaub, the country became much disturbed; several regiments had mutinied, and bands of robbers marauded all over the kingdom. As the ladies' jewels were valuable, and the convoy had a considerable quantity of property in charge, a strong inducement to attack was held out to men ever ready to plunder under the slightest of temptations. Much sickness prevailed, and nearly 150 sepoys are said to have deserted. An accident occurred early on the march, eminently illustrative of eastern manners, in reference to the seclusion in which the females of the higher ranks are maintained. A restive camel threw its load, consisting of one of the wives of his majesty, concealed with as much privacy as a camel litter would permit. The beast fell heavily upon his burthen, which now entangled him. In a moment an European officer was on the spot, anxious to release the suffering captive; who amidst all the terror and torture which the struggles of the restive animal must have occasioned, deprecated interference, and entreated that no man might approach to subject her to sufferings worse than death,—that of being seen! She was so injured that she died a few hours afterwards. Though repeatedly threatened, the prudent conduct and bold front at all times manifested by Captain Broadfoot, overawed the rebels. His chief danger was near Attock, where the occupants of a stockade first threatened an immediate attack on him. Though outnumbering his force by about six to one in strength, he sent a peremptory mandate to them, intimating that unless they immediately gave him what assistance was required to help him on his way, he would compel them; and that if they continued to maintain the present unfriendly attitude, he would attack and destroy

their fort. It was easier to make this threat than to carry it into execution; but the bold confidence it implied, served the purposes desired. Entrenchments meanwhile were dug, and defences thrown up, and the most active preparations made for hostilities. The Seikhs even proceeded so far as to plunder the women's travelling litters, having got it into their heads that they carried treasure. They next secured several of our cattle, and some of the chiefs came into camp and became insolent. Finding that Captain Broadfoot was not to be bullied, they produced a letter from Genl. Avitabile, assuring him of protection. This was thrown back in their faces—they were told that fifty letters from the General would not make thieves honest men; and that they must restore every thing they had taken, or they would be instantly attacked; and that if this was not done in ten minutes, they would be treated as criminals. They now became terrified, and did as they were desired. Alarmed and humbled, they permitted the convoy to cross the Attock and proceed towards Peshawur, where it arrived in safety on the 18th May. Such, however, had been the alarm for their safety, that Col. Shelton proceeded by forced marches through the pass with H.M.'s 44th, 1st troop 1st brigade H. A., two squadrons of the 5th L. C., with the 27th and 54th N. L., to assist him in case of need—or at all events to show the Seikhs that aid was at hand. Their duties were happily limited to those of an escort from Jumrood to Jelallabad. They reached Cabool on the 17th June; a party of the Sappers having been left behind to look after the magazine stores at Gundamuck.

To the northward and westward of Cabool though discontent was general, and casual outbreaks of a trivial nature not unfrequent, no affair of any considerable importance occurred betwixt the surrender of Dost Mahomed and the general rising which took place exactly that day twelve-month—on the 2d November 1841. To the south the Ghilzies and Khyberrees were liberally rewarded for the use of their passes; and just so long only as their stipend of £8000 a-year was paid in full, did they remain at peace.

The scene of the narrative which relates to the warlike proceedings of summer 1841 must now be shifted to the westward. At Candahar popular discontent appeared to be approaching a crisis just as matters around Cabool were becoming tranquillized by the surrender of Dost Mahomed on the 3d November. (7) Sufter Jung, son of Shah Soojah, had been appointed governor of the town and province, with a salary of £1700 a-year. The whole of the offspring of the Doorannee sovereign—Prince Timour alone excepted—appeared to have been men of the most worthless character, and depraved and dissipated habits. The Candahar governor was a wretch too execrable

7. See Chapter III., p. 162.

to live. He is said frequently to have increased an income of £140 a-month to £10,000, by extortion alone: on one occasion, he put a merchant to the torture on some frivolous pretence, and released him only when £300 had been paid by his relations for his liberation. The money thus villainously obtained was squandered in the grossest sensuality, and in shameless and excessive indulgence in a vice not uncommon in the east, which in Europe is reckoned so infamous, above all others, as to be nameless. (8) On one occasion he managed to entice some Europeans into his residence, and, having drugged them with brandy, took advantage of their helpless condition. One of them afterwards poisoned himself. The political agent was not allowed to interfere with the pleasures of the Prince, whose misconduct was thus bringing scandal on the British name. (9) The contrast betwixt the family of the late and present ruler was most disadvantageous to us: the sons of Dost Mahomed being so remarkable for their good conduct, and manly, soldier-like, and intelligent bearing, as to make a deep impression on every European who came in contact with them. (10) By the middle of December the country was threatened with a general insurrection—discontent was at its highest pitch everywhere, and the detestation of the Shah Soojah, intense and universal as it had now become, was too manifest to be disputed by the most devoted of his friends. A detachment of 800 men—a sort of armed police—provided with a couple of guns, having been sent to the westward to collect revenue on the banks of the Helmund, were attacked by the enemy and defeated, 400 or 500 of them having been killed and their guns taken. Such a casualty demanded instant attention from the authorities. About this time a detachment, consisting of the 1st troop Shah's Artillery, 2nd N.I., and 1st Cavalry, with 2 guns and some Irregular Horse, was dispatched from Candahar by General Nott, under charge of Captain Farrington, into the Zamin Dawur country, for the purpose of dispersing a body of rebels assembled under a chief named Akhtar Khan. (11) They reached Koosh-kina-Khood on the 28th December, and halted on the following day to permit Lieut. Elliott, the political agent, to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 30th, they proceeded to Sungboor, 16 miles in the direction of Saerwan-killah, where the detachment of the Shah's troops, under Mahomed Allum Khan had the evening before been completely worsted, his guns and baggage having been captured by the insurgents. This success on the

8. *Agra Ukhbar*, Nov. 7.—*Bombay Times*.

9. Letter of the medical attendant of the prince.—*Bombay Times*, October 21, 1840.

10. Letters from the late Dr. Grant, Bombay medical service.—*Bombay Times*.

11. Captain Farrington's despatch, 4th January, 1841.

part of the enemy was likely to acquire for them many new adherents, and as their force was now making formidable head, Capt. Farrington resolved to hasten matters as much as possible, preserving the utmost secrecy as to his intentions. On the morning of the 31st, the detachment marched 25 miles, crossing the river Helmund, here a broad and difficult stream, and occupying the fort of Ghirisk on its western bank 80 miles from Candahar.

On the 1st Jan. the march was continued 22 miles farther to Kareegha. By these rapid movements the rebels were outmanœuvred and outwitted. They became so completely misled as to the object of our movements, and nature of our position, as to believe at one time that another force was in their rear. On the 2d a halt to refresh the men was indispensable. It having been reported that the insurgent force was in the neighbourhood, a reconnoitring party, consisting of some irregular horse and a portion of the 1st cavalry, under Lieutenants Patterson and Hawkins of the horse artillery, proceeded in the direction of Lundie Nowah. The enemy were discovered to have taken up a difficult position among the sand hills in the neighbourhood. They had a strong range of heights in their front, and a canal in their rear. The irregular horse, with Lieutenant Patterson, having succeeded in driving in their outposts, gave Lieutenant Hawkins time to bring his guns, which were supported by the 2d N.I., into position. A well-directed fire of grape and shrapnell having been opened upon the rebels, they were prevented crossing the crest of the heights, behind which they ensconced themselves. The 1st cavalry followed up the advantage thus gained by the 2d N.I.: they charged under a heavy fire of matchlocks, and drove the enemy everywhere from their position. The insurgent force consisted of from 1200 to 1500 horse and foot: they were drawn up in four divisions, two of which attempted to turn our left. Their objects were frustrated by the cavalry, who charged and defeated them. They were now completely routed: sixty were left dead upon the field, amongst whom was one chief of distinction. A standard was taken. Their wounded must have amounted to several hundreds. After half an hour's halt at the conclusion of the action, the detachment posted on to Shornek, the stronghold of a rebel chief: where the guns, lost on the 29th, were recaptured. We had six killed, and fourteen wounded. Lieutenant Young was severely, and Lieut. Patterson slightly, injured. This seems to have been a very judiciously and gallantly conducted expedition altogether, and reflected the utmost credit on Captain Farrington, the military leader, and Lieutenant Elliot, the political authority. (12)

On the 9th Feb. the 38th N.I. under Colonel Wymer, arrived at Candahar, and were added to the strength of Gen. Nott's brigade. On the 20th,

12. The narrative is slightly abridged from the despatch.

the 1st regiment of the Shah's infantry, 500 irregular horse commanded by Captain Leeson, together with the 5th Shah's infantry under the command of the gallant Captain Woodburn, (13) left Candahar to reinforce the garrison at Ghirisk. Fears were entertained for Major Tod and his party, now known to have left Herat, and believed to have Ukhtar Khan in front, and Yar Mahomed in their rear. They arrived at Ghirisk on the 21st without sustaining harm : they had left on the 9th, and were aware that numerous parties of marauders were on the way ready to attack them : but the escort of the embassy was too strong, and the intended assailants kept their distance. Matters having become comparatively quiet in Shawl, Captain Anderson's troop of horse artillery, with the remainder of the 33th N. I., were ordered to return to Candahar from Quettah, at which latter place the army of General Brooks was immediately expected.

The troubles of the Ghilzie country affords a connected and almost uninterrupted series of disturbances from the surrender of Dost Mahomed—the date at which the scene was shifted from Cabool to Beloochistan,—down to the termination of our connection with the Dooranee empire.

The characters of the political administrations of Mr. Bell and Capt. Bean, —the authority of the former of whom was absolute in the countries below the Bolan pass, that of the latter being supreme in the district immediately above it, have already been detailed in a previous chapter. Major Rawlinson (14) held the chief political authority at Candahar—Major Lynch (15) being immediately under him in charge of the Ghilzie country. The latter officer unfortunately seemed to have been deeply imbued with the creed at this time unhappily of general prevalence amongst the politicians of India, whose votaries held it a maxim, that in state affairs the ordinary principles of morality were by no means to be held binding, but that something which they termed "expediency," which seemed to warrant every variety of roguery, trick, and deceit—which furnished every man, in short, with authority to do without reproach in his public character, whatever he thought fit, was the sole rule by which statesmen, big and small, should be guided. The laws of war and of nations as recognised in Europe, were held to be inapplicable in cases where such countries as Afghanistan had to be dealt with. (16) These things, which are gathered from the published statements

13. This brave and excellent officer was, along with a party of one hundred sick sepoys on their way to Hindostan, attacked at the outbreak of the insurrection on the 3d Nov. 1841, and cut to pieces near Ghuznie.

14. Lieut. Rawlinson has the local rank of Major in Persia. At the time referred to he was a Lieut. of 1835, of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers, and is a Knight of the Lion and Sun.

15. The same is the case with Major Lynch, a Lieut. of 1833.

16. These seem still favourite views amongst a considerable class of persons, both at home and here, in reference to Indian affairs. The statement of

of Major Lynch, are necessary to be explained to account for some portions of his proceedings, otherwise not easy to be accounted for.

On the restoration of the Shah Soojah in August 1839, Sunnud Khan had been appointed chief of the Tokey (Ghilzie) tribe, more from the consideration of his having been a well-wisher to his Majesty, than for any intrinsic qualities for government possessed by him. He seemed to have been a weak-minded man, unfitted for the exercise of the authority which had been placed in his hands; and Major Lynch accordingly recommended his removal—not says he “that this was a just act, for nothing could be brought forward to impugn his loyalty or fidelity,” but because he was ill qualified to rule the tribes over whom he had been set.(17) The change was accordingly effected; Sunnud Khan was removed, and a chief more vigorous, one of his rivals of the race of Shaboodeen Killie was set up to rule in his stead. The country for a time became comparatively tranquil. In the beginning of July, Lieutenant Nicholson, who had hitherto been the active manager of Ghilzie matters, left for Cabool,—the entire charge hereby devolving on Major Lynch, who had a force consisting of the Shah's 5th Hindostanee Regiment, 4 guns, and betwixt 300 and 400 Irregular Horse placed at his disposal.(18) These were directed to remain in the field till the beginning of winter; but they were not expected to be required in actual fighting, as every effort was directed to be made to conciliate the tribes. Sultan Mahomed Khan, one of the most obstinate and refractory of the chiefs, was at length, and with much difficulty, induced to take the oath of allegiance to the Shah Soojah. He was a shrewd, cunning, unscrupulous, and enterprising man, and much value was attached to his friendship. He, so early as the month of August, recommended that the troops meant to be maintained in that quarter of the country should occupy Kelat-i-Ghilzie, which place he recommended as in itself a commanding station, and one where the government of the country had generally been located. When Dost Mahomed made his appearance on the Kohistan frontier previous to the battle of Bameean on the 18th September,(19) emissaries had been sent into the Ghilzie country, but were unable to shake the loyalty of the chiefs. In this auspicious condition matters remained till the approach of winter, when the

Lord Lansdowne, received by the House of Commons as axiomatic in 1818, seems to have become exploded before 1838. His lordship said “that he did not believe their lordships would sanction any rules of war in India, differing from those prescribed in Europe; that it was their duty to convey over every portion of the globe where their power extended, those principles of justice and moderation which governed them in Europe.”

17. Major Lynch's statement for the Envoy, June 22, 1841. *Bombay Times*, April 20, 1842.

18. The narrative of the affairs of the Ghilzie country will be found to have been brought down thus far in Chapter III., pp. 147 and 148.

19. *Vide ante*, p. 156.

severity of the cold compelled the withdrawal of the troops. They retired to Candahar on the 14th November attended by such an escort of friendly Ghilzies as had rarely been seen assembled together for any purpose save to concert for war or plunder.

In the beginning of Decr. (20) it became known that about 70 of the members of the Shaboodeen tribe, including a brother of a chief of note who had found refuge in the Punjaub the previous year, (21) had been made over to the British Government and sent prisoners to India. The Affghans appear all along to have held in special abhorrence the idea of being removed from their native country, and detained as captives in Hindostan. "It is a very common saying amongst them," observes Major Lynch, from whose statement this much of the present narrative is chiefly taken, "when they talk of the Shah Soojah in connection with the British, and when they are told that he is king of Affghanistan, and only supported by the Indian Government, that they conceive it rather a curious fact that Shah Soojah should be king of Affghanistan, and have his state prisons in India or London. I am firmly of opinion, that if there has been one measure more than another calculated to make us unpopular with the Affghans, it has been the untoward circumstance of sending into exile Hadjee Khan Kakur and the other Affghan khans."

From this time Major Lynch considered that all chance of the system of conciliation—which had previously been so promising—ultimately proving successful was now at an end, and that coercion and severe measures could alone produce or maintain tranquillity. The mode in which he proposed to change from the one to the other was certainly summary and unscrupulous enough. He writes to the Envoy under date 27th December—"It is just as well the Tokies did not know you had seized their Pet-man [one of the Ghilzies given up to us by the Seikhs, and for the possession of whose person it appears the Envoy had for six or seven months been negotiating] or the chief of the Shaboodeen Killie, or they might, in all probability, have boned me, and given you some trouble, when the Dost was at large. However, we have laughed at their beards, and hope you will now approve of my adopting a new system, for the conciliatory one will not work in the Tokey land for the future. **WE CAN EASILY GET THEM TO COMMIT THEMSELVES, AND IN LIEU of their present pay, give them a few more rounds of cannister from Anderson's guns, which they will now in all probability**

20. It is called March in Major Lynch's MS.; instead of 1st March it must be 1st December,—a note farther down discusses the matter.

21. "The Seikhs who had been detected giving harbourage to the Ghilzie refugees some months before, were now (Sept. 1840) proved to have promised supplies of money to Dost Mahomed Khan," *ante*, Chap. III., p. 152.

require before the winter is over." (22) A more indefensible system than this, though it was afterwards practised on a larger scale against the Ameers of Scinde, cannot be conceived:—premeditatedly to drive or to entrap men into a quarrel, for the purpose of being able to slaughter and get rid of them, is so closely allied to wholesale murder, that it gives a sad view of the political morality of the time to see such a sentiment as is here expressed, in a formal official paper, should have been passed uncensored. In the month of January 1841, so strong was the feeling of dissatisfaction through the tribe, that Major Lynch proceeded at once into the country, when a deeply laid plot to seize himself and his escort was discovered. He was met by about 1000 horse, who pretended to have been assembled to welcome him back, but were so in fact for the purpose of attacking him. He managed to make them aware that he was not ignorant of their designs, and persuaded them to abandon them, and once more to seal the Koran in the name of the king—the Affghan mode of swearing allegiance.

Shortly afterwards, intimation was sent to the chief by whom this very measure had been originally advised, that Kelat-i-Ghilzie was to be fortified and garrisoned. Sultan Mahomed Khan assembled the head men to consult on the subject; and though he pointed out the futility of resistance to our wishes, they determined to set themselves in this matter against us. A very civil but guardedly-written letter was sent back to the political agent, intimating that the measure in contemplation would be most unpopular with the tribe. They suspected our objects, and were in the last degree jealous of permitting a foreign force to be permanently established amongst them. The minor chiefs were written to in succession, but with no better success: the determination to resist the construction of fortifications and establishment of a garrison, seemed firm and universal. Failing to persuade them to permit us to establish ourselves peaceably in the capital of the country, it was resolved that a garrison should be placed there by force.

About the end of April, a detachment consisting of the 1st and 2d Shah's Hindostanee infantry, commanded by Captains Griffin and Macan, about 300 of Christie's horse (Shah's 1st cavalry), and a couple of guns, were dispatched from Candahar to occupy the ground on which the fort was to be built. The distance from Candahar is 80 miles, and the country here attains an elevation of 5773 feet, intermediate betwixt that of the place they had

22. We are unable to reconcile Major Lynch's dates with each other. In his statement, he says that it was on the 1st of March 1841 on which he made the discovery about the Ghilzies having been carried to India—yet the letter itself is dated 27th December 1840. Moreover, in a letter of 1st Dec. same year, the matter is specially referred to; and the Envoy, under date 15th same month, makes some severe remarks thereon. 1st Dec. 1840, instead of 1st March 1841, must be the date intended, though even this produces confusion with the rest of the narrative.

left, which was 3484, and Ghuznie, still 140 miles further to the north-west of them, which rose to the altitude of 7726.

The troops appear to have experienced no molestation on their advance, but no sooner had they reached their destination than they planted the British standard with much ostentation and display, and saluted it with a salvo of artillery and three volleys of musketry: a silly proceeding in itself under any circumstances; but, on the present occasion, calculated to irritate and madden a people sufficiently discontented, and prepared to take umbrage at what they must have viewed as insult added to aggression. They were already boiling with rage and indignation at the seizure of their kinsfolks, and chafing under the oppression of the new order of things; and were ready to rise in arms on the slightest additional provocation, and take vengeance on any one who came within reach of their wrath. It does not appear that this was even a part of the execrable system suggested "to get them to commit themselves," but a simple act of spontaneous imprudence. Just after this, Major Lynch, hearing of the discontents everywhere prevailing around, resolved to satisfy himself as to the state of matters with his own eyes, and so started with a feeble escort to take a general survey of the country. In passing the fort of Kulla-i-Ingoz, about six miles off, the people observing a body of 200 or 300 horse, as they supposed with hostile intent in their neighbourhood, turned out and made demonstrations to the extent of flourishing their swords, indicating that they would not tamely submit without resistance. (23) An officer was immediately sent back, ordering out a regiment, and a couple of guns to chastise this instance of contumely. The detachment arrived about 10 o'clock at night, and an attack was immediately commenced on the fort, which turned out to be garrisoned only by 30 men. They defended themselves stoutly till half their numbers were slain; and not till we had blown up the gate with powder-bags, by which an officer was nearly destroyed, nor till Captains Saunders and Macan and Lieutenant Hoppe were wounded, and several sepoys slain, did we manage to get possession of the stronghold, in which *five* prisoners were taken! It afterwards appeared that the Kulla-i-Ingoz chief was a firm friend of the Shah Soojah!

The country was immediately in arms, and the garrison at Kelat-i-Ghilzie surrounded by from 3000 to 4000 men furious for the fray. A requisition for troops was at once forwarded to Cabool and Candahar. The Envoy disapproved of the whole proceedings, and declined to permit reinforcements to be sent. He desired Capt. Macan to act strictly on the defensive, and he accordingly remained in cantonments, merely driving off the enemy, who, mistaking

inaction for timidity, attacked his pickets. So soon as the tidings of these unhappy events reached Candahar, a reinforcement under Colonel Wymer was ordered to be dispatched with the utmost speed to the Ghilzie country. This consisted of 400 men of the 98th N.I., the remainder of Christie's horse, commanded by Capt. Leeson, shortly before returned from Ghirisk, with four horse artillery guns, and a large supply of stores for the fort. When the enemy, about 4000 strong, heard of their approach they retired from the neighbourhood of Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and proceeded to interrupt the advance of the reinforcement. They came upon our camp about 6 o'clock in the evening of the 29th May, at a place called Assos Hazzarah, and immediately attacked it, rushing down upon the bayonets of our troops, who had formed in front the moment the alarm was given. They were believed by this time to have been betwixt 4000 and 5000 strong—their old enemies the Doorannees having forgotten their quarrels, and joined them in common enmity to us. They were steadily withstood and repulsed, but again and again they rushed on with the most determined gallantry. Foiled in this, the Ghilzies endeavoured to turn our flank with still worse success than that which attended their attempt to force our front. The engagement lasted till 11—the five hours' fighting being chiefly in the dark. They were beaten in every quarter, and when morning broke were found to have quitted the field, leaving 70 dead behind them. Their wounded were as usual carried away. Our casualties amounted to four killed and fifteen wounded. Col. Wymer's force was too weak, and the country too formidable, to permit of a pursuit being attempted. The conduct of officers and men is said on this occasion to have been admirable: the coolness of the commander in making his arrangements when taken by surprise, was above all praise. Next morning the detachment and convoy proceeded on their march, and reached Kelat-i-Ghilzie without further interruption. Strangely enough these events were afterwards associated with the general rising in November, a matter with which, as will appear in the narrative, they had no earthly concern. The *London Times* newspaper first took up this view—misled, apparently, by an Indian correspondent, and the error was fallen into by the writer of the *Annual Register*, who supplies one of the most inaccurate accounts of oriental affairs in existence.

The severe castigation inflicted by Colonel Wymer, and the strength to which the post at Kelat-i-Ghilzie had now been raised, appears for a time to have overawed the people; the more impatient and fiery of the malcontents having probably joined the standard of Ukhtar Khan, who was still in force on the Helmund, giving great annoyance, and about to beleaguer or attack the garrison at Ghirisk. The construction of the works of the intended fortress was commenced and proceeded with apace; the place was strong by nature, a beautiful eminence of about 100 feet in height, with a splendid

spring on its summit, surmounted by a cone of rock 60 feet higher still, was to be walled in and defended by a couple of 18-prs and other guns; and further to ensure tranquillity while these were in progress, a detachment was sent out from Ghuznie to the westward, and quartered in the Ghilzie country. The post they occupied was at Mookloor, six marches from Ghuznie, and nearly as much from Kelat-i-Ghilzie. The troops consisted of the 16th and 43d N.I., now set down amongst the reliefs as about to return to India by the Bolan Pass in October, (24) the 5th Light Cavalry, and a ressalah of Local Horse, with three of the Shah's guns, the whole commanded by Colonel Chambers, of the 5th Cavalry. The insurgents having made their appearance in considerable numbers in the neighbourhood, the detachment already alluded to broke up its camp on the 1st of August. About noon they arrived at Eck-au, 18 miles in advance. They here expected to have overtaken the enemy, who were found, however, to have retired to a pass adjoining, where they were reported to be in numbers, both horse and foot. On the evening of the 2d, a part of the detachment arrived in the valley of Karootoo, well knocked up with a march of 25 miles over hilly and irregular ground. (25) For the next three days the enemy continued to increase—our troops apparently remaining in camp till such a body should make their appearance as might be attacked and dispersed with effect. About eight o'clock on the morning of the 5th shots were heard on the left of the valley, where the grass-cutters were employed in procuring forage, and a troop was immediately ordered to be got in readiness. Soon after this, information was brought that the enemy were descending the Sheakotel Pass, in the direction of a weak reconnoitring party of the 4th Irregular horse under Capt. Walker. Lieut. Bazzett's troop being by this time in readiness, was dispatched to his assistance, with as many of the 4th ressalah as could be sent, with a view of keeping the enemy in check till the infantry and remainder of the cavalry were able to make up with them.

There were supposed by this time to be not fewer than 3000 Ghilzies bearing down upon the grass-cutters, when Capt. Walker, now strengthened by the arrival of Lieut. Bazzett, made a brilliant charge with the Local Horse, cutting up about 200 of the enemy. Lieut. Bazzett meanwhile attacked another party, of whom about 20 were slain. The last-named officer was

24. *Calcutta Englishman*, 30th August.

25. The chief portion of the above is taken from the *Delhi Gazette* of the 23d June and 28th August, and gives an abstract of letters from camp. Col. Chambers's dispatch is meagre and obscure. Mr Stocqueler in his "Memorials of Afghanistan," the most incorrect and untrustworthy work on the subject which we have seen, states (p. 159) that Colonel Chambers's detachment was sent out from Candahar in consequence of Capt. Woodburn's application for reinforcements at Ghirisk !

shot through the thigh, and Captain Walker's horse was killed under him in the charge. Colonel Chambers states, that as his column approached the scene of action, he could distinctly see Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazzett with their parties dashing boldly over the hill after the enemy, driving them off in all directions, and, in short, leaving nothing for him to do.(26) A few Horse and Foot having been observed in the Syaeghan Ghaut as the main column passed, Captain Oldfield, with a troop of the 5th Cavalry, was directed to halt at a distance and merely hold them in check until the troops returned. As they speedily increased both in boldness and numbers, the cavalry charged and dispersed them, killing from 28 to 30. Our loss in all amounted to 1 man killed and 9 wounded,—that of the enemy by the statement just given, appears to have exceeded 250,—this, we think, must be an exaggeration, —it is difficult to suppose anything like 200 to have fallen by the hands of the Irregular Horse on such ground. The detachment after this remained for a time in the valley previous to proceeding to the westward; the 16th resumed its march about a week afterwards, and arrived at Kelat-i-Ghilzie on the 17th, and Candahar on the 25th August.(27) Half of the 5th Cavalry, and a similar proportion of the 43d N. I., had been sent into the Toree passes when the detachment first moved.(28)

The strength now attained by the force at Ghirisk, and the magnitude of the army assembling at Quettah, and mystery of its destination, tended to impress on the recollections of the insurgents the lesson Captain Farrington had read them in the first week of the year. Though the country continued in a state of disorder, they seem not for some months to have mustered any where in such numbers as to permit scope for a regular attack being made on them. Sometime in June, Ukhtar Khan took the field, and fairly set himself down before Ghirisk, with a body of 3,000 men, from which, by this date, Captain Woodburn's troops appear to have been withdrawn. (29)

On the news of these disturbances reaching Candahar, General Nott ordered out a force, consisting of a detachment of the 1st troop horse artillery, with detachments of the 1st and 2d Janbaz horse, and the 5th Shah's Hindostanee infantry. These were placed under the command of Captain Woodburn, with the following officers under him :—Captain Hart, Lieuts. Cooper, Golding, Ross, and Clark, and Assistant-Surgeon Colquhoun.

26. Colonel Chambers's Despatch *verbatim*. The chief part of the narrative continues to be taken from the *Delhi Gazette*.

27. *Delhi Gazette*, 8th Sept.

28. *Delhi Gazette* *ut supra*.

29. The information from this quarter is, from Jan. to June, very defective. The inference of the withdrawal of Captain Woodburn's troops is based on the fact of that officer having advanced in the end of June from the Candahar side, as related in the text from his own despatch.

It was thought likely that on hearing of the approach of the Candahar troops the enemy might retire along the river's bank, and a short detour was resolved upon with a view of meeting them. They continued, however, before the walls of the fort until Captain Woodburn approached the Helmund, and found that they were in possession of all the fords. The river, which at certain seasons of the year is 350 yards wide, and from 2 to 3 feet deep, is two miles from the fort. (30) The enemy appearing determined to prevent Captain Woodburn from crossing the stream, Capt. Hart was directed to advance three miles up its banks about daybreak on the 4th, to the ford of Sumboolee, and there cross, with the 2d Janbazes, and so move down upon the enemy while Captain Woodburn himself attempted to get over lower down, at a place where, according to the assistant political agent, it was no more than knee deep. Capt. Hart executed his portion of the movement with perfect success, when, on advancing towards the insurgent force, he luckily discovered the mishap that had befallen Capt. Woodburn: the so-called knee-deep ford, from the depth and rapidity of the water, proved impracticable, and he was condemned to see, from the high banks, the enemy's force drawn up in order on the further side, while the Janbazes were in danger of being attacked, and cut off in detail. Captain Hart observing what had happened, was able to retire and recross in time. Capt. Woodburn, with the remainder of the force, joined him at Sumboolee about eight o'clock in the morning. The enemy having observed these movements, advanced up the farther bank of the Helmund, and posted themselves at the entrance of the ford right opposite to our troops. It was now excessively hot, and the men were fatigued with the march of the morning and previous night, having been in motion for nearly twelve hours, so Captain Woodburn contented himself with firing some round-shot, which compelled them to retire to a respectful distance. Immediately on this he pitched his camp close to the river, having resolved to wait till the excessive heat of the day was over before commencing an attack. The hills in the British rear were, for a mile up the river, crowded with horsemen, whose duty it was to watch the enemy and give information of his movements. About half-past 4 the insurgents, it was observed, began to get in motion. Lieut. Golding was detached with the Janbaz cavalry to watch their progress and prevent them from crossing the river. In the latter of these he failed in accomplishing his object, the enemy having contrived to ford the Helmund considerably further up. They were now advancing in large bodies on the position of Captain Woodburn, from which they were less than three miles distant. The British troops immediately changed their ground, taking up a strong

30. See Conolly's Travels, vol. ii., p. 384. This traveller visited Ghirisk and crossed the Helmund in October.

post on the left of the camp, the best which, under the circumstances, appeared to be attainable. The guns were stationed betwixt the 4th and 5th companies of the 5th Hindoostanee Infantry; the Janbaz regiments were formed on either flank, and 200 horsemen were placed in the rear to protect the baggage. A large mass of the enemy's infantry were shortly after this seen passing towards the left of Captain Woodburn's force, which required him to make a considerable change in his order of battle,—an alteration very speedily accomplished,—all the troops, save the Janbaz, moving with the steadiness and precision of a review. The attack was made with great boldness by the insurgents, but was repelled by the well-directed fire of the guns and infantry; the enemy on pushing towards the right, experienced a similar reception, with results similarly disastrous to them. Large bodies of horse and foot were now seen crowding along the heights, and making for Capt. Hart's Janbaz, posted on the extreme right of the infantry. These the assailants speedily forced back, driving them to the rear, and following their advantage close up to the baggage. Lieut. Clarke now faced round the rear rank of the infantry, and poured a deadly fire on the enemy, compelling them to retire. The rear was still threatened, the utmost exertions of the officers failed in recovering the Janbazes from their confusion. It became necessary to move back one of the guns, with the Grenadiers of the 5th, to disperse the masses of Infantry and Cavalry now threatening the baggage. Nor was this effected, so determined were the assailants, until three rounds of grape and a volley of musketry had been delivered within 50 paces of them, when they were fairly driven back. Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding were now directed to pursue the fugitives, and scour the country around—but they were hurrying back, crowding in upon the baggage, and could not be induced to follow their leaders to the field. The baggage was now placed within some melon ground, so as to be easily guarded by the Infantry in case of a night attack. The enemy again made their appearance in heavy masses about 11 o'clock at night, and kept pouring in a desultory and useless fire till morning, apparently with the view of distracting attention till they had carried off their dead. At sunrise on the 4th, Lieutenant Golding was dispatched to observe the movements of the enemy: he found them strongly posted, and in considerable strength, about two miles higher up on the further side of the river. Soon after this they resumed their retreat; and Captain Woodburn's force being too weak to follow them proceeded to cross the river. This operation occupied some hours, and not till 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th did the convoy reach Ghirisk: the troops having for thirty hours scarcely rested. The Janbazes who conducted themselves so indifferently, were a portion of the Afghan cavalry of the Shah's contingent. They occasionally fought well, but their feelings were all opposed to us—and they were never to be depended on. The rest of the

troops conducted themselves admirably: the British officers as usual exposing themselves to every danger, and submitting to every variety of fatigue. The enemy were believed to be at least 6000 strong; and though beaten, seemed neither broken nor disheartened, though 300 of them were understood to have fallen. They had lost three standards—and the villages all around were said to be full of the wounded. Our casualties amounted to 12 killed and 28 wounded. In forwarding an account of this gallant and decisive action, Captain Woodburn took occasion strongly to recommend that reinforcements should be sent to follow up the present success, the Ghirisk detachment being much too weak to take the field, with cavalry so little trustworthy as the Janbazes had just proved themselves, and the enemy still in such strength in the neighbourhood. A force was accordingly sent out under Captain Griffin, consisting of four 6-pounder guns under Captain Cooper, a wing of the 2d Bengal N. I., a portion of the 1st Shah's infantry and 5th cavalry, under Captain Woodburn, with the 1st and 2d Janbaz (cavalry) regulars, under Captain Hart and Lieutenant Golding—amounting in all, besides artillery, to 800 sabres and 850 bayonets. On the afternoon of the 16th August, information was received that the insurgents were in force near Khawind about ten miles off. At 4 A. M. our troops broke ground, and at 7 they came up with the enemy, strongly posted in a succession of small forts with walled gardens in front. The combined Dooranee and Teeree troops amounted to about 5000 in all. Immediately on our advance they opened a heavy fire of jezails and matchlocks from the efficient cover behind which they had placed themselves. After a few skilfully delivered rounds of grape, parties were detached from the 2d Bengal N. I., and the 1st Shah's infantry, to clear and take possession of the enclosures. The 5th Shah's, (31) with a wing of the 1st cavalry, deployed into line, and advancing at double quick time, drove in a body of the enemy's skirmishers concealed behind a range of broken walls, and whose fire was becoming mischievous. Simultaneously with these things, the enclosures in front of the column were speedily and gallantly carried, under a heavy fire of matchlocks, by two companies of the 2d Bengal N. I., led by Lieutenants Cooke and Travers, supported by a party of the 1st Shah's infantry, under Lieutenant Gardener. The enemy suffered severely in this charge—many of them resisting until bayoneted. The whole of our troops now advanced with a view of attacking the main body of the enemy, who were seen *en masse* in the rear of the gardens—but before the assault could take full effect, some confusion being observed amongst them, Captain Hart's Janbazes and the Shah's 1st Cavalry charged and broke them, and pursued them for several miles, taking fearful vengeance upon them. (32)

31. Captain Griffin's Despatch.

32. Captain Griffin's Despatches *verbatim*. Lieut. Golding, who we find

Prince Sufter Jung headed the pursuit in person. Lieutenant Golding's Janbazes, who had, till now, been on rear-guard duty with the baggage, were, by the request of their commanding officer, and at their own special desire, permitted to share in the close of the fray—both these regiments so conducted themselves on this occasion as completely to regain the character they had lost on the Helmund a month before. The enemy's resistance was stout and protracted—their position eminently favourable for defence; their casualties are said to have amounted to betwixt 600 and 700 killed, of whom 100 are said to have fallen by the bayonet. (33) Our losses were somewhat severe, consisting of twelve killed, and 104 wounded, for the most part slightly.

This affair seems to have been ably planned, and gallantly conducted. Captain Woodburn, though up to this time requiring to be carried in a litter in consequence of a wound shortly before received, quitted his couch and remained throughout the action on horseback at the head of his regiment.

As usual on occasions such as this, the enemy, when they found that they had been fairly beaten, and that there was no chance for them against the strong and well organized force now in their country, dispersed, and left our troops without molestation. The country, however, was still as far as ever from being tranquillized.—Akram Khan, a chief of the Teeree tribe, had joined Ukhtar Khan just before the fight with Captain Griffin, and it was against him we next prepared to direct our vengeance.

On the 11th of September, a force under Colonel Wymer, consisting of Sappers, Miners, and Bildars, under Captain Sanders, two 18-pounders and four 6-pounders—the former with European artillerymen, Leeson's horse, and the 2d and 38th Bengal N.I., were directed to proceed to the Teeree country to collect tribute and chastise the refractory. Such was the scarcity of camels, that 1200 jackasses had to do duty as draught and baggage cattle. Lieutenants North and Conolly were the politicals in attendance. The Teeree country is 100 miles north of Candahar: it had never till now been travelled through or surveyed by any European, much less traversed by our troops, and nearly all that was known of it amounted to this, that it was rocky, wild, and difficult of access, inhabited by a fierce and lawless population, eminently disinclined to pay homage, allegiance, or tribute to

fighting at Syghan in Oct. 1840; in the Nazian Valley in Feb. 1841 with Col. Shelton; with Capt. Woodburn at Ghirisk in June; and with Capt. Griffin in the Ghilzie country in August,—was, in November, murdered by the men of his own regiment, who rose in mutiny and went over to the enemy.

33. A correspondent of the *Delhi Gazette*, subscribing himself "Rienzi," states the number at 700—there is a tone of exaggeration about the letter which leads us to doubt its statements. We should think 600 more near to the mark than 700, though the latter is adhered to by several writers.

the Shah Soojah, or to conduct themselves towards their neighbours or their Peringhee allies as peaceable and well-disposed citizens. (34) The detachment left on the 16th September, and General Nott shortly afterwards followed in person and took command. On the 21st they reached a tremendous mountain gorge at the entrance to the Duramut valley: the utmost difficulty was experienced in getting forward the artillery, and the transit of the battering guns occupied three days. Lieutenant Conolly with a small party of Janbaz horse came by surprise on the Teeree chief, Akram Khan, and captured him. He was sent as a prisoner to Cabool, and being sentenced to death, was blown from a gun. From the Teeree and Duramut valleys the inhabitants fled on our approach, so that with the exception of the capture of the chief nothing whatever was effected by it. It returned to Candahar on the 2d of October; and the 16th, 42d, and 43d N.I., which had, from the beginning of August, been under orders for relief, started on the 7th Nov. on their return to India by the Bolan Pass. But the insurrection which proved so fatal to us had by this time broken out around Cabool; and when three marches on their way towards Quettah, Colonel M'Laren's brigade as this was called, was directed to return and endeavour to make their way to the assistance of the garrison in the eastern capital;—they started on the 17th November. In this they failed, having been compelled from want of baggage cattle, and the severity of the weather, to return after they were well on their way towards Ghuznie. It is not to be supposed that the politicals were mad enough to diminish the strength of the army, notwithstanding the exigencies into which the state had now fallen in this scene of tribulation. H. M.'s 40th had been marched to Candahar, and though Beloochistan was now at peace, and all thoughts of an expedition towards Herat abandoned, a portion of the force which ascended the Bolan pass in April, still remained unemployed at Quettah. The 25th Bombay N. I. returned thither from Kelat, immediately after the coronation of Nusseer Khan on the 3d October; so that, had the Bengal brigade returned to India, there still would have been a larger force above the Bolan pass to the westward of Ghuznie, than had at any time been thought necessary betwixt Nov. 1839 and Feb. 1841. (35) But we are now approaching

34. *Bengal Hurkaru*, 6th and 15th October.

35. The following return gives pretty exactly the strength of General Nott's army, including Colonel M'Laren's Brigade, which, on the 10th Dec., returned to Candahar from its unsuccessful attempt to succour Cabool. This enumeration does not include officers; its force of all ranks amounted to 8724. (*Blue Book*, p. 171.)

AT CANDAHAR.

2 Troops of Shah's Horse Artillery, 12 six pr. guns.....	200
$\frac{1}{2}$ Co. Foot Artillery with Capt. Blood, 4 nine prs.....	70
2 Eighteen pounders.....	
H. M.'s 40th Regiment.....	800

that portion of the history of the Dooranee alliance which spreads over too large a field for being at present entered on—which is so recent and so big with events of unprecedented moment, as still to be fresh in the recollection of the public; and with the commencement of which the present narrative must be concluded.

The posts in Western Afghanistan at this time occupied by our troops, were Candahar, Quetta, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Killa Abdoola, and Ghirisk, with sundry lesser stations up and down the country; the latter of these were wisely called in as our troubles thickened around us: afterwards the troops at Killa Abdoola fell back on Quettah, except those belonging to the Shah's service who deserted us, and ultimately the three garrisons first named alone remained in position. They maintained themselves right gloriously till it was resolved finally to abandon the country.

Turning shortly to Cabool, we find the same incessant disquietude prevailing here to the end with which the whole country, from first to last, had been afflicted. The garrison itself was so strong, and troops so easily available to move in any direction, that from the time of the victories of Colonel Shelton in the Nazian valley in February, no conflict of any moment had occurred.

2nd Bengal Native Infantry.....	850
16th do...do.....	850
38th do..do. (one wing).....	450
42nd do..do.....	850
43rd do..do.....	850
1st Shah's Infantry.....	500
2nd do.....do.....	500
5th do.....do.....	500
1st do.....Cavalry.....	500
One Squadron Skinner's Horse.....	300

AT KELAT-I-GHILZIE.

2 I lighten pounders.	
2 six do., with $\frac{1}{2}$ Co. European Artillerymen.....	70
3rd Shah's Infantry.....	500
Wing of 38th Bengal N. I.....	450
	<hr/>
	1020

Total rank and file, 8240

The force at Quettah, according to the Blue Book, at this time, consisted of two strong native regiments (say 1700 men), two 9-prs. with European artillery, two 9-prs. of the Bolan Rangers, with Major Southeby's company of European artillerymen, in all about 2200 regular troops; so that, above the Passes, there were nearly 11,000 men to the westward of Ghuznie when the insurrection began, and about as many more to the eastward, including Sir R. Sale's brigade of 2273, the Charekar Goorkahs of 800, and the Ghuznie garrison, the 27th N.I.

In the beginning of September an expedition had been arranged for the usual purposes of punishing the refractory, and collecting tribute. A detachment was ordered to proceed to the Zoormut valley, consisting of two hundred men of H.M.'s 44th, the 5th Bengal N.I., one Shah's regiment, a detachment of sappers and miners, with two iron and four brass guns. (36) The mountain train, under Captain Abbott, with two ten-inch mortars, accompanied the force, and which was, for its magnitude, unusually well supplied with artillery, the king's regards for his subjects being manifested by knocking down the strongholds when he could not manage to secure or slaughter the inhabitants. On the 27th of the month the whole moved forward, under command of Colonel Oliver, towards the mouth of the Zoormut valley, resolved that not one stone should be left standing on another in the country of the rebels. Captain Hay, when in the same neighbourhood collecting tribute shortly before, had endeavoured to persuade the Zoormut chief to disjoin himself from his friend, a much more notorious malcontent and enemy of the Shah than even himself. His counsels had been responded to by a shower of stones and torrents of abuse: and after replying to this by our usual retort, a few rounds from his six-pounder guns, he found himself too weak to proceed further, and so withdrew. This was the immediate cause of the dispatch of an expedition of such magnitude as the present at this late period of the year. The valley was, as in the case of the expedition to Teeree by General Nott, abandoned by its inhabitants, and the force returned to Cabool on the 17th October without having fired a shot. (37)

It has already been stated that in the course of the spring and summer of 1841, about 1100 men were permitted to retire from Afghanistan,—nearly 4000 of a reinforcement having been sent to the eastern capital.

It had been resolved on the arrival of the brigade of Colonel Shelton at Cabool in July, that that of Sir R. Sale, whose term of service had now expired, should return to India. By this exchange of 2000 men about to be withdrawn for upwards of 3000 which had been sent, the Army in Afghanistan would still have been permanently increased. (38) Should the force at Cabool appear to have been too much weakened, H.M.'s 9th, with two native regiments, were ordered to be in readiness to take the place of Sale's brigade. (39)

36. *Delhi Gazette*, October.

37. *Delhi Gazette*, 17th November.

38. *Bombay Times Overland Summary*, Dec. 1, 1841. The Brigade of Colonel Shelton, it will be recollected, consisted of H.M.'s 44th and the 27th and 54th N.I., with Horse Artillery, &c.; that of Sir R. Sale, of H.M.'s 13th, and the 16th, 35th, and 37th N.I. The 16th, as will be remembered, had, in July, been sent to Mukloor, 60 miles from Ghuznie in the western Ghilzie country, and had arrived at Candahar on 25th of August, being destined to form part of Colonel Maclaren's Brigade about to return to India by the Bolan Pass.

39. Blue Book of 1843—No. 1.

The Dooranee alliance had now so completely drained the treasury that the Government of India were compelled to enjoin economy in every quarter. An accumulated surplus of ten millions sterling(40) in the hands of Government sometime after the war began, had been entirely expended : an annual surplus revenue of a million and a half, which had existed in 1836, had, in 1840, been exchanged for a deficit of above two millions and a quarter ;(41) and so severely were the finances at Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of payment at Fort William in September was at one time contemplated by the Supreme Council.(42)

The authorities in Affghanistan had, like those throughout India, been naturally urged to husband their means with the utmost care. The revenues of the country were in the last degree narrow, and while we seemed to contemplate bearing the burthen of the army of tranquillization for an indefinite period, the instructions given the envoy that beyond this he was not in future to rely on assistance from the British treasury, left no alternative but to attempt retrenchment in the only quarter where this seemed practicable.(43) The department in which reduction was commenced was in the pension of £8000 a-year allowed to the Ghilzies of the eastern passes for the free transit of troops, stores, and merchandize. It was resolved to curtail this by a half, and the country was in consequence in a blaze in a moment. The remonstrances of the chiefs were in a great measure disregarded, and they at once proceeded to take matters into their own hands. A kaffila with property of £2000 in value, was seized at Tezeen on its way to Cabool. The roads were stopped, and all communication with Hindostan entirely cut off. The Envoy appeared to despise the danger of the insurrection. He induced Gen. Elphinstone to dispatch the 35th N.I., with a couple of guns, to clear the way to Jellalabad. They were stopped at Bhoodhak as they entered the passes ; and, after a severe struggle, found themselves unable to proceed till joined by H. M. 13th. The fighting continued almost without interruption till they reached Gundamuck, and afterwards Jellalabad, where they were shut up for six months. Such was the commencement of the general Ghilzie insurrection,—a movement in many of its characteristics unprecedented amongst the fickle and incoherent hordes of Asia, unparalleled in the amount of calamity it occasioned us, and in the nature of the retribution exacted after our misfortunes had come to an end.

40. Parliamentary paper ; also Major Hough on the Finances of India.

41. Sir R. Peel's speech, House of Commons' Debates, 11th March, 1842.

42. Statement of the Hon'ble Mr Bird, Senior Member of Council, given in the letter of Sir H. Willock to Lord Aberdeen, Sept. 1841.—*Colonial Magazine*.

43. Sir W. Macnaghten's despatch, Oct. 23. Blue Book of 1843, page 8.

HAVING thus drawn our narrative to a close,—for, with the occurrences just mentioned the system of policy which we had for three years attempted to carry out may be said to have been brought to an end,—the war of aggression having been changed first into a struggle in our own defence, and finally into a war of vengeance,—a few general observations may be permitted as to the concomitants and consequences of what must be regarded one of the wildest adventures in which any Government ever was engaged.

It will have been seen from the preceding pages that betwixt November 1839, when the armies of Sir J. Keane and Sir T. Willshire quitted Affghanistan, till November 1841, when the Ghilzie insurrection made its appearance, our troops, varying in numbers from fifty to two thousand, had been on thirty-four several occasions engaged with the enemy; that we had had 1500 killed and wounded, and had slaughtered about 5000 of the insurgents. This was in addition to the 2500 already enumerated as having fallen in the first campaign, so that from February 1839 till October 1841, we had slain about 7500 Affghans, yet we marvelled at their ingratitude in not requiting with attachment the *blood* relationship we had established. The connexion was cemented by the sacrifice of above 5000 more in the course of the succeeding year!—12,500 in all. About 18,000 of our own army, and camp followers had been destroyed before December, 1842. We had in the course of this period, lost about fifty British officers, of whom nearly one-half had fallen by the sword. The names of twelve killed in Beloochistan have already been given: those who fell in Kohistan or near Jellalabad are as follows:—Captain Douglas, Dr Lord, Lieutenants Collinson, Conolly, Broadfoot, Crispin, and Pigou. We have not been able to make up a complete list of those who died from climatic causes. During Lord Keane's campaign we had lost 32 officers, of whom one was killed in action, three wounded by the enemy, three were burnt, and one drowned; about half the rest died from natural causes, the other half fell victims to the climate,—nearly one hundred officers having perished in the country before the insurrection. We had on thirteen several occasions been unsuccessful: by these not only dispiriting our troops, but injuring the character for irresistibility we had hitherto maintained, and which is so often more than half the battle.

No official returns of the precise cost of the Affghan war have yet been published, but we have sufficient data to enable us to make a very close approximation to this. The earliest estimate in point of date which has been

attempted, that of the *Bombay Times* of July 1841, comes singularly near the truth. The cost of the first year's campaign is set down at nine millions sterling, that of each succeeding year at three : these were deductions from the known charges of the troops, the salaries of political agents, and the pay allowed to the tribes. By the Parliamentary papers since published, it appears that there was ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various treasuries of India when the war began. Not only was this entirely expended by the end of the year 1841, but Government required a loan at an unusually high rate of interest, by which about five millions more were raised. Sir R. Peel stated in Parliament on the 11th March 1843, that there had been for some years just before the commencement of the war a surplus revenue of somewhat above a million sterling annually. The domestic government of Lord Auckland was, if not parsimonious, far from extravagant or wasteful : and as the revenues of India have for some years been growing in productiveness, we must suppose this surplus, amounting betwixt 1838 and 1841 to four millions, to have been absorbed in the one vast drain that was carrying off all our wealth. On these facts, and this assumption, the cost of the Doorannee alliance up to the time of the siege of Cabool will be found to have amounted to betwixt seventeen and twenty millions at the lowest estimate, without taking interest into account at all.

But the enormous loss of treasure thrown away without any hope of pecuniary return, was only a portion of the financial evil. The whole of the money sent from India to Afghanistan was so in the shape of coined silver—it was expended there on baggage-cattle, forage, provisions, commissariat stores, and other matters which the country itself supplied. Nearly a million sterling went for camels alone, of whom upwards of 70,000 were sacrificed within the period referred to. The Affghans are not a commercial people, and their trade with the countries below the mountains never in all appears to have amounted to a million annually in gross value, if it ever came up to anything like this. It was just beginning to set in the direction of Hindostan when it was fairly turned by us ; the imports from Russia by the Herat frontier, having, according to Sir Alexander Burnes, more than doubled from 1838 to 1841. Such was one of the most natural and foreseeable results of our interference. Without any exact means of estimating, the conjecture that from four to five millions sterling was withdrawn in specie from the currency of India to which it has not yet, nor will for many years, return, may probably be found within the truth.

The more the matter is examined, the more difficult it is to discover by what process of self-delusion it was that the projectors or advocates of the Doorannee alliance could for a moment persuade themselves that the restoration and maintenance of the Shah Soojah on the throne, could conduce to any one of the ends we professed ourselves anxious to attain.

Assuming, for argument's sake, that which we know to be either unproven, improbable, or utterly untrue—that Herat was meant to become a Russian outpost—that Dost Mahomed was determined to recover Peshawur and attach himself to the Czar, without regard to our interests, wishes, or friendship, yet it seems impossible to discover by what process we supposed that matters, in any one of those respects, save that of Peshawur, which concerned us not, was to be one whit improved.

It was apparent from the beginning, to all who chose to open their eyes, that in the person of the Shah Soojah was no inherent potency or virtue to repel Russia or draw the tribes around him;—that by our arms and resources, expended directly in Afghanistan, and encumbered and deadened by the very parties the thorough efficiency of whose assistance was the only thing which, under any circumstances, could have rendered the Dooranee alliance in the most remote degree desirable, must the Northern Autocrat be repelled should he dream of advancing.

Copious extracts have already been given from a report laid before the Envoy by Sir Alexander Burnes, on the 7th August, 1840. (44) The following from a letter to Mr Secretary Torrens, by the Envoy in handing this up to Government, will throw light on the difficulties experienced at the commencement of the new reign:—

To H. TORRENS, Esq., *Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.*

SIR,—I was about to submit my sentiments to Government on the present condition and future prospects of this country, when I received a paper, of which the accompanying is a copy, from Lieutenant Colonel Sir A. Burnes, to each Para. of which I have annexed my comments as being the most convenient form of showing wherein I agree, and wherein I differ, with that officer.

2nd. It will be seen that this paper reached me originally in a private form, but with the permission of Sir A. Burnes I have placed it on record, as was done with his former paper written in February last on similar subjects.

3d. In this paper Sir A. Burnes has enumerated all the defects of the present Government, and the dangers to which our position is exposed. Of the defects, nothing certainly has been extenuated, but when they are weighed it would be but fair to take into consideration the difficulties by which we have been surrounded from the time of the assumption of authority by His Majesty up to the present period. Of the dangers to which we are exposed from the perpetual intrigues of secret foes in our front and in our rear, I have already, I fear, written too much.

4th. No sooner was His Majesty seated on his throne than his attention was attracted to the necessity of sending an Expedition against the rebellious Ghiljee Chiefs, and against the treacherous Khan of Kelat. Whilst these operations were going on, His Majesty was anxiously considering the best means of frustrating the

44. *Vide ante*, pp. 164-169.

machinations of Dost Mahomed Khan, and before they were brought to a conclusion he was compelled to proceed to Jellalabad.

5th. Whilst on his way to that place, His Majesty was informed of the insurrection of the Khyber tribes ; and hardly had this been suppressed by negotiation, when the rebellion broke out in Koonner. Next followed our own negotiation with a view of conciliating Saadut Khan, Azeez Khan, and other disaffected chiefs. And just before His Majesty quitted Jellalabad to return to Cabool the disturbances broke out in Bajore which have not yet been quieted.

6th. Immediately after His Majesty's return to Cabool it became necessary to take measures for coercing the Ghiljees a second time ; and scarcely had this object been effected when the disturbances in the neighbourhood of Quetta and Kelat demanded his attention.

7th. When it is considered that all these occurrences, and many others of minor importance, were crowded into the brief space of one twelve month, it must be admitted that His Majesty has quite enough to occupy his attention without the settlement of the internal affairs of his kingdom. In his efforts for the improvement of these, I know that His Majesty has been indefatigable. Governors, with their subordinate officers, have been appointed to the different districts ; His Majesty himself examines his treasure accounts, and superintends, in conjunction with Capt. Trevor, the muster of his Troops. All objectionable taxes have been abolished, and His Majesty invariably evinces the greatest anxiety that justice should be done to all his subjects. His Majesty sits in Durbar every morning, except Thursday, for about two hours, and listens with the greatest patience to the representations of his chiefs. One day is set apart for hearing the complaints of all those who may allege that they have not received redress from the authorities to whom their cases have been referred.

8th. Though stern in the execution of justice, (as was exemplified only the other day in the case of the murderer in whose pardon so much influence was exerted,) yet His Majesty is merciful and kind-hearted in the extreme ; and if the personal qualities of a monarch could ensure popularity, Shah Shooja could not fail to obtain it. My longer experience of His Majesty's character more thoroughly convinces me of the truth of what I have already asserted, that there is not an abler, or better man, than himself in all his dominions.

9th. But His Majesty labours under peculiar and complicated difficulties, the foremost of which is his connexion with us. We have placed him on his throne, but it will be some time before our motives in doing so are thoroughly understood. There are many who wilfully misunderstand them. The difference of our religion is, of course, the chief cause of antipathy on the part of the people. The Affghans are a nation of bigots. Besides an intolerance of our creed there is an intolerance of our customs, and it behoves us therefore to be very wary in our attempts at innovation : nor ought it ever to be forgotten that a system, though excellent in itself, may not be good as applied to this country, nor though good, may it be such as to admit the due appreciation of its advantages. It requires the most cautious steering to refrain, on the one side from alarming popular prejudices, and on the other from leaving the Government in the same imbecile state in which we

found it : a safe foundation has been laid for improving the natural strength of the country, but on this subject I shall shortly do myself the honor of submitting a separate report.

10th. It would be impossible to enumerate the various difficulties with which the British Representative has daily to contend in this country. Our enemies try to impress the people with a belief that we are the rulers of the country. We must necessarily interfere on some occasions, and the risk of exceeding or falling short of the exact medium is of daily (I may almost say of hourly) occurrence. There are other minor causes which operate against us : we have raised the price of provisions by increasing the number of consumers, and the quantity of the circulating medium, and the inconvenience from this unfortunately tells chiefly on the two classes of the greatest influence—the priesthood, and the military,—who have fixed stipends.

11th. His Majesty has found an Augean stable of iniquity to cleanse. He has to defeat the accumulated impurities of thirty years. During the whole of that period, all has been anarchy, and what little of government there was, has been chiefly supported by a system of perfidy and assassination. It is notorious by these means alone that Dost Mahomed Khan was able to prop up the little power he possessed beyond the gates of Cabool. The most virtuous Affghan would deem it no sin to break faith with a rebel ; and assassination, as a means of conquest, was of daily occurrence. His Majesty has not been exempt from those inconveniences which ordinarily beset restored monarchs. His old retainers were insatiable in their wants, and his new adherents entertained the most sanguine expectations of reward for their desertion ; whilst all looked forward to the appearance of some miraculous change in their favour. The splendour of the ancient monarchy was revived in the recollection of all ; whilst the king, succeeding to a dismembered monarchy impoverished by the struggle which placed him on the throne, as well as by the long-continued system of grinding oppression which preceded the restoration, found himself without the means either of rewarding his friends or conciliating his enemies.

12th. It appears that even at the time of Mr. Elphinstone's mission, (p. 49) the Dooranee Lords were averse to an alliance with the British Government, which might strengthen the king to the detriment of the aristocracy. How much more averse must they now be to such an alliance after having participated with Dost Mahomed, almost on equal terms, in the spoils of the country ? They are now powerless, and they feel that every additional security we grant to His Majesty, lessens their own consequence.

13th. I have on more than one occasion stated the great facilities which exist for disturbing the peace of this country. The people I have described as being rapacious, bigotted, and credulous. Sikh Agents with Sikh gold can easily set the whole country into a flame by taking advantage of their position, by power and offers of money, and by artful appeals to the religious prejudices of the people ; whilst the mountainous nature of the country, and the prevalent notions of hospitality which prevent the people from giving up a refugee however criminal, render it a work of infinite difficulty to root out the disturbers of the public tranquillity.

14th. There is one, and only one, remedy for all these evils, namely, to deprive those of the power who have the will to injure us. The Sikh Feudatories on one side, and the Herat authorities on the other, should be for ever deprived of the means of molesting us,—If such a vigorous policy as this should suit our convenience, it would further be recommended by proving to the world that there was no original miscalculation taken of the risks to be run in the bold and sagacious measures of the Governor General, but that all the evils which have happened were as unexpected as they are undeserved,—that they are attributable to the perfidy of pretended friends, which could not of course be either foreseen or provided against.

15th. I have now enumerated the principal events which have occurred in this country since His Majesty's accession to the Government ;—I have recapitulated, as succinctly as was in my power, the chief obstacles which have arisen to the successful administration of affairs ;—and I have endeavoured to show that the existing state of things is as prosperous as, under all circumstances, could reasonably have been expected.

16th. I would now respectfully solicit the expression of His Lordship in Council's opinion as to the course of policy which I have pursued. I am of opinion that it would be impolitic to alienate His Majesty's affections by suddenly and harshly calling upon him to dismiss the comparatively small number of armed attendants whom he is desirous of retaining about his own person ; especially when it is clear that we should have to supply their place by troops of the contingent, who have already more duties than they can perform, and whose discipline would be ruined by such employment.

17th. I am of opinion that it is the duty of the British representative here rather to watch carefully for opportunities of suggesting reform, and to treat His Majesty with all possible consideration, than to urge sweeping innovation, or to assume towards His Majesty anything like a tone of dictation. Such proceedings would reduce His Majesty to the condition of a cypher, and would afford to our enemies the means of successfully propagating reports to our prejudice, and to the effect that our design is to seize the Government of the country. I am of opinion (and if wrong I hope to be corrected) that it is preferable to work at minor abuses which are inherent in every Eastern Monarchy, than to exercise frequent and authoritative interference, the good effects of which would be at least problematical.

18th. It has been my principle therefore to turn a deaf ear to all trifling complaints that are brought to me, and to refer the complainants for redress to their lawful sovereign,—deeming it of paramount importance to our interests that His Majesty's authority should be felt and respected.

19th. Where complaints appeared to me to be of such a nature as seriously to involve the interests or reputation of His Majesty's Government, I have never failed to bring them privately to His Majesty's notice, and I have not unfrequently found those complaints utterly destitute of foundation.

20th. Though fully aware of the difficulty of making a proper solution, I have never ceased to urge upon His Majesty the great importance of selecting a competent minister, of reforming his army, and of reducing his expenditure within the limits of his income. These and other objects will be gradually attained by kind and persevering counsel. This is not a country in which our objects are to be attained *per saltum* : His Majesty's wishes must meet with some little attention. The prejudices of the people must be respected, minor abuses must be overlooked, and our proceedings at every step must be guarded by caution, temper, and forbearance.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

August 10th, 1840.

The first portion of this is a justification or extenuation of the errors into which Government had fallen, as enumerated by Sir Alexander Burnes : in point of fact it affords precisely the picture that was at the time drawn by the opponents of the Dooranee alliance, and which was repudiated and denounced by its supporters as gloomy and exaggerated—just a representation of that state of affairs, for which, at the commencement of the expedition, the Government ought to have been prepared to look. Yet at this time, with these documents in their possession, the Ministry at home depicted everything as bright and sunshiny : the halcyon days of Affghan tranquillity were hastening on ; the golden age of the Dooranee civilization was at hand ; and it but required a few years continuance of that blessed peace and prosperity which was ruining the armies, draining the treasury of India, and filling Central Asia with tumult and slaughter, to prove that the Suddozye alliance was one of the miracles of modern statesmanship ! A miracle it was most assuredly, but in the opposite sense to that in which it was intended to be understood as such by those who so characterised it.

It has already been stated, that the vast majority of the newspapers of India were, from the beginning, most hostile to the Affghan war ; and now that we can look back on the occurrences which have happened within the last four years, and compare them with the anticipations formed of them by the press, the extraordinary accuracy with which their prophecies have been realized occasions less admiration of the sagacity of the writers than astonishment that what was so obvious to the guides or representatives of public opinion should have been so utterly lost sight of by Government.

Not only is this most marvellous, but still more so in the apathy manifested by the ministry and people of England at the fearful warnings the events of each succeeding month supplied. In May 1841 the *Bombay Times* published a corrected list of thirty-three actions in which our troops had been engaged during the preceding twelve months, in thirteen of which they had been unsuccessful ; and two months afterwards an account current drawn

up on the facts supplied by the *Government Gazette*, the *Almanack*, and the *Army List*, from which it appeared, that up to that date twelve millions sterling had been expended, and three millions annually hardly covered the current charges of the Doorannee alliance. The paper referred to was at this time extensively circulated in England, yet not one of these fearfully alarming facts, or the inferences deduced from them, that the hour of our compulsory retirement or expulsion from Afghanistan was then drawing rapidly near, occasioned the slightest attention. Within ten months, the gloomy, but unheeded auguries, were all realized.(45)

This was the period of the general election of June and July 1841, when the merits of the measures, foreign and domestic, of both parties are in general pretty keenly canvassed. About this time Lord Palmerston, in addressing the electors of Tiverton (46), took infinite credit to himself and his colleagues for the excellency and thorough success of their policy towards Afghanistan, which country he described as so perfectly tranquillized, and so entirely satisfied with our management, that Englishmen might travel from the one end of it to the other without fear of danger or annoyance. At this very time the papers in the archives of the Board of Control, to which the foreign secretary had access, showed that, from the hour we had entered the country, it had been one scene of incessant bloodshed and turmoil, that the chiefs whom we subsidized were the only ones who maintained even the semblance of submission; and that our soldiers dared not venture beyond sight of the sentries without perilling their lives. Yet these observations of Lord Palmerston's,—which, in India, were received

45. The *London Times* and the *Spectator* are at this time the only papers which seemed to be fully alive to the momentous warnings then so universally neglected, and which, if attended to, might have saved the expenditure of so much blood and treasure.

46. The following extract is from the newspaper report of the famous Tiverton Speech of June 1841. At the time it was delivered Lord Palmerston must have been aware of the documents in the hands of the Board of Control, giving accounts of Shelton's operations in the Nazian valley—of the general discontents in Kohistan—the three separate expeditions then on foot betwixt Candahar and Ghuznie—the victories of Farrington and Woodburn on the Helmund, with the preparations for Captain Griffin's expedition—the Noosky expedition—the affair of Kojjuck and general movement of the troops in Scinde and Shawl—the universal marching and countermarching of detachments throughout the country, occupied as they were in five simultaneous or immediately consecutive campaigns around Jellalabad, Kelat-i-Ghilzie, Ghirisk, Noosky, and the Seebee country. The Foreign Secretary must either have spoken ironically, or desired to ascertain how far the credulity of the people might be taxed. It must have been gratifying to him to discover, that there was no statement whatever, however enormously at variance with fact, which would not be received in England in reference to the affairs of India, if made by a minister of the Crown. The same system is at present being adopted by the conservative journals in defending the policy of Lord Ellenborough, and apparently with similar success; the statements of the *Morning Post* and

as a bitter mockery of the sufferings our troops were then enduring in Afghanistan,—were at home passed over without question, reprehension, or observation. So late did public apathy continue, that when the abstracts above referred to were reprinted after the destruction of the Cabool force, they were still regarded, and in many cases stigmatised, as exaggerated or fictitious. They are wrought into the preceding narrative, with the authorities on which they have been made given in detail; and now that abundance of corroborative official information has been supplied by Government, defy impeachment.

It appears, as already stated, from the official papers published in the Blue Book of 1843, that had the Ghilzie insurrection not occurred, Lord Auckland was anxious to have his policy carried out as long as it would hold: H. M.'s 9th, with two native regiments, were under orders to sup-

Standard on this subject may, in point of accuracy, be fairly placed beside those of the ex-Foreign Secretary: it is to be hoped that their illusions will be somewhat less rudely dispelled.

"Now let me travel a little further to the east; for there is no quarter of the globe in which we have not had occasion to uphold the dignity of the country, and to vindicate its honour, and to maintain its dearest interests. Transactions had taken place in countries which many of you have, perhaps, never heard of till they came to be introduced to your notice in consequence of events to which I allude—transactions, I say, had taken place in Persia and Afghanistan, in the centre of Asia, which threatened destruction to the vast empire which we possess in the East Indies; but, acting with promptitude and decision, we carried our armies into the centre of Afghanistan, and the noble Lord, whose name my honourable friend mentioned just now, there rendered the most important services to his country, by achieving military successes which have rendered secure to us that vast empire which we possess in India, and the importance of which it is hardly possible to over-rate, though, perhaps those who have not turned their attention to these matters may not at once sufficiently perceive their value. We brought within British influence, in one campaign, a vast extent of country, larger than France, almost as big as half Europe; and the way in which this was done, and the results which have followed, are well deserving of the attention of the people of England. There is a contrast, of which we may have reason to be proud, between the progress of our arms in the East and the operations which a neighbouring power—France—is now carrying on in Africa. The progress of the British arms in Asia has been marked by a scrupulous reference to justice, an inviolable respect for property, an abstinence from anything which could tend to wound the feelings and prejudices of the people; and the result is this, that I saw not many weeks ago a distinguished military officer who had just returned from the centre of Afghanistan, from a place called Candahar, which many of you, perhaps, never heard of, and he told me that he, accompanied by half a dozen attendants, but without any military escort, had ridden on horseback many hundreds of miles through a country inhabited by wild and semi-barbarous tribes, who but two years ago were arrayed in fierce hostility against the approach of the British arms—but that he had ridden through them all with as much safety as he could have ridden from Tiverton to John o' Groat's house, his name as a British officer being a passport through them all, because the English had respected their rights, had afforded them protection, and treated them with justice; thence it is that an unarmed Englishman was safe in the midst of their wilds."

ply the place of Sir R. Sale's Brigade, should this be found necessary at the time our misfortunes began. H. M. 41st, with 2000 Bombay troops, were ready to ascend the Bolan Pass, if needed, in room of McLaren's brigade. It is equally clear, that though this was the Governor-General's determination, it was merely contingent upon the continuance of affairs in a state not more unfavourable than that in which they had been for the preceding two years,—and probably with a view of getting rid of the matter in the best way he could, leaving the difficulties of the winding-up in the hands of his successor: the moment the intelligence of the insurrection reached Government, they declared that, in the event of military possession of Cabool and the surrounding country being lost, it was not their intention to direct new and extensive operations with a view of re-establishing our supremacy ;(47) and they were prepared for the contingency of our political influence in that quarter being for a time entirely subverted.(48) Mr Bird's apprehensions of immediate bankruptcy have been already noticed: the Commander-in-Chief shortly afterwards declared his belief that the state neither of the army nor treasury of India were such as to permit them to think of renewing the war.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that early in the year 1842, the Dooranee alliance must have been broken off, and Affghanistan abandoned at all events, without reservation or delay, whatever its condition. The originators of the policy, had they remained in power, would have been compelled to undo their own measures with their own hands,—to abandon a system, which, from its own inherent defects, was incapable of being maintained. The Cabool disaster was for them and their already bankrupt credit as statesmen, far the best thing that could have happened: making it appear as if the policy of 1838 had been brought to an end by a great and unlooked-for catastrophe, which no one could have foreseen or guarded against, and withdrawing public attention from the fact that, in the first place, the Ghilzie insurrection, and its results, was a natural and long-expected emanation from the system itself; and, in the second place, that if, by some rare piece of unimagined good fortune, we had contrived to escape any thing like this, the whole fabric of our policy, which the disasters of Cabool so suddenly dissolved, was ready to crumble to pieces from its own intrinsic rottenness. (49)

Such frequent mention has been made of the mismanagement of the political agents, in contrast with the excellent conduct of the military,

47. Letter of Governor-General in Council, Dec. 3. News from Cabool at this time extended to the 9th Nov., and gave details of only one week of the insurrection, which began on the 2d. Blue Book, p. 37.

48. Letter, &c. &c., Dec. 5. Blue Book, p. 38.

49. See extract from memorial of Sir Alex. Burnes, page 151.

that a misapprehension has got abroad that these gentlemen did not belong to the army at all. This is a mistake which ought to be rectified. On referring to the list given at the commencement of the third chapter (p. 143) it will be seen that at the first the Envoy and Mr Bell were the only political agents who did not belong to the military service; and that after the demise of the latter of these gentlemen, the envoy alone was a civilian. Of the thirty-two political agents employed in Afghanistan between 1839 and 1842, not one had attained the rank of major in the army, (50) ten were captains, and 21 lieutenants. Had these gentlemen continued to act in their military capacity there is no reason to doubt but that they would have done no discredit to the service from which they had been temporarily in some measure withdrawn. They were selected chiefly for their proficiency in languages and knowledge of the country: and as these accomplishments did not necessarily imply the possession of a high order of intellectual endowment, the men whose power was supreme over the various districts of the Dooranee empire were too often found awaiting for the adequate discharge of the onerous and important duties imposed upon them. The amount of irresponsible authority with which they were invested was enough to have turned stronger and stabler heads than theirs—and the idea had unhappily got amongst them that subtlety and dissimulation were essential, and the most tortuous policy and Machivellian morals permissible in the position of statesmen which they now occupied—that in fact they must fling aside the military frankness and straightforward candour which became them as officers, and assume a character from which, in their private capacity of English gentlemen, they would have shrunk. There are many, very many, to whom these observations are inapplicable, and the examples of the eminent success of Major Outram, and Captains M'Gregor, Mackeson, and Lawrence, in pursuing the straightforward system becoming high-minded soldiers and honourable men, may shew how sadly some of their brethren erred in supposing wisdom incompatible with perfect candour, frankness and simplicity. The evils which arose from the general system of political agencies might have been greatly diminished had the sphere of the labours of the agents been restricted to that of interpreters and collectors of information—leaving the political power in the hands of the military chiefs. Yet the mischiefs complained of were, in a considerable measure, inherent in the system, and it is difficult to conceive any organization which could have worked

50. Sir Alex. Burnes had merely the army rank of Captain—Major Outram was so by Brevet—Majors D'A. Tod, Rawlinson, Pottinger, Leach, and Lynch, were Lieutenants in the army, and held the rank of Major in Persia or Afghanistan only.

really well in carrying out the objects we had in view, considering the nature and magnitude of these, and the circumstances under which they were desired to be elaborated.

A single subject remains yet to be noticed—the conduct of the army—which we have reserved to the last, because it is the only one which can be discussed not only without a preponderance of censure, but with unmixed approbation, and unalloyed pride and pleasure.

Highly as the sepoy soldier had been appreciated by every one acquainted with the history of oriental wars, half the merit of the Company's native army may be said to have remained unknown till brought to light by the Affghan campaigns. There are no people on earth more averse to quit their homes for foreign lands than the natives of Hindostan, and no country could have been more abhorrent to them than that where the climates of the frigid and torrid zone alternated, and from which had descended those torrents of gigantic and resistless warriors by whom, from time to time, the fairest provinces of India were overrun.

From November 1838 till November 1841, the native army sustained a series of incessant and most perilous encounters, over an expanse of 800 miles of rugged, difficult, and inhospitable country, without one solitary instance of alleged misconduct, save that on the part of a single squadron of cavalry at Purwan Durrah. Patient of fatigue, tormented by extremes of heat and cold, in a country where the thermometer ranged from 120 deg. to 40 deg. below freezing—often suffering from scarcity of food and want of camp accommodation, we have not so much as an example of a threat of mutiny, or manifestation of discontent. Frequently disappointed in the expectation of returning to India, they received their orders to remain in the country and resume campaigning with the most perfect cheerfulness. With no single instance of timidity or backwardness, save that just named, and a trifling case at Kojjuck, only worth adverting to because we are anxious to extenuate nothing which the censurers of the service would desire to dwell upon—there were numberless examples of endurance, coolness under fire, and intrepidity, which would have been the boast of any service. It must be kept in view that we were on almost every occasion of conflict enormously outnumbered,—that the enemy individually were stronger and more powerful men, far better armed, and equally as brave as those they encountered: and that the advantage of choosing their battle-ground was always on their side. These observations refer exclusively to the Hindostanee troops,—the character of the British-born soldier is sufficiently known to require no commendation—it was never more gloriously sustained than in the campaigns in Affghanistan, to which this narrative relates. A portion of H. M.'s 4th dragoons, H.M.'s 13th, 17th, 40th, and 44th, and the 1st Bengal Europeans, with various

corps of artillery, all more or less shared in our Dooranee wars before the Ghilzie outbreak. The 13th alone were engaged throughout, and fought gloriously, and suffered patiently from the beginning to the end. The perfect harmony betwixt the various races, and the brotherly feeling with which they fought, side by side, is above all commendation. The fellowship which afterwards sprung up betwixt H.M.'s 13th and Bengal 35th N.I., and the admiration of H.M.'s 22d for the Bombay 25th N.I., indicate that the sympathies of the brave with each other are impeded by no difference of country, colour, or creed.

Of the British officers nothing need be said: the history of their achievements and sufferings, brief and meagre as it is, is enough. With the service of more gallant, upright, able, or efficient men, no Government need desire to be blessed or honoured. Where there was so much to irritate and excite, it is not to be forgotten that with the daring and promptitude, the mercy and humanity of Englishmen was duly mingled. More instances of individual heroism and personal gallantry, under circumstances of extreme trial, might be quoted in this campaign than in any one in which our armies ever were for a similar time engaged. To the army the Affghan war was in many ways a curse: its hardships they cheerfully surmounted—its dangers they defied. But it was a war as void of apology or justice as of honour, its objects awakened no sympathy in its favour, their attainment was unworthy of British ambition. The laurels it yielded, however ably won, were grudgingly given, and scarcely coveted, their exhibition hardly furnished food for gratification—they gained no glory in so worthless a cause. The terrors of the sword were nothing, those of sickness and poverty were less easily defied. Instead of the campaigns from 1838 to 1842 requiting the soldier for his sufferings and toils, they were, in all cases, sources of loss, in many, of absolute ruin. The extra allowances were utterly inadequate to meet the extravagant charges on the march, and expenses attending on the detention in cantonments; and unless to those to whom lucrative political or staff appointments fell, the officers, not only in health but in emolument, were grievous sufferers.

Overleaping the interval occupied by the active operations of the insurrection, it may be as well shortly to notice the fate of the leading characters which have occupied so prominent a place in the preceding pages.

Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten were murdered at Cabool—the one on the 2d November, the other on the 23d December, 1841. General Elphinstone died a prisoner in the enemy's hands.

General Nott, with his army, remained at Candahar till August 1842, when he himself, with the larger portion of them, advanced on Gluznie,

which they destroyed, and returned by Cabool and the Khyber Pass to India, gaining two victories, and attended by the most brilliant success on the way. The other portion returned by Quettah and the Bolan Pass.

The Shah Soojah is suspected to have been connected with the Ghilzie insurrection. At his own desire he was left behind when our armies quitted Cabool on the 6th January 1842, and for a time appeared likely to maintain himself in power. He was murdered a few months afterwards by the chiefs.

Of his sons, Prince Timour, the only one whose character was without reproach, remained faithful to us to the end, and retired with our armies to India, where he now lives a pensioner on government. Prince Futteh Jung succeeded the Shah in nominal authority at Cabool, but afterwards fled from the capital for fear of his life. Prince Shahpoor it was at one time believed would be able to maintain himself in power, and he was left behind after our final retirement: he quickly followed his brother, and the two are now elemosynaries of the Seikh ruler.

The miscreant Sufter Jung of Candahar went over to the enemy shortly after the commencement of the insurrection, and having continued for six months to fight against us, ultimately surrendered himself into our hands. He was left behind on General Nott's advance, but having been shortly afterwards expelled from his country, is said to have found refuge at Kelat. According to another rumour he is now in chains at Candahar, where every one who befriended us is made subject of persecution by the ruling powers.

On the 1st of October 1842, a proclamation dated Simla, announced that our connection with Affghanistan had ceased, and that the government of India would meddle no more with its affairs; our own prisoners had been recovered, and the Affghan chiefs and their families were all to be set free.

After devastating the country—cutting down the trees, and uprooting the orchards and vineyards, after having blown up or burned with fire the cities and forts of Ghuznie, Cabool, Istaliff, Jellalabad, and Ali Musjid, by which about 70,000 human beings were, on the eve of winter, left houseless—our armies were, in November, entirely withdrawn from the country.

In April 1843, Dost Mahomed, after a long sojourn in the Punjaub—where he was entertained by the Seikh ruler in a manner becoming both their stations—returned with his family, without obstruction and in safety, to Cabool, and resumed sovereignty without opposition or resistance. His indomitable son, Ukhbar Khan, for a time laying aside the sword, set himself about the reconstruction of the fort of Jellalabad, and the ruined cities.

The king of Bokhara sent an ambassador to congratulate the Ameer on his return: he was received with favour, and returned with presents.

Sarawan was once more re-annexed to Kelat, and Quettah left uninjured—Cutchee had been before made over to Nusseer Khan.

The Candahar Sirdars do not appear so easily to have regained their authority : by the latest intelligence their government was said to be in the hands of Persia—the Shah coining money—the surest stamp of oriental sovereignty—in his own name.

Kamran Shah is understood to have died about May 1843, and the sovereignty of Herat was immediately assumed by the king of Persia.

The Ameers of Scinde appear on the whole to have conducted themselves inoffensively enough from the date of the hostile demonstration near Hyderabad in January 1839—fresh treaties were urged upon them from time to time, and successively agreed to. In February 1843, terms were proposed to them by Lord Ellenborough, to which they considered it impossible to assent—they resolved to oppose the advance of Sir Charles Napier, then pressing forward on Hyderabad, with an army of nearly 30,000 men. They were beaten with a loss of 5000 killed and wounded, and having surrendered themselves prisoners, were sent to be confined in India for life. A second battle with a similar loss occurred near Hyderabad some weeks afterwards. Scinde was declared ours by right of conquest, and was added to the British territories in India. At present 16,000 men, at an annual cost of above a million sterling, are required to maintain it in peace—the share of its revenue claimed by us being less than the fourth part of this !

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