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

The Action of the Surtop Pass, 16th May, 1840.

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

The Action of the NUFOOSK PASS, August 31st, 1840.

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Wm J. Eastwick

OUTLINE OF THE OPERATIONS

OF THE

BRITISH TROOPS

IN

SCINDE AND AFFGHANISTAN,

BETWIXT NOV. 1838 AND NOV. 1841;

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

WITH REMARKS ON THE POLICY OF THE WAR.

By GEO. BUIST, L.L.D.,

EDITOR OF THE BOMBAY TIMES; SECRETARY TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND AGRI-HORTICULTURAL SOCIETIES; AND IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT OBSERVATORY, BOMBAY.

BOMBAY:

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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

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THE following memoir was drawn up for the *Bombay Times* and *Monthly Times* newspapers: the former a bi-weekly print, chiefly read in India; the latter, for which it was principally intended, being published on the morning of the dispatch of the Overland Mail, and having much the greater part of its circulation in Europe. Various valuable narratives, giving accounts of the campaign of 1839, were published in the year 1840, the titles of which have been quoted as their pages have been referred to and drawn upon for the substance of the Second Chapter of the present volume. The writers of these treat, after their own fashion, of the events of which they were witnesses or sharers: Dr KENNEDY confines himself to an account of the march of the Bombay column, which at first, for three months, pursued a different route from the Bengal portion of the army; until, reaching the mouth of the Bolan Pass, it afterwards followed the track of the leading column, although ten marches in its rear, until the whole assembled at Candahar on the 4th May, where the elements of the grand army were, for the first time, united. The march between this and Cabool furnishes common ground, which has been traversed by all the writers who describe the operations of Sir JOHN KEANE. Dr KENNEDY retires with the Bombay force by the new route over the Toba mountains, to the southward of that which had been previously traversed, and brings the reader back through Sukkur with the last fragment of the force. Major OUTRAM'S "Rough Notes" are entirely confined to what he himself did or saw: he gives us his adventures at starting in Cutch in quest of camels—the gallant,

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dangerous, though unsuccessful pursuit of DOST MAHOMED,—the independent operations amongst the Ghilzies, and the advance on, and capture of, Kelat. Majors HOUGH and HAVELOCK chiefly confine themselves to the details of the proceedings of the Bengal troops—the work of the former officer being valuable as a body of statistics and book of reference, but scarcely claiming the character of a history or narrative. Of the first campaign, no general account is to be found comprised in any single work; and the reader who desires to make himself acquainted with the operations of 1839, must not only study with care those just alluded to, but must peruse, besides, many elaborate and tedious official papers, before he can have any thing like a distinct conception of the subject. The Second Chapter of the present volume is an attempt to callocate the facts, and condense the matter, furnished by the books just named and official papers referred to, as well as that contained in the newspapers and letters of the time, and so for the first time to supply, in the shape of uninterrupted narrative, a general view of the whole operations of the original campaign.

No attempt has hitherto been made to continue the history of the events which occurred betwixt November 1839 and November 1841, which connect by close and indissoluble, though generally disregarded or unexamined, links, the triumphs with which the Dooranee alliance opened, and the calamities wherewith it closed: for before the war of retribution began the SHAH SOOJAH was dead, and all peaceful political connexion with Affghan affairs at an end,—the material for which lies scattered in abundance amongst the Despatches which have appeared in the *Government Gazette*, and the published accounts furnished by the officers engaged in the war.

Throughout the greater portion of this period the present writer had been occupied as Editor of the *Bombay Times*. Constantly engaged in examining, sifting, and comparing accounts from the seat of war, reconciling discrepancies, correcting or rejecting statements which appeared over-coloured

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or inaccurate, and then reducing them to a narrative form for a bi-weekly paper,—to be subsequently re-examined, corrected, and abridged for a monthly publication,—he was necessarily, from the nature of his profession, nearly as familiar with the subject as any man by incessant study could become. He had, besides, the advantage of knowing his authorities, which the public were compelled to take on trust:—he was perfectly aware of the weight to be attached to statements which, appearing before the world in an anonymous form, were always authenticated to the publisher by the names of the writers, and often came from such men as Colonel DENNIE and the general officers engaged in the actions described.

It was but too apparent, from the errors constantly committed not only by such writers as those of the *Annual Register*, but by others whose familiarity with discussions appertaining to Indian affairs ought to have kept them informed, that the amount of ignorance generally prevalent on these topics was almost unbounded, the indifference to enlightenment nearly incurable; and that few indeed, even of the best informed, had carried the continuous thread of the story of events unbroken and fully along with them. On these grounds, a narrative such as the present seemed to be a desideratum which no one appeared, at the period when it was most required, inclined to supply:—the time was hastening on when the interest attaching to the annals of 1840–41 was passing away,—and ill qualified as the present writer might otherwise have felt himself for the task of historiagrapher, from the nature of his professional avocations, the subject was, at all events, familiar to him in most of its aspects, and he was ready to do the best which circumstances permitted while public curiosity was not quite asleep, and when no other labourers seemed disposed to come into the field.

In completing the revisal and correction of proofs, he chanced to be peculiarly fortunate, in from time to time obtaining the services of seven different staff officers, two of them of the Queen's and five of the Company's service, all of whom had been

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engaged in one or more of the several campaigns under review, and nearly all of them at the heads of departments in the detachments to which they belonged, and each of whom most frankly and willingly complied with his request for their advice and assistance. The introductory and concluding chapters are the only ones which have not been subjected to this species of ordeal. To these gentlemen the Author's most grateful acknowledgments are due; and he only regrets that, in consequence of the etiquette of the Service, forbiding them to be formally known as contributors to a newspaper, he cannot thank them by name for the labour and pains bestowed by them in correcting casual errors, which fortunately were less numerous than might have been apprehended,—as well as for the complimentary manner in which they have been pleased to express themselves as to the accuracy of the narrative. For the opinions maintained as to the policy and management of the war, the gentlemen alluded to are, of course, in no way to be held responsible.

The sale of books of the present description is in Western India in the last degree limited: the want of curiosity so constantly manifested in England in reference to the concerns of the East, left no reason to suppose that a work of greater magnitude on this subject, if published separately, would have covered the heavy charges incurred in printing at Bombay,—the difficulty at once and necessity of having the proofs carefully corrected and revised, put home publication out of the question,—and the style of the writing pretended to none of the graces which might have attracted the attention of the reader where the subject by itself was to him of little interest. On these grounds, a very small edition (200) of the volume has been thrown off: this being not, strictly speaking, a reprint from the *Bombay Times*, but an impression from the types as re-adjusted and placed in pages. Several errors have been corrected, and some few changes in arrangement, and a slight enlargement made, while the whole has been subjected to repeated and very careful revisals: and this is all that has been done in the way

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of alteration. These explanations are required to account for the numberless imperfections with which the volume is chargeable,—for the defects in style, and occasional want of method which, though inexcusable in a formal historical work, may be pardoned in a newspaper memoir, written occasionally amidst attacks of sickness, at all times in haste and under the pressure of numerous, complicated, laborious, and varied avocations. The duties of a newspaper editor at home give no sort of idea of the labours and perplexities of a journalist in India:—without reports of public meetings or parliamentary debates,—where political discussions, in the English sense of the term, which at all times furnish food for unlimited speculation to a ready or fluent writer, are disrelished,—with a hot and relaxing climate to contend against, and many of the duties which in Europe are discharged by correspondents, reporters, sub-editors, or other assistants, thrown entirely into his hands.

In drawing up the present narrative, each month demanded its chapter complete, however numerous might be the documents required to be consulted, or perplexing and inaccessible the authorities to be referred to,—whatever might be the amount of interruptions, or the pressure of extraneous avocations; and the several sheets were generally taken away by the compositor as written—the first proofs not being ready for revision till the last pages were out of the writer's hands. The dispatch of the mail required that the printing machine should be at work by a given hour, without regard to the fatigues of the party who prepared for it its supplies of food. This will account for, if not excuse, much repetition and not a little confusion, which will be observed especially in the first and second chapters, and of which no one of those which follow is wholly free. To have got rid of these, which even an author's partiality for his own writings leaves sufficiently apparent to himself, would have required an amount of alteration, incurring an expenditure of money and of labour which there was no reason to suppose the return of sales would compensate, and which no prudent person would have recommended a poor

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man to undertake without hope of requital, for the benefit of those who might not, after all, have appreciated the outlay that had been incurred in their behalf.

No exertion has been spared to complete the work to the best of the writer's ability under the disadvantages which hurried periodical publication always impose; he is conscious of no selfish motive, or personal bias towards any one; and has neither been influenced by fear or favour of any party; he has warmly and fearlessly assailed the dishonest and aggressive foreign policy alike of Lord ELLENBOROUGH as of Lord AUCKLAND, aware that, in so doing, he should incur the displeasure of the men of both parties who might happen to favour his speculations with perusal: he undertook the task in his capacity of newspaper editor, in the hope of supplying something not quite familiar nor wholly unacceptable to the reader, but under no delusion as to his pre-eminent qualifications for its discharge,—and now passes the result of his labours from his hands, not as a volume worthy of the name of history, or capable, as a literary production, of withstanding the censures of the critic, but as a mere reprint of an ephemeral memoir, which may help to assist the recollection of those into whose hands it shall chance to fall,—and who prefer a book to a series of chapters spread over seven months of a newspaper file,—of the connection betwixt the victories of Lord KEANE and the terrific disasters of the army of General ELPHINSTONE. The excessively limited amount of its circulation precludes it from being considered so much even as a memoir to serve in the place of history till history be written. It was originally intended that the chronicle of events should have been brought down through the calamities of winter and spring 1841–42 to the triumphant return of our armies to India: and this is a work of much interest and importance which yet remains to be performed by some one,—the narratives of the prisoners being confined to the affairs at Cabool. But the parliamentary papers and numerous journals published in the course of the past six months, furnish a mass of material which would, after the utmost

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compression, occupy as large a space as that devoted to the events of the three preceding years; and it seemed doubtful whether public interest might not flag had this been attempted to be issued in chapters,—more than doubtful whether it would have been cared for as a separate volume. The narrative, therefore, was broken off at the period supplied by the Ghilzie insurrection—when a new roll rather than a new chapter in our history may be said to have been opened up.

The woodcuts of Nufoosk and Surtof were engraven for a work of a different nature from the present: that having fallen aside they are now taken advantage of. This, it is hoped, will be accepted as an explanation why, if any illustrations were thought of, more were not given. These are presented to the reader because they were at hand, at any rate; they were not purposely prepared: more could not have been afforded.

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ERRATA.

At page 2, line 7 from the top, for 1837 *read* 1839.
.. 17, ... 2 from bottom, for *fall* of Herat *read* safety of Herat.
... 49, ... 4 from the bottom (note 41,) *for* expected *read* expressed.
... 63, ... 10 from top, *for* presents to Lahore *read* presents to Runjeet Sing.
... 92, ... 11 from the top, *for* 6th April *read* 26th April.
... 124.—Omit from line 5 to line 10 from the top of the page. The change of plan adopted in the course of publication excludes the account of the destruction of the Cabool army and advance of General Pollock's troops, proposed to have been given in the concluding chapters.
.. 127, line 15 from the bottom, *for* Lieut. McKenzie *read* Lieut. Nicholson.
... 148.—A note, copied from the *Agra Ukhbar*, states, that the chiefs who fell into the hands of Lieut. Nicholson were executed contrary to agreement. Sir W. Macnaghten in his letter, printed at p. 287-89, states, that the chiefs were perfectly aware that they were to be capitally punished, and that there was no stipulation whatever to the contrary.
... 203.—Line 15 from the bottom, *for* judgment of a court of inquiry *read* decision of a court, &c.
.. 233, ... 16 from top, *for* Kojuck *read* Kujjuck.
.. 243.—Mr Bell's demise is said to have taken place on the 1st August: it occurred late on the evening of the 31st July.
... 249.—Line 7 from top It is stated that Lieut. Outram was specially mentioned by Colonel Deacon in his account of the capture of Kittoor. This was not Lieut. James (afterwards the distinguished Major) Outram, as stated by mistake in the text; but his brother; both were present and did good service, but Lieut. Outram of the engineers is the party stated to have been named in the dispatch.

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Events near Cabool in the beginning of 1841—Brigading of the Troops in Affghanistan—Shelton's Brigade leaves Ferozepore—Alleged reduction of the Army—Expedition into the Nazian valley in February—Lieut. Pigou killed by an explosion—Captain Douglas shot—Arrival of the 3d Convoy at Cabool—Return of the Shah and Envoy to the Capital—Arrogance of the Shah—Seikh affairs—Death of Kurruck Sing—Of Nao Nehal Sing—Shere Sing proclaimed King—Dissipated habits of—His coronation—Queen Dowager declared pregnant—Shere Sing withdraws himself—A revolution in the Army—He is restored to the throne—Tranquillity of the Punjaub—Captain Broadfoot's convoy—Death of one of the Royal Ladies—Danger of the Convoy—Coolness and good conduct of Captain Broadfoot—Arrives at Peshawur—Scene of Narrative changes—Suftur Jung Governor of Candahar—His misconduct and dissipation—Discontents in the Ghilzie country—Expedition to Ghirisk—Detachments of the Shah's troops destroyed—Captain Farrington sets out—Pursues Ukhtar Khan and defeats him on the Helmund—Major Tod's arrival from Herat—Reinforcements sent to Ghirisk—Major Lynch's management of the Ghilzie country—Resolves to fortify Kelat-i-Ghilzie—Unhappy affair at Kulla i-Ingoz—General rising of the country—Colonel Wymer's reinforcement from Candahar—Defeats the enemy—Detachment from Ghuznie quartered at Mookloor—Colonel Chambers's expedition—Success of Captain Walker and Lieut. Bazzett—Captain Woodburn's Detachment sent to Ghirisk—Battle with Ukhtar Khan on the Helmund—Misconduct of the Janbaz Horse—Brilliant victory Expedition under Captain Griffin—Battle with Ukhtar Khan's troops—Great slaughter of the enemy—Expedition under Colonel Wymer into the Teeree country—Capture of Akram Khan—His execution—Colonel Maclaren's Brigade leaves for India—Directed to return and proceed to Cabool—Advance found impossible—Posts in Western Affghanistan in October 1841—Affairs at Cabool—Expedition into the Zoormut Valley—Strength of Army in Eastern Affghanistan—Ghilzie insurrection occasioned by stoppage of

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tribute—Conclusion—Loss of life during the Affghan war—Loss of Treasure—Sir W. Macnaghten's letter on presenting Sir Alexander Burnes's memorial—Apathy of the people at home—Lord Palmerston's Tiverton speech—Proposed continuation and subsequent abandonment of our Affghan policy—Reflections on the conduct of the Political Agents—Noble conduct of the Army—Conclusion.

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PREFACE.

AFFGHANISTAN is walled in on the north by the Hindoo Koosh and the Paropamisan range of mountains,* many of which reach the elevation of 20,000 feet—the summit level of the passes through which the intercourse betwixt the countries to the north and south of these is maintained, varies from 10 to 13,000 feet.† On the south and east it is bounded by the river Indus from Attock in longitude 73° east, latitude 34° north, to as far south as latitude 32° 20′. On the east it is divided by stupendous mountain ranges from Chinese Tartary—on the west it borders with Bokhara, Koondooz, and Persia; on the south-west with Beloochistan and Scinde, from both of which it was wont to claim allegiance, military service, and tribute. The kingdom of Cabool, which more immediately concerns us at present, arose out of the dismemberment of the empire of Nadir Shah. When that monarch was murdered in 1747 he was succeeded by Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Doorannee monarchy;—a skilful, brave and enterprizing soldier, whose whole reign, to the period of his death in 1773, was spent in war. He bequeathed an empire which reached from Khorassan to Sirhind, and from the Oxus to the sea, to his son Timor, a weak and indolent monarch, unable to rule the extensive realms and turbulent subjects the more vigorous hand of his father had with difficulty controlled. Timor Shah transferred the seat of government from Candahar to Cabool, and was, in 1793, succeeded by Zemaun Shah, one of the youngest of his sons.‡ On the elevation of this prince to the throne, which had been effected by a faction of

* Hamilton's Gazetteer.

† Rough Notes on the Campaign in Scinde and Affghanistan, &c. By Captain James Outram, p. 110.

‡ Asiatic Journal from September to December, 1838. The whole of the papers in this periodical on our Affghan policy are able and excellent, and would form valuable subjects of study to those who have the ignorance or impudence to assert that the mischiefs of the Affghan war were only first discovered after it began to appear unfortunate.

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the nobles, his elder brothers broke out in open insurrection: one had himself proclaimed king of Candahar, but was afterwards defeated and blinded by Mahmoud Shah, another brother, who seized Herat, which he was permitted to retain. The elevation of the Shah Zemaun to the throne, had given rise to much popular discontent: and Futteh Khan, head of the Barukzyes, having formed an alliance with the ruler of Herat, advanced to the eastward, where, near Candahar, he defeated Zemaun, who was afterwards betrayed into the hands of the conqueror, by whom he was blinded and sent prisoner to Cabool. Shah Soojah, a still younger son of Timor, and brother of Zemaun, now, for the first time, appears in the field. In 1801, on learning the mishap of his brother, he advanced on Cabool from Peshawur, but was defeated, and his army dispersed by Futteh Khan and his Barukzyes. An attempt in 1803 was more successful. When Futteh Khan, acknowledged on all hands to have been a man of talent and courage, was absent from his capital engaged in quelling an insurrection, advantage was taken of some religious quarrels betwixt the leading Mahommedan sects: and the Shah Soojah, who had shortly before been a second time defeated, from a fugitive living on the bounty of the tribes was raised to the throne. After six years of almost uninterrupted turbulence and discord, during which he, on more than one occasion, nearly lost his crown, he was, in 1810, totally defeated by Futteh Khan, and driven from his kingdom. In 1811 he made an unsuccessful attempt to regain the sovereignty. He subsequently resided in the Punjaub till stripped of the crown jewels and all his other property by Runjeet Singh. This is a brief but exact outline of the early career of the Shah Soojah. His grandfather obtained the kingdom by conquest. His brother, to whom he temporarily succeeded, was one of the younger sons of Timor, the son of Ahmed Shah, and was raised to the sovereignty by force over the heads of his elder brothers; to whom, if seniority and hereditary right were to be considered grounds of claim, it properly belonged. Kamran Shah of Herat, son of Mahmoud, the eldest of these, has throughout, since his father's death, been the representative of the lineal branch, and is so still. The Shah Soojah maintained a weak and troubled reign for the space of seven years, during which he never exercised authority over one half the territory or subjects, or claimed one tithe of the rights of which we afterwards for a time put him in possession. It is well to recollect these things, because the general impression amongst

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the public at large appears throughout to have been, that in placing the late Doorannee ruler on the throne, we were restoring a once powerful and popular monarch to rights which he had formerly enjoyed:—to a kingdom and subjects so ruled by him through a long period of time, as that, from them with him as their sovereign, we might look for a strong and imperishable barrier against all invasion from Persia and Russia. Instead of this, we associated ourselves with an ally who was only able to maintain a precarious rule, because of the dissensions of the other chiefs:—who never possessed the confidence of the Affghans to an extent that would have enabled him to ward off foreign aggression, from whatever quarter it might have been threatened.

Futteh Khan, though actually holding the power and destinies of the kingdom in his hands, had never claimed the title of Sovereign, which was enjoyed by Shah Mahmoud, the hereditary Grand Vizier. The former chief was shortly afterwards deprived of sight at Candahar by a son of the latter, in revenge for the contemptuous manner in which he had spoken of the ruler of Cabool. This barbarous act of vengeance immediately converted the brothers of Futteh Khan into the most active enemies of Mahmoud Shah and his family.* After a considerable period of turbulence and strife, the Doorannee empire was dismembered. In 1826, Dost Mahomed made himself entire master of Cabool.† He deprived his brother Jubbar Khan of the Ghilzee country, of which he had just before obtained possession, and made him his vizier; seizing also on Jellalabad, which had belonged to Mahomed Zemaun Khan. Candahar fell under the rule of three of Dost Mahomed's brothers. In 1833, the Shah Soojah made a last attempt to recover the sovereignty; he defeated the Scindians and possessed himself of Shikarpore. Having advanced by the Bolan Pass and Quettah, he was, on the 2d of July 1834, defeated by Dost Mahomed near Candahar, and sought refuge from the Khan of Kelat. From this date he lived a pensioner on the Indian Government within the Company's territory. He had, indeed, resided at Loodianah since 1818: we allowed him a pension of £4500 a-year, but avoided meddling with his quarrels.‡ Sixty winters had cooled his ambition, and he seemed content to spend his days in affluent and luxurious

* The above is chiefly an abridgement from the Asiatic Journal, as already quoted.

† Major Hough's March and Operations of the Army of the Indus, p. 414.

‡ Ibid, p. 404, note.

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exile, when in 1838 it pleased the British Government to treat with him as a sovereign about to be placed once more in power!

Having given thus much of a cursory glance at the state of politics in Affghanistan when we first embroiled ourselves with its affairs,—its revenue, and the character of its people fall next to be noticed before enlarging on the political questions whose discussion immediately preceded preparations for war, and which will not, for some time to come, have ceased to occupy public attention.

The entire population of the Doorannee empire is estimated by Mr Elphinstone at about a million of souls: of these, from 80,000 to 100,000 are inhabitants of Cabool,* and about a similar number of the city of Candahar.† The town of Istaliff, but little known to us till attacked and destroyed by Gen. McCaskill on the 29th Sept. 1842, contains about 15,000 inhabitants; Charekar about 3000; Ghuznie about 3000; and Quettah about 6000. The last-named town was at this time a portion of the Khanate of Kelat, to which it has since been re-annexed; from 1839 to 1842, we held it as belonging to the Shah Soojah. There are no other towns of note in the kingdom, save Jellalabad, which is within the first line of passes. Cabool, the capital, is situated in Lat. 34 deg. 30 min. N., and Long. 68 deg. 31 min. E. It is more than three miles in circumference. It is surrounded by rocky hills; and the beautiful but narrow valley in which it stands is no less than 6396 feet above the level of the sea.‡ It is remarkable for the excellency and abundance of its fruits. The Bala Hissar, or citadel, is placed on an eminence, half a mile long and half as much broad, overlooking and commanding the town, which is difficult of access either to friend or foe. It is, or rather it was, chiefly remarkable for the magnificence of its bazaars. These buildings, formed by a continuation of streets roofed in and crossing each other at right angles, were, until our troops blew them up in 1842, the admiration of every traveller, and the architectural pride of Central Asia. The revenues of Cabool with all its territories, amounted in Dost Mahomed's time to from £250,000 to £300,000 a year;‖ during the period of our occupation they seldom exceeded £220,000;¶ while,

* Burnes. Major Hough.

† Major Hough states that there are 40,000 houses, and 100,000 inhabitants in Candahar (p. 135.) We are disposed to take a lower estimate.

‡ Major Hough, pp. 284 and 430.

‖ See Burnes's Travels.

¶ Letter of Sir Alex. Burnes, published in the *Bombay Times*.

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in addition to this, Candahar yielded £80,000; and the whole revenues of the Shah Soojah betwixt 1839 and 1841, never probably amounted to any thing like £400,000 a year. The charges we incurred on his account annually were about eight times this. The winter throughout Affghanistan is exceedingly severe, the thermometer at Cabool often sinking below zero, and remaining 8 or 10 deg. under freezing for three or four months together.

Recent occurrences have occasioned so much wrathful discussion as to the character of the Affghan population, that instead of attempting an analysis or delineation of it for ourselves, we shall borrow what appears to us an exceedingly fair one from the *Asiatic Journal*; the article we are about to quote being an abstract of the views of Elphinstone, Conolly, Burnes, and Moorcroft:—

"These tribes differ so much in their internal government, manners, and customs, that they may be almost regarded as distinct nations; the only feature which is most marked amongst the Affghan tribes, as common to all, is a wild independence, which, in some approaches to a republican sentiment of equality. They are all, likewise, remarkable for a lofty martial spirit, simplicity of manners, and hospitality. The original number of their tribes, or family divisions, is four; but these have been subdivided into several branches, each ruled by its own independant khan, or chief, though retaining an idea of a community of blood and interests. Each tribe, or *ooloos*, has a distinct form of government, of the patriarchal character, constituting a complete commonwealth in itself. The Affghan nation is composed of an assemblage of these commonwealths, which form one state by obedience to the authority of a common sovereign, though the submission of some of the tribes has ever been but nominal. The Affghans exult in the free spirit of their institutions; they cherish the notion that 'all Affghans are equal.' When Mr. Elphinstone urged, on an intelligent old man of the Meeankhail tribe, the superiority of a secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the discord and bloodshed which prevailed under their present system, he replied proudly, 'We are content with discord, we are content with bloodshed, but we will never be content with a master.'

"The condition of the Affghan women, who are described as large, and very fair and handsome, varies with their rank; those of the upper classes are entirely concealed, those of the poor do the work of the house. The former are not uneducated. In the country, they go unveiled, and exercise hospitality when their husbands are from home. 'I am not sure,' says Mr Elphinstone, 'that there is any people in the East, except the Affghans, where I have seen any trace of the sentiment of love, according to our ideas of the passion.'

"The Affghans exhibit a remarkable contrast to other Mahommedan nations in their treatment of Christians, to whom they have not the smallest aversion. M. Durie, an Indo-Briton, who travelled through Affghanistan as far west as

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Candahar, mixing with all classes as a Mahommedan, though suspected of being a Feringhee, represents the people as kind, free, liberal, and tolerant: their aversion towards the Sikhs arises from their regarding them as pagans.

"One of their most remarkable characteristics is their hospitality; the practice of this virtue is so much a national point of honour, that their reproach to an inhospitable man is to say that he is no Affghan. A man's bitterest enemy is safe while he is under his roof, and a stranger who has come into an Affghan's tent or house is under the protection of the master as long as he stays in the village. The protection, however, does not extend further; there are instances, in some of the predatory tribes, of travellers being entertained and dismissed with presents, and yet robbed by the same tribe, when met again without the bounds of their protection.

"The tribes most addicted to rapine in the west are about Candahar, in the desert country on the borders of Persia and Beloochistan, and the Ghilzees, who inhabit the Paropamisan mountains. All the tribes of the range of Soliman, especially the Khyberees and Vizcerees, are notorious plunderers; many others in the east are disposed to plunder, and it is remarked that all the pastoral tribes in the west are more disposed to robbery than those who live by agriculture: robbery is, however, never aggravated by murder.

"The nomade population is diminishing, though the Dooranees extol the charms of a pastoral life. Those who live in tents are chiefly to be found in the west, where they amount to one-half the population. All over the east, the people live in houses. The commonest house is built of unburnt brick one story high, and roofed with a terrace or low cupola. There is little or no furniture within, except a coarse woollen carpet, and pieces of felt to sit on. The houses of the great are of two or three stories, and enclosed with high walls containing stables and offices, and several courts laid out in gardens with fountains. The halls are supported by pillars and Moorish arches, carved and painted. The walls are ornamented with paintings in distemper or oil, and pictures. The furniture consists chiefly of carpets and felts. The tents of the shepherds are of coarse black camlet; those of the common people are from twenty to twenty-five feet long, ten or twelve broad, and eight or nine high, supported by poles, and divided into two apartments by a curtain; those of the khans are larger and better—the Dooranees line their tents with felt.

"The Affghans are a social, sober, steady, cheerful people. Though merry, they do not laugh much, though they talk a great deal. They are fond of tales and songs, which are of love or war; but their favourite amusement is the chase or hawking.

"The men are all of a robust make, generally lean, though bony and muscular. They have high noses, high cheek-bones, and long faces. Their hair and beards are generally black; sometimes brown. They shave the middle part of the head, but wear the rest of their hair, which is coarse and strong. Their countenance has an expression of manliness and deliberation, united to an air of simplicity. The western Affghans are larger and stouter than those of the east, and some Dooranees and Ghilzees are of surprising

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strength and stature; but, generally speaking, the Affghans are not so tall as the English. Their manners are frank and open, and though manly and independent, they are entirely free from military pride and *ferocity*. About towns, the Affghans are in some degree polished; but in many parts of the country they are plain and rustic, but never fierce or insolent. Their deportment is easy, yet it is not uncommon to find them bashful, a defect rarely seen in an Asiatic. Their conversation is rational, they are desirous of information, and the bulk of the people are remarkable for prudence, good sense, and observation. Capt. Burnes says they always interrogated him closely regarding Europe, and that 'it was delightful to see the curiosity of even the oldest men.' Though far behind Europeans in veracity, and though they would seldom scruple to deceive when their interest was at stake, they have not the habitual falsehood of the natives of India and Persia. They are all remarkably hardy and active, industrious, and laborious. From the nature of their country, they are exposed to endure cold and heat, and accustomed to climbing mountains and swimming torrents. They are impatient of heat, though much of the climate of Affghanistan is hot. They are attached to their clans and families, proud of their ancestry, and all take a lively interest in the honour of their country. They are kind to their immediate dependents, though the Affghan rule over conquered nations is severe and tyrannical They are faithful in friendship, and mindful of favours. They are *neither irritable* nor *implacable*, but they retain a long remembrance of injuries not retaliated: revenge is esteemed a duty. Capt. Burnes taxes them with idleness and a passion for intrigue; yet he adds, 'I imbibed a very favourable impression of their national character. Mr. Elphinstone sums up their character in these words.—'Their vices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity, obstinacy; on the other hand, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious, and prudent; and they are less disposed than the nations in their neighbourhood to falsehood, intrigue, and deceit.' "—*Asiatic Journal*, 1838, pp. 306—308.

There is, in one particular, a remarkable difference betwixt the Affghans and the tribes to the north and west of them in a matter which of itself is sufficient to mark the character of a people. The Heratees, Khivans, Uzbegs, and Tartars of every race deal freely and extensively in slaves.

"In the Khurm valley we overtook another slave party from the Hazara country. The owners, to the astonishment of our party, were men of Cabool. They appeared greatly mortified at being seen by us, hung down their heads, and wished, but in vain, to escape notice. The Khirakushes recognised them as inhabitants of Chardeh, a plain in the vicinity of Cabool, and at once charged them with carrying on a traffic as degrading to an Affghan as it is accounted honourable in an Uzbek. They were asked how they could face their clansmen after such disreputable conduct. In extenuation of their conduct, they stated, that after trading to a considerable extent with the Hazaras,

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and waiting twelve months for a settlement of their claims, they had been unable to obtain payment. The correctness of the demand was readily acknowledged, and slaves, valued at its full amount, offered in lieu of all claims. At first they refused this mode of payment, but were at length induced to comply. Unable after such a description of compromise to return direct to their own country, they were now proceeding to the Uzbek mart of the Khurm, or Tash Kurghan, there to realize by sale the proceeds of this discreditable barter.

"Nothing surprises one so much, nor is more difficult to be accounted for on rational principles, than the marked shades of difference which often, as in this case, are exhibited in the moral character of neighbouring nations. Here we have two races of men, professing the same belief, whose habits in many respects are alike, and whose location and pastoral pursuits offer many points in common, yet differing in almost every feeling that marks the man, and which in their combined influence constitute the peculiar genius of a people. Of the freedom enjoyed by the Affghans, the Uzbeks know nothing. The liberty of the slave they capture is not more at their disposal than their own life is in the hands of their chief or Beg. To love of country, a feeling dominant in the breast of an Affghan, and which glows with more or less intensity in the soul of every other people from the Zahara to the Esquimaux, the Uzbek is almost a stranger. The custom of man stealing appears to have smothered every better feeling; and the pratice of trafficking in human beings extends even into their domestic arrangements; for their wives are as much articles of property as their slaves, and are bought and sold with the same callous indifference."—*Wood's Journey to the Oxus*, pp. 210 & 211.

The following extract, from Mr Masson's late work, gives an idea of Affghan liberality and toleration, for which we should in vain seek a parallel in the wide limits of Asia:—

"Affghan Toleration.—It is matter of agreeable surprise to any one acquainted with the Mahomedans of India, Persia, and Turkey, and with their religious prejudices and antipathies, to find that the people of Cabool are entirely free from them. In most countries few Mahomedans will eat with a Christain; to salute him even in error, is deemed unfortunate, and he is looked upon as unclean. Here none of those difficulties or feelings exist. The Christian is respectfully called a 'kitabi,' or 'one of the book.' The dissolute Vazir Futi Khan, when occasionally an Armenian Christian presented himself desiring to become a convert to Islam, was wont to inquire what he had found deficient in his own religion that he wished to change it? and would remark, that those persons who possessed a book and would adopt a new faith, were scoundrels, actuated by love of gain, or other interested motive. To the Hindu anxious to enter the pale of the Mahomedan Church, he made no objection; on the contrary, he applauded him who, having no religion, embraced one. I at first imputed the indifference of the Cabool people to their own laxity, for I soon observed that there was very little religion among them. Those called Shias were very generally of the Sunmazzabz, which, whatever its mystical pretensions, I fear implies no religion at

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all. The same system largely prevails among the Suni professors: but when the same liberality was found to extend over the country and among all races whether Affghans, Tajiks, or others, who could not be chargeable with Sufi doctrines, I was sensible that there must be some other reason. * *

"Living with the Armenians of the city, I witnessed every day the terms of equality on which they dwelt among their Mahomedan neighbours. The Armenian followed the Mahomedan corpse to its place of burial;—the Mahomedan showed the same mark of respect to the remains of the Armenian community. They mutually attended each other's weddings, and participated in the little matters which spring up in society. The Armenian presented gifts on Id Noh Roz, or the Mahomedan New-year's Day; he received them on his own Christmas Day. If it had happened that a Mahomedan had married an Armenian female who was lost to the Church of the Cross, I found that the Armenians had retaliated, and brought Mahomedan females into their families and inducted them into their faith. An Armenian, in conversation with the present head of the Wais family, said, that some person had called him a Kafir, or Infidel. The reply was, 'He that calls a kafir is a kafir himself.' It is something for a Christian to reside with Mahomedans so tolerant and unprejudiced. Wine prohibited to be made or sold in the city, is permitted to be made and used by Armenians, who are simply restricted to indulge in their own houses. They have not unadroitly induced the Mahomedans to believe that to drink wine is part of their religion, and to interfere on that head is impossible. There are a few families of Jews at Cabool; but, while perfectly tolerated as to matters of faith, they by no means command the respect which is shown to Armenians. Like them, they are permitted to make vinous and spirituous liquors; and they depend chiefly for their livelihood upon the clandestine sale of them. Some years since, a Jew was heard to speak disrespectfully of Jesus Christ: he was arraigned, and convicted before the Mahomedan tribunals on a charge of blasphemy; the sentence was sangsar, or to be stoned to death. The unhappy culprit was brought to the Armenians, that they, as particularly interested, might carry into effect the punishment of the law. They declined; when the Mahomedans led the poor wretch without the city, and his life became the forfeit of his indiscretion. It was singular that an attack upon the divinity of our Saviour should have been held cognizable in a Mahomedan ecclesiastical court, and that it should have been resented by those who, in their theological disputes with Christians, never fail to cavil on that very point."

These matters are given with the greater minuteness and detail, because it has been the habit ever since our armies entered Affghanistan, to speak of the people as treacherous and deceitful savages, characterized by scarcely a good or estimable quality, and hardly, amidst the severest sufferings inflicted on them, or the most intolerable exasperations to which they were exposed, entitled to the sympathies of civilized men! It appears of late to have been forgotten that Affghan-

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istan and its people were well known to us before our soldiers entered it; that it had, betwixt 1808, when Mr Elphinstone went on embassage, till 1832, when Conolly and Burnes traversed it from the love of travel and desire to extend our knowledge of geography and statistics, been described by travellers surpassed by none in modern times in unimpeachable veracity, in careful and minute research, and in powers of graphic description.* The testimony of these and of those who followed after them in 1837 and 1838, on the eve of the outbreak of the war, of whom Lieut. Wood was one, is perfectly unanimous,—the passage already quoted from the Asiatic Journal giving a full and faithful abstract of their opinions. No man knew more of the Affghan character than the late Sir Alexander Burnes: he had lived with them in peace, and traversed their country before our discords began with them; he had negotiated with them, and striven to avert collision, and examined every turn and winding, every nook and crevice of their policy: he had watched them in open war, and purchased their forbearance when it could not otherwise be procured. On the 23d October 1841, within a week of his death, he writes thus: "I have often wondered at the hatred of the officers towards the Affghans. They surpass their western neighbours, the supple lying Persians; their northern ones, the enslaved Uzbegs; their

* The books of travels referred to are the following:—

Travels into Bokhara, containing the Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus from the sea to Lahore, &c.; and an Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, &c., in 1829 and 1830. By Lieut. Burnes. 3 vols. 8vo. 1832.

Journey to the North of India, overland from England through Russia, Persia, and Affghanistan in 1830. By Lieut. Arthur Conolly.

Moorcroft's Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindostan and the Punjaub, in Ladakh and Kashmir, Peshawur, Cabool, Koondooz and Bokhara. Prepared for the press by H. H. Wilson, Sanskrit Professor, Oxford. [These volumes were not published till 1841, though referring to the period intervening betwixt 1819 and 1825. Moorcroft had corresponded very extensively with the Government as well as with his friends in India, and a large amount of the information, systematically arranged by Dr Wilson, had appeared before in fragments.]

Wood's Journey to the Sources of the Oxus in 1837-8. 1 vol. 8vo. 1841.

Cabool; being a personal Narrative of a Journey to, and Residence in, that country in 1836-8. By Lieut.-Col. Sir Alex. Burnes. 1842. This journal, though prepared by Sir A. Burnes at the date just mentioned, was not passed from his hands till May 1841; so that he had abundance both of leisure and opportunity to correct any imperfections in his previous observations.

Narrative of a Journey in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, betwixt 1826 and 1838, by C. Masson, 3 vols. 1842. The best portion of these volumes appeared in the Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society for 1840.

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Eastern, the timid Indian; and their southern ones, the fierce savage Beloochees. Yet they are blamed because they fight at night, when in fact the poor wretches are unable at any other time to cope with disciplined armies. This course, after all, is I imagine, nothing else than is allowable; it was the same as the Scotch Highlanders pursued a century since." * The Affghans throughout found themselves unable to withstand us in the field: our guns, with which they had nothing to cope, mowed them down in hundreds, and although certainly on numerous occasions they threw themselves upon us regardless of all danger, charging home to the points of our bayonets, as often as they could they took advantage of the darkness of night, or the defiles and ravines which their country supplied, and which did something to equalize the condition of the disciplined soldier with that of the untrained warrior of the mountains. This was provoking for us, but it was the only wise course they could have pursued: the vexation and annoyance, the frequent mischiefs and continual irritation occasioned by it, made our officers as indifferent judges of the people against whom they were employed, and of whose character they wrote, as honourable-minded men could well become. They were placed in a false position: they saw everything through a tinted medium; and they naturally described as they observed: being at the same time in the worst possible position for philosophical observation.

* This is copied nearly verbatim from an entry, dated 23d October, in a private journal of Sir Alexander Burnes's, which extends to the 1st November, the day before his murder, and which, singularly enough, amidst the wreck of all other things has been preserved entire. It is now in the hands of his friends.

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UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

OPERATIONS

IN

SCINDE AND AFFGHANISTAN,

FROM 1837 TO 1842.

CHAPTER I.

Opinions of the British in India little affected by consideration of Home party politics. Perplexity in the Narrative from the diversity of authorities, the imperfections of the published papers, and the incessant alternations betwixt peace and war amongst the rulers of Central Asia—Feeling of all the Affghans against Persia in 1832. AFFAIRS OF PESHAWUR—Hostile movements of Runjeet Singh against the Doorannee States in 1818—Seizes on Attock and Mooltan—On Cashmere—Captures Peshawur—Resigns it in favour of Kamran Shah and Dost Mahomed—Hurry Singh gets possession of, by treachery, in 1834—Defeat of the Shah Soojah near Candahar—Dost Mahomed attempts to recover Peshawur in 1835—Retreats before the Seikhs—Successful attack on Nao Nehal Singh in 1836—The Prince seizes Deera-Ishmael Khan—Preparations for another descent of troops from Cabool—Battle of Jumrood in May, 1837—Death of Hurry Singh—Prostration of the Seikhs—Our tender of mediation. AFFAIRS OF HERAT—Size of the Principality—Character of Kamran Shah, and his Vizier—Death of the King of Persia in 1834—Warlike preparations of the new King—Lord Palmerston's remonstrances—Preparations to march on Herat in 1836—Mr Ellice's alarm—Mr M'Neil and Mr Ellice agreed upon his right—Advance of the Persian army in July, 1837—Occupation of Karrack—Our complete command of Persia throughout the Gulf—Money wasted on the embassy—Gratitude of Kamran Shah. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA—Harmony of the Courts of St Petersburgh and London in 1834 and 1835—Suspicions of Mr Ellice—Bugbear of Russian influence—Count Simonich joins the Persian Camp before Herat—Gives Directions—Negotiations with the Candahar Sirdars—Mission of Lieutenant Vicovich to Cabool—Withdrawal of Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich—English Cabinet express themselves entirely satisfied—Sir J. Hobhouse's Speech in 1842—Remarks on—Assumptions of Falsehood and Folly of Russia unsupported. CAPTAIN BURNES'S NEGOTIATIONS AT CABOOL—Mission at first Commercial—Became Political in June 1837—Letter to Mr M'Neil—Dost Mahomed and Lord Auckland's Correspondence in 1836—Burnes arrives at Cabool—Cordial Reception—Opinion of the reasonableness of Dost Mahomed's Demands — Russian and Persian influence—Candahar Affairs—Mission of Lieutenant Leech—Arrival of Kohun Dill Khan at Cabool in April—Arrival of Vicovich—Unwise importance attached to—His Character—Burnes's Despatch of 22d January in reference to Sooltan Khan—Insolent papers of the Government of India—Despatch of 5th March with Suppressed Passages—Further Misunderstandings—Farewell Letter of Lord Auckland—Retirement of the Mission—Determination to have a War—Negotiations at Lahore—Vacillation of Lord Auckland—Influence employed with.

THIS chapter has, with a view to explicitness and perspicuity, been broken up into four subdivisions—on the affairs of Peshawur and those of Herat—on the alleged intrigue of Persia and Russia, and negociations of Sir Alexander Burnes at Cabool, betwixt September 1837 and May 1838; though it must be allowed that the danger of occasional

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repetition has thereby been incurred. As the statements put forward may appear strange and new to the English reader—at variance, as they are, with most of what has been set forth in and out of Parliament by the defenders of Lord Auckland's policy,—it is proper to explain that very nearly the whole of the facts are taken from the official papers of the Government of India, or Foreign Office, selections from which were, in 1837, published by order of Parliament. The sources of all the information have been carefully and copiously indicated, that the reader, who may chance to suspect prejudice or partiality, may have an opportunity of satisfying himself as to whether the extracts have been fairly dealt with. The works whence these are taken are perfectly open and accessible; and we have every wish that the suspicious should resort to them to see whether their doubts are capable of verification.

The writer has no hesitation in admitting that he is, and has always been, conservative in his views,—opposed to the late Governor-General in his English politics, but not, therefore, opposed to him in his Indian administration. In India, these considerations have little weight in the discussion of general questions. The keenest and most consistent advocate of Lord Auckland's policy, is the *Englishman* newspaper—a conservative in its politics: one of its ablest opponents is the somewhat more than Whig *Bengal Hurkaru*. Divided as the newspapers of India have been in their ideas of the wisdom of the Simla policy of 1838, they have borne unanimous and willing testimony to the good intentions of Lord Auckland, and the amiable and benevolent character of his domestic administration. They have been still more heartily cordial and united in ridiculing and exposing the alternate bursts of madness and imbecility, the fickleness, vacillation, and caprice which have throughout characterised the rule of Lord Ellenborough. These considerations may perhaps be permitted to have some weight in exempting us from the charge of that undeviating partizanship which manifests itself in England, where, amongst one class of disputants, nothing is wrong—nothing censurable or dubious in the conduct of the late Gov.-General—nothing in that of the present one which is not more or less liable to one, or all, the three imputations—and where, amongst their opponents, these predicaments are maintained—the individuals placed in them being shifted. With all the opprobrium of the Affghan war on its head, the administration of Lord Auckland will, in India, be regarded henceforward with far more respect than that of Lord Ellenborough with undisputed claims to the popularity and wisdom of the abandonment of the unimaginably wicked and disastrous scheme of his predecessor. To the European reader much confusion of ideas must necessarily arise from the constant references to parties at war the one day and peace the next, incessantly making arrangements for attack or for defence; terrifying the Calcutta cabinet with the ideas that the flames of war were to be lit up in the very

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regions where we were endeavouring to extend our commerce—the next with alarms for intrigue and coalition, threatening danger on the threshold of our Indian possessions, and filling the rulers thereof with alarm and dismay. These constant alternations are in the last degree perplexing in the study of the Parliamentary papers; from which the advocates of either side, who chose to restrict their selections to isolated passages, may draw weapons enough to defend themselves against their opponents.

The documents themselves have been furnished by a variety of individuals, very differently situated from each other, in respect, alike, of their opportunities, as of their aptitude for observation, and deducing their conclusions from appearances in the last degree varying from each other.

The papers themselves besides, have been garbled and sent forth to serve the purposes of the late Cabinet in supporting their Affghan policy, rather than to supply correct information: they are in some cases, as in that of the share supplied by the late Sir Alexander Burnes, so made up as to support positions as much as possible opposed to those they were intended to sustain, which they now establish when set forward entire. It is evident besides, from the allusions in many of the unmutilated despatches, that much of the information which it would be desirable to possess remains to this hour concealed in the archives of the Board of Control.

No pains have been spared to clear up the obscurity flowing from these channels in so far as this could be accomplished by a careful study and comparison of all the papers which appeared with or without consent of parliament. There are other sources of perplexity which can only be surmounted by a careful consideration of a few leading particulars about to be explained.

It must, in the first place, be kept in view amongst the constant allusions to the alternations of hostile and of friendly intercourse amongst the chiefs themselves, that they in fact had no settled or consistent system of policy: that their alliances were transient and uncertain: that the incursion of one month was followed by the embassage of the next. Take the case of Persia and Herat as an illustration: we find the former threatening the latter early in 1834, and before the end of the year they were on terms of friendship; and in 1836, 1837, and 1838, Herat was besieged—and Persia agreeing with Russia to have Kamran, the Suddozye prince, set aside, and Kohun Dil Khan, the Barukzye Sirdar, put on the throne in his stead. In Nov. 1838, Persia foregoes all these schemes, and once more makes peace: in 1840 the tables are turned, and the king of kings is induced by England to strengthen the hand, and increase the territory, of the Suddozye. Scarcely is this arrangement completed, when the latter turns his back on England, makes spontaneous submission to Persia, and restores what we had procured for him. Turn next to Candahar: the Sirdars there had, from the time their brother Dost Mahomed acquired supremacy in Cabool, been almost incessantly at feud with him.

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They were throughout in league with another brother to destroy his power, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, on whom the Ameer had conferred Peshawur; and seemed ready to accept the assistance of Herat and Persia in turn to accomplish their objects as these presented themselves. On one point only were all the Mahomedan princes just named thoroughly agreed,—in their hatred to the Seikhs, and their determination to recover Peshawur from heathen dominion. In this great object they were united, but in nothing beyond it. Dost Mahomed had given it to his brother, from whom it had been fraudulently wrested in 1834, and he desired to re-annex it to Cabool. His brother, himself in league with the Candahar Sirdars, coveted it for their own use alone, being in the last degree jealous of the Cabool chief, and eager to subvert his authority. Kamran Shah apparently lent himself to this confederacy without hope of immediate gain, unless indeed the dream might have crossed his mind that in the midst of the confusion he might have some chance of recovering a further portion of the territories ruled over by his grandfather; his chief object being to avenge himself on the Barukzye chief, who had successfully driven and excluded the last hope of the Suddozyes from kingly power. The king of Persia obviously desired to increase the Doorannee empire as much as possible, in the hope of making it all his own. It must besides, be recollected, that war in these countries, so far from being regarded, as in civilized Europe, the worst of evils, is looked upon as a heroic and exciting occupation,—as the only means by which power and glory are really to be won. The rapture of the strife is reason enough for the leaders—the hope of plunder for the followers—rushing into battle.

In 1832, when Captain Burnes first visited Affghanistan, Persia threatened Candahar; and the Sirdars, alarmed at the danger from the west, and aware of how little they merited kindness at their brother's hands, knew not where to look for assistance. Dost Mahomed was too large-minded a politician to permit personal feeling to betray him into the folly of suffering his country to be endangered. He knew that if Persia advanced on Candahar, she would come farther, and that Ghuznie or Cabool itself might suffer. He wrote to his brother—"When the Persians come, let me know, and as I am now your enemy will I then be your friend." (1) The threat of invading Affghanistan seems indeed to have been a peculiarly favourite one with Persia; made use of from time to time from the period of the final dissolution of the Doorannee monarchy. Dost Mahomed appears to have been the only prince in those parts who had seriously set himself about extending the interests of commerce, and maintaining the vigorous administration of justice amongst his subjects. As nothing could more seriously have impeded the tranquil advancement of these than the continual alarm to which the threats allud-

1. Travels in Bokhara, vol. iii. p. 272, 12mo edition.

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ed to from time to time gave rise, the wisest course he could have pursued was to have endeavoured to obtain a secure and permanent alliance with the sovereign who uttered them. His anxiety to establish relations with distant foreign powers was equally an evidence of his desire for peace, and ought, so far from exciting our jealousy, to have elicited our warmest approbation, —the more especially when it appeared that an alliance with ourselves was that which he preferred above all others, and for whose sake he was willing to sacrifice them all. One thing alone he refused to concede to us—the abandonment of his claims to Peshawur,—a measure which, if yielded, would have disgraced him for ever in the eyes of his subjects, as well as of surrounding nations. For this refusal we expelled him from his throne!

No stronger evidence can be had of the solicitude of all the Affghan chiefs as far west as Seistan, for an alliance with England, than the promptitude with which all their own individual schemes were abandoned so soon as the appearance of the mission in 1837 held out a prospect of this being acceded them. It must be kept in view that we offered our interposition betwixt them and their enemies at a time when they asked not our assistance; that they were under no treaty or obligation to us whatever; and that if they had something to hope from our friendship, they had no reason to suppose that they had any grounds of fear from our enmity. They were perfectly independent of us, and entitled to accept or decline the friendly offers so superfluously and officiously proffered them, without our having the slightest grounds of anger, further than may be considered justifiable when felt by one who, meddling with the affairs of his neighbour, receives, as he deserves, the meddler's requital.

When we tendered Kamran Shah, the Suddoyze, help against *our allies* of Persia, he frankly told us, he did not want us. "With regard to the coming of the Persian army," says he, as stated in the official despatches, "I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Russian government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble about the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may be able to prove what they can do. May it please God, the most Merciful! the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design."

AFFAIRS OF PESHAWUR.

"With a view to invite the aid of the DE FACTO Rulers of Affghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahommed Khan, the Chief of Cabool. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor General, that the troops of Dost Mahommed Khan had made a sudden and un-

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provoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maha Raja Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maha Raja, would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor General resolved on authorizing Capt. Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahommed Khan that, if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maha Raja, His Lordship would exert his good offices with His Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maha Raja, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor General to the effect, that in the meantime hostilities on his part should be suspended." —*Simla Proclamation, 1st October*, 1838.

THE troubles of Affghanistan, and strife of its Chiefs, had, from an early period, been watched with intense interest by Runjeet Singh; eager to profit by every opportunity of extending his dominions to or beyond the Indus. In May 1818, the Affghan forces having been withdrawn from Peshawur to meet the exigencies of civil broils at home, the ruler of Lahore—who had some time before possessed himself of the Fort of Attock—dispatched a select body of troops with a heavy battering train to lay siege to Mooltan. The expedition was successful: after a gallant but unsuccessful defence, in which 1000 of the garrison fell, the town was captured and sacked, the mosques destroyed, the muzzin forbidden, and the cow declared sacred. The following year he attacked the Capital of Cashmere, and after a severe engagement, where the Affghans fought with all the rage and zeal of religious enthusiasm, he made good his conquest. Driving the enemy before him, he next entered Peshawur, and received the submission of the inhabitants. (1) These aggressions were commenced without the claim of right, or pretence of quarrel, and on no colourable grounds but lust of conquest. The territories on his north-western frontier were valuable and desirable: the disagreements of their rulers rendered them weak and ill-defended: and accordingly they were seized upon and annexed to the Seikh dominions. The countries beyond the Indus were at this time so torn by internal dissensions that the rebel Sirdars feared to leave Cabool,—apprehensive that the heir of Timour might return from Herat and claim the sovereignty. Tranquillized on this point by three years delay, in 1823 Azeem Khan, learning that the Seikhs were about once more to cross the Indus, advanced to Peshawur to meet them: another engagement, more severe and bloody than any which had hitherto occurred, again ensued: the Seikhs were victorious, and the Affghans retired upon Cabool.

So excited was the state of public feeling, that Runjeet found himself unable to retain Peshawur as a Seikh province, and accordingly he divided it betwixt Kamran Shah of Herat, grandson of the emperor Nadir,—and Dost Mahomed Khan, the bitter rival of the Suddoyze race of kings, and most active of the Barukzye chiefs, as yet only struggling for the supremacy soon after-

1. Conolly's Travels, vol. ii., p. 402.

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wards attained by him at Cabool. (2) Five months afterwards, Cashmere was lost to the Dooraunees. Dost Mahomed having possessed himself of supreme authority at Cabool, in 1826 made over his share of Peshawur to his elder brother, who had been the last of his competitors for power, on his abandoning further pretences to the capital. (3) In 1834 the Shah Soojah, as already mentioned in the preface, made one more attempt to regain his throne. It fell in with the views of Runjeet Singh, on the present occasion to offer him assistance, on the condition that Peshawur, together with the whole of the Affghan territory betwixt the Hills and the Five Rivers, should be formally ceded to him, and annexed to the Punjaub. The treaty was agreed to,—the only portions demurred at being the surrender of the gates of Somnath, then at Ghuznie, and the giving of Shahzadah as a hostage.(4) The presence of Dost Mahomed and his chiefs was in July required to the westward to repel the advances of the Shah Soojah, now approaching Candahar with a numerous army. The Chiefs of Peshawur took advantage of these events to arrange a series of plans against the authority of the Cabool Chief: and fearing, from the rapidity with which he had just before overrun Jellalabad, that he might, so soon as his hands were free, inflict on them summary chastisement, they solicited aid from Lahore. Hurry Singh, the most fortunate and talented of the Seikh commanders, was at this time encamped with a powerful force near Attock; watching, as is supposed, the opportunity of seizing on Peshawur, lest perchance the Shah Soojah, on recovering his throne, should be supported by us in making it, if found more convenient, tributary to Cabool: his master wished to be beforehand with us in securing this new acquisition, that we, on giving assistance to the Shah, should have no pretext for claiming it as compensation for our services, should this other untoward alternative present itself.(5) He appeared within six miles of the city of Peshawur, on pretence of receiving the usual tribute of horses, rice, swords, &c., which the Sirdars had bound themselves to pay; finessing to gain time, which was of the utmost importance to him, he delayed his departure on pretence that the horses were not of such quality as had been agreed upon. Finally, it was proposed that Nao Nehal Singh, the prince royal, should be permitted to make a friendly visit to the capital. Under cover of this conciliatory concession, the whole Seikh army advanced, and at once sat down in hostile attitude opposite the walls. The Affghan Sirdars, wholly

2. Masson's Journeys in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, vol. iii., p. 60.
3. Ibid. 4. Parliamentary Papers 1839, p. 143.
5. This is the explanation given by an apparently well-informed writer in the *Delhi Gazette*, June 1835, and it seems a probable one. Strange that two years afterwards we should make the claim of Runjeet Singh on this province, which he had snatched to keep it from us, the chief pretence for the deposition of Dost Mahomed. See Asiatic Journal, 1835.

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unprepared for this, had no means of resistance: they fled at once with their wives and treasure—yielding to an army of 9000 men a territory which a few years before the Seikh sovereign himself had been unable to retain with a force of 25,000. (6) This digression is essential for the full understanding of the events just about to be related, which formed the chief ostensible cause of our resolution to dethrone Dost Mahomed. (7) The Shah Soojah having been defeated near Candahar, as narrated at the close of the preface, retired once more to the previous asylum the British Government had provided for him within their territories at Loodianah. It was not to be supposed that Dost Mahomed would submit with patience to an act of such fraudulent and barefaced spoliation without an attempt to recover the portion of his kingdom which had been ravished by trickery. He was stated by Captain Wade (25th September, 1834), to have roused the whole Mahomedan population for an attack on the Seikhs. Runjeet Singh, who had then 25,000 men at or near the scene of action, was determined (writes the Loodianah Resident) not to let go his hold on Peshawur, while Dost Mahomed Khan, and the other Affghan rulers, were equally resolved to stake their political existence on the capture of the place. Little could be done before the setting in of winter, and the earlier operations appear to have been of inconsiderable importance. Some severe skirmishing ensued with small parties of troops detached from the main army, assembling at Jellalabad under Ukhbar Khan,—in which Hurry Singh had the worst of it,—having on one occasion been repelled with the loss of 150 men. (8) The Maharajah himself made every preparation to meet the approaching contest on a larger scale than had hitherto occurred. He reinforced his army; and advancing from Lahore remained encamped for some time at Rotas, and then proceeded to Peshwur, around which a very large force was assembled by the end of April. (9) Dost Mahomed having joined the army, which for some time had been collecting under his favourite son, prepared to descend through the Khyber Pass. Runjeet Singh advanced to meet him, and drew up his Seikhs in battle array across the line of the advancing Affghans,

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6. Masson, vol. iii., pp. 225—228.

7. Sir Alexander Burnes thinks that the Maharajah was urged to this against his better judgment, by Hurry Singh. "It has proved [says he] a source of annoyance, and latterly of serious disaster. Its revenue, under the Dooraunees, used to be £80,000 a year: under the Seikhs it is £100,000; but of this £60,000 is allocated amongst the Chiefs holding Jaghires—Mahomed Khan Barukzye and his tribes enjoy £40,000 of this, and the bulk of the remainder is devoted to religious purposes." "It is [concludes Burnes] a drain on the finances of Lahore, with the additional disadvantage of being so situated as to lead the Seikhs into constant collision with fierce and desperate tribes, who, were it not for their poverty, would be dangerous antagonists."—Cabool, by Sir A. Burnes, vol. i., 1842.

8. *Calcutta Courier*, June 3, 1835; and *Delhi Gazette*, April, same year.

9. *Delhi Gazette*, June 3, 1835.

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and within two miles of their front. The Ameer, who seemed at no time to have been sanguine of success, on seeing himself outnumbered by the powerful and disciplined army of the Maharajah, considering affairs hopeless, returned towards Jumrood, and was followed for some distance up the Khyber Pass by the enemy (11th May, 1835.) Proposals were sent to him, that if he would abandon all claims to the conquered territory, and give one of his sons as an hostage for the maintenance of peace, he would receive a Jagheer (estate) worth £30,000 a-year. (10) This proposition was at first favourably received, but afterwards declined. Meantime the Affghan Sirdars had tendered unconditional allegiance to the new ruler; and it was agreed that they should receive a territory of equal value with that rejected by Dost Mahomed,—they doing homage, and acknowledging the Seikh sovereignty. This reward for their hostility and treachery to the Ameer was accepted of, and they became thereafter the dependents of the infidel.

General Avitabile, one of the Corsican officers who had, many years before, joined the service of the Maharajah, was made Governor of Peshawur, —the duties of which office he has now for seven years discharged with the utmost ability: 2000 cavalry and 5000 irregulars were left to protect the country. It was said that Dost Mahomed on retiring towards Cabool, pledged himself to retake Peshawur or die in the attempt.(11) He returned to his capital, leaving his sons to settle the affairs of Jellalabad; while his principal opponent retired to Lahore, withdrawing all his troops from beyond the Indus, save those already referred to. The Affghans of Peshawur, discontented with the new order of things, meanwhile repaired in vast numbers to Cabool to lay their grievances before their former ruler, and express their desire to be led against the Seikhs; and their eagerness to sacrifice their lives for the faith, and in the expulsion of the infidels. Influenced by these, and with the desire for the recovery of his territory unslacked and unabated, it was determined that his eldest son, Afzul Bey Khan, should proceed to

10. We are at a loss to understand the allusion of Mr. Masson, vol. iii., p. 416, where he says—"The proposal [made in 1837 or 38] to give Peshawur to the Ameer—Runjeet Singh receiving in return one of his sons, had never been made by the Maharajah;—Capt. Wade denouncing it—and I am sorry to say justly—as insidious." Why it was the very offer Runjeet Singh had himself made in 1835—only instead of the whole of Peshawur he was to receive a jagheer of £30,000 a-year. Dost Mahomed, as will be seen from the text, for a time entertained the proposal. Runjeet Singh had made a similar one to the Shah Soojah in 1833, when negotiating for his restoration.—Parliamentary Papers, 1838.

11. Asiatic Journal, December 1835. This passage is a quotation; but the source whence it is taken is not named. The officers referred to are Generals Avitabile, Allard, Court, and Ventura,—all men who have distinguished themselves for military skill and general literary acquirements, and for the wisdom and the friendly feeling towards our Government with which they have conducted the affairs of the Maharajah.

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measure his sword with the unbeliever. An army of 20,000 men, mostly Kuzzilbashes, were, without delay, accordingly assembled at Jellalabad. Descending the Khyber Pass with about half of this number, he came up with the Seikh army only 5000 strong, under Nao Nehal Singh, at the Ghurry of DeCassah, in June 1836. The fight was obstinate, and the slaughter on both sides severe, when victory determined in favour of the Affghans: their enemies completely defeated, dispersed and fled. Just before, a bloody encounter had taken place near the city betwixt the troops of Shere Singh, father of the prince already named, and immediate heir to the Seikh throne, and the Chief of Lalpoora: both suffered severely, and each claimed the victory; but the Affghans appear to have had the best of it. A few months after this, Nao Nehal Singh descended by the line of the Indus towards Dejerat, and obtained Deera Ishmael Khan by stratagem—imprisoning the Chief, Shah Newaz Khan; the alleged ground of offence being, that the Sacred Cow had been openly killed within his territories. This fresh appropriation of Affghan territory, effected almost without bloodshed, was an evidence that the Lion of the Punjaub had given all consideration of right and justice to the winds, when an opportunity presented itself of aggrandizing himself at the expense of his Mahommedan neighbours beyond the Indus; and the rumour now ran, that as he had taken possession of nearly the whole of the Doorannee territory on the hither side the mountains, he might be expected to prepare himself without delay for an advance upon the capital; an idle boast, probably encouraged by the Court to cover the mischances which had just been experienced at Peshawur, and brazen out the appropriations he seemed determined to make, so far as his power permitted.

Preparations were meanwhile made by the Seikhs for the seizure of Shikarpore, a wealthy and populous town belonging to the Ameers of Scinde, who appear to have given not the slightest cause for quarrel or displeasure. From the beginning of autumn 1836, till the approach of spring in the following year, though we read of no encounters of note betwixt the Seikhs and Affghans, the hostility betwixt them appears not for a moment to have been modified or interrupted. Great preparations having, in the course of the winter and early in spring, been made by Dost Mahomed for a further attempt upon Peshawur, an army, said to have consisted of about fifteen thousand men, descended the Khyber Pass, and came up with the enemy at the Fort of Jumrood, just beyond the mountains, on the 1st May 1837. The strength of the Seikh army is not mentioned: they were commanded by the celebrated leader Hurry Singh. The Affghans commenced by cannonading the Fort; and, finding themselves for a time unresisted, considered that the day was their own.(12) Hurry Singh having

12. Masson, vol. iii, p. 424.

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suddenly burst upon them with a compact body of disciplined warriors, while their irregular troops were divided from each other by separate ravines, for a time carried every thing before him. Victory appeared for a while to lean first to one side, then to the other, as the parties were alternately successful. The Seikhs had captured fourteen of the guns of their enemies, who managed in the course of the day to recover eleven of them, and make up their original number by the seizure of three pieces of Hurry Singh's artillery. The Seikhs, who had committed themselves in pursuit of a body of retreating Affghans, were unexpectedly met by a fresh and powerful force, and compelled to retire. Their gallant and able leader had fallen, and the troops were everywhere compelled to quit the field. The Affghans claimed the victory: but hearing that heavy and highly-disciplined reinforcements would immediately be sent to join the beaten army, considered it hopeless to proceed further, and retired accordingly on Jellalabad, elated with the pride of success. It has generally been asserted, that the incursion terminating in the battle of Jumrood was designed in the knowledge that at this time the bulk of the Seikh forces were absent at Amritsur in celebration of the marriage of Nao Nehal Singh, and it is to this that the term "*sudden*," in the Simla Proclamation, is assumed to apply. Mr Masson publishes a letter from Captain Wade under date the 7th April, blaming the Ameer for having overlooked the opportunity then gone by. The festivities were over in March, and the Maharajah immediately afterwards hurried off his forces to Peshawur in the full knowledge of what had been for several months impending.

It appears (says Masson, vol. iii., p. 424) that the Maharajah was so confounded at the death of Hurry Singh, that he informed Captain Wade he should be glad to give up Peshawur, preserving his pardah or his honour. Nothing could be clearer (continues the same writer) than that he was willing, at the request of the British Government, to have abandoned this unjust conquest—such request would have saved him the appearance of a forced surrender. Capt. Wade, on the 15th Sept. 1837, wrote to Mr Masson that the Seikhs are ready to bring their quarrels to an amicable adjustment on any reasonable terms, in accordance to our wishes for mutual peace. (13) With this in view, it is important to observe, that there was nothing, save in the death of a man of such note as Hurry Singh, at all different in the circumstances or concomitants more than in the half dozen other encounters which had taken place betwixt the conquerors of Peshawur and its former possessors throughout the four preceding years. It will be seen, also, that Runjeet Singh had all along acted on a system of most unprincipled aggression towards all his neighbours on every side of him: that Dost Ma-

13. Masson, vol. iii, p. 424.

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homed only strove to recover the territory of which he had been robbed. In the Simla proclamation, issued on the 1st October following, the Ameer was reported as the disturber of the peace on our N.W. frontier,(14) whereas Runjeet Singh had maintained the whole line of the Indus from Sukkur to Attock,—a scene of incessant strife. We tendered our mediation, to the effect that we would guarantee the robber the permanent possession of his plunder, and he very naturally accepted so generous an offer:—the party robbed declined it on these terms, and we dethroned him for his pains!

AFFAIRS OF HERAT.

"It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor General, that a Persian Army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Affghanistan, for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the Officers of Her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain." * * * * * *

"The Governor General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian Army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause, and the Governor General would yet indulge the hope, that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor General has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeil, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian Arms into Affghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Government."—*Simla Proclamation, October* 1, 1838.

HERAT, a principality on the borders of Persia, was one of the provinces of the Dooranee empire, as constituted under Nadhir Shah, and his two

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14. With those facts in view—given as they are on admittedly unquestionable authorities—how are we to regard such passages as the following?—

"Whilst Captain Burnes was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mahomed had made a sudden and *unprovoked* attack on those of our *ancient ally* Runjeet Singh!!!" —*Simla Proclamation*, para. 4.

"It was naturally apprehended that his Highness would not be slow to avenge this aggression; and it was to be feared, that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated."—*Ibid.* Runjeet Singh, from the time he took Moultan and Attock, and invaded Cashmere and Peshawur, had, for ten years, kept the flames of war blazing along the Indus, and we never interposed! It was him who fed them now, when we blamed Dost Mahomed! Capt. Burnes mentions that we had no objection to his seizing on Jellalabad in June 1838, or doing what he liked with Dost Mahomed; so that we had no dislike to the flames of war in the abstract,—it depended entirely on the party who kindled them whether we should fan or quench them. Dost Mahomed's preparations were incessantly commented on by the newspapers from March onwards.

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successors, Ahmed and Timor, whose joint reigns occupied the greater portion of last century. It was ruled over, under the crown, by one of the principal chiefs or princes of the empire. Its revenue amounts to about £90,000; the population of the city to about 50,000 souls. When the Suddozyes were driven into exile, Shah Mahomed, the lineal heir and elder brother of the late Shah Soojah, was, in 1818, expelled from power; he found refuge in Herat, and was permitted by the Barukzyes to retain a hold on the principality after the authority of the other members of his family had become extinguished throughout the rest of the Doorannee empire. He died in 1829, and was succeeded by the present ruler, Kamran Shah, nephew of our late royal protege, and, as descending from the elder branch, rightful representative of the Suddozye line. This prince, who seems a man of intellect without principle, has lived without a friend, and has often suffered from the treachery of those he trusted; and, having been driven to a corner of his dominions by rebel enemies, he has thought it expedient to fill his coffers by any means that could be resorted to, in order, perhaps, to be prepared for still greater reverses. (1) For ten or fifteen years he has apparently resigned the cares of government to the hands of his Vizier, Yar Mahomed, a man still more unprincipled and detested than his sovereign. With this short personal notice, attention must be turned to the affairs of Persia, which will speedily bring back our narrative to the more immediate consideration of the concerns of Herat.

In Oct. 1834, the death of Futti Ali Shah raised his grandson and adopted heir, Prince Mahomed Meerza, by the title of Mahomed Shah, to the throne the late sovereign had bequeathed to him. Fearing that the recollection of his father's successes in the field might tempt the youthful sovereign to endeavour to signalize the commencement of his reign by extended schemes of conquest to the eastward, Lord Palmerston, in July 1835 (letter dated 22nd) instructed our ambassador at Teheran that the Persian Government should be specially warned against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war with the Affghans. (2) The course apprehended was the very one which the King had resolved to pursue. (3) "It is unsatisfactory to know," writes Mr Ellice in November 1835, (4) "that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Affghanistan; and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that he has the right of sovereignty over Herat and Candahar. He proposed various expeditions for spring 1836—one against Herat—one against Candahar—and another against

1. Conolly, vol. ii., p. 416.
2. Lord Palmerston's Letter, 22nd July 1835. Parliamentary Papers 1839, No. 10.
3. Mr Ellice to Lord Palmerston, November 13, December 24, and December 30. Parliamentary Papers with Supplement.
4. Memo. to Lord Palmerston for 1835.

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the Beloochies: (5) the minister stated that the dominions of Persia extended as far as Ghuznie." (6) Whether the young king really thought of this at the time, or merely spoke of it in empty bravado, does not appear. It might have been either, or partly both: but this is beyond dispute, that whatever were his purposes eastward of Herat, it required not the disastrous experience of a year spent in preparation for the attack of the fortress to no end, but that, after a nine months' siege, he should retire baffled from its walls, to prove that he was unable to carry them into effect, or to march an army a hundred miles beyond his own frontier, calculated to alarm any one but the peasantry on the line of march. In September 1832, when Captain A. Burnes visited the Persian camp at Koochan, he found the Prince Royal Abbas Meerza, whose exploits afterwards fired his son with martial ardour, at the very pinnacle of his triumph. Yet his success was ascribed by him entirely to the British officers who had trained his troops: he had no money to pay his army, and admitted that, without supplies from us, he despaired of success. (7)

In April 1836 Mr Ellice informed Lord Palmerston that the king had resolved to march upon Herat to chastise Kamran Shah for a gross breach of treaty, in having failed to fulfil the agreement made with Abbas Meerza for the restoration of Ghorian, and of certain Persian families detained by him from their native country; and the payment of £10,000 annually to the Shah. Mr Ellice considered that he had a perfect right to obtain redress on these points by force of arms. (8) Mr McNeil took exactly the same view of the question, expressing himself in still stronger terms:—"Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty of Herat," writes the Ambassador to Lord Palmerston, under date 24th February 1837; "and, regarding the question as one bewteen two separate sovereigns, I am inclined to believe that the Government of Herat will be found to have been the aggressor." From the death of Abbas Meerza, when an agreement had been concluded for a suspension of hostilities between the parties, and the line of boundary agreed upon, Persia had committed no act of hostility against the Affghans (of Herat; but at the death of the late Shah (October 1834) the Government of Herat made a predatory incursion into

5. Parliamentary Papers with Supplement. Mr Ellice in his note, 8th January 1836, states to Lord Palmerston that he had explained to the Persian Minister that the SHAH had THE MOST ABSOLUTE RIGHT to obtain redress from the Herat Prince but that the British Government would much rather prefer negociation than force of arms:—the friends of Lord Auckland have, as yet, omitted to explain on what grounds this were called in the Simla proclamation—a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression.

6. Letter to Lord Palmerston, received 28th February, 1839. Parliamentary Papers 1839.

7. Ibid, December 24; received April 7.

8. Ibid, December 30; received ibid.

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the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and Hazarehs, and captured the subjects of Persia (to the extent of 11,000) for the purpose of selling them as slaves." At the very time the Shah was making preparations for an advance on Herat, with ulterior views on Candahar and Ghuznie if any faith could have been placed on the vapouring threats of his ministers, a source of alarm of a precisely opposite description, and from a different quarter, appears to have burst on Mr Ellice. In March 1836, an ambassador arrived from the most important of the destined victims of the purposed invasion of the countries to the east,—the Candahar Sirdars themselves—proposing that an alliance, offensive and defensive, should be entered into betwixt them, for the purpose of attacking Kamran Shah, betwixt whom, as the representative of the Suddozye dynasty, and the Barukzye chiefs, there was a blood-feud. The chiefs required an acknowledgment of their independent administration in the internal arrangements of the country, and submitted themselves to Persia in their foreign relations only. (9) The terms of the proposed alliance were immediately granted them. It was probably these successive threats of the Shah of advancing on Ghuznie, baseless as they might have been considered, which induced Dost Mahomed at the same time to send an ambassador with overtures of alliance. These were to the effect, that the Cabool Ameer would assist in attacking Herat, taking vengeance on the enemy of his house, on condition that the King of Persia should aid him against the Seikhs, who, taking advantage of the embarrassments the Shah Soojah had in 1834 occasioned him, were now stripping the Dooranee empire of the whole of its former dependencies west of the Indus. The proposition was a most natural one: a power threatening to undermine or overthrow him was about to be converted into an ally,—Persia, Candahar, and Cabool were jointly to attack first Herat, and then Peshawur, the joint powers severally benefiting by the result. It was scarcely to be expected that the Ameer was to regard England with much affection, when he knew that we protected, and were in closest alliance with, his most hated enemy—the Lion of Lahore, and that we supplied the Shah Soojah, his competitor for the crown, with a safe hiding-place whence to sally out and attack him, under cover of our wing, when he thought fit. "Pressed on one hand by the Seikhs," says Mr (now Sir John) M'Neil,(10) "and, on the other,

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9 Bokhara Travels, 12mo edition, vol. iii. p. 79—Burnes's Address—"I did tell him (on his application for money) as I have ever felt, that I considered the payment of money to such a Cabinet derogatory to the name and honour of Britain; since it has tended more to lower our estimation in Asia than our most noble deeds have done in India to raise it,"—a sentiment which should be written on the girdle of every British ambassador at the Court of Persia.

10. So writes Mr Ellice on the 1st April 1836; on the 10th we find him once more stating, that His Majesty had been encouraged and promised pecuniary assistance from the Russians, who well knew that the conquest of Herat and Candahar by the Persians is in fact an advance for them towards India, if not

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fearing that some member of the Suddozye family may incite the Dooranees against him, he had for some time been seeking to strengthen himself by a foreign connection." The Ameer had forwarded letters almost simultaneously to the Emperor of Russia, the Shah of Persia, and the newly appointed Governor-General of India—all sent ambassadors in return, and none at first wrote more cordially than Lord Auckland in reply. The anxiety of the Russian Minister for the chastisement of these man-stealers, was most satisfactorily explained by the extent to which they kidnapped the subjects of his country. It was not wonderful that parties having a common object of such importance in view, should have been drawn somewhat closely towards each other—the marvel was, that, considering the causes, they were not more so. We have, however, in these observations, permitted ourselves to wander from the subject of the eastward march of the Persian army, to which attention must now be directed.

The summer and autumn of 1836 were occupied in preparing an expedition meant to be of overwhelming magnitude,—but so unskilfully had arrangements been made, that, on the approach of winter, the head-quarters of the army, with all their supplies, were still 600 miles to the westward of the declared point of operation. Alarmed at these things, Kamran Shah now of himself proffered terms of treaty; he acknowledged his previous man-stealing practices, but pledged himself to abstain from this and every other species of aggression, if the Shah would bind himself to abandon the present advance. This he declined to do, and accordingly in July 1837 an army of 40,000 men, with 70 pieces of artillery, was on its march from Teheran to Herat. The utter worthlessness of any professions of submission on the part of Kamran Shah had, before this, become apparent. The British ambassadors had laboured incessantly to bring about an amicable arrangement, and had in part succeeded: when, on a check which had been sustained by the Persian army, the Herat ruler sent a message full of contumely and insult. On receipt of this, the councillors of Persia determined that a force should, next season, be marched to chastise the faithless and unprincipled chief. The fear of the approach of this, occasioned a second overture for negociation. (11) New light on all these matters appears about this time to have beamed from Downing Street on the Government of India: and a communication from the Governor-General entirely altered the opinions of Sir John M'Neil. He now considered the war eminently unjust, and urged the utmost remonstrances against it. The Per-

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for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization.'"!!! This within ten days of the time when he had given an account of a treaty, offensive and defensive, having been concluded betwixt Persia and Candahar! The name of Russia seems to turn the wits of British statesmen!

11. Letter to Mr Macnaghten, 22d January, 1837.

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sian route lay wholly through their own country, yet they were unable to reach Herat before the end of November,—the sole obstructions arising from an empty treasury and defective commissariat, and an undisciplined and disorderly army, which frequently threatened to melt utterly away before they had seen the enemy; an excellent illustration of the futility of our fears of the danger of aggression on Affghanistan from the troops of *modern* Persia. The siege lasted nine months, the Persian army having retired from before it on the 30th of September. An expedition from Bombay, which had landed at Karrack, in the Persian Gulf, in the middle of June, showed them how completely Persia was within our grasp: that we could disembark any force we pleased at Bushire within a fortnight of its quitting Bombay, and possess ourselves of the chief towns of the empire before the people at large could be made aware that hostilities were intended. This, together with the urgency of our remonstrances, were assigned by the Shah as the reasons for his retreat. Yet it must be kept in mind that his attempts against Herat had throughout proved failures; that he in one unsuccessful assault lost 1800 men; that his casualties had exceeded 3000. He was, in September 1838, as remote from his object as in Nov. 1837. His army was short of provisions, and without clothing or pay; and rather than have continued before the fortress which had so repeatedly defeated them, for another winter, would, in all likelihood, have dispersed of themselves in spite of all remonstrances. It may here be remarked as one of numerous illustrations of the crooked and hollow policy in which we had now engaged ourselves, that though the occupation of Karrack was an able and most effective military movement, both this and the preparations against Affghanistan, in consideration of any movement Persia might have in view, were specific violations of treaty. It had, in 1814, been expressly stipulated by us, that if war should be declared between the Affghans and Persians, the English Government should not interfere with either party unless their mediation to effect a peace should be solicited by both parties; (12) and in a despatch from Lord Palmerston to Sir J. M'Neil, dated 2d June 1836, the obligation to neutrality was emphatically recognised. Yet we took possession of Karrack, an island belonging to Persia in the centre of the Shah's dominions, which placed the whole sea coast of the country at our command, and we prepared to attack Affghanistan on suspicion of her desire to ally herself with Persia, or to resist her aggressions, the alternative apprehended by Government not being apparent! The intimation of the fall of Herat, one of the alleged causes of our invasion, reached the Government before a single regiment had marched; while Runjeet Singh,

12. Treaty of 1814, article ix. The previous article binds Persia to assist us with troops in case the Affghans should be at war with the British nation.—Parliamentary Papers, 1839.

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whose personal animosity, another cause of our movements, was on his death-bed, and Dost Mahomed had consented to postpone his claim to Peshawur, and to keep all Russian and Persian embassies out of his territories would we only afford him temporary protection. Every one of the pretexts of quarrel had thus vanished before conflict began! We had still the bugbear Russia before us as a pretended source of apprehension. Yet surely little weight, in reality, was attached to this, however much might have been pretended, when the Cabinet waited till Russia had offered an explanation of her conduct—declared to be frank, gratifying, and satisfactory—before either remonstrances or inquiries were thought of! What definite project we imagined the Court of St Petersburgh to have had in view, has never been explained by any one. A foreign writer had the sagacity to point out, that should all the powers of the empire, with all the material the best appointed army could desire, reach the western borders of Beloochistan in safety, that a descent by us on Bushire would place us in possession of all their communications, compel Persia at her peril to act against them, and place the rear of their armies, and the line of their advance and relief, completely at our mercy. The descent on Karrack gives practical proof of the soundness of Count Bjornstjerna's speculations. (13) The uniform testimony of travellers had speculatively shown that which the expedition to Khiva practically demonstrated—that for Russia to send an army as far as the eastern border of Persia, was *impossible*. Our own experience is now sufficient to convince the most sceptical that were they there, the mountain tribes would cut off their supplies, destroy their cattle, and appropriate their baggage, before they reached the Indus, without our intervention. We could, any day, cut an expedition from the westward to pieces, by landing a force at Bushire, where the coast country, with our fleet and supplies, would furnish a base of operations from which Europe and Asia together could not drive us. A Russian army would take twice the time to march from her furthest to our nearest frontier that the armies of England would occupy in being transported from the banks of the Thames to those of the Indus. We take no account of how our fleets might meanwhile be employing themselves in the Baltic or Black Sea.

The manner in which Kamran Shah has manifested his gratitude towards us since 1837, might furnish a salutary lesson as to the nature of these treaties of amity; how hopeless it is to attempt to establish an alliance betwixt barbarous and civilized nations, which can be made agreeable or advantageous to either—and how worse than wasteful to fling a nation's wealth away on wretched chiefs who can never be satisfied or enriched—who cast us off the moment we stop our subsidies,—whose gratitude ex-

13. The British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna.—Translated by H. Evans Lloyd. 1840. J. Murray. 1 vol. 8vo.

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tends not beyond the hour of their receiving our gifts into their treasury,—and who employ the bounty we bestow on them for the basest and worst of purposes. It has been seen how incessantly Messrs Ellice and McNeil laboured to dissuade the King of Persia from advancing on Herat, and how anxious they were to promote negociation. When this failed, and an army of 40,000 men appeared under its walls, Herat was first defended by the prowess of an English officer, and then relieved by the descent of an English force on the shores of Karrack. Their requital was, that, within two months of the Persian retreat, Major Todd and Lieutenant Pottinger were ordered to quit. (14) The following year another deputation was sent from the army then at Candahar on its way to Cabool. They remained for nearly two years, and spent £300,000 in bribes, and in endeavouring to repair the fortress. The moment they began to shorten their expenditure they were dismissed with contumely. The British Ministers had laboured incessantly to obtain from Persia the cession of Ghorian, and its annexation to Herat, with a view of establishing it as an independent princedom. They had no sooner succeeded in this, than the object of our solicitude being now no longer in our pay, made his submission to the Shah spontaneously, and restored to him, under certain conditions as to which we never were consulted, the very possession we had just before procured for him! These things all stand on official record; the oldest of them have occurred since the year 1836: yet we go on wasting millions annually on embassies at the courts of wretches who only hold to us while we bribe them: when we could purchase them for any service they could perform, for one-tenth of the sum we pay them annually; and for whose hostility, aided by all the assistance all the nations of Europe could conveniently supply, we need not give ourselves the slightest disturbance!

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA.

So much for the Persian branch of the Russo-Persian question apart from the affairs of Cabool,—a part of which will shortly be considered under the head treating of the last-mentioned subject. In September 1834 so cordially were Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode at one on Persian affairs, that the English minister directed the ambassador at St Petersburgh to intimate the gratification experienced by His Majesty's Government that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia were acting in the same spirit, and were equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity, of Persia. (1)

14 Despatch of Sir A. Burnes to Mr Torrens, dated Shikarpore, Oct. 31.

1. Lord Palmerston to Mr Bligh, 5th September, 1834.—Parliamentary Papers, 1834.

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The letter (dated 5th Sept.) in which these expressions of amity and good-will are contained, had been crossed by one from Count Nesselrode (Aug. 22) couched in terms still more satisfactory—the Russian minister stating "that the Court of St. Petersburgh continued to think that a conformity of language and conduct on the part of the representatives of Russia and Great Britain would, of all political combinations, be the one which would most effectually contribute to maintain tranquillity in Persia, and to prepare the country for a new reign without exposing the empire to the disorders inseparable from any contested succession." (2) In 1834, the Shah of Persia, Futteh Ali, died, and was succeeded by his grandson, as already explained: the same harmonious feelings which up to this time had existed betwixt the Courts of London and St Petersburgh appear to have continued without any interruption. In December, Mr Bligh writes Lord Palmerston—"I have just seen Count Nesselrode, who has given me some details respecting the death of the Shah of Persia. Count Nesselrode seems to anticipate that Persia will inevitably become the scene of civil commotion, and expresses his satisfaction that, under such circumstances, the British and Russian Governments should have come to a good understanding about this matter." (3) Upon this hint our foreign minister writes to the ambassador at Teheran, warning the Persian Government against aggressive war. (4) It does not appear whether Mr Ellice had been duly kept informed in reference to the friendly terms of the correspondence betwixt Lord Palmerston and Count Nesselrode on Persian affairs—it is to be presumed he was: but a very different train of feelings had obtained hold of his mind in regard to the views of Count Simonich, his brother ambassador at Teheran. In January 1836 he writes "that the Shah had determined on attacking Herat; and that his success was anxiously looked for by Russia, whose minister did not fail to press its execution." (5) "The motive," continues the ambassador, "cannot be mistaken: Herat once annexed to Persia, may become, according to the

2. Ibid, Nov. 8.

3. Mr Bligh's note dated St Petersburgh, December 5, 1834—received 5th January, 1835.—Ibid.

4. Ibid—Lord Palmerston's note to Mr Ellice, July 25, 1835, referred to under Herat affairs.

5. The Parliamentary Papers, from which the whole of the above facts are derived, are marked as extracts. After the mutilation of the Cabool papers, so justly characterised by Burnes as "sheer trickery"—we knew not well what to make of them; they form of course what ministers mean to be set up as a justification of their measures. They are full of confusion, which might probably vanish had we the documents complete. In speaking of Herat affairs, Mr Ellice constantly refers to the Persian claims on Ghuznie; yet there seems to have been no intention of advancing even to Candahar, as there were no preparations attempted, or capable of being made, for doing so. It is possible that the entire documents would show that there were two different expeditions in view, and that Count Simonich was favourable to that on Herat only.

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Commercial Treaty, the residence of a consular agent; who may from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Affghanistan." "The extension of the Persian monarchy in the direction of Affghanistan, will at once bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our empire: and as Persia will not, or dare not, place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain, our policy must be to consider her no longer an outwork for the defence of India, but as the first parallel from whence the attack may be commenced or threatened." This metaphor of Mr Ellice seems at once to have been accepted as a substantial and tangible fact: and from the hour this view of it began to be taken, the Board of Control seemed to think of nothing but a battery of Russian cannon playing on the walls of Delhi—1500 miles off! What there would have been either objectionable or inconvenient in the establishment of a Russian commercial agent on the frontiers of Persia—seeing that Russia carried on an extensive trade with these countries, and was the only European power which did so, is not explained to us;—nor does it appear what damage India could have sustained from any researches or communications, either secret or open, which he could have conducted. But this was the political mania of the Foreign Office for the time; and any one demanding an explanation of the words "Russian influence," or daring to doubt the potency and malignancy of its effects on his country, must have run the risk of having his sanity, sincerity, or patriotism called in question. This fantasy affected the sound understanding of Sir Alexander Burnes; and in all his communications—clear and sagacious as they are in every other respect, and full of statesman-like policy and prudence—whenever the visions of Russian intrigue, and Persian influence come across him, he becomes visionary, and all but unintelligible. From this time forward, we find that every look and word of Count Simonich is tortured into something threatening evil to the common weal, and portending mischief to India! The shake of Lord Burleigh's head conveyed not half so many meanings, when nodded most strongly, according to the directions of Mr Puff, as did the most meaningless civil speech of the Russian ambassador, interpreted by the lights of Mr Ellice and Mr McNeil! Yet Count Nesselrode assures Lord Palmerston that, if the Russian envoy comported himself as described by the members of the British mission, he was acting in direct contradiction of his instructions: and that so late as the 4th May 1837, he had received the most positive orders "to employ all his credit with the Shah [of Persia] to dispose him to a formal accommodation with Herat." (6) Count Simonich's own

6. Count Nesselrode's reply to Lord Palmerston, 1st Nov. 1838—Parliamentary Papers.

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letters to his government give evidence that these instructions were most heedfully attended to. On the 28th of May—before receiving the despatch of the 4th of the same month just noticed—he writes to his own Cabinet, "I have made the most pressing representations, in order to induce his majesty [of Persia] to content himself with the voluntary submission of the Prince of Herat, and not undertake that expedition at least before placing the affairs of his country in order." (7) The Emporor of Russia called back the battalion in the Persian service, formed of Russian deserters, at the very time when he knew that this was the principal force in the Persian army, then before the walls of Herat. (8) Instead of accompanying the army with the view of urging on hostilities, Count Simonich attended the movements of the Shah with the same peaceful intent as Mr McNeil: and he did this by special permission, asked for and obtained, from the Court of St. Petersburgh. On his arrival in camp, in the end of April, a fortnight after Mr McNeil, and in the seventh month of the siege, when danger to Herat was considered nearly over, the Ambassador, witnessing the distress from which the Persian army was suffering, did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah when the sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the siege. (9) Any English officer placed in similar circumstances, would unquestionably have acted in the same manner, in order to render a friendly sovereign the assistance he might have applied for in so critical a situation. Count Nesselrode further declared, that if the King of Persia had succeeded, by the capture of Herat, in getting victoriously out of the dangerous situation in which he had placed himself, it was the determination of his cabinet to have refused sanctioning the extension of Persian power in that direction; and to have negociated the cession of the city and territories to Kohun Dil Khan, chief of Candahar, on an arrangement having expressly for its basis the very thing we pretended most to desire—a formal obligation being imposed on Persia in no other way to assail the integrity of the country of which the Sirdars were in possession, or the tranquillity of the tribes of which they were the chiefs. (10) The explanation in reference to the appearance of Captain Vicovich at Cabool was still

7. Count Simonich to H. E. Count Nesselrode, 28th May 1837—Ibid. This was forwarded to Lord Palmerston 15. and received July 24, 1837.

8. Count Nesselrode's note to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 1838, *ut supra.*

9. We have taken the above nearly verbatim from Count Nesselrode's note;—a fine, bold, perspicuous document,—as given in the Parliamentary Papers selected for publication by the Foreign Office.

10. Count Nesselrode's note to Lord Palmerston, October 20, 1838.—We have, throughout, in a great measure copied the note verbatim. Also note of same, March 5, 1839.—Mr Leech sent a copy of the treaty to Mr M'Neil in March 1837.

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more minute and satisfactory: he was sent there from Herat by Count Simonich, in consequence of the arrival of an agent from Dost Mahomed Khan, or rather, as it will by and bye be seen, from Mirza Sami Khan his minister, who had taken it upon himself to address the Emperor of Russia in name of his master. (11) The objects of his mission were purely commercial; in order to ascertain the advantages, and degree of security Russian merchants might expect in entering on commercial speculations with Cabool. (12) Surely we were the last parties in the world who had a right to find fault with such a measure as this,—our own countryman Burnes, having, six years before, approached the very gates of Orenberg on a similar expedition. On one point the Russian ambassador exceeded his instructions when before Herat, and he frankly confessed it, as did his cabinet before being called upon to do so: he not only lent his aid in negociating a treaty betwixt the King of Persia and the Sirdar of Candahar, with a view to the cession of Herat to the latter, "securing thereby the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they were incessantly disturbed," (13) but he gave the guarrantee of Russia for the maintenance and fulfilment of the agreement. The determination of the Emperor had ever been not to maintain with Affghanistan any other than purely commercial relations: he would take no part in the civil wars of the Chiefs, nor in the family feuds, which had no claim on his attention. Count Simonich's guarantee was therefore at once disallowed, and he himself recalled. Not only so, but General Duhamel, by whom he was succeeded, so soon as he discovered that the objects of Capt. Vicovich's mission had been misconstrued by us or by himself, or by both, without waiting for fresh directions from St. Petersburgh, and in conformity alone with the spirit of his original instructions, immediately on his arrival at Teheran ordered the agent to return. With these assurances, given with the utmost

11. Masson, vol. iii. p. 465. Masson doubts if Vicovich really was accredited by the Russian minister at all; or whether he was not adopted after the sensation which his appearance at Cabool had made became known: he says—"Count Nesselrode, in acknowledging the mission of Vicovich, may be supposed to have adopted his letters, although he does not expressly say so: I still, however, believe it to have been a fabrication while admitting the Russian minister's dexterity in relinquishing projects he never entertained." The explanation in Count Nesselrode's note quoted in the text, is such that we cannot for a moment concur in this view of the case. Sir J C. Hobhouse calls him a Polish renegade (See Speech, June 23). He appears to have been murdered on his return from Cabool, and no more inquiries made after him. It might have been enough to know this much, to feel assured that Russia had no intention of attempting the revolution of empires when an agent such as this was resorted to.

12. Count Nesselrode, *ut supra*.

13. Ibid, March 5, 1839—*verbatim*.

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apparent frankness and candour in two very able and elaborate papers, of dates 1st November 1838, and March 5, 1839, Lord Palmerston declared Her Majesty's government to be entirely satisfied (Dec. 20, 1838)—convinced that Russia harboured no hostile designs against the interests of Great Britain in India; and that the two powers would thereafter unite in earnestly dissuading the King of Persia from undertaking any similar expedition to that against Herat. In reply to the second note (that of 5th March, 1839,) the declarations of reconciliation were still more cordial,—expressing the satisfaction which the renewed assurances of friendship afforded H. M.'s government, and the gratification felt especially by the information, that the first act of General Duhamel on arriving at Teheran was the recall of the commercial agent already referred to. The same declaration on the part of our foreign minister was afterwards emphatically repeated in Parliament. It is impossible to peruse the official papers, even as prepared for publication—tricked out as a portion of them has since been proved to have been, to bolster up the policy of Lord Auckland—without coming to the conclusion, that a more baseless vision than that of hostile design on the part of Russia, conjured up by Mr. Ellice, and unhappily believed in by Lord Palmerston, never misled the rulers of a country. If it be affirmed, as it has often been, that the declarations of Russia, however plausible and specific in appearance, are wholly untrustworthy,—it must be replied, in the first place, that H. M.'s ministers declared that they implicitly confided in them: they may take the alternative of confessing, that in this they uttered a falsehood knowing it to be such; or that they then said what they believed to be true, but which has since been proved to them to be the opposite. If so, however, we are entitled to demand what new light has been thrown on the intentions of Russia in regard to the affairs of Central Asia, since March 1839? If the affirmations of the Court of St. Petersburgh are at any time to be received with less confidence than those of other kingdoms, it will require to be shewn on what grounds? When, and how, it has deceived its allies? If it be established that its assertions are untrustworthy, then it is a mockery to receive, or respond, to them; or to maintain towards a country, thus affirmed to be self-outlawed from the society or privileges of civilized nations, the demeanour required where ordinary principles of political morality are adhered to: those who neglect or violate the laws of the European commonwealth have no right to require that these be observed towards them. With matters as they now appear before us, the accusations of duplicity and dishonesty brought against Count Nesselrode and his colleagues, in reference to their conduct towards Persia and Affghanistan, must be looked on as base and malignant slanders. Lord Palmerston asks, with a confident air of triumph, whether the intentions and the policy of

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Russia were to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Lieut. Vicovich? (14) The reply to this is simple—that the acts referred to are no where to be found but in the fancies of the members of the Persian and Cabool missions;—the grounds of suspicion set forth by Mr Ellice and Mr McNeil, as published in the Parliamentary Papers, would not have been admitted as circumstantial evidence to convict an English poacher! Captain Burnes gives us his suspicions only; we are wholly in the dark as to the grounds on which they were founded. The explanations of Count Nesselrode were declared to be so entirely satisfactory, that the accusations against Russia were thereby *de facto* admitted to have fallen to the ground. Under these circumstances, the following passage from the Speech of Sir John Hobhouse, delivered in Parliament on the 23d of June 1842, in opposition to the motion of Mr. Baillie for the production of the papers on which the justification of the Affghan War was grounded, is worthy of quotation:—

"I am sorry to say (observes the Hon. Bart.) that that advice came from the Russian Minister at the Court of Persia. It came from the representative of that most powerful state, who had hitherto acted in the most friendly way with the British Minister, but who gave advice to the Schah totally contrary to the advice that was tendered by the British Minister, and carried his advice afterwards into effect by the intervention which I must more particularly allude to hereafter—an intervention on the part of the representative of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which was totally incompatible—I say was totally incompatible with the very safety of India. Count Simonich advised the advance upon Herat. Hon. Gentlemen are now so familiar with the importance of that city and state, from its position in Central Asia, that it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon it. This, however, I must state, that the best authorities had laid it down as an indisputable fact, that that city and its immediate dependencies are the most important of all the cities and states of Central Asia, and that the master of Herat is in a position, both with reference to Persia and to the Affghan states, to hold the balance, if he has any considerable power, between the parties who might contend for empire much further and with much greater proximity to India. But Count Simonich did not confine himself to giving advice. At the very time that the English Minister, in consequence of instructions from Lord Palmerston, retired, after fruitless endeavours to prevail upon the Schah to relinquish his pretensions, Count Simonich remained in the neighbourhood, and actually, it might be said, superintended the siege, and an officer of distinction, who had been in the Russian service, assisted at the siege, and I think I recollect, was killed there.

"But it did not stop there. The intervention of Russia did not stop with the

14. Draft of a note presented to Count Nesselrode, dated Foreign Office, 26th October, 1838. The Simla Proclamation was issued three weeks before Lord Palmerston thought of enquiring whether Russia had given any cause for our going to war with Dost Mahomed! It turned out she had given none: yet we went to war notwithstanding, when the last of our pretences for so doing had admittedly failed us!!

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mere appearance of the Russian ambassador at the siege of Herat. Forsooth, a treaty was entered into—it will be found in the papers before the House—by which, in the most summary way, the lawful sovereign of Herat (the real representative of the ancient dynasty) was to be dethroned, and his dominions were given to one of the princes of Candahar, a brother of Dost Mahomed. By that treaty an entire change was to occur in the whole of that important part of Central Asia; and who does the House of Commons think was the guarantee of that treaty? No less a person than the Russian ambassador, and I hold a proof of it in my hand. Was the Governor-General of India, or the Minister at home charged with the Indian department, or my noble friend, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or the Cabinet at large, to permit such a state of things for a moment? Was Lord Auckland to look on tamely when this transaction was taking place, I might say, at the very gates of India? But there was a person who has gained an unhappy notoriety by the publication of these papers, deputed also, I am sorry to say, by the Russian Ambassador—a renegade Pole he was said to have been—a Captain Vicovich, whose exploits, no doubt, Hon. Members have read of in this history. That individual was deputed by Count Simonich to go—whither? To the ex-chief of Cabul—and he went there accordingly. But not contented with that, there was to be another mission, a sort of branch mission to the Ameers of Scinde, and another to the Court of Lahore; and was Lord Auckland to consider those things as nothing but a trumpery effort made by the Schah of Persia, which the very shadow of the British bayonet from beyond the Sutledge would at once put down? No! Lord Auckland considered, with the Cabinet at home, that the time was come for resistance. My noble friend (Lord Palmerston) directed a remonstrance to be made to Count Nesselrode, and an answer was given to it. The Hon. Gentleman said, that my noble Friend, in his reply, considered the answer satisfactory; that was not the word. My Noble Friend said he considered the assurances were satisfactory, and so they were, for they were carried into effect. For what occurred? Count Simonich was recalled; and, moreover, the unhappy man, Captain Vicovitch, who was a tool in these intrigues, was also recalled, and has been heard of no more. The rumour was, that he put an end to his own existence; but he has been heard of no more. An effect, however, a very serious and dangerous effect, had been produced by these intrigues. It did not signify to those barbarous states whether or not that ambassador, Count Simonich, or that envoy, Captain Vicovitch, had exceeded their orders or not, as Count Nesselrode said they had. What did Dost Mahomed know of that? How could he judge?"

Sir John Cam Hobhouse, who now adduces charges of the grossest duplicity and fraud against the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, was, by his own showing, in possession of the evidence supplied by Mr McNeil and Lord Auckland in 1838: this was embodied in a note to Count Nesselrode of date 26th October, but had been unofficially before him in a separate form; and the several points replied to specifically and seriatim by a note from the Russian minister of date 1st November—before the formal note of our foreign minister was received. Lord Palmerston states, that Count Nessel-

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rode's communication had received all the attention that its importance so justly demanded, and that its general result had been highly satisfactory to H. M.'s government. "The proceedings of Russian agents in Asia [continues the noble viscount] had for some considerable time been so much at variance with the professed policy of the Russian government, and so inconsistent with the friendly relations subsisting between Great Britain and Russia, that the British Cabinet deemed it its duty to ascertain, by frank explanations with that of St. Petersburgh, whether any change had taken place in the declared policy of the Imperial cabinet in regard to the affairs in question, or its friendly dispositions towards Great Britain? The despatch of Count Nesselrode contains upon these points, assurances the most full and complete, and H. M.'s government *accept, as entirely satisfactory,* the declarations of the Imperial cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interest of Great Britain in India; and that its own policy, with respect to Persia, remains unchanged, and is the same which, in 1834, the two powers agreed to adopt."

Sir John Cam Hobhouse was, in 1839, President of the Board of Control, and one of the members of the Government who stated themselves satisfied with the explanations in reference to the conduct of the Persian and Affghan missions;—admitting by this declaration, that the impressions founded on their previous information were groundless, and that the statements now recapitulated, on which these were based, were utterly fallacious! The statement contained in the revised report of the speech,—that "Lord Palmerston and his colleagues considered the assurances of Count Nesselrode satisfactory, *because they were carried into effect,*" Count Simonich and Lieutenant Vicovich having been recalled when the intimation of the pleasure of the Cabinet was conveyed to the Court of St Petersburgh, is at variance with the evidence supplied by official documents! The announcement of the recall here referred to is contained in a note dated 5th March, 1839: this again called forth expressions of pleasure and satisfaction from Her Majesty's Government, who had "been much gratified by learning, that one of the first acts of General Duhamel, on entering upon his functions at Teheran, [in supercession of Count Simonich] was to recall Lieut. Vicovich from Affghanistan."(15) The paper of explanations referred to by Sir John Cam Hobhouse with which the Cabinet first expressed themselves so highly gratified, is dated the 1st November, and contains not one word of the second mentioned recall! Why should not

15. The very words of the official correspondence have, for the most part, been retained in the text,—which throughout this section is little else than an abridgement of the Parliamentary papers of 1839; in which the late ministry put what they *then* meant to be the defence of their policy. These are now abandoned, and old exploded or refuted statements once more dragged into the field.

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Russia or Persia have sent missions to Cabool, or Lahore, or Scinde,—or China, or Burmah, or Japan if it so pleased them? We were then on terms of amity with them all,—though the first three enumerated were at deadly feud with each other,—so that no deputation could have any common hostile object in view. The explanation in reference to the transference of the sovereignty of Herat from the wretched effete Suddozye prince, to the more vigorous Barukzye Sirdar, was fully set down in Count Nesselrode's notes,—and this also was, in 1838 and 1839, considered entirely satisfactory: well it might, if our pretended wishes for peace in Central Asia contained one particle of sincerity: the wretch proposed to be set aside was the son of the elder brother of the father of the Shah Soojah, who had seized upon Herat on the general dismemberment of the kingdom, and was permitted to retain it. He was, according to the rules of legitimacy and primogeniture, the rightful sovereign of the Dooranee empire, to the exclusion of the Shah Soojah himself. He had no more claim on Herat than on the Punjaub, Peshawur, Cashmere, Cabool, or Ghuznie,—save that given him by the sword. His character as a sovereign, and his value as an ally, may be gathered from the section referring to the affairs of Herat. Russia desired to have him removed and a better man put in his place, "to secure the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they are incessantly disturbed."(16) Kamran Shah, "the lawful sovereign—the real representative of the ancient dynasty"—derived his revenues from man-stealing,—from plundering merchants passing in his neighbourhood, and by making inroads into conterminous countries to carry off their inhabitants and sell them as slaves. The more peaceably-disposed states which suffered from his malpractices, were as much entitled to depose him as a common nuisance, or a robber in the highways of commerce, as were England and France in dealing with the far more dignified and honourable plunderers the Deys of Tunis or Algiers! The ex-president of the Board of Control states, that the guarantee for the fulfilment of the treaty by which these changes were to be effected, "was no less a person than the Russian ambassador." He might, in candour, have added, that in doing so this ambassador acted in opposition to his instructions, and was recalled for having so acted before Lord Palmerston offered any remonstrance or complaint:(17)—as also, that thus much was admitted by the ambassador himself to the British embassy! How lightly Dost Mahomed held the Russian mission in comparison to the hope of the friendship of England, the members of the late Cabinet knew right well, though their hearers might not. The portion of the despatch referring to this was sup-

16. Count Nesselrode's note, 5th March 1837; also 1st November 1838.
17. See Count Nesselrode's Note of 1st November 1838.

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pressed, when all the extracts injurious to the credit of Russian candour were given to the world. Sir Alex. Burnes, in one of these, of date 27th December 1837, writes to the Government of India :—"On the morning of the 19th, that is, yesterday, the Ameer came over from the Bala Hissar, with a letter from his son, the Governor of Ghuznie, reporting that a Russian Agent had arrived at that city on his way to Cabool. Dost Mahomed Khan said, that he had come for my counsel on the occasion ; that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British ; that he did not wish to receive any agent from any other power whatever, so long as he had a hope of sympathy from us ; and that he would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in any other way that I desired him." In a further suppressed portion of another despatch, dated 26th January 1838, Sir John knew that the following statement was to be found :—"Since arriving here [at Cabool] I have seen an agent of Persia with alluring promises, after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to quit the country, because no one sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, an agent from Russia, with letters highly complimentary, and promises more than substantial, has experienced no greater civility than was due by the laws of hospitality and nations. It may be urged by some, that the offers of one or both are fallacious ; but such a dictum is certainly premature. The Ameer of Cabool has sought no aid in arguments from such offers, but declared that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, which he will never desert so long as there is a hope of securing one. It is evident, therefore, that in this chief [Dost Mahomed] we have one who is ready to meet us ; and from what is passing in Central Asia at this moment, it is any thing but desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose position makes him courted ; and whose aid may render powerful for or against us." (18) Amongst the various anomalies apparent in these singular passages of our political history, it is not unworthy of remark, that the speech on which these observations have been offered, was delivered on the debate on a motion by Mr. Baillie for the production of papers alleged to have been on a previous occasion printed in a garbled form. Sir J. C. Hobhouse was opposed to this—the chief argument against granting the request of the mover turning on the misunderstandings this might generate betwixt

18. Burnes's suppressed Despatches. Lord Fitzgerald and Vesci, the present President of the Board of Control, took upon himself to affirm in his place in the upper house, that his predecessor in office was not liable to the charge of unfairly garbling Burnes's papers : we must in charity believe that the noble lord had not examined them when he made the affirmation : yet under such ignorance of what he assisted to defend, the assertion was something more than bold, in the face of the declaration of Sir Alexander himself—that the publication was sheer trickery, and that he had been made to support doctrines which he denounced. The noble lord may, by this time, have had the means of correcting his impression !

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us and Russia! When the papers were posthumously published from the MSS. of Sir Alex. Burnes entire, without consent of Parliament, it turned out that the tenor of the cancelled portions was calculated to produce an effect the very opposite of animosity! In contrast to the English minister's perversion or concealment of the contents of state papers, Count Nesselrode had himself explained "that Lord Palmerston's having informed him that the affairs of Persia would probably form the subject of serious discussion in Parliament, and that the English cabinet will probably find itself obliged to give publicity to the communications which have been exchanged on this subject betwixt our cabinet and that of London,—the Emperor desires me to state to you, in his name, that he does not see any inconvenience in that publicity. The policy of our august master does not fear open day. On the contrary, His Majesty will be glad to see that explanations which he has spontaneously offered to England should be generally known." (19) "Strong in our rectitude, and in our conscience, we shall never have anything to conceal or to dissemble which we have designed or undertaken."

It seems throughout to have been assumed by the Melbourne administration, that such was the policy of Russia that no faith whatever was to be placed in her professions; this postulate has already been adverted to above:—we had no right to assume that Count Nesselrode and his colleagues were fools as well as scoundrels. Yet nothing short of fatuity could ever have induced the Cabinet of St Petersburgh to believe that Russia could have possibly maintained herself in India, had Britain made her a gift of it: that she could ever have reached it, even had she attempted to do so: or that, if having succeeded in the inconceivable exploit of placing a hundred thousand men on our frontiers, she could have maintained them on British ground for a single campaign. To any nation in Europe less used to enlightened, liberal, and honest government—less blessed with commercial enterprise and perseverance than our own, India would prove a ruinous possession.

To those who have perused the contents of the previous pages, it will have become apparent, that so far from the attack of Persia on Herat being, as asserted by Lord Auckland, "cruel and unjustifiable," it was declared by two successive ambassadors the very opposite of both—that so far from being at variance with the principles and objects of our alliance, we were bound by a special clause contained in each of three successive treaties to give no assistance, except as mediator at the solicitation of both parties, to either Affghan or Persian, should war arise betwixt them.(20) So far from the attack of Dost Mahomed on Peshawur being either sudden or unprovoked, it had been long premeditated—was one of a series which had been going

19. Count Nesselrode's Notes of 5th March 1839, and 6th Nov. 1838.
20. Treaty of 1814—1826, repeatedly referred to by both parties as in force in 1837.

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on without interruption for three years in succession—and was provoked by the perfidious conduct of the Seikh ruler seizing on a portion of the Doorannee territory, which the Ameer of Cabool was endeavouring to recover. It will be perceived from what immediately follows, that the Ameer of Cabool, who in 1838 had been declared by the Governor-General to be an usurper, had just two years before (22d Aug. 1836) been written to by Lord Auckland, the same Governor-General, in terms expressive of "regard and esteem"—the Dost having been designated Ameer, without question as to the validity of his title, and called by the name of "*friend*";—that Runjeet Singh was desirous that the Governor-General should be the channel of submitting to his consideration the pretensions described as unreasonable;—and that the Cabool ruler himself, in case any difficulty should be made on this point, was willing that this should be left in abeyance throughout the lifetime of the Lahore chief. The negociations at Cabool betwixt September 1837 and May 1838 require next to be examined. We cannot in this, as in two of the preceding sections, draw our materials from papers printed by Parliament: the portions which will most avail the purposes of the present enquiry were withheld from the public as long as the ministers could keep them back: they have been published from the private papers of the late Sir Alexander Burnes, being portions of his despatches forwarded to Government, but suppressed when the others were printed by order of the House of Commons.

CAPTAIN BURNES'S NEGOCIATIONS AT CABOOL.

"After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabool, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor General could not, consistently with justice, and his regard for the friendship of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the Frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened in furtherance of these schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs of Affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British Power in India, he was well apprised, and by his utter disregard of the views and interest of the British Government, compelled Capt. Burnes to leave Cabool without having effected any of the objects of his Mission." * * * * *

"It was now evident, that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh Ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the later Chief showed too plainly that so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate."—*Simla Proclamation, October* 1, 1838.

We have in this, as in the two preceding portions of this narrative, placed the paragraph of the Simla Proclamation to which the observations which follow next in order more particularly relate, as a text to which the reader may refer: should he succeed in reconciling it with the official documents on which it is professed to be based, and on the examination of which we are now about to enter, he will have been more fortunate than the writer of the narrative.

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In 1832, treaties had been entered into with the Ameers of Scinde, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, which had for their object the extension of British commerce by means of the opening up of the navigation of the Indus. (1) The glowing descriptions of Burnes (2) appear to have given a very exaggerated idea of the value of the internal traffic of the countries beyond the Indus. It was forgotten that where there was no industry, no manufactures, or mineral wealth, no sea-coast or rivers to permit exportation, there could be little or nothing to give in exchange for imports:—and that the wants of a population, purely nomade, must at all times be simple and singularly few. The whole of our commerce with Persia has never exceeded two millions sterling a-year, rarely got above one; (3) the total of our trade with Affghanistan certainly never exceeded a million annually, and has very rarely amounted to much more than the half of one. (4) Besides this, the Indus in reality was never closed save by its own dangerous entrances and shallow depth of water. (5) Lord Ellenborough has opened the Indus as far as Mithen Kote, and the Sutlej in continuation of this to the Markunda, where it ceases to be navigable for the smallest craft. Yet the gross value of the British goods consumed by the countries adjoining does not at present amount to a quarter of a million sterling, and will not in all likelihood be doubled for ten years to come: the expense of maintaining troops betwixt Kurrachee and Bukkur, both stations included, exceeding £600,000 a-year; with a less force, it would be unwise to think of keeping these stations at all. The great line of traffic was not along, but across, the Indus by the Delhi frontier, (6) or parallel to it, at a distance of 100 miles, by Sonmeanee and Kelat. The countries beyond the Indus, besides, have always been open to the free admission of every variety of foreign imports on paying a moderate fixed duty. The chief obstructions in reaching these, are irremediable by treaty: and arise from the attacks of the plundering tribes in the passes, which cannot be restrained save by the payment of a black mail or subsidy. This, in the time of the Doorannee monarchy, amounted to £8000, and during the short reign of the Shah

1. Masson, vol. iii. p. 432.
2. Simla Declaration, October 1, 1838—*ut supra*. Bokhara Travels, Book iii. The term exaggerated, is applied without censure on Burnes: his statements are apparently quite within the mark, but the idea of commerce with the interior at all appears to have induced all sorts of absurd conclusions. The inferences were exaggerated; the premises were glowing, but not too much so.
3. Sir J. M'Neil, quoted in Hough's Preface.
4. See Mr Torrens's Tables, June 1841.
5. Burnes's Cabool, p. 126.
6. Masson's Returns supplied to the *Bombay Times*, and given in detail, July 1841. Torrens's Trade Tables by the Delhi Frontier—a set of papers of very dubious authority—the last;—from which it appears that £670,000 worth of goods crossed the Delhi frontier for Cabool in 1840-41.

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Soojah from 1839 to 1841, to £12,000 a-year (7) for the use of the Khyber Pass alone.

In the month of October 1836, Captain (afterwards Lieut. Col. Sir Alex.) Burnes was directed by the Government of India to proceed from Bombay through Scinde, and thence to Cabool on a commercial mission, whose object was to bring, if possible, into operation, a line of policy some years before chalked out by Lord William Bentinck, for the extension of trade and promotion of our intercourse with the countries to the westward of the Indus. The traveller had, six years before, traversed the countries to which he was now sent on mission, and acquired the friendship of many of the chiefs, especially of Dost Mahomed of Cabool—one of the most able, vigorous, and enterprising rulers in central Asia; and he had, besides, distinguished himself beyond any man of his time in the Company's service, for the accuracy and copiousness of the Commercial statistics he had, from time to time, laid before the Government. With him in this embassage were associated, Lieut. Wood of the Indian Navy, Lieut. (now Major) Leech of the Bombay Engineers, and Dr Lord of the Company's Medical service.

A combination of events occasioned the speedy alteration of the objects and character of the mission. Before the end of June he had received instructions to proceed without delay to Cabool, and enter on a train of political arrangements,—destined, as it proved, to terminate in the dethronement of Dost Mahomed, and the restoration of the Shah Soojah;—in the murder of the latter, and eventual reinstatement of the former in power.

Urged forward by successive expresses with instructions from the Government of India, as the emergencies seemed to arise, he proceeded to Peshawur, where he arrived on the 12th and left on the 30th August; having delayed in hopes of the arrival of an escort, expected to have accompanied them through the Khyber Pass.(8) On 20th Sept., the mission entered Cabool with great pomp and splendour. Ukhbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mahomed, had been sent out to meet them, with a fine body of cavalry. The Sirdar, a youth scarcely twenty years of age, but the largest man in the cortege, placed Sir Alex. Burnes on the same elephant with himself, and conducted them straight to the Bala Hissar to be introduced to his father's court, where his reception was most cordial. A spacious garden, close to the palace and under the Bala Hissar, was allocated as the residence of the mission. The following day they were admitted to a formal audience. The Ameer's view of the Governor-General's letter was all that could be desired. On being informed that some of the rarities of Europe had been brought to him as presents, he promptly replied, that Captain Burnes and his friends were the rarities the sight of which most pleased him. As they passed

7. Journey to the Oxus, p. 171.
8. Major Hough, p. 318.

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through the city, some of the people cried out, "take care of Cabool;" "do not destroy Cabool,"—and wherever they went they were received with cordial welcome. "Power frequently spoils men (says Sir A. Burnes in his excellent work on Cabool); but with Dost Mahomed, neither the increase of it, nor his new title of Ameer seems to have done him any harm. He seemed even more alert and full of intelligence than when I last saw him."(9) The following account is given of the Dost by Lieut. Wood, a member of the mission. (10)

"Dost Mahomed Khan is about forty-five years of age, and looks worn out and aged before his time. His frame is large and bony, and all his features strongly marked. There is a sternness in the general expression of his features, which is increased by his flowing, jet-black beard, but his countenance is lighted up by eyes of peculiar brilliancy and intelligence: when he fixes them upon those by whom he is addressed, they actually seem to flash with approbation or dissent. From the ease with which he ran over the names of places visited by Captain Burnes in 1832-3, it is evident that his memory must be a good one; and the various subjects on which he spoke, the good sense of his remarks, and the readiness of his replies, proved that his conversational talents were of no mean order. When any one of us addressed him, he sat with his eyes rivetted upon the speaker, and his whole soul appeared absorbed by the subject: when he himself spoke, though he did not resort to Persian gesture, nor assume the solemnity of a Hindoo rajah, there was that in his manner and tone of voice which enforced attention.

"Our welcome had been cordial; and as we left the apartment I could not help contrasting the audience we had just quitted with the scene in a Haiderabad durbar on a like occasion, and the bearing of the blunt, homely Afghan with that of the vapouring Beluche. Dost Mahomed's reception of the mission was less warmly expressed than that of the Sind Amirs, but the ruler of Kabul felt what the others only feigned. He deemed himself honoured by the arrival of a British mission at his capital; while on the contrary the potentates of Sind, when they grant an interview to a British agent, affect to think that the condescension is on their part; they consider only the servant who is sent to them; but the more intelligent Affghans view in the servant the government which he represents."—*Wood's Journey to the Oxus*, pp. 171 and 172.

The following extract from a letter, addressed, after the march on Herat had begun, to Mr M'Neil, Ambassador at the Court of Persia, is important, as explaining the views of Captain Burnes on the claims of Dost Mahomed, just before the Government of India had determined that no concession whatever ought to be made to the Ameer, and that the claims

9. Burnes's Cabool, p. 149. It may be of interest to recollect, that this is the celebrated Ukhbar Khan who had, six months before this, distinguished himself against Hurry Singh at Jumrood. If Wood's statement be correct, he could be no more than 24 when he joined the Cabool insurgents. He is now about 25.

10. Wood's Journey to the Oxus, pp. 171 and 172.

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which the best-informed of their own servants considered equitable and just, should be set aside, and he deposed, on the plea of putting forward aggressive pretensions calculated for his own aggrandisement, and injurious to British views:—

Extract: Letter from Captain A. Burnes to the British Ambassador in Persia, dated above Mooltan, on the Indus, 6th June 1837.

Assuming then, as I have done in my late communications to Calcutta, that a friendly commercial connexion with the states beyond the Indus, and between that river and Persia, would be highly beneficial to our interests, the advantage would be greater if we could render that connexion political. There is certainly now no alteration since 1809, and it was then desirable. The only objection to it at present is the offence which we shall give to our old ally at Lahore, but as his death cannot be very distant, I have urged upon notice the propriety of taking a middle course. Supposing it were found that Dost Mahomed Khan possessed all the influence, and all the ability, for which he universally receives credit, much embarrassment is not likely to accrue to us, by either promising to that chief, or entering into a secret treaty with him, that we should throw our influence into his hands, to establish himself on the right bank of the Indus, as far down as Shikarpoor, on the demise of Runjeet Sing. Till then, by a judicious friendly intercourse we might so guide the course of events, as to consolidate his power, and prepare the way for the closer future connexion, which we contemplated. A loan of money would of course be by far the most substantial way, but that I was afraid to suggest, not that I think it should be withheld, but from the utter hopelessness of getting it; nor would I urge its being given at all, if the cash were to be employed against Runjeet. To that I see strong objections. We should let him keep Peshawur while he lives, and meanwhile, turn Dost Mahomed Khan's attention to Candahar and Herat. He has annexed Jellalabad to his country since I was in Cabool in 1832, which gives him an addition of six lacs of rupees to his revenue.

Though the above be the outline of the policy which it appears to me we should follow, I should like first to see with my own eyes, the state of affairs in Cabool, the more so, after reading your letter of the 22nd of January.—As for Suddozye ascendancy in Cabool, I consider that hopeless, either from Kamran, or Shoojah ool Moolk; the former, by the way, is said to be dying of dropsy, and the latter has not the head to manage any thing.—The most powerful tribe of the Dooranees is assuredly the Barukzye. Your view of the influence of the Cabool Kuzzilbashes is new to me. At first sight it might appear anti-national, and the power of Dost Mahomed Khan in consequence to be anti-national; but still Ahmed Shah, Timor Shah, Zeman Shah, and even Shoojah, trusted greatly to these Kuzzilbashes, and the Ghoolam Khanee, as they are called, have at all times had great influence in Cabool. I look upon them as the main stay of Dost Mahomed Khan, and it is to them that he will owe the crown of Cabool if he ever gets it. His own clan the Barukzye, will not oppose their influence, as I think, with some few exceptions, they were glad of the supremacy which a Barukzye has secured. It is certain that the chief of Candahar acknowledges in some degree

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the superiority of Dost Mahomed Khan, as you have been informed; and I hear that it was by the advice of the whole clan, that the chief of Cabool has taken the title of Ameer. In fact, there is a circumstance written to me by Mr. Masson quite corroborative. On receiving the Governor General's notification of my approach, Dost Mahomed Khan summoned Kohun Dil Khan to Cabool, and if he would not come himself, requested him to send one of his brothers and not reproach him hereafter, since every thing depended on this visit. I very much fear I shall find one of the Candahar Sirdars at Cabool. On all these points, however, I hope soon to be better informed, and before I get to Cabool to find myself invested with other authority than what I now hold. The part which the Candahar chief is acting requires particularly to be watched. Immediately I got your letter I sent off a messenger from Dera Ghazee Khan to Candahar, through the Lukkee Surwur pass, by which it has been reached in 8 days, to ascertain what was going on there, and I addressed Kohun Dil Khan for the first time as to the objects Government had in view in deputing me to the countries west of the Indus. I shall very soon hear what passes, for since I dispatched the messenger, which is but four days ago, I have had a letter from Candahar saying "that the Persian Elchee is expected to reach in a day or two, and that the Sirdars have made pompous preparations to receive the Embassy," though my informant had no idea of presents from the Russian Envoy. I shall not fail to avail myself of the worthy Meer Mahomed Candaharee, and if things are not right in Candahar, when I get to Cabool, I shall wait there till I put them so. At all events, I shall leave nothing undone to try and put a stop to their intercourse with the Russian minister, and if matters go rightly we shall, I take it, be able to neutralize the power of the Candahar chiefs, or, at all events, place them in complete subjection to Dost Mahomed Khan, whose influence increases daily, and will be nought diminished by his late victory over the Sikhs. As to that indeed, a letter from Captain Wade, which has just reached me, says "that the "Sikhs have never been so severely handled, and a near move at the present time "towards the Sutlej might secure the independence of Dost Mahomed Khan," so that the game at present is all in favor of Cabool.

Captain Burnes was entrusted with a letter of the most warm and cordial tenor from the Governor-General to the Ameer, written in the same kind and friendly strain as that of the preceding year. It was dated 15th May, 1837. It is needless to say how much gratified Dost Mahomed felt at what he assumed to be a fresh instance of our good wishes towards him. At this time, Lord Auckland was perfectly aware of the King of Persia's preparations for attacking Herat,(11) as also of the allegations in reference to the advice given to this effect by Count Simonich. (12) He knew, likewise, that messages of friendship, (13) and letters of amity and regard,(14) had been

11. Mr M'Neil's Letter to Lord Palmerston, Nov. 3, 1836.
12. Ibid. As also Letter of Lord Palmerston to the Earl of Durham, 16th January, 1837.
13. Mr M'Neil, &c., December 30, 1836.
14. Ibid, Feb. 20, 1837. The above is abridged from Extracts of Letters

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exchanged betwixt the Ameer of Cabool, the Candahar Sirdars, and the King of Kings. The incessant attempts of Dost Mahomed Khan to recover Peshawur, were known to every one. There was, in fact, nothing which had occurred, so far as appears by anything on record, betwixt the 15th May, when the letter of friendly greeting which was to introduce Captain Burnes as a commercial agent was written, and the 1st of June, when it was determined to convert this into a threatening embassage, demanding explanations and denouncing vengeance, for the sole crime of defeating the Seikhs at Jumrood on the 1st of May. The preparations for attacking them were long before well known; the result of the action was the only thing which had transpired.(15) We have assigned the last fortnight of May as the period in which this wonderful alteration was wrought in the Calcutta Council Chamber. The letters of Captain Burnes, indicating this, are dated Indus 5th of July; it must have taken a month or nearly to transmit letters from Calcutta to the Indus. He says, "I came to look after commerce, and already I have required to abandon my ledger for treaties and politics.(16) I was ordered by express to pause; and, while hurrying on my accounts, another express cries pause,—which places a vast latitude in my hands. * * I have not as yet got replies to my recommendations on our line of policy in Cabool, consequent on a discovered intrigue of Russia, and on the Cabool chief throwing himself in despair into Perso-Russian arms." If these things were new to Burnes, the published papers show that Lord Auckland and Lord Palmerston had been for many months acquainted with them. It was the interpretation which was to be put upon them, and the line of policy to be pursued in consequence, which were the only things that were novel—and new these were with a vengeance. No papers relating to these have been published, and we are left to look to Downing Street, where a tottering Cabinet required some achievement in India, considered certain of success, to divert public attention from mismanagement at home, for a solution of the mystery which attends them.

Lord Auckland had, a year before, as will be seen by the subjoined communication, expressed himself in the warmest terms towards the Ameer, calling him his friend, and expressing his anxiety to know in what manner he could be of service to him in bringing about a reconciliation with the Seikhs!

Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool, to Lord *Auckland*, the Governor-General of India, 31st May, 1836.

After compliments.

As I have been long attached to the British Government by the ties of friendship

published in most of the London newspapers, from the posthumous papers of the late Sir Alex. Burnes, first printed in Bombay for private circulation.

15. *Delhi Gazette*, Feb. 15, 1837; and so on till May.

16. Cabool, p. 142. Letter to Mr Secretary M'Naghten, dated Sept. 24.

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and affection, the late intelligence of your Lordship's arrival, enlightening with your presence the seat of Government, and diffusing over Hindoostan the brightness of your countenance, has afforded me extreme gratification; and the field of my hopes (which had before been chilled by the cold blast of the times) has, by the happy tidings of your Lordship's arrival, become the envy of the garden of Paradise.

It may be known to your Lordship, that, relying on the principles of benevolence and philanthropy which distinguish the British Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it; and the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the effect that, in the time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance.

I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own; and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.

Lord *Auckland* to *Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan*, written 22d August, 1836.

After compliments.

I have had the pleasure to receive your friendly letter, which was transmitted to me through Captain Wade; and I am gratified at the opportunity which it affords me, so shortly after my assumption of the Indian Government, to convey to you the assurances of my unfeigned regard and esteem.

It is my wish that the Affghans should be a flourishing and united nation; and that, being at peace with all their neighbours, they should enjoy, by means of a more extended commerce, all the benefits and comforts possessed by other nations, which, through such means, have attained a high and advanced state of prosperity and wealth.

My predecessor, aware that nothing was so well calculated to promote this object as the opening of the navigation of the Indus, spared himself no pains in procuring this channel for the flow of industry and enterprise; and it shall be my study to second his philanthropic purpose, and to complete the scheme which he so successfully commenced. I feel assured that you cannot but take a lively interest in the success of this undertaking, so especially conducive as it must be, to the prosperity of the people over whom you rule.

It is probable that I may, ere long, depute some gentleman to your Court, to discuss with you certain commercial topics, with a view to our mutual advantage.

I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet Sing. My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states; and indeed it does not immediately occur to me how the interference of my Government could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to learn from you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance; and, in the meantime, I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a recon-

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ciliation with the Sikhs; it being not only for your own advantage, but for the advantage of all the countries in the vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord.

Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard,

I am, &c. (Signed) AUCKLAND.

Sir A. Burnes's instructions, in reference to the mercantile portion of his mission, were sufficiently copious and explicit: when this was transmuted into an embassage of a widely different character, he appears to have been left almost wholly to the guidance of his own understanding.(17) If we consider the very imperfect condition of our information at this period, or rather the impenetrability of our ignorance, and the total want of justification for the measures afterwards adopted, that Burnes's reports did actually supply, the conclusion is almost forced on us, that the mission was sent to see and speak of matters on which a quarrel might be founded. When this failed, Captain Wade fell back on the reports supplied by Mr Masson in 1835.(18) Captain Burnes had learnt, on his way to Cabool, how easy would be the adjustment of the Peshawur question on the part of Runjeet Singh.(19) On arriving at Cabool, he found Dost Mahomed anxious to come into all the views of Government.

Persian influence was rapidly on the decline: and though a Persian Elchee was then known to be on his way to Cabool, it seemed doubtful if he would be received; if he had been so, there were no offers which he could have made which would have been placed for a moment in the balance against those of the British Government.(20) Our Envoy, ten days after his arri-

17. In a private letter, dated Cabool, 30th October, Burnes thus writes:—"I hardly know what the Government of India will think of my measures, for my line of conduct is only indicated by them, not marked out. I am in a very critical position, and they tell me so *totidem verbis*." Masson complains incessantly of this matter; he quotes a letter from Burnes, in which the writer says,—"My last accounts from Calcutta are, in plain language, as follows,—that Lord Auckland looks with great anxiety to hear from me in Cabool, after I have seen about me; the meaning of which is clear enough, that they are to act after I have reported. This looks like toasting our toes at Cabool for the winter."

18. Masson's Travels.

19. We have, in the text, given Burnes's own views of this matter. Masson's are almost word for word the same. In commenting on a letter received on that subject from Captain Burnes, he says, "While perfectly aware that the occupation of Peshawur was unprofitable, and the constant source of alarm and inquietude to Runjeet Singh, and satisfied that he would relinquish it if solicited to do so, I had not hoped that he would have voluntarily come forward and expressed a desire to be eased of it."—Masson, vol. ii., p. 447.

20. Burnes's Letter to Sir W. M'Naghten—Cabool, Oct. 4, 1837—Blue Book, 1839. We shall require to refer to these papers almost incessantly for some space to come. They form a continued series from the 25th September to the 1st May. Those quoted as "unpublished papers" are fragments of the original despatches as forwarded to Government. They were suppressed by the Board of Control when ordered by Parliament to be published in 1839. They give a totally altered complexion to the conduct of Dost Mahomed.

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val, was closetted with the Ameer, and found him most frank and circumstantial in his explanations. He had been before, as already explained under a previous head, on treaty of alliance with Persia; he declared that he already bitterly repented ever having had anything to do with that country—the more especially since he had received the Governor-General's notification of Captain Burnes's intended mission. He stated that the Candahar negociations with Mahomed Shah were entirely without his concurrence, and much against his inclination. If the affairs of Peshawur were ever adjusted, he said he would be expected to have no more occasion for aid from any one; but whether the British Government interested itself in this or not, he was resolved to do every thing he could to show his respect for its wishes; if he could not succeed in regaining our friendship, he was equally resolved to have nothing more to do with Persia. It was impossible that anything could have been more satisfactory than this, if we really were in earnest in our desire to treat with him as an independent sovereign. The same tone of friendship was maintained with the most perfect consistency to the end, when our offers of alliance became so absolutely insulting, considering the terms on which they were made, that he had no choice left but to decline them. The following extract from a private letter, dated Cabool, 30th October, gives Captain Burnes's opinions in a more concise and graphic form than do his communications with the Government of India, though the two are in substance identical:—

"Cabool, 30th October, 1837.—Here a hundred things are passing of the highest interest—I arrived here on the 24th of last month, and have had a very cordial reception—Dost Mahomed Khan has fallen into all our views, and in so doing has either thought for himself, or followed my counsel, but for doing the former I give him every credit, and things now stand so, that I think we are on the threshold of a negotiation with King Runjeet, the basis of which will be his withdrawal from Peshawar, and a Barukzye receiving it as a tributary of Lahore, the Chief of Cabool sending his son to ask pardon.—What say you to this after all that has been urged of Dost Mahomed Khan's putting forth extravagant pretensions? Runjeet will accede to the plan I am certain, but *** is a great little man, if you comprehend what I mean, and while he is looking to the horizon (to use his own words) of politics and considering, events crowd on, and spoil his speculations. I have, in behalf of Government, agreed to stand as mediator between the parties, and Dost Mahomed has cut asunder all his connexion with Russia and Persia, and refused to receive the Ambassador from the Shah now at Candahar.—His brothers at that city have however caressed the Persian Elchee all the more for this, and I have sent them such a Junius as I believe will astonish them. I had indeed reason to act promptly, for they have a son setting out for Tehran with presents to the Shah and the Russian Ambassador, and I hope I shall be in time to explain our hostility to such conduct.—Every thing here has indeed run well, and but for our deputation at the time it happened, the house we occupy would have been tenant-

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ed by a Russian Agent and a Persian Elchee. I hardly know what the Government of India will think of my measures, for my line of conduct is only *indicated* by them, not marked out.—Yet I am inspirited by their free use of laudatory adjectives regarding my proceedings hitherto—* * I am in a very critical position, and so they tell me—totidem verbis,—but I like difficulties—they are my brandy."

We have already had occasion to refer to the utter want of instructions from which the mission suffered on first reaching Cabool. So far from this having been remedied, it became aggravated each month of their stay. The pure no meaning of the terms "Persian aggression" and "Russian intrigue" puzzled them far more than the phantoms they apprehended would have done if converted into substantial realities. Mr M'Neil sounded the double alarm, that Persia was about to march on Herat, Candahar, and Ghuznie, and that Mahomed Shah and Dost Mahomed were about to form an alliance—out of which some fearful and indefinite mischief was to spring, whose form was too dreadful to be described, its power too terrific to be resisted. Dost Mahomed was forbidden to make terms for himself with Persia, on pain of our severest displeasure, and the Ameer at once declared that if this would please us, we should have no grounds of dissatisfaction: he had treated with Persia as he had done with other powers, with a view of strengthening his authority, and without any idea of annoying us. But then again, Persia threatened to advance towards Cabool with a view to invasion. This intention, which, whether real or pretended, we have every reason to believe incapable of being carried into effect, was fully believed in as practicable and imminent by the whole Persian mission, (21) by Dost Mahomed, and the members of the mission at Cabool; Captain Burnes having offered himself to serve with the troops of Candahar, and to assist the Sirdar with money in case it should be carried into effect. (22) It was implicitly relied on by Lord Auckland, and is yet held as an unquestionable article of creed by the then chairman of the Board of Control. (23) Yet Lord Auckland de-

21. See letters of Mr Ellice, Mr M'Neil, Major Tod, &c. from 1834 to 1838; they will be found more fully quoted and referred to under the Herat and Russian heads.

22. Burnes's private letters, also despatches.—See Mr Macnaghten's letter, dated Belleiry, 20th Jan., severely blaming Captain Burnes for having made an offer of assistance. Burnes himself says, "I entertain the belief that if we keep our footing in Cabool and Herat falls, the presence of Mr Leech alone will prevent the Shah of Persia from attacking Candahar."—Suppressed Despatch, 22d February, 1838.

23. Sir J. C. Hobhouse's speech, 23d June, 1842. The ex-chairman quotes Mr Ellice as an authority on the imminence of the dangers of invasion from Persia. This is *naivé* enough; he seems to have forgotten that the alleged cause of the war was, the desire of Dost Mahomed to screen himself from this danger, by an alliance with Persia. We would not help him in fighting with

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clared in his minute (12th May, 1838), that he had before stated to the Secret Committee his determination not to oppose the hostile advance of Persia upon Candahar or Cabool, whether by arms or money. (24) He, in short, would not permit Dost Mahomed to enter into a treaty to save himself from Persian invasion, nor suffer him by alliance with her to protect himself. This was the state of matters in the beginning of the year 1838, but a change in our conduct towards the Cabool chief was at hand, to which, after noticing the affairs to the eastward, we shall speedily have occasion to advert. On the 25th December, two months after the arrival of the mission at Cabool, Lieutenant Leech was dispatched to Candahar to ascertain how matters stood in that quarter. The three brothers who ruled in Western Affghanistan, were Kohun Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, and Meer Dil Khan: the first described by Captain Burnes as an honest good man and staunch Soonee; the second, as having some energy; and the third, as possessed of more talent than either of the other two. (25) These chiefs were at this time in treaty with Persia, with a view to their assisting in the attack on Herat. It does not appear whether or not any hint of the intentions of Russia as to the bestowment of the princedom on the eldest of the brother Sirdars, had transpired. The treaty was submitted to them and agreed to in January: (26) how long before this they were informed of the intentions of Persia and Russia in their favour we have not discovered. If, in the knowledge of this, they were still disposed to break off all arrangements with Persia and Russia in our favour, we surely could have desired no stronger evidence of their anxiety for our alliance:—nor could we assuredly blame them for endeavouring to complete an arrangement so favourable to themselves, if their exertions for this had only begun after they saw that there was no longer reason to hope for our friendship, much less for our assistance. Herat, and the territory dependent upon it, would have more than doubled in extent, and tripled in value, and infinitely increased in political weight their territorial possessions. (27) However these things may be, we find from the instruc-

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her, and deposed him because he would not comply with our wishes in endeavouring to make friends with her!

24. We only became aware of the existence of this very important document by a reference to it in a paper of subsequent date. It bore upon the pacific view of the question apparently, and was therefore suppressed.

26. Lieut. Leech's despatch, 12th March, encloses Count Simonich's guarantee.

25. Burnes's Instructions to Lieutenant Leech. This very important despatch was omitted by Sir J. Hobhouse on the publication of the Parliamentary Papers. It was found amongst the posthumous papers of Sir A. Burnes:—we quote from a copy published in the *Caledonian Mercury* of 22d October 1842.

27. *Quarterly Review*, June 1839. The article referred to is a review of the mutilated Parliamentary Papers. It is believed to have been written by Sir

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tions of Captain Burnes to Lieutenant Leech, as well as from his other letters, that by the beginning of December "they had listened to advice—declined sending one of their sons to Persia as previously agreed to—dismissed the Persian Elchee, and began to look with serious anxiety for counsel and assistance towards the British Government, and their brother Dost Mahomed." The King of Persia, in referring to this, sent back information that their assistance against Herat was no longer desired. (28) Serious and not unnatural apprehensions were however entertained by them, that, in case of the Shah succeeding at Herat, their proceedings on this head might so incense him as to furnish him with an excuse for resuming his often threatened measures for an eastward march, with a view to the subjection of the countries to which he never failed to prefer claims so often as opportunity occurred: claims which, when put forward, invariably filled our statesmen with alarm. In reply to a representation from the Sirdars, apparently to this effect, received on the 22d December, (29) Captain Burnes stated that, in the event of Persia attempting to subdue their chiefship, he would proceed in person along with the Ameer of Cabool to assist them; that he would do every thing in his power to aid them—even to the extent of paying their troops. The sum proposed to be advanced for this latter purpose was three lakhs of rupees—*i. e.* £30,000. The chiefs declined the pecuniary portion of the offer, writing, in return, that the original intent of their negociations had been to keep off Persia,—to ruin Kamran, and make themselves masters of Herat. This was understood to mean that their apprehensions at this time were more from the aggressions of the latter than the former power. (30) It is difficult to reconcile this with the previous representations of the brother Sirdars. This proposition appeared calculated to meet all the exigencies of the case, assuming that our designs were honest,—that we wished to maintain the Barukzye chiefs in the position in which we found them; (31)

John McNeil, and at any rate is embued with the darkest tints of Russophobia. The writer had only the minor half of Burnes's papers to resort to. He deals in the broadest assertions beyond the records he pretended to review. The article is full of talent, and has had more influence in favour of Lord Auckland's policy than all the other writings which have been published on the subject. Some admirable remarks will be found in the *Spectator* newspaper of July 25, 1839, relating to this subject.

28. Instructions to Lieutenant Leech, *ut supra.—Caledonian Mercury.*

29. Neither the letter nor the reply appears amongst the printed papers, though both must be in the hands of Government. We know of the existence of the former, and quote the substance of the latter from Burnes's instructions to Lieutenant Leech. The sum offered was stated by Masson, in a MSS. note to the present writer, at three lakhs—£30,000.

30. Letter of Captain Burnes to Dost Mahomed Khan, April 23, 1838. We confess we are unable to reconcile some of these very prominent contradictions in the Parliamentary Papers.

31. Mr Secretary Macnaghten, in his letter 20th January, just about to be examined in the text, stated, that "it was our object also to mark our wish for

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but so far from this being the view of the matter taken by Lord Auckland, Burnes's conduct was severely censured, and only not repudiated to prevent exposure of the fact that he and his Government were at variance. A different view of it was taken by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, and when the Governor-General intimated that her Majesty had been pleased to confer the honours of Lieutenant-Colonel and Knighthood upon him, (December 1839) his Lordship was obliged to confess that this very policy which had incurred his severest displeasure, had been judged by the authorities at home as the wisest that could have been adopted. We learn little more than the above from the published papers of the intent of Lieutenant Leech's mission, or the motive of his residence at Candahar; and here, without regard to order of time, we may bring the narrative of the negociations in this quarter to an end. The treaty with the King of Persia, by which Herat was to be made over to Kohun Dil Khan, some time before concluded, had been guaranteed by the Russian ambassador in March, and probably at this time only waited the sanction of the Cabinet of St Petersburgh. This was not only not accorded to it, but Count Simonich was recalled immediately on its being known that he had so far exceeded his instructions as to give the authority of Russia as a voucher for its fulfilment. Of all these things it is to be presumed our minister at Cabool was fully aware, as we find by the printed papers, that Mr M'Neil, then in the camp before Herat, had been made acquainted with them by Mr Leech before the 11th of April. Under these circumstances, and with no further light before us on the subject than that which the Blue Book supplies, we are unable to explain how in the account given of the arrival on the first week of April of Kohun Dil Khan at Cabool in quest of pecuniary or military aid against Persia, they happen not to be referred to. There was at this time no doubt entertained in Western Affghanistan that the fall of Herat was at hand;(32) and apparently in anticipation of the speedy occurrence of this event, the Sirdar waited on Captain Burnes, with a view of obtaining a direct promise of protection from Persia, should she, in the event of succeeding in her present expedition, advance with hostile purpose to the westward. It is difficult to suppose, after what we know to have occurred, that the apprehension pretended could really have been experienced, or if it had been so, that the supplies ap-

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the maintenance in their actual position of all the chiefs of Affghanistan, being the most just course of proceeding in itself, and as the existing division of power amongst them was felt to be on the whole decidedly most beneficial to British interests." By the middle of May Lord Auckland had come to conclusions exactly the opposite of these!

32. Burnes's Despatch, 25th April—Blue Book. It is curious that Mr M'Neil, writing at this same date from the camp before Herat, apprises Lord Palmerston that there is no apprehension of its fall.

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plied for could have been expected to be received. Yet the enormous amount of treasure which we had lavished in Persia caused it to be believed throughout the whole of Central Asia, that whenever we interposed our authority, or proffered friendly offices, money would be scattered in almost boundless profusion. The expenses of the embassy at the Court of Teheran, including subsidy, amounted to about £128,000 annually betwixt 1809 and 1827, and betwixt this latter date and 1837 to about £30,000 a-year, or in all to about two and a half millions(33)—a sum justly deemed enormous by us, till taught by the Dooranee alliance that a similar one might annually be required to maintain a so-called wise and popular Suddozye sovereign on the throne of Cabool. The able writer in the *Quarterly Review* states, that "the hope of playing off England against Russia and Persia, and these powers against England, and the prospect of advantage to themselves, which they believed to be opened to them by a competition between states so powerful and wealthy, for their attachment—divested their communications of all sincerity, and enough transpired to destroy every feeling of confidence in their good faith. A comparison of dates will shew that they were at the same time holding out to England on the one side, and to Persia and Russia on the other, professions of the most cordial attachment and exclusive alliance." Of the last mentioned fact there is no sort of doubt—the first two assertions are pure assumptions. Russia and Persia in agreeing to the cession of Herat, should it fall before the armies of Mahmoud Shah, had guaranteed all that was desired of them already, and more perhaps than ever had been hoped for before. There was therefore no reason why England should be played off against them. From us, again, the aid they asked was purely conditional on two contingencies, neither of which ever arrived—the fall of Herat, and the hostile advance of Persia, with a view to the conquest of the Affghan states to the eastward. We can only suppose this danger to have been apprehended as the result of the alliance the Sirdars had entered on with us, and the indignation the King of Persia might have been expected to have felt at the slight put upon him and his offers of alliance, so soon as Captain Burnes promised them the friendship of England; or the alternative vengeance of Kamran Shah, should the siege prove unsuccessful. Captain Burnes had formerly been severely snubbed for offering aid of any sort: he of course — now on the eve of his departure from Cabool—had no choice left but to refuse it. He probably began to suspect, what proved to be the case, that the Government of India desired any thing rather than the conciliation of the

33. Pamphlet of Sir Hartford Jones Brydges, late ambassador at the Court of Persia; Lon., Oct. 1838. Lord Auckland considered the fall of Herat, and the consequent advance of Persia eastward, as the most probable event so late as the 12th May. (See Simla Minute of that date.)

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Affghan chiefs. Had it been otherways, we could readily have afforded to promise them all that they desired from us, conditional as this was on two things never realized. If Herat had fallen, and Persia advanced, we should, if we had left her progress unopposed, have permitted her to take up a position, through sheer lust of conquest, which would have enabled her to assume a threatening attitude towards us, the idea of which Lord Auckland pretended to deplore.(34) The arrival and requisition of Kohun Dil Khan—an event of sufficient importance to warrant the present amount of remark, was, in all likelihood meant for no other end than to ascertain, by a specific proposition, what at any rate were *not* the intentions of the Government of India; that some sort of conclusion might from this be drawn, as to what they probably were. On this last point Capt. Burnes was unable to form anything like a conjecture; he was as much at a loss as the Ameer or Sirdar, what was meant to be the result of his mission, and long after his departure, when, as it appears from the minute of the 12th of May, Lord Auckland's mind was made up for something very warlike, he writes to Mr Macnaghten, under date 29th June, indicating how much he was at a loss to conjecture the ultimate intentions of Government,—not more so than they themselves appear at the time to have been.(35) Accounts being for the present closed at Candahar, the condition of the state of affairs at Cabool falls to be resumed, back as far as the arrival of Lieut. Vicovich on the 20th December. Subsequent events have brought many things to light in reference to the character and position of this adventurer, of which Mr M'Neil and Capt. Burnes were at the time necessarily ignorant; yet it does seem most unaccountable, that, taking into consideration the only objects which could by possibility be contemplated by Russia, supposing her likely to pursue the same principles of action which had in all other quarters throughout guided her policy during the past and present reign, and the questionable shape in which Vicovich at first and throughout appeared,—such consequence should have been attached to his approach, and such ill-supported inferences drawn from his detention. This man is reported by Captain Burnes as a Cossack Lieutenant; by Sir J. C. Hobhouse as a renegade Pole. His credentials appear to have consisted of a letter, professedly written by the Emperor himself, not by any secretary or minister—a circumstance sufficient to have excited suspicion. (36) He was

34. Lord Auckland's Minute, dated 12th May 1838.—We have copied his Lordship's observations almost verbatim. It was curious, that when so much alarm was experienced lest Persia should advance, we refused to permit any steps to be taken for driving or keeping her back.

35. See letter quoted in part, unfairly as usual, by Sir J. C. Hobhouse in his speech of 23d June. It is given entire in the *Bombay Times* of the 24th, and *Summary* of the 27th, August.

36. Masson's Journeys, &c. In quoting Mr Masson on this subject, we are bound to state, that whatever he writes in reference to Captain Burnes, bears an appearance in the last degree suspicious.

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said to have been provided with money, which he promised liberally; but there is not the slightest reason to believe that ever it made its appearance. He bore with him a genuine letter, of a general and perfectly inoffensive character, from Count Simonich, which appears amongst the Parliamentary Papers, expressive of respect and promising presents; but the presents themselves, like the pecuniary assistance, appear never to have reached their destination. (37) He spread reports in all directions "that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Astrabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Shah's army against Herat." (38) This we now know to have been a falsehood so monstrous, that the man who could have had recourse to it was wholly untrustworthy. So much opposed to this was the fact, that every Russian soldier in the service of Persia was ordered, in the course of the siege, to return to his own country to prevent the possibility of suspicion. He was admitted by Count Nesselrode to have been sent by the Russian ambassador at Teheran as a commercial agent, and it is now demonstrated that even in this capacity his rank must have been of the humblest. Mr M'Naghten alludes to him as appearing in this character, and Captain Burnes himself, in one despatch, declares his disbelief that he could by possibility be acting on the instructions of the imperial court. He was ordered back by General Duhamel, and when he disappeared near Candahar, where he is supposed to have been murdered, (39) no notice of the event was taken by his Government. The mission of Lieutenant Vicovich, as already stated, was explained by the Russian minister to have been in return to a messenger from Dost Mahomed. The arrival of this man with his letter, says Charles Masson, "astonished the Ameer, particularly as he was unconscious of having written a letter to Russia. He did not at the time remember Hussein Ali [the messenger sent to St Petersburgh, who was said to have fallen sick and been delayed at Moscow] and he required to be told that he was the son of Baji Nurwari. He then observed, I gave him no letters, and Mirza Samee Khan [the minister] explained that he had written one, and claimed for himself much credit for having procured the Ameer the honour of a reply from the Emperor. (40) Whether the Ameer believed his Mirza or not I cannot tell. It was known that Hussein Ali had accompanied Vicovich from Bokhara to Orenburg. His non-appearance with the Cossack officer was considered badly accounted for by the pretence stated that he was sick at

37. Masson, in a MS. note in the *Quarterly*, states that they never were received.

38. Mr M'Neil to Lord Palmerston.—Parliamentary Papers. The circulation of the report is deponed to by Masson, MS. note.

39. Masson's Travels. Sir J. C. Hobhouse's speech.

40. Masson's Travels, vol. iii. p. 464.

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Moscow, and the general opinion was that Vicovich had murdered him; and this I state not wishing to belie Vicovich, but to shew the little respect in which his mission was held." "The reception of Vicovich was not such as he had reason to boast of, and in the house of Mirza Samee Khan he resided, in fact, under surveillance."

This agent remained some seven or eight months at Cabool. We cannot discover in any paper, public or private, a single overt act of intrigue laid to his charge. With all the means and appliances possessed by the various missions at Cabool, Candahar, Herat, and Teheran, which seem to have been resorted to so unsparingly, and with such success, that scarcely any communication of note escaped them, not one letter, either to or from Vicovich, from any party whatever, has ever been produced or referred to. His vocation seems to have been limited to "a system of enormous lying"—to the exhibition of his Cossack uniform, and certain mysterious closetings with the Chiefs, with a view, probably, on their part, to discover whether the man, to whose appearance we attached such mighty consequence, had really been intrusted with any commission at all from his Government, or had any function whatever, above those already described, assigned to him, with the wish on his side of appearing a greater man than till now he had dreamt of becoming. Political quacks of this sort have been found to emanate from other countries than Russia without being similarly successful in attracting attention. Yet, if Count Nesselrode, with half his Cabinet, had been at Cabool, with a Russian army half-way on its march to Delhi, greater consequence could hardly have been attached to them than that with which we find this miserable adventurer treated in the official papers of Lord Auckland and Lord Palmerston, and in half the other despatches! About the 20th of January, Captain Burnes received letters of dates 25th November and 2d Dec., from Mr M'Naghten, giving him, for the first time, apparently some definite instructions on one or two points as to how he was to proceed and what to require, for up to this period he seems on both questions to have been left to follow his own discretion. From this it appeared, that though Runjeet Singh was asserted to be unlikely to consent to the restoration of Peshawur to Dost Mahomed, he might probably be induced to make it over to its former ruler,—Sooltan Mahomed Khan, the Ameer's brother. It is singular, that up to the time of the publication of the Simla Proclamation, the Governor-General had never taken the very simple and obvious step of directly ascertaining from the Maharajah himself whether or not he would cede Peshawur without objection. Captain Burnes and Mr Masson, the only two authorities referred to on these matters, had both assured Government, as has already been stated, that the Seikhs would at this time have been most thankful to have got rid of it: and wanted but the pretext of our interposition with them to save their honour, to make it

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over to any one we were disposed to have named. (41) It appears to have occasioned much mortification in the Simla cabinet, that the Affghan chiefs, one and all, had come so readily into our views, as to leave scarcely a single point on which to disagree with them. It looks as if serious apprehensions had been entertained that Runjeet Singh, if applied to, might have manifested so much of the same complying spirit, as to have left no room for a quarrel, the only thing which from the commencement appeared to have been determined on; and relieved us even from the impertinence of intruding the offer of our friendly offices on those who desired them not, and stood in no need of them. Sooltan Mahomed Khan, it will be recollected, was stripped of all authority when Dost Mahomed obtained power at Cabool, but had the half of Peshawur assigned to him in compensation for his loss. He had from this time forward been constantly engaged in plots against his brother: it was in the course of one of these while intriguing with the Seikhs, that Hurry Singh seized on his territories, as well as those of the Ameer on the Attock in 1834. At this very time the Ameer had just been made acquainted with an intrigue against him that had originated at Peshawur; Sooltan Mahomed Khan having sent an agent to the Shah Soojah at Loodianah with a view of obtaining his restoration. The position in which matters at this time stood will be most readily understood by the republication of one of the mutilated despatches of Captain Burnes, extracts from which are to be found in the Blue Book. The portions marked with single inverted commas were suppressed by the Board of Control on its original appearance, and have been extracted from his posthumous papers:—

Capt. A. Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 22.)

Sir, Cabool, 26th January, 1838.

'I have now the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the '25th Nov. and 2nd of December last, which reached me about the same time,

41. "Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance on Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstandings with the Seikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his highness."—Simla Proclamation. It was surely a pity that they should not at any rate have been submitted, when Lord Auckland had such strong assurances that had they been so, they would have been favourably considered. The passage about assistance from Persia contrasts curiously with the paragraph in the Simla minute of 12th May already referred to, where such serious apprehensions are expected by his Lordship, that Persia might, in sheer lust of conquest, occupy Affghanistan altogether. Was it Persian alliance or Persian invasion that was apprehended? They seem to have been put forward alternately just as suited. Sir J. C. Hobhouse feared the latter when he last expressed himself on the subject.

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'and conveyed the views of the Right Hon. the Governor General' regarding the overtures made by Dost Mahomed Khan, for adjusting his differences with the Sikhs, and the apprehension that the Maharajah would not be disposed to surrender Peshawur on those terms, but be more likely to restore it to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, its former governor. I lost no time in making known these circumstances, 'as well as the sentiments of his Lordship on them,' and the policy which it would be advisable for the Ruler of Cabool to pursue.

2. After listening with considerable attention to what I impressed upon him, the Ameer proceeded to make his own comments on what was recommended. He said that he felt satisfied that the British Government was actuated by the most pure and upright motives in making known its sympathy with the sufferings of the Affghan nation, and that, in seeking to apply some remedy to them, it only followed the generous course for which it was celebrated throughout Asia; that there were, however, obstacles and objections to what had been recommended, 'which the Government of India might not know' which it behoved him to unfold, 'for its deliberation,' before any adjustment of differences on such terms was carried into effect.

3. "In offering to render tribute, horses, and apology, to Runjeet Sing, and to hold Peshawur under him," continued he, "I was actuated by no motive of hostility to Sooltan Mahomed Khan: he is my brother, and though we have differed, the rancour is on his side, and not on mine. I stated that I would secure to him and his brothers the jagheers they enjoy; and this, with what would have to be paid, would not have rendered it a very profitable appendage to my power; for these were precautionary measures to secure myself in Cabool, and prevent injury befalling me. Of Runjeet Sing's power to invade me in Cabool, I have little fear; of his power to injure me, if he reinstates Sooltan Mahomed Khan in the government of that city, I have great apprehension, for in it I see a Mahomedan ruler instead of a Sikh; and had the Maharajah been more conversant with the politics of Affghanistan, and bent on my destruction, he might ere this have succeeded, had he not displaced Sooltan Mahomed Khan from Peshawur, and supplied him with funds to corrupt those about me, who are inimical, and envy the rise to my present elevation.

4. "At the present time, many of the chiefs who belonged to Peshawur and their retainers, are subsisted by me. They fled from their country on its invasion by the enemies of our religion, and on my brother becoming a servant to them. It cannot be supposed that with my limited revenues I can either give to these persons what they are entitled to, or what they received in their own country; but at this moment I expend about 90,000 Rupees annually in giving them bread. When Peshawur is restored, these individuals will of course leave me, and along with them will proceed every one who may take offence at his merits not being appreciated as he considers they deserve; and thus, instead of being freed from enemies, I shall be lowered among my countrymen far below my present situation; and, far from being free from danger, as at present, have that situation most certainly endangered. I think,

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therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement for governing Peshawur, a rectification of the errors of the Ruler of Lahore; and that his designs are sinister, and his object to draw the British Government unawares into them.

5. "In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Affghans by the British Government, I see clearly, that it would not permit itself to be made a party to my destruction. If you are not disposed to strengthen my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, it cannot be your intention, with offers of sympathy, to bring about my ruin. On that point I am at ease; but in separating us all one from another; in seeking to keep the chiefs from being dependent on one another; you are certainly neutralizing the power of the Affghan nation, and sowing the seeds of future dissension. Your object is to prevent harm; you will prevent good. You will secure to yourselves the gratitude of Peshawur, of the Eusufzyes, the Khutucks, and the tribes near the Indus; but as for myself, you open a new door of intrigue against me; and as you see injury likely to accrue from the Chief of Candahar entering on an alliance with Persia, I see injury to myself in Sooltan Mahomed Khan, when restored to his chiefship of Peshawur, being in alliance with Lahore: and, above all, what security am I to have that the chiefs of Peshawur and Candahar will not join to injure me, and be aided in their designs by Maharajah Runjeet Sing?"

6. To these arguments I opposed the views of the British Government, and said that it would ill tally with its wishes to find new causes of quarrel arise consequent on an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Affghans; that as the Ameer had renounced his connexion with Persia, we had in return hoped to do him a good office by entering into a negociation with Runjeet Sing on the differences existing between them, but that if he was thoroughly sincere in his belief that the restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan Mahomed Khan was positively injurious to him, it was proper to state most decidedly that we had no such design, 'and would be a party to no measures 'of such a tendency. I then pointed out the various advantages which must 'arise from the Sikhs withdrawing themselves to the other side of the In-'dus, and I dwelt upon the increase of reputation which must follow to him-'self on his having contributed, by his determined opposition, to the release 'of his brothers, their wives and their children, from the hands of the Sikhs, 'to have once more in the possession of the family the burying place of its 'ancestors, and to hear again in a country inhabited by Mahomedans the 'Summons to prayer (eezan,) and secure the permission to follow the usages 'of Islam, and their Mosques from defilement and spoliation.'

'7. Giving every weight to what had been urged, I proceeded to lay be-'fore him (the Ameer), the positive advantages derivable from an altered 'state of things in Peshawur.—'The number of troops entertained by you 'will become unnecessary, your increased exactions from the merchant and 'the cultivator will cease, because war with the Sikhs will no longer engage

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'your attention, decrease of expence will be tantamount to increase of re-
'venue, your resources will be improved, your power concentrated and
'strengthened, and as to the charge brought forward of our raising up many
'Chiefs in Affghanistan, he was to recollect that those Chiefs were his bro-
'thers, that Candahar, Cabool, and Peshawur, would thus be in possession
'of one family, the sons of one father, who had a common interest against
'the enemies of their house, and whose family differences whatever they
'were, might be made to disappear when they ceased to be threatened by a
'powerful Ruler like Maharajah Runjeet Sing; that as to the neutralization
'of the Affghan nation which he complained of, it was certainly no part of
'the policy of the British Government to injure any of the present holders
'of power in this country more than himself, and that we looked to the ge-
'neral good of all parties; that the Ameer no doubt understood better
'than we did what injured, and what availed him; but it appeared to me
'that he had too exaggerated a view of Runjeet Sing's designs, and that it
'would certainly be taken into the Governor General's consideration, if this
'subject proceeded further, how far he should receive security against the
'plans of Lahore to be compassed by means of his brothers in Peshawur,
'and also the nature of the counteraction which would be used to prevent
'his brothers at Peshawur and Candahar combining to do him injury.'

8. To this Dost Mahomed Khan replied, that there were no doubt many advantages in prospect, and that the arguments adduced had both foundation and solidity, but that the advantages were chiefly on the side of others; that he had hitherto been able to stand on the defensive against Runjeet Sing, and to do it with some effect; that that Ruler's withdrawal was more injurious to him on the terms proposed, than his continuance at Peshawur; that he himself now received a degree of respect which he could then no longer command, and that it was better to leave things as they were, in the hopes of some future charge, than to shackle himself by being a party to an arrangement, which did him little good, and seemed fraught with danger; and in return for which, things might be expected of him which he could not perform. Peshawur, said he, has been conquered by the Sikhs; it belongs to them; they may give it to whomsoever they please; if to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, they place it in the hands of one who is bent on injuring me, and I cannot therefore acknowledge any degree of gratitude for your interference, or take upon myself to render services in return. 'I admit that it will be highly beneficial in many ways to
'see the Sikhs once more Eastward of the Indus, but I still can dispense with
'none of my troops, or relax in my precautionary measures, as equal if not
'greater anxieties will attach to me.—I have unbosomed myself to you, and
'laid bare, without any suppression, my difficulties. I shall bear in lively
'remembrance the intended good offices of the British Government, and I
'shall deplore that my interest did not permit me to accept that which was
'rendered in a spirit so friendly, but which to me and my advisers has only
'seemed hastening my ruin. To Runjeet Sing your interference is beneficial,
'as he finds himself involved in serious difficulties by the possession of Pesha-

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'wur, and he is too glad of your good offices to escape from a place which is a 'burthen to his finances, but by that escape a debt of gratitude is exactible 'from him, and not from me: and if your Government will look into this mat- 'ter, they will soon discover my opinions to be far from groundless, and my 'conclusions the only safe policy I can pursue.'

9. The Nawab Jubbar Khan followed his brother, and said, it was undoubtedly true that the Ameer had not mistaken the evils which might ensue to himself from the entire restoration of Peshawur to Sooltan Mahomed Khan, but that the Affghan nation could not afford to lose the sympathy which had been exhibited by the British Government; and an arrangement might be made on the basis of a treaty which Runjeet Sing had once entered into with the Ameer and his deceased brother Yar Mahomed Khan, which was to divide Peshawur between them and receive equally at their hands a fixed tribute. Such an arrangement might now be made, and the Ameer would be free from fear of injury, and Runjeet Sing receive from him and Sooltan Mahomed Khan conjointly, the amount on which he was disposed to surrender it. The Ameer added, that such an arrangement would remove his fears: and he should wish no other person placed there but the Nawab himself, and one or two of his own agents under him. 'These observations coming from the Nawab 'Jubbar Khan are the more remarkable, since he is devoted to his brother 'Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and would rejoice to see him restored to Peshawur '—They consequently carried with me a conviction that the Ameer's fears are 'not groundless, and that they will deserve all due consideration before Go- 'vernment enters upon any measures for attaching this Chief to its in- 'terests.'

10. To the proposition of the Nawab, and the observations of the Ameer which followed upon it, I made no further remark than that the plan would also be taken into consideration; but before proceeding further, it was incumbent on me to ask one categorical question: 'I had stated that the 'British Government considered itself conferring an everlasting favor on the 'Affghan nation by prevailing on the Sikhs to withdraw from this side of the 'Indus; that I who had seen this country, considered this act as one of the 'greatest blessings which could happen to this people. I had however heard 'from the Ameer, that he did not appreciate this service as we did,' and 'was I' then 'to consider that he would rather have the Sikhs in Peshawur. 'with all their exercise of prejudice and all the disgrace that it entailed', in preference to Sooltan Mahomed Khan's being restored to his government in that city?

11. The Ameer replied, that this was certainly placing the matter in an extreme light, and that he found a difficulty in answering the question; 'He 'admitted fully the advantages of getting rid of the Sikhs, and was far from 'depreciating the good offices of removing them if it could be done, but' he would candidly ask in return, if the mode of accomplishing an act generally beneficial were proved to be detrimental to himself, who had the most sub-

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stantial share of power in the Affghan dominions at this time, it could be said to be applying a remedy to the difficulties under which the Affghans laboured; and it in return for it, the British Government could reckon on those acts which all powers naturally look to in return for benefits conferred. 'I ask you not to aid me in achieving a supremacy throughout this country; but I do ask to be allowed to stand in the position in which you have found me: if I am to be protected from intrigues in Peshawur, I will then consider myself benefitted, but without such a plan as that which the Nawab has stated, or some such other, that places a Barukzye there, which the Governor-General must devise, I foresee evils which cannot have entered into the minds of those who are my well-wishers.

"12. 'As an instance in point, at this moment I have been made acquainted with an intrigue that has originated in Peshawur, and as I believe with 'Runjeet Sing, which will convey to your Government juster notions than any 'expressions of general apprehension. Sooltan Mahomed Khan has just sent 'an agent to the ex King at Loodianah to offer his services to combine against 'me, and to secure my brothers at Candahar in support of this coalition; what 'security am I to receive against a recurrence of such practices? As for the 'ex-King himself I fear him not, he has been too often worsted to make head 'here unless he has aid from the British Government, which I am now pretty 'certain he will never receive. If my brother at Peshawur however, under a 'promise of being made his minister, and assisted with Sikh Agents and money, appears in the field, I may find that in expressing my satisfaction at his 'restoration to Peshawur I have been placing a snake in my bosom—and I may 'then, when too late, lament that I did not let the Sikhs do their worst instead 'of replacing them by another description of enemies.'

13. I have thus placed before the Right Honorable the Governor-General the opinions and views entertained by the Ruler of Cabool, and the nature of the arguments which I have opposed to them. 'It has appeared to me that 'they call for much deliberation. It will be seen that the Chief is not bent on 'possessing Peshawur, or on gratifying an enmity towards his brothers, but 'simply pursuing the worldly maxim of securing himself from injury; the arguments which he has adduced seem deserving of every consideration, and the 'more so, when an avowed partizan of Sooltan Mahomed Khan does not deny 'the justice of the Ameer's objections. It will be for His Lordship to judge 'how far the British Government will agree to an interference through its 'Agent that will prevent the Chief of Peshawur from caballing against his 'brother in Cabool, and if this could not be brought about by the plan suggested of placing the Nawab Jubbar Khan there on the part of the Ameer, and on 'the terms proposed. It would give Runjeet Sing tribute from both the Ameer 'and Sooltan Mahomed Khan, and thus gratify him, while the known good feeling of the Nawab towards the British Government would give confidence to 'Runjeet Sing in the arrangement, and secure to the British a great reputation 'in these countries. In the event of this arrangement being also rejected, it

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'does certainly appear to me that we are bound in some way to protect the 'Ameer from the cabals of Peshawur and Candahar, without which this coun- 'try will become a scene of strife, injurious alike to our commerce and our po- 'licy. Those Chiefs will acknowledge the Ruler of Cabool as the head of the 'family, and respect him accordingly, but they do not admit being dependent 'on him, nor is it desirable to make them so. If we stand aloof and do not en- 'courage Runjeet Sing to recede, the Ameer of Cabool will hold his present 'ground, since he is the most powerful of his family.—If we interfere, we en- 'danger his supremacy such as it is, and consequently it seems incumbent on us 'to prevent such interference being detrimental.'

'14. Under such circumstances it might be urged that all interference had 'better be avoided, but this, as it appears to me, would be, under the existing 'state of affairs, a very doubtful line of policy, unless it is intended to put 'forth the ex-King at Loodiana, secure through him a footing in these coun- 'tries, and sweep the present rulers from their authority, which has happily 'never been contemplated. Besides the very questionable nature of such a 'proceeding, it would not gain the objects of Government, for we should 'then be unable to balance one Chief-ship against another, and though we 'might be sure of him whom we advance to the throne of his fathers, we may 'experience in his successor all the evils of a powerful Mahomedan neigh- 'bour. With the Barukzye family in the three Eastern divisions of Affgha- 'nistan, we have to deal as it were with but one house, and we have the cer- 'tainty of their good will and services for these good offices, which will keep 'them stable, as they are, and prevent them injuring each other.—In time, 'when one Chief found he could not destroy another, the family differences 'will be allayed, and we shall thus force into one mass materials which are 'less incoherent than they appear, and have all that is wished on this impor- 'tant frontier of our Indian Empire.'

'15. I have not hesitated, while reporting on a question of this 'magnitude, to give expression to sentiments which have been adopted 'after much reflection on the scene of these distractions. Since arriv- 'ing here I have seen an Agent of Persia with alluring promises, 'after penetrating as far as Candahar, compelled to quit the country, 'because no one was sent to invite him to Cabool. Following him, an Agent 'of Russia with letters highly complimentary, and promises more than sub- 'stantial, has experienced no more civility than is due by the laws of hospita- 'lity and nations.—It may be urged by some, that the offers of one or both 'were fallacious, but such a dictum is certainly premature ; the Ameer of 'Cabool has sought no aid in his arguments from such offers, but declared 'that his interests are bound up in an alliance with the British Government, 'which he never will desert as long as there is a hope of securing one. It is 'evident therefore that in this chief we have one who is ready to meet us, and 'from what is passing in Central Asia at this moment it is any thing but 'desirable to exhibit indifference to the solicitations of one whose posi-

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'tion makes him courted, and whom aid may render powerful for or against us.'

'16. As this letter contains matter which may materially affect an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Affghans, I have sent a copy 'of it specially to Captain Wade.—I am not in possession of his letter to you 'handing up the first overtures of the Ameer of Cabool, and I cannot in consequence give my sentiments thereon, which will be received as an apology 'for my not having touched upon them in this letter.—Captain Wade and 'myself have, I am sure, but one object, which is to gain the ends of Government by using our most strenuous endeavours respectively at Lahore and 'Cabool, but I must respectfully entreat that Dost Mahomed Khan's views be 'subjected to strict scrutiny before they are pronounced to be a mere "gratification of his personal resentments."—Did I think so, I would not transmit this letter, but this Chief is perfectly aware of the policy we have marked out for ourselves in this country, and his conduct has been already in some 'degree put to the test by Persia and Russia.—With regard to the latter, the 'importance of it has now become manifest by the arrival of an express from 'the Bombay Government, conveying to me the despatches of our Ambassador 'in Persia, which prove all previous conjectures to be well founded, and that 'Mr. Vickovitch is, what he has given himself out, an Agent from the Emperor of Russia.—The necessity for a good understanding with this Chief has 'thus become more than apparent, as the dangers from such an alliance are no 'longer imaginary, but fairly developed.'

'17. I have just received a letter as I finish this, from the Ameer to the 'Governor General, which I enclose with its translation.'

I have, &c.

ALEXANDER BURNES.

Nothing, certainly, could be more conclusive or convincing than the reasoning of the Ameer: the accuracy of his facts we never disputed. But this was a mild specimen of the requirements of the Government of India. A letter from Mr Macnaghten, dated 20th January, was received by Capt. Burnes on the 22d of Feb., containing another from Lord Auckland himself. The latter of these was smooth in expression, but imperious in demand; the former was in the last degree insolent in both—such only as we were entitled to prefer to a ruler, who, having placed himself absolutely in our hands, was still urging the most unreasonable and absurd requests. The immediate object of this was to intimate Lord Auckland's extreme disapprobation of the assistance proposed to have been given by Burnes to Candahar, in the event of an attack from the westward. The principles laid down on which Dost Mahomed was for the future to be treated with were,—first, the Dost being now essentially dependent upon our good

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offices for the removal of his apprehensions from Seikh power, (42) his compliance in having thrown himself on our friendship, and cast aside the alliance of other states, was to be taken advantage of; and now that he had left himself without an ally save ourselves, we were to abuse, insult, and plunder him as the reward of his esteem and regard for us! Burnes was once more (43) instructed to tell him "that, in the precarious position in which he was placed, our good offices for the peace and security of his *remaining territory* should be thankfully accepted by him." This was the language the British envoy was to employ towards the most vigorous minded and enlightened ruler in Central Asia:—a ruler who, from the time our intercourse began with him, had, according to our own account of the matter, treated all the Europeans who ever visited him with the utmost kindness and consideration: who having lost one of the most valuable portions of his territory while engaged in defending himself against a wretched and unpopular imbecile, to whom we gave harbourage and assistance, had for four years striven without intermission to regain it—who had in the majority of cases been successful, and in no case, even when compelled to retire, quitting the field under such circumstances of disaster, as that he did not, within three months of any given retreat, return undismayed into the field, —and who, when we officiously interposed our uncalled for "good offices," had given the enemy so severe a handling, that had we kept away they were ready of themselves to have come in to his terms! (44) That Dost Mahomed could have endured a proposition so insulting, evinces an anxiety to avoid offence almost without a parallel in the annals of royal forbearance. Well might his brother reply—"that government must be ignorant of the true state of affairs in the country; that so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet Singh being of the nature stated, the Maharajah had never sought to attack Cabool, and that hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer, and not the ruler of Lahore" —"of his attacks they were under little apprehension."(45) But we must

42. Letter of Mr Macnaghten, 9th paragraph. This paper does not appear in the Blue Book. There certainly was good reason why it should have been suppressed as a manifestation of the commencement of the most unjust and rigorous system of policy on record. The comparatively mild letter of Lord Auckland to the Ameer of the same date and superscription, is given at length in the Blue Book, so as to throw the odium of the impending misunderstandings on Dost Mahomed! The bullying and overbearing note of the Secretary told too much.

43. The same instructions appear to have been given in a letter of 27th December, not published.

44. See extract from Burnes's Cabool, under head Peshawur, note 7; also extract from Captain Wade's letter to Mr Masson, under the present head.

45. This it will be observed, is one of Burnes's longest despatches:—there are just 22 lines of it given in the Blue Book, and these are garbled; 250 lines are suppressed without intimation!

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give the suppressed despatch entire, illustrating as it does the clear and vigorous intellect of the good Nawab, and how ill able the sophisms of the Indian Government—which Captain Burnes was directed to employ, to bolster up a dishonest course—could stand against the arguments of the untutored Affghan, with right upon his side:—

Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Vide Blue Book, No. V. p. 28.)

Cabool, March 5, 1838.

Sir,—On the 23d ultimo, I had the honor to report to you the result of my intercourse with the Ameer of Cabool, on the subject of the extent to which he was to reckon on the good offices of the British Government, in an adjustment of his differences with the Sikhs, and the returns which would be expected from him in consequence.

2. From various quarters I have meanwhile heard, that the Ruler of Cabool is but ill disposed to meet Government in its wishes; and the advice given to him by one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought, 'viz. Mahomed Khan Byat' was that he should take the British Government at their word, and dismiss their agent, since there was nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. From the receipt of the Governor General's letter to the present time, nightly meetings have been held at the Bala Hissar, and the Ameer has, on more than one occasion, given vent to very strong expressions, both as to his future proceedings, and the disappointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by Government regarding him.

'3. On the morning of the 2nd instant, I had a visit from the Nawab Jubbar 'Khan, who arrived at Cabool on the preceding day from his estate, having set 'out immediately he heard of the decision of the British Government. He had 'previously read His Lordship's letter to the Ameer, and he had just come from 'visiting his brother,—I need not detain Government with a repetition of what I 'stated to the Nawab, since I made him fully acquainted with the views of Go-'vernment, and the only terms which it seemed just in regard to Maharaja Run-'jeet Sing, that we could tender our good offices, which consisted in an endea-'vour to use our influence at Lahore to put a stop to future aggression on the part 'of the Ruler there on the Affghan dominions, and thus releasing them from the 'wrath of a powerful sovereign whom they had offended, against the danger of 'whom their applications in every quarter for succour afforded manifest proof of 'their fear and danger.—I further told the Nawab of the views of Government 'regarding Peshawur, of its restoration being in the hands of Runjeet Sing, but 'most certainly it would not be given to the Ameer.'

'4. The Nawab replied, that the Government must be ignorant of the true state 'of affairs in this country, that it was well known he was an avowed and open 'partizan of the British, and that he might therefore give his opinions with a 'frankness that was not liable to be mistaken; that the good offices of the Go-'vernment to remove the Sikhs and their future attacks, and to make some set-

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'tlement in Pashawur were proofs of sympathy, but his Lordship might not have 'reflected that so far from the proffered protection from Runjeet Sing being of 'the value stated, that the Maharaja had never sought to attack Cabool, and 'that hitherto all the aggression had been on the part of the Ameer and not the 'Ruler of Lahore—That it appeared we valued our offers at a very high rate, 'since we expected in return that the Affghans would desist from all intercourse 'with Persia, Russia, Toorkistan, &c. &c. &c. Were the Affghans to make all 'these powers hostile, and to receive no protection against the enmity raised for 'their adhering to the British? As for Peshawur being withheld from the Ameer, 'it might be got over, and he believed he did not over-rate his influence with 'Sooltan Mahomed Khan when he stated that he might bring about a reconcilia-'tion between him and the Ameer; but he must say that the value of the Aff-'ghans had indeed been depreciated, and that he did not wonder at the Ameer's 'disappointment.'

'5. I replied to the Nawab that I really did not comprehend the motives 'which swayed him or his brother.—I had before found that it was not Candahar 'which he wished to subdue, and that the difficulties about Peshawur were not 'insurmountable, and that in consequence it could not be that Chiefship which the 'Ameer sought to conquer.—What then were his wishes or expectations? Digni-'ty and respect (izzut wa ikram,) was the reply, and to be looked upon in the light 'of being able to do something for the British Government, and for such service to 'receive its real friendship and not a proffer of its sympathy, which did not insure 'protection from the West, and which dwelt upon the good done on the Eastern 'frontier by withdrawing Runjeet Sing, of whose attacks they were under little 'apprehension.—The whole of the Affghan country, continued he, is now at your 'back, and no future opportunity may prove so favorable to gain any ends which 'you may have to establish your influence in Cabool, and if you lose this opportuni-'ty you will have yourselves to blame.—Before leaving, the Nawab asked me to 'tell him confidentially if the real object of the Governor General's letters was to 'withdraw from the Affghans, or to make friendship with them, for he hoped he 'would be told his exact meaning that he might use his influence to bring about 'a good understanding, or at once to save himself from disgrace, refrain from in-'terfering. I gave him an assurance that we did most sincerely sympathize with 'his brother and all the Affghans, and that the use of his influence would be much 'appreciated, but that after the explicit letter of the Governor General, and the 'instructions which I had received, I would deceive him if he founded hopes of 'any thing farther being done for the Affghans than what had been stated.—He 'took his leave, telling me that he hoped for the best, but that he too was disap-'pointed. He made also the singular declaration, that if you wish the good of this 'country, you must either put aside by force the Ameer, or find some means of 'obliging him.'

'6. On the 3d instant I had a visit from Mirza Samee Khan, the principal 'Secretary, who made me acquainted, of course by desire of the Ameer, with what 'had passed since I last saw him; he stated that the Ameer was more depressed

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'at what had occurred than he had ever been, that he had often written to the 'British Government about his affairs, and in return they replied to him about 'their own, and spoke of commerce: that the answer which he had however re- 'ceived from Lord Auckland on his assuming the Government, differed from all 'others, and had been most acceptable: that it now appeared if the Ameer took 'any means which he thought advisable to resist Runjeet Sing, it will be consider- 'ed a direct breach of friendship, so that by seeking the good offices of the British 'he had brought upon himself their enmity instead of their indifference. And for 'what did the Government claim the gratitude of the Ameer and from abstaining 'from all communication with powers to the West? that it would use its good 'offices with Runjeet Sing to prevent future aggression, and that the Ameer 'should be satisfied with this and his remaining territories. The Government 'could not as it appeared to the Ameer have known the true state of things when 'Runjeet Sing had never made aggression on Cabool, or taken a jureeb (acre) of 'the Ameer's territories, which are now larger than ever, and that he had hitherto 'successfully resisted. He had however no hope against the Sikhs if the British 'Government aided or encouraged their attacks, but he certainly would consider it 'unjust if he sought other aid to hinder Runjeet Sing, and the British Government 'interfered.—That the offers to adjust affairs at Peshawur did not suit the Ameer's 'views, that he waved all expectations of that place for himself since it was dis- 'pleasing to us, but that he regarded Sooltan Mahomed Khan and Runjeet Sing 'as identified, and that by such a settlement his character (purdeh) did not remain 'with the people who had attached themselves to him, whose injury would follow 'on Sooltan Mahomed's restoration, and whom he would then have the disgrace 'of having deserted.—In addition to all this, he was to get no protection from 'Persia, or any power whose anger he might have raised because of his adherence 'to the British, which in Mahomed Shah's approach to Herat seemed both an act 'of honesty and justice.'

'7. These, continued the Mirza, are not only the views of the Ameer himself, 'and tho' as yet no general assemblage of his advisers had taken place he had 'had the opinion of others. The Nawab Mahomed Osman Khan had written in 'reply from Bala Bagh, that subjugation by Runjeet Sing could never disgrace 'him even if it did take place, but a desertion of those who had served him in his 'wars with the Sikhs would most certainly do so, and if he could not ma- 'nage to have some influence in Peshawur such must follow, but that he 'must know he had no hopes of resisting the British Government what- 'ever he might do to that of Lahore.—The Mirza made nearly the same obser- 'vation as the Nawab about the expectations which the Ameer had cherished of 'doing service for the British and devoting himself to it, that it was not the ad- 'justment of Peshawur affairs that dissipated his hopes, but the indifference to his 'sufferings and station which it was now clear we felt, and this was the more 'strange as he abandoned all his intercourse with Persia and every other power to 'please us, for he could not be charged with over civility to Captain Vickovitch, 'who had not been even received till he had consulted with me, and whose con- 'tinuance here depended upon the moon, and to whom letters which had been

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'written, had not been given because they met my disapproval.—The Ameer, said 'he, has taken up an impression that your Government has misunderstood the 'nature of the correspondence with Russia, and attached to it a degree of 'blame which would only have been just, had it taken place after an exhibition of 'your friendly feelings.'

'8. I replied to Mirza Samee Khan, that they knew as well as I did the views 'of the British; that I could not take upon myself the responsibility of doing more 'than reporting all they had to say, and that I really did not see how Government 'were to blame, since I did not know exactly at this time what the Ameer of 'Cabool expected of us.—That as far as the respect due to his situation, my 'presence here was proof enough of the friendly estimation in which we held him, 'and that there was no doubt some grounds for the claims made to protect him 'from the west, but my Government knew its own interests best, and the extent 'which the British agreed to go in its good offices had been explicitly stated, and 'that if they considered their own interests they would gladly accept what had 'been tendered in a spirit so friendly, for if we did not appreciate the services of 'the Affghans in the light which they themselves did, we wished to do them a 'substantial service, which it grieved me to see that they did not hold in that 'light. It was certainly true, I added, that Captain Vickovitch had been received 'as had been stated, and that the letters which were to be sent had been altered, 'but I begged him to remember the message about waiting till the vernal equi-'nox (nowroz) for an answer, and if he thought a Government like the British 'would submit to be tied down by such a limit.'

'9. The Mirza observed, that the Ameer had apologized for that message, which 'was decidedly wrong, but that I who was on the spot, should judge of the agi-'tating circumstance.—I took this occasion to say, that if the Ameer thought we 'were in error about Russian letters, he had it in his power now to transmit the 'originals from Russia to the Governor General, but I observed that this was a 'suggestion far from agreeable, and the Mirza said that if I wished to see these 'letters again he would bring them to me, but he did not think the Ameer would 'ever permit their being sent to India, but we had received copies of them.— 'I treated the reply with indifference, and said that the remark on my part had 'arisen from his own observation.—Before Mirza Samee Khan left, I gathered 'that the result of all the conference up to this time (3d instant) went to claim 'from the British Government a means of protection from the West as the price of 'their adherence to us, and farther, that, however Peshawur might be settled by 'Runjeet Sing, no acknowledgment could be made for our good offices unless means 'were taken to prevent injury from such settlement to those who had befriend-'ed the Ameer—even with this latter arrangement it appeared we could not carry 'the Ameer's heart along with us,—since he believed it in his power to do service 'from the position he held, and the anxiety to be allied to us above all others, to 'which we seemed to give little or no weight, but on the contrary had shewn in 'the Governor General's letter that we looked with a degree of indifference (be 'purwaee) to any connection with the Affghan nation.'

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'10. On the morning of the 4th, I had another visit from the Nawab. While conversing on the contents of the Governor General's letter I observed that no communication could more clearly convey the sincerity and good feelings of the British Government than such a declaration, to which he assented, adding that there were hopes conveyed in it which appeared on a re-perusal to be satisfactory, but that I dimmed all these expectations by declining to give any promises about protection from Persia, or any proof of our friendly feelings towards the Affghans; we had weighed much on our good offices at Peshawur, and no one would be more rejoiced to see Sooltan Mahomed Khan once more established in his Government than himself, but we had really gone too far in fixing that as the limit of our good offices, and if we meant to purchase the Affghans by it we should not succeed, that our policy appeared to him the more strange since we had furnished cannon, muskets, &c. &c, and even officers and money, to Persia, when in Affghanistan the door of India (durwaza i Hind) we mean to do nothing, and what was more, to consider Dost Mahomed Khan our enemy if he entered into any description of political intercourse with others.—The singular attachment of this man to the British Government made its appearance however in a form different from what has been stated—he made a serious proposal to me to keep the Ameer in check if we were determined to go no farther, by drawing closely to Candahar; establishing Sooltan Mahomed Khan in Peshawur, and then bidding defiance to the Ameer; but to effect this, added he, you must substantially protect Candahar. I replied that Government had not contemplated any such measure, and it was its object to maintain all the Affghan Chiefs in their actual position.'

11. It seems very clear, from what has been above stated, although the final answer of Dost Mahomed Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of establishing a friendly connection with him on the terms wished for by Government; even if it could be brought about before a vast change of opinion takes place, the friendship would be delusive, and no degree of dependence could be placed on this Chief.

'I am aware that the views of Government are decided, and it would be highly presumptuous in me to make any observations on the record of the different conversations which have been above reported.' As Mr. Vickovitch still remains in Cabool (and his presence is the strongest test of the Ameer's disposition to make use of him against us); and as Dost Mahomed Khan does not appreciate our good offices in Peshawur, I shall deem it my duty to retire when I receive the Ameer's letter unless some very decided change of tone takes place at Cabool. 'The only feeling, and it is one of the highest importance, which will counteract this step is the expression of His Lordship's opinion that the line of Policy marked out in respect to Dost Mahomed Khan ought to be readily successful, and the belief that this Chief will have judged better for his interests than to compel me to quit Cabool. I am well aware of the responsibility when I shall incur as a public servant by this act, if it be too precipitately taken, but as our unavoidable loss of character must equally follow my continuance here under expectations

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'which appear deceptive, I shall not hesitate between such responsibility and the 'paramount consideration of what appears to me due to our national honor.'

I have, &c.

ALEX. BURNES.

Even this, however, was insufficient to obtain the quarrel which we had, it would appear, three times determined to provoke. We had a last resource yet left us: it was now clear that there was hardly any thing which we could demand of the Ameer which he was not prepared to concede to us, rather than forego the hope of our friendship: the master-stroke of our policy was to ask him for what he *could* not give. It was proposed that the Ameer should be requested to send presents to Lahore, in testimony of his gratitude for having been relieved of Peshawur—to make submission to him after having inflicted on him severer humiliation and chastisement than he had ever before endured at the hands of an enemy—and ask his pardon for having endeavoured to get back his own! The whole of the papers on this subject are suppressed, and we only discover the fact of this scheme having been in contemplation from Burnes's posthumous MSS. It would be important to possess the documents to which these are replies. This last act of tyranny was one to which our envoy refused to be a party. "He found that he could not propose to the Ameer of Cabool to send presents to Lahore as an opening to the establishment of future friendship: the difficulties had been great, without adding to them. Had Dost Mahomed Khan himself assented, the Mahommedan populace would have despised him, and probably have prevented him."(46) An untoward event at this time occurred, which, with parties less determined for hostilities than the war party in the secretariate,—for Lord Auckland unhappily was now removed from his council, in which, we have every reason to believe, he would have been out-voted,—would have deprived us of all excuse for the Affghan campaign. (47)

On 5th March, the Ameer called on Capt. Burnes. The usual explanations were gone over—it was no wonder that they were in so far unsatisfactory, when Burnes admits that, up to this time, he could not discover what were the intentions of the Governor-General.(48) The Envoy told him explicitly, that if he did not wish our good offices on the terms proposed, he should dismiss him. The Dost (49) professed himself shocked at this

46. Suppressed portion of despatch, 13th March.

47. He was on his way to Simla. A most unwise provision in the Charter Act permits the Governor to act alone, and on his own responsibility, when absent from Calcutta. The Commander-in-Chief is known to have been hostile to the war, and the Hon. Messrs. Prinsep and Bird were universally believed to be the same—Three out of five.

48. Suppressed portion of the despatch of the 5th March. The presentable fragments are given in the Blue Book, pp. 29, 30, and 31.

49. The above is given nearly verbatim. What the phrase, "our good

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last proposition, from which he considered disgrace to him would flow:— "You have been welcomed," said he, "by every Mahommedan State since you left Bombay, from the belief that you were the bearer of good news to an unhappy race of men, whose internal discord has made them the prey of a nation of another faith. I dare not, if I wished it, set myself up against the Affghan people: the belief has gone abroad that your presence is connected with their advantage, and, though I admit that I profit by it, still the objects of my heart are not fully accomplished."

"There are Affghans in Tak fighting in thousands at this hour against the Sikhs; they have aided me, and they looked to me, but their sufferings will have no abatement; but I throw myself upon the generosity of the Governor-General of India, and I rely on the sympathy which his Lordship has expressed.

"I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest better than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation so well disposed towards him; but that it was now my duty to tell him clearly what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You must never receive agents from other powers, or have aught to do with them, without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vickovitch with courtesy; you must surrender all claim to Peshawur on your own account, as that chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Sing; you must live on friendly terms with that potentate; you must also respect the independence of Candahar, and of Peshawur; and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family. In return for this, I promise to recommend to the Government that it use its good offices with its ancient ally Maharajah Runjeet Sing, to remove present and future causes of difference between the Sikhs and Affghans at Peshawur; but as that chiefship belongs to the Maharajah, he may confer it on Sooltan Mahomed Khan or any other Affghan whom he chooses, on his own terms and tribute; it being understood that such arrangement is to preserve the credit and honour of all parties.

"'To this I assent' said the Ameer; 'but as these arrangements are not set forth in full in his Lordship's letter, it would be desirable for you to reduce the matter to writing, as far as your knowledge of the Governor-General's views will permit you, that I may fairly see what is expected, and what is to be done in return. The differences of the Affghans and Sikhs can never be said to be adjusted so long as the Maharajah keeps his troops and Officers at Peshawur: and, consequently, though I place every faith in the friendly intervention of the British, and know that the Maharajah must be left to himself I am bound to state that fresh causes for disturbance must arise if his Highness does not place my brother, or an Affghan, in Peshawur, and leave him to govern it subject to his (the Maharajah's) orders, but without the presence of Seikh

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offices" meant, the Affghans appear never to have been able to discover,—nor will the reader be very likely to find it out from the Blue Book.

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troops." I replied, that since the Ameer agreed himself to peace, it was better to leave these things to be settled hereafter, since the less that was now said about them the better."

18. 'Having thus, it appeared to me, gained the ends desired by Government, I 'proceeded to improve the dawn of good feeling towards his brothers, and sued 'for the Nuwab Jubbar Khan's co-operation in making up matters between the 'Ameer and Sooltan Mahomed Khan. This most amiable man declared to me 'that the matter was easy, and begged that I would write to the Governor Gene- 'ral and say that he pledged himself to bring it about, and that there was but one 'difficulty which could prevent it, and this *would be the disapproval of the Maha- 'raja Runjeet Sing.* If this was no obstacle, he would proceed at once to Pesha- 'wur and bring all his brothers to Jellalabad, where they would be met by the 'Ameer, and in my presence he would get them to exchange papers that the Pesha- 'wur family may come to Cabool in summer, and the Ameer go to Peshawur 'in winter, each with a few hundred horse; and that further, he pledged himself 'to bring together the whole family from Candahar, or at least one of the bro- 'thers, and to witness the much desired object of the restoration of harmony 'and unanimity in their house. On this he added that all the Ameer's fears 'for his Peshawur adherents, now with him, would end, if the affair could 'be adjusted.—I assured the Nuwab Jubbar Khan that his exertions would 'receive high applause and appreciation, and that if things went right and I hap- 'pened to be present at the peace-making, I would consider it one of the most 'happy events that had occurred, and which would rescue a brave nation from 'inevitable destruction. I do not believe the Nuwab overrates his influence; he 'has great weight both at Peshawur and Candahar, through Sooltan Mahomed, 'Kohun and Ruhum Dil Khans, and when war no longer disturbs the peace 'of the Eastern frontier of Affghanistan, these much wished for objects will cer- 'tainly follow, as is amply proved by my previous correspondence. With Persia, 'we should have had Russian influence in her train, and had the Ameer been 'disposed to doubt the sincerity of the Shah, the presence of the Russian Agent, 'Captain Vickovitch, would have gone far to remove his suspicions.'

Here, then, so late as the month of March were the last of our difficulties surmounted, and everything gained from the Ameer which the British Government appeared to have desired. Nothing of any moment—save the arrival of Kohun Dil Khan from Candahar, formerly noticed at length, is recorded as having occurred for the next four weeks.

There were said to have been letters written to Candahar by the Dost, stating that he had now lost all hope from the British—no great marvel that there should,—and interviews discovered with Captain Vicovich, of which no one professed to know the purport; and with matters in this *alarming* state, Burnes felt that he could no longer remain at Cabool consistently with his instructions. He left on the 26th of April, being accompanied in all honour by three of the Ameer's sons and the prime minister two miles beyond the gates. Captain Burnes writes from Jellalabad (30th April,) that he

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had heard reports of the Dost's having gone over to Persia, and sought the security of Russia,—that some of the Ameer's family, or of his brothers at Candahar, were to be sent with letters to the Shah; that Captain Vicovich had promised to get the guarantee of Russia to all their arrangements,—and that, when Herat fell, the King of Persia would either assist with troops or money for an attack upon Peshawur. Burnes at the time seems to have been very doubtful of the weight to be attached to this report, and on more mature consideration he manifestly held it of no account whatever. The light which subsequent disclosures has thrown upon the subject, now shews that Captain Vicovich had no political authority; but that he was one of the most wild and unscrupulous of romancers. Russia formally refused to give any guarantee whatever in the case of the cession of Herat to Candahar: the latter place never fell into the hands of Persia, so that this most mendacious of nations could never have been brought into the predicament of requiring to fulfil her promise, if she had made any: she had no money to pay her own troops, and was therefore sufficiently unlikely to afford subsidies to Dost Mahomed; and as she required a twelvemonth to march her army from her capital to the nearest frontier—from Teheran to Herat,—it is sufficiently unlikely that she could, even had she desired it, have succeeded in ever reaching Peshawur, a thousand miles beyond it! With this closes the narrative of our negociations with Dost Mahomed: the reader may judge whether anything had arisen in the course of these to justify the infliction on him and his brothers of the last of ills rulers can endure. We took their country from them and gave it to the enemy of their race, leaving them the choice of the alternatives of becoming outcasts and wanderers from the land of their fathers, or prisoners of state within our territories. The majority of them preferred the former—the nobler selection. The subject of this chapter was introduced by a letter from Lord Auckland to Dost Mahomed, and with another at the interval of less than two years, it may be closed.

Lord *Auckland* to Ameer *Dost Mahomed Khan*.

After compliments. Simla, 27 April 1838.

I Have received your letter, and fully comprehend its contents.

It has been a source of much regret to me to find that your views of what is most for your advantage, have led you to decline the good offices which I have tendered, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between you and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, on the only terms on which I could, consistently with what has appeared to me just, engage to exercise my mediation for the settlement of the unhappy differences existing between you.

With the explanation, however, of your sentiments which you have now afforded to me, my further interposition in this affair could not lead to beneficial results; and as, in so unsettled a condition of things, the continuance of Captain Burnes, and of the officers under his orders, in Affghanistan, would not

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be conducive to the good ends which I had hoped to accomplish by their deputation, I have now issued orders to them to return to India ; and they will accordingly set out, on receiving from you their dismissal, for which their immediate application will be made to you.

I have to express to you my acknowledgments for your attention and kindness to these officers while residing in your dominions.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

Dost Mahomed and Captain Burnes had parted in sorrow but not in anger, and surely, from aught that has yet appeared, there was nothing to lead to the belief, from any thing which had occurred, that the country would be invaded by our armies, and its chiefs—not one but all—rendered fugitives or captives. From what appears in the printed papers, there is no reason whatever to believe that the Ameer or his brothers were, from this date, guilty of one disloyal act towards us. The assertion that Dost Mahomed ever threatened to call in foreign aid to enable him to consummate schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India, is founded on no better grounds than the declaration that Persia was prosecuting throughout Affghanistan intrigues, " having for their object the extension of her influence to the banks of, or even beyond, the Indus ; " (50) and both, so far as the printed papers are concerned, are as thoroughly unsupported as any averments ever made by the most reckless statesman. Lord Auckland, in his Simla minute of the 12th of May states, " that Dost Mahomed Khan had shown himself to be so disaffected and ambitious (51) that with him we could form no satisfactory connection ; although he might not, under such circumstances, furnish us with grounds of direct hostility against him." This is most decidedly an admission that, up to this date, no grounds of direct hostility had been furnished by the Ameer. The probability is, that the secretaries, or the leaders under whose influence the Governor-General had placed himself, had, by this time, arranged the whole matter without his Lordship's knowledge : the mission of Mr Macnaghten to Cabool, three days afterwards, proves that the thing was completed by the 15th May.

This mission, from which results so singular in many ways arose, was as strange as it was important. It has just been seen that on the 12th of May the Governor-General placed on record, opinions in many respects pacific—in no respect countenancing the idea that Dost Mahomed was to be dethroned. Three days afterwards the chief secretary set out on a mission

50. Simla proclamation.

51. Verbatim extract from the minute. His Lordship does not condescend to enlighten his readers in what way the Ameer had evinced either ambition or disaffection to us. The published papers exhibit none, but much of the contrary of both.

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to Lahore with the draft of a treaty ready prepared, by which the Indian Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and Shah Soojah-Ool-Moolk, bound themselves together so that the friends and enemies of any one of the parties were to be considered the friends and enemies of all the others. After this had been duly discussed and determined on, and was on the very eve of being subscribed, Mr Macnaghten continued to consult Sir Alexander Burnes and Mr Masson, as if every thing was to be regulated by their advice. The opinion of both these gentlemen on this point, almost exactly coincided. That of Sir Alexander Burnes, as expressed in his official letters not quoted in the Blue Book, is as follows:—

Extracts: Opinions as to the mode of restoring Shah Shoojah, submitted by Sir A. Burnes.

Lahore, 18th June, 1838.—But objections arise to sending Shooja-Ool-Moolk from the country of the Sikhs, of which Dost Mahomed Khan would not be slow to avail himself, agitating the country to war against the infidels who had come to invade him. These objections seem stronger than they really are, and indeed amount to little when we have gained the end of directing the Sikhs. Sikh troops should if possible not be used at all; but I adhere to the opinion, which I have already expressed, that one if not two of our Regiments should be given to the Shah nominally as an escort to his person, and to show decidedly to the Affghans how much we are interested in his safety and welfare. The smallest number of our troops will be exaggerated in Cabool to an army, and we shall speak at once to men's eyes and senses. If Maharaja Runjet Singh objects to the use of our troops when he has so many of his own, he might be told they were merely honorary, as their small number proved, and that the Shah required them as the nucleus on which he was to form his future forces. Besides this direct assistance, opportunity should be given to the troops of our army to volunteer, as they have lately done for the force in Oude, and instead of raw levies a good army might soon be collected; but though it is doubtless necessary to have a force of sufficient strength to cope with the Chiefs of Cabool and Candahar, for my part I have more faith in political agitation for the Shah's cause than in physical force.* * * *

Matters being thus arranged, I would recommend the following line of proceedure. From Peshawur, Shah Shooja should issue a proclamation and send it in hundreds through the Affghan country, that he had arrived at Peshawur to recover the throne of his fore-fathers, to put an end to wars with the Sikhs, to unite the Affghan nation, and to repel the enemies of their creed, the Persians, who had dared to invade the kingdom; that he was now able to chastise his enemies, both internal and external, since he and the British Government were one; and that, from the affection he bore to his people, he could not think of declaring war till he had given all parties a fair opportunity of repairing to his camp and tendering their allegiance; that the treatment all would experience would be according to their early presence, and that His Majesty's object was not to scrutinize particularly what had passed, but to

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restore the glory of the Dooranee Monarchy. This, with a distribution of money in Khyber, where Shooja has more friends than in any part of Affghanistan, and the Kohistan of Cabool, which could easily be managed, would in all human probability dissolve Dost Mahomed's power, and the Shah's advance on Cabool would be a triumph without bloodshed; for the Affghan nation never will submit to Persia but by fear, and Dost Mahomed Khan by going over to Mahomed Shah, has converted doubting friends into enemies, and materially contributed thereby to Shah Shooja's success. * * *

"The next, and probably the most delicate, of all questions which present themselves, is the disposal of Dost Mahomed Khan. His ambition makes it more than questionable if he ever would consent to act in a subordinate capacity, but he should have the offer, for he will be a dangerous antagonist if he flies to Persia, and we have the first authority for recording that one of Shah Shooja's most serious errors, when King, was in failing to conciliate Futteh Khan Barukzye, the brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, and in whose place he may now clearly be said to be. These are the words of Mr Elphinstone: 'Futteh Khan was soon after persuaded to make his submission to the new King (Soojah). An opportunity was now offered of securing the attachment of this powerful and active Chief, but it was allowed to escape, and hence arose the misfortunes which disturbed the rest of Shah Shoojah's reign, and which drove him at length from his throne.' This is high authority, and though it perhaps would be impolitic to offer the Viziership to such a Chief, some situation as a Doorannee Lord, such as existed in the old court of the Suddozyes, might be found for him, and a liberal provision in land. The presence of a British agent, and an active and decided influence in all that relates to the political affairs of Cabool, which I take for granted is to be our policy, if it did not break the factious spirit of Dost Mahomed Khan, would prevent his doing harm. I think also that it would be highly to the credit of the British Government to aid in such an offer of conciliation; for if the Ameer is disappointed, our hopes, the difficulties that beset him from the west are to be considered, and we escape the odium of being privy to his entire destruction by showing that our object is the restoration of the Dooranee monarchy, and not the punishment of the Chief of Cabool. It is to be observed, that Affghan differences are much easier healed than those of other nations; and, above all things, it should be Shah Shoojah's policy to forget the past, and the talents of Dost Mahomed Khan may yet avail him in subduing some of his rebellious subjects. Much is to be said on this subject, and it requires great reflection and consideration, which may and must be given to it when matters are more advanced.

Lahore, 19th June, 1838.—2. I attach importance to the presence of a small portion of our troops from the prestige it will exercise. There are as solid objections to the presence of our officers as our troops; a disaster in either case would be unfortunate, and going so far as to give money and officers, an honorary escort is not a step far beyond. It is not essential to success, but I think would contribute to it.

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The reference by Mr. Macnaghten to Capt. Burnes, replied to on the 18th and 19th of June, was clearly nothing else than a pretext, with a view of extracting something from him capable of receiving a construction favourable to the views of the war party—now unhappily in the ascendant; so as to satisfy, if possible, the still wavering resolution of the Governor-General. The treaty, providing for war on the largest scale, and ratified on the 26th, betwixt the British Government, the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and the Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk, must before this have been drawn up.

It has already been seen that Mr Macnaghten was, so late as the end of January, in favour of the maintenance of the arrangements among the Barukzye chiefs as they stood, considering their divisions well calculated to ward off the advances of a foreign foe. He had now abandoned this and taken an entirely opposite view of the case, and determined that nothing could save India but the re-integration of the Doorannee empire under the Shah Soojah, the proverbially *unfortunate*. The sole original objection to the maintenance of Dost Mahomed's claims upon Peshawur was, that it kindled up the flames of war in those regions where we were most anxious to promote the interests of commerce; but when it appeared that the equitable claims of the Ameer could readily be adjusted by peaceful negociation,—our aversion to hostilities took another form, and it was now the aggrandizement of this man, who had, more than any Ruler in Asia, courted our friendship without selfishness—without hope of favour or fear of injury—until we meddled with his affairs, that alarmed us! A few months afterwards, when Runjeet Singh asked permission to advance with fire and sword on Jellalabad, and increase his territories by fresh appropriations from his neighbour, our fears, both of war and aggrandizement on *his* part, had vanished. If the historian were permitted to examine into the archives of the Colonial Office, with a view of ascertaining when certain unsatisfactory despatches from Calcutta first began to be received—and were then to turn to the Board of Control, and see whether the first warlike instructions sent out by Sir John Hobhouse had not considerably more to do with these than with any tidings sent by the Persian mission—the results might be curious.

The arrival in India of the news of the unfortunate issue of the general election of August 1837, would, if examined into, probably be found to coincide remarkably with some of the more pugnacious Simla minutes. These things will be matter of speculation for the annalist to inquire into, when the records of the public offices are transferred to the Tower or the British Museum.

Although it was obviously our intention, from the month of June 1837, to pick a quarrel, and have a war on some account, somewhere, with somebody—a source of recreation in which our statesmen were permitted to indulge with-

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out enquiry, by virtue of an accumulated surplus of ten millions of hoarded treasure in the coffers of government,—the form and pressure this was to assume was left to be determined by the chapter of accidents. According to Mr Masson, it was the Punjaub that the Board of Control wished us to seize upon, and the mistake into which we fell was that of marching on Cabool, when Lahore was intended to have been the point of our destination—making a traverse of 1500 miles instead of 50. The gentleman referred to professes to have been shewn, by Captain Burnes, the letter to this effect from the Secret Committee. It passed through the hands of Lord Auckland and his secretaries, and might be worth while enquiring after. There was said to have been such difficulty in keeping Lord Auckland's courage at the sticking point, that the secretaries were terrified lest the whisper of the possibility of pacific arrangements should reach his ear. An amusing anecdote is mentioned on this subject by Masson. "I had previously learned," says this not over-trustworthy authority, "a strange account of the mode in which the *amiable* Lord Auckland had been driven into measures which his better judgment disapproved, and how he was obliged to yield to the assaults of certain female A. D. C.'s and Secretaries, and I now questioned Sir Alexander on the part he had taken, particularly as regarded this useless expedition. He replied that it was arranged before he reached Simla, and that when he arrived, Torrens and Colvin came running to him, and prayed him to say nothing to unsettle his Lordship; that they had taken all the trouble in the world to get him into the business, and that even now he would be glad on any pretence to return from it." The correspondent of a London daily paper is still more explicit as to the sources of the plan of the campaign on the great scale—how Mr Macnaghten was at once ambitious and unpopular, he wished to become an Envoy, and was wished out of the Secretariat to make room for Mr Torrens, whose wife, a fashionable and accomplished woman, was in great favour with the rulers of the ruler of India—the Hon. Misses Eden, sisters and managers of Lord Auckland!

From the subscription of the treaty at Lahore, on the 26th of June, the State Papers furnish no further light on the course of events till the middle of August, when a despatch of Lord Auckland's to the Secret Committee indicates that matters were finally arranged, much as set forth in the Simla proclamation of the 1st October—the bulk of which has been quoted in paragraphs at the heads of the sections of the present chapter. It was one amongst the singular anomalies with which the arrangements of the Affghan expedition abound, that we relied for our means of getting into the country on the Governments of Scinde and Khelat—both in former days dependencies of the Dooranee empire, but both for thirty years perfectly independent of all superiors. The inducement to assist us which we held out to them

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was, that they should be once more replaced under their old oppressive masters, be annexed to the Doorannee empire, and merge their individual authority in the sovereignty of the Shah Soojah! The alternative offered for declining a request so modest and equitable was—deposition, or probably death!!

It must not, in conclusion, be forgotten, that we never gave Dost Mahomed the most distant hint that we intended to wage war with him. He had, on numerous occasions, expressed himself so awed by British power, and so apprehensive of its being employed against him in assisting the Seikhs, that had we made him aware that we purposed attacking him, it is probable he would have made any sacrifice that could have been required of him. We never gave him the alternative; we never made him a tender of the terms on which we were willing to have abstained from invading his country. We, on the 1st October, for the first time announced our intention of restoring the Shah Soojah, and deposing the Ameer and the Candahar Sirdars,—not pretending that with the last we ever negotiated or had any grounds of quarrel! We marched an army into the country without having asked whether, with the alternative of invasion before them, the chiefs would not concede the points which they knew we would compel them to yield to us in the long run at any rate. The Affghans knew our power too well,—as indeed they had often told us,—to imagine that they could keep the field against us. In this particular the campaign of 1839 was wholly without precedent: and it is beyond question, that according to the principles of civilized war, Lord Keane's army could not have complained had they been treated as marauders. The Colonial Society has drawn up a statement on the subject, shewing, that had the whole of our people who fell into the hands of the enemy during the period of our occupation of the country, been hanged, the Affghans would have acted under the sanction of the highest European authorities, and would have been countenanced by the conduct of all civilized nations, on whose territories similar aggressions had been attempted. It has of late become the custom to affirm, that the objections to the policy of Lord Auckland only began to make their appearance after the calamities of Nov. and Dec. 1841: a statement more unfounded cannot exist. It has already been seen that had Lord Auckland been at Calcutta when hostile measures were in agitation, he would in all likelihood have been outvoted at his own Council Board on the question of Affghan invasion. The whole of the military chiefs in India viewed the expedition as one of pure insanity. The aversion of the Government of Bombay, far more intimately acquainted than that of Calcutta with the countries we proposed to subdue, to the whole scheme of the Simla policy, has long been notorious. The press of India, though far from unanimous certainly, generally condemned the measure, and predicted with very great accuracy, as the

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results afterwards exemplified, the mischiefs to which it must give rise. We have already seen with what aversion the matter was regarded at the India House, and how early Sir Henry Willock, and Mr St John Tucker, recorded their opinions against it. The press, in general, entered but slightly into the discussion: the journals which ventured on an examination of the question, with the exception of the *Quarterly Review*, gave their opinions decidedly against it. The *Asiatic Journal*, as the best informed of those on Oriental affairs, has been repeatedly referred to, and its articles on the subject in 1838 and 1839 are well worthy of perusal. We cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting, in conclusion, some extracts from a very excellent article in the *Spectator* newspaper, of 27th July 1839, on the *Review's* observations on the Parliamentary papers, pointing out not only the general danger incurred by the newly adopted policy of the Governor-General—for that of the Government of India it could in no sense be called—but the shape this danger was likely to assume, and the quarters whence it might be expected to approach us. The *Spectator's* views were given to the world in the midst of our triumphs; he boded evil while the shouts of victory still filled our ears. His anticipations have been realized:—

"THE WAR IN INDIA.

"The current number of the *Quarterly Review* has an elaborate paper on Russia, Persia, and India; distinguished by a tone of friendliness to the Government and its agents, and what is more, a substantial vindication of recent British policy and proceedings in Asia, which few would have expected at the hands of that stanch organ of the Opposition, even in charity. To us, indeed, it seems that the Reviewer is, for once, *too* charitable: for a pretty careful examination of the file of papers laid before Parliament in the passing session, leads us to conclusions considerably at variance with his; and at the same time it has confirmed some of our previous opinions and speculations, it enables us to correct or qualify others. In short, we rise from the perusal of the Eastern Correspondence with a persuasion, that our present war in India, or rather outside of India, is more questionable in its objects, and suspicious in its pretexts, and likely to be more extensive and perilous, than any which the British Government of that country has ever yet waged with any Asiatic power.

"Let us begin by examining the pretext for the war. For thirty years and upwards, we have maintained, without interruption, an embassy at the Court of Persia, and paid in salaries, in subsidies and gifts, in arms and ammunition, between three and four millions sterling. The object of our Persian diplomacy was to secure India against French and Russian invasion. The upshot of our thirty years' expenditure of money, protocols, and despatches, is, that Persia, on our own admission, instead of being a bulwark against the aggression of an European power, has become a stepping-stone for Russia. In a word, by our own showing, all our Persian diplomacy has been worse than useless—it has been highly detrimental.

"With the Shah of Persia we have three respective treaties, every one of which

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contains the following article—'If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it; nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace.' Well, a war arises between the Persian King and the Afghans—as just, upon the part of the former, as any ever waged by an European government, and far juster than most of them. The Prince of Herat, the most westerly state of the Afghans, taking advantage of a moment of anarchy, invades a Persian province, burns its towns and villages, and, carrying off twelve thousand of its inhabitants, sells them, man, woman, and child, as slaves. The King of Persia, naturally indignant at this outrage, marches an army to chastise the public robber, and invests Herat. According to the admission of the British Envoy, (a man of mark and talent,) twice repeated in the papers laid before Parliament, the King of Persia has right and justice on his side. Well, then, are the English Minister, the Envoy, and the Governor-General of India, neutral and quiescent, as in good faith became parties to the treaty we have just quoted? Quite the contrary. They are not only not asked to interfere as mediators *by both parties*, but one party expressly repudiates their interference; while the other does not solicit it, and only accepts it when it has been often obtruded: as we may see from the following curious passage of a letter from the Prime Minister of Herat to the British Envoy—'With regard to the coming of the Kajur (Persian) army to this country, I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Persian Government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble in the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may prove what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace and assistance of the Almighty, the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design.' This is the polite Oriental fashion of saying 'laissez nous faire' to a meddler; and the recent obstinate refusal of the Prince of Herat to accept a British subsidiary force for his protection, shows that our interpretation is the right one. The English Government is not only not neutral, it directly interferes, and without being asked. It is far from stopping even at the point of impertinent negotiation. A roving agent of the Governor-General of India, a skilful engineer, throws himself into the fortress of Herat, and assists in its defence against the Persians; a squadron of men of war is sent and takes possession of a portion of *our allies'* territory on the Persian Gulf; and a great army is marched to dethrone an Affghan chief *suspected* of preferring a Persian to an English alliance, (*some* alliance or other being indispensable, and *we* having expressly refused him ours except on terms intolerable,) for his protection against a fourth party, the Seiks, who had wrested from him, by a series of aggressions, a large portion of his dominions. In reference to this conduct, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs has the following pertinent remarks—'We are ignorant by what evidence the British Government considers our interference in the affairs of Afghanistan as a mark of hostility against itself. Besides the auspicious treaty, the observation of the stipulations of which is the foundation of the friendship of the two states, are there any other treaties or engagements between Persia and England relative to

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which any neglect or non-observance has proceeded from us? or did the plenipotentiaries of both states forget this point at the time of forming the treaty, that they omitted any allusion to it? or have new rules of friendship been instituted in this world, with which we are not acquainted? or does the party which considers itself strongest consider also that the observation or violation of treaties rests on its discretion?' Here is a *shocking* charge of Punic faith, made against the government of a civilized country by a people whom we have been accustomed to look upon as faithless barbarians; and the only reply we have made to it, virtually amounts to this, that our original intention in making the treaty was not accomplished,—that is, that Persia did not turn out to be the bulwark against Russian aggression which we mistakingly supposed it would. In short, we talk of the 'spirit' of the treaty, carefully avoiding to say one word about its plain and obvious letter.

"Against the faith of treaties, then, we set up necessity and expediency. Now let this plea be looked into. Herat is declared to be the key to the British dominions in India—the key which is to open the door to the Russians and their allies the Persians, to Hindoostan. The supposed key, in this case, is surely at a vast distance from the door. Our own army has been already five months on its march from the frontier, backed by all the resources of India, and without firing a single shot, unless at a few freebooters; and there is no trustworthy intelligence that it has yet reached the first spot where there is any probability of its meeting with resistance, viz. Candahar; in the neighbourhood of which, by the way, it is proposed that we should canton for the whole summer,—by which (for Cabool, the main point, and a month's march through snowy mountains and narrow defiles, remains untouched) it is plainly pronounced that the affair is to cost us two campaigns. From Candahar to Herat, allowing for halting-days, and supposing no interruption from an enemy, is at least a month's march. Thus, therefore, without meeting an enemy—and, supposing the barren country which it had in its rear and along its line of march could afford it the same supply of food which fertile, populous, and peaceful India affords us—it would take a Russian army five months to march from Herat to the nearest British frontier, with many a 'key' to get possession of, and many a door to unlock, between; and, after that, there is a march of at least fifteen hundred miles further to the chief seat of our power and resources, Lower Bengal and Calcutta; which would take at least four months more, supposing the climate, our armies, and our fortresses offered no resistance, and that John Bull (who in one half the whole time mentioned could send an army from the banks of the Thames) were to look on with his hands in his breeches-pocket doing nothing. But to reach India, is not to conquer India, (never so powerful and united as under our own administration,) as any one who will take the pains to read, may learn from the history of its invaders from ALEXANDER to AHMED SHAH. Most of them never penetrated much beyond the frontier, and the few who established themselves in the North-west, took not months or years, but from one to two centuries, to conquer the East and the South. The truth is, that a Russian invasion, and conquest of India, is but the dream of a troubled and uneasy conscience.

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No man in his waking moments and sober senses imagines the possibility of the thing, or fancies it even probable that any nation whatever, without the command of the sea and of immense pecuniary resources, would be mad enough even to make the attempt. 'At the conclusion of your letter,' says the Persian Prime Minister to one of our agents, 'there are some remarks about alarm. I am in great astonishment at this declaration, considering the distance of four months' journey and the great friendship between the two states, which during this length of time, has never been interrupted by a hair's breadth on either side. What cause is there for alarm, or for these remote speculations, which have never entered into the mind of any one, nor ever will?' It is clear, from these remarks of the Persian Vizier, that his Excellency had no personal acquaintance with Lord AUCKLAND or Lord PALMERSTON, or he would not have expressed himself so rashly. What, after all, does the reader fancy has thrown the Indian Council Chamber and the foreign Office into a turmoil? The Russian Envoy at the Court of Persia *is supposed*, contrary to his instructions, to have advised the Shah to attack Herat: and a Russian Lieutenant of Infantry goes on a commercial mission to an Affghan state; and this has sufficed to frighten the Foreign Secretary and the Governor-General from their propriety. At the very moment we are making this charge against Russia and Persia, our English officer of Engineers, being the agent of the Governor-General, is fighting in the ranks of the Herattees; and there is a diplomatic agent at Cabool, and another at Candahar, endeavouring to force treaties on the chiefs of those two places, by which they are to break off all connexion with Persia and Russia. Where is our sense of political justice?

"There is not the least doubt but the very measures we are pursuing lead us into far greater difficulties than the actual invasion of the Persians and Russians themselves could produce. The war with the Burmese cost us fifteen millions. If we escape from the present more difficult contest with a penalty of double the amount, we may look upon ourselves as fortunate. This will add just one-half to the national debt of India, and an annual interest of a million and a half will add a tithe to the taxes of the already over-taxed Hindoos. Is it not better to stay at home, administer justly, tax lightly, and thus gain the support of the conquered millions, than squander their money in so dangerous, extravagant, and Quixotic an enterprise? The very undertaking itself proves that we are ill at ease at home, conscious of the instability of our power, and suspicious that we have misgoverned India, to the dissatisfaction of its inhabitants.

"If our diplomatists and politicians would only keep their hands out of mischief, it is astonishing how perfect a bulwark nature and fortune have opposed to the possibility of a successful invasion of British India from the westward. The country lying between Persia and British India is one either of rugged mountains or of uncultivated and almost impassable sandy deserts. On the side of Persia, all but on one narrow quarter, it is a sandy desert two hundred miles broad. On the side of India, there is a far more extensive one, generally of double that breadth, except at one point also. Even at this last point there is, according to Mr. ELPHINSTONE, one hundred and sixty miles of 'the strongest country' he had 'ever seen.'

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The people that an invading army would have to encounter, if not alienated by our ambition, is as formidable as their country is strong. They are estimated at fourteen millions; a fourth part of whom, probably, are in that shepherd or nomade state in which men have little to lose and much to gain by war. The ruling people exceed four millions in number; and in their manners, habits, and customs, are rather Europeans of the middle ages than Asiatics. 'An European,' says Mr. ELPHINSTONE, 'coming among them, would scarce fail to admire their martial and lofty spirit, their hospitality, and their bold and simple manners. He would admire their strong and active forms, their fair complexions, and European features; their industry and enterprise; the hospitality, sobriety, and contempt of pleasure, which appear in all their habits; and, above all, the independence and energy of their character. The Afghans themselves (he adds) exult in the free spirit of their institutions. They endeavour to maintain that all Afghans are equal. I once strongly urged on a very intelligent old man, of the tribe of Meankhail, the superiority of a quiet and secure life, under a powerful monarch, to the discord, the alarms, and the blood which they owed to their present system. The old man replied with great warmth, and thus concluded an indignant harangue against arbitrary power—'We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood—but we will never be content with a master.'"

"The plain truth is, that we are breaking down, by our aggression, the most formidable portion of the bulwark that lies between us and invasion to the West. We are making, in fact, the false movement of a general, who, finding a broad marsh between himself and his opponent, wantonly crosses it, with great loss and inconvenience, posts himself on the opposite margin, and, cutting himself off from his supplies, affords his opponent, at the first favourable moment, an opportunity of driving him into the swamp, or starving him to death, or compelling him to surrender at discretion. Such is a fair view of our present adventure; nor can we see any termination, utter discomfiture excepted, to the course into which it leads, until it bring us to the very thing we deprecate—contiguity and collision with the power of Russia in Persia."—*Spectator*, *July* 27, 1839.

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CHAPTER II.

Runjeet Singh refuses to permit our troops to pass through the Punjaub—Route by the Bolan Pass—Augmentation of the army by 13,000 men besides the Contingent—Retirement of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir H. Fane—Sir J. Keane nominated Generalissimo of the Army of the Indus—Entrance into Affghanistan—Bengal column—Reserves—Bombay column lands at Vikkur—Hostile aspect of Scinde—Want of camels—Scarcity of Commissariat stores—Demonstrations on Hydrabad—Ameers agree to our terms—Bengal column reaches Roree, and crosses the Indus to Sukkur—Misunderstandings betwixt the Bengaland Bombay columns about camels—Colonel Dennie's remonstrances on the inutility of the Shah's levies—Capture of Kurrachee—Reserve left there—Amount of force at Shikarpore in February—Bengal troops ascend the Bolan Pass—Apprehensions on reaching Quettah—Rumours of a retreat—Conduct of the Khan of Khelat—Sir A. Burnes's mission to—Breaks his agreements—We resolve to dethrone him—Extreme scarcity of provisions—Troops on half rations for six weeks—Arrive at Candahar and enter it unopposed—Progress of the Bombay column—The Lukkee Pass—Larkhana—The desert—Reach Dadur—Excessive heat—Enter the Bolan Pass—Reach Quettah—Arrive at Candahar—Adventures of Colonel Dennie betwixt Shikarpore and Candahar—Force at—Condition of—Remain six weeks at Candahar—March on Ghuznie—Description of fortress—Conflicting accounts of enemy's force—Open fire of artillery on the walls of—Move round from the Candahar to the Cabool side—Plan of attack of—Captain Outram's attack on the enemy's irregulars—Slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners—Preparation for the attack—Successful explosion of powder-bags at the gate—Storming of the gate—Capture of the fortress—Excellent conduct of our troops—Advance on Cabool—Dost Mahomed abandoned by his troops—Capture of his guns and baggage—Pursuit of, by Capt. Outram—Treachery of Hadji Khan Kakur—The Dost makes his escape into Toorkistan—Return of the pursuing party to Cabool—The Shah enters Cabool—State Durbar for the purpose of conferring the Dooranee Order, Dr. Kennedy's account of—Bengal column quits Cabool—Proceeds by Jellalabad and Khyber, through the Punjaub, to Ferozepore—Bombay column proceeds to Ghuznie—Captain Outram's operations against the Ghilzies—Column takes the left of Candahar—Reaches Quettah—One portion descends the Bolan Pass and reaches Scinde—Loss by Cholera—General Willshire advances on Khelat—Gallant capture of—Slaughter at—Captain Outram's adventures—General Willshire descends the Gundava Pass to Scinde—Lord Keane's return to Bombay, and reception—General reflections—Troops required to be left in Affghanistan—Opinions of the campaign entertained in England.

So soon as it became manifest that nothing but a war on the largest scale would fully meet the views of the Governor-General and his advisers, it was resolved that this should be commenced in form next spring, as early as the disappearance of the snow beyond the passes would permit. Runjeet Singh declining to suffer our troops to traverse the Punjaub, our principal rendezvous was appointed to be Shikarpore in Scinde; our line of advance, by the Bolan Pass, Quettah, and Candahar.

During the preliminary diplomatic arrangements, which had occupied

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from December, 1837, till August, 1838, military preparations had been in rapid progress. The Army of India, which had, since 1826, been reduced from an effective force of 274,000, did not, in 1837, exceed the strength of 190,000, exclusive of contingent or subsidiary troops. (1) This was, before the month of October in the following year, raised to 203,000;—an augmentation of ten men to each company (2) ordered on the 30th June, and a second of similar amount on the 28th August, having given an increase of 13,000 men. (3) Besides this, a force raised amongst the camp-followers at the Company's various frontier posts, officered from the Indian army, and paid by the British treasury, under the name of the "Shah's Contingent," added, before next midsummer, nearly 8,000 men to the muster-roll of the army: these, if not very efficient, were as expensive as our best drilled veterans. The encrease of our army, occasioned by the Affghan war, betwixt 1838 and 1842, amounted to 50,826 men.

Sir Henry Fane was at this time Commander-in-Chief of all India. He is said to have disapproved both of the principles of policy, and the arrangement of the details of the expedition; (4) and viewed with great apprehension the prospect of having our armies so far removed from their base of operations—our own frontier. The Commander-in-Chief was, besides, in indifferent health and about to proceed to Europe: he had, indeed, retired, and was succeeded by Sir Jasper Nicholls, before the expedition returned

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1. British Empire in the East, by Count Bjornstjerna, 1838.—Translated by H. Evans Loyd. London, 1840. Vol. i., p. 185. The following is given by this illustrious foreigner as the strength of our armies in 1837:—

Staff, British	312	Brought over	17,576
Company's officers of British birth	3,416	Artillery train	1,392
Officers of Hindoo birth	3,416	Cavalry	14,529
Engineer corps	3,498	Infantry	124,281
Horse artillery	1,022	European troops	26,582
Foot ditto	5,892	Medical Staff, &c.	5,000
	17,576	Total	189,360

2. See General Order, Simla, 30th June and 28th August,—republished in Bombay G. O. to the same effect, for the army of the Western Presidency, July 12th and September 3rd.

3. *Asiatic Journal*, new series, second part, p. 328, for Dec. 1838. The cost of the Company's military establishment was in 1830 set down in the Parliamentary papers at 9½ millions sterling. The ordinary annual charge of a sepoy regiment of 1000 men, every thing included, is reckoned at about £40,000:—that of a European regiment at about £80,000. Cavalry charges are double those of infantry.

4. Letter from his son, published in the *London Times* of 5th June 1842:—"I am prepared to prove, if called upon, [says Colonel Fane] that the military head in India and second member of council of that country, did oppose, or perhaps rather point out to the Governor-General, the extreme danger of this wild and unmeasured expedition."—"He ensured Lord Auckland of the success which did at first appear to attend us, but warned him, that to maintain large bodies of troops in countries so distant, and which scarce produced food sufficient for the scanty population, was next to impossible."

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to India. (5) He resigned the command of the onward force at Ferozepore, and boats were provided for himself and staff to drop down the Sutledge and Indus, (keeping parallel with the marching column) with the intention of remaining at Bombay, (which he in fact did for several months afterwards) but retaining the post of Commander-in-Chief in India until his successor should be appointed from home. The Governor-General, immediately upon this resignation in December 1838, nominated Sir John Keane to the chief command and direction of the whole force; a brave and experienced officer, but head-strong, passionate, vindictive and domineering, though bold and determined in action. From this period he was instructed by the Governor-General to give his own orders to Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, as senior officer, succeeded to the command of the Bengal column as a temporary measure, until its junction with the Bombay troops. This also gave the temporary command of a division to Major General Nott, and of a brigade to Colonel Dennie. The head-quarters of the Bengal column had assembled at Ferozepore, an outstation on the banks of the Sutlej, about 50 miles from Lahore, the capital of the Punjaub. The nearest course for this body to have pursued would have been through the Seikh territory; by which route a march of 350 miles from their cantonments would have brought them to Peshawur; 200 more through the Khyber and Khoord Cabool passes and by Jellalabad, would have taken them at once to Cabool. The difficulties of this line have at all times been considered formidable: no army save our own ever appears to have forced them. Nadir Shah, in 1739, paid £100,000 for the use of the passes; (6) and the Khyberies and Ghilzies who inhabit the adjoining mountains, have always been in the habit of receiving from £4,000 to £8,000 a-year as black-mail, from the Doorannee rulers. for free passages to kafilas to and from Cabool. Yet the facility with which Colonel Wade made his way, the following August, from Peshawur to Cabool with 10,000 men, shews that when the natives are liberally treated, and prudently dealt with, and not previously excited to hostility, their country may be traversed with comparatively little trouble. The objections to this route, however, lay not in the physical difficulties which presented themselves to our progress,—these have grown upon us as we have become better acquainted with them. They were at the time surmounted by the Shahzada Timour's contingent, and were held comparatively lightly of by officers of experience. (7) The insurmountable objec-

5. Narrative of the War in Affghanistan, by Capt. H. Havelock, H. M. 13th L. I., Vol. ii., p. 173.

6. March and Operations of the Army of the Indus—1840. Major Hough, to whom we shall have many occasions of acknowledging our obligations, omits to quote his authority on this point.

7. Captain Havelock reasons this matter very ably: he gives the preference to an advance by Dera-Ismael Khan—a little-known path over the

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tions of our ancient *ally* Runjeet Singh to the passage of so formidable a force through the centre of his country, compelled us to take the western or Bolan Pass route, towards which the Bengal column now prepared to march. By the beginning of December, the force on the Bengal side, just mentioned as destined to proceed without delay to Scinde, amounted to 9,500 men. A considerably larger number had originally been intended; but intelligence of the retirement of the Persian army from Herat in the end of September, diminished the exigencies of the service; and the intimation which notified this, stated that, under these altered circumstances, the command of the column would be assumed by Sir Willoughby Cotton, on the march downwards to Shikarpore. (8) Besides this, a reserve division of 4,250 men was stationed at Ferozepore under Major-General Duncan. A Seikh army of observation of 15,000 was agreed by Runjeet Singh to be maintained at Peshawur, while the levies of the Shahzada Timour, the eldest son of the Shah, amounted to 4,800 of the contingent, with 6,000 Seikh allies. This last was taken charge of by Lieut.-Colonel Wade, (9) and moved on Cabool by the eastern passes.

The Bombay column, under Sir J. Keane, landed at Vikkur, on the eastern bank of the Hujamry mouth of the river Indus, 50 miles to the right of the town and fort of Kurrachee, betwixt the 20th and 28th of November. (10) The Ameers of Scinde—feudatories of the Dooranee Empire, with whom, for the space of ten years, we had been on terms of alliance (11)—had faithfully promised to provide supplies and the means of conveyance for our armies. On our arrival at Kurrachee, so far from finding that either the one or the other had been attended to, it was discovered that they entertained the most jealous and hostile feelings towards us, and had done all that they could to obstruct and annoy us on our advance.

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mountains from Dejerat direct upon Ghuznie; by which it was pretended General Nott's force were, on a recent occasion, ordered to return. Havelock wrote after returning to India by the Khyber route; and speaks disparagingly of the Khoord Cabool and Tezeen defiles, which at that time he had not seen. It is curious that this officer should have had three times to force his way through this series of passes—once on the march of Sir R. Sale's force in October 1841, and twice with that of General Pollock in September and October 1842.

8. General order quoted by Hough, p. 3, dated Secret Department, December 4.

9. Captain, now Lieut. Colonel Sir, C. M. Wade, then political agent in these parts.

10. Rough notes of the Campaign in Scinde and Affghanistan, by Captain James Outram.—Campaign of the Army of the Indus, by R. H. Kennedy, M. D., Superintending Surgeon to the Bombay column of the force. The port of Kurrachee, at which the British force has, since 1838, been stationed, is 500 miles by sea from Bombay. A Lighthouse, and new cantonments, have just been ordered to be constructed, with a view of maintaining it as a permanent possession.

11. Visit to the Court of Scinde, by James Burnes, M. D., K. H., F. R. S.

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While they continued to profess the utmost friendship for us, they began to levy, *en masse*, their fighting men from seventeen to sixty years of age. From 16,000 to 17,000 Beloochees occupied the Hydrabad side of the river. So eager were these undisciplined hordes to attack us, that it was said the Ameers had to distribute from £50,000 to £60,000 amongst them to keep them at peace. (12) Captain Outram, (who acted as extra A. D. C. to Sir John Keane,) one of the most active, indefatigable, and adventurous soldiers in the army, was dispatched without loss of time to Cutch, a subsidiary state to the eastward, with letters from Sir John Keane and Colonel (now Sir Henry) Pottinger to the Rao. His Highness was the personal friend of both, as well as one of the most zealous and faithful supporters of the British government to be found among the princes of India, and his aid and influence on this occasion enabled Captain Outram to succeed in collecting a considerable supply of camels—a most seasonable help to Sir John Keane. The troops which had disembarked at Vikkur 5,500 strong, after various difficulties and delays, advanced towards Tatta on the 24th December. They crossed an arm of the Indus by a bridge of boats: the heavy baggage was transported in flat-bottomed vessels up the stream. The climate here was very trying for the native troops: the thermometer, which rose to about 90° during the day, descending as low as 35° over night,—a temperature, this latter, which nearly incapacitates the sepoy, as the former unfits the European, for duty. (13) It had originally been proposed that, for the sake of producing a moral effect, the army should proceed up the river by boat; but this unwise project was afterwards renounced. Its extreme inexpediency was subsequently proved by the difficulty experienced in providing boats for the transportation of the mere ordnance stores of the army,—whatever was transported by the river being afterwards found an impediment and vexation. (14)

The granaries had been plundered by the Beloochees, as was believed by the sanction of the Ameers. At length, seeing that we could make our way without their aid, and in spite of their resistance, they agreed to the terms of the treaty proposed by us; having further pledged themselves to supply us with whatever we required, on being duly paid for it. A tribute of £280,000 having been set down as due by them to the Shah Soojah, we, as his patrons, for the present compelled them to make payment to us of £100,000 as a first instalment of the long arrear. By the 1st February they had duly professed submission, their army having, with much difficulty,

12. Outram, p. 30.
13. Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Affghanistan, in 1838-39—By R. H. Kennedy, M. D., Chief of the Medical Staff of the Bombay Division.
14. Kennedy, Vol. i., p. 145.

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been disbanded by them. Their resolution on this point was probably stimulated by the fact, that while the Bombay column was encamped within two marches of their capital, the Shah's contingent, 6,000 strong—which was the first to approach the river at Shikarpore on their left, moved down parallel to the line of Sir John Keane's upward advance, and occupied Larkhana, while half the Bengal column moved upon their right, the other half standing fast at Sukkur; so that they had in their immediate neighbourhood three armies, amounting in all to above 20,000 men. After a considerable halt at Tatta, collecting camels and making other preparations, as well as carrying on negotiations with the Ameers, the force moved on to Jerruck, one of the strongest positions on the Indus, and within two marches of Hydrabad. Here it was that the Ameers were desired to communicate their final answer to the terms proposed. They at first resolutely refused their assent to these, and Sir John Keane adopted measures without loss of time to compel them to come in to our views. He dispatched messengers and additional guards down the river to hasten up and protect the heavy ordnance and ammunition, which would be required in the event of an attack upon Hydrabad becoming necessary; while the other demonstrations from the force above were directed as already detailed. The Ameers seeing themselves in this serious predicament—threatened with an attack upon their capital from all points, immediately gave in to all the terms proposed to them.

It did not come within the plan for the campaign that Hydrabad should be taken, or the Ameers deposed: the instructions of Lord Auckland were very strong and specific on this point, and nothing short of an actual attack on our troops, or positive refusal of the Ameers to come in to our terms, would have justified the Commander-in-Chief in using force and attacking their capital; it being thought that the consequences of such a measure might retard the ulterior operations of the campaign, and perhaps the season be so far advanced as to render hazardous the march of the troops through the Bolan Pass, and thereby delay the operations for a whole year. The resident, Colonel Pottinger, was most resolute in resisting all propositions involving the idea of actual aggression, to which abundant provocation had been given. The Governor-General was afterwards greatly pleased with Sir John Keane's management of the affair. (15) The brushwood adjoining the camp having taken fire, during the halt at Jerruck, three promising young officers, who had been out shooting, were burnt to death.

On the 24th Jan. the Bengal column reached Roree, on the Indus; and on

15. We state this on the authority subsequently referred to as unquestionable, although not named. An impression has hitherto very generally prevailed that Sir J. Keane was in fault in not having attacked Hydrabad: on no point were his instructions more explicit: they were to the effect notified in the text.

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the 27th crossed to Sukkur, on the left bank, by a bridge of boats. Bukkur, a strong fort situated on a rocky island in the middle of the river, was, after some delay, ceded to us by authority of the Ameer of Khyrpoor. On the 28th, a detachment of 5,500 men was dispatched towards Hydrabad, under Sir W. Cotton, to act in concert with the army of Sir John Keane, whose movements have just been given, should the conduct of the Ameers have compelled active measures to be resorted to. The treaty had, however, meanwhile been subscribed; and, when seven marches on his way, Sir W. Cotton was, on the 6th February, ordered to retrace his steps. The Shah's contingent having marched in a line nearly parallel to that of Sir W. Cotton's detachment, but on the western side of the river and at some distance from its banks, had meanwhile occupied Larkhana some 25 miles lower down, but on the same side with Shikarpore. Intimation having been received that there was no further occasion for their services in the direction of Hydrabad, the two detachments retraced their steps, and returned to head-quarters; that on the right bank of the river having crossed the Indus from Roree to Sukkur by a bridge of boats betwixt the 13th and 15th. At Sehwan, Sir Henry Fane and Sir John Keane met by a preconcerted plan, and the meeting was such as could not but gratify all who saw it. The two men embraced: they had always, it seems, been upon the most intimate and friendly terms, and meeting for the first time in the east on such an occasion, and in such a place, was full of interest.

On reaching Larkhana, Sir John Keane, in a general order, dated 10th March, announced to the troops of both presidencies the arrangements consequent upon his assuming the command, in obedience to the Governor-General's orders, by which amongst other things Sir Willoughby Cotton, as a matter of course, fell back to the command of his division, General Nott to his brigade, and Colonel Dennie to his regiment; Major-General Willshire to command the Bombay division, Major-General Thackwell the cavalry division, and Brigadier Stevenson, as senior officer, the artillery of both presidencies. The troops of Bengal and Bombay to be guided as much as possible by the regulations of their own particular presidency; and the orders of the Commander-in-Chief intended for both to be issued through, and signed by, Lieut.-Colonel Macdonald, the Deputy Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, Bombay, and senior officer in the department of the Adjutant-General with the force, officiating also as Military Secretary to his Excellency.

Sir John Keane quitted the Bombay column a few days afterwards for the advance, taking as his escort a wing of the 1st cavalry, and one of the 19th Native Infantry. On reaching Dadur, he had his first interview with his Majesty Shah Soojah and Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Macnaghten, whose camp had reached that place the day before, and all moved on

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together through the Bolan Pass. The Shah's camp continued during all the after operations with the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General employed Sir Alexander Burnes, Major Leech, and several other officers to collect camels, and was under the impression that when all should be concentrated at Shikarpore, they (including those with the Bengal column) would amount to 45,000; and this number, he informed Sir John Keane, should be distributed into fair proportions between the troops of the two presidencies and Shah Soojah's contingent, but not one half this amount was ever collected. The Bengal column, which had just arrived, took it for granted that all the camels were for them; and thought it extremely hard that the Commander-in-Chief should order any to be appropriated for the Bombay troops, or for the Shah: the Bengal Commissariat officers left at Shikarpore, in particular managed to evade every order sent to them to dispatch camels to Larkhana, until Captain Outram was sent there, and Colonel Dennie, who was then in charge, exercised his authority very properly on that point. At this time Colonel Dennie was still in command of two native regiments of General Nott's brigade, and thought it hard these troops should be left there, and the camels given up for raw levies of the Shah. On this point he addressed a letter to Colonel Macdonald for the information of the Commander-in-Chief; and out of this has arisen an erroneous impression, as now ascertained, that Colonel Dennie thereby incurred the displeasure of Sir John Keane. His Excellency was himself completely of the same opinion with Colonel Dennie, but the Governor-General's policy and his orders were, to send on the Shah's contingent entire if possible. It seems Sir John Keane at this period had a very high opinion of Colonel Dennie; that he thought equally well of him when he joined at Candahar; and up to the day after Ghuznie was taken, when, by a visit Colonel Dennie paid him in his tent, he greatly offended the Commander-in-Chief. (16) The reports, therefore, which have gained such extensive circulation, countenanced as they are by his own letters since published, that Sir John Keane bore enmity to Colonel Dennie before the capture of Ghuznie, are totally without foundation. Sir John Keane felt himself bound to disapprove of some arrangements made by Colonel Dennie, when he volunteered to take charge of a convoy from Dadur through the Bolan Pass, which included two troops of the Shah's artillery, a great part of the material belonging to them having been captured by bands of plunderers and robbers in the pass on that occasion; but this circumstance made no difference in the feelings of the Commander-

16. We give this view of the case on the highest authority: our own impressions have, we confess, been hitherto different: we are happy to have this opportunity of correcting them.

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in-Chief towards Colonel Dennie, who was a guest at Sir John Keane's table, partaking of his hospitalities during the halt at Candahar.

A reserve force of 3,000 men had been ordered up from Bombay to be stationed at Kurrachee. They landed near the town on the 3d February, about 50 miles from the Hujamry mouth of the Indus, where the troops under Sir John Keane had disembarked on the 27th November.

The fishermen on the coast had informed them that the fort was one of the strongest in Lower Scinde, and that it was defended by one of the Ameers in person, with an army of 3,000 men. Her Majesty's ships *Wellesley* and *Algerine*, under command of Admiral Sir F. Maitland, accompanied the transports. Her Majesty's 40th having landed under command of Colonel Valiant, with some artillery, the fort was levelled by the first broadside of the men-of-war, and was within the hour in our possession, without the troops having occasion to fire a shot. The garrison were captured in endeavouring to make their escape, and were found to consist of no more than 20 men! Cholera, which has since that period proved so fatal to the troops stationed at Kurrachee, broke out soon after the brigade was encamped, and carried off many men; together with Colonel Thomas Powell of the 40th regiment; an old and experienced Peninsular officer, much regretted. To return, however, to the armies now on their march towards the mountains. It had been agreed that the Bengal division, for the sake of conveniency of carrying on baggage and supplies, should move at some distance ahead of the Bombay troops, which had not yet overtaken them, and by a line considerably to the right, and that the whole army should unite at Candahar. It was at one time proposed that Sir John Keane's force should ascend the Gundava Pass, and take a line of route for a time forming an acute angle with that the others pursued. This resolution was, however, departed from, from the apprehension of obstructions which proved to be unreal. The descent of Sir T. Willshire by this pass, after the fall of Kelat the following November, shewed its perfect practicability. (17) The whole of the principal division, which had been separated into three portions by the diversion on Hydrabad, having, as already stated, been once more reunited on the 17th February, proceeded towards Shikarpore, a large commercial town containing about 6,000 houses, and 30,000 inhabitants, on the edge of the desert, (18) which interposes itself betwixt Scinde and the fertile plains of Cutchee, skirting the foot of the mountains; the Bengal 35th Native Infantry had been ordered to stand fast at Sukkur till relieved, part of the treasure having been deposited in the adjoining fort of Bukkur. Sir Willoughby Cotton arrived at Shikarpore on the 20th February; the other portions of

17. Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 157.
18. Hough, p. 33—Sir Alexander Burnes's Travels to Bokhara.

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the force having come in in the course of the five preceding days, orders were given to commence the march towards the Bolan Pass without delay. The force under his immediate command, including the Shah's contingent, amounted to about 15,000 fighting men, attended by about 60,000 camp-followers; so that there were nearly 100,000 people to feed from the commissariat. (19) This was altogether independent of the Bombay division, amounting to 5,500 fighting men, with probably not fewer than 30,000 camp-followers; so that the whole army betwixt Kurrachee—where the reserve of 3,000 was stationed—and Dadur, just before we entered the Bolan Pass, amounted to 27,000 soldiers, and probably 125,000 camp-followers,—or nearly 150,000 in all. The Bombay camp followers provided their own food, and were not rationed by the commissariat. The desert having been crossed in safety, Dadur, at the foot of the mountains 150 miles beyond Shikarpore, was attained by the 6th March, the Bombay troops being still nine marches, or nearly 100 miles, behind. Here supplies began to run short, so that it was thought prudent to put the non-combatants of the Bengal column on half rations before entering the mountain country. Yet they had scarcely left the territories of professing allies, and overcome no more than one-half of the road to Cabool; they had hitherto lost little or nothing by pillage, and never encountered an enemy. Dadur is, as already stated, the nearest town to the base of that enormous ridge which, buttress-like, supports the table land beyond. The latter is here attained by the defile known by the name of the Bolan Pass—a terrible chasm which, in the course of 70 miles, carries the traveller to a height of 5,637 feet above the level of the plains below, which are here about 750 feet in height above the sea. This portion of the country is inhabited by the poorest and wildest tribes, who live entirely by plunder—supporting existence on the plainest and scantiest fare. Fortunately, they offered no opposition to our troops till just about to quit the defile, when some skirmishing took place, by which a few of our people were wounded. The excessive barrenness and steepness of the line of march had caused the destruction of a vast number of horses and camels, and a considerable loss of private baggage. On the 26th March the troops arrived, in safety, at Quettah, where a very short halt was permitted them. This is the capital of the fertile valleys of Shawl and Pesheen. It contains a population of about 6,000 souls. The territory was, in the reign of Ahmed Shah, made over to Kelat on condition of contributing a contingent of 12,000 men when the exigencies of the state

19. Hough, p. 34. We give the above on the authority of Major Hough. We are assured, however, by a member of Lord Keane's staff, that the camp-followers must be prodigiously over-rated—28,000 only having been mustered at Candahar.

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required it: it afterwards became, along with Kelat, wholly independent of Candahar, whose chiefs desired to keep it in subjection. We have just seen how the expectations of the army had been disappointed in obtaining supplies from the Ameers of Hydrabad and Khyrpoor; a more severe source of mortification awaited them in the non-fulfilment of the promises of Mehrab Khan of Kelat, whose dominions had been traversed by us from a little beyond Shikarpore to Quettah. The chief just named governed the various rude tribes who inhabit the eastern portion of Beloochistan. He could boast a descent from seven princes; was a shrewd, brave, unscrupulous ruler, who had never sought our friendship, or received overtures of amity, till the march of our armies had begun. "While the Dooraunee empire preserved the semblance of authority [says Masson], there was, agreeably to the original treaty concluded between Ahmed Shah and Nasser Khan, a Belooch force of one thousand men stationed in Cashmere; and the Khans of Kelat had ever been attentive to the observance of their engagements. On the dislocation of the empire, and after Cashmere had been lost (1809), there was, of course, an end to the treaty, and, virtually, of dependence." "So long as there was a nominal Shah in the country, as in the case of the Shah Ayub, they professed a certain allegiance; but when, by the final partition of the remnants of the Dooraunee empire, it became parcelled into small and separate chiefships, they no longer felt the necessity of acknowledging the supremacy of either." (20) In 1834, when the Shah Soojah was defeated at Candahar, Mehrab Khan gave him shelter, and refused to deliver him up to his enemies. (21) In November, 1838, Sir Alexander Burnes (22) had been dispatched to Shikarpore to endeavour to obtain a treaty with him, binding himself to supply our army with carriage and provisions so far as our march lay through his country. For this, the Khan was to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the war, besides payment for the supplies; but was to be denuded of all his independence, and a moiety of his territory, so soon as the Shah was restored! He held out as long as he could, but at length gave a hesitating, reluctant, and apparently insincere assent. It was no wonder that he should have been concussed into this: an army of 20,000 men was then on its march, the whole of which was to pass through his territories—one-fourth of it by the Gundava route, subsequently abandoned, close to his

20. Journies in Beloochistan, Affghanistan, and the Punjaub, by Charles Masson. 3 vols: Bentley, 1842, vol. ii., p. 101.

21. Ibid, p. 102. Mr. Masson was the chief, or rather the only, authority referred to by Sir C. M. Wade, in support of the views afterwards adopted by Lord Auckland in opposition to those of Sir Alex. Burnes.

22. Sir Alexander Burnes was appointed Envoy to Kelat and other states, under Mr. Macnaghten's direction—General Notification by the Governor-General, Simla, October 1.

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capital. All the historians of the campaign agree that, had this last line of march been pursued by the Bombay column, Kelat would have been dealt with at once. Mehrab promised plentifully, as most oriental, and many European princes, under these circumstances, would have done; trusting that the chapter of accidents would enable him to evade, or release him from, a treaty which was acceded to under fear or constraint, and which we had no right whatever to impose upon him. Major Leech had been at Kelat some months before (August 1838), urging the chief to supply us on our march. The answer received at this time was such as to furnish but little hope that our wishes would be complied with. (23) It is important to keep these things in view: the affairs of Kelat furnish two singularly important episodes further on in our narrative; and nearly all the writers of the time, apparently without searching into the facts, or seriously considering the matter, concur in condemning the Khan as guilty of some grievous piece of ingratitude, or a gross breach of treaty,—well deserving the capital punishment afterwards inflicted on him! Before leaving Shikarpore the Kelat chief had desired us to send people to take charge of the stores he had provided for us, as he would not be responsible for their safety. On applying at Dadur for what we considered we had reason to expect from him, less than one-tenth of what we looked for was found to have been provided. On the 24th March, Sir Alex. Burnes, with Lieutenants Simpson and Paterson, went from Sir-i-ab on a further embassy to Kelat, to endeavour to reason the chief into terms. "He appears [says Atkinson] to have had a morbid dread of the Shah Soojah; and could not be brought to promise that he would see him, without the assurance that the British would stand his friends, and guarantee his safety." (24) He was informed that he needed be under no apprehension on that head,—that he should hold the territory dependent on Cabool, (25) on the same terms as in the reign of Ahmed Shah, grandfather of the Shah Soojah, in the middle of the preceding century. He was, as formerly intimated, proposed to receive a subsidy of £15,000 a-year during the continuance of our army

23. Hough, p. 45, note :—"I must say, [writes Hough,] he, *i. e.*, Major Leech, was never very sanguine as to his keeping his promise."

24. Hough, p 73, note. The above are nearly the words said to have been used by the Khan.

25. The Expedition into Affghanistan—by Dr. J. Atkinson, Superintending Surgeon of the Bengal Division. The apprehensions here detailed were, in all likelihood, a feint to get rid of a peculiarly disagreeable arrangement. The whole of the Kelat episode has been excessively compressed. Our treatment of Mehrab Khan was, perhaps, the most tyrannous proceeding during the campaign. We send an army of 20,000 men into the country—ask one of the rulers to supply us with the means of carrying on the war, which, if successful, robs him of his power and independence—and then, when he endeavours to resist us, we attack and plunder his capital, and kill himself and his Chiefs!

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in the direction of Khorassan, on condition of supplying provisions, carriage, and escorts, to the extent of his ability; all of which were to be separately paid for. After a good deal of shuffling and evasion, he at length subscribed the treaty. When it is considered that, during the Barukzye rule, Kelat and its acquisitions—Quettah and Shawl amongst the rest—had been perfectly independent, his reluctance to accede to a measure whose object was the restoration to the throne a man who had treated him with gross ingratitude, and who he hated and despised,—and that from this must follow the loss of the fairest half of his country, and all his independence,—his aversion to our advance, and reluctance to assist us, seems neither so marvellous nor reprehensible as the writers of the time appear to regard it. The provisions were at length promised, but were not forthcoming, and the payment never was required. (26) Burnes gives a very minute account of one of his discussions with this Chief, in a letter to Government, dated March 30, 1839. He said that "Dost Mahomed was a man of resource and ability; and though we could easily put him down through the Shah Soojah, even in our present mode of procedure, we could never win over the Affghan nation by it." (27) "Wait," said he, "till sickness overtakes your troops—till they are exhausted with fatigue from long and harassing marches, and from the total want of supplies; wait till they have drank of many waters; and wait, too, till they feel the sharpness of the Affghan swords." (28) The Khan is said, on another occasion, to have used these ominous words:—"You have brought an army into the country, but how do you propose to take it out again?" (29)—the very expression which fell from the Duke of Wellington, on the same subject, on

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26. These statements are given on the authority of Major Hough, who is generally correct, though he does not quote his informant. He states that Lieut. Simpson, one of the party, informed him that a plot had been laid by Mehrab Khan to murder them, which was only foiled by their sudden departure. This is not noticed in any of the letters, either public or private, of Sir Alexander Burnes,—who speaks of the Khan with great respect: neither is it so by Masson, to whom he was intimately known: and we hold it, therefore, groundless, as it certainly is eminently improbable.

27. This letter was first published in the *Bombay Times* of the 24th and 27th August, 1842—Subsequently at greater length in the *Caledonian Mercury*, (an Edinburgh paper) 22d Oct, 1842. Several other documents appear in this paper not previously printed, to which we shall have occasion to refer. Burnes concludes his letter to Government by stating, in reference to the counsel the Kelat Chief had offered as to the conduct of the Shah Soojah—"I agreed his advice was sound and good."

28 Atkinson, p. 131. Dr. Atkinson's book contains far the fullest information of any of our printed authorities on the Kelat treaty. His facts and inferences, however, seem often singularly inconsequential. He gives the above as evidence of the connection of the Chief with Persia and Russia!

29. We take this from Hough: it is not mentioned by Burnes The remarkable sagacity of the observations of the whole of the Affghan Chiefs, as given in the official papers, contrasts strikingly with the flimsy sophistry of Lord Auckland's politicals.

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the intimation of our advance into the country having been made in parliament. (30) We never took the army out of the country—their bones rest in Affghanistan! Sir Alex. Burnes rejoined the force on the 7th April, without any satisfactory arrangement having been effected. To return from this digression to the Bengal column, which we left at Quettah—the Bombay column not having as yet entered the Bolan Pass. On the 4th April, Sir John Keane having established his head-quarters at Quettah, issued an order in continuation of that promulgated at Larkhana, dated 10th March, by which Sir W. Cotton was directed to resume charge of the first division, and General Nott of the second brigade, from which they had been temporarily transferred on the 4th December. Colonel Dennie, who had been left in command of troops at Shikarpore, was ordered to join his regiment,—Brigadier Gordon, commanding in Upper Scinde, succeeding to his duties. The other details may be passed over for the present. So scarce and dear had grain already become, that the camp-followers greedily devoured the fried skins of sheep, coagulated blood, roots, or whatever else they could procure, to save themselves from starvation. (31) With a march of 150 miles before them to Candahar, they were obliged to push on as far as Pesheen (25 miles) with only ten days' half rations for the men, and none at all for the cattle. (32) All communication betwixt the front and rear divisions, now 100 miles apart from each other, was completely cut off by the tribes in the Pass. A very unlooked for spirit of discontent had began to make its appearance amongst the Bengal troops just before Sir John Keane took command at Quettah. They had been on half rations for some time before his arrival, and had permitted themselves to believe that their situation was desperate. A political officer (Major Leech, we understand) tendered his advice, in writing, to Sir Willoughby Cotton, among other alterations, that a retreat towards Shikarpore would be prudent; this baneful counsel got circulation through the camp, and was in everybody's mouth, and many had made up their minds that it must end in a retreat. The first act of Sir John Keane was, to desire that no officer or soldier should permit themselves to indulge in such nonsensical and mischievous talk, and he issued an order for a march forward the next morning. This confidence on the part of the Commander-in-Chief seemed to inspire spirit in all. The adoption of some prompt and stringent measure for the subsistence of the troops now became indispensable; and as more than nine days' provisions for a fifteen days' march could not on any terms be procured, the fighting men were put on half, and the non-combatants, who had been reduced to this ten days before, were brought

30. Hansard's Debates, February, 1839.
31. Hough, p. 74.
32. Outram, p. 62.

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down to quarter rations (33)—or, as Havelock calls it, famine allowance. (34) On the first march towards Candahar, sixty of the artillery horses were shot, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy,—no more food for them being procurable. In the course of seven days, 116 cavalry horses died from the effects of starvation; and of eating a poisonous weed often mixed with the grass which was gathered: and, betwixt the 6th April and middle of June, this arm of the service was nearly disabled for want of food! Nine hundred camels had died in the course of three months! (35) It is needless to follow, in detail, the footsteps of the troops on their march to Candahar—a distance of 150 miles, which occupied them till the 6th April. They found some supplies of forage, as well as live-stock, on the way—as welcome as unlooked-for,—which considerably relieved the pressure of their necessities. They were incessantly harassed by the predatory tribes, who, without venturing to attack them, omitted no opportunity of committing the most audacious acts of robbery on their baggage. These were, on most occasions, pursued, and on many overtaken; and, when captured, were hanged or shot—no quarter being on any occasion given them. On the 26th April the head-quarters of the army reached Candahar. (36) The Bengal column had traversed a distance of 1,000 miles since quitting Ferozepore; the non-combatants had been on half or on quarter rations for the preceding 48 days; the fighting men, with the cattle of all arms, on half rations; the cavalry and light artillery horses had had no grain for 26 days, and were at length found unfit for duty,—in which state they continued for some weeks after their halt. (37)

We must now return, however, and trace the progress of the Bombay column; which, when the Bengal troops entered the Bolan Pass, was nine marches in the rear, but had now so far gained on the advance as to be in the Kojjuck Pass, 60 miles behind, when the head-quarters of the grand army arrived under the walls of Candahar.

On the forward movement, just after the demonstration opposite Hydrabad, betwixt the 4th and 10th February, the Bombay column kept along the western bank of the Indus, continuing to approach the range which divides Lower from Upper Scinde at the Lukkee Pass. Here 1,000 men were, for four days, employed in cutting a road along the face of the precipice which overhangs the river, and in dragging up the guns and heavy baggage. Having experienced some inconvenience in consequence of an order which, having been misunderstood, caused the baggage to separate

33. Atkinson.
34. Havelock, vol. i., p. 255.
35. Ibid, p. 298.
36. Hough, p. 96. Havelock, p. 298.
37. Kennedy. vol. i., pp. 188 to 209, gives a very lively and graphic account of the march of the Bombay column till it fell, at Dadur, into the route of that which preceded it.

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into several portions, and some alarm in crossing the Arul, a large artificial canal, where the pontoon bridge was threatened to be carried away by a premature inundation;—they, on the 3d March, reached Larkhana, the post already described as having been occupied by the Shah's troops on their descent from Bukkur to assist in hastening the resolves of the Ameers. In the plan of operations for the campaign, one brigade at least of the Bombay troops was ordered to be left on the banks of the Indus, to be distributed as might be found necessary, and such portions stationed at Sukkur and Shikarpore, and along the line to Dadur, as might be deemed proper to keep up the communication with the brigade of Bengal troops above the Bolan Pass, at Quettah, and the advance—three native regiments under Brigadier Gordon, were, therefore, selected for the purpose. Indeed, it would have been almost impossible to have taken them on for want of carriage. The remainder of the Bombay column, then reduced to 3600 men, two-thirds European and the other natives of India (1st Cavalry and 19th Bombay Native Infantry) moved on. They crossed the desert by a forced march of 30 miles on the 16th. A person sent to explore the Gundava Pass, returned and reported it impracticable. Had it been threaded as was intended, it would have carried the force close by Kelat, and out of the already impoverished track of the leading division. It does not appear how the reporter came to the conclusion just stated: that it was an erroneous one, appeared the following November, by the facility with which it was traversed in the opposite direction by our troops. On the 23d March, Sir John Keane, with his staff, escorted by a detachment of Bombay light cavalry, quitted the force, and after joining Shah Soojah at Dadur on the 28th March, arrived, as already stated, at his command at Quettah on the 4th April. He was succeeded in charge by Sir T. Willshire. (38) Mehrab Khan, whose actual hostility towards us had scarcely sought to conceal itself by so much of the semblance of friendship as to mislead any one, even when in the act of treating with us, appears to have urged the tribes along the line of our march to practise every species of annoyance against us; a system which needed little stimulant amongst the predatory hordes, who have, from time immemorial, subsisted almost entirely by plunder. In an intercepted letter addressed to a hill chief, of a date subsequent to that of the treaty of the beginning of April, he is reported to have written—"What is the use of your treaties and your arrangements? all child's play. There is no relief but in death: no cure but in the destruction of the English. Their heads, goods, and bodies must be sacrificed. Strengthen the Pass. Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy." (39) How nearly this system had proved successful,

38. Kennedy, *ut supra*.
39. Atkinson, p. 132.—Though both Major Hough and Dr Atkinson furnish

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under the very imperfect shape it assumed, we have already seen: had it been carried out as just suggested, the campaign would probably have closed short of Candahar. Orders had been given to withhold all grain from us in Cutchee; and the most annoying system was that of rifling the letter-bags, so that, from the end of March till the troops reached Cabool in August, the safe arrival of not a single packet could ever be depended on. (40) Numberless executions occurred in consequence of this very vexatious species of molestation; but it does not appear to have, in any degree, decreased with the deaths of a few of the culprits. On the 8th April, the now diminished column, having suffered grievously from excessive heat—the thermometer often standing as high as 104°—reached Dadur, and found Major Griffiths in charge of the depot of the Bengal commissariat. Stores having been received from Shikarpore, the whole of the troops had entered the Bolan Pass by the 12th. The thermometer was 110°; but could they have borne fire by thinking on the snowy Caucasus the accounts they received of a snow storm which had been experienced just above the Pass a few weeks before would have relieved them. On the 20th they reached Quettah, having, on their progress through the Pass, escaped molestation from the enemy till near the conclusion; a rather sharp attack was made upon them in a very exposed position, but occasioned nothing more than the loss of some baggage and three or four men: the loss of forty-nine camel-loads of grain, with five horses killed, was the heaviest of our casualties. (41) During the march from Dadur they had been considerably annoyed by the stench of dead camels, and multitudes of unburied bodies of the enemy left behind along the line of the advance of the first division. General Nott, with the second brigade, and a considerable force of foot artillery, had been left behind at Quettah to keep open the communication with the rear. Here, a large amount of camel-men deserted.

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facts sufficient to illustrate the character of the chief, as well as to prove the sagacity, if not the honesty, of the system proposed to be put in force, neither of them seem to comprehend the drift of their own statements! They speak of Mehrab Khan as a weak-minded traitor, well deserving the punishment inflicted on him, because he promised but did not fulfil that which he dared not refuse, but might well withhold! Major Havelock and Sir A. Burnes give him due credit for talent and sagacity.

40. Kennedy speaks of this as having been done in sheer wantonness of mischief. This is improbable: it is easily accounted for by the wish of interrupting communication—by retarding dispatches—a motive which has been held to legitimatise this species of annoyance in every war. Masson gives particulars of matters of this sort, when he and Loveday were prisoners in the hands of the Brahoes in August 1840—see Masson's letter dated Quettah, Dec. 24, 1840,—published in the *Bombay Times*, March 13; and *Summary*, April 1. Dr Kennedy mentions that the Khan had been sent monies as bribes, and received all he got: we cannot discover any evidence whatever of this in any quarter. All the other writers agree that he was *promised* a subsidy,—but he never earned, nor, so far as we can perceive, *obtained* any.

41. Outram, p. 68.

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The sudden change of climate which, in the course of ten days, had elevated their position by nearly 5,000 feet, and lowered the temperature from 96° or 104° to 80° and 58° produced a slight, but almost universal, though transient, attack of dysentery. Nothing of any note, further than what has just been mentioned, occurred till they reached Candahar, where they arrived, by rapid marches, on the 4th May, and found the Bengal troops, who had been there since the 26th April.

Before proceeding to examine the state of affairs at Candahar, we must record a notable adventure of an officer already well known to fame through forty years of distinguished military service ; and whose name, from this date to the close of his honourable career leading the van at Jellalabad on the 7th April 1842, occupies a conspicuous place in the narrative of the conflicts which from this time, on to the memorable close of our connection with the country three years and a-half afterwards, continued almost without intermission. The party just referred to was Lieutenant Colonel Dennie, of H. M. 13th Light Infantry. He had been left in command of the second brigade, consisting of the 31st and 42d Bengal Native Infantry, ordered to remain at Shikarpore till means of conveyance should reach them from Mooltan and the Punjaub : this was a temporary arrangement, which ceased on the remodelling of the commands. The reserve stores and carriage were here put under his charge ; while he was, at the same time, engaged in organizing a portion of the raw levies directed to form the Shah's contingent. (42) No sooner had Head Quarters got above the pass, than the whole of the camels, horses, and means of conveyance were withdrawn from Shikarpore. Colonel Dennie remonstrated ; but in vain : he complained that he had neither been left hands or feet (43)—neither the means of defence or escape. Remonstrance, however, was useless, and in this helpless state he remained at Shikarpore till the end of March. Captain Stock-

42. Colonel Dennie's letters, 9th March 1839, and 24th Nov. 1840. As we shall have frequent occasion to refer to these papers, we may state that they consist of a series of letters to friends in Bombay, not immediately meant for publication, but of which the writer stated that any use might be made which was desired. provided he was not in his military capacity committed with his superior officers. A number of these were published either in substance, or in the shape of articles, during his life, without the author being referred to, and the proceeding was, we have every reason to believe, highly approved of. When his death removed all personal objections to their appearing in the form in which they were written, a selection made from them was published in the *Bombay Times* during the month of April. They form important historical documents on many points where our information was defective. A similar series of letters, rather of an earlier date, was published in the Dublin University Magazine for September and October 1842. A number of unpublished letters from the same quarter are in the present writer's hands : they also have occasionally been drawn upon, and are marked MSS. papers.

43. Letter dated Cabool, 13th April 1841. We have given nearly the whole of the letter.

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ley of the Bombay commissariat, had, in the mean time, while on his way to Dadur with cattle, grain, and stores, been surrounded and shut up in the fort of Janneedeera by the Beloochees ; 250 of his camels had been captured, and numbers of his people had been cut up. (44) Securing a few treasure camels, the only cattle left him, with 200 sepoys he marched to the rescue ; and, after a rapid march of 150 miles, one-third of it across the desert, he succeeded in saving the convoy, and delivering it safely over to the commissariat depot at Dadur. All intercourse betwixt the troops above and those below the pass had, as before explained, been cut off by the Beloochees. It was here, in the middle of May, that he first learned of the Quettah General Order of the 4th of April, already adverted to, ordering him to join his regiment, now on its way to Candahar. At Dadur, Captain Anderson, commanding two newly raised troops of the Shah's Horse Artillery, with tumbrils, ammunition waggons, &c., amounting to 50 carriages, claimed Colonel Dennie's protection through the Bolan Pass. Opposed in like manner by a numerous enemy the greater part of the way, with horses that could not draw, and boys that could not ride—compelled to halt every alternate day in this mountainous and rocky defile, they were destitute for several days of all powder, and their casualties in killed and wounded were necessarily increased by men dying of apoplexy or going mad from heat. With all these obstacles to be overcome, the detachment was brought in safety to Quettah with astonishingly little loss. From Quettah, Colonel Dennie, with this insignificant force, augmented at Dadur by the accession of five companies of the Bengal 37th N. I., took charge of treasure to Candahar, a distance of 150 miles, the Kojjuck Pass intervening. With this he arrived in safety, (45) and joined the head-quarters of his regiment on the very day appointed.

Having thus brought our narrative to the point where the whole of the elements of the grand army were assembled at Candahar, we may be permitted shortly to review the general aspect of the military arrangements of Sir J. Keane at the opening of a campaign which, up to this date, could scarcely be considered as begun. The troops had marched to the battle-ground, but had hitherto met with no opposition : they were now about to engage in combat. The army which had assembled at Candahar, by the 6th of May amounted to 10,400 (46) fighting men, of which the Bengal

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44. Letter to Major Henderson, Officiating Military Auditor General.—Cabool, 24th Nov. 1840.

45. Letter to Major Henderson, *ut sup.* He says in a published letter of the 13th April 1841, " I have always considered that duty the most arduous, if not the most meritorious, which fell to my lot in Affghanistan."

46. In all numerical matters we have taken Major Hough for our guide. He gives no account of the Contingent in his muster roll, dated Candahar, 1st June. This author is one of those whom every body copies, and no one commends. As a store-house of exact statistical facts, his work is invaluable ; but

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column supplied 6460, the Bombay division, last arrived, 3940 ; these were exclusive of the Shah's Contingent, of whose exact strength, at this date, we are not informed, but which probably brought the force up to 15,000. The followers at Candahar amounted in all to 28,653, of which more than half were on the muster-roll, and all depended on the commissariat. These were attended by about 4000 horses and bullocks, and above 10,000 camels. It was computed, that from Shikarpore about 500 Beloochees had been slain by us ; our own loss amounting to about 40 or 50 men, with about 500 horses, besides 900 camels, and a large quantity of baggage.

The Shah's Contingent constituted a description of force to which we shall have such frequent occasion to refer, that we may here give a short notice of its origin, expense, and uses. It consisted of six regiments of regular infantry, two of cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, a corps of sappers and miners, and a mountain train, besides five local corps of irregulars. These amongst them mustered about 13,000 fighting men, paid and officered by the Government of India, (47) at an outlay of about half a million an-

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it is so dry, and so severely statistical, that it forms rather uninteresting study by itself. In saying this much, we most readily acknowledge the extent to which, on the present and innumerable other occasions, we have been indebted to him. Hough states in his journal, p. 105—"The British force then present at Candahar (8th May) was about 9000 men, and there were about 3000 of the Shah's Contingent, besides some Affghan cavalry." We are unable exactly to reconcile the two statements, but have assumed 15,000 as the gross number.

47. The following abstract of the charges of the Shah's army was supplied us by a Cabool correspondent of 27th September, 1841, whose name is unknown to us, but who, we have reason to believe, held a high official appointment:—

Paid by the Indian Government.	Rupees.
6 Regiments of Infantry of the line, yearly	7,92,000
1 Kohistanee Corps	78,000
1 Khyber Corps	78,000
1 Jezailchee Corps	90,000
1 Bolan or Kakur Corps	48,000
2 Regular Cavalry Corps (50,000 monthly)	6,00,000
1 Atchukzie do.	36,000
2 Troops Horse Artillery	1,44 000
1 Company Mountain Train	54,000
1 Corps of Sappers and Miners,	1,20,000
General Staff:—(1 Brigadier, 1 Brigade Major, 1 Judge Advocate, 1 Superintendent of Cavalry, 3 Cavalry Officers, 1 Artillery Officer)—9500 monthly	1,14,000
Medical Department—(1 Surgeon, 5 Assistant Surgeons)	60,000
Paid by the Shah.	
4 Regiments of Jan Baz, 1 Battalion of Artillery Guards. Not paid by the Company, and therefore the real cost unknown, but estimated at	6,00,000
Total, 28 lahks—	28,14,000
Add ½d for pension, half mountings, and contingencies	9,38,000
Add Commissariat Department, at 60,000 monthly	7,20,000
Grand Total	44,72,000

I need not mention that the amount for pensions, half mountings, and contingencies, is very uncertain ; I take it at 9,38,000, which, if not now, it will be at no distant day. Total, £447,200 sterling.

Major Hough gives their numerical strength as high as 13,000 men, including the Affghan and Kohistan levies of 4000, raised subsequent to our arrival at Cabool.

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nually, their pay alone amounting to £280,000; the regular portion of them consisted entirely of men of Hindostan. (48) The reason why this body of raw levies should at the first juncture have been added to a couple of well appointed armies, already adequately strong for the performance of the task prescribed to them, is not explained. Our ideas of the then prospective objects of the campaign are still so imperfect and obscure, that it would be rash to pronounce an opinion on a piece of policy which seems eminently unwise and inexplicable, and in reference to the objects of which no one has ventured to offer any information:—it was disapproved of by Sir J. Keane, and censured by the highest military authorities. The only colourable pretext is that suggested by Colonel Dennie in his official letter to Col. Macdonald, that "it was in the vain hope of giving plausibility to the fiction that the Shah was entering his dominions surrounded by his own troops,—when, in fact, it was too notorious to escape exposure, that he had

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Hough in his preface, gives thefollowing as a recapitulation of the numerical strength of the force at the commencement of the campaign:—

By way of Candahar, Bengal and Bombay columns, 13,030; Shah's contingent, 6070; total, 19,100. At Bukkur, under Brigadier Gordon 2200; reserve at Kurrachee, 3050; reserve at Ferozepore, 5000. The Shahzada Timour's force and Seikh contingent, to act by way of the Khyber Pass, 10,886. The whole force amounting to 40,186. The difference betwixt this statement and that already given from the same quarter, is not explained. The force left in Affghanistan and Scinde amounted to 20,000 men, with from 70 to 80 guns. This was gradually raised up to nearly 25,000 men before the insurrection broke out. It is well to keep this in view, because it has been urged innumerable times, that we stripped the country of troops before it was quieted!

The subjoined from Major Hough's preface, gives us the details of the Shahzada's force:—

Shahzada Timoor's force, under Lieut.-Colonel Wade. Lieut. J. D. Cunningham, Bengal Engineers, Mily. Secy. and Political Assistant.

Artillery.—Two 24-Prs. Howitzers and two 6-Prs. (and 20 Swivels) under Lieut. Maule, Bengal Artillery,	4
Golundauze,	40
British,—2 Co.'s 20th (Capt. Ferris) and 2 Co.'s 21st N.I. (Capt. Farmer),	320
Cavalry.—Mahomedans armed with swords, shields and matchlocks 400—iregulars 600,	1,000
Juzzailchees (rifles), 320. Infantry (matchlocks). Regulars 3 Bns. (683)—2,040. Irregulars 820 (under native commandants,)	3,180
Affghans,	100
Pioneers,	200
Total,	4,840

British officers with these troops and commanding parties, Lieut. F. Mackeson, 14th; Lieut. Rattray, 20th, Political Assistant; Lieut. J. G. Caulfield, 68th; Lieut. Hillersden, 53rd Bengal N. I., and Dr Lord, Political Assistant to Lieut.-Colonel Wade, Bombay establishment: Dr Alexander Reid, Bengal establishment, in medical charge.

48. See letter of Colonel Dennie to Colonel Macdonald, D. A. G., Shikarpore, March 9, 1839. We have as usual given nearly the words of the letter.

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not a single subject or Affghan amongst them,—his army being composed of camp-followers from the Company's military stations."(49) We can hardly suppose but that it was intended to leave the contingent behind us as constituted—that is of Hindoo sepoys, commanded by British officers and paid by the Company; and yet if such was proposed at the time of the publication of the Simla proclamation, the writers who stated that so soon as the Shah Soojah was established on his throne, the British army would be withdrawn, were guilty of embodying as gross an equivocation in a Government proclamation as ever state paper contained! To return from these digressions, which have been considered necessary for the full elucidation of this portion of the narrative, the reader will recollect that we have now arrived at that period when an army of 15,000 British soldiers having encamped around Candahar, the Shah Soojah was prepared to enter the western capital of the Dooranee empire—a city containing a population of from 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants.

On the approach of a force so perfectly overwhelming, the three brother Sirdars, who had for a period of 12 years maintained Candahar, fled with their families and about 200 followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress on the river Helmund, 80 miles distant, which formerly belonged to one of the other brothers, latterly to themselves. They left their capital on the 24th April. "Antecedently to the occupation of Candahar," says Major Havelock, "they might by timely submission have received at the hands of the British government a comfortable provision and honourable asylum in Hindustan; they have now no resource left but flight into Persia." Who doubts but they made the nobler choice? It would be humbling were it not ridiculous now to listen to the tone in which the contemporary narratives of the Affghan war are written. The most unjustifiable acts of the Indian government figure as worthy of all admiration; the bold freedom of thought and

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49. Letter dated Shikarpore, 9th March, 1839, addressed to Lieut. Colonel Macdonald, Military Secretary to Lord Keane. We have so far given the words of the letter as they stand. The following are farther extracts:—"I cannot but lament, in common with the *whole force*, that two regular and disciplined armies, brought from so great a distance with so much difficulty and cost, should, at the very moment of united action, be thus maimed and dismembered merely for the sake of keeping together a mass of raw levies like the Shah's contingent, whose carriage and supplies would suffice for the Bengal and Bombay divisions, and who would again be much better employed in being left here for formation and instruction, whereas in their present state they must prove worse than worthless in advance. * * A necessary evil which has arisen out of this has been the effort to establish the efficiency of one part of the army at the expense of the other," &c. These observations were as sound as fairly put, and their justice was heartily concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief. But the Government of India on this occasion desired no advice on military matters from the officers in its service: Sir John Keane knew this, and he troubled them with none, but executed what he was ordered.

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action manifested by the Affghans, whose analogies in our history are sources of our highest and purest national pride, are spoken of by English officers as pieces of fatuity wholly unaccountable! The Shah was anxious to have made his troops pursue the Sirdars, and bring them back to camp: the more considerate Envoy having, without success, endeavoured to make terms with them and secure their submission or friendship, and fearing that the treatment they might receive from any one under the immediate authority of the sovereign might not be altogether consistent with English justice or generosity, dispatched Brigadier Sale, on the 12th May, in pursuit of them; who, however, on approaching the Helmund, found that they had continued their flight without interruption to Meshid in Persia. (50) The chiefs had been driven to the alternative of seeking exile rather than attempting resistance, by the treachery of one of their number—Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had deserted them, and shortly afterwards displayed similar treachery to us. They proposed before this to have posted a body of cavalry to oppose us at the foot of the Kojjuck pass, but had not carried their intention into effect. (51) This arrangement, if conducted with the most ordinary skill, might have been sufficiently inconvenient for us, considering the strength of the position and the crippled condition of the mounted portion of our troops.

On his approach to Candahar, the Shah appears to have been received in a very friendly spirit by the populace. It was with the chiefs he was unpopular; and they had quitted their country when they found their inability to defend it. Up to this period the King kept in the rear of the British Troops. "As we drew near to Candahar," says Sir William Macnaghten in a letter to Government of the 24th April, "at every hundred yards of our progress we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, all tendering their allegiance to his majesty; whilst the peaceable inhabitants of the city assembled in crowds and manifested their joy at the Shah's restoration, in the most unbounded terms."(52) "On the morning of the 24th April the king approached Candahar, but without any intention of entering the city. The scarcity of water compelled his majesty to proceed within three miles of the walls. This, at all events, was the excuse for passing to the front, and leaving the British army in the rear. The king was in advance of his own troops. The morning had scarcely dawned when parties of horse were descried; they were soon ascertained to be friends come to pay homage to their sovereign. They galloped up, dismounted, drew up in line, prayed to the king, who welcomed them, and then fell into the rear of the procession. One standard after another succeeded,

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50. Atkinson, pp. 159, 160.
51. Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 248.
52. Dr Kennedy.

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and ere his majesty entered the city he had been joined by 1500 well-mounted, dressed, and caparisoned horse. On his majesty's entering into the city, there could not have been less than between 60,000 and 70,000 persons present."(53) After they had visited the shrine containing the shirt of the prophet, and prayed at his grandfather's tomb, the party returned through the city amidst universal demonstrations of loyalty and respect. These emotions must either have been shallow, insincere, or of very transient duration. The Shah had not been six months seated on his throne, when discontent and insurrection made their appearance, which, in this quarter never was subdued while we remained in the country. On the 25th, the day following that on which so favourable a reception had been given to a chance visit, he took possession of his western capital in form. On the 8th of May the whole of the British army was drawn out in review order, by desire of the sovereign, to make a display of our strength in the eyes of his subjects, and celebrate his restoration to his throne. "The king was surrounded by his loving subjects, (says Lieutenant Fane,) and ragamuffin soldiers, but by very few men of rank or consequence."(54) Nothing could have appeared better than the whole array of people, but from fear or dislike of the Shah, few, if any, men of influence in the country were present. It is needless to give the details of the Shah's levee, with the other regal ceremonies, by whose means it was hoped to give the phantom the authority of a king. The modern city of Candahar is comprised within a fortification, three miles in circumference, forming an irregular oblong square, surrounded by a ditch 24 feet wide and 10 deep. The wall just within this is 27 feet in height, and from 14 to 20 feet thick. It has six gates, all at this time in bad repair. The gateways are defended by six double bastions, and there are 54 lesser bastions distributed along the face of the wall. There are four leading streets running from north to south and from east to west, and meeting in the centre in a large circular space 50 feet in diameter, and covered in by a dome. This forms the principal market place, where the chief merchants reside.

When we arrived at Candahar in April, the crops were in process of rapid vegetation. We still clung to the hope that Mehrab Khan would supply us with cattle and provisions; and as forage was becoming more plentiful as the season advanced, though the means of transport were rather falling off than improving, we hung on from week to week till the

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† 53. Letter from an officer of the Bombay force, published in a Bombay paper, quoted in Capt. Outram's rough notes. This visit to the city was made at the suggestion of the Envoy, and gave the greatest offence to Sir J. Keane. It certainly was a singularly rash and imprudent adventure: wholly ignorant as we were of the temper of the populace, it might have been fatal.

54. Five years in India—by Lieut. Henry Fane, late aid-de-camp to H. E. the Commander-in-chief; now Captain in H. M. army, vol. ii., p. 131.

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approach of harvest:—that season being later at Ghuznee and Cabool than at Candahar, in consequence of the great additional elevation and higher latitude of the latter two than the former, gave us reason to hope that we should find the produce of the soil ready for us as we advanced. It was a singular feature in the design of the campaign, that we should have sent an expedition of such magnitude to so great a distance, knowing that for its success we must in some measure be dependent on the aid of chiefs whom we might punish for broken promises, but could not coerce, and whose whole interests lay in retarding and resisting us. "Had Mehrab Khan of Kelat obstructed us in the Bolan Pass (says Dr. Kennedy); (55) had Candahar been properly defended; had the 28 guns we found at Urgundah been bestowed for the defence of Candahar and Ghuznee; and had the 1200 cavalry shut up in the latter fort been merely employed in riding round us, wasting all the forage, and watching all foraging parties from the Bolan Pass to Cabool: finally, had Russian agency been so far developed as it was supposed, and ought to have been, to have justified such a campaign; had any one of these contingencies occurred,—and not only one but all were to be looked for,—the army could not have advanced; not because we should not have been able to defeat the enemy if he would have given us the opportunity; but because it was his wisdom to avoid a contest, and the distance to be travelled exceeded the means of any Commissariat to convey supplies in the face of hostile opposition. The wretchedness of the country denied pasture for our cattle, and they must have perished on the road had the necessary delay occurred, which must have resulted from a cool and calculating enemy, however feeble, availing himself of the natural advantages his position gave him, and of the length of way we had to travel." At Candahar there was every appearance of a plentiful harvest. The Commander-in-Chief had a very heavy responsibility on his shoulders,—that of the future provisioning of the army; and one of his first acts was to consult the king and the envoy in regard to the crops on the ground. It was considered, that if the owners consented to receive a high price for their grain, and a certain number of the largest mills were placed under the control of the commissariat, such an arrangement would be the best, and least annoying to all parties; but unless the king could satisfactorily establish that he had power to guarantee this, and assurance of it was given by the principal men in the place, and by the owners of the crops, there was still left the power of *might* in the hands of Sir John Keane, to take possession of the crops on the ground, and pay the owners a fair valuation—but such a measure as this last was not to be resorted to except in an extreme case. The most satisfactory assurances were given that there would be no occasion for coercion on the point of collect-

55. Campaign of the Army of the Indus, vol. i., p. 261.

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ing grain, and this free system was carried out to the letter; but the cost was tremendous, and the treasury was in consequence most severely drawn upon. So extremely guarded was the Commander-in-Chief obliged to be, and so parsimonious in the disbursements from the treasury at that time, that not a rupee could be issued to any functionary, or establishment, whether to the Envoy for the service of the Shah, the expenses of the commissariat, or the pay of the troops, without a written order from Colonel Macdonald, his Excellency's military secretary. The grounds and necessity of the requisitions for money were required to be made manifest before the order was given. In this way it was managed to keep the chest in such a state that there was always something to go and come upon for exigencies. All attempts failed of raising money at Candahar, by giving bills upon India. Whether this proceeded from poverty in the place, or a want of confidence in us, has not been clearly ascertained, but in all probability from the former cause. Daily reports were sent to Sir John Keane of the progress made, and great exertions were used by the commissary-general to complete the quantity of provisions required for an onward move, and for which there was carriage. The four heavy guns of the battering train were left behind, for two reasons, first, because the carriage for their transport, together with the ammunition and all belonging to them, could ill be spared; and, secondly, but *the principal cause*, owing to the strong opinion given by the chief engineer, Capt. Thomson, that they would be wholly unnecessary, *as Ghuznie was not a place of that strength to require their being brought into use.* This opinion was not formed by Captain Thomson on light grounds. It was, strange to say, come to on the authority and report of an engineer and an artillery officer in our own service, who had seen the place, and who were actually then present with the force! How difficult then is the situation of a commander of an army in a country so little known as this was. Who could Sir John Keane look to for information with so much confidence as to the officers in our own service who had seen Ghuznie, and those, officers too of the scientific branch? Captain Thomson states in his official reports, that he was misled by this information. The Commander-in-Chief has been blamed in more than one publication for leaving the heavy guns behind. He did so, however, on the recommendation of those from whom he had the best right to expect good counsel on such a point, the heads of the engineer and artillery departments; and although the lamented Brigadier Stevenson is not alive to verify the fact of what is here stated, Colonel Pew and Majors Thomson and Peat are, and will readily subscribe to its accuracy. (56) At length the order was given

56. The above explanation is given on the authority not named but already

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that we should advance on the 29th June, and by the 1st July the whole army had quitted. They met with no obstruction in their progress, and no event of any considerable note occurred to them till their approach to Ghuznee, when they were much annoyed by alarms of night attacks which never were made. The troops still continued on half, and the followers on quarter rations. (57) On the 21st of July, they arrived under the walls of Ghuznie; the distance from Candahar being 230 miles. The British force consisted of 8000 fighting men fit for duty, and the Shah's contingent, about 4,000 : making 12,000 in all, with 40 pieces of artillery. (58) Their baggage covered an area of 16 square miles. (59)

Ghuznie is situated on the northern extremity of a range of hills running due east and west. The west, south, and east sides of the town, are protected by a broad and deep ditch supplied with water from the river adjoining. (60) The citadel or Bala Hissar is an irregular square on an eminence overlooking all the city. The fortress was considered by the Affghans so strong that it was believed capable of being maintained against us for twelve months. Its garrison consisted of betwixt 3000 and 4000 men, half of which were cavalry; they were provisioned for three months. The population of the city was about equal in amount to the garrison. It was commanded by Goolam Hyder Khan, youngest son of Dost Mahomed. "The accounts of the fortress received," says Captain Thomson, (61) "from these who had seen it, were such as to induce his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to leave at Candahar the very small battering train then with the army, there being there a scarcity of transport cattle. The place was described as being very weak, completely commanded by a range of hills. When we came before it on the morning of the 21st July, we were very much surprised to find a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarped mound about 35 feet high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a fausse braye and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the 'enceinte' gave a good flanking fire, whilst the right of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles had been enlarged, screen-walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built on the right bank of the river so as to command the bed of it. As we approached Ghuznie the most conflicting accounts reached us of the intentions of the

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repeatedly referred to. It has been made more minute because of the misapprehension which has generally existed on the subject.

57. Major Hough, p. 156, note.

58. Ibid, p. 164.

59. Dr Kennedy.

60. Hough, p. 227.

61. Memoranda by Captains Thomson and Peat, engineers, July 1839. We have employed the words of the writers.

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enemy: it was at first maintained that night attacks were intended; then that battle was to be given us in form; afterwards that the city and citadel were to be abandoned without resistance; and, finally, which proved the truth, that the garrison had been reinforced and received instructions to hold out to the last. General Willshire's brigade having pressed on by forced marches, the whole army were arranged by the Commander-in-Chief in three columns, ready to deploy into line, and give battle at a moment's warning, and thus they moved across the extensive plain by which Ghuznie is approached on the west, and after a march of twelve miles halted within a mile of the walls of the fort. (62) On the arrival of the infantry a party of skirmishers was thrown into a garden from which some matchlock fire had appeared to proceed, and cleared it without difficulty. It was desired by the Commander-in-Chief that it should be ascertained what amount of fire the enemy could direct against us. With this object, 18 horse artillery guns, together with the camel battery of 9-pounders, making 30 in all, were got into position 700 yards from the walls. (63) They opened a brisk fire of shot and shrapnell, which lasted for three quarters of an hour, the enemy appearing to suffer severely, especially from the explosion of the shells. The practice of the Affghans was good, and their guns were well supplied. Having ascertained all we wanted to know, our artillery were withdrawn. (64) The fort was now reconnoitred in form: it was found that all the gates, save that opening on the Cabool road on the opposite side from whence we halted, had been built up. It was impossible to breach the walls with guns of the calibre we had alone brought along with us, or in any reasonable time with the small battering train brought from Sukkur and left behind, even could this have been commanded. Mining and escalading were equally out of the question, from the height of the parapet and magnitude of the wet ditch; to sit down in formal siege was an operation much too tardy to be thought of, considering the advanced period of the year, and it was therefore determined, on the recommendation of the Engineers, that the Cabool gate should be blown in, and capture attempted by assault. On the evening of the day of their arrival, the

62. Outram, p. 91.

63. Major Hough, p. 166, and note.

64. The works were evidently much stronger than we had been led to expect, and such as our army could not venture to attack in a regular manner. We had no battering train, continues Captain Thomson: to besiege Ghuznie in form, a much larger one would have been required than the army ever possessed. The command of the parapets from 60 to 70 feet, with the wet ditch, were unsurmountable obstacles to an attack either by mining or escalading * * * The result of this reconnoissance was a report to His Excellency the Commander in-chief that, if he decided upon an immediate attack on Ghuznie, the only feasible mode of proceeding, and the only one which held out a prospect of success, was to make a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by powder-bags.—*Report, ut supra.*

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troops were directed to change their ground: they marched in two columns, right and left of the fortress, to take up their new position on the Cabool instead of the Candahar side: they were directed to make a considerable circuit, so as to keep without the range of the fire of the fort: they reached the new halting place in the course of the night. Besides being now in a position for the operations about to be carried into effect previous to the assault, the army was so placed as to prevent the escape of Hyder Khan and the garrison should they think of abandoning the fort, as well as to preclude the possibility of his receiving assistance or supplies from his father or brother, whose troops were still further to the eastward. The Commander-in-Chief having, at break of day, reconnoitred the new aspect the city now presented, laid down his plans and issued his orders for the proceedings of next night. (65) About noon the hills to the southward of our camp were crowded by masses of horse and foot, displaying several standards. The whole of the Shah's horse, supported by the Lancers and a Bengal regiment of cavalry, moved out with a couple of guns to meet them. So soon as the cavalry approached, the enemy, who had begun to descend into the plain, found it expedient to re-ascend the heights, leaving behind one of their standards in our possession, four or five of their horses having fallen. Captain Outram had at this time galloped out to ascertain what was astir: he reached the scene of action just before the occurrence of the incident already described, and finding no European officer on the spot, persuaded a body of the Shah's horse to follow him round the hills to the enemy's rear, where he stationed them so as to cut off their retreat. Intimidated by this movement, and repulsed by the gallant charge of Ensign Nicholson, the Affghans ascended the heights beyond the reach of our horse. Captain Outram now suggested to an English officer, whom, at this juncture, he met in charge of 150 infantry and matchlock-men, that they should make an attempt to drive the enemy from the heights in the direction in which the cavalry had been stationed. They scrambled over the rocks with great gallantry, Captain Outram at their head; and after scaling the steep and rugged acclivity of the hill, sheltering themselves from the fire, which was hot and well-directed, by every stone and rocky promontory which came in their way, they at length step by step attained the highest summit. They now reached the head-quarters of the enemy, marked by a large green and white banner, which had been consecrated by the priests, and was supposed to confer invincibility. On arriving within fifty paces of this, the whole of our party rushed in with a general cheer—a fortunate shot brought down the standard-bearer, and the standard itself fell into our hands. The enemy were panic-struck, their charm had

65. Outram, p. 95.

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failed them, and they fled on every side. The loss of the Affghans amounted to 30 or 40 in killed and wounded, and 50 were made prisoners by the cavalry—the greater part of which were afterwards executed, because one of them in the king's presence stabbed an attendant; his Majesty gave instant orders to behead him and the others. As may be supposed, this was done without the knowledge of the Commander-in-chief, who was astounded when Sir Alex. Burnes came to him soon after from Mr Macnaghten to report it. It was also perpetrated without the knowledge of either of them; but the deed was done, and it was too late to recall it. His Majesty was, however, distinctly informed by Sir John Keane's orders, that such butchering would never again be permitted within the limits of a British camp, *even on his Majesty's own subjects.* (66) By 3 o'clock of the morning of the 23d July, the va-

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66. This version of the matter may be relied on, though very widely different from that usually given. Sir W. Macnaghten, though disapproving of the measure at the time, afterwards attempted to defend it. [We have retained this note, as well as the text to which it refers, exactly as it stood in the *Bombay Monthly Times.* A letter subscribed "OLD VERSION," gives Sir W. Macnaghten's own account of the matter, which is very greatly at variance with the above.]

On referring the matter to an Officer of rank now in Bombay, who held a confidential Staff situation with Sir John Keane at the time, he writes as follows:—

Sir,—As you have asked my impression as to the two versions regarding what immediately preceded the beheading of the Ghazee prisoners by order of Shah Shoojah, I can have no objections to give it, in so far as I had any means of forming an opinion,—it being a matter that did not in the most remote degree come within the sphere of my office or duty. The point upon which I believe you wish an opinion is, whether Sir John Keane was aware of the King's intention to behead the prisoners, and gave his concurrence to it, *before the fact*; or whether he was only made aware of it after the fact. The impression on my mind is, that he only knew it after, and for this reason; having gone into Sir John Keane's tent that afternoon, and finding Sir Alexander Burnes with him, Sir John Keane exclaimed "what do you think has happened?—the King has beheaded the prisoners taken this afternoon." Sir Alex. Burnes then related how, and why the King had done so—that when they were brought into His Majesty's presence and questioned regarding their rebellion and treason, they said they would glory in taking His Majesty's life; that he was an infidel, and had brought an army of infidels into the country, and that they would take his life whenever they could, or had an opportunity; and one of them, suiting the action to the word, plunged a dagger into the breast of one of the Shah's attendants in His Majesty's presence;—upon which the King gave orders that they should all be beheaded.

I cannot be mistaken in what Sir Alexander Burnes said, as I have above related it, nor do I think he could have come with a message from the Envoy asking concurrence, previous to that afternoon, without my knowing it, as I was seldom out of Sir John Keane's tent, it being a time of heavy work, as well as heavy responsibility and much anxiety to him, as the arrangements for the storming of Ghuznie were still in progress and not completed. My impression therefore, for the reason I have stated, is, that the account in the text is the nearest to the true version. There was no writing of any kind upon the subject that I was aware of, and I seldom or ever heard it afterwards talked of or condemned by the Officers in the Field: at the moment all seemed to think the treason of the Ghazee prisoners of a double and

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rious detachments were at their posts, and all the guns in position at points which commanded the eastern face of the fortress, as well as the Cabool

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most aggravated kind; and although at the time of Sir Alexander Burnes relating the tragic story to me, as I have stated it, I heard Sir John Keane condemn the Shah for his rash act, and that such a thing must not happen again, I at the same time heard him say, that "the murderers and treacherous rascals deserved it," or words to that effect. I therefore think, that if Sir William Macnaghten wrote a year afterwards, to the effect stated in the note, he must have jumbled two things together, and confounded the account Sir Alexander Burnes gave him of the Commander-in-Chief's conversation with concurrence in the Shah's act.

I had for Sir William Macnaghten personally a very great regard, and so thoroughly convinced am I of his good intentions, and his strict regard for truth, that if he did write to the effect stated, he had convinced himself of its correctness, however he may have mixed up two circumstances at a time of intense anxiety, and of no small danger, when my lamented friend Sir Alexander Burnes went back to him and related his conversation with the Commander-in-Chief.

It was not an unusual thing for Sir John Keane to offer advice to the Shah (the Envoy being of course cognizant of it). This he was not only authorized to do, but also to enforce the advice in any case of necessity. In that way, he caused the Shah to be informed on one occasion, when the ears of a man had been cut off by His Majesty's orders for a heinous crime, that mutilation, which was abhorrent to British feelings, however it might accord with Affghan law and usage, would not be permitted, so long as His Majesty and his followers formed part of a British Camp.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

AN OFFICER OF RANK NOW IN BOMBAY, WHO HELD A CONFIDENTIAL STAFF SITUATION.

"The following extract is from an autograph-letter from Sir William Macnaghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, dated "Cabool, Nov. 27, 1840,' now before me, and a Copy of which I have supplied by last Mail to Sir William's friends in London, to enable them to meet the new 'version of the matter' in your Summary with such denial as they may think proper.

"Extract from a letter from Sir William Macnaghten to Sir Alexander Burnes, on the subject of the destruction of the 36 prisoners who were put to death at Ghizni the presence of Major McSherry, on the evening of the 22d July 1839.

'The facts of the case, as contained in my official letter to Government, were simply these: to the truth of my statement you and many other persons can testify.

'On the morning of the 22d July, whilst we were before the Fort of Ghizni, a numerous body of armed people (I have recently heard their number estimated at nearly four thousand) were seen ascending the hills immediately to the left of His Majesty's camp. In the course of the day they several times threatened to come down upon our camp; but they were repulsed and kept in check chiefly by the Shah's own troops and Christie's horse, who were at different periods engaged with these fanatics. Towards evening, a report was brought to me, that the King's people had taken several prisoners, and that His Majesty had determined upon the execution of them all. On the impulse of the moment, I suggested that a selection should be made of the offenders for execution; and I immediately consulted Lieut.-General Sir John Keane, through Sir Alexander Burnes, who was in His Excellency's camp; and his opinion was, that 'the most summary example should be made of all such dastardly ruffians.' In the meanwhile, I had received several messages from His Majesty, expressing his determination to put the prisoners to death, as the only safe and proper course to be adopted in the exigency of our situation. I replied, that His Majesty was supreme, but that I would at least strongly recommend him, if he thought a severe example necessary, to liberate some of the

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gate. The weather was peculiarly favourable for the concealment of our movements. The wind blew strongly and in gusts from the east, and occasionally with such violence over night and towards dawn, as to render inaudible to the devoted garrison the tramp of columns or rattle of artillery wheels.(67) Under these circumstances, so quietly and judiciously were all our arrangements effected, that not a shot was fired from the garrison until after the commencement of the false attack by Captain Hay, with three companies of the 35th N.I. from the opposite quarter to that from which real danger was preparing. As an attack for the relief of the garrison had been threatended, Col. Stalker with the Bombay 19th N. I., was ordered to guard the Cabool road, but no enemy appeared. At midnight, the first battery left camp, followed by four others at intervals of half an hour. Those to the right of the road were conducted to the right of their positions, by Lieutenant Sturt, those on the left by Lieutenant Anderson. The ground for the guns was prepared by the sappers and pioneers, taking advantage of the irregularities to the right, and some old garden walls on the left.(68) The artillery being all in readiness shortly after 3 o'clock, Captain Peat of the Bombay Engineers moved down to the gateway, accompanied by six men of H. M.'s 13th, without their belts, and supported by a detachment of the same Regiment, consisting of 18 officers, 28 sergeants, 17 buglers, and 276 rank and file, which entered to the right and left of the road, taking what cover they could find as they arrived at the ditch, and endeavouring to keep down the fire of the ramparts, which became very heavy on the approach of the party, though it had been sufficiently slack throughout on previous operations. Blue lights were shown by the besieged, which rendered surrounding objects distinctly visible ; luckily they were burned on the top of the parapet instead of being thrown into the passage below. (69) The explosion party consisted of Captain Peat, Lieuts. Durand (70) and M'Leod,

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prisoners, in order that the retribution which had overtaken their comrades might be made known to the whole of these fanatic offenders. My recommendation was not concurred in by His Majesty to the extent that I could have wished: of 38 prisoners 2 only were released,—the one on the ground of his being a Syud, and the other because he begged his life. The remainder, who obstinately persisted in exasperating His Majesty, were executed.' * * *

'On such an occasion it was my duty to seek the advice of the chief military authority on the spot, and I have shown that I did so."

OLD VERSION."

67. Havelock, vol. ii. p. 71.

68. Captain Thomson's Report.

69. Report, *ut supra*. Copied verbatim.

70. This officer having been home on leave, returned to India with Lord Ellenborough, and was appointed his Lordship's Private Secretary. Long before the capture of Ghuznie, when very young in years, he had distinguished himself in scientific research : especially by his discoveries of some of the most famous sub-Himalayan fossils.

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three serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers, in working dresses, carrying 300 lbs. of powder in 12 sand-bags, with a hose 72 feet long. These advanced steadily, silently, and rapidly, led by Lieut. Durand. The enemy were perfectly aware that we were in the gateway, but appeared to have no idea of the nature of the operations in progress. If they had been so, they might have rendered it impossible to place the powder-bags, by throwing over blue-lights, of which they had abundance in store. The powder pots, and other fire-works so much used by the natives of Hindostan, would easily have rendered the cramped space leading to the gate much too hot for such an operation, but the ignorance of the besieged was known and calculated on; the results show how justly. Lieutenant Durand, on first going up, saw, through the chinks of the gate, that there were lights, and a guard immediately behind it. The men on duty were smoking quietly thinking of no danger: three minutes after, they must have been destroyed by the explosion! The powder was placed, the hose laid, the train fired, and the carrying party had retired to tolerable cover, in less than two minutes. No man was hurt; Captain Peat was momentarily stunned by the concussion, but speedily recovered. The success was complete. There having been reason to apprehend that the enemy might have built up or strengthened the gate from within, more than double the quantity of gunpowder recommended by Colonel Pasley had been used. The charge was so heavy that it not only destroyed the gate, but brought down a considerable portion of the square building in which it was placed, the ruins obstructing the advance of the assaulting column. (71) A few moments elapsed before a bugler could be found to sound the advance. (72) The instant the trumpet blast was heard, the storming party, consisting of the grenadier companies of H. M.'s 2d and 17th, with those of the Bengal European Regiment, and a company of H. M.'s 13th, led on by the heroic Colonel Dennie, rushed in and found themselves for a few moments in fierce hand-to-hand conflict with the Affghans amidst the ruins of the demolished gateway. "Nothing could be distinctly seen in the narrow passage; but the clash of sword-blade against bayonet was heard on every side." (73) The soldiers had to grope their way between the yet standing walls; there was neither room nor leisure for regular firing. Each section loaded in turn, and delivered its deadly volley at half pistol-shot distance on the enemy. The entrance-way just on passing the gate, took a sudden turn at right angles to the line of its previous path. This led at first to the erroneous impression that the passage was built up within, and that the explosion had not opened

71. Capt. Peat's Report, verbatim.
72. Capt. Thomson's Report.
73. Havelock, vol. ii., p. 76.

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a thoroughfare. The illusion was only dispelled when the sky began to appear over head; and the leading files immediately afterwards found themselves in the open square within the town. Meanwhile an erroneous report, that Col. Dennie had been unable to make good an entrance, reached the supporting column, consisting of H. M.'s 2d and 13th, with the remainder of the Europeans, under Brigadier Sale, (H. M.'s 17th being directed to follow the storming party into the fort.) They halted for a moment, and the retreat was sounded; (74) fortunately it was imperfectly heard and unattended to during the tempest of the night and the excitement of the events in progress. A few minutes more elapsed, and the true version of the matter was communicated; Brigadier Sale pressed on, but the loss of the few minutes his halt had occasioned, gave rise to mischief. (75) A considerable interval was left betwixt the forlorn hope, under Col. Dennie, and the column of Brigadier Sale. As the latter pressed into the gateway, the Queen's regiment taking the lead, a large body of Affghans, driven from the ramparts by the fire of the forlorn hope, rushed down upon them in hopes of escaping beyond the walls. The attack was made on the rear company of the Queen's and the leading files of the Bengal European regiment.(76) The fury of their assault for a moment drove back the troops opposed to them. Brigadier Sale was cut down, and his adversary rolled over him. Capt. Kershaw of H. M.'s 13th, during the struggle passed his sword through the body of the Affghan. This, however, was not enough; and not till Sir Robert Sale managed to get uppermost and cleave his skull to the eyebrows, would his desperate enemy let go his hold. The reserve under Colonel Croker now speedily followed, and made its way into the city without resistance. On the evening of the 22nd a council of war had been held in the garrison of Ghuznie: it had been proposed by Hyder Khan the governor, that all the females should be sent into the fort as a place of protection; this was opposed; and just as the assembly, whose debates had occupied the live long night, were being dissolved, the gates were burst open, and the batteries opened their fire. (77) No one dreamt of what had happened, and the three leading companies under Col. Dennie were within the fort before the chiefs suspected the approach of danger. The Commdr.-in-chief, perceiving that the city had been won, desired that the whole force of the artillery should be directed against the citadel, from which a determined resistance was still expected. But the enemy were panic struck with the suddenness and magnitude of the misfortune which had fallen upon them, and though in their attempts to reach the gateway, the flying Affghans laid about them in all directions, there was no further resistance systematical-

74. Major Hough, p. 175.
75. Havelock, *ut supra*.
76. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 79.
77. Dr. Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 48.

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ly attempted. By five o'clock A. M. the colours of H. M.'s 13th (78) and 17th waved from the battlements of the citadel of Ghuznie. There had been some sharp fighting in the streets: one lofty building offered a desperate resistance, and upwards of 50 Affghans perished in defending it. There were 514 dead bodies picked up within the walls: we took 1600 prisoners, and the number of the wounded was estimated about equal that of the captives. For weeks afterwards, however, bodies were found in the recesses of private buildings or narrow streets, mostly those of men who had died of their wounds, so that the total loss of the Affghans is estimated at about 1000 slain. (79) No city taken by assault ever suffered so little as Ghuznie, and no men ever conducted themselves under similar circumstances with temperateness and moderation equal to that of its captors. On this point all writers are unanimous. With the close of the fighting all violence ceased, and not one female was exposed to insult or injury. It may not be superfluous to add, that long before this the commissariat store of intoxicating liquor had been exhausted, and Sir J. Keane commanded a temperance army. To the want of liquor is ascribed by the medical men the unprecedented celerity with which the injuries of the wounded were healed. Our casualties in killed, wounded, and missing, officers and men together, amounted to 191, of whom 17 only were killed. Hyder Khan, the governor, surrendered himself in the course of the morning, and was placed under the surveillance of Sir Alexander Burnes; he subsequently accompanied the Commander-in-Chief with the part of the Bengal army which returned through the Khyber Pass, and in progress through the Punjaub he requested that, owing to the kind treatment he experienced, he might be allowed to accompany Sir J. Keane all the way to Bombay,—a request which was assented to by the Governor-General. He remained through the year 1840 a prisoner of state at Bombay, where he was left almost entirely at liberty. The fall of Ghuznie was known at Cabool, 80 miles off, at 5 o'clock the same day. (80) Meer Ufzul Khan, the eldest, and commonly known as "the *fighting* son" of Dost Mahomed, was afterwards found to have been close upon our camp early in the morning with 5000 cavalry. He heard the firing, and was

78. Major Hough, p. 6.—The colours of the 13th were placed on the battlements by Ensign Frere, an able, amiable, and gallant young officer, who, after having been present at all the remarkable actions which occurred in Affghanistan betwixt 1838 and 1842, including the siege of Jellalabad and return to Cabool, died on his way to India on the final abandonment of the country.

79. Dr Atkinson's Affghanistan, p. 236—"On our arrival at Cabool, information reached us, that in searching through every recess and corner, between 200 and 300 more dead bodies had been found and buried; so that, together with those cut down in their flight, the total amount of killed has been estimated at upwards of 1000."—*Ibid, ut supra.* Major Hough estimates them at 1200.

80. Major Hough.

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only waiting for daylight to discover the state of Ghuznie. Dawn showed him the British flag waving on the citadel, and indicated that it had already met its fate. He immediately fled towards Cabool, leaving his elephants and baggage behind him, within six miles of our camp. These were afterwards captured by us. (81)

Lieut.-Col. (now Sir Claude Martin) Wade, political agent at Loodiana, had, as mentioned at the commencement of our narrative, assembled near Peshawur an army of 4800 men of the Shah's levies, besides a Seikh contingent of 6000, (82) so early as the month of January. These were to move upon Cabool by Jellalabad, nominally under Shahzada Timour, eldest son of Shah Soojah; while a further Seikh contingent of 10,000 was to remain as an army of observation at Peshawur. Col. Wade having been duly informed of the progress and success of the grand army under Sir J. Keane, proceeded into the Khyber Pass on the 22d of June. On the 27th he obtained possession of Ali Musjid, a fort previously held by Dost Mahomed's troops, and considered the key of the pass: the enemy abandoned it without fighting on the approach of the advancing force. Mahomed Ukhbar Khan, second son of Dost Mahomed, and afterwards too famous amongst the insurgent chiefs in 1842, was then stationed at Jellalabad, of which he was the governor, with 2,500 men and 14 guns. On the fall of Ghuznie he was recalled to defend Cabool. This at once opened the way for the Shahzada's advance through the passes. He arrived at Cabool on the 2d Sept. Near Gundamuck, Ukhbar Khan abandoned his artillery and camp equipage, so that 12 guns, 7000 rounds of ball cartridges, with camp appointments, horses, and draught bullocks, fell into the Shahzada's hands. Gen. Ventura, who was to have taken command of the Seikh contingent, remained behind in consequence of the death of Runjeet Singh, and the entire command of this force, amounting to betwixt 10,000 and 11,000, devolved on Col. Wade, (83) who, for this well-directed movement, received the special thanks of the Governor-General: and appears well to have deserved them. A march through the passes, at all times a difficult operation, was at this juncture a very important one; and though little opposition was experienced, it seems to have been got rid of by skilful and judicious management,—by a series of difficult and intricate arrangements amongst a set of most untractable subjects.

So soon as all was tolerably quiet, H. M. Shah Soojah and the Envoy

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81. Major Hough, p. 183.
82. Major Hough.
83. Dr Atkinson's expedition into Affghanistan. This work supplies us with a great many valuable facts, but it is impossible sufficiently to censure the tone of childish adulation towards Lord Auckland's administration, which characterizes it every where, or the perverted credulity with which all sorts of silly and incredible anecdotes against the Barukzyes are raked up.

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and Minister were conducted round the citadel and a great part of the fortress, by the Commander-in-Chief. The King was astonished at our having made ourselves master of a place considered to be impregnable, in the space of two hours of assault, and within 48 hours of our having presented ourselves before it. (84) He was still more delighted than astonished at the result. On the recommendation of the medical officers of the force, it was determined that the sick and wounded should be left at Ghuznie under charge of field-surgeon Pinhey of the Bombay service. The garrison to be stationed there consisted of the 16th Bengal N. I., a detachment of 30 artillerymen, and 200 of the Shah's horse: to these were afterwards added a ressalah of the 4th Bengal local horse, with four of the Shah's guns. (85) On the 28th July, the Nawab Jubbar Khan, eldest brother of Dost Mahomed, arrived in camp on deputation from the Ameer. Sir Alex. Burnes and an escort of Lancers went out to meet him. This chief had been celebrated by all the travellers whoever visited Affghanistan, for his hospitality, his kindness to Europeans, and general liberality and benevolence of disposition. (86) His strength of intellect and shrewdness of remark have already been noticed by us in our introductory chapter, where the reasoning of the state papers of the Government of India is shewn to have been completely demolished by him and his brother. "The conduct of Jubbar Khan (says Major Hough) was on this occasion noble: he had at one time been defrauded of his estates by his brother, but he said he wanted nothing for himself." The drift of his present proposition was, that Hyder Khan should be released, and that Dost Mahomed should cease to offer further resistance, and should resign all power and authority into the hands of Shah Soojah, provided we consented to his becoming Vizier or Prime Minister—a position which he claimed by right of heritage. After the steps we had already taken, this proposal was clearly inadmissible. He was informed that the only terms which Dost Mahomed could look for, were a safe asylum and liberal allowance within the British dominions. He declared that his brother would never consent to reside in India on any terms. He was offered for himself the continuance of his property, with honours from the hands of the Shah. These were declined, and the chief seems to have resorted to a boldness of speech not over grateful to royal ears. "On being

84. Lord Keane's dispatch.

85. Major Hough, p. 221.

86. Dr Atkinson's work is on this, as on most other points affecting the Barukzye character, at variance with all our books of travels. He does not state whence his lights are drawn—that they are tinted by the medium of the Shah Soojah court is sufficiently apparent. He speaks of Jubbar Khan with much disparagement.

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introduced to the King," says Dr. Atkinson, "his deportment was not uncourteous, but he said, 'if you are to be king, what is the use of the British army here? If the English are to rule over the country, what use are you here?'" "The Shah," continues the courtly historian, "with unruffled temper, parried this observation by soothing his hurt mind, and, in a bland manner, promised him a confidential station near his person." If, instead of parrying, the Government of India had endeavoured to solve the difficulty here set forth, as also that pressed by Mehrab Khan of Kelat—— "you have brought an army into the country, how do you propose to feed it while here, or get it back again?"—before entering on the war, Britain might have been spared the loss of much life, treasure, and fame. The Nawab having failed in effecting any of his objects, left us, declaring his determination to follow his brother's fortunes to the close.

On the 30th of July our troops marched from Ghuznie towards Cabool. Near the end of the first day's march they passed a defile of about 200 or 300 yards, behind which, a very inferior force with a few guns might have made good. The elevation here was the greatest attained by them, being 9000 feet above the level of the sea. Very rigid orders were issued for the protection of the villagers, and to prevent injury to the growing crops, now nearly ripe in the field. On the 1st of August a message from Peshawur brought accounts of the death of Runjeet Singh: this event, by which the triple alliance was so materially affected, had occurred on the 27th of June, the day before the troops left Candahar. On the 3d, intelligence was received of Dost Mahomed having been wholly deserted by his chiefs and army, the latter said to have shortly before amounted to 13,000 men. (87) Quarrels and jealousies had arisen amongst them: old feuds and grudges were, as usual, called up just at the time they should have been forgotten. The severities of Dost Mahomed's vigorous government were recent and minutely recollected: distance had mellowed the errors of the Shah Soojah, and caused his half remembered seven years' reign of 30 years since to be looked back upon as an era of happiness and prosperity. The force, besides, which was accompanying him to the throne, appeared capable of bearing down all opposition. The result was, that with perfidy, treachery, dissension, and disaffection every where, with enemies on every side, and no one to encounter them, Dost Mahomed, with 600 horsemen, fled to Bameean with a view of seeking refuge amongst the chiefs in Trans-Oxania till more auspicious days should come around. So soon as authentic accounts of this reached camp, it was resolved to send a detachment in pursuit of the Ameer, who, so long as he was left at liberty, must necessarily prove the hope of the disaffected, and a source of substantial annoyance to the new

87. Letter of Sir J. Keane, dated 8th August, to the Envoy and Minister.

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ruler. Two thousand of the Shah's Affghans, under Hadjee Khan Kakur, were ordered for this service, accompanied by a hundred of our Cavalry, regular and irregular, for the purpose of stimulating their exertions, and checking hostilities in case of the fugitive chief or his family falling into their hands. (88) These were accompanied by the following British officers: —Captain Outram, Captain Wheeler, Captain Troup, Captain Lawrence, Captain Backhouse, Captain Taylor, Captain Christie, Captain Erskine, Lieut. Broadfoot, Lieut. Hogg, and Dr. Worral—Capt. Outram to take command. The party assembled at 4 P. M., according to order, at the tent of the Envoy, where the Affghans were also to have been in readiness; but not more than 300 effective men had made their appearance when it became dark; the remainder, consisting of from 400 to 500 of a ragged rabble, mounted on yaboos or half starved ponies. It was promised that the rest should follow, and the details were made up by 100 of Captain Christie's horse. Hadjee Khan Kakur was extremely desirous that the high road should be pursued as far as Meidan, in order, as he pretended, to take up the track of their quarry; and it was not till Capt. Outram had repeatedly urged the impossibility of ever succeeding in this manner in the pursuit, seeing that Dost Mahomed was already 24 miles a-head of them, that the line of march was changed. It was with great difficulty that guides were ultimately procured to enable them to make a short cut across the hills, so as to intersect the path of the Ameer, about three miles from Meidan. The first night the party marched thirty miles, leaving Gada, a small village situated in a confined but fertile valley, about 7 A. M. Several halts had been made to admit of the Affghans closing up, but not more than 100 of the 1600 awanting had made their appearance. Those who dropped in in the course of the day gave evidence, from the plunder with which they had encumbered themselves, of the cause of their delay. The March was renewed in the evening; the road was precipitous and bad; at the end of ten miles they bivouacked till one in the morning, when the moon having risen they proceeded on afresh till 7 A. M. Barely 50 of the Affghans kept up with them, the rest straggled in in the course of the day. Information was here received that Dost Mahomed was at the village of Yourt, one march a-head. Hadjee Khan Kakur, who had hitherto proceeded with the greatest reluctance, became urgent for a halt till reinforcements could be sent for. He declared that the Ameer had 2000 followers, and was much too strong for the present force to attack him with any hope of success. Capt. Outram having insisted on proceeding, the followers of the Hadjee were mus-

88. We have taken the whole narrative of the pursuit of Dost Mahomed from Major Outram's Rough Notes, which we have given a good deal abridged.

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tered, and were found to amount to 700 in all,—less than one half of them being suitably mounted. Before they had advanced four miles on the evening's march the guides were reported to have deserted: in a dark night, amongst abrupt precipices and interminable ravines, it was in vain to attempt to move without conductors, so a halt was made till day-break, and Yourt was, in consequence, not attained till the morning of the following day, the 6th. Few of the Affghans were now forthcoming, and no inducement whatever could prevail on the Hadjee to advance sixteen miles further to Huzar, where there was positive intelligence of Dost Mahomed's presence; he promised most solemnly, however, to proceed in the evening, and this afforded some hope of their being able to beat up the Ameer's quarters during the night. Next evening he fell back on his old resolution: nothing would induce him to move that night, but he promised to make a forced march of double the distance next morning.

It was most singular that in arranging this most important expedition, the whole authority was intrusted to Hadjee Khan Kakur; the European officers were vested with no power save over their own men, and Capt. Outram's only instructions were, that he should act along with the Affghans, and second them if necessary! All accounts agreed that the Dost was accompanied by at least 2000 followers, but their progress was retarded by the sickness of one of the young princes: this greatly increased the chance of success in the pursuit, and Hadjee Khan was informed that, in the event of his hanging back on the morrow, the party would proceed without him or his assistance. It rained and hailed violently over night, and our people had for the two preceding days had nothing to eat but a little unripe parched corn. On the 7th they marched at daybreak, and, on arriving at Huzar, found traces of the Ameer's camp of yesterday; they learned that he had that morning encamped at Kalloo, without apparently being in any hurry to depart. They reached the place at three P. M., but found the Dost gone so many hours before that he must have surmounted the Kalloo Pass, the highest in the Hindoo Koosh. Every one of the Affghans had now fallen behind, and the little sepoy band had been nine hours in the saddle; their horses were knocked up; they were 12,000 feet above the level of the sea, and saw snow 1300 feet below them. In the evening they obtained a scanty meal of flour. On the morning of the 8th they were joined by Captains Trevor and Taylor with 30 troopers. In the course of the day they surmounted the Pass called the Camel's Back, 15,000 feet high, nearly the altitude of the summit of Mount Blanc. Hadjee Khan they now found to be totally untrustworthy: a council of war was held, when it was resolved that on the Ameer turning to oppose us in the event of his being next day overtaken, of which no doubt was enter-

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tained, that the thirteen British officers should charge in the centre of the band, every one directing his individual efforts against the person of Dost Mahomed Khan, whose fall in this way must be next to certain. It was evident that all the Affghans on both sides would turn against them, unless they were immediately successful, and this plan appeared to afford the only chance of escape to those who might survive. It was an object of paramount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer rather than permit his escape. (89)

On reaching Bameean, on the morning of the 9th, the intelligence of the Dost's escape, which had previously been received, was fully confirmed. He had pushed ahead by long forced marches, and was, by this time, on the extreme verge of the Shah's territory, and close upon the confines of that of the Wullee of Khooloom, who had always been a friend of the Barukzyes; it would, under these circumstances, and in the utterly exhausted state of their horses, have been madness to proceed, and it was resolved to halt until they were so far refreshed as to be able to return to Cabool. They arrived at the capital on the 19th. Hadjee Khan Kakur was immediately arrested,—abundant evidence of his treasonable intentions having now made their appearance. This wretch was originally a melon-vendor. He deserted Dost Mahomed Khan to join the Candahar Sirdars, and, having betrayed them and joined the Shah Soojah, forced them to quit their country without a blow. For this he was ennobled with the title of "Nusseer-ood-Dowlah,"—or Sword of the State,—and received territory valued at £30,000 a-year. It now appeared that he had leagued himself to fight against the King in the event of any change of fortune arriving. He has been since detained a state prisoner at Chunar,—as deeply dyed a traitor as ever betrayed an empire.

Returning to the movements of Sir John Keane's army: simultaneously with the despatch of the party towards Bameean, Major Cuerton, with 200 of H. M.'s 16th Lancers, was sent forward to take possession of the guns left at Arghundee. They were all of brass, and amounted to 28 in number, of various calibres, generally from 6 to 9 pounders. Many of them were double-shotted, and would, in all likelihood, have been as injurious, if fired, to the army to which they belonged, as to that against which they were directed. They were badly mounted, difficult to work, and their carriages liable to damage or destruction from comparatively trivial accidents. They were unskilfully placed, and an army situated where the guns had been planted could very easily have been attacked in flank from (90) the

89. Captain Outram's Rough Notes, *ut supra.*
90. Dr. Kennedy.

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high grounds, within easy range of them. A deep ravine would have carried our light companies safely into the midst of them before they suspected danger. Yet there was much strong ground eminently favourable for military dispositions in the neighbourhood, where, had they known how to make use of it, a very formidable resistance, even with their troops, might have been maintained. (91) A large quantity of powder and shot, with tumbrils, ammunition-waggons, and gun-bullocks, were also captured. He was directed to push forward his reconnoisance as far as the walls of the city. The army continued its march without interruption, and on the evening of the 6th encamped under the walls of Cabool. On the evening of the 7th, His Majesty proposed to proceed in state from Nanuchee to the Bala Hissar.

At 4 in the afternoon, when the heat of the day had been succeeded by one of those mild and beautiful evenings which characterise the autumnal climate of the cooler latitudes or altitudes, the Shah Soojah, accompanied by the Envoy and Minister, the Commander-in-Chief, and the general officers of the army; Sir Alex. Burnes and other officers of the mission; the staff, and a vast number of other officers; left the camp to proceed, with much pomp, into the city of Cabool. (92) They had about three miles to march. The escort of His Majesty consisted of a squadron of the 4th Light Dragoons, and one of the 16th Lancers, with Captain Martin's Troop of Bombay Horse Artillery. They were paraded in review order in front of the lines, and on the road leading to the city. A royal salute was fired as the Shah approached the escort; and the cavalry having saluted him as he passed, fell into the rear of the procession.

The royal reception was respectful but cold; the people were orderly: curiosity brought them in thousands to witness the spectacle, and a feeling of decorum seems to have prompted them to pay distant respect to the king. The chiefs were absent; there was no enthusiasm, and not even that clamorous exultation which a crowded populace commonly display on the first fall of one who has kept them in order, or in the manifestation of any important change in the order of things. The king led the way into the palace: he wept as he witnessed the dilapidation the neglect of thirty years had occasioned. (93) The cavalcade returned at a late hour in the evening to camp, finding some difficulty in making their way past the baggage of the Shah, then passing through the narrow streets. For the next three weeks no event of any moment occurred to the army. Capt. Outram

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91. Major Havelock.
92. Major Hough. Copied *verbatim*.
93. Major Hough, *ut sup.*, p. 252.

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and his party returned on the 19th August from the fruitless pursuit of Dost Mahomed, and on the 3d September the Shahzada Timour and Colonel Wade, with betwixt ten and eleven thousand men under their command, arrived from Peshawur by the Khyber Pass, Jellalabad, and Khoord Cabool. These things have been already mentioned. Of the events which occurred on the march from Ghuznie we should have noticed the death of Lieut.-Colonel Herring: he was following the grand army in charge of treasure from Candahar, when he with two other officers had imprudently gone out some way from camp unattended, and been murdered by the robbers by whom the whole country seemed infested, who hung upon the skirts of our army. He was a gallant and experienced officer, and his death was deeply lamented. Lieutenant Inverarity had in like manner fallen a victim to a similar imprudence during the halt at Candahar in May.

On the 17th September a magnificent state durbar was held at the palace for the purpose of conferring the badges of the Doorannee order on certain of the most distinguished officers of the army.

"In a court-yard of about a hundred yards square [says Dr. Kennedy (94)] a ruinous and neglected garden, and surrounded by ruinous buildings of the old palace in which a dozen or two of bricklayers and plasterers were at work repairing the dilapidation and neglect of the past thirty years, and who never stopped their work to look at us, sat the old King alone in his glory; his throne being one of our old camp-chairs, value, when new, some four or five rupees at the utmost; behind it stood two old fat eunuchs, each holding a dish in his hand: and up to this extraordinary dumb show we marched, and were all ranged behind and on the right of the camp-chair with the King in it.

"When all was ready,—and it took less time than I could have supposed,—Sir John Keane stepped before the said camp-chair with the King in it, and gravely dropped on his knees before the Douranee Emperor. One of the fat eunuchs waddled to the front, and uncovered his dish, in which was the decoration and ribbon of 'the order of the Douranee empire.' The Emperor with great difficulty stuck it on; and, Sir John's coat being rather too tight, it cost him some effort to wriggle into the ribbon: but the acorn in time becomes an oak, and Sir John was at last adorned, cap-a-pie, a Knight Grand Cross of the Douranee empire.

"The decoration required eloquence; and Sir John, standing before the Emperor, delivered himself of a speech, in which there was a great deal about 'hurling a usurper from the throne,'—at which my uncle Toby might perhaps have whistled his lillibullero.

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94. Campaign of the Army of the Indus, vol. ii. p. 112.

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"But as the Emperor of the Douranee empire did not understand English, the Chief's Persian interpreter, Major Powell, stepped to the front to interpret. Poor man! he was 'not accustomed to speak in public,' and made but a bad job of it; and the Emperor, who seemed to wish the whole affair over, broke into the midst of the interpretation with his own observations complimentary to the British General, the British Army, and the British Government. Burnes, for some reason best known to himself, wished the whole interpretation to be fairly and fully driven into and through the imperial ears, and whispered 'Deegurust,' 'There is more of it;' which silenced the Emperor, and Major Powell went on: but, making a pause to take breath, his Imperial Majesty began again and was again silenced: a third pause, and again his Imperial Majesty commenced; and by that time Burnes seemed tired too, and the Emperor had it all his own way, and all the talk to himself for the rest of the ceremonial. Mr. M'Naughten and Sir W. Cotton were next invested; and Sir A. Burnes and Sir Martin Wade were told that they were created Knights Grand Crosses too, but that the goldsmith had not been able to make the decorations in time for them, but they might rely on receiving them in as short a time as he could compass it. Lord Auckland was declared a Knight Grand Cross also; how Colonel Pottinger escaped can be only explained by the wonderful good fortune that has attended that gentleman through life.

"The Grand Crosses being created, the Knights Commanders and Companions were to be invested, but the decorations had not been made; and it was clear that if there was to be a kneeling and a tow-tow for each, there would be no end of it: so an officer in a Bengal Cavalry uniform, holding a paper in his hand, shouted out the names of the 'men whom the King delighted to honour;' and we, the *ci polloi*, being all drawn up on the right of the King, the parties so named stepped forth in succession, and, crossing in front, bowed to the King, and ranged upon the left. The officer, who thus enacted the Grand Mareschal of the palace, read with a clear good voice, and deserved to have been a Grand Cross himself, if his taste lay that way, for the fine feeling he showed when, in reading the original list, he paused on the names of Brigadier Arnold and Colonel Herring, and, reading them with a subdued tone, added 'deceased,' and passed on to the next in order. This honourable tribute to the dead was the only incident in the whole affair that seemed worth recording for anything but its extreme absurdity.

"The decoration of the order is a Maltese cross, a bad imitation of the Guelphic order of Hanover; and it was the more absurd to give a Christian's most sacred religious badge as an honour supposed to be conferred by the most bigoted petty Mahomedan government in the world; because the arabesque star of six points, which forms the ornament of the historic

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gates of the tomb of Mahomed of Ghuznee, would have been so peculiar and appropriate an emblem of a Douranee institution. The ribbon, 'party per pale vert and gules,' is in good taste; and when manufactured in England, will no doubt be very ornamental.

"When the list was read out, and all was over, there rose the cry of the disappointed; and I saw Sir John Keane much excited, and apparently in a bewilderment and amaze at the storm that threatened. The rule for the selection had been, that the brigadiers and heads of departments were to be Knights Commanders; and all field officers, and sundry head-quarter favourites, Companions. The claimants who now started forth were the field-officers by brevet: there were only four or five; and these of course from the simple fact of their brevet, were the oldest officers of their class, and much senior to many who were preferred before them. One of them had served nearly forty years in India, and was old enough to have been the father of half the new-made knights: he is said to be writing a history of the campaign, and will no doubt make known his grievance. No satisfactory reason was assigned for their being omitted; had they been too numerous, it would have been otherwise, but they were not so."—*Kennedy, vol.* ii., pp. 113—118.

On the 14th of September, before the separation of the Forces of the two Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, a General Order was issued, of which the following is an extract:—

"Sir John Keane cannot omit this opportunity of assuring the Troops of both Presidencies, that it will be a proud reflection to him throughout his after life, to have had the honour of commanding Troops of such high character and bearing, and who have surmounted difficulties of all kinds without a murmur, but on the contrary, a cheerfulness which does them honor, and which marks their high discipline and good feeling: these qualities, combined with gallantry, they gave the enemy a signal proof of, on the memorable day when their stronghold Ghuznee fell.

"The conduct of the Troops has been no less marked by their gallantry and high bearing on that occasion, than it has all along by the cordial good feeling which has subsisted between the combined forces of Bengal and Bombay throughout this service, and to which it will be the pleasing duty of Sir John Keane to call the attention of the Right Honorable Lord Auckland, the Governor-General; and he is convinced it will be equally gratifying to his Lordship to learn it, as it is to him to report it.

"His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk has requested Sir John Keane to signify to the Troops that His Majesty has, in token of his gratitude, determined on conferring the decoration of the Order of the Dooraunee Empire on certain Officers, and to present every Officer and Soldier present at Ghuznee on the 23d July last, with a medal. That his Majesty has further addressed a letter through the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, to our most gracious Sovereign Queen

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Victoria, requesting that Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to permit the Officers and Soldiers to wear these marks of distinction."(95)

By order, &c.

(Signed) R. Macdonald, Lieut. Colonel,
Mily. Secy. and Depy. Adjt. Genl. H. M.'s Forces, Bombay.

On the 18th September the Bombay column quitted Cabool; they retraced their steps by the route over which they had advanced as far as Ghuznie: thence crossing the Toba mountains, they made a short cut on Quetta, evading the detour by Candahar, and pursuing a line of march to Quettah entirely new to them. From Quettah part of the force proceeded to Kelat, which they captured. But this will form a part of our narrative to which we must return after tracing the progress of the Bengal troops to Ferozepore. Towards the beginning of October, the affairs to the northward of the Hindoo Koosh began to wear an aspect so alarming as to occasion serious apprehensions to the authorities at Cabool. Dost Mahomed appeared to have so firmly established himself in the favour of the Chief of Koondooz, and to have obtained such entire command of the resources of the country, that the Envoy and Minister, at the suggestion of Dr Lord, had at one time resolved to establish, even at that late season of the year, a brigade near Syghan. From this ill-considered measure he was dissuaded by Sir John Keane. The troops sent out could have had no time to construct for themselves sufficient cantonments before the setting in of winter; and would, even if they had, have been cut off from all communication with the army at Cabool, and exposed single-handed, and without ammunition, provisions, line of operations, or means of resistance, to the attacks of all the forces of independent Tartary, which, as subsequently shown, could easily muster to the extent of 12,000 men. (96) This was a bud of the fatal system which afterwards spread abroad, and proved fatal to us. The Bengal troops remained for nearly a month after the departure of the Bombay column—as late, in fact, as the season would permit. Head-quarters, under Lord Keane, marched on the 15th October, and the remainder followed with as little delay as possible,—and the whole of those who proposed returning for the present to India had left before the 20th The cold was severe in the pass—ice was found upon the roads, and the bodies of dead camels and horses lay frozen all around, and the horsemen's cloaks which chanced in the morning to be splashed with water in crossing the stream, were immediately decorated with a border of ice. (97) Hyder

95. These Medals have since been presented to the Officers and Soldiers in the name of the Government of India.
96. Major Havelock, vol. ii., p. 171.
97. Major Havelock, vol. ii. p. 176.

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Khan, governor of Ghuznie, and Hadjee Khan Kakur, accompanied the force. We shall not at present attempt a description of this tremendous chain of defiles, or the savage predatory tribes which inhabit them, which occupy nearly the whole space betwixt Cabool and Peshawur, a stretch of 200 miles. We shall, in the last chapters of our narrative—those which record the melancholy loss of 13,000 men in the pass in January 1842, and in that which describes the victorious advance of General Pollock on his mission of vengeance eight months afterwards,—require to go over every part of the ground which Lord Keane with his retiring force traversed without annoyance or impediment. It is enough at present to mention, that the army which left the capital on the 18th October reached Peshawur on the 8th November. They had not been attacked or molested in any way, except the rear division on the last day's march in the Khyber pass, when two officers were wounded, several men killed and wounded, and many camels with their loads taken by the tribes that afterwards gave so much trouble; nor experienced greater difficulty than might have been anticipated in traversing such wild and sterile regions. From Peshawur the route lay through the friendly territory of the Seikh ruler: the distance is 350 miles, which was traversed without inconvenience or obstruction, our troops reaching the frontier station of Ferozepore on the Sutlej on New-year's day 1840.

A deputation from the Maharajah Kurruck Sing met Sir John Keane at Attock, on crossing by the bridge of boats over the Indus after its junction with the Cabool River at that place, to invite His Excellency to visit the Court of Lahore. At the head of the deputation was Lena Sing, a young and handsome Sirdar of great wealth, with an escort of 2000 men well mounted and appointed, who continued with the Commander-in-Chief during his whole journey afterwards through the Punjaub until he reached Ferozepore. Lena Sing is one of the very few men of high rank (or indeed of any rank) in his country given to literary and scientific pursuits. He is particularly fond of Astronomy, and not a day passed without his asking questions, and taking instructions from Major Thomson and the other Engineer officers. He was presented with a Sextant, which pleased him much, and a set of instruments and telescopes were ordered out for him from England.

Sir John Keane with all his personal Staff and the Staff of the Bengal force, made the detour to Lahore, while the Army continued to move by the direct route through the country, where he arrived on Christmas day, taking with him as his Escort—Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, a Troop of Bengal Horse Artillery, and his Infantry Escort of the Bombay 19th N. I. His reception was most cordial, and attended with a degree of splendour which cannot be rivalled by any other Eastern Court in the present day.

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All the usual ceremonies were gone through, and a display made of Jewels, Cashmeers, Cloth of Gold, &c. &c., that surprised all who had seen it for the first time. Sir John Keane was unfortunately so unwell at times, as not to be able to attend all the ceremonies, and by the approval of the Maharajah he was on those occasions represented by Colonel Macdonald. The most imposing of all the ceremonies was a review of 45,000 men, with 152 pieces of cannon, drawn up in one continued line, under the command of the Heir apparent to the throne, Nao Nehal Sing, a high-spirited youth of about 20 years of age, who afterwards lost his life by the falling of a beam, at one of the gateways, on the day of his father's funeral, when he was to succeed as sovereign of the Punjaub. The courtiers, Generals and others, as well as the whole of the Staff Officers of the British Force, were mounted on Elephants, and mostly seated in gold and silver Howdahs, (98) to afford them a better view of the troops from their elevated seats, than they could command on their chargers. The fine appearance of the troops, and their appointments, surprised the British Officers. The arms, cuirasses and clothing were all of French manufacture. The late Runjeet Sing had given a carte blanche to two of Napoleon's officers of distinction, Allard and Ventura, Generals in the Maharajah's service, to procure in France all that they considered requisite for the equipment and respectability of His Highness's Army. There were besides in his service, of the Napoleon school, Generals Court and Avitabile (the latter a most intelligent energetic man, who has since proved himself so useful and such a stanch friend to the British as Governor of the Province of Peshawur,) together with many other French, German and Italian officers of inferior grade; and the drill and discipline was entirely French. The Cuirassiers and Artillery were particularly well horsed and appointed, and all had the appearance of soldiers; it is believed that if it came to blows, they would make but a poor stand against a British Force.

On the 7th January Sir John Keane and his staff left them for Bombay, and the various regiments were dispersed amongst their respective cantonments. Since the 8th November 1838, the Bengal column had traversed a space of 2070 miles, the longest continuous march ever accomplished by an Indian army. (99)

We must now return to the movements of the Bombay column, and follow them through this important episode, detailing the operations against Kelat, out of which one of the most singular passages in the history of our policy in the East so speedily arose. "It was a strange feeling in retracing our steps," says Dr Kennedy (100), "to compare the numerous recollec-

98. A Howdah resembles the body of a Gig, or very large arm chair.
99. Major Hough, p. 362.
100. Vol. ii. p. 121. History of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus.

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tions of our journey on the advance, with its doubts and uncertainties, and the thousand wild rumours which were every day afloat, in contrast to the solution of all difficulties and the termination of all danger, on the homeward march of the army."

Capt. Outram appears on most occasions to have been the officer in all the army sought out when any enterprize of especial hazard, or where unusual dispatch or daring was required, whose services were put in requisition. The Envoy having applied to have him placed in political employment,—on the 7th Sept., a week before the march of the Bombay column, he was sent out to depose, and, if possible, to arrest the refractory Ghilzie chiefs, Mehta Moossa Khan, Abdool Rehman Khan, Ghool Mahomed Khan, and the Mama, a Chief so named from his being the uncle of the Candahar Sirdars, (101) and to establish the newly appointed Ghilzie Governors, Meer Allum Khan, Zeman Khan, and Khulleel Khan;—to punish the inhabitants of Maroof, who, in May last, wantonly destroyed a caravan proceeding from Hindostan to Candahar;—and lastly, to reduce the forts of Hadjee Khan Kakur, should they still be held by his adherents. The murder of Colonel Herring was reported just as he was about to start; he was directed if possible to search out and punish the perpetrators of that atrocity. The force placed under his charge consisted of a wing of the Shah's 1st Cavalry and Goorkah Battalion, Capt. Abbot's Battery of 9 pounders from Cabool, a reinforcement from Capt. Macan's Regiment of Shah's Infantry at Candahar, half of the Shah's 2d Regiment of Cavalry, and a brigade of Horse Artillery. In consideration of the difficulty of obtaining forage and preventing plunder with so large a number, the regular force was, at the especial request of Capt. Outram, reduced to 500 men. A thousand Affghan cavalry, under Mahomed Oosman Khan, an uncle of the King, led in parties by 20 Affghan Chiefs, were to be added. After the experience of the trust to be reposed in the Affghans, which had been supplied from the time we reached Quettah, and especially after the conduct of Hadjee Khan Kakur and his people, it seems singular that the system of pressing them into a service in which they seemed determined only to impede or thwart our aims, should have been persisted in, when we had troops of our own in the country sufficient for the discharge of all the duty desired to be performed. It is impossible to conceive what good end could have been purposed to be served by it, unless to delude the people at a distance into the belief that the Shah was subduing and quieting the country by the help of his own subjects; a more thorough delusion, or one more zealously striven after, could not be imagined. The Affghan auxili-

101. Outram's Rough Notes, p. 123. We have copied the instructions *verbatim.*

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aries could not be got ready, and Capt. Outram marched without them. His Majesty, though unable to make his faithful subjects accompany the expedition, promised to *drive* them after it, and, in three days after it was gone, he succeeded in driving a part of them from Cabool; they joined on the 7th day of the march. On the evening of the 14th, Meer Allum Khan succeeded in capturing some of the banditti connected with the murder of Colonel Herring. On the 20th, Buxee Khan was captured. The following day, Capt. Outram's party were reinforced by a wing of the 16th N. I. under Major M'Laren, and they arrived at daybreak at a deep dell occupied by the gang of which they were in quest. Our people managed completely to surround the marauders; they fought desperately, and maintained their position until their ammunition was exhausted, when they were induced to throw down their arms, after 16 of the most desperate of their body had been killed, and 71 wounded. We lost three sepoys, and had two European and two Native officers wounded. Not a soul escaped; 112 prisoners, with a similar number of camels, fell into our hands. The Company's mark on the head of the animals showed that they had been acquired by plunder. Forty-six of the most ferocious of the robbers were selected, and despatched to Cabool for execution. Capt. Outram's party were now moving on a line nearly parallel with that of the Bombay column, which had left Ghuznie on the 29th Sept., (102) under a temperature which at night sunk to 34 deg., and were now only three marches to their right. They were in constant intercourse with Sir T. Willshire, who supplied them with whatever reinforcements were necessary. On the 1st Oct., the detachment of the Shah's 1st Cavalry, under Lieut. M'Kenzie, was ordered to return to Cabool—three weeks of such severe marching as that required amongst the Ghilzie mountains, having knocked up all the horses. On the 3d the Poonah Auxiliary Horse, under Captain Keith Erskine, arrived in camp; the next night they made up with a couple of nine-pounders, escorted by a wing of the Bombay 19th N. I., sent out to meet them from Ghuznie by previous agreement. On the 5th, Capt. Outram marched his little band 42 miles in the course of 24 hours. The following day he surprised in his fort the principal Ghilzie chief Abdool Rehman Khan. The father of this man, when disputing the empire with Shah Zeman, besieged Cabool with 50,000 horse and foot. Abdool Rehman seemed to have had no intention to fly. He had, just before the arrival of our troops, sent off his women and property: he himself, with eighty chosen horsemen, remained within his hold. It was a well-constructed fort, with a wet ditch and lofty citadel, before which in former days the Shah Soojah had twice been foiled and forced to

102. Dr. Kennedy, &c., vol. ii., p. 122.

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return. Capt. Outram had resolved to defer the capture of the place till the following evening, that the cavalry might be sufficiently rested to be able immediately thereafter to make a dash upon the other chiefs, whose strongholds were only about a forced march off. Major M'Laren had the fort surrounded by 500 cavalry, besides two companies of the 16th Bengal N. I. stationed under cover within 200 yards of the gate. Near midnight, however, Abdool and his party suddenly rushed out on horseback through our piquets, and dispersing in all directions, managed to escape in the dark. He had remained to the last in his fort under the expectation of being joined by a neighbouring chief, who was to have attacked our rear with 1000 horse. This man had been brought over to our interests, and had come into our camp the previous evening before sunset, leaving no choice to Abdool Rehman but to attempt the flight thus boldly and successfully effected. The fort was completely destroyed, having been mined and blown up by us after its evacuation. On the evening of the 8th, Captain Outram rode into Gen. Willshire's camp, attended by no more than a couple of Ghilzie followers, though the distance was 20 miles. These operations against the Ghilzies were continued with the utmost enterprise and spirit, and with no inconsiderable success, till the troops reached Quettah on the 31st October. Captain Outram had latterly occasionally accompanied the Bombay column, sometimes moved parallel with it, and occasionally crossed its path in all directions. The season of extreme cold was now approaching; the country was to the last degree barren and inhospitable. On the 18th October, on reaching the summit of the Toba mountains, the thermometer at daybreak stood at 19 deg.—13 degrees below freezing. The engineer officer in charge (Captain Peat) stated that it only required the difficulties of the country to be a fraction of a fraction greater than they were, when the roads would have become impassable. On the 29th they regained the line of their original advance at Hyderzye, and found themselves plentifully supplied with provisions, sent out on purpose by Captain Bean from Quettah; the fort was attained in safety the second day after.

Before the Bombay column quitted Cabool it had been determined that Mehrab Khan should be deposed, and a remote relative, Newaz Khan, a Cutchee chief, placed in authority at Kelat. The conduct of the Beloochee chief has been pretty fully treated of in the preliminary chapter and earlier portion of the present narrative. Finding that all the obstructions which he had endeavoured to throw in our way, and the numberless annoyances he had occasioned us, had failed to retard us on the path of victory, or to prevent the restoration of the Shah Shoojah: he no sooner found the Suddozye power supreme, and the British army likely to maintain itself in Affghanistan, than he sent in all sorts of professions of loyalty and devotion towards the king, and friendship for his allies. On General Will-

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shire's arrival at Quettah, he received a letter written in the same unblushing style as those addressed to the envoy and minister, in which he declared himself the faithful subject of the Shah Shoojah, and devoted ally of the British government, (103) and entreating that he would interfere to prevent the hostile measures which Captain Bean, the political agent for Shawl, had meditated, from being put in execution against him; concluding by stating, that if attacked he would defend himself to the last. The nature of our information as to the state of affairs at Kelat appears to have been almost inconceivably imperfect. The most fitting time for a movement against it would probably have been the month of August, when General Nott, left at Quettah to keep the Beloochees in check, had a force under his charge abundantly powerful for the purpose, especially as the intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie had at that time astonished and stunned the whole of Affghanistan. It was afterwards said that Captain Bean had requested General Nott to undertake the adventure with a single native regiment and a company of artillery. He was believed to have been prevented from this by a point of military etiquette on receiving a copy of General Willshire's instructions. Matters being now fully arranged, Brigadier Baumgardt was dispatched on the 3d Nov. with H. M.'s 2d and 17th Foot, and the 31st Bengal N. I. The whole of the line regiments being weak, these mustered less than 1000 bayonets. (104) To these were added six light field pieces, two of the Bombay Horse and four of the Shah's Artillery; the sapper corps, and 150 irregulars, the whole in the best possible order. General Willshire and staff followed them the ensuing day. The remaining portion of the Bombay column under Brigadier Scott, consisting of the park, with the whole of the cavalry and greater part of the artillery, and the 19th N. I., proceeded through the Bolan Pass, and so by Dadur on to Sukkur, where they arrived without obstruction or adventure on the 29th November. Accounts of the fall of Kelat and of the advance of the Russians on Khiva, had reached them on the way, and in consequence of the latter event they were directed by the political agent to halt near Bhaug; but cholera had broken out amongst them in a part of the country where comforts were not procurable, and acting on the recommendation of the head of the medical department, Brigadier Scott moved on. Betwixt the 20th and 30th of November, the force, mustering short of 700 men, lost by this appalling visitation Surgeon Forbes of the 1st Bombay Cavalry, and Captain Ogle of H. M.'s 4th Dragoons, together with 56 European soldiers. The natives escaped.

To return to the operations against Kelat, whitherward, as above stated,

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103. Dr Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 135.
104. Dr Kennedy, vol. ii. p. 143, *verbat.*

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General Willshire had marched on the 4th November. Until the 13th of the month, when they closely approached Kelat, the column met with little opposition in their progress; it was now that active operations commenced. We shall draw on Capt. Outram's rough notes for an account of the capture of the town. (105).

"13th Nov. Marched at sunrise, the Local Horse being left in charge of the baggage. About a mile from the encampment we had just left, we were met by a body of about one hundred horse, who kept aloof until they observed that we had no Cavalry to oppose to them, whereupon they became bolder, and galloping close up to the head of the Column, discharged their matchlocks. A party of Light Infantry having been thrown out to keep them at a distance, we continued our march without further molestation about six miles, when, on our surmounting a small range of hills, the town and fortress of Khelat suddenly burst upon our view. It was truly an imposing sight. Some small hills in front were crowned with masses of soldiers, and the towering citadel which frowned above them in their rear, was completely clustered over with human beings,—ladies of the harem chiefly, who had assembled to witness the discomfiture of the Feringees, and the prowess of their Lords, all of whom, with the Khan at their head, had previously marched out to the heights, where they awaited us in battle array!

"No sooner had the head of the British Column shewed itself, than the enemy's guns, of which there were five in position on the heights, opened upon it; but being ill directed, they were unattended with effect. In order to assemble every efficient man of his small army, General Willshire here halted the troops until the baggage had closed up, assigning the charge of it, and of the sick, to the Local Horse. It was very evident that the enemy, who greatly outstripped us in point of numbers, were fully bent upon mischief; and our total strength amounting to less than one thousand bayonets, we had nothing to spare in the contest that awaited us. During this delay two companies were sent to clear some gardens on our left; and a body of horse threatening us from that direction, a few shrapnel shells were thrown amongst them, which caused them to withdraw to the fort. The cool and determined demeanour of our veteran General inspired every one present with confidence of success, nor shall I ever forget the obvious feeling of delight with which his deep toned word of command, 'Loosen cartridges,' was received by the soldiers—evincing as it did, that an immediate attack was intended, and that serious opposition might be expected.

"The following plan of assault was then communicated by the General. Under cover of the Artillery, the three redoubts on the heights are first to be carried by four companies of each Regiment. Two companies are to advance through the gardens, on our left, and the remaining ten companies are to form the reserve. The heights, once in our possession, would serve in a great measure to cover our camp from the Artillery of the fort, and would afford us a commanding position from which to annoy the Garrison.

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105. Captain Outram, pp. 141—147.

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" All being in readiness, the three columns of attack moved steadily forward preceded by the Artillery, which unlimbered at the foot of the hills, and opened a cannonade of shells and shrapnel with such admirable precision, that the masses of the enemy, crowning the heights, were compelled to abandon their position long before the Infantry had gained the summit. Observing the enemy endeavouring to draw off their guns, the General despatched me with orders to the Column of the Queen's Royals, which was the nearest to the gate, to pursue the fugitives, and if possible, to enter the fort with them—but at any rate to prevent their taking in the ordnance. I overtook the head of the column before it had attained to the redoubt (C.) and galloped on to the redoubt at the very moment that the enemy were vacating it ; when perceiving them to be engaged in the attempt to carry off one of the pieces of Artillery, I called on Captain Raitt of the Queen's Royals to push down quickly with his Grenadiers, and if unable to enter the gate with the enemy, at all events to capture the gun. I accompanied this party, which rushed down the hill, but arrived too late to enter the Fort with the enemy, who however abandoned the gun outside, and hastily closed the gate after them.

" Leaving the Grenadiers to take post under cover of a ruined building, (marked E. in the plan,) within sixty yards of the gate, so as to be in readiness to enter by it, in case the general might decide upon following up this advantage by blowing open the gate before the Garrison should find time to block it up, as they doubtless would do, were the attack to be delayed, I rode back to report progress. The whole of our troops were already on the heights, and the guns were also being dragged up. Four of the latter were directed to play upon the towers commanding the gateway from the positions B. B., whilst the other two were ordered down to D. for the purpose of battering the gate itself. The General at the same time despatched me to G., with instructions to bring up the Light Companies under Major Pennycuick to H., where a mud wall about four feet in height, afforded shelter within thirty yards of the wall, on the opposite side of the gate to that near which the Grenadiers of the Queen's Royals were posted. Having brought them at double quick time across the plain to within two hundred yards of the walls, and then directed them to scatter and rush under cover, I returned to the General, taking the point E. in my way, in order to warn the Grenadiers that the gate would be immediately blown open, when they were to rush in simultaneously with the Light Companies from the opposite side. It was whilst taking up the positions E. and H. that most of the casualties during this day occurred, the troops so engaged being exposed to an exceedingly hot fire from the walls. On these two occasions I was the only mounted officer present, but although both the nature of my occupation, and the singularity of my rifle uniform, differing as it did from all others, must have attracted a considerable share of the enemy's observation, I escaped with my usual good fortune.

" From the point D., the two guns now opened upon the gate, and being admirably directed (by Lieut. Henry Creed of the Bombay Artillery,) a few rounds were sufficient to throw down one half of it. The general's signals for the advance

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of the storming parties, not being immediately observed, I galloped down, and accompanied the Grenadiers to the gate, after seeing them in secure occupation of which, I returned to the General, whom I met close to the fort, bringing up the main body of the troops. He immediately despatched me with Captain Darley's Company of H. M.'s 17th Foot, with instructions to take the 31st Regiment Bengal Native Infantry along with me, and with these to storm the heights and secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. After passing quickly round the western face, from which we were exposed to a considerable fire, I placed the Company of the 17th under cover of a spur of the hill, and thence proceeded back to seek for the 31st Regiment, which I found scouring the suburbs. Having united the two detachments, we stormed the heights at K., where we experienced some trifling opposition from matchlockmen occupying the rocks above: these being soon dispersed we rushed down to the gate L., driving in a party of the enemy with such precipitation that they had not time to secure the gate, possession of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off.

"We were here joined by a party under Major Deshon, which had been sent round by the eastern face of the fort; when I directed the officers to leave a detachment in charge of the gate, and with the remaining portion to make their way up to the citadel, which still maintained a fire upon our troops, whilst I accompanied Lieutenant Creed for the purpose of selecting a position from whence to bombard it with the Shah's guns. Placed the guns in position at N., and opened a fire on the citadel which was continued with destructive effect, until our soldiers had obtained possession. Rejoining the General in the meantime, to report progress, I found him at the gate first carried, giving orders for attaching bags of gunpowder to the gates of the citadel, which had hitherto successfully resisted all attempts to enter it from this side. Reported that the party from the opposite quarter had already got well up, and with the aid of Lieutenant Creed's guns, would shortly surmount every obstacle. Hereupon troops were again sent up to co-operate, and a few minutes more sufficed to display the British standards waving over the highest of the towers of Khelat. All hostilities immediately ceased, and the soldiers displayed much greater forbearance than they usually do on such occasions. Quarter was never refused by them when craved by cries of 'Aman' 'Aman,' and before nightfall nearly two thousand prisoners had been removed from the fort unharmed.

"About four hundred of the Garrison are supposed to have fallen in this affair, and amongst them are the chiefs Mehrab Khan, Wullee Mahomed Khan, and other principal Beloche chieftains—every person of note having been either slain or captured. Some anxiety was expressed by the General on the occasion of my rejoining him at the first gate, in consequence of the rumoured escape of Mehrab Khan; but I assured him that as the fighting portion of the Garrison had been driven back whilst in the act of attempting to decamp by the opposite gate, I entertained no doubt that the Khan was still within the fort, since he could not, in honor, have previously deserted his followers. This afterwards proved to be the case. Foiled on that occasion in his attempt to escape, the

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Chief had returned to the citadel with Wullee Mahomed Khan of Wudd, and others of his most trusty followers, where they had all died sword in hand; the Khan himself being slain by a shot through the neck, from whose hand it is not known. Considering the small number of our troops, not one half of whom were actually engaged, the loss on our side is severe. Thirty-two were killed, and one hundred and seven wounded; amongst the former is Lieutenant Gravatt of the Queen's Royals, and there are nine officers amongst the latter.

"14th. Working parties have been employed the whole day in removing and burying the dead, as well as in collecting prize property. Scattered as the dead bodies are over every part of the town, among houses, the numerous dark chambers of which are not easily explored, it has not yet been practicable to ascertain the number of the slain. The amount of booty is supposed to be very considerable, but we unfortunately do not possess the means of carrying it away, nor is there any market here in which to dispose of it. The arms especially are of very superior manufacture, and the sword of the fallen chief Mehrab Khan in particular, which is of the most costly workmanship, is estimated to be of great value. The members of our little army have with one accord resolved upon presenting this enviable trophy to their gallant leader, General Willshire, in token of their admiration of his heroic bearing yesterday."—*Outram's Rough Notes*, pp. 141—147.

The joyous tidings of this event were carried by Capt. Outram to Bombay through the very heart of the enemy's country, until he reached Sonmeeanee by the sea. (106) The adventure was as dangerous and daring as any that could have been undertaken, and the bold adventurer only escaped on reaching the shore by about five hours before his pursuers.

There is no doubt that the capture of Kelat was not only the most creditable affair during the campaign, but that it was in itself exceedingly brilliant and meritorious,—well able to bear comparison with any exploit our troops ever performed in India. Kelat, with a garrison only one-third less numerous than that of Ghuznie, and fortifications scarcely less formidable, was captured by a force mustering little over 1000 bayonets, without cavalry, and with only one light guns. At Ghuznie we had 40 pieces of artillery, and above 6000 men; we speak comparatively; we have no wish to disparage the skill, bravery, or moderation of the last named gallant exploit which sealed the fortunes of the war. The loss of the enemy was computed at about 500 men; amongst these were numbered eight of the most influential chiefs, including Mehrab Khan himself: three others were taken prisoners. This brought up the loss of the Affghans

106. Capt. Outram had, after quitting Cabool, been, during his operations against the Ghilzies, invested with extensive political powers. These ceased on his approach to Quettah, when he was made aide-de-camp to Sir T. Willshire, and permitted to do duty with the engineers.

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during the campaign to about 2500. Our casualties amounted to 31 killed, and 108 wounded. The value of the spoil taken at Kelat was at first calculated as high as £60,000, it turned out considerably less than a tenth of this. The principal item was the crown and Zenana jewels: these had been built up and plastered over in the wall of the house of the chief counsellor of the Khan. No hint had been given in regard to them until our army was about to leave, and the tenement in which they were secreted had been assigned as a habitation to our future resident. A native, fearing probably that they must by and bye be discovered without his aid, or without advantage to any of those who were in the secret, disclosed the place of concealment—which it required much labour to break open. The history of this much of our spoil is so singular as to deserve a few lines of notice; they were valued at £60,000; we have seen how nearly they were *missed*: on their way to India they were as nearly lost. The jewels were entrusted to the care of H. M.'s 17th. About 300 of this Regiment having embarked at Kurrachee on board the transport *Hannah* for Bombay, were shipwrecked at the mouth of the Indus on the 17th of March. None of the people were lost, and the jewels were saved by Colonel Pennycuick, who carried them on his back for a considerable way through the surf and marsh. They were sold at Bombay the following July for betwixt £5000 and £6000: but the premises of the salesman shortly after the sale were broken into and robbed, and he himself afterwards became bankrupt; the amount realized to the army was a sufficiently insignificant fraction of that originally looked for.

Mehrab Khan and his principal chiefs having thus been summarily disposed of by the fate of war, the field was all but clear, and Newaz Khan was at once established on the musnud. We had become so familiar with the unseating and reseating of rulers on thrones, that it seemed to be thought that it required no more than the announcement that the house of Nusseer had ceased to reign, to ensure stability to the rule of his successor. Newaz was accordingly left to maintain himself in authority as he best could over the fierce and independent tribes whom he was designed to controul and to re-subject to the new Doorannee sovereign. Although Mehrab Khan had left a son—a spirited boy of fourteen years of age, to whom his subjects seemed devoted,—and a widow—a woman of infinite courage, talent, and perseverance, no apprehension appears to have been entertained on his account, or effort made to get them into our hands. The new ruler, as if established by the prescription of half a century, was left with Lieut. Loveday as our Envoy at his court, and 30 sepoys as a guard of honour! The result was, that in six months' time he was expelled from Kelat; Loveday was taken and murdered; and an insurrectionary movement of 18 months'

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duration brought about, which cost us £300,000 in treasure, the lives of 12 British officers, and some 300 soldiers, and ended in our reversing all that we had done;—pensioning the widow, and replacing the son of Mehrab upon his father's throne. This, however, comes to be treated in a subsequent chapter.

Sir T. Willshire returned by the Gundava pass into Cutchee—a fertile district in Upper Scinde; and joined the force stationed at Sukkur,—his gallant little army being shortly afterwards broken up. Sir John Keane and his staff arrived there from Ferozepore, on the 4th February, 1840, and gave the final orders for the breaking up of the army of the Indus, under instructions from the Governor-General, after which the Commander-in-Chief proceeded to Kurrachee, where he embarked for Bombay and there landed with his staff, on the 27th February, amidst the roar of cannon and other demonstrations of respect.

Thus closed the first Affghan campaign; and as the people at home appeared to have believed, concluded all arrangements exactly as had been desiderated, bringing round a period of universal peace. The war expenditure of these fifteen months seems, as near as can be guessed, to have amounted to nine millions sterling. Our loss of men, including camp-followers, appears altogether to have been under 300,—the principal part of the deaths having been occasioned by predatory attacks on our line of march. About 33,000 Government camels had perished on the march, occasioning a loss of £140,518 in this item alone, (107)—this includes about 4000 private camels, the value of which amounted to nearly £30,000, besides the loss to Government just stated. The total loss of property incurred by individual members of the service, is estimated at nearly £70,000 in the course of fourteen months, and which fell to be paid for by the officers of the force. Upper India was drained to supply this amount of carriage; (108) and we never, till the conclusion of the war, could command sufficient means of transport for our stores. The enemy had, as already stated, lost about 500 men before we reached Candahar, and 1000 at the storm of Ghuznie. We find no return of their casualties either on our advance to Cabool, or our retirement through the Khyber Pass, or during Major Outram's operations against the Ghilzies, where their loss must have been severe. We are satisfied that to set them down at 500 will be under the mark: 500 more at Kelat, bringing up the casualties on their side during the campaign to about 2500.

But though the fighting was closed, the most momentous and costly portion of our connection with Affghanistan was only just begun. The

107. Major Hough—Appendix.
108. Ibid, p. 7.

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Shah's contingent was already about 10,000 strong; it was, within six months, raised to 13,000; it was officered and paid by us, and was chiefly composed of subjects of the British Government. The cost of this, falling on our treasury, amounted in 1841 to very nearly half a million sterling.

Of the Seikh force of 5000 men which had ascended the Khyber Pass with Colonel Wade, a single regiment alone returned with him. The rest remained at Cabool. But the aid of 25,000 foreign soldiers, even with the fear of British power, was found inadequate to assure the Shah of the loyalty or submission of his subjects. We have traced to the confines of India the Bengal and Bombay columns on their retirement; but these were the mere skeletons of the forces which, under the same name, had ascended the Bolan Pass. The whole of the Bengal division of infantry, the 2nd Bengal light cavalry, and No. 6 light field battery, were ordered to remain in Affghanistan; (109)—the clouds which began to threaten on the N. W. just as we were preparing to leave, induced the Commander-in-chief to comply with the request of the Envoy and Minister, that another brigade might be left behind beyond what had been originally contemplated.

In detail, the arrangements of the force stood thus: H. M. 13th, and the 35th N. I., with three guns, were stationed in the Bala Hissar, Cabool; together with the Shah's 1st Cavalry, with some of his Artillery. This force, amounting to about 2,000 men, were to be commanded by Lieut-Colonel Dennie. The 48th N. I., the 4th Brigade, a detachment of sappers and miners, and 2d cavalry, with a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and three guns, were to be cantoned at Jellalabad; where the King and Envoy, according to the former luxurious custom of the Doorannee Sovereigns, proposed to spend the winter. If the Shah was slow in taking on himself the toils of King-craft, he was resolved that he should postpone the enjoyment of none of the luxuries of royalty for the sake of the tranquillization of his kingdom. The Ghuznie garrison was to be placed under charge of Major (now Colonel) McLaren, and to consist of the 16th N. I., a ressalah of Skinner's horse, and such details of the Shah's contingent as could be made available. The 42d and 43d N. I., with heavy artillery and local horse, with details of the Shah's troops, were to be stationed at Candahar. (110) The Shah's infantry mustered in all about 4000, his regular cavalry about 2000. Subsequent to the arrival at Cabool, garrison-artillery had been formed, with a mountain-train of 12 3-prs. The Affghan and Kohistan levies, raised on our arrival, amounted to about 4000, and the whole contingent to about 13,000 men. Including the British force, which consisted

109. Major Hough, p. 268.
110. General Order copied from Major Hough.

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of H. M.'s 13th, 1st Bengal European Regiment, 2d Light Cavalry, and the 2d, 16th, 35th, 37th, 42d, 43d, and 48th N. I., with details of Artillery: there was, by the beginning of 1840, an organized force in Affghanistan of 20,000 men; with from 70 to 80 guns. But the most formidable-looking and unlooked-for source of outlay was the salaries of thirty-two political agents who were dispersed over the country to see after its interests: and who received amongst them a revenue of £50,000 a-year. We shall speedily see that liberal as was the scale of expenditure at starting, before six months had elapsed it was found necessary to have it vastly encreased: and the regular Indian army which, when left behind in October 1839, amounted to about 8000, was within the next twelve months more than doubled in its strength. At the outbreak of the insurrection in November 1841, we had upwards of 14,000 men, *besides the contingent*, in the Shah's dominions!

How long such a state of matters as this was proposed to be continued, does not appear:—if we might judge from the solidity and extent of the political edifice we should infer that it was expected to be occupied by British tenants for a considerable period of years. The expense of the 13,000 men added to the Indian army before the war began, necessary to make up for the troops dispatched and detained beyond the Indus, amounted to above £600,000—the cost of the maintenance of the extra field force alone exceeding a million and a quarter annually, besides all commissariat, civil, and diplomatic charges. The services of the political agencies and the army called the Shah's contingent, must, at all events, have been expected to be required for a long lapse of time. Yet the net cost of these, as we have seen, amounted to £550,000 a-year; whereas the total revenues of the kingdom screwed up to their highest pitch, could never be raised, during the three following years, to more than £250,000; and were never estimated higher than £300,000. With a country so situated,—without sea-coast or navigable rivers,—mineral produce or manufacturing industry, or any single capability or means of purchase,—it seems difficult to divine what could possibly be contemplated by further occupation. The fears of Russia and Persia had proved a dream;—the siege of Herat was raised before our troops left their cantonments in Hindostan;—apprehensions of disaffection in India had been dispelled, and the Rajah of Sattarah, and Nawaub of Kurnool, from whose Portuguese allies and hidden cannon so much was apprehended, had been reduced to the condition of state prisoners with as little trouble as a bankrupt is brought to gaol;—Runjeet Singh, one of the most important parties to the tripartite treaty, was on his death-bed when it was signed, and in ashes before we left Candahar;—the Shah Soojah was in years above 60, in constitution at least ten years older from the life he had led,—and his sons, from the atrocious dissoluteness of their characters, were worthless or scandalous as

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allies to any nation:—yet with all the parties for or against, or with whom the treaty had been contracted, thus vanishing from the scene,—preparations were being made on a scale of such magnitude as if the drama had been destined for perpetuity!

The intelligence of the fall of Ghuznie, and occupation of Cabool, reached England in the middle of October; and nothing could exceed the triumph with which it was received. There was certainly much that was peculiarly brilliant and captivating in the exploit itself, and something extremely striking in the length, the difficulty, the boldness, and the success of the march which had preceded it. At a quarterly meeting of the Court of Proprietors held on the 18th December, a series of resolutions passed the week before by the Court of Directors was read: by these it was agreed that the thanks of the court should be tendered to Lord Auckland, "for the sagacity and promptitude with which he had planned the expedition, and the zeal and vigour he had displayed in preparing the troops to take the field." Sir John Keane and the field officers were also thanked for the intrepidity and spirit manifested by them in conducting the campaign. (111) This was cordial enough so far as it went, and was not unmerited: it was carried with dissent. Sir Charles Forbes spoke at great length on the subject,—urging the strongest objections to the policy of the Affghan War altogether, and especially adverting to the reported slaughter of the Ghazee prisoners by the Shah Soojah at Ghuznie. He said that the expense of the expedition had been estimated at three millions sterling: it was now admitted that it would cost five: and for his part he would not undertake to defray them for seven, up to the time of the return of our troops to India—about the period when the Hon'ble Baronet addressed the court. We have already seen that the war charges of 1839 have since been set down, by the best authorities, at about nine millions sterling. It now appears that so many as nine-tenths of the Court of Directors (112) were hostile to the policy of the war, however much disposed to approve of the military skill and bravery by which it had been carried into execution: and the chairman never ventured, on any one occasion, to ask the court for an approval of the policy! Mr. St. John Tucker had, early in 1839, made a formal protest against the war; and Sir Henry Willock a short time afterwards addressed Lord Palmerston at length upon the subject. The country were, however, so completely carried away by the clash of victorious arms, and the shout of triumph, that it was regarded as the extremity of party rancour to speak despairingly or disparagingly of a system whose commencement had been crowned with

111. Report—*Asiatic Journal* for January 1840, Vol. 39, N. S. p. 49, part ii.
112. Mr. Hogg's speech in the House of Commons, July 8, 1842.

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victory. They knew not then how much greater at one time had been the probability of failure than of success; and how much more terrible would have been the consequences of the former than those of the latter were auspicious. The general impression besides, appeared to be, that large acquisitions of territory had been gained, and ample additions made to our revenue. (113) They little expected that the laurels we had reaped had cost us nine millions sterling—that our new ally could only be maintained upon his throne by 20,000 British bayonets, and an expenditure of three millions a-year!—the return for which was NOTHING!! So cowed were the opposition into silence, or so ill-informed on the details of the policy, that scarcely any reply was made to it when alluded to in the Queen's speech of the 15th January, 1840. Sir R. Peel said he would wait and watch for the results. The Duke of Wellington had before remarked, that he never entertained any doubt but that the valour and discipline of our troops would secure victory to our arms: but it was when we had completed our first conquests that our difficulties would begin. When a vote of thanks was proposed to the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army, the same cautious reserve was maintained by the Conservatives: no formal opposition was offered: and up till after the time of Lord Keane's pension bill being passed in February 1841, no one save Lord Ellenborough,—who declared the war to have been a folly, and said that it remained to be seen whether or not it might not prove a crime,—ventured to speak out in Parliament in terms of open and decided disapprobation; but in great praise of Lord Keane for the manner in which he conducted the military part of it.

Lord Auckland—previously a Baron—was made an Earl: Sir John Keane was raised to the Peerage by the title of Baron Keane of Ghuznie and Cappoquin;—the following February a pension of £2000 a-year was conferred upon himself, to be continued to his male representatives for two generations: Mr Macnaghten and Colonel H. Pottinger—the great diplomatists on the occasion—received Baronetcies: Colonel Wade obtained the honor of knighthood. (114) Sir Alexander Burnes had been Knighted, and raised to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the commencement of the war;—the official intimation thereof having reached him in Scinde in January. (115)

Before concluding the present chapter, it may be as well to take leave of

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113. The speeches of Sir Phillip Durham and Sir John Cam Hobhouse at a meeting of the Directors, evidenced how extensively the delusion prevailed. The error of the Minister must have arisen from something worse than ignorance!

114. These Patents are dated Whitehall, Dec. 11, 1839.

115. Gazetted September, 1838.

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the principal actor,—the only one who retired from the stage no more to appear before the public in person,—almost the only one who reaped the honours and rewards of conquest, without suffering from the calamities which fast followed at the heels of original success. Lord Keane arrived at Bombay on the 27th February. He remained for five weeks, during which period he and his companions in arms received a splendid public entertainment in the Town Hall: the whole period of his sojourn, in fact, was filled up with feasts and festivities in honour of his successes in war. On his return home he received a public entertainment from the Court of Directors on the 11th July. As to his character, Lord Keane is a man of talents not entitled to be called eminent, yet considerably above mediocrity. He has had much experience in his profession, having served in Egypt, in the Peninsula, and in the American war of 1814. That he is a man of enterprize and resources—of vigour, spirit, and determination of purpose, is disputed by no one. The cool equability of his courage has repeatedly been called in question, (116) but without, as it appears to us, any sufficient reason: and though there can be no doubt that, for the master-stroke of the campaign—the capture of Ghuznie, the feat which won him all his fame, he was in a great measure indebted to the science, skill, and conduct of the Engineers, and the dauntless bravery of the troops; there are abundance of points remaining, of which he alone can claim the merit, to entitle him to the gratitude of his country. He was not the planner of the campaign; nor is he understood to have concealed his disapprobation both of the plan and the policy which led to it: though entrusted with its execution, he was not called upon for more; and this much he effected well. He was a stout Conservative in politics; and after the glowing Ghuznie despatch had been penned, he is understood to have said that "the fort was but a rotten hole after all!"—but that its capture would give the Whigs another year in office.—We have here given the bright side of Lord Keane's character: we have omitted the darker portions for the present,—many of which would ill bear public scrutiny.

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116. See Colonel Dennie's Letters.

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CHAPTER III.

Extent of the Doorannee Empire under Ahmed Shah—under Shah Soojah—Political Agents—Establishment and Expense of—Expedition to the northward, November 1839—The Shah and Envoy winter at Jellalabad—Colonel Orchard's unsuccessful expedition to Pushoot—Affair with the Hazarah Tribes—Grand Convoy arrives at Jellalabad in April—Expedition against the Ghilzies betwixt Candahar and Ghuznie—Detachments under Captains Walker and Tayler—under Captain Anderson—Colonel Wallace's Detachment—Successes of—Returns—Surrender of Nawaub Jubbar Khan and two of the Sons of Dost Mahomed—Reception of at Cabool—Dost Mahomed proceeds to Bokhara and is made prisoner—Adventures of—Escapes and returns to Khooloom—Dis contented state of the country—Alarming state of Kohistan—Captain Hay compelled to fall back on Syghan, which is reinforced—Captain M'Gregor's mishap near Jellalabad—Alarm of the Envoy—Apprehensions that we should require to quit all our outposts and concentrate on the Capital—Colonel Wheeler's success against the Kudjah Chiefs—Affzul Khan repulsed near Bajgah—Detachment abandons Syghan leaving much private property behind—Desertion of a part of the Shah's Troops—Colonel Dennie dispatched from Cabool to reinforce Bameean—Extreme apprehensions of Dr Lord—Colonel Dennie's brilliant manœuvres on the Irak mountain,—Reaches Bameean—Advance of Dost Mahomed—Battle of Bameean—Dennie's Advance on Syghan—Flight of the Affghans—The Khooloom Confederacy broken up—Sir R. Sale attacks Tootan Durrah—Death of Lieutenant Connolly—Destroys the whole of the Tootan Durrah Forts—Attack on Juglah—At first unsuccessful—Movements of Dost Mahomed—Destruction of the Village of Heibuk and adjoining forts—Battle of Purwan Durrah—Disgraceful conduct of the 2d Cavalry—Death of Dr Lord, Lieutenants Broadfoot, and Crispin—Surrender of Dost Mahomed to the Envoy—Sir Alexander Burnes's account of the State of the Country.

We have as yet been favoured with no sufficiently trustworthy materials to enable us to come to any distinct conclusion as to what might have been Lord Auckland's intentions or expectations at the beginning of the war as to the line of policy to be adopted after the Shah should have been replaced on his throne. It is probable, however, that he might have some such scheme as the following before him: as we cannot imagine any man mad enough to enter on an expedition, forseeing that long before any thing final or effective could be brought about, it must be abandoned because the finances as well as the credit of India were exhausted. We have already seen that the withdrawal of a much larger portion of the regular army than it was found prudent to permit to return to India, had been contemplated, and that the Commander-in-Chief, on the solicitation of the Envoy, left an additional brigade behind him at Cabool in October. It is probable that, by the second or third year of the new reign, it was hoped that the services of the whole of our troops might be dispensed with, and that the charge of the empire might be committed to the contingent for a few years longer, when probably our more immediate connection with the country might either have been expected to cease, or that by this time our faithful

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ally being gathered to his fathers, his kingdom might have become worthy of annexation to our other territories. When, or by whom, the marvellous scheme of political organization, immediately afterwards brought into operation, was devised,—how long it was meant to last,—or what useful purpose it was expected to serve, does not appear. There is no doubt but that it was implicitly believed that the Dooranee empire might speedily be stretched very nearly to its original limits. At the death of Ahmed Shah in 1773, it consisted of the provinces of—

Neshapoor,	Ghuznie,	Dheera Ishmael Khan,
Meshid,	Candahar,	Mooltan,
Herat,	Jellalabad,	Scinde,
Cabool,	Peshawur,	Beloochistan,
Balkh,	Cashmere,	The country as far as Sir-
Bameean,	The Punjaub,	hind.
Ghorebund,	Dheera Ghazee Khan,	

The revenues of the Dooranee sovereigns at this period amounted to about three millions a-year. The total revenue of Cabool in Dost Mahomed's time was about £250,000, and it fell considerably below this after his deposition. The Shah Soojah had, in addition to these, the revenues of Candahar, his other acquisitions yielded him none—which brought up the whole financial returns of the empire to something under £300,000 a-year. The dominions of which we put him in possession were Cabool, Bameean, Ghuznie, Jellalabad, and Candahar, the last of which alone did not belong to Dost Mahomed. One of our earliest arrangements for reducing the Dooranee states to order, was the appointment of an expensive set of functionaries termed political agents; so often adverted to, that it will be convenient here to give a brief account of them. These were selected from the civil or military services—mostly from the junior grades of the latter, their chief recommendation being their familiarity with the Persian language. They resided in the larger towns or troubled districts, and were vested with the most extensive powers over the troops in their neighbourhood, without any relation to age or rank in the army;—the youngest lieutenant (and out of the thirty-two there were nine captains and seventeen lieutenants) within the limits of the corps diplomatique being competent to direct the oldest general in the service! Sir Alexander Burnes invariably denounced this variety of diplomatic organization as productive of the most detrimental consequences to the country. In his memorial to the Envoy of the 19th April, 1841, he says—"It seems to me that wherever our political officers are, collision forthwith follows;" and in his private letters he speaks of the frog-spawn and fry of politicals with which the country was overspread. The Envoy, on the other hand, conceived them indispensable as means of gaining information. We shall have

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