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
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THE
VIEWS AND OPINIONS

OF

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B.,

AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE QUEEN;
AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, &c. &c. &c.
LATE COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF THE BRITISH FORCES IN PERSIA;
AT PRESENT COMMANDING THE SIND IRREGULAR HORSE,
AND POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF SIND.

COLLECTED AND EDITED

BY

CAPTAIN LEWIS PELLY,

AUTHOR OF "OUR NORTH-WEST FRONTIER."

SECOND EDITION.

LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER & CO., 65, CORNHILL.
BOMBAY: SMITH, TAYLOR & CO.

1858.



ERRATA.

- Page 44, line 4—for "the seaport at Kotree, &c.," read "the seaport at Kur-rachee. Kotree, the station on the western bank of the river, opposite Hydrabad, appears to be the only available point for the river terminus of the railway, within the terms of the contract; but the whole place," &c.
- Page 50, last line—for "involve," read "follow."
- Page 51, last line but one—for "what other minds have written," read "what others have written."
- Page 81, line 21—for "that of the canal," read "that of the Begaree Canal."
- Page 82, line 29—for "Khyree Ghurree Canal," read "Begaree Canal."
- Page 134, line 6—erase the words "one troop only of."
- Page 177—after "Memorandum, No. II," insert the date, "1848."
- Page 193, line 17—for "a hostile population; they," read "a hostile population; and the people are generally," &c.
- Page 193, line 20—for "remain," read "become."
- Page 193, line 25—for "upsets," read "repels."
- Page 230, line 13—for "for their own amusement," read "or for their own amusement."
- Page 230, line 20—for "he is convinced of," &c., read "he is convinced that manly confidence, ready intelligence, and habits of self-reliance which are invaluable in war, are best developed in the absence," &c.
- Page 310, line 9—for "Tructnee," read "Trukkee."
- Page 320, line 21 from bottom—for "Loree Kooshtuck," read "Shoree Khooshtuck."
- Page 408, line 25, and last line—for "Nanarck," read "Nanazek."
- Page 409, line 5—for "Gurikhan," read "Guseekhan."
- Page 411, line 13—for "Bushire," read "Reshire."
- Page 415, line 14—for "steamers lie alongside," read "steamers cannot lie alongside."
- Page 422, line 3—for "town," read "turn," &c.
- Page 422, line 11—for "the whole moral growth," read "their whole moral growth."
- Page 423, line 10—for "poor ensigns," read "wretched ensigns."

"I have sometimes thought it a great pity that every one seems ashamed of publishing to the world that a certain able man is alive and still usable. But no sooner is the able man disabled by death, than any number of ~~men are ready to let him slip through their~~

The Address of CAPTAIN LEWIS PELLY is

55, WIGMORE STREET, CAVENDISH SQUARE.

ERRATUM.

Page 233, line 4, *for saddle-bag read saddle-cloth.*

“ ‘ I have sometimes thought it a great pity that every one seems ashamed of publishing to the world that a certain able man is alive and still usable. But no sooner is the able man disabled by death, than any number of Biographers will abuse the poor world for letting him slip through their fingers.’

“ ‘ Well, well, neighbour, I am thinking it would require some pluck to print thy virtues and sign my name. Yet, peradventure, and we were both honest, a man might dare even this.’ ”—*Old Novel*.

“ Here is an earnest, truth-speaking man ; no theorizer, sentimentalizer, but a practical man of work and endeavour, man of sufferance and endurance. The thing that he speaks is not a hearsay, but a thing that he has himself known, and by experience become assured of. * * * His grand excellency is this, that he is genuine. As his primary faculty, the foundation of all others, is Intellect, depth and force of Vision ; so his primary virtue is Justice, the Courage to be just. * * * He lives, as he counsels and commands, not commodiously in the Reputable, the Plausible, the Half, but resolutely in the Whole, the Good, the True.”—*Thomas Carlyle*.

ERRATUM.

Page 233, line 4, *for saddle-bag read saddle-cloth.*

TRACTS ON THE NATIVE ARMY OF INDIA.

By BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN JACOB, C.B.

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE	xi

PART I.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.

The Secret of our Rule in India	1
Moral Being	2
European Officers should not be wasted on Trivial Employ- ments	3
Natural Forces	3
The Control of Predatory Tribes	4
Interference with Trade opposed to the Laws of Political Eco- nomy	5
The Liberty of the Press	6
On Missionaries ; and the Interference of the State in matters appertaining to Religion	8
Selection <i>versus</i> Examination	9
Reduction of Civil Salaries	14
Should Officers unable to Pass in the Language of a District be removed from Office ?	17
Non-Removal of Incompetent Officials	18
Abolition of Statute Labour advocated	18
Minute on Objections urged against the Abolition of Forced Labour in Sind	21
Abolition of Forced Labour in Sind	26
Calculation of Labour Rates in certain Districts	34
Wheel-Carriages and Bridges	35
Repairs of Roads by Contracts	37
Plans and Estimates <i>versus</i> a Road and Canal	38
A Navigable Canal to the Indus, and the Requirements of Kur- rachee as a Port	40
Public Ferries	41

b

	PAGE
Remarks on a Railway to connect the Indus with the Seaport of Kurrachee	43
Travellers' Bungalows and Serais	49
Trade creates a Market, but does not necessarily follow a Mar- ket-place	50
Political Science related to all Science	51
Customs and Pier Dues	52
Frontier Trade Returns	52
The Indus Flotilla and Forest Conservancy beyond the sphere of the State's Functions	53
Engineer and Normal Class Scholars should not be limited to Government Employ	54
Remarks on the Revenue System of the North-West Provinces	55
Revenue Settlement	57
Titles to Land, and Leases	59
Artificial Encouragement to Agriculture	71
Management of Pastoral Hill Tracts	71
Tax not the Desert	73
Restoration and Duties of Village Accountants	73
Salaries to Village Accountants	74
Protection of Bunds by Contracts	76
Tank-Digging	78
Effect of removing Dams	79
Increased Cultivation followed by more abundant Rain in the Desert	80
Moral Influence exerted as an Element in securing large num- bers of Labourers among Rude Tribes	80
Military Commissions as Courts of Civil Judicature	83
Police Confessions	83
On the Supply of Carriage in a Free Market	84

PART II.

ON MILITARY MATTERS.

On the Arming of a Free People ; and on the true Principles of the Organisation of the Armies of England	93
The Defects of the Bengal Army	101
Comparison between the Systems obtaining in the Armies of Bengal and Bombay	117

	PAGE
Remarks on the State of the Native Army of India in general ; upon the Principles whereon its Efficiency depends ; and on the Means whereby its existing Defects may be remedied .	124
Sildar Horse	135
On granting Compensation to Sildar Corps	164
Sildar Rifle Corps	168
Three Memoranda on the Constitution of the Sind Irregular Horse, as exemplifying the Sildar Principle	170
Carriage Arrangements of the Sind Irregular Horse	189
Camp Supplies and Baggage Corps	193
The Military Fund	203
Furlough Regulations	204
Daily Orderly-Room to be held by every Commanding Officer .	209
The Vices of the Seniority System in the Native Army	211
Fixed Head-Quarters for Regiments	213
The Obedience of Soldiers not to depend on their own pleasure	214
On the Purchase of Horses by Government for Military Pur- poses	214
Stud-bred Horses	217
The Military Board and Audit Department	219

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

Military Rules on High Caste Men	220
Sepoy Mutineers and their Officers	220
Powers of Commanding Officers, and Candidates for Enlistment	221
Prize Property	221
Fortifications	222
Flank Companies and Sizing	222
Qualifications of Staff Officers	222
Night Attack by Shere Mahomed	222
The Sepoy's Musket	223
Horse Fairs	223
Cavalry Swords	224
The Point and Cut	225
Cloth Pantaloon <i>versus</i> Leather Breeches for Mounted Men .	227
Horse Artillery and Cavalry Charges	228
Good Tools do not make Bad Workmen	228
The Greatest Danger to our Indian Empire	229
Removal of a Prohibitory Order	230
Cavalry Charges should succeed	230
European and Native Soldiers on Service	231

	PAGE
Directions for a Saddle	232
Memoranda on Rifles, in their Application to the Purposes of War, and on Rifle Practice	233
Penetration of Jacob's Iron-pointed Rifle Balls	275
Best Army Rifle	275
Explanation of the Difference between the Minié and Jacob Rifle Ball	280

PART III.

RELATING TO THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER OF INDIA.

Memoir of the First Campaign in the Hills North of Kutchee, to the North-West of the Frontier of Sind	287
Subsequent Proceedings on the North West Frontier of Sind up to the close of the year 1847	317
Appendix to the Memoir	326
Arrangements carried into effect for the Security and Pros- perity of that portion of the North-West Frontier forming the Boundary between Sind and Beloochistan, comprising—	
Memorandum on the Principles of Procedure on the North- West Frontier of Sind	349
Summary of Arrangements made on the North-West Frontier of Sind	353
Military System introduced for the protection of the North- West Frontier of Sind	356
Disarming of the North-West Frontier of Sind	362
Mistaken Leniency towards Marauders	364
Standing Orders for the Frontier Posts of the North-West Frontier of Sind	367
Assessment on the Land of the Frontier District of Sind	367
Advice to a Native Prince	369
The Brahooees, Affghans, and Pathans, considered as Recruits for our Armies	370
Suggestions towards the Permanent Defence of the North-West Frontier of India	375
Memorandum of Proposed Arrangements in case of a British Force being stationed at Quëtta, or at other convenient Spot above the Bolan Pass	385

PART IV.**RELATING TO THE PERSIAN WAR.**

	PAGE
Its Policy	401
On the Policy of invading Persia	403
The Valleys of the Karoon and Euphrates; and Russian Policy	403
Cavalry for Transport by Sea to the Persian Gulf	406
Military Requirements in the Expedition to the Persian Gulf	407
On Holding our own Ground after Victory	408
Kuzistan having become ours by Conquest, should be permanently occupied	409
Water Supplies at Bushire and Karrack	411
Mohumra, Karrack, and Bushire, considered as places for Troops to summer in	411
Insalubrity of Mohumra	412
Supplies from Bombay	413
Supplies from the Valley of the Euphrates	413
Employment of the Men in Hutting themselves	414
It is better to be, than to seem, strong	414
Bushire as a Point of Embarkation	415
Orientals are commanded, not by Etiquette, but by Habitual Nobility of Being	415
The School of Smooth Words	416

PART V.**OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF INDIA, AND ON THE REORGANIZATION OF ITS CIVIL AND MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.**

Three Extracts on the present Condition of India	419
A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Civil and Military Administration of India	425
Reply to some Observations on the Scheme of Reorganization	439



ADDENDA.

	PAGE
Security for the Good Conduct of Recruits	447
Order relative to the Mahomedan Festival of the Mohurram .	448

INDEX	451
-----------------	-----

PREFACE.

WE frequently find theorists advocating the application of Natural Law to the affairs of men. We more frequently find the legislators and actors in these affairs working in contempt or ignorance of that law. But it is of very rare occurrence to meet a man possessing at once the ability, will, and opportunity himself to apply the Law of Nature in many departments of common business. And believing that General Jacob has both faithfully and successfully so applied it, I have collected some of his views, and now lay them before the public, in the hope that they may become as useful to others as they have been to myself.

I beg the reader to bear in mind, when perusing the following papers, that they are not the effusions of a mere theorist, but contain some of the pungent maxims arrived at by a man whose life has been passed in action. Himself believing in Universal Law, the General has dared to apply its principles to business immediately in hand, presuming that what was true for the whole could not but prove true for

the particulars of this whole. And thus, testing his theory by practice, and finding his assumptions borne out by practical results, he now claims to affirm these with the authority of a master.

The foregoing observations apply equally to the papers upon civil and upon military matters. But it is upon their application to the latter that I propose to remark : for it is but too manifest that our existing military system in India has failed ; and that if England still purpose to hold India, she must do so by means either of undisguised English military occupation, or of a Native army re-organised on sound and lasting principles.

Choosing the former course, we must be prepared to maintain in India an English force as large as, or larger than, we were able to maintain in the Crimea ; to acknowledge before all the world that our rule in India is based, not on the good-will of the governed, but upon palpable military occupation ; to maintain our English army in India, still undiminished, in the event of an European war ; to increase this army in the contingency of our European enemies extending their influence into Asia ; to drain (beyond the drain already involved in our government as foreigners) India of that wealth which is now returned to her in the form of pay and pensions to a vast Native military establishment ; and, lastly, to create and provide for discontent among a large section of our Indian subjects who now trust to the military profession for subsistence.

Choosing the latter course, it is incumbent on us to lose no time in availing ourselves of such material for

a loyal and efficient Native army, as may be ready to hand; and in availing ourselves of all workmen able to fashion this material into shape.

Convinced that neither the present military resources of England, nor the present financial resources of India, could permanently support, in India, an English army equal to holding our Eastern empire; and convinced, moreover, that if those resources could respond to this demand, England would not be justified in subjecting India to an English military occupation—I accept the alternative of reorganising our Native army; and I appeal to the military papers contained in this volume, and to the practice upon which they are founded, in proof of the assertion which I now publish—that we have at least one man among us who can discern and point out to us the material for a Native army, and who has shown himself able to organise it into loyalty and efficiency.

It is unquestionable that, standing alone, at the hazard of his commission, and subjected to prolonged obloquy and opposition, General Jacob has during a period of many years past, exposed the vices of the system now failing us; has predicted that the combined direct and indirect operation of this system would result in failure; and has, at the same time, advocated, elaborated, and carried into effect, under very adverse circumstances, and without once faltering, a new system, capable of bearing every test, and which, though often assailed,—and sometimes virulently,—has never yet been shown to be hollow or defective.

Whether for good or for ill these principles, which

General Jacob has exemplified in the constitution of his regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, have, from the first, had in view the reformation of our Native armies in India. The reformation thus exemplified has, from the first, been declared to be, not in degree, but in essence; to aim, not at a modification of the existing system, but at a radical, essential abolition of this system, in favour of another by him introduced. This latter was, in the first instance, tried with one, subsequently with a second, and is about to be tried with a third regiment of horse. In the two first instances, the men enlisted were drawn from the very heart of those districts now in revolt. In both these instances, the experiment met with strenuous and continued opposition from all quarters; and was stigmatised as mere theory, inapplicable to the real practice of war. In both instances it proved, under severe and prolonged trial, to be completely successful.

There remained, however, one supposed objection to the permanent and extended application of the General's system. It was this—that though successful when carried out under his immediate direction, it would fail if entrusted to less able men. Nevertheless, one of the regiments so trained was recently sent on foreign service under the command of a young lieutenant; was harassed by sea as cavalry seldom have been harassed; and was then scattered under its *Native* officers to Kurrachee, Bombay, Poona, and elsewhere. Yet those detachments remained staunch under their native officers while mutiny was being enacted in these stations,

by regular troops ; and showed, as plainly as need be, that *the School* had formed both officers and men.

Meantime, the other regiment so trained remained, under another officer, on the frontier ; and this officer's military powers were unavoidably contracted by the presence of a senior officer in command of an irregular corps from Bengal. To the rear of this frontier was the station of Shikarpoor, holding disaffected regular troops ;* to its right front was the Punjaub, in which nearly every regular regiment was in revolt or disarmed ; to its left front was the State of Khelat, in temporary disorder, attributable to the Khan's demise ; and in its immediate neighbourhood was a border chief† striving to awaken rebellion. Yet this second regiment

* The most important arm, the Native Artillery, actually broke out into open mutiny ; while one of the most trusted Subedars in the only Native Infantry regiment at the station of Shikarpoor was arrested, and soon after executed, as ringleader of a plot to mutiny and murder. I should add, that no European troops were stationed within several hundred miles of the frontier.

† This borderer wrote to all his neighbouring chiefs, calling upon them to strike a blow for freedom. He told them it would be in vain to tamper with the troopers of the Sind Horse, but that they should all assemble at Jacobabad on an appointed day, under pretence of making their usual obeisance, and should, then and there, upon a signal to be by him given, rise and murder the European officers, and afterwards raise the surrounding country.

Among the chiefs so addressed was one, of whose tribe some five hundred men had, within the past ten years, been destroyed by the officer then commanding the Sind Horse. Yet he, like all his neighbours, returned for answer that the English Government had

stood and stands staunch, although in a position, and under temptations, than which it were difficult to imagine any more trying to the loyalty of mercenaries.

I am well aware that, in thus plainly laying the truth before the public, I may incur, from some persons, the charge of undue presumption. But I am not less confident that every man, really careful for the honour and welfare of our Indian Government and its army, will dispassionately consider whether the system advocated and practised by General Jacob is or is not adapted to our requirements; and, in the event of his denying its suitability, that he will support his denial by valid reasons, and endeavour himself to submit a system which Theory may argue, and practice have proved, to be preferable. Meanwhile, to those who look for precedent I would suggest that our own history affords an example of an army remodelled upon a regiment of Silidar Horse—which regiment was Cromwell's.

Having found occasion to use the term "Bengal,"

been just to them, and that they would take no part in the proposed massacre. Many of them also sent in trusty agents, bearing news of what had occurred.

Upon receiving this intelligence, the officer commanding called for two of his native officers, informed them of the plot, and directed them to provide for its frustration, and for securing its ringleader. They arranged accordingly; and the borderer had no sooner arrived upon the day appointed, than he was quietly arrested. Yet his plot had been divulged to some hundreds of the men in the lines; and its divulgence was, further, known to many of the border chiefs on the frontier. The traitor alone remained ignorant of his own betrayal.

in connection with the defects of our military system, I deem it on every account proper to explain that I am far from intending to cast reflections upon any officer or body of officers. The development of the present crisis has assured me that our failure is attributable, not to individuals, but to system; and for the framing of this system the executive are not responsible.

For myself, had not the Indian army, to which I belong, been disgraced by mutiny, I had assuredly remained silent. But as matters are, I should deem myself culpable in neglecting to submit to our legislators, and the English people, information which they should, in the present crisis, possess; and towards supplying which I chance, by a long residence with General Jacob, on his personal Staff,* to have been favourably circumstanced.

I am convinced that no unprejudiced person, accurately acquainted with the history of our native army, can read these military papers, or become familiar with the practice on which they result, without perceiving that the principles advocated are in exact conformity with whatever has been or still may be worthy in the constitution of that army. I believe there is scarcely a commanding officer or an adjutant of a regiment who would not at once acknowledge that the details in which he has found

* As Assistant in the Revenue and General Department when the General was acting as Commissioner in Sind; as Aide-de-Camp when he was in Command of the Cavalry Division Persian Field Force; and as Political Secretary when he was Commander-in-Chief in Persia.

himself hampered are those pointed out in these papers. And all who have perused the works of the late Sir John Malcolm, and the selections from the correspondence of the late Lord Metcalfe, recently edited by Mr. Kaye, will be impressed with the coincidence of the principles enunciated by these statesmen with those independently practised by General Jacob. One principle, common to all three writers, cannot be too strongly urged. It is this—*That from the moment when the command of a Native Regiment becomes less sought for than other employ, we may date the commencement of our downfall. To render this command so sought for, we must place the commander in a position to be looked up to by his own men, and by society, whether English or native; and we must support him in the exercise of full authority. To do this involves selection,—selection, that is, of officers for a class of appointments more essential to the existence of our rule in India than any other class of appointments whatsoever, be they military or civil.*

LEWIS PELLY.

CAMP POKRUN,

December 1857.

PART I.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION:

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.

THE SECRET OF OUR RULE IN INDIA.

To the Anglo-Saxon race self-government is essential. But force the Oriental to take his share in government, and you will soon have no government at all. The former considers that which unnecessarily interferes with his freedom to be wrong, and thinks and acts upon the principle that all men have equal rights. The latter considers being compelled to govern himself as the greatest oppression and tyranny. He expects to be ruled, and to be ruled well; otherwise he will, perhaps, rebel and destroy his bad rulers. But in no case will he attempt to establish freedom.

It is obvious that two races of men with principles of action and feelings different, can never be successfully managed by adopting one system, and forcing it alike on both. But while incapable of self-government, the natives of India, like other human beings, feel gratitude and devotion towards those who raise their moral, intellectual, and social position; and are actuated by a strong wish and earnest zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position to which they are

raised. Too mistrustful of their equals to submit to their rule, they cheerfully submit to an English gentleman, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior.

We hold India, then, by being in reality, as in reputation, a superior race to the Asiatic; and if this natural superiority did not exist, we should not, and could not, retain the country for one week. If, then, we really are a morally superior race, governed by higher motives, and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the natives of India are able to understand us, and the more we improve their capacity for so understanding, the firmer will become our power. Away, then, with the assumption of equality; and let us accept our true position of a dominant race. So placed, let us establish our rule by setting them a high example, by making them feel the value of truth and honesty, and by raising their moral and intellectual powers.

But if we are not superior to the Indians, the attempt to retain our sovereignty over them will be as hopeless as it will be vicious. And England neither can nor wishes to be powerful in evil.—(1854.)

MORAL BEING.

I would untiringly inculcate the maxim: *Be. Be yourself*; and all the attributes and effects which nature has attached to that condition of existence must necessarily attend and follow you. Our rank in the universe depends on our real nature—on what we *are*, not on what we seem, or others think us, to be; and I would remind you, that among these rude people in

particular our real intentions and motives are those which tell. If we really do wish them well, and always act fairly, honestly, and justly towards them, their old mistrust will certainly disappear. For our real character, and the real nature of our proceedings, must necessarily produce their natural results.—(1857.)

EUROPEAN OFFICERS SHOULD NOT BE WASTED ON TRIVIAL EMPLOYMENTS.

Whatever tends to make European gentlemen “cheap”—to lessen their evident value—to hold up their vices rather than their virtues to the view of the natives—to show them to the natives only in inferior positions, where their powers are not called forth, and where they have little influence for good—must tend to destroy in no slight degree the hold we have on the people. Whatever, on the contrary, raises the European character in the eyes of the natives of India, and in reality, must greatly add to our security and power.—(1854.)

NATURAL FORCES.

Our regulation authorities do not seem to have any idea of *natural* causes, or to know that natural forces exist. Yet all other forces are contemptible, and deceptive appearances only. Our present proceedings are exactly like those of a man who, wanting a great forest, should stick some huge branches into the earth, and then think the business done. His labours would make a grand display for a while, but in one season or so all would rot and disappear.

But if he sowed acorns—feeble-looking things at

first, but containing mighty *principles* of life and growth—he would assuredly raise giant oaks, whose strength might resist the utmost force of the storm for a thousand years.—(1856.)

THE CONTROL OF PREDATORY TRIBES.

It is moral more than physical force which is required to control predatory tribes : both are doubtless necessary, but the latter is so, chiefly, to enable us to apply the other. Justice, honesty, high principles, unswerving firmness, and force without violence, succeed best with these men, as with others. If we imitate their crimes, on pretence of retaliation, we only perpetuate the evil. The power of the border marauder does not wholly consist in the damage he is able to cause, or in the terror he is able to inspire, but in the fact that his name and deeds are associated, even in the minds of those he injures, with chivalric daring, and attributes not altogether bad. But if the trade of marauder be proved to be unsuccessful, and disreputable, it soon receives the ridicule and contempt of all.

The province of—— and the frontier district of——, containing more than 10,000 square miles, and some 100,000 of the wildest and most untameable men on earth, were formerly one continued scene of rapine, murder, and every conceivable horror ; yet in the course of a few years' *just* administration, these borderers have settled down to peaceful industry, and to as tame a repose as little disturbed by violence as many of our old districts in India.

The most active and the most violent of the old robber tribes are now cheerful and thriving agricul-

turalists. And, believe me, the principles which have guided proceedings in this instance are of universal application. If we *are just and true*, we shall be trusted even by the Affghans, whatever measures we may find it necessary to undertake.—(1856.)

INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE OPPOSED TO THE LAWS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

I am astounded at finding that the export of corn has been prohibited by proclamation; and that the prices of the market have been regulated by general orders. I do assure you, I cannot imagine any publications more certain to contravene the universally received laws of political economy than these documents, which defeat, moreover, the very object for which they profess to have been issued, namely the maintenance of an abundant supply and low prices.

But such notifications not only tend to produce present scarcity, but are calculated to leave deep and lasting ill consequences to the trade of —, and to cause deplorable ill consequences, in this country, to the reputation of the British Government for wisdom and justice. For it cannot but be expected that the evil effects of such authoritative interference with trade, and with the rights of private persons, will be felt long after such interference shall cease.

The confidence of merchants and traders is delicately sensitive; and, when once justly shaken, cannot be speedily restored to a healthy state. Supplies will not readily flow from distant points towards a market which is not free, and where the rates of sale and purchase are arbitrarily regulated in lieu of being left

to be adjusted naturally, by the existing relations of supply and demand.

I beg that all restrictions of every description on the commerce and external trade of this place may be immediately removed by proclamation, and that, henceforth, no interference with the private rights of buyers and sellers may be permitted, on any pretence whatsoever.—(1857.)

THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

I am very glad indeed that you cancelled the letter you drafted relative to the newspaper criticisms on your proceedings. Rely upon it, every public man will best command public praise by deserving it; and every attempt to stop the mouths, even of false railers, is unwise and weak. Let those who will, rail on! If you are abused, the abuse will only excite reaction in your favour; but if you wince under criticism or censure, the chastisement will be thought to be merited. It is what we *are*, not what is said of us, that is alone worth thinking on.

Every servant of the public should glory in publicity; and if he be really striving simply and solely for the public good, he will rejoice in seeing his proceedings subjected to the full light of public opinion, which, more surely than any other means, will expose his errors and defects. It is only evil that dreads publicity.

It is the fashion to abuse the Indian press for its scurrility and falsehood. But the press, like the government, is everywhere indicative of the people supporting it. If society be scurrilous, the press,

which is the expression of its contributors, will be scurrilous also. If, again, the Government, and those possessing accurate information, maintain secrecy, the press must seek information from unreliable sources. But it is illogical to argue that the press, which is dependent for its existence upon the subscriptions of the public, would wilfully mislead that public, or adopt language other than that which was found to be most popular and remunerative.

On the whole, however the press may libel you, you have, and Government should also have, but three remedies, viz., to inform the editor of the real facts of the case in point; secondly, to employ a governmental organ for publishing the truth; or lastly, to prosecute the libeller according to law.

Even assuming the lowest ground for argument, and contending in conformity with the views of the narrowest and least scrupulous minds, I should still maintain that it is unwise to gag the press. When all are free to speak, men know that the worst is said. Ill-will and sedition evaporate in words, and the public believe as much as they please of what they see printed. But when the public voice is stifled, suspicion, distrust, fear, discontent, and almost every other public ill, commence.

* * * * *

I would wish to see every government and every public man live down calumny and falsehood. If you really are good, be sure that the consequences which nature has attached to that goodness must ensue. It is not more certain that a pound of matter, scatter it how you will, still weighs one pound in God's universe,

than that a good performed, hide it, deny it how you will, has its due and certain weight in the same universe. In this, as in all else, the law of the moral is identical with that of the physical world. Therefore, I say again, *be yourself*, and leave consequences to the Author of all being: perfect freedom is perfect law.—(*March*, 1857.)

ON MISSIONARIES; AND THE INTERFERENCE OF THE STATE IN MATTERS APPERTAINING TO RELIGION.

To interfere with the labours of the missionary, by whatsoever church or sect deputed, would be as unjust and impolitic as to interfere with the business of any person trading or professing. Let the missionary preach, and, if he can, convert, so long as he remains, and be generally known to be, wholly unconnected with the State. But the interference of Government, or the members of Government in their official capacities, to countenance or sanction the endeavours of missionaries, or any other ministers of religion, is, in India, fraught with evil. And every semblance, even, of such sanction or countenance, should be studiously avoided.

There is no maxim of government more certainly true and wise than that all interference whatever on the part of Government with the creeds or religions of the people is mischievous and unjust. This maxim is in my opinion true in all places, and at all times. But such interference, whether for patronage or discouragement, must be more than usually unwise where, as in India, there are many different faiths, and those the most ancient and revered of any on earth, existing

among two hundred millions of men, who cling to their religion as to their life; while the governing class, who propose to make their own faith the religion of the State, may count their numbers, probably, as one to ten thousand of those subjects on whom their doctrines are to be forced.

It seems to me unwise to carry our State religion to India at all, even as respects Englishmen in this country. In our public capacity, as governors of hundreds of millions of men, of twenty different faiths and sects, we cannot, with justice or propriety, exclusively patronise *any* religion. Absolute freedom should be allowed to all so long as they do not annoy others. But Government should identify itself with none. It appears most injudicious to *parade* our State religion. In short, a State religion in India is absolutely incompatible with the security of our empire.—(1857.)

SELECTION *versus* EXAMINATION.

Among the objections to our competitive examinations, and in fact to our examinations generally, are the following:—That they are limited to intellectual acquirements, and wholly ignore moral and physical acquirements. That even in regard of intellectual acquirements, they do not test those which are most requisite in civil and military servants of the public. That the candidates are generally of an age when it is impossible for any examiner to predicate, or reasonably to infer, what their future value as public servants may be. And, that the examinations have a tendency to force the young brain; and thus to deteriorate the

material out of which our public servants are to be formed.

Experience shows that the highest order of mind is by no means of the quickest growth. The future statesman may very probably appear a dull and stupid, or an idle boy, while the clever clerk is learning by rote. The mental power of the former is growing; he is acquiring that power with which he will afterwards work; and, it may be, is training his body in those manly sports natural to youth. The latter, meantime, is carrying to his nest the thoughts of other men, without once attempting to assimilate them into his own being, or to originate fresh thought. And yet it would be the clever clerk, and not the embryo statesman—the receptive and not the creative mind—that would carry off the prize at our examinations.

Look, for instance, at the competitive examinations for entry into our Indian civil service. These tests are excellent in their way; but they most assuredly do not test the qualities which we desire to see in our civil administrators of India. The test of superintending a factory were infinitely preferable, for by this the candidate would at least prove himself able to organize labour, and to manage men; whereas, by the other, he is simply shown to be a more or less efficient scholar. And the argument that the most brilliant among our public men have also been accomplished scholars, appears to me wholly without force when applied to the question now under discussion. It were as reasonable to allege that all candidates must possess extraordinary physical endurance because our lord chancellors have shown themselves to possess

this among numerous other excellencies. We are not dealing with the geniuses of English administration, but with the average material of administrative capacity which the gentry of England supply for the government of India. Observe, again, the effects of our examinations in the native languages. Nobody denies that every officer who undertakes to command, or to deal with, the natives of India, should, among other qualifications, possess that of communicating with these natives. But the objection is to selecting this one qualification, and making it the one test upon which all appointments in India shall depend. Nor is this all; for the examination in this case also fails of securing that which it professes to aim at, viz., the appointment of none but officers able to communicate with the natives in their vernacular tongue.

Let us examine a little into these two objections:

1st.—An officer is required, say to command a body of horse, or to take charge of a collectorate. What is the one question asked regarding the nominee? It is this: "Has he passed in the language?" If he have passed, he is appointed; if he have not passed, he is rejected. Yet the commander or the collector should surely possess qualities of infinitely greater importance than that of grammatical knowledge of a native language,—qualities which, if they did possess, would most certainly induce them to so far acquaint themselves with the vernacular as business should require; and qualities which, if they did not possess, would be in no degree compensated by a knowledge of all the languages of India.

2nd.—It is notorious that as a body (there are of

course brilliant exceptions) the passed officers have less knowledge of the language for practical purposes than the unpassed. That is to say, they show themselves less able to communicate with the mass of natives with whom they come in contact. This assertion may seem paradoxical; but it should be remembered that while the one young man has been studying books the other has been studying men. The former will be able to read a native book, or to converse with his Moonshee in elegant phraseology, but will be probably quite incapable of understanding the expressions of a peasant, or of making the peasant understand him. The latter would be quite unable to read a word of the book; but having been associated with the *people*, would talk with them readily. A knowledge of the thoughts, habits, beliefs, desires, wants, &c., of the natives of India, is to be gathered, not from Hindoostanee books, but from intercourse with the people.

It is remarkable, again, that while passing in the native vernacular is considered as the *sine quâ non* for detachment from a native regiment upon miscellaneous employ, the rejection of a candidate involves his remaining in command of native troops,—a position which, one would suppose, required, equally with or more than any other, a knowledge of the sepoys' language. Fortunately, however, a knowledge of the language is widely different from a passed examination in the vernacular; and thus some of the best practical linguists, and those most intimately acquainted with the ideas of their men, remain with their regiments.

But, in truth, unless the chief business to be performed related to such knowledge of oriental language, there should be no need of passing any examination in any native tongue whatsoever. The best security for fitness in this, as in other respects, is in the opinion and approval of the candidate's superiors, who if efficient themselves, and allowed sufficient power, would take very good care that their subordinates were as well qualified in this as in any other portion of their duty. But this arrangement would necessitate the maintenance of competent superiors. It would, in truth, go to the root of the matter, and involve the selection of proper men at the head of affairs. And in this lies the secret of opposition to, and the certainty of success for, a system of selection. I firmly believe that at this very hour we have in India a total amount of English talent and energy adequate for all the administrative requirements of our empire; provided only this total were so organized and distributed as to ensure its acting with full effect. But as matters at present are, we cripple the entire body by wasting the energies and crushing the minds of thousands of English gentlemen upon trivial military duties, which could equally well, and with far greater general advantage, be performed by native officers properly trained; while at the same time we overtask another portion of the body, by confining the administration of the empire to the members of the civil service. Nor is this all; for the continual emergencies of the service requiring that the military members shall be availed of as civilians, we are often compelled to accept this material without having

prepared it, and, when rendered really efficient, to discard it, to make room for a civilian, to the *detriment* of the general administration, and to the disgust of the military officer, who thus finds himself excluded from active and lucrative employ, not because he is inefficient, but because an officer—possibly an inferior one—belongs to another service, which enjoys the monopoly of administering the empire.

But I am convinced that, in India at least, we must ere long discard examinations and monopoly, and adopt selection. The energies and moral excellence introduced into India by a given number of English officers form the general stock of power for the civil and military government of the country. This stock forms the sole import to counterbalance the millions sterling of which, as foreigners, we annually drain India. And it is surely incumbent on us to use this stock in the most profitable manner possible, by adopting a system which tends to develop and improve English energies and moral power, and by selecting from the whole body in accordance with the principles advocated in my remarks on the native army.

REDUCTION OF CIVIL SALARIES.

Reason, experience, and observation alike concur to convince me that the civil officers in this province are much underpaid; and that the salaries of the appointments, although not, perhaps, always of the individuals now holding them, might be considerably raised, with advantage to the State.

I arrive at this conclusion on purely economical principles, holding that to be the best and most judi-

ciously adjusted rate of salary which ensures the largest return to the State.

There is no investment of capital in this world comparable, with regard to the return which it produces, to liberal payment of efficient civil officers in India. Every reduction of salary below that which is necessary to command the highest available moral power and intellectual vigour on the part of our revenue officers, and civil officers generally, must assuredly result in the exclusion from the public treasury of many thousands of times the amount supposed to be so saved in the salaries. A decent mediocrity of talent may be secured, perhaps, at what appear to be more economical rates even than those now paid for the services of English gentlemen in this country; but the effects of such reduction will assuredly be most lamentable.

The energy and moral excellence which we introduce into India by means of English officers form the only articles of import—the only possible means—by which we can restore and repay to India the amount of capital which, as foreign rulers, we are and must be continually draining from the country.

Whatever tends to add to the self-confidence of the timid Asiatic, to increase the active working-power of the people, to give them new thoughts and new desires, and to put them in the way of advancement generally, must, in like proportion, add directly to the wealth of the nation, and consequently to the revenue of Government.

A single European officer in a large district is often able, in a few years' time, by the influence

of personal character alone, to multiply the wealth of the people, and of course the Government share of that wealth, fourfold. I have myself witnessed instances of this: such effects might almost always be produced if care were taken to choose men for appointments on the principle of fitness alone, by causing them to feel that their services are appreciated, and by furnishing them with the means of residing comfortably and free from sordid cares in the country in which they are labouring. But such effects will never follow when civil officers are underpaid, and, therefore, probably of inferior ability in the first place, and also made discontented and unwilling to throw their whole force and energy into the public service of a Government which holds their labours cheap.

It is not less pay, but more English mind (which is cheap at any price), which is required for India. The underpaid official will, if he feel himself not fairly appreciated by Government, assuredly not remain in the country, or, if he do continue to hold his appointment, he will probably be of an inferior stamp of mind, and will get through his duty with stolid listlessness, which will cause everything to stagnate around him.

In introducing European honesty, energy, perseverance, knowledge, high principle, and ability, into this country, we are, in fact, importing so much life; every single human creature within the range of such influence becomes a higher order of being, and possibly tenfold more productive, as respects the public wealth than before.

On the other hand, to employ the listless, indifferent, and unintellectual European in the revenue, magisterial, or indeed, in the performance of any civil duties, is bringing in death—is to dry up, as it were, the very sources of natural wealth, and to destroy the public revenue.—(1856.)

SHOULD OFFICERS UNABLE TO PASS IN THE LANGUAGE
OF A DISTRICT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE?

I would on no account fix a time within which an officer on civil employ must pass an examination in the language of the district.

All such rules operate, I think, injuriously to the public service. It often happens that the officer most highly qualified for the work entrusted to him, and most able and willing to perform the duties of his appointment efficiently, is, under the proposed rule, excluded, because unable *to satisfy a committee* as to his knowledge of a language, an acquaintance with which may be the only qualification possessed by the successful candidate.

If, from want of knowledge of the language, or owing to any other deficiency, an officer cannot perform his duty in a perfectly satisfactory manner, he should, after a fair time allowed for trial, be removed from his office. But long experience assures us that those who appear to be the best linguists before a committee are not always those who are best able to interchange ideas with the country people.—(1856.)

NON-REMOVAL OF INCOMPETENT OFFICIALS.

A man in office, known to be inefficient, is sometimes allowed to remain, because there is no superior who will take upon himself the odious task of causing a good-natured, and perhaps really estimable individual, to be removed from a position for which, nevertheless, he has shown himself to be unfit. This is a great evil; and, in its consequences, so widely disastrous as to render the non-removal criminal. It is to indulge benevolence at the expense of conscience, or to deceive oneself by undue regard for a friend. But it should be borne in mind by public men, that omissions of this description injure frequently thousands of square miles of cultivation, and affect the rights, the happiness, and the civilization of thousands of human beings. He who, fearing to offend the few with whom he is in immediate contact, consents to perpetuate evil influence on the many subject to his control, is unfit to rule. And, however the circumstances of the case may appear to the ruler himself, such shrinking from duty does practically resemble the conduct of Alexander, who burnt Persepolis to please a courtesan.—(1857.)

ABOLITION OF STATUTE LABOUR ADVOCATED.

I have laboured hard for many years to inculcate on all around me the evil effect on all parties—even on those supposed to benefit by the arrangement—of interfering with market prices, and the great and certain advantages to the consumer as well as the producer of absolutely free trade.

I have, during a long series of years, enforced

absolute freedom for market prices in the bazar of the Scinde Irregular Horse with the happiest effect, notwithstanding that great opposition and prejudice had at first to be overcome. The supply of two strong cavalry regiments is equal to the transaction of a large town, so that the scale of the business has been sufficiently large, while it has been tried under great variety of circumstances.

Whatever those circumstances might be, I always insisted that every man should sell at whatever rate he chose to every one whatever, and that all purchasers should pay at those rates, even though the prices rose to a thousand rupees a seer for grain.

The effect of this has been that—with the exception of a part of the period, when we were at a station where the proceedings of the collector disordered all the natural relations of demand and supply—the bazar has always been most amply supplied at the lowest possible rates.

A proclamation almost exactly similar to that now received from you had been already published by me throughout the district under my charge, a copy supplied to every thana and outpost, and to every kardar and tuppadar, &c.

The proclamation now received will also be published as directed.

As connected with this subject, I beg permission to remark that similar principles might, with the greatest possible advantage, be applied to the question of statute labour. The present state of affairs in this respect is of enormous evil: it crushes every energy, and, more than all else, stops real improvement in the country.

It reduces the peasantry to a species of slavery, *causes all labour* to be looked on as *an intolerable hardship*, and places it in the power of ill-disposed zemindars to delay or to prevent the execution of all public works.

The remedy appears to me at once evident, simple, practical, and most readily applicable. Thus, a certain amount of labour for canals, or other public works, is due from certain villages or lands. This labour is evidently due from the landlords of the villages or lands, who receive all the profits—from those, in fact, who own them and their produce.

Let, then, the number of labourers which a landlord is bound to supply for any work be engaged and regularly paid by the British officers, at the full market rate of hire, whatever it may be, each man receiving his hire personally. The amount, whatever it may be, to be recovered from the zemindar from whom the supply of labour may be due.

This plan seems calculated to meet every difficulty.

The labourer would not be cheated, and, at the same time, it would be directly for the advantage of the zemindars to keep the price of labour low, and every effort and all fair means would be employed by them to induce the labourers to offer themselves for the work, and thereby keep the supply equal to the demand.

The labour market would soon assume a healthy state; the habit of free labour established, all odium would be removed from it, all men would endeavour to share in its profits, and labourers would be procurable in the greatest possible numbers, at the lowest fair rates, for all public works.

All parties must largely share in the profit of such an arrangement. Its effect on the society generally would be like that of restoring a sickly and feeble body to vigorous health and strength. The actual amount of labour available, and the productiveness of the people generally, would become enormously increased: for one willing and free working man will do as much as five or six "statute labourers"; exactly as the vigorous and healthy individual can do five times as much work as one suffering from the languor of disease or famine.

At the same time, the moral effects must prove unspeakably great, but they will readily suggest themselves, and it is perhaps unnecessary to enter on them here.—(1855.)

MINUTE ON OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF FORCED LABOUR IN SCINDE.

This letter of ——'s appears to me to be written under entirely erroneous impressions as to facts, and undoubtedly with very mistaken ideas as to the true principles involved in the questions of which he treats.

All experience and all reason prove that the freest market is the cheapest market.

The increased demand for labour mentioned in ——'s first paragraph *will* probably cause—and ought in reason and justice to be permitted to cause—a rise in the price of labour.

If this price rise to such a height as to make it profitable for labourers to immigrate into Scinde, they will immigrate accordingly, and the price of labour

will soon adjust itself to the LOWEST NATURAL RATE, which natural rate is always the best for all parties in the end.

If, on the other hand, the increased demand do not cause the price of labour to rise sufficiently high to induce the labourers to offer themselves for the work, it never can be a profitable transaction for Government to import labourers from other countries.

For, with respect to the countries here in question, Government could never with reason hope to effect this so cheaply as could the labourers themselves.

BUT THE FACT REALLY IS, THAT THERE IS AN ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF LABOUR IN SCINDE, WHICH HAS HITHERTO BEEN KEPT OUT OF THE MARKET BY OUR INSISTING ON REDUCING THE LABOURING MAN TO THE CONDITION OF A SLAVE, AND BY OUR EFFORTS TO FORCE THE MARKET BY AUTHORITY.

To remedy this, — would prescribe more authority! But the reports of the executive officers all over the province show that a full supply of labourers is always obtainable at fair rates of wages. If the rates rise above these, we need not fear! A FREE PEOPLE WILL NOT LONG CONSENT TO REMAIN IDLE AND POOR, WHEN SOME OF THEIR BRETHREN AROUND AND AMONG THEM ARE DAILY GROWING RICH BY THEIR INDUSTRY.

Every one will soon be anxious for work, and down will come the prices to their lowest healthy level.

It is the *slave* who abhors labour, for he works for a task-master.

The *freeman* glories in his industry, for he labours for himself and his children,—for food, for luxury, for

the gratification of every natural and artificial desire and want.

— is manifestly in error in supposing that an increased rate of payment by Government for labour in this country must be injurious to the interests of the State.

Whatever stimulates the industry and adds to the productive power of the people, must undoubtedly in like proportion directly add to the public revenue.

Scinde is capable of yielding ten times the revenue it now pays: THE REVENUE IS NOW LOW, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE ARE POOR, AND ARE WITHOUT THE CAPITAL NECESSARY FOR CULTIVATING THE GROUND.

As the people become rich, and WHEN THEY FEEL FREE TO USE THEIR LABOUR AND WEALTH AS THEY PLEASE, cultivation will extend, and population increase. Every rupee paid to *the inhabitants of the country* for their labour, above the amount necessary to purchase their mere subsistence, will be returned to the soil, and ultimately be restored with large interest to the Government treasury.

But the *foreign* labourer will take with him out of the country all his surplus earnings; none such will return to the ground, but the profit will be entirely transferred to other countries.

It is abundantly certain that the most natural, most simple, most healthy, and most economical method of obtaining labour, is to pay whatever may be necessary to command the required supply in the open market: all good authorities are agreed on this head.

Private persons, if left freely to themselves, generally know their own interests much better than does

any government. Labourers will speedily flock to a field where they are highly paid and fairly treated. There is no need to "import" them: they will, if there be a natural want of their services, soon come of themselves.

It is undoubtedly the truest economy for Government to abstain from interfering with market prices.

This had, I thought, been considered by well-informed persons as axiomatic, at least since the time of Edmund Burke. (Vide his "Thoughts and Details on Scarcity.")

But there are higher and nobler principles than any which — has touched on, which point to the self-same end as do considerations of immediate profit and loss.

We have NO MORE RIGHT to force any man to labour for less than he chooses to work for, than we have to steal his household property. To attempt to do so is *criminal*; and to speak of the "*extortionate*" demands of LABOURERS appears to me to imply confused ideas of natural right and wrong.

The labourer *demand*s nothing: the employer may possibly *demand* the labourer's services, and—as formerly in Scinde, until the practice was prohibited and abolished by me—may sometimes enforce his demand by unjust violence; but the poor labourer can only *offer* his services, and—having no capital but those services—he must either obtain work or starve.

Nothing tends to repress the productive energies of a people more than a sense of injustice. The labourer working for Government HAS A RIGHT to such a share of the public wealth as the labour which he performs

may represent, or may be fairly equivalent to. This *cannot* be arbitrarily assigned; it can only be known—*only be ascertained*—by allowing every man to fix his own price on his exertions.

If he value these too highly, we need not employ him: hunger will soon teach him what his labour is really worth in the market.

On the other hand, the labourer has no right to *more* than this due share; and to give him more has also a depressing effect on productiveness, as it may tend to encourage idleness, and waste the public capital. The true and just amount *can only be discovered* in a perfectly free market.

Freedom, moreover, develops every manly attribute, increases all the natural powers, IS THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE STIMULUS TO INDUSTRY, AND VASTLY AUGMENTS THE PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF THE PEOPLE; whose energies and self-respect are, on the contrary, crushed by slavery and injustice.

A labourer who has once experienced the advantage of being fully paid for his freely offered labour is not likely ever wilfully to remain idle when work is to be had.

THE SLAVE FLIES FROM HIS WORK, WHICH TO HIM IS ASSOCIATED WITH MISERY AND DEGRADATION; THE FREE LABOURER GOES REJOICING TO HIS TASK, FOR TO HIM IT IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY COMFORT AND HAPPINESS IN LIFE:

WHEREFORE, THE SLAVE IS IN THE END RUINOUSLY COSTLY AND FREE LABOUR IS COMPARATIVELY CHEAP ALL OVER THE WORLD.

This is the case, proportionally, in every degree and with respect to every approximation to absolute

slavery or perfect freedom. Every approach to injustice to the labourer LESSENS his productiveness, drives men from the field of labour, and *injures* the Government revenue.

There is no escape from this axiom, that the freest market is the cheapest market all over the world, and with regard to everything which has an exchangeable value among mankind.

Government have called on the Commissioner on his return to the province to report on ——'s letter, but I think it my duty to leave this minute on record, for communication to Government, or not, as the Commissioner may think proper.

I am further of opinion, that, to aid in the execution of public works, a corps of Sindhee labourers might be permanently embodied with much advantage to all parties.—(*March*, 1857.)

ABOLITION OF FORCED LABOUR IN SCINDE.

In the —— collectorate, all canals, above a certain size, are cleared, or are supposed to be cleared, by the officers of Government, and a water-tax is levied to meet the cost. But owing to attempting to work at rates very greatly below the fair value of labour, much fraud and confusion has been there introduced.

False measurements were habitually used; the people were debased, disgusted, and defrauded; while the public revenue was frequently wasted to an enormous extent, and large sums were expended on clearing canals which yielded little or no return, and, at the same time, the most valuable and productive feeders were often neglected. Much improvement in these

respects was introduced by —; but to bring matters to a healthy state, and to prevent enormous loss of revenue, an entire change of system appears necessary. The statistics of canal-clearances, &c., are much the same in the — as in the — collectorate.

In the — collectorate, only the main feeders have been cleared, wholly or partially, at the expense of Government and under Government superintendence. The zemindars make their own arrangements for the clearance of their private canals, and with these no interference seems necessary. But in —, also, “statute” or forced labour is largely had recourse to, even when the work is superintended by Government officers. In some instances these statute labourers receive food, or some trifling money payment; in others, nothing whatever is paid to them, though they may be kept at the work for months together.

I would respectfully observe that the question of the advantage or disadvantage of pressed labour appears to me to depend on those laws of political economy which are as well established as the truths of geometry. No disputed doctrines are involved in this matter. The principles on which I rested my arguments are, it seems to me, as self-evident as the axioms of the mathematician.

The differences of opinion shown in the summary now forwarded appear to me to have been caused solely by want of study and of acquaintance with the general laws affecting the matters in question. To say, with regard to such matters, that what may be right with respect to one part of a country might be wrong with regard to another, appears to be like

asserting that though a triangle might have three sides at Bath, yet at Bristol it must have four.

The natural laws and principles on which the truth of the matter depends may be shown very clearly in a few words.

A certain amount of labour has to be performed by the inhabitants of a country in order to make that country productive. In the case of Scinde this labour is canal-clearing, and such like irrigational works.

The amount of work to be done is the same in whatever form it may be represented or be brought to account; its real value is always the same. And this must be taken from the people of the country in some shape or other, in whatever manner the work be performed.

It is evidently indifferent whether the actual work performed be called so many cubic feet of earth, so many rupees, or so many days of human labour. These all represent the same thing, and, however reckoned, the work so represented requires ultimately the same amount of the capital existing in the country to be expended in its performance.

The capital of the country may be in this instance represented by the amount of labour available.

The arguments brought forward by me, and maintained by —, are to this effect: that paying a full and fair rate of wages for the labour required—that is, paying such a price as might be sufficient to induce a full supply of labourers to offer themselves of their own accord—tends to make men work with greater power and energy; to add to the number of men willing and able to work; and thus to increase the

capital, and necessarily, of course, the revenue of the country.

On the other hand, forcing men to work without pay, or with insufficient pay, disgusts them with labour; drives them into idleness; excites all manner of ill-feeling; produces a very great amount of crime, disorder, and disaffection; and thus destroys a great proportion of the capital, and, therefore, of the revenue of the country.

This question I would urge as being one of the greatest importance. I have little doubt, if the matter should remain in the hands of —— or myself, but that forced labour of every kind may gradually ere long be totally abolished in Scinde; but meanwhile, much evil may be, and must be, caused by the remains of such a system; and I would therefore suggest that, inasmuch as many men bow to authority who are deaf to reason, it would be highly beneficial to the revenue, and to the country generally, if it were at once positively prohibited to have recourse to statute, or forced, or unpaid, or ill-paid labour, under any circumstances whatever.

It is evident that whatever drives that labour from employment, whatever induces idleness and weakens the productive energies of the people, must exactly, in like proportion, injure the public revenue. Twist and turn the subject as we will, the facts are as I have endeavoured to set forth, and in this, as in all else, the eternal law of Nature and of God holds true—that to be unjust is to be unwise.

The manner in which I would propose to carry out these principles is as follows:—

All canals, being main feeders, and generally such as have hitherto been cleared out by Government partially or wholly by means of forced or statute labour, and the revenue returns from which show that it would be advantageous that Government should continue to clear, be henceforth cleared by hired or contract labour, paid for only at free market rates.

The work to be superintended by Government officers, and paid for by measurement; a rate being at first assumed, such as may be considered fair, and afterwards increased or decreased, as it may be found to affect the labour market on the spot.

The amount of available labour in the country, and of the work to be performed, must be generally nearly a constant quantity, so that the natural and fair rate of hire will very soon be ascertained. Little change will afterwards be found requisite, and estimates can then be prepared with certainty and precision.

I have found it an excellent plan to divide the work of excavation into small portions, such as five or ten rupees' worth, and to allow labourers to contract for the execution of one or any number of these portions within the required time.

Under this arrangement, a man and his family can get through a surprising amount of work, while the least possible amount of superintendence is required. Even the little children do something, while each member of the family works at any time of the day he pleases; and I have often observed the people continuing their task all night, relieving each other as they found convenient. This plan I would recommend for general adoption.

Wherever statute labour may have been due for the clearance of canals, I would recommend the levy of a water-rate on the lands irrigated; the rate being proportioned to the number of labourers which the zemindars holding those lands have hitherto been compelled to supply.

Any zemindars who may wish to clear their own canals, without Government aid or interference, should be permitted to do so; and from them, of course, no water-rate should be levied for lands so irrigated.

But whenever Government is called on to interfere in the work, the clearance should be executed in the same manner as that of the main feeders.

These rules appear to be applicable to every species of canal superintendence; and however the canal department may be arranged, the adoption of the above rules throughout the province of Scinde would, I think, meet every difficulty, and tend to abolish every abuse.

It nowhere appears that Government ever authorized the practice of seizing labourers and making them work without pay; but, on the contrary, it seems evident that Government supposed the amount estimated and sanctioned for canal-excavations to have been a fair equivalent for the work to be performed.

The system of forced labour appears to be an abuse which existed under the government of the Ameers, and which has been heedlessly allowed by the local officers to continue since the annexation of Scinde.

A monstrous idea seems gradually to have estab-

lished itself in the minds of the civil officers, to the effect that whenever they fancied that more canal work ought to be done than the sum of money allowed by Government would pay for, they were at liberty to force the people of the country to execute such work without remuneration. But it is evident to me, that however such an idea may have arisen, the assumption of a right to force men to labour unpaid is, in this instance, as little supported by authority as by reason.

The fact of such a barbarous practice having existed under a rude native government can never suffice to justify its continuance under British rule; while its ill effects, which now prove to be absolutely ruinous, must have been comparatively little felt under the native princes, for the simple reason that under the native rule the whole revenue of the country, however drawn from the people, justly or unjustly, by fair means or by foul, was again expended among them, and thus capital was to some extent circulated, and though much injustice was done to individuals, nothing was lost to the whole community.

Under the practice which — and myself have been labouring to put a stop to, the estimates were never trustworthy; the measurements were untrue; and the rates of account were not those by which the work was really executed: the whole arrangement was as faulty and unsound as its results were evil.

In introducing a more healthy system, with work truly and fairly performed, accounted for, and paid for, it will doubtless be necessary at first to raise the estimates and the amount sanctioned for canal clearances; but it is equally certain that the real cost to

the State will be actually much less, because the work will be better done, and the people will not be impoverished.

Having now personally witnessed the ruinous effects of the old system throughout the province, and being deeply impressed with the urgent necessity of its abolition, I have thought it necessary to follow up ——'s intentions, and at once to prohibit, in anticipation of orders, the use of forced labour throughout Scinde. I have done this as the only means of restoring productiveness to the country, and preventing a greater and still increasing loss of revenue to the State; and in so doing I trust that I shall receive support and approbation.—(1856.)

Notice.

I. Statute or forced labour is abolished.

II. Every man is at perfect liberty to work when, where, and at what rates he may please.

III. Any Government servant who may hereafter be guilty of compelling any person to labour, whether upon canals or any other public or private work, will be liable to be dismissed from the Government service, and to legal prosecution by the injured parties.

IV. Every work, of whatever description, may be performed either by means of contract or measured task-work, or by payment of daily task wages, at the discretion and pleasure of the parties immediately concerned. But no person must henceforth assume the right arbitrarily to fix the rates at which labourers or others are to be paid for work performed. Such

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rates must always be fixed by free consent and mutual agreement of the parties themselves.

CALCULATION OF LABOUR RATES IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS.

I cause the nature and extent of the proposed work to be explained by proclamation all over the country, and then invite tenders for its execution by contract. Having thus ascertained that the work can be executed for a certain sum, and that no one giving good security would undertake it for a less amount, I calculate the rates in my estimate forwarded for sanction, so as to meet the sum required.

This I find to be the very best mode of obtaining fair work at fair cost, and I have never yet been disappointed in the result. The rates thus estimated cannot, it appears to me, be higher than is necessary. In executing thus, in these particular districts, we do the best possible, I think. Something, however, must be left to my discretion. I will be responsible that the works proposed be executed for the amounts mentioned, that full value be received for the public money expended, that the means allowed be not wasted, and that the work answer the purpose intended. I will answer, in short, for the general result; but I cannot pretend to be able to conform always to the rates of the engineer department, or to make estimates correct in minute detail.—(1853.)

Note.—This practice has been found eminently successful.—(1857.)

WHEEL-CARRIAGES AND BRIDGES.

With regard to bridges, those built without lime-cement stand tolerably well when the arch-joints are correctly drawn to a centre, and when the bricks are rubbed, and carefully laid, so as to fit, with very little mud between them. But whenever lime is procurable at a reasonable cost, it would be far better to build the bridges with lime mortar throughout, and this would ultimately prove the more economical plan. But the first cost would be great, and the time and establishment required would exceed those at my disposal.

To give a permanent pavement to bridges built without cement would be out of place. On the whole, it has seemed preferable to secure moderately-good roads at the least possible expenditure of time, money, and labour, than to have the prospect of better roads ten years hence. Indeed, with the means available in this country, ten years would not have sufficed to construct all my bridges with lime, mortar, and paved roadways.

Accordingly, I set to work (not altogether in ignorance of constructive art) after a fashion of my own, without establishments, without any aid whatever, and with the people of the country alone. The result is, that a country which was almost impassable is now traversed with ease and comfort, at all seasons, in every direction. And the work has been accomplished in one year, at a very trifling comparative cost.

With regard to the preservation of the roadways of the bridges, experience shows that the most effectual

way of protecting the masonry in this district is to keep it well covered with earth. The bridges near camps or towns, which necessarily are those most used, should be covered with stable litter or such like, which, if renewed occasionally, till the whole be consolidated into an elastic mass, stands better than anything else. No ordinary metal will bind in so very dry a climate. The earthing of the bridges should be included in the road-repair contracts.

With regard to the question of wheel-carriages with iron tire, &c., everything in my power has been done to endeavour to introduce a better construction of vehicle; but I have for some time past abandoned all attempts of the kind, being convinced that they are useless.

The introduction of wheel-carriages with iron tire, &c. might be an advantage in many ways, but would not, I think, benefit the roads much, if at all; the whole ground of the country, with the exception of a few patches of salt earth here and there, being such that the roads become speedily reduced to an impalpable powder, many inches in depth, *whatever description of wheel-carriage be used.*

The roads are excellent for camels, by which the traffic of the country is almost wholly carried on, the carts being chiefly used for the transport of agricultural produce: but the roads in such a soil could not be made well adapted even for the best wheel-carriages without metal, which is not readily procurable, but which, I think, from the excessive dryness of the air, would be found not to answer.

Bridges always passable, and straight roads from

place to place, form an immense improvement on the former condition of things ; but it would be unreasonable to hope for roads really good for wheel-carriages in this country.

The introduction and general use of an improved description of wheel-carriage with iron tire, &c., implies a complete change in the entire native population or society ; it involves the necessity for the existence in each little village of such artificers as are now not to be met with in twelve places throughout the province ; it involves, also, the existence of increased capital, new wants, and improved habits, among the country-folk generally : all this may come in due time naturally, as civilization advances.

But as things now are, the carts at present in use are, perhaps, better adapted to the means and wants of the people than anything we could hope to succeed in substituting for them.

The things are rude and noisy, it is true, and at first sight seem ridiculous : but they can be constructed in any village at a cost of four or five rupees each ; they can be kept in repair by the village carpenter : while the loads they carry are as heavy as could well be drawn (I have carried from six to eight hundredweight of iron) by a pair of bullocks on these roads.—(1854.)

REPAIRS OF ROADS BY CONTRACTS.

I request attention to the annual repairs of roads. If the contract for repairing them be made for one year only, it evidently becomes the advantage of the contractor to execute the work as cheaply—that is, as

badly—as possible, just keeping within the terms of the contract. In fact, the worse the work may be done, the more the man will profit by it.

There must be a continual endeavour on the part of the contractor to conceal defects, instead of remedying them. In such extended works as these roads and bridges, the means at our disposal do not admit of the continual and minute surveillance necessary to guard against this, and the evil becomes most serious. Besides this, even where the contractor behaves with perfect honesty, he cannot, to advantage, lay out capital on the work for one year, as he could do were his contract extended over a longer period.

On the other hand, where the contract has been entered into for a series of years, it becomes the *interest of the contractor* to execute the repairs in the strongest and most durable manner; while not only will the work (quality being equal) be executed at considerably less cost, but repairs must be much less frequently required, and the nuisance of continually breaking up bridges be avoided.—(1853.)

PLANS AND ESTIMATES *versus* A ROAD AND CANAL.

We have occupied the country for fifteen years, and for the last ten years and more it has been our own, yet *still this most important little piece of road in the whole province* is even in a worse state now than it was in 1839. There have been far too many “plans and estimates,” and too many discussions for any *work* to be done; and now that the thing has been given up to the tender mercies of “the board,” it may, I fear, be classed with a Chancery suit, and we may

expect nothing but plans, estimates, and wise opinions to all eternity! Yet the business presents not the least difficulty, and the whole might have been accomplished in one season by contract at a very moderate cost.

It is as plain as the day, that to secure constant dry communication by land, and straight communication by water, between —— and ——, all that is necessary to be done is to dig a canal from one place to the other, throw the earth excavated to one side only, and on the top of this bank make your road,—all the watercourses crossed by the bank being of course bridged. What can be simpler or better for the purpose? This was proposed by me in 1840; and, in spite of all the plans and estimates, I doubt if anything better has been thought of since.

As things are now, the road by land—very bad at all times—is quite impassable for four months in the year; while, though the direct distance be only twenty-two miles, the distance by water is about seventy!

The bank on which the road would be carried would abot ethyf five feet wide at top, but nowhere more than seven high—generally much less. But last season experiments were made with a bank ten feet thick, apparently in order to ascertain whether one of five times that breadth would stand or not. The strange devices played off on this little piece of road, or rather no road, during the last twelve years, are almost incredible. The money wasted would have made the work properly several times over, I believe. —(1854.)

A NAVIGABLE CANAL TO THE INDUS, AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF KURRACHEE AS A PORT.

The measures really requisite to affording this port free scope for becoming whatever its geographical or commercial position may admit of its becoming, may be summarised as follows : —

1st.—The bar at the entrance of the harbour should be so far removed as to render it possible for ships of heavy burthen to enter the port at all seasons, without risk or hindrance.

2nd.—A steam-dredge should be maintained in the harbour ready to remove silt or sand accumulating along the fair-way channel.

3rd.—Two European and four native pilots should be appointed.

4th.—The Chinnee Creek should be reclaimed, in view to improving the salubrity of the neighbourhood, and for the convenient extension of building-ground.

5th.—A navigable canal should be constructed to connect the port with the Indus. No work is of so great importance to the prosperity of the port as this. It would afford that supply of fresh water which is vitally essential to the full development of every great seaport town. It would furnish, by the cultivation along its banks, those necessities of life which have now to be brought from a distance, at considerable risk of loss or damage, and consequently at an enhanced value. It would maintain an unbroken water communication between the Indus, its tributaries, and this their natural outlet on the sea coast. It would obviate the inconvenience at present experienced

during the monsoon months, when communication by sea between the mouths of the Indus and the harbour is closed. It would make the port independent of the Ghizree Creek, the passage through which is tedious and uncertain. Above all, it would be a sure and necessary preparatory to the introduction of the railway, which all considerations, as well political as commercial, induce me to conclude must—unless it be permitted to fail—ignore the town of Hyderabad, and all merely provincial termini, and seek, by the directest route practicable, that one sole, fixed point, viz., Sehwan, where all possible lines of communication and trade from the northward concentrate. A glance at the map shows these lines to pass from the north and north-east down the Punjaub, and from the north-west—that is, from Affghanistan, the Khelat State, and Central Asia in general—down the Bolan Pass.

Lastly.—Establish your telegraphic line along your north-west frontier, and connect its Kurrachee terminus so soon as possible with London.—(1856.)

PUBLIC FERRIES.

I consider the farming of ferries to be an evil. The object of Government is economically to provide means of safe and commodious transit for the public across the river; and no more effectual means could be devised for defeating this object than the farming system.

The system of licensing is doubtless a great improvement on the farming arrangement. But, under the circumstances existing on the —, I am con-

vinced that the best plan would be to make all the ferries on the river wholly free and open to the unrestrained action of public competition.

The experiment of freedom has accordingly been tried at numerous ferries, where, owing to the scantiness of the population, it was thought that the experiment would be most likely to fail. I was assured repeatedly by those who should have been trustworthy authorities, that the greatest inconvenience to the public would certainly ensue if my principles on this subject were to be carried into practice. Nevertheless, as these principles appeared to me as being universally true, the experiment was fairly tried, and found to prove perfectly successful. The public have never been better accommodated: boats have always been ready in sufficient numbers, and of sufficient size, and the rate of hire has somewhat decreased;—the truth being that the trade in ferry passage, like all other trades, follows the well-known laws of demand and supply.

It has been urged in regard of the ferries contracted for, that the contractors would not care for the smaller ferries. Possibly so; for, holding a monopoly, their gains are independent, to some extent, of the amount and quality of accommodation which they provide. But where all is left free, ferries will certainly be established, men and boats will be ready for hire at all points where ferries were required, and people were willing to pay for their passage. Free competition must undoubtedly afford the amplest accommodation at the cheapest rate, and exactly of that quality and quantity best adapted to the wants of the public.

Municipalities are of course at liberty under this system to establish their own ferries under their own arrangements; provided always they do not prevent other parties plying for hire.

Approaches to ferries should be considered as parts of the road with which they are connected, and provided for accordingly: they no more require special arrangement than the approaches to a bridge.— (1856.)

REMARKS ON A RAILWAY TO CONNECT THE INDUS WITH THE SEAPORT OF KURRACHEE.

On the subject of the railway in Scinde I have clear and decided opinions.

It seems that by the terms of the contract entered into by the railway company and Government, the railway should be taken from Kurrachee to Kotree,—Kotree being the only available point which can be described as being “at or near to Hyderabad.”

The contracting parties appear to have forgotten that to reach Hyderabad from Kurrachee, the river must be crossed. But be this as it may, it appears to me to be clear, that in any wise scheme for a railway in Scinde, whether considered as a part of a great northern line, or solely as a means of connecting the traffic of the Indus with the sea, Hyderabad should be totally neglected. In my opinion, the mention of Hyderabad at all, in connection with the scheme of a railway in Scinde, is a very grave error, and one which could only have been caused by the absence of correct information and of due consideration.

Hyderabad is not even on the Indus: this town is

some four miles from the river. It is on no great permanent line of communication, and has the Indus where the stream is greatest running between it and the seaport at Kotree, the station on the western bank of the river opposite Hyderabad, which appears to be the only available point for the railway terminus within the terms of the contract. The whole place for several miles around is insecure; any station formed there would be liable to be carried away bodily by the river at any moment during the inundation. It rests wholly on the alluvial soil, which near the banks of the Indus is never safe anywhere from year to year; while this particular spot, Kotree, has been, within my recollection, several times on the point of destruction.

Supposing other circumstances to be favourable, it seems, then, that to make Kotree the terminus of the railway would be to incur great risk of loss and destruction.

Such a site for the river terminus of the railway might probably ere long result in rendering a considerable portion of the line absolutely useless; for if the terminus at Kotree were carried away by the river, a new and more safe site must be sought for, and a new line constructed, to connect with it.

But it appears to me to be almost certain that, until a water communication shall have been established between the Indus and the harbour of Kur-rachee, any railway constructed merely to connect the seaport with the river will prove an enormous failure.

To give a chance of a profitable return from such

a railway, we must first connect the seaport with the Indus by water; and the best project for this purpose with which I am acquainted is the canal proposed and planned by the late Lieutenant Chapman.

By such a canal, the river would be perfectly connected at all seasons with Kurrachee as respects navigation; and at the same time an inexhaustible supply of fresh water would be provided, and a large tract of country now desert waste would be rendered productive.

The one great want at all large seaport towns, sooner or later, is a full supply of fresh water.

The proposed canal would, in meeting this want, supply the means of life and growth to a large city and seaport at Kurrachee, which could not exist without it, and which, with it, must ultimately become the chief, or probably the only, outlet to the ocean of the commerce of a portion of the globe far more extensive than even the whole of the countries drained by the Indus and its tributaries.

The growth and vitality of such a seaport are essential to the full employment and success of the railway which leads to it; and the construction of such a canal as that proposed, instead of being in anywise antagonistic to the rail, is, in my opinion, a work necessary to be undertaken in the first instance, to enable the railway to prove really remunerative.

Again, the bulky agricultural produce borne by the river boats, which would not bear the cost of transport by rail, would by means of this canal be at once transferable with the utmost facility to the sea-going craft in the Kurrachee harbour. While a very large tract

of country now lying waste for want of water would, by means of the canal, become highly productive; and its produce, both of pasture and arable land, would reach the market at the seaport in the easiest and cheapest manner by means of the canal itself, which had fertilised the ground.

At present, even to supply the existing limited demands, Kurrachee is compelled to import by sea large quantities of grass, grain, firewood., &c., from Kutch and Kattywar.

Indeed, whether a railway be constructed or not, I am quite convinced that sooner or later such a canal must be constructed.

It is very improbable that any railway, constructed *merely* to connect the Indus with the seaport, will ever prove remunerative. But the natural commercial road to the ocean of the greater part of the countries from Bokhara to Mekran,—of a very large portion, in fact, of Central Asia,—is that by the Bolan Pass.

This road, and the country in the table-land of Affghanistan near the head of the pass, is in the territory of the Khan of Khelat. The government and people of this country have for a long time past been entirely friendly and well disposed towards us, and towards the extension of commerce.

We have it in our power to improve this grand natural and almost sole outlet,—the Bolan,—as a commercial road, to almost any extent.

Sooner or later, it *must* become the channel of a mighty stream of commerce from Central Asia to the ocean,—there is no other great road.

From Dadur, at the foot of the Bolan, to Sehwan, in Middle Scinde, the country is the most favourable possible for a railway. It is almost a dead level, hard, dry plain. Sehwan is on the Indus, and is nearly in a straight line from Dadur to Kurrachee.

Such a railway will at some future time assuredly be laid down, and it appears to me that, if a railway is now to be made to connect the Indus with the sea, Sehwan is the proper point for its river terminus.

Such a line, straight through the hills from Kurrachee to Sehwan, or its neighbourhood, would not only at once serve to bring all the produce of Upper Scinde and the Punjaub by the shortest possible route to the sea, but would ultimately form a most valuable portion of the main line of one of the greatest railways in the world.

The station at Sehwan would occupy a rocky site, and apparently the most permanent position along the whole course of the Indus in Scinde; and in this respect it must be considered as a highly eligible situation for a river terminus for a railway, considered as a means of connecting the Indus with the ocean: while ALL the great northern lines of road naturally converge to and pass through this point. If it be proposed to continue the railway from Kotree to Sehwan along the valley of the Indus, it will be found that the peculiar nature of the hills which abut on the river at the latter place will present a practically insuperable obstacle to the communication, whether by tunnel or otherwise.

With regard to the direct line through the hills from Sehwan to the sea, I may observe that I know

the road well personally, having repeatedly traversed it at all seasons. It does not appear to me that any very serious engineering difficulties exist anywhere along its whole course; but to speak with any degree of certainty on such matters without a regular survey, and critical examination, is of course out of the question.

But supposing this line of road to be as practicable as it is said—and I believe truly said—to be, it must, I think, be the best possible, as being the shortest from point to point, and as avoiding all crossing of the Indus, lying, as this route does throughout, on the same side of that river as the seaport. I can imagine no change of circumstances which will not tend to add to the advantages of this route, and to lessen those of every other.

Whatever may become of the question of the railway, it appears to me to be certain that the wisest possible course of proceeding, at present, for improving the commercial communication through Scinde, would be to construct Lieutenant Chapman's canal, and to complete as speedily as possible good broad metalled roads from Kurrachee along the valley of the Indus over the Lukhee Hills, and also straight through the western hills by the line proposed above for the railway, from Kurrachee to Jungar and Sehwan.

The profit which must ensue from these works, the increased productive power and wealth which they must create in the country, might perhaps—if anything could do so—make remunerative even the short line of railway from Kotree to Kurrachee.—(*July, 1856.*)

TRAVELLERS' BUNGALOWS AND SERAIS.

I have the honour to observe that, in my opinion, it would be of the greatest advantage to the public, and, therefore, necessarily to Government, if good travellers' bungalows were erected at convenient distances along the chief lines of communication throughout

Every bungalow should have plenty of roomy out-houses or sheds, which can be erected and kept in repair at a trifling expense, while it is of the greatest importance that every one travelling in this country in the hot season should be able to find cover.

At each station, quite distinct from these bungalows, it would be well to have a large shed, for the accommodation of native traders and travellers.

I am certain myself that all such accommodation, made available to the public entirely free from all payment whatever, must result eventually in a pecuniary return to the State.

Thus, by way of example, say one-third of the produce of the land belongs to the State, and comes into the public treasury ; the country is not half peopled, and not half cultivated ; every increase of means of the people is employed in increased cultivation : wherefore, everything which adds to the means of the people, in like proportion adds to the revenue.

Travellers and traders are attracted by good roads, good accommodation, and safety. The amount which such persons expend among the people is out of all proportion greater than any fees which could be collected from them : one-third of such expenditure

almost always finds its way eventually into the coffers of the State; while the free passage of strangers through a country excites new wants, new desires, and new efforts to gratify them, and thereby adds to the energies as well as to the means of the people.

On the other hand, the imposition of fees for accommodation is a merely deceptive gain: the impost, however just it may appear, is assuredly unwise. The amount collected is itself trifling, but the injurious effect of such collections may be very great. They tend to keep strangers out of the country, and to impede their progress through it; and assuredly every rupee so received into the public treasury keeps three rupees out of it.

This principle is a law of nature; its effects are certain. Even the establishment for registering traffic on this frontier acts repulsively; and though we collect no import or export duties, we actually pay an establishment to impede trade and injure the revenue. —(1854.)

TRADE CREATES A MARKET, BUT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW A MARKET-PLACE.

I am unable to concur in the opinion that the increase of exports is attributable to the proclamation of fairs; and that the most important element of success still wanting is the establishment of a market at —. For I consider that to believe the development of trade to be consequent and dependent upon the establishment of a market is to mistake an effect for a cause. Trade implies and creates a market, but does not necessarily involve a market-place artificially pre-

pared for it. In like manner, to assume that the proclamation of a fair is sufficient to attract commerce, under a free government, is, in my opinion, to assume that a measure which, in barbaric countries, where the highways of commerce are unsafe, is essential to the congregation of merchants and to the rendering of trade possible, is applicable also to a civilized state, wherein the functions of Government should be strictly confined to the removal of obstacles, and should in no instance extend to direct interference with commercial enterprise, whether for stimulus or restriction. And my belief is, that the impetus given to the exports of this province shortly subsequent to the period when the proclamation under notice was issued, is attributable to the construction of a series of bridged roads, to the abolition of frontier duties, and to the reduction of transit dues in the neighbouring territory. —(1856.)

POLITICAL SCIENCE RELATED TO ALL SCIENCE.

It is false political economy to increase the rates of import duties, or to tax duty-free goods, as temporary expedients, to be given up when “the land-tax and other revenues have expanded to sufficient dimensions to *permit of a reduction of the tax on trade.*” The land revenue will and must increase by the reduction of taxes on trade, and in proportion very much greater than any such reduction. — should be told that to form correct ideas of the principles—the natural laws—at work in the science of political economy, it is most necessary to study what other minds have written thereon. In fact, to understand any science thoroughly,

acquaintance with all science is necessary, for nothing is isolated in nature. Political economy, for example, may be treated chemically, as Liebig shows in his "Letters"—*vide* page 467.—(*March*, 1856.)

CUSTOMS AND PIER DUES.

I am of opinion that the pier fees should be abolished so soon as practicable, and that all parties, of whatever description, should be allowed the free and wholly untaxed use of the pier. If, as apprehended, the present pier accommodation prove, under a system of freedom, insufficient for the accommodation of goods and passengers, additional accommodation should be provided. But the policy of securing free and unimpeded means of transit in every direction, and under all circumstances, appears to me as unquestionable. * * * —(1856.)

The levy of a moderate import duty, which formerly existed, could not check the introduction of machinery into this country. While the difficulty experienced in defining precisely what articles constitute machinery causes much discontent and uncertainty. * * * —(1856.)

* * * Either goods should be passed on the valuation of the importer, or, on his declining to pay the duty on the appraised value, the goods should be purchased on account of Government. The one rule is a perfect check on the other. * * * —(1856.)

FRONTIER TRADE RETURNS.

The annoyance to traders and the impediment to trade, caused by the vexatious interference to which

they were subjected by the measures necessary to obtain the information requisite for the framing of trade returns, were at least equal to that caused by the levy of the old transit dues.

The happiest effects have followed the introduction of perfect freedom of trade on the frontier; and if a large increase of the trade itself be held to be of more value and importance than the preparation of trade returns on paper, it is certain that the abolition of the establishment maintained for registering the trade was a most just and wise proceeding.—(1856.)

THE INDUS FLOTILLA AND FOREST CONSERVANCY BEYOND THE SPHERE OF THE STATE'S FUNCTIONS.

If the flotilla be maintained, as at present, by Government, arrangements should be made for rendering it complete in itself, and independent of the dockyard at Bombay: in other words, proper docks, and the requisite establishment for repairing and building river-steamers and flats, should be prepared on the Indus itself. But, in my opinion, it would be advisable for the flotilla to be made over wholly to private enterprise. The effects of Government agency in this matter are, that traffic on the Indus by steam is uncertain, irregular, and costly. The people are driven, by the proceedings of the flotilla servants, from the banks of the river; and the agency itself is more costly to Government than would be that of private companies contracting with Government to perform the transit accommodation required by the State along the line of the Indus.

The conservancy of the forests by Government agency should also, I think, cease ; and the forests be let in long lease to private parties, similarly with other landed estates. A clause should be entered in the lease providing for the maintenance, during the entire term of the lease, of the forests in proper condition. I am aware that, owing to the requirements of the State and the people, in regard to fire and building-wood, many administrators, who, in other particulars, justly limit the functions of Government, yet shrink from asserting the principle of non-interference in this instance : nevertheless, it seems plain, that in regard of steam requirements, the transit companies would be as careful to maintain an adequate supply of fuel as of machinery, and that the lessees of forest land would be as anxious to produce a remunerative supply of timber for general sale as are the lessees of ordinary estates in regard of corn.

ENGINEER AND NORMAL CLASS SCHOLARS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOY.

It seems that a wish is evinced by many of the educational authorities to stipulate with the scholars of the engineering class, and with the teachers of the normal school, that they shall accept no employment other than that of Government. But from this measure I wholly dissent. The object of Government in maintaining institutions of the above description is to create in the country a better description of artificers and a higher class of public instructors. And every normal teacher or engineer who proceeds into the districts, whether upon private or public employ, tends

directly to further this object. The knowledge he has gained is at some time applied to use, and influences those around him. Thus education and engineering knowledge become general, and the State indirectly profits a thousand-fold. Whereas, every stipulation for limiting the sphere of the scholar's future exertions tends to limit the sphere of the whole, and to reduce the supply of candidates proportionately. Every scholar leaving the school, and working for his own profit, carries with him into the districts the knowledge he has acquired, and becomes a centre of practical instruction.

REMARKS ON THE REVENUE SYSTEM OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES.

It remains only to notice one particular in which I propose to deviate from the practice which I understand to have obtained in our North-West Provinces. It relates to the system of coparcenary in a village, with joint and mutual responsibility on the part of the villagers to pay the Government demand upon the entire village. This coparcenary is not, I believe, compulsory ; and can, upon the petition of one partner or more, be in part or wholly dissolved, each partner thus becoming responsible for his own estate or share in an estate. I gather, also, that under certain rights of "pre-emption," which are declared to "exist in communities of landholders," a member of such community may transfer his share, whether by sale or otherwise. But it appears to me, that whatever may be the advantage of thus preserving the village system in provinces where this system may yet survive, it

would not be consistent with the spirit of our rule to introduce among a people already too prone to follow various modifications of caste rules, a system which, in my respectful opinion, is artificial, and of a tendency to lead the community to the conclusion that Government have sanctioned their allotted spheres in life.

It is true, as I before observed, that, upon petition, the coparcenary may be dissolved. But, as the natives are found in this quarter, it would require an individual to possess unusual force of character to assert his independence; and, when asserted, it might create ill-will between him and those with whom he should live in daily friendly relations. And, on the whole, it appears to me that no method of procedure is at once so simple and so adequate to all the true and permanent requirements, as well of the peasant as of Government, as that which—after ascertaining and recording, in respect of lands already claimed and brought under the plough, the names of all parties having rights therein, together with the nature and extent of these rights—determines what the demands of Government should be against each and all of these parties, and then fixes and records what in perpetuity or for a long term of years are the exact limits of these demands.

While, in regard of lands unclaimed and lying waste, it should be generally understood that, upon application being made, any person might receive at the hands of Government such area as he may require, on long lease, upon terms admitting of the lessee's reaping a fair profit upon all labour and capital that may be expended.

By adopting this course of procedure, Government would, I consider, exercise all its own legitimate functions, and would place the entire community in a position to adjust itself in the readiest and best manner possible, and in that wherein all its energies would most certainly be called forth. The relations of neighbours would be wholesome and lasting, in that, while they would one and all be independent, it would be to the common interest of one and all freely to assist one another.

I beg, however, to add, that in thus expressing my opinion I am far from presuming to criticise proceedings which may have resulted beneficially under circumstances differing from those to be encountered here. But I have, at the same time, no hesitation in submitting that, in so far as this province is concerned, we should, by binding up the peasantry in village coparcenaries, or by sanctioning their being so bound up, interfere directly or indirectly with the social freedom of society. We should place the agriculturalists in false relations among themselves; should increase indolence and want of independent spirit; and, precisely in proportion as we might prove successful in creating and maintaining the village communities to be so composed, should tend to stereotype society, to nip the expansive energy of the people, and thereby to check industry, and to diminish the sources of wealth and of increased public revenue.—(*August, 1856.*)

REVENUE SETTLEMENT.

We cannot too earnestly bear in mind that a revenue survey and settlement is merely a short name

for proceedings involving the rights, good order, and advancement of the true interests of the Government we serve, and of the people confided to our charge. When boundaries have once been clearly defined and permanently marked, and when agricultural rights have been fairly ascertained and registered, the collector and magistrate should exercise his revenue powers as seldom as possible, and should endeavour never to appear unless in his judicial capacity. To prevent neighbour interfering with neighbour; to positively resist all undue interference on the part of Government agency, whether high or low; to leave the people alone and let them grow: in this lies the essence of a really good collector. He should never for an instant allow the appearance of his next revenue report to weigh against any measure which he knows to be right, and for the permanent good of his districts. For myself, I have long perceived, that despite the best intentions on the part of our home and Indian governors, we have sadly overtaxed the people. They have no surplus; no room for growth; no spare cash wherewith to indulge any wish, even for the cheapest luxury. And, fully aware of all that has been said in favour of exactly adjusting the Government demand to the quality of the soil and its facilities of waterage, I am persuaded that, with our defective information of the real resources of the country, and perhaps under any circumstances, we should better and more permanently have developed our agricultural wealth, should have more surely secured the comfort and the increasing productive powers of the agricultural classes, and should at this

day have been richer as a Government, and with more certain prospect of future increase, both for the people and Government, had we in the first instance limited our demand to that which the poorer soils can bear, and had we considered the waterage not as a separate tax, but as included in the one sole demand per acre upon the land.

Above all, avoid over-governing and unnecessarily interfering. Depend on it, the people understand their own interests better than you do. See that all men know, and feel secure in, their rights. Remove all obstructions to free intercommunication; and then stand by to keep the peace.

TITLES TO LAND, AND LEASES.

I learn that in some parts of the — collectorate considerable extents of arable land have been thrown out of cultivation, owing to what seems to me an unquestionable misapprehension of the instructions which have from time to time been issued relative to proprietary rights and claims upon the soil.

It appears that when a cultivator rents land upon which a zemindar or other claimant may hold an admitted right to a portion of the surplus produce, whether under the name of “lappa” or what not, the practice is to demand from such cultivator the same rate of tax which Government may be levying from similar lands cultivated by a proprietor subjected to no claim intermediate between himself and the State; and then to allow the zemindar, lappawalla, or other claimant, to levy what he may claim as his due from the cultivator also. In other words, the Government

having levied what is assumed to be the full tax which the cultivator can pay, and yet retain a fair profit upon his own labour and capital expended,—having, that is to say, taken as much of the surplus produce as can be equitably taken,—another and third party, under the name of lappawalla or zemindar, is allowed to make a further demand upon the remaining produce, which Government had left to the cultivator as necessary to a fair profit on his own labour and capital. Nor is this all; for when the cultivator, gradually impoverished by the levy of this double land-tax, is compelled to relinquish his fields, it is supposed that no other tender of tenancy can be accepted, unless upon condition of the applicant's assenting to the double tax which had already ruined his predecessor.

Manifestly, such a mode of procedure must inevitably lay waste and ruin any country subjected to it; and, in the instances under notice, amply accounts for the wide tracts of good land, with facilities for waterage, which, during my tour through the districts, I observed to be lying waste.

As manifestly it never would or could have been the intention of Government that any tax should be levied from the cultivator, whether on behalf of Government or by the zemindar, unless upon the surplus produce, I consider it is necessary to explain that no rules should be held as rules inculcating that Government and all other claimants on the soil are to be in the first instance satisfied to the full, and then the remainder, if any, of the produce, to be left with its immediate producer, the tenant or cultivator; but

that all rules should invariably be understood in the spirit in which they were written, viz. as pointing out to the revenue and settlement officers, that claims of the specified descriptions would be advanced in different parts of the province, for greater or lesser portions of the surplus produce of the land, and that, where found, the settlement officer should carefully investigate them.

And deeming it further essential to preclude the possibility of measures so widely disastrous in their effects as those now commented on being stereotyped under the regular settlement, I think it right to lay down the following propositions, which, taken in connection with former correspondence on the same subject, will, I trust, render it impossible for any revenue or settlement officer to feel himself at a loss to determine who may have claims upon any given area of land, what may be the nature of those claims, upon what terms they are to be admitted, and from what particular portion of the gross produce of the said land they are to be satisfied.

I. All lands, of whatsoever description, must fall under one or other of the three following headings:—

1. Lands lying waste, and unclaimed. 2. Lands lying waste, but claimed, wholly or in part. 3. Lands claimed, brought under the plough, and cropped, whether annually or after a shorter or longer succession of fallows.

1st Heading—Waste Lands, Unclaimed.

II. Wherever any revenue or settlement officer

may find land coming under the first heading (waste and unclaimed), he is at perfect liberty to grant all or any portion of the said land in lease for a short or long term of years, upon such terms as he may consider expedient and equitable ; and subject, of course, to the confirmation of competent authority.

III. Leases so made shall be drawn up, duly signed, and witnessed ; and shall be administered in exact conformity with the terms specified in the deed itself.

IV. In leases so made of waste lands unclaimed, the sole parties having any claim whatsoever upon the land leased are the Government and the lessee. And every man in the country is perfectly free to contract for such lease, without let or hindrance on the part of any jagheerdar, zemindar, or other party, provided he (the lessee) be willing to accept the terms, and give the security required by the leasing officer, in the deed of lease.

V. It is not necessary that the lessee should be one, and one only. On the contrary, if two or more persons tender to accept a lease, they shall severally, and with joint responsibility, sign the deed, as set forth in Rule III., and shall jointly and severally be held responsible for the fulfilment of the terms of the lease.

VI. Should the lessee so contracting make private arrangements with third parties, whether in view to sub-letting, or other contract or advantage, he is at liberty so to do. But in the event of any dispute arising consequent upon the sub-tenancies, or

other private arrangements, such dispute shall be tried in the ordinary manner of a civil suit in the civil courts.

VII. And no sub-tenant, private contractor with the lessee, or other third party, shall be admitted by the revenue officer as having any claim whatsoever upon the land leased, which land, upon the expiry of the lease, shall revert free and unencumbered to the Government, unless the same or some other lessee shall accept the said land in further lease, upon terms to be re-adjusted and registered in the form laid down in Rule III.

VIII. Upon the lease being re-adjusted, preference should be given to the former lessee over any indifferent party.

2nd Heading — Lands lying Waste, but Claimed, wholly or in part.

IX. Wherever the revenue or settlement officer may find lands lying waste, but nevertheless wholly or in part claimed, he should, after thoroughly satisfying himself of the validity of such claim, interrogate the claimant as to whether he were able and willing either to cultivate all or any portion of the land himself, or to produce other parties to do so under his superintendence, or under his guarantee of the Government tax. Evidence should also be taken from trustworthy persons as to the period during which the land in question may have remained waste. And if it should appear that the land had lain waste for a continuous period of six years, and that the claimant was still unable or unwilling to take the responsibility

of paying the Government tax upon all or any portion of it, this whole or portion should be declared to be unclaimed waste land, and should be treated in exact conformity with the rules already enumerated in regard of lands lying waste and unclaimed (viz. Rules II. to VII., inclusive). For no deviation should be allowed from the rule that every claim upon the surplus produce of land—every claim, that is, to participate in rent, whether under the appellation of zemindaree, lappa, or other name—does by its origin and nature imply and involve the Government's receiving its fair amount of revenue also; and that, therefore, unless the claimant can ensure the latter, he cannot equitably advance the former.

X. But should it, on the other hand, be ascertained that the land claimed, although at present lying waste, had been cultivated within the period of limitation, viz. six years, and that there existed a reasonable probability of its being again brought under the plough within a moderate term, say of one or two years, it will in such case remain in the discretion of the settling officer to allow the claimant one or two years' law, or, in the event of another party offering to take the land in lease, to grant such lease, for a long or short term, and to decide that, during the term of the said lease, the claim should remain dormant, but be capable of revival at the expiry of the lease, in the event of the claimant being then in a position to fulfil, and willing to satisfy, the conditions inherent in the origin of the claim.

XI. Waste land claimed, and thus to be brought

again under cultivation, will, of course, be dealt with as land claimed and already under the plough, as set forth under the next heading.

3rd Heading—Lands Claimed, and under Crop or lying Fallow.

XII. Under this heading, it is manifest that all claims must be either upon the means requisite to production, or upon the profits of production.

Clause 1. By the means requisite to production is understood the outlay of capital and labour, and the fair equivalent for risk in, and interest upon, this outlay, without which the producer cannot subsist and continue to produce.

Clause 2. By the profits upon production is understood the surplus yield of produce over and above the outlay requisite to production, as set forth in the receding clause.

XIII. And it is to be clearly understood and acted upon, that on no occasion, and under no circumstances whatsoever, should claims upon the said surplus yield be allowed to fall upon the means necessary to enable the producer to continue production. In other words, whenever there may exist one or more parties other than the Government, having valid claims upon the surplus produce, the claims of Government and of the other claimants must be so settled as that the total of them shall not exceed the total of the said surplus yield. For example, suppose an estate to yield a gross produce whose money equivalent should be equal to Rs. 300 annually; and that of these Rs. 300 some Rs. 166½ were expended in the tillage, waterage,

and other outlays requisite to secure the said gross produce, while Rs. $33\frac{1}{3}$ were required as an equivalent for risks and interest on outlay.

Clause 2. Further, suppose this estate to be held successively under the following tenures:—1. By the proprietor, holding direct from Government, and cultivating the estate himself. 2. By a zemindar, holding a claim of greater or lesser value upon the surplus produce, and cultivating the estate by hired labour.

Clause 3. In either case, it is evident that, if any portion greater than Rs. 100 be taken in the shape of rent or surplus produce, whether by one or more claimants, such excess must be taken from the remaining sum, $\text{Rs. } 166\frac{2}{3} + 33\frac{1}{3} = \text{Rs. } 200$, which are required in order to render continued full production possible, and must therefore inevitably result in the state of matters described as being now visible in parts of the — collectorate.

Clause 4. It follows, then, that this state of affairs, can be avoided only by Government and all other parties limiting the aggregate of their claims upon the estate to an annual demand not greater than that of Rs. 100.

Clause 5. If, then, as supposed in the first instance, Government should make its demand direct upon the cultivating proprietor, it should consider that beyond the Rs. $166\frac{2}{3}$ requisite for tillage, waterage, &c., the proprietor should also be allowed a certain margin on account of risks and interest, &c. This margin has been now supposed equal to Rs. $33\frac{1}{3}$. There would then remain a balance of Rs. 100 leviable as rent,

and which balance would, accordingly, form the limit of the possible Government demand, although it would not follow that Government should in every case demand this full amount.

Clause 6. Again, suppose, as stated in the second instance, that a zemindar or other claimant upon the said estate should intervene between the actual cultivator and the Government: in such case, Government should not, as appears to have been the practice in some instances, levy the full rent of Rs. 100 direct from the cultivator, and then leave the zemindar to levy his perhaps indefinite demand from the cultivator also. But Government should, on the contrary, first admit that, be the claims on the surplus produce what they may, Rs. 200 must remain with the producer, or otherwise production would eventually cease; and that therefore, be the claims on the surplus produce what they may, they must not in the aggregate exceed Rs. 100. So much admitted, it would next remain to be ascertained who the claimants may be, what the validity of their claims, and what their extent. Suppose, then, it to be ascertained that the zemindar took all risks, and provided all capital, &c., requisite to production: Government would in such case consider him entitled to the margin set apart as before shown, as an equivalent to those risks, &c., viz. Rs. 33½, and would consider the limit of the extreme Government demand to be Rs. 100, leaving the remaining Rs. 200 in the hands of the zemindar, to do with as he might please.

Clause 7. But suppose the proved claim of the claimant to be merely that of a small and specified

lappa : it would then be open to Government to select either of two courses, viz., to constitute the claimant, if he be so willing and able, the responsible tax-payer of Government, defining, at the same time, the rights of his sub-tenant, or cultivator, and so to levy upon the claimant the Government's fair tax ; or, in the second place, to settle directly with the sub-tenant or cultivator in the manner laid down in regard of the cultivating proprietor, viz., to allow the party settled with Rs. 166 $\frac{2}{3}$, on account of outlay requisite for tillage, waterage, &c., Rs. 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ on account of interest and risks, and to consider the Government demand limited to the remaining Rs. 100. But, in this second case, the lappawalla would have no claim whatsoever against the sub-tenant's or cultivator's Rs. 250. On the contrary, whatever he might receive, he would receive out of this Rs. 100 surplus.

Clause 8. But although, in each and all of these examples, Rs. 100 forms the limit which the Government could demand, and yet admit of production continuing, and the producer's subsisting and fairly meeting his risks and outlay, yet it does not follow that Government should in all cases demand the Rs. 100 in full. On the contrary, in the case of the lappa claimant, referred to in the preceding paragraph, a specified portion of the Rs. 100 would be set aside for him. In like manner, but in greater proportion, would a zemindar proving a claim to the entire rent, minus the Government tax thereon, participate in the Rs. 100.

XIV. The settlement officers should bear in mind that, having determined what the Government demand

upon any given area shall be, and having further particularised upon whom the demands shall be made, they have reached the limit to which the interference of Government can legitimately extend in regard of Government's relation to the soil. And any further inquiries and decisions which the settlement officer may record are purely of a judicial character, having for their object,—1. To determine clearly, and for a permanence, what the exact position of the tax-payer may be, to the end that, when he has entered into his contract of lease with Government, he may not be subjected to the fraudulent claims of other parties.—2. To decide and record, once for all, all rights and claims in this soil which might otherwise come before the ordinary civil courts, held at times and in places where it would be impracticable for the judge to collate evidence of the fulness and reliability which is usually open to the settlement officer.

XV. The determination of these claims (other than those of the Government) and relations being of this purely judicial nature, the settlement officer should be most careful to avoid checking the individual freedom and energies of the villagers, by binding up the entire community, as it were into one body corporate. To do this would be to return in spirit to rules of caste, and to nip the energies of the people in the bud. Nothing of this character, therefore, should be attempted. On the contrary, while recording what may be the proved rights and claims upon a given area of land, the settlement officer should never omit to make all the villagers understand that every man, be he whom he may, is at perfect liberty to

employ his labour and capital in such place and in such manner as he may consider most advantageous to his own interests. And that it is, therefore, quite open to him and his neighbours to take up new lands, or lands lying waste, in lease, upon his own account, if he consider such course preferable to remaining on land whereon other parties may hold claims proved and admitted before the settlement officer.

XVI. If the settlement and revenue officers will constantly and effectually impress the foregoing freedom of action upon the villagers, and decide upon and register the proved claims, we may then become perfectly assured that, in regard of determining all rights in the soil, and in removing at the same time all obstacles to the free development of agricultural industry, we shall have accomplished all that is practicable with advantage. And if, after such warning and adjudication, it should be found that the villagers still remain in the hands of the bunya, or remain as sub-tenants or mere labourers, while it is wholly at their option to take up fresh lands upon their own account and on equitable terms, we may also become assured that the party voluntarily remaining thus trammelled and subordinate does so on account of circumstances subsisting between the bunya or the zemindar and himself, which induce him to consider that, on the whole, it is preferable to remain in his present position rather than try his venture elsewhere. To obviate or ameliorate circumstances of the description here alluded to is beyond the power, as it is beyond the province, of Government. They can diminish and cease only with the growing intelli-

gence, honesty, and industry of those who suffer from them.

In the foregoing rules, no mention is made of "jagheer," "hissadaree," or other rights to the Government share. These rights are alienations, in part or altogether, of the Government share.

ARTIFICIAL ENCOURAGEMENT TO AGRICULTURE.

It is the practice in some districts to endeavour to stimulate the exertions of peasantry towards the cultivation of some peculiar produce—such, for instance, as linseed or indigo—by proclaiming rewards or honorary distinction to the individual who may successfully extend the cultivation of the specified produce. But it seems to me, that the effect of this artificial encouragement on the part of Government is to defeat the object in view. In brief, it unhealthily interferes with the natural market of the articles thus forced into existence; and, by disturbing the free adjustment of demand and supply, tends in the long-run to diminish the latter. The fair profits of farming, in an open market, are the best and sole legitimate stimulants of an extended cultivation.

MANAGEMENT OF PASTORAL HILL TRACTS.

I instructed the collector that I did not anticipate we should be enabled to turn this region to any profitable account by collecting a revenue from the present scanty agricultural produce of its rain lands, and that I should not deem it advisable to levy such tax, even although cultivation should be extended; but that the hill tracts were chiefly valuable as grazing-

lands, and that we might do something towards ameliorating the condition of the hillmen, by assisting them to construct a few wells or bunds for supplying their cattle and themselves with water ; by endeavouring to introduce into their villages or grazing districts some form of patelship ; by ascertaining, registering, and *perhaps* levying some slight capitation tax upon the cattle ; and by opening up roads through the more frequented villages, to enable the hillmen to bring the produce of their flocks and herds readily to market.

With the object of more accurately ascertaining the social statistics of this region, I supplied the collector with a form of statement, showing the name of every village, tract or valley ; the names of the chief men, and approximate estimate of the numbers of inhabitants ; the size and description of boundaries ; the number of flocks and herds ; and the number of wells. But, above all, I impressed on him the necessity of bearing in mind throughout these proceedings with the people of the hill tracts, that they are essentially a pastoral, and, therefore, in some degree a nomadic race, and that no attempt should be made towards compelling them to have recourse to agriculture ; on the contrary, that they should be left wholly free to choose their own mode of life, as circumstances might permit.

The staple wealth of these districts naturally consists in flocks and herds. These, together with ghee, wool, and other pastoral produce, they can exchange for the more varied commodities of the plains, thereby commanding the supplies of distant markets at a less cost than they could be produced for at home ; and I

think that our object should be to promote these interchanges, by means of improved communications, and thus gradually to create, among these half-civilized races, new wants, increased productiveness, and a higher social condition. By thus encouraging its natural development, we should tend to supply wants now much felt in the plains. And as the hill region lies along our western frontier, we should, by civilizing and attaching to us its wild people, tend to cause a corresponding extension of wholesome English influence among exterior tribes, and so, permanently and by the most unexceptional means, to strengthen our front, whether for peaceful or warlike operations.

TAX NOT THE DESERT.

The Thurr or Desert District yields a coarse but very nutritious grass. I would not, however, recommend that any grazing-fee should be levied upon this: for it appears to me that, in a tract like the Thurr, our main object should be to induce the tribes to refrain from plunder, and settle down peaceably to the agriculture of the neighbouring lowlands; and that, in order to secure this result, we should render their circumstances easy, by leaving untaxed their pastoral wealth.

RESTORATION AND DUTIES OF VILLAGE ACCOUNTANTS.

Government have resolved upon restoring the ancient office of putwaree or village accountant, which fell into desuetude when the village communities were broken up. This agency is intended to record and and preserve the rights of the cultivator, and to

supply full and accurate agricultural statistics. These registers will be maintained in a form so clear, simple, and public, as to preclude the possibility of the abuse of power on the part of Government servants. These accountants will be paid by Government; but their being thus rendered Government servants does not preclude their keeping the accounts, or providing for the interests, of the cultivator. On the contrary, these agents are intended to form the connecting link between Government and the land-tax payers, in their mutual relations. It will be their duty equally to protect the Government revenue from fraud on the part of the cultivator, and the cultivator from undue interference on the part of the Government officials. The putwaree's records will eventually be kept in the provincial vernacular; but in the first instance general intelligence and good character should determine the selection. And no candidate should be rejected simply because he does not understand a particular written character. A Hindoo villager may be as apt material for an accountant as a Persian writer, although he may be conversant only with the 'khoda-wadee' mode of writing.

SALARIES TO VILLAGE ACCOUNTANTS.

The question is in fact reduced to this:—Shall the putwaree (village accountant) be paid by Government in cash, or be remunerated in kind or what not by the cultivators? Viewed from a financial point merely, it is manifestly immaterial which alternative be adopted. For if the cultivator should pay this tax, allowance would be made accordingly in the revenue

settlement; otherwise the labour of the cultivation would be indirectly forced to the amount of the tax. If, on the contrary, Government should pay the putwaree, the revenue demand upon the cultivator would be proportionately increased. In other words, the interest of Government and the cultivator being identical, and there being a given amount of wealth to be partitioned in equitable and recognised proportions between these two parties, it is evidently indifferent whether these portions be allotted under the name of revenue, or pay to putwarees.

The question of who should be the direct remunerator of the putwaree must, then, depend upon considerations other than those of finance. And it appears to me, that, when introducing a settlement whose chief intent and use is to define, register, and secure the rights and obligations of both Government and cultivator in their relations to the soil, it would be neither consistent nor wise to leave the wages of the connecting link—the putwaree—between the two parties unfixed, undefined, and liable to the caprice and convenience of the less wealthy and less intelligent party. For these, and other reasons, I beg you will act upon the principle that all putwarees are to be paid in cash, by Government. The exact amount of remuneration in every individual case, being dependent upon the yield and difficulties of the particular charge, may be left to the discretion of the settling officer.—(*April, 1856*).

PROTECTION OF BUNDS BY CONTRACTS.

I am of opinion that these disbursements are the most unsatisfactory that are made. They are wholly unchecked, and are made at a season when frauds can be, and doubtless are frequently committed.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to remedy the present unsatisfactory state of this public expenditure, and to endeavour so to provide, as that, while the bunds shall be efficiently watched and guarded, no charges shall be made on such account other than may be fairly and necessarily incurred.

It may not, perhaps, be practicable to make these provisions with any great degree of accuracy: still something may be done; and I quite concur in a recent suggestion that the zemindars, really interested in the security of these bunds, should be invited to enter into contracts for their maintenance. Accordingly I request that, upon all future occasions of providing for abkalanee expenses, you will be guided by the rules now transmitted.

It is possible that, for a year or two, the tenders for these contracts may be unreasonably high; and in the first instance, therefore, no contract should be entered into for a longer period than one season. But sooner or later the market will certainly find its own level, and it will then remain in the discretion of the local officers to grant contracts for one or more years, as they may deem expedient.

Whether the work be given to contract or be estimated for (*vide* Rule VI.), each and every work, given in contract or estimated, should be reported, so

that the Government may be informed beforehand of the amounts to be expended, during each successive year, in watching and protecting the bunds in this province.

Rules relative to the Preservation of Bunds.

I. The watching and protection of bunds will, for the future, be performed by contract.

II. With this view, the collector or his deputy will annually invite tenders for the watching and protection of all bunds situate within their districts.

III. All parties making tender shall provide full and good security. The security should be some substantial native banker, who should agree to make good whatever cost may be necessary, in the opinion of the officer making the contract, to complete any portion of the work contracted for, which the contractor may have failed properly to execute.

IV. The parties directly interested in the preservation of the bunds must be those who will be able to undertake the contracts for keeping them in repair at the smallest cost to the State, and greatest profit to themselves; and the officers concerned in these transactions should endeavour, as much as possible, to induce a right understanding of this business among the zemindars whose lands the bunds affect.

V. The work the contractor will be expected to perform is, before the water reaches the bunds, to fill up all cattle-tracks, to fill up any sinking, all cracks or ruts, and all rat-holes; to repair, and, where necessary, to renew the "juk." When the water comes on the bund, the contractor must keep up the number of watchers ordered. He must at

once stop all leaks and breaches, and repair all damages done by rain.

VI. Failing any tender, the probable expenses of watching and protecting bund or bunds should be approximately estimated, upon a calculation of the average expenses of former years, allowances being of course made for any accidental circumstances that may affect the particular season under estimate.

TANK DIGGING.

The object contemplated in digging the —— tank was to try whether a considerable body of fresh water could not be made to penetrate into the ground during the inundation of the Indus, and whether thereby it might not be possible to render the sub-soil sweet, and to make the wells in the neighbourhood of the tank supply a sufficiency of fresh water all the year round. It was also expected that eventually the tank itself might be made to contain water throughout the year.

The experiment, as far as it has gone, has been perfectly successful, and the tank has proved a very great blessing to the people. One of the wells in its neighbourhood, into which the river-water was not turned, purposely to try the percolation of the tank, has been rendered perfectly sweet, whereas before it was brackish. The tank itself contained water two months after the subsidence of the inundation; and if dug deeper would never be dry. * * * Of course no masonry is used for lining the tank.—(1852).

EFFECT OF REMOVING DAMS.

I find that all the offshoots from the main feeder have had their mouths constructed with dams projecting far into the channel of the main feeder. This practice is most injurious under any circumstances, is liable to the greatest abuse, and has been the cause of much unfairness in the supply of water to the landholders, without corresponding benefit to any party.

While these dams greatly impeded the onward flow of the water in the main channel, they really added very little, if anything, to the quantity flowing into the smaller canals, which (the main channel being sufficiently full) must be regulated by the quantity drawn off from them for irrigation. * * * I therefore determined to remove every particle of dam. Upon this, many of the landholders refused to clear their canals, and gave out that the removal of these dams would prevent them getting a drop of water, and that every rupee expended on their water-cuts would be wasted. Such, however, proved to be the increased supply, owing to the free clearing and opening of the main channel, that the water, even in these uncleared canals leading from it, stood two feet higher than usual, and, in many instances had to be banked out of the fields. * * *

Many of the landholders have now admitted the unreasonableness of their opposition; and the complete exposure of the fallacy of their strong prejudices in this matter will, I doubt not, be of great benefit generally among the country-folk.—(1853).

**INCREASED CULTIVATION FOLLOWED BY MORE
ABUNDANT RAIN IN THE DESERT.**

My remarks regarding the boundary line on this frontier, and the advantage of having the political to coincide with the geographical boundary of the desert, were founded on the supposed permanency of the latter. No change appeared to have occurred between the time of my first visiting the desert and that of recording my opinion—an interval of twelve years. According to the traditions of the natives, no important change had occurred for nearly a century, and its limit appeared to me to be as permanent as that of the sea shore. It now, however, seems that the desert is partially disappearing, and that its line is no certain boundary. I attribute this disappearance in part to the greatly increased cultivation along the border, which tends to augment the fall of rain. It is true the natives attribute this fall to the blessing of God, which may be true enough; but the secondary cause is cultivation. And I anticipate that if peace and quiet continue, and a few more such seasons as the last occur, the great part of that which was formerly a desert will become arable or pasture land.—(1851).

**MORAL INFLUENCE EXERTED AS AN ELEMENT IN
SECURING LARGE NUMBERS OF LABOURERS AMONG
RUDE TRIBES.**

In judging the rates of labour at which I believe it practicable to excavate a large canal leading from the Indus through the heart of the desert to the hills

of Beloochistan, I rested my calculations on principles which refer to wild tribes, human passions, and a patriarchal rule. Not indeed that I disregarded the rules of ordinary civil engineering. But possessing an intimate knowledge of the country, of the people, of their statistics and habits, and taking into my account moral forces and influence, which I knew could be exerted by myself and my lieutenants in aid of the work, I arrived at the conclusion that the project of the great desert canal could be successfully carried out at the cost mentioned by me,—a cost for which, I am equally certain, it could not be carried out by the Public Works department, proceeding on principles having reference to a more regular, a more civilized, and a more highly-organised state of society.

The forces here employed are not apparently such as are commonly calculated on: yet I have used them largely: have found them of mighty power, and to lead to excellent results. I thus reckoned on them according to my own experience and knowledge.

I would allude to one instance, that of the canal leading through the desert to Khyree Ghuree. This canal has been extended some thirty miles, with an average sectional area of about two hundred square feet. It has been executed at the rate of one thousand cubic feet per rupee, and the largest boats can move along it through the middle of the desert. The mode of procedure was as follows:—Those tribesmen wishing to become holders of the lands to be watered by the canal were assembled, the scheme freely discussed for some days; and, upon their becoming convinced of its utility, every man under-

took to perform a part of the excavation proportioned to the area of his lands, receiving a similar proportion of the total sum allowed by Government for the work.

A contract to such effect was then regularly drawn up, and signed by every individual, the work was justly apportioned, and the result is, that the canal is completed in good style, without any professional aid, and to the entire satisfaction of every man concerned in it. The people are as proud of their work, and boast of it as loudly, as they would, in former times, have boasted of a successful foray. The return to Government upon its original outlay is fifty, and will soon be seventy-five, per cent.

The truth is, that having during a long series of years dwelt among, and, by acting justly, obtained the confidence of the tribes, we found it possible to collect a large number of men from the neighbouring territory, who were ready to work at very moderate rates upon a popular public work. But these men would not have worked under, or even appeared before strangers; and I am well assured that had the work been undertaken by professional officers, not only would the preliminary requirements have delayed, and the professional rates have enhanced the cost of its execution, but labourers would not have been forthcoming to execute it.

The principles I had found successful in the case of the Khyree Ghuree canal, I had proposed to adopt in the case of the great desert canal. And I would not advise that, in such a country, and among such a people, any proceedings in this matter should be com-

menced, unless upon the principles I have tried, and proved to be sound.—(1856).

MILITARY COMMISSIONS AS COURTS OF CIVIL JUDICATURE.

These trials were always rehearsed before the “civil judge-advocate,” and then the farce was duly played off, all being well drilled in their parts before three officers, forming what was called a military commission. The members of these commissions were sworn to try the titles to lands, cases of bribery, &c., by civil officers, and all manner of such like things relating to revenue matters, &c., “according to the custom of war in like cases.”

The trials were a mere pretence, a veil to delude the public, the only real authority being the pleasure of the Governor.

But even up to the present moment the want of proper courts of justice is one of the greatest wants. Though it may be true that the system in India, with its eternal appeals and reversals, &c., is so bad that it is better to have none, still it is a serious want. There is now no court in which an action can be brought against the collector or against Government; while—and this is the greatest evil of all in practice—the revenue officers, having the whole judicial duties of the province to perform, have little time left to attend to their proper fiscal duties.—(1854).

POLICE CONFESSIONS.

I would point out to you that a police officer is quite forgetful of his duty who, on any occasion, even asks, however gently, a prisoner to confess: violence

of any kind on the part of a police officer, in such cases is a deeply criminal offence, for which several years' imprisonment with hard labour would be a just reward.

Police officers should not only never resort to violence or threats to obtain confessions, but should invariably abstain even from persuasion in such cases. Police officers or men should *not even be permitted to receive confessions*, and should be rebuked when they presume to do so.

It is the function of a magistrate alone to receive the confessions of criminals, and this cannot be too often or too carefully impressed on the minds of Eastern policemen. The neglect of this well-known rule has been, in many instances, throughout India, the cause of extensive and deplorable evils.

These principles have been investigated by some of the ablest men of the day. They are in accordance with sound sense and reason; and they continually receive the stamp of the highest legal authorities, in being taught and enforced by the judges in our courts of law.—(1856).

ON THE SUPPLY OF CARRIAGE IN A FREE MARKET.

I have to remark, that there are no orders or regulations whatever in force in regard to the supply of carriage for public or private purposes in the bazar of Jacobabad. In this, as in all other respects, everything has been left to find its own level.

To meet existing demands, however, divers persons have established themselves at Jacobabad, who profess to supply, and who do actually supply tattoos, camels,

&c., as required, for hire ; but these people are acting entirely as private traders, and are not interfered with by authority in any way. In this, as in all other respects, our market is perfectly free. Every effort has been made to remove obstacles to free trade ; but in all other respects, even on emergencies, interference with the natural adjustment of demand and supply has been studiously avoided.

It is absolutely certain that the cheapest market is the freest market ; and it is only the effects of interference which cause even superficial observers ever to think otherwise.

When slaves are first emancipated—unfitted for freedom, they commit outrages and excesses : but these evils are the effects, and the very worst effects, of slavery, which debases body and soul, destroys self-respect, and unfits men to take their places as social beings ; not of freedom which tends to bring out every good quality, and to make men see that their well-being is involved in that of all around them. The same laws hold good in trade on the largest or on a small scale—the law is universal.

Interference with a man's right to sell, how and where, and at what price he chooses, keeps sellers from the market, limits supplies, and raises prices.

Compelling men to sell at certain rates, or in any manner contrary to their own will, is a species of robbery ; it can only be perpetuated by violence on one hand, and by the payment of exorbitant prices by the consumer to meet the cost of the machinery by which this force is applied, as well as the price of the supply, on the other.

The extra price paid by the consumer for the article he requires in such cases not only has no tendency to improve the rate of supply, but is actually expended in hiring men to drive traders away from the market. Like all principles which oppose nature's laws, the evils caused thereby must increase until they become perceptible to the dullest understandings, or until a dead lock occurs.

On the other hand, where perfect freedom is carefully maintained, the most exorbitant prices are those which soonest adjust themselves. Where real freedom exists, no combination can possibly long maintain prices above their natural rates, while competition must bring them down to the lowest healthy prices.

It is evident, where a vicious system of interference has long prevailed, especially among Orientals (who are naturally dependent, and who fear to stand alone, trusting to truth, industry, honesty, only for success), that when all restraint may be withdrawn, some time may be required to enable natural causes to act, and to restore the equilibrium which has been disturbed by our faulty proceedings.

During this interval, the market may not be supplied at all, or may be very badly supplied; but to restore health we must pay nature's penalty for vice, whether moral or corporeal.

We must be content to *pay*; we must open new channels of intercourse; we must seek supplies further off: all this honestly persevered in for a very moderate period brings everything into a sound, healthy, vigorous state! obstacles having been re-

moved, everything flows towards the spot where it is wanted, and all parties are more than satisfied.

These laws are as well known and recognised generally as the theorems of Euclid; but there always seems to be a difficulty in applying them to *particular* occasions. Men seem to want firmness and faith to follow out, even in such matters, principles which their reason tells them are true. But a very little perseverance would resolve all doubts.

In these cases, the inconvenience at first experienced often falls very severely on individuals; and, indeed, let these proceed as they will, the evil never can be remedied until Government and its officers, in their public capacity, act in conformity with the natural law.

For instance, any violent or sudden change in a market must take time to adjust itself properly.

The move of even one regiment, under present arrangements, constitutes such a change.

A demand suddenly arises; the supply is not forthcoming: the only remedy applied by Government, or its official, is *force*; every man's property is seized, and an enormous evil perpetrated, which, as all such evils must do, ultimately causes to the public revenue a loss, through indirect channels, enormously greater than any requisite direct payment could amount to.

Let the only wise principle be established, and always be enforced, that the State, requiring anything, is bound to purchase it, like other people, fairly in open market, and all difficulty disappears.

One sudden payment of an immense sum, to enable

a regiment to move, would at once open the eyes of our rulers to the necessity of putting matters on a more healthy footing. Yet it is certain that the injury to the revenue of the State, through the effects on trade and agriculture, is almost infinitely greater than the loss which would be caused by such payment.

The remedy manifestly is to cause our troops to be maintained in a moveable state; officers and men being at all times provided with proper carriage. There is no difficulty in this; I have practised it with a large body of troops, for fourteen years past, with perfect success.

The effect of such a healthy system is that the presence of such troops, whether stationary or moving, is felt to be the greatest blessing by all the country-folk.

The people find a ready market for labour and supplies, and the troops find, and are made to feel practically, that the good-will of the people is of vast importance to their comfort and convenience.

A large proportion of all such expenditure as that on the permanent carriage of troops, also speedily finds its way by a thousand indirect channels to the Government treasury.

By expenditure on the permanent carriage of soldiers I mean, of course, *bond fide* expenditure: the sums laid out on gomashas, contractors, and all manner of commissariat underlings, come under very different conditions.

To have things in a healthy state, the soldier must be his own commissary.

In regard to the different working of the systems under discussion, it may not be amiss to note one glaring fact.

In December, 1845, when troops were suddenly ordered from Sind to take part in the Punjaub war, I was in the act of mounting my horse one morning for parade at Hyderabad, when the Assistant Quarter-master-General came to me from the General, and asked when I should be able to march with my regiment on service to Bhawulpoor.

I replied that I was ready to march that moment. This was scarcely understood, until I explained that such actually was my meaning; but march I did that same day, with the whole corps complete and in perfect order, without any external aid whatever.

At the same time, the necessity of the speedy march of the regular troops from Hyderabad was strenuously urged on General Simpson by Sir C. Napier. To supply carriage there was the newly-formed Baggage Corps, and, besides this resource, the whole country was "driven" far and wide by collector and commissary.

Yet, in spite of every effort, and of all this heavy machinery, not a single regiment, even of infantry, could be moved one march until fifteen days after the Sind Irregular Horse had departed; by which time we were encamped at Roree, some 220 miles distant.

Yet the cost paid for carriage by the State on this occasion would probably have paid that of the carriage of the Sind Irregular Horse for ten years together; and in the one case the money would have been

expended to the improvement of the revenue, while in the other the operation caused grievous injury to the country generally, and thus to the Government treasury.—(*July*, 1855.)

PART II.
ON MILITARY MATTERS.

MILITARY MATTERS.

ON THE ARMING OF A FREE PEOPLE; AND ON THE
TRUE PRINCIPLES OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE
ARMIES OF ENGLAND.

THE maintenance of a large standing army by a perfectly free people is an unnecessary expenditure, and diminishes the total available amount of national labour, and, consequently, of national wealth. This expenditure is unnecessary, because every legitimate object for which a standing army is maintained would be more effectually attained by the abolition than by the support of such a force; and it diminishes the total of national labour and wealth, because it implies the setting apart of a portion of that labour exclusively for the unproductive business of war.

The legitimate object for the maintenance of a standing army is the defence of the nation; and this object could be most effectually attained, in the case of a people really free, by abolishing a separate army, and rendering the entire nation defensively warlike.

This abolition of the separate army would imply its incorporation with the remainder of the people; and

thus, while the abolition of a separate army would involve a direct saving to that remainder, it would also increase the total amount of available natural labour by the amount which the incorporation of the separate would add to the general national stock.

To understand what is meant by rendering a nation defensively warlike, we need only look back through English history, to a period prior to that of the first introduction of a standing army, when the English people really were thus warlike. In those times, every village had its archery-ground, every country church its place of arms, and every graveyard its yews. The entire youth and peasantry of the country were then trained, by habitual practice, to the skilful use of those weapons which, in the event of war, they would be called upon to use in battle. The effect of thus habituating the people to the use of warlike weapons, and of associating the use with their pastimes and sport, was the highest development of individual skill, combined with pride and pleasure and absolute faith in the use of the weapon,—qualities which have ever been found to be invaluable in actual war; and which, while they admitted of the soldiers readily understanding combined action, rendered them also independent and self-reliant.

Accustom the peasantry of England to the use of those arms which the advanced state of mechanical science and art have enabled us to invent, as our ancestors were accustomed to the use of the bow, and the native qualities of the Englishman would soon again become as pre-eminently valuable as were those of the bowmen of Cressy, Poitiers, Agincourt, or

even of Homildon Hill and Flodden, and it would be impossible for any foreign power to insult them on their own ground.

But the thus rendering of a free people warlike presupposes them to be represented by a really free Government. For there can be no question that, to a Government wilfully despotic, the existence of the power and spirit implied in a free people habituated to arms would be dangerous in the extreme; and this arrangement, therefore, although well suited for England, could not be adopted by our Continental neighbours with safety to existing despotisms. But assuming that an army is still to be maintained in England, and admitting that the maintenance of armies is absolutely essential to her colonial and Indian rule, it seems to me that there exist principles upon which all these armies should be organised, and upon organising them in accordance with which their efficient maintenance must depend.

Soldiers, like other servants of the State, observe the law of demand and supply; and the supply of soldiers will always be regulated by the rates of wages held out to them, by the description and remoteness of the work to be performed, and by the description of the masters to be served for these rates. On this subject, then, we may learn from the manufacturer. If he desire to establish a factory, and to collect and organise the several grades and descriptions of skilled labour implied in this organisation, he proceeds to invite these grades and descriptions at what he believes to be the several market values. If the trade be dangerous, the rates will rise proportionably. If

the manufacturer be of ill-repute as a master, the collection of servants will be proportionably difficult. If prospects of promotion and pension in case of injury be held out, labour will respond at once to these advantages. Eventually the factory is started, and is maintained simply upon the principle of paying every man, from the highest to the lowest, engaged therein, what his labour may be worth, and by causing the engaged to feel dismissal from employ as a more or less grievous punishment.

What is to the interest of the manufacturer in the establishment of a factory, is to the interest of the State in the establishment of an army. Let the State, therefore, accord to its soldiers such pay and position as to draw into its ranks the flower of its yeomen and peasantry; train them in accordance with their noble nature, by appealing to the highest and best faculties of man; and arm them with weapons suited to skilful workmen. Let there be regiments of counties;—let, that is, each regiment have permanent head-quarters, where a considerable district around might be interested in the conduct of the corps in the field; where recruits might be enlisted, and where families, pensioners, &c., might reside in comfort during the absence of the regiment in the field. Let there be a liberal scale of pensions allowed for all ranks of officers and men, both for wounds and long service. Let the service be such that dismissal from it may be felt as a grievous punishment. Let promotion to the highest ranks be open to all who may deserve it. Let even the marshal's baton be within the reach of the grasp of the

private soldier who may prove himself worthy and able to wield it.

For the rest, the admission of common-sense, and the operation of public opinion where no concealment is allowed, will necessarily at once sweep away the enormous and wasteful follies of half-pay, purchase and sale of commissions, unwieldy and inefficient weapons, unfit clothing and accoutrements, and all similar follies.

Allow the principle of admitting the free exercise of reason and common-sense under the eye of the public, and all evil must disappear; while the best men for every post, and the best means of effecting every object, must soon be known, and, when once known, must be employed.

In the adoption of such principles exists the real efficiency of army organisation; yet this seems not to have been thought of on any hand, and has not even been noticed by late writers on the subject.

Yet it might have been remembered that the best cavalry the world ever saw (and acknowledged to have been so by universal consent) was an *English* *solidar* corps—the Ironsides of Cromwell. The excellence of these soldiers did not depend on their being large men or small men, or heavy or light, or anything else with respect to their mere carcasses. It was caused by their high moral nature and mental culture. And the private soldiers of Cromwell were eagerly sought for as officers elsewhere, and the whole history of the world could not show their peers.

Experience gained in real work, and upon a sufficiently extended scale, during a period of many years,

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has convinced me that the principles which rendered the soldiers of Cromwell irresistible may still be applied with like effect; and that even with the poor Asiatic something may be done in this way, for it is working in the right direction, in the path of nature's laws. Man's power—that which constitutes him man and not brute—depends on his brain, not his muscles; on his mind, not his body. Improve the moral and intellectual being of the men; lead them upwards and onwards by their best and noblest attributes, and not through sordid hopes and fears,—make them love their duty, and do it, *because it is right to do so*,—and success will attend our endeavours, be the material worked on European or Asiatic.

But how different in its operation is this principle of attracting by adequate inducements the men best suited to the military requirements of the State, of supplying these men with the best weapons possible, and of developing all their powers—from that which at present obtains in our military system, of enticing recruits at rates lower than the market permits; of arming them inefficiently; of attempting to govern them by the fear of punishment, and that punishment bodily pain; and of retaining them in the service by penal enactment.

Is it to be wondered at, that however excellent the raw material whence our army *might* be drawn, it should be found, under the working of such a system, often difficult to obtain for the service of the State any but the most inferior class of our citizens or peasants; that the supply even of these does not meet the demand; and that the army of England holds a

position at an immense distance behind the position which the general advance of the nation in moral and intellectual power should have enabled it to hold ?

The chief evil of the present system is the existence, and perpetual renewal, of a special code for the army. The effect of the Mutiny Act is altogether injurious to the military force of England ; it is as an instrument for harm in the hands of the ministry of the Crown ; and it possesses no redeeming qualities whatsoever. I speak advisedly, after long experience, and after expending on this subject an amount of thought and labour which few men have either the inclination or opportunity to bestow, when I assert that no special laws are necessary for the good government of soldiers. Those commanders whose object is good—who proceed towards that object on right principles, in accordance with nature's laws ; who appeal to men's best and highest qualities, instead of to the most base ; who endeavour to cultivate, draw forth, and aid in the development of, the powers and good qualities of those under them—will always be able to lead without the support of unreasoning authority ; while it is certain that the more intellectual the men really become, the more easy will it be for real intellectual and moral power to govern them.

But the military code enables the wrong man to be kept uppermost, and all manner of outrages on common-sense to be practised in the army, without much scandal, until the time for real warlike exertion arrives. Then real workmen are absolutely necessary, and the amateurs at once fail. While the steam-engine is at rest, and its fire is out, any one may

pretend to be competent to its management; but get up the steam, and the real engineer alone is able to maintain and to guide, with safety and utility, the mighty power of the machine.

This has well been shown in our war with Russia. There has been plenty of power, for even the poorest material of Englishmen is comparatively powerful. Our soldiers are still unmatched in fight, and show a martyr's endurance of misery; but these warriors have been systematically trained to helplessness. The natural qualities of the men make them, in the actual shock of battle and in the struggle of personal combat, the most formidable soldiers in the world: they are the best and bravest of the earth. But what has their military education done for these noble beings? It has merely crippled them, body and soul! What the stock, the belts, the pipeclay, the tight coat, the knapsack, &c., are to the soldiers' bodies, their moral and intellectual training has been to their minds: they must only think, as Frederic's soldiers prayed, according to regulation.

The men can do nothing for themselves; while their amateur leaders and heads of departments can neither feed, clothe, shelter, nor move the army. At the commencement of operations, our generals endeavoured to enforce regulations regarding stocks and jackets, &c. And with such matters many of them seem alone competent to deal.

Under our present system, there can be no long reach of understanding of military affairs, and no practical readiness in handling and supplying the wants of soldiers in the field: it seems abundantly

certain that thousands of our English merchants are really better able to command an English army than many of our general officers.

To attempt to reform, that is, to improve on, the present system, is plainly futile. It must be entirely abandoned, and new principles (directly the opposite of those now acted on) adopted, or continual failure may be expected.

The military arrangements should be thrown open to public view and public opinion: *evil things cannot bear the light*, and will disappear before it—generally without the harsh exertion of force or punishment. Reason, good sense, good feeling, with individual activity and practical knowledge, should be the guides; and the rule should be, to endeavour to develop these as much as possible in all members of the army, of whatever rank.

At present, every law of nature is reversed in our military system; and the rule of brute force is substituted for that of reason.—(1855.)

THE DEFECTS OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

The defects and indiscipline of the Bengal army, even as compared with the other armies of India,—in which also numerous faults and deficiencies might be pointed out,—are manifold and glaring. Let us inquire what really are these defects, and what the best method of remedying them. Let the officers of the Bengal army apply themselves fairly and honestly to the task of reform, where reform is really needed, AND LET THEM NOT FLATTER THEMSELVES, AS IT TOO OFTEN IS THE CASE. that THEY HAVE REMEDIED A DEFECT

WHEN THEY HAVE ONLY CONCEALED IT, OR DENIED ITS EXISTENCE: old sores must be laid open with an unsparing hand, and the caustic be freely applied, before they can be properly healed,—let not the patient think the surgeon an enemy because he gives pain.

For myself, I shall endeavour to write exactly as if I were myself an officer of the Bengal army: my judgment may be erroneous, and my opinions unsound; but my motives are undoubtedly good—they are the wish honestly to serve my honourable masters and my country, and to benefit, in my humble capacity, the service to which I am proud to belong. I have served altogether twenty-three years, have never been absent from my duty, and have long commanded a native corps of high repute; during the course of my service I have seen a good deal of the Bengal army, and have conversed much with its officers.

With the opportunities and experience above-mentioned, my observations and opinions may be useless and unsound, but they cannot justly be deemed presumptuous or hasty.

The most serious faults existing in, and peculiar to the Bengal army, appear to me to be as follow:—

First.—The absence of the highest moral tone, and of a simple and vigorous Anglo-Saxon honesty in dealing with Asiatics on the part of the English officers of the army of Bengal.

Secondly.—The want of power placed in the hands of regimental commanding officers; the want of confidence reposed in, and support afforded to them, by the Commander-in-Chief and by Government.

Thirdly.—The most pernicious system of drawing pay by companies direct from the divisional paymaster, instead of by regiments, which again tends to bring regimental commanders in contempt, and to reduce their power and usefulness.

Fourthly.—The most defective system of conducting officers' messes.

Fifthly.—The entire absence of a proper confidence between the officers and the native soldiers.

Sixthly.—The most pernicious practice of attending to the caste of native soldiers, thereby frequently excluding from our ranks the best material for soldiers, and enlisting the very worst.

Seventhly.—The very bad and fatally injurious system of promotion existing with respect to native officers and soldiers.

Eighthly.—The entire absence of a proper discipline throughout the native part of the Bengal army.

Ample proof of the first-mentioned fault is found in proceedings towards mutineers—in the late orders to the Bengal army regarding courts of requests, &c.—in disclosures which have been made regarding gambling affairs, banking transactions, &c., too notorious to require detailing, and too extensive and numerous to be attributable to causes affecting individuals only. These proofs are public, and patent to all men.

The defect being admitted, where shall we look for the cause and the remedy? One cause appears to me to consist in the lowering of the English character, by insensibly adopting Asiatic habits, manners, and feelings. The Anglo-Saxon becoming partly merged

in the Hindoo. That is extensively the case in the army of Bengal.

From the moment a young officer sets foot in the Bengal presidency, he is perpetually reminded that every English idea and habit is the sure mark of a griffin (that is, of a fool). He must not go out in the sunshine—he must travel in a palkee instead of on horseback; he must be punkaed, and tattied, and God knows what else; he must have a “khansa-maun,” a “kidmutgar,” a sirdar-bearer, and bearers, and a host of other servants—one for his pipe, another for his umbrella, another for his bottle, another for his chair, &c.—all to do the work of one man; and which work would be done by one man in the case of a Bombay griffin. By all these people the youth is called “ghureeb purwar,” “hoodawund,” &c. &c.

This state of affairs bewilders the new comer, till, resigning himself to his fate, he becomes accustomed to it, and gradually loses part of the manliness of the Anglo-Saxon character. With the external luxurious and lazy habits of Hindoostan, he imperceptibly adopts somewhat of Oriental morality.

Another cause is the difficulty existing in obtaining furlough to Europe, which, if removed, would effect a wonderful improvement on the tone of Indian society: this cause, although of grave importance, is, of course, not peculiar to Bengal, but common to all India.

The remedy is evident,—LET IT BE THE FASHION TO BE ENGLISH. It is a fallacy to suppose that the climate compels to be otherwise. There are faults

enough, I suppose, in the European society of the Western presidency, but assuredly it is ten times more English than that of Bengal; yet the climate is no better than that of the latter.

Let the griffin have no more than two body-servants at most; let him have no one in his service who will not do such work as his master bids him do: if the Hindoos object to such service, there are plenty of Mussulmans, ready, willing, and able to take their places, and with no more prejudices than a Christian.

Let the young man never enter a palkee, but go about on the back of his pony; let him not fear the sun—it may tan his cheeks, but it will not hurt him.

It is your effeminate gentlefolk, who live in dark houses artificially cooled, with a dozen Hindoos at work, with fans and flappers to beat the flies off them, who suffer by exposure—not the hardy young Englishman, who, if not intemperate, soon becomes acclimated; and the more readily so the less he regards the sunshine, which is healthy enough in moderation; *experto crede*.

Let him, in short, while studying the character of the natives of India as deeply as possible, and making himself completely acquainted with their habits, thoughts, feelings, modes of expression, &c., endeavour himself by all means in his power to remain a *thoroughly* ENGLISH gentleman. As he succeeds in doing so, he will assuredly succeed in commanding the respect and regard of every native around him. ALL OUR POWER IN INDIA RESTS ON THIS. We may lay it down as an absolute certainty, that the millions of natives which a handful of Englishmen govern in

this vast continent will not consent to be governed by a *handful of their equals*. Our power consists in our being essentially different from them, and in their belief in our moral superiority only. The only thing which can endanger the existence of this power, is the destruction or weakening of that belief.

The state of the body will often affect the mind ; habits and manners will act on, and be reacted on by, morals and religion.

Let us then be English in all things, to the utmost of our power, internally and externally—in morals, in habits, and in feelings, allowing absolute freedom of opinion and fair play to all men—and all will be well.

The second evil is notorious : it has been frequently remarked on, its existence is everywhere acknowledged, and its effects are lamentable. The commanding officer of a regiment in the Bengal army is almost powerless for good : he is allowed to do nothing ; his men are almost taught to despise him ; and in many instances of late years the sepoys have been allowed and encouraged to forward written complaints against their commanders direct to army head-quarters. What can be worse than this ? It is utterly destructive of all military discipline and soldier-like pride.

The third and fourth mentioned evils are closely connected with the second. In the Bengal army the practice prevails of each commander of a company drawing pay for that company himself separately, direct from the divisional paymaster, so that the pecuniary transactions of the regiment are carried on, in a great measure, independently of the commanding officer, and often without his knowledge ; as, for exam-

ple, has appeared in some late disclosures regarding banking transactions, wherein the officers commanding companies appear to have made arrangements with divisional paymasters for the recovery, by regular instalments, of payments on account of various banking transactions, without the commanding officers of the regiments knowing anything of the matter. All these also tend to reduce the useful power of regimental commandants, and make them be despised.

With regard to messes, the state of affairs is very bad. In some regiments no mess exists: the maintaining a mess is not only not made compulsory, but even where a mess is maintained, it is optional with officers whether to belong to it or not. Such a state of affairs is fraught with the worst consequences: it breaks a regiment up into separate parties, and gives rise to all manner of ill-feeling. It also lessens the power and good influence of the commanding officer in an extraordinary degree. It takes away much of the support which a commander quietly and imperceptibly receives from all well-disposed officers, who have a proper pride in their noble profession; and it enables others, who may be ill-disposed, to work mischief unperceived, till its effects become apparent in the bad state of the regiment.*

The remedy for all these evils is in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief and of Government: let the commander of a regiment be systematically and effectually supported in the exercise of his legitimate powers; let those powers be as ample as possible in

* This defect has lately been to some extent remedied.

every respect; regarding regimental affairs, let all turn, centre, and rest on him; and with these full powers, make him responsible that all goes well. If it do not, displace him from his command. Let there be a regimental paymaster, to whom the company officers send their muster rolls, and whose duty it is to draw the pay of the regiment, under the authority of the regimental commander.

Let the mess be a public institution, to belong to which is compulsory on all officers. Let the commanding officers be held responsible that it be conducted with due and proper regard to economy, comfort, and propriety, and give them full power to enforce such a state of things. There is nothing new in these rules; they exist with the happiest effect in the other armies of India, and would be equally advantageous to that of Bengal.

The fifth evil is notorious, and is plainly proved by men deserting their officers in the field, by frequent mutinies, &c., where nothing has been known by the officers of what was going on, until it resulted in open resistance to authority. The causes of this are various, part depending on what has been mentioned above, but chiefly on the abominable system of recognising caste in our ranks, and on the absurd system of promotion, whereby the native officers are absolutely useless.

The remedies are, of course, as described with respect to those causes.

The sixth evil is of a very grave and important nature. The effect of enlisting men of a certain caste or creed, to the exclusion of others, in the Indian

army, is to subject that army to the control, not of the Government and of the Articles of War, but to that of Brahmins and Goseins, Moollas and Fakeers. By this system a man is not to be chosen on account of his fitness to be a soldier, his willingness and strength, docility and courage, but because he is a twice-born worshipper of Vishnoo. Whatever his other qualifications, if a man think that a stone with a patch of red paint on it is not to be worshipped as the Creator—still more, if he have been a shoemaker, &c.—he is not to be admitted into the ranks of the Bengal army, for fear of offending the lazy and insolent Brahmins. The consequences are ruinous to discipline. BY REASON OF THIS, A NATIVE SOLDIER IN Bengal is FAR MORE AFRAID OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST CASTE THAN OF AN OFFENCE AGAINST THE ARTICLES OF WAR, AND BY THIS MEANS A DEGREE OF POWER RESTS WITH THE PRIVATE SOLDIER, which is entirely incompatible with all healthy rule.

TREACHERY, MUTINY, VILLANY OF ALL KINDS, MAY BE CARRIED ON AMONG THE PRIVATE SOLDIERS UNKNOWN TO THEIR OFFICERS, TO ANY EXTENT, WHERE THE MEN ARE OF ONE CASTE OF HINDOOS, AND WHERE THE RULES OF CASTE ARE MORE REGARDED THAN THOSE OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE. To such an extent does this evil exist, that I have known a Bengal commanding officer express his regret at being compelled to discharge an excellent sepoy, because the other men had discovered him to be of inferior caste, and had demanded his dismissal. To a Bombay officer such a state of affairs appears incredible—it amounts to open mutiny; but it is the normal state of the Bengal army at present. It is

curious, that though the Bengal sepoys have contrived to have it believed that their religion is concerned in this business of caste, in our ranks nothing is further from the truth. In conjunction with the system of promotion which prevails, THIS ATTENTION TO CASTE KEEPS ALL REAL POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE PRIVATE SOLDIER; and, as they think, saves them from much trouble and annoyance: but when they assert that this evil is a necessary consequence of their religion, the Bengal sepoys state the contrary to truth.

This is positively proved by that which takes place in the army of Bombay, wherein hundreds and thousands of men from Hindoostan, from the same villages, of the same caste, and even of the same families—brothers by the same fathers and mothers—as the fine gentlemen of the Bengal army, are seen in the ranks, shoulder to shoulder—nay, even sleeping in the same tent—with the Muratha, the Dher, and the Purwaree, without scruple or thought of objection. The one prides himself on being a Hindoo, the other on being a soldier. Which pride is the best for our purpose? The system of regarding caste is the original cause of many other evils in the Bengal army; and much of what has been said regarding the adoption of Asiatic manners tells again heavily here.* The Bombay sepoy, whatever faults he may have, has

* The fact is, that when, without giving offence, the English officer shows, by his habitual conduct towards the sepoys, that he feels their caste prejudices, &c., to be marks of INFERIORITY, which excite only his pity and regret, the sepoys endeavour to keep all such caste prejudices, &c., as much as possible out of sight, will never allow them to interfere with duty, and will never willingly obtrude them on notice at all.

one great excellence, which is, that he looks on the European soldier as his model in all things pertaining to soldiership, and endeavours to imitate him. Like the European soldier, the native sepoy of Bombay will turn his hand to any labour which he may be ordered to execute.

If the lines require cleaning, &c., &c., a working-party of sepoys is ordered out as a matter of course, with pickaxe and powrah, and the work is well done. The technical term "working party" is as familiar in the mouth of a Bombay sepoy as "shoulder arms." Nay, I have known more than once the men of a Bombay regiment to volunteer for such work as building their officers' houses, mess-room, &c., and to do the work well, too, making the bricks, mixing the mud, &c., &c., entirely by themselves. This would not be credited by the greater part of the Bengal army; and to such a state of helplessness has the recognition of caste in the ranks brought the Bengal sepoy, that a regiment of native cavalry, as I have repeatedly witnessed, is unable to picket, unsaddle, or groom its horses, until the arrival of its syces and grass-cutters—sometimes, as I have seen, several hours after the arrival of the regiment at its ground. In a Bombay regiment, before that time had elapsed, the horses would have been picketed, groomed, fed, and watered, stables would have been over, the tents pitched, and the men have had their breakfast. To such an incredible extent has this helplessness been carried, and recognised by authority, that a Bengal sentry cannot think of striking the gong at his own quarter-guard, and men called "gunta pandays" are

actually maintained, and paid for by Government, to do this duty for them. It is the khansamaun, kid-mutgar, hookah-burdar, &c., &c., over again. The remedy is obvious: never allow any reference to caste when enlisting men. If others now in the service object, let them be told that Government does not care one pin whether its sepoys be Hindoos, or Mussulmans, or Brahmins, or Purwarees, so long as they be good soldiers; and that if they do not like the rules of the service, they may leave it. If they still object, or make any difficulty about the matter, discharge them on the spot. There are millions of better men ready to occupy their places. Let also the use of entrenching tools be part of the drill of the sepoy, as much as is the musket exercise; and when he has learnt this, let him be occasionally employed in working-parties, &c., to prevent his forgetting it again. This trifle would be found to possess much more importance than at first sight appears to attach to it.

The seventh evil—the bad system of promotion—is the worst of all; its effects are crushingly ruinous. In the Bengal army the promotion of natives is made to depend on seniority only, so that if a man keep clear of actual crime, and lives long enough, he must become a commissioned officer, however unfit for the office.

Under this system, the private soldier feels himself entirely independent of his officers; he knows that they neither hasten nor retard his advance in the service. He has nothing to do but to live, and get through his duties with listless stupidity, and with

the least possible trouble to himself. No exertion on his part can help him ;—talent, courage, fidelity, nor good conduct are of any avail. Confidence and pride in each other, between men and officers, cannot exist. There is no real co-operation ; for the one being powerless to aid, the other becomes careless of offending. This is the effect on the private soldier. The system is equally, if not more baneful, as respects the native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned. The whole of the native commissioned officers are entirely useless—the amount of their pay is a dead loss to the State ; every one of them is unfit for service by reason of imbecility, produced by old age, or, where in rare instances the man may not be altogether in his second childhood, he is entirely useless from having been educated in a bad school. All should have been pensioned long ago : but, alas ! if the present system of promotion be continued, the getting rid of these poor old gentlemen, who cut such painfully ridiculous figures in the Bengal regiments, would be of no use whatever, for the non-commissioned officers, who would have to be promoted in their places, are but little better—even the very naitques (corporals) are almost too old for service.

How very different is the state of affairs under a proper system of promotion by merit alone ? It gives the commanding officers of regiments and companies a good deal more trouble, certainly, in making promotions ; but how are they repaid ? If they rally and honestly do their best to choose the men for promotion without partiality, favour, or affection, but by merit and fitness alone, it is soon found that every

man in the regiment (at least every man who is fit to be in our ranks) exerts himself to aid his officers. A degree of vigour and activity, amounting to a new life, is infused into every part of the regiment. The men, seeing all the prizes of the service within their reach, exert themselves to obtain them. They can only obtain their end by becoming good soldiers—by learning their duty, and performing it to the satisfaction of their superiors.

The native officers, being chosen with regard alone to their qualifications, and their fitness to hold commissions, are alike proud of the distinction they have acquired by their appointments, and able to perform their duties. They are not enfeebled by age; and the consciousness that their respectability and success in life depend on their own conduct makes them exert themselves willingly and zealously in maintaining the discipline and reputation of the service in which they acquire honour. The ill effects of the one system, and the excellencies of the other, appear to me so self-evident, and have been both proved on so large a scale, that I should consider it to be insulting to the understanding of my readers were I to enlarge on it, if it were not for the astonishing fact that such an evil system of promotion still actually exists in Bengal, and has been lately enforced, in spite of reason, common-sense, and experience, by —.

With such a system of promotion, the good and the bad, the clever and the foolish, the brave and the timid, the energetic and the imbecile, are nearly all on a par. The officers are powerless for good; and the men, keeping just clear of open violence, have their

OWN way in all things. IT IS ASTONISHING, AND SAYS MUCH FOR THE GOODNESS OF THE RAW MATERIAL OF THE BENGAL ARMY, THAT, UNDER SUCH ARRANGEMENTS, THE WHOLE FABRIC HAS NOT ENTIRELY FALLEN TO PIECES. THE THING IS ROTTEN THROUGHOUT, AND DISCIPLINE THERE IS NONE ; BUT IT IS WONDERFUL THAT EVEN THE OUTWARD SEMBLANCE OF AN ARMY HAS BEEN STILL MAINTAINED UNDER SUCH DEPLORABLE MIS-MANAGEMENT.

The eighth evil—the want of discipline—is the necessary consequence of much that has already been described. In speaking of want of discipline, I do not only mean that which is shown by serious mutinies and misconduct on extraordinary occasions, but also as evinced in the ordinary every-day routine of duty in the Bengal army : this is such as to be almost incredible to an officer of the Royal army, or of the other armies of India. The first thing done by a Bengal sepoy when he mounts guard, is to strip himself of arms, accoutrements, and clothing ; the muskets are piled, and a sentry is posted, who remains generally (not always) properly accoutred, &c. All the others, including non-commissioned officers, disarm and strip : if there be any water near, they go and dabble in it after the fashion of all Hindoostanees ; otherwise they cover themselves with sheets and go to sleep, quite naked, with the exception of a “lungootee.” When the sentry thinks that he has been on long enough, he bawls out for some one to relieve him : after a while, up gets a sepoy from beneath his sheet, and, after a few yawns and stretches, puts on his clothes and accoutrements, but

does not take his musket—that would be too much trouble, and endanger upsetting the whole pile ; he then goes to the sentry, takes his musket from him, and occupies his place ; away goes the relieved man, and strips like the others. No naique attends with the relief ; he remains fast asleep under his sheet. Now this state of things I have myself seen in hundreds of cases. It is so astonishing to a Bombay officer that he cannot help remarking on it ; yet I have been assured by numerous Bengal officers that this is the regular way of mounting guard. It should be borne in mind, also, that in the Bengal army four men are allowed to a sentry, instead of three, as with the other armies ; so that a sepoy with them is on sentry only six hours altogether, during his tour of twenty-four hours, instead of eight, as usual.

But it is by no means uncommon in the Bengal army to relieve a guard once a week, and even at longer intervals, when the state of affairs above mentioned must take place, even if it were not so on other occasions. This was the case when the Bombay and Bengal troops met at Peshawur ; and considerable grumbling and complaining took place when Sir H. Dundas insisted on the guards being relieved daily. To the mind of any practical soldier, no further proof is necessary on this subject—want of discipline. He must at once see that where guards are relieved weekly, where the sentries relieve each other as they please, and where the whole guard strips naked, there can *be no discipline whatever*. It is useless to ask whether a man can read and write, when you find that he does not know a letter of his

alphabet. If it were necessary, however, I could adduce abundance of other facts to the same purport. The remedy is apparent, from what has been said before. Such are some of the reforms peculiarly required by Bengal. But there are many others equally requisite, with regard to the native Indian army generally; for instance, with respect to the regimental orderly-room.—(1851.)

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SYSTEMS OBTAINING IN THE ARMIES OF BENGAL AND BOMBAY.

The native soldiers in the Indian army, other than those of Bengal, are, though formed of exactly the same raw material, essentially different from them in training and in discipline, in habit and in feeling. The normal state of the Bengal army is such as must appear to an officer of the Royal, or of the Bombay army, as a state of mutiny! I have known the men leave the ranks by hundreds at a time, without leave, to cook, to plunder, or what not. Yet such is the force of habit, that the excessive want, or rather, total absence, of discipline, and all the gross evils which pervade the native army of Bengal, are looked on by the European officers of that army as necessary consequences of employing a native army at all. Having little opportunity of comparing the native soldier of Bengal with others differently educated, their eyes are never opened to the true cause of the existing evils—they attribute all to the deficiency in the *numbers* of the European officers. The fact being, that they are already more numerous than is

necessary to real efficiency, and that, unless means were adopted to improve their *quality*, addition to the numbers would be hurtful.

The officers are not too few, but they mistake their proper functions, and act on wrong principles. The officers of the Bengal army are formed exactly of the same materials as those of the other armies of India; their native soldiers of material, in its raw state, perhaps, somewhat better than that of the others; but from the hour he enters the service, the Bengal officer *is trained to sink the European and adopt the Asiatic*. In the Bombay army the "feeble Hindoo" becomes half European, and adopts the feelings and ideas of Europeans, as far as they refer to his position as a soldier, till they become his own. In Bengal, the European becomes half Hindoo, and thus the commanding influence of superior energy and superior moral character (I deny any superiority of intellect) is, in a great measure, lost. This pervades the whole society in Bengal; but its effects are most glaringly apparent in the army. In the Bengal army there is a constant studying of men's *castes*, which the EUROPEAN APPEARS TO THINK AS MUCH OF, AND TO ESTEEM AS HIGHLY, AS DO THE NATIVES THEMSELVES; and the sepoys, instead of looking on the European officers as superior beings, are compelled to consider them as bad Hindoos! Instead of being taught to pride themselves on their *soldiership* and discipline, the sepoys are trained to pride themselves on their absurdities of caste, and think that their power and value are best shown by refusing to obey any orders which they please to say do not accord with their religious

prejudices. It is a grave mistake to suppose that religious feelings have any real influence on these occasions—it is a mistake which would be ridiculous if its consequences were not so serious; but it is certain that the Bengal sepoy is a stickler for his imaginary *rights of caste* for the *sake of increased power*: he knows well that Government never intend any insult to his creed, however absurd it may be; but he knows that by crying out about his caste, he keeps power in his hands, saves himself from many of the hardships of service, and makes his officers afraid of him. This is proved by what takes place in the other armies of India. In the army of Bombay, even a Purwaree may, and often does, rise to the rank of subadar by his own merit; in Bengal, such a man would not even be admitted into the ranks, for fear of his contaminating those fine gentlemen the Brahmins; yet in the Bombay army the Brahmin (father, brother, or son, it may be, of him of Bengal) stands shoulder to shoulder in the ranks—nay, sleeps in the same tent—with his Purwaree fellow-soldier, and dreams not of any objection to the arrangement! If this subject be mentioned to a Bombay Brahmin sepoy, as it is sometimes by *Bengal* officers, who are always asking the men about their caste, the ready answer is, “What do I care; is he not the soldier of the State?” The reply speaks volumes, and shows a state of affairs which officers of the Bengal army *cannot conceive*.

The system of promotion in the Bengal army is exactly in keeping with the principle of the immutability of caste. No individual merit can advance, no

individual incapacity nor misconduct (unless actually criminal) can retard the promotion of the Bengal sepoy,—seniority alone is considered. What is the consequence? The men, not feeling that their prospects of advancement in the service depend on the favourable opinions of their European officers, want the most powerful stimulus to good conduct. They are never disciplined (as I understand the word), are often mutinous, and never acquire the knowledge of their profession which may qualify them to hold commissions with advantage to the service.

The Bengal native officers are inefficient, and necessarily so under the present system, because they are chosen without any regard whatever to their fitness to hold commissions, and because they are almost always worn out with age before they receive them. It is often objected by Bengal officers that the pension-list of Bombay is much larger in proportion than that of Bengal. It is so : but why? Poor old wretches, feeble in body and imbecile in mind, who would in Bombay have been pensioned off ages ago, still remain holding commissions in the Bengal army. Does this arrangement cause any saving to the State? Does it really enable a greater military power to be maintained at the less cost? Again, the assertion that few men of any pretensions to independence will submit to our rigid drill, &c., is erroneous as a general rule, however agreeable it may be to Bengal experience. Men of good family, &c., will enter the service fast enough if the service be worth entering,—witness the Sind Irregular Horse. But reverting to the question of European officers, it is certainly true that more officers

of artillery and engineers are required for the Indian army,—the duties of these officers are generally quite independent of the number of men under their command; and many more European officers are required with European troops than with natives, owing to the presence of the native officers with the latter. With scientific corps the number of officers has no reference to the number of the men; it must be regulated altogether by other circumstances. The great number of European officers now allowed prevents the native officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable position in the army; thereby keeping out of its ranks natives of birth, wealth, and family, and preventing in the native soldier the full development of that love for, and pride in the service, which are essential to great efficiency. There are already too many European officers with reference to regimental duties only. A certain number of European officers is necessary, but very few suffice. Three to a regiment, actually present, is, perhaps, the best number. The duties of subaltern officers, and even of captains of troops and companies, are most efficiently performed by native officers.

If there were but one European officer in a regiment, he would, if possessed of proper qualifications,—if not trained in a school which makes him half Hindoo, and if *entrusted with proper power* and authority,—soon form around him such a body of native officers as would make the corps far more effective under the one Englishman than it could be under any number of Europeans who held the opinions, with regard to native troops, which now, to a great

extent, prevail among the officers of the Bengal army.

Take for example the corps of Sind Irregular Horse, 1,600 strong: this has but five European officers, yet it has on all occasions proved to be perfectly efficient, and is generally believed, by those best able to judge, to be the best native cavalry corps in India. Yet this corps is *most carefully and minutely drilled*, and is armed and accoutred in the European style. The squadron and troop commanders of the Sind Irregular Horse are natives, yet the greater part of them perform their duties as well, and in all respects as efficiently, as the best European officers, whether in quarters, on parade, on the line of march, or in battle.

No Bengal officer can understand this; but it is nevertheless the truth. There is no native regiment in the Bengal army, horse or foot, in which the duty is carried on with such steady regularity, as that with which all is conducted in the Sind Irregular Horse, with its two and a half Europeans to a regiment. There are no soldiers on earth better disciplined than those of this corps. Their discipline is founded on the mutual pride, confidence, respect, and good feeling which exist between them and their European officers. They are confessedly among the best native soldiers in India, yet they cost the State less than one-half of the "regular" native soldiers, and they have been trained, educated, and altogether treated, after a fashion diametrically opposed to *Bengal* principles.

I repeat, then, that the ordinary state of the Bengal army is such as must appear, to an officer of the Royal

or of the Bombay army, to be a state of *mutiny*. The men are *not* taught and trained instinctively to obey orders, and even the European officers are afraid of them. This is not wholly the fault of the regimental officers of Bengal. The evil is produced and perpetuated by the false ideas formed from the first moment a young officer enters the service in the school of errors, which the native army of Bengal is at present; and by the fatal effects of taking all power from regimental officers, and concentrating it at army head-quarters, thus producing an artificial sameness of dull stagnation, instead of encouraging the natural uniformity of progressive improvement.

In the Bombay army, on the contrary, the native officer is invaluable, and his authority is respected, though he be the lowest of the low in caste; because the practice in Bombay is for the European officers to make the Hindoos SOLDIERS, instead of, as in Bengal, the sepoy making the European officers half Hindoos. —(1850.)

[In a work published by General Jacob in 1854, he remarks that “the evil influence of the state of affairs in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating itself to the Bombay army also.” He considers, I believe, that the orders, which have within the past few years been increasing, for the assimilation of administrative details to the practice obtaining in Bengal, to be the main cause of the altered condition of the lesser body. Like causes produce like effects.—EDITOR.]

REMARKS ON THE STATE OF THE NATIVE ARMY OF
INDIA IN GENERAL; UPON THE PRINCIPLES WHEREON
ITS EFFICIENCY DEPENDS; AND ON THE MEANS
WHEREBY ITS EXISTING DEFECTS MAY BE REMEDIED.

On all sides we hear outcries regarding the state of the native army of India.

The most conflicting opinions are given to the world, and continually uttered in conversation, with regard to the merits of the Indian soldiers, the number of officers with native regiments, &c.

Little light has lately been thrown on the matter, and as directly opposite opinions cannot both be just, much false doctrine has been promulgated, and much truth concealed.

The subject of the native army of India was long ago discussed, and most ably handled by Sir John Malcolm. (*Vide* his "Political History and Government of India.") He well knew the native soldier: his words have now, in some instances, proved prophetic.

The position of European officers of native regiments, whether in command or otherwise, is no longer a favourite position, and the native army has been thereby ruined, as he foretold that it would be.

(Particularly the army of Bengal.)

Every officer of a native regiment of the line now endeavours to get away from his corps, to escape from regimental duty, by every effort in his power. The "REFUSE" only remain. All proper feeling is thus totally destroyed between the native soldier and his European superior.

At the same time, the genius of the Indian, of the Oriental generally, has been so little understood, that, with the best possible intentions at head-quarters, the greatest possible evil has been caused, by the attempt to govern and treat the sepoy like an Englishman.

The native soldiers, to be in a really efficient state, must look on their immediate commander, the head of the regiment, as their absolute prince—as the paramount authority, as far as they are concerned.

Concentrating all real power at head-quarters of the army, and leaving none to the commanding officers of regiments, has been attended with ruinous results.

In many instances, the sepoy has been allowed and encouraged to look on his regimental commander as his natural enemy; and, in the Bengal army, at least, to forward secret complaints against him to army head-quarters. While courts-martial, articles of war, rules and regulations, bewilder the native soldier, and fill his mind with the idea that his officers are wishing to keep him out of his rights—he knows not what, but certainly important ones, or such a fuss would not be made about them.

The only principle of military discipline which a native Indian soldier thoroughly understands is obedience to his commanding officer. He cannot, without great injury to efficiency, be taught to look beyond him.

On the regimental commander he should, and must, to be in a healthy state, wholly depend. Enlistment, discharge, promotion to all ranks, and everything else should rest with the regimental commander alone.

There should be no Articles of War (at least none of the nature of those at present in force, to the ruin of our native army); but the commanding officer should have full powers in his own right over his men.

The want of power entrusted to regimental commanders is one enormous evil now existing in our native army. It is, perhaps, a necessary consequence of another very great error.

The seniority rise among the officers of a native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it impossible at present to ensure there being at the head of each native regiment a man capable of wielding the powers necessary to govern it efficiently and well. This is the great difficulty experienced at headquarters; this is the stumbling-block of all honest reformers, and must be overcome and removed before anything can be done towards effectually remedying existing difficulties.

The posting of officers to native regiments without regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with ruinous consequences.

The presence of unselected Europeans, in such numbers as are at present borne on the strength of native corps of the line, is not less ruinous.

Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of native Indian soldiers. One active, energetic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel the greatest pride in acting in his absence as

they know he would wish them to do if present. The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honourable.

The native officers and men feel the deepest gratitude towards him who has raised their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish and energetic zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which they find themselves.

With thirty Europeans, on the contrary, instead of one, the native officer finds himself of no importance, and the sepoy becomes a lifeless automaton.

The Englishman becomes too common to be held in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding no important position, but in the performance of trifling duties which any native officer or non-commissioned officer would do equally well. He is often seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his energies in vicious, pursuits. The prestige of the superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often happens that the European officer, having nothing important to occupy him, loses somewhat of his own self-respect.

The young boy is placed in command of the old subadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, he has to crave instruction; and the men see that, so far from taking a pride in them and in the service, their European officers are generally longing to be removed from them, craving intensely for staff appointments, &c.

The example of the idle, the evil-minded, and the indifferent, does more harm than the good can remedy.

To be in a healthy state, the native soldier should never see his European officer living an idle, useless life, or holding a degraded or unimportant position. While the European officer should be proud of his men, and, as Sir J. Malcolm most justly observed ("Government of India," Appendix E, paragraph 25), it should be arranged that the command of native corps should be the most sought after of all existing appointments.

A most unwise adoption of every useless form of office paper-work, style of dress, and accoutrements, has accompanied the excess of indifferent European officers with the native Indian army. Real efficiency has been in all things sacrificed to appearance. Voluminous "returns" &c., on paper, pervert the attention of commanding officers and adjutants from their really important duties, while knapsacks, basket-hats, stocks, tight clothing, pipeclayed belts, and other unspeakable absurdities, introduced in imitation of European follies, are quite sufficient to crush and cripple the soldiers, without much effort on the part of an enemy.

But it is not my intention at present to enter into minute details. My wish is now only to set forth the true principles on which the efficiency of our native Indian army depends.

I will, therefore, now briefly endeavour to show how, in my opinion, all the defects now existing in our native Indian army may be remedied.

The principles I contend for have proved true in practice.

The presence of a great number of European officers, and the assimilation of everything to an Euro-

pean model, however absurd that model may be, has enabled the native army to accord in all outward appearances, ceremonies, and forms, to the European armies, but its real efficiency has been thereby destroyed. A sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat; trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all; bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack, so that he can hardly breathe; strapped, belted, and pipeclayed within a hair's-breadth of his life; with a rigid basket-chako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance there, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour; and with a leather stock round his neck, to complete his absurd costume—when compared with the same sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency, forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the “regular” system with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common-sense now recommended for adoption.

Let the common-sense system be adopted, and nearly one-half of the cost of the native army of India might be saved to the State by reduction in the number of European officers, while the real strength and military power of the army would be more than doubled.

It is quite as absurd to force all our European forms of courts-martial, &c., &c., on our native soldiers, as it is to force them to cripple themselves with our ridiculous chakos, &c., instead of their own most soldier-like, easy, and neat pugrees. Let the foolish system which crushes the native soldier, and requires so many Europeans to render him useless, all go

together. Abolish it, *in toto*, and have recourse to common-sense, reason, and experience.

It will not be difficult, if prejudice be lost sight of for awhile, to show how principles, similar to those proved to lead to good results, can be applied with overpowering advantage to the native army of India generally.

Few European officers only, and those carefully selected and entrusted with full powers, must be appointed to native regiments.

Three officers to a regiment would suffice. Let four be appointed—a commandant, a second in command, an adjutant, and a quartermaster.

No army rank solely to be regarded, but individuals to be selected on the professed principle, at least, of being best qualified.

Sir John Malcolm proposed that the regiments of officers should be retained as they now stand in the "Army List," but not have regiments of men attached to them. All officers of the native Indian army to be, in fact, unattached; and that, from the whole body, properly qualified individuals should be selected for staff appointments, &c., &c. The plan appears a good one, and practicable enough, but it appears to me that we have a better. Let all the officers of the Indian army be borne on the strength of the European portion of it. We know that any amount of excess of English officers with English regiments can do no harm, and the numbers of officers of artillery and engineers are totally irrespective of the numbers of the men of those corps.

Suppose, then, in round numbers, the Bombay army to be composed as follows :—

Let each regiment or battalion of officers consist of—

2 Colonels.
4 Lieutenant-Colonels.
4 Majors.
16 Captains.
16 Lieutenants.
16 Ensigns.

Total.....58

Say that there be six battalions of artillery, 58 each.....	348
Three battalions of engineers.....	174
Four European regiments of infantry.....	232
One European regiment of cavalry	58

Total European officers for the whole army..... 812

Of these there would be appointed to, say—

30 Native infantry regiments, at 4 each.....	120
6 Native cavalry regiments.....	24
Staff appointments, say.....	180
Sick and on furlough	80

Total..... 404

Remaining for duty with 14 European battalions..... 408

(I would have no native artillery). Numbers and details might be altered and re-arranged to any extent, but the above will show the principle on which a sufficient fund of European energy and talent might be placed at the disposal of the Indian Government for the performance of public duties of all kinds; the highest appointments being the prizes for the most worthy. While the principle of posting a few selected officers to native regiments, instead of a

crowd taken at hazard, might be fully carried out, and for all manner of duty the individual most fitted might easily be selected, without incurring the enormous cost of more Europeans, or having to face the apparently insurmountable difficulties of an Indian staff appointment corps (it is nonsense calling it a staff corps, which means quite a different thing). The appointments to native regiments, both of horse and foot, should be considered as the highest prizes of all in their various grades, and should be made so both in station and emolument. The allowances should be such as to cause the commands of native corps to be sought after by lieutenant-colonels, and to have commandants of that rank in the army would be an advantage; but rank *alone* should never be considered in such appointments. The principle of giving them to those best qualified for them should always be acted upon, and strictly followed out.

All pipeclay, metaphorical and actual, should be at once abolished; black leather accoutrements should be adopted, and no difficulties should be made or allowed to exist with regard to the introduction of improvements generally, in respect to arms, clothing, accoutrements, and all else.

The pay of both men and officers should be increased, and every man should be compelled (as in good *sildar* corps) at all times and in all places to be provided with sufficient carriage for his kit, &c.

These principles might perhaps be better followed out by placing all the European gentlemen required for the public service in India, whether civil or military, on one unattached list, letting them rise in

the list by seniority only, calling them generals, colonels, &c., &c., as at present, and assigning to each grade a proper and liberal amount of pay even while unemployed.

From this general stock all officers might be selected, according to merit and qualification, for every appointment and duty whatsoever, the amount of pay as to the "unemployed" being allowed to all grades of officers while on leave on any account in any part of the world, and on retirement from the service.

Under such arrangements, and so organised, the native army of India would be fully capable of going anywhere and doing anything. It would be equal to the encounter with equal numbers of any troops in continental Europe, and of course far superior to any Asiatic enemy.

It is a grave mistake to suppose, as we are often told, that it is necessary to enlist men of the Northern tribes—Pathans, Belooche, Goorkas, &c.—to enable our Indian army to encounter successfully the warlike tribes now on our Indian frontier.

The Mussulmans of *Hindoostan* are the very best men for our army. The Pathans, &c., are faithless and treacherous. These Hindoostanees are very bold, brave, strong, well-made, active men, fully equal in these respects to the Affghans (though the latter be the stouter-looking of the two). They are generally most excellent horsemen, and many enlist in our cavalry regiments, but under the present system no great numbers are found in the infantry corps of the line. As an example of the qualities of these Hindoostanee horsemen, I may point to the fact that very

lately a regular Persian battalion—perfectly well drilled, armed, accoutred, &c., after the best European model, composed of splendid men, who stood perfectly firm, bold, and confident in their array—was ridden over and utterly destroyed by Major John Forbes and ONE TROOP ONLY of the 3rd Regiment of Bombay Light Cavalry.* Have *any* soldiers ever done better?

There cannot be better Eastern soldiers than these men make when properly treated. They have scarcely more prejudices of religion, &c., than Englishmen, whatever the Bengal officers may fancy; they have most liberal ideas as compared with those of the Hindoo sepoy, to whom they are in every way superior beings. With all this, they are the most faithful and trustworthy of any men in India; they are, in fact, more like gentlemen than any other class of Indians.

With such men in our ranks, and fixed head-quarters for each regiment, where their families could remain in safety and comfort while the corps might be absent on service, the native troops of the Indian army might be employed on foreign service for any length of time, and at any distance from their homes; and the time may possibly not be far distant when their services may be of the greatest value.—(1854.)

Note, added in 1857.

After the fullest study of the subject, I am convinced that Sir John Malcolm's original proposal was

* This passage was added in 1857.

better than mine, in one respect : that the best possible arrangement would be to have all the officers in one list unattached, rising in army rank by seniority in the whole body ; and from this general list to select for every duty whatever—regimental, staff, military, political, and civil. I would pay even the unemployed officers fairly, so as to keep them easily above sordid want. The mere presence of a number of English gentlemen would be of the utmost advantage to our rule in India, while most of them would, while “unemployed,” *be engaged in qualifying themselves for employment*, which they could only do in this country.—(1857.)

SILIDAR HORSE.

Remarks on an Article in the “Calcutta Review” for March 1846, entitled “Hints on Irregular Cavalry,” &c.

The Bengal irregular cavalry is still, comparatively speaking, badly horsed and ill found, and *must* be so on the present miserable pittance of pay,—Rs. 20 a man and horse,—which sum is altogether insufficient to support a respectable horseman. Bad customs ought immediately to be changed, which can always be done if the commandant be fit for his situation. With regard to the qualifications mentioned by Captain Trower as necessary for a commandant of irregular cavalry, and on which the reviewer remarks that “such men are not to be obtained in these degenerate days,” it appears to me that the Bengal army must be in a miserable plight if such men be

not obtainable by hundreds. Some of the qualifications mentioned by Captain Trower are of little moment, such as not being of hasty temper, conciliatory manners, &c. These things, however desirable, are little thought of by the men (who are excellent judges of their officers' real characters), if higher and more necessary qualities exist. The supposing it necessary to flatter men's prejudices, &c., which appears to be so much insisted on throughout the Bengal army, is a sad mistake,—it is the *greatest evil* which can exist,—it is the destruction of all mutual confidence and respect. It creates and fosters those very prejudices and mutual misunderstandings which it professes to “conciliate.” Why did the soldiers of the Tenth Legion love Cæsar? Because they were proud of him, not because he coaxed them. Men and soldiers, native or European, hate being commanded by “spoons.” Show the men that you respect and regard them as *soldiers* and *men*, not as *Hindoos* or what not ; treat all men under your command as men and soldiers, without any regard to (although without giving offence to) caste or prejudices ; treat the native officers as gentlemen, and you will soon understand each other perfectly. The differences of religion, &c., between officer and man are forgotten—positively never thought of: you have one common interest, and the European commander, if worthy by nature of his command, becomes the object of the most profound respect and regard—even though his demeanour be not very “conciliatory.”

There are other qualifications, besides those mentioned by Captain Trower, which, in my opinion, are

essential to, or very desirable for, a good commandant of irregular cavalry. He should, if possible, be a good and successful partisan soldier, quick in danger, fertile in resources : indeed, until a commanding officer and his regiment have been on service together, the corps must be considered in a greater or less degree in an imperfect state : the proper feeling between each other can hardly exist. But after all, everything else is of trifling consideration when compared with a natural *talent for command*,—that quality, or combination of qualities, whereby a commander gains not only the respect of his own men, but makes them *respect themselves*, and raises their character in their own estimation, and in that of the world. This is the grand secret of being loved, respected, almost adored, by the native soldier. Get him “abroo ;” let him find himself honoured and respected wherever he goes,—even among strangers, on account of the service he belongs to, and there is nothing he will not gladly do to please his commander ; there is no inconvenience he will not willingly undergo to maintain or increase the *abroo* of the regiment. The commandant and his men are naturally proud of, and confident in each other : the discipline is perfect, for it is the discipline of the heart.

Commanding officers should be most carefully chosen by Government, with whom the means of judging correctly *do certainly* exist. When once appointed, they should have ample powers—they should in fact be absolute in their regiments ; they should have all promotions in their hands, and power to discharge any man of any rank. The appointment,

also, of the subordinate European officers should rest with them: they should be allowed to go their own way to work in all things, but be held strictly responsible for the efficiency of their regiments in every way; no excuse should be admitted. If the regiment be not what Government wishes, and has a right to expect it to be, the commandant should be removed at once. In fact, it should be a contract between the commandant and Government. A good commander will always make a good regiment: its state will be the best possible both for the men and Government. Without a properly qualified commander, no rules, orders, nor regulations, will avail in the least; they will only make bad worse. The sepoy should never think of looking to higher authority than the commander of his regiment, who should be the patriarch of his tribe, the chief of his clan; every member of the regiment should feel identity of interest with him, and instinctively look to him as his natural head. Unless this state of things be fully carried out, the regiment is imperfect; where it exists, all is healthy and strong. To do justice to silidar cavalry, Government cannot give commandants too much power: there should be *no* rules, *no* code of laws, nor any trammels whatever. This I consider essentially the one thing needful. Whatever trouble it may be supposed to give Government in the choice of officers, scores of well qualified men do exist in the Indian armies, and Government can find them if they think proper to do so.

With regard to making "Horse Guards" of the irregular cavalry, some grievous errors prevail. It is

not the European *discipline* which native gentlemen dislike—it is the stable duties, the European riding-school, and all those little harassing frivolities, having no connection with duty under arms, which exist in the regular cavalry, and are so disgusting to the purely Indian soldier ; and ABOVE ALL, *the low rank, below the junior cornet*, to which he can ever hope to attain. With the exception of the riding-school (that is, the dragoon riding-school), sword exercise, and stable duties, the silidar cavalry (the word irregular ought to be abolished) may be, and ought to be, as well disciplined and drilled as the regulars. When mounted and under arms, there ought to be no difference, except that in the regular cavalry, the powers of the horses being more equal, and the horses better drilled, than those of silidar corps can *be now*, their movements must always be more steady, and their formations made with more squareness and precision, than those of the silidar cavalry ; but in proportion as this difference lessens, the silidar cavalry is good. The *discipline* of the latter ought to be *better* than that of the regulars, inasmuch as you have better security—the men have more at stake, and discharge from the service is a very severe punishment.

With regard to the number of assamees or silidarees allowed to be held by one individual, no rule should be laid down : it may be for the advantage of the service that a certain individual should hold fifty or a hundred assamees, and as regards another individual, it may be advantageous that he should not be allowed to hold more than three : of this the commandant is the proper judge ; all should rest with

him. One man, I believe, in the Nizam's service holds five hundred assamees, and one in the Guzerat Horse some three hundred.

The assamees are of course hereditary, and saleable property, but only during good behaviour, and subject to the commandant's approval. All assamees are liable to be forfeited for misconduct on the part of the silidar, by sentence of a punchayet, and the orders of the commandant. The system of allowing men not in the service to hold a very great number of horses in a regiment works, I am told, excellently well in the Nizam's service, and in the Guzerat Horse, but for the foreign service it is altogether bad; indeed it could not exist long, for the absent silidar would find so little profit, even from his five hundred horses, *that he would sell off as soon as possible*. Not a single assamee in the Sind Irregular Horse is now held by any one not belonging to the corps; and in my opinion the system of "be-nokur" silidars is bad under *any* circumstances, but for a regiment always serving at a distance from the men's native country, as in the Sind Horse, the system is certainly most injurious, and Captain Jacob with much labour completely destroyed it in that corps.

On the death of a silidar, whose heir is not a member of the corps, the horse and assamee are sold by auction, and the amount realised paid to the heir as a part of the estate. The heir, unless in the regiment, or a youth likely to be soon fit for service, is never allowed to retain the assamee.

The reviewer is in grievous error about bargheers: if the state of affairs he describes be that of the

Bengal irregular cavalry, it is nevertheless very bad. The bargheer is certainly more likely to misconduct himself than the silidar, and therefore to remedy this in the Sind Horse no bargheer is admitted without two silidars becoming security for him. This security is not a mere form, but is always enforced. Under this simple arrangement, it is not found that the bargheers are much more liable to misconduct themselves than the silidars.*

It is also a very grave error on the part of the reviewer, and one likely to lead to much harm, to assert that "every additional bargheer is a burden on the State," and that it would be better to have all silidars. I can on this point speak positively, and with certainty, after having belonged to an irregular corps almost constantly on service for many years. *There is no doubt about it!* So far from agreeing with the reviewer, I assert, then, that the ONE-HORSE SILIDAR IS THE WORST OF ALL, and that a regiment composed wholly of such men would be wretchedly inefficient. The one-horse silidar is always poor and miserable; his horse is badly fed and cared for; he cannot afford to keep a pony nor a syce; and, on the

* In the Nizam's cavalry, the silidar enlists his own bargheers, who are responsible to him, and under his command. Nothing of this kind is allowed in the Sind Horse. The bargheer is not under the authority of the silidar in any way whatever: he is enlisted by the commandant as a soldier of the State, not as the servant of the silidar. It is not even thought *necessary* that the bargheer should always be placed on the horse of the silidar who is his security, although of course he is generally so placed. The bargheer may at any time be transferred to any horse; but it is a rule to consult the wishes of the men, and to keep friends and relations together as much as possible.

whole, I consider him worse off than the bargheer : *at least one-half more pay would be required to maintain a regiment of one-horse silidars* than on the present plan, equal efficiency being supposed in both.

I am quite certain that for a regiment intended for service, and at a distance from the men's homes, your three-horse silidar hath no fellow for efficiency : he keeps a tattoo or two, or probably a camel, a syce, and a grass-cutter, so that he and his two bargheers, with their servants, form a very comfortable little family. He has generally a little money in hand, instead of being in debt, and can on a pinch get on for two or three months without pay (the Sind Horse have often had to do this), and is altogether as superior a man as possible in every way to the miserable one-horse silidar. When a man has more than eight or ten horses on service, some of them are apt to be neglected : they cannot always, perhaps, be together, and the bargheers may cheat both the horses and the silidar ; but the three or four-horse silidar is the true mean—he is not poor, and everything is done under his own eye.

The reviewer is also greatly in error about a russaldar being “ entitled to five assamees, &c., &c.” The russaldar may be entitled to hold—that is, he is *allowed* to hold—five or five hundred assamees, but these are not *taken from others* to be given to him ; if he wish for more horses than he already has, he must buy them, and the assamees too. “ The russaldar who is promoted claims a like number of assamees : where is he to get them ? ” says the reviewer. Now all this shows such profound ignorance of the genius

of the service, that it is difficult to deal with it without much explanation. All that the russaldar has, I repeat, is the permission to hold a certain number of horses in the regiment: he must get these horses how he can—by purchase, of course; for I should think that any vacant assamees in the gift of the commandant would rather be presented to poor and well-deserving *sowars*, who could not so well afford to purchase, than to the rich russaldar, who had the means of buying any number. The russaldar is entitled to have so many horses, as he is entitled to wear the russaldar's coat; but he must first buy that coat—he has no right to another man's. But it is a great error on the part of Government interfering at all in the matter of the number of horses held by individuals; it should be entirely discretionary with the commandant.

With regard to six-horse silidars being excused sentry, the idea appears to me bad in principle, and even absurd: the men ought never to be allowed to suppose that *they are degraded by performing* the duties of a soldier.

With regard to men of good family, whether six-horse silidars or not, it is well after a short time, *when they have thoroughly learnt their duties as private soldiers*, to promote them, but until that takes place there should be no distinction allowed. Every rank in the service should be considered honourable, even that of the private sowar.

The remark about Government not reducing the number of bargheers also betrays bad principles. Government ought not to interfere at all in the mat-

ter; such interference would be highly injurious, if not ruinous, to the service. The proper men for irregular cavalry are doubtless the Mussulmans of Hindoostan. The men of the Nizam's service are the best horsemen in India, I believe; and the service being so popular, there are always hundreds of excellent oomedwars to choose from. Whenever a vacancy occurs, a *bargheer* will pay for his place Rs. 400. Such men cannot* misbehave—they have too much at stake; neither do they require drilling—they are trained soldiers before their enlistment. But this state of things, which has so many advantages, cannot exist when the regiment is constantly serving in a foreign country.

The remarks about “keeping up the prices of assamees,” &c., betray the existence of some lamentable evils in the Bengal irregular cavalry. A thing is only worth what it will fetch: if the attempt be made to force an artificial price, either above or below the real one, immense evil is the consequence. Something of the kind formerly existed in the Sind Horse, or rather among the men of the Poona Horse who were transferred to form the new corps. The old assamees of the Poona Horse were supposed to be worth Rs. 500 each, and at this rate they constantly changed hands; but the silidars were all in debt, and the sale was not real—it was merely a transfer of debts in the bankers' books. There were no means of knowing the real value. Afterwards, as the Sind Horse was raised, and

* It is not, of course, meant *literally* that a man *cannot* misbehave as one of my antagonists (“H”) gravely proceeds to refute. A man *can* cut his throat if he likes, but it is not usual to do so.

new assamees were offered for sale, it was found that their value was only about Rs. 300 or less, and to maintain the regulated price of Rs. 500 it was thought advisable by the commanding officer to form an assamee fund by subscriptions from the silidars, from which fund the difference of price was made up to the silidar who sold his horse and assamee. This appeared to Captain Jacob a strange, troublesome, useless, and complicated proceeding; wherefore he abolished the assamee fund, repaid the money to the subscribers, and let everything find its own natural level. No matter whether a silidar chose to sell his assamee for Rs. 5 or Rs. 500, one thing was insisted on—that all sales should be for ready money. The change produced was like magic: within a few months afterwards a horse in the Sind Irregular Horse would sell by auction for *ready cash* for Rs. 500 and Rs. 520, or even more; and these prices were maintained till the raising of the new regiment threw so many assamees into the market gratis. With the exception of allowing no one not a member of the regiment to purchase, and of insisting on ready money being paid, every silidar is free to sell his horse and assamee as may seem good to him.

The recommendation of the reviewer as to the filling up of assamees vacant by death, &c., is not sound: the assamee is not vacated by death unless the deceased leave no heirs, in which case it lapses to the commandant, who gives it to any deserving man, or orders it to be sold for the benefit of the regimental fund. If there be heirs, the assamee is just as much

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their property as anything else belonging to the deceased, and should never be otherwise disposed of.

The fixing the price of assamees at a certain sum is very bad (as has been proved on a large scale in the Sind Horse), and leads to all manner of evil: they are just worth what they will fetch at a public *bonâ fide* sale, neither more nor less. The remark that this would enable many bargheers to purchase *without getting irretrievably into debt*, exposes the besetting sin of the irregular cavalry of Bengal. A silidar in debt is *absolutely and altogether unfit* for the service: he ought always to have a little money in hand, or he cannot be efficient. A rule is established, and acted on, in the Sind Horse, whereby any man borrowing money for the purpose of buying a horse, *ipso facto*, forfeits his assamee. Men who cannot afford to buy and equip a horse are totally unfit to be silidars. When men once begin to borrow, there is no end to it; their pay will not suffice to cover the interest of their debts; they are ground down to the earth, and always at the mercy of their creditors.*

With regard to the sons of native officers, why should they not enter as bargheers? Very many ex-

* Since these pages were written, another fact has occurred which bears on the subject. Another regiment of Sind Irregular Horse has been raised, 800 strong, mounted, clothed, armed, accoutred, and drilled, all in first-rate style, without allowing a man to borrow a rupee. This fact speaks volumes. *By being forced to keep out of debt, the men are compelled to save money in spite of themselves.* The only exceptions to this were a few men who came from the Nizam's cavalry. These men brought their debts with them, which was not known to Major Jacob till after they had joined the Sind Irregular Horse.

cellent men do so enter, but soon purchase assamees and get promoted also. With regard to bargheers selling their places, I am of opinion that it ought not to be thought of. But the reviewer says, who will buy? The answer is plain: in the Nizam's service the place of a bargheer sells for Rs. 400; but if it be worth nothing, as in the Bengal irregular cavalry, of course it will sell for nothing. The rate of pay in Bengal is much too low, and it appears to me most injudicious to bring down the pay of the Poona Horse to the same rate, the expenses at Seroor being about double those in Bengal. To be really efficient, a private sowar in Bengal should receive Rs. 30, and in Sind and the Bombay presidency in general Rs. 45. The adoption of these rates would be true economy in the end: a bad article is not cheap, though purchased at a low price.

With regard to the expediency of altering the denominations of the different ranks, as proposed by Captain Trower, and objected to by the reviewer, it is merely a return to the old nomenclature, which is in my opinion in some respects the better of the two: the Bengal ranks have only lately been introduced into the Bombay army, and appear strange, and some of them unmeaning and troublesome. Why call a native adjutant a "wordee major," or a pay duffedar a "wukheel?"—What on earth is a "nakeeb?" This man ought to be replaced by a kote duffedar major, whose duties are defined and well understood. The reviewer says that he has a great objection to Captain Trower's one great russaldar, who he says will apparently have no specific duty, &c.; and then he talks

nonsense about his "cocking up his beak," &c. Now, after many years' experience of his use, I assert that the one great russaldar, or a russaldar major, is invaluable in a regiment of irregular cavalry. He holds the place of subadar major of the regulars, and *no number of European* officers could supply his place. But the fact is, that the value of native officers is not properly understood in the army of Bengal. They have in that army little power over the men, are perfectly separated in heart and feeling from the European officers, and only half understand each other: moreover, they are very often old imbeciles, incapable of active exertion, whether of mind or body. But it is not so with us. A native officer or soldier after twenty years' service in the Bombay army is half an Englishman in feeling. He is not valued, either by himself or others, on account of his caste, &c., but according to his ability as a soldier, and his conduct as a man: he is much more proud of being an officer than of being a Brahmin or a Syud. Whatever, then, may be the case at present in Bengal, it is certain that a russaldar major, properly selected, is of the greatest advantage to the well-being of a regiment. He completes the chain connecting the natives with the Europeans; and, when really what he ought to be, affords the greatest support to the authority of the commanding officer: besides which, the appointment is one of great repute and respectability, and is something to look forward to as a reward for long and meritorious service.

The reviewer's remarks about kettle-drums and trumpets do not appear to be judicious. The kettle-

drum is an absurd affair altogether, and ought to be abolished: it is fit rather for the establishment of a nautch-woman than for use as a soldier-like instrument. Its very appearance is ridiculous. A trumpet to each troop is quite sufficient, and nothing else ought to be allowed. With regard to the drums adding to the consequence of the russaldars, it may be truly remarked, that if the russaldars be fit for their places they would blush to hear that their respectability rested on such things. Teach them to pride themselves upon their officer-like qualities, and they will not affect such childish folly.

We now come to the regimental fund,—a most important subject,—about which the reviewer is shockingly in the dark, or the system in the Bengal irregular cavalry is shockingly bad.

The whole affair appears so monstrous, that, instead of attempting to point out the evils of the system described by the reviewer, I will simply mention what is the state of affairs in the Sind Horse.

There is a regimental fund, formed by the subscription monthly of fourteen annas per horse, and two annas per man; all fines, &c. also go to the fund. On the death of a horse, the owner receives Rs. 100 from the fund, to assist him in the purchase of another. The farriers and artificers of sorts are paid from this fund, and some other things of general benefit supported by it. There is *no* regimental banker, and no shop-keeper in the regimental bazar dare give a man credit beyond the end of the month (this rule is strictly enforced). *Any man getting into debt to purchase a horse forfeits his assamee.* Debt is

considered to be the utter destruction of efficiency ; and a most constant watch is kept, and the most stringent rules are enforced, against it. A man in debt is considered just as unfit for the service as if he had lost his limbs, and is treated accordingly. In consequence, the men are *not* in debt at all, as they never need be, and therefore are always ready for service : no more notice or preparation is required to march the regiment one thousand miles than to turn it out for parade, — indeed, the Sind Horse have seldom received more than twelve hours' warning before a march. We have only to consider that whatever the rate of pay, much or little, incurring debt *must reduce* the amount by the whole sum paid for interest : if the pay be already too small, borrowing money, to be repaid with interest from that pay, only makes the state of affairs infinitely worse. Yet to such an extent does this evil exist in the irregular cavalry of Bengal, that an old and excellent commandant told me that he had been obliged when he took command of his regiment, to borrow, on his own personal responsibility, some *three lakhs of rupees* to pay off the men's debts, so as to get rid of the ruinous rate of interest they were then paying ; and that, after all, in a few years' time, by reason of a famine, they were as bad as ever—*hopelessly* involved ! Another commandant told me that before he could come to Sind he had to borrow a very large sum (some Rs. 80,000) from the Agra Bank. I know also numerous other cases in point. This state of affairs appears to me to be so utterly destructive of everything like military efficiency, that it is astounding

how things can go on at all under it. The system is rotten at the core, though tolerably fair outside.

With regard to the arms of irregular cavalry, after many trials, I am certain that the native sword and a good percussion carbine are the only weapons for use, save that the officers and duffedars may carry pistols. The Government carbine is almost, if not quite, *useless* to the native horseman, however well it may answer for a dragoon; it is much too long, and, from being of musket bore, is far too heavy and clumsy.* After many trials, and much correspondence with the makers in England, Captain Jacob got a manufacturer to supply the Sind Horse with a very perfect carbine, description as follows ---

Length of barrel, 22 inches.

Bore, 17 gauge.

Weight altogether, under 6 lbs.

Percussion lock of the best construction, half-cock just above the nipple, with sliding stop.

These pieces are exactly adapted to the men, and are *most formidable weapons*.† They are used easily

* The Government percussion pistols are *most disgracefully bad*. Those procured lately from England for the Sind Irregular Horse are beautiful and excellent, but rather expensive, costing Rs. 56 a pair. They are supplied to the native officers and non-commissioned officers. The Government cavalry fire-arms have been completely spoiled by the adoption of the musket bore in place of the 17 gauge.

† Vide despatch about the fight of Zemanee on the 1st October 1847. I have seen the same thing often before as occurred on that day, but not to the same extent. No *swordsmen* on earth *could* have killed five times their own number of armed, brave, and desperate enemies, fighting for their lives, which was accomplished by the Sind Irregular Horse in the fight of the Zemanee, in two hours' time.

on horseback in one hand; and in the hands of the old sowars, who make the muzzle nearly touch an enemy before firing, their effect is terrific. The sowars make excellent practice with them on foot: at a hundred yards it is quite equal to the generality of infantry regiments with percussion muskets. The lance is in my opinion (formed after considerable experience of its use both in the chase and in battle), useless for light cavalry; it may be very showy, but out of five hundred lancers not half a score will be found really masters of their weapon for war. The sword and carbine are "*facile princeps*" among light horsemen's weapons: there cannot be better carbines than those of the Sind Horse, but they are rather expensive, costing at Hyderabad about Rs. 28 each; but the men are delighted with them, and would gladly pay much more for them if necessary. The matchlocks I should class with the kettle-drums. I know them well!

The truth of the story about the Brahocees and Skinner's Horse at Dadur is not exactly as stated by the reviewer. The Sind Horse were present also, which he appears not to have known. The best Brahocees who ever drew sword would *never dream* of standing a regular charge: it is easy to do "great havoc" on flying enemies; but after all, not much *was* done on that occasion. The enemy (after a feint of advancing, to gain time for the Khan and others to escape), bolted;—that is the whole matter. As to the fire of matchlocks from horseback before the charge doing any execution, it is too absurd to be thought of.

With regard to the uniform of irregular cavalry, most officers appear pretty nearly agreed except as to colour, and to the head dress. For the latter, there is nothing in my opinion to be mentioned in the same breath with the common scarlet pugree; it fits close to the head, protects it from the sun, and partly from a cut; is never in the way, looks beautiful and soldier-like, and withal is as light as a feather. Its cost also is trifling. The dress of the Sind Irregular Horse is a dark green cloth "alkalug" (tunic, with silver lace and embroidery for the officers), white drawers, jack-boots, red pugree, and "kumer bund." The saddle-cloth is green and red, and the horse accoutrements are also covered with green and red cloth: the whole looks well, plain, and soldier-like. The dress of the native officers is very handsome.

With regard to the supply of clothing, the remarks of the reviewer again show the crying evil which exists in the Bengal army, want of mutual understanding and proper feeling between European and native. With us no such feelings as those described could, I should hope, take place or be dreamt of, and it is sad to think that they should exist in Bengal. An officer is not liable to be thought a tailor because he interests himself about the clothing of his men, their arms and equipments in general, and procures them for them of far better quality, and cheaper, than they could get them themselves. They are delighted with, and most grateful for, all such arrangements: "Who else have we to look to—are you not our father?" say they!

Is it likely that those whom you have led in a thousand difficulties and dangers, who are proud of their commander, and he of them—when you perfectly understand each other, when you have been intimately associated with each other for many years, under all kinds of circumstances, till the accident of one being Christian, another Mussulman, &c., is completely forgotten—is it to be supposed, I say, that *anything* you please to do for the good of your men will be misrepresented among them? Away with such nonsense!

Besides carbines and pistols, the Sind Horse are supplied from England with pouches and belts, cap-pouches and sword-belts, of black patent leather. The clothing, horse accoutrements, &c., are supplied by the army clothing agent in Bombay, of excellent quality, and at a rate which, though high, is cheaper than they could be procured in any other way. Every man is under regular monthly clothing stoppages from the day he enters the service. What can be better? All that about troop officers and regimental bankers is bad in principle, and worse in practice. That abominable incubus, the regimental banker, is the root of all evil! Thank God there is no such monster with us!

With regard to the marching of irregular cavalry, of course they are, or ought to be, always able to move at a moment's warning. The Sind Horse is so, and seldom has more than twelve hours' notice for a march of any length, or for any service: every man always is provided with a sufficiency of camels, tattoos, &c.

With regard to the regimental bazars, they appear to be excellently managed in the Nizam's cavalry (however, they have had little experience of desert countries as yet, I fancy). With us, we cannot carry at the outside more than five days' food for man and horse; but it appears to me, that if the necessary supplies exist in the country through which the regiment is marching, the bazar can supply itself from day to day. If, again, as has often happened to the Sind Horse, the supplies do not exist, no bazar, however perfect, could carry them for above a few days, for this plain reason, that the cost of transport alone of one month's food for man and horse amounts in this country to more than the sowar's whole pay. When, then, the country does not afford the necessary supplies, the commissariat must feed the irregulars as well as any other part of the army, or they starve; but if food exist in the country, the sowars will get it somehow. The proper rule is this: let the commanding officer of the regiment certify, on honour, that sufficient supplies do not exist, and then only let the necessary food be carried and supplied at a reasonable rate by the commissariat. This is the rule in Sind. The men detest being obliged to have recourse to the "godown" (as they call it), and would far rather purchase elsewhere, so that no abuse is likely to occur.

In every regiment there is a "koti," or bank, says our reviewer. Marry! is there in every Bengal regiment! And this koti or bank appears to me to be a crushing evil! It paralyses every energy; nearly every man is hopelessly in debt; frequently he cannot

even pay the interest of these debts. His self-respect is gone; he is put to all kind of shifts—sometimes most disreputable ones—to enable him to keep up appearances; and after all his horse is starved, and, with his rider, alike unfit for any efficient service away from his home. The bank is of essential service in buying remounts, &c., says the reviewer: he, however, admits that it has ill consequences, but ends by saying that it is of no use to argue the question, because no corps *can be serviceable without one!!*

Strange infatuation this! But so true is it, that habit will reconcile us to anything: that which we are accustomed to appears best. Exactly the reverse of the statement of the reviewer is the truth. No corps can be serviceable with one of the banks and regimental bankers in full force!

There is neither bank nor bankers in the Sind Horse, and any man found borrowing money for the purpose of buying a horse, *ipso facto*, forfeits his assamee. *If a man have not a little money of his own he is unfit to be a silidar*, and his being allowed to become or to remain one without the means (independent of borrowing) of supporting himself and his horse respectably and efficiently, is, I consider, absolutely ruinous to the regiment in which such practices exist. The pay allowed (Rs. 20 per man and horse to a Bengal regiment, and Rs. 30 to the Sind Horse,) is not sufficient, any how, to maintain the horseman as he ought to be: how then can he pay the interest of his debts? A horseman in debt I consider *utterly ruined* as a soldier: he may turn

out for ordinary duties, or make a decent appearance on parade now and then, but for real service he is worth nothing. The evil once begun, the debt once allowed, it goes on rapidly increasing; the case is hopeless; there is *no* remedy: the silidar in debt is useless, and ought at once to be discharged. There is no rule of such vital importance to the efficiency of a silidar corps—none which requires such constant watchfulness and determined resolution to enforce—as this: *NEVER to allow a horse to be purchased with borrowed money, and never to allow pauper silidars.* If the contrary be the state of affairs in the Bengal irregular cavalry, the commanding officers of regiments ought at once to stop it, sell the horses and assamees of every silidar in debt, pay the debts with the proceeds as far as they would go, pitch the regimental shroff to the devil, and never allow a man to borrow a rupee again—no, not to save his life. But, alas! the great mass of these debts has been incurred under the sanction and signature of the commandants,—a suicidal proceeding, which renders them powerless.

If things cannot be carried on without borrowing money, they must become worse *with* borrowing, which lessens the man's means by the whole amount of the interest paid for the loan. If moneyed men will not enter the service, leave the ranks vacant till they *will* do so, or until Government increase the pay! The system of borrowing money is alike deceptive and ruinous. It cannot be too much insisted on, that a man without sufficient ready money of his own to purchase his horse and equipments is unfit to be a

silidar, and should *never, on any account*, be allowed to be one.

The application of articles of war and regimental courts-martial, forms of law, &c. to corps of irregular cavalry, is injurious in the highest degree (and in this I speak advisedly and with confidence). Of course, if a man commit murder or such like, try him as a camp-follower, but all ordinary offences should be left to be dealt with by the commandant of the regiment. The introduction of regimental courts-martial is *very* bad,—it is unmixed evil ! The punchayet is ten thousand times more efficient. The genius of the service should be kept in mind. The native officers of irregular cavalry are *really* officers: the russaldar is as much commanding officer of his troop as the captain of regular cavalry is of his. The native officers of irregular cavalry do not hold the places of the native, but of the *European officers* of the regular army. They are men accustomed to think and act for themselves. A punchayet composed of them, and the proceedings of which are conducted after their own fashion, is, out of all comparison, a more just and efficient tribunal than the native court-martial, with its European superintendent, interpreter, articles of war, forms of law, &c. &c.

There never yet has been a court-martial at all in the Sind Irregular Horse, and a punchayet is seldom known to fail in its duty; and, indeed, I have never heard of a single case in which its decisions were not strictly just. A regimental punchayet in the Sind Irregular Horse is composed of a russaldar as president, and four other native officers as members:

none below the degree of a commissioned officer are allowed to sit. Their method of proceeding is peculiar, but exactly adapted to the ideas of the men themselves, which our forms of courts-martial most certainly *are not*. The witnesses are sworn at the discretion of the court, and all evidence is recorded in Persian. The sentence of course requires confirmation by the commandant before it can be carried into effect.

A punchayet has power to inflict forfeiture of one or more assamees, fine, imprisonment (in the regimental guard), or to recommend dismissal.

The commandant of a corps of irregular cavalry ought to have it in his power to discharge any man, even a russuldar, from the service ; and all promotions should be absolutely in his hands, even to the highest grades. The appointment of the European officers should also be left to him. He should also have magisterial powers,—which, indeed, he in general has with us.

With regard to silidars neglecting horses, the proper proceeding is simple enough. The commanding officer sees a horse in bad order, or unfit for service : he immediately, as a matter of course, orders the man to get another, and his horse's pay lapses to the fund till he does so. As to the silidar being ruined, I repeat, that if the silidar have not sufficient money of his own to purchase and maintain a good horse, he is useless ; and the sooner he is turned out of the regiment, or at least ordered to sell his assamee, the better. I have never heard any man of the Sind Irregular Horse object to this proceeding in the case

of bad horses,—its justice is at once felt and acknowledged by all: indeed, the more respectable silidars often do not wait to be told to change a horse, but, when they think that an animal will not be approved of by the commandant, frequently of their own accord bring another horse, to be passed and entered in place of the bad one.

This is the proper state of affairs. The men see that the object of the commandant is the respectability of the corps and the good of the whole, and that in the end this is for the good of each individual in it. Horses in the Sind Irregular Horse are always examined by the commandant himself, and, if approved of, branded in his presence.

The reviewer's remarks about pensions appear just; but after all, perhaps pensions are not much required in a silidar corps on a proper scale of pay, and properly constructed.

With regard to standards, in my opinion they are *a nuisance*. The Sind Horse have standards, having won them at Meeanee, but the corps would be better without them: they are never of any use, and on real service are only in the way; the better a regiment behaves, sometimes, the more risk there is of losing its standards.

The idea of teaching the sowars the sword exercise is silly: they are far better swordsmen than the regulars as it is. With regard to the riding-school, it is different; and, if proper pay were allowed, I would establish one,—not, of course, precisely in the dragoon style, but appointing some of the best riders among the old sowars regularly to teach the recruits

to ride after their own fashion, and to *drill the horses*. In the Nizam's service this is not required, for only fully trained men are taken into the service, which the number of candidates in waiting always enables a commanding officer to act up to, the service being so popular.

It is different in the Sind Horse. Our pay is small, the country is not liked, the climate is bad, and everything very expensive; consequently, our raw material is somewhat inferior, and to make it equal to the other requires more labour in working up. Men will rather take service in the Bengal Irregular Cavalry than in that of Sind: the difference of pay is not adequate to the increased expenses and inconveniences of distance from home, severer discipline, &c.

In my opinion, it would be greatly to the advantage of Government, and materially add to the strength of the Indian army, were all the regular (that is bargheer) cavalry made European: of course much fewer regiments would be required, say half the number now existing, the present cavalry officers of two native regiments being appointed to one of Europeans; and all the native cavalry made silidar corps, on a scale of pay and establishment which, though at a less cost, would enable them to be superior to any native cavalry now existing. The cost of each trooper of the regular cavalry of the Bombay army is about Rs. 83 a month. The cost of each man of the Sind Irregular Horse as it now stands is about Rs. 36; and the cost of each man of the proposed silidar cavalry would be Rs. 58 monthly. The saving in the native cavalry would pay the increased expense of

the European soldiers, and the increase of strength would be *very great* ; for I maintain that the silidar cavalry on the proposed scale would be *superior* in every way to the native cavalry now existing. The best among the native gentry, who now have no connection with the army, would be proud and delighted to enter such a service, where the native officers have real command and authority, and where much of that harassing stable duty, &c., &c., which is so disagreeable to them, does not exist. Not only would the service be composed of a class of men very superior as soldiers to any now entering the native army, but the political effects of such a service would be immense : the most influential native sirdars, men of landed property, and so forth, throughout India, would have a distinct interest in this part of the British army, which would be filled with their brothers and sons. Neither could their connection with the army in this manner ever be attended with danger to the State, for to their position in the British army would they feel that they owed greatly increased respectability and honour : they would be grateful to the British Government, and be proud to serve, instead of only fearing it. The effect of such a state of things, in securing the fidelity and attachment of the people in general, must be very great. At the same time, not only is the cost of such a service much less than that of the present native cavalry, which has no connection at all with the most influential and best families of India, but the silidar corps is, from its construction, at all times much more ready and much more easily moved than any other troops whatever ; and by its

movement the State is *put to no extra expense*, save in the extreme case of a march through a desert country for more than a few days successively

There is but one thing required to ensure the perfect success of the proposed scheme, viz., a proper choice of officers to command, and the entrusting them with full and sufficient powers. The subordinate grades of European officers would then form an excellent school for future commandants, and the supply would never fail. The commandants should always be allowed to choose their own European officers. The service should always be one of careful selection; and if the commandants be really and honestly chosen by merit and fitness alone, Government need never find difficulty in appointing properly qualified individuals. The officers of the regular cavalry are, *in general*, not well adapted for a silidar corps. But if they should possess the necessary qualifications, and be above the *prejudices caused by education and habit*, they would in such case certainly be the best. A certain number of the native officers and men of the "regular" cavalry might with advantage be incorporated into the silidar corps (some of the best men of the Sind Irregular Horse are volunteers received at various times from the regular cavalry of Bombay); but a general transfer would not succeed at all—indeed it would ruin everything. One other thing especially should be borne in mind, viz., the absolute necessity of not appointing more than three European officers (besides the doctor) to each silidar regiment. The essence of the proposed advantages of the construction of the corps consists principally in

the respectable position held by the native officers inducing a very superior class of men to enter the service. This state of things is not compatible with many European officers: quality, not quantity, is required. This cannot be too much insisted on.

It is proposed to take the "Political Advantages of Silidar Cavalry in India" as the theme of an essay hereafter. The subject is well worth the grave consideration of Government.—(1847.)

ON GRANTING COMPENSATION TO SILIDAR CORPS.

The whole system of granting compensation to men of silidar corps appears to me to be founded on false principles; to be most injurious to the service, by striking at the root of that which forms the peculiar strength and advantage of a silidar corps, viz., its entire independence of external aid; to be contrary to true economy, inasmuch as it entails a great and uncertain expense on the State, without an equivalent benefit resulting in increased efficiency; to open a door to fraud; and to cause the worst conducted corps, or the worst individual silidars, to be the most costly to Government.

The regulations in force since 1849 with regard to compensation for horses of irregular cavalry dying of fatigue, &c., also involve another practice which appears to me to be fraught with the greatest evil to the service. I allude to the assembling of committees of cavalry officers to ascertain the circumstances of the case, &c. Such a rule can only be understood by the native soldiers as implying that Government distrusted their commandant, and thought it possible

that he might cheat the State, or allow others to do so. I can hardly imagine anything more calculated to destroy mutual respect and proper soldierly pride than such a proceeding. The rule has never been acted on in the Sind Irregular Horse, and I trust that it never will be. My opinion of the evil working of such arrangements—checks, as they are called—is neither vague nor theoretical.

Let Government call for returns, showing the amount of compensation for horses drawn by regiments of irregular cavalry while serving on this frontier, in the Punjaub, or in similar positions, receiving the same rate of pay as the Sind Irregular Horse, under the operation of such checks, and compare it with the amount drawn by the Sind Irregular Horse on the same account, while entirely free from any such interference, during the last nine years of almost constant active service, including a share in several great battles, and the practical working of the two systems will at once be apparent. * * *

I have been informed, that when the 6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry was posted at Khanghur in 1844-45, it received compensation for about five hundred horses. Another corps of Bengal Irregular Cavalry, when serving on this frontier, had, when I visited its lines, three out of four horses suffering from sore backs. The horses were still worked in that state; those dying or becoming unserviceable being, of course, paid for by Government, under the committee system. How was this? It was assuredly not owing to the superiority, or otherwise, of individuals; but clearly because such a system makes

men helpless, careless, improvident, and dishonest—in a word, unsoldierlike.

As an illustration of this principle, I beg to mention what appears to me exactly a case in point. When on service, in the year 1844-45, I found that more of our horses were laid up with sore backs than I thought right. The owners and riders of the horses had always plausible and ready excuses to offer; nevertheless, it appeared to me that the evil could be stopped, and, accordingly, I ordered that the *bargheer* riding a horse becoming sore-backed should forfeit to the regimental fund at the rate of one rupee a month, and the *sildar* owning the horse two rupees, until the animal should be well again; and that, meanwhile, the horse should not be ridden, nor anything whatever be carried on his back.

This rule caused much dissatisfaction at first, especially among the senior native officers, who, having a great number of horses, were usually the most careless *sildars*, and suffered most. However, I was certain of my ground, and remained firm; when in a very short time the advantage of the arrangement so much complained of became apparent to every man in the regiment; the penalty became virtually a dead letter, for there was scarcely a sore back remaining, and now such a thing is almost unknown in the whole corps.

There is no better method of making a man take care of his horse than making him lose by the injury or death of the animal. My own opinion is firm, after much consideration of the subject, that all manner of compensation to men of *sildar* cavalry should be

avoided as much as possible, as undoubtedly tending to injure their efficiency and make them helpless. Any increase of monthly pay which the men may receive will, up to a certain amount, in proper hands, be attended by a more than proportional increase of efficiency: but it is otherwise with occasional grants of compensation and such like; these cannot be regularly calculated on, and the prudent and steady soldier does not depend on them; while they tend to destroy honourable feeling, by enabling a rogue sometimes to obtain more than the honest man, and the owners of the worst horses to receive the most pay.

With regard to compensation for horses, the only exceptions which I would make are in the cases of horses actually killed in battle, drowned, or lost when proceeding on duty by sea, and such like; where it must be evident that no care or providence on the part of the man could have prevented the loss, and that the condition and quality of the horse had nothing to do with the matter.

Whatever may be the fair amount, on a liberal average, necessary to enable a silidar (free from debt, which ought not to be allowed) to maintain a serviceable horse, &c., it should be included in his monthly pay, which being sufficient for the purpose, he should be left to make his own arrangements, under the direction of his regimental commander; but no excuse should ever be admitted for inefficiency, and no external assistance, under any but very extraordinary circumstances, should be either looked for or granted.

The system, then, of casting the horses of silidar

cavalry by committee, and Government paying for them, being shown not only to be enormously expensive to the State, but attended with positive evil to the service, it appears unnecessary to discuss the question as to what is to become of the cast horses.

However, my opinion is clear, that such petty savings as the one in question, with regard to the silidar service, do harm, as tending to check a certain degree of liberality which is expected from, and which is essential to, a good silidar, and to produce a feeling towards Government in the native mind which it is most desirable to avoid.—(1856.)

SILIDAR RIFLE CORPS.

It would, I have not the least doubt, be perfectly easy and very advantageous to the State to raise and organize infantry on the same principles which I have acted on with the Sind Irregular Horse. Such infantry would be the most efficient in India. The only difficulty which I anticipate is the apparently invincible prejudice of authority. I must have no courts-martial or articles of war. I want no lawyers among my men, neither do I wish to govern them by force or by fear.

I will have "sober God-fearing men in my troops," as said old Cromwell, and will govern them by appealing to their higher, not to their basest attributes. Actual crimes can be dealt with by me and my lieutenants as civil magistrates: all else must be left entirely to my discretion.

The men should receive ten rupees a month each, and provide their own arms, accoutrements, clothing,

&c., &c., just as do the Sind Irregular Horse, under regimental arrangements made and controlled by me. Nothing extra to be furnished by Government except hospital stores and hospital tent medicines, ammunition, and carriage for these. I should have full power to enlist, discharge, promote, and reduce, also of fining or otherwise punishing men, without articles of war, as with the Sind Irregular Horse.

The choice and removal of officers to rest wholly with me. I should arm the men with rifles; and it would be our chief peculiarity—for which purpose the amount of pay is calculated—that all should at all times be provided with proper means of carriage of kit to take the field at a moment's notice, as with the Sind Irregular Horse. Carriage for the hospital and ammunition being permanently maintained at Government cost.

Permanent head-quarters to be at Jacobabad, but the corps to be available for service anywhere, always returning, however, when its tour of service was over. Families, Pensioners, &c., to remain always at head-quarters.

I would also add to each regiment of Sind Irregular Horse a troop of Silidar Horse Artillery; the troop to form part of the regiment.

A force so organized would be complete in itself; would be independent of departments; would be able to move anywhere at a few hours' warning; and would be capable of long and rapid forced marches, the riflemen availing themselves of their baggage ponies, &c., to reach the place of action.—(1855.)

THREE MEMORANDA ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
SIND IRREGULAR HORSE, AS EXEMPLIFYING THE
SILIDAR PRINCIPLE.

Memorandum, No. I.

On the raising of the 1st Regiment of Sind Irregular Horse, two hundred men were transferred from the Poona Horse to the new corps. The men so transferred appeared to consider that they had a right to a sum of Rs. 500—neither more nor less—for each assamee they might choose to dispose of. This right appeared to have been recognised by commanding officers, and the assamees were constantly transferred at that price. At the same time, there was hardly ever a real sale; every man was deeply in debt to the regimental banker; and the sum of Rs. 500 for an assamee was merely transferred in the banker's books from one name to another. On the raising of the Sind Irregular Horse, the new assamees were presented, of course, either to deserving men of those received from the Poona Horse, or to others newly enlisted.

The silidars could assert no such claim for a guaranteed price, with regard to the new assamees, as they had preferred with respect to those of the Poona Horse; and, in consequence, the greatest confusion existed.

There were three or four descriptions of assamees in the corps, such as original Poona assamees, presented Poona assamees, new assamees presented, and

new assamees purchased, all coming under different rules.

The commanding officer attempted to remedy this great evil, by forming an assamee fund. This fund was formed by large monthly subscriptions from the silidars of the corps ; the prices of the horses were registered ; and on the sale of an assamee, the difference between the price of the horse and Rs. 500 was made good from the fund.

This contrivance, which was an attempt to remedy one error by another, was found greatly to increase the evils of an already vicious system ; and, on my joining the Sind Irregular Horse, nothing could have been more confused than the silidaree system in the regiment.

Nothing was left to find its natural level ; and, in spite of all guarantees and artificial supports, there was no confidence in the system, and the assamees were actually worth nothing ; while many of them were held by women, children, shroffs, and all manner of persons not in the regiment at all. Wherefore, thinking that it was manifestly impossible that a respectable military corps could exist under such arrangements, so soon as I had sufficiently mastered the subject to see my way clearly, I ordered that the assamee fund should be abolished, and the money repaid to the subscribers. I explained to the regiment that Government did not recognise the sale of assamees at all, but that the proceeding had been permitted as a private arrangement among the silidars, for their own convenience ; that all differences between assamees, however acquired, would immediately cease.

That all assamees, held by persons not belonging to the corps, should be considered vacant on the death of the horses now representing them in the regiment.

That whenever a silidar might be permitted to sell an assamee, the sale should be by public auction, for ready money only; that no one should be allowed to bid except bargheers and silidars not holding already more than two horses in the corps. No borrowing of money, in order to purchase, to be allowed.

That under every circumstance, the assamees should be held only during good behaviour; and that no sale or transfer should ever take place without the express permission of the commandant first obtained.

Finally, that the price of an assamee was just what it would fetch, whether Rs. 5 or Rs. 500.

These rules have been strictly acted on in the Sind Irregular Horse since 1842, and with the happiest results.

The silidars were at first somewhat startled at the complete overthrow of all their accustomed habits and received ideas concerning silidar arrangements, and I was even told that the ready-money sales would be absolutely impossible; but the arrangements had not long been in force before their benefit was apparent to all.

The drain on the capital of the regiment by silidars not in the service, and by the interest paid to shroffs under the system of purchasing on credit, being stopped, it was found that not only were ready-money purchases perfectly practicable, but the prices rapidly rose.

Since I joined the Sind Irregular Horse, 1,100

assamees have been presented free to the men of the corps, each man on receiving his assamee paying Rs. 20 donation to the regimental fund. At the time of raising my second regiment, when 800 places were given to the silidars, of course there was little or no selling of assamees, but soon afterwards they were sold for Rs. 600 to Rs. 700. This is the price which they still fetch, and appears to be the rate to which they have settled down.

With regard to the prices thus obtaining, it should be borne in mind that, under the system in force in the Sind Irregular Horse, the price of an assamee must be wholly regulated by the pecuniary means of the poorer members of the corps, no one not in the regiment, and no silidar holding three or more horses, being allowed to purchase. As the silidar assamees had long been considered as hereditary property, and had been sold as parts of the estates of deceased men, I did not think it advisable suddenly to disturb the arrangement, especially while, before the augmentation of the corps, so large a proportion of the assamees had been purchased.

But I am disposed to think that it would have been better had I done so at once; and that in a corps untrammelled by old customs, assamees should be vacated by the death of the silidar: at the same time, if the deceased silidars left sons or brothers in the regiment, being eligible persons, it would be well always, as a favour, to transfer the assamees of the deceased to them.

In all these things, consideration for the good of the service should be paramount.

But experience convinces me that the permitting property in, and the sale of, assamees, is necessary to the well-being of a silidar corps. It gives the greatest security for the good conduct of the men, who are not likely to misbehave when they have embarked their whole property in the service.

The right of property in the assamees gives a tone to the whole structure of a silidar corps, without which its greatest strength would be wanting. It is this which makes the best soldiers in India attach themselves to the service, till they look on their regiment as their country, and their place in it as their estate.

It should be fully understood that it is assumed that Government does not recognise the right of property in the assamees any further than a private regimental arrangement, and that all purchases of assamees are made with a full knowledge of the fact that if the corps be disbanded to-morrow the silidars have no claim on the State on account of any such purchases.

Unless on a greatly increased rate of pay, it would not, I am of opinion, be practicable to raise a regiment, in which the silidar had to commence by the purchase of his assamee,—that is, if the purchase-money amounted to anything like the value which the assamee would be worth soon after the complete formation of the corps.

But the principles of political economy are as true, as regards the sale of assamees, as of other things; and if the new assamees were sold for what they would fetch, as in the Sind Irregular Horse, their real value would at once be apparent.

With an entirely new corps for general service, the value of the *assamees* would at first, in my opinion, be almost nominal.

I have not the smallest doubt but that the best proceeding on raising a regiment would be to give the *assamees* to the *sildars* free, and if they were afterwards allowed to sell them, it would be by favour and permission of the commanding officer.

Even supposing that it were possible, which I do not believe it would be, to get respectable *sildars* to pay a round sum for their *assamees* on the first raising of a corps, and that the money so paid was to be applied to the formation of a fund, I have a strong opinion that the arrangement would be absolutely ruinous to the regiment.

It would, in fact, be re-introducing the state of affairs which was found so injurious in the Sind Irregular Horse, and which was in that corps remedied with so much labour.

Such a proceeding would tend to destroy the self-dependence which constitutes the *sildar's* peculiar strength.

The less Government interferes with him the better: he should receive his pay, and be left to make his arrangements for performing his part of the contract, being compelled always to have man, horse, arms, &c. complete and ready for service; no assistance being given, and no excuse accepted.

On the whole, I have not the least doubt, after nine years' constant attention to the subject, but that the best system of *sildar* arrangements is, that Government should not recognise the sale of *assamees* at all;

but that their sale should be permitted, at the discretion of commanding officers, as a private arrangement between the men of the regiment. That such sales should be *bonâ fide*, for ready money only; and that only members of the corps should be allowed to purchase or to hold assamees in the corps.

I am of opinion that it would have been much better if Government had never recognised even the distinction between bargheer and silidar; and if it were to refuse to do so now, a silidar corps should be mustered and paid as so many sowars, &c.; the horse being considered as part of the man, and commanding officers being held strictly responsible that everything be kept in an efficient state; all details being left to them to manage as they can.

It is undoubtedly possible that, under a different system, with less left to the regiment, and more established by general rule and regulation, no silidar corps would ever be in a very bad condition; but it is certain that such a system would reduce all to a decent mediocrity; the genius of the service would be changed, and a tame and listless spirit everywhere take the place of emulation and zeal, of attachment to, and pride in the service.

I have seen a good deal of silidar cavalry under each of these conditions; and the opinions above expressed are founded as much on actual observation as on reflection.

It will be perceived that all I have written above refers solely to a silidar regiment, considered as a body of cavalry soldiers for general service in any part of the world.—(1850.)

Memorandum No. II.

The subject of the pay, &c. of the Sind Irregular Horse is a very difficult and a very delicate one for me, so deeply interested as my feelings are in it, to write on, so as, on the one hand, to do it justice and set its merits fairly forth, and, on the other hand, to avoid the appearance of presumption and undue personal bias.

The truth is, that the Sind Irregular Horse is not now an irregular corps at all, and cannot be fairly judged of if confounded with really irregular corps. The whole daily routine of duty in the Sind Horse is carried on with quite as much steady regularity, and in just as good style, as I have ever known in the best regiments of regular native cavalry. The only resemblance, as far as I can understand, which exists between the Sind Irregular Horse and the other regiments of irregular cavalry of the Indian army, inclusive of the Nizam's service, is that all are *sildar* corps. In everything else, the Sind Horse essentially differs from them all. The Sind Irregular Horse stands alone, and it is a new service lately called into existence, and the capabilities of which are only now being gradually developed.

I was appointed to command one irregular regiment, and afterwards to raise another: I have made both regular. The corps has been formed and trained after a fashion entirely opposed to all formerly received opinions, to time-honoured prejudices, and to

reputed experience. Whether I have done right or wrong in so acting it is for my superiors to judge,—I have at least worked honestly and zealously, to the best of my judgment; and the result has been that the corps, man for man, even in its still infant state, carries far more military power with it, under all the various circumstances of war, than any irregular corps (more even than our “regular” native cavalry under most circumstances); and it appears certain, that had the Sind Irregular Horse been formed on the model of other corps of irregular cavalry, it could not possibly have performed the service it has done: disgraceful failure would, in all probability, have followed attempts to do with irregulars that which the Sind Horse has done with complete success.

The corps has been constructed so as to retain the activity, independence, and readiness of the best irregular cavalry, with the solid strength, certainty, and steadiness of action of the regulars. It is armed in a style very superior to any other cavalry in India, regular or irregular.

The present rate of pay would suffice well, probably, for a really irregular corps; but an irregular corps could not possibly have done the duty which has been successfully performed by the Sind Irregular Horse, and other troops must also have been employed. The pay allowed is not sufficient for regular sildar cavalry, and on it they cannot be what, with a more liberal scale of allowances, they might easily, and with true economy, be made.

It is true that the Sind Horse has hitherto done whatever duty has been required of it in a satisfactory

manner; but it must be borne in mind that the best and most influential of its native officers were formed in a different school, and entered the service during the Muratha war, under the attractions (to the uneducated native mind) of a perfectly irregular service, and on a scale of pay very far above that now allowed.

Many of these men, although all their prejudices, habits, and opinions were in favour of the irregular system, possess excellent sound common-sense, and are becoming gradually convinced of the superior advantages of a higher and stricter discipline, freedom from debt, more careful training, regular routine of duty, drill, &c., and seeing the success and honour to which these things led, they have entered heart and soul into the new order of things. Some of these native officers are men of good family and considerable landed property: being also excellent officers, their influence is invaluable in the regiment, and no number of European officers would make amends for the loss of it; but we may look in vain for a succession of such men on our present rate of pay in Sind. It is not to be expected that such men will leave their homes to serve at first as private soldiers, under a strict discipline, in a foreign country, on ten rupees a month.

My constant endeavour has been to make the Sind Horse fit for service in any part of the world; and, to the extent of the means allowed, these endeavours have possibly succeeded. But the corps could not have been efficient had it been organized on the system prevailing even in the best irregular cavalry of

India. We cannot allow one man (and he not always even in the regiment) to hold all the horses in a troop, squadron, or more, ridden by bargheers of his own choosing, and thereby induce men of birth, wealth, and influence, to connect themselves with the service; such a system may, and does, after a fashion, succeed with local corps serving at or near the men's native homes, but would be ruinous in a corps intended for general service; the regiment so constructed could not long exist in a foreign country and on rough service; and if called on so to serve permanently would assuredly fall to pieces, or rapidly deteriorate, the actual working soldiers not having sufficient interest in the service to induce them to submit to its inconvenience under such circumstances. The Sind Irregular Horse labours under many disadvantages when compared with the service in India. To enable the men to do the work required of them, it has been necessary to make the corps, with regard to drill, discipline, and, in fact, to all intents and purposes, regular cavalry; it is armed and accoutred in a very superior manner to any cavalry I have ever seen in India; its horses, also, though not equal to those of the regular cavalry, are very much superior to those of any corps of irregular cavalry with which I am acquainted. The service in Sind is not generally liked by the Indian soldier—in fact, it is much disliked by the class of men from whom the best cavalry soldiers in India are to be obtained; and our expenses are great: from all these causes combined, the raw material of the Sind Irregular Horse must at present be inferior to that of the irregular cavalry

serving in India. The men generally prefer ease and comfort, on seven rupees a month, in Bengal, to hard work, strict discipline, and bad, or at least disagreeable climate, on ten rupees a month, in Sind.

That we have hitherto succeeded so well as we have done is chiefly owing to the high character which we have been so fortunate as to obtain : in fact, this has been our greatest strength ; by reason of it we get a better class of recruits than would otherwise join our ranks ; and the men have willingly submitted to all kinds of inconveniences, losses, and hardships, for the sake of reputation, which they would not have done for the pay. But there is a limit to this, and that limit I think the Sind Horse has attained.

As an instance of the extraordinary expenses which service in this country entails on a silidar corps, I may mention the virulent epizootic disease which prevailed among the horses of both regiments of Sind Irregular Horse during the year 1847, and which has not yet entirely left us. This was brought by me to the notice of Government, not with the intention of applying for any compensation to the silidar, but that Government might know of the losses which the men's small pay had to cover. A return of horses which died of the disease above mentioned ("malignant epidemic catarrh"), was appended to the report, the average price paid for horses in the Sind Horse being about Rs. 200 each. The loss and injury to the regiment by reason of this unprecedented mortality among the horses have been very great, and to an extent which could hardly have been contemplated by

Government when fixing the scale of pay to the men ; but I did not wish to apply for compensation for such losses, because it appears to me that the system of granting compensation, pensions, or any extra allowances whatever, to silidar corps under any circumstances is bad, and that it would be far the best economy for the State to consider all these things fairly in the regular monthly pay allowed, and to leave the regiment to arrange all details itself, the commandant being responsible to Government, and the men to the commandant, that perfect efficiency be always maintained. Our present rate of pay is not sufficient to enable the men to mount themselves as they ought to be mounted, or to meet extraordinary losses fairly, and the service must suffer injury accordingly.

It should be borne in mind that up to a certain amount every additional rupee allowed is attended with an increase of strength and efficiency in far greater proportion than the increase of pay. There is no analogy in this respect between silidar corps and the rest of the army, for the "regular" troops being mounted, armed, clothed, &c., &c., &c., by the State, the amount of pay which the men receive has no influence whatever on the state of a regiment in all these essentials ; but it is all in all to the silidar, who provides everything for himself. In this, as in everything else, it is true economy to pay a good price for a good article, instead of aiming at cheapness, without sufficient regard to quality : the sum paid in the latter case is too often absolutely thrown away, while in the former full value is received for every pice expended.

If Government were to raise our pay, for each sowar and his horse, to Rs. 45, instead of Rs. 30 monthly, with proportionate increase to the superior ranks, a regular silidar cavalry would speedily be formed very far superior to any native cavalry now existing in the East, in every respect, yet costing the State in time of peace less than two-thirds, and in time of war less than one-third of the cost of the present regular cavalry of the Bombay army. No compensation, commissariat charges, pensions, nor any extra allowance whatever, would be required under any circumstances, with the single exception that, should the regiment be ordered to proceed on service to Europe, to Egypt, or elsewhere beyond sea, passage for man, horse, followers, and baggage cattle, would be supplied by the State. Such a cavalry would be available for service in any part of the world—it would go anywhere and do anything. Wherever there was purchase in money, it would subsist without any aid but its regular monthly pay; and it would carry with it the greatest military power at the smallest possible cost to the State.

Memorandum, No. III.

It would be of very great advantage to the corps were there more native officers allowed to each regiment, viz :—

- 1 Russaldar major, at 300 rupees per month.
- 1 Native quartermaster, at 75 rupees per month.
- 1 Kote duffedar major at . . 55 rupees per month.

The above “effective;” also the undermentioned
“non-effective :”—

1 Farrier major, staff pay,	25 rupees per month.
16 Farriers	5 rupees each per month.

The nakeeb to be abolished. It would also be a great improvement to abolish the wukeels now allowed, and to give, in their places, an effective pay duffedar to each troop, on a salary of Rs. 45 a month.

The above will, I trust, suffice to bring the question of pay to the Sind Irregular Horse fairly before Government; but whatever may be its decision on that point, I trust that the designation of the corps may be changed, as recommended (after closely examining us) by Colonel the Honorable Sir H Dundas, C.B., commanding the troops in Sind.

It would be conferring a very high honour on the corps to order it to be styled "Silidar Light Cavalry" instead of "Irregular Horse;" it would be an honour deeply and gratefully felt by every man and officer in the corps; it would be a reward for past services, and a stimulus to future exertion on the part of us all: lastly, I hope I may be allowed to say, with honest pride, but without presumption, that it would be an honour which we have fairly earned, and a favour which we may reasonably hope for from a Government ever ready to acknowledge the zealous services of its faithful though humble servants.* * *

An adequate establishment must exist, in some form or other, whether paid for and recognised by Government or not, in every disciplined regiment, whether called irregular or otherwise.

If this establishment do not exist in the irregular cavalry of —, the consequence necessarily follows

that there is a corresponding defect in their discipline.

When the —— irregular cavalry were stationed on this very frontier, now guarded by the Sind Irregular Horse, the whole country exhibited one scene of violence and bloodshed—of fear and disorder. There was no peace anywhere on the border, save where there was a void, desert waste.

The soldiers of the State—the irregular cavalry—were only seen shut up in forts, or flying from the enemy, on the one hand, or destroying their friends—the unresisting peasantry of the country—on the other.

The notorious state of the frontier detachments, and the general orders by the Governor of Sind of the 23rd June and 4th July 1844, afford full proof of the former position. The latter is sufficiently shown by the pensions which Government is paying to some fifty or sixty of the survivors of those wretched people, who recovered from the wounds they received from the hands of the troops who should have protected them.

The brigade at Shikarpoor was kept constantly on the alert, and, as I was informed by the general officer in command, was in continual expectation of being attacked by the mountain robbers, who invaded the country at their pleasure. On the contrary, what was the state of affairs on the same frontier when guarded by the Sind Irregular Horse in the year 1842, during the awfully trying period of the Cabool disasters?—and what has been the state of affairs on this frontier since the Sind Irregular Horse again became the border force in January, 1847?

On the former occasion the poor people of the country looked on the men of the Sind Irregular Horse as their friends and protectors, and aided them in every way in their power. There were many sharp encounters with the enemy, in which the men of the Sind Irregular Horse were invariably successful; and the general result of the proceedings was acknowledged by the Political Agent in Sind and Beloochistan.

On the second occasion the results of similar conduct have been even more valuable: plunder, rapine, and disorder, which existed to a fearful extent wherever there were inhabitants along this frontier, have entirely ceased; hostile inroads into the British territory, formerly so common and so formidable, are entirely unknown; peace, quiet, industry, and plenty, with full protection for life and property, everywhere prevail; towns, villages, and green fields are gradually taking the place of a frightful wilderness.

The people, who are fast returning to the country, are contented and happy, well-disposed towards, and confident in the Government. The change produced for the better is so great as to be almost incredible by those who have not seen it. It has been produced by nothing but the discipline of the Sind Irregular Horse. To produce and maintain this discipline has been my constant study and unceasing labour, since Government did me the honour to entrust me with the command of the corps in the year 1841.

I have never been absent a day from my duty; I have never swerved from my purpose for one moment; but have endeavoured, to the utmost of my ability, in

spite of all prejudices, to make the Sind Irregular Horse efficient for all manner of service in any part of the world, and against any enemy; to develop the powers of the native soldiers of India; to do justice to those powers, and render them fully available for the successful performance of any duty which might be entrusted to the men of the corps; to attach those men to the service and to the Government, by their pride in their profession, until their feelings and affections became warmly excited in favour of good order and military discipline, so that little coercion be necessary—for example, there has never yet been a court-martial in the Sind Irregular Horse. I have laboured at this task for ten years past. How far I have succeeded is known to the Commander-in-Chief and to the Government of Bombay.

Sir Charles Napier and Sir Willoughby Cotton have both recorded, in general orders, that I have brought the Sind Irregular Horse “to perfection.” It is certain that the words of the historian, Macaulay, are as truly applicable hitherto to the men of the Sind Irregular Horse as they are to the Ironsides of Cromwell, the earliest silidar corps on record. In the mountains and plains of Kutchee, in Sind, in the Desert, or in the Punjaub, the men of the Sind Irregular Horse, often surrounded with difficulties, sometimes contending against tenfold odds, not only have never failed to conquer, but have never failed to destroy and break in pieces whatever force was opposed to them.

They came, at length, to regard the day of battle as a day of certain triumph, and marched against

the most renowned soldiers of Asia with disdainful confidence. This spirit, which they have hitherto invariably shown, whether under personal command of their European or of their native officers, without a single European present, together with their orderly and regular conduct in quarters, has been produced by their discipline alone. This discipline is not dependent on one man—it has little or no reference to individuals; it depends on a regular and proper system being introduced and maintained in the corps.

As conducing towards the introduction and maintenance of such a discipline among our native troops, an adequate establishment is necessary. The duty cannot go on properly without it. I beg leave most respectfully to submit, that ten years' hard labour, unremitting study of, and close attention to, these matters, resulting in invariable success, whether myself present or not—and rewarded, I am proud to say, with high praise from all my superiors—entitle me to be heard on this subject: and will, I trust, be sufficient to acquit me of presumption in again urging my request that the slight alterations required to complete the establishment of the Sind Irregular Horse on a proper, sound, and soldier-like footing may be granted. You may rest assured that the State will be richly repaid for whatever extra expense may be caused by the grant of the establishment applied for, even if it be granted to all the irregular cavalry regiments in India.—(1851.)

CARRIAGE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE SIND IRREGULAR HORSE.

The following minute was penned by order of a general officer who had just then reviewed a regiment (800 sabres when complete) of the Sind Irregular Horse :—

“ The whole of the baggage was packed and laden on the reverse flank of the column, ready for a march, and everything was in that state of preparation, with only a day’s warning, that the whole body on parade, numbering 796 sabres, could have moved, on the sounding of the trumpet, in any direction where their services might be required.

“ The whole of these appointments, as well as the horse furniture, are perfectly uniform and complete, even to the small leather water-mussucks for the use of the men, carried under the belly of the horse, attached to the girths. In short, the marching order parade proved, what I had long heard, that the Sind Irregular Horse were ready and able to march at the shortest notice, complete in every respect, and quite independent of the people of the country, in respect of carriage. Nothing can, I conceive, be more soldier-like and complete than the marching order of the Sind Irregular Horse.”

General (then Major) Jacob being called on to report the description and quantity of baggage and animals required by each regiment, submitted as follows :—

“ Reason and experience have convinced me that the very best, or rather the only good, check on

excess of baggage, is compelling officers and soldiers at all times, and in all places, to be provided with carriage; their means being limited, they cannot carry too much.

"It is only necessary to insist on a sufficiency of baggage animals being maintained by each and all, and these animals being private property, the men never injure them by overloading or ill-treatment.

"No wheel-carriages are ever allowed in the Sind Irregular Horse; in other respects, no restriction is placed on the nature of carriage. The soldiers keep camels, ponies, or mules, as they please.

"No carriage is ever allowed to be *hired*, under any circumstances. All men are made to keep their own baggage animals.

"These rules are enforced by heavy fines on those who break them; but for many years past everything in the Irregular Horse has worked perfectly smooth, and the last instance of a soldier having been fined for being unprovided with proper carriage occurred more than five years ago, the offender on that occasion being an officer lately received from the regular cavalry.

"Carriage is always ready, sufficient in quantity and quality, to carry the men's bedding, cooking apparatus, tents for such as choose to carry them, and three days' food for man and horse, when necessary. No more preparation is required for a march of any distance than for a parade.

"The only delay beyond the time occupied in saddling and loading, is the few hours necessary for

bringing in the baggage animals from the jungle or country, where they go daily for forage.

"I have never found more than twelve hours' warning necessary to enable the whole corps of Sind Irregular Horse to commence a march of any length.

"For instance, in December, 1845, when General Simpson received orders to move a brigade from Hyderabad to Bhawulpoor with all possible despatch, I was in the act of mounting my horse for parade when the assistant quartermaster-general rode up and asked me from the General when I should be ready to march. I replied that we were always ready; and we actually did march the same day, reaching Roree with the whole regiment in perfect order, and fully equipped, before a man of the "regular" troops could be moved from Hyderabad (fifteen days after our departure), although they were aided by a "Baggage Corps," by the commissariat department, the collector, and the police authorities, while the Sind Irregular Horse was wholly independent of all external aid. * * *

- "The whole essence of the strength of the silidar system with reference to carriage, as to all else, consists in the men being made to provide for themselves in all respects, and the commanding officer being left to make his own rules and arrangements untrammelled by the forms and regulations of the regular army. Thus, the regiment is rendered at all times complete in itself, and independent of all other departments. * * *

"It should be borne in mind, that there is no fixed proportion established, and that the more carriage the men have in their possession, and the more baggage

they can carry, the more efficient is the regiment in the field, and the more independent of daily supplies from the country through which it may be marching.

“The syces, grass-cutters, &c., generally travel mounted on the baggage animals, which is a very great advantage ; and I have always found all to keep up with the regiment, even on long marches, such as forty miles a day.

“The success of these arrangements has been caused especially by the absence of any but regimental regulations, and by the absence of everything not found to be useful ; by the commanding officer being left to manage matters as he finds best, the men not being made to be mere machines, but intelligent *individuals*, not controlled by fear of punishment, but each one exerting himself to be at all times ready, able, and willing to do his duty as a soldier, and proud of being and appearing to be so.

“Our strength is not so much in our array as in the personal character and habits of the individuals, engendered by such a system as exists in the Sind Irregular Horse.

“The discipline is perfect, for all wish to obey and to do their best ; none look to higher authorities than the commander of the corps ; while the possession of full powers by the commanding officer almost prevents the necessity of ever using these powers, dismissal from the service being a severe punishment even to a private sowar.”—(1853.)

CAMP SUPPLIES AND BAGGAGE CORPS.

In the East it is generally a more difficult business to reach than to beat the enemy. And the success of an expedition often depends upon the management of your baggage animals and supplies. These, like all other marketable articles, follow the law of supply and demand, and the secret of collecting and maintaining a full commissariat lies in *attracting* all the resources of the country into your camp. This can only be done by publishing, by means of your agents, what you require, and by paying punctually, and in accordance with the free adjustment of the market, for what you purchase. Do this, and nothing can prevent your obtaining supplies so long as the country affords them ; no, not even the presence of the enemy in your neighbourhood. For in the East we have seldom to deal with a hostile population ; they are generally indifferent to either army. It is true that, as under such circumstances was found to be the case in Affghanistan, prices may temporarily remain exorbitantly high ; but in the long-run they will certainly adjust themselves, and the tendency is always in this direction. But every attempt to arrange by other means—above all, every attempt to regulate prices or to restrict the market—upsets supplies and induces scarcity. Nevertheless, the crowds of camp followers, baggage animals, and provisions, implied in the presence of a good camp bazar, have been matter of astonishment and horror to officers not experienced in eastern campaigning ; and attempts have been made to remedy the supposed evil by organizing baggage

corps, which, however, only create the evil they are supposed to remedy. I will give you an instance of such an attempt; in the Hill campaign of 1845, owing to the emptiness of the military chests, and the absence of proper commissariat arrangements, operations were suspended ere well begun. The failure was ascribed to the want of a baggage corps, and, with a view to preventing similar failures in future campaigns, the embodying of a Camel Baggage Corps was ordered by Government. The establishment of the corps was ultimately fixed at 1,000 privates and 1,000 camels.

About three hundred camels were required to move a regiment of native infantry, inclusive of tents, ammunition, and the private baggage of officers and men, but without any commissariat stores; and supposing but one-half of the European officers to be present, two hundred of these camels would be employed in the carriage of the private baggage of the officers and men. When the camels of the baggage corps were thus employed, they were paid for by the men using them, at the rate of ten rupees each camel per mensem.

The camels were attached to regiments, and paid for only during actual service, which, for the period of the existence of the corps, may have amounted on the average to one-fourth of the whole time.

The baggage corps existed from the middle of the year 1845 till the end of 1851, or six and a half years. Its total cost during that period amounted to Rs. 14,87,855 per thousand camels.

The total amount received during that period, as

the hire of 1,000 camels, from officers and men, amounts to Rs. 1,95,000.

The total loss to the State, therefore, on 1,000 camels of the corps, employed in carrying the private baggage of the troops, amounts to Rs. 12,92,855, or nearly thirteen lakhs of rupees, in excess of the cost of moving the troops under the old system, on this one item alone.

Again, as respects the camels of the baggage corps employed in carrying the tents, ammunition, and the public stores belonging to the troops.

The cost of 1,000 camels on the baggage corps system being, as before, Rs. 14,87,855.

The cost of hiring 1,000 camels by the commissariat department, when required for the movement of troops under the arrangement heretofore adopted in India, would amount during the same period to Rs. 12,000 per mensem, according to the usual rate of Rs. 12 per camel. This is the Bombay rate. That of Bengal, on service, is about Rs. 8. But these camels were accustomed to carry about double the loads allotted to those of the baggage corps. Their cost must, therefore, be reduced by one-half when compared to the others; they were also only engaged when required. Assuming this period to have been three months in the year, as before; and the total cost on the commissariat contract system of 1,000 camels during six and a half years, employed in carrying the public stores of the regiments, amounts to Rs. 1,17,000: total loss to the State on 1,000 camels so employed amounts to Rs. 13,70,855.

The men of the baggage corps were supposed to be

soldiers as well as camel-men; so that on the line of march, in camp, and while out grazing, no other baggage-guard would ever be required. This was generally, though not always, the case on ordinary marches, through a friendly country, where a guard was only required as a matter of form; but when treasure or other valuables had to be transported, and whatever the nature of the loads in the field in an enemy's country, it was always found necessary to employ the soldiers of the line in guarding the camels, &c., as usual. Thus no real advantage was, in practice, gained by the camel-men being considered as sepoy.

On the other hand, the attempt to make them soldiers seems to have spoiled them as camel-men; for while the common camels of the country could, without ever being fed on grain, with ease carry a load of 400 lbs. on the average, and the best of them very much more than this, the camels of the baggage corps could with difficulty carry the smallest weight allotted to them by the orders of the Governor of Sind, namely, 240 lbs. They also, from the ignorance and bad management of the sepoy camel-men, became so sickly, and died so fast, that anywhere but in a country abounding in camels the corps could not have existed for six months. But in such a country, the facilities of hiring camels in any numbers, when required, is so great, that a baggage corps becomes there more than usually unnecessary.

A baggage corps, as has been shown, is exceedingly advantageous to the private convenience and comfort of the officers and men: the boon granted by its use is about equal to the grant of double batta to the

troops while in the field ; but the amount paid by the State for this boon is, as shown by the figures set forth before, something more than seven times the amount by which the troops benefit by the arrangement. Moreover, as respects the facility of moving troops, the baggage corps could only be of use in a friendly country, abounding in supplies, inasmuch as, under any other circumstances, as large a commissariat establishment of cattle, &c., &c., must be entertained, as if the baggage corps did not exist, for the purpose of carrying food, &c., for man and beast ; nay, a *larger* commissariat establishment must be maintained by reason of the baggage corps, because the sepoy camel-men, &c., of that corps must be fed and provided for like the real soldiers of the army. Extra carriage must also be provided for the conveyance of the tents, ammunition, and the officers' and men's baggage of the baggage corps itself, or, which amounts to the same thing, these must be carried on the camels of the baggage corps, and the amount of available carriage for the rest of the army be lessened by so much.

Again, a baggage corps is evidently useless, even in a friendly country, for the transport of battering trains or other heavy stores : for this, recourse must be had to the old commissariat arrangements, or to something equivalent to them.

It appears, then, that a corps, on the model of the late Sind Camel Baggage Corps, could only be maintained in a country abounding in camels, in which these animals could be readily purchased or hired as wanted ; or evidently under circumstances wherein

such a corps must be very little required for the convenience of the troops, who could easily provide themselves with carriage without it.

Secondly.—That such a corps could only be maintained at a cost, out of all reasonable proportion, greater than the value of the benefits accruing from it.

Thirdly.—That under those circumstances wherein alone it becomes a matter of any real difficulty to move troops in India and the countries bordering on it, viz. when it becomes necessary to carry all the supplies for the use of the troops with the moving army itself, such a baggage corps becomes entirely useless, being unable to carry a month's supply of food even for itself. Under the old commissariat arrangements, there was never more than one driver to five camels, each camel carrying about 5 cwt. The camel corps had more than a man to each camel, and that camel carried 240 lbs.

Fourthly.—When the army is serving in an enemy's country, and it consequently becomes of the greatest advantage to reduce the "*impedimenta*" as much as possible, a baggage corps, on the model of that lately disbanded, &c. tends only to increase, instead of to diminish, the necessary train. An officer, even of ability, and though experienced in the armies of Europe, may well be excused for at first sight becoming alarmed at the train found necessary for moving troops in time of war in the East, and being dismayed at all the danger and disorder which apparently must accompany such a crowd of animals and followers; but it is soon perceived that the greatest evil in the matter exists in imagination and inexperience,

and that the real difficulties have long ago been mastered, and the whole affair reduced to systematic rule by those to whom the subject is familiar.

The arrangements for supplying armies in the field in India, and conducting the enormous trains of beasts of burden which accompany them, have been brought to the greatest perfection by the commissariat department of Bengal. The details of the arrangements are well known to most old Indian officers who have served much in an enemy's country; the general results are familiar to all officers of local experience in India; and when these arrangements are properly understood by a general, they enable him to reduce to sufficient form, order, and regularity, that which at first appears an interminable, incongruous, and riotous mass of confusion. It is not, perhaps, necessary here to enter into the details of the gigantic arrangements of the Indian commissariat department. But it has been acknowledged as an axiom by the greatest generals who ever led armies in India, that the safety of an army, or the success of a campaign, depends at least as much on the state of the "bazar" of the army as on the goodness of the troops. The remarks of the Duke of Wellington on Colonel Monson's disastrous retreat are very instructive on this point. The Duke shows clearly that the whole of that serious misfortune was caused by the inefficiency of the Colonel's bazar and commissariat arrangements; and states, that he himself made it a point always to have in his camp a month's provisions for his whole force. The multitude of traders of all sorts, and the immense train of baggage animals, which this implies,

and which the Duke justly considered as essentially necessary to his safety and success, might have been considered by an inexperienced officer as ruinous to the army ; but few would probably have had the boldness to propose, as a remedy for the apparent evil, an arrangement by which the number of men to be fed would be greatly multiplied, and the means of transport greatly diminished. Yet such was the scheme not only proposed, but attempted to be carried into effect, under the title of the Sind Camel Baggage Corps, to the amazement of all Indian officers of experience, and to the great delight of thoughtless young subalterns.

The experiment of the Camel Baggage Corps cost the revenue of India £159,000 sterling; yet, notwithstanding the enormous outlay lavished on it, and quite irrespective of the inadequacy of the return to the amount of capital expended, it proved a complete failure. It was at once discovered that it was impossible to carry into full effect the original scheme; and, to move troops on real service, as many extra camels had to be provided as if the camel corps had not existed. The attempt to transport the stores and provisions of an army by any such arrangement as that of the baggage corps was at once, in effect, abandoned, and the baggage corps camels were employed solely in conveyance of the tents, muskets, and ammunition in charge of regiments, and of the private baggage of the officers and men. For the carriage of the latter, it had been hitherto the custom for the officers and men to make their own arrangements, and to supply themselves as they could; so that the

baggage corps relieved them of considerable trouble and expense, and the scheme was in consequence considered, by the parties who profited by it, as excellent and praiseworthy.

This circumstance may go far to account for the astonishing fact of such a baggage corps having been continued in existence for six and a half years !

Having discussed the merits of this method of transporting the private baggage and tents of an army, let us now see if our Indian experience will enable us to propose a better plan.

First, let us observe, that for the transport of provisions and stores, park guns, ammunition (other than that in regimental charge),—in short, for the carriage of at least nineteen-twentieths of the whole train accompanying an Indian army *in the field*, *nothing can be imagined more perfect than the system of the Bengal commissariat* as it appeared with the first army of Affghanistan, in 1839.

But still, however small a proportion it may be, as to the general train following an army in the field, the carriage of the regimental baggage, public and private, is, for many reasons, a matter of great importance.

Under the present system, the march of regiments is sometimes considerably delayed for want of such carriage ; while our officers and sepoy, having everything done and provided for them by others, become helpless, and unable to shift for themselves.

This is almost always the case with our regular army. But let us take a hint from the despised irregular, who marches at once when ordered, without troubling collector or commissary.

The scheme, then, proposed in the place of the awfully expensive baggage corps, is as follows :—

Let the plan of paying batta in the field be wholly abolished. Let officers and soldiers of the native army receive one rate of pay under all circumstances. Let there be no allowances. Let this rate of pay be sufficient fairly to meet actual wants, which can easily be calculated, and then insist on every officer and man being at all times, and in all places, provided with a proper description of carriage to enable all to move anywhere at once at a moment's warning. Let the quarter-master of each regiment have a contract for the carriage of tents, ammunition, &c., and hold commanding officers strictly responsible that everything is always kept in an efficient state for immediate service.

This is no fanciful scheme ; it is done to our hand ; in all good silidar corps it has been long proved on a large scale, and with admirable success.

The indirect benefits of such a system would be nearly as great as those more directly accruing from it.

The sepoys, instead of being pipeclayed automatons, would become comparatively clever and sensible men, able to provide themselves with whatever might be necessary, without giving the slightest annoyance to the people of the country, with whom they would necessarily take care to be on the best terms.

There would also be, in this system, the best possible check on men carrying too much baggage. A sepoy, who had to keep himself provided with proper carriage at his own expense, would very soon discover

what articles were necessary to be carried; and would assuredly carry none which were useless or superfluous.

The men might be a little awkward at first, from not being accustomed to such work, but would very soon master every difficulty.

If more leisure time were required for the proper performance of their new duties, abolish pipeclay, give the men black belts, and at least one hour more a day would be at their disposal. The ill effects of pipeclay, of leather stocks, of chacos, and of knapsacks for soldiers in India, are unspeakable; and the wisdom of using them in the army resembles that of a manufacturer who should tie up the limbs or disable the right arms of his artificers, in the hope of improving their handiwork.

THE MILITARY FUND.

Unquestionably the military fund has, by encouraging imprudent marriages, been attended with very ill consequences. The knowledge that, in the event of death, the widow and children will be provided for by this fund, has, more than any other cause perhaps, contributed to the uncommon spectacle of an army a large percentage of whose subaltern officers are married. Aware that in any event there will be the provision of this fund for the widow and children, the parents of the bride are less careful of requiring from the bridegroom those very qualities—thrift, energy, and power of general management—without possessing which no young soldier should take on himself the responsibilities of the marriage state. Again,

the youth himself, also trusting to the fund, rushes into marriage, without having previously cultivated, or even considered concerning those qualities, attention to which would, in the absence of any fund, have been forced on him before he either would or could have married. In short, under the operation of the military fund, the tendency is to cause precisely those to marry who neither should, nor, without the provision of the fund, could marry. And whatever good may, in individual cases, have resulted from this fund, I am not the less of opinion that it is in fact a joint stock company for the promotion of imprudent marriages.

FURLOUGH REGULATIONS.

Another subject of vital importance to India—not only to the army, but to all the services, and to the whole people of the country, natives as well as Europeans—is the furlough regulations.

The existing rules are not adapted to the present state of things; they belong to days long gone by, when a period of twelve months or more was necessary to receive from England an answer to a letter from Bombay.

Moreover, the present rules regarding leave of absence are excessively unfair in another respect. Their tendency in every way is to favour the least valuable servants of Government—those who are continually suffering from real or imaginary sickness, and on that account continually absent from their duty.

It is an undoubted physiological fact, that hard-working, energetic men, who continually exercise

themselves in bodily and mental occupation, suffer the least from ill health. They have no time to be sick. Authorities are agreed on this point. For example, Copland (Med. Dict. page 562) says :—

“ When the mental energies are depressed by grief, anxiety, disappointment, fear, &c., the powers of life are less able to oppose the debilitating causes of disease which invade them from without, and of which nature all the exciting causes of fevers, particularly those which, as specific or contagious and miasmatic, generally partake in a most marked manner. On the other hand, when the mind is elevated by success, by hope, by confidence, and the other exciting passions, the depressing causes make little or no impression upon the constitution, and individuals thus circumstanced almost always escape from diseases which readily invade the fearful, the dejected, and the disappointed.”

Again, Copland (Med. Dict. page 920, para. 118) :—“ Confidence, continued mental occupation, and moderate excitement are especially efficacious in resisting the causes of most fevers.

“ There is a moral courage sometimes possessed by persons, the weakest perhaps in respect of physical power, that enables them to resist infectious and epidemic influences more successfully than the most robust, who are not thus mentally endowed.”

On the other hand, it is certain that a large portion of the sickness which causes so many officers to be absent from their duty in India is produced by feebleness of character, by idleness, laziness, listlessness, or languor.

Now, I would not for a moment wish to lessen the indulgences granted by a beneficent Government to such of its faithful servants as might have the misfortune to be suffering from ill health. I would leave the rules regarding leave of absence on sick certificate as they are; but, assuredly, I would so order matters that long-continued, honest, unremitting, and valuable labour should be deemed to constitute at least as good a title to the favour of a furlough to England as the want of health alone.

Moreover, if such furlough were *obtainable* at moderate intervals, and with greater facilities than at present, the number of sick certificates would assuredly be immensely decreased. It is probable that after a while they would *almost* wholly disappear.

The evil done, both to England and to India, by the present furlough regulations, is incalculable.

A large proportion of the Indian officers who can now return to England is composed of those worn out in the service, of the aged, the feeble, the sickly, the discontented, the idle, and the lazy; while the energetic, the active-minded, the able, the zealous, and the strong, are compelled, for the most part, to remain at their work in India without any intermission, without a day of real rest, until their failing vigour qualify them also for the indulgence of a visit to their native land.

In English society, by reason of this state of affairs, India is not fairly represented.

The real working men of India—the soldiers, the magistrates, the statesmen, all those men of clear heads, strong minds, and active habits, by whose

practised intelligence and honourable labours our Indian empire is held together—have little connection with, or influence on, the English public. They are very rarely seen in England.

From this cause it proceeds that, in the imagination of the people of England, the idea of an Indian officer, military or civil, is always connected with those of rice and curry and diseased livers.

From this cause chiefly results the deplorable ignorance regarding Indian affairs which prevails, even among educated gentlefolk, in England. How easily might all these evils be rectified !

Let us have recourse to a principle as old as the history of man—the institution of the Sabbath. This at once satisfies all our wants, and meets every difficulty in every single point ; while no objection whatever can be brought against it, save by those who would wish, if possible, still to retain a dark veil between India and England for their own supposed private advantage, but to the grievous injury of both countries.

My proposal is to give every officer, civil or military, every seventh year to himself, if he wished to avail himself of the indulgence ; to allow him, during that period, to go wherever it might please him to go, whether in India or any other part of the world ; to allow him, during that year, to receive HIS FULL INDIAN ALLOWANCES, to retain his staff appointment if he held one, but during his absence not to receive the staff salary, which should go to the officer who might officiate until his return. If an officer should wish to remain in India, even in the very camp in which he was serving, and there to enjoy his Sabbatical year, he

should be allowed to do so. The year should be his own, to employ as he pleased.

If an officer chose to allow his Sabbath to pass by, and to wait till he had served twelve years, he should be allowed two years' rest on furlough ; after eighteen years' uninterrupted work three years should be allowed, and so on.

The consequences of this arrangement would be great and numerous, and all of them good,—good for the Government, good for the people, and good for the services. The amount of vigour infused into Indian society by this means would be almost incredible. Hope, looking forward to the enjoyment of the Sabbath, would stimulate even the lazy and the idle to work hard during the six years of labour.

The continual return to England, and reflux into India, of the tide of Europeans, would be to the body, moral and politic, exactly what the circulation of the blood is to the animal body. England would be our lungs: the old blood would be there aërated, and new life, health, and strength thereby sent flowing vigorously to every corner and extremity of our empire. Energy and health would everywhere take the place of languor and disease.

The outcry for more Europeans would be at an end, for those now in the service would be found willing and able cheerfully to do well double the amount of work which is now thought to tax their powers too highly.

THERE WOULD BE A FAR MORE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMOLUMENTS OF STAFF APPOINTMENTS, BY REASON OF THE NUMBER OF OFFICIATING MEN. There would also

be a far greater number of men well acquainted with, and ready efficiently to perform, the duties of such appointments, to the great advantage of the service, which now often suffers from the inexperience of new incumbents.

Society in the two countries would become one, and all manner of blessings would indirectly follow.

Let any man of sound common-sense, and a tolerable knowledge of the subject, think over the matter, and he must be convinced at once of the truth of the conclusions set forth above.

The doctrine is founded on the laws of nature, and its truth will be the more apparent the more those laws are studied.

DAILY ORDERLY-ROOM TO BE HELD BY EVERY COMMANDING OFFICER.

The commanding officer of every regiment should, every day of his life, hold his orderly-room in some convenient public place, where the commanding officer, his staff, and all the European officers not otherwise engaged, should assemble. Here all regimental business should be transacted in public. Every man in the regiment should have an opportunity, every day, of seeing his commanding officer.

Everything being done with perfect openness, in the presence of all the English officers, many common sources of discontent and grievance, real or imaginary, would be removed. Every officer would be habitually well acquainted with everything relating to the regiment, and would be undergoing a course of

education calculated, better than any other, to fit him for command in his turn.

While the habitual daily presence of all the English officers around the commanding officer would afford him the best possible support in doing right, and impose the most effective check on wrong: a very ordinary mortal might, under such an arrangement, be safely trusted with absolute powers, while no officer's qualifications could ever be for a moment doubtful. Where everything is open to the public, common-sense has the fairest chance of prevailing, and "regulation" need be but little intruded.

Officers need be troubled, as little as possible with form, dress, ceremony, and matters of etiquette at their daily orderly-room; and the inconvenience of daily attendance would speedily be overcome by an increasing feeling of interest in all regimental affairs, and all irksomeness would be removed by the grant of leave of absence when required for any rational purpose.

The arrangement here contemplated appears to me to be of the very highest importance to the welfare of the native army of India; and I may observe that I have myself practised it with satisfactory effect during the past fifteen years.

The commanding officer of every regiment, native or European, should hold orderly-room every day of his life in some public place, hearing every man who has anything to say to him. Where is the objection to men being properly dressed on these occasions? Coming to the commanding officer at improper times, and in an improper manner, if permitted, gives rise

to backbiting, or the reputation of it. Everything should be open and public between the officers and men.—(1854.).

THE VICES OF THE SENIORITY SYSTEM IN THE NATIVE ARMY.

It is a fatal error to suppose that we are guilty of breach of faith in promoting according to merit, instead of according to seniority; for the sepoys, on enlistment, know and think nothing about their rights to promotion: they enlist to obey orders, and serve the State; and their notions of seniority are always acquired after they enter the service, under the influence of a vicious system. But the evident and unavoidable consequence of promoting according to the seniority system only is the paralysation and ultimate ruin of the army. Talent, skill, energy, high principle, and soldierlike pride fall crushed and powerless under its operation. Of what use is it for the zealous European officer to endeavour to instruct the native, and to make him really, and not in name only, a soldier? Of what use is it for the latter to endeavour to learn, when neither instruction, nor acquirement, nor merit of any kind, avail to advance the sepoy a single step? * * *

The fact is, that the native officers of the Bengal army have been purposely made powerless for evil or for good. Why, then, blame these poor old gentlemen? Make them really efficient, by promoting, not the oldest, but the most able and deserving men; make their advancement depend only on their merits,

as estimated by their regimental commander ; and you will have no mutinies. * * *

Where the native army is in a proper state, NOTHING will induce the sepoys to remedy a supposed grievance by force, nor even to represent it, except through their officers, to whom they entirely trust for protection. It is the seniority system (with other causes) which has ruined the discipline of the Bengal army, and destroyed mutual confidence between officers and men. The evil influence of this state of affairs in the larger body is, I fear, fast communicating itself to the Bombay army also.—(1854.)

* * * I plainly and deliberately assert, that any one who, wishing well to the native army of India, advocates promoting the native officers and non-commissioned officers of that army by seniority only, must undoubtedly be deplorably ignorant of the real merits of the matter.

My means of forming correct opinions on these matters have been stated in my paper on the native Indian army, and need not be here repeated.

I have been accused of asserting that it is right to place the brave old “sepoy at the caprice of prejudiced and ignorant commanding officers.” But I never asserted any such thing; but rather strongly advocated the having as commanding officers men *not* governed by caprice, ignorance, &c., and leaving the promotions to *them*: and I now assert that such is the only wise course of proceeding.

Men are often very good soldiers, having three or four medals on their breasts, &c., who are as unfit to be drillmasters as any old woman taken at haphazard

out of a village ; yet such men are recommended for promotion, if senior, rather than one really efficient.

It is difficult enough to find half a dozen really good drill-masters in any regiment ; but if they are to be chosen not by qualification but by seniority, it would be far better to have none at all.

The seniority system, so far from being just, is the greatest possible injustice to the really deserving men, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which sepoys and all other men really like best in their hearts. Let there be no favouritism ; but let the European officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the *best* men for promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained between them and their native soldiers.

My officers and myself have acted on these principles for twelve years with one regiment, and for eight years past with two regiments, with good effect, although I have but two European officers under me for each regiment. The whole corps of the Sind Irregular Horse is as if it had but one heart and mind ; any difference of feeling on common interest between the officers and men would be as unnatural as a quarrel between a man's hand and limbs.— (1854.)

FIXED HEAD-QUARTERS FOR REGIMENTS.

Our system of fixed regimental head-quarters, where all the families reside, affords an additional

and most powerful security for good conduct. It forms a very strong bond of attachment to the service, which no other corps possesses. It makes the commandant the patriarch of the regiment, as he should be. The success which has attended the introduction and maintenance, during many years, of this system, with the two regiments of Sind Irregular Horse, affords a safe ground for recommending its adoption on the proposed military reconstruction of our native army. Depend on it, that where this security is enforced, we may readily increase the numbers of our sepoys without risk of adding to those of the mutineers.—(1857.)

THE OBEDIENCE OF SOLDIERS NOT TO DEPEND ON THEIR OWN PLEASURE.

It has been said that Government can supply the places of the mutineers with Goorkas. This measure may be wise ; but it is not wise to allow the discipline and obedience of your soldiers to depend on *their* good will and pleasure ; and it is certain that the Goorkas would soon be as bad soldiers as the Hindoos of the Bengal army if treated in the same way. The Hindoostanee Mussulmans are the best materials for our soldiers *in proper hands*.—(1854.)

ON THE PURCHASE OF HORSES BY GOVERNMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

Understanding that it is in contemplation to purchase, in the valley of the Euphrates, a large number of horses for military service in India, I venture to submit a few remarks upon this subject, founded upon

a long and somewhat extensive experience of the horse market and cavalry requirements.

And it seems to me, that if Government sends its own agents to purchase horses, whether in Turkish Arabia or elsewhere, it would, by this direct and sudden interference with the usual channels of this trade, tend to lessen the supply passing through these channels, without causing an equivalent increase of supply through the extraordinary channel. The presence of the Government agents in the horse-breeding districts would, of course, disturb and injure the market for horses at Bombay and other places. The prices of horses would immediately be raised in the districts themselves. And experience proves, that the employment of Government agency in businesses of this description is almost invariably attended with so much difficulty and delay, as would render the purchase of the horses useless in so far as immediate service in India is concerned.

Again, in respect of cost: horses of a size and description inferior to those of the class of horse now purchased in Bombay for Indian cavalry could not be obtained in the breeding districts, and in any considerable number, at a less average price than 35*l.* each; a rate, which, by the time the horses should reach Bombay by means of the proverbially costly agency of Government, would most assuredly increase to the present remount price in Bombay of 50*l.* So that the general result of Government's direct appearance in the market would in this, as in all other markets, be to disturb the common market, to lessen and delay the total supply, and to enhance prices.

I would suggest, then, that the best plan Government could adopt for purchasing horses would be to inform the horse merchants at Bombay, Kurrachee, and elsewhere, that Government is prepared to purchase an extraordinary large number of horses at the present remount prices ; and that if the required number cannot be collected of the present standard height, Government will accept horses something—say an inch—below this standard, at the same rates ; or horses of a yet lower standard, at reduced rates.

The standard of the first class of horses would then be 14 hands 1 inch, instead of, as at present, 14 hands 2 inches ; and the standard of the second class might be fixed at 14 hands. These sizes may seem very small, but it is certain that some of the best Arab horses, able to carry any weight, and equal to any service, are no larger : and that horses of these sizes, if well-shaped and well-bred, are better fitted for hard work as cavalry horses in the field than are the tall country and stud-bred horses.

Remount agencies, with the requisite establishments, might be stationed at convenient points, for the purpose of purchasing from the dealers, in accordance with the above suggestion ; and I am persuaded that in this manner, while Government avoided disordering, and confined itself to healthily stimulating the market, it would at the same time be preserved from all risks of bidding against itself in different markets, and would obtain, ready for immediate service, as large a supply of really serviceable horses as the countries whence they are drawn can supply.—(1857.)

STUD-BRED HORSES.

There is no doubt but that the stud-bred horse of India is the worst of all. But had the physiology of horse-breeding been understood and attended to, this horse would probably by this time have been the best of all on earth.

Having recourse to English horses at all for breeding purposes in India was a grave error.

The English horse was formed from the Eastern horse, and having become peculiarly well adapted to the climate, &c. of England, to bring him back to the East again was to undo all that the English breeders had been doing for centuries. Arab horses should alone have been used to breed from after the first start, which must necessarily have been made with a sufficient number of mares, the best procurable of any breed, as Arab mares are not obtainable.

The qualities of individuals should have been carefully and scientifically studied before bringing them together. On this depends the whole success of the scheme. To ensure a good produce, it is by no means sufficient to put a good dam to a good sire. The excellencies of each may be great, but may be neutralized in the produce by *similar* defects in each.

Both parents may be generally good, but may possess peculiarities, which if exaggerated in the produce, would render it useless. Many breeders suppose that a sire and dam, being both winners of races, ought to produce winners; but their *excellencies*, though *great*, may be *unlike*, and their *defects*, though small, may be *alike*; in which case it is next

to certain that in the produce the excellencies will have disappeared, and the defects be enormously increased. Were all stallions of other breeds now in the studs at once sold off, and none but the best Arabs used to breed from, in future, no mare or horse of any other breed being hereafter admitted, Government might reasonably expect in twenty years' time to possess the finest breed of horses in the world — so quiet and docile that they might be used entire, without any of the evils now complained of. But the physiology of the business and individual incongruity must in every case, and with every breed, be most carefully attended to, or the result will be a failure. A stallion originally vicious should never be employed. One becoming so should immediately be removed from the stud. Really good Arabs are never vicious.

As to the Cabool and Affghan horse generally, he is a fine large horse to look at, but his real powers are contemptible. He is in reality the worst horse out of all the breeds in the East. The first horses to fail in any fast work in the hot weather are *always* the Cabooles. In fact, as riding horses, they are as bad as can be, though they answer well for draught.

The Arab horse is *unapproachable* in excellence, for military and general purposes, by any other breed on earth.

A good Arab will *fly* with fifteen stone on his back. He will thrive on any fare, never loses his temper, is bold, gentle, docile, and enduring — while he has almost as much sense and reason as some men.

Next to the Arab in the East ranks the Persian.

The best *country* horses with us are those of Katty-

war, Kutch, and the valley of the Bheema. These three breeds are excellent. Then follow next in merit the horses of the Thurr and Guzerat; then those of Kutchee and Khelat; then Punjaubees, Kandaharees, and Cabooles; and, last of all, the Bengal-stud breed. The Toorkaman horse is *excellent*, but a real Toorkaman is never procurable in the market.

THE MILITARY BOARD AND AUDIT DEPARTMENT.

These are hindrances to the conduct of public business. Ruinous delay and prolonged correspondence are the attributes of the Board; while the system of audit trammels honest men without checking rogues. A dishonest servant, by conforming to the forms of the audit department, can cause a false account to be passed; while an honest servant is so hampered by the forms, that it is with great difficulty, and after long delay only, that he can obtain payment for his just expenditure.

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS.

MILITARY RULES ON HIGH CASTE MEN.

It is a positive fact that when a proper discipline and a proper soldierly pride exist, the men of high caste give less trouble about their castes than the low-caste men. The cry about caste among the sepoys of Bengal has no real connection with their religion; it is maintained as good policy, to enable them to keep power in their own hands. But doubtless the best materials for soldiers in India are the Hindoostan Mussulmans, who are highly-civilised beings, with no castes at all.—(1854.)

SEPOY MUTINEERS AND THEIR OFFICERS.

I deny the possibility of the sepoys mutinying while their English officers are alive *and do their duty*. Men are *not* suddenly most vicious, and would never mutiny for trifles, when they know that the FIRST STEP must be that which *they* know and feel, even among themselves, to be a detestable crime—the murder of their officers. Let the officers have calmly made up their minds to be obeyed or be killed, and there would be little disobedience. To show they were in earnest, let the first man guilty of open mutiny be shot on the spot by his commanding officer, and the thing would spread no further: let there be no talking or reasoning with the offenders on such occasions.

It is not that officers want the determination necessary to carry out this course successfully, but such proceedings are *not the fashion* at present, and the officers feel doubtful of support at head quarters. Yet what is here advocated is undoubtedly wholesome, good, and merciful.—(1854.)

POWERS OF COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND CANDIDATES FOR ENLISTMENT.

Let commanding officers have power to dismiss and to promote, and Government might enlist a million of excellent men in India in a day, in spite of any impertinent opposition on the part of Brahmins, &c.

If the commanding officers had more power, and were left to make their own arrangements with their corps, there would always be with each regiment a good body of “oomedwars” (candidates for enlistment) ready instantly to take the place of any discharged men.

There are generally fifty or more of these “oomedwars” with the Sind Irregular Horse, so that they have always the pick of good, seasoned, and half-trained men, eager to serve.—(1854.)

PRIZE PROPERTY.

I loudly and frequently uttered my opinion that no conquest gave any right over the private personal property of individuals, much less over that of women and children: and that, be the right what it might, it was a shame to strip ladies of their dresses and furniture.

FORTIFICATIONS.

Peshawur is one of the very few places where I would build a fortress. But, in general, we want no fortifications: to be reduced to defend ourselves is tantamount to defeat in India. We must assume the superiority, be worthy of it, and keep it.—(1854.)

FLANK COMPANIES AND SIZING.

All flank companies are bad in principle. So also is all “sizing.” The companies should all be alike, and all able to act in any part of the line in which they may find themselves.—(1854.)

QUALIFICATION OF STAFF OFFICERS.

The work of most staff appointments requires superior qualifications, and involves superior responsibilities to those belonging to the command of a company of sepoys.

If higher qualifications be required, you must pay for them, or you will not get them. You cannot buy good steel at the price of iron.

The error is in employing such numbers of costly Europeans in command of native companies, whose duties would be just as well or better performed by native officers properly chosen, and formed in a good school.—(1854.)

NIGHT ATTACK BY SHERE MAHOMED.

In June, 1843, Shere Mahomed, with some ten thousand men, attempted to surprise my camp; but I attacked him with eight hundred native soldiers of all

arms, on his line of march ; totally defeated and dispersed his army ; and took all his artillery.—(1854.)

THE SEPOY'S MUSKET.

The sepoy's musket is too light for the ball, or the ball is too heavy for the musket. Call it what you will, the recoil is more than the sepoy can properly bear.—(1854.)

HORSE FAIRS.

These fairs appear to be silly things ; their day is gone by. They were useful once, in order that the traders might have that safety for goods and person in congregated numbers which they had not singly ; but at present, it seems to me that if we make roads, abolish dues, and generally clear away obstacles, we do all that Government should do. The trade in horses, like all other trades, will then best develope itself. But if we interfere by proclaiming a particular day for congregating horse-dealers, we tend to spread abroad the impression that the fair is a Government matter ; and the particularization of one day leads the distant Hill men to infer that the other days of the year are not equally open to them. It is argued that our proclamations do not have this effect ; if so, what is the use of issuing them ? If they have the effect, then Government appears authoritatively to interfere in the market, oversteps its proper limits, and does harm. There is, of course, no objection to Government preparing serais, for the reception of travellers, and facilitation of intercommunication ; to do this is, in fact, to remove an obstacle to transit.

CAVALRY SWORDS.

It is no mistake to arm cavalry sepoy with good *cutting* swords of one uniform pattern. The English sword—not the Government regulation iron, but a weapon made in England, of good steel, and of proper shape—is infinitely better than any Eastern blade. All the native soldiers prefer it, and even my wild Beloochees are all begging to be allowed to buy these swords at any price. The things cut of themselves, however unskilfully handled.

The steel scabbard is best, *if* it have a complete wooden scabbard inside it,—a construction, however, which I have never yet been able to persuade any English maker to adopt or to understand. They always leave the wood open, or imperfectly closed at the edge, where it is wanted most, and put a lot of screws and iron springs about the mouth of the scabbard, which totally defeat the object of the wooden lining. The scabbards of the Sind Horse are of wood and leather, made as strong as may be ; but still they wear out too fast, and break too often to please me. My own swords have metal scabbards, made large purposely, and lined with complete wooden scabbards, in this country, the bell-mouth being formed of wood. These scabbards are best of all.

Great mistakes exist regarding the respective powers of the edges and points of swords. On foot, or when moving slowly, it is unnecessary to argue in favour of the point of the fencer—its superiority is evident to all. But on horseback, *the speed of the horse prevents the swordsman from drawing back his*

arm with sufficient rapidity after a homethrust. So that if going at speed, as every cavalry man ought to be in attacking, his sword, after passing through his enemy, is very liable to be knocked out of his hand, the weapon running up to the hilt, and then, of course, violently stopping. This has occurred to myself, when I should have been disarmed had not the sword been buckled to my wrist with a very strong leather strap. The same thing must have occurred to others. Such a tremendous twist, too, will certainly break any but a very first-rate blade, and is not a fair trial for a good sword. Wherefore, for cavalry soldiers, curved cutting blades are best. Straight swords will not cut, save in skilful hands; curved blades cut fearfully, with very little or no skill on the part of the soldier. —(1854.)

THE POINT AND CUT.

Experience in real fight shows that, for horse soldiers, the cut is far more deadly and effective in every way than the point of the sword.

The straight sword, and the use of its point, are far more formidable than the cutting sword in the hands of men on foot, and I was myself strongly prejudiced in their favour for use on horseback also, until many trials in the field quite convinced me of the contrary.

On horseback, when moving at a rapid pace, as the cavalry soldier ought always to be in attacking, the arm, after a home-thrust, cannot be drawn back sufficiently quickly; the speed of the horse carries all forward with great velocity, and the blade runs up to the hilt, or breaks, before it can be withdrawn.

I have had my own sword forcibly struck from my hand in this manner, the hilt striking with the greatest violence against a man's breast after the blade had passed through his body. The blade happened to be very good and strong, and the hilt was attached to my wrist by a stout leather strap: neither gave way; but, as the horse passed on at speed, the body of the tall heavy man who had assailed me was turned completely round and over by the blade of the sword in it, before the weapon could free itself.

The violence of the shock, and the concurrent circumstances, attending this and hundreds of other somewhat similar circumstances, perfectly convince me that on such occasions the chances are ten to one that the sword will break or the cavalry soldier be torn from his seat; or both these accidents may occur.

I have for long past had not a doubt but that the cutting sword is by far the most formidable weapon for the hands of the cavalry soldier.

The old curved dragoon sabre is about its best form: these blades, made of the best English cast steel, mounted with steel basket-hilts, with the scabbards lined with a complete *scabbard of wood*, appear to me to be the most perfect weapons possible.

The native soldiers much prefer them to any eastern blade whatever, and I can imagine nothing more effective.

I have never used any sword exercise with the men of the Sind Irregular Horse, thinking that it is not required; but I have myself witnessed very many instances of the terrible power of their cutting weapons, and those of the enemy.

Two remarkable instances occur to me, which it may be well to mention.

At the battle of Meanee, a well mounted Belooch warrior was flourishing his sword, and challenging all comers. A sowar of the Sind Irregular Horse rode at him at speed, and in an instant cut the man's head off at one blow. In the same battle, a sowar of the Sind Irregular Horse, riding hard at the man opposed to him,—a stout, able-bodied Belooch on foot, armed with sword and shield,—the latter was knocked violently down by the horse's shoulder; but as he lay on his back on the ground, the Belooch warrior struck upwards so violent a blow with his heavy curved blade, that the sword cut completely through both branches of the under jaw of the sowar's horse; and the front part of the animal's lower jaw, with all its incisor teeth, remained hanging by a piece of skin only.

The force of this blow appeared to me so extraordinary, that I for long preserved the skull of the horse on which it took effect.

In my opinion, it would be of very great advantage to replace the straight swords at present in use by the broad curved cutting blade, like those now used by the Sind Irregular Horse.—(1854.)

CLOTH PANTALOONS *versus* LEATHER BREECHES FOR MOUNTED MEN.

The cloth *pantaloons* are out of all proportion superior to the leathers. The soldier always covers them or the seat over with leather, which gives them the advantage of leather breeches without their incon-

veniences. The long trowsers are, however, bad. Cloth pantaloons and jack-boots should be worn by all mounted men.—(1854.)

HORSE ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY CHARGES.

The closer the horse artillery can accompany the cavalry the better.—(1854.)

GOOD TOOLS DO NOT MAKE BAD WORKMEN.

The possessing superior weapons does not tend to keep strong and brave men from closing with their foes. The bowmen who won the fields of Cressy, Poitiers, Agincourt, and Flodden—did they fear to close because they had the power to strike at a distance, and did actually destroy the enemy's men-at-arms afar off, in spite of plate and mail, hauberk and helmet? Nothing was then esteemed sure fence against an English arrow: but when England was in exclusive possession of such a powerful missile weapon, were her sons less brave, *less* inclined to *grapple* with their foes, than were their neighbours? Does the seaman—the English sailor—feel less inclined to board because his skill in gunnery is improved? Away with such nonsense!

The Minié rifle, or rather the Minié ball, has most serious defects; the gun may at any moment become unserviceable, the ball, or rather a leaden tube which *was* the ball, remaining in the barrel. This happens about once in ten shots. Even when the ball is not left behind, it often, from being blown into a tube, drops short and feebly from the gun. These cups and balls are wholly untrustworthy.

I have expended a small fortune on these things, and have probably made more experiments with fire-arms than any man living. Ten years ago I offered Government a rifle which is still quite unequalled for military purposes. It was rejected, because the Court of Directors did not require anything superior to the two-grooved rifles then in use with the English army. Yet the two-grooved rifle is the worst of all, being painfully difficult to load, and because the ball, being confined in one direction only, is at liberty to roll or lean over in the other, so that the *conical ball cannot be used*. On the use and proper shape of *this* ball, however, depends the whole power of the rifle at long distances.

My rifle loads more easily than a common smooth-bored musket, and never becomes so foul from firing as to cause any difficulty in loading. However loose the ball, it still follows the twist of the rifle grooves with perfect accuracy. It is effective at 1,800 yards, and just as good as a common musket at 20 yards, or any other distance.—(1854.)

THE GREATEST DANGER TO OUR INDIAN EMPIRE.

There is more danger to our Indian empire from the state of the Bengal army—from the feeling which there exists between the native and European, and thence spreads throughout the length and breadth of the land—than from all other causes combined. Let Government look to this; it is a serious and most important truth.—(*Extracted from a pamphlet published in 1850.*)

REMOVAL OF A PROHIBITORY ORDER.

The order issued by —, prohibiting officers from proceeding out of camp beyond the cavalry pickets, appears to be no longer necessary, and is hereby countermanded.

In removing this restriction, it is expected that the officers of this force will exercise due discretion as to the distance and direction in which they may proceed, and that their soldierlike tact and common-sense will enable them to take care of themselves in an enemy's country.

When proceeding out of camp in pursuit of field sports, for their own amusement, all officers and their followers should be well armed, and they should constantly bear in mind that foolish rashness and want of circumspection are quite as unsoldierlike and blameable as are timidity and excess of caution.

The brigadier-general has no wish to impose unnecessary restrictions on the officers and soldiers of the force; he is convinced of that manly confidence, ready intelligence, and habit of self-reliance which are invaluable in war in the absence of such restrictions; and feels confident, that the conduct of those now entrusted to his command will be such as to justify and confirm this conviction.—(1857.)

CAVALRY CHARGES SHOULD SUCCEED.

The whole of the orthodox education of our cavalry soldiers tends to teach them that to attack infantry prepared, and standing firm and steady in square, is madness, and *must* prove unsuccessful. The moral

force of an enemy so prepared is thus increased, and becomes to ordinary minds very formidable. It is certain, nevertheless, that a cavalry charge delivered home is irresistible by any infantry that ever stood in the field.—(1857.)

EUROPEAN AND NATIVE SOLDIERS ON SERVICE.

The only European portion of our whole strength of six thousand men of all arms retained at ——— consists of two companies of artillery: the conduct of these English soldiers has been in the highest degree praiseworthy—no men could possibly have behaved better; they have been what English soldiers should always be in the Indian army—excellent examples of good conduct for their Asiatic brethren in arms, the sepoys.

The main body of the field force has consisted of eight native regiments—horse and foot—of the Bombay army. The conduct of these regiments has been such as to do honour to the army to which they belong. Their discipline is perfect, and is of that high order which rests, not on external pressure only, such as the fear of punishment, but on the influence of good feeling, self-respect, honesty of purpose, and an honourable determination to do their duty to the State.

The cheerful alacrity and manly power with which every sort of work has been performed by the men of this field force, whether the task fell within the scope of ordinary military duty or consisted in working at trenches or erecting buildings, has been most commendable; while their just, kind, and conciliatory bearing towards the inhabitants of the country in

which they are serving, and their habitually steady and orderly conduct at all times, have been worthy of the faithful soldiers of a great and benign Government.

The impression left on the minds of the peaceful inhabitants of —— by the conduct of the British troops during their occupation of —— and its neighbourhood must prove deep and lasting.

The soldiers—irresistible in war, and before whom the best troops of —— had fallen or fled in terror—have been felt throughout the protracted period of their residence in this country to be the greatest benefactors and protectors of the inhabitants; and the people of —— now feel, on our departure, as if their best friends were quitting them.

In the minds of all those who have come in contact with our troops during this expedition, the idea of our British army will remain impressed as the combination of the highest power with the highest benevolence and justice.

To leave such a reputation behind us may be as valuable to our country as the most brilliant success in war.—(*July, 1857.*)

DIRECTIONS FOR A SADDLE TO MESSRS. GARDEN AND SON.

I shall be obliged by your making me a saddle with pommel cut away, and stuffed flaps coming well forward at the knee, like a large hunting-saddle, without pistol holsters, but with wallets; also bags or pockets under the cantle; plenty of D's or straps, and any other contrivances which your experience may