# **RJN EXHIBIT 2**

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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
9	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO			
10	NATIONAL STRENGTH AND	Case No.: 37-2016-00014339-CU-DF-CTL		
11 12	CONDITIONING ASSOCIATION,  Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS		
13	vs.	[IMAGED FILE]		
14	GREG GLASSMAN; RUSSEL BERGER;	Dept: C-73		
15	RUSS GREENE; CROSSFIT, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,	The Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil		
16	Defendants.	Complaint Filed: May 2, 2016		
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	NOTICE OF ORDER NO. 6			

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD; PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 15, 2017, the Honorable William McCurine, Jr. (Ret.), duly-appointed Discovery Referee, issued an Order No. 6 Ruling Re: Discoverability of Identity of Peer Reviewers ("Order") in the above-captioned case. A true and correct copy of the Order is attached hereto as EXHIBIT A. Dated: December 5, 2017 Respectfully submitted, MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY AND POPEO P.C. By: Joseph R. Dunn Attorneys for Defendants
GREG GLASSMAN, RUSSELL BERGER, RUSS GREENE and CROSSFIT, INC. NOTICE OF ORDER No. 6

## Exhibit A

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8	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA		
9	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO		
10	NATIONAL STRENGTH AND	Case No.: 37-2016-00014339-CU-DF-CTL	
11	CONDITIONING ASSOCIATION,		
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS	
13	v.		
14	GREG GLASSMAN; RUSSEL BERGER;	Dept.: C-73 Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil	
15	RUSS GREENE; CROSSFIT, INC., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through	Complaint Filed: May 2, 2016	
16	20, inclusive,		
17	Defendants.		
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19	A live hearing in this matter was held on Wednesday, November 15, 2017, at 1:30 p.m.		
20	before the Honorable William McCurine, Jr. (Ret.), duly-appointed Discovery Referee, concerning,		
21	among other things, the discoverability of the identity of Peer Reviewers. Kenneth Kawabata, Esq.		
22	of Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester LLP appeared for Plaintiff. Justin S. Nahama, Esq.		
23	and Wynter L. Deagle, Esq. of Troutman Sanders LLP and Joseph R. Dunn, Esq. of Mintz, Levin,		
24	Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C. appeared for Defendants. After hearing argument from		
25	counsel for the parties, and good cause appearing therefor, the Discovery Referee hereby rules as		
26	follows:		
27	<i>'</i>		
28	ORDER NO. 6 RITLING RIP DISCOVERAL	1 BILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS	

**CHRONOLOGY** 1 2 A review of part of the procedural posture of this issue is important: 3 1. July 15, 2015: The Honorable Karen S. Crawford issues a Ruling Re: 4 Compensation and Disclosure of Reviewers' Identities. 5 2. May 2, 2016: NSCA files the instant action in state court, alleging trade libel, 6 defamation, and unfair business practices. 7 3. May 25, 2017: The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino issues a sanctions order against 8 NSCA. 9 **ANALYSIS** In the instant action, CrossFit again seeks discovery of the identity of the peer reviewers in 10 11 the Devor Study. The NSCA opposes such discovery arguing privilege and that Judge Crawford has already ruled that the identities of the peer reviewers are not discoverable. The NSCA also 12 13 argues it has already provided some information about the peer review process which is all the 14 discovery to which CrossFit is entitled on the subject. Judge Crawford and the parties rely heavily on Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 15 General Rule Re: Discovery. 16 A. California Code of Civil Procedure Section 2017.010 sets the standard for discovery: 17 18 Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with this title, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is 19 relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself 20 admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 21 discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action. 22 Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, 23 description, nature, custody, condition, and location document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other 24 property. 25 26 ///// 27 28 ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS

### B. No Privilege.

 There is no applicable, established, peer review privilege. Nor has there been found a compelling justification to create a new privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. "Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes federal courts to define new privileges by interpreting 'common law principles...in light of reason and experience." (Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1927 (1996).) However, in an academic tenure peer review case the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it 'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence" (University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S.Ct. 577, 582 (1990). The Court then concluded, "[w]ith this in mind, we cannot accept the University's invitation to create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials" (Id). See also Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Thus, absent a 'compelling justification for a new privilege,' [citation omitted], weighty judicial authority counsels against the creation of a rule that will presumptively impinge upon the truth finding process."). Affirmed 870 F.2d 642(1989).

### C. Factors and Circumstances to Consider in Balancing.

Absent both an established privilege and a compelling justification to create one the standard for addressing discoverability must involve the balancing of interests – for and against discovery. Succinctly stated, the balance is between relevance and necessity demonstrated by the party seeking discovery, versus undue harm and/or burden demonstrated by the person opposing that discovery.

The parties rely on Solarex, a federal case dealing with federal law. However, both federal and state law focus on the issue of relevance which, in turn, is determined in light of the pleadings. See Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [herein below]. See also Sanchez v. Matta, et al, 229 F.R.D. 649, 654 (D.N.M. 2004) ("The federal courts have held that the scope of discovery should be broadly and liberally construed to achieve full disclosure of all potentially relevant information."); University of Pennsylvania, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 582 ("Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that 'the public...has a right to every man's evidence."). Rule 26 (c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, "[t]he court may, for good

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cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery...." Solarex, supra, states that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a framework for balancing, in the pre-trial discovery context, a litigant's need for disclosure against a societal interest in confidentiality asserted by one opposing such disclosure" (at 168-169). Solarex then cites that portion of the former Rule 26(c) that is similar to Rule 26(c)(1) cited above, and concludes that "[u]nder the Rule, a court is required to compare the potential hardship to the party against whom discovery is sought, if discovery is granted, with that to the party seeking discovery if it is denied. The court in Solarex was influenced by several factors. First, the court needs to weigh societal interest and private interest. "Any finding that information is protected from discovery must reflect a balancing between on the one hand, the parties' right to discovery, which stems from society's interest in a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in the litigation and, on the other hand, the existence of a societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of certain disclosures made within the context of certain relationships of acknowledged social value" (Solarex, supra, at 169). The court in Solarex considered several factors. The Solarex court further explained: "In balancing conflicting interests, courts are admonished not only to consider the nature and magnitude of the competing hardships, but also to 'give more weight to interests that have a distinctively social value than to purely private interests." (Solarex, at 169.) Second, non-party status should be considered. "When deciding discovery disputes, concern for the burden upon non-parties carries 'special weight'" (Rocky Mountain Medical Management v. LHP Hospital Group, 2013 WL 6446704, \*5 (D. Idaho 2013). "[C]ourts have considered the fact that discovery is being sought from a third or non-party, which weighs against permitting discovery" (Tucker v. American International Group, 281 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D. Conn. 2012) (emphasis original). Third, how necessary is the information. "In measuring a party's need for evidence [sought in discovery], courts look to a variety of factors, including the need to prepare an adequate defense or establish a claim, the availability of alternative evidence, the need to cross-examine expert witnesses, and the need for underlying data" (In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 2009 WL 2395899, \*3 (S.D.N.Y.

2009).) Fourth, there should be a credible claim of fraud.

Judge Crawford's ruling was correct in the context of the federal pleadings and the state of the pleadings at the time of her ruling. However, a different result is obtained in the state court action based on the pleadings and the current procedural posture.

First, in her ruling Judge Crawford states:

At this time, plaintiff is not entitled to an order compelling defendant to disclose the identities of the peer reviewers or to disclose documents or information that would make the identities of the peer reviewers obvious. However, plaintiff is not precluded from making further inquiries about the peer reviewers for the Devor study and/or the integrity of the peer review process. In addition, this order is without prejudice to plaintiff seeking to compel disclosure of the identities of the peer reviewers in the future if it can establish the relevance of this information to its false advertising and or unfair business competition causes of action in the complaint or to an affirmative defense in the defendant's answer and establish a genuine need to obtain evidence directly from the Peer reviewers that it cannot obtain by other means. [Ruling, pg 20, ll. 15-24.] [Emphasis added.]

Judge Crawford recognized the possibility that CrossFit might later be "entitled to an order compelling defendant to disclose the identities of the peer reviewers." At the time of Judge Crawford's ruling, Judge Sammartino had not issued her sanctions order and NSCA had not filed the subject complaint. Both those events have now transpired. In her sanctions order, Judge Sammartino has already determined as established, *inter alia*, as follows: (1) "the NSCA made the false statement in the Devor study with the intention of disparaging CrossFit and thereby driving consumers to the NSCA"; (2) "the NSCA was aware of the misleading nature of the Erratum"; (3) "the NSCA's false statement in the Devor study were disseminated sufficiently to the purchasing public to constitute advertising or promotion"; (4) "the NSCA was aware that the false statements in the Devor study was being circulated to the media." Judge Sammartino's ruling, at the very least, makes NSCA's alleged fraud relevant to this case and pertinent to CrossFit's Answer and Affirmative Defenses. In the instant action the NSCA has sued Crossit for trade libel, defamation

Judge Sammartino's sanctions ruling, pgs. 11-14.

and unfair business practices all surrounding the NSCA's role in the content, publication and dissemination of the Devor article. See for example, ¶¶ 11, 13, 14a, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33 and 34. By its pleadings, the NSCA has injected into this action the very integrity of the peer review process. In the federal action, the NSCA used the peer review process as a shield. Now, in the state court action it seeks to use the peer review process as a sword.

Second, in the present action, the NSCA has implicitly raised the issue of fraud by CrossFit and CrossFit has expressly raised the issue of fraud by the NSCA in its answer and affirmative. The relevant facts of the peer review case in question are akin to facts in an academic tenure peer review case where, instead of a "credible claim of fraud", prohibited employment discrimination is charged. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, supra, the Supreme Court noted that, "when a court is asked to enforce [an EEOC] subpoena, its responsibility is to 'satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is relevant to the charge....' It is not then to determine 'whether the charge of discrimination is 'well founded' or 'verifiable'" (110 S.Ct. at 191). See also McLane v. EEOC, 137 S.Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017) ("A district court is not to use an enforcement proceeding as an opportunity to test the strength of the underlying complaint. Rather, a district court should 'satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested is 'relevant' to the charge'"). In the present case the fact that the claim of fraud is "credible" is sufficient for balancing regarding the discovery issue.

Third, in seeking to balance the societal and private interests involved here, the Court concludes that disclosure of the identity of the peer reviewers is necessary. In the federal action, NSCA used to peer review process as a shield. Now, CrossFit convincingly argues, in the state court action it seeks to use the peer review process as a sword. There is now credible evidence of fraud in the peer review process. The NSCA is correct to argue that confidentiality of the names of the peer-reviewed is important to the integrity of the scientific review process. However, it is equally true that the lack of transparency regarding the identity of peer reviewers or the peer review process can undermine scientific knowledge, integrity, and trustworthiness. When there is evidence of fraud, the goal of scientific integrity is achieved through transparency, not through an

1 impenetrable wall always shielding the identities of peer reviewers. Accountability in the peer 2 review process is as important to the integrity of that process as accountability is in social ethics. To the extent that there is an impenetrable wall shielding the peer review process, there is no 3 4 accountability. Without the constraint of accountability the peer review process can be corrupted 5 and undermine the very scientific ideals the process espouses. The gravamen of both the NSCA's 6 complaint and CrossFit's affirmative defenses focus on whether there was a conscious and 7 deliberate dissemination of knowingly false-injury data in the Devor study that has the appearance, 8 but not the reality, of scientific objectivity, integrity, and reliability. CrossFit has produced credible 9 evidence that the NSCA wrongly influenced the Devor study in a way that compromised the 10 integrity of the peer review process. CrossFit further argues that the Devor study gives the 11 appearance of being scientific but is clearly not scientific; rather it was entirely anecdotal. The lack 12 of scientific rigor by the peer reviewers could cause society to question whether there was collusion 13 or other corruption of the scientific process. 14

The credible evidence that the identities of the peer reviewers is relevant and discoverable *in* this specific case includes the following:

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- The Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research ("JSCR") is a respected scientific journal on which the sports industry relies.
- 2. Dr. Kraemer has admitted in deposition that the peer review process is designed to "support the public interest in reliable science [and] enhance the quality of scientific publishing." NSCA's opposition, pg. 2. He has also admitted that the peer review process is designed to "enhance the scientific credibility of studies published in the JSCR." Id. However, it appears that the critical information in the Devor study was based on information, data, and process that the NSCA knew was unscientific, false and unreliable.
- 3. Dr. Kraemer was the Editor-in-Chief and his wife was the Managing Editor.
- The Devor Article was submitted to JSCR by Michael Smith, a graduate student,
   who worked for Dr. Steven Devor at Ohio State University. NSCA and JSCR did

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not participate in the underlying study. Dr. Devor went to a CrossFit facility in Columbus, OH. His study evolved into a paper about exercise physiology. Dr. Devor submitted a proposal to the JSCR to publish the article and Dr. Kraemer made the decision to publish the article. That original submission did not have injury data and the article was provisionally rejected on that basis. Dr. Devor amended the article to include the false injury data. CrossFit argues that Dr. Kraemer manipulated events in order to have the false injury data included.

- Although the NSCA and JSCR did not author the report, CrossFit Dr. Kraemer, as
  the Editor-in-Chief purposely manipulated events to produce a false and
  scientifically invalid report injurious to CrossFit and helpful to NSCA.
- 6. CrossFit produced credible evidence that Dr. Kraemer steered the authors of the Devor study to discuss injuries among CrossFit members. Prof. Devor's first article had no injury data at all. The insertion of injury data came after Dr. Kraemer indicated that such inclusion would make the article publishable.
- 7. After the article was published, one Russell Berger had a telephone conversation with Dr. Kraemer regarding the Devor study. Berger said he was highly suspicious of the reliability and data identified in the study, that to him the data was "questionable". Mr. Berger had in fact contacted six of the participants in the Devor study who apparently believed the data was questionable if not fully fabricated. Berger said it was difficult to believe that 16% of the test subjects dropped out because of CrossFit methods. Dr. Kraemer said he was not surprised by the 16% figure: "So he said he was unsurprised by the results. He said that because it had been peer-reviewed 'That was good enough'. And that's another direct quote, 'good enough'. He had no concerns about it as far as he was concerned because it had been peer-reviewed." Berger deposition, pgs. 232-233.
- 8. According to Keith Cinea, NSCA's Person Most Qualified ("PMQ")<sup>2</sup> Dr. Kraemer

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Person Most Knowledgeable aka Person Most Qualified shall hereinafter be referred to as "PMQ".

1	protective order <sup>3</sup> . As CrossFit has effectively argued: the NSCA cannot use the peer review process	
2	as a shield and then as a sword. Furthermore, society's right to have a fair and unbiased peer review	
3	process outweighs the need to protect the identity of the peer reviewers in this instance. Finally,	
4	this information is critical to CrossFit's defense against the complaint.	
5	SUMMARY	
6	The NSCA must forthwith disclose the identity and contact information of the peer	
7	reviewers of the Devor study.	
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9	William McCurine, Gr.	
10	Dated: December, 2017 Hon. William McCurine, Ret.	
11	Discovery Referee	
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27	<sup>3</sup> The information is to be produced under the protective order but not under any designation such as "for attorney's eyes only".	
28	ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS	
	ORDER NO. 8 ROLLING RE. DISCOVERABLETT OF IDENTITY OF FEER REVIEWERS	
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Santa Ana Office

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### PROOF OF SERVICE

### National Strength & Conditioning Association vs. Greg Glassman, et al. Case No.: 37-2016-00014339-CU-DF-CTL

I, the undersigned, an employee of Judicate West, located at 1851 E. First Street, Suite 1600, Santa Ana, CA 92705 declare under penalty of perjury that I am over the age of eighteen (18) and not a party to this matter or proceeding.

On December 5, 2017, I served the foregoing documents, described as:

### ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF PEER REVIEWERS

to the following parties:

### SEE ATTACHED MAILING LIST

- (X) BY E-MAIL I caused the above-referenced document to be transmitted via electronic mail (e-mail) to the parties as listed on this Proof of Service
- ( ) BY ELECTRONIC FILING I caused such document to be sent via electronic service by submitting an electronic version of the document(s) to One Legal, LLC, through the user interface at www.onelegal.com.
- ( ) BY FASCIMILE I caused the above-referenced document to be transmitted via facsimile to the parties as listed on this Proof of Service. The document was transmitted by facsimile transmission and the transmission was reported as complete and without error.
- ( ) BY PERSONAL SERVICE I personally delivered the documents to the persons at the address (es): by leaving the documents at the person (s) office, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the person(s) being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office.
- ( ) BY UNITED STATES PARCEL SERVICE I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence and mailing with the United States Postal Service; such correspondence would be deposited with the United States Postal Service the same day of deposit with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Ana, California in the ordinary course of business
- (X) STATE I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
- ( ) FEDERAL I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Executed on December 5, 2017, at Santa Ana, California

Judicate Wes

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### Case Contact List

as of Tuesday, December 05, 2017

JW Case #: A233444

### Case Caption: National Strength & Conditioning Association vs. Greg Glassman, et al.

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Wynter L. Deagle, Esq.

Representing Greg Glassman; Russell Berger; CrossFit, Inc.; Russ Greene

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I am employed in the County of San Diego; my business address is Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris 3 Glovsky and Popeo PC, 3580 Carmel Mountain Road, Suite 300, San Diego, CA 92130. I am over 4 the age of 18 and not a party to the foregoing action. 5 I am readily familiar with the business practice at my place of business for collection and processing of correspondence for personal delivery, for mailing with United States Postal Service, 6 7 for facsimile, and for overnight delivery by Federal Express, Express Mail, or other overnight 8 service. 9 On December 5, 2017, I caused a copy of the following document: 10 NOTICE OF ORDER NO. 6 RULING RE: DISCOVERABILITY OF IDENTITY OF 11 PEER REVIEWERS 12 to be served on the interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy thereof, 13 enclosed in a sealed envelope, and addressed as follows: 14 Jeffrey M. Lenkov Attorneys for Plaintiff 15 MANNING & KASS, ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP Telephone: (213) 624-6900 16 801 S. Figueroa Street, 15th Floor Facsimile: (213) 624-6999 Los Angeles, CA 90017 17 iml@manningllp.com 18 Kenneth S. Kawabata Attorneys for Plaintiff MANNING & KASS, ELLROD, RAMIREZ, 19 TRESTER LLP Telephone: (619) 515-0269 550 West C Street, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Facsimile: (619) 515-0268 20 ksk@manningllp.com 21 Hon. William McCurine, Jr. (Ret.) Discovery Referee 22 Judicate West 402 W. Broadway, Suite 2400 (619) 814-1966 23 San Diego, CA 92101 24 Justin S. Nahama Counsel for Defendants Wynter L. Deagle 25 Troutman Sanders Telephone: 858 235-4040 11682 El Camino Real, Suite 400 26 San Diego, CA 92130 Justin.nahama@troutman.com Wynter.deagle@troutman.com 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE

1 2	X MAIL:	Such correspondence was deposited, postage fully paid, with the United States Postal Service on the same day in the ordinary course of business.	
3	PERSONAL:	Such document was delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee.	
5 6 7	FEDERAL EXPRESS:	Such correspondence was deposited on the same day in the ordinary course of business with a facility regularly maintained by Federal Express, the United States Postal Service or an authorized courier or a driver authorized by that courier to receive documents for overnight delivery.	
8 9	ELECTRONIC MAIL:	Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in item 4, above. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.	
11	ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION:	By submitting an electronic version of the document(s) to One Legal, LLC, through the user interface at www.onelegal.com.	
12	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing		
13	is true and correct.		
14	Executed on December 5, 2017, at San Diego, California.		
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