

ONTARIO
AND
QUEBEC
WRECKS.

Reports on Railway Accidents.

The Board of Railway Commissioners has decided to make public the reports of the investigations into the accidents on the C. P. R. at Mountain, Ont., on Mar. 1, and at Brunel, Ont., April 1. The report of R. C. Labaude, Inspector of Accidents, on the Mountain accident is as follows:

"The accident was a head-on collision between passenger train 6, engine 908, conductor W. Bart, baggageman A. Lesperance, brakeman E. Williams, engineer J. Hartney, and fireman H. Richmond, and westbound extra freight train 984, conductor H. Scott, brakemen E. Saffel and W. J. O'Mara, engineer J. E. Marryon, and fireman J. A. Remick in the yard at Mountain at 6 a.m.

"The cause of the collision was the failure of engineer J. E. Marryon, of train 984, to determine correctly the place where to meet the fast passenger train 6, when receiving dispatcher's order 36, on form 19, at Winchester, advising that train 6 was running 50 minutes late from Kemptville Jet. to Vaudreuil.

"The result of the collision was that Engineer J. Hartney, of train 6, H. Richmond, fireman, and A. Lesperance, baggageman, employees of the same train were injured, and W. Hitchins, Dominion Express messenger, and his assistant, J. J. Nicholson, of the same train, were burned to death while pinned in express car 1765, which was set on fire by oil lamps lighted in the car at the time of the collision.

"From the evidence it is shown that passenger train 6 was a superior train as to class and direction, and not scheduled to stop at any place between Kemptville Jet. and Vaudreuil. It consisted of six cars, two express and baggage cars, tourist car, Wabash passenger car, Pullman car Amideo, and a C. P. R. sleeping car Algoma. The cars were equipped with and were burning gas except in the two express and baggage cars which were lighted by 4 ceiling lamps and two desk lamps. At 5:25 a.m. dispatcher McKae issued an order, 36, addressed to train 6 and extra freight 984, 3rd no. 50 at Finch, extra 976 and 2nd no. 50 at Monklands, as follows:

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Mountain Ontario
MARCH 1
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Engine 908
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Brunel Ontario
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JUNE
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Reports on Railway Accidents.

The Board of Railway Commissioners has decided to make public the reports of the investigations into the accidents on the C. P. R. at Mountain, Ont., on Mar. 1, and at Brantford, Ont., April 1. The report of E. C. Lalonde, Inspector of Accidents, on the Mountain accident is as follows:

The accident was a head-on collision between passenger train 6, engine 905, conductor W. Burr, brakeman A. Lester, fireman W. Williams, engineer J. Hartney, and fireman H. Richmond, and westbound extra freight train 984, conductor H. Scott, brakemen E. Suffed and W. J. O'Mara, engineer J. E. Manyon, and fireman J. A. Remick, in the yard at Mountain at 4:59 a. m.

The cause of the collision was the failure of engineer J. E. Manyon, of train 984, to determine correctly the place where to meet the last passenger train 6, when receiving despatcher's order 36, on form 19, at Windsor, advising that train 6 was running 50 minutes late from Kempsville (et. to Vandriell).

The result of the collision was that Engineer J. Hartney, of train 6, H. Richmond, fireman, and A. Lester, brakeman, baggage men, and other employees of the same train were injured, and W. Williams, Dominion Express messenger, and his assistant, J. J. Nicholson, of the same train, were burned to death while pinned in express car 1765, which was set on fire by oil lamps lighted in the car at the time of the collision.

From the evidence it is shown that passenger train 6 was a superior train as to class and direction, and not scheduled to stop at any place between Kempsville, Ont., and Vandriell. It consisted of six cars, two express and baggage cars, tourist car, Walsh passenger car, Pullman car Amador, and a C. P. R. sleeping car Algoma. The cars were equipped with and were burning gas except in the two express and baggage cars which were lighted by 4-candle lamps and two desk lamps. At 5:25 a. m. despatcher McKee issued an order, 36, addressed to train 6 and extra freight 984, and no. 50 at Finch, extra 976 and 2nd no. 50 at Monklands, as follows:

Order No. 36. No. 6, engine 905, with min. 30 minutes late, Kempsville (et. to Vandriell).

The above order was correctly delivered to Conductor Burr, of the passenger train, at Kempsville, Ont. This train is scheduled to leave Kempsville (et., east bound), at 4:59

o'clock, he looked at his watch again and read it 4:48 a. m., instead of 5:48, and was proceeding with the intention of meeting no. 6 at Kempsville, Ont., whereas he should not have gone further than Mountain, to clear the main line in time for no. 6. Ten minutes was about the running time for extra 984 to get to Mountain, which would have made Mountain at 5:58 at the east end switch, and the collision occurred west of Mountain station at 6 a. m. As per C. P. R. rule, extra 984 should have been cleared of the main line at least five minutes before no. 6 arrived, or rather was due to pass.

Rule No. 202 reads: "An inferior train must keep out of the way of a superior train."
Rule 214A: "Enginers must read their train orders to their firemen, and conductors to their rear brakemen."

In this matter Engineer Manyon and fireman Remick knew perfectly well the contents of the order and should have corrected their watches; the engineer should have read the order to fireman Remick, as per rule 214A. The head end brakeman, E. Suffed, was riding in the engine cab after leaving Windsor, and was not made aware of the contents of order 36. Only the engineer told him and the fireman as follows: "We have lots of time to get to Kempsville to take a little coal and water," and nothing was said about the time. Conductor H. Scott received similar order as above stated; read the order to the rear end brakeman W. J. O'Mara, and neither of them made a move to ascertain or to figure out the meeting point, only when too late to avoid the catastrophe.

I therefore find that engineer of extra freight train 984, J. E. Manyon, and Conductor H. Scott, are responsible for this collision, inasmuch as they neglected their duty in regard to meeting no. 6, thereby violating the company's rules, and fireman J. A. Remick is also responsible for not checking or comparing the time with his engineer, Manyon. Rear end brakeman W. J. O'Mara is responsible for neglecting to signal the engineer to stop at the east end switch, to go on the siding, and neglecting to comply with rule 86. Despatcher McKee acted in violation of instructions set forth in rule 28 by compelling the 10 order to extra 984 before 31 order was delivered to passenger train 6. The Assistant Superintendent, R. W. McCormick, being questioned on this matter, has admitted that it was a violation of instructions, and that McKee, the despatcher, in this case has shown been dismissed for the above reason.

rail was 7 1/2 in. to the yard and was manufactured by the Johnson Co., Lorain, in 1898. About 11 miles of these rails were placed in the track in the summer of 1898 and there was not a single failure until last winter when two broke. The rail appears to have been broken by the engine passing over it, the west side of the brake had been hammered by the wheels of the mail car and the express car passing over it. Then the rail on the east side of the track appears to have sprung out about half the width of the head of the rail, as there is the mark of the flange of the wheel where it mounted the rail.

The flaw referred to in the rail was very small and could not be detected until after the rail was broken. The track in the vicinity is in good condition; the embankment is of standard width, and the rails and ties are in good condition. At the point where the rail was broken, the track had been shinned up about half an inch, showing that the trackmen were paying attention to the track. The inner rail on the curve was not disturbed, and the ties were so little damaged that it was not necessary to replace them in repairing the track. In my opinion that, considering the severity of the past winter, the company had done everything to keep the track in condition, and that the accident was due to something which they could have no knowledge of, and consequently were unable to provide for.

At the time of the accident the train was running at a moderate rate of speed, and was made up of an engine, mail car, express car, baggage car, tourist car, two tourist cars, 1st class car, then another tourist car, then dining car and sleepers. For convenience I have numbered them, commencing with that next to engine. Cars 1 and 2 stayed on the track, car 3 was the first to leave the rails, and was followed by 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The dining cars and sleepers stayed on the track. The cars went off the track where there is a slight cut of about 3 ft., and about 100 ft. further the cut runs out and the track runs on embankment about 15 ft. high along the shore of a small bay of Lake Windermere. As soon as the cars emerged from the cut they went down the embankment on to the ice, and car 5 pushed past car 4 and lay parallel to it. Car 6 pushed the rear ends of these cars farther out on the ice. Five cars were buried, but the great loss of life all took place in car 5. From what information I could gather, it appears that car 4 turned over on its side, the bottom of the car where the gas tanks are located being close to the windows of car

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train, were burned to death while pinned in express car 1765, which was set on fire by oil lamps lighted in the car at the time of the collision.

From the evidence it is shown that passenger train 6 was a superior train as to class and direction and not scheduled to stop at any place between Kempsville Jet and Vandroville. It consisted of six cars, two express and baggage cars, tourist car, Walsh passenger car, Pullman car Amecio, and a C.P.R. sleeping car Algonac. The cars were equipped with and were burning gas except in the two express and baggage cars which were lighted by 4 kelling lamps and two desk lamps. At 5:25 a.m. dispatcher McKae issued an order, 38, addressed to Train 6 and extra freight 984, 3rd mo. 50 at Finch, extra 976 and 2nd mo. 50 at Mendlands, as follows:

Order No. 36. No. 6, engine 608, with run 50 minutes late Kempsville Jet to Vandroville.

The above order was correctly delivered to Conductor Part, of the passenger train, at Kempsville Jet. This train is scheduled to leave Kempsville Jet, eastbound, at 4:59 a.m., and being reported 50 minutes late, she was due to leave at 5:49 instead of 5:59 a.m., and left at 5:51 a.m., 5 minutes later than the time specified in the order. According to her schedule-running time 50 minutes late, plus five minutes more delay at Kempsville, she was due to pass Mountain where the collision occurred, at 6:04 a.m. At 5:40 a.m. Fireman Rennick, on extra freight 940, the westbound freight train, consisting of 41 cars all told, while passing at Winchester, received from the agent order 36 on form 10, which he read and handed over to his engineer, J. E. Manyon. It read as follows:

No. 6, engine 608, will run 50 minutes late Kempsville Jet to Vandroville.

A similar order was handed to Conductor H. Scott, when the van passed the station just previous to coming into Winchester. Engineer Manyon had looked at his watch and read the time 4:30 a.m. instead of 5:30 a.m., one hour earlier than it was. It was actually 5:30 a.m., and after receiving this order he said to his fireman: "We will have time to go to Kempsville and get out before we 6 is due there." Fireman Rennick never looked at his watch to compare the time with his engineer, nor ascertain whether the engineer was right in his calculation or not. The train proceeded right along, and after passing Vandroville the first station west of Win-

chester of them made a move to ascertain or to figure out the meeting point, only when too late to avoid the catastrophe.

It therefore find that engineer of extra freight train 984, J. E. Manyon, and Conductor H. Scott, are responsible for this collision, inasmuch as they neglected their duty in regard to meeting no. 6, thereby violating the company's rules; and Fireman J. A. Rennick is also responsible for not checking or comparing the time with his engineer, Manyon. Rear-end brakeman W. J. O'Mara is responsible for neglecting to signal the engineer to stop at the east end switch, to go on the siding, and neglecting to comply with rule 86. Dispatcher McKae acted in violation of instructions set forth in rule 38 by compounding the 49 order to extra 984 before 31 order was delivered to passenger train 6. The Assistant Superintendent, R. W. McCormick, being questioned on this matter, has admitted that it was a violation of instructions, and that McKae, the dispatcher, in this case has since been dismissed for the above reason.

In view of the fact that there were no means of extinguishing the fire set to the baggage car after the collision, that the life of the two victims might have been saved if the fire had been checked by some available means, and that in cases of that kind water is rarely obtainable, I beg to recommend that the railway companies be requested to install in each car on passenger trains sufficient underwriter fire extinguishers to be used in cases of fire.

THE BRINEL ACCIDENT

This accident was the derailment of passenger train 1, three-quarters mile east of Brimel, Ont., at 11:27 a.m. It was investigated by T. L. Simmons, Assistant Engineer, who reported as follows:

On April 13, I inspected the scene of the accident which occurred near Brimel station, about 2 1/2 miles west of Cheltenham. I was accompanied by A. L. Hertzberg, the company's Engineer of Maintenance, and W. K. Thomson, Assistant Superintendent. The accident was caused by a broken rail on the outside of a 5° 30' curve, or in other words, a curve having a radius of 1,040 ft. I examined the broken rail carefully and it appeared to be a good quality cold-chambered steel and quite flawless except for a small portion about the size of the end of a lead pencil on the extreme outside of the base of the rail. The

running at a moderate rate of speed, and was made up of an engine, mail car, express car, baggage car, coach car, two tourist cars, 1st class car, then another tourist car, then dining car and sleepers. For convenience I have numbered them, commencing with that next to engine. Cars 1 and 2 stayed on the track, car 3 was the first to leave the rails, and was followed by 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The dining cars and sleepers stayed on the track. The cars went off the track where there is a slight cut of about 3 ft., and about 100 ft. farther the cut runs out and the track runs an embankment about 15 ft. high along the shore of a small bay of Lake Windermere. As soon as the cars emerged from the cut they went down the embankment on to the ice, and car 5 pushed past car 4 and lay parallel to it. Car 6 pushed the rear ends of these cars farther out on the ice. Five cars were burned, but the great loss of life all took place in car 5. From what information I could gather, it appears that car 4 turned over on its side, the bottom of the car where the gastanks are located being close to the windows of car 4, or possibly from the tanks of both cars 4 and 5, entered the broken windows, and in some way became ignited, setting fire to the interior of the car so rapidly that a number of the passengers had no time to escape. I am of opinion that if there had been no gas on the train, not a life would have been lost.

In connection with the foregoing Inspector Lalonde says: "I beg to call the attention of the Board to that part of Mr. Simmons' report where he says: 'I am of the opinion that if there had been no gas on the train not a life would have been lost.' I fully concur in his opinion with the additional fact that if the passenger coaches had been equipped with fire extinguishers, there is no doubt that most of the victims would have been saved; and I beg to recommend here what I recommended in my report on the accident at Mountain: that all passenger coaches should be equipped with underwriter fire extinguishers to be used in case of fire to rescue those imprisoned or pinned in the debris of any wreck."

The On'Appelle, Long Lake and Saskatchewan Rd. and Steamboat Co. has filed with the Board of Railway Commissioners a local mileage freight tariff, to be used in the absence of special tariffs giving lower rates, subject to Canadian freight classification.

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