



SA33901 / CVE-2009-0658

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Introduction:

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An array indexing error in Adobe Reader can be exploited to corrupt arbitrary memory via a PDF file containing a specially crafted JBIG2 stream.

Technical Details:

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The PDF "JBIG2Decode" filter is used to provide image data via a JBIG2-encoded stream. A JBIG2 stream includes an arbitrary number of JBIG2 segments, each segment having the following header structure:

```
[4 bytes - Segment number]
[1 byte - Segment header flags (segment type in low 6 bits)]
[Variable size - Referred-to segments]
[1 or 4 bytes - Segment page association]
```

The segment page association field specifies the number of the JBIG2 page associated with the current segment. It contains one byte by default and can optionally have four bytes if the 6th bit is set inside the segment header flags.

An array indexing error when processing a JBIG2 segment having an overly large segment page association value can be exploited to corrupt arbitrary memory.

sub_9AD380() in AcroRd32.dll is called in order to process an encountered JBIG2 data stream. The function parses each JBIG2 segment, extracting segment information via calls to sub_9BB160().

```
.text:009AD380 sub_9AD380      proc near                ; CODE XREF: sub_9AE700+8Cp
.text:009AD380
.text:009AD380 var_20        = dword ptr -20h
.text:009AD380 var_1C        = dword ptr -1Ch
.text:009AD380 pSegments     = dword ptr -18h
.text:009AD380 nSegNum       = dword ptr -14h
.text:009AD380 pSegmentsHolder = dword ptr -10h
.text:009AD380 var_C         = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:009AD380 segtype       = dword ptr -8
.text:009AD380 var_4         = dword ptr -4
.text:009AD380
...
.text:009AD509      mov     bl, [edx+4]      ; segment type
.text:009AD50C      and     bl, 3Fh
.text:009AD50F      mov     byte ptr [esp+30h+segtype], bl
.text:009AD513      mov     edx, [esp+30h+segtype]
.text:009AD517      push    edx
.text:009AD518      mov     ecx, esi
.text:009AD51A      call    sub_9AD2A0      ; allocate memory by looking at flags
.text:009AD51F      mov     edi, eax
.text:009AD521      test    edi, edi
.text:009AD523      jz      loc_9ADB54
.text:009AD529      xor     eax, eax
.text:009AD52B      mov     ecx, edi
.text:009AD52D      mov     [edi+38h], ax
.text:009AD531      mov     [edi+40h], eax
.text:009AD534      mov     [edi+24h], ax
.text:009AD538      mov     [edi+2Ch], ebp
.text:009AD53B      call    sub_9BB160      ; process segment
```

Among other fields, sub_9BB160() extracts the segment number, segment type (low 6 bits in segment header flags), and the segment page association (in big-endian order) into a heap object allocated for the current segment.

```

.text:009BB160 sub_9BB160      proc near                ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+1BBp
.text:009BB160                                     ; sub_9AD380+291p
.text:009BB160      push     ebx
.text:009BB161      push     esi
.text:009BB162      push     edi
.text:009BB163      mov      esi, ecx
.text:009BB165      mov      ecx, [esi+2Ch]
.text:009BB168      push     4
.text:009BB16A      call     sub_9BA6B0      ; read 4 bytes and advance
.text:009BB16F      mov      [esi+JBIG2Seg.segnum], eax ; segment number
.text:009BB171      mov      eax, [esi+2Ch]
.text:009BB174      mov      ecx, [eax]
.text:009BB176      movzx   edx, byte ptr [ecx]
.text:009BB179      mov      [eax+0Ch], dl ; segment header flags
.text:009BB17C      add      ecx, 1
.text:009BB17F      mov      [eax], ecx
.text:009BB181      mov      al, dl
.text:009BB183      mov      cl, al
.text:009BB185      and      cl, 3Fh      ; segment type (low 6 bits)
.text:009BB188      test     al, 40h      ; bit 6 set
.text:009BB18A      setnbe   dl      ; dl becomes one if the segment page association field occupies 4 bytes
.text:009BB18D      mov      [esi+JBIG2Seg.segtype], cl
...
.text:009BB192      movzx   cx, dl
...
.text:009BB1A4      mov      [esi+JBIG2Seg.assocpage_4b], cx ; segment page association field occupies 4 bytes
...
.text:009BB388      cmp      [esi+JBIG2Seg.assocpage_4b], 0
.text:009BB38D      jnz     short loc_9BB3A3 ; page association has four bytes
.text:009BB38F      mov      eax, [esi+2Ch] ; here if 1 byte
.text:009BB392      mov      ecx, [eax]
.text:009BB394      mov      dl, [ecx] ; length
...
.text:009BB39E      movzx   eax, dl
.text:009BB3A1      jmp     short loc_9BB3AD
.text:009BB3A3 loc_9BB3A3:      ; CODE XREF: sub_9BB160+22Dj
.text:009BB3A3      mov      ecx, [esi+2Ch]
.text:009BB3A6      push     4
.text:009BB3A8      call     sub_9BA6B0      ; read 4 bytes and advance
.text:009BB3AD      ; CODE XREF: sub_9BB160+241j
.text:009BB3AD loc_9BB3AD:      mov      ecx, [esi+2Ch]
.text:009BB3AD      push     4
.text:009BB3B0      mov      [esi+JBIG2Seg.assocpage], eax ; Segment page association
.text:009BB3B2                                     ; (number of page to which this segment belongs)

```

After extracting header fields from all included segments, sub_9AD380() re-parses the segment array, computing the number of page information segments (segments with a type of 0x30).

```

.text:009AD593 loc_9AD593:      ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+F6j
.text:009AD593      mov      edx, [eax+0Ch] ; array of segment objects base
.text:009AD596      mov      ebx, [eax]    ; number of segments
...
.text:009AD75E      mov      cl, 30h
.text:009AD760      ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+3F1j
.text:009AD760 loc_9AD760:      mov      ebp, [edx+eax*4]
.text:009AD763      cmp      [ebp+JBIG2Seg.segtype], cl
.text:009AD766      jnz     short loc_9AD76C ; not page information (0x30)?
.text:009AD768      add      dword ptr [esi+0Ch], 1 ; number of page information segments
.text:009AD76C      ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+3E6j
.text:009AD76C loc_9AD76C:      add      eax, 1
.text:009AD76F      cmp      eax, ebx ; number of segments
.text:009AD771      jb      short loc_9AD760

```

An array of 20-byte elements is allocated on the heap, holding a maximum number of elements equal to the previously computed number of page information segments.

```

.text:009AD773 loc_9AD773:      ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+3D3j
.text:009AD773                                     ; sub_9AD380+3DCj
.text:009AD773      mov      eax, [esi+0Ch] ; number of page information segments
.text:009AD776      lea      ecx, [eax+eax*4] ; * 5
.text:009AD779      add      ecx, ecx ; * 2
.text:009AD77B      add      ecx, ecx ; * 2
.text:009AD77D      push     ecx
.text:009AD77E      call     sub_9BA700      ; allocate page information * 20 bytes
.text:009AD783      add      esp, 4
.text:009AD786      cmp      eax, edi
.text:009AD788      mov      [esi+10h], eax ; save it

```

After additional operations irrelevant to this analysis, sub_9AD380() enters a loop in which the segment page association value of each segment is used to index the previously allocated array of 20-byte elements while incrementing the first double word of an element. Due to missing boundary checks, the operation results in memory corruption for an overly large segment page association value.

```
.text:009AD86F loc_9AD86F: ; CODE XREF: sub_9AD380+43Fj
.text:009AD86F ; sub_9AD380+44Aj
.text:009AD86F xor     edi, edi
.text:009AD871 cmp     [esp+30h+nSegNum], edi
.text:009AD875 mov     [esp+30h+var_1C], edi
.text:009AD879 jbe     loc_9ADA31
.text:009AD87F mov     edx, [esp+30h+pSegments] ; array of segment information objects
.text:009AD883 mov     [esp+30h+segtype], edx
.text:009AD887 mov     ecx, [edx] ; extract object for the current segment
.text:009AD889 mov     eax, [ecx+JBIG2Seg.assocpage] ; segment page association
.text:009AD88C test    eax, eax
.text:009AD88E jz      loc_9ADB40
.text:009AD894 mov     ecx, [esi+10h] ; page information structure
.text:009AD897 lea     eax, [eax+eax*4]
.text:009AD89A add     dword ptr [ecx+eax*4-14h], 1 ; page_info[segment_page_assoc - 1] += 1
```

Other similar operations, reading and writing to out-of-bounds indexes into the array follow (not shown in disassembly).

Exploitation:

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The vulnerability can be exploited to reliably overwrite an almost arbitrary memory address with a pointer to controlled memory. This results in the execution of arbitrary code when a specially crafted PDF file is opened.

Secunia has developed a PoC and working exploit, which are available to customers via the BA customer web interface.

Characteristics:

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Detection:

Look for PDF files containing a JBIG2 stream with a segment page association value greater than the number of page information segments included in the same stream.

Verification:

Create a PDF file containing a JBIG2 stream defining a segment having bit 6 set in the segment header flags and a segment page association value equal to 0xFFFFFFFF. A vulnerable Adobe Reader crashes when opening the file.

Identification:

AcroRd32.dll version 9.0.0.332 is confirmed to be vulnerable. Prior versions are also reportedly affected. The default installation location of AcroRd32.dll is "%ProgramFiles%\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader".

Tested Versions:

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The vulnerability was analysed on Windows XP SP3 with Adobe Reader version 9.0.0.

Fixed Versions:

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The vulnerability is currently unpatched.

References:

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SA33901:

<http://secunia.com/advisories/33901/>

Adobe:

<http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa09-01.html>

JBIG specifications:

<http://www.jpeg.org/public/fcd14492.pdf>