CEP REGULAR MEETING

SONGS DISMANTLEMENT UPDATE BY

SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING*SOLUTIONS*

Microsoft Teams

TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING

September 5, 2024

Reported by:
Denise Herft, CSR #12983
Assignment #6451356
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SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

Transcript of video-recorded meeting via Microsoft Teams commencing at 2:00 p.m., Thursday, September 5, 2024.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT MEMBER ATTENDEES:

CEP CHAIRMAN - DAN STETSON, THE NICHOLAS ENDOWMENT

CEP SECRETARY - MARTHA McNICHOLAS

VICE CHAIRMAN - HON. VICTOR CABRAL - MAYOR, CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE

CAPTAIN MEL VERNON - (SAN LUIS REY BAND of MISSION INDIANS)

MICHELLE ANDERSON - (ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIRECTOR)

HON. JOHN TAYLOR - (SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO CITY COUNCIL)

GARRY BROWN - (PRESIDENT/CEO - ORANGE COUNTY COASTKEEPER)

HON. MICHAEL VILLAR - (DANA POINT CITY COUNCIL)

MIKE BALSAMO - (SR. VP, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS RANCHO MISSION VIEJO AND SOUTH ORANGE COUNTY ECONOMIC COALITION BOARD MEMBER)

MICHAEL PARHAM (VP, CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES)

JIM DESMOND - (SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERVISOR, 5th DISTRICT)

KATRINA FOLEY - (ORANGE COUNTY SUPERVISOR, 5th DISTRICT)

ALYSSA NAPURI (Alternate for KATRINA FOLEY, ORANGE COUNTY SUPERVISOR, 5th DISTRICT)

TED QUINN (AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY)

MARK ENMEIER (Alternate for VICTOR CABRAL, CEP VICE CHAIRMAN/MAYOR OF SAN CLEMENTE)

MICHAEL PARHAM - (VP, CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES)

VALENTINE “VAL” MACEDO (LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION of NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 89)

KELVIN BARRIOS (Alternate for VAL MACEDO LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 89)

SAM JAMMAL (CAMP PENDLETON, COMMUNITY PLANS And LIAISON OFFICER)

MARNI MAGDA - (SIERRA CLUB)

MARISOL BELL - (Alternate for JIM DESMOND, SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERVISOR, 5TH DISTRICT AND SPENT FUEL SOLUTIONS COALITION CO-CHAIR)

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON SCE REPRESENTATIVES:

FRED BAILLY - CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER AND VICE PRESIDENT OF DECOMMISSIONING

JERRY STEPHENSON - SCE INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (SFSI) ENGINEERING MANAGER

RON PONTES (SCE ENVIRONMENTAL, WASTE AND RADIATION PROTECTION MANAGER)

GUEST SPEAKERS:

RICH KALMAN, EXECUTIVE SPONSOR, SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONINGSOLUTIONS)

SCE TECHNICAL SUPPORT PRESENTERS:

JULIA MARTINEZ - Presentation Slides

GENERAL PUBLIC COMMENT

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Via Microsoft Teams, Thursday,

September 5, 2024

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Welcome today to the third meeting of the SONGS Community Engagement Panel. My name is Dan Stetson, and I am the volunteer chair of the CEP. Thank you all for joining us this afternoon.

Please note that this meeting is being recorded.

One of our main topics today is the SONGS dismantlement update by San Onofre Decommissioning Solutions, the general contractor of the Decommissioning project.

We'll also receive an update from the Spent Fuels Solutions Coalition with the co-chairs who are the leading the effort to clear SONGS site of the spent fuel. A draft presentation of these were posted about a week ago. Please thank -- let me thank Julia Martinez from SONGS for advancing the slides for us.

Next slides, please. Here you can see the agenda. We have a lot to go through today, so I think we're going to keep things moving as quickly as we can. With respect to the meeting,

timing, and format, we've made some adjustments to accommodate participant schedules and to dive right into the main topic.

I'll provide a quick recap of the DOE shake table demonstrations. Our CEP vice chair and mayor of San Clemente, Victor Cabral will provide the status on the rail line, and give us an update on the recent disruptions. The co-chairs of the Spent Fuel Solutions, Orange County Supervisors, Katrina Foley and San Diego County Supervisor Jim Desmond will share updates on the Assembly Joint Resolution Number 18 and the latest on the Canadian siting program.

SCE VP and SONGS Chief Nuclear Officer Fred Bailly will cover the big picture at SONGS and introduce Rich Kalman executive sponsor of San Onofre Decommissioning Solutions -- that's a mouthful -- will provide a dismantlement update.

After Richard's update, Jerry Stephenson, who we've heard before, SCE's engineering manager and Ron Pontes SCE's environmental waste and radiation protection manager, will cover recent topics of interest.

Following these presentations, we will take a short break and we will dedicate a full

hour to public comment.

CEP vice chair Victor Cabral and CEP Secretary Martha McNicholas will facilitate responding to any questions -- well, we have a number of questions, so they'll be responding to those and directing them to the appropriate members.

For the members of the CEP, we welcome your comments during the presentations.

Fred, first of all, I want to congratulate you on your host country's on the wonderful job on the Olympics. This year's Olympic games were really spectacular, and especially during these turbulent times they were just a joy to watch.

Anything else you would like to add regarding the agenda topics for today?

FRED BAILLY: Thank you, Dan. Yes, the Olympics were great. They were in France where I was born, and really happy coming to the U.S. where I belong as a citizen. Thanks for the comment. I will be there in 2028.

Just one comment on the agenda, you mentioned the update on the pressurizer transportation, and I want -- just wanted to say a

word on this event, even though there were no consequences to the environment or the public, and SCE received the lowest level of violation from the NRC, I want to make sure that people understand that we are taking this very seriously, and that this event is unacceptable to SCE. We'll have a discussion on that and look forward to it.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Fred.

Fred, of course, was referencing to the recent rail shipment of the pressurizers where there was a small leak of a liquid that came out. That will be covered in more detail a little bit later.

If we could move on to slide 3, please. Here you can see a list of all of our CEP members. Of course, as you know, these are all volunteers, and I want to thank each and every one of them. I won't call you out individually by name, but I want to thank each and every one of you for your participation on the panel.

Also, special thanks to Victor Cabral, he's a vice chair, and Martha McNicholas who is secretary. Once again, all of these members of the CEP form a key link and a bridge to the community. Please feel free to reach out to any

or all of us with your concerns, questions, and/or suggestions, and we will certainly bring those forward to SCE.

If we could go onto the next slide, please. Slide number 4. Today's meeting was adjusted to the early afternoon to accommodate participant schedules and is via Microsoft Teams so our guest speakers and public can participate without the commute. You may recall that our second quarter meeting at the casino in San Clemente on June 13th was a hybrid and well-attended.

Fred, any comments here?

FRED BAILLY: I think you hit on in June we had a guest speaker from the DOE Paul Murray, and we were very pleased with the turnout of the CEP and the involvement of the CEP members and the public.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, very much. Next slide please. Just a quick reminder on public comment, you will recall that we'll have a dedicated public comment period following the presentations. Here you can see the directions for participating in the public comment.

For online participation, as always,

members of the public have the opportunity to submit comments and questions in advance, and I want to thank Alice, Ace, and a few others of you who have already submitted your questions. Comments submitted by e-mail will receive priority, and that address can be found on the meeting page.

For those participating in the public comment during the meeting, number A, submit written comments and questions or sign up for oral comments using the online CEP form.

For CEP members joining online if you have a question or a comment, please raise your hand, use the icon under reactions at the top of your screen so that we can identify you and make you a presenter. And Victor and Martha, I know you will help me, because so often I miss them when the folks raise their hand.

For CEP members who join late, we may not be able to see your name on the list and change your status from a guest to a presenter, and thereby allow you to open and close your microphone. In that case, you'll have to use the raise-your-hand icon for us to see your name and make you a presenter.

For CEP members calling in, audio only, to open up and close your microphone, please use star 6 and keep yourself muted until you wish to speak.

To raise your hand by phone, CEP members should use star 5. And during the questions, as I mentioned, Martha and Victor will facilitate the public comments.

Next slide, please. Go right on to the next slide. So, yes, I was fortunate to visit UC San Diego for two demonstrations for, I believe, two of the largest shake tables in the world. During that time there were on the first one full-sized horizontal canister was subjected to an earthquake on this table to on approximately 7.5, and then the second time, one was done in the vertical position.

So both of those were tested and Congressman Levin was there, and these tests were used to demonstrate the ability of the modules to withstand seismic events. Again, they were in the range of about a 7.5 earthquake. It was really amazing to see the table shake, and they had an aquarium there filled with water to see what happened with that.

The safety and the integrity of the spent fuel was paramount, especially during seismic regions, and this has been one of the many concerns that has been raised by the general public, and this test was crucial in validating the robust and storage systems in ensuring the continued protection of public health in the environment.

They had a trailer there that was adjacent to the canisters, and they were, gosh, I don't know how many -- they told us how many miles of wires were leading into that and all of these different sensors, so they were collecting data on just about everything that you can think of.

And at the end the day the conclusion was that there would be no damage whatsoever to the spent fuel, which would be inside of those.

So, Victor, that's a quick update on that, and I think you would like to give us a quick update in terms of the rail line, if you would, please.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I will do that quickly, and I will say that the issue of the rail lines and the future of offsite shipments of SONGS spent fuel came up during one of the recent member

CEP consultation meetings. As mayor of San Clemente, I'm familiar with it, I'm briefed all the time on this, I work closely with the OCTA, which has some responsibility, along with the Department of Energy and SCE if rail lines are unavailable.

We know this past few years we've had three different incidents that have closed the rail lines for significant periods of time. There are a lot of challenges with the rail lines remaining open. OCTA and Metrolink have had those challenges and corrected all those challenges expeditiously.

We have seven mile stretch of rail line between Orange County and most of that is vulnerable because of the lack of sand and the cliffs that are next to the line so closely. In fact, as we speak today, one of the hillsides is up against our walkway and walk path trail that is the only thing that's protecting the rail line from being closed.

OCTA, I met with them this past week, they know -- they had their Orange County Transportation Authority, Regional Transportation Planning Committee, and our supervisor is doing a

great job on representing us on that committee and is a leader in that effort. So OCTA has identified and reenforced several areas since last December and is working to implement solutions for the fall of 2024. There are short term and mid term solutions being developed that will be vetted through early 2025, and the process will be completed in 2026.

There's many potential solutions, including things like more rip rap and sand, and I think for San Clemente the sand is very important, because we think that the main way to protect those rail lines. If we're looking at long time, and I think it was stated this past week, this past meeting, 30 years is when they would even start to develop the plans to move those lines if they ever got to that point.

It's a long-term solution in the interim for the next 30 years we have to protect those rail lines and the city and the state and the federal government will do everything we can to make sure those lines are open and available for use as best we can.

So that's my report on that. We're going to do as a city all we can and continue to protect

those rail lines, and we think sand replenishment is one of the ways that we'll also -- aside from the rock, the revetment. That's the report.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you very much, Victor.

Ted Quinn, I see you had your hand up. Open your microphone. There you go, Ted, thanks.

TED QUINN: Thank you, Dan. Can you hear me okay?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Yes.

TED QUINN: Very quick question to you, Dan, was there any video or any recording processed for the seismic event test that is available to the public and to us?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Yes, there are. In fact, the DOE prepared a video that has either one or both of them, and Manuel, let's make sure that those are available. I do not have if they're available right now.

MANUEL CAMACHO: They are, the videos are available.

And, Dan, we usually produce the key takeaways, and we can make sure that a link to that video is included in the key takeaways.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: In the key takeaways will include a link and send it out to everybody. Can we also post that on our website so that members of the public that may not be receiving the updates can also access that?

MANUEL CAMACHO: You bet.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I was tempted, because I actually videoed the one myself, and I was tempted to put it on right now. Thank you. In the interest of time, we'll move on.

If we could go to the next slide, please. Thank you very much. I believe we now have Supervisor Katrina Foley who is going to give us an update.

KATRINA FOLEY: Hi there, everyone. I'm Katrina Foley Orange County Supervisor and co-chair here representing the fabulous 5th district. I'm pleased to provide this update on the Canadian Spent Fuel Management program.

Spent Fuel Solutions strongly supports the Department of Energy's consent-based siting efforts and we look forward to -- we're looking toward, let's say, international best practices when considering solutions here in the United States. Canada's repository siting program

provides one successful example that's close to home.

As you may know, Canada's Nuclear Waste Management organization hopes to select from two candidate sites, the Ignace site -- I think I'm pronouncing that correctly -- and the South Bruce site for their repository by the end of 2024. So they're well ahead.

Both the candidate municipality and the affected first nations must agree for a site to move forward. Earlier this year both candidate host municipalities signed partnership agreements outlining the benefits they would receive if selected as well as the roles and responsibilities.

One of the candidate municipal hosts Ignace -- might be Ignace, I'm not sure -- recently became the first to announce its willingness to be a host based on the results of a qualitative community survey. The other candidate, community of South Bruce will hold a quantitative referendum on the issue in late October.

Each municipal government has decided for itself how to gage consent, so they did a variety

of different activities within the community to get community input and moving forward with that involvement and engagement.

The two first nations governments Wabigoon Lake Ojibway Nation and Saugeen Ojibway Nation are in negotiations to do partnership agreements and have yet to decide their willingness.

We will continue to keep you informed of this progress, which can help us inform how our own consent-based siting process might work here in the United States, and we'll keep monitoring these and follow and give you updates regularly.

Thank you all so much for the work you're doing, and we look forward to the next session.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Supervisor Foley. Yes, we can learn a lot from our neighbors up north and also a little bit from you on how to pronounce those difficult names so thank you.

KATRINA FOLEY: I'm not sure I'm the best to learn from on that.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you. That's better than I could.

Now we'll go onto the next slide, please.

And I believe we have Supervisor Jim Desmond who is also going to give us an update.

Supervisor.

JIM DESMOND: Hello. Thank you very much for having me here.

So as you know, raising awareness about our spent fuel issue and advocating for federal action on Spent Fuel Solutions, those are our key priorities. Last month during our San Diego County Board of Supervisors meeting, we shared an update on an Assembly Joint Resolution 18, a bipartisan resolution introduced by Assemblywoman Laurie Davies and Senator Catherine Blakespear in May.

This measure urges congress of the United States to prioritize fulfilling the federal government's legal and contractual obligation to provide a home for spent nuclear fuel that currently sits in California and in 33 other states across the nation. It also urges congress and the United States Department of Energy to take action to permit the consolidation of spent nuclear fuel at one or more interim storage sites and ultimately dispose of it in a permanent geological repository.

For our coalition AJR, or Assembly Joint Resolution 18, plays a dual purpose. First it sends a strong message to the federal decision makers that this is an urgent issue that requires action. Second, it serves as an important opportunity to raise public awareness, and with these goals in mind, we're pleased to announce that the Assembly Joint Resolution 18 successfully passed the Assembly in July and the Senate in the last month.

Along the way the resolution never received a no vote from either chamber. We're greatly encouraged by this strong demonstration of support and plan to continue media outreach to amplify our message through op-eds, letters to the editor, webinars, and other engagement.

We also believe that this bipartisan effort can serve as a model hopefully for other states who want to show their support for federally licensed spent fuel storage and disposal solutions.

So on behalf of the Spent Fuel Solutions, I want to thank Assembly Member Davies, Senator Blakespear for their support in this effort. That is all.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you very much, Supervisor.

Ted Quinn has a question or comment.

Ted.

TED QUINN: I do, thank you.

For Supervisor Foley, I want to ask on the Canadian process, is that an interim storage or a final storage? Did they define that yet?

ALYSSA NAPURI: Hi there, sorry. I'm Supervisor Foley's chief of staff, Alyssa Napuri, she got a phone call while hearing Supervisor Desmond's update -- not that she doesn't like your voice, Supervisor Desmond -- regarding your question about the --

JIM DESMOND: I'm offended.

ALYSSA NAPURI: Okay, well.

Regarding your question about the Canadian program, I believe that it is a permanent consent-based siting situation in Canada, but we will have them confirm with Spent Fuel Solutions and get a firm answer for the public.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Manuel, anything you want to add to that?

MANUEL CAMACHO: Sorry, Dan, I spoke over

you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: That's okay.

Anything that you would like to add?

MANUEL CAMACHO: Yeah, Alyssa is correct. The Canadian program is for a permanent deep geological repository. They are not pursuing consolidated interim storage. Of course they have a smaller volume, total volume of spent nuclear fuel than we do here in the U.S., but Alyssa is correct, as usual.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you both. Of course special thanks to Supervisors Katrina Foley and Supervisor Jim Desmond for leading the effort on the Spent Fuel Solutions. It's a big deal. This resolution is a big deal and really could be used as a model for other states. We want to thank you for your leadership in this area.

If we could please move onto the next slide.

Fred, I would like to turn it back to you and give us some updates.

FRED BAILLY: Absolutely. I'll start with principles that guide our work on the next slide. We'll start with safety is number 1. It

remains our top focus, top priority. It means being prepared for ever-changing conditions but also keeping the workers safe. We're constantly working to improve our safety on site, and that's again, our priority.

Stewardship, we are the stewards of the safe storage of our spent fuel until DOE picks it up. And we will continue to bring updates on our efforts to find a path to move the fuel off site.

On the decommissioning we have experts dedicated to dismantlement, waste packaging, transportation, and protecting the environment during the decommissioning work.

And engagement, meetings like this when we're committed to openness and public meetings. I mention, again, the onsite public walking tours. People enjoyed but it's also unique opportunity to see the progress that we've made on decommissioning, and it's also an opportunity to share the experience with friends and neighbors. The last tour we had was on August 17th, and the next public tour scheduled for this coming Saturday, September 7th.

If we go to the next slide on our big picture. So the project, number 1, project is now

65 percent complete, and it's on track for completion in late 2028. We're safely managing the used fuel as long as it remains stranded on site, and number 3, we're advocating for offsite storage and disposal solutions to allow us to clear the site of spent fuel. I'll now let Rich comment, the executive sponsor of our general contractor, give an update on decommission activities on the next slide.

Rich, you might be on mute.

RICH KALMAN: I am. Thank you, Fred. I sounded pretty good though when I was on mute.

Thanks, Fred, for the introduction. To follow up what Fred said about the pressurizer. As executive sponsor I take full ownership and responsibility for that issue. I was the one on the phone at 1 o'clock in the morning working with the people in the yard in San Bernardino, and I was the one directed the team to send the pressurizers back to SONGS.

Since then we have done a very comprehensive evaluation, implemented a lot of corrective actions, more are being implemented so that's what we do. We get better every day. I can guarantee you that a similar event will never

happen for the remainder of the SONGS project.

Ron Pontes will get into more details as we move forward in the presentation.

Next slide. So the one of the maps that gives you a general overview of the progress, everything that has been blackened out is complete. The control building, which is right on the ocean side of the blue box there was completed, and we're actively doing the demolition of the rad waste building that is the blue box there. So you see some photographs as we move forward. So good progress.

We've started aggressive demolition again, and we're shipping dry waste, a substantial amount of dry waste off the site.

Next slide. So Fred indicated that everything is built off safety, and that is true. Everything we do here, all the planning, all the scheduling, the execution of work is founded on safety. We're going to talk about safety and our management commitment. We'll getting into the decommissioning plan, waste management and environmental stewardship.

The photograph on the left-hand side is sweet for me, because that means that the RVI

project is completed, the water has been drained, and the cavity has been stripped of its protective coating, and I love to see stainless steel on the cavity, because that's where we want to be. This is all in preparation of starting unit 3 reactor vessel, which we have started.

Next slide. As far as --

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Rich, real quick, you've given a couple of acronyms, as you go along, if you could please instead of using acronyms, tell us what they stand for.

RICH KALMAN: I think we have 200 pages of acronyms here, believe it or not. The worker safety and safety culture is founded on the left side of the program and the culture. You've seen me present this before. We are still actively pursuing a VPP status through CalOSHA. It's been a challenge, because they -- we're trying to get them involved. They seem to be, I don't know, less engaged as what we would expect them to be. We're working on it.

The workers are engaged in everything we do. The workers do the work. They're the foundation of the whole safety culture. It starts with them.

And then myself and all my leadership steam are out there interfacing with workers on a daily basis listening to their advice and counsel. If they have issues, we're immediately resolving the issues out in the field.

Continuously learning and improving everything we do with respect to the safety and, of course, setting our safety goals at zero across the board.

When you do that, you get the results you see on the right side. We have 2.3 million person hours without a lost time accident. We have 705,000 without an OSHA recordable. The performance has been excellent. As you remember, we were challenged a few years ago. We've really focused on what the issues were, and we've implemented the right corrective actions and the proof is in the pudding, as they say.

We have an EMR modifier, insurance modifier rate of 0.35, which the industry average in California is a 2.0, so that's excellent safety performance.

We celebrate that by our safety luncheons. We have executive summits with executives on the SDS and SCE side, which have

been very productive. We got the craft involved, we got the craft foreman involved. These are all the key ingredients to develop the right safety culture at SONGS. And it's proving out to be well worth the effort quite honestly.

Next slide. So a management commitment. We have a lot of repetitive and first of a kind work tasks. Repetitive would be 5500 rail cars shipping off site, we do that every day. First of a kind would be, as an example, we're starting the first RV in unit 3, first of a kind here. There's a heightened focus and awareness on a first of a kind efforts.

Increased presence in the field. The more time you're in the field, the closer you are to the work, the more you get a pulse on what the real issues are -- that exist out there, and the people on the field are more comfortable approaching you with their issues and concerns.

So accountability up and down the line. That's what you need. And then we're always challenging the staff to be proactive. So all this is -- I'm pleased to say that the project has really turned and the last couple years have been extremely safe on SONGS. It's one of the safer

jobs in California, if not, in the active large complex jobs in California, if not the whole country at this point in time. And that's not because of me, that's because everyone that's engaged in fostering the right safety culture here at SONGS.

Next slide. Okay. So that's -- I know there's certain people that like photographs. That's the active demolition. You've got three excavators, the high reach on the left, then two others. That's the control building, wrecking the control building, that is now complete, and the building behind that was the building in blue, which was the radwaste building.

Next slide. So I love to see blue, that means progress. You see blue on the demo, the aux buildings, that's the control building. We have a little blue in the next line, which is the unit 2 and 3 RV segmentation. We started the installation of the equipment on the unit 3 RV. You'll see some photographs of that later. We're still holding the end date of December 2028.

Next slide. So as far as overall progress the way SDS calls it, is the reactor vessel overall about 73 percent, reactor vessel

internals 100 percent. That's very difficult challenging work, that's behind us.

Building equipment removals, 100 percent complete, a lot of safety challenges there, that's behind us. Turbine and intake structure, substantial amount of work, behind us, and of course the spent fuel racks are complete also.

With respect to the D&D waste shipments, about 31 percent. It's predominantly concrete and steel at this point, and it all goes to Clive in Utah.

Containment, large components removal, about 71 percent, and we've started the reactor vessel about 4 percent on that. We're sort of seeing, like let's call it the light at the end of the tunnel, with respect with a lot of this work, and it will be really focused on structural building demolition from now until the end of 2027.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Rich, could you stop for a second. Ted Quinn has a question for you.

RICH KALMAN: Sure, Ted.

TED QUINN: My question is about Unit 2 versus Unit 3, when you give percentages, are you

equally applying to both sides? Is that how you process it?

RICH KALMAN: Yes. As far as the overall project percent complete, that's what we do, yes.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

RICH KALMAN: As an example, RVI is complete in both -- it's almost complete in Unit 2, and 100 percent in Unit 3, it's close to 100 percent.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: About how many railroad cars we estimate this has been so far?

RICH KALMAN: We shipped about -- I think there's a slide on that, don't quote me on this, but I think it's about 1200 rail cars that have been shipped off site to date of a total of about 5500.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Wow. Thank you.

RICH KALMAN: Of course you know all the RV cars go south, and then they go north along that rail that the mayor of San Clemente has a picture of so -- next slide.

So as far as 4th quarter focus areas, number 1 is safety, of course always is. ALARA is continuing to deliver the best performance with respect to ALARA, which is keeping the dose down

as low as possible, and then in 2024 setting a goal of less than 160 rems. We have some dose work left, the generators in the RV, but once we get through that, the yearly dose goal should be substantially lower than that.

With respect to the environmental, maintaining the excellent environmental compliance, we've had no environment compliance violations. Protecting the environment we successfully managed another bird season here at SONGS, so we got through that. We always are concerned about that.

So you can see the continued shipping of waste. It's picking up again now, and then continuing to implement focus from the control demolition. So that's the demolition that you saw the picture of. That is leading towards what we call -- some people call it open air demolition, we call it control demolition. They're the demolition of, let's say, non-clean, or if they're contaminated, it's a very, very low level but we have to additional safeguards in that area now that we're into the so-called nuclear island.

Licensed termination plan, that's well along. That's with SCE, and we're advancing the

critical path which is the longest path on the project, which is through the control building demolition and the start of the radwaste building demolition.

Right behind that is the secondary critical path, which is RV on the unit 3 side.

Next slide. And here's some pictures. On the left is we drain the cavity down. That blue that you see on the cavity walls is a protective coating. That is strippable, so we peel that so any type of surface contamination comes off with the coating, and that is drummed up and shipped off to Clive. And when you go through that entire process on the left, you yield what it looks like on the right. Clean cavity, stairway installed, getting ready to start the RV segmentation, which is underneath that white cover there. That's where the reactor vessel is.

Next slide. Here's the guys in their pack, and they're down there cleaning, sponging, squeezing the water. You can see the guy on the right pulling the protective coating off. It peels, it's strippable, which is exactly what you want. They've done a great job on Unit 3. That's behind us at this point.

Next slide. Here are the pressurizers that Fred talked about and I talked about. This is the down-ending operation. So it's fairly substantial effort that you have to go from the vertical to the horizontal position. The pressurizes weigh about 200,000 pounds. It's quite the operation when you get them from vertical to horizontal.

Next slide. This is the surgical removal of a section of the steam generator. Now the -- a generator weighs 1.2 million pounds. Each one of these sections, they're the tube sections there, about 10 to 15,000 pounds, so we segment the generators in place, so there's roughly 80 segmented pieces that are cut with oxylances and then lowered into the sealands that lowered into gondolas, that are surveyed and released and shipped off to Clive.

That's going well on the unit -- losing my units here -- Unit 2 just about done. The two balls are left, and we're working the other two generators on the 3 side. Good progress on generators.

Next slide. This is the reactor coolant pump. They weigh about 110,000 pounds each. So

we've pulled three of them out of unit -- I always get my units confused here -- Unit 3. We have one more to go and four in the other unit. So we've done everything.

We've implemented the corrective actions that we learned about the pressurizer, make sure that there was no leakable water coming out of the reactor coolant pumps prior to shipment, and they'll be verified as ready to ship.

Next slide. So this is sort of someone asked me a question, 1.094 million pounds, 339 million shipped off the site, 5500 railcars, I was pretty close. 1212 shipped off to date. So we have 4288 left to go. Still a lot of work, about 22 percent through the railcar shipments off site.

Next slide. On the environmental stewardship side, you can see some of the -- our friends, our visitors, owls and ospreys and roadrunners. It's nice to look out your window and see these beautiful creatures. That's the benefit of seeing these here at SONGS. I don't have the luxury of seeing these on the East Coast.

Next slide. So with respect to this stewardship, as you know, everyone that comes here is trained in environmental awareness. We take it

serious. We talk about the nesting birds and the management. We work closely with federal, state and local agencies. We monitor the water discharged the air and excavation monitoring. You'll see signs of that water. Implementation of the storm water management practices.

We went through the -- my understanding is they were classified as 500-year storms in January. We made it through that. We had really no major issues that's good stormwater management, that's a good indication of how serious we take it here. And then we minimize truck traffic. That's why you see so many railcar, because each railcar eliminates the six truck trips and that reduces the carbon footprint on the project.

Next slide. So from the environmental stewardship you can see the spraying of water. That's done to control the silica dust. When you hammer concrete you generate silica, so you want to keep it and control it. Wetting it forces it to drop to the ground, so we have pretty stringent requirements in OSHA with respect to the control the silica.

So you can see the high reach spray nozzles there and the excavators getting in the

wrecking control building, so next slide.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Real quickly, Rich, does the water just evaporate, or is it enough of it where it collects somewhere?

RICH KALMAN: We only utilize -- we don't use more water than will evaporate in a day. When we spray, we control it, and we minimize and reduce it, so we want it to evaporate. We do have contingent plans if we're in this type of demolition and we get the heavy rains we experienced in January. We do have contingency plans on how we would monitor the water at that point.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

RICH KALMAN: Next slide. That's July 2022 on the left, and sort of what we look like now from that same vantage point. A lot of progress. It continues to be a very clean, organized, safe project. We do have our challenges, but that's what it's all about is meeting the challenges and overcoming them and advancing the ball and getting the project done safely.

Next slide. And we close out with some of our environmental FSS technicians doing some

surveys for site characterization and they're wearing protective clothing to protect them from the elements, a lot of bees, a lot of things that we need to protect them from. They've done a very, very good job.

That's all I have at this point.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Thanks. We have a couple of questions.

RICH KALMAN: Okay.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: First, Victor is that you?

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: No, not me.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I can't see the name.

Manuel, can you help me? It's says ME.

MANUEL CAMACHO: Mark Enmeier.

MARK ENMEIER: Sorry, I'm unmuting myself and turn on the camera.

My question is about the nuclear waste going out into the ocean, and if you could speak a little bit more to that, and what protections there are for that. Then I've also heard some complaints that there's no warning to any of the beachgoers at San Onofre when these -- when these are happening out in the ocean.

RICH KALMAN: Yeah, I think Ron Pontes is going to get into that in some detail. Our releases are planned, they're measured. We do a lot of pretreatment before we release them. They have to meet a certain standard before we release them. We do it in batches so it's roughly 100,000 gallons batch. All the release dates are on the website, so we announce it -- SCE announces the releases well in advance of the day of the release.

MARK ENMEIER: I understand the announcements are going out well in advance online. My concern is for the beachgoers down at San Onofre are most likely not on these websites and being informed of that. Is there a way to get better information to them as they're going on the beach at San Onofre that, Hey, this release is happening on this day, you should be aware of that?

RICH KALMAN: I certainly would defer that answer to SCE so they could follow up on that one.

RON PONTES: I'm going to cover that a little bit later in the presentation. This is Ron Pontes. We'll do our best to answer your

question.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you very much.

Ted, I think you had a question or comment.

TED QUINN: Question for Rich, had to do the emergency diesel generators on the polar crane. Are those -- are the diesel generators gone now, and is the polar crane in operation and that also not used anymore?

RICH KALMAN: The EDGs are gone, the polar cranes are used, and we actually came off the diesels and we are feeding them from the substation here at SONGS. So we put in what we call the sun dark there, we killed the power at the plant, and then we brought dedicated separate power to feed the loads that we need during demolition.

TED QUINN: You'll use that up until a certain point?

RICH KALMAN: We'll use them until we're ready to get rid of them, yes.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

RICH KALMAN: They'll come down with the dome, when we drop the dome, the cranes will be

inside, de-energized. And actually what we'll do is we'll take the energy out of the polar cranes, we'll partially cut through the beams, we'll release the stored energy before we drop the domes.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

Martha, you must have been happy. We saw a lot of destruction pictures today.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: The only thing better would be a video instead of the stills. I still liked it. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Maybe we'll get a video time lapse of all these things as we go along.

Just want to turn quickly to our other CEP members to see if there are any questions or comments before we move on to the next section?

Okay. And we'll get some questions, of course, from the public after the presentation so, Alice, don't go away. We got you. In fact, you're up early in the public section.

RICH KALMAN: I think Fred mentioned that the public walking tours --

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Yes.

RICH KALMAN: -- there's a lot of them here. But when the public comes through, there's a bird's eye view of the work face here at SONGS. So they tour -- the people in the tour have an upfront and personal view of the work face on the radwaste building, so they see it up close and personal when they come through.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I know that team volunteers are happy to ask any questions that come along. So seeing no additional questions, we're going to move onto Jerry Stephenson then.

Jerry, are you there?

JERRY STEPHENSON: Yes, I am.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay.

JERRY STEPHENSON: Good afternoon. I'm going to give an update on the spent fuel storage outlet vent covers.

Next slide, please. These are on our Holtec system, which is the vertical system. The -- here's a picture of what it looks like. So the canisters are just off the bottom of the slide to the bottom. The heat from them comes up through so the bottom layer is the concreted steel lid. There's a tortuous path through there. You can follow the arrows as the heat comes up through

there, okay. Then after you get through that bottom layer that's got triangles and dots on it, that's steel and concrete, now you're in the original outlet vent covers.

So all the gray lines are the original equipment. The dark black lines are what we're adding. So you can see these dark black lines up at the top, that's the outlet vent cover. The straight vertical lines that's not meant to represent a 360 degree circle, that's just to support.

So as you follow the flow up through the concrete and steel tortuous path, then it gets into the original outlet, those blue rectangles, that represents the screens that the heat comes out, then it turns back up and goes out the top. I think some people thought that these outlet vent covers were closed on the top, they're open on the top. Rain that comes in through the top will hit the original vent cover top and drip harmlessly off.

These outlet vent covers are designed to prevent wind driven rain from going in the screens on the side. A little bit of rain going in on the side is generally consistent with the design. You

know, it will tell us it wasn't designed to be waterproof, here on the coastal environment we decided we wanted keep every bit of rain out that we could, so we put these outlet vent covers on. We're proactively installing these ourself to increase weather resistance. They're engineered and designed so that they do not impact air flow or cooling.

You can see the flow path that I went through with you provides the same amount of air flow and cooling. In fact, if you know about chimneys, having a taller chimney can actually increase air flow. So they do not require NRC review prior to installation. We did not have to contact the NRC and ask for approval. However, the California Coastal Commission deemed that this change should be documented as immaterial amendment to our coastal permit.

Next slide, please. So that was done. The California Coastal Commission published that permit for public comments, and they did receive a few comments, they addressed those comments at the July 12, 2024, Coastal Commission meeting. The immaterial amendment to our coastal development permit was approved.

So a few days later on the 17th we received approval to install them and we started installing them on the 17th -- or the 26th, and we plan to have them all installed by November 1st, beginning of the rainy season. So we're very happy to be installing these. We're proud that we're proactively doing everything we can to keep the canisters warm and dry and happy.

Any questions from the CEP members?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Any questions?

I was down there last week. Jerry, you were kind enough to drag me around. Thank you again for that. We saw a number of them in place.

Ted Quinn.

TED QUINN: Yeah, Jerry, just very quick, we would define this as not a safety-related change. This is an augmented self-imposed but not -- no regulatory approval, right, that's what we would view it?

JERRY STEPHENSON: Correct. The lid is an important safety component. I'm not sure, frankly, I'm not sure if this was qualified as important safety or not, but the installation of them did not require NRC approval. Now, we can make changes to important safety equipment without

NRC approval if it doesn't impact safety.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Ted.

Jerry, of course these were -- I mean the structure originally was designed and built by Holtec. Were they involved in these additions at all?

JERRY STEPHENSON: Yes. Holtec owns the design. They got a very strong staff of engineers, more Ph.D.s than I think any engineering staff I worked with, and they own the thermal analysis. They did the computer runs to confirm that the thermal analysis was not affected.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: That's a good point. That would certainly be something to be considered, so thank you for that additional information.

Any additional questions or comments from our CEP members?

Not only that, they look good.

Thank you, Jerry.

JERRY STEPHENSON: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Next turn to Ron Pontes. Are you there, Ron?

RON PONTES: I am here, Dan. Can you all hear me?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Loud and clear.

RON PONTES: Super. Okay. We're going to start with a discussion about the exclusion area boundary and its elimination. When we were operating the plant, Edison had the ability under its license in the event of a reactor accident to control activities within an area that's about 200 feet around each one of the reactors. If you look over to the right, you can see that green line, that oval, that represented boundary of the exclusion area.

Now with the plant's permanently shut down, all the spent fuel and dry storage and Greater-Than-Class C material safely stored in dry storage, those kind of accidents can't occur any more. And as such, the EAB was eliminated from our procedures on June 6, 2024. Why is that -- why does that matter? That means that now the public has unrestricted access to all the areas that were outside of our licensed area, where before we could exert some control over activities in those areas.

Interestingly, the Coastal Commission

when the Coastal Commission's requirement for the beach walkway, which is in front of the plant or the westerly side of the plant, that stems from the Coastal Development Permit that was approved for operating SONGS back in the '80s. That CDP required the walkway due to the existence of an exclusion area around the plant.

Because the EAB would be eliminated, we worked with Coastal Commission staff to continue our commitment to maintain the walkway until decommissioning is fully complete, and we're removing the sea wall and walkway one day in the future. That commitment now is secured to a coastal commission approval of a CDP immaterial amendment that happened back in June. That was concurrent with the amendment that Jerry was just discussing about the covers on the Holtec system.

So unless there's a questions, I'm going to move on.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Question.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Martha.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: This is Martha. With the exclusionary boundary, SONGS was required to maintain that pathway for access to the ocean. Without the exclusionary boundary in theory, SONGS

wouldn't have to maintain that, but the Coastal Commission asks us to or required us to?

RON PONTES: Yeah, it's interesting the way this developed. Originally when we were working with California State Lands Commission for the environmental impact report that they were developing for the decommissioning that we're performing now, this matter came up in their discussions with Coastal Commission. Coastal Commission was a little bit concerned that we might abandon our commitment to the walkway once this EAB was removed, mainly because of the way they had administered that original CDP, the language in the original CDP for operating the plant. We never had any idea that we would not maintain the walkway. We would maintain it regardless, but they wanted us to secure an agreement with them that we would continue to maintain the walkway and, you know, put it in writing and make it official. That was the nature of this immaterial amendment.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay so the plan was all along to continue to maintain the walkway but the amendment was just basically codifying it saying yes we promise we will.

RON PONTES: That's right.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: That's how I understood it. Thanks for the clarification.

RON PONTES: You're welcome.

Let's go to the next slide.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: This is Victor. I have a question too, just -- I mean, the walkway is in very close proximity to the storage of the fuel, the canisters. Is that a concern losing our ability to, you know, exclude people in that area if there's a necessity?

RON PONTES: No, because there's no accident that can happen now that would require us to remove anyone from that area, okay, where we exercise our authority to demand that they be removed.

There is another smaller exclusionary, if you will, it's called the controlled area boundary. That's required by regulation, and that is around the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation itself, that facility. That controlled area boundary is entirely within the licensed area of the plant. It doesn't go outside into areas where the public has access. So that's why we don't have to have that.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: My question is not so much of the protection of the individuals, but for the protection of the materials stored there.

RON PONTES: No. The whole idea behind the exclusionary boundary and controlled area boundary is to ensure members of the public would not become exposed to higher levels of radiation if we had a reactor accident. That's the whole idea. It's not about protecting the ISFSI from folks outside.

We have a very well-defined perimeter around the ISFSI that is managed by our security team, and that's what protects the ISFSI from a security prospective.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I understand there's a separate security protocol, I wondered if that -- our losing control over this would change our ability to protect the fuel also.

RON PONTES: No, not at all.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: All right.

RON PONTES: There's another question.

Michelle?

MICHELLE ANDERSON: Just statement. To let you know, so Orange County emergency manager Michelle Anderson.

It is actually something that was discussed with local law enforcement when that modification was going to be made, because if there is the need to close that area, so it is something that local law enforcement has discussed and is prepared to address should issues arise.

RON PONTES: That's right.

Okay. Any more questions?

Let's move on then. Let's go to the next slide.

Okay. Dan, I think you asked for this slide. Really wasn't planning to include this originally, but here it is. I think you wanted an update on our action that are required in the future for the specific conditions in the ISFSI CDPs.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

RON PONTES: Is that right?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Correct.

RON PONTES: Okay. So both CDPs contain similar requirements to return to the Coastal Commission in year 2035, to provide an evaluation of the current coastal hazards -- "current" meaning at that time -- an analysis where the ISFSIs -- an analysis of where the ISFSIs could be

relocated either off site or on site if ever needed.

So you can see a summary there on the slide what comes out of those two special conditions, one for the Holtec CDP in 2015, and another for the recent 2022 new homes CDP Special Condition 4.

So by 2035 we're going to have a better understanding of what's going on with coastal hazards, really meaning a particular emphasis and understanding on what's happening with sea level rise, and we'll know a lot more about the prospects for getting the fuel off site, what that looks like, because in 2035 if the fuel is not all gone, it's likely still be here in my opinion, maybe we're moving some of it, but it's not all gone. We'll know more about, you know, getting it off site. If we can't move it off site timely and there's some problem with the coastal hazards, then, you know, that might -- that would inform, you know, moving it at some later time.

But in 2035 we'll come back and we'll say, if we need to move it ever in the future, we can move it here -- and here, when I say "here" is really where the Unit 2 and 3 power plants exist

today on that plot of land would be probably about the only place that we could move them to that's higher in elevation and farther away from the ocean.

So that's what we'll be -- we'll prepare an amendment. It will be informed by what we know about both those matters, and we'll get that in front of the coastal commission in 2035.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: So Ron, just in summary, then, should Coastal Commission come back and say that you need to move it, you would then prepare the site where the two domes are now, move it over to that site, out of where it is now and then, of course, I'm assuming, then, that you would sue the federal government and reclaim the costs for that from the judgment fund; is that accurate?

RON PONTES: Yeah, that would be how that would work out. I do not foresee the Coastal Commission demanding that the ISFSI be removed in 2035. I think what we'll be telling them is we could move it to this area if it's ever necessary to do so. And you know, that would be informed by what's happening with the sea level rise again.

You know, we don't know enough today to

make that kind of judgment. But I think in the future in 2035, it's only 11 years from now, we'll know a bit more, and we'll know a bit more about prospects for getting the fuel moved off site, which is the right thing to do. Moving the fuel on site, very costly, not the main reason but it's also risky. You got to move all those fuel canisters again into a new system. If you're going to move them, move them one time somewhere else. That's kind of our position.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Right. So this is just a contingency, depending upon that the Coastal Commission says there needs to be a move, and then SCE is prepared and has the area where it could be moved at a higher elevation?

RON PONTES: Correct, yeah.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Let's move on.

RON PONTES: Go to the next slide.

Okay. Let's get to slide 41. Okay. So on these next slides I'm going to focus on the shipment of the Unit 2 pressurizer. I think most folks are aware that there was a small leak that was identified while we were transporting the Unit 2 pressurizer towards Clive, Utah.

While it was parked at a rail yard in

San Bernardino a leak was identified. I'm going to describe the leak, the actions that were taken, the prompt actions that were taken, and the investigation that was performed afterwards, after the pressurizers were returned to SONGS.

If you look at that photograph on the right, it shows the Unit 2 and 3 pressurizers at SONGS before they started their journey to Clive, Utah for disposal. You'll see that the pressurizers are secured to the railcar and are in a horizontal position.

Just take note, it' a little bit hard to see in the photograph, but that pressurizer that's in the forward part of the picture on the right-hand side of it, you'll note that there's a manway, that manway is in a down position or 180-degree position. That's kind of -- that's an interesting point to remember as I go through these other slides.

These pressurizers were being shipped as what we call a surface contaminated object or SCO shipment. What that means that they would -- that the vessel itself serves as their own shipping package. They're not encased in other box or anything like that. Recognize that these are big

vessels that are about 37 feet tall, about 10 feet in diameter, give or take, and they weigh, like, about 100 tons or 200,000 pounds, very heavy components.

To meet the DOT shipping requirements, an SCO package must be dry, must be leak tight, and the external surfaces have to be decontaminated to meet the shipping requirements.

So the Unit 2 pressurizer was transported off site on June 27th. The Unit 3 followed a couple days later, two days later. Both pressurizers were moved forward to a rail yard in San Bernardino arriving there the morning of June 30th.

I will note the Unit 2 pressurizer spent about two days at the Steward Mesa Rail Yard at Oceanside before it was moved up to San Bernardino. So it did make a stop somewhere else.

So on June 30th later that evening at around 7:30 p.m., a rail yard worker noticed a small leak from the Unit 2 pressurizer manway. It was dripping about one drop every two minutes by his count. He took prompt action to control the leak, in other words, he put a berm around it so it wouldn't leak off the railcar, notifies

management, and his management, in turn, notified the San Bernardino Fire Department, a first responder, and the shipper Energy Solutions. The California Office of Emergency Services, Cal OES was also notified by the rail company.

The San Bernardino Fire Department did respond quickly. They took some radiation measurements of the package in the area around the railcar. We're not aware that the fire department expressed any concerns about the leak. Cal OES did what it normally does. The watch office there notified other state and federal agencies, you know, like California Department of Public Health, DTSE, USEPA, among several other agencies that they also notified. That all happened that evening. Energy Solutions, they're the shipper, once they found out about this event from the rail company, they dispatched an initial response team that evening. So late that evening, you know, getting around midnight or early in the morning the next day, that team arrived on site. They confirmed that the leakage was confined to the railcar, nothing leaked to the ground, the team took radiation measurements and smears to characterize the leak. Measurements of the smears

using very sensitive radiation detector showed readings less than background radiation levels.

So they took the smears, they took them someplace else away from the pressurizer, low background radiation levels, and they read the smears or measured them.

On July 1st SDS dispatched a second team, so this is the next morning now, we rolled into the next morning, they dispatched a team here from the SONGS site to perform additional surveys, stopped the leak and cleanup the railcar. The surveys performed by the team were more comprehensive in detail than that initial team that arrived early in the morning, but like the initial surveys, no readings above background were found on, around, or near the railcar.

Okay. So at no time was there any risk to the public health or public and no public declarations were made.

We also looked at the Unit 3 pressurizer, it was there too, and there was no leakage found on the Unit 3 pressurizer. The leak was stopped, the manway was sealed, and then both pressurizers were returned to the site on July 4th very early in the morning.

Go on to the next slide. Okay. So most of the information I've already covered on the previous slide. We entered that condition, the leak into our corrective action program and formally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 1st.

And then over the next couple of weeks the NRC reviewed that condition, concluding that the Unit 2 pressurizer package did not confirm to NRC or DOT shipping requirements, and they issued to us two severity level 4 non-cited violations. One because the package was not leak tight, which I'll explain a bit more why that was, and another because the package should have been dry, and I'll explain why it wasn't dry here in a moment.

I just want to pause here a second. Whether we had received these violations or not, or you know, they are the lowest level or whether they were more serious violations, regardless of what would have happened in that respect, we were very concerned about this event. Okay. We're taking it very seriously, in fact, when I got the phone call, similar to Rich, Rich Kalman, I was going why is there a water in the pressurizer? How can that be?

Okay. So let's go to the next slide.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Ron, before you leave, is the material inside the pressurizer is that radioactive?

RON PONTES: Yeah, we're going to talk about that now. Let's go to the next slide, Dan.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

RON PONTES: Okay. What did our investigation find? I'll start by saying that the SONGS pressurizers are designed to be self-draining, that any water that would be held up inside the pressurizer was completely unexpected. I was totally blown away when I was told that there was water inside the pressurizer, and it was leaking out, not only because it was an SCO shipment, but because I couldn't understand how there could be any water inside the pressurizer.

Let me explain a little bit. If you look at the image there in the middle, that's a cartoon of a reactor coolant system. You see the reactor, see the pressurizer in the middle, see a steam generator on the right, reactor coolant pump down at the bottom. The pressurizer is connected to the reactor coolant system through a nozzle, which

is called a surge line, and water goes in and out of that pressurizer when we're operating. Typically it's pretty stable, water it not moving, you fill it up, you pressurize the system, we operate the plant at 2,000 psi and steady state. Then we shut down the plant, we're going to do a refuelling, we're going to drain the pressurizer at some point.

Water drains out. It drains out through -- if you look at the image on the right -- you'll see in purple what's called a thermal sleeve, and that thermal sleeve has got an inside diameter of about 10 inches. Water goes in and out of that pipe, if you will, through the thermal sleeve.

Now, what's interesting and why I said it was self-draining is because by design there's three little holes installed near the bottom -- well, kind of in the middle but near the bottom of the vessel where the thermal sleeve protrudes through it. Those holes are about a quarter inch in diameter, and they're there so that any water that doesn't drain out through the thermal sleeve, through the top of it there, will drain completely out of the pressurizer.

Now, I've replaced -- I've worked on three pressurizers very similar to this early in my career where we had to do work on the bottom head to repair some nozzles. We drain the pressurizer, just like we've done here, and when you pull the nozzles or you pull the heaters out of the nozzles, there was no water coming out, and they were the same exact design that we have here at SONGS. Anyway, so by design it should have drained, it didn't drain.

Let's see here. So if you look on the left-hand side all the words here, these bullet points, this is what we found after we brought the pressurizers back to the site and opened them up. The Unit 2 pressurizer thermal sleeve weep holes unexpectedly blocked leading to retention of about 190 gallons of water from the reactor coolant system.

You asked if the water was radioactive, Dan, it was reactor coolant. Yes, inside the reactor coolant is contamination, corrosion products, things like cobalt 60. So there is a little bit of contamination in that water.

The Unit 3 pressurizer was dry. So the weep holes weren't blocked over there. It drained

as expected and as designed. Okay. One thing I should point out, I mentioned the size of this vessel 37 feet tall, 10 feet in diameter. The total capacity of that thing is about 16,500 gallons. When he found out that there was water inside the pressurizer, we were trying to -- before we even got them back here to the plant, we were trying to understand why is there water.

So we looked at the drawings, we understood there were supposed to be weep holes, and the only thing we could imagine was maybe the weep holes were blocked some way. If they were blocked, we asked ourselves, how much water would be there, and it was about 190 gallons. We had that number going into the investigation that Rich Kalman's team performed when they opened the pressurizer up. We found water inside the pressurizer.

Rich's team pumped the water out, and we measured how much was removed. Guess what? 190 gallons. Right on the money. So that kind of confirmed the theory that these weep holes weren't, in fact, open like they should be. Either they were not installed correctly to begin with many years ago by the manufacturer of these

components or somehow they became blocked by sediment or something like that at the bottom of the pressurizer.

Actually, we don't know, but I can tell you, they're blocked because the water didn't come out.

So the other thing, why did the manway leak? Well, the gaskets weren't installed on the manway? Why was that? That's because when we shut the plant down, and we shut the plant down in 2012. We had the steam generator problems. We were trying to get the plant restarted, and then finally in the middle of 2013, we said no more, we're going to go to decommissioning.

At that point the manway was put back on. We're not going to ever restart the plant. It's going to be shut down forever, and we're going to take it apart and decommission it. The manway covers were put back on and bolted in place but without the gaskets. That's how we reinstalled the manway covers.

And you fast-forward to the decommissioning process where in around the year 2020, and we've turned the plant over to SDS, Rich Kalman's team, and what's one of the first steps

they take, they drain the reactor coolant system. They drain all the water out of it, and then between 2020 and 2023, they cut up the reactor coolant piping. That red piping you see there, they hacked it out of there, they packaged it all up, they send it to Clive, Utah for disposal. So the pressurizer is sitting there severed from the reactor coolant system.

In 2023 Rich's team closes it. And what I mean by closing it, they installed a steel plate on the bottom in that surge line nozzle, and they welded it closed, and the other connections to the pressurizer that had been severed for the spray line and the safety valves and so on, those were also plates were installed over those, and those were welded closed. That's 2023.

So the thought process by the workers including people like me, was the pressurizer was drained, it's empty. Now we're counting on SDS to make sure that it's properly sealed and leak tight, and there were some mistakes made there. They didn't verify if the manway was properly installed with a gasket, so that's what led to the leakage from the manway later.

So when it left the site, you saw those

earlier photographs from Rich's presentation. You can see the pressurizer being down-ended out of the containment building onto the railcars, with the manway in the down position, which was fine if you're expecting no water to be in there, and the manway to be sealed. That water that had been remaining in there now is no longer looking like it looks on the right-hand side here, it flowed out through the middle of the vessel, it spread out. As it was moved, it sloshed into the manway nozzle. Okay.

Then it leaves the site, and it travels from here up to San Bernardino. And what's different about here and San Bernardino? Here we're in the coastal environment. It's not that hot over here, but you get up to San Bernardino, you got temperatures up in the 90s, and it's sitting out in the sun.

So there is a slight pressure build up inside the vessel, and that helps drive some of water out through the manway, because it doesn't have a gasket in it. So the water finds its way to each one of those studs and leaks out. So that's the story about why there was water in it, shouldn't have been there, and why it leaked.

Okay.

Remember, it's an SCO package, supposed to be dry, supposed to be leak tight, but it had water in it, and it was not leak tight. So that's the big picture here.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Martha?

RON PONTES: Any questions on that? That was a lot of talking.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Martha has one.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: That water has been there for at least three years?

RON PONTES: It's been there since 2013.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: It's been there for ten years?

RON PONTES: Yeah.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: So the -- I don't want to say mistake, but the not having been fully drained was an issue ten years ago, not something last month? You discovered it last month but --

RON PONTES: That's right.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay.

RON PONTES: The folks we have working here in the decommission organization, my organization, the folks that work with me, the folks that work with Jim Peattie, we did not have

memory of the problem of the pressurizer not draining when we are operating that plant. We just didn't have that resident here in our organization.

Now, after this event occurred and there's been some interviews in SDS's organization but some ex-SCE folks, there is some institutional memory that there was some difficulty with Unit 2's pressurizer when they were pulling pressurizer heaters, but that would have been a long time ago. It certainly wasn't in the forefront of anybody's mind when this thing was getting packaged and prepared for shipment.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Thank you.

RON PONTES: Here's one thing I want you to take away from what I'm telling you, so it was unexpected that the water was there, but really, we should have looked inside the pressurizer. We should have looked so we knew that it was dry, and that didn't happen. It was assumed to be dry because that's how it's supposed to drain. Okay.

So we could have done a better job by looking inside, and that's what we're doing on any other components like those reactor coolant pumps that are being prepared for shipment. Richard's

team is putting big holes in those things and looking inside all the nooks and crannies to make sure there's no water left in them before they leave here. They're going out in a package. They'll be in a box of sorts, so they'll be contained that anyway, so shouldn't be any water in those objects either.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Ted?

TED QUINN: Yeah, Ron, a question is really I think you're covering it, what are the corrective action? Can you give a few steps on what the corrective action includes? You mentioned reactor coolant pumps, and if you can cover pressurizer as well, thanks.

RON PONTES: On the next page I think that's where that is, next slide. Okay. These are the big picture corrective actions. There's way more than this. There's a lot of other things that are happening as well.

So we removed the water from the pressurizer. We put desiccant inside both pressurizers. Desiccant is an absorbant material. Think of kitty litter, right, so if there's any traces amount of liquid, it's going to be

absorbed. We have positively verified that both pressurizers are dry. We put a camera in there and looked all over the inside of it. In fact, Rich went as far -- his team went as far as rolling the pressurizer to make sure that any water that might be trapped someplace would get drained. Okay. So that's what we've done to the pressurizer.

You see that the black thing -- you'll notice the manway sticking up on this photograph in the right, we sealed that manway. So this sealing method that SDS has installed here will meet DOT transportation requirements, closure requirements, sealing, leak tight, okay. So that's how we're sealing up that manway. That's the pressurizer.

Now about other -- we're not expecting any more SCO shipments to leave here. It just happened that those are the last type of shipments. The only other one that we shipped was the Unit 1 reactor vessel. Remember a few years ago when we moved it out of here. That was the only other SCO that I'm aware.

Again, I don't think we're shipping any more. Everything else will be boxed up or

containerized somehow. But like the reactor coolant pumps, the seal housings on the reactor coolant pumps have a lot of nooks and crannies in them. We have been telling SDS you need to figure out how you get inside those things or remove them to make sure that there's no liquid caught up in there, even a little bit of liquid.

And they're cutting holes inside the volutes to make sure that the inside of the pumps are, in indeed, empty as well. They are taking those additional steps.

Now, the other things that aren't mentioned on here are more administrative-type things and some cultural training that's going to happen to make sure that we -- all of us, us on my side with the oversight and on Rich's team with the implementation -- that we have the right culture about a questioning attitude.

In other words, let's stop the assumptions and let's look so we know before we ship something out of here, okay. Fortunately, for us this was a small leak. It was captured on a railcar. It doesn't result of a spread of contamination off the railcar. That's all great, but you know, it could have been a bit worse had

this thing tumbled off the railcar, there had been an accident and all the water came out someplace, not that that would have been a huge deal, but that would have been a problem as well.

I don't know if I'm answering your question there, Ted?

TED QUINN: You covered it. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Michelle, you had your hand up earlier. Do you have a question, or do you want to make a comment?

MICHELLE ANDERSON: Sure, two things. The first part being a comment. One, I do want to thank Edison for making the notifications to local agencies about what had happened, because the incident was kind of discovered, if you will, up in San Bernardino. That's where the Cal OES notifications went, but obviously on the Orange County side we were very curious about was there ever a time it had pulled over into an Orange County siting and potentially leaked there. And so we were happy, if you will, that it wasn't pulled over into a siting in Orange County.

So we definitely we appreciated the notification. The only other piece that I would raise is especially because it was liquid and that

liquid has the ability to change how, you know, if you think of a tanker truck how things move and especially the railcar if something had happened, so I really appreciate the corrective actions that are being taken, the verifications.

And at the Sheriff's Department back when Sheriff Hutchins was here we read a great book called Turn the Ship Around. That is actually about this very type of thing of not making assumptions, having somebody double check your work, making sure that as you're preparing to do future shipments, especially as we look forward to actually transporting the waste, making sure that you encourage that culture of questioning, but again, to support that transparency that you had in talking us through what had transpired. So thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Michelle. As a sailer, I think I'm going to go get that book right away.

Victor.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: One thing, I'm trying to understand, and I appreciate everything that's being done now to make sure to certify everything is correct, but was there an

ineffective certification in place before? Because I thought there was a certification process that said these were dry? How did that fail?

RON PONTES: Well, it failed because there were assumptions made that it was empty, that self -- it's a component that is self-draining in the vertical position, all the water should drain out. It drained out of a Unit 3 pressurizer. This was the same design, but it didn't drain out of this one.

So those drain holes that I was talking about earlier --

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I understand the process. I'm understanding someone says we have to certify this as --

RON PONTES: They assumed.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: -- was dry, and it didn't happen.

RON PONTES: That's why you have to look. There were opportunities to look inside, and we didn't take them.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Okay.

RON PONTES: That's what should have been done. That's how you positively know that there's

nothing inside of it, and that's a failure.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Okay. That's been corrected, so all right. Thank you.

RON PONTES: Welcome.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Ron, I have a question. Earlier I asked if the material inside the pressurizers was radioactive, and you confirmed that it was, and then we had some water that leaked out, and my understanding that that water was then tested for radioactivity, and it came back negative. To me, that just doesn't -- I don't quite understand how one time it is and the other time it's not, what happens there?

RON PONTES: Okay. So the water leaked out onto the railcar and interestingly it was evaporating quite quickly, because it was warm and it was dripping slowly. So in the water -- I'm going to come to the radioactivity business in a moment -- in the water is boric acid, boric acid is not radioactive, but the boric acid leaves a residue as the water dries out. It left a residue on the railcar. We smeared the residue that was there.

By smear, we take these wipes and you get a representative 100 square centimeter smear and

you take it and you measure it with a very sensitive radiation detector, okay, and you count the activity on that smear. And our counts were really low, less than a thousand decades per minute, and the radiation levels, also frisking, were less than background. They weren't going above the background.

You've been to the site, Dan. I think you've used one of these radiation detectors before, maybe you have, to frisk your hands and feet. It's the same type of thing. If you don't see counts rising above background, you consider it clean, okay, not contaminated.

That's another conclusion that we made. Not one that I think that we should go with necessarily, but that residue that was left on the railcar actually met requirements for shipment. Okay. That wouldn't meet our expectations at all, but you know, strictly speaking, you could -- we could have shipped it that way. Seems crazy you would do that, but we didn't have any detection.

Now, about the radioactivity. When we brought them back, we took water from the pressurizer, and we counted it, and we determined the concentrations of radioactivity in the water.

And we had trace amounts of cobalt 60 and cesium 137. That's what we found in the water, okay. And we also took all the material that was used to absorb and contain the leak and clean it up, the rags, the absorbant material, everything, we brought it back to the site, and we counted it, and we were able to determine how much activity was on that material.

So when you concentrate it like that, you can get higher counts. So we were able to quantify how much radioactivity was actually on the railcar. So there was radioactivity on it, but it was below indication by the radiation monitors.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

RON PONTES: If that helps your understanding. I hope it does.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Well, a little. Thank you. It helps a lot.

Now, of course, this was reported to the NRC. Could you give us a little bit of feedback that they provided to you guys?

RON PONTES: Well, they gave us a very direct feedback in the form of two violations. What -- the lead up to this was they had just been

on site just before the pressurizers left the site. They had performed an inspection of the site. They were very close to issuing their inspection report when this happened, and we notified them. They held their inspection report back. They analyzed all the information we gave to them about this event, and then they gave us the violations, which are documented in the inspection report.

So the inspection report -- if you guys have not read the inspection report, you should read it, because it clearly goes through how they arrived at their conclusion, how they assess the severity of this particular violation.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I understand it's a low level violation. Is there a fine included as well?

RON PONTES: Is there a fine? No, there's no fine.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you.

RON PONTES: That would be a higher level type of violation.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: These railcars are currently at SONGS; correct? When do we anticipate that they will leave?

RON PONTES: Good question.

We are just finishing up the reviews and acceptance of the investigations, an investigation performed by SDS and a separate investigation that complements that, complements theirs but performed by us, SCE.

So as soon as those investigation packages are accepted, formally accepted, and we're satisfied that all the corrective actions identified in those documents have been properly taken, then we will lift our hold on shipping the pressurizers. I would say, and I don't know exactly, but I would say probably in the next couple weeks we're out of that, maybe sooner.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you. My understanding is those reports then will be available to the general public for their review.

RON PONTES: No, they will not be available. We'll be glad to summarize what's in them. But we're not going to release them.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Let's go ahead and move on then, unless there are any other questions real quickly?

RON PONTES: Okay. Let's see, next slide.

Okay. Batch releases. Go to the next slide. I think Alice McNally brought to our attention that we should make it easier to find the batch release notifications. They were hard to find, I have to admit. So this change was just implemented, I think, yesterday. There's now a button on the landing page when you go to our website, if you click there, it will take you right to the notification about the upcoming release.

Now, somebody was asking about, you know, this notification process. Let me kind of explain to you what we do and why we do it. First of all, under our NRC license, there's no requirement to inform anybody about the releases we make to the ocean. To my knowledge, there's no nuclear plant in the country makes any advance notifications.

During the process of analyzing the decommissioning project, State Lands was doing that for us, the Environmental Impact Report (EIR), there was a lot of concerns raised about the water we're going release to the ocean during the decommissioning.

One of the things that we agreed to, and personally I think this is just fine, I don't see

any reason why we wouldn't want to do this, is that we would provide notification to the public in advance of our releases at least 48 hours beforehand, and we would post that on our website and folks could go to our website, find that release information and know what is going to happen and what the character of the release is.

So I think what we've got here with this button to take you right to it makes it a lot easier for folks to know. I will add too that on our website is a tremendous amount of information about the batch releases, what's in the water, why they're safe, so that people can understand that if they want to, you know, read the information that we supplied there.

Now if we can go to the next slide. This is what -- there has also been questions about the release notifications and the information contained on them, and what we do after release is completed in terms of, you know, following up that it's been completed.

So on the right-hand side you see the typical information that's in one of our release notifications. It has the date, the estimated start date, how much we're going to release, how

long we think the release is going to go, its status either planned or completed, and then how it's characterized.

So all this notification stems from a requirement in the lease with State Lands, which came out of the EIR that they prepared for the decommissioning, okay. So all the requirements from that special condition are in our release notification.

So the total dose, that's the amount of dose from a specific release, like this particular release that you see here, based on the concentration of radioactivity that's in the water, okay. So let's pause here for a second and talk about what the limit is for water releases or liquid releases from the SONGS plant in a year's time.

Over a year we're allowed to release water that would have a dose consequence to a member of the public of 6 millirem, 6. Okay, that would be 6.0000. You can see here that this one is just a small fraction. We released 115,000 gallons, round numbers and it would give a total dose of 0.00067 millirem. That's close to zero, okay.

Now, compare that if you get on an airplane and you fly from San Diego to New York, you will get 3.5 millirem, give or take a little bit, okay.

If you go get an x-ray of your teeth at a dental office, it's, you know, about 1 millirem, or 0.1 millirem, somewhere in that range. If you get a CT scan, it's much higher. Just living on the planet here in San Diego, you're going to get -- a person gets about 600 millirem a year, half of that from natural sources, from the sun, from the terrestrial sources, from the food we eat, okay. And then the balance of that is coming from the medical and other manmade sources.

So the dose from this release here 114,480 gallons was 0.00067. The limit is 6 millirem, way higher than that. Okay. I'm emphasizing that because these releases -- this water is cleaned up a lot before we release it. It will -- we'll talk about that in a moment how we clean it up on the next slide.

Now, the percentage of whole body dose limit. So we start the year with zero, and then as we make releases, we're calculating the percent of that 6 millirem, okay. So you can see for all

the releases we made to the point in this one here, this example, it was 0.076, not even 0.1 percent of the 6 millirem. That's an accumulated number over the year.

Now, when we finish a release, we give an update of when it was completed. Typically we haven't been updating that total -- that percent and of annual whole body dose or the total dose numbers. We don't come back and give you an actual. Usually we release in just about exactly what was planned. Sometimes, though, recently we had a release that was, I think, it was scheduled for more than a 100,000 and only released about 10,000 gallons, and we didn't update these numbers. This hasn't been our practice.

We haven't been updating them, because they're already so small to begin with. That was our rationale with not doing the updates. Every month we will reconcile the actuals to what we estimated originally. That happens around the 10th of the month that follows a month. That's when we do that update. So that number gets adjusted a little bit throughout the year as we make releases.

Any questions on this slide?

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I have a question. Is there any other -- is there any reason -- I heard the comment earlier. Is there a reason we wouldn't want to give the people in the public notice and push out some of that information? Is there a danger in pushing that out? I think it's harmless. I think most people agree it is. I mean, if we put it, for example, on our city website. Would that cause concern?

RON PONTES: Wouldn't cause concern for us if you want to do that. Our obligation is to put it on our website. I don't know how far I'm supposed to make the publication if we're going push it out? Am I supposed to go to all the major newspapers? Does it need to be on the radio? Does it need to be on television? Where do you stop? Okay.

We've told people where -- we've informed the public where they can go find this. If you really want to know, come take a look. Look at our website. Look at it once or twice a week, and you'll see if there's a new notification.

I'll just say one more thing.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Wait, Ron.

RON PONTES: Hang on a second, I want to

say one more thing. Early on when we started releases, there was a lot of signage posted down at the beach warning people not to go into the water. Well, that is really -- when you think about it and when you think about the numbers that we're talking about here, that's not right. Telling people not to use the beach when we're not releasing anything that's really harmful. You know, that's the wrong message. That stopped. I think most people have calmed down.

Surfrider went and did their own samples, which Dan supported with his boat, and they had them sent off to a lab in Massachusetts for an analysis, and they didn't find anything.

Okay. So, you know, I think this idea that we should scare people over these releases, I don't think that's right.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Ron.

Victor, was there anything else you wanted to add to that?

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I would only add, I'm not trying to scare people. Maybe you can educate them at the same time about the levels and what it really means. There are people that surf every day and maybe don't know, and maybe

education is the only way, but I'm not suggesting we scare them. I'm just saying we make the information available, more easily available. I'm not saying we have an obligation to do it.

RON PONTES: I understand. What we'll do is I'll talk it over with Fred. We'll let Fred decide how he wants to handle this. I'm just telling you my own opinion is I think that's probably not necessary, but we're certainly open to it.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: All right.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Victor. Thank you, Ron.

Mayor Pro Tem, Mark, go right ahead.

MARK ENMEIER: I just want to echo what Mayor Cabral was saying. It's not necessarily that we're trying to scare them, just that we need to educate them that this is happening and for their public good. I'm not saying that we need to post signs saying don't go in the water, but on those release dates, those who are going in the water should at the very least know that this release is happening, then they can do with that information what they will.

Again, it's not a scare tactic. It's

just education.

RON PONTES: I understand that point. I get it.

There's another interesting thing particularly about this beach, this is a state beach here, San Onofre State Beach, and you'll know the beaches up and down the coast have got notifications about bacteria, right, when the bacteria levels rise high enough. You can go to a web page, and you can find that information right there.

This beach isn't reported on, because it's a state beach. There's no reporting about bacteria here. It happens sometimes, I guess. Who knows about that? I don't see anybody asking about it either.

Again, I'm not the decision maker here. Fred, this is up to Fred about how he wants to handle this, and if the recommendation is to maybe go a little bit further with the notifications, we can do that.

FRED BAILLY: That is a good question for consideration. Let's think about it. There are two sides to it, and I understand both.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Let's talk about it

off line.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Sounds like a another good discussion for one of our meetings.

Martha, before we leave this subject, any final thoughts?

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Yes.

Again, Ron, I think I understand the last item on there on the right side, the release notification, the characterization, percent of annual whole body dose limit, so is that cumulative?

RON PONTES: Yes, it's cumulative.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: So if I were, if I didn't get my teeth x-rayed and I didn't go on an airplane, but I was there at that release every -- at every release, that would be my total body exposure?

RON PONTES: From this release. If you got no exposure from anything else, this would be it.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Thank you.

MARK ENMEIER: Just to clarify on that, when you say "cumulative," are you meaning for one release, or are you meaning for the whole year?

RON PONTES: That's for the whole year.

MARK ENMEIER: So that 0.076 percent is for the whole year of the releases?

RON PONTES: Yes. You would start out on January 1st, it would be zero, because we haven't made a release yet. Then you have your first release, and it starts to go up and accumulates. It's reconciled to actuals the following month, if that makes sense.

MARK ENMEIER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thanks everyone. Thank you, Ron. That was an excellent discussion. I think you have a -- is there anything else that you wanted to cover, Ron?

RON PONTES: Not on this slide.

Let's talk a little bit about where we stand with releases. The graph or the table on the left shows the status of releases that we've made so far, almost 950,000 gallons this year. And if you look at the very bottom for all those releases that we've made, the sum total of all that release, the dose is 0.00434 millirem, not even 1 millirem, so really tiny.

Now, we're expecting about another 850,000 gallons in round numbers for the remainder of the year, and at that point we've released just

about everything. That would leave probably 1- to 200,000 gallons for next year to be released. So it's a bit of a moving target, depends on when Rich's team is able to get back into releases from Unit 3. That is the next plant to release water from.

Now, how do we clean this water up --

RICH KALMAN: It's Unit 2, Ron.

RON PONTES: Oh, Unit 2, sorry. Thanks, Rich. I got it backwards.

This little diagram on the right-hand side, that shows how we clean up the water. First we put the water in a storage tank, then we process it through a series of filters and ion exchangers. So that strips out almost all of the radioactivity. Then it goes into a process tank, a tank that can be recirculated and sampled so that we get a representative sample of what's in it. Then we release the water through a rad monitor. That rad monitor has got a really low set point and that water is then discharged to the ocean while we're running dilution pumps. So then it's heavily diluted, and it's discharged through our outfall.

If we go to the next slide.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Ron, before you go, Mark had another question.

RON PONTES: Sorry, Mark, I didn't see you there.

MARK ENMEIER: Sorry, I just forgot to put my hand down from the last one.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: No problem.

RON PONTES: No problem.

Let's move on to the next slide. Okay. So this is an overview of where the water gets released to. So we release it through the Unit 2 discharge conduit, and over there on the left you can see where the diffuser sections are. That starts about one mile off site, okay. That's where the diffusers are. And it's 50 feet below the surface of the ocean, give or take. That's where it gets discharged.

It's far away out in the water, and the water is heavily diluted before it gets there. There's consequently almost no dose consequences from these releases that we're making.

Any questions on that?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I think you covered it very well.

RON PONTES: I'm not done yet.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Martha, is coming back.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: This is a surfer question. How far out do surfers go? Do they go out a mile?

RON PONTES: No. I've never seen anybody out that far. That's quite a ways out there.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Do they go out to where the diffusers start?

RON PONTES: No. Do you see where it says "auxiliary off shore intake structure" and "primary off shore intake structure"?

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Yes.

RON PONTES: You see those -- there's buoys out there, and you've been out to the site before, if you look off shore, you'll see those buoys, okay. They are navigation buoys, and they don't even get close to that.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay.

RON PONTES: They're probably -- where it says "fish return conduit terminus" --

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Yeah.

RON PONTES: -- that would be pretty far out for a surfer, typically.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Just trying to get an

idea of scale. Thank you so much.

MARK ENMEIER: Another quick question, is there any worry about currents and having that diffuser go into shore?

RON PONTES: Okay, so the water does circulate around here. Okay. So the water that's being released out here in the diffusers, it circulates around towards the beach, that happens. So there's another thing that we do. We have what's call a Radiological Environmental Monitoring program. What we do is every month we sample ocean water from a variety of sources up and down, in front of the plant, and even north up in front of San Onofre State Beach, so we collect water samples. So we analyze those for radioactivity, both gamma emitters and tritium, for example, everything we look for.

We also monitor the marine life. We will get fish and crustaceans, and we'll split samples with the California Department of Public Health, and we'll measure them for uptake of radioactivity. We also sample sediment, offshore sediment and beach sand and measure that for radioactivity. And we report all of that information on an interactive website. That's on

our website. So you can go there, you can push a button and you can see what the latest reports show for that.

I will tell you that typically, very rarely, do we see any indication of radioactivity anywhere. There's been a couple of times since I've been here that a sea bass might show up with some trace amount of radioactivity, but we've never seen anything since I've been here in water sediment, sand, no activity whatsoever.

That should give folks assurance that the radioactivity that we're releasing is not accumulating in the environment.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Mark, really quickly to your question about it going in shore, when I partnered with Surfrider, we did samples or they did samples right from the beach on the surf line, also out off shore near the diffuser sections, and those samples were taken before, during, and after discharges. A set of the samples were sent to Woods Hole, another set of samples were sent to UC Irvine, and both were consistent in really showing very low or almost non-detectible limits.

Thank you, Ron.

RON PONTES: Okay. I'm done with my slides here, but there's one more thing I want to talk about.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Please do.

RON PONTES: Okay. So I want to take a moment to inform you about an emerging issue here at the site. As you may know, we monitor the groundwater below the SONGS site for signs of inadvertent releases to the groundwater. We've been doing that for a long time for decades and reporting the results of what we monitor for in our -- to the NRC and our annual effluent reports.

So in the past couple of months during our routine monitoring, we have observed a slight elevated level of tritium in one of our groundwater monitoring wells in the Unit 2 area. In August we decided to sample a nearby well, a well that's not used for monitoring radioactivity. It's used for other purposes, but we decided let's go monitor that well, sample it, and it also showed signs of activity in it.

So the levels are relatively low, they don't pose a risk to public health or safety, and it's important to understand that the groundwater below the SONGS site and, in fact, surrounding the

SONGS site and everything kind of west of the 5 Freeway is not drinking water, okay. So there's no drinking water here.

Although not required, we did today voluntarily inform the NRC, California Department of Public Health, San Diego Water Board, California Office of Emergency Services, and members of our ERPC, Energy Restriction Planning Committee, San Diego, Orange County. We also informed Camp Pendleton and other entities. We made them aware of this.

I'm bringing this up now so that you know that we've got an issue here, and I want to bring to your attention so that you're aware that we're aware of it. We're monitoring it and taking action about it. We have engaged a hydrogeologist that will advise where to install additional monitoring wells or sampling wells so that we can understand the spread of this tritium, where it is exactly and then to come up with plans, if needed, to remediate the tritium.

I will tell you too that this is not something we haven't had to deal with before. In Unit 1 while we were decommissioning that plant, taking it apart, we did find tritium in the

groundwater there too at similar type levels to what we're seeing now in Unit 2. And we -- between I think it was 2012 we started extraction pumps there, and we extracted that water out between 2012 and April 2015 when we turned those pumps off, and there's been no rebound of tritium in that area.

So although not desired, probably not -- should not have been entirely unexpected that we would find some tritium in the groundwater. We are taking action to figure out where it is and to characterize it properly and then take action to remediate it.

Any questions on that?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Yes, Mark.

MARK ENMEIER: So you mentioned the groundwater there, is there any worry that this might seep into other environmental areas, or wildlife, habitats in the surrounding area?

RON PONTES: Yeah, so groundwater along this coastline here and under the SONGS site generally travels from east to west, you know, from the right side of this photograph to the left side of the photograph, and that's how the groundwater travels below the site, so there's no

risk that it's going to enter some drinking water well or something like that, because the worse case it would migrate into the ocean, okay.

So that's one of the reasons we want to take action here, because we'll have to report, calculate and report how much this is going to the ocean if we don't remove it from the plant, take action to extract it.

MARK ENMEIER: Follow-up question, have you done any testing outside of the plant itself, either to the north or the south on groundwater there?

RON PONTES: Not beyond the ground -- not outside the plant boundary. Like I said, before, we do sample the ocean water, along the shoreline, and we're not seeing any signs of tritium or other radioactivity in that water.

MARK ENMEIER: Do you think there's any threat that tritium would go beyond the plant?

RON PONTES: It could go beyond the plant, but you know, the releases that we're making also have tritium in them. There's tritium everywhere, by the way, Mark. Tritium is naturally occurring in the environment. It's created first in the upper atmosphere, interaction

between cosmic rays and gases in the upper atmosphere. It's present in the ocean.

MARK ENMEIER: I should say in terms that would be concern.

RON PONTES: No, we don't do it that way. But we feel obligated to address this, and we have a sense of urgency about it.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Victor. Victor, you're muted.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: We did have a chance to talk with staff earlier and get notified by the city, notify the City of San Clemente, but it did help in understanding where those groundwater sites are, and I think through your answer, the question from Mark, you pointed out they are all on site and local to the facility, and not in other areas outside of the facility. They're all on site.

RON PONTES: Correct, that's right.

Any other questions?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Ted had a question.

RON PONTES: Ted.

TED QUINN: Ron, what do you intend to do?

RON PONTES: First we need to get the hydrogeologist here so he can take a look at the groundwater models and the infrastructure that exists below grade to see how water moves around. Then he will advise us where to install additional wells, additional wells to figure out the size of this contamination. Then once we've done that, the next step would be to enter -- likely to enter into a remediation program, meaning to extract the water and remove it.

TED QUINN: Thank you.

RON PONTES: That's exactly what we did on Unit 1, by the way.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Do we know the depth of the groundwater below the plant?

RON PONTES: Well, yes. One of the things we want to do, Dan, is characterize how deep this contamination goes to. We need to bound it. It's a three-dimensional problem.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. My understanding is you guys tested a lot of different wells. About how many wells do you guys test?

RON PONTES: There's about 20 wells that we regularly test for radioactivity.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay.

RON PONTES: I think 11 or 12 of those we test quarterly and the others we test semiannually, and there's a whole series of other wells we've installed for nonradiological hazards, chemicals, some metals that we don't normally use for radioactivity samples. We have a lot of wells available to us right now. We really need the hydrogeologist to advise us so we got a good sense of where to move forward.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Thank you.

Any other questions from the CEP with reference to -- Victor?

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I have one more. I know that we have the issue now of the groundwater, do we have any idea, or would it be pure speculation at this point to get a better understanding of where you think it came from?

RON PONTES: Yeah, we want to know that too. I don't want to speculate now, but there's many areas of the plant that it could originate from, and we want to nail that down as well.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Michelle.

MICHELLE ANDERSON: Just for clarity, who

is your oversight agency or regulatory agency on something like this when it has to do with groundwater and this type of situation?

RON PONTES: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

MICHELLE ANDERSON: Do you coordinate at all with any of the local water agencies?

RON PONTES: The Water Board governs all of our releases and, you know, anything that would be non-radioactivity that would be getting into the groundwater or drinking water, that would be the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, but they don't govern radioactivity from a licensed nuclear power plant. That's the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That's federal.

MICHELLE ANDERSON: Just wanted to confirm. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Mark.

MARK ENMEIER: Just one more question, you mentioned the groundwater going out into the ocean side going westward, again, with currents, is there any chance that the tritium would go up north to where the beaches are or down south, is there any concern there?

RON PONTES: Well, first of all, I don't

think we'd be able to detect it in the ocean water, because of the mixing and so on and the dilution factors. Could it go north or south? I'm not prepared to answer that question. I don't know. I think generally it travels south here.

FRED BAILLY: One point I'm not sure you mentioned, maybe you did, Ron, to put this in perspective, the tritium levels that we are measuring they're below the standard for drinking water. So it doesn't mean that there's any drinking water at the site or below the site, but just in terms of putting this in perspective that we are below the drinking water standard.

RON PONTES: Yeah, that's a good point, Fred. Again, just to reemphasize, we do take monthly ocean water samples all along the front of the plant and even up to the beach to the north of us, and we compare those to control stations at other locations on the ocean, and we're not seeing any radioactivity here.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Ron. Thank you, Fred.

Any other questions from our CEP members?

Just a couple of quick comments with reference to this. Number one, I want to thank

SCE for your commitment to transparency. I think that's very important. I want to thank you on terms of the CEP and the community for coming out and bringing this to our attention, even though it's not a concern, safety concern, I think it's speaks a lot about your commitment to transparency.

And also just as a pledge for our future meetings, obviously this is something that's going to take a while to get to the bottom of, and so I think it's something that we would like to have on our upcoming agendas for our upcoming meetings where we can give future updates in terms of what we find out and what the actions are going to be about this topic.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: So --

FRED BAILLY: Absolutely, Dan. Will do.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thanks everyone. I think this was a really spirited and robust discussion. We started ahead of schedule, but as luck would have it, the questions, we really welcome those questions. They were great questions, so I really want to thank everyone for them, but we need to move on.

Let's move onto the next slide, please.

We're getting ready for our public comment. Here again are the directions for the public comment. The CEP public comment form link is available to submit to a question or to speak online. The names of the individuals who signed up to speak will be displayed on the slide. I will call your name when it's your turn to speak, you'll have three minutes, then you'll see a countdown timer.

I would ask everyone to please be respective of the three minutes. We've got a fair number of folks to ask some questions or to make some comments, and we have a full hour dedicated to public comments. And after that we're going to have Martha and Victor facilitate the public dialog.

Let's move onto the next slide, if we may. And we're going to give everyone a quick five-minute break. So let's -- I'll see you back in five minutes. Thanks, everybody.

(Recess taken from 4:09 until 4:14.)

PUBLIC COMMENT

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Let's go ahead and begin our public comment if we could, please. I think we're ready for the next slide which will tell us who our first speaker is.

And our first speaker is going to be Ace Hoffman. And, Alice, you're going to be on deck.

So, Ace, are you ready?

Do we see Ace as one of our participants?

I don't see Ace. I guess we will come back to him. So we'll go down the list.

Alice, you are next, and Joe, you're going to follow Alice.

Alice, are you there?

ALICE McNALLY: I'm ready.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Alice, go ahead.

ALICE McNALLY: Okay. I've got some comments and questions and requests for the CEP. The public deserves easy access to the liquid batch releases through the media in a public bulletin form, signs on the beach, whatever it takes. The Surfrider says you should know before you go, and we believe that.

I'm also questioning the name change on

your website. You're now calling it water releases. I think this is very deceiving, because they're made up of radioactivity nuclides. It's not just water.

When you go to the website and you want to look this up, there's a pop-up that comes up right in front of the notification, and it is to sign up for the latest SONGS news. So unless you know to get rid of that, you're not going to see it.

So I think Ron is really comparing apples to oranges when he talked about exposure. Dental, medical, and flights, those are choices. It's not something thrown into our ocean. And let's remember, tritium, according to Ron, is heading south. Well, there is 19 miles approximately to the south, it's a decell plant, and all of us in San Diego County get 10 percent of our water from that. Tritium cannot be extracted from the water.

The other thing I'm commenting and asking about is the June fluid leak that forced the shipment to return to SONGS. That was a very impressive presentation, but it really goes -- points to sloppy work by untrained workers going by assumption, just like when that canister got

stuck on the rim. They weren't told that the circumference measurement has changed. Is this -- what goes on every 24 hours that we don't know anything about? And how does all this affect your consent-based program? Ramsburg, for instance, are they still going to be on board?

The third thing is the Coastal Commission has told us in the permitting meeting on July 12th that the NRC research shows weld corrosion. I imagine that's part of the reason you're asking for vent covers for flooding. You are admitting that it is flooding. So I do worry that the added welds for these covers is going to add more corrosion and cracking, which is the main problem that we're worried about.

So these recent events confirm our fears, which have continually been referred to as unfeasible and non-credible of more catastrophes to come due to human error, mother nature, terrorist activity. So these are certification by assumption, leaky shipments, tritium in groundwater headed south.

What about the vernal pool? There's a vernal pool there. Is that now being tested? And the requests for the canister vent covers due to

prevent flooding, you're saying rain water and flooding --

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Alice.

ALICE McNALLY: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you very much, Alice. We do have some more of your written comments, so Martha and Victor will go through those as well, but thank you very much, very much.

Thank you also for your comments with reference to the website, and I was glad to see that SCE responded to your question. Unfortunately we have limited time, and we have a lot of folks that we need to be able to give some time to. Thank you again, and I want to now we're going to go to Joe.

Joe Moross, are you available, Joe?

SPEAKER: I don't see his name listed unless he called in through the phone.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Are you Joe?

SPEAKER: No.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I see Joe raising his hand. Can we unmute Joe? There you are.

JOE MOROSS: I got my mic on now.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay, you're on.

JOE MOROSS: Thanks, Dan. Good to hear

from you again.

My name is Joe Moross. I'm the lead engineer with the environmental monitoring group, Safecast. My particular specialization is radiation monitoring, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak today.

On July 18th, 2024, my sensors detected elevated radiation levels near but outside the SONGS decommissioning site. These readings were somewhat sporadic beginning around 8:00 a.m. and peaking around four times normal background levels around 3:00 p.m. The levels then returned to normal sometime after 4:00 p.m.

I cannot definitively identify the source of the radiation. The proximity to the decommissioning site suggests a strong need for further investigation. The pattern of the readings is consistent with an inadvertent release of radioactive decontaminated material. Wind and weather data from the same period is also consistent with a release originating from an area approximately 400 meters radius centered on the reactor domes.

I am bringing this to the attention of the Community Engagement Panel, because I believe

it is crucial for the community and relevant authorities to be aware of these readings. I strongly urge the panel to take this matter seriously to investigate the source of these readings. I have detailed data available for review, and I'm willing to collaborate to provide further information.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Joe. Joe, thank you very much. I was just out at the plant, one of my 20 tours and during every tour they show us where the monitors are around the site that are used to detect any potential leaks. I would really like to know the dates of this information that you have, and then of course we can speak with SCE to correlate with their findings in terms of the monitors that they have there. Always good to cross-reference this.

Thank you very much for bringing this to our attention.

Next one, we will move onto Daryl.

Daryl Gale, are you available, please?

Do we see Daryl anywhere? I see a hand up. Hopefully that's Daryl.

DARYL GALE: Am I on mute? Can you hear

me.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I can.

DARYL GALE: So people have the right to know --

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Did we get a name?

DARYL GALE: This is Daryl.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Okay.

DARYL GALE: People have the right to know what, and I mean what kind of radionuclides and when Edison is dumping them into the water, and aerosolizing them onto the beach air. So if you're going to any of the beaches within 50 miles of the San Onofre dump site with your family for surfing, swimming or sunbathing, you need to know when these cesium, strontium, and tritium, et cetera, there's more than those three, but those are the common ones are being released into our water and our beaches.

Radionuclides, such as cesium, strontium, and tritium, et cetera are not harmless no matter what the NRC and Edison says. So think about what is going into your eyes, nose, mouth, and ears. If you've got young children or your adorable new puppy with you, the strontium will integrate into their growing bones.

If you're a young wearing a Speedo showing off your chisel manhood, that Speedo won't prevent those radionuclides entering your orifices, even the small ones.

And you, young lady, in that hot new bikini it won't keep the cesium, strontium, tritium, et cetera from coating your beautiful hair and entering your external and internal lady parts. This toxic stuff is cumulative. Look up the word if you're confused.

So we all need good, easy access and nontechnical information if we're thinking about going to any of the Southern California beaches. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you very much.

Nina, you are next, and Mandy is on deck.

Are you there, Nina?

SPEAKER: Mandy.

MANDY SACKETT: Hi, should I talk? This is Mandy Sackett from Surfrider?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Nina, we're looking for you first. Are you there?

Mandy, you'll be standing by.

SPEAKER: I don't see Nina.

MANUEL CAMACHO: I wonder if Nina is with Charles. I see PL, I think that's --

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Good point, Manuel. So let's see if those guys are on together.

Charles, are you there? You're muted.

CHARLES LANGLEY: Can you hear me?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: We can.

CHARLES LANGLEY: I'm not here with Nina. She's actually in a separate office right now. But I do have a question. I can ask it later, or I can ask it now?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: You're on. Why don't you go ahead right now and hopefully we'll get her afterwards.

CHARLES LANGLEY: What I don't understand, and I think Ron might be able to answer this, is why the radiation is so minimal or so low inside the pressurizer? My understanding is is that this radiation comes from a hot leg of the whole nuclear power plant, the water that flows through the pressurizer actually flows around the nuclear reactor, gets heated up, irradiated, and then goes into the steam generators in a separate loop from the steam

generators because it's so radioactive. How is it that the water is less radioactive?

Second Nina, just stepped into my office, and I can set her down and she can ask her question when she's ready and when you're ready. Okay?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Charles. That's a really good question. We'll go ahead and reset the timer now for three minutes, and thank you for moving to Charles's office.

NINA BABIARZ: I want to let you know before my time starts, I sent you an e-mail quite some time ago that everybody that was on the phone got disconnected. I called back twice, and so I thought I was on the phone, I pressed star -- I'm hanging my phone up now. I pressed star 6 as instructed, I couldn't get through, I went ahead and pressed star 5, because CEP members can do that just because you were calling my name for the third time, but I think there were several people that were on the phone that got hung up on.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you for letting me know that. You know, I think the technology has still a long ways to go. But thank you for bringing that to our attention.

NINA BABIARZ: I sent Ace a text because I think he got cut off earlier. You'll have an e-mail from me.

I have a couple comments.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Please start.

NINA BABIARZ: Thank you. Thank you, Dan.

My first comment is that when that Edison is quote/unquote considering releasing diluted discharge information now that we know is mixed with tritium information to go to the public, please keep in mind, this is a Community Engagement Panel meeting and paid for with decommissioning trust fund money, so I couldn't understand any push back from Ron on that one.

But Ron also mentioned the June 6, 2024, Coastal Commission CDP amendment on the Coastal Commission June 6th consent calendar regarding the exclusionary plan. I reviewed the Coastal Commission June meetings, which were the June 12th, 13th, and 14th consent calendars, so what Coastal Commission meeting was held and what consent calendar on June 6, 2024?

And Ron, I believe, also indicated that the SONGS exclusionary plan was only, I repeat

only included in the original decommissioning Coastal Commission CDP. That's actually not true. During the Edison's demolition, Coastal Commission CDP application process that we see Coastal Commission approval on October 17, 2019, the exclusionary plan was the referenced within Edison's CDP application. How do I know that? Because Public Watchdogs had to request a copy of the exclusionary plan when it was referenced in Edison's application for the demolition CDP, and it was not included for the public's review during the application period.

Public Watchdogs requested the California Coastal Commission's staff to provide it, and we received the entire exclusionary plan including that map referenced in Edison's application, so I just want to bring that to your attention.

I read the NRC inspection report on the leak, and so if anybody is in need of that report, you can go to a Public Watchdogs website and read that report. The NRC report indicated two critical repetitive behaviors by Southern California Edison. One, Unit 2 was in the wrong container; and two, obviously Edison personnel not properly trained or Unit 2 would have been in the

correct container.

Our deduction, similar to the NRC 2019 near-miss accident's investigation report, are similar to not the right equipment and the personnel not properly trained, unless Edison thinks assuming is proper training.

Regarding the leak, there was a specific reading taken in San Bernardino that Ron mentioned, and I'd like to know what the exact result of that reading was, because Ron continued to describe that reading to the public as background, and that's a detection. I want to know what was the reading, not his deduction of the reading, if it was taken to a third party, et cetera, and he also said that pressurizer didn't drain.

Since Edison admits they actually didn't know the water contents in Unit 2 pressurizer, how does the public know if it wasn't full to its capacity of 16,500 gallons and leaked all the way from San Onofre to San Bernardino?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Nina.

NINA BABIARZ: Thank you, Dan.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Some good points there. I'm sure Ron will address those shortly.

Mandy, are you there?

MANDY SACKETT: Hello. I'm here.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Take it away.

MANDY SACKETT: Thank you. Mandy Sackett with Surfrider Foundation.

We are really concerned about the radioactive leak during transportation and the groundwater findings and even just the comments that were given by hearing public comment with the independent air monitoring readings.

I want to say I really hope that Edison will take radical steps to improve their processes an employee training and prove to us that public health is taken seriously. It's really concerning to me that there's water and potential corrosion, especially with the threat of groundwater rise and sea level rise. Can we trust in Edison's monitoring processes?

Edison has assured us repeatedly that these canisters are dry and water intrusion will not be an issue, and I'm also confused how there wasn't a process for passing on institutional knowledge of something like water intrusion. It just feels tracking.

So perhaps Edison should do some kind of internal review process for any other potential-like institutional knowledge, and I hope they will follow up with us and just let us know exactly what's found.

And then quickly on another note we have a request for the sediment monitoring reporting that's available on the interactive map. We're having a really hard time understanding the data, and we've e-mailed physicists and, like, tried converting it using ChatGPT, but I don't trust that. So the radiation monitoring for the sediments uses a unit we're not familiar with, and most of the reporting that Edison does is becquerel per meters cubed, so that's kind of what we understand, but that's not the unit that the monitoring reports and the interactive map is using.

Maybe this is just an e-mail I need to write, but we're hoping that you can change the monitoring reporting units. For example, what's the detection limit of the cesium 137 in becquerels per meters cubed.

And yeah, that's -- that would be all. If there's someone I can talk to directly on that,

I would appreciate it. Thanks so much.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thanks Mandy. Thank you very much.

Let's see, I think we're going to give Ace Hoffman, one more chance. Hopefully he was not disconnected.

Ace, by chance, are you out there? We see that you have some written comments, so since we're not able to get you on the phone, we'll go ahead and move to Martha and Victor, and they're going to go through the written comments and direct those written comments and questions and direct those to the appropriate members from SCE.

Victor and Martha, please take it away, thank you.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I will say, maybe Martha can do those, and I will do the analysis of the questions that were asked over the phone, since I don't have access right now to the forms that have the written questions.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Got it.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: So the written questions, let's -- since Ace didn't get -- hopefully he's listening, but some of his questions I think have already been discussed, but

I will go ahead and read those. He had several questions. One, it's been over ten years since the plant closed and some of the canisters are nearing their planned life expectancy at the site of not more than 20 years. How will canisters be removed and inspected for embrittlement especially for developing circumferential cracks and replaced as necessary and returned to their silos?

Number two, how does SCE intend to ensure that the circumferential cracks in the 5/8 inch thick sides of the canisters do not cause the canisters to fall apart when they're lifted out either for inspection or transport?

Number three, what contingencies has SCE prepared in a case if a sudden breach occurs during an attempt to remove a canister?

Number four, what efforts are being made to protect the site 24/7 from airplane strikes, accidental or on purpose, missiles, terrorists, infiltrators within the workforce, other nontechnical hazards, such as astroids, earthquakes, Tsunamis, and sea level rise and eventual abandonment as civilization descends into chaos amidst global warming, pandemics, general warfare and/or nuclear war?

I would probably stick to the top three. That last four kind of goes down a rabbit hole that I'm not sure we can predict. Maybe that's back to Jerry on the life of the canisters.

JERRY STEPHENSON: I can address the first three questions and some parts of the fourth question. The first question, the canisters are licensed for 20 years, then renewed for another 40, that makes 60, and that requires an aging management plan, which we have already approved on the Orano, and we'll do an aging management plan on the Holtec system when it reaches 20 years. Many ISFSIs around the country are extended to 60 years.

At the end of 60 years they can be renewed again. The NRC has documented a service life of up to a 100 years and likely more using an aging management plan. Our canisters will be safe, they're be transportable in their storage locations until a permanent location is available. On the second question about circumferential cracking, circumferential cracking is not a credible failure mechanism for dry cask storage. These canisters are ductal stainless steel, very robust. Any -- any cracking is very unlikely. We

have an aging management program to ensure that any cracking is addressed. Chloride-induced stressed corrosion cracking, CISCC is the one we always talk about, it's really the only credible aging mechanism, and it's generally localized and small.

And so these canisters with their ductal stainless steel 316L, extremely flaw tolerant, and CISCC does not create any structural concern. So picking them up and having them fall apart, that's just not credible, not going to happen.

On the third question, sudden breach during removal, that's also not a credible accident. Canisters will be inspected before their removed at least a sample of them, that's required by the license, and we also have an aging management program to ensure they're maintained in good condition.

On the fourth question we can't comment on any security measure or safeguard information. I'm not going to comment on the zombie apocalypse, but our ISFSI structures are very robust. We have several feet of concrete around each canister, which will protect from airplane crashes. There's never been an event where an aircraft actually

struck a nuclear facility, and analysis concludes that this is extremely unlikely, so that's not something that we're concerned about. That's all I had on those four.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay. Thank you.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I'll go to Alice McNally's questions, and the first one was about, again, back to the public access to information on the groundwater release, and her concern that it's now on the web page called water release, but I think it's the same question that was discussed earlier about how do we get the information out to the public. I guess the subpart of that is the pop-up sign up for more information came up when you signed in, and people may not know how to get around that. I don't think it's a big issue, but that was the first part.

And the second parts were about the impact on this, on consent-based siting, and I guess the last one was about welding and corrosion for the storage bins, so multiple persons can tackle that.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Can I, one thing added to that, she mentioned the vent covers that we admit there's going to be flooding, I don't

think that's the --

JERRY STEPHENSON: I can address that one. There is no flooding concern with the vent covers. We just don't want the canisters to get any rain water on them. If any rain water did get on them, it would rapidly evaporate because the canisters are warm. But we are in a coastal environment where mist and rain can have some chlorides in it. We assume our canisters are covered with chlorides, but wet chlorides aren't a good thing. So we took the opportunity to minimize any exposure of our canisters to wet chlorides. It was something that was fairly easy for us to do, we took the opportunity to jump on it and get it done, and we're very happy that we've done it, but it isn't like we should have seen this coming.

The Holtec design is not intended to be waterproof. Many, most nuclear facilities, you know, in the Southeast, the Midwest, where rain water is clean, clear, basically distilled water and doesn't cause a problem. Here on the coastal environment, we felt like we wanted to take a little more action to protect the canisters and keep them as chloride-free as possible.

That's all.

RON PONTES: Victor, this is Ron, remind me what the first question was.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: It was really about, there were three parts, one of them was she said what cannot be detected in the release will go downstream to the decell plants, and so her concern is really about better access to information and the water releases, when they're going to happen and how they're going to happen, so the issue you talked about and we also all talked a little bit earlier. That's her concern, how do we get information out quickly to the public.

RON PONTES: Okay. So we agreed we'd take a look at that with Fred, so we'll get back to you on that point.

On the button, she didn't like that it was called water releases. That's fine. We can change that to liquid batch releases, because that's, in fact, how the NRC refers to them. Liese Mosher can handle that one. That's easy.

The pop-up thing that jumps in front of it when you open up the web page, I don't know what to do about that. There's a little X on it,

you press that, and it goes away.

As far as what we're putting in the water is honestly very, very tiny and small, you know, our REMP monitoring demonstrates that that's not detectible. I don't see where that's going to be any problem for any water decell plant somewhere far away from here. That's definitely not a problem.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: The only other thing she did talk about was the welding and the corrosion issues on the storage bins. I think she was talking more about the covers but --

JERRY STEPHENSON: It sounded like she thought the wells were going to be at the ISFSI facility. The wells are hundreds of feet from the wells -- W-E-L-L-S, not welds, W-E-L-D, the wells are hundreds of feet from the ISFSI facility and no impact on corrosion.

RON PONTES: I didn't understand it. Okay. She was talking about wells that we sample from. We have wells near the ISFSI too, and the wells that show some traces of tritium in them are far away from the ISFSI. This is definitely not coming from the ISFSI, no way.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: And then I guess the

last part was impact on consent-based siting and whether the issue of batch releases will have an impact on that.

RON PONTES: None whatsoever. They're not related.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: I'm going to go back to one that was sent in from Gene Lenard, and I think part of this was already discovered, but I at least want to read the question so it doesn't look like we're trying to skip over anybody. And I think this is for Ron and you, again, I think you already addressed this but regarding an article about Alexander Nguyen about the recent SONGS spill of radioactivity material, number one, what does a small amount mean? Number two, what does barely radioactive mean? Three, what was the level of radiation measured? Four, was this data reported and retained in any official report? Five, if not, how would one know if the material was barely radioactive? Six, what is the normal background of level of radiation? Seven, what level of radiation would be of a concern for your family? If you wanted to -- I anticipate this will already have been discussed in material presented today.

I think it was, unless there's anything else you want to add, Ron, on that.

RON PONTES: You know, the author of this Alexander Nguyen that put out that report, yeah, he used some of these terms. Here's what I would say, so when we measure the pressurizer, we took the smears from the pressurizer to determine whether we had detectible radioactivity or not. We used a very sensitive meter for measuring that. And it reads in counts per minute, and the background levels vary anywhere, depends on where you stand, but typically anything less -- typical backgrounds up there would be less than a hundred counts per minute, something like that, and if it's not detecting above that background level, then you can't detect anything.

That's how we -- that's how you measure if you got detectible radioactivity or not.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: We had Joe Moross who I think it was from Safecast who said he had detected, through his radiation monitoring equipment, elevated radiation levels on -- in a pattern on certain dates, which we don't know, and times of the day that I guess don't align with

what we've disclosed, and he's trying to reconcile that. It may not be something we can handle here, but it's something that, I guess, needs to be discussed at least at some point in time.

RON PONTES: Here's what I would suggest, I think Dan offered to receive that data, if Joe would sent him that data, Dan can share it with us, and we'll have somebody take a look at it, and see if there's any issue there.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: One of the other questions that Joe had written in was have there so far been any facilities or structures dismantled at SONGS that were possibly radioactive or contained radioactive material at the time of their demolition, and I believe that's true, right?

RON PONTES: We are -- okay. So we just recently demolished the control building. That did not have any real radioactivity in it.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay.

RON PONTES: The building beyond that moving eastward is what we call the rad waste building, and that building is demolished now. And there are a lot of preparations were made to lock down any trace amounts of radioactivity that

might remain inside on the walls and floors and stuff. So that's underway.

There's a monitoring program that is installed around the plant to monitor the air and to monitor the ground for any radioactivity, and not finding anything in any of that monitoring, that building is one of the radioactivity buildings, if you will. We have a controlled process for taking those down so we prevent the spread of radioactivity. It's very, very controlled. A lot of water being applied to the building to suppress any dust.

I don't know if that's what he's talking about. We only started that demolition recently in the past two weeks, I guess.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: But we've been sending low level radioactive demolition waste off to Clive, Utah for a while, right?

RON PONTES: Yeah. And all of that concrete that was ground up and placed in those cars, gondola cars and shipped out of here, all of that concrete that's left the site until now wasn't radioactive.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Okay.

RON PONTES: It was being used by Energy

Solutions to fill in and around at their disposal facility, okay. Really, it's not truly radioactive. I don't see the connection.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Ron, since I have you on, Charles Langley had a question over the presentation that you made about the tank and the transportation. His question is why is the radiation level so low inside the tank given the loops that it runs through and its exposure and its connection to all the highly radioactive water that's moving through that system?

So maybe you can help us understand that.

RON PONTES: Glad to answer that question. On that diagram on the slide where I was explaining how the pressurizer is connected to the reactor coolant system. The water -- the reactor coolant system, yes, it flows through the reactor, it flows through the steam generators, and the water is present inside the pressurizers. It's not flowing in and out off the pressurizer while we're operating, per se, it's pretty much stagnant.

Okay. That water is reactor coolant, it's consistent, and concentration of any contamination as the water elsewhere in a reactor

coolant system is all the same, say it's uniform.

To kind of get to his point or his question, as I understood it about what's inside the -- what was inside the pressurizer, the pressurizer is not emitting much radiation, because the wall thickness, the steel thickness on that vessel is, as I recall, around about six inches thick. There's tremendous amount of shielding just from the vessel itself for what's inside, okay, any residue that's left inside the pressurizer.

As far as the water that leaked out, yes that water did contain some radioactivity in it but not above levels that we could detect, okay. Both things can be true. We have contamination in something, and it can be at such low levels that we can't really detect it with a frisker.

We did sample the water after it was returned to the site, and we emptied the pressurizer of that 190 gallons, and we counted it in a special detector to understand and counted it as we described it, so we can identify the radionuclides in the water, and we found trace amounts of cesium and cobalt 60 as expected. We weren't surprised by that, but it was relatively

low levels.

And I will point out cobalt 60 has a half life of 5.2 years. So we've been shut down for -- since 2012 the plant hasn't operated, that's two half lives. We've gone through at least two half lives on the cobalt 60. Cesium is about 30 years, so we're one-third of the way to a half life on that.

I think I'm answering his question.

JERRY STEPHENSON: Ron, let me add that much of the radioactive material that's inside the RCS is not dissolved in the water, it's particulate or it's stuff that ends up plated out on the inside of the pipes, on the inside of the pressurizer and things, so it would not leak out with the water.

A lot of the radioactive material would stay inside the pressurizer. Only a small amount of cobalt, cesium, or whatever radioisotope is actually dissolved in the water would leak out when you had the leak.

RON PONTES: That's a good point. Thanks, Jerry.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Daryl Gale both sent a couple of questions in, and then she had some

other comments, and she wanted to confirm what kind of radionuclides are being dumped into the water and aerosolizing, and she said some radionuclides are not on the release list, for example, cesium, strontium, and tritium.

RON PONTES: Okay. So the liquid batch releases that we make, not all of them, but most of them contain tritium. Okay. Tritium is abundant in the reactor coolant system that we used here at SONGS, again, not all, but most.

Cobalt 60 would be another one that we would typically find, but cobalt 60 is filtered out by our -- most of it is filtered out by our cleaning process; the filters, the ion exchangers, and so on.

There is also some cesium, very low levels of cesium don't get filtered out either in the water that is being released. But the quantities and concentrations of that material in these releases is tiny, and what is really important to know is what is the consequence of that release? Okay. So the releases are made to the ocean, they're diluted, they're further diluted when they get to the ocean, and then they're taken up by the environment, okay, they're

taken up in the water, they're taken up in sea life in things like kelp, they're taken up in crustaceans and fish and so on. And then people have to consume that stuff: fish, crustaceans, okay. And there's modeling that has been performed to understand how that translates into dose for people that consume this fish and crustaceans.

That's how we know what the dose consequence is. The dose consequence is tiny, small. Nobody is drinking the sea water, for example, that I know of. I don't drink the sea water. You got to put all this stuff in perspective to understand what the consequence of the release is. That's what is important to understand. And that's why we characterize it in terms of dose.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: I'm going to add another one here question from M. Lewis who was not a speaker, but I think Ron can clarify this too, what are the plans in place for enabling realtime monitoring of both air and effluent measures for public review?

RON PONTES: So we do have around the perimeter of the site and beyond the site we have

air samplers that are operating all the time. And those air samplers are attended to, and we measure the media, the filter media that comes from the air samplers, in fact, the California Department of Public Health also operates some of their own air samplers in conjunction with a few of ours, and they also measure what's on that filter media.

And all of that information is rolled up and provided in our annual REMP report. So we produce a report once a year, and it reports out on what we're finding in the environment, not only for air, but for direct radiation that emanates from the plant through our thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) that are installed around the perimeter of the plant as well.

All that information is compared to control stations far away from the facility so that we can understand what impact we're having or not having. You know, we also sample, we have a garden over the on the mesa, and we sample that garden for radioactivity as well to get an indication of what is happening with the food supply, if anything.

We've got a very robust program around here, and we've been doing this for many decades,

and we don't see the accumulation of radioactivity in the environment.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: You do do -- you said there's an annual report, but you also do some of the realtime monitoring is available for public view, is it not?

RON PONTES: We have realtime direct radiation monitoring around the ISFSI that was installed some years ago, and that's streamed realtime to three agencies: California Department of Public Health, that produces a monthly report that's available to the public, but there's skilled, trained health physicists at CDPH to interpret the data, and it also goes to the City of San Juan Capistrano, and the data also goes to California State Parks, San Onofre State Beach so it's available to them too.

But realtime radiation monitoring elsewhere is not performed. We report it, we collect those TLDs quarterly, we measure them, and we report out on what we're finding.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Mandy had a couple questions. I'm sure she -- she usually submits hers in writing, but there's a couple things she mentioned, and maybe you can review those, but the

one thing is on the sediment monitoring, the reports she talked about the units of measurements that Edison reports in and how they're trying to translate that into their knowledge base. Can you just address that first.

RON PONTES: Mandy has raised that question before. We've looked at it, her request and we honestly decided that we would not change to becquerels, you know, the European method of reporting out radiation dose. We report in the same units that we report to the NRC. A little bit concerned if we start doing it in different units, then it creates more confusion and, perhaps, more explanations needed.

She can, maybe this is work on her side, and I apologize for that, but she can easily convert that information to units that she would like to understand. It's not that hard to do, but we're not going to that. We want a consistent set of results that we're reporting -- that we put out on a website that we report to NRC.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Another thing that she raised is the institution knowledge, that somehow through the process we learned that there was a little bit of institutional knowledge that

were lost that could have helped in the process of dealing with those canisters and her suggestion was are we looking at anything else, is there any other areas where we have to go back and see if we're missing some institutional knowledge that might assist us in dealing with a future problem.

RON PONTES: Was she referring to the pressurizer?

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I think she was.

RON PONTES: That's a fair comment. When a plant goes into decommissioning one of the recommendations is lessons learned from previous plants that have gone through it, is to retain some knowledge basis by the people that work at the plant that were here before you entered decommissioning.

As time goes on, that's harder and harder to do, because folks age out and retire and leave. So there's a few of us left here, not including me, because I came after they shut down the plant. But there are people here, a few of them, few of us left, that were here when we were operating. Even the folks that were operating may not know about particular things like that happened long ago.

That's a good point, fair question. We need to guard against that as we go forward as consider the staffing of this project and so on. That is important. That's a fair point.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: Martha, did you have anything else?

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Yeah, there was another one that was submitted that was not a speaker, and this is Harvey Liss. Since the spent nuclear fuel in the thin-walled canisters is not transportable, how do we move to another site or is it now deemed transportable?

I think we've discussed this before, but maybe it's a good idea for Jerry to do that one.

JERRY STEPHENSON: Our canisters -- thank you. Our canisters are 5/8 inch thick stainless steel. That's 25 percent thicker than what's required by the design. We made that choice proactively, give us some margin. They're not only transportable, but they're actually licensed to be transported on multiple transport systems.

Orano just licensed another transport system that we can use. There's a lot of misinformation out there, but there's never been a question about the transportability of any of our

spent fuel canisters. I want to make that clear.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Thank you. I know sometimes we get repeated questions for maybe people haven't been around long enough to hear the answer the first time.

FRED BAILLY: If I may add one point, it was mentioned before the canisters being moved twice would be risky, it would not be risky to move the canisters to another elevation and then transport them. We could do it very safely. It's not a problem. The point is we would do it only if it's necessary.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: I think that's -- let's see Julie from Oceanside said in a question, she was not a speaker, that said apart the tritium that leak into the groundwater, are there other issues we should know about concerning or otherwise?

I think that's kind of an open end question. I'm not sure this is the place to bring up those things, and we've discussed a lot of them today, but if anybody has any other response to that.

RON PONTES: I'll take a crack at it. We established a very low threshold for reporting

just about anything that happens at the site. These meetings come up, more or less, once a quarter. I think that we are very transparent about what's happening here at this site. We try to get the bad news out with the good news so that everybody gets a pretty good understanding of what's happening.

I mean, offhand, to me, I don't think there's anything happening here now that is worthy of mention. Everything is normal in all of our procedures and programs.

FRED BAILLY: I would add that what's -- I mean, the disclosure today on the tritium matter is an example of how low a threshold we've put to ourself to disclose the information. We have no obligation for any report of tritium for what are finding, and this is happening on site. Since we are seeing something that we have not seen before, even though it's going to be manageable, it has no impact, we decided that it was the right thing to do to put it in front of the CEP and the public. And we're committed to keeping -- to keeping the CEP informed in the future on those type of events and certainly on the tritium matter.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Thank you. I

appreciate ma.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: I guess the last thing I thought might have had a written question too, but there was a question about the results of the actual readings as opposed to, as they call them, the conclusions, I think, of what we found with the transportation and of the pressurizer, and they also in that same line were asking about the NRC reports and conclusions. So I don't know if you want to comment on that or --

RON PONTES: The NRC reports are public. That is the inspection report that mentions the two violations and why we receive those violations. We do document all of the surveys that were performed. We don't normally share that with the public. We did -- the NRC did request survey maps and we provided it to the NRC. That's how we handle it. It is all documented here at the site under our programs.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: All right.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. Thank you Martha. Thank you, Victor. Thank you, all of you who participated from the public and asked questions, and again, thank you, SCE, for your answers to those questions. We really appreciate

that.

Fred, I'm going to turn it over to you for some closing comments.

FRED BAILLY: Thank you, Dan.

Just one point before closing comments on the posting or alerts on the releases, we are committed to making the information available. It is available, and we will be happy to facilitate access to the information with the city so we'll work with you guys.

So let me thank the members of the public and members of the CEP who participated today in the meeting and ask questions about what matters to you. We very much appreciate the challenge.

I wanted to mention that the team here at SONGS take these matters very seriously, whether it's related to waste shipments or the emergent tritium matter. We value transparency. Our team includes some very talented professionals who work hard to demonstrate our commitment to safety, stewardship, and engagement.

As I mentioned before with respect to the tritium matter, we continue to keep the CEP and local committees up to date on our assessment and any mitigation -- mitigating actions.

Thank you, Dan.

For the next slide I have one quick reminder, the website is a good source for nuclear facts and updates on decommissioning. There are some videos there. You can find information also on social media channels, so we can find it there. I encourage that you visit our website, songscommunity.com.

And now I'll turn it back over to you, Dan.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Thank you, Fred.

First of all, Joe, with reference to reaching out to me or anyone else that wants to easy e-mail to reach me at is danstetson@me.com, S-T-E-T-S-O-N, and I look forward to receiving your e-mail, and then cross-reference your information with SCE.

Gosh, I just want to thank everyone today. We covered a lot of materials. We ran over a few minutes, but I think it was really productive. I mean, we had a lot of information that was covered. I mean, we had an overview of the dismantlement, we talked about the shake table demonstrations, the Supervisors Katrina Foley and Jim Desmond gave us updates with reference to the

state resolution, again, very, very important. Gosh, we had a number of updates with reference to a few things that we are expecting and a few things we're not expecting, such as a little bit more information about the water leaking from the pressurizers.

We appreciate all of that information and we look forward to continued information as that comes forward. Also, the information about the tritium, which is now being discovered, and we certainly appreciate SCE's transparency and discovered tritium levels in the groundwater, even though there's no risk to public health and safety, but it is a concern, and we appreciate the information and we, again, pledge that this will be covered in our upcoming meetings.

So, again, I really want to thank everyone for this robust discussion. Let's go ahead and move on to the next slide, please.

So this is what our meetings schedules looks like up to date in terms of what we are going to. So our next one is going to be September 5th. We are going to be talking about the things that are mentioned here, and we are going to give you some updates on a number of

other new things that came up today. Then of course we've got our meeting on November 4th, and we'll have our CEP meeting for the consultation, and that will be on December 10th.

Next slide, please. Let's see, I think we got one more slide.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Dan, can you go back one? I was listening, and I didn't match. What I'm hearing and what I'm seeing didn't match. Today is the September 5th one.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Right.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: And next one is November 7th. You said the 4th but did you mean 7th?

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: I'm sorry, our fourth quarter meeting.

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: Fourth quarter, I get it sorry. My confusion.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: No, no, I should have slowed it down a little bit. Our fourth quarter CEP meeting and also the topic has been brought up about the time of the different meetings, and my understanding is that the next meeting will be at a later date, I believe it's going to be at 5:00 p.m., but the timing we've

shifted around a little bit, because in the past we've had some presenters from the East Coast, and right now if we had this meeting starting later, they would be ready to start the next day. So we're trying to be responsive, but we are taking a look at the timing of the meetings, and we want to make this as available to as many people as possible, and my understanding is our next meeting is going to be at a later date -- later time.

Go on to the next slide.

HON. VICTOR CABRAL: And the next.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: And the final slide which says thank you. Right now you've got a few minutes if you want to turn on -- the U.S. Open is on, we've got the woman's match -- Martha, you have one last thing you want to say?

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: You skipped the last one. It's the 2025 schedule. You thought it was same slide but it's not.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. So let's -- thank you, Martha. I'm kind of --

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: You want to get to the tennis match, I know, I know.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: That's exactly right. We got a couple Americans that are

playing, so I'm hoping that they do well. Pardon me for rushing through the last slides. Thank you for pointing it out.

The 2025 tentative meeting schedule is posted here, and these are the topics which we anticipate going over at those upcoming meetings and the dates, as you can see, are not posted here, so those are yet to be determined.

So, Martha, thank you very much. What else have I missed?

MARTHA McNICHOLAS: You're fine now.

CHAIRMAN DAN STETSON: Okay. You know, I really need you guys to keep me on the straight and narrow. Thank you very much for that.

With that, unless there's anything else, I wish everyone a safe evening, and thank you all for your active and valued participation. Good night.

(WHEREUPON THE PROCEEDINGS WAS ADJOURNED AT 5:17 P.M.)

(CERTIFICATE OF COURT OFFICER ATTACHED ON FOLLOWING PAGE HEREOF.)

CERTIFICATE

OF

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That the foregoing proceedings were taken remotely before me at the time and place therein set forth; that a verbatim record of the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand which was thereafter transcribed under my direction; further, that the foregoing is an accurate transcription thereof.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date subscribed my name

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