Community Engagement Panel
Public Meeting

Transcript of Proceedings

Date: 07/23/2015

Job #: 597477
SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

OCEANSIDE, CALIFORNIA

THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015

Reported by:
CARLOS R. HICHO
CSR No. 13111
Job No. 597477
SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

Transcript of proceedings, taken at
1938 Avenida Del Oro, Oceanside, California
92056, commencing at the hour of 6:07 P.M.,
THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015, before
CARLOS R. HICHO, CSR No. 13111.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:

DAVID G. VICTOR
CHAIRMAN

TOM PALMISANO
VICE PRESIDENT, DECOMMISSION
AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER AT SONGS

DAN STETSON, CEP SECRETARY
OCEAN INSTITUTE

LISA BARTLETT
SUPERVISOR FIFTH DISTRICT

JEROME M. "JERRY" KERN
OCEANSIDE CITY COUNCILMEMBER

DONNA BOSTON
ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

RICH HAYDON
CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS

DR. WILLIAM PARKER
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

JOHN ALPAY
CAPISTRANO UNIFIED SCHOOL BOARD

JAVIER ALVAREZ
LOCAL 89 SAN DIEGO

GLENN PASCALL
SIERRA CLUB

CARLOS OLVERA
MAYOR DANA POINT

TOM CAUGHLAN
CAMP PENDLETON

(Continued.)
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEMBERS PRESENT:

JIM LEACH
SOUTH ORANGE COUNTY ECONOMIC COALITION

TED QUINN

KELLI GALLION
EMERGENCY PLANNING MANAGER

BOB BAKER
SAN CLEMENTE MAYOR PRO TEM

GUESTS PRESENT:

DR. KRIS SINGH
HOLTEC PRESIDENT & CEO

PIERRE ONEID
HOLTEC SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT and CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER

SARA KAMINSKE
ASSISTANT EMERGENCY MANAGER FOR ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF and IPC CHAIR.
THURSDAY, JULY 23, 2015
OCEANSIDE, CALIFORNIA
6:13 P.M.

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CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Let's get started.

Welcome to the regular meeting of the Community
Engagement Panel. Tonight the meeting is going to
focus on dry fuel storage, Defense in Depth, and the
implementation of emergency plan.

We have an extremely busy agenda. I'm sorry
we're starting a few minutes late, but the 5 is, by all
accounts, a parking lot right now. So, thank you for
all of you who have braved the 5 to get here. We may
run a few minutes over, but we'll keep the meeting in
total at three hours.

My name is David Victor, I'm Chairman of the
Community Engagement Panel; Dan Stetson, Secretary,
here with me. I just want to remind everybody that if
there is an emergency and you need to evacuate the
building, you can go back out the doors that you came
in or those doors there also marked "Exit" and then
back out to the parking lot.

We have two officers in attendance for your
safety and security. And if there's anything we can do
to help you, please don't hesitate to let me know.
Let me just remind everybody the Community Engagement Panel is not a decision-making body. There are lots of decision-making bodies involved in various kinds of oversight of the Decommissioning of San Onofre. We are -- we're designed and are designed as a conduit between the communities affected by the plant and the owners and operators of the plant and it's a two-way conduit.

This body is here to help, Edison, in particular, understand what the communities are worried about and concerned about and talk about that in a serious way and also to help the many communities understand what Edison is doing and to have a two-way interaction and we've had a lot of interaction on the two topics of today's -- tonight's agenda.

Before we get started, let me remind you that there's a website, www.SONGScommunity.com, where you can sign up for walking tours, you can obtain all the meeting materials on the website, there's livestreaming there for those around the world who are watching us.

I believe all the presentations from tonight's present -- for tonight are already posted on that site, and I will also commit to you that we are going to up our game on improving the usability of that site so that's easier to find information on the site. We've
heard from a number of people that had difficulty and we're working on that. But the idea is to be completely transparent and make sure that everything is available to the community.

I want to acknowledge several alternates and guest speakers tonight: San Clemente Mayor Pro Tem, Bob Baker, who is sitting down here, sitting in for Tim Brown, who unfortunately is unable to be with us tonight due to overseas travel.

We'll have a presentation later on the permanent -- Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan, the PDEP. And I acknowledge Sara Kaminske, who is the Assistant Emergency Manager for Orange County Sheriff and Chair of the IPC. Sara, thank you for joining us tonight.

We'll also have presentations from Holtec on the Defense-in-Depth Plan along with Edison. And from Holtec tonight we have Kris Singh, who is President and CEO of Holtec, as well as Pierre Oneid, who is Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer for -- for Holtec. I think, also, Javier Alvarado, from Local 89, is here to observe because Val Macedo is -- and Rick Smiles aren't able to be with us tonight.

Let me remind you that the public comment period is not completely open-mic night where you can
get up and say whatever you want to say, but if you have a theme for your comment, please let us know what that is, and you have to sign up for the comment period over at the registration table. And we'll talk later about a slight revision in that process to hopefully make the open-comment period as productive as possible.

We have on everyone's chairs agendas as well as hard-to-read documents. I've discovered, as I get older, that more and more documents are in the hard-to-read category. But there are hard-to-read documents on your chairs.

And those of you who speak both in the open-comment period and members of the CEP during the sessions prior, please do state your name for those watching, not only livestream but in the archive. Every single CEP meeting is archived. And I will call out, along with Dan Stetson, various items that come up for the public record and for a concrete action by Edison and by others afterwards.

Let's begin now. We have -- the first segment of our meeting is going to be an update on the decommissioning process and, in particular, focusing on what's happened since the last report from Edison. And we have, as always, Tom Palmisano, who is Vice President of Decommissioning and Chief Nuclear Officer
for Edison, a familiar face and a key supporter of the CEP.

   Tom, the floor is yours.

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you, David. Good evening, everybody. I look forward to addressing the Community Engagement Panel and the public tonight. In this segment, I'll provide an overall update on our decommissioning activities and some related activities.

   The -- just to refresh, keep in front of all of us are Decommissioning Principles: Safety, Stewardship, and Engagement. You know, fundamentally, safely decommissioning San Onofre, safely storing and then managing spent fuel until the Department of Energy removes it from our site; Stewardship of the environment and the Trust Fund; and Engagement, ensuring we are talking openly about what we're doing, what our plans are, and listening actively in terms of feedback from the panel and the public and other stakeholders.

   I'll keep this brief, David, because I know we've got some significant topics in the agenda, so if there are any panel members at this point who have questions, please, please ask as I go.

   You've seen our 20-year timeline before. I just want to give you an update. Again, the bold
vertical line to the left of that is quarters; that is the first quarter of 2016. And after that is years, taking us out to a 20-year timeline. We're still in the pre-decommissioning activities at this point.

The upper left activities are all in progress. This is retiring systems and equipment that are no longer required. This is reconfiguring the plant. You've heard me talk before about removing hazards, such as transformer oil and acid and caustics; all that is well underway and a good bit of that is now complete. So we anticipate completing --

And go back one, please. Hit the wrong button too quick.

So we anticipate completing that at the end of the fourth quarter into the early first quarter. The middle section is really the NRC licensing basis changes. I'm going to talk in a few minutes about the Defueled Emergency Plan, which has been approved and implemented.

And this week we received approval for the Defueled Technical Specifications, which are part of the license, and that's been implemented. This now changes the license to reflect that we're no longer authorized to operate the reactor and modifies all the extraneous stuff from the license that doesn't apply
The ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Project we're going to talk about more specifically. We are in the engineering and permitting phase at this point. A lot of the focus in 2015 shifts away from NRC submittals to California permitting activities with the Coastal Commission particularly as we look at the ISFSI expansion. So a lot of work going on in the permitting arena at -- at the state level at this point.

The Irradiated Fuel Manage Plan, Decommissioning Cost Estimate, and Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report; these are unique submittals the NRC requires for decommissioning.

The Decommissioning Cost Estimate has been done, submitted to the NRC, and submitted to the Public Utility Commission, and they're starting the proceeding to review the appropriateness of the Decommissioning Cost Estimate.

The NRC has accepted the estimate; their 90-day review period completed at the end of December 2014. We now will be on an annual update process with the NRC. The Public Utility Commission is just starting their review process.

The Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report -- some of you were here last year, we had a couple of meetings on this -- it's a fairly high-level document, about a 40-to-50 page document, outlining the 20-year decommissioning plan and the plan to manage spent fuel through the longer term on site until it's removed from the site. So those two documents have been accepted by the NRC at the end of the 90-day period.

The Irradiated Fuel Management Plan is a document which describes the Irradiated Fuel Management Plan, in particular how we're going to fund that, that is, completed its review. And I expect, at the end of July or early August, the NRC will actually approve that and issue a Safety Evaluation Report because that's about spent fuel, so they actually take a more involved role in approving that plan.

The rest of the activities are really activities on site: Historical Site Assessment & Site Characterization, characterizing what's on the site after 30 or 40 years of operation, preparing for the Remediation Plan and the Decommissioning Plan.

And we're in the middle of the process of selecting a General Decommissioning Contractor who will actually plan and execute the overall decommissioning under our -- our oversight.
So with that, that's a quick update on decommissioning. Any questions on that?

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Questions? Can you just let us know, is there anything that's not going according to schedule that we -- to which we should be attentive?

MR. PALMISANO: Right now everything is going to schedule. What I would tell you to be attentive to is the Coastal Commission work over the next two to three months. We've got several key discussions coming up in August and October and they're important and I know a number of people on the distribution list for that, so that's what I'd draw your attention to.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. And the schedule right now calls for the spent fuel to be offloaded into canisters, starting in early 2017 and then finish by 2019. Is that, more or less, the --

MR. PALMISANO: That --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- the position?

MR. PALMISANO: That is the current schedule, so when the permitting is done, we're doing our engineering, our off-site fabrication currently, and that will continue. On-site construction will start after the Coastal Commission permit is approved and issued.
And then, anticipating about a year for on-site construction, we would offload the pool somewhere, starting in 2017 to be complete by mid-2019 or earlier, just depending on when we get started on the activity.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. I just asked because we're going to have a segment of the meeting later -- MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- where we talk about Consolidated Interim Storage, which would involve moving the fuel out of here completely, and that could then potentially begin as early as 2019 or so.

MR. PALMISANO: Certainly. It could -- could begin as soon as really an off-site facility is available, but I'll touch more on that in a minute.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Right. Thank you. Any other questions?

(Brief pause.)

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. You've seen this slide at every meeting. I'm just showing you. These are the NRC Submittals. We are now complete with the emergency plan since the last meeting and the defuel tech specs. The PSDAR (Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report), the Decommissioning Cost Estimate -- again, I apologize for the acronyms -- have
been accepted as of December 26, so we're really down
to just a couple NRC submittals that we'll be
completing over the next three -- three months or so.

    Industry Initiatives: This is important
because part of what we're going to talk about today is
not only on-site spent fuel storage, but Consolidated
Interim Storage off site.

    Now, the Department of Energy -- I think we've
all talked about this -- under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, is responsible for removing spent nuclear fuel
from all the commercial nuclear sites and disposing of
it. They've had that responsibility since 1982.

    We're all frustrated that they haven't done
that yet. And, quite frankly, that's an important
element for all of us to push forward.

    Now, as part of this, though, every several
years they publish a report that is looking at a
preliminary evaluation of removing fuel from shutdown
nuclear sites. Now that we've permanently closed units
2 and 3 and notified them, they made a visit in June to
update their report. They had previously looked at
San Onofre 1 since that had been closed many years
earlier.

    So we hosted a DOE visit and they spent a day
on site; more importantly, they spent two days in the
area. So there were DOE officials, up to an assistant, under Secretary of the Department of Energy, Department of Transportation Officials, Federal Rail -- Railway Administration officers, technical staff, DOE National Labs Personnel.

The California Energy Staff Commission participated in all the days because they're certainly very interested in what is going to take to remove fuel from the San Onofre site. I think it was a very productive visit.

They met -- not only they spent a day touring the site, understanding our infrastructure and rail access and highway access, they then met with some of the CEP officers to get some public perspective. They met with local officials. They met with railroad representatives and heavy haul company to understand.

And we are fortunate in this area. We have some pretty good access to rail and highway compared to some sites. So they came away with a lot of good information. They looked at the on-site fuel storage, our infrastructure, and the transportation infrastructure in the area.

They expect their revised draft to be done in the fall of 2015. This is what the cover page looks like (indicating). I believe this was the 2014 report.
We can easily put on this our website. You know, it's a bit dated. This would be updated and probably publicly available early 2016 once they get through their draft-review process. So this was an important visit and I was pleased to see them come out when they did.

Let me go on and talk about Consolidated Interim Storage. So there is a couple of things going on in the industry that I think it's important the Panel and public know about. Really, there is three possibilities, if you will, right now that appear to be on the horizon:

First is in the Skull Valley, Utah, on the Goshute Indian Reservation. This is private fuel storage. And, actually, we are a very small part-owner over this limited liability company that actually license this facility.

So this facility is owned by utilities, including us. We actually have an NRC license that was issued in 2007 to build an interim off-site used fuel storage facility. You'll see my bottom bullet, it's "Unlikely ever to be constructed."

This really never had the appropriate support at the state level in Utah. There was a lot of local support from the Indian ba — band, some support from
the counties, but a lot of resistance at a state level, and this truly highlights what has come to be known today as "Consent-Based Siting."

That lacking consent-based siting you can get this license, but the reality is you probably never get it built. We were never able to secure rail access to the site due to opposition. So this one really will not come to fruition. The good thing about it, it really laid out the template, though, for a private entity to be licensed for off-site fuel storage.

So then the next thing, and this is fairly new, in Andrews County, Texas, which is in West Texas, a company called Waste Control Specialists, with a couple of other companies, have announced the intent to build and license a Consolidated Interim Storage facility. They've partnered with -- with AREVA. There's significant local and state support for the facility, both local counties as well as state level, the Governor has weighed in.

So this appears to be on a positive track in terms of consent-based support for that -- for that location. They've actually commenced their initial licensing activities and filed with the NRC with the intent to submit a license application.

So this is a promising development for
off-site interim storage in the much nearer term than Department of Energy functioning. In addition, in Eastern New Mexico, Holtec and the Eddy -- Eddy Lea Energy Alliance -- Eddy Lea are two counties in this area. This, again, is an area where there is a lot of local and state support for continuing -- for Consolidated Interim Storage. It is based on the Holtec UMAX System.

As I said, a lot of local and state support. And initial licensing activities will commence relatively soon. They've announced this to the industry and are preparing to inform the NRC of their plans for licensing. So I see these as two very viable options.

Now, what both options need beyond what these companies can do is they need some work at the federal level with some changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to authorize DOE to work with private companies for interim storage, and they need funding lined up through the Nuclear Waste Fund, which has been collected from all of us for many years. So there's some things that we need to urge federal legislators to make happen.

The companies, the states are active in that scheme, but I think these are two very viable things that will provide us an interim solution much sooner.
than a permanent solution from the Department of Energy. So I'm encouraged by that.

And I would say, though, that I was talking to a couple of CEP panel members, we really need to send the message clearly to Congress related to this, of the interest in Consolidated Interim Storage as a solution for a plan, like San Onofre, which has no need to keep fuel on site anymore.

And with that, David, questions before I turn it back to you?

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Great. Thank you very much. We'll have a chance to talk later in this meeting about Consolidated Interim Storage.

Let me ask Dan Stetson. Do you want to comment on the visit from the Department of Energy? You and Tim Brown and I met with them at a ridiculously early hour of the morning and it was so early I don't remember what happened, but maybe you could tell us what happened.

MR. STETSON: That's right, David. I think it was because of you that we had to meet at six o'clock in the morning, but the folks from the East Coast, certainly, that was on their schedule.

I thought it was a very interesting meeting, to come and be able to ask questions of these folks,
and I think so much of it revolved around transportation. And, once we have a place, when can we move it?

So my question that I really took away was, if we had a place to move it tomorrow, does the DOE have legal authority to move it? And the gentleman there looked at me and he smiled and he said, "We have legal authority, but we don't really have realistic authority."

And I said "Well, what do you mean by that?" He said "Well, we, under the statute, we have the authority to do it, but realistically all the jurisdictions that we would have to move it through we would need to get their buy-in at some level before we would be able to move it through there." So I thought that that was really interesting to -- to come away with that, a big take-away.

The other one was that there are two bills, one in the Senate and one in the House, that are moving forward. And really on the basis of that, that'll be the marching orders for the DOE.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you very much. Let me see if there are any other comments. I will say that I asked the DOE to send us, CEP and, therefore, the community, a letter outlining what their
next steps are here and they are going to send that letter. And so as soon as we have it, we'll circulate it along with, as Tom mentioned, the new report on the status of spent fuel. Any other comments or questions?

MR. ALPAY: I just have --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: John?

MR. ALPAY: I just have a quick question. Where in New Mexico is this proposed facility?

DR. SINGH: Southeast New Mexico.

MR. ALPAY: I'm sorry. Where?

MR. PALMISANO: Kris. Kris --

DR. SINGH: The southeast corner.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Kris. Kris. Let me ask Tom to -- it's in the southeast corner of New Mexico.

MR. PALMISANO: Northeast of New Mexico, Kris.

DR. SINGH: No, the southeast.

MR. PALMISANO: Southeast. Thank you. Southeast corner of New Mexico. Eddy Lea County is just across the Texas line.

MR. ALPAY: Okay. Thank you.

MR. CAUGHLAN: I have -- Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question of Dan. When you say jurisdictional permission, do we have to get permission from every single county this goes through or is it state? Or how -- I see a nightmare coming.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: I think, yeah, this --

MR. CAUGHLAN: By nodding yes, I think you agree with this.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: You know, I think we've heard -- the idea of moving the fuel permanently to Yucca Mountain is becoming more and more distant as a serious prospect, but not completely gone. And so now there is a lot of excitement about Consolidated Interim Storage. It makes a whole lot of sense. And we, in this community, really should be pushing for this.

I came away from the meeting with DOE really struck, as Dan said, that the real problems are going to be transport-related, that they're going to need to have multiple routes and figure out what local consent really means and how do you engage those communities.

And if that doesn't get done properly, then we're going to be stuck with the waste here. So I think this is a lot of spadework that needs to be done on that. And we'll come back later in this meeting to talk about how we would help push along that spade -- spadework.

Ted Quinn, did you want to comment?

MR. QUINN: Well, you said we were coming back later in the meeting. I think the benefit is, as part of those Senate and House bill that Dan talked about
is -- is part of the transportation is being addressed
as part of those bills with funding towards looking at
procedural and program support to make that work.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much. Any
other comments or questions about this?

(Brief pause).

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: This is an extremely helpful
update. Thank you. Thank you very much, Tom.

Let's move on now to the first and the main
topic of today's meeting, which is the New Emergency
Plan for San Onofre. It may be slightly mistitled in
the agenda. What's happened recently is that the
emergency -- parts of the Emergency Plan have shifted.
And this has been on the news quite a lot. We thought
it would be valuable to have a serious discussion about
this right now.

So, Tom, I know you're going to lead this, but
then bring in some other folks to comment along the
way.

MR. PALMISANO: Right. Right. What I will do is,
I will introduce kind of give a high-level summary,
turn it over to Kelli Gallion, our Emergency Planning
Manager, and then Sara Kaminske will talk from an
off-site perspective. And we appreciate both of you
being here to help us with this.
This is a discussion we have had periodically through the last year, going back every meeting, with status of the submittal. We submitted these Emergency Plan changes in March of 2014. So, starting the first meeting, we've talked about this. We had an in-depth meeting back -- do you remember when that was, Kelli, when we had the deep dive into the emergency plan? I think that was in July?

MS. GALLION: It would've been in -- in May.

MR. PALMISANO: May? May. Thank you. So we've had a regular discussion about Emergency Plan changes. But it's important, and now that it's been approved and implemented, I want to just recap for everybody.

Again, our decommissioning principles; I won't repeat that, but this is built really on safety and our discussion on engagement.

So, why is emergency planning changing?

You've heard this before, but just I'll be redundant quite frankly, you know. In an operating plant, the full scale emergency plan with the 10-mile emergency planning zone, the four levels of emergency from unusual event to alert the site area emergency to general emergency are based really on the accidents that can occur on an operating nuclear plant that can happen relatively quickly and, in bad accidents,
release significant radioactivity that can affect
off-site population. Okay?

What's different in a permanently shutdown
decommissioning plant, first there's no fuel in the
reactors. These reactors are not operating at full
power of 2,000 pounds and 600 degrees. The fuels --
the reactors are permanently defueled.

In our case, the fuel has decayed greater than
three years. These reactors last operated on
January 31st, 2012, for Unit 3, and Unit 2 had shut
down in early January 2012. So, the fuel is decayed.
There is significantly lower decay heat and
radioactivity levels.

Now, there is significant long-term
radioactivity. There is no doubt about that in the
fuel, but it doesn't present the same hazard that the
short-lived radioactivity does in an operating plant.

Most potential scenarios related to an
operating plant are no longer possible simply because
the reactors are no longer in service. And there is
much more time to respond and mitigate -- mitigate
potential issues before they could affect on-site
employees or the public. That's kind of the
fundamental basis that the NRC and we look at in terms
of why it's appropriate to change an emergency plan.
This just gives you a little more detail:

"Operating reactor, on the left, potential accidents that dominate risk and create radiological --" things like reactor coolant system line breaks. Again, the reactor cool -- coolant system is no longer in service. It simply can't occur.

"Loss of steam generator feedwater." Steam generators are no longer in service, so the serious accidents that can happen quickly and release significant radioactivity are no longer possible.

In a permanently defueled reactor the hazards are reduced; primary risk is related really to fuel stored in the spent fuel pool to a lesser degree in dry cask storage, mainly the spent fuel pool.

And, in fact, the accident -- the emergency plan requirements for dry cask storage in the shutdown plan are the same as they are in the operating plan. And the spent fuel pool is at atmospheric temperature and low pressure. Again, there is a low-heat source and we don't have a high-energy system that can release radioactivity.

This -- this curve we had our folks develop just to show you. This would show you back at February 2012 when we first shut down Unit 3, and Unit 2 had been shut down just three weeks. Don't worry about,
you know, millions of BTU's per hour, but that's a high-heat load, for example.

You can see within about 15 to 18 months that decays to 10 percent of what it was when we first shut down and then you have a slow decay after that. So this is principally what changes in terms of the hazard in the spent fuel pool.

The Emergency Plan changes impacts only part of the original plan; much of the plan remains the same. We have noted unusual events and alerts. We have an on-site staff that's robust, able to deal with emergencies. We have requirements to notify off-site authorities and cooperate and train. So, much of the plan remains the same.

The NRC spent 15 months reviewing, approving this. This is not something we could do unilaterally. This went through 15 months of review, including public comment periods.

So, "What remains?" The dedicated Emergency Response Organization. We continue the coordination with off-site emergency responders and the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee. And there is one point here, there has been some discussion about ongoing funding. So, you know, as an operating plant, there is a state law that requires us to fund off-site
emergency planning, okay, and through the Interjurisdictional Planning Commission.

After we shut down, we were asked the question "Would we lobby for a change of the law?" And we said no. We -- in fact, we said through 2019 until the fuel is out of the fuel pools, we will continue the same level of funding. It doesn't matter if the plan is the defuel plan or the operating plan, we have committed to continue the same level of funding.

Cal OES recently decided that they can no longer charge us that because we're no longer an operating plant. We have told the counties and the cities we'll continue the funding and we've offered to work out Memorandums Of Understanding with all the appropriate jurisdictions to assure that funding for that period of time. So I just want everybody to understand we are committed to that.

You see some numbers when we look at the local and the county agencies, it's about 1.7 million a year. And after 2019 when all the fuel is in the independent fuel storage installation or dry cask storage, we're willing to continue some appropriate level of funding then because we recognize it's important. Okay. And we'll work that out after we're down the road farther on that.
This just -- I just want to kind of reiterate the timeline. We submitted this in March 2014. Actually, it was October. We had an in-depth presentation, as Kelli mentioned, May. In every meeting I status the NRC's submittals and talked about this.

But if you remember in October, we brought in the NRC to talk about emergency planning and their process for reviewing plan changes and exemptions and license amendments. We brought in the chair of Interjurisdictional Planning Committee at that point in time, and then we talked, as well, explaining emergency planning and how it was going to change many months before it was approved.

And we wanted -- we had a very good discussion, I think, with the panel and the public about what was changing, the basis for the change in the process, and we've continued to status that throughout. You see some additional things.

The NRC commissioners had to approve a series of exemptions to the rules and then they did that in March. And why are exemptions necessary? Because all the rules were written for an operating reactor and the NRC has recognized that and decided to start rule-making.
But in the interim, for San Onofre and other decommissioning plants, the NRC has an approved process to say for us to propose these rules should not apply and request exemptions; took them a year to approve those. It's not a trivial decision. They had extensive review time and they actually had some very good staff guidance that we and the other utilities follow. That's available on our website, and we've shared this before.

And then the NRC then completed their work and issued the changes in June and we implemented on June 8, so we've now implemented the Defueled Emergency Plan.

And with that, let me take it -- turn it over to Kelli for a little more discussion.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Are there any burning questions for Tom before we shift to Kelli? Lisa?

MS. BARTLETT: I want to thank Southern California Edison for its commitment to offer funding through 2019, that's really important. I know, in July 1st, it came as a real surprise from the state level that they were going to -- to stop the funding level. So, we appreciate the -- the commitment from Southern California Edison.

You know, public safety is our number one
priority. And even though the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has reduced, in the event of an emergency,
because of the levels of activity at the nuclear power
plant, that you only have to have a -- an emergency
plan for a 2-mile radius, I want everyone to know that
the county and Southern California Edison have been
committed to not have the 2-mile radius but the
10-miles radius around the SONGS facility.

I have a number of cities in my district of
South Orange County, San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano,
Dana Point, that are within that 10-mile radius, so
it's really critical that we have that -- that radius
to ensure safety of the residents in those cities.

MR. PALMISANO: And I -- and I appreciate that. I
think we were all surprised, those of us involved, on
Cal OES's decision that the funding couldn't continue
under that mechanism. But, again, you know our
commitment and we're pleased to be here.

MS. BARTLETT: And it's actually better to keep the
state out of it at this point.

MR. PALMISANO: Yes.

MS. BARTLETT: It takes out the middle man and we
just deal directly with Southern California Edison, so
I think we'll be a lot more efficient.

MR. PALMISANO: Very good. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much. Any other comments before we -- okay. Why don't we move on? Thank you very much.

MR. PALMISANO: It advances slide and that's --

(Hands controller to Ms. Gallion.)

MS. GALLION: Okay. Thanks.

First, I want to start out by thanking you guys for allowing me to come and talk about our Emergency Preparedness Program at SONGS.

A little bit about myself: I am a native, a San Clementian, actually born and raised. I've been at SONGS for almost 29 years; 25 of those years have been in radiation protection.

I'm going to talk about our mission, which has not changed. Our mission continues to be to protect the health and safety of the public. Some of the ways that we accomplish that mission is by having a dedicated Emergency Response Organization.

We also have good partnership with our off-site jurisdiction, which was previously mentioned by Tom. So we continue to have routine meetings and we also do drill and training together as well. And, as Tom already mentioned, we are committed to funding our local county and our local cities for emergency funding.
On this -- the next couple of slides, I'm going to kind of talk about and get into more detail about the emergency plan and what our capabilities currently are compared to what they were before we implemented our Permanently Defueled E-Plan. You'll see largely that a lot of our capabilities remain the same, that they have not changed.

So I'll go over those: The first one, which is a high priority, is Dose Assessment. You'll see that during the operating plan that it was a requirement to have off-site Dose Assessment.

And, although, it's no longer a requirement, it is something we still continue to do both on site and both off site by San Onofre and also by the local jurisdictions.

We also continue to provide our notification to Orange County, San Diego County, California Operate -- Office of Emergency Services, Camp Pendleton, and the NRC. We notify them within 15 minutes and we provide a verbal notification within 60 minutes.

And we still have public information. We disseminate public information via our public information officers, via our corporate office instead of the Joint Information Center. So we no long -- we
no longer have a Joint Information Center, but we do have our corporate offices that still disseminates public information.

   Law Enforcement Response: You can see there that there's been no change in the level of support from the local law enforcement agencies. We do maintain a Law Enforcement Response Plan that's maintained by our security department. They also participate in exercises with us on an annual basis.

   Hospitals and Medical Treatment: You'll see that we went from two hospitals to four hospitals -- or, I'm sorry -- from four hospitals to two hospitals.

   We have agreements with all of these agencies that are listed up on the screen. Our two hospitals are Mission, which is to the north of the plant, and then Tri-City, which is to the south of the plant.

   There's no -- have been no changes in transportation or our fire fighting capabilities. You can see what they are up on the board. Again, there is no change in capabilities for those two areas.

   CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Lisa, do you want to ask a question?

   MS. BARTLETT: Yes. I know you're going from four hospitals to two. I would think you would want to have as many hospitals as possible. I know that the
Saddleback Memorial Hospital right now in San Clemente has an uncertain status. But with regard to Mission and Laguna Beach, why would that not be included?

MS. GALLION: Mission is included -- or not Mission Laguna Beach --

MS. BARTLETT: Laguna Beach.

MS. GALLION: But Mission Regional is included, and their requirement was to have a primary and a backup hospital, so we went with the primary and the backup and having one north and one south; and then Mission Regional, in Mission Viejo, had the trauma -- the trauma unit, so that's why we chose those two hospitals.

MS. BARTLETT: Even though you're only required to have a primary and a backup, I would still think you would want to have as many available hospitals in the region as possible and have those designated.

MS. GALLION: Yeah, and we have during our IPC and communication with Camp Pendleton, in the event of a -- you know, a large event where required multiple transportation of injured workers, we would be able to take them to any hospital that would be available and willing to receive patients.

MS. BARTLETT: That's why I think they'd be listed on the emergency plan.
MS. GALLION: Yeah, these were -- yeah, these were the two hospitals. I can't go back. Manuel, do you want to --

MR. PALMISANO: (Inaudible.) And take that --

MS. GALLION: Right. Thanks, Tom.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Yeah, so let's -- let's get back to the CEP with some more articulation of what the game plan is here because it seems like you still have relationships with the larger number of hospitals, but you have special relationships with two of them, and I think we should understand that and why that was done.

MS. GALLION: Yeah. Based on the number of events, we went down to the two hospitals, but we'll get back to you on that.

MR. BAKER: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, before you move on from that.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Please.

MR. BAKER: Why -- I'd like to know why San Clemente Hospital was left out? I mean, as part of the fact-finding, I'd like an answer to that.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. By the way, for the streaming, that was Bob Baker.

MS. GALLION: Okay. Like Tom said, I'll have to look into that and get back to you with an answer as far as how we chose the two hospitals that were chosen.
I'm sharing with you as much as I know as far as why we chose the two. My honest opinion was, there was no specific reason why we didn't go with more hospitals other than the regulatory requirement required us to have a primary and a backup hospital.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. We'll get more information and we'll share it with the CEP and then we can have a further discussion, because I think it's an important issue.

MS. GALLION: Lastly, we recognize the importance of -- we still have some risk, albeit a low risk. We still have a risk and we recognize the importance of maintaining collaboration with our off-site communities.

Some of the examples that I can share with you how we maintain collaboration with our off-site jurisdictions is, one, we have a common goal of ensuring protection, health and safety of the public and our plant workers; that's our number one priority.

We've also committed to maintaining the 50 sirens that are within our 10-mile emergency planning zone. We've also made provisions to allow a member of the off-site Dose Assessment Center team to be able to come into the command center if there was any kind of a radiological event at the plant where they would be a
source of information to our off-site jurisdictions.

We've also -- I already said this several times. But we're committed to funding through 2019 and we're also discussing funding beyond 2019. So, again, we continue to work together and make sure that our number one priority together as a team is to protect the health and safety of the public.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Great. Thank you very much.

Let me just see if there are other questions for Kelli. I know that some people are going to be interested in the question of what the criteria are for deciding around continued funding post-2019, so maybe we could also include that in the list of things to report back to CEP on. Other questions for Kelli or Tom related to this? Bob?

MR. BAKER: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bob Baker from San Clemente. Are the parameters the same for the sirens as they have been in the past? Will they be -- will there be some different parameters when the sirens will be activated?

MS. GALLION: Yeah, there'll be different parameters. We're developing a maintenance plan right now, but we're going to work with the jurisdiction that have sirens within their jurisdiction. So the -- the maintenance and testing will change somewhat, they
won't be held to FEMA requirements, but we'll still continue to do maintenance and testing of those sirens. It'll be up to the jurisdictions to establish expectations and response requirements from the public, but we'll continue to maintain the sirens themselves, the equipment.

MR. BAKER: I'm not talking about the maintenance of the sirens, I'm talking about when the sirens really alert you to something dangerous. Are the parameters when those sirens are going to be --

MS. GALLION: Yes.

MR. BAKER: -- activated different than with an operating plant?

MS. GALLION: Right. So, under the operating plant, they were activated -- first of all, San Onofre never activated the sirens. We gave protective action recommendations to the jurisdictions who would then make the decision to sound the sirens.

So our procedure guidance at the time was you would sound the sirens at a general emergency. But, again, that was a decision that was made on behalf of the jurisdictions. Does that answer your question?

MR. BAKER: Yes.

MS. GALLION: Okay.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: And Lisa, again. And then, I
think, John, you wanted to --

MS. BARTLETT: With regard to the sirens, because now you've got the 2-mile radius, so are you going to have the sirens activated then on an emergency basis within the 2-mile radius only or within the 10-mile radius that was previous?

MS. GALLION: So, again, we will maintain the sirens that are within the 10-mile emergency planning zone.

MS. BARTLETT: Okay.

MS. GALLION: That's 50 sirens. And, again, it's going to be up to the jurisdictions to determine when they would activate the sirens and for what type of events.

MS. BARTLETT: Okay.

MS. GALLION: Sirens can be used for, you know, different disaster-type situations. But we would not provide or provide any protective action recommendations that would warrant siren activation.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: And I think I understood, from Tom's presentation, that there is now no scenario in which there would be radiological release outside the plant boundaries. So is that -- is that the right interpretation?

MS. GALLION: It's --
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: So you don't see any scenario in which the sirens would be activated for San Onofre purposes?

MS. GALLION: That's correct. We would not exceed in an alert.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: John? John Alpay?

MR. ALPAY: Yeah. I knew you're going to give us more information on the hospitals but, I mean, just to emphasize the point for San Clemente, being a San Clemente resident myself, just based on proximity, it seems to be a gaping hole there. I mean, Mission Hospital and Tri-City are both obviously qualified facilities but, again, geography plays a role and it's right there. So I would just emphasize a point, I think that it's probably a deficiency.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Jerry Kern and then Dan and I --

MR. KERN: Just --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- do need to move on.

MR. KERN: Just one quick follow up on this hospital thing. Today, if you had an industrial accident, a one-off, one person gets hurt, wouldn't you transport to the closest hospital? It's not that you would pick these. If there is some event that would trigger a multiple transport to these hospitals, who
determines that multiple transport and who calls the shots?

MS. GALLION: So let me -- let me clarify, maybe I wasn't clear on that.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. I think, maybe Donna Boston? Do you want to answer this? And then I do -- we're going to get a full answer to this question back in front of the CEP. So let me ask Donna Boston and Dan and then we're going to move on.

MS. BOSTON: So I think that the difference that we're seeing here is what's required for Edison to put in their NRC required PETA (Plutonium Equipment Transfer Area) Plan and what our emergency response activities would actually include.

And so responding fire fighting assets or firefighters, paramedics will respond into a situation and they will employ the normal triage system that they do for every single event and they will look at their regional medical area hospitals and they will transport the traumas to the trauma center that have open-bed space and they will triage it in such a way that they are sending the patients that need the most acute care to the right places right away and then the lesser injured or lesser affected individual go to the lesser hospitals. So in our response portfolio we will
include all of those hospitals.

    Edison may be following their plan, but the
off-site response agencies will follow our normal
protocols and that will include all of our medical
assets, and we will rapidly push them to the hospitals
and get them cared as quickly as possible.

    MS. GALLION: Thanks, Donna.

    CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you. Thank you
very much.

    MS. GALLION: One -- one important point that I
would add is that our agreements are for transportation
of contaminated injured workers; that's kind of the big
differences. Our agreements are for the hospitals to
receive contaminated injured workers; that's what the
agreement is. They're acknowledging that they will
care for a contaminated individual.

    CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much.

    MS. GALLION: So that could be the difference.

    CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Yeah. Last comment, Dan
Stetson.

    MR. STETSON: Thanks. Will there be a change in
this plan a few years down the road when all of the
fuel has been moved into the casks?

    MS. GALLION: Yes, there will be.

    MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, the next anticipated change
will be when the pools are offloaded and all the fuel
is in dry cask storage will trigger yet another review
in change to the plan.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MR. PALMISANO: David, one last comment. I
should've clarified up front, none of this affects the
Site Security Plan. The Security Plan remains
unchanged. And remember the meeting we had last year,
we went in depth on that. None of this affects the
Site Security Plan. There is no change or exemptions
to the security requirements. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Great. Thank you very much,
Kelli. Let me now give the floor to Sara Kaminske from
the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee known as the
IPC.

MS. KAMINSKE: Thank you. Can everybody hear me
okay? Okay. First of all, I'd like to thank the panel
for giving me sometime to speak today about off-site
emergency planing. The second thank you is, allowing
me to present from my seat because I'm recovering from
a little hip, and they're saving me the embarrassment
of hobbling around stage. So, thank you for that.

Again, I'm Sara Kaminske. I'm an assistant
emergency manager with the County of Orange. I work
for the Orange County Sheriff's Department Emergency
Management Division. I'm currently the chair of the SONGS Interjurisdictional Planning Committee. I'll talk about that in a minute.

I've been a chair since 2011, and it's been one heck of a journey. We all know what happened since then. Now the decommissioning has thrown us into a new realm of emergency planning. Things will change, some things will not change, and I'll explain that in a minute.

I do want to acknowledge that I know there are people in this room, maybe you've heard me present before on emergency planning for an operating nuclear plant, and now I'm going to present for decommissioning nuclear plant. But I understand there is concerns from the community members and we respect that, we acknowledge that. We, in Emergency Management, worry about stuff all the time, so that's what we do. So with that -- oh, I need my clicker.

Okay. So the SONGS Interjurisdictional Planning Committee, if you've been coming to these -- the CEP meetings, Jeremy Kirchner, who was the chair in 2013, did a presentation on the IPC.

But planning for SONGS has always been complex. You know, it's not in Orange County, it's in San Diego County, on federal lands, surrounded by state
parks, et cetera, so it takes a multi-agency coordination system in place to plan for emergencies, that includes an operating a nuclear plant and it includes the decommissioning nuclear plant.

So the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee -- I'll refer to it as IPC, if that's okay to use that acronym to speed things up a little bit. But it's actually codified in the California Health and Safety Code. And even though SONGS is not an operating nuclear power plant, the IPC will remain intact and we will conduct radiological specific emergency planning for San Onofre.

So I'm going to talk about a couple of areas here and I'm going to go back to risk and responsibility. So we, as emergency managers, know that if there is a risk, then we have a responsibility to the communities that we serve to have that responsibility for emergency planning.

If there is a risk, we have a responsibility. We take that responsibility seriously. I know people have concerns about "Will our plans really work?" You know, but we hope we are very, very thoughtful in our emergency planning and they can be implemented.

So I'm going to touch on these areas: Public Perception, Emergency Planning, and off-site Dose.
Assessment Capability, Public Information and Communication, and I'll touch a little bit on Funding.

So we know there is still the capability of an emergency happening at San Onofre nuclear generating station. We understand there is a lot less things that can go wrong, but we understand that there are still things that go wrong, and we want to have appropriate emergency plans in place to address those issues.

So we know that there is a perceived risk in the community. We know that there are still things that can go wrong. It's not imaginary. So, what can we do as off-site jurisdiction that support the community?

Can we do something better as an Interjurisdictional Planning Committee as we move through the decommissioning process? You know, we work for you and we want to continue to offer our support. Every city has an emergency manager, so if you have questions, reach out to your emergency manager.

I'll have my contact information at the end of the presentation. You can reach out to me as well. But we do want people to know what to do. We want people to know what to do for an all-hazards event.

We're going to stick to nuclear planning. But when we talk about evacuation -- evacuation plan moving
forward, some people say, "Oh, the evacuation plan go away," and it doesn't. Because we, as local authorities, might order evacuations for a number of other reasons; it could be fires, it could be a Hazmat. Just know what hazards are in and around your community and follow the instructions of local authority.

Evacuations are very complicated and it's the last resort. We don't want to move people out of their homes, if we don't have to. But we want you to listen to local authorities if we do order evacuations. So just keep that in mind.

There are educational opportunities where members of the community can learn about SONGS Decommissioning as well as Emergency Planning, and so I support those events on behalf of the IPC and welcome people to come up to our table and ask questions and learn about what our ongoing responsibilities are going to be. But, again, we maintain that responsibility to our communities to have appropriate emergency plans in place.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: We probably need to cover these next few slides a little faster. Just be mindful of time.

MS. KAMINSKE: Okay. And there's some things that we touched on. So, when we talk about emergency
planning, when we say that the local jurisdictions are
going to maintain SONGS -- SONGS specific emergency
plans, that statement really isn't enough, so I'm going
to touch on some of those key things that we're going
to continue to provide, and Kelli touched on some of
them.

We need to maintain dedicated trained and well
equipped law, fire and health care personnel as well as
emergency operations and their personnel. So we need
trained people, we need the personnel and equipment
needed for independent off-site dose assessment.

And what that means is, if there's an
emergency situation at the plant and they're conducting
radiological monitoring, then the off-site
jurisdiction, which is the cities in the counties, will
maintain an independent dose assessment capabilities so
we can mobilize Orange County and San Diego teams to do
that independent off-site dose assessment to verify
what's happening.

And then the Orange County liaison in the
Command Center is a -- is a real benefit to us because
then we have that person linked into the Command Center
that can provide information to the off-sites, so it
opens up that line of communication.

At an alert level, that's the highest level
currently that SONGS can declare, all the off-sites
will activate their emergency operations center. But,
again, we're going to continue to need training and
exercises and drills and we will communicate with SONGS
during their communication drills and they'll invite us
to participate in their exercises as well.

And then we touched on the community sirens
system. The challenge with that, and we have to be
careful because we've done a huge public education
campaign, that if you hear the sirens, it's related to
SONGS and so go turn on the television. So we have to
be careful how we are going to use that system in the
future.

The Joint Information Center, SONGS used to be
responsible for establishing the Joint Information
Center; that's a place where the media can go and hear
from local authorities as to what's happening at the
plant. Some of these things will change.

One of the things that will be important for
us if we do activate, we will activate the Public
Information Hotline. It's a very, very important
component and it's a very, very effective component to
open the lines of communication with members of the
public and our EOC (Emergency Operations Center). It
takes the -- drain off the 911 system but it allows you
to get verified bedded information directly from the county.

We touched on Funding. Edison has agreed to that in the near term and maybe long term as well and we're currently working with them on the MOU. There are changes in state and federal legislation that are driving us what we do. We touched on some of those.

But there is also justification for our continuing Emergency Planning because there is a shift in some responsibilities from SONGS onto the county and local jurisdictions, one of those is the Joint Information Center. SONGS had a dedicated facility locally. They'll now communicate out of corporate, so that responsibility will shift to the county. We'll need to maintain a local SONGS specific Joint Information Center.

The other thing that has changed is the Emergency Operations Facility. That was the facility that was co-located at San Onofre with San Onofre personnel. We could provide liaisons right to the plant to communicate what was going on. That facility -- they no longer maintain that facility, so we have to find a new location for that. So the emergency operation facility function also shifts to us.
And then the other change is in the notifications. So SONGS notifies four jurisdictions and, then, and one of those is Orange County, and so Orange County then has the responsibility of communicating with the other jurisdictions. Before it was kind of a "one call reaches all," so that emergency notification is also shift as well. But we're going to maintain our emergency plans, including SONGS specific.

Here's my plug. Get prepared. There are a couple of things that you probably know about and, if you don't, here you go. Mass notification systems. The county and cities, we use mass notification systems. It's an effective way to get a message out to a large number of people. Alert OC is for Orange County; Alert San Diego, San Diego County; and then there's also two important websites, Ready OC and Ready San Diego where you can learn more about getting prepared. So we'll continue to share that message.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: And we put your slides up on the website, so these addresses will be available on the website.

MS. KAMINSKE: Absolutely. Absolutely. So to sum it up, changes are going to be made to local emergency plans. There are less things that can go wrong. There are only two emergency alert classifications. So we're
going to adjust our plans accordingly.

Again, this is all going to be coordinated through the efforts of the IPC. It's -- we're taking everything -- it's not a fast break-in event for us. We want to be very thoughtful in our emergency plans, we want to make sure they're appropriate, make sure they're implemented, and make sure we're communicating with members of the public.

You know, we've established really great relationships with local, state, and federal partners. We want to continue with that as well. They may say, "Hey, we're no longer requiring you to do this," but we have the responsibility to do that. And then SONGScommunity.com is another website.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you very much. And your contact information up here as well is quite helpful. Let me see very quickly if there are any questions for Sara? Jerry Kern?

MR. KERN: I just have one question and actually relates not to Oceanside, because I don't think we're at much risk, but the city -- the town of Fallbrook, which is directly east, which is the onshore breeze, notification to them because if an event happens and the breeze will take it directly into Fallbrook. Is there some way to notify them or is that through the
County of San Diego?

MS. KAMINSKE: That would be through the County of San Diego. And so we're communicating with each other and then also with the jurisdictions that rest within the boundaries of our responsibility.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: So, but just to make it -- there is a system in place whereby San Diego County, County of San Diego is notified; is that correct?

MS. KAMINSKE: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Or not correct?

MS. KAMINSKE: Correct.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MR. PASCALL: David?

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Glenn Pascall.

MR. PASCALL: Thank you, to Tom and the other presenters for an excellent presentation. Tom, I really appreciate it you drawing the distinctions between an operating and a decommissioned plant.

It was an area of clarification, I think, we badly needed. And I'm impressed with the dedication of our -- our public safety and emergency response people.

I wanted to flag one point and I want to just put it on the table. I don't want it to delay or divert tonight's meeting at all. A previous presentation by Edison really showed a very complete
plan to deal with terrorism that was land based, and then we got the whole issue of a sea attack, a seaborne attack or an airborne attack.

Now, obviously, once everything is in the ISFSI, that's a pretty highly strengthened target, but there is still fuel in the pools. And I just wanted to flag, I think there was a general feeling that Edison needed to flesh out its terrorist scenario with seaborne and airborne dimensions that was thorough at the land born dimension. And I'm only raising this issue. I don't want to take time tonight.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Glenn, that's an important -- I'm going to talk briefly about that because it leads into our next conversation. But let me just see if there's anything else directly on the topics of the emergency plan before we move on. Okay. Thank you very much.

So the topic that Glenn Pascall raised is one of many dimensions to what the Defense in Depth is going to look like for this site. And of the things I've learned in the last year and a half is that people are understandably concerned to very upset that the fuel is going to stay here as opposed to going to Yucca Mountain or some other place.

And so we need to really understand what the
layers of defense are going to look like and as they 
evolve as opposed to just being just kind of something 
that gets done and then the community is told about it, 
and we have -- as a Community Engagement Panel, have 
requested that information as it evolves to have the 
opportunity to discuss it.

Parts of that Defense in Depth are now the 
next subject of our meeting tonight, so it won't be -- 
it won't be as much about the seaborne attack and 
airborne attack and so on, but later, as this evolves, 
we will learn more about those kinds of scenarios.

But instead tonight we're going to -- we're 
going to learn about the arrangements of Defense in 
Depth as they pertain to the cask system, so these 
stainless steel casks that are going to be stored on 
the fuel pads and so-called ISFSI.

We have two presentations on this topic: 
First from Tom Palmisano and then from Kris Singh. So, 
Tom, do you want to help set the scene for what we're 
doing tonight? And this conversation -- and, frankly, 
this conversation is going to go on for several years.

And so there are going to be some things that 
we can't -- that Edison, Holtec, and others can't 
answer tonight, but the purpose is to have a discussion 
early as opposed to later. Tom?
MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you very much. So as David said, we're going to start talking about Defense in Depth as it applies to dry fuel storage. This has been a comment from the public and the panel and now that we have selected Holtec and starting down the road of the new system and looking at the existing system and well -- as well we need to start talking about Defense in Depth.

Now, this is an evolving topic. The NRC has also heard feedback from us, from the Community Engagement Panel, through some of David's work and testimony and they are working on refining their view of Defense in Depth as it applies to dry fuel storage.

Historically, it's been applied -- the concept and the principles have been applied to reactors and safety systems reactors not as exclusively applied to dry fuel storage; that is changing now, and it's changing part as a result of the work of the Community Engagement Panel and the public here in San Onofre.

So a couple of things. I wanted -- now is the feedback from the Community Engagement Panel and the public. This has been important. And it's difficult because there are some things we will agree on, some things we will never agree on realistically. And I understand that, I can appreciate that, but we are
going to stand up and engage and transparently talk about it. Okay?

We are partnering with Holtec. And I want to make a comment on this. You know, we have the AREVA NUHOMS system, a good company, a fine system. We went through a selection process as we looked at the need for decommissioning and we selected Holtec, a good system, a fine company. But quite frankly -- and I'm largely the one who made the decision or recommendation is, I simply didn't want a contractor to build the system, deliver a product and leave. Okay?

You've heard me talk about this fuel is going to be on site till 2049, under the current DOE plan. And now we all know -- we're all somewhat skeptical about that. Okay? So this fuel is going to be there for a while.

We need to work harder on interim storage, but we need -- we collectively need a partner who is going to be here every step of the way with us. Holtec knows exactly what I expect for the long-term and we are partnering not just executing a contract because we're going to need support for the long-term to maintain this system, to monitor this system, and to manage this system and, eventually, to transfer the fuel off site.

So I think that's an important concept that
you're going to hear me and Holtec start talking about tonight, is that partnership.

Dry cask systems, and I'll apply this generically, are robust and we're going to start talking about how we're applying defense-in-depth principles to the new system and applying it to the existing system as well.

And I want to point out this is a long-term effort. I should point out -- I didn't bring up a slide with regulatory requirements. Some of you have done extensive research. You know, under the NRC rules, they license canisters in 20-year increments.

And in the first 20 years, there's some basic monitoring requirements but there's not inspection requirements; that's one of the possible flaws in the current regulation on inspection.

Inspections are typically required in the second 20-year interval and then going forward. We are not going to wait for the existing system until we've got to re-license it for 20 more years nor are we going to wait for the new system for 20 years out.

We have decided with Holtec and EPRI (Electric Power Research Institute) that we're going to lead the industry in developing the aging management program, the inspection, and the remediation capability, and
that's part of the partnership that we need to do that going forward.

So by a long-term effort, this isn't something that's done in three months top to bottom and put to bed. We're going to be talking about this regularly with the panel and the public.

So, some of the things I've heard from the CEP and, collectively, these are public comments that we've collected through the CEP directly:

How long will the cask be on site? Why do they have to be on site that long? How is Defense-in-Depth concept applied? How will we monitor the cask? How can we direct/detect corrosion? How will we mitigate a crack? How do we protect against physical threats? That'll be a topic we talk more.

And some of these we aren't going to have all the answers tonight and I would ask you not to expect them. We will talk about these overtime.

Just to recap, for those of you who may be joining us for the first time or for a while, the current on-site situation, up in the yellow boxes -- I won't read the numbers -- those are the Unit 2 and 3 spent fuel pools, about 2,600 assemblies, a little more.

What's in green is already on the Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation; our acronym is ISFSI. We have Unit 1 fuel and some Unit 2 and 3 fuel, and we actually own 270 assemblies in GE -- of GE (General Electric) pool in Morris, Illinois. We actually shipped spent fuel out of San Onofre in the mid-70s to the early 80s.

Okay. So, what has to happen over the next several years after we expand the ISFSI is we empty the pools into a roughly 73 to 75 additional canisters and at the end we'll have 3,855 assemblies stored in dry cask storage, the rest in GE Illinois. And they'll -- the ones in Illinois will not return to the site. Department Energy will take title to them there.

This is not an acceptable situation to anybody to have this fuel stored on site for an indefinite period of time. We all recognize that. I think we're aligned on that. It's a matter of taking care of it while it's here and getting it off site as soon as we can reasonably, safely get it off site.

So, Existing ISFSI: I'm not going to hit all the bullets. Many of you've seen this before. This is all available on our website. This is the existing NUHOMS, the AREVA product, a very robust above-ground, horizontal storage system. We have can -- 50 canisters loaded with fuel and one loaded with what's called
"greater than class-C" waste, that's the Unit 1 reactor vessel internals.

The system we have selected that we're going through some of the permitting activities on and the design and off-site fabrication is a below-ground system. Some people like to say we're burying canisters in the sand; we're not.

This is a large concrete monolith that's got a reinforced concrete pad at the bottom, the cavity enclosure shown in yellow, the steel canister that's sealed in there, concrete poured around it, then a reinforced concrete top pad on it. So, basically, it's two ISFSI pads on top of a large concrete monolith. And you can see the rest of the bullets.

This is actually the picture of the completed installation at a nuclear plant in the Midwest. We have visited this plant during construction. You're seeing what amounts to the very top pad those rectangular covers under each one of those is a canister and a cavity enclosure container where the -- the canister will be located.

We will go observe them, loading canisters into the system in the next year or two. So that -- that's what their situation looks like. Ours will be a bit more elevated above grade.
So, Defense in Depth: So now I'm going to shift over and really start defining Defense in Depth. Now, some of this has gone from the developing NRC work, so I'm going to use some -- unfortunately, some technical jargon as we talk about engineered controls and programmatic controls.

I'm trying to stay consistent with how the NRC is describing this for the industry, how we're describing this in the industry, so bear with me.

So, first of all, Defense in Depth, designing and operating facilities in a way that prevents and mitigates accidents; that's the generic definition applied to reactors. Okay?

Creating multiple independent redundant layers of defense, and this just might -- might not be physical. Security is a layer of defense, for example. Access controls; people who have access to the search screen. They go through background checks regularly, FBI background checks.

They go through a metal detector to go into the plant; that's a layer of a control. And then minimizing the reliance on any single feature.

So, Three Principal Functions: Now, this is dry cask storage specific. There's three things the system needs to do: Maintain sub-criticality. In
other words, this is used nuclear fuel. It's got to be controlled such that it cannot go critical again. Okay? That's relatively easy to deal within the design and loading phase.

Prevent radiation exposure from exceeding limits. This is radiation exposure through the canister. And then, prevent a release of radioactive materials from exceeding limits. This would be leakage from the canister. Those are the three key functions the system has to do.

So as we look at Defense-in-Depth strategies, we think of engineered controls, so this may be design and materials, and we'll elaborate on this. And when Kris Singh talks, we'll get a little more specific.

We'll talk about programmatic controls. This is an example, fabrication. So I pick a material that is highly resistant and very strong, highly resistant of the various corrosion phenomenas, very strong, but then I make sure I weld it properly, I make sure I inspect the welds properly, so I've got controls in the fabrication phase.

And then what's called Mitigating Controls, this gets more into the operational phase, and don't think of operating reactors, think of operating the ISFSI, managing the canisters, after they're loaded.
Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance: What are we doing to make the canisters retain their integrity? So at SONGS, the program includes Engineered, Programmatic, Mitigating Controls, Prevention.

We're using a higher grade of stainless steel. The typical grade used in many installations is a grade called 304. We, from the start, with the first system used a higher more resistant grade.

We also used a thicker canister. Okay. The typical thickness is 1/2 inch. We went from 5/8 -- to 5/8s inch early on with the first system; that will continue. So that's an example of using programmatic or engineered controls to help mitigate the likelihood of a problem.

Prediction/Detection: We're going to put in place test canisters and test coupons. We're going to buy extra canisters, seal them up with no fuel in so we can monitor them for salt deposition, corrosion. We can pull them out and inspect them without any radiation, exposure, or remote tooling, and we're going to spend the time and the money to do that as a way to monitor these as they perform in the same environment as -- as a loaded canister.

We're developing inspection tools. The
industry has developed technology to inspect and -- and
exam stainless steel to do that, examine welds. We do
that remotely, we do it in high radiation areas, we do
that under water in reactors.

That tooling does need to be adapted to do it
on dry cask storage, so that tooling does have to be
developed. It's based on technology that exists, but
the tooling has got to be developed.

And then, Remediation, Repair Techniques or
Use of an Overpack. You heard in the October
discussion, and we had both the AREVA and Holtec, there
is different views on how you might remediate an
indication or a potential crack in a canister, it
depends if it's a surface blemish, if it's partly
through a wall, if it's completely through a wall.

AREVA, as a company, may elect to -- to look
at repairing a crack. Holtec, as a company, may
recommend an overpack. There are many options when it
comes to dealing with something like that.

The key thing on something like a dry cask is
there is no internal driving pressure to drive a lot of
radioactivity out quickly, like in an operating
reactor. Okay? So, a crack, you have time to examine
it, assess it, and decide how to remediate it on site.

So with that, I've gone fairly quick in the
interest of time. I wanted to give an overview. But I really want to turn it over to Holtec so they can pick up and elaborate a bit further, but I will --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MR. PALMISANO: -- leave you with that this is work in progress, we're going to have this well in place, leading up the industry, and we'll be talking about this regularly to the Panel.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you very much, Tom. And I think one of the many important features of this being a work in progress is we've already had over the last year pretty extensive conversations about this.

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: And it's nice to see those concerns reflected in the fact that you're building extra layers of defense and that you're also running, it sounds like, a pretty big research project in parallel to really understand how these things age.

Let me ask if there are any members of the CEP who have specific questions to Tom before we move on to the Holtec presentation. Ted Quinn?

MR. QUINN: Yes. Tom, the question is, what's the Electric Power Research Institute doing to help? What's the coordination you're doing with them?
MR. PALMISANO: Well -- and thank you very much. I did mention EPRI, the Electric Power Research Institute, heavily. We have partnered with them and Holtec. We are leading several of their subcommittees on the inspection technology first and some of the tooling development. And Kris will talk a little more about that.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: You know, this was -- just to pick up on that, when we looked at the various cask options last year, the issue of using technology that is being widely used in the industry was very, very important because it allows us here in San Onofre to learn from what's going on in other sites and vice versa, and I think if we had chosen a technology that was an orphan, then we would not be in that position. Let me see if there are any other comments.

Tom, can you just define, what is a coupon? I know what a coupon is at Safeway, but I don't --

MR. PALMISANO: A coupon, a test specimen. When we talk in terms of a material coupon, think of it as a piece of test material. In this case, we're going to take a coupon of the same material --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MR. PALMISANO: -- as the canister and stress it more heavily, which would make it an early warning
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Great. Thank you.
MR. PALMISANO: -- corrosion crack.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Because I saw that in Kris's presentation.
MR. PALMISANO: Yes.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Let me give the floor now to Kris Singh, CEO at Holtec.
DR. SINGH: How much time do I have?
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: You have about 12 to 13 and a half minutes.
DR. SINGH: I'll be fast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Panel, and members of the public. I appreciate your time to come, join in this conversation. I wouldn't call it a presentation, it's a conversation with you.
And my expectation and my hope is that the information I share with you will -- will give you the confidence that Edison and Holtec are doing the right thing for the community here.
We have 73, I think, latest count, nuclear plants with our dry storage systems are being deployed or have been deployed, and many of these sites have --
I'm sorry. Is this a right-hand clicker?
Okay. Good. Great.
-- many of these sites have community panels in various forms, like you, and they invariably make a great contribution to our program of establishing a dry storage system around -- in the community.

Your concern here is canister integrity. I can tell you that, in the past, another community was concerned about getting the fuel from wet storage to dry storage as rapidly as possible, and we responded to that request by developing appropriate technology changes to enable that to happen at the earliest possible date. Another community was interested in making the plant more rugged against, say, an airp -- a crashing aircraft. We did that for the community.

And at each site, as we worked, we developed technologies and we bring them to other sites, to other places. So you would be the beneficiary of scores of plans where we have worked and have, in the process, continuously improved our technology.

Now, this particular effort here is called Defense in Depth. "Defense in Depth" is a term that was coined by the NRC over 50 years ago and it was really first applied to cranes, cranes in a power plant.

If you're carrying a heavy load in a crane, you want to make sure the load doesn't drop, under any
condition, any conceivable condition. And the term was
defined to basically transmit to the designers,
operators, to the entire industry that you must have
measures in place that will make an accidental lowering
of the load impossible.

Well, here the same term is being applied,
Defense in Depth. Defense in Depth here means the
canister, under no conditions of -- of normal or
abnormal event, will cause its content to be released
to the atmosphere. That is the challenge. That's the
problem we have.

And we have partnered with Edison to work on
it, to make sure that all, every possible measure that
can be implemented, reasonably implemented, to make the
canister absolutely safe and invulnerable to -- to
release of radioactivity is adopted. And I'm going to
give you, basically, the areas in which we're working
in the next, I suppose, 11 minutes I have left now, so
I'll make sure that I give you --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: I have a slightly different
math, but we can keep going.

DR. SINGH: Okay. Our -- our plan is to -- to
expand the -- add the UMAX Storage System with all the
Defense-in-Depth features that can be -- that can be
implemented in the near term and, of course, during
operation of the plant.

Our Defense-in-Depth initiatives and measures that we will develop will also be used with NUHOMS canisters, which are already operating at the site, so it's not limited just to -- just to UMAX.

And as Tom told you earlier, that we -- our plan is not to wait for 20 years. We're going to implement these measures. Actually, in UMAX we'll be implementing these measures. We're doing them now and you we forward, we keep implementing them in the design phase and then, of course, in the installation phase and operations phase. We will introduce these features in NUHOMS also at the site as we go forward.

Now, the Defense in Depth -- I think this slide "Tom Pageni" did already, so I'm not going to go over this again with you, except the summary is that the canister should not release radioactivity.

Of course, we have designed the UMAX System to minimize radiation dose, that's why we put it under ground, so you have minimum radiation scattered in the environment. And the Defense in Depth, that basic concept, that you would have multiple barriers against any of the things that -- that you consider inimical to local population, keep them from happening.

No single failure will cause a release of
radioactivity, will cause excessive exposure, exceeding the regulatory limits or will cause release of radioactivity -- or will cause criticality event at the plant.

The term in use is Aging Management, canister -- the canister ages as the system ages, the measures that you implement that keep it youthful and functioning is the -- is the object of aging management, if you were to look at the canister as a human.

The measures begin in the engineering phase, they -- they're applied in the fabrication phase, and they're applied in the operation phase to inspections, surveillance, testing and, of course, remedial measures if the unthinkable happens and, indeed, a hypothetical situation actually becomes real, have -- have measures in place to deal with them.

Now, the main challenge as we get down to the -- to what they really all mean in case of dry storage, it means for a canister stress corrosion cracking; that's the defining term. How do you keep the material from undergoing stress corrosion cracking?

Now, I should tell you, Austenitic stainless steel, which is what we use and I'll explain in a second why, Austenitic stainless steel is a wonderful
material; it has the highest ductility of any material used in a power plant. You can hit stainless steel with a hammer and you will need to stretch it by about 80 percent before it would break on you, stretch it by 80.

That's better than elastic band. That's how -- that's how resistant it is to failure to developing a crack. Austenitic stainless steel, under normal steady-state conditions, would have to stretch for about 40 percent before it will crack on you. It's a highly ductile material, that's why we use it.

And it is -- it's extremely weldable material. It works very, very well in welding, it responds to welding extremely well. But the problem is that under certain sets of conditions, a very narrow band of conditions, stainless steel becomes vulnerable to stress corrosion cracking; not immediately.

Don't think it is that happens within 10 minutes or 10 years, but it can. For example, in a canister, under a storage canister, under proper confluence of events and conditions, you can begin to get surface degradation in, say, a hundred years.

The challenge here is that we know well before such an event might occur and take remedial measures, preventive measures to keep it from occurring at all;
that's the challenge of the Aging Management Program.

Let's talk about Engineered Controls, that's the phase that we are in for UMAX right now. By the way, a lot of UMAX components are being manufactured in our plant in Pittsburgh. So the project here is employing good American workers in Pittsburgh. They're working right now.

The engineered controls that we -- that we have introduced, for example, are canister vertical. But vertical canister keeps deposits from accumulating, soil deposits from accumulating, and makes the -- takes away one important variable and that can induce stress corrosion cracking.

We have selected, at Edison's insistence, personally I think 304 stainless is an excellent material for this environment, but Edison insisted that we upgrade the material to 316L; 316L is substantially more expensive and it is known to be substantially more resistant to stress corrosion cracking.

We have increased the thickness of the canister from 1/2 inch to 5/8 inch, as Tom told you earlier. We have replaced the foundation around these -- the underground canister. We have replaced it with -- it could be engineered fail, but we have replaced it with solid concrete. The idea, again,
being to basically sequester the storage facility entirely from the surrounding environment.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Just for planning purposes, Kris, you have a couple of minutes left.

DR. SINGH: I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Just -- you have a couple of minutes left, so we should --

DR. SINGH: Okay. Okay.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- probably go to the other dimensions.

DR. SINGH: All right. All right. And we are -- we have changed the -- the CEC(Cavity Enclosure Container), the container, from carbon steel to stainless steel, also at Edison's request.

In fabrication space, we are developing, manufacturing approaches that would make the canister even more robust against stress corrosion cracking. We are making -- we're going to be making changes in welding processes, welding materials, and possibly surface improvements that further inoculates the canister against stress corrosion cracking.

Moving on to Aging Management, I'm not going to go through all the bullets here. You can -- you read them. They're fairly easy to understand. But our goal again is in the -- in this Aging Program is to
develop measures so, first, we can predict with significant reliability when a crack might initiate under worst conditions that may -- that may obtain at the plant.

In other words, all of a sudden, Southern California begins to have rainfall every day and your humidity goes up, which, of course, acts -- is a contributor to stress corrosion cracking if you have high humidity alone with stress.

So we take all these worst set of conditions and we will determine how long the canister can -- will absolutely see no -- no effects before incubation of nuc -- nucleation of stress-corrosion cracking might begin.

We have developed and we are developing several measures to deal with conditions if the unexpected were to happen. In other words, all our predictions, the laws of science got suspended and we did -- we did find a case where the canister is developing a leak. The remedial measures to deal with that, we are develop -- we are actively working on developing it.

They are -- they're going to be, I assure you, they'll be sound and they'll be elegant and they will be easily implemented without exposing workers to
significant dose. Those are the criteria we employ.

I had mentioned last October when I spoke to you that we would use a transfer cask and use that to sequester. There are other ways to sequester the canister also and those are being developed. But I can assure you that they will be developed and deployed here.

We have been working with EPRI to answer prior questions here. We're working with EPRI to develop tools to, for example, quantify the amount of soil that has deposited on a surface, to deal with means to eliminate the source of crevice corrosion around the canister and so on. We expect to have these tools ready for deployment here.

In summary, to conclude, our Defense-in-Depth strategy for Engineered, pragmatic -- Programmatic, I'm sorry, and mitigating controls are being developed. We expect the program to be a solid sentinel to protect these canisters if they have to be here for a hundred years, that you will not -- your local public health and safety will not be in jeopardy.

This program will be implemented -- is being implemented now and it is being implemented on UMAX canisters are canisters that we are manufacturing. Later, as we go into the implementation phase, we will
also implement it on the -- on the NUHOMS canisters.

That is all I can tell you within the very short time that the chairman gave me. So I will now --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: The Chairman, I hear, is a tyrant. So I want to thank you for helping start this conversation. I want to leave some time for us to ask some questions and then I want to summarize, I think, some action points. I see Ted Quinn, Jerry Kern and Lisa Bartlett.

MR. QUINN: Very quickly, for Dr. Singh and for Tom, maybe. I'd like to see a chart that shows the industry and programs and/or Aging Management Programs and NRC programs. And the history is, in industry we've always come up -- industry came up with programs, NRC came up with review of those programs, of safety evaluation reports, some form of approval process, and I understand that NRC has a significant effort working on this now, the industry has a significant effort.

And I'd like to see the timeline of what you're doing and industry is doing and then what the NRC is doing in parallel to review and approve your improved processes for detection and prevention of any form of cracks. Is that fair?

DR. SINGH: Yes, that's a fair question. I tell ya, the -- the wheels of the NRC turn, but they turn
slowly. It's a government agency. Of course, it takes
time to get ideas and things implemented. We cannot
wait for the institutional overseers we have, the NRC,
the national laboratories, to all get together and
finalize and tell us what they will find acceptable.

We have decided, we seriously have decided,
with Edison's partnership to lead the industry, to lead
in the sense to -- to intellectually lead the NRC.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Well, Kris, I think this is
an action point for Edison and for Holtec together --

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- to respond to this because
we need some sense of what the industry programs are,
the NRC programs, to kind of how this is going to
unfold, mindful that you've got your own program that
goes above and beyond that, I think that's important.

But we need to articulate this in plain
English so that then the CEP and the communities can
understand what the game plan is here.

Let me ask Jerry Kern.

MR. KERN: I have one question, to be really frank,
the idea of 1/2 inch to 5/8s, what drove that decision?
Was it strength? Was it corrosion resistance? I -- I
just wanted to know why that change happened.

MR. PALMISANO. Go ahead, Kris, and I'll fill in
some background from Edison's perspective. You know, that was a decision made with the first current system, the NUHOMS system, to go from 1/2 inch to 5/8s.

And I think is a recognition of both the seismic capability as well as the corrosion resistance, more thickness, and that's what we've continued in with the Holtec UMAX design, insisting on the highest-grade stainless steel and the thicker material.

MR. QUINN: Just a quick follow up, so that decision are they still evaluating it? Do they say, "Well, maybe we should go 3/4s? Or, like that, or have you decided that 5/8 after --

MR. PALMISANO: 5/8 has been decided.

MR. QUINN: Okay.

MR. PALMISANO: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Lisa Bartlett?

MS. BARTLETT: I appreciate the fact that the canisters can withstand a salted environment for up to a hundred years under, you know, regular conditions. But what about a major earthquake? Have you -- have you done any testing with regard to earthquakes?

DR. SINGH: Well, we have done testing, shake-table test, on -- on structures that emulate racks and canisters, but today most of these predictions are done by dynamics codes, computer codes, that have been
benchmarked against actual test data.

In other words, if you drop a canister from 18 feet height, which we have done the actual testing computer simulations, the shape of the canister after the impact checked against the predicted shape from the program, and these programs today are so accurate that they will give you precisely the weight.

If you drop it, break, and -- or you hit it, you have an earthquake and you end up with large inertia forces, you can predict the response with great accuracy.

And, yes, we have analyzed. The main question -- information to give you here is that we have analyzed these canisters and, actually, NRC has reviewed it, and inertly had NRC on it, to a level of earthquake that has never occurred in the history, recorded history, on this earth. That's the level at which we have analyzed these canisters, and it shows that there will be no breach of confinement boundary. These calculations are available for you to look at.

But I repeat, the strongest earthquake that ever occurred on the history of this planet that we recorded was in Lisbon, Portugal, back in 1560 or something, and the earthquakes that we have imposed are substantially stronger than that on these canisters.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Let me ask, as another action item, maybe we could summarize what we know about the seismic integrity of the system. I mean, it strikes me as just absolutely open and shut that for seismic purposes and many other purposes we want the fuel in these casks as quickly as possible.

Can you tell us, Kris Singh, also, what is the status of getting your system approved with the seismic approval that would be necessary? Because I understand there's been a variation in the design and so it's not finally approved yet. Where do we stand on that?

DR. SINGH: Yes. We submitted -- see, our original license approval by the NRC was for all earthquakes across the country of nuclear power plants. We took the most bounding earthquake, which was your earthquake at San -- San Onofre, we used that. That was the design-basis earthquake. And we qualified and we received the license.

Then we were told by Edison to -- to up the earthquake. We call it "Most Severe Earthquake," which is stronger than the earthquake that was in UFSAR(Updated Final Safety Analysis Report).

So we, in order to get that certified, we had to re-qualify the canister, we had to submit the
application again to the NRC for an amendment to the
license, and we also made some internal structural
reinforcements to meet the stronger earthquake.

That was submitted. NRC has written a safety
evaluation report. In other words, NRC agrees with our
safety findings and I believe that the public comment
period ended yesterday.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MR. SINGH: Today? Okay. You're keeping track of
it, Donna.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: I am confident that Donna is
keeping track of that in lieu you jump up to go make
comments, we know why. Okay. So the reason for this
delay was because Edison had asked for a more robust
system?

DR. SINGH: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much.

DR. SINGH: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: I don't see any other -- Bill
Parker and, then, last then I want to move on to the
next segment.

MR. PARKER: Not so much a question but a comment,
many of the analytical tools, monitoring tools, the
potential correction tools you described as
technologies in development, which mean they do not
exist today, and I understand that and I appreciate that. But what it does mean is that the status of the development of those tools should come back for periodic presentation in an open session.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Absolutely.

MR. PARKER: And to peer review so we can feel confident that these developments are proceeding in a schedule that is commensurate with the construction. I fully understand and appreciate that the tools don't exist today but they do highlight the need for monitoring in a public setting.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Yeah, thank you very much. And that's -- I just want to summarize what I've heard today in terms of action items next. I think it's clear that Defense in Depth is a lot more than an Aging Management Program and I think the industry, my sense of the industry overall is focusing a lot on aging management programs and that's important. But what we're talking about here is a lot more, many more layers and a bigger game plan.

We have Tom's list of questions from your presentation, questions that you have heard us want answers for. We should, as CEP and as community, should look at that list and see if there are more or fewer questions and kind of -- that should be an
evergreen list that should evolve.

I think sometime soon we should be in the position, and Edison and Holtec should be in a position to make a draft of what this Defense in Depth looks like in plain English, so not all the terms that makes sense to you guys, but terms that make sense to us folks in plain English and we should -- I don't know -- at the end of this year, beginning of next year, be able to review that draft. And

Then, as part of that, I think Bill Parker's comment is exactly right, with some tables or information about where the status is for the different parts because technology is being developed and that's awesome, that's to our advantage, but we need to understand kind of where that stands.

And so I think those would be very helpful action items in addition to the other items that were called out along the way. So I want to thank both of you for this conversation.

I want to switch gears and talk about Consolidated Interim Storage. We said we would come and give CEP members another opportunity to talk more about this today and so I just want to give you that opportunity now.

To help make that process as efficient as
possible, Tim Brown, Dad Stetson, and I did a survey of
CEP members. We didn't talk to everybody yet, but
we've talked to most of you, and I sent around an
e-mail, which has also been posted on the website, that
summarizes what we've learned from that.

Those questions included questions about how
the CEP overall is working for which overall impress --
impressions are positive, although a lot of people were
upset about the website. So, I said that before, you
know, declare your upsetness heard and the website will
be improved. But I think we -- makes sense for us to
focus on Consolidated Interim Storage in particular.

At our last meeting, Tim, Dan, and I put a
memo in front of you, it was about a California
strategy and it wasn't a strategy saying the waste
should be stored in California, but it was a strategy
where the California Energy Commission, in particular,
would help start the spadework that we've already
talked some about -- how a transport work, what would
sequence and shipments look like.

There is a lot of really important stuff that
if people don't pay attention to it, we're going to be
stuck with the waste here longer than we would want
otherwise.

We talked with CEP members about this. We
heard, I want to say, three things: First we heard a lot of support for this California strategy and we heard no support, as far as I can tell, for the idea that the waste should only be stored in California or stay in California.

I know Tom Caughlan would like to make some comments about that since people seem to be very enthusiastic about putting the waste on military basis, and Tom knows quite a lot about that.

The second thing that I've heard -- we've heard is that we want to make sure that there's long-term program for management of the site, for high-quality management by Edison of the site over decades while we're getting Consolidated Interim Storage in place, so Edison does not lose -- lose focus on that.

And the third thing in the area where I would welcome any additional comments is we've heard a lot of different ideas about what needs to be done politically right now to help make this a reality. Some people want us to put pressure on the federal government, some people think we need a little more attention in Sacramento.

I'm quite persuaded, actually, that we need some more support in Sacramento for this. Some people
are very enthusiastic about the various resolutions
that have been adopted or considered at various local
councils and political groups.

And so I want to hear from CEP members if
there are other views as to what we should be doing and
what Dan, Tim, and I should make sure happens on behalf
of the CEP as we try and make Consolidated Interim
Storage a reality. This is our best bet for getting
the fuel out of here as quickly as possible.

So let me see if there are any comments that
people would like to make about this. Jerry Kern.

MR. KERN: Well, we've -- I've been having this
discussion with the Chairman off and on. I'm trying to
coordinate a meeting with Senator Pat Bates's office,
Assembly Member Rocky Chavez's office, and Assembly
Member Bill Brough's office, because those are the
jurisdictions that overlie that, you know, that's right
in the center of all their districts.

And then, actually, getting Congressman Issa's
office involved because that's right at the center of
his district. We were having some difficulty
coordinating the meeting, but I think that's going to
happen probably within the next month, and the Chairman
and whoever else he feels should come, at least we can
get that on the table in front of these elected
representatives and see if we can actually start having a champion up in Sacramento.

Politically, the problem is, all of them are Republicans in a Democratic-controlled legislature. So somehow we're going to have to draw in the other side of the aisle, but I think we should start with our local elected officials first.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Yeah, I think that makes a lot of sense. It would be helpful. Maybe, Jerry, you can help me articulate a list of things we're asking for as well. So, addition, to be nice, we have a list of things we want them to try and do in Sacramento.

Glenn Pascall, did you want to comment on this?

MR. PASCALL: I wanted to commend the Chair and the Secretary and others who've taken the lead on this. They've just really done a great job of surfacing this option and bringing it to the floor.

And a couple of supporting comments: The CEP is an advisory body or you could even say a body just to ventilate the depth of the topic. It is not a decision-making body and that was one of the first things that was said today.

So when we get into these deep, dark issues of the detail design features of Defense in Depth, at some
point we have to recognize that those who are
decision-makers will make those decisions, and we can
express our views passionately and hopefully in an
informed way, but the final call is not ours.

However, when you get onto an issue like
Defense in Depth -- pardon me -- interim storage, which
is primarily a political issue, it's an issue of
sign-off and consent, we are much more effective and we
have a much more significant role to play in the sense
we have a substantive contribution to the process
that's very serious because we are broad-based, we're
broadly represented, we have become deeply informed on
this.

And if we speak out on an option like this, on
an political issue that does not drown in technical
detail, it's easy to understand, it's a matter of will,
not a matter of technology and design, we have a much
greater potential for impact in an area like that.

And the final comment I want to make is, to me
it's not either/or, it's not a matter of demonizing or
writing off Yucca Mountain or demonizing or writing off
privately operated sites that we negotiate with. It's
not either/or, it's both/and.

There's no reason why any of these potential
approaches to remove the waste from San Onofre should
preclude the attempt to move forward on any of the other approaches. And so let's move forward on all of them, recognizing these are essentially political issues and we are political body with the potential for political impact.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you. I just want to underscore -- I agree with what you said -- it's really, really important that we never create the impression that we are speaking on behalf of the community or that we, as a CEP, are speaking with a single voice about these things. We're just trying to help focus and corral energies in the right -- in the right direction.

And in this case, this is a tremendous opportunity for us now at these consolidated sites and we've seen three, there may be more sites -- sites that have emerged.

Let me just see if there are other comments people want to make about the political strategy. I take -- I think Jerry and I will work -- Jerry Kern and I will work on articulating what it is we might want to be asking for in Sacramento and also maybe how we'd reach across the aisle. Why don't we share that once we have some sense of what that might look like with the CEP and get any other input?
Let me just ask Tom Caughlan. If you wanted
to say anything about the idea that has surfaced at
previous meetings about putting the waste in your
garage, I guess.

MR. CAUGHLAN. Well, it's the people's garage. But
tank you very much. So, we've got a couple of slides,
I think, to pop up here. First, I think you'll all
recognize this as North America. The point of this
slide is that, if you look at the East Coast, you see
two things: You see coast and flat.

If you look at the West Coast, you see
mountains, deserts, flat, coasts. In other words,
every kind of terrain in which your military service
is, and the one I speak for is the Marine Corps, has to
train with, the fable words are "Every climb and
place," except triple-canopy jungle, you can do that
within an hour's drive or hour's flying time from the
bases in which these folks live and train every day;
that's a very important reason that you find yourself
with a Marine Corps, Navy, Army, Air Force on the West
Coast based here.

Essentially, since World War II when the land
was unoccupied and when we could create live-fire
training areas, 85 percent of the live-fire ranges are
on the West Coast and that's because they're in the
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1. desert where they can do things that they need to do

2. without damaging other people or disturbing too many

3. people. They're also greatly off shore.

4. So instead of hearing sonic booms, all that

5. happens so distantly over the ocean horizon. It all

6. has to be done. These ladies and gentlemen that wear

7. the cloth of the Country are charged to be ready when

8. the Nation is least ready to go forward and do the

9. kinds of things that are necessary to protect our

10. security.

11. That means that at that moment of execution

12. order, they don't get any better trained. As a matter

13. of fact, they only get worse trained. And so that's

14. why they have to be most ready all the time and they

15. have to use the terrain and land that's been given to

16. accomplish that.

17. Next slide, please.

18. Okay. So this is the complex of bases that

19. live on the West Coast. I've heard various member of

20. the audience propose the use of various pieces of

21. military terrain for interim storage, most commonly is

22. the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, which is

23. out there to the -- to the east and north of El Centro.

24. Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range has

25. been a live-fire bombing range since 1941 or '42,
rather. It is open and rolling desert and pretty much badlands, which have collected armaments all the days of those years. There's lots of stuff out there, most of which has exploded, some of which has not.

The clearing of it to make it safe for anything else would be almost -- it would not be an impossibility. It would take a very, very, very long time to make sure that it's safe.

And if it were used for any other purpose, it couldn't be used for a live-fire bombing range and it is the largest and only one left since the loss of Vieques in Puerto Rico has made it necessary for all the services on all the coasts to use it.

My point is simply this: The military ranges are used to train almost 365 days. At Camp Pendleton we shoot live fire, everything from small arms to artillery, 363 days a year. We don't shoot Christmas, we don't shoot New Year's, and we usually don't shoot on Thanksgiving.

Every other day there's things going boom and bang there; that's how much those ranges are used, that's the demand signal, and that's why there is not any available land on military installations that isn't needed either for maneuver training, mitigation for maneuver training, meaning honoring the environmental
regulation and stewardship that is the law of the land or live-fire training. It simply is fully committed.

And at many other times we seek the partnership of the Bureau of Land Management for service and even private communities to do the kind of gradual level training that we need to do to be ready and ready to go.

And I will tell you one short story: An example, my experience as a helicopter pilot, one of the things we had to be prepared to do was evacuate embassies. How do you plan to evacuate an embassy? The answer was, in the dark of the night, off the coast of California, in the USS Tarawa, 24 Aircraft of my squad, and evacuated Parker Center in Downtown Los Angeles of a thousand people.

Now, we don't own Parker Center. We certainly don't hope to own Parker Center. But it allowed us, in partnership with the people of City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department, to execute this vital mission that has to be done right the first time without owning -- without owning things that we don't need to own, but we were able to do that because good relationship, good stewardship, good partnership, and some understanding in the community.

I would offer you that that is the reason that
we were ready to go and ready to do it and that's the
reason your military is as successful as it is. But
all of that comes back to training and all that
training comes back to the need for real estate.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.
MR. CAUGHLAN: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you very
much for that comment. I think we have to focus on how
California and other states with similar situations,
specially for plants like San Onofre that are -- that
are now in the process of decommissioning how we get
the fuel out of here, these two new sites that have
emerged are a really an interesting possibility.

And let me commit that we're going to update
the Panel on discussions that have been had around this
every meeting or almost every meeting and, if there are
people in various city councils and other governing
bodies who are themselves kind of putting things and
want to try and coordinate, let's -- let's all row in
the same direction on this. This is a tremendous
opportunity for us. So thank you very much.

We have on the agenda right now a break, which
we will take, but I'm going to sit in my chair the
whole time. And in five minutes exactly, on my time
zone, which is the Apple clock, we're going to start
again and have the public comment period.

(Break taken from 7:56 p.m. to 8:02 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: We have two city council members who asked to speak as well as several members of the community. And I very much look forward to this conversation. The game plan is, we have three-minute public comments and Dan Stetson is going to keep notes about questions that get raised that can have answers from the people in the room here or action items.

And so we're going to hear the public comment periodic as normal and then he's going to put those questions to Tom, to Kris, to Kelli, to Sara, and others, and hopefully none to me, and we'll see how that process works. We're just trying to make this efficient and representative as possible.

MR. STETSON: And if I might just add that if, by chance, you would like to follow up with a written comment that you would like to be part of the public record, you could give that to us today, you could also send it to us via email.

There is an opportunity, a way to do it on our website. You could put it in writing. As long as we -- as long as we, actually, Edison, receives that within the next five days, it will become part of the public record. Thank you, David.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. And if you have ideas about how we can better organize the public comment periods, send those as well. So first, Lori Donchack and then Daryl Gale.

Lori Donchak is San Clemente City Council.

MS. DONCHAK: Okay. First of all, thank you for writing the safety of long-term storage checks. Excellently done. My name is Lori Donchak. I'm San Clemente City Council member and I was also mayor during the Fukushima Daiichi tragedy, so I have a deep history with nuclear energy in Southern California.

I'm here tonight because in the past month our city council has received upwards of a hundred emails from concerned citizens about the decommissioning process. And for a small town like San Clemente to have a hundred folks weigh in on a quality of life issue it's important. So I'm hoping to give our small town a big voice tonight.

My big message is that I urge this panel to be a force or, at least, a focus that keeps San Clemente's Saddleback Memorial Care Hospital open both registered and essential to the new emergency plan.

I want to read you an excerpt from a July 2011 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) scenario summary: "A loud crash and an individual screaming
emanates from unit 3, Penetration Building, room 209. Upon investigation, workers find an individual lying in water that may be contaminated. The individual is bleeding and has significant injuries to the lower -- to the face and lower legs."

This is an excerpt from a medical services drill conducted by FEMA at Saddleback Memorial Medical Center in San Clemente to assess state and local emergency preparedness for RERPs, which are Radiological Emergency Response Plans:

"Clearly the hospital had been viewed as critical at that time, yet the new proposed plan is silent on the role or even the existence of San Clemente Hospital."

How can it be? It is a 41-mile hospital desert between Tri-Cities in Oceanside to Mission Hospital in Mission Viejo and SONGS is smack in the middle of that desert. Why wouldn't San Clemente Hospital be part of the plan?

Please, please ensure that there is emergency care near the plant for the workers, for the residents; and use your considerable focus and weight to keep San Clemente Hospital a resource and make sure that hospital is there for the life of decommissioning.

You spoke about funding commensurate with a
retired plant, what that appropriate level might be. And I encourage you to think about that appropriate level as including the support it might need to take to keep that hospital viable and also as an important reso -- resource to your decommissioning.

I was going to talk about the earthquake because that's seismic stability as a geological concept, it's important in our community. And my final comment is on page 6 of your report. You talk about the importance of a long-term trust fund and I think that's essential to a successful decommissioning.

Thank you for listening.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. So we ought to include in Tom's list of questions what the long-term funding strategy is and how it's going to be funded. Let me also mention, Lori, that -- later, I see Gary Headrick is on the list and Gary's organization's organized many of those comments, and so we'll have a chance to hear also from him and his organization about the questions and concerns that they have. Daryl Gale is next and then Rita Conn.

MS. GALE: Hello, good evening. I'm Daryl Gale. I live in Los Angeles. And my friend and I, we drove the approximately 90 miles down here to come to this engagement panel. We are both very concerned about the
safety of the local residents and the waste, they --
both safety-wise and time-wise. I will be reporting
back to a big environmental coalition, that I belong
to, about what's going on with this progress.

Many Angelinos, we come down here for
recreation and because we have family members down
right, you know, in these beautiful beach communities.
I'm very happy about these regular public meetings and
all the information I've learned tonight. It was very
interesting. But I'm still very concerned about these
casks, 5/8s of an inch of steel, it just doesn't make
me feel comfortable. And, remember, I live about 88
miles away.

I just really want to think that after
Fukushima companies and governing bod -- bodies in
America will bend over backwards and spend enormous
amount of money, time, and studies to prove that we're
not going to be like TEPCO. I know Edison isn't like
TEPCO and we're not going to be like the Japanese
government. So I will continue to come to these
meetings and I thank you for having them and I'm very
much open to keeping up with the progress. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much for your
comments. Next is Rita Conn and then Toni Iseman.

MS. CONN: Good evening. Rita Conn, Chairman of
Let Laguna Vote. And I would just like to thank and congratulate this panel for the tremendous amount of work and progress that you have made in getting the stuff out of our backyards.

I know you would like us to feel safe and we would like to feel safe. We have a big stake in this. It's our communities and it's our families.

And to this end, I would just like to talk to Dr. Singh about what he considers the integrity of your cask system. It's important we believe you, but when I read things, such as the 210 Department of Justice Summary, which was based on the results of a criminal investigation of Holtec, we find that Holtec was fined 2 million dollars and you lost your status as a U.S. contractor.

Yet, today we know that Holtec has the NRC's current quality assurance approval, but we all know that the NRC simply relies on Holtec's written promise to correct dangerous designs and fabrication problems and does nothing to follow up to see if indeed they were corrected.

In 2007 the manager of the Tennessee Valley Authority Nuclear Power Plant pleaded guilty to accepting a bribe from Holtec despite Holtec's clever scheme to camouflage the bribe.
Dr. Ross Landsman, Chicago's Ex-Chief dry cask inspector, had this to say about your quality assurance, and that was: "As far as I'm concerned, Holtec has no quality assurance." Dr. Landsman was asked by the NRC to sign off on your cask and he refused, saying that "This is the same kind of thinking that led to the NASA's space shuttle disaster."

In Fact, Dr. Ross Landsman and, whistleblower, Oscar Shirani, both believe that the Holtec nuclear spent fuel dry casks are nothing but -- I hate to say this -- garbage cans, with dangerous welding, manufacturing, and design flaws that threaten public safety in our backyards.

Perhaps, this is why Edison refers to your system as experimental and it's an experiment that we, the residents, did not sign up to be guinea pigs.

Sorry to bring this up, but in order for us to believe that we really are safe these issues need to be addressed.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much --

MS. CONN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: -- for your comment. We will put that to -- to Holtec at the end of the public comment period along with all other questions that arise.
Next is Toni Iseman, from the Laguna Beach City Council, and then Lea Vasquez.

MS. ISEMAN: Good evening. I'm serving my 5th term on the Laguna Beach City Council, glutton for punishment. For those of you who were elected, you'd appreciate what I'm saying. I appreciate all of your service. (Indicating) This bag contains signatures on paper that are people in my area that are very concerned about the fact that we have a very dangerous situation there even though the plant closed.

And I appreciate the tough questions that you've been asking today, but I also was very concerned what to listen to Edison presenting something that, cavalier may be a little too big a word or to -- to -- but I had a gut feeling that things were rather not as serious as they really are.

I would appreciate this being addressed. I mean, if we're talking about how dangerous it is, it's like, "Okay, before, you could die instantly." But now, you know, "If we have it, it'll be a long, slow death and you'll be radiated and we won't be able to live here anymore, but it won't be quite as fast."

We have something that is so dangerous. And please continue to answer or ask those questions and follow up and know that the public is very nervous,
very nervous about what's there.

And -- and thank you for being on this panel, and continue to ask the tough questions.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much for your comment. Next we have Lea Vasquez. And then after that I believe it says Charlotte "Mazak," from Village Laguna, but my -- the handwriting is hard for me to determine. So, Lea Vasquez.

MS. VASQUEZ: Thank you very much. And, again, thank you for all your time, attention, your expertise. My name is Lea Vasquez. I've been involved with the City of Laguna Beach for many years.

And I have a personal stake, my mother was one of the victims in 1950s of a nuclear test that occurred outside of St. George, Utah. And tons of irradiated material was brought back onto the stage set and the result was that everybody got cancer.

And the Native Americans had lawsuits. And I'm sure people here, who know the history of all of this, know how serious it was. And it's been buried for many years, literally buried.

So this is very concerning. This is not a situation that is 2 miles or 10 miles of potential disaster, it's 150 miles, at least. And -- and we're sitting in a very, you know -- our -- our physical zone
here is subject to, as you showed on the map, all kinds of different natural occurrences. And if it's going to happen, it will happen. So, you know, we know, we -- we're hearing it.

Anyway, a Department of Energy letter came to Let Laguna Vote and it basically thanks us for expressing our concerns about the safety and storage and the handling of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

And it goes on to say that "This applies to a pilot interim storage facility and while legislative authority will be required to fully implement the strategy, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Department of Energy is moving forward to begin deciding if one or more interim storage facilities that could accept the spent fuel from shutdown commercial reactors."

"Looking ahead, they plan to take steps, all used in the process consistent with phase, adaptive consent-based approach. The DOE believes that we must solve the issue of nuclear waste disposal and we must do it in a way that ensures the public trust and confidence in the decision-making throughout the process."

In addition to this, and although all that
sounds fine, the DOE is considering two interim locations per letter received by the Let Laguna Vote to secure the nuclear waste and the time is of essence to have tested and tried transportable canisters if we were to be considered for these two interim locations that are being proposed.

I don't have time to speak much more, but I will say that the concerns are very great and your attention to this and listening to the public is extremely important and we know there are great concerns about Holtec and you've heard those already.

So, thank you very much, and we look forward to more hearings and appreciate the questions that have been brought up also --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank -- thank you.

MS. VASQUEZ: -- by the Panel. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you for your comments. Next is Char -- Charlotte?

MS. MAZURIK: Mazurik.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Mazurik?

MS. MAZURIK: Yes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Charlotte Mazurik. I'm sorry for not getting your name correct. And then after that is Marni Magda.

MS. MAZURIK: Thank you very much. Good evening,
everyone. Charlotte Mazurik of Laguna Beach, a Village
Laguna Board Member, and in conjunction with Rita Conn
and Let Laguna Vote. And earlier you saw Council
Member Toni Iseman show you a bag with some petitions.

    I would like to say that we have close to
2,000 petitions now that have been signed, and I would
like to just read a couple of quick paragraphs to you
of the petition:

    "We call on you to demand the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy work
with the Department of Defense and California
legislators to immediately create a California interim
storage facility on or near an existing isolated,
sparsely populated, guarded military base so that it
can be protected from the growing threat of nuclear
terrorism."

    And the last paragraph:

    "We call on you to demand that any dry storage
system for radioactive spent fuel that Edison purchases
must have fully developed available transport casks are
available to be inspected for cracks that would lead to
radioactive leaks and able to be repaired before such a
disaster occurs and to be above ground in a steel and
concrete building and carefully guarded while it awaits
transportation." Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much. And thank you also for quoting from those petitions because I think it's very helpful to hear what people are asking for and we'll have a chance to respond, to -- to get some responses in just a little bit.

Next on the list is Marni Magda and then Lorraine Auger.

MS. MAGDA: Thank you tonight. And, Dr. Singh, I was very pleased to hear that you will be taking over AREVA for us and watching it carefully since we don't have a crane here to protect those canisters anymore, and we have -- I've learned we have some fuel that is -- still needs many more years of cooling before we can move it.

I have been heartened by what the Department of Energy has started to finally wake up to what should have been 50 years ago begun. They have just starting to -- they had -- their last site visit had been 1991 and now, thank goodness, Melissa Bates has been to 12 of the 13 stranded field sites, and we've heard John Hertzeg, of the DOE, say that "The Congress is very interested in getting stranded fuel off the Pacific Coast of the United States."

We must focus on that new focus. I know that Tom Palmisano and Southern California Edison want this
fuel out of here. I'm horrified that I heard tonight that date of leaving at 2049, I'll be 103. We cannot do that. I would love to be 103. But I want that fuel out of here in 10 years and we can do it if we all work together, and we must.

We finally have the Department of Energy that will need legislation. Dianne Feinstein and Lamar Alexander, a very unusual combination, in my mind, but it is essential that that kind of combination work together to begin to create the legislation that allows interim storage. We don't -- we can't even put it anywhere until the law changes.

So I have changed from believing it could go to a military base. Thank you. And I am so thankful for all of those Marines and I do believe that there is hope, that we can get it to interim -- to a private hundred-year contracted, private storage in New Mexico and in West Texas.

We don't have any of the rights to put it across states right now, we're going to need to have everyone working on all angles of this if we are to get this fuel out of San Onofre in the next 10 years. I cannot stand the idea of 35.

And I don't want to see a study that creates leaving it here, so we can see if it's safe. Let's get
it out. And that demands that all of us meet with all
of our California and our congressional contacts around
the United States. We absolutely cannot hold back on
this and pretend that it's safe.

In 2006, we had a fire that hit the south
parking lot of San Onofre and the NRC was up all night
in their Ready-Room. We have an El Nino coming that'll
blast the asphalt in Oak Street into the sky. We
cannot depend on the climate to work for us leaving
that fuel here. It must be moved.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much
for your comment. Next is Lorraine Auger and then Gary
Headrick.

MS. AUGER: Good evening, Panel. Lorraine Auger,
stakeholder. And I'm very concerned. I spoke with
Mr. Singh a little earlier today because I'm very
concerned about the 3,000 PSI strength -- tensile
strength concrete that's being projected.

In my opinion, that's not adequate. We need
45. We need to discuss what type of aggregate is being
used. He claimed Portland Cement. I'd like to see
Gunite, but I'd like to see also the specifications,
which Mr. Singh said he would send to me.

My involvement is in design-build. The DOE is
responsible for developing energy and the NRC's charge
is more nuclear power plants and their motivation is to expedite their agenda. Edison is motivated by profit.

Edison's VP has confirmed that we uncovered in DC that they collected 100 million dollars last year from the DOE and the NRC as a result of the lawsuit filed against by Edison against the DOE for partial breach of contract for not removing the waste.

Let Laguna Vote has met with them and learned how the State of Nevada protected their people from the dangerous of Yucca Mountain. The state hired their own biologists and experts to uncover the state -- unstable contamination of ground water.

The state controls Water Rights. And although the NRC dug the hole in the mountain with false promises by NRC that the ground was stable, the state's expert told quite a different story and revealed the unstable ground and contamination of ground water.

The CEP is Edison's panel and has several members hand-selected by Edison to continue to shore up their promise, to protect their 14 years in a row of increased profit, for share -- annual shareholders report to the tune of billions.

I urge the county representatives here to call on Edison and the NRC for -- for extended time to study the safety of the experimental containers and the true
risk and cost that Southern California's economy and people would be left with.

I urge our county and state representatives to hire your own experts, just as Nevada did, to assess our own risk. Many pronuclear advocates in DC are conceiving that dealing with the removal of stockpiles of nuclear spent fuel rods must take priority.

Recently, Senator Lamar Alexander, of Tennessee, signed onto our state or senator's bill to call for community consensus of handling the waste in their community.

Senator Alexander chairs the Appropriations Committee for the Department of Energy and funding to move the waste to an interim location, such as a military base, and it must be driven by him, that is why we are calling for a California interim location for California's waste on more stable ground and a more sparsely populated area.

With the support of our officials, this can be accomplished, but we cannot allow it to be buried in unsafe canisters that are not transportable.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much for your comment.

MS. AUGER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Next is Gary Headrick and
then Lori Headrick.

MR. HEADRICK: Could I ask a favor and if I could go last? I know public perception is important to you, and it actually turned out --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: It's really important that we keep the order as -- because then the person who signed up last is signed up last, so. Why don't you make your comment? And --

MR. HEADRICK: Well, it's nine minutes long if you want to hear the whole thing, but --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Well, may I suggest that --

MRS. HEADRICK: An mine is the same time.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: May I suggest -- we can't do that because then we're going to end up with -- why don't you make a comment for three minutes and then submit via email the full text, which I see is written out, and then we'll make sure that ends up as part of the full record of the meeting?

MR. HEADRICK: Well, I'll take my chances at the end. Thank you. It's okay.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Lori Headrick, are you going to the end?

MRS. HEADRICK: I was going to -- (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: It's not how the system works. So, would you like to make a comment now?
MRS. HEADRICK: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Donna Gilmore, do you want to talk now or do you want to go at the end? Because, we're going to have a competition to -- for who speaks last.

MS. GILMORE: Donna Gilmore. I have a website, San Onofre Safety, where I put the facts. So, if anybody in the room wants to know what's really going on, please check my website.

Fact No. 1: There is a Koeberg nuclear plant that has a component made out of similar materials, in a similar fashion, according to the NRC. It had a through-wall crack, meaning it leaked, in 17 years. It was located in a similar environment, on shore winds, surf, frequent fog, 17 years.

We have -- it was at a more ambient temperature. However, the Diablo Canyon, EPRI inspected a canister there, a two-year old canister had all the conditions for stress corrosion cracking in two years. The temperature was low enough for the salt to dissolve on the canister, salts were found in two years.

We've had canisters loaded since 2003 at San Onofre. If we have the same luck as Koeberg, we're talking five more years before one of those canisters
will leak. That is the reality. That is the facts. That is what we need to deal with here. All the other stuff is speculation.

And why are we buying vaporware? You don't buy a product that doesn't exist. I've researched for the world market. We're not a little, tiny world here in the United States; we're part of the world. Most of the rest of the world uses thick, 20-inch thick cask. They do not crack. You don't need three quarters of those slides because you don't have the cracking issues. They put them in reinforced building. Maybe it'll -- maybe that will give us the 100 years.

And in terms of moving the fuel, that's going to take many more years because, Glenn, it's not just politics, it's technology, railroad systems, legal lawsuits. Yucca Mountain has, at least, 200 pending lawsuits.

So, you know, I wish the fuel could be gone right away, like everyone else. But the reality is, we're just not in control of that. So, Tom, I want to know what you're going to do if one of those canisters cracks all the way through. What -- what is in place? There's no approvals, there's no process that I've seen to deal with that.

Do I need to put my house on the market now or
move in five years, if that happens? That's what I'm concerned about right now. And I think that's what everybody needs to be concerned about. This is not a game. This is real. Even Dr. Singh says they're not repairable; on that we agree with.

He even says there's millions of curies of radiation from those -- from those leaks. I have yet to get a good answer as exactly what's going to happen when once of those leaks all the way through. I'd like to have that in writing.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay.

MS. GILMORE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much. And I think that's on Tom's list, but we'll hear more from him at the end. Joanna Field and then Roger Johnson.

MS. FIELD: I yield my time.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you. Roger Johnson and then after Roger Johnson will be Vinny Arora.

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. I think we need to put some perspective on our choices, and it's only if you want us to remain a nuclear waste dump for the rest of the century. That's completely unacceptable. I know you said that, unacceptable, but I wish you'd make your voice louder and clearer, that -- that this is not
possible. Another is to give the impression that this
a survivable, manageable RAD event, it's a manageable
crisis, and that's not poss -- that's not acceptable
either, it is not.

The chairman of the NRC in October of 2013
made a speech in which he said there is no possible way
to protect the public in a RAD emergency, a serious RAD
emergency, and now we hear people in the emergency plan
are saying the opposite. They're doing it as service
to the public, to give them that impression. It's not
manageable.

So I think the only solution is to get it out
of here and I'd like to hear that louder and I do agree
with Glenn that it is a political issue, and so let's
get busy with doing it.

Tonight I saw four major problems with the
presentations: The first was to focus narrowly on
minor, slow-moving accidents and most of these
accidents were assumed to be manmade accidents at the
plant. So that's one possible thing: Human error.

I'd like to see planning for worst-case
scenarios. I didn't hear any talk about worst-case
scenarios, so we should do that.

I'm thinking about high explosive, direct
attacks, hits by missiles, truck bombs -- all kinds of
terrible things are possible, very, very possible, and
they could happen very quickly, escalate very quickly.
And so they --

The second problem is the bureaucratic
solutions. I see most of the discussions of the
emergency plan is -- is based around bureaucratic
solutions. Bureaucratic solutions are not solutions,
so, making a list of agencies involved is not a
solution.

We need to advise the homeowners and the
businesses, and I don't -- I didn't see any of that.
They tell you "Turn on your TV set." That's not a
solution. Homeowners need to know more.

The third one is the reliance on authority. I
hear that over and over. "Turn on your TV set. Trust
authority. Do what you're told." This is a big
mistake. There have been hundreds of nuclear accidents
and 33 major ones, according to the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency); two of the worst were in
California, the meltdown in Rancho Seco in 1978 and in
Santa Susana 1959.

If we look at what authority said, look at our
nuclear testing program, for half a century the
government lies systematically, all of these things.
And it's completely unrealistic about radiation.
That's my last one; alpha, beta, gamma radiation. Nobody's going to go anywhere. All police cars, fire engines, ambulances are going to be hopeless and contaminated. My car today was 115 degrees. You shut off all the air-conditioning --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much.

MR. JOHNSON: You've have to strip-naked to enter a building and being hose down to get your clothes.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much for that -- for your comment. Vinny Arora is next and then Gary Headrick.

MR. ARORA: Since I have an accent, I will be very slow so everybody can understand me. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Vinny Arora. I'm the CEO of a public charity dedicated to nuclear safety. I work with consultants all over the world, including retired NRC inspectors.

My emergency plan teacher is Robert Taylor, NRC, Emergency Plan Chief. And my practical teacher Lee Kelly, with whom I work for six years at SONGS and I interface with Sara also.

I'm going to ask you a question. You don't have to give an answer today. What kind of actual radiological accident you're postulating? And what are your radiological assumptions for doing that? And what
kind of a protective action recommendations are you
going to tell the off-site agencies? That's all.
Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much for your
comment. Garry Headrick.

MR. HEADRICK: Thank you. And then if -- may I
read my nine minutes? Is that --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: No, you can read -- why don't
you make the essence of the comment for three minutes
and then send us by email the full text? And we will
make sure that's part of the public record.

MR. HEADRICK: Yeah, I can try to --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Because --

MR. HEADRICK: -- speak off the top of my head.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Because we need time for the
questions that people have raised to be answered so
that we can, you know, keep the conduit open in both
directions; that's the reason for the three-minute
rule.

MR. HEADRICK: Okay. Well, I thought, you know,
going at the end, it would allow the 60-minute period
before that's over. But basically -- it's hard to talk
off the top of my head, but I just wanted to commend
the CEP for the job you're doing.

But I also think this has to be reviewed in
context with the history, and that's rather brief history for myself, about a five-year period. And as much as I'd like to believe all the things that I've heard tonight and how well-spoken they were and well-researched, and I had not known some of the things I experienced in the past five years, I would be totally on board and so supportive of this action.

But the truth is, Edison does not deserve our trust and there's been several instances where I can point to, and I guess that's why this is a nine-minute speech I can't really say in three minutes.

But probably the biggest offense was the steam generator fiasco, not just that Edison put us at risk in the design phase and they relied on a computer model. As we heard, computer models, you know, are reliable, except in that case it was 400 percent wrong.

And the second part of that fiasco was what we've discovered recently through emails that were discovered as an investigation in CPUC occurred, indicating that Edison has been doing backroom deals so that the ratepayers would get stuck with most of the 5 billion dollar loss in the gamble they took with the steam generators.

Not only that, they way they managed that behind-the-scene negotiation was they skipped the
investigation that went into what went wrong at San Onofre and jumped right to the settlement, and the problem with that is, if we did the investigation, I'm pretty convinced that the NRC, Edison, and the CPUC would all be culpable in why that steam generator project went bad. And they're protecting themselves by not allowing that investigation. And that was the president of Edison who became the president of the CPUC that prevented that investigation from happening.

So in that background, along with a lot of other poor experiences, I think the public perception that you're seeking to gain is not going to be handled when Edison is controlling. We need to have a blue-ribbon panel and we need to have the public have some authority over what the decisions are made.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much for those very important comments about trust. Please do send me the full text so that I can be sure to share that with the full CEP and get it posted on our website.

Dan Stetson, can you -- some of the questions that have been raised, such as about the hospitals, are already action items for us. But can you flag particular items and then help identify who on the panel should -- should address them?
MR. STETSON: Sure. Thank you, David. And -- and some of these actually came up prior to this meeting. And, Kris, the question came up about the 3,000 PSI with the concrete. There's been a lot of discussion about the cask, quite a bit less about the concrete. First of all, could you tell us what that means, 3,000 PSI? And then, also, connected onto that, if there was a significant seismic activity, could it be such that we would not -- you would not be able to remove the canisters from their silos?

DR. SINGH: I'll be glad to answer it. The 3,000 PSI compressive strength concrete is a minimum requirement placed on the filler concrete that is below the ground between the top ISFSI pad and the bottom support foundation pad.

Typically, typically that space would be occupied by engineered fill, which is not concrete. We have upgraded that fill to a CLSM(Controlled Low-Strength Material) material, controlled contraction material that has strength of about 1,500 PSI compressive strength.

Subsequently, for -- for this plan, for San Onofre, we increased that to 3,000 PSI minimum. Now, that doesn't mean that it will be a 3,000 PSI concrete. That's the minimum acceptable requirement.
We qualified it for the earthquake.

And I told you earlier the earthquake is substantially stronger than anything experienced by men. Under that, the canister remains fully retrievable. You can take the canister out after the earthquake has occurred and there is no damage to the canister in the sense that there will be release of radioactivity with substantial margins.

So, that is, this 3,000, unfortunately, there was one sentence in the presentation and it gave -- perhaps, it gave some wrong impression. But I have promised the young lady that I'll send her material on the -- on the concrete, its characteristics, and how -- how it will be used at the site.

Most likely, the concrete compressive strength, the actual measure strength, will be in the order of four-to five-thousand PSI. But when we do calculations, we use the minimum permissible value. Anything above that, of course, is additional margin.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: When you do, could please copy me, so I can make sure the whole CEP can see it, too?

DR. SINGH: Oh, I intended to send it through you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you. Dan?

MR. STETSON: Another question, this one is for
Tom. Tom, there were some comments made that some cracks have been appearing on some canisters after 17 years and that the ones that are currently at SONGS are at risk within the next five years.

If a leak was to occur with the current canisters that you have, how would you detect it? And I know you've spoken a little bit more about what you might do to repair it.

MR. PALMISANO: Well, we've talked about this briefly before. I'll address it briefly tonight. And I think we're going to have to talk more in-depth on this because it's certainly an important subject and I don't want to give it just a two-second or a two-minute answer.

You know, the current monitoring that goes on is generally radiation and contamination around the modules and the outside of the concrete storage modules that exist today.

What is being developed, and it's required by the NRC for the license renewal period, we'll develop it earlier is more inspection inside the modules and around the canister peri -- you know, boundary itself. So those requirements are coming. It is some of the tooling that is being developed by Holtec for us based on technology.
So in terms of inspecting for the early indication of a crack, that tooling has to be developed. If one were to occur today and leakage developed, you know, as we talked earlier, with both the AREVA and Holtec options range from repair to encapsulation.

Practically, as, I think, Dr. Singh said in the previous session the last year, one of the simplest and quickest things would be to put it in a transfer cask or a transportation overpack. Okay? We would stage those on site and have those available for both systems.

And one comment, it was a good comment about the Koeberg in South Africa, that was not a dry storage canister that was written up in an NRC information notice, it's a lower grade of stainless steel. It is stress corrosion grade, it's 304 stainless, which is one reason these are higher grade stainless steel.

So, these are real issues that need to be evaluated and figured in, you know, included in the formulated plan, recognizing the sensitivity. But it's also what drove us to thicker steel and higher grade steel. So I appreciate the comment.

MS. GILMORE: Yeah, I appreciate that but the --
(Inaudible.)
CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: We -- we -- we really need to allow Dan to do what Dan said he was going to do. This issue has come up several times now. It is addressed even in the white paper that's come out of -- that I wrote on behalf of the process that we had and I've checked all of this information with, in fact, the same people at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, they say quite different things.

Dan, could you continue on, please?

MR. STETSON: Certainly. Tom, actual, this kind of moves right along into the next question. The question was brought up: If there was a radiological accident scenario that you might be postulating, what would your response be? Is this right in alignment with that?

MR. PALMISANO: What, a canister?

MR. PASCALL: The question is, what scenario is most probable or is the one that you're sort of using as a paradigm?

MR. PALMISANO: Oh, okay. So, scenarios. So, as part of shutting down the plant we had to redo the accident analyses. I alluded to earlier there are many accidents that can no longer occur. There are some accidents that still can occur. The ones of most concern would be around the spent fuel pools more so than the dry storage canisters.
A spent fuel pool holds 1,300 fuel assemblies, the canisters hold 24 to 37 assemblies. So this is one reason we are interested in emptying the pool sooner rather than later in this decommissioning plan. Quite frankly, it's a way to minimize risk.

So the scenarios we've analyzed, generally, are in the spent fuel pool related to an item dropping on a fuel, damaging fuel and releasing radioactivity out of fuel assemblies, dropping the fuel assembly itself; those are the scenarios analyzed in the Emergency -- the Defuel Emergency Plan.

When we do those projections and then that -- that show that any radiologically release with this older fuel not operated greater than three years would not provide a Dose off-site that would challenge public health and safety.

And then the plan also requires us to look at what's called a design -- beyond-design basis accident in the case of a fuel pool zirconium fire and we had to show that a zirconium fire would not occur in the event of a drain pool with more than 10 hours margin to add water to it, and we showed 17 hours and that's a very conservative analysis.

A more realistic analysis crediting air cooling shows we never reach those temperatures. So
those are bounded in the NRC's 15-month review and approval. We had to demonstrate that.

MR. STETSON: And, basically, those are the scenarios that went from over 50 down to 11?

MR. PALMISANO: Right. And those are the scenarios that are analyzed in the emergency plan and the basis for the approval for the defuel plan.

MR. STETSON: Great. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Can I ask, the answer to this question is going to be complicated so I don't know, as a practical matter, how much progress we can make on this tonight.

But perhaps Rita Conn could -- I'll ask the staff at Edison to make a transcript of what you said, but maybe you could just send me that, and I want to share that with Kris Singh and I'd like to get a letter back from Holtec so that we understand what the concerns and allegations are here and I'm sure the details matter a lot and they're complex.

And so, Kris, I want to give you the opportunity to make a brief response on this question, but I think we need a fuller record that won't happen in the 14 minutes we have left tonight.

DR. SINGH: Thank you. Thank you, David.

Look, normally, if somebody makes such an
allegation, as you did, to me, I would not dignify it
with an answer. But being that you have asked it and
made the allegations in a public forum, I'm going to
give you direct, straight answers.

Holtec has never paid a penny, a single cent,
in fines to anybody. You cited some code, 200 or
whatever, I didn't really take notes, but I can tell
you, categorically, Holtec International has never paid
a dollar in fine to anybody.

And if you can find evidence, then I will give
you a check for 2 million dollars -- okay? -- the
amount that I'm supposed to have been fined. And, if
that's not true, then you should have the decency to
apologize. Okay?

The second item, you stated that somebody
tried to bribe us in TVA(Tennessee Valley Authority).
Explaining the entire circumstances, of course, it
would take time. Let me cut to the chase, TVA is a
federal entity, has its own office, OIG they call them,
Inspector General. The Inspector General would bar
Holtec from any business if we had actually given bribe
to anybody.

Holtec currently provides dry storage services
to all of TVA's plans, has 300 million dollars in
standing business with TVA. If we had engaged in any
behavior of the kind that you so blithely alleged, then
we will be banned from doing business.

The second two people that you quoted,
Landsman, from NRC, used to be an NRC employee, and
another employee of Exelon, Oscar Shirani, these people
have their own visions to make allegations.

The Exelon, which is our customer -- was our
customer, ignored them because they were absolutely
vacuous. They had no substance to them. They could
not produce any proof.

They were, by the way, looking for employment
with us, both of them, and we denied and then we got --
we ended up with these allegations. Nobody believed
them. And I suggest that you look for some
substantiation before you take a person's casual
comments and make a public allegation to --

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR:  Okay.

DR. SINGH:  -- to -- to blacken somebody's
reputation.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR:  Okay. Thank you.

DR. SINGH:  I don't think anybody would appreciate
it.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR:  Thank you very much.

DR. SINGH:  And your last comment.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR:  Very briefly, Kris.
DR. SINGH: Well, you -- well, now I -- yeah, you said Holtec has no quality. It's wonderful to say that. Holtec gets audited by different organizations from around the world -- people should know this -- at least five times a year. NRC, of course, audits us, continuously.

Holtec has not been cited a violation. The most recent audits occurred only a few months -- a few months ago by the NRC. We get audited by NUPIC (Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee), which is a utility group. No one, no one has ever withdrawn a contract from Holtec for lack of quality.

Now you take those facts and ask yourself did you make a reckless allegation of all the facts here?

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you.

Let me just jump in here. Let me suggest that if the responses weren't adequate, that you send me a note and I will work with Holtec, and within -- within the bounds of what's reasonable, and I'll canvas the CEP on that issue, we'll see if additional information is necessary.

But I thank you for your concern, but I also want to thank Kris Singh for the very direct responses to the questions you raised.

My understanding is that Dan has been over
some of the main topics. We can't go through every single comment in that ping-pong, back and forth. But I want to ask the members of the CEP before we adjourn tonight whether you have other questions that you want to put back to other people who have spoken tonight in the comment period or other concerns that you want to raise right now to fill out the conversation. Glenn Pascall?

MR. PASCALL: The Sierra Club has been very involved in the cost-sharing issues connected with the premature shut down of the plant, the economic loss of a 10-year premature shutdown, which is actually a little more than 3 billion dollars in play right now in terms of ratepayer liability.

And I just want to clarify, the California PUC is the responsible party in that area and its president got in great difficulty because of discussions. But they have no role with regards to safety and, by the same token, the NRC has no role with regards to cost-sharing issues, and so we have to clarify that. It's all important stuff. But we shouldn't miss-allocate blame.

And I also want to say that the question has arisen Edison has explicitly been charged with not being worthy of trust. And I want to raise a question,
can that ever change? Can behaviors be shown that are such that the prospect of an era has begun that might merit trust?

And I may be exposing myself horribly here, but, in my view, Tom Palmisano has won my trust. And if there are great concerns that remain, I think they are due to imponderable technological questions that may not have been properly resolved. They were not due to profit motives or irresponsibility.

And, to me, Tom is an example of why you've got to keep the books open and create an environment which trust is possible going forward regardless of troubling experiences in the past.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you very much. I think this ongoing discussion about Defense in Depth and the evidence that's already accumulated about Edison and Holtec going above and beyond what would be required from the regulatory point of view, I think this is part of that process. I think that's very important.

Let me see if there are other comments people would like to make? Ted Quinn?

MR. QUINN: Yeah, I'd like to -- I'd like to say I thought that the meeting went very well. I appreciate the speakers doing their -- their time. I'd like to say that I'm disappointed that this item 7 on the
agenda, Mr. Chairman, the strategic approach to making interim consolidated storage a reality, we didn't give it enough time.

And I'd like to ask that in the next agenda that you prepare we have more time on it. There were many comments tonight in sync with this process of -- of general consensus. We all need to work on this. We all feel this way. So if we could do that more.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Right. Thank you very much. I think in between now and the next meeting -- I don't have that date in front of me -- Jerry Kern and I are going to do some work on the Sacramento side, we're going to cycle with the CEP to understand what we're actually looking for in Sacramento.

We really need to understand what, if anything, is feasible at the federal level and what we should be doing. Did you want to make additional comments about places we should be focusing between now and the next meeting, Ted?

MR. QUINN: No, not really. Just other people, like Per Peterson, and others that want to participate in on this consensus gathering. I mean, you had them come speak before. They want to come again.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Yeah, exactly. And I think it's encouraging to see that the Bipartisan Policy
Commission that, that organization which co-sponsored the meeting we had in January, is moving full speed ahead on this question.

The Department of Energy now is moving. I'm not sure what "full speed ahead" means for the Department of Energy, but it's moving ahead on this question. I think all of that is very encouraging.

I do want to make one comment: I'm very encouraged by the number of people here tonight from Laguna Beach, including Toni Iseman. And I want to -- I appreciate the petitions. I love to work with you and understand the people who are organizing the petition, to understand how we work on solutions that are not just California restricted.

Because if we do that, we will narrow the list of feasible sites to zero and that's not in our interest. Whereas we have real players, real jurisdictions in other states, we have real companies putting money on the table that are looking at other sites, so we've got to find a way to build a bigger tent here or have a broader approach.

And so I really look forward to looking to working with Laguna Beach to understand how there, in San Clemente and other places where these issues have arisen how we -- how we kind of grow strongly in the
same direction here, if I can mix up my metaphors. And I'm going to stop with the metaphors there and see if there are any other comments. Bob Baker?

MR. BAKER: Yes, Mr. Chairman. And I would like -- I would like to hear more about the transportation aspect. Maybe it's too soon to talk about that, but I would like to hear some more about that and what's being done, what some of the scenarios can be.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Okay. Excellent. Yeah. Let's -- let's -- let's take Ted Quinn's advise that we have, not just one, but several periodic meetings where we continue to layer in what are we doing in terms of strategic approach to consolidated storage -- storage, let's make sure the transport issue is a part of that.

The Department of Energy Report that we expect this fall should include some significant attention to the transport issue because that's what we heard from them when they were here. So let's see what's in that report and that might be a way to start the discussion.

Any other comments people would like to make?

MS. BARTLETT: I know we want to work with some of our legislators in Sacramento and we've identified, Senator Monroe, Senator Pat Bates, and -- what's the other one?

MR. KERN: Rocky Chavez.
MS. BARTLETT: Oh, and Rocky Chavez, yes, in the assembly. And they are all republicans. The county has some great lobbyists that we use up in Sacramento and I think they can help us identify some folks on the democratic side, just some legislators that we can partner with because this has to be a Bipartisan effort if we're going to get anything done up in Sacramento. So, I'll take that task on.

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: Thank you. That would be enormously helpful. Thank you very much for that.

Any other comments people would like to make? Okay. I want to -- just before we adjourn, I want to recognize Dan Stetson, who has just retired as the operational head of the Ocean Institute, and much to my pleasure is able to continue to serve with us on the Community Engagement Panel.

But I want to congratulate you on retiring as head of the Ocean Institute, which I gather gives you more time to swim with the sharks, and I'm not sure that that's a good thing or a bad thing. But thank you, Dan, for all your service and I'm delighted that you're able to continue working with us even in your new role.

(Applause)

CHAIRMAN DR. VICTOR: And with that, let me adjourn
and thank all of you for spending the evening with us here in Oceanside.

(Whereupon, the Community Engagement Panel meeting concluded at 8:58 p.m.)
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of California, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken down by me at the time and place therein set forth; that the foregoing is a true record of the proceedings and of all the comments made at the time of the proceedings.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name on this date, FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 2015.

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