San Onofre Decommissioning Community Engagement Panel

REGULAR MEETING

Thursday, July 23, 2015, from 6:00-9:00 p.m. PDT in Oceanside, California

Meeting Minutes and Action Items

1) Community Engagement Panel (CEP) Member Attendance
   a) Present: Dr. David Victor (CEP Chairman/University of California, San Diego), Dan Stetson (CEP Secretary/Ocean Institute), Hon. Lisa Bartlett (Supervisor, Orange County, 5th District), Ted Quinn (American Nuclear Society), Hon. Jerome “Jerry” M. Kern (Oceanside City Council), Donna Boston (Orange County Sheriff’s Department), Dr. William Parker (University of California, Irvine), Jim Leach (South Orange County Economic Coalition), Rich Haydon (California State Parks), Tom Caughlan (Camp Pendleton), Hon. John Alpay (President, Capistrano Unified School District Board of Trustees), Hon. Carlos Olvera (Mayor, Dana Point), Glenn Pascall (Sierra Club), Javier Alvarez (Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 89; alternate for Valentine Macedo)
   b) Absent: Hon. Tim Brown (CEP Vice Chairman/San Clemente City Council), Valentine “Val” Macedo (Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 89), Garry Brown (Orange County Coastkeeper), Hon. Pam Patterson (Mayor Pro Tem, San Juan Capistrano), Hon. Bill Horn (Supervisor, San Diego County), Hon. Bob Baker (Mayor Pro Tem, San Clemente; alternate for Hon. Tim Brown)
   c) Guests: Dr. Kris Singh (President and CEO, Holtec International), Sara Kaminske (Interjurisdictional Planning Committee Chair)
   d) Southern California Edison (SCE) Representatives: Tom Palmisano (VP of Decommissioning and Chief Nuclear Officer), Kelli Gallion (SONGS Emergency Preparedness Planning Manager)

2) Meeting Convened by Chairman David Victor at 6:10 p.m.:
   a) Chairman David Victor opened the meeting by reiterating that the role of the CEP is not a decision making body, but is designed as a communication conduit between the local communities and SCE, as well as a forum to educate the public on the decommissioning process
   b) Tonight’s meeting will focus on both the new Emergency Plan for SONGS and Dry Fuel Storage Defense-in-Depth. Making consolidated interim storage a reality will also be discussed
   c) The presentation from tonight can be found on SONGScommunity.com, as well as live streaming, and links for signing up for walking tours
   d) A structured public comment period will follow the presentations

3) Decommissioning Update by Tom Palmisano, VP of Decommissioning and Chief Nuclear Office
   a) SONGS principles are safety, stewardship, and engagement (including transparency and an open dialogue)
   b) Decommissioning Update:
      i) A brief review of the 20-Year Decommissioning Plan – project is still in the pre-decommissioning activities stage, such as retiring systems that are no longer required, reconfiguring the plant and removing hazards, environmental permitting, etc. Right now everything is going to schedule
      ii) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Submittal Status identifying submittals approved; remaining approvals include the Irradiated Fuel Management Plan Safety Evaluation Report, expected 7/31/15, and the Defueled Quality Assurance Plan, expected 8/14/15
      iii) Industry Initiatives:
         1) Department of Energy (DOE) Visit to SONGS:
            a) June 2-5, 2015, a DOE group visited SONGS, including DOE officials, representatives from the Department of Transportation, Federal railway administration officers,
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technical staff, and DOE national laboratory personnel; California Energy
Commission staff participated
(b) Topics included site used fuel storage, site infrastructure, and transportation
infrastructure
(c) The DOE group also met with CEP officers, local officials, railroad representatives,
and heavy haul companies
(d) A revised DOE report on “Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel
from Shutdown Sites” will be drafted by DOE in Fall 2015 and published in early
2016

(2) Consolidated Interim Storage
(a) Private Fuel Storage (PFS) planned a consolidated interim storage facility on the
Skull Valley Goshute Reservation in Utah. PFS is owned by utilities, including SCE.
NRC license was issued in 2007, however, the Goshute facility will likely never be
constructed due to local and state opposition
(b) Waste Control Specialists has partnered with AREVA to construct a consolidated
interim storage facility in Andrews County, Texas. There is local and state support
for the facility and the initial licensing activities have commenced
(c) Holtec and Eddy Lea Energy Alliance are planning a consolidated interim storage
facility in New Mexico based on Holtec’s UMAX system. There is local and state
support for the facility and the initial licensing activities are expected to commence
late 2015
(d) Both the Texas and New Mexico facilities are viable options and SCE, the CEP, and
the public needs to urge the Federal government to make both happen

(3) Secretary Dan Stetson discussed the DOE visit, during which he asked whether the DOE
has legal authority over transportation
(a) The DOE representative confirmed that DOE has legal authority, however,
realistically all jurisdictions would have to give approval
(b) There are two bills, one in the Senate and one in the House, addressing
transportation of used fuel
(c) Chairman David Victor has asked the DOE to provide their findings from the
meetings and sees transportation as being the real problem

4) SONGS Emergency Planning and Preparedness:
   a) Tom Palmisano presented the SONGS Emergency Plan, operating plant vs. decommissioning
      plant scenarios
      i) The SONGS emergency plan is changing due to the significantly reduced risk resulting from
         the permanent shutdown of the plant: (1) no fuel in the reactors, (2) fuel has decayed
greater than three years, (3) lower decay heat and radioactivity, (4) most potential scenarios
related to an operating plant are no longer possible, and (5) there is more time to respond
to and mitigate potential issues
      ii) Accident Analysis: Operating vs. Decommissioned
         (1) Potential accidents that dominate plant risk and create possibility of radiological
             releases in an operating reactor include: high pressure steam line breaks, reactor
             coolant system line breaks, control rod ejection causing power excursion and loss of
coolant, and loss of steam generator feedwater (undercooling of the fuel)
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(2) Hazards are greatly reduced in a permanently defueled reactor, such as SONGS, resulting in low probability of an accident. Primary risk is associated with used nuclear fuel stored in the spent fuel pools and this risk is reduced because the spent fuel pool is at atmospheric pressure and low temperature, the heat source is low, and there is significant mitigation time.

(3) A table was presented showing SONGS spent fuel decay (heat vs. time) depicting a significant drop in MBTU/hr as of September 2013, followed by slow decay.

iii) Emergency plan changes impact only parts of the original plan and much remains the same. The NRC spent 15 months reviewing and approving these changes during which there was opportunity for public comment.

iv) Remaining in the emergency plan are a dedicated emergency response organization at SONGS, coordination with off-site emergency responders and the Interjurisdictional Planning Committee (IPC), NRC oversight, funding for local and county agencies at current levels through 2019 ($1.7 million annually), and funding for local and county agencies after 2019 commensurate with a retired nuclear plant. A continued funding memorandum of agreement is in progress with the agencies to continue funding for the IPC.

v) PDEP Timeline:

(1) March 31, 2014 – Submitted EP exemptions and license amendment requests (LARs) to NRC; NRC emergency planning exemptions are necessary because the NRC rules apply to operating plants, not decommissioning plants; the NRC provides staff guidance
(2) October 9, 2014 – In-depth CEP presentation: Emergency Planning at SONGS
(3) March 2, 2015 – NRC Commissioners approved SONGS EP exemptions
(4) Mary 22, 2015 – SONGS Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and off-site agencies trained
(5) June 5, 2015 – NRC issued Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) for EP exemptions and LARs
(6) June 8, 2015 – SONGS implemented the NRC-approved PDEP

b) Hon. Lisa Bartlett thanked SCE for its commitment to continued emergency funding through 2019; SCE and Orange County are committed to a 10-mile radius emergency zone versus a 2-mile radius required by NRC regulations.

c) Kelli Gallion, SONGS Emergency Preparedness Planning Manager, summarized emergency preparedness during decommissioning.

i) SONGS has a dedicated emergency response organization and is an active partner with off-site emergency partners to protect the health and safety of the public and our employees, and is committed to funding local and regional emergency response agencies through June 2019.

ii) The Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) includes the following:

(1) Dose Assessment: onsite radiological monitoring is required. Although no longer a requirement, Orange County, San Diego County, and San Onofre continue to include offsite radiological monitoring in their emergency response procedures.

(2) Emergency Notifications via 24/7 Staffed Warning Points: notification within 15 minutes and verbal verification required within 60 minutes (Orange County, San Diego County, California Office of Emergency Services, Camp Pendleton, and NRC)

(3) Public Information: SCE Corporate Communications Department disseminates information to the public through press releases and media conferences; 24/7 Corporate Media line available.
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(4) Hospitals/Medical Treatment: Mission Hospital Regional (Mission Viejo) and Tri-City Medical Center (Oceanside)
(5) Law enforcement (in support of security related events), transportation of injured persons, and firefighting and rescue remain unchanged
   (a) Hon. Lisa Bartlett questioned why only two hospitals are included
       (i) Kelli Gallion responded that the regulatory requirements call for two hospitals (a primary and a backup hospital), not four and the decision was made to have one north of the plant and one south; Mission Hospital Regional was selected for the north because of its trauma unit
       (ii) Tom Palmisano took an action to provide the panel with more information about hospital relationships
       (iii) Hon. Bob Barker asked why San Clemente Hospital was not chosen
       (iv) Kelli Gallion will address all hospital decisions in the feedback to the CEP
       (v) Hon. John Alpay emphasized that he would like the San Clemente Hospital reconsidered as it is local and that its exclusion is probably a deficiency
       (vi) Hon. Jerry Kern asked that if there was an industrial accident where would the patient be transported and who calls the shots
       (vii) Donna Boston clarified that there was a difference between what is required for the SONGS PDEP and what the off-site jurisdictions include in their emergency response activities; triage would occur and the appropriate hospital would be selected based on that triage. The offsite agencies include all area hospitals in their emergency response portfolios
   1. Kelli Gallion clarified that the hospital agreements associated with PDEP are specifically for the transport of contaminated injured workers
   iii) SCE and the IPC share a common goal of continued protection of the health and safety of our community and our workers
      (1) SCE has committed to maintain the Community Alert Siren System for the jurisdictions within 10 miles of the plant until June 30, 2019
      (2) SCE has committed to allowing an off-site dose assessment team member into the Command Center during an actual radiological event
      (3) SCE is committed to funding the IPC through June 2019 and has committed to discussing off-site funding for emergency preparedness beyond 2019
         (a) Chairman David Victor asked for updates on the funding issues at future CEP meetings
         (b) Hon. Bob Baker asked if the parameter for siren activation is changing
             (i) Kelli Gallion responded that a maintenance plan was being created and SCE will work with the jurisdictions that have sirens; maintenance and testing will no longer be held to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requirements but there will still be a dedicated program
             (ii) Hon. Bob Baker clarified that he was referring to the activation of the sirens, not the maintenance program
             (iii) Kelli Gallion clarified that SCE never activated the sirens, but provided protective action recommendations to the jurisdictions and it was then up to the jurisdictions to decide to activate the sirens
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(iv) Hon. Lisa Bartlett asked if the sirens would be activated in the 2-mile radius or the 10-mile radius
(v) Kelli Gallion said the sirens within the 10-mile radius would be maintained and tested, but it would be up to the jurisdictions when they were activated
(vi) Chairman David Victor stated that there were no longer plant emergency scenarios that would require the activation of the sirens
(c) Secretary Dan Stetson asked if there will be a change in the plan a few years down the road, when all fuel has been moved to the dry cask storage
(i) Tom Palmisano responded that when all the fuel is offloaded from the spent fuel pools, the Emergency Plan will change again. However, none of these PDEP changes affect the site Security Plan
d) Sara Kaminske, Orange County Sheriff’s Department Assistant Emergency Manager and Chair of the IPC, summarized the continuing roles of onsite first responders
i) The IPC includes members from Orange County, Camp Pendleton, City of San Clemente, City of Dana Point, City of San Juan Capistrano, San Diego County, California State Parks, and SCE
ii) The IPC addresses public perception, such as perceived risk, knowledge of evacuation plans, and community responsibility
iii) Emergency planning consists of local jurisdiction SONGS-specific emergency response plans and communication procedures, as well as dedicated, trained, and equipped fire and health care personnel. Emergency planning includes emergency preparedness exercises, communication drills, and the community siren system
iv) SCE has agreed to continue funding in the near term. State legislature and Federal requirements for nuclear training and exercises will change, as well as a shift in some responsibilities from San Onofre to the County. Orange County will maintain a robust all hazards training and exercise schedule
v) Short term changes will be made to local emergency plans and there will be a slow transition between the existing emergency plan and the decommissioned emergency plan
(1) Hon. Jerry Kern asked who notifies the town of Fallbrook of an emergency
(a) Sara Kaminske responded that San Diego County would do the notification
(2) Glenn Pascall, referring to a previous Security Plan presentation, commented that there was a general feeling that SCE needed to flesh out the terrorist scenarios to include airborne and seaborne
(a) Chairman David Victor commented that this topic is one of many dimensions of what the defense-in-depth is going to look like for this site, and the CEP will be looking at the subject as it evolves, to understand what the layers of defense-in-depth are going to look like. Parts of that defense-in-depth are one of the subjects of our meeting tonight, as it pertains to the dry cask storage system. This subject of conversation will go on for some years

5) Dry Fuel Storage Defense-in-Depth (DID), presented by Tom Palmisano
a) As a result of feedback from the CEP and the public, SCE is partnering with Holtec on long term strategies regarding DID as it applies to dry cask storage. The NRC has received feedback from us and others and they are working on refining their review of DID as it applies to dry fuel storage. Historically, the concept has been applied to reactors and safety systems for reactors now it is being explicitly applied to dry fuel storage
b) This is an evolving topic.

c) SCE is partnering with Holtec; Holtec is a good system and a fine company. Because the fuel is expected to be on site until 2049, based on the current DOE plan, SCE did not want a vendor that would deliver a product and leave. SCE needed a partner to be there every step of the way. Holtec knows exactly what SCE expects of them in the long term, a partnership, not just execution of a contract. Long-term support is needed to maintain, monitor, and manage the system, and eventually support the off-site transfer of fuel.

d) Dry cask storage systems are robust and SCE is going to start talking about how to apply DID principles to the new system and the existing AREVA system. Under the NRC rules the canisters are licensed in 20-year increments; during the first 20 years there are some basic monitoring requirements but there are no inspection requirements. Inspections are required in the second 20-year period. SCE is not going to wait for those 20-year milestones. SCE, Holtec, and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have decided to lead the industry in developing the Aging Management Program (AMP), the inspection and the radiation capability, and that is part of the partnership we need going forward.

e) Some of the things heard from the CEP and the public comments collectively: How long will the casks be on site? How is the DID concept applied? How will we monitor the casks? How can we detect corrosion? How will we mitigate a crack? How do we protect against physical threats? SCE will not have all the answers for you tonight but we will talk about these over time.

f) A brief recap of SONGS Used Fuel was provided. Having the fuel on site at a decommissioning site is not an acceptable situation to anybody; this is a matter of taking care of the fuel while it is on site and moving it off-site as soon as we can reasonably and safely do so.

g) Tom Palmisano provided a brief overview of the existing AREVA ISFSI installation and the proposed Holtec ISFSI Installation; photos of existing Holtec systems at other facilities were shown as examples.

h) Definition of DID, consistent with how the NRC is describing it in the industry:
   i) Designing and operating facilities in a way that prevents and mitigates accidents (generic definition as applied to reactors)
   ii) Creating multiple independent and redundant layers of defense (e.g., security is a layer of defense)
   iii) Minimizing the reliance on any single feature

i) Dry Storage DID
   i) Three principal functions of a dry cask storage system: (1) maintain sub-criticality (e.g., control the nuclear fuel so it cannot go critical again), (2) prevent radiation exposure exceeding regulatory limits (this is radiation exposure through the canister), and (3) prevent release of radioactive materials from exceeding regulatory limits (e.g., leakage from the canister).
   ii) DID Strategies Include: (1) engineered controls (design/material), (2) programmatic controls (fabrication), and (3) mitigating controls (aging management – testing, inspection, surveillance).
   iii) Highlights of SONGS DID Program
      (1) The SONGS program includes engineered, programmatic and mitigating controls that will ensure:
         (a) Prevention – using corrosion-resistant 316L stainless steel and thickness that exceed regulatory requirements
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(b) Prediction/Detection – canister test and coupon programs
(c) Inspection – developing inspection tools (based on technology that exists)
(d) Remediation – repair techniques or use of overpack

(2) Ted Quinn asked what EPRI is doing to help
(a) Tom Palmisano explained that SCE has partnered with EPRI and Holtec and leading several of their sub-committees on inspection technology as well as some of the tooling development

(3) Chairman David Victor asked for a description of a coupon
(a) Tom Palmisano explained that a coupon is a canister test specimen or a piece of test material

6) SONGS Dry Cask Storage System and Defense-in-Depth, presented by Dr. Kris Singh, President and CEO of Holtec International
a) Canister integrity is a concern of this community. Holtec is responding to that concern by developing technologies associated with defense-in-depth
b) SCE, Holtec, and Industry Partnership:
   i) Holtec is collaborating with SCE to develop an AMP as part of DID for the dry storage canister systems – to ensure that every possible measure that can reasonably be implemented to make the canister absolutely safe and invulnerable to release of radioactivity, is adopted
   ii) Holtec’s DID measures will also be used with NUHOMS canisters, and not limited to UMAX
   iii) SCE and Holtec efforts are for both the NUHOMS and HI-STORM type dry storage canisters
c) SCE and Holtec will implement the AMP well in advance of regulatory requirements
d) The canister should not release radioactivity; the Holtec system is in the ground to minimize radiation scatter, and the basic concept of DID is to have multiple barriers. No single failure would cause a release of radioactivity, nor a criticality
e) The term in use is “aging management” and these measures are to keep the canisters “youthful” and functioning
f) The main challenge is keeping the material from undergoing Chloride Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking (CISCC), which can occur under certain conditions and over a long period of time:
   i) Chloride atmosphere with high relative humidity
   ii) High stress
   iii) Susceptible material
g) Engineered Controls
   i) Design features include:
      (1) Warm surface of canister shell helps prevent dissolved salts in the air from condensing
      (2) Vertical orientation allows for easy access to 100% of the surface from sample collection, options are being developed for NUHOMS horizontal canisters
   ii) Identify and introduce CISCC-resistant design features in the new canisters, such as the use of corrosion-resistant 316L stainless steel
   iii) Thickness increased from 1/2- to 5/8-inch
   iv) Additional foundation strength with concrete fill by replacing engineered fill with 3,000 PSI concrete for entire foundation
   v) Use of stainless steel in lieu of carbon steel for the cavity enclosure canister to enhance corrosion resistance
h) Programmatic Controls  
   i) Fabrication methods such as reduction of stresses by over-roll  
   ii) Weld materials  
   iii) Welding methods such as minimization of heat affected zone  
   iv) Consideration of surface improvements such as peening for reduction in stresses  

i) Mitigating Controls – Aging Management  
   i) Monitoring of radiation detectors (existing requirement)  
   ii) General area periodic inspections (existing requirement)  
   iii) Maintain security surveillance and access controls (existing requirement)  
   iv) Develop an AMP using NRC guidance to maintain the integrity of the confinement boundary  
   v) Monitor environmental parameters (temperature/humidity)  
   vi) Develop surveillance tools by converting existing methodologies into monitoring plans for UMAX and NUHOMS  

vi) Develop chloride content inspection tools by converting existing equipment (used in pilot inspection programs)  

vii) Stage a NUHOMS existing empty canister within the salt-laden atmosphere for periodic surveillance of salt accumulation  

ix) Install empty Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) in a CEC for a periodic inspection, developing delivery tools, and evaluating inspection and repair methods  

x) Install pre-stressed coupons for accelerated environmental impact within the UMAX CECs  

xi) Stage a transfer cask for long-term storage of any compromised canister  

xii) Evaluate inspection results from DSC in salt-laden atmosphere, spare empty canister, pre-stressed coupons, and operating experience for input to the AMP  

j) Mitigating Controls – Remediation  
   i) Periodically inspect using visual examination tools  
   ii) Identify any indication of salt accumulation, pit or crack that may identify the initiation of a crack  
   iii) Develop remediation measures for NUHOMS and UMAX canisters years before the risk of confinement breach becomes credible  
   iv) Convert existing delivery tools and methods for use in inspection and repair of DSCs  

k) In conclusion, a program to protect the long-term performance integrity of the SONGS storage system is being developed and the program will be implemented on the HI-STORM UMAX canisters for the entire lifecycle of the storage systems  

l) Ted Quinn would like to see a timeline of SCE, industry, and NRC Aging Management Programs, SERs, review and approval processes, etc.  
   i) Dr. Singh and Tom Palmisano agreed to respond together  

m) Hon. Jerry Kern asked what drove the change in the thickness  
   i) Tom Palmisano said that he requested the thickness change with the AREVA system and is a recognition of the seismic capability as well as the corrosion resistance; we insisted on the high resistance stainless steel and the increased thickness with the UMAX system  

n) Hon. Lisa Bartlett asked what seismic testing has been done  
   i) Dr. Singh responded that shake-table testing had been done on canisters, but today most of the predictions are done by computer code and computer simulations; Holtec has analyzed these canisters and the calculations have been reviewed by NRC. The canisters can
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withstand a level of earthquake that has never occurred in recorded history. The calculations are available for review.

o) Chairman David Victor asked for a summary of the seismic integrity of the Holtec system, and what is the status of getting the seismic approvals for this system.

i) Dr. Singh stated that the design basis for the original license approval was for the most bounding earthquake across the nation. SCE then requested that we increase the earthquake level to more than what was in the FSAR. Because of this change, Holtec then had to submit a license amendment. The NRC has issued the Safety Evaluation Report and the public comment period ends today (7/23/15).

p) Dr. William Parker commented that many of the analytical and monitoring tools that are under development do not exist today. Going forward, the CEP should be updated on the status of the development of those tools.

q) Chairman David Victor asked that SCE keep an evergreen list of all the questions surrounding DID and that SCE and Holtec work together on a draft of what DID looks like, in terms the public can understand, and at the end of this year, beginning of next year we can review that

7) Chairman David Victor Led a Panel Discussion on Consolidated Interim Storage

a) Prior to the meeting, Chairman David Victor, Secretary Dan Stetson, and Vice Chairman Tim Brown did a survey of the CEP members and sent an email which has also been posted on SONGScommunity.com that summarizes what was learned from that survey. The questions included how the CEP overall was working for which the overall impressions are positive, although a lot of people were upset about the website, it appears that the members would like to focus on Consolidated Interim Storage in particular.

b) At the last CEP meeting, Chairman David Victor, Secretary Dan Stetson and Vice Chairman Tim Brown shared a memo with the CEP members for a California strategy involving the California Energy Commission starting the spade work with that has already been talked about in this forum, e.g., transportation issues. Three things were communicated by the CEP members: 1) a lot of support for the California strategy, and no support for the strategy that California waste should stay in California only, 2) ensure a long term program for high-quality SCE management of the site over decades while the Consolidated Interim Storage issue is pursued, 3) the need for doing something politically, e.g., put pressure on the Federal government, more attention in Sacramento, etc. Chairman David Victor asked CEP members if there were other views regarding what the CEP should be doing in regards to Consolidated Interim Storage.

c) Hon. Jerry Kern commented that he has been trying to coordinate a meeting with Senator Pat Bates office, Assembly Member Rocky Chavez’s office, Assembly Member Bill Brough’s office, as well as getting Congressman Darrell Issa involved, and his expectation is that the meeting happen sometime over the next month. The hope is for having a champion in Sacramento. Politically, the problem is that all of them are Republican in a Democratic controlled legislature. But we should start with our local elected officials.

(1) Chairman David Victor asked Hon. Jerry Kern for help with articulating what the CEP is asking for.

d) Glenn Pascal commended Chairman David Victor, Vice Chairman Tim Brown, and Secretary Dan Stetson, for taking the lead on this issue and surfacing this option. The CEP is an advisory body, and at some point the CEP needs to trust the expert decision makers on the DID detailed design features. But when it comes to Consolidated Interim Storage, which is primarily a political issue,
the CEP has a much more significant role to play and the potential to make an impact. Lastly, it’s not an either/or situation: Yucca Mountain and privately operated sites are all good and one should not preclude the other when it comes to moving the waste from San Onofre

i) Chairman David Victor added that consolidated interim storage is a tremendous opportunity. Jerry Kern and Chairman David Victor will work closely together on articulating the ask in Sacramento

e) Tom Caughlan presented two slides for an explanation of why military bases are not available for the storage of used fuel:

i) The first slide showed a map of North America. The eastern side is coastline and flat; the western side is comprised of mountains, deserts, flat, coast, and in other words, every kind of terrain the military services need to train with (with the exception of triple-canopy jungle). Those terrains are within an hour’s flying time of the bases on the west coast. These bases have been here since WWII and were established here because of the capability of creating live-fire training areas (85% are on the west coast)

ii) The second slide showed the bases located on the west coast, including the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range has been a live-fire gunning range since 1942. It is open, rolling desert and badlands which have collected ordinance all those days since its inception, some of which has not exploded. The clearing of it to make it safe for any other use would not be impossible but would take a very long time, and then would not be available as a life-fire gunning range, and it is the only one left and is used by all the services. The point being, these military ranges are used to train almost 365 days a year and that’s why there is no available land on military bases that is not currently being used maneuver training or live-fire training. The land is fully committed.

f) Chairman David Victor stated that the CEP would be updated on Consolidated Interim Storage at almost every CEP meeting going forward

8) Chairman David Victor Facilitated the Public Comment Period

a) Public Comments made by the following:

i) Lori Donchak, San Clemente City Council Member – San Clemente Hospital

ii) Daryl Gale, Los Angeles resident – Public Safety

iii) Rita Conn, Chairman of Let Laguna Vote – Holtec Integrity

iv) Toni Iseman, Laguna Beach City Council Member – Used Fuel Safety

v) Leah Vasquez, City of Laguna Beach resident – DOE Storage

vi) Charlotte Marak, Village Laguna resident – Interim Storage

vii) Marni Magda – Private Fuel Storage

viii) Lorene Auger – Risk Assessment

ix) Donna Gilmore, San Onofre Safety – Canister Integrity

x) Roger Johnson – Emergency Planning

xi) Vinnie Arora – CEO of AVP Aroma – Emergency Planning

xii) Gary Headrick, San Clemente Green – SCE Integrity

b) Secretary Dan Stetson asked Dr. Singh about the 3,000 psi for concrete, as well as seismic damage

i) Dr. Singh explained that 3,000 psi (compression strength) is the minimum requirement for the filler concrete between the top pad and bottom support pad of the ISFSI; that fill has
been upgraded to a CCSI fill; the canister is fully retrievable after an earthquake with no damage, due to the substantial margins

ii) Secretary Dan Stetson asked Tom Palmisano about the potential for canister cracking after the 20 year milestone and how would a leak be detected

(1) Tom Palmisano responded that he will follow up with a more in-depth response, but the current monitoring is for radiation contamination, but in the future will involve inspections in the modules and around the canisters. This is included in the aging management program efforts being worked in conjunction with Holtec. The simplest way to address a cracked canister right now would be to put it in a transportation over pack (those will be staged on-site for each system). The South African example was a lower grade steel and one of the drivers of SCE using a stronger grade steel

iii) Secretary Dan Stetson explained that the accident analysis had to be redone because of the plant shutdown; there are many accidents that can no longer occur. Some accidents still can occur and the ones of most concern are around the spent fuel pools, more so than the dry fuel canisters. The spent fuel pools hold 1,300 fuel assemblies and the canisters each hold 24 to 32 fuel assemblies, so this is one reason we want to empty the pools sooner rather than later in this decommissioning plan, as a way to minimize risk. The scenarios analyzed are generally in the spent fuel pool related to an item dropping into the spent fuel pool, damaging fuel, and releasing radioactivity, dropping a fuel assembly itself, and those are the accidents analyzed in the PDEP. Any radiological release with this old a fuel would not provide a dose offsite that would challenge public health and safety. The plan also called for beyond design base accident involving a zirconium fire, which can no longer occur.

iv) Chairman David Victor asked SCE to make a transcript of Rita Conn’s comments that could be shared between CEP and Dr. Singh, and asked that Holtec provide a written response.

(1) Dr. Singh refuted the allegations made by Rita Conn. Holtec has never paid a dollar in fines to anybody. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is a Federal entity and has an inspector general. If a bribe had been given, Holtec would have been barred from providing business to TVA. Holtec gets audited by a variety of international agencies at least five times a year. The NRC audits them continuously. No contracts have ever been withdrawn due to quality.

(a) Chairman David Victor asked Rita Conn to contact him if follow up response was needed by Holtec.

v) Chairman David Victor asked the CEP members if they had additional comments to make

(1) Glenn Pascall commented that the Sierra Club was concerned about the ten year economic loss due to the premature shutdown of the plant. Also, can distrust in a company be changed; can behaviors change such that a prospect of an era of trust begin; Tom Palmisano has won Glenn Pascall’s trust

(2) Ted Quinn commented that he was disappointed that more meeting time had not been spent on the interim storage issue and that the topic be included in the next meeting’s agenda. Perhaps including Per Peterson again as a guest speaker

(a) Chairman David Victor responded that there will be an update at the next meeting
San Onofre Decommissioning Community Engagement Panel
REGULAR MEETING
Thursday, July 23, 2015, from 6:00-9:00 p.m. PDT in Oceanside, California
Meeting Minutes and Action Items

(3) Chairman David Victor acknowledged the number of people present from Laguna Beach and appreciates the petitions; the Chairman would like to work with Laguna Beach going forward and to grow in the same direction

(4) Hon. Bob Baker asked to hear more about the transportation issues in the future

(5) Hon. Lisa Bartlett commented that OC has some great lobbyists in Sacramento that may be able to help with identifying Democratic legislators that the CEP can partner with; this must be a bi-partisan effort if anything is to get accomplished in Sacramento

9) Chairman David Victor – Closing Remarks
   a) Chairman David Victor recognized Secretary Dan Stetson’s retirement from the Ocean Institute and has agreed to continue to serve on the CEP and thanked him for his continued service

10) Meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.
### ACTION ITEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Item Description</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Post DOE Report on SONGScommunity.com</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Provide CEP with information on hospital choices for PDEP</td>
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<td>3 Follow-up on IPC off-site agency funding post-2019</td>
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<td>4 Provide a timeline that incorporates SCE, Holtec, and industry Aging Management Program efforts, including DID</td>
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<td>5 Provide summary of the seismic integrity of the Holtec system</td>
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<td>6 Provide routine updates on progress of the analytical and monitoring tools being developed by Holtec &amp; SCE</td>
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<td>7 SCE to keep an evergreen list of all questions surrounding DID and that SCE and Holtec work together on a draft of what DID looks like, in terms the public can understand, and at the end of this year, beginning of next year provide to the CEP for review</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Provide transcript of Rita Conn’s comments to Dr. Victor</td>
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