Case: Community Engagement Panel Public Meeting

Transcript of Proceedings

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Job #: 596487
SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CALIFORNIA

THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015

Reported by:
CARLOS R. HICHO
CSR No. 13111
Job No. 596487
SAN ONOFRE DECOMMISSIONING

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PANEL MEETING

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE

Transcript of proceedings, taken at
25925 Camino Del Avion, San Juan Capistrano, California 92675, commencing at
the hour of 6:13 P.M., THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015, before CARLOS R. HICHO,
CSR No. 13111.
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PANEL MEMBER APPEARANCES:

GLENN PASCALL  
SIERRA CLUB

ROSS QUAM  
NRC  
SITE SECURITY MANAGER

CARLOS OLVERA  
MAYOR DANA POINT

PAM PATTERSON  
SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO  
MAYOR PRO TEM

MARK HAIRE  
CHIEF PLANT SUPPORT BRANCH

DUANE WHITE  
NRC PROJECT MANAGER

RICHARD MCPHERSON  
AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY

TOM CAUGHLAN  
CAMP PENDLETON

JIM LEACH  
SOUTH ORANGE COUNTY ECONOMIC COALITION
THURSDAY, APRIL 16, 2015
SAN JUAN CAPISTRANO, CALIFORNIA
6:13 P.M.

* * *

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Hi, good evening. Thanks, everyone, for your patience, in particular, given the incredible difficulties on the roads this evening.

My name is David Victor and I'm the Chairman of the Community Engagement Panel and I'm really pleased to welcome everybody here to the second official meeting of the Community Engagement Panel, regular meeting of the Community Engagement Panel this year, not only on behalf of my myself but also Tim Brown, vice chairman, and Dan Stetson, secretary.

Before we get started, just a reminder, we've been to this facility several times before and I'm really delightful that the community of San Juan Capistrano can allow us to use this facility.

Should there be a need to evacuate, you can go out through the exits over there or back through the door that you came in when -- when -- when you arrived.

We have two CHP officers with us this evening. I want to thank you for your service here, for our safety. And if there's anything that we can do to help you, please don't hesitate to let me know.
I just want to remind everyone that the CEP is -- is not a decision-making body, we don't have decision-making procedures, we're not designed to make official decisions, we're not a regulatory body, we're not a financial oversight body; we were designed as a conduit between the local communities around the plant and Edison, both directions, so that Edison can understand what people in the communities are worried about and how they can address those worries and vice versa.

And so the idea is that we have focused conversations around a handful of very important topics as this plant goes through the various stages of decommissioning and we hear, in a fairly structured way, what the community cares about and we also, in the communities, learn about the decommissioning process and what to expect and a variety of other things.

While we don't make decisions, there have been some areas where we've had very important discussions and we can get a sense of the CEP and a sense of the conversations in the communities and then go off and hopefully help do things and we're going to have one topic on that tonight later about the issues surrounding consolidated interim storage and the moving of the spent nuclear fuel away from the site as soon as
practical.

I want to introduce new members of the CEP since our last meeting: Mayor pro tem Pam Patterson from San Juan Capistrano -- right here. Pam, welcome -- replacing Larry Kraemer.

Mayor Carlos Olvera from Dana Point. Mayor, welcome, replacing Lisa Bartlett, who moved to a different role. Lisa Bartlett is the superintendent from Orange County in the 5th District, replacing Pat Bates. Lisa Bartlett is unable to be here tonight, but she is represented by Victor Cowell, who is in the audience right here.

And so if you have any messages you would like to pass on to Lisa Bartlett, I'm sure that you would help us convey those and also convey the sense of the meeting tonight.

Also, I want to welcome Glenn Pascall, right here, from the Sierra Club, replacing Gene Stone. And Tom Caughlan, Camp Pendleton, down at the end there, replacing Larry Rannals. This is Tom's second meeting in this capacity.

I want to remind everybody that the website www.SONGS.community.com, it went down for a couple of days. I'm not sure who was hacking whom, but in the case it's been de-hacked and is now up.
And if you want to have a walking tour of the facility, there are dates on the website and I think there is more information on how to sign up for those walking tours there. More than 300 people have toured the facility so far, and all reports I've heard of is that these are very interesting and important tours. And so, please, go to that site and get more information.

On the same site, you will find live streaming of this meeting here as well as archival copies of prior meetings and transcripts and all meeting materials. Every document that we send around to the CEP becomes a public document, we post it on that site, and then, every once in a while, I get a lot of correspondence from folks that this is of large importance for the CEP and so I share with the CEP and then also post all that correspondence on the website as well. And if you think somebody -- something needs to be up there, let us know and we'll do our -- our very best to be transparent and efficient in all of this.

I also want to acknowledge that we have several guests here from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The topic of tonight's meeting is not spent fuel. We will spend a little bit of time on
spent fuel, but the topic of tonight's meeting is
security and the regulatory arrangements around
security.

And folks who are visiting us from the NRC are
here to help us talk about those issues and so, please,
bear with us if you ask questions and are interested in
NRC responses around other topics, such as spent fuel,
that they may not be able to address those.

Duane White -- where's Duane? There you go.
Duane, thank you very much. Mark Haire. And in the
audience, observing, we have Tom Weingart, Senior
Project Manager of SONGS for the NRC. Tom, thank you
very much. He is part of the Office of Nuclear Reactor
regulation in the Division of Operating Reactor
License.

A couple of more announcements and we'll get
on to the agenda: Members of the public, we're going
to have a public comment period. The short delay at
the beginning of today's meeting will not affect the
length of the public comment period.

If you want to make a comment, go ahead and
fill out one of these cards and indicate the topic on
which you want to make a comment and we're going to do
what we've done in the past, which is to group comments
together thematically and try and summarize those and
ask people if we got it right and have a little more
back-and-forth between the public and people who are
responding to these comments so that we don't just have
a ping-pong in three minutes, in three minutes, in
three minutes.

But if you just want to get up and speak about
something that's not listed here, then just write down
you want to speak. The people who are -- who want to
make public comments around the themes of tonight's
meeting, they'll go first, but we will make sure we'll
do our very best to make sure that everyone who wants
to make a comment will have the opportunity to do that.

The agendas have been -- are in very fine
print and so you have a copy, I think, in every chair
of the agenda, so that you can see where we're headed.
The presentations from the -- from Edison have been
posted on the SONGScommunity.com website already.

And I just want to remind panel members to
please identify yourselves when you speak so that we
have that information on the live stream. As items
come up, I'm going to call them out. Dan, and Tim, and
I will call them out so that we keep a record of the
main items that come up for action tonight and then we
can get Edison or other relevant folks to respond to
those action items and keep the information as useful
and focused as possible.

Before we continue with the rest of the agenda, I want to ask CNO of Edison, Chief Nuclear Officer of Edison, Tom Palmisano, to make a few announcements.

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you, David. I am Tom Palmisano, vice president of decommissioning and the chief nuclear officer. In addition to welcoming the new panel members -- we're pleased to have you on board -- one comment: Over the last year you've met Chris Thompson and Chris carried the title of vice president of decommissioning while I carried the title of Chief Nuclear Officer.

Chris has completed his assignment to the decommissioning project; moved on to other projects within Edison, so I'm combining both roles as vice President of Decommissioning and Chief Nuclear Officer.

Chris's focus was largely in some of the corporate activities in support of the site and those activities are important and continue to be important, but we're combining both of those responsibilities under my position.

So Chris could not be here tonight due to another commitment. He wanted to convey his appreciation to all the panel members and all the
members of the public who have contributed to help make the first year of the Community Engagement Panel successful and looks forward to our continued success.

In a dialogue, understanding we may not always agree on things, but we need a more open and transparent dialogue. So, Chris -- we thank Chris for his service and wish him well, and he wishes us well in our future endeavors as a Community Engagement Panel.

So, thank you, David.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much, Tom. And one of the many things that Chris helped us do is understand the landscape in Washington, the federal legislative landscape in particular, and that really relates to the first item that's on our agenda tonight, which concerns long-term spent fuel storage and, not just storage, moving the fuel off site.

As everyone knows, this is a very, very important issue, this is a highly emotive issue, and this is an issue where our options are not as ideal as we would want them. In the ideal world, we would see a clean line of sight for the fuel to come out of the pools and then put into casks, a process that is now underway and to be completed by around 2019, and then moved promptly off site to a permanent repository, Yucca Mountain.
That option is not dead, but that option --
the odds of that option working, the Yucca Mountain
option, those odds have diminished for a variety of
political reasons, environmental reasons, and a variety
of other things and so on.

And that might change, it might not change,
but it seemed incumbent upon us to start thinking about
other ways to move the fuel out of our communities into
some other place where it could be stored more securely
and certainly not along the side of the highway here to
allow the complete elimination of the plant,
decommissioning of the plant, and removal of the fuel,
and I think everyone is rowing in the same direction on
that. There are a lot of different ideas about
different strategies for doing that. We've spent a lot
of time over the last 14-15 months talking about these
issues.

One of the things that's emerged in those
closeversations is that the idea of consolidated interim
storage and, I guess, as Bill Clinton would say, it
depends on what you mean by "interim" and on "storage."

But the idea that you would consolidate
storage spent fuel from a variety of sites, especially
decommissioned sites like the one here, where there is
no reason for the fuel to be there for the long haul
because the site itself is non-operational producing electricity, the idea of consolidating that fuel in a small, in a few interim storage facilities where it can be put under lock and guard, where it can be stored efficiently, including economically efficiently away from populations, and then eventually moved to permanent repository, that makes a whole lot of sense.

And with the difficulties in Yucca Mountain, the private sector itself has come in and it's now looking at a variety of possible solutions and strategies in this area.

At our last meeting in January, it became clear, at least to me and I think to many other members of the CEP and the broad public that we might -- one of the things we might do in the communities around the plant is help push along practical consolidated interim storage and that can be done through some kind of California strategy by which I don't necessarily mean the facility would be in California.

Some people want it to be in California, some people want it to be on military basis in California, some people don't want it in California at all, they want it in some other state. It seems like there's a lot of places where you can put it.

But if we start getting serious about
consolidated interim storage, there are a lot of really important practical things that need to be worked on in terms of the strategy before this can be a reality. We can imagine lots of cool things that can be done, but there are a lot of really important things that need to be worked on in some detail.

There is some important regulatory questions, there's some questions; about whether new law would be needed, there's some questions about how you would fund all of this because the trust fund for spent fuel is tied up, focused on Yucca.

And it's not entirely clear how much -- which of those funds could be used for other purposes, a variety of other things, including some very important technical questions about how you would move the fuel, which fuel would be moved first, how would we sequence it; those are lots of issues that people at our last meeting, who are experts in this business, spent time talking about and which -- and those conversations have continued in the month or two since that last meeting.

To make a long story short, I put together, with Dan's help and Tim's help and a lot of input from a variety of experts in the industry, including the folks at BPC, who sponsored the last meeting we had here, put together a concept memo that outlined what
might be done in terms of developing a California strategy and, in particular, what we might do to ask the California Energy Commission and the governor's office for help developing this kind of strategy.

And so I wanted to pause now and see if there are members of the CEP who wanted to comment on that 4-or 5-page memo, there's a brief summary of it right in the beginning of the memo, and if they had any particular views about this. I think the three of us believe that this memo reflects the sense of the conversations that we've had so far in the CEP, but we want to make sure that that's true and, if that's true, then we need to go off and do some spadework and help get this started and a cause to come back to the communities here and maybe there are resolutions in local town councils and other forums that would be supportive for that and I look forward to having those conversations.

So let me pause here and ask the members of the CEP if anybody would like to comment on that memo.

Glenn Pascall?

MR. PASCALL: First of all, I -- loved its energized spirit. We've gotten into a mindset in this country where we view this situation as a total hiatus and deadlock. Well, most other advanced nations that
have made any commitment in nuclear have moved much
farther ahead in solving the storage problem, so I
commend you for the re-igniting of energies to address
this issue.

Secondly, it is actually the only aspect of
all of the issues we're wrestling with where the Sierra
Club has had a position for 30 years, which is to move
waste from closed plants sites that are often in
sensitive locations, that's been a consistent position
for over 30 years; and very happy to see it directly
addressed.

Thirdly, I think it's an issue where within
this body and within the group of attendees at the
meetings there is wider agreement than there is on some
of the technical issues where people have, in very
passionate and committed ways, presented a wide range
of options that have not been resolved on one approach.
There is a wider area of agreement here.

And somewhat out of order, I want to mention
that, by serendipity, and you may already know this,
Mr. Chairman, Ray Lutz informed me that the California
Energy Commission is meeting on April 27th on what
appears to be this issue and, if true, you know,
important, if true, and it would indicate that our
timing may be good to tie in with the process.
CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Yes. And I just want to -- well, thank you very much, Glenn. And let me just say I'm not igniting passions here, hopefully I'm channeling passions that were already on fire. So I'm not sure who is responsible for the original spark, but passion, nonetheless, is being channeled.

MR. PASCALL: Actually, energy, I think, is the term I used.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And, I believe, Tom Palmisano as well was involved in that meeting. I've been asked to speak at that meeting and I've said, yes, I'm happy to speak about what's happening here, and I've very studiously not told them what I'm going to speak about because I wanted to wait and see what the sense of the CEP was about this kind of initiative, which I think reflects what we were thinking about doing.

Tom, do you want to comment on this?

MR. PALMISANO: Yes, let me make a comment. On one of my slides later in the presentation I have this meeting listed because we've been asked to make the public more aware of meetings where decommissioning topics are going to arise.

This is the California Energy Commission workshop in Sacramento on April 27 in the afternoon.

We have invited to speak Jim Madigan, from our staff,
will speak. And this is part of the California Energy Commission's process, that every couple of years update an energy report for California.

The workshop topic on that Monday is Nuclear and there's going to be topics related to Diablo Canyon, to San Onofre decommissioning. The NRC will be out to speak, Mr. Larry Camper, who spoke to us several times.

And part of the panel will be on spent fuel storage, where we will speak. I believe, David Victor is on the agenda, David Lockbaum, from the Union of Concerned Scientists, and there may be another rep.

And the agenda is publicly available, so I'll ask our folks to put it on the SONGS Community website, but it's also on the California Energy Commission website.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you ver much. And now Gary Brown and then Richard McPherson. Gary?

MR. BROWN: Yes. I was -- I too was delighted to see the memo and, I think, at our very first meeting we talked about a need to go forward and need to wake up some other agencies, in particular the state, and get them talking with the Federal Government.

I think -- I think there could be a California solution and, certainly, that's better than having five
separate storage locations just in California. I've -- it's going to be interesting -- because of the design of the CEP, it's going to be interesting to see how we promote something from the CEP when we really don't have the authority to order lunch, so I -- I think that's going to be a nice fence to walk.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Well, I just assumed you're ordering lunch for us.

MR. STETSON: You can order it, you'll just have to pay for us.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And let me just say one more word about, specifically, what I think is on the table, which is, we can't do all the corralling that's necessary because we're not a decision-making body and also we don't have the -- we're not an arm of the government.

The logical place to do this is the California Energy Commission, which in the past has done some things related to fuel storage and the Energy Commission we could ask, with the Governor's support, them to develop basically the elements of the strategy, not to make decisions about a strategy, where they would look and we would, in the memo, as you know, have outlined what we think some of the key questions would be and some of those questions have come from a lot of
technical input we've had from various experts in this area.

We also would want them to take a look at the question of whether it's -- it would be useful to look at California locations for this or whether we think to private-market on its own. There's several projects that are emerging just almost spontaneously from private industry, with a private market on its own.

We've produced site, there's one interesting site developing very rapidly in West Texas. I think -- I think those are up in questions here (indicating).

Richard McPherson, do you want to comment on this?

MR. MCPHERSON: Your memo -- the memo is great. And all of you guys have worked on it. I really appreciate it. I started following nuclear in California very closely with the Sundesert nuclear power plants just after the California Energy Commission was stood up.

And I've been to an awful lot of meetings and awful lot of documents and this is the first document that I've seen since before that meeting that is positive for everybody concerned to try to move forward.

As we do, I'd like you to think a couple of
things: One is, while San Onofre is being
decommissioned, we have some other sites with
decommissioned plants in California already where fuel
is stored. We also have, ultimately, Diablo Canyon
would be dealt with some day.

But while we're looking in California, you
might want to consider what's west of the Rockies.
There are not that many nuclear power plants west of
the Rockies, the only states involved west of the
Rockies as far as nuclear power, commercial nuclear
power, there's Oregon, Washington, and California,
Arizona -- nobody else has any.

So I think that we have an opportunity here to
start the initiative here in California, but to
enjoining those other, at least inform them of the
process, that we're doing here.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: That is exactly right. Well
said. We're going to need -- are there comments people
want to make about this? (Brief pause).

So, I guess, I'm going to -- with your
license, Dan, Tim, and I are going to start doing some
poking around at the Energy Commission about how this
would be done, the governor's office.

Why don't we commit to report back to at our
next meeting as to where that seems to stand? And also
if members of the CEP and members of the community have
advise on things that local communities can do,
including an alliance with communities around other
plants. You mentioned Diablo, in particular. I would
think those are all going to be natural allies, and so
we should work on that.

And let's get this started. We said, you
know, a year or so ago we wanted to focus not just on
what's done at this plant, but also how we could help
kind of reinvigorate a Federal strategy here and I
think this will be a big part of that. So, excellent.

Well, thank you very much.

And so why don't we move now to the next topic
in the meeting, which is the main topic of today's
meeting, and that is security at San Onofre both the
regulations and the plan. There are several elements
to this segment of the meeting and so I'm going to ask
Tom Palmisano to give us an introduction and then guide
us through that -- this segment. Tom?

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. Thank you, David.

Manuel, can you advance the slides, please?

Okay. Tonight's main topic is -- is Plant
Security and then later I'll have the typical
Decommissioning update. We'll talk a bit about spent
fuel storage at San Onofre, but we wanted to start off
with the main topic tonight.

The security topic was identified last year by CET -- CEP as a list of topics. Overtime, we would like to visit with the CEP and public, so this is our first time really talking in any depths about plant security.

We are pleased that the NRC has joined us tonight. They're going to give an overview from their perspective of security regulations and requirements and how they inspect. I'm going to introduce Ross Quam. Ross? Ross is the site security manager.

And over the next year, we're going to have more of the plant people talking to the CEP on specific topics. So, Ross is up first tonight. And so Ross will do the bulk of the presentation on San Onofre security. I'll handle some questions as well after the NRC speaks.

Now, security is a challenging topic to talk about because a number of specific details about security, either what the threats are, what the specific capabilities of the site are mandated by NRC, inspected by the NRC, provided by us, but they're considered safeguard information and are security sensitive that are prohibited from public disclosure, and as you can imagine, for a very valid reason.
So this information is closely inspected by the NRC. We're going to talk in appropriate terms to give you, I think, a pretty good feel of plant security. Ross and I will be answering -- he will answer some questions to a certain depth, but at some point here I may say that's safeguard to security sensitive information. We can't give you any more specifics.

So -- and I know that may be frustrating, but you need to appreciate the rules that we follow for something like that. So with that, I think this will be a good discussion and we're looking forward to panel questions and then, later on, public questions.

So with that, let me turn it over to Ross.

So, Ross, go ahead.

MR. QUAM: All right. Good evening, members of the panel, members of the public. As Tom said, I have the unique and fun-filled opportunity to talk to you all about things that I can't talk to you about. So, as we go through, I'll be keeping the -- our NRC guests on their toes because they're going to see some words that might make them think I'm going to go down the wrong path.

MR. PALMISANO: And, Ross, probably -- I should probably turn it over to the NRC first. Would you like
to cover your aspect first here?

MR. WHITE: If we can.

MR. PALMISANO: Yes, Ross, why don't -- this is showing the field goal-kicker, Ross.

MR. QUAM: Got it.

MR. PALMISANO: So, okay.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: You said too much.

MR. WHITE: My name is Duane White. As they mentioned, I've been serving as the project manager for security or NRC project manager for security for San Onofre, and so I wanted to briefly just kind of go over NRC structure. Basically, I'm at NRC's headquarters in Rockville, Maryland, in Washington, DC, area.

And you probably know, but NRC, we are the ones that basically develop the regulations with safety and security, with radioactive materials. We also develop guidance for our licensees so that they have an understanding of what is required to meet those requirements, and we also review and approve licenses and we approve, in this category, the security plans that the licensees have to prepare.

We also have four regional offices that basically cover the oversight of the licensees, basically, through performing inspections. The primary
regulation that we require licensees to follow for security is under what we call Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73, so 10CFR Part 73, which is basically physical protection of plants and materials.

The primary purpose of this regulation is to prescribe requirements, I would say, for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection program for protecting special nuclear material, and so I just wanted to emphasize that the requirements are for special nuclear material which, in this case, it would be the fuel, the spent fuel, that you've been talking about.

And so the requirements that the plant had before, they decommissioned. So when they were operating, they had to follow the same requirements as a decommissioned plant. So we still make sure that they do that through -- through our inspection program.

I will note that, you know, I think there are questions as far as the decommissioning. There are changes possibly in the protective strategy of how they do it but that's because, you know, now that they no longer had the reactive vessels and some of the safety equipment, of course, the size of the plant, the operations of the plant that's necessary have reduced,
and because of that reduction, they had to change how they structured their security.

But the security that they do have is at the same level and ensures high assurance that -- that the material will be protected.

One thing I mentioned earlier, that we at headquarters, we review the security plans. All licensees, including SONGS, have four security plans that they have to maintain:

There's a physical security plan, which basically goes over the physical measures that the plant has to maintain; there is a training and qualification plan, which basically goes over what all the requirements are for all the security personnel, and there's the safeguards contingency plan, which basically the plant has to go through several different scenarios and make sure that they cover a lot of the various levels of scenarios and how they're going to do that, and so they have to provide that to us;

And then we also have a cyber security plan, which -- which goes over the, you know, the digital assess as far as making sure that they are not vulnerable to cyber attacks.

Our regulations are very prescriptive. They do specifically tell the things that must be required
in these plans and we check those, and we also make sure that we check when they make a change, such as the changes they made for the decommissioning, that they still maintain their same level of -- level of protection that they have.

Oh, and also just to kind of note, there is also plans for the independent spent fuel storage installation also, so they do have to also maintain certain requirements for the -- for the spent fuel that's being stored.

So with that, I'm going to turn it over to Mark Haire, who works with our regional office in Region 4.

MR. HAIRE: Okay. Thanks, Duane.

I just wanted to give a quick perspective. My name is Mark Haire. As Duane said, I work for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I work out of one of our four regional offices that Duane mentioned where the inspection effort occurs.

I work in the Region 4 Office, which is in Arlington, Texas, which is Dallas/Forthworth area, a great place to live. And we cover, basically, everything west of the Mississippi, so that includes the California plants as well.

So I thought it would be interesting to just
share with you quickly what kinds of things that we inspect and how -- how much inspection effort actually goes on at a power plant and who is doing those inspections, so I just wanted to quickly give you that perspective.

First of all, what -- what gets inspected:

There are really 12 inspectable areas in the security realm that our inspectors look at and I'll just give you a quick summary of what those 12 areas are; they're all related, obviously, with ensuring that the utility complies with the requirement to provide high assurance that they can defend against the design-basis threat and protect the public health and safety. And so we -- we independently inspect their efforts to comply with those requirements.

So, areas that we look at:

We look at how they authorize who can have access to the site, access authorization. We also look at their access control, how do they physically control who can get into the site and how they gain access to the site. So there is only certain ways you can access the site: You have to have credentials, there are biometric scans to ensure you are who your credential say you are; there is -- there is a significant amount of control over who and how they get into the site. So
those are two areas that we inspect.

Then we have a significant inspection program ran out of our headquarter's office called the "Force-on-Force Inspection Program." It's a huge inspection effort and it is kind of just what it sounds like. It's -- we bring a mock adversary force and we challenge their security officers to implement their strategy and prove that they can protect the plant against the design-basis threat.

And I use that phrase, design-basis threat, maybe -- maybe that phrase is not familiar to you. Any time you are -- you know, in security philosophy, any time you want to secure something and protect it, you need to define -- to some degree, define what it is you're protecting against.

Are we protecting it against the Iraqi army from attacking the California Coast? We're not -- we're not asking utilities to protect the power plants against a national army, but we are asking them to protect against what we consider a reasonable threat based on our intelligence's assessment of what kind of threats there are in the world that are doing terrorist activities that could be a threat at a power plant.

So we're informed by the things that are going on around the world, terrorist attacks, probing
attacks, things that have been forwarded, things that
have been successful around the world, so we define
that threat.

And as Ross mentioned, we can't talk about
what those definitions are very well in public, that's
secured information. But we do define the threat, we
do test their ability in performance space to defend
against that threat during a force-on-force exercise.
We do those every three years.

They're required to do force-on-force
exercises at the site every year and we inspect those
as well. We look at their equipment, their equipment
maintenance and testing, and that's everything from
their intrusion detection system, their cameras, all
the way down to the radios that the security officers
use and, of course, the weapons.

All those things need to be deliberately
maintained and periodically tested to ensure that they
function and we inspect to make sure that those things
are carried out properly, so that's equipment.

We look at their protective strategy, which is
another way of saying how they design their protection,
do they understand their fields of fire, what things
they're trying to protect, where they're placing their
officers so that they can interdict an adversary
attacking from any direction or multiple directions.

So have they designed their strategy effectively and have they accounted for as many variables as they can, for instance, the time line it takes for an officer to run down a flight of stairs and get in position when the attack is coming from a direction that he wasn't previously positioned for, so all of those things are factored into their protective strategy and we evaluate and test that as well.

We look at their safeguards controls program and that's kind of what Ross was alluding to. We look at how they control the security-related information that they're not allowed to divulge to the public. They've got to have significant control on that information, how it's stored, how it's handled, who can look at it. And so we'll be watching you, Ross, as you present to make sure that you stay within those bounds. And I'll check that off for my inspection.

We also look at their training. There is a significant amount of training required for security officers, so we inspect what they do on their tactical course, on their course of fire for their weapons handling, for their use of force training -- all the different things that the security officers are required to be able to do they have to be trained on
effectively and we look at that in an inspection effort.

We look at their Fitness for Duty -- Fitness for Duty Program and that phrase may mean different things for different people. If they have a military background, it may mean one thing to you.

What we mean by "fitness for duty" is that every person who shows up at the site needs to be not impaired in any way, by chemicals or by fatigue or by emotions, so they have to have a program where they systematically evaluate and test their employees fitness both before they hire them and then randomly throughout their career, as they work. So that's a significant program that we do fairly substantive inspection on.

There is another inspection called the Material Control and Accounting System, which it may not sound like much of a security program, it is -- it is simply how they track and maintain control of and custody of all of the special nuclear material that they're required to protect, so they have to account for every gram of radioactive material, specially nuclear material, that they have custody of.

And so they have to have records, they have to have transfer records, they have to know where it's
stored, and we inspect that as well.

So that is 9 of the 12 areas I was going to mention. So, quickly three more: We look at their target sets. They have to maintain a list of target sets and that is the elements that they know are most attractive to an adversary that would do the most damage to the site, create the most threat to the public.

Those are -- are identified and their strategy is built around protecting those, so we have to inspect to make sure that they properly identify those and that as changes occur throughout the life of the plant, that they continue to update that list so that we know we're protecting -- they're protecting the right thing.

We have a Cyber Security Inspection Program, so it's kind of those things that's evolving, all the corporations in the United States have to deal with this. It's a significant issue that we need to deal with and inspect here in the nuclear area.

They've got to be able to protect their digital assets and they've got to protect them against potential attack vectors from the digital world, so air gaps and isolation and things like that, we inspect that area.

And then the last thing that I'll mention that
we inspect is their performance indicators and that's a regulatory term. We require every licensee to report certain statistical data to us on a periodic basis, and when we come out to inspect, we always try to verify, not try to, we do verify that they have properly reported that information to us by checking the data when we're on site.

So those are the 12 areas that we inspect, that's what we inspect in the security realm and, of course, we have other safety and other areas of inspection, but that's the security area, that's what I focus on in my position.

I don't think I've described what my position is. I work in the regional office. I'm a branch chief, I'm a manager, and the folks who work for me are security inspectors, that's why I'm up here on the panel for this security topic. So I have eight guys that work for me that do security inspections.

How much inspection effort do we provide? I don't know if this would mean much to you, but we -- I did the average and we, as a requirement for our baseline inspection program, we spend about 313.5 hours of direct inspection at a power plant every year and we do that with inspections that are required annually, some of our inspections are required every two years,
some of our inspections are required every three years.  But that's direct inspection hours on site, 313.5.  

And then we would have additional inspections when we identify issues that need to be followed up or events that need to be followed up on. And, as Duane said, we've not relaxed any of those requirements for the decommissioning sites, so we continue to spend significant inspection hours to verify those programs for the decommissioning site, so that's how much inspection we spend at a power plant.

And then a quick statement about who is doing the inspection: I said I have eight inspectors that work for me. Each of those guys have significant background and significant training before they come to the agency and then we provide them about a year and a half to two years of training on the job in order to prepare them to do these inspections.

What kind of background do they bring? All of my guys bring either a law enforcement background or a military security kind of background, and I'll tell you that I have three ex-Marines that work for me. Although, some people say you're never an ex-Marine, you're always a Marine. Right?

But I have three guys that had Marine service, Marine Corps. service that work for me, I have two guys
that were ex-Air Force security specialist, I have one ex-Army security specialist that's working for me, I have one guy that -- that did not bring a specific security background to my group, but he brought an engineering background to my group and then cross trained and he brings a different perspective as he looks at the equipment, the safety security interface aspect of that. He's very valuable to my team.

And then the most recent member of my team that I just added is a Navy SEAL, and so we have a very, very diverse but experienced group of guys that understand how to protect assets and how to find vulnerabilities in the protection system for assets and that's what we try to do, make an independent assessment, that the licensees are actually following our requirements.

So that was probably a longer-winded answer that I intended, but I think I'm done. And, Ross, I've got my eyes on you.

MR. QUAM: Okay.

MR. HAIRE: Go ahead.

MR. QUAM. Thank you. You pretty much covered my entire presentation. So I'll go into -- there'll be some repeating of what Mark has covered and then we'll go into some site specific details on what we do
specifically at San Onofre.

Next slide. Let's see. So, overview of what I'll cover: I'll cover our mission at SONGS and what our objectives are, I'll cover adversary characteristic, though not all of them, we'll go over our security plans, our licensing documents, and our security procedures, we'll cover the inside of mitigation program and the local law enforcement agency support.

Next slide. As our mission, it's to protect the health and safety of the public against the threat of radiological sabotage. How we do that -- we have well-trained, highly-qualified, armed security force. Just like marked talked about, most of our officers, if not all -- actually, all of them, have a military or law enforcement background; probably, 90 percent former Marine, then the rest are made up with Army, Air Force, local law enforcement, et cetera.

We have a state-of-the-art intrusion detection system and cameras so we can detect and assess any attempted entry into the early warning zone or protected areas and then meet that attempted breach with the appropriate use of force.

We use that -- we implement our use of force from hardened defensive positions. Most of those
positions, actually, all of them on the perimeter, are elevated positions that provide officers with both bullet resistance and glass protection.

Next slide. The objective and requirements, these are outlined by 10CFR 7355. Physical protection program has to be designed to address the design-basis threat of radiological sabotage. We have to maintain the capability to detect, assess, and interdict and neutralize threats, and the program has to demonstrate effective implementation of the protective strategies, so that's our drill and exercise program, which includes the force-on-force exercises and integrated exercises. We have our emergency preparedness group and outside law enforcement agencies.

Next slide. So, Radiological Sabotage and Theft: Theft isn't something we deal with at this level because just getting into the plant is going to be hard enough let alone trying to make it out while you're carrying something.

So, really, we're dealing with sabotage, deliberate acts that could endanger the public with exposure to radiation. Usually, that's going to be going into the plant and blowing things up. The threat is a determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, including diversion.
reaction by an adversary force.

It could be a single group attacking through one entry point, it could be multiple groups attacking through multiple entry points.

Next slide. This group of attackers is well trained, dedicated individuals with sufficient knowledge to identify specific equipment or locations necessary for a successful attack. They also might be using active or a passive insider, somebody that works at the plant, has access to the plant.

They have suitable weapons to accomplish admission, again, weapons, explosive. They also hand-carried equipment: Ladders, ropes, other tools, breaching equipment. They also may have a land- or water-borne vehicle assault. That would be a blast attack scenario. They also might do a cyber attack.

Next slide. Our security plans. These are our licensing documents. Kind of what Mark talked about, we have a physical security plan, safeguards contingency plan, training and qualification plan, and cyber security plan.

We have all those plans that have roles and responsibilities, chain of command, compensatory requirements, that's what we've know -- known as Plan B, right, if something fails, what do we do to
compensate for that until we can get the failed equipment to work, whatever it is, repaired?

We have a Training and Qualification Plan, that also includes our annual drills and exercises. So officers need to perform, they need to go to the range, they have to qualify with each weapon that they use; they need to do physical fitness testing, demonstrate their ability to perform actions in accordance with our protective strategy.

Then we have a pre-determined response plan of strategies for 21 different events that could happen and then on top of that there's other events that aren't covered and we have a plan for those events as well that I can't talk about.

All right. Next slide. Our procedures go into more detail on specifically how the site implements those plans, such as equipment and maintenance and testing program, training and qualification plan, how often we go to the range, how often we do drills and exercises, what officers need to do to demonstrate their critical task performance on an annual basis and sometimes more often, cover search requirement, post responsibility and our tactical response procedures.

So each officer in the physical security
plant -- in the security plan knows what their post responsibilities are if there was an attack.

And, generally speaking, I'm not going to say our timelines, Mark or Duane, but generally speaking, this is a matter of seconds that the officers are ready to respond. So if there's an alarm on the fence, the perimeter early warning zone, it's a matter of seconds that they have their weapon in hand, ready to engage in adversary threat.

Next slide. Protection of Plans. Again, all plans are protected under the safeguard information under 10CFR 73.21, and that's the physical security plan, training and qualification plan, safeguard contingency plan, cyber security plan, and some of our implementing procedures are also safeguards information.

Next slide. So, Defense in Depth. Duane talked a little bit or Mark talked a little bit about what we do as a -- you know, we're not protecting against an Iraqi army, but what we do have is, it starts with the owner controlled area. This is our defense in depth.

The owner controlled area is controlled with gates, armed security officers, fences, et cetera. But we know that could have holes in it, so we keep going
to the next level.

   Early Warning System. This early warning system doesn't have holes in it. If you try to penetrate the early warning system, we will know about it and there will be an armed response. Between the early warning system and the protected area, there's a significant amount of delay features, things like razor-wired fencing, et cetera.

   After that, you get to the protected area, again, intrusion detection, video capture, assessment capabilities, and armed response and, also, additional delay at the protected area. Then we have Vital Area of Protection. So, inside the protected area, we have vital areas protected by steel doors, concrete walls, structures, et cetera, other delay features, again, and armed response. And inside the vital areas we have the targets and components or the target sets.

   Next slide. So this is the owner-controlled area. It goes all the way around the entire plant here and this area is patrolled 24/7, either on foot, vehicles, video capabilities, and then inside further you get into early warning, protected area fence, vital area, et cetera.

   Next slide, so this is the OCA access. You can see the gates. We have armed security out there.
We have various barriers in the OCA, vehicle barrier system, active and passive vehicle barrier system, closed-circuit TV monitoring and roving patrols.

Next slide. Hardened Defensive Positions.
Again, elevated fighting positions for the security officers, it gives them a tactical advantage, also, bullet resistance and blast resistance.

Next slide. Again, Vehicle Barrier System.
This one in particular is specifically for the independent spent fuel storage installation, ISFSI. So on the other side of this is where we store our spent fuel. That vehicle barrier system, again, goes all the way around the entire area to prevent any vehicles from getting within the minimum safe stand-out distance for the target.

Next slide. U.S. 2-3 Protected Area. This is where currently our reactors are and spent fuel.
Again, to get to this area, you're talking about going through the OCA, getting through the Early Warning System, protect -- going through the Delayed Protected Area, more delay, to get inside this area.

And, again, the entire perimeter is covered with hardened defensive positions, elevated positions, that can maintain overlapping, interlocking fields of fire on every piece of that perimeter.
Next slide. Delay Fences. These are inside the protected area, so if somebody was to magically get past the protected area fence, they're going to run into more delay features and on the inside more security officer, fallback locations, et cetera, that would meet the adversaries before they could get to a target set location.

Next slide. Vital Area Protection. Concrete floors, walls, ceilings, steel locked doors that are also alarmed, they require key -- key card access, additional delay barriers, and anti-grenade or explosive screens. So in this picture here, if you're looking from the point of view, from the security officer, from a protected position, and these red doors came from the outside, if you come through those doors, you're going to be facing armed security response.

If you decide to open the door and throw a grenade, guess what's going to happen, it's going to hit these delay -- these grenade screens, it's not going to impact the officer; if you come through the door, you're going to be met with appropriate use of force.

We also have defensive channeling and man-traps. This is where we drive adversaries to certain location to trap them so we can respond to that
location and meet them with the appropriate use of force.

Next slide. Security Monitoring Systems, there are at least two security monitoring systems at the plant, those monitor the Early Warning Zones protected areas, vital area alarms, they have the capability to detect and assess remotely any alarms on protected areas, vital areas, or early warning.

They have video playback so they can see what happened. If we get an alarm on a fence somewhere, they can play that back and see what caused that alarm. So if somebody came up to the fence and put an explosive to breach it or started cutting it, they would see that happening, they would know is a -- that's an attack on the plant and we would implement the response plan.

We have multiple methods of communicating from the central alarm station and secondary alarm stations, those include communicating with the on-site security force and communicating with outside agencies.

(Locked conference door forcefully shakes.)

MR. QUAM: We're attempting to be breached at this moment. (Member of public enters conference room.)

All right. Next slide. So we talked about the inside, the adversaries may be aided by active or
passive insider. So we have Insider Mitigation Program and we are aware that this is a mitigation program, it's not an insider prevention program, so there are other measures we take in the event that we have an insider.

So we have Access Authorization Program: We check the backgrounds and the qualifications of personnel that request access to the plant. Fitness for Duty Program that includes the continuous behavior observation program with supervisors that are trained to identify any signs of changes in behavior and they have to report out on that and approve that person each day -- each 30-day period to maintain their access to the plant.

They also have to be free from drugs and alcohol. There's random testing, there's post-event testing, four concepts testing, and, of course, pre-hire screening. And also it has to contain the elements of the physical protection program, meaning that we patrol all areas of the plant, vital areas, protected areas, owner-controlled areas, and look for any unauthorized activity, anything that looks suspicious, and the officers are trained and qualified to look for those types of activities that may be an indication that we have an insider activity going on.
And, of course, all the personnel that enter the plant receive a complete search regardless even if it's an armed security officer showing up for shift; they need to be searched for all contraband, weapons, explosives, et cetera, prior to entering the plant.

Next slide. We have integrated law Enforcement Agency Support. So our primary law enforcement agency is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, primarily because we are located on Camp Pendleton and that is federal property.

The FBI maintains a SONGS integrated law enforcement response plan, which outlines response actions for all agencies listed: Coast Guard, FAA, Border Patrol, State Park, Highway Patrol, Orange County Sheriff, San Diego County Sheriff, and USMC Provost Marshal's office.

Next slide. With all these agencies listed here, FBI, Highway Patrol, Marine Corps., State Parks, and Border Patrol, we have multiple methods of communicating with them. They have our radios. We do contacts with them on a "shiftly" basis in some cases, in some cases on a monthly basis to make sure our communication systems are operable.

All right. Next slide. Is there questions, comments?
CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much to all the presenters. Let me see -- I've got some questions, but I want to see if other members of the CEP want to begin. Tim Brown?

MR. BROWN: Do you want to do your thing where you turn the card upside down?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Efficient.

MR. BROWN: Yes, it's very efficient.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Particularly, overrated, but you know --

MR. BROWN: It can be. My question is more pertaining to the insider mitigation slide that you had. This is particular relevant to me because we saw recently that a Lufthansa pilot, who was a very determined, very intelligent, very disturbed individual, was able to use the only security protocol that had been put in place to actually sabotage and override the systems and crash into the Italian Alps, I believe, and did a tremendous amount of damage. I'm glad that you covered this because that was one of the questions I had.

The second question I had was systems defense, for example, if they take an action to, say, drain the pool, to program it so that it would do that, similar to what the pilot did, where he was able to guide the
plane into the mountain and override the safety system.

Do you oversee that as well, all of the system defenses or mechanisms, that will prevent an individual from having that power and authority? And is that in place current? And I just wanted you to chat a little bit about what systems are in place inside the plant that would prevent someone who had the know-how, who passed all the screening from doing damage?

MR. QUAM: So I'll give Tom the first shot and then I'll cover.

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. So, in general terms, as Ross said, our people, who have access to the plant, particularly inside the protected areas and vital areas, that's where the sensitive equipment is. Okay?

So not every employee who works at the site has access to the protected area or fewer even have access to vital areas. So, first of all, you have a need to be there.

Secondly, every body pre-hired and post-hired subject to drug, alcohol screening and we, through this Behavioral Observation Program, we look for signs of behavior that would tell us that somebody is under duress, whether it's an emotional issue in their personal life or work issue, to see if we're seeing early signs of somebody's behavior that would concern
us. Okay?

And, you know, the reactors are out of service so, quite frankly, a lot of equipment that we used to worry about are not in play anymore, it's largely the spent fuel pool. You know, we have multiple people on duty in the plant in the control room elsewhere, you know, with the people highly screened and trustworthy and observed for trustworthiness. We mitigate a lot of the risk that way.

We have other people who are watching for how systems are operating and responding to see if something doesn't appear normal that other people could then step in. As well as, Ross alluded to, cyber security, which are serious requirements for a lot of the industry in this country, in particular electric utilities and nuclear plants.

Again, most of our systems are pretty isolated from the outside world in decommissioning fewer systems are susceptible. So that high level answer, Ross, what would you add?

MR. QUAM: What I would add is that there are methods that people who work at the plant and security understand for, say, draining the spent fuel pool. There are monitoring systems in place to know if the fuel level starts to decrease; security would be
notified and we have response actions and emergency plans for that -- for that action.

If we were to lose that capability, to remotely monitor spent fuel level temperature, et cetera, things that I can't go into a lot of detail about, if for some reason we lost that ability, we have additional security patrol who are put in place to ensure that people don't go to the systems or manipulate components that could drain the pool.

MR. PALMISANO: So these are the types of things that are thought out ahead of time and predefined plans if something does not appear to be responding or acting normally between operations and security actions would be taken.

MR. QUAM: Correct.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And at this moment, the spent fuel pool is presumably the central focus.

MR. PALMISANO: Yes, as, I think, Mark and Duane alluded, as you go to decommissioning, our security requirements have not changed, our security plans to protect the required systems to the same level, we've asked for no exemptions for security, but there are fewer target sets, if you will, that have to be defended because the reactors and a lot of the associated equipment is no longer in service.
MR. QUAM: And then one other thing, personnel that has unique knowledge of, say, security plans and plant operations also have another level of requirement; they need to be in the critical group and they get more frequent background investigation, the psychological evaluation than the standard employee.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Great. Thank you. And Mark and Duane, do you agree? It looks like you guys agree with that. So, Pam Patterson is next.

MS. PATTERSON: So my question is along those lines. I was wondering what is sort of your "World Trade Center" plan when somebody is driving in a 747 to hit San Onofre. What's your -- what's your solution to that?

MR. QUAM: So, do you want to cover that one or I can cover it?

MR. PALMISANO: Well, you start Ross and then I'll throw in a broader picture with mitigating strategies and other actions.

MR. QUAM: Okay. So if -- if we did have a situation where we had a plane headed in and we knew about it, the FBI knew about it, there are capabilities to get air support from the Marine Corp. base, the FBI will do that through the DOD.

If there is some threat that there may be an
attack, the FBI then will go through Homeland Security, et cetera, to look at the potential for patrolling the air space, because it is Camp Pendleton air space.

And then ultimately if a plane did arrive at the site and did crash into the building, most likely, it wouldn't cause spent fuel sabotage, it wouldn't result on that. And then we have mitigating strategies in place to deal with the large area lost to fire or explosion.

MR. PALMISANO: Yeah. So let me pick up from there. We also ought to mention the FAA has some requirements to notify, starting with Homeland Security, the FBI, and the NRC, if there is an aircraft that appears to be a threat to a nuclear plant and we are notified and we have some actions if we're notified there's an airplane, potentially incoming, 60 minutes out, 30 minutes out, there are some things we do at the plant to disperse people and other things, and I can't go in any more detail, to prepare for the worse outcome.

Post -- this is really post-9/11, a lot -- a lot of analysis was done by the NRC and a lot of changes made in the industry to look at the vulnerability of nuclear plants to aircraft impact, in particularly large fires, due to aircraft impact, to
look at how hardened is equipment.

The good news is, containment buildings, spent fuel pool buildings, particularly in San Onofre, because ours is very robust because the seismic requirements, are pretty hardened against that. But we all put in place what are called today "mitigating strategies," which is part of our -- our license that we maintain with the ability to have diverse equipment away from an area that would be impacted that we could bring in and mobilize, in our case, to provide water and cool the spent fuel pool.

So there is a layer of defense, starting with early warning, how we would disperse people to survive an attack and how we have equipment staged away from the specific equipment that could be impacted that would be brought in to mitigate the damage and prevent a radiological release. So there's a whole layer of activities that have been thought through since 9/11.

MS. PATTERSON: Okay. But you understand that this is an ultra-hazardous activity, slash, condition that you've created there and so, obviously, there is -- I mean, the law is, it's all about strict liability in that case.

Now, obviously, we're not really interested in the outcome of a lawsuit after something happens, so
what we're concerned about is the fact that you're prepared ahead of time. And so, obviously, we've got multiple airports around here, John Wayne, being -- what? -- less than 40 minutes away.

So, to me, it seems like you should have drills where you already have the plan in place where if -- if an airplane comes into the air space where there shouldn't -- you know, you should be watching for it every second of the day.

And if an airplane is coming in, you've got -- you're going to shoot it down. So I don't really -- that doesn't really sound like that's set up. And so that's, obviously, a big fault. Because, obviously, we know that this is a tactic that has been used, not just at the World Trade Center but, you know, we saw recently where that occurred.

Okay. So San Onofre has been on notice for years that the terrorist have actually stated there was, you know, people testifying in front of Congress that the terrorist said target the power plants. So and like the guy on this slide 12, I'm not really feeling confident that this guy is the guy that is going to be like some suicide guy, terrorist comes rolling in that he's going to be able to do anything.

He looks like he's about, at least, 40 pounds
overweight. I can't really tell what color his hair is, but he doesn't look like he's in any kind of condition to, you know, combat a bunch terrorists.

So I'm just not feeling confident with respect to, No. 1, the threat with some jet coming in. It would be disastrous. Okay? We can't afford that. And so, quite frankly -- I mean, I came to one of these meetings back, I think, in 2003 and I've pretty much said the same thing, that it's not properly secured.

And so I really feel like you're underestimating the risk, and since it is an ultrahazardous condition that you've got, that you've created there, you don't have -- you can't -- you can't be lackadaisical about this. You've got to assume for the worst. And the worst, in my opinion, one that's absolutely predictable is the World Trade Center scenario.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So, why don't we put this in a -- why don't we put the question with respect for what you can and can't say, Tom? Why don't we put the question back to you, then, about give us a little more detail about the kinds of scenarios that you're already ready for, the monitoring that's already going on.

MR. PALMISANO: Sure. So, you know, this gets, as the NRC representatives talked and Ross talked there,
the NRC mandates a design set of threats that we need
to be able to detect and defend against.

And I appreciate the concern about an airplane
impact. The nuclear plants are not equipped to shoot
down an airplane, quite frankly, you know, that's not
part of the defined threat, nor do I think we would
want nuclear plants equipped to shoot down airplanes.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MS. PATTERSON: Well, you've got Camp Pendleton
right there. Aren't they in the business of doing that
sort of thing?

MR. PALMISANO: No, I can't really speak for Camp
Pendleton's mission, that's -- that's not our role.
What my point is, there is an integrated mechanism,
starting with the FAA, to monitor air traffic to
identify potential threats, to alert NRC, Homeland
Security, FBI, and us, the licensee.

With respect to something like that, post-9/11
we've all analyzed the plans and the NRC has done quite
a bit of work to look at should an airplane attack a
nuclear plant, what the damage scenarios are and how
you mitigate a radiological release.

We are prepared for that, we do practice and
train on that, we test the equipment, we test the
people, we have to train on that and the NRC inspects
that. So I don't want to leave you with the impression that we're not ready, we don't have procedures and plans.

We do not engage and shoot down a commercial aircraft, quite frankly, but within the threats that Ross -- Ross talked about, where we interdict -- interdict and neutralize, we do defend against certain threats and incoming aircraft miles away is not one of them.

MR. QUAM: Can I just address one of those?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Very briefly. Then I do want to make sure we get other comments.

MR. QUAM: Got it. So the guy in the picture there, there are some security officers that are overweight. This one in particular probably has a vest, with a lot of bullets on it. Also, this guy is not in a foot race with anybody. This person will let people know that a truck is coming, a vehicle is coming, blew passes his checkpoint or it's coming in too fast and, ultimately, there's hardened barriers that that truck is going to run into. Then you got the fence, early warnings, the multiple posts that are going to engage.

MS. PATTERSON: Yeah, I really like this thing that -- what? -- they're going to call in, "Hey,
there's an airplane coming your way. Guys get ready."
And then the guy at the front gate that doesn't even --
I can't even see a gun on him, is going to go "Oops."

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MS. PATTERSON: "This big -- this group of
terrorists just came in, so get ready," that doesn't --
that's not, you know, making me feel very secured.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Can I just comment briefly on
this? So there are a lot of different -- I think what
we're focusing on right now are the arrangements around
the plant and we need to ask all these questions and we
need to get answers to these questions.

There's also been an exchange where Bill
Parker and I were involved with a member of the
community about aircraft or other threats against
nuclear plants and maybe we could, with your
permission, Bill, we could make that email exchange a
matter of public record. If that would be okay with
you? I want to say something else about aircrafts.

MR. PARKER: If I may, let me pose the question
direction to Tom: You do not have on-site defenses
against an aircraft that delivers a suicide pilot
onboard, so let's assume that a commercial aircraft
fully loaded with fuel does impact the fuel storage
pool, you can't stop that, at least Southern California Edison can't stop that. But let's assume that it does impact, what do you do? What is your anticipated scenario for release of radioactive material?

MR. PALMISANO: So, what we do to respond to that, again, worse-case scenario, a large aircraft, with a lot of fuel impacts the facility, there's going to be significant damage, significant loss of life, we have people in dispersed areas --

MR. PARKER: But my question had to do with the release of radiological materials. Of course, any local workers would die. But I think the issue is more of a regional disaster where spent fuel would be vented into the atmosphere by a collapsed pool.

MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, the nature of the San Onofre buildings are very -- you know, because of the design of San Onofre and the seismic design and the amount of concrete, these plants in San Onofre have more robust spent fuel pools, say, than some older nuclear plants elsewhere in the country. If you've visited other plants, you'd somewhat be aware of what I'm talking about.

These are highly resistant to an impact, a fire would be a scenario which would be a challenge, so I don't anticipate an initial breach of a fuel pool,
it's more mitigating the fire, which is where the
diverse equipment we have staged, the people that would
man it, and the response from Camp Pendleton's fire
department to extinguish the fire to prevent a
significant release of radioactivity.

MR. PARKER: That is, I think, the issue you need
to be specifically clear about.

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

MR. PARKER: That it's not the physical damage
immediately to the structure, it's the subsequent fire
and degradation of safety systems that you have to
mitigate.

MR. PALMISANO: Right. Right. And the pool itself
does not need much in the way of safety systems. You
know, as cool as the fuel is, if I turned off all
cooling today, it has many hours before it even heats
up from 70 degrees to 200 degrees, as an example. And,
you know, the issue is responding to a large fire with
our equipment, with Pendleton's response and other
off-site response.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Let me make a suggestion,
that we pull together, in a compact way, the material
that can be released on this issue, including the
material that would be relevant to the same scenario as
relates to ISFSI because then, once the fuel is out of
the pool, then we've got the issue of ISFSI. So, why
don't we take that on as something we ask Edison to put
back in front of this panel?

We're running tight on time. I want to say
one thing about aircraft, which is, it turns out --
unrelated to this work that I'm doing as a volunteer --
I'm a pilot and a certified airline transport pilot.

Since September 11, the piloting community has
been forced to undergo a huge amount of training and
including training on interdiction, and so the central
line of defense in this scenario, I think it's very
important that we ask the question, Bill's asked about
what happens if all those lines of defense fail.

The central line of defense around aircraft
danger is to intercept or divert away the aircraft
before it gets to the facility; that's the central line
of defense.

And we do not have cockpit procedures, like
the Lufthansa procedures. We have never allowed single
individuals in the cockpit on commercial aircraft, and
so there's -- and there's a tremendous amount of
interdiction that's going on, including aircraft
either on high alert on the ground or in the air around
sensitive facilities and restricted zones that create
an extra buffer.
So, I think we need to respect that the folks at San Onofre are engaging with us on questions that relate to protection of the plant, which is their responsibility, and then there are these other, and maybe we should have a future meeting on this. There are a lot of things that probably can't be discussed, but a future meeting on the other layers of defense outside the jurisdiction of the NRC and the plant itself. Glenn Pascall, you had a question?

MR. PASCALL: A summary comment that I hope won't complicate the discussion. If I had been the first questioner, I would've asked about aerial attack. And as I listen to the presentation, the description of defense against ground attack was very persuasive, very robust.

There was only one mention of seaborne attack; that word appeared once, but without any reference to responses, and the only reference to airborne attack was a mention of the FAA being one of the participating partners.

And so I would just say, from a persuasive context, this is a presentation that's very persuasive on land-based attack and not persuasive on the other two because it barely touches on them, and I think the subsequent discussion has totally satisfied the
question I would've asked which is that you need to
round out this presentation with as much specific
detail within the security requirements of divulgence
on those two forms of attack, is on the ground-based
attack.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. I want to
ask -- other questions? I wanted to just ask three
questions very quickly. First question to Ross: You
mentioned force-on-force or somebody is doing --

MR. QUAM: We both are doing force.

MR. WHITE: We both do.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Everybody is doing
force-on-force. What should we expect in terms of
force-on-force drills and so on as we go through
decommissioning? Because presumably at some point,
it's not going to be as important for you to be sending
guys dressed up like Ninja turtles to go pretend to
attack the plant and see if they can get through.

MR. QUAM: So as long as there is fuel in the spent
fuel pools, we will be running force-on-force drills.
Every single officer will participate as a responder in
a force-on-force exercise once per year and a drill
every quarter, on top of that, whether that's a
tabletop drill, a limited scope force-on-force,
etcetera, they will have drill and exercise
participation, that's a total of five times each year for every single officer.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. And you guys agree with that?

MR. WHITE: I would just add that the -- what Ross said is true, the requirement for them to conduct their annual drills and their quarterly exercise -- quarterly --

MR. QUAM: Drill.

MR. WHITE: I'm getting the words wrong -- quarterly drills, annual exercises is not suspended until they transition out of decommissioning into an independent spent fuel storage installation, so that is true, and we will continue to inspect that on a periodic basis.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Second question of the three I have is: I was asked a few weeks ago by somebody who is very heavily involved in the communities around Diablo Canyon about the support for local law enforcement, because they're very important relationships, as you said in your presentation, for local law enforcement and there are some moneys that flow to local involved law enforcement.

So I'm wondering maybe, Tom, you're going to cover this in your time line later, but can we get some
sense of what those relationships look like? Because what you're telling us is the picture where the risks go down, so presumably they're for the relationships, including the funding with local law enforcement, diminish with time as well.

What should we expect there? What do the communities think about that?

MR. QUAM: So I can't speak to the funding, perhaps Tom can. But as far as the relationships, on a least an annual basis, we have a "joint law enforcement response plan" meeting. We review the plans with all the agencies, make sure they're up-to-date, the communication systems are up-to-date, et cetera.

We do a walk-down of the plant, they look at our defenses. They're set even though, ultimately, law enforcement is going to come after the fact because if they come running in during the assault, they're going to be basically victims of our response strategies.

But we do go through the law enforcement response plan on an annual basis, and we have regular contact with State Parks, FBI, Highway Patrol, for various suspicious activities, the things that go on just on a routine nature. Tom?

MR. PALMISANO: And, David, with respect to funding, I think you're probably confused with Diablo
Canyon because you're probably talking about emergency plan funding as opposed to law enforcement funding. So emergency plan funding for California, currently, there is a law, and I won't get the right law number, but emergency plan funding by Diablo Canyon and San Onofre flows through the state, then to the local counties and agencies. That's a matter of law.

The law is in effect until mid-2019. We have very clearly said, and we've put a letter out to the Inter-Jurisdictional Planning Commission, we have no intent to petition for a change to that funding between now and 2019.

So, San Onofre will fund at its 100 percent level as if we had two operating reactors between now and 2019; that's important funding, our local -- local agencies provide excellent off-site response. We value that and appreciate that and we've made that commitment.

After 2019, we have also indicated a willingness to continue an appropriate level of funding. We will have both spent fuel pools emptied and be a dry cask only facility from a fuel standpoint, and that's really the radiological hazard at this point after 2019.

So the emergency plans will change, yet, again
at that point and then the off-site response needs will
go down and we have said we will support an appropriate
level of funding and we're engaged in the early
dialogue to say what is that level of funding that the
off-site agencies need and what's the right mechanism.
So I think that's probably what you heard from the
folks at Diablo Canyon.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I
want to get the last couple of comments in here.

Jerry Kern? And then Dan Stetson.

MR. KERN: Tom touched -- kind of touched on
something that says there's going to be a transition
and so when they -- and I feel pretty comfortable right
now about where the fuel is at, sitting in the pools
inside the vessels. But I think there is a different
set of vulnerabilities when you move it.

And so when they -- who designs or is that an
NRC regulation when they talk about moving the fuel and
what the security is and all the other things? Or is
that site-specific? Or how does that work? I see
somebody nodded over here (indicating).

Yeah, totally transition, once it's out in the
open, you have a different set of vulnerabilities.

MR. HAIRE: Yeah, but the direct answer is yes,
there are regulations that govern the movement of the
fuel and the transfer to the independent spent fuel
storage facility and they'll be required to comply with
those rules and we will be observing.

MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, and, you know, so just to
reiterate, we're under the same security requirements
that we had been as an operating plant and we will be
until the spent fuel pools are emptied.

The target sets are different because the
reactors are not in service and the NRC has
requirements once the fuel is all in the ISFSI, the
independent spent fuel installation.

We will have to propose a plan change, they
will have to approve it before we implement it to make
sure it is the appropriate level of security for the
radiological risk.

A month ago I visited the Zion Plant, which is
decommissioning north of Chicago, right on the shore of
Lake Michigan, not seismically active but certainly a
pretty high population density. They shut down in the
late 90's. They've just recently off-loaded their fuel
pools. They went into safe store for 15 years and now
we -- we were there particularly looking at their
security changes. But that's five years down the road
for us, four or five years down the road.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Dan Stetson, do you want --
MR. STETSON: Well, actually it was the same question relating to the security for transportation, so I think we covered that.

MR. PALMISANO: Well, and, you know, transportation on site is a rather short movement of the cask in a transportation overpack from the fuel pool to the ISFSI. We're not talking off-site transportation, that's the topic, once this paper is successful and we have an interim storage facility, we'll be talking about off-site transportation.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Right. Okay. That would be for a future day. I just wanted to say one last thing, which is, next time we talk about these safety issues, I'd like us to get some feedback, and I don't quite know how to organize this, around this question of whether the system, as a whole -- and this is not a comment about San Onofre or Edison or the NRC -- whether the system, as a whole, is doing a good job of imagining new threats.

My colleagues at the university, who study threats in war and so on, one of the things I've learned from them is that these systems are very good at fighting a last war and so they have design-basis requirements and so on that are all organized around threats that we've been actually seeing in the real
world, but then this whole process of imagining other things is really important.

And so I would love -- not now, but I'd love next time we work on this issue to maybe bring somebody in who is involved, either from the FBI side or the Intelligence Community, who's helping the system understand a larger picture of threats and how we are nimble in addressing those threats, because that might help us both, in the communities, understand that issue and maybe even contribute where we can.

Do you want to comment?

MR. WHITE: Could I -- could I make a quick comment on that "imagining potential future threats"? I would tell you that for the NRC training force-on-force exercise, we bring in our own -- it's a contract adversary force, and we bring in our own specialist from the Department of Defense, people who have special forces backgrounds, we call them consultants, but they're SEALS.

And what they do is, assess the site and imagine attack vectors that they think would be most successful in exploiting the site's protective strategy. We assume, during those exercises, that we have a fully compliant insider who provides our attack force detailed information about the vulnerabilities of
the plant, and then we exploit that information, to the
best of our ability, to challenge the site's protective
strategy.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Oh, that's terrific. Thank you
very much. Well, not terrific -- it's terrific that
you're doing that. Richard, do you want to have the
last comment on this and then we have to move on?

MR. MCPHERSON: Two days after 9/11, I went back to
work and been dealing in the threat issue, that's one
of the areas I've been dealing with and we've had 61
meetings of this in Washington, DC, with lots of folks,
and we have looked at every conceivable threat there
is.

I was one of the people who was picked and we
had some nuclear power plants and water plants to look
at right after 9/11; we did that for two years. And I
can tell you that, from a threat standpoint, every
conceivable threat and beyond has been looked at and
has been studied and it's in the pipeline to the NRC or
the NRC already has, which I believe they have, to make
the current changes and future changes.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you.

MR. MCPHERSON: The best I can say.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. Thank you
to the gentlemen from the NRC and thank you, Ross.
We're now going to switch to the next segment of the meeting, which is an update on the decommissioning process. A lot has been going on, including many developments related to the ISFSI and the spent fuel storage. So, Tom Palmisano, you're going to give us a briefing on where that stands and we've seen in the press, in the last few days, in the blog sphere a variety of comments and so I think you added a couple of slides to your presentation to address some of those as well.

MR. PALMISANO: Yes. Thank you, David.

So, normally I would go earlier in the agenda to talk more about a general decommissioning update. Because of tonight's topic, we wanted to start fairly quickly with security.

So this may be a briefer update than normal. In the next meeting, we'll come in with a typical longer update, but there's important things I'd like to brief you on. One of which -- this doesn't appear to work. So, next slide, please.

Okay. So just -- we didn't open the meeting with our principle, Safety Stewardship Engagement. We're really working hard to engage and be transparent and have a good dialogue, whether we ultimately agree with each other, there are some things we never will,
but we really want a good dialogue about issues and questions. And, again, we appreciate the NRC being here as part of that dialogue tonight.

Next slide. Decommissioning Update, next slide. Hard to see, nothing really on the milestone since December to mention when we awarded the spent fuel installation contract. This is really historically, for historical purposes. It's on our website.

Next slide. Decommission Plan. We had hard copies passed out. Manuel, did all the audience get these? Okay. So we took your feedback that this is awfully hard to read, and I appreciate that.

A 20-year time line, not to scale. The bold, gold vertical line is January 2016, so the first quarter of 2016 all the activities on the left are really preliminary activities before major decommissioning start.

So major decommissioning will start sometime in 2016 or later. So, up on the left, things like System Retirement, implementing cold and dark, decommissioning power ring. This is all configuring the plant to remove all power sources, all energy sources, making the plant safe physically.

We've removed all chemicals, and oils, and
gases we used to use while we operate. We removed all
the lead acid batteries that we no longer need, so it's
just really getting the plant to a very fundamentally
low energy and safe condition.

The middle, Permanently Defueled Tech Specs,
the Emergency Plan; these are the NRC licensing changes
we need to make, and these were submitted in March of
2014 and are due for approval second -- mid-to-late
second quarter of 2015 and we'll implement these.

The ISFSI project, independent spent fuel
storage. This is the expansion. I'm going to show you
some slides on the Holtec system, actually, having been
completed at another plant. We've selected the vendor
and we're now starting through the California Coastal
Commission Permitting process to get permission to
expand the ISFSI.

We submitted the application. We have some
questions to give them complete information and that
would play out to about an eight-to-twelve month time
line by the Coastal Commission before we're approved to
proceed with physical work on site.

Right here, IFMP, the Irradiated Fuel Manage
Plan, decommissioning cost estimate and post-shutdown
decommissioning activity report. These are three very
specific NRC decommissioning submittal we made last
fall. Some of you may remember we had one or two
meetings on these in detail last summer, where we
walked through these in some detail, fairly dry
meetings, I admit, but we went through what's in these.

So the decommissioning cost estimate to
post-shutdown decommissioning report, the NRC
requirement is we submit these and they have 90 days to
review them before we would start any decommissioning
activities. They were submitted last September, the 90
days was completed in December, the NRC has told us
they have no significant comments, so those two have
been accepted.

The irradiated fuel management plan, the NRC
writes a safety evaluation so that is about a
six-to-eight month process and I'm expecting that to be
issued sometime this summer. Historical Site
Assessment Site Characterization. This is kind of a
baseline assessment of the radiological and other
contamination on the site after years of operation. We
do this as part of our planning.

And, ultimately, 10 years down the road, this
would be what we use to demonstrate we've cleaned up
the site to the NRC and other criteria in terms of
remediation. So this is early characterization work
for the planning activities.
And then we're evaluating how best to select a large general contractor who will actually do the 10-year dismantling period. So everything to the left of the line is really the preliminary activities, the physical changes, the licensing changes, or the decommissioning specifics submittals.

The ISFSI itself, depending on the permitting path, will be expanded physically in 2016 and the fuel pools off-loaded in the 2017-2018 time frame, so the fuel will stay in spent fuel pools until 2017-2018.

Once the ISFSIs are completed and acceptable, we'll then finish off-loading the fuel pools. And then at the end of the 20-year period, the completion of the radiological decommissioning, the NRC's actual license termination process, which is a license amendment process to -- and the word is "terminate," but it's actually reduce the part-50 license to just the ISFSI, that's what typically is done in decommissioning plans.

And then the final non-radiological site restoration to the Navy's satisfaction, that's where that'll occur. And at the end of 20 years, the site will be reduced to the ISFSI only and then going forward until the fuel is moved off site somewhere to where Rancho Seco is or Humboldt Bay is.

Next slide. Spent fuel storage is certainly
an important topic we want to talk about every time. Nothing has changed on this slide you've heard me cover before. The lower left in green is the canisters that are already loaded with fuel from units 1, 2 and 3 on the ISFSI pad. 51 canisters, 50 with fuel, and 1 with greater than Class-C waste.

270 fuel assemblies we ship. We actually ship fuel out of San Onofre back in the late '70s to the '80s. They were shipped to GE Morris, Illinois, that are stored in a spent fuel pool there. And what's in yellow is the assemblies and the two spent fuel pools, Unit 2 and Unit 3, just showing once we expand the ISFSI, we'll load these canisters.

And at the end of that process, the canisters will be on site with 3,855 fuel assemblies and approximately 125 canisters.

Next slide. Now, we selected the Holtec System. We're showing you some schematic drawings from Holtec. This system, the predecessor is in service and loaded in Humboldt Bay today and I've shown you pictures of that before. The system has just been constructed at another nuclear power plant, so I want to show you the pictures under construction, so hopefully everybody in the panel can see this next slide.
So this is -- although it's called an underground system, this plant is in the Midwest, a little different layout than ours. But, basically, we excavate down to a certain level. And in our case, we're going to excavate down not too far because we're going to stay above ground water.

Next slide. What you do, you first build a seismically-designed and install heavily reinforced concrete pad, that's steel. Those of you who can see that up close, that's a lot of reinforcing steel, a very thick concrete pad.

Next slide. These are the vertical canister enclosures. They call them cavity enclosures. So this pad has now been completed, built to certain specifications, including seismic specifications. The canisters are set in place. You can see people standing next to the canisters, so you get a feel for the physical size.

Next slide. Around these canisters, they are totally encompassed by concrete. Next slide. You now see the top of those canisters where they have poured -- continuously poured concrete all around these canisters.

And then you see at the very top, there is about a 3-foot space there, what they do now is, they
put another concrete reinforced pad on top of the large concrete pour. Next slide. That is what the completed facility looks like with the final concrete pad on top around the top of the canisters. So under each one of the rectangles is a vertical canister where the spent fuel steel canisters will be inserted for storage.

Next slide. So I wanted to share that with you because we looked at schematic diagrams, but this has just been completed. We visited the site twice during construction; had a good look at how this is built and how is constructed, and they were gracious enough to let me share the pictures with you.

So, let me give you a licensing status. This is the topic we talk about periodically. So the current system at San Onofre, we have two NUHOMS Transnuclear systems. These are the horizontal systems. Those of you who have been at our other meetings, I didn't bring those pictures, but you remember the horizontal above-ground system, that's loaded today.

We have two -- two types: 24 PT-1 and 24 PT-4. "24" means they each hold 24 fuel assemblies. 24 PT-1 system, which is unit 1 fuel, is licensed for storage. That is a certificate of compliance. You can look it up on the NRC website. It is licensed for
transportation today in the MP187 transport cask.

The unit 2 and 3 fuel 24 assemblies in the
PT-4 canister, it is licensed for storage today,
including high burnup, and it is licensed for
transportation in the MP197-HP, high burnup,
transportation canister.

The UMax System, the new system, the NRC has
issued amendment to Rev zero of their license. It was
effective April 6, 2015. Holtec has already submitted
the amendment for the seismic spectrum. They submitted
that in July 2014. Typically, 18 months to 24 months,
the NRC is telling us and Holtec they expect to approve
the SONGS seismic spectrum.

So just like we do with the NUHOMS system, for
somebody who remember last year's meetings, the NUHOMS
system is licensed for storage, but we at SONGS have a
higher seismic requirement that we've applied to the
spent fuel storage canister, actually, even higher than
the reactors were designed for.

So, what NUHOMS and Transnuclear had to do was
submit an amendment to license our canisters for the
higher seismic spectrum. Holtec is doing the same
thing. They have their initial license. By the end of
the year, hopefully by September they'll have the
amendment for the higher seismic requirements for
SONGS.

And then transportation license, the specific transportation canisters for this system, they're going to submit for the transportation license 2015, that's about a two-year process. So Holtec has a number of transportation casks already licensed for the earlier cask designs, including things like at Diablo Canyon.

So they will then now proceed to license this once they complete this licensing work. So that's the licensing status for the canisters currently at San Onofre or planned for San Onofre.

Next slide. Regulatory submittals and upcoming public meetings. Next slide. Submittals. We kind of touched on some of these, some things that were approved last year, I'm not going to really touch on those. I mentioned that the NRC accepted the PSDAR and DCE; after the 90 days they had no significant comment, so they're accepted.

They will provide us an official letter in the second quarter. The irradiated fuel management plan is coming. The defuel emergency plan, there is three different things we submitted: Exemption request and two license amendments. The NRC Commission approved the exemption request in early March. They're not yet issued. They will be issued with the two license
amendments, which I expect in the second quarter of
2015.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Exemption from what?
MR. PALMISANO: Pardon?
MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Exemption from what?
MR. PALMISANO: There are some emergency plan
requirements that the NRC has some criteria and that's
posted on the website. I'll be glad to point you to
that. So, next slide.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let me -- let me just make a
footnote here, which is, in part because the NRC got
focused on other regulatory tasks after September 11
and then after Fukushima, there isn't streamlined
system for dealing with plants that are in
decommissioning.

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And, therefore, a number of the
normal regulatory changes that would happen when you
change a plant like this, from an active plant to a
non-active plant, are actually handled as a formal
administrative legal matter as exemptions as opposed to
as new rules. And so, frankly, I hate the word
"exemption" here, but it's what -- it's what happening
as a matter of administrative law.

MR. PALMISANO: Thank you. Next slide. Upcoming
public meetings. So we had a request from some of the public comments to find a way to show you meetings that are coming up, so this is just the first cut. I'll be looking to add to this.

So a little historical: There was an annual reef workshop at the Ocean Institute recently. I already talked about the California Energy Commission meeting on decommissioning on April 27th, which we, Pacific Gas and Electric, David Victor, David Lockbaum, others will be talking about nuclear topics.

There's a Wetlands Technical workshop in May. And anticipating the ISFSI permit for the expansion to be considered somewhere in the third to fourth quarter of the Coastal Commission. It's a little early for them to actually schedule which meeting it would go to.

We want to make sure we keep this in front of you and we'll make sure this is on our website, so if you have interest, you can certainly look to attend or at least pay attention to that.

Next slide. David Victor mentioned earlier public walking tours as part of our outreach. We're looking to do more than certainly a Community Engagement Panel, so a couple of things:

We've opened up a public walking tour program. We've now had more than 300 people tour the plant.
It's easy to sign up for it. We run them during the week or on the weekend, for people who can't make it during the week. For certain groups, we can make special arrangements, for example, for a school group or a Boy Scout group.

This has been very well received. It's a simple tour. We stay outside the protected area, but you get a good view of the plant and some of the facilities. And then we also run public education fairs, where in the evening we go out into the community and make ourselves available to people to talk and answer questions. The next one is June 11. We've not yet determined the venue for that.

Next slide. So that's a brief update, given our main topic of security, but I wanted just to keep the panel and the public up to date on where we are on some key topics.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you, Tom.

MR. PALMISANO: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I think it's very helpful to get those updates. And I think it's a good idea that we get some kind of an evergreen calendar on the website.

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So people can see the larger events that are happening to the public.
MR. PALMISANO: So, questions?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: This was intended as an informational item, but let me see if there are any particular questions related to this.

Richard, is your flag up? Or --

MR. MCPHERSON: There was a GATES teacher up in Huntington Beach who went on one of those tours, and she asked me up to give her a talk to her people about science stuff every year and she was impressed with the guy that led the tour, but I don't know who it was. And there was some detractors there and he handled the stuff that she knew to be untrue, he handled it very well.

MR. PALMISANO: Okay. I appreciate that. These are our employees who volunteer to be tour guides and we -- we encourage them to do that and we appreciate their support, and it's good to get feedback, and we just want people to come in and talk.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. Any other comments or questions? We'll take a five-minute break now and then we're going to go to the public comment segment of the meeting. Thank you, Tom.

MR. PALMISANO: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please if you want --

(A brief recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let's -- let's get settled here.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let's get settled here. The comment cards are not quite as crystallized as they have been in meetings past, so we're going to have a little more of the 3-minute modes than normal. First question from Audrey Prosser about safety and then I have a question from Al White, from San Clemente, about the security plan, as I understand, the role of humans.

So, Audrey Prosser? And you're keeping the clock and we've got three minutes for each comment.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Correct.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And if I see other comments that relate to your comment, then I'll hopefully get -- stitch them together. Audrey, the floor is yours.

MS. PROSSER: Thank you. I'd like to ask a question of the representatives from the NRC that are here. Soon after 9/11, there was a no-fly zone implemented over San Onofre and very soon after that it was abandoned.

With hearing Mr. Palmisano say that they had no means of shooting a plane down, I understand that 2,000 -- you can fly as low as 2,000 feet over -- over San Onofre now, according to pilots -- pilots that we know. So, why not reinstate that?
Sorry. I wasn't quite prepared to be so quick. Let me get my notes here. Our biggest concern is safety and our biggest concern is that there is no national interim solution and we all, in this room, have to admit that Yucca Mountain, it's not going to happen.

We just got back from Washington, DC, where we met with Senator Reid and the other representatives from Nevada, and it's unbelievable to us that 14 billion dollars were spent to dig a hole in a mountain before we discovered there were geological problems and lakes and -- and Nevada owns the water rights and they're not going to license water rights to Yucca Mountain.

So that's one of the promises that we don't see happening from all the research we've been doing. And, for 50 years, we've been promised that the nuclear waste would be moved and, as of today, they don't have any place to move it to, and I'm concerned about the Holtec System being buried, not being able to move it.

Although, I believe, I read on Edison's website that they were going to do research on how to inspect it underground, but currently there is no system. So, and the NRC's regulations call for it being stored above ground, but now we're talking about
below ground.

So we have a great concern that it can't be inspected and maintained. We honestly would like to have a little more openness. We've been many promises that it's safe even after the plume of nuclear toxic spewed from the plant, so we'd like more dialogue and -- and information where the community can engage not -- with the panel on the website.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MS. PROSSER: Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much for that.

Let me just ask very briefly, do you have 15 seconds on the issue of the no-fly zone?

MR. HAIRE: Yeah, I would just say I'm not an aviator and I don't know what the right term is, but I do know there are controls over how aircraft are allowed to fly around nuclear power plants.

And I do know that, in response to the question about what is the threat, we don't require licensees and we don't allow, I think, licensees to shoot down aircraft over their site.

But we have had over the time period since 9/11 occasions where pilots have wandered into air space that's restricted and they've been engaged by national defense assets and have been educated on where
they're allowed to fly.

And so we do have a response posture, we do have a monitoring system, and we do engage when people are flying in areas they're -- they're not suppose to.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: The response -- the educational process is very different when you're being escorted by an F-16. So let me just say one other thing, which is, the monitoring of aircraft varies a lot by flight plan command and the kinds of aircraft that people worry about are on flight plans where there is a lot more control than just the 2,000 foot no-fly zone.

Let me say that the end of your comment resonates very much with a comment that Ms. Boarchman has made to us and sent in this afternoon. She's watching this via live streaming, but can't be here today. She's in Escondido, California, and is urging us and the CEP to make sure that the processes of the emergency plan modifications and exemptions and so on, that that's done in a completely public way, that's, obviously, compliant with the law, but it's done in a way that facilitates public input.

And so I don't know, Tom, if you want to talk briefly about how we can do better on that front. We're getting lots of notifications sent around, but maybe this process of making calendars available on
SONGScommunity.com would help us in making the public aware of these various milestones and how to input.

MR. PALMISANO: Yeah, with respect to the calendars, certainly we'll start adding more milestones and we'll work with the panel officers in terms of what milestones you would like to see on there, whether it's upcoming NRC activities or California activities or Coastal Commission activities.

With respect to the emergency plan, you know, we filed those changes in March of 2014 and we spent several meetings last year, talking through the detail with the panel and, you know, with the public and the NRC has had open comment period on those.

So we'll make sure, as we get close to implementation, that we make sure the panel and the public are aware.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. That'll be helpful. And Ms. Boarchman, I only saw her letter tonight. I'll make her letter available to the CEP and put it on the website.

MR. PALMISANO: Right.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Let me ask Al White, you've said that you have some criticisms concerning humans and whether humans are involved in the process. Mr. White, do you want to comment? I couldn't fully read your
handwriting and so -- it says, "Over for my major
criticism." And I turn it over and, it says, "Turn
over for my major criticism."

And then back on the front page, it says, "It
appears to me that the lack of human beings -- there's
a lack of human beings in all parts of the process,"
and I'm not entirely sure what the comment is, so maybe
you can stand up and make the comment.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: I think he's gone.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: He's gone? Okay. Well, we'll
follow up with him and find out what his concern is.

Roger Johnson, the floor is yours. You said
you had a comment about security.

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. I'm a little disappointed
in some of the discussions so far tonight about
security. What we heard was not defense against --
safety and defense, what we heard is defense against
NRC defined threats, that's all we've heard.

There's a lot of threats that the NRC doesn't
deal with and we didn't hear about those, for example,
missile attacks, drone attacks, truck bombs,
surface-to-air missiles, all kinds of high explosives,
so those are the kinds of things that are a real
threat.

What we've heard is a lot about bad guys with
guns, climbing over fences with a hand grenade or
something and I think we're really worried about the
other kind of things. And so another thing I'm
disappointed in is that there was no mention one of
the -- one of the best studies done about this by the
National Academy of Scientists published in 2007, I
think, about terrorist attacks on fuel pools and dry
cask storage.

And it's is a long report, it went into a lot
of details -- details, it was done by the Sandia
National Labs and they concluded that there are
definitely scenarios under which the plants could be
severely damaged, causing release of radioactive
plumes. Some of the things I said were a truck bomb, a
medium sized-truck bomb, outside the perimeter of a
plant can cause significant damage.

The truck bomb barriers have to be 500 feet
from the plant. 500 feet from the plant, there's the
Pacific Ocean and I-5, if you can imagine the scenario
of, say, 10, 15, 20 RVs or pickup trucks driving to the
parking lots of San Onofre and they all have mortar
launchers inside and they open up, they could launch
1,000 mortar shells within 10 minutes, they could have
a shoulder-to-air fire missiles that shoot down the
helicopters.
They could do a tremendous amount of damage, they would penetrate the walls, they would knock out the power, the pipes, the security systems, all kinds of stuff, and it would just be absolutely devastating. So, anybody can drive and notice -- you can have -- you could have terrorists anywhere. There's all kinds of scenarios that we worry about.

So, I think, the original -- the way you start the meeting was very good. The only real safety is to get that stuff out of here and is true that it's not safe anywhere, but it's better to have a major incident in an unpopulated area and so it's of no interest to terrorists.

This area is of extreme interest to terrorists. You could take out all of Southern California, Los Angeles, San Diego, Marine Base Camp Pendleton is toast, and that is a very attractive target. And we should be moving the stuff somewhere else and, I think, on an interim basis, so I hope you follow up on that original plan, and I think that's the most productive thing. All those transport casks are movable, in theory, so I'd say let's get this stuff moved out. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much for that. I just want to ask the NRC, I believe you may
have even commissioned the academy study. I assume that when the academy does a study like this about threats against nuclear reactors, you guys read it and then adjust the rules. Is that, more or less, accurate?

MR. HAIRE: I have to apologize and say I'm not personally well read on the study, but if I can phone a friend. Yeah, so we don't --

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Are you his Lifeline?

MR. HAIRE: Tony is another representative of the NRC. I thought he might have some knowledge on this issue. We didn't -- we didn't bring knowledge of the Sandia study along with us to be able to answer this.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. And it was unfair of me to put you on the spot. Let me make this commitment, which is, we'll find that study. There have been several studies done since September 11 about a variety of threats to the national infrastructure, including threats specifically to nuclear plants.

The National Academy of Science is essentially involved in many of these studies and many of them are commissioned either by the -- by the Security Apparatus of the United States or by the regulators. And so why don't we just pull together a few of those and understand what's happened with these?
Because -- I appreciate your point, Roger. I do think the system has been reading that information more widely and then they can turn into regulations and that's maybe why the discussion tonight was more focused on regulatory issues and to find threats, then, maybe would be your appetite, but I think the defined threats, in part, reflect those assessments.

MR. HAIRE: Dr. Victor?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Yes.

MR. HAIRE: Could I make one more comment?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please.

MR. HAIRE: There was a -- the gentleman listed a number of threats that were not discussed tonight and it included some concerns about how explosives and vehicle proximity and I would say that we do evaluate those kinds of threats; some of those issues are incorporated into our requirements for what the utility has to defend against.

We don't go into those kinds of details about the specific types of threats that we require them to defend against or the specific numbers or standoff distances, but we do require a particular vehicle barrier system in recognition that you can put a fairly large amount of high explosives in vehicles, so we require a minimum standoff distance in a vehicle
barrier system that protects against that.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. We have a question here from Marni Magda about the waste strategy, Secretary Moniz, who gave a speech about this in late March, and Marni would like us to summarize what Ernie said.

Why don't I get Ernie's speech and just make it a public record? I think for us, my read of that is, one of the most interesting things is, the Department of Energy itself is frustrated with the difficulties at Yucca and so it's pursuing its own strategies for disposing of its own high-level waste. It has very urgent problems, as all of us know.

In the course of putting together this memo, we had some conversations with Per Peterson, who among other things, made the point that the new DOE strategy would include also some investment in new technologies for storage, like deep-bore holes.

So there's -- there's actual potential to really improve the potential for long-term storage with technological innovation. We just haven't been doing very much of it because of the Yucca problem, and so I think that's a sign that the DOE right now is focused on these things. I'll get the speech and make it available to everybody.
Marni, did you have other comments that you wanted to make? Because, we're in the process of moving over to the topic of -- our favorite topic of spent fuel storage and so, maybe, some of your comments are in that area, if you want to make those.

MS. MAGDA: Is that all right, to move into that?
Okay. Thank you. His speech was very exciting in that he is first focusing on military because he can do that without the law changing, we would have to change federal law in order to allow there to be interim storage.

We're trying to get in California a resolution right now with the Democrat party to get some of that legislation taking place, we're trying to get the Republicans as well. Southern California Edison helped with that language of the Democrat resolution, and we're working with the Republicans. We need everybody. So I'm hoping that we will get that legislation to allow an interim solution.

My concern is that we continue to try and make everyone feel safe with where we are, and what we should really be doing is spending all this energy on getting it moved out of here. When you spoke of the Yucca -- Yucca Mountain, he said it would not happen.

When he spoke of WIPP, he really let us know
that that isolation plant that had contamination will not be open for four years, not just two, but not working for four, and that's from a very tiny mistake that is costing billions of dollars and four years of an isolation plant that is private.

So I am continuing to ask that we have DOD inspection, not just the NRC, but we actually get someone in there that begins to realize that we can't have people who don't understand nuclear radiation in charge of watching it.

I'm going to bring up the workshop on the degradation of concrete, spent nuclear fuel, dry cask storage systems on February 25th, I listened to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission meeting and I can give you, on page 144 through 160, they're talking about "What in the world are we going to do to inspect underground cement, the degradation of it?"

And they go, "Oh, maybe we should excavate."

Well, that would be kind of dangerous." And then they all, "Maybe in one year, maybe in two years. Can we tell from the top if it's going to be okay? Do we need to look inside in any way?"

And as I went -- as I'm listening, I'm starting, as I am tonight, stuttering. It's in all of their language. These are the experts on degradation
of cement and they are in front of -- there's 10 of us
listening on the United States, they're making it up,
they're trying to figure it out, and they do speak of
it being 200 feet from the ocean.

So I just want you to know that it is very
frightening to me that we have a system going in that
is an experiment and I'm terrified that we're going to
bury it there and not get it moved, so let's focus on
consent-based moving it out of here right away.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. Let me just
ask Chris Johnston. You had a comment, also, about
Holtec inspection. Did Marni summarize your comment?

MS. JOHNSTON: No, but I believe it's there.

MS. CONN: I just want to say one thing about
security before we go on to Holtec. Is that okay?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Well, we're going to come back to
security in just a moment.

MS. MAGDA: Okay. Fine.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So, on Holtec, maybe we could --
we want to stay there.

MS. CONN: I have something to say about Holtec,
too, if you want, but --

MS. JOHNSTON: I actually changed my question.
Hope you don't mind. It was sort of based on
another -- some comments that were made, I believe, by
Ross. Yeah. And you were talking about basically personnel that's hired to look at the plant and I was sort of wondering if you might let me know what screening, as you use so many personnel from the military to -- right? Correct? You use a lot of military people? Yes?

MR. QUAM: Correct.

MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh. What is the percentage? Do you mind? Do you have any idea what percentage?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Why don't you ask your question?

Make your comment and then ask your question.

MS. JOHNSTON: Okay. My -- my question is, I want to know, from my own line of work, very specifically what is the type of testing that's done for posttraumatic stress disorder?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. That is your comment. Okay. Why don't we get an answer?

MR. QUAM: MMPI or psychological?

MS. JOHNSTON: And I'd like to know who does, who does the testing?

MR. QUAM: We have two doctors that are contracted.

MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh, and what is the testing?

MR. QUAM: It's a standard MMPI.

MS. JOHNSTON: Uh-huh, okay.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Hold on. Why don't you ask your
question? Are you done asking the question?

MS. JOHNSTON: Yes, that's what I wanted to know.

I wanted to make certain there was -- there was some testing and some screening done and the MMPI is a good test. Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. And you answered the question.

MR. QUAM: Yes.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So thank you very much. We're not -- we're not going to do the Q&A if we can't organize ourselves, so please bear with me, part of my job in making the meeting efficient is to ask people to make their comments and then we'll get questions -- responses to as many questions as possible. So, please bear with me on that.

So, Donna Gilmore, did you want to make a comment?

MS. GILMORE: Oh, no. Wake you up a little. Okay.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I am awake.

MS. GILMORE: I'm working with the California Public Utility Commission. I'm intervening in the decommissioning proceeding because I believe that Edison should not be allowed to spend money on decommissioning and canister systems without a review beforehand to ensure that they're making the right
decisions.

And on the dry cask systems I agree with Marni's comment about the concrete. I listened in on that. There is no way to inspect an underground concrete system. This is an experimental system that's never been tested, never been used anywhere in the world. The Humboldt Bay system is totally different system. I totally researched that one.

So this is brand new, this is another experiment on Southern California and it's known that the canisters are subject to cracking from stress corrosion cracking. The Diablo Canyon has a canister that has all the conditions for cracking in only two years. The NRC -- I have documentation from the NRC that they said once there's a crack, 16 years of crack could go all the way through.

So you know, security -- I mean, with security you need to be able to see something. We can't even see these cracks, so I think our real security threat is within. We're using containers that cannot be inspected, cannot be repaired, and we don't know if they're cracked now, we won't know when they're cracked.

And then if you want to take a canister, you can't inspect and transport it on a rail system or a
road system that may have cracks in it and it's going
to continue to crack as you go. I would not want to be
that community on the other end, trying to unload the
transport cask and then having to put it in,
apparently, another hole on the other end because with
these kind of containers you have the big cement part
that you have to build and pay for and we paid for.

The way you move that is you take the thin
half-inch, 5-inch canister out, put it in a --
eventually put it in a transportation cask, move it to
the other end, and then you have to have something
built on the other end, so that's a whole lot more
money.

If you were using the thick cask like they use
in Germany or even the ones they use -- even the ones
the French make, they're thick enough that you don't
need to build a concrete infrastructure, so they would
be ready to roll for everybody that's wanting to move,
you save a whole lot of money because it's already
built to be, you know, transported and -- and in, you
know, storage or transport. It's already designed for
that. So there is a big money saving.

And I believe that the system is going to fail
prematurely and -- it's going to fail prematurely and
we're going to have to spend over -- another 1.3
billion dollars to replace it prematurely and there is no money to do that.

So, I think that issue needs to be -- I know we talked about it a lot.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MS. GILMORE: It's just because we haven't -- because you haven't satisfactorily answered our questions.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. So I wanted to just -- I wanted to pick up on the issue that you raised about the inspection of the canisters, it was in Marni Magda's comments as well. Sandy Stiassm. Am I pronouncing your last name correctly?

You said you also wanted to say the public safety concerns are more from within. And with that, is it the same issue that Donna just raised? Or did you want to make a comment on that? I want to collect these because they're all the same comment, not the same comment, but on the same theme and I want to suggest a way forward on this.

MR. STIASSM: Good evening my name is -- excuse me -- Sandy Stiassm. I'm an Orange County resident, I live in Irvine. I'm a member of the Green Party. I've served on its central committee on and off over the last 10 years, our political party was the only
political party in Orange County which opposed the continuing revamp of SONGS, everyone else sort of fell into place after us.

Very appropriate for me to continue after Donna. There's been a lot of infesting speculation this evening about how a decommissioned SONGS will withstand external threats. But I think many people who live within 30 miles of this plant are more focused on the best storage strategy, the threat from within.

While, by default, it remains for Edison to remediate many aspects of this plant. I question how much authority as public officials and the citizens we can safely entrust to this company. This is the same company which first lied about the extent of plant operations defects. This is the same company, which less than truthfully, outlined the impact upon the grid if SONGS were taken out of operation.

This is the same company which lied to its workers and their union officials about job safety at SONGS, and this is the same company which is trying convince both citizens and public officials that it has the nuclear waste option handled.

The question I'd like to end on is, as public officials, how much authority do you want continue to give this private company? And to what extent, as
public officials, at the local, regional, state and federal level do you want take to ensure the long-term safety of all residents in Orange County? Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much for your comments. So I want to say something briefly about how we can collect these last few comments and make sure that we act on them. At the meeting we had last October with the two cask vendors, this is before Edison made the decision to purchase the Holtec design, we had a discussion, extensive discussion, about the capacity to monitor and detect and repair, if necessary, and a variety of views about whether it's a good idea to repair the canisters versus just putting it into a transport cask, and that's not a conversation we're going to rehash right now.

The white paper that we put together to kind of collect many of the views, which I signed individually but was a reflection of a larger process, included the recommendation, which Edison has said they -- they honor, that the Holtec plan or whatever plan is adopted, now, the Holtec plan will include a clear articulation in plain English of what defense in depth means, of how monitoring and inspection is going to take place, which kinds of schemes will be in place for repairing versus taking a damaged canister and
putting it into a transport cask.

I've checked today with Holtec to make sure that that can be done and it's in the process of being done and I've been assured that that is the case, so we will make sure as a panel that that happens and that happens in a very prompt way over the course of the next few months or half year while they're in the process of doing this new regulatory filings and so on, to make sure that we, in the community, understand how actually you would monitor degradation of concrete and, if you can't, what the consequences are of that and the same is true for the canisters and so on.

So I assure to you that we will have that plan in plain English and we'll have an opportunity at a future meeting to talk about that and to share that in advance so people can talk about this. We demanded that of Edison and Edison said that, along with many other things, will be part of their -- their program.

Is that your understanding, Tom?

MR. PALMISANO: Yes, that's absolutely true. We've already started with Holtec based on the comments from the panel and in the public in terms of long before the license renewal period is done and some others know when the aging managing programs are required to develop those techniques now and the capability now,
and at the right point we'll be glad to come in with Holtec and explain that.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you. We have several comment cards that relate to the next steps on long-term storage, which is related to this. And so I want to get C. Griffin, then Jim Cummings, and then Jennifer Massey. C. Griffin? It just says C. Griffin here. Please, sir, the floor is yours.

MR. GRIFFIN: My name is Charles Griffin. I'm -- I'm a registered professional system engineer, developed weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons, but -- including 21 stealth bombers and rockets, defending us against tanks in Germany.

But also I spent most of my career developing electrical power systems for the airplanes, commercial airplanes, of DC7, DC8, DC9, DC10, in the 80s, and also in my spare time I worked with a professor at UCI on development of a fusion reaction, which was funded by Palel and it's constructed in Lake Forest with Tri-Alp Energy, with the hope of fusing hydrogen and boron together in an electric magnetic field, accelerating the ions together.

But part of it will not work because the ions repel each other to an astronomical value, and it's hard to overcome that. So another approach has been
made by students from Texas A&M over 30 years and also
was funded by Paul -- by Gates, our Secretary of
Defense, developed a reactor for our submarines to
replace the harmful reactors in our submarines and
aircraft carriers, to fuse hydrogen and Boron,
emulating what happens naturally in the sun where
fusion of hydrogen and boron are fused together and
form carbon, which breaks up into free helium ions.

And the way that it's done, also, by these
people at Texas A&M funded by Bob Gates for the Navy is
to build a spark plug that creates a high voltage bulb
of lightening, similar to what happens every day in a
thunderstorm to create helium ions that radiate -- that
spiral off the ions sphere by the fusion of hydrogen
together in the thunderclouds into helium.

But to bring -- put this group in Texas, from
Texas A&M and New Jersey, the focusedfusion.org or a --
focusfusion.org is their website and I encourage all of
you to go to that website and study it and maybe the
Edison Company, I've given them information on this,
maybe that was the reason they shut down the plant,
but -- and also the person, our governor and
congressman, they're working on this.

So it's something that I think you should
realize because once you fusion hydrogen and boron
together and create these helium ions, not only helium -- accelerated helium ions, which are positively charged with electricity, they also can be focused into a spiral and onto your radioactive waste and accelerate that radioactive waste, so you won't be storing it for eons --

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Excellent. Thank you.

MR. GRIFFIN: -- active ions, how to handle that. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much for that. I think that's an important reminder that there's still a lot of innovation going on both in the power supply side and also on the waste disposal side.

Jim Cummings, the floor is yours.

MR. GRIFFIN: And yet you don't mention the public here.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Jim Cummings?

MR. CUMMINGS: Well, I'm impressed what the gentleman just said. I've operated a reactor for 30 years in San Onofre and I'm part of the problem, I guess, because we've created a lot of waste. We created a lot of good, too. We had 30 years of electrical power in South Orange County and I think all of us are beneficiaries today of that factor.

What to do with the spent fuel is an issue
that came up in 1976. The Atomic Energy Commission was supposed to go ahead and find a storing place for the spent fuel to go. They have failed, the NRC has failed to provide that for us, the government of the United States has failed to provide this for us.

This meeting is going to go on at every location throughout the country as they decommission the plants. This should not occur. You folks, for example, are on the cutting edge right now, I feel, of being able to go to congress right now with Darrell Issa, with Senator Boxer and effectively give your input to this and put pressure on Yucca Mountain to come back and be restored.

Senator Reid is no longer running for office. The Senator Reid's program never to bring Yucca Mountain to come to pass. He's going to be out in two years. This group of people here, I think, have a committee to go to congress and start putting pressure on the NRC, the Department of Energy, to go ahead and make a proper request to have these meetings not to continue any longer. This is foolish, totally foolish.

I mean, you folks are great. Don't get me wrong. But the fact that every community -- every community has got to go through this again and again and again, we have failed once again, and the
government has failed to do what they promised for us. So those are my comments. But there was something else --

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: The industry has failed.

MR. CUMMINGS: The industry has failed. Yes, sir, it has.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Yes.

MR. CUMMINGS: Oh, one other thing on the subject of security. I didn't hear any word that you're going to shoot somebody. I wanted to hear that once, but it didn't happen. I'm sure it's in there somewhere in the many procedures you have you will shoot somebody, but I didn't catch on just when, but it needs to be done.

MR. QUAM: We said appropriate use of force.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MR. CUMMINGS: That's what I -- is it really?

MR. PALMISANO: And the word interdict a nuclear --

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please, please, please.

MR. CUMMINGS: I stand corrected. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. So your question is "Are they going to shoot people?" And his answer, Ross's answer is "Appropriate use of force."

MR. CUMMINGS: "Appropriate use of force."

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MR. CUMMINGS: We're going to shoot them if we --
didn't think they'd be getting so close that we need to
shoot them.

MEMBER OF PANEL:  David?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR:  No, we're going to do the public
comment period --

MR. CUMMINGS:  Okay.  Anyway, thank you for your
time.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: -- with a few responses where
necessary and then go from there.  I guess, I'll come
back to that one next.  Rita Conn, please.  I'm sorry.
You're absolutely right.  Jennifer Massey and then Rita
Conn.

MS. MASSEY:  I'll be very quick.  I won't use up
the three minutes.  But thank you so much to all of
you, we very much appreciate your listening to our
comments.  Just very quickly, is it -- it's my
understanding that Holtec, that you will bury nuclear
waste in Holtec canisters underground at San Onofre?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR:  Why don't you make your comment
including the questions?

MS. MASSEY:  Oh, because --

CHAIRMAN VICTOR:  And I'll make sure they can
answer it.

MS. MASSEY:  -- that's what I sort of thought
because if that's the case, then it's been commented to
me that it doesn't seem to be the greatest idea in the world considering San Onofre sits very close to the three earthquake faults and the canisters could be disturbed if they're buried underground and a bad earthquake hits, which is supposedly we're overdue for.

And, you know, talking about what Pam had to say about airplanes, I used to fly airplanes and, you know, if you take off from San Onofre -- from Orange County Airport, you could probably be in San Onofre in about 10 minutes. And I remember the movie "United 193," and what a mess everybody made of trying to intercept that plane and where are all these planes anyway.

Do you think, say, within 10 minutes that you can have a conversation with the pilot and if his response isn't appropriate or adequate or not to your liking that you will then -- I want to know what you plan to do to take that plane down before it flies into San Onofre? And then finally, I was at the San Clemente Presbyterian Church for an Edison event not very long ago and I'm speaking to somebody who had some badge on and asked them about the evacuation or something, she said, "Oh, there's no plan for evacuation anymore." I said, "really? I hadn't heard that."
I said, "Well, what is the public suppose to do?" And this woman said, "When the siren goes off, you're suppose to turn on the radio." And I said, "What channel?" And she said, "Oh, I don't know." And I said "FM or AM." She said, "I think it's FM." But I said, "But you know what I think it would be really helpful. We have a free newspaper that's dropped on our garage driveway every Thursday. I think it might be helpful if you published that information to the general public because I'm unaware of it and maybe there's some others that are also unaware of it and it would be helpful, so we know what to do in case something happened. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I think we've had a full discussion of the issues around interdiction of the aircraft because that's really other agencies. Tom, do you want to comment very briefly on the issue of emergency preparedness?

MR. PALMISANO: Sure. In fact, we've just, I think, recently had our annual mailing on emergency preparedness, so today we're under the operating plan emergency plan, and there are evacuation requirements in the -- the annual mailing for the folks in the 10-mile emergency planning zone. I think, at least, if I remember, it has recently gone out in the last
several months.

So we do communicate that and we -- on our SONGScommunity.com we can get you to that information.

Okay. I think what you're hearing is the emergency plans that change once you're decommissioned, after the NRC approves them, change the off-site requirements.

That's what we discussed last summer in several meetings and I'll be glad to discuss those further as we get closer to that time. And, again, that is also on SONGScommunity.com.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. And there's also an unsigned comment on this report that there was a question about whether Yucca Mountain is still proceeding and whether and how we can put pressure on the NRC and other federal agencies to continue in that process.

The environmental licensing of Yucca is proceeding. It needs to be funded. It is not fully funded, and so this is a constant kind of cat and mouse, or whatever, choose your metaphor, in Washington. It may be that the odds of Yucca Mountain are going up with the changes in Nevada, it may be that they're going down. I think the spirit of what we're talking about here is, keep pressure on Washington, but work on other options at the same time. And so that
was that comment there.

I want to ask Rita Conn and then Berton Moldow to comment. Berton wants to talk about Laguna Woods. And Rita Conn.

MS. CONN: Thank you, Dr. Victor. Before I talk about security, I just wanted to read something that was said by one of the NRC's in Chicago, the inspector for dry storage or the inspector for dry storage cask, and it's particularly concerning because it's in regards to Holtec, and what he said was that "Holtec, as far as I'm concerned, has a non-effective quality assurance program."

This same kind of thinking led to NASA's space shuttle disaster and he, therefore, would not sign off on something that the NRC asked him to sign off on in regards to whistle blower Oscar Sherani's concerns about the manufacturing process of Holtec. I'd be happy to provide those concerns with anyone.

The next thing that I wanted to talk about is, there is a lot of money going on in the nuclear energy industry. This is just a full page ad that was taken out of the New York Times this week in which they are encouraging everyone to vote for those candidates that support nuclear energy.

And I think it is this kind of thing that also
went on, not only in this country, but it goes on -- it went on in Japan and it was part of what Japan's six-month investigation showed, is that -- is that Tepko knew about all of the problems.

They were forewarned, but because of profits over public safety, they did not fix it and it was because of collusion going on between elected officials, their regulating energy -- their regulating commissions, like our NRC or DOE, that those never happen because there is so much money in this industry that the public is not always protected.

We had a lovely meeting with Tom and then we went back because this is what we found on a nice Sunday and Bren will show you this picture. I believe that what it shows is that I hope I have all these terms right that you talked about, but that the owner-controlled area had no control. There was no one in the guard towers.

You might want to show it to the public.

There was no one in the gate. We were able to be there and we took pictures of the guard tower, the reactors, domes with the spent fuel pools behind them, we were able to actually go up to another area at which time someone did tell us no pictures. I talked to him. Told him we had seen Tom, "yada-yada-yada." And he
said, "Okay. You can stay 5 minutes, but no pictures."

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MS. CONN: There was no investigation. I know my
time is up. There was no investigation as to what was
in our car. Thank God we were well-intended.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you.

MR. PALMISANO: Listen, David, I can't let that one
go.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Tom?

MR. PALMISANO: Let's see where she was.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Can you just briefly reply and
then if there's additional information we need to
provide, why don't we do that?

MR. QUAM: So that picture that we're shown, that's
taken from Highway 101, which is a public access road
and that's not a guard tower.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: No, it was taken at your south
gate.

MR. QUAM: Yes, it is the south gate, which is
along the side of 101.

MR. PALMISANO: And it's outside the
owner-controlled area.

MS. CONN: And then we went into the
owner-controlled part.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. One brief comment here and
then I want to just -- if you want to provide the
photographs, we'll get another response to you, but it
sounds like there's some disagreement as to where you
were actually standing.

MR. QUAM: Correct, that is a public access point.
The other picture, that scene, that was taken at the
north end, of what we call parking lot 4, we have a
search area up there, that's also another area to
access another part of the Camp Pendleton beach. It's
a public access road.

We have pictures -- people go out to the bluff
and take pictures all the time. It's not a gated
portion of the OCA.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. We're not going to
continue because we do not have any more time. We have
other people who are on the list.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We are not going to continue
this.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We are not going to continue
this. You've made your point and I thank you for
making your point. You provided photographs.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Are you angry?

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: No, I'm not. I'm just asking
that everybody follow the procedure. That strikes me
as a really inappropriate comment, sir.

Berton Moldow, please.

MR. MOLDOW: I'm a director of one of the HOAs at
Laguna Woods, and because of some of the things that
I've worked on, the city counsel finally recognized the
danger that existed with San Onofre, in particular, now
the waste storage, and they had passed a resolution,
and I don't know whether you have seen the resolution
or not.

Basically, they said, No. 1, we want to have
the waste removed as soon as possible. Okay. And,
No. 2, in the interim, they want the canister storage
to be as safe as it possibly can. Now, with regard to
No. 1, removal, we know that the permanent site is not
there and what we're saying is "Why isn't there a
temporary site?"

Certainly, you know, we have 50 canisters
sitting there right now. We have areas within the
State of California that are dry, we have a site that
is secured, we have a site that has a no-fly zone that
is huge, and I'm referring to China Lake. The Navy
owns 1,100,000 acres of which the majority of that land
is undeveloped.

The Marine Corps. had their turn. Why not let
the Navy have their turn? And by the way, they're
generating waste anyway, so maybe they can use it. So
it's something to look at. I think there are other
interim sites that we could look at and we certainly
should do that immediately and at least get rid of
those first 50 canisters.

Okay. The second issue has to do with the
Holtec System. We, as rate payers, you know, have been
on the hook for a 3.3 billion dollar rate that we will
have to pay because, quote, We wound up with a steam
generator, okay, which design was faulty and it was an
unproven design.

And I looked at the canisters that we're
proposing and the system that we are proposing and I
say, again, "My God. This is an unproven design. What
are we in for? Are we in for another 3.3 billion
dollars?" Okay. Holtec's president said "These
canisters cannot be repaired."

And I said, "Oh, that's terrific. What's the
solution? Well, solution is, you know, Russian dolls.
You just get a bigger container and you put that little
container into the bigger container; that's not a
solution, that's a Band-aid. That's it. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you very much. I
think a number of people have seen the Laguna Woods
resolution, but if you would do me the favor of sending
it to me by email or something, then I'll make sure
that the whole CEP sees it. We'll make it available on
the public site. Thank you very much for your comment.

Jay Steinmetor and then Ray Lutz and Bruce
Campbell.

MR. STEINMETOR: Good evening and thanks for having
this meeting, I appreciate it, to voice our opinions.
I wanted to stress the fact that I'm in total
disagreement in Holtec expecting -- excuse me --
Southern California expecting to go to the California
Public Utilities commission and get 1.3 billion dollars
to purchase this system when they know, when they
requested that, that it had yet to be approved by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission for seismic concerns.

They were told by Judge Darling that they
needed to have approval from the NRC before asking for
the decommissioning funds. But when they asked for the
money, they failed to let anybody know at the CPUC that
they had not got this approval yet.

Now, there is a different judge. Okay. And
the same CPUC commissioner that was kicked off the last
case is now judging this. So let me be clear, after
the four failed steam generators, a 670 million dollars
debacle, which resulted in a 3.3 billion dollar bill
for the rate payers, I am without question questioning your integrity, Southern California Edison.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Yes.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Please just -- please make your comment.

MR. STEINMETOR: It's crazy that we should be asked actually go forth with this 1.3 billion dollar contract that is sealed and we cannot look into it. This is the rate payer's money and it is held in a fund by the CPUC for our protection. We should be able to evaluate that contract. We should know what's in it. We should know how many canisters you're buying. We should know whether you're replacing the old ones.

It is wrong that that should be sealed and we should not have access to it. And anybody on this panel who is not insisting on that is failing the public.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay. Thank you for your comment. The comment, I think, deals in large part with issues in front of the CPUC and I'd really leave the CPUC and the public to talk about this. This panel is not in a position to provide the financial, the proper financial oversight to this process.

And I know Ray Lutz, among others, has been urging us to do this. There are other folks who are
doing this. We're not staffed up to do that kind of function. The issues you raised, though, about Holtec and about that system, we will be coming back to as regards to security and the safety and inspections and so on, and that's part what people are concerned about and I totally understand that.

And we have demanded that information and we'll come -- and we will put it in front of you and have a chance to talk about it. I want to underscore one thing that was in Tom's slide, which is, in September of this year, 2015, it is expected as a normal part of the regulatory process that Holtec get a seismic approval.

So, I think, what I've seen reported in the papers about how this is kind of a wild or unregulated or unapproved system strikes me as somewhat outside the bounds of what's actually going on as a matter of regulatory procedure.

Ray Lutz, the floor is yours.

MR. LUTZ: Ray Lutz with Citizens Oversight. I'm kind of disturbed a little bit about how this body continues to come across as if you are a decision-making body, which you decided that you're not, and everyone here should understand that this body is not going to represent you.
David Victor is not representing you. The only people that can represent you, and that's every person in this room, including the entire audience, is yourself or a group that you're with because this body is not -- is not a representative body.

So, what you should be encouraging this body -- this body should be encouraging members of the public to formulate their own documents and bring those forward to these other decision makers. I encourage everybody here to contact your public officials, not the people on this room, the people up in Sacramento that need -- that need to deal with this problem.

Citizens Oversight will be sending a letter up to the California Energy Commission regarding this idea that we've been pushing for months and months and months so, I guess, a year or more, to have a separate interim storage area.

I'm really happy that some of you have come on board with this. California Energy Commission, the public -- the California Public Utilities Commission, Department of Energy, Governor's office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Senate Committee on Energy, utilities and Communications, and the Assembly Committee on utilities and Commerce, all these are specifically tasked with this job.
And it's not the job of this body to do anything except to go to these people that are tasked with this job and pound on their door and make sure that they do it. And it is not David Victor's job to do it for us. And that is -- that's what comes across. We've got the paper. If it's okay with everyone, we're going to be bringing it up there to promote it.

No. Everybody here has to do it yourself. Everybody here who is a representative of the people, who is an elected official from the local communities, get on the horn and get you going. It's your job to be representing your people in contacting them.

They're very sensitive to it. If you call up the Senate Committee they answer the phone within the first ring and they want -- and they know exactly how many people have called about each issue. And if you start calling them about these issues, they will know about it.

Now, Yucca Mountain is not big enough to hold -- house all the waste, all the dream about opening up and suddenly it's a solution, it's not. It's over capacity. Even if we had it, it wouldn't all fit in there. We'd still have a problem.

Water is another issue that I'm concerned about and I put in a request to stop everything at this
plant until the water situation is planned. We're under drought conditions right now and there's been zero planning that I've seen about the water use in this decommissioning project, so I want to see that dealt with and that's been a request.

Finally --

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank -- thank you.

MR. LUTZ: The last 10 minutes you said I could have.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: What?

MR. LUTZ: The secured area -- since you didn't bring it up, I'm going to do it now, David. I asked you to earlier. The secured area in the picture that I saw does not include the ISFSI, so I want to get that answered. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I think I'm concerned about the tone of our discussions here and I can totally appreciate. This is not a decision-making body. We said that in the beginning and we said that at the beginning of every one of these meetings. We are not trying to get in the way of anybody wanting to go to Sacramento; quite the opposite.

The problem here is, we can't just spread around ideas. We have a very practical problem here, which is, we want to find a way to get the waste out of
here as quickly as possible. So we should all be
calling Sacramento with some sense of what we want
Sacramento to do; that's what we're trying to help
with.

That's not David Victor, Dan Stetson, and Tim
Brown trying to take over this process. We're just
volunteers, part of a panel of 18, who are trying to
help us in this communities focus around some ideas
that work; that's the idea.

Bruce Campbell, the floor is yours.

MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you. Oops. There have been
too many -- I'm Bruce Campbell from the Northern part
of the Newport-Inglewood Fault. There have been too
many worker layoffs which may compromise safety at
San Onofre. I have more concerns about the ethical
fiber and motivations of utility executives and their
lackeys as much as the mind-set of nuclear facility
workers.

Would there be a difference between -- I want
to -- you can answer this at the end of my comments, if
you'd like. Would there be much different between fire
at a spent fuel pool containing high burnup fuel and a
fire at a spent fuel pool which does not have high
burnup fuel?

Let's just assume that the spent fuel pools
being compared have spent fuel which have been out of
the reactor for a similar length of time. I think it's
reckless to -- and a hazard to workers to move the
spent fuel rods into whatever cask in fast track
process. Let it cool down for a while, specially for
the high burnup fuel, which is what it's been used in
recent years.

   And so I believe it's reckless to move the
spent fuel in a fast track manner and if it's moved
into a dry cask, it should be the German dry cask,
which has a pretty good track record, it seems. And I
believe it's reckless to transport the spent fuel in
faulty casks even if it was going to a reasonable
destination.

   Nuclear power facilities already have their
waste consolidated more densely than they were designed
for. The casks -- the casks are so huge that all those
fuel assemblies even in a single cask can almost be
considered consolidation.

   During the Ward Balley "rad waste" struggle,
some had offered the biomed-biotech industry monitor
and retrieval storage for the small percent of
California's rad waste that they made. They almost
went for it, but then the nuclear power industry
whipped them into line, so they did not support such a
Dr. Singh of Holtec admits that a microscopic through-wall crack can release millions of curies of radiation and that, apparently, they cannot be repaired. Is this the faith of a swell company who hasn't been approved by the NRC?

Also, I noticed these agencies and industries, they say, "Oh, yeah, the seismic approval is coming in September." It's as if they already know it's the -- they know it's the nuclear regulatory -- rubber stamp, rubber stamp, rubber stamp. So they know things -- anyway, it's suppose to be -- we're weighing the concern. Should we approve this? Let's look at the data and concerns. But instead it's "We're going to approve it," to help those utilities and, of course, nuclear power has been an excused for the nuclear weapons program since 1945 or well nuclear power development from the 50s, justifying having lots of weapons.

The integrity of transporters and the variety of casks must be ascertained before moving the rods. However, due to so many people and important farmland the other things in Southern California, I do think -- and Central, I do think California rad waste should be moved very carefully and safely in the best German
casks, perhaps in the 20 to 30 year time frame.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MR. CAMPBELL: But I don't -- I don't support state-wide consolidated dump, that's basically a license to make more rad waste.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you. Thank you for your comments.

MR. CAMPBELL: And then Yucca Mountain isn't a spot, it's in a volcanic and seismically active area on the Ghost Dance Fault, the Ghost Dance Fault.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you for your comments. You mentioned, as part of your remarks about -- concerns about unemployment and workers, and I just want to -- the last comment I want to report is not signed. Is concern that -- about will SCE outsource jobs through the Holtec/Areva to other than American workers?

And I want to show you, we had a very helpful exchange with Jerry Kern and his communities have been affected by the plant's closure and will make that exchange part of the public record. We also have as one of our meetings later this year, maybe we can get the next slide, I just want to remind everybody of the two upcoming regular meetings in the CEP: The one in July is going to focus on environmental review process, including some very important coastal issues, there are
a lot of very important environmental questions,
environmental impact questions, including NEPA and CEQA
reviews; those will be the subject of that meeting in
July.

And the meeting in late October will be
directly on this issue of economic impact, the economic
impact of decommissioning, the economic impact of the
process of decommissioning itself will be a job
creator, and we'll have an opportunity to focus
conversations about how to make sure that as many of
those jobs stay in the local communities as possible.

So I want to quickly see if there are any last
points the members of the CEP want to make. I know
we're running a little bit over, but we got started a
little bit later. Gary?

MR. BROWN: Yeah, but I think a lot of good
comments were made here tonight. And one thing, we've
all heard a lot about Holtec and you've assured us that
we're going to have another meeting and get further
into it. In the newspaper, we've seen schematics of
how the Holtec system is going to -- going to work and
how it's buried and stuff.

You know, I would like to see that same
schematic, but I would like to see a study or an
analysis done on what elements of that schematic is
beta tested, it's new. It hasn't been proven before, because I think that's -- that's a big question and we've never really approached it from that -- from that standpoint.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Okay.

MR. BROWN: You know, we're under the impression that so much is proven -- proven technology, there is data out there, but I -- I want to know specifically what isn't proven.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: So let me just commit again to undertake. I don't know if the data can be organized quite that way because --

MR. BROWN: Okay.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: -- part of what's new is, as I understand the way the systems are put together and some of what's new is actually internally to the canister the way the racks are and so on, but I will commit and make sure, not because I'm trying to take over the process, I'm just trying to help us be organized and efficient.

I will commit that we will make sure that Edison and Holtec show us what this "Defense in Depth" looks like and we'll also get a sense of the parts of the system where there's a lot of experience and where there's less experience, and I think that's the spirit
of some of the comments about being able to inspect
cement, that Donna and other have made and so on.

I want to say two last words about the Holtec
System: I've seen in the newspaper this 1.3 billion
dollar figure, my understanding that that's a figure
that's been taken from the decommissioning cost
estimate, including the cost override, the amount of
money that's built in as a cushion for potential cost
overrides.

That's not a check that gets sent to Holtec,
that's the entire process of moving the fuel out,
building the pad and so on, and the part of it that is
the canisters, we don't know exactly because this is a
private, confidential contract, but it's probably on
the order of a 100-150 million dollars or something
like that and the actual canister is part of that.

So I just want to make --

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: I just want to make sure that we
don't mix apples and oranges when we see this 1.3
billion figure and people start talking about having to
pay that multiple times.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: 1.3 that was my statement. The
intent of the 1.3 was to accommodate the cost related,
not just the canisters.
CHAIRMAN VICTOR: And --

MR. PALMISANO: Let me clarify, we did the decommissioning cost and 1.3 billion is the estimate to manage spent fuel between now and 2052.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: Right.

MR. PALMISANO: So it's not just the Holtec System, it includes the Holtec System in that whole decommissioning cost estimate of 4.4 billion, that 1.3 billion piece is the spent fuel management cost between now and 2052 when it's presumed all the fuel is off site. I'll be glad, at a future meeting, to get back into the cost estimate of that as well.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you. When we get back -- I need to -- we need to -- we need to --

MS. GILMORE: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Donna, we need to --

MS. GILMORE: (Inaudible.)

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: We need to close -- Donna? We need to close the meeting. I wanted to see if there are any other members of the CEP who want to put last items on the agenda here.

When we come back to this issue of what defense in depth looks like at the Holtec System, we will also come back to this item that's been attributed to Mr. Singh multiple times, that you cannot fix the
canisters.

That was -- that happened in this room and I was sitting in this chair with Chris Singh, sitting right there, and I just want to -- the context was, if you discover the conditions that might lead to a crack, what would you do?

And the question in front of people was, would you try and weld it and fix it? which is one possible strategy, or would you just try and take the canister and do the dolls approach and put it in a transport canister? or, as Chris Singh said, after he made this remark that he's been misquoted about, "Would you take the fuel out and put it into a new canister?"

So I just -- we will come back to this issue, but it is very, very important that we think about the whole system and how the whole system operates as opposed to plucking individual facts out of individual comments out -- out of context.

MEMBER OF PUBLIC: The video is on the website, if you want to hear it.

CHAIRMAN VICTOR: Thank you very much. This has been not the easiest meeting and appreciate everybody's patience and contributions. These are not easy issues, but we're working on them. And thank you all for your assistance in that process.
(Whereupon the CEP meeting concluded at 9:07 p.m.)

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