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**A
Christian
Perspective
on
Abortion**

by Vernon Ratzlaff

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LBJ.*

A Christian Perspective on Abortion

When does life begin? Can someone who advocates the destruction of a human foetus claim concern for the quality of life? What are the ethical issues involved in abortion? These are the questions Vernon Ratzlaff grapples with in this significant statement.

Abortions—consciously human-induced terminations of pregnancy—are being carried out in increasing numbers. The United States records about 200,000 legal abortions annually, compared to 18,000 two years ago (New York state accounts for about 90,000 of these);¹ Britain has about half that number;² Canada in 1970 had 11,200 and the monthly rates shown thus far (as of June, 1971) indicate that about 30,000 abortions will have been performed here in 1971.³

The Canadian provinces with the highest rates of abortion (December 1970—the last month for which I

have specific figures) were British Columbia (where abortions numbered 19% of live births), Alberta (10.5%), Ontario (9.8%).⁴ In fact, abortions are beginning to be seen as a means of birth control in preference to contraceptive methods. (In one British Columbia hospital, two women have each had their third abortion in eight months.⁵)

That abortion is a question which has been focused only recently in terms of major proportions is seen in the treatment granted it in the writings of moral philosophers. Two of the major works in Christian ethics⁶ make no mention of abortion, although they both have sections dealing with the taking of human life and with sex; in contrast, books written in the last half of the 1960's invariably deal with the question.

To the extent that abortions are equated with murder, as claimed by church father Tertullian, or to the extent that they are seen as one step along the way to increasing dehumanization, to that extent the Christian owes it to himself to be concerned about what George Williams claims to constitute the "second major moral issue of our society" (i.e. abortion/euthanasia).⁷ (The first issue, he feels, is "peace in the world.")

It may be that abortions constitute little more than an operation similar to removal of any extraneous tissue; if that be so, we must train ourselves to evaluate it accordingly. But it may also be that abortions constitute a violation of human life, and we must then also evaluate it accordingly. Above all, we as Mennonite Brethren must



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speak to it as Christians, drawing for the justification of our stance—whatever it be—on the insights of the basic documents we consider normative for faith and practice, i.e. the Bible. Thus, statements by Christians which appeal **only** to pragmatic and societally-determined standards and insights are not sufficient bases from which we can evaluate adequately.⁸

With the wealth of good material available from a theistic perspective, it would be both superfluous and presumptuous to add additional. I would, however, like to point out areas in which debate might most fruitfully be carried on. I would appreciate personal response, or a continuing exchange in the letters section of our papers, where the reading constituency could come to a group understanding through community exchange.

What has science to say?

One of the factors which has resulted in the disagreement over the abortion issue is the question of what constitutes life. Pro-abortionists have amassed a considerable listing of euphemisms which tend to beg the question: the "object" is referred to as a foetus or a fertilized ovum, not an organism or an unborn child; the boast is that there have been "50,000 abortions and only three deaths (!)"; removal of the "object" is referred to as "termination of pregnancy." The question, "What constitutes life?" appears to be as difficult to answer as the question, "What constitutes death?" And to the latter we know the agonizing and still conflicting answers that those concerned with organ transplants have given in an attempt to satisfy the various levels or queries raised. And the unequivocal answer has not yet been found.

Similarly, in reference to "When does life begin?" the answer to the more primitive question "What is life?" is still in doubt. The answers of the church may not be permanent here: that life begins when God creates a soul for the "organism"—creationism (so Clement of Alexandria), or that the soul is the offspring of the parents' soul—an offshoot, hence "tradux," i.e. traducianism (so Tertullian). The question of when the soul inhabits the organism (if, in fact, there **is** a soul), is not one which scientific methodology can investigate; the latter's categories do not provide the grid for such a discussion. The question of the beginning of "life" from a scientific perspective must begin with the categories of one of its own disciplines, e.g. genetics.

This informs us that through fertilization (performed by the "joining" of the sperm and the ovum, each carrying 23 chromosomes from the parent), the resultant zygote is given the full complement of the normal body cell's 46 chromosomes. The chromosomes, as the zygote "splits" and forms daughter cells, are reduplicated in each of the resultant body cells. The chromosomes are carriers of genes, which transmit the hereditary characteristics of the parents to the fertilized ovum, which then begins the task of decoding that characteristic and ensuring that the zygote and the reduplicating cells each carry out the message entrusted to them. "The development of an individual may be said to represent a translation . . . of the

genetic messages this individual received from his parents."⁹ Basically, "genetics teaches that we were from the beginning what we essentially still are in every cell."¹⁰ In this sense, life (i.e. individuation) is present from the moment of conception.

This individuation is also suggested in that both the fertilized ovum (technically, all who are reading this are such) and the mother have an autonomous life: each has illnesses in which the other does not necessarily participate; the relation may be termed closer to that of parasitic on the part of the one—but it is life, nevertheless.

Another criteria for life is that of "potentiality": the potentiality of becoming a "person"—rationality, culture-making, social-consciousness. And the progress of the fertilized ovum from conception to the grave represents in many respects stages of developing potentiality. With the death of the brain, e.g. a flat EEG, comes the loss of all potentiality for personhood, for the physiological basis is gone. "In the instance of zygote or early embryo, however—even before the advent of brain waves—the potentiality for personhood exists. The potentiality for personhood of a zygote is thus obviously greater than that of a moribund adult, however much greater the morphological development of the latter."¹¹

Life, then, in many respects can be seen to be defined **not only** in terms of mechanical (i.e. chemicophysical responses) criteria—the moment of quickening (or some fixed arbitrary period—26 weeks from conception, in Maryland), the first sound of heart beat, the first brain wave patterns, etc. Life does not **only** begin at 40.

Concerns of medical men

Two basic concerns that medicine might have in relation to abortions include the psychological considerations relating to abortion, and the adequate utilization of hospital facilities.

Since therapeutic abortions are now given primarily for mental, and not physical, reasons, "purely medical reasons have been almost completely abandoned with the shifting to the protection of the mental health (of the mother)."¹²

If this is the case—and certainly medical advances in terms of vaccines against rubella have minimized the possibility of foetal damage—then the reasons for abortion on psychiatric grounds might well be examined more rigorously. Why not have "as an alternative to abortion on psychiatric grounds the increased practise of psychotherapy to assist a patient through pregnancy?"¹³

Sharp lists a study, carried on by the University of Miami's Medical School, of pregnant women who, although stating suicidal intentions, were not granted abortions. No suicides, even after several years, occurred. However psychiatric studies diverge sharply on this matter, illustrating the fact that the moral position taken **prior** to the study, to the counselling sessions, will determine the outcome, particularly where open-ended concepts such as "guilt," "unwanted" necessarily figure in the questioning and in the findings. The opinions and interpretations given, then, will be heavily influenced by "the moral

stance taken by a physician toward abortion in general and foetal life in particular,"¹⁴ and must be weighted accordingly.

A second factor of concern to some members of the medical profession is the time and care now being taken by abortion cases, to the detriment of using hospital facilities for other purposes. In an article signed by three Winnipeg doctors,² attention was drawn to the case of two patients suffering from pelvic cancer who had to wait several months for treatment because abortion cases were given priority. Their suggestion is that, like East European countries, abortion cases pay their own costs; they also suggest that "abortions be moved out of our public hospitals into separate facilities."

A question of ethics

Moral considerations weigh heavily in the matter of abortions, as well. As indicated earlier, the moral stance of the researcher will help determine his conclusions regarding psychiatric-psychological effects of granting or refusing abortions. The importance of the moral decision is emphasized once more by Callahan when he points out that "our moral policy becomes crucial at each stage of the decision-making process: choosing the relevant data, interpreting the data and then deciding how we should act in light of the data."¹⁵

Thus, it is not sufficient to state that "life" begins with the fertilization of the ovum; some claim about the value, "sanctity," of life must also be present in order for a value to be placed on the "life" present, and such a claim constitutes a moral judgment. It would thus seem clear that the question of abortion is fundamentally an ethical one, funded by the moral currency which one brings to the transaction. Another example of the role of ethical services in debating the question of quantity vs quality of life.¹⁶ Opting for one rather than the other is again a function of a value placement, and the question of the genesis of such a value becomes pressing. It is thus that the basis of ethical decision-making must be clearly understood, and this basis dare be none other than the documents—the Scriptures. This is the ground on which the concerned Christian doctor, nurse, legislator, citizen, et al, must eventually come to.

Concern of theology

The one specific reference to criminal law having to do with the foetus is Exodus 21:22-24.

"When men strive together, and hurt a woman with child, so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no harm follows, the one who hurt her shall be fined, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."

Here the death of the "child" does not appear to constitute a capital offense—he is not "nephesh," life. In the case of miscarriage, then, the organism is not equated fully with life; the father is entitled to civil damages, not

to the satisfaction of *lex talionis* (eye for eye) as in the event of the death of his wife. But this does not permit abortion—the deliberate termination of pregnancy. Neither does the absence of any specific command against abortion demonstrate its permissibility; the argument from silence cannot be taken as its endorsement.¹⁷

However, Montgomery points out in the same book some reservations.¹⁸ (At the same time, Montgomery's easy setting of "Law" over against "Gospel," i.e. questioning the validity of the Old Testament for bearing on the topic at hand, is not an entirely satisfactory solution, either!) He quotes several commentators who point out, on linguistic grounds, that the rendering of these verses should be as follows:

"If men strive and thrust against a woman with child, who has come near or between them, so that her children come out (come into the world), and no injury is done either to the woman or the child that is born, a compensation is to be paid . . . (A fine is imposed, because even if no injury had been done to the woman and the fruit of her womb, such a blow might have endangered life."¹⁹ (so Keil and Delitsch)
Or, "when men strive together and they hurt unintentionally a woman with a child, and her children come forth but no mischief happens—that is, the woman and the children do not die—the one who hurt her shall surely be punished by a fine. But if any mischief happen, that is, if the woman dies or the children die, then you shall give life for life."²⁰ (so Cassuto)

This agrees better with the Septuagint, which reads, in part, "And if two men strive and smite a woman with child, and her child be born imperfectly formed, he shall be forced to pay a penalty: as the woman's husband may lay upon him, he shall pay with a valuation."²¹

In either case, even when damage to the foetus was accidental, it became an offense, the gravity of which depends on the actual reading of the text.²² Neither reading endorses deliberate harm to the foetus.

Further, the Old Testament viewpoint is one which sees conception as a gift of God. The Hebrew emphasis on the Lord who opens the womb (Gen. 29:31, 30:22; Ruth 4:13) is a reminder that conception is that whereby man and God together create—and the wonder of that creation is evident before term, not after. This continuing work of God is hymned by David when he marvels,

"Thou didst form my inward parts, thou didst knit me together in my mother's womb. I praise thee, for thou art fearful and wonderful . . . My frame was not hidden from thee, when I was being made in secret . . . Thy eyes beheld my unformed substance; in thy book were written, every one of them, the days that were formed for me, when as yet there was none of them" (Psalm 139:13-16)

That there was personhood even before term is indicated usage of the first person singular in Psalm 51:5 ("Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me"). The concept of the worth of the person, from conception on, is thus given explicit reference.

Again, the theology of the Incarnation focuses questions which may take us back to the periods of creedal formulations, but still: was Mary "theotokos," mother of God? If she was—and our creeds and confessions express our beliefs²³—then the announcement to Mary of her coming conception was the heralding of the incarnation of

God, of "God with us" from conception on, not from a later "adoptionist" perspective.²⁴

But again, when does life begin? Here my Christian perspective echoes Bonhoeffer when he points out that

"destruction of the embryo in the mother's womb is a violation of the right to live which God has bestowed upon this nascent life. To raise the question whether we are here concerned already with a human being or not is merely to confuse the issue. The simple fact is that God certainly intended to create a human being and that this nascent human being has been deliberately deprived of his life."²⁵

Further abortion—in the context of the biblical understanding of family (and it is in that context that Bonhoeffer wrote)—is a negation of God's gift; it becomes an evasion of responsibility. With the exception of those pregnancies resulting from rape and most of those from incest, pregnancies are one of the class of acts for which people must bear responsibility. To accept any other possibility is to countenance the first result of man's alienation from God—seeking to evade responsibility for his actions. Thus,

"murder does not begin with the active killing—nor in the killing of the embryo. It begins rather with the renunciation, the wishing away of the embryo; for here is a person who refuses to say Yes to a gift bestowed by God and a responsibility imposed by Him. This is not only disobedience to the divine command but also ingratitude for the privilege offered in the talent and most certainly and in the child entrusted to me."²⁶

Another consideration for the theological concern with abortion is the high value which God placed on man; man is created in **his** image, God has **chosen** men (Deut. 7:7), and in the light of the Incarnation identified himself completely **with** man.

It is here that I am a trifle puzzled by developments in the churches. That part of the church which has only too willingly sent its best men to war to die in never-ending struggles for someone else's economic interests, has been most insistent on preserving the sanctity of the life of the unborn child. Conversely, that part of the church which in the last decade has suddenly found that pacifism squares with its own insights, has been at the same time most vociferous in terms of championing liberalized abortion laws—and even operate their own clinics!²⁷

Our own heritage—hopefully it remains more alive than just an heirloom shown to interested visitors—is one which had as a major strand the respect for the life which God made. Mennonites, and others of the historical peace churches, need in a special way to remind ourselves of what we were called from—and to—recognizing that

"pacifism and opposition to abortion converge here, for both find their ultimate justification to revere human life and its potential, and to respect all of the rights associated with it."²⁸

Abortion, thus, from a theological perspective, is a destruction of that which God has caused to come into being, a being that is the potential bearer of the **imago dei**; it is the destruction of the most sacred of God's gifts—life; it is an acquiescence to man's continuing evasion of responsibility.

Is society concerned?

Is North American society in a position to look at abortion from any of the perspectives suggested above? Robert Drinan, basing his statement on the results of a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Centre, suggests that

"the principle of the inviolability of every human being, even an unborn one, is at present overwhelmingly adhered to by the American people, except in rare and unusual cases. But that conviction can easily be eroded unless there is a constant reminder to everyone that the rights of one or more human beings to health and to happiness, however compelling they may be, can never become so important that they take precedence over another human's right to exist."²⁹

The deliberate taking of human life, at any stage in its development, is contrary to God's expressed will.³⁰ In order to implement God's expressed will in a fallen society (one could contrast Bonhoeffer's categories of "creation orders" and "mandates"), the Christian should be concerned to utilize all legitimate means possible to ensure the prevention of continuing erosion of respect for life. "Secular" groups such as the "League for Life" require strong leadership that will operate from a base other than a well-intentioned humanism. There are opportunities to speak to community groups and to commissions established to gather community opinion.³¹

Our Christian professional people need to be involved in an active program of representing Christian perspectives. Are our doctors in favour of the acceleration in the abortion rate? If so, on what grounds? If not, why do we read in the press of other doctors who oppose abortion but (at least here in Winnipeg), except for the occasional letter to the editor, they appear silent? What of our hospital administrators—can they set policy or does the fact that (as one of them told me) they're publicly funded tie their conscience? Our nurses require support, particularly from doctors, in a stance against caring for those cases which conflict with their own moral codes. While their professional stance asks that they care for all in need, it does not imply that they have no responsibility for speaking to the root-problem of that need, especially where that need is a compendium of the patient's carelessness or ignorance and the doctor's cowardice or lack of perspective. Doctors can refer their patients to someone else—nurses are assigned to wards, and pressures (not always subtle) are placed on them in terms of their assignments. We are a pluralistic society, and as such entitled—nay, obligated—to bring our moral perspectives to bear on this situation. Abortion is no instance of a private morality being transmuted into a public morality.³²

That such a stance poses specific problems is quickly evident to anyone who has followed the debates of the last years.

First, what of the claim of those who hold that the unborn child is no more than another piece of tissue, and who claim the right to "control of their own body"? The unborn child is, of course, not just another piece of tissue—it is an organism that will develop into a human being completely separate from the mother. Its genetic structure is completely different from its mother's and thus establishes its own individuality.

Also, aside from the rather obvious fact that the unborn child is a reminder that this control might have been exercised earlier, is the understanding of "rights"—that the "right" to the body is not an absolute right, but is tempered by the need to take into account the rights of others. "Abortion on demand assumes that the unborn has no rights at all. Abortion on demand is therefore a violation of human rights—the right of the foetus to be born."³³

Second, what of those cases where the continuing pregnancy threatens the life of the mother? Here we are the area of those questions to which there can be no "right" answer, for these situations come as a result of the perplexing state of things gone awry after man's alienation from God; the whole universe has been infected and got out of kilter, Paul calls it.

"In the borderline situation the overwhelming force of these questions which cannot be decided with strict theoretical clarity brings out very clearly what is always the case, namely, that we can decide only subject to forgiveness We are moving in a world that is saturated with sin and that no one can pass through it without incurring guilt."³⁴

And here, dealing situationally, I would probably support killing the unborn in order that the mother might live—yet not saying (as Fletcher does say) that this is the **right** thing to do.

Third, what of those cases involving rape and incest? Fletcher makes much of the former case—his major reference to abortion deals with an inmate of a mental hospital who is raped by another inmate.³⁵ (Abortion in this instance is the "right" thing, he says.) Apart from the fact that in our permissive society relatively few undisputed rapes occur, these are instances which must be considered on their own merits. "They do not constitute a large enough proportion to justify the emphasis placed upon them by proponents of abortion."³⁶ But even in such cases we have the same kind of life as that in other pregnancies. To refer to the unborn child, *a la* Fletcher, as "an aggressor," and to state that just as the rape victim would have been justified in killing her assailant so she is justified in killing **this** assailant (i.e. the unborn child) is to utilize language for game playing, not for information transfer.

What is society's responsibility, and the Christian's within that society? Basically, I would underscore the proposals made by Schrottenboer and Williams.

"I would propose the undertaking of a program of broad assistance to expectant mothers who contemplate seeking abortion. An effort should be made to give them counsel, places of retreat and assistance in adoption."³⁷ "The mother must be required and, if socially necessary, aided to bear her child, and the child must have the full protection of society's laws Society . . . should bear some or all of the burden of its stringent upholding of a basically humane law: either by subvention of families afflicted by sadness at a birth or by full custodial care of defective offspring beyond the competence of a parent to sustain it."³⁸

What do Mennonite Brethren say?

Because of our conviction that man was made in God's image; that an attack on man's life constitutes a

violation of God's expressed will; that **the unborn from conception on constitute life as God called it into being, with potential for development into knowledge of, and faith in, the Creator, we are agreed on the following:**

(1) that all abortion—the wilful termination of a pregnancy—is a violation of God's will;

(2) that we in the helping professions (e.g. social workers, nurses, doctors, psychiatrists, etc.) stand in firm commitment to this view, seeking to bring our colleagues and the community at large to see the seriousness of the erosion of human values;

(3) that we as members acquaint ourselves with this problem and seek to align ourselves with groups which together with us can speak with a united voice to our community;

(4) that we as individuals and in our various organizational affiliations present our views to our legislators with a view to bring God's will to be expressed in the laws of our country;

(5) that we recognize our own involvement in the social and spiritual breakdown of our communities, and support preventive measures (sex education, contraceptive clinics), counselling services and care facilities charged to the community purse;

(6) that we reaffirm our task to "destroy arguments and every proud obstacle to the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ" (II Cor. 10:5).

FOOTNOTES

1. "Everyday World of Abortion." *Winnipeg Free Press*, Jan. 19, 1971, p. 15.
2. "Abortions and Hospital Care." *Winnipeg Free Press*, Mar. 25, 1971, p. 34.
3. "Therapeutic Abortions." *Winnipeg Tribune*, April 19, 1971. Other countries with higher abortion rates than those indicated include Japan (in 1967, with 39 abortions for every 100 live births; Czechoslovakia, 44 abortions/100 live births); Bulgaria, 79 abortions/100 live births; Hungary, 126 abortions/100 live births; Rumania, 400 abortions/100 live births. In all instances, these represent sharp increases since liberalization of abortion laws came into effect, increases in the order of 7900% in Bulgaria's instance. This data is in D. Callahan, *Abortion*, p. 243, 267.
4. *loc. cit.*
5. "Abortions and Hospital Care."
6. E.C. Gardner, *Biblical Faith and Social Ethics* (Harper & Row, 1960) and G. Thomas, *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy* (Scribner's, 1955).
7. G.H. Williams, "The No. 2 Moral Issue of Today." Jersild & Johnson (eds), *Moral Issues and Christian Response*, Holt-Rinehart-Wilson, 1971, p. 175.
8. Letters to the MBH indicate such a basic orientation, speaking from a totally humanistic viewpoint. See "Deceitful Matters," April 16, 1971; "Setting the Logic Straight," June 11, 1971.
9. T. Dobzhansky, *Heredity and the Nature of Man*, Signet Science Library, 1966, p. 38.
10. Paul Ramsay, "The Morality of Abortion." *Life or Death: Ethics and Options*, U of Washington Press, 1968, p. 62.
11. D. Callahan, *Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality*, Collier-MacMillan, 1970, p. 389. It is this latter point which creates a concern for many—that if "humanness" is defined **solely** in realized and **actual** potential, that the fertilized ovum which has only a flat EEG reading may also be terminated, i.e. euthanasia.

12. J. Lavelle, "Is Abortion Good Medicine?" **Our Family**, October, 1967, p. 18.
13. K. Sharp, "Abortion's Psychological Price." **Christianity Today**, June 4, 1971, p. 4. See also Callahan, **Abortion**, p. 62 ff.
14. Callahan, **Abortion**, p. 83.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 395, 396.
16. The matter of "quantity" vs "quality" is not all that simple, even apart from the ethical implications. Terminating a pregnancy, in order to opt for "quality" of life for children already in a family, may well result in an erosion of the concept of "quality" (i.e. value, worth) of other developed stages of life itself. Selective termination may well result in an attitude of a general cheapening of life at other stages, and the criteria of "quality" readily transmuted into characteristics of social utility, public enhancement, etc., extrapolated to endorse infanticide as well as euthanasia. What will constitute the criteria of quality?
17. Waltke believes in the argument from silence; "from this negative evidence we may infer that God does not invariably prohibit abortion." B. Waltkey, "Old Testament Texts." **Birth Control and the Christian**. Tyndale House, 1969, p. 10.
18. J. Montgomery, "Christian View of the Fetus," **Birth Control**, p. 87 ff.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
21. **The Septuagint Version of the Old Testament**, Ragster & Sons. R. Rushdooney also supports this interpretation in his article, "Abortion," **The Encyclopaedia of Christianity**, vol. 1.
22. For an answer by Waltke to Montgomery, see **Birth Control**, p. 23. You can choose your authority—it's up for grabs!
23. Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, could not accept that—he said, "I cannot term him God who was two and three months old."
24. The question of "When does the soul enter the body?" is one which construtes consideration in a separate paper altogether. If we hold to the monist perspective which sees man as a unit, as an "incarnated body, not an animated soul," then there is no problem. Consciousness can be identified with brain states, and requires no "ghost in the machine" theory. For an excellent exegetical treatment, see O. Cullmann's "Immortality or Resurrection," **Christianity Today**, July 21, 1958.
25. D. Bonhoeffer, **Ethics**, SCM Press, 1955, p. 130, 131.
26. H. Thielecke, **The Ethics of Sex**, Harper & Row, 1964, p. 229.
27. C.F.H. Henry, "Facing the Abortion Crisis." **Christian Leader**, Jan. 12, 1971, p. 3.
28. G. Zahn, "A Religious Pacifist Looks at Abortion." **Commonweal**, May 28, 1971, p. 281.
29. R. Drinan, "Strategy on Abortion." **Moral Issues and Christian Response**, p. 174.
30. While not all of our brotherhood will agree with me on this, I am opposed to capital punishment for reasons similar to those sketched out above.
31. Paul Schroetenboer prepared a statement which was presented to The Abortion Task Force in Grand Rapids. See **The NACPA Politikon**, June 15, 1971, p. 1.
32. John Montgomery espouses very neatly the classical Lutheran "two-kingdoms" concept (**Birth Control**, p. 83). Schroetenboer, however, recognizes God's absolute law which applies to all, the right to life. Hence, "The State must guarantee the rights of all and where necessary protect the rights to life of one against the whim or selfishness of the other." (*op. cit.*)
33. Schroetenboer, p. 1.
34. Thielecke, p. 242.
35. J. Fletcher, **Situation Ethics**, Westminster, 1966, p. 36-39.
36. Zahn, p. 282.
37. Schroetenboer, p. 1, 3.
38. G. Williams, p. 176, 177. Williams, however, agrees to abortions in the events of rape, incest and contracting "fatal burden."

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