

## Chapter 9

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## Our First Casualty - T/S Charles W. Schwarz

"12 Sep - Fired interdiction, counter-battery, destruction (bridge) and targets of opportunity missions. Sporadic enemy shelling (probably 155 mm gun) caused first battle casualties killed, 1 wounded. Total rounds 330 HE 2 Sm, 2 WP"

"Our first casualty was T/S Charles W. Schwarz, and I was with him when it happened. I might first mention that Charlie was sent along with Major Samuel Gray and W.O. Flanagan on the advance detail to England. Charlie was Major Gray's jeep driver. Major Gray was the only one that would ride with him with him because he had poor eyesight. Anyway, Charlie and I became close buddies here in the states after we met in the service. He was 20 years old and I was an old guy of 25. He was a big kid, weighing about 210 and 6'1" tall. After we caught up to them in England, we got together and visited some of the cities in England. When we went into combat we were able to be close to one another, even sharing the same pup tent the night he was killed. That was September 12, 1944. After we pulled into an area, we were along side the of the Madon River. As we put up a pup tent, we discussed as to what we should do if we were shelled. We decided, if it got bad we'd jump into the water and stay below ground level. We also debated who should sleep on the right side or left side of the pup tent. It wound up that Charlie would take the right side, with both heads towards the river edge. Later I had wished it was me on the right side, I felt he was too young to die. It wasn't long after it got dark and we are bedded down, that we heard a shell burst. So then we decided to put on our helmets. Within 5 minutes another shell came in at us and it sounded very close and loud. As we lay facing each other, all of a sudden I heard Charlie making a sound like he was vomiting. Not being able to see, I asked him if he was sick. He never answered me. Then I realized that something was wrong and I got out of the tent and called for help. About the same time I heard others calling for the medics. One was Sgt. Bincarosky calling for help for Sgt. Hesson who was also hit. Shrapnel cut across his face and cheek. The medics came and picked up Charlie, as he died instantly. Later several of us were put in a command car and taken across a shallow part of the river on up to the side of a mountain in front of us that would be safer for the rest of the night. The next morning we returned to get our gear, etc. My tent had a tear in it, about 4 or 5 inches above the ground where the shrapnel came through. It hit Charlie right in the back directly behind his heart. They say that the shell was fired from a German 105 mm howitzer tank. The next day, the 14th, we had funeral services for Charlie with members of the battalion in attendance. We were asked to view his body and pay respects to him. No one made a move to the casket and being in the back row I chickened out too. I always regretted that decision. At that time I promised myself, if I ever got back to the states alive, I would first make a trip to Upper Darby, Pennsylvania to visit Charlie's parents. It all worked out as planned in December 1945. I got to the states and went straight to PA, and Mr. and Mrs. Schwarz. They were so happy to see me and so happy to hear my story how Charlie died. They thought maybe he had volunteered to go on a mission and was killed that way. Charlie was their only child and came along late in their lives. I'd say they were already in their 60s when I saw them. I sent Christmas cards to them for a few years and always received the same. Finally, their cards stopped coming and I then assumed that they passed away. Recently I learned that Charlie's body was reinterred at a cemetery in Upper Darby, which is 15 miles from Philadelphia, PA. That happened November 17, 1948."

*This memory was contributed by Robert Schneider of Scottsdale, Arizona (HQ). According to Major Samuel Gray (Newtown, PA), Charlie was killed on the Madon River at Xeully, France, just south of Nancy. Tech. Sgt. Robert Hesson of McSherrystown, PA (now Hattiesburg, MS) was injured the same night. Major Gray also remembered Schwarz as a "tall, blond .... with eyes so bad that he was entitled to special lenses in his gas mask". However, his stenography skills persuaded Capt. Dupree to select him as a driver/clerk. Gray remembers that "Neither Flanagan nor I displayed any skill as instructors. Our survival was a miracle - no one would ride with Schwarz and myself". Major Gray attended Charlie's burial in Upper Darby on December 17, 1948. Following conversations with Bob Schneider and Samuel Gray, the burial site of Charlie Schwarz at Arlington Cemetery in Upper Darby was visited by Bill and Debbie Cosgrove in December 1993. Charlie is buried with his grandparents and parents: Charles and Barbara. Mr. and Mrs. Schwarz were 61 and 54 years of age when Charlie was killed. The head stone reads "1924 Cpl. Charles W. 1944, HQ. Btry. 945th F.A.Bn., Killed in Action". The December 17, 1948 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin contained the obituary.*

## Chapter 10

### The Lorraine Campaign: Part Two

#### 3 November to 16 December 1944

"To the Sarre"

#### XII CORPS RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE: THE SAAR CAMPAIGN

On 3 November General Eddy issued Field Order No. 10, giving the mission for the offensive to begin on 8 November. The main objective was designated as Faulquemont, twenty miles east of the front lines on the rail line from Metz to Saarbruecken (Figure 1). General Patton addressed officers and a few selected enlisted men on this same date to impress upon them the honor of being permitted to attack alone (1). He reiterated the importance of marching fire (General Patton was constantly concerned that the infantry would not fire their weapons - a concern that was justified based on later studies), and that all supporting weapons were to be used in the attack. He later spoke to the officers and men of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, although he felt it unnecessary to address these veteran units.

On November 7, two years to the day from when General Patton landed in North Africa for Operation Torch, the XII Corps offensive was set to go. Then, the rains came and all day it poured. Generals Eddy and Grow came to General Patton and asked him to "hold off the attack", General Patton posed this question to them - "Whom would they like to name as their successors"! They immediately assented and "as usual did great work" (1).

At 0515 General Patton was awakened by the artillery preparations, the rain had stopped and the stars were out. "The 400 guns sounded like the slamming of doors in an empty house - very many doors all slamming at once. All the eastern sky glowed and trembled with the flashes of guns, and I thought how the enemy must feel, knowing that at last the attack he has dreaded has come" (6). The artillery plan was elaborate and detailed (2). Seventeen battalions of Corps artillery (945th included) would fire a preparation beginning at H minus 60 and continuing through H plus 150, supported by 20 battalions of divisional artillery and numerous 90mm anti-aircraft guns, 3-inch tank destroyer guns, and 105mm howitzers of the regimental cannon companies (2).

Both Bradley and General Eisenhower called to check on the attack, General Eisenhower telling General Patton to "carry the ball all the way". H-hour was at 0600, and everyone kicked-off on time. The attack of the 26th Inf. Div. was on the right front of the XII Corps (Figure 2). They moved into position during the night before the attack. The 945th was located in the middle of the 26th position just outside Arracourt (Figure 2). The attack was a complete surprise to the Germans for the following reasons: radio silence, late movement of the troops to the departure line, a short artillery preparation, lack of air activity, and a concentration of tanks to the rear (2).

The 104th Infantry (26th Inf. Div.) advanced into Vic-Sur-Seille, and the 101st Infantry seized a bridge at Moyenvic; however, Hill 310 just east of Vic-Sur-Seille remained in German hands. The deterioration in the weather prevented artillery support, and the men on the hill, many of whom had shed their coats in the initial attack on the first day, suffered from exposure when rain and snow began to fall late on the 8th and into the next two days. It would take three days of fighting in the cold and snow to take the hill, with a cost of 478 officers and men killed or wounded. The 945th was again close to the front with all three batteries around Vic-Sur-Seille on 10 November.

At the end of the first day all of the units for the 35th, 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions were at their assigned objectives - then the rain started. The 945th fired 435 HE rounds on 8 November to support the attack. The War Diary notes that the 8th started clear, turning to rain in the afternoon. By the next day it was snowing.

On 11 November, all five Batteries displaced to new positions after having been stopped since 27 September. This was 46 days during which supplies of gasoline, ammunition, and other necessities were replenished. During this period some men in the Batteries were privileged to move into homes with some of the French families in the villages.

#### THE TRAP AT RODALBE

12 November would prove to be a day that the men of the 945th, or the 104th Infantry would always remember. The 3rd Battalion of the 104th had advanced into Rodalbe accompanying Task Force Hunter from the 4th Arm. Div.. Lt. Paul Remillard, a forward observer with the 945th FAB, accompanied the 104th Inf. With his radio operator Cpl. Charles Albrecht. They "walked all day, carrying our 40 lb radio by hand" (I47). The town they entered was Rodalbe, a small village well to the northeast of Chateau-Salins, was the point of furthest penetration by American forces on 12 November. Unfortunately the Germans set a trap by mining the road and covering it with hidden gun emplacements, essentially closing off the road to Rodalbe. Efforts to relieve the battalion failed as darkness closed in and the muddy roads restricted movement.

A 28-man patrol from the 2nd battalion entered the town with orders for the 3rd battalion to withdraw, but it was too late. Another effort was made to enter the village, but they too were turned away by German tanks which now held all entrances to Rodalbe. Remillard was wounded during the initial German assault, but was able to escape with several other men to get help. After being treated for his wounds, he and some other men from an armored command headquarters were preparing to return to Rodalbe when a colonel stopped, warning them that German tanks had cut off all roads leading into the village.

The men remaining in Rodalbe hid in cellars, but the local residents gave away their locations and the German tanks fired directly into the cellars. Over 200 men and officers were lost in Rodalbe. A few men escaped during the night. Paul Remillard told the story of his narrow escape at the 8th annual reunion of the 945th in Nashville, TN, nearly fifty years after it had occurred. His radioman,

decided to stay and take his chances - he was later found dead in one of the village cellars. Only twelve men survived from the group that was with Lt. Remillard.

The War Diary for 12 November reads as follows (3):

12 Nov

Light snow during night and fog during day restricted air observation.  
FO with Companies "L" and "K" of 104th Inf in Rodalbe (244-348).  
Radio operator casualty. Lack of communications blamed for losses.  
75 HE expended.

The 945th, which had just displaced to Chateau Vous on 14 November, was in top form as 362 and 479 HE rounds were fired on 13-14 November, the highest two day total to date. By 16 November the 945th was "mired in mud" and General Eddy was realigning the boundaries of the XII Corps in preparation for the push to the Sarre River.

#### THE XII CORPS DRIVE TOWARDS THE SARRE

The attack towards the Sarre would begin on 18 November on the left wing with the 35th and 80th Inf. Divisions, and the 6th Arm. Div. striking towards the road junction of Morhange. On the right wing the 26th Inf. Div. and 4th Arm. Div. would, supported by the 945th, would push past Dieuze towards Sarre-Union, a "bleak industrial town" just beyond the Saar River.

The mud restricted American armor to the roads and prepared defensive positions; however, the artillery support afforded by the XII Corps was punishing, stopping both armor and infantry attacks in their tracks. At one village, Gros-Tenquin, time-on-target (TOT) artillery fire by nineteen battalions of field artillery, combined with fighter-bombers and mortar attacks, left the few surviving German soldiers "quaking with fear". Each village was in turn assaulted and reduced at a rate which the armor officers destined - they called it "an infantry pace" (2).

On 25 November the HQ for the 945th was in the Dieuze, and the weather was consistently poor with notes in the War Diary such as "stormy weather; wind, rain and sleet; unable to observe registration; etc.". Jack Carr remembers that the "towns and dates were meaningless", that his main concern was to "do his job and stay alive" (I4).

At the end of November the advance on the right wing found the 4th Arm. Div. and 26th Inf. Div. overlooking Mackwiller, poised to advance on Sarre-Union. The month of November ended on the left wing with the front lines pushed back another 27 miles in front of the 6th Arm. Div. and 35th Inf. Div. The 26th Inf. Div. had suffered 661 killed in action and over 2,000 wounded since the beginning of the month, almost 90 percent riflemen (4). Maj. Gray recalls that the 945th CP was located in a country inn that was also being used by the Graves Registration Service for the 26th Inf. Div. He awoke one morning to find that the 26th had collected bodies and had them stacked like

cord wood outside the CP. The Third Army was now along the west bank of the Maderbach River - at the western most border of the famous West wall defense network.

During November the 945th fired a total of 5,561 high explosive (HE) and 150 smoke rounds. The smoke was generally used to aid in registering the howitzers after the Batteries were moved into new positions. Registration was normally done by observers in the L-4 aircraft when the weather was suitable for flying. Otherwise it was done by the forward observers (I27).

## XII CORPS ATTACK TO TOWARD THE WEST WALL (1-18 DECEMBER)

The XII Corps had come to a halt by 30 November with the following divisions lined up from north to south: 80th Inf. Div., 6th Arm. Div., 35th Inf. Div., and the 26th Inf. Div. (Figure 3). The corps front was twenty-five miles in length, with the left wing at Bening-les-Avoid, and the right near Mackwiller. General Patton had quietly given up on reaching the Rhine River by mid-December, but SHAEF still recognized that continued offensive operations by the third Army would "attract considerable German resources from the northern and central sectors...", which in fact it did. Units that were scheduled for deployment for the Ardennes offensive were held in line by the Third Army until the last minute.

As the net slowly closed around Sarre-Union, American infantry were caught in the town by eight German tanks. The American infantry took shelter in the cellars while an artillery forward observer, hidden in a house surrounded by Germans, radioed back for artillery fire. In ten minutes the 105mm howitzers of the 101st Field Artillery Battalion fired 380 rounds into the area (2). This was just another example of the dependancy of infantry on the power of American artillery.

Saturday, 2 December was the first date available through the National Archives for the 945th FAB Daily Journal (Figure 4). On that day the weather was clear, the Purple Heart was awarded to five men including 2nd Lt. Milton C. Worley, and the battalion fired 146 HE rounds. Note that at 2400 the Journal was closed and one "situation overlay" was attached. These velum overlays were used to pinpoint the location of the battalion Hqs and firing batteries on the standard topographic maps used throughout the war. The original situational overlays were saved and are also in the National Archives collection. On that date the first concentration (#467) was fired at 0450 (4:40 am) for a TOT (Time on Target) of 12 HE (high explosive) rounds to location (5895-3640) on the Saarbrucken 1:100,000 topographic map, a target near Mackwiller (Saarbrucken Map). It would only be 16 more days until the battalion, located several miles east of Sarreguemines near Erching, would turn towards the north and the Battle of the Bulge.

At the end of 6 December the 6th Arm. Div. And 35th Inf. Div. held the western bank of the Sarre River in force from Grosbliederstoff to Wittring, a distance of ten miles (2). General Eddy delayed the 35th Inf. Div. until the 26th Inf. Div. could come along side and attack on 8 December. On 5 December the War Diary states that the weather was "cloudy with rain", and that the battalion displaced to Mackwiller, fired one mission, then displaced to Sarre-Union.

On 7 December the XII Corps regrouped for the next phase of the advance to the northeast (2). The main effort would be by the 35th and 26th Inf. Div. attacking abreast in order to position the XII Corps for a final push through the West Wall. Before sunrise on 8 December the 35th and 26th Inf. Div. Attacked to cross their respective barriers, the Sarre River and Maginot Line. The 945th FAB supported the 26th Inf. Div. As they drove forward to "crack the Maginot Line" (2). The 945th participated in a 30 minute artillery barrage that inflicted "severe losses on the German troops". The German SS XIII Corps commander, General Balck, stated that "The experiences of the last days have taught that the enemy artillery, employing air or ground observation, easily destroys our own counter-attacks before they are actually formed" (2).

"The Lorraine Campaign" specifically mentions the 945th FAB in footnote 33 on page 541 where it says that "The enemy too had a rough time at the hands of the artillery. The 945th Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm Howitzer) and the 731st Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm Gun) picked up a German tank park near Bebelnheim, some 5,000 yards northeast of Frauenberg, and crippled or destroyed several enemy tanks". The War Diary for 11 December includes the notation that "Tanks and counterattacks vital targets. Total rounds 546 HE..." (3). The 945th fired over 500 HE rounds for three days in a row on 10-12 December 1944. It should be noted that the 26th Inf. Div. was replaced on line by the 87th Inf. Div. (Golden Acorns) on 9 December. The 945th FAB subsequently supported the newly arrived 87th Inf. Div. On 12 December with 583 HE rounds.

On 10 December the 945th Fire Direction Control had just registered a road where it entered a patch of woods when three tanks emerged from the woods. Maj. Clay fired one volley from the registered Battery and three tanks were either disabled or destroyed. Sgt. Mitchum recalls that the Batteries were using few charges (powder bags) because they were so close to the Germans, and if you were behind the howitzer often you could see the shell leave the muzzle because of the lower velocity. As the Chief of Section, Mitchum was responsible for ensuring that the howitzer crew could maintain a firing rate of four rounds per minute. This entailed aligning the howitzer and working deflections off the stakes that were set up to keep all the howitzers in the Battery in proper alignment.

On 14-16 December the 35th and 87 Inf. Div. Fought a series of "grim Battles" that lead them up to the wood lots held by German infantry adjacent to the West Wall (2). It would be the last progress to the east in the Lorraine, for on 16 December the Germans launched the attack into the Ardennes forest of Luxembourg and Belgium, the Battle of the Bulge. General Patton's all-out offensive against the West Wall, scheduled for 18 December, would have to wait. The 87th and 35th Inf. Div. Were told to halt their attacks, and the 35th Inf. Div. was removed from the battle line after 162 consecutive days of fighting (2). Total American casualties for the Lorraine Campaign was 6,657 killed, 36,406 wounded, and 12,119 missing.

On 18 December, just before the orders came for the 945th FAB to head for Luxembourg, battery C was hit hard by enemy shells. Rudolph Amschler remembers that the location was near Erching on a cloudy, rainy day (I31). As their convoy reached the top of a hillside and got the howitzers uncoupled the German 88mm. guns began direct firing at the battalion. "The driver stopped the engine and told me to take cover. We ran into a branch 3 feet deep for cover. About

60 rounds of artillery hit the Battery C area. One section was knocked out. Two of our men were killed, and 9 were wounded. The gun was knocked out too. This was late in the afternoon" (I31). Cruiser recalled that "... we got beat up pretty good - several casualties. C battery at one time was down from 102 enlisted men to 72 enlisted men. It is pretty tough to go on with about a third of your people gone".

Two men, Sgt. Henry T. Payton and Pvt. Benjamin F. Fry, were killed. Payton had sought cover between the trails of the howitzer that was destroyed and was killed instantly. Nine others, including 2nd Lt. John T. (Tom) Cope, were wounded. Fred Mackey and his wife Hazel had been good friends with Henry Payton and his wife during training, and Fred later found out that Payton's first child was born the day after he was killed in France. Fred attended Payton's funeral in Newnan, Georgia after the war. Battery B was also hit and two men were wounded by shrapnel. In fact, Sgt. Mitchum saw tree limbs in the vicinity of B Battery that had been cut by the shrapnel. Later in the day the battalion was hit again at a different location, and Amschler's tent was "riddled" with shrapnel holes. Mackey remembers that the tent was absolutely shredded, but a clock inside was undamaged.

Dan Hale remembers that the men were cold, hungry, and exhausted in the Lorraine by December (I1). The Germans had broken through the American lines, and he noted that Tom Cope from his battery was wounded. Tom Cope was born in Ohio, but his father, a World War I veteran, returned the family to Alabama when he was one year old. Having graduated from Auburn University in 1942, he entered the U.S. Army and joined the 179th FAB at Ft. Sill. He was subsequently transferred to the 945th while at Camp Gruber and assigned to Svc. Battery as the motor officer. Cope was assigned to the 945th as an air observer, and he frequently flew with Lt. Eaton in the small Piper L-4 observation planes. Cope had about 60 missions when he was wounded on 18 December, and later received the Air Medal in addition to the Purple Heart. On 15 December he had been temporarily transferred from Svc. Battery to C battery. As the battery stopped in an apple orchard near Erching they received counter-battery fire from across the German border. Cope states that "... we received a 60 round concentration which killed two and wounded 10" (I27). Wounded in the shoulder, he spent 8 months in the hospital. He was promoted to 1st Lt. upon separation at LaGarde General Hospital in New Orleans, LA.

## THE XII CORPS ARTILLERY IN THE LORRAINE

LTC. Dyer's book "XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Army" provides a good summary of the XII Corps Artillery during the drive across France. The Third Army had over 1,000 artillery pieces along the front, with close to 25,000 rounds being fired on days late in November. General John Lentz, Commander of the XII Corps Artillery, was a field artilleryman during World War I and knew first-hand the importance of leadership within the Corps. His frequent visits to the firing batteries created his morale and esprit within the Corps. From the Corps HQ to the firing batteries the quality could be noted. Lentz once commented that he had "never seen a bunch of battalion commanders who had their tails so high".



The organization was flexible and comprehensive. The corps artillery was divided into four Field Artillery "Groups", the 182nd being the primary assignment for the 945th FAB, although transfers to other groups for specific objectives did occur. The History of the 182nd Field Artillery Group notes that it was historically a Michigan National Guard unit from the Detroit area. The history also notes that "The first actual firing by the artillery battalions attached to the 182nd group occurred at the siege at Montargis, when the 945th FA Battalion fired 76 rounds from their 155mm howitzers on 21st August" (5).

Control for all the artillery within the Corps was exercised through one or two fire direction centers which were located well forward. Col. Rodney Gott, Lentz's Executive Officer, stated that "In the whole history of corps operation we never had battalions out of supporting range of our advance elements" (4). "No other corps had their artillery further forward than ours. We never lost any of it" (howitzers to the enemy).

The XII Corps history uses the 945th FAB, "one of XII Corps favorite fighting battalions", as an example of the aggressiveness and co-operating spirit of the corps artillery (6, page 221). Col. Wilbur V. DeLoach, commander of the 945th FAB, stated that "Less than 10 percent of the positions we occupied were goose eggs (predetermined areas) sent down by Group {182nd Field Artillery Group}. My normal practice was to stay out with my driver, acting as my own radio operator. I had contact with the direct support artillery battalion CO and his infantry. By doing this I could keep up with the situation much better and plan my displacements so as to always be well within range and cover any possible targets in the infantry sector. These tactics always enabled our artillery to stay well forward where it would do the most good, and keep us in position where we could reach a mass of targets with the green bag powder (Charge five or less)...." (6). Sgt. Mitchum explained that the howitzers usually were loaded with 5 to 8 powder bags or "charges". He recalled one time in the Sarr where the Germans were so close that the battalion was only using one powder bag; and that you could see the 155 mm shell as it departed the barrel due to the decreased muzzle velocity.

General Lentz recognized the 945th and other corps artillery battalions on 4 October 1944 with a Commendation, noting that "The performance of the corps artillery battalions in recent operations has been outstanding" (Figure 5). General Eddy echoed this opinion on 16 October 1944 in a letter to General Lentz stating that "In probably no other branch of the ground forces has the skillful application of enormous power produced a more devastating effect upon the German army than with the artillery, and I can assure you that the XII Corps artillery is no exception. It has performed its missions consistently with distinction. All its members may well be proud of its record to date" (6).

General Patton wrote two letters of congratulations to the XII Corps on 24 November and 2 December, both of which were forwarded with ringing endorsements from General Eddy. General Lentz concluded this round of congratulatory notes on 12 December ending with the following: "We now stand on the border of Germany. There is still more rain, still more cold, still more mud, still more Germans to overcome. But the end is inevitable. It remains now but to accomplish this final

mission in the same magnificent manner that the Corps Artillery has made its standard" (Figures 6 and 7).

The Germans recognized the importance and quality of the American artillery, being distinguished by a speedy system of communications, accurate fire, plentiful ammunition, greater range, extensive use of white phosphorus, and the skillful use of artillery planes as aerial observation posts (2). It seemed like the Germans couldn't hold out much longer, but as the 945th pushed towards the Sarr, Hitler and the German High Command were preparing to unleash one of the best planned and largest counter-offenses in military history into the Ardennes Forest - the "Battle of the Bulge".

Figure 1  
XII Corps Front  
8 November 1944  
The Lorraine Campaign: Map 7






Figure 2  
Advance in the 26th Division Zone  
8-17 November 1944  
The Lorraine Campaign: Map XXVII






Figure 3  
Third Army - The November Offensive  
8 November - 2 December 1944  
The Lorraine Campaign: Map XXXVIII




Figure 4  
945th FAB Daily Journal  
2 December 1944

945th FA Bn  
(ORGANIZATION)

JOURNAL

329 #

From: 20001 Dec '44  
(TIME AND DATE)  
To: 22400 Dec '44  
(TIME AND DATE)

Time		Serial Number	Time Dated	Incidents, Messages, Orders, etc.	Action Taken
In	Out				
				(Day and date)	
				Sat 2 Dec '44	
				Clear weather	
				By direction of the Pres, under the provisions of AR 600-45, 22 Sep 1943 as amended, the Purple Heart is awarded to the following members of this organization: GO 8, 2 Dec '44 this Headquarters -	
				2d Lt Milton C Worley	
				2d Lt Aolis C McAda	
				Sgt Preston E Blaylock	
				Tec 4 Roscoe F Walker	
				Pfc Lee F Cooper	
		0450		Conc #467 (5895-3840), TOT from Ocean fired by Bn. 12 HE	
		0900		Conc #533 (6470-4320) from Ocean fired by "C" Btry on armored infantry CP expending 9 HE.	
		1030		Enemy battery silenced by Conc #528 (5582-3903); mission from Ocean air observer. Btry "B" expended 34 HE.	
		1100 & 1130		BP registration (5804-3935); Luxury Air Officer observed expenditure of 9 HE by Bn on Schoolhouse and 5 HE fired by Btry "B".	
		1300		Conc #529 (5718-3846) fired on enemy tank; mission from Ocean air observer expended 25 HE.	
		1520		Conc #530 (5482-4218) fired on enemy battery, mission from OHM, by Btry "C" expended 6 HE.	
		1845		Conc #531 (6300-4028) silenced enemy battery after expending 1 Smoke and 24 HE. Mission came from Ocean air observer and was fired by Btry "A".	
		1530		Conc #532 (6368-4105) silenced enemy battery after expending 22 HE. Mission came from Ocean air observer and was fired by Btry "A".	
				Total rounds: 148 HE; 1 HC	
				"Air Log"	
				Lt Grawburg and Lt Bletzer 1045 to 1140	
		2400		Journal closed.	
				Situation overlay attached	
				1 Metro message attached	

(See instructions on back of this form.)

Figure 5  
4 October 1944 Commendation  
General Lentz

HEADQUARTERS  
XIII CORPS ARTILLERY  
APO 312

4 October 1944

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO: Group and Separate Battalion Commanders.

1. The performance of the corps artillery battalions in recent operations has been outstanding.

2. They have been out in front generally. Many have been under small arms fire with no thought of withdrawal. One medium battalion laid directly on hostile assault guns. The observers of another, in the absence of infantry or other troops, fired charge I at tanks over a low crest, turning back the tank attack only after two direct hits were made on tanks within 200 yards of the observers. Batteries suffering casualties from hostile artillery have continued their own firing.

3. They have fired at all times and in all directions. Heavy battalions displayed amazing mobility, and changed positions at every possible chance to kill additional Germans.

4. The cooperation and coordination with supported infantry and tanks and with the reinforced artillery has been unprecedentedly superior. There has been no selfishness, only a desire to serve the supported troops.

5. Air OP's have been active constantly over the entire front. Extraordinary courage has been displayed in so many cases, usually under hostile fire, as to become common. Such devotion to duty is in the best tradition of field artillery.

6. Forward observers of corps units have also shown exemplary devotion to duty. One corps observer was isolated with his infantry across a river for over twelve hours and was the only artillery observer present. Innumerable other instances of outstanding service could be cited.

7. The courage, fighting spirit, and team work of the corps artillery are causes for congratulations to the fighting battalions of the XIII Corps Artillery.


  
JOHN M. LENTZ  
Brigadier General, US Army  
Commanding

Figure 6  
24 November 1944 Commendation  
Generals Patton and Eddy

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO 403

24 November 1944

SUBJECT: Congratulations from General Marshall.

TO : Commanding General, XII Army Corps, APO 312, U. S. Army.

Radio gram received from General Marshall which is in substance as follows:

"Congratulations on the capture of Metz. In spite of flood, cold and bitter enemy resistance. My very personal congratulations to Eddy and Walker on the ground work their troops are putting on towards bringing this war to a triumphant conclusion."

I personally wish to add my commendation and congratulations for the splendid advance which you and your Corps have made. With such troops, the triumphant conclusion of the war is inevitably near.

s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.  
t/ G. S. PATTON, JR.,  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,  
Commanding.

Reproduced by XII Corps  
28 November 1944

AS RPO.6


1st Ind.

(24 Nov 44)

HEADQUARTERS XII CORPS, APO 312, U. S. Army, 28 November 44

TO: Commanders, all units attached or assigned XII Corps

I know you will share my pride and pleasure in General Marshall's and General Patton's generous expressions. Be sure they reflect my own feelings towards you, your troops, and the magnificent part they are playing in hastening our victory over Germany.

  
E. S. EDDY  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

A & B



Figure 7  
2 December 1944 Commendation  
Generals Patton and Eddy

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
Office of The Commanding General

2 December 1944

SUBJECT: Commendation.

TO : The Commanding General XII Corps, APO 312, U. S. Army.

1. Today marks the end of thirty days of relentless and victorious action against a well-posted and determined enemy in the face of appalling conditions of terrain and weather.
2. Please accept for yourself and pass on to the heroic officers and men of your command my deep appreciation of your significant performance.
3. All ranks of the XII Corps are hereby highly commended for their super-human and victorious efforts.

/s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.  
/t/ G. S. PATTON, JR.,  
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

Copy To:

Commanding General Twelfth Army Group.

REPRODUCED HQ XII CORPS  
11 December 1944


AG 330.13 (G-1)  
(8 Dec 44)

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS XII CORPS, APO 312, U. S. Army. 11 Dec 44

TO: Commanders All Units Assigned or Attached XII Corps.

It is a great satisfaction for me to indorse to you General Patton's message. Let me express my deep confidence in the certainty that you and your troops will continue your superb performance in the hastening of our victory.

  
H. S. EDDY  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

## Chapter 10

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3. U.S. Army Military History Institute, "War Diary of the 945th Field Artillery Battalion in the ETO", 202-945FA 1945, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
4. Weigley, Russell F., Eisenhowers Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany 1944-45, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1981.
5. U.S. Army Military History Institute, "History of the 182nd Field Artillery Group", 204-182FA 1945, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
6. Dyer, George LTC, XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Army, XII Corps History Association, 1947.



Camp Blanding, Florida



155 mm Schneider Howitzers  
Camp Blanding, Florida

121C



Camp Shelby, Mississippi




179th Field Artillery Battaion  
William Skinner - Sardis, Georgia  
Camp Shelby, Mississippi

121 D



M-5 Tractor (manufactured by International Harvester)



155 mm M1 Howitzer

121 B





Lt. Robert Grawburg, L-4 Pilot  
20 October 1944, Moncel-Sur-Seille, France (Summerour)



Moselle River Crossing at Velle-Sur-Moselle, France  
13 September 1944 (Mackey)

121 G



945th FAB on the move in France



945th FAB Headquarters - Moncel-Sur-Seille, France (Howenstine)

Top - Giles, Breitenstein, Bean, Plas, DeBenidictus, Wenzel


Middle - Howenstine, Torma

Bottom - O'Daffer, Trump, Claney, Sagy

121 H



Pvt. Charlie Schwarz - 945th HQ  
Killed in Action 12 September 1944  
Madon River, France (Schneider)



Sgt. Wayne Cruser  
France 1944 (Kline)

121 F






155 mm Howitzer Emplacement  
Parambo's Section (Bolton)



American Red Cross Clubmobile  
Bincarowsky, Hansen, Jacobsen, McDevitt (Price)

1210



A 945th FAB M-5 Tractor and 155 mm M1 Howitzer  
on the move through France - September 1944 (Price)




Sgt. Dan Hale (left) - C Battery  
in France (Horning)

121 E



945th FAB Headquarters at Echternach, Luxembourg - Decmber 1944  
Sgt. Hugh Howenstine, Sgt. Joseph Summerour, Maj. Samuel Gray (Howenstine)



945th HQ  
Capt. Gooding Bean, Lt. Col. Wilbur DeLoach (Summerour)

121 L



945th FAB Headquarters at Consdorf, Luxembourg  
December 1944 (Worley)



A Battery Howitzer Section - Consdorf (Summerour)  
Top - Blaylock, Smallwood, Stewart, Gordon, Mitchell  
Bottom - Bowen, Giles, Cooper, Malick, Ritter





945th FAB Headquarters at Consdorf, Luxembourg  
December 1944 (Bolton)



A Battery with Nazi Battleflag - Consdorf  
Ralph Call, George Mitchell, Charles Shea (Buck)

121 K



Maj. James Clay "Calling in Fire" from the 945th HQ (Summerour)




Across the Rhine River - 22 March 1945 (Bolton)

121 m



The 945th FAB - Germany 1945 (Summerour)



Lt. Col. Wilbur DeLoach and Sgt. Maloy (Summerour)

121 N



155 mm M1 Howitzer "Lucky 13" in full recoil  
Teagle on the Lanyard (Bolton)



945th Fire Mission

121 I





Lt. Col. Wilbur DeLoach Speaks to a 945th Battery  
After the Surrender of Germany - May 1945



Montini, Cruser, Krick and Kline in Paris, France - October 1945

# Chapter 11

## Battle of the Bulge

### 16 December 1944 - 25 January 1945

"We are going to attack until the war is over" - General George S. Patton

#### THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

The Ardennes Offensive was conceived and planned by Hitler to drive a large wedge between the Allied Armies. This wedge would be both physical and psychological, with the objectives being the port of Antwerp and the destruction of the Allied alliance, respectively. Field Marshall Gerd Von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West for the German Army, was to coordinate the attack, although he personally doubted the potential for success. Hitler had outlined at different times his reasons for the offensive (1). He reasoned that the:

- o enemy front in the Ardennes sector is very thinly manned,
- o blow between the British and Americans would lead to disharmony,
- o British and Canadians could be encircled and destroyed,
- o port of Antwerp was within reach, even in bad weather,
- o Ardennes terrain would require the use of fewer German divisions,
- o terrain to the east was wooded and would cover the build-up, and
- o attack would protect the vital Ruhr industrial area.

In fact, General Patton had anticipated the German attack by late November, noting that "the First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up to the east of them" (2). General Patton's intuition was exactly right, the Germans were massing for the attack just to the west of the Ardennes area of Belgium and Luxembourg (Figure 1). The German attack began during the early hours of 16 December 1944. On 17 December Gen. Bradley notified Gen. Patton that at least two divisions would be needed to contain the German attack. The Americans were paying the price for, in General Patton's opinion, sitting still. The next day Gen. Patton met with Bradley in Luxembourg, and on the way home was notified that the situation was deteriorating, and that one combat command of the 4th Arm. Div. needed to move that night.

Unknown to the Americans, over 200,000 German troops were at that time attacking from the Eifel area of Germany into the Ardennes forest. Twenty German divisions were involved along