

**CENTER FOR STUDY OF  
PUBLIC CHOICE**

**Annual Report 1996**

**GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY**

## PUBLIC CHOICE

"Choice" is the act of selecting from among alternatives. "Public" refers to people. But people do not choose. Choices are made by individuals, and these may be "private" or "public." A person makes private choices as he goes about the ordinary business of living. He makes "public choices" when he selects among alternatives for others as well as for himself. Such choices become the objects of inquiry in *Public Choice*.

While traditional economic theory has been narrowly interpreted to include only the private choices of individuals in the market process, traditional political science has rarely analyzed individual choice behavior. *Public Choice* is the intersection of these two disciplines; the institutions are those of political science, and the method is that of economic theory.

*Public Choice* scholars are perhaps best characterized by their emphasis on comparative institutional analysis, and, in particular, by their concentration on the necessary relationship between economic and political institutions. While many orthodox social scientists have inferred that governmental regulation be substituted for free market process whenever imperfections are present in the latter, *Public Choice* students are unwilling to take such a logical leap. They are realists who do not view the government as necessarily performing less poorly than the market. *Public Choice* analysts share a lack of enthusiasm for, but not an unwillingness to turn, to government for the solution to innumerable problems. The realization is that markets are imperfect, but that alternative institutions (i.e., government) may also have defects.

## GRIDLOCK ?

This is being written on October 21, 1996, fifteen days before the national election. The Iowa Political Stock Market suggests that President Clinton is a sure thing (.88 cents for a winner-take-all contract) and that the odds of a Republican House and Senate are pretty good (.63 cents for a winner-take-all contract). Since polls are hopelessly politicized, we can have this be a small predictive test of how well the market predicts the results of the election.

Divided government has much to be said for it, though it will undoubtedly be decried by the pundits (who are worse than ever!). It is a way for the electorate to communicate a demand for a more constrained government operation. Perhaps they are saying to their political agents, spend your time debating and arguing and not in legislating. And this is about the only way to contain government, since incumbents of either party will not pass other constraints of interest — term limits, session limits, pay and retirement limits, spending and tax limitations, and so on. The problem is that government cannot seem to govern itself, so that until we can achieve a real constitutional revolution in the form of constraints on government action, we must muddle through with little action, lots of rhetoric, and no meaningful change on the horizon.

But we must admit that it is easy to be fooled. The movement of welfare and other programs back to the states foretells many unintended consequences. If public choice is correct, many of these outcomes (not all) will be beneficial to the overall health of our political economy and our federalism.

## THE YEAR IN REVIEW

James M. Buchanan continued his active research and educational program in 1996. The work completed by Buchanan in 1996 can be summarized under the following headings:

1. **Generality in Politics.** The projected book, provisionally entitled *Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Toward a Non-Discriminatory Democracy*, has been delayed, but completion in late 1996 is now assured. James Buchanan and Roger Congleton, co-authors, have set November 1996 as a deadline for submission of a manuscript to prospective publishers.

2. **Increasing Returns.** This research program, jointly developed by James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, generated a draft article for professional journal submission in 1996.

3. **National Debt and the Deficit.** A new phase of this long-continuing program, involving joint efforts by James Buchanan and Charles Rowley, has scarcely commenced, but work is projected for late 1996 and early 1997.

4. **Federalism.** This continuing research program, part of a larger Center project, was marked by a paper prepared for a Hong Kong lecture in 1996, following a paper prepared for a Mexican conference in early 1996.

5. **Prospects for a Free Economy.** General evaluation of prospects for the market economy in Korea, Hong Kong, Peru, Spain, Italy and Europe were specifically addressed in papers prepared for international conferences in 1996.

James Buchanan also received an honorary doctorate from the University of Valladolid in Spain on October 31, 1996.

Other Center scholars had a productive year as well. Robert Tollison finished a two-year term as President of the Public Choice Society, organizing the meetings and giving a presidential address in Houston, Texas. His book on the medieval church, *Sacred Trust*, recently appeared from Oxford University Press. Professor Tollison also continued as a Senior Joint Editor of *Public Choice*. Richard Wagner is a Senior Editor of *Constitutional Political Economy*, and is busy working on several new book projects. Mark Crain continues as a Senior Joint Editor of *The Journal of Cultural Economics*, and published several scholarly papers during 1996. Professor Crain is also on Governor Allen's Commission on Tax Reform in Virginia. Tyler Cowen had his book on the market and the arts accepted for publication by the Harvard University Press. He is currently working on a book on monetary theory. Jennifer Roback Morse continued her research into American economic history and her directorship of the highly successful Public Choice Outreach Program. Roger Congleton has been working with James M. Buchanan on the above-mentioned book project, which is nearing completion. Professor Congleton also completed several other research papers in 1996, and had a collection on environmental economics published by the University of Michigan Press. Ronald Heiner continued his basic research on the prisoners' dilemma. David Levy published several important papers on economic methodology and scientific behavior during 1996. Professor Levy continues to run the Center's Brown Bag Luncheon Series and the Working Paper Series.

Dr. James C. Miller III had another productive year as the John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow at the Center. The Center's Adjunct Research Associates -- Gordon Tullock (University of Arizona), Peter Bernholz (University of Basel), Geoffrey Brennan (Australian National University), Hartmut Kliemt (University of Duisberg), and Dwight Lee (University of Georgia) -- also had productive years. More details on Center scholarship appear at the end of the report.

## THE BUCHANAN HOUSE

The Buchanan House completed its third year of operation in 1996. The facility serves as a library and a focal point for research in constitutional economics. It also houses the memorabilia, books, and papers of James M. Buchanan. The Buchanan House librarian is Jo Ann Burgess. Also residing at the Buchanan House are Professors James M. Buchanan, David M. Levy and Mrs. Betty Tillman. The Buchanan House is also the host facility for senior visitors to the Center.

The Buchanan House library had its first major infusion of books in 1993 with the generous donation of William C. Mitchell. This year we were extremely fortunate to increase our holdings with the receipt of another donation by David Meiselman, Professor Emeritus, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

Videotaping continues to be an important project. A thirteen minute video, "Federalism and the New Republic," was produced by the Center and includes comments by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, John H. Moore and Walter Williams. We have a series of one-half hour conversations with Professor Buchanan, two Virginia Political Economy Lectures, Economics 827-Economic Philosophy and Economics, and Economics 828-Constitutional Economics. Other tapes of lectures and interviews by Professor Buchanan (including the Nobel lecture) are also available for viewing in the Buchanan House. We will continue taping other series as the occasions arise. For further information concerning the availability of the videotapes contact Mrs. Jo Ann Burgess at the Buchanan House (703) 993-2337 or MSN#1E6, Buchanan House, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030.

### *Interviews with Professor Buchanan*

"The Erosion of the Constitution" with Professor Walter Williams  
"The Federal Reserve: Puncturing the Myth" with Professor David Fand  
"Political Correctness-American Style" with Professor Allan Mandelstamm  
"Political Correctness-European Style" with Professor Dr. Hartmut Kliemt  
"Classic Liberalism" with Professor Charles K. Rowley  
"The Method and Practice of Economic Science" with Professor Robert Tollison  
"The Economics of Children" with Professor Jennifer Roback Morse  
"Approaches to Economics" with Professor Dwight Lee  
"Democracy and Rent-Seeking" with Gordon Tullock  
"Justice and the State" with Antony de Jasay

### *Virginia Political Economy Lecture*

1995, Professor Thomas D. Willett, "The Public Choice Approach to International Relations"  
1996, Professor Edgar K. Browning, "The Economics of Welfare Reform"

### *Economics 828-Constitutional Economics*

"The Domain of Constitutional Political Economy" (Buchanan)  
"The Reason of Rules I: Personal Rules" (Vanberg)  
"The Individualist Foundations of Constitutional Order" (Buchanan)  
"The Reason of Rules II: Social Rules" (Vanberg)  
"The Relatively Absolute Absolutes: A Generalization of Constitutional Understanding" (Buchanan)  
"Hayek's Two Kinds of Order and Two Kinds of Rules" (Vanberg)  
"Competitive Federalism and National Sovereignty" (Buchanan)  
"Competition As a Constitutional Principle" (Vanberg)  
"Politics by Principle, Not Interest: Generalization As a Constitutional Norm" (Buchanan)  
"Constitutional Choice and Cultural Evolution" (Vanberg)

### *Economics 827-Economic Philosophy*

"On Ethics and Economics" (Kliemt)  
"Welfare Economics and Political Economy" (Buchanan)  
"Homo Economicus and Homo Ludens" (Kliemt)  
"The Contractarian Enterprise: Agreement in Exchange, Politics and Science" (Buchanan)  
"On the Economics of Virtue, Trust and Love" (Kliemt)  
"Justice As Fairness, Generality and the Welfare-Transfer State" (Buchanan)  
"On F.A. Hayek's Political Philosophy" (Kliemt)  
"Ethics and Economic Interdependence" (Buchanan)  
"Liberalism and Its Supposed Paradoxes" (Kliemt)  
"The Mirage of Social Choice" (Buchanan)

## RESEARCH PROGRAMS

### *Constitutional Political Economy*

Professor James Buchanan has continued his work on the projected book, *Politics by Principle, Not Interest*, work jointly pursued with Professor Roger Congleton. The thrust of analysis in this book involves the *extension of the generality principle to politics* with practical applications in support of the flat tax and against means testing for transfer payments. It is estimated that a first draft of this book will be completed in early 1997.

The *political economy of federalism* has become increasingly important in the political-constitutional setting of the 1990s. Professor Buchanan has written several papers on federalism, with application to the European and Mexican, as well as the United States setting. A major research project on federalism is projected for 1996 and beyond.

Discussion of a *constitutional amendment for budget balance* attracted attention in 1995, and this discussion will continue in 1996, 1997 and beyond. Professor Buchanan completed a paper that attempts to clarify confusions in this discussion. He and Professor Rowley plan to complete a book-length monograph on *Constitutional Budget Balance* in early 1996.

The bulk of Professor Wagner's work during the year was devoted to his completion of the initial draft of a book that is tentatively titled *Economic Policy as a Problem of Constitutional Governance*. The conventional approach to economic policy treats economic life as a simple phenomenon, with economic policy similarly being construed in similar fashion as a simple matter of intervening into the operation of the economy to achieve desired results—economic policy is like the action of a mechanic in fixing a malfunctioning engine. The point of departure for Professor Wagner's book is that economic life is a complex phenomenon, for which it is impossible even to gauge the full consequences of any policy measure. Economic policy is a constitutive and not an interventionist enterprise, in that it is centrally involved with constituting the framework of rules that govern human relationships. The primary intellectual sources of inspiration for this book are public choice, constitutional economics, law and economics, the new institutional economics, and the Germanic tradition of *ordnungs politik*. A précis of this book appears in the paper "Complexity, Governance, and Economic Policy," which was delivered as a public lecture under the sponsorship of the Center for Economic and Policy Education at Saint Vincent College, and which will be published in their *Economic Directions* series. Related constitutional themes were explored in a paper Professor Wagner wrote on "Common Law, Statute Law, and Economic Efficiency," which was accepted for publication in the *New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics*.

In "Equal Protection, Efficiency and Public Choice," Roger Congleton examines the logic of equal protection of the law from a public choice perspective. He argues that, in many settings, economic efficiency in law enforcement appears to require differential enforcement of the law. For example, crime prone populations warrant stronger sanctions than less crime prone populations if costly sanctions are to be meted out in an efficient manner. However, it is well known that the direct interests of dictators and majority coalitions tend to be significantly narrower than required for Pareto efficiency. Consequently, democratic (and other) governments are inclined to enact policies at odds with the goal of achieving Pareto efficiency or maximizing social welfare. The paper demonstrates that constraining majority coalitions to write laws consistent with the principle of equal protection generally yields better outcomes for essentially all affected parties than those obtained when majority coalitions are permitted to discriminate in an arbitrary manner. The efficiency case for equality before the law is based on political considerations rather than economic ones per se.

#### *Public Choice*

*The Political Economy of Environmental Protection*, edited by Roger Congleton, was published by University of Michigan Press in 1966. It includes several previously published works on environmental public choice, plus original contributions by Todd Sandler, Werner Pommerehne, Scott Farrow, Gerald Faulhaber, Dan Ingberman, Dennis Coates, Michael Leidy, Bernard Hoekman, and George Van Houtven. The papers analyze the political economy of several policy making settings: (1) Interest Groups and Majoritarian Politics: Environmental Legislation, (2) the Environmental Bureaucracy, (3) Relations among Local Governments, and (4) Relations among Sovereign States: Environmental Treaties. Many of the contributions included in the volume go beyond application of public choice tools to environmental policy, and significantly advance the public choice analysis of public policy generally.

In a paper forthcoming in *Public Choice*, Roger Congleton and Bernard Steunenberg develop a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. They analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions.

Much of the work of the above mentioned Buchanan and Congleton manuscript on the generality norm derives from the problem of majoritarian cycles in settings where legislation is concerned with distributional issues. In a complementary line of research, in "On the Stabilizing-Inducing Properties of Unstable Coalitions," Congleton and Tollison argue that whenever the cost of negotiating new coalitions is relatively large, coalitions may be stable because of transaction cost frictions. In other cases, majoritarian cycles tend to generate a downward spiral of falling net benefits for all parties concerned. This form of instability may itself lead participants to adopt stabilizing institutions like the generality principle, as a means of avoiding the downward spiral. Rational players, naturally, prefer zero or positive-sum games to negative-sum games.

#### *Public Finance*

Professor Wagner prepared several papers on public finance during the year, all of which represent efforts to inject themes from public choice and constitutional economics into public finance. In "Fiscal Exchange and the Evanescence of Excess Burden," he developed the argument that excess burden is not a property of taxation per se, but rather depends upon the particular institutional framework within which fiscal choices emerge. In "Public Finance in Constitutional Perspective," prepared for the January 1997 meetings of the American Economic Association and to be published in the May 1997, *Proceedings* issue of the *American Economic Review*, Professor Wagner incorporates that institutional theme into a general overview of public finance, contrasting in the process the Wicksellian and Edgeworthian approaches to fiscal scholarship. Professor Wagner also prepared a paper on the World Health Organization, "Does the WHO Return Good Value to American Taxpayers?." This paper was prepared for a conference sponsored by the Cato Institute, and will appear in a forthcoming conference volume.

#### *Rent Seeking*

Robert Tollison and Robert Ekelund revised and extended their classic and widely cited study of *Mercantilism As a Rent-Seeking Society* (Texas A&M University Press, 1980). This new volume will appear from Texas A&M University Press in early 1997.

#### *Empirical Political Economy*

Robert Tollison and Gary Anderson completed two empirical political economy projects. In one paper, "The Political Economy of the Military Draft," they analyze the determinants of military conscription policies across countries. This paper appeared in the *Journal of Defence and Peace Economics* during 1996. In a second project, they study the passage of federal legislation during the late 1800s which banned the practice of polygamy in Utah.

#### *Economics and the Arts*

Tyler Cowen has recently completed a manuscript on the economics of the arts entitled *Enterprise and the Arts*. The book argues that the arts fare best in a market economy, and that predictions of cultural decline are unwarranted. This book is forthcoming from Harvard University Press.

Professors Crain and Tollison completed the first two papers in a project on the economics of music. The first paper is entitled "The Architecture of Popular Music." The analysis employs basic supply and demand principles to explain characteristics of songs that achieved number one status on the *Billboard* charts between the years 1940 and 1988. An extensive data set consisting of roughly 900 number-one songs is used to test the model empirically. The framework for the analysis is that economic factors such as wages and discount rates on the demand side, and market concentration and

technological changes on the supply side, are key determinants of the characteristics of hit songs. This paper has been accepted for publication by the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*. A second paper has been completed on "Pop Music Superstars."

### *The Economics of Religion*

This year Robert Tollison, Gary Anderson, Aubrey Davidson, Robert Ekelund, and Robert Hebert continued their work on the economics of religion. These scholars have completed a manuscript on the economics of the medieval church. This manuscript looks at how economic forces impacted on the behavior and doctrines of the church, and, in time, how the institutions of the church impacted on the economic growth and development of these early European economies. The title of the book is *Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm*, and it was published by Oxford University Press in 1996.

### *Econometrics*

*Econometric Replication.* One way to think about the replication project upon which David Levy and Susan Feigenbaum have embarked is to put the economics back into econometrics. They demonstrate, using the simplest of statistical examples, how biased outcomes can derive from seemingly unbiased procedures. The paper which develops this line of argument, "The Technological Obsolescence of Scientific Fraud," was presented at the History of Economics Conference at the University of British Columbia and published by *Rationality and Society*. As a result of the discussion of this paper on the Internet discussion group SCIFRAUD, Levy and Feigenbaum have been invited to present an extension of the argument to the August meetings of the American Statistical Association. The paper will be titled "The Technological Obsolescence of Peer Review."

If individual incentives are not necessarily consistent with exemplary scientific work, would a Buchanan-club help solve the problem? This issue will be addressed in a paper which will be presented at a March 1997 Economics of Science conference at Notre Dame, "Towards a Positive Theory of Economic Schools."

Central to an attempt to apply economic insight into the scientific process, what does an economist pay for being wrong? Levy and Feigenbaum consider the citation consequences of Martin Feldstein's retraction of his data of Social Security wealth. While the citations to the retracted article has fallen, especially if one distinguishes negative from positive citations, there is very little adverse impact on other articles. "Second Thoughts About First Impressions," which describes the analysis, has been submitted to a major economic journal.

*R&D Econometrics.* The central insight in the endogenous growth literature is the enormously plausible concept of the intertemporal externalities in technology. Why then it is hard to find evidence of this in the empirical analysis of R&D's impact on growth? Levy and Terleckyj, in a paper submitted to a first-line journal, propose that the problem can be resolved only if we recognize that the notion of intertemporal externalities in technology is wound up with seemingly exotic, and much neglected, notion of the rate of depreciation of R&D capital. To go from investment *flows* of R&D to output, we must form an R&D *stock*. This is where we need a rate of depreciation of R&D. The difference between a private rate of depreciation of R&D and a social rate of depreciation is where externalities in technology can be estimated. They test for the existence of these intertemporal technological externalities by asking whether the private rate of depreciation of R&D capital is the same as the social rate of depreciation. Unlike the private rate of depreciation of R&D capital, they find that the social rate of depreciation of R&D capital is negative.



### *History of Economics*

Perhaps the most exciting development in the history of economics research program at the Center is David Levy's demonstration of the century long quarrel between economic theorists and racial "theorists." The first thesis put forward in "Sharing the Lash from Carlyle's Whip" is that economic theory as proposed by Adam Smith was at foundation antiracist. Therefore, when in nineteenth century Britain one finds racist theory, one will find the friends of Adam Smith in opposition. The second thesis is that scholars who see the conflict over racism do not know economic texts well enough to understand that economists' antiracism is not just the random opinion of people who happen to be economists, but had a basis in their articulated theory. This paper was presented in the Kress Library History of Economics Club at Harvard University.

Another paper which is proposed for Levy's projected *Lost Economics of Adam Smith* is "Adam Smith's Rational Choice Linguistics," which has been accepted for publication by *Economic Inquiry*. The argument here is that Smith used rational choice principles to explain why a language which adults might learn to conduct business would be grammatically less complicated than languages which are learned from childhood.

Finally, Levy's paper on how George Stigler revived and extended the ideas of another eighteenth century economist-philosopher, Bernard Mandeville, was published as "Stigler's Revival of Mandeville: A Mistake-Free Theory of Society," *Journal des Economistes et des Études Humaines*.

### *Rational Cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma Situations*

Over the last two years Professor Heiner has begun research with Dieter Schmidtchen (Universität des Saarland) about the possibility of rationally motivated cooperation in the one-shot prisoners dilemma (PD-situations). This research has now expanded to include another collaborator, Max Albert (Universität des Konstanz). Traditional economic theory argues that a person will be worse off from cooperating rather than defecting regardless of whether his partner cooperates or not. Accordingly, one-shot PD-situations have come to represent the "hardest case" for rationally motivated cooperation to arise. Contrary to this traditional view, Heiner has shown that two individuals facing a one-shot PD situation have an incentive to forecast whether each other will cooperate or defect. That is, if they can both forecast each other's actual choice better than pure chance, then it may be optimal for them to "conditionally-cooperate" contingent on forecasting their partner will also cooperate.

The authors received a number of comments on their first paper, and have been generally pleased with readers' comments from both game theorists and economists with diverse research interests. Even the most cautious and critical comments have not found a flaw in the basic argument of the paper. Instead, the most critical comments have sought to cast doubt on the premise that players can display positive forecasting ability (can forecast another player's behavior better than pure chance when separated without communication). Even these criticisms are encouraging, since they implicitly acknowledge the key first step: that positive forecasting ability, if ever possible, can make a major difference to the strategic incentives of rationally self-interested players.

Nevertheless, they have not sought to downplay these latter criticisms. First, they have developed a theory of the "causal origins" of positive forecasting ability. To do so we have developed a generalization of the extensive form game tree (called a causal-history tree) in order to represent explicitly the sequence of events governed by causal processes that actually generate the forecasts and actions of players in strategic situations such as the PD.

Second, they have generalized the basic analysis beyond a two person, two action, single play PD situation, to allow arbitrary numbers of players and arbitrary size of players' action sets, strategy sets,

message spaces, state spaces, causal history trees, and so on.

With the above comments as introduction, the following is a list of papers thus far arising out of this ongoing project: "Rational Cooperation in One-Shot Simultaneous PD-Situations," "Exogenous versus Endogenous Information: A General Theory of Nash Equilibrium," "Pareto Superior Nash Equilibria with Almost Exogenous Information: A General Existence Theorem," "Rationality, Endogenous Information, and Contingent Cooperation: Application to the One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma," "Equilibrium Selection for the One-Shot Simultaneous PD," "Causation and Subjective Rationality: A General Synthesis for Game Theory," and "Game Theory Naturalized."

#### *Law and Economics*

Two basic papers were completed in this area during 1995. Roger Congleton and Robert Tollison present and test a theory of crime waves in their paper on "The Political Economy of Crime." Tollison and Brian Goff present a scheme for the private provision of addiction control in their paper on "Addiction and Tournaments."

#### *Sportometrics*

During 1995 Robert Tollison and Robert McCormick completed two papers on sports-related issues. In one paper these authors attempt to assess whether the *ceteris paribus* wage differential between black and white professional basketball players is due to customer discrimination or to price discrimination. This paper is under review at a major journal. In a second paper in progress McCormick and Tollison model the process by which college basketball became integrated. In other words, which teams integrated first, and why? Finally, Tollison with William Shughart and Brian Goff address the theory of moral hazard in the form of the behavior of major league baseball pitchers and the number of hit batters by league. This paper has been accepted for publication by *Economic Inquiry*.

#### *The Political Economy of State and Local Taxes*

Virginia Governor George Allen appointed Professor Mark Crain to the Commission on Competitive and Equitable Tax Policy. State Senator Walter Stosch and State Delegate Alan Diamonstein co-chair the bipartisan panel which will report to the Governor in December 1997 on its evaluation of state and local taxes and recommendations for improvement. The Commission's work includes three general areas: the impact of taxes on economic development; the complexity and understandability of taxes; and the allocation of the tax burden.

Professor Crain, the only academic on the Governor's Commission, created a Special Topics course involving George Mason students in the analysis of the underlying fiscal policy issues. Crain and several Center graduate students have launched an extensive empirical investigation of the effects of alternative tax instruments on economic growth in the American States.

Professor Crain also continued his service on three other state government policy advisory panels: the Governor's Advisory Board of Economists; the Transportation Revenue Advisory Panel; and the Department of Public Safety Policy Advisory Committee.

#### *The Political Economy of Majority-Minority Legislative Districts*

In 1996 the United States Supreme Court rendered decisions that the Congressional redistricting plans in North Carolina and Texas were unconstitutional. These decisions continued the high court's attempt to shape the principle that legislative districts based predominately on race or ethnicity can survive strict constitutional scrutiny only under extraordinary circumstances. Professor Mark Crain addresses this issue in "The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting." Crain provides analysis

and empirical evidence relevant to the constitutionality of congressional districts in which racial or ethnic considerations predominate. The empirical investigation of the narrow tailoring question compares the legislative performance of minority and non-minority House members, and seeks to determine whether effective minority representation depends on the race or ethnicity of a House member.

## VISITING SCHOLARS PROGRAM

The Center hosted a number of visiting scholars during the year. Dr. Roger Congleton is currently coordinating the program. The visitors and their university affiliations are as follows:

Max Albert Universität of Konstanz, Germany	Richard Gamble Palm Beach Atlantic College	Taro Ozawa Keio University, Japan
Sebastiano Bavetta Università degli studi di Palermo, Italy	Bernd Hansjürgens University of Marburg, Germany	Pill-Woo Rhee Kon-Kuk University, Korea
Geoffrey Brennan Australian National University	Samson Kimenyi University of Connecticut	Gordon Tullock University of Arizona
Peter Coughlin University of Maryland	Gebhard Kirchgassner Universität St. Gallen	Akihito Udagawa Meikai University, Japan
Domenico da Empoli Università La Sapienza, Italy	Hartmut Kliemt University of Duisburg, Germany	Martin Van Hees University of Twente, The Netherlands
Anthony de Jasay France	Chrysostomos Mantzavinos Freiburg, Germany	Attila Yayla Hacettepe University, Turkey
Juan Carlos Gamazo University of Valladolid, Spain	Katsuyoshi Okui Otemon Gakuin University, Japan	Jesus M. Zaratiegui University of Navarra, Spain

### *Visiting Graduate and Postdoctoral Students*

Rainald Borck University of Berlin	Masashi Nishikawa Hosei University	Jason Saving California Institute of Technology
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## PUBLIC CHOICE SEMINAR SERIES

The Center's weekly seminar series produced a number of interesting new ideas and discussions and was organized by Professors Mark Crain and Robert Tollison. The seminars were held every Wednesday in George's Hall from 4:00 to 5:30. Participants in the 1996 seminar series were:

- Roberto Mazzoleni*, George Mason University, "Sources of Path Dependence in Technological Innovation: Comparative Evidence on the Development and Diffusion of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools," January 31.
- Alfredo Pereira*, William and Mary, "Public Capital Accumulation and Private Sector Performance in the United States," February 7.
- James Poterba*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Fiscal Institutions and Public Sector Labor Markets," February 14.
- Tyler Cowen*, George Mason University, "Discounting and Restitution," February 21.
- Mark Zupan*, University of Southern California, "The Effect of Distributive Politics on the Allocation of Defense Spending Across States: Was Ike at Least Two-thirds Right?," February 28.
- Bruce Johnson*, George Mason University Law School, "The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory," March 6.
- Steven Fuller*, George Mason University, "Monitoring the Metropolitan Economy," March 20.
- Robert McCormick*, Clemson University, "Family Values: On Illegitimate Births," March 27.
- Leonard Burman*, Congressional Budget Office, "Medical Savings Accounts and Adverse Selection," April 3.
- Richard Geddes*, Fordham University, "Self-Ownership and the Rights of Women," April 17.

- Roger Congleton*, George Mason University, "Return to Rio: Agency Problems and the Political Economy of Environmental Treaties," April 24.
- David Austen-Smith*, University of Rochester, "Endogenous Informational Lobbying" May 1.
- Robert D. Tollison*, George Mason University, "Mercantilism Revisited," September 4.
- Richard Higgins*, Capital Economics, "Diagonal Merger," September 11.
- W. Mark Crain*, George Mason University, "The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting," September 18.
- Ronald Heiner*, George Mason University, "Update on Prisoner's Dilemma Research," September 25.
- John Jackson*, Auburn University, "Public Choices Aspects of the Homeless Problem," October 2.
- James M. Buchanan and Yong Yoon*, George Mason University, "Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler's Theorem and Competitive Equilibrium," October 16.
- Dennis Coates*, University of Maryland - Baltimore, "The Political Economy of Voting on Welfare Reform," October 23.
- Tyler Cowen*, George Mason University, "The Economics of Approbation," October 30.
- Timur Kuran*, University of Southern California and University of Chicago, "Moral Overload and its Alleviation," November 5.
- Charles K. Rowley*, Locke Institute and George Mason University, "On the Nature of Civil Society," November 13.
- Dwight Lee*, University of Georgia, "The Efficiency of Genuine Federalism," November 20.
- Robert Schwab*, University of Maryland, "Education, Finance Reform, and the Distribution of Income," December 3.

### BROWN BAG LUNCHEON SERIES

This is a weekly program that offers an opportunity for Center scholars and visitors to discuss their research in progress. The programs were organized by Professor David Levy and were held every Tuesday at noon in the Buchanan House. The 1996 programs were led by:

- David M. Levy*, George Mason University, "Preferences over Scientific Outcomes," January 30.
- James M. Buchanan*, George Mason University, "Rule Feasibility and Rule Dominance," February 6.
- Roger Congleton*, George Mason University, "Public Choice Efficiency and Equal Protection," February 13.
- Royall Brandis*, University of Illinois, "Keynes's Long Struggle of Escape from Classical Theory," February 20.
- Tyler Cowen*, George Mason University, "Why are Universities Not-for-Profit?," February 27.
- Gordon Brady*, George Mason University, "Duncan Black," March 5.
- Thomas Apolte*, Gerhard-Mercator University, "European Federalism," March 19.
- David Fand*, Center for Study of Public Choice, "Origins of Chicago Monetarism," March 26.
- Warren Coats*, International Monetary Fund, "Towards a Palestinian Monetary Constitution," April 2.
- Sandy Struckmeyer*, Federal Reserve, "A Primer on Revisions to the National Accounts," April 9.
- Peter Coughlin*, University of Maryland, "Group Rights," April 16.
- Robert Tollison*, George Mason University, "The Interest-Group Theory of Government," April 23.
- Randall Morck*, University of Alberta - Canada, "U.S. Steel Industry Lobbying for Protection," April 30.
- David Levy*, George Mason University, "Belief as Preference over Theory," September 3.
- Willem Thorbecke*, George Mason University, "Monetary Policy, Time-Varying Risk, and the Bond Market Debacle of 1994," September 10.
- Roger Congleton*, George Mason University, "On Generality Without Uniformity," September 17.
- James Buchanan*, George Mason University, "Majoritarian Rent Seeking Under Alternative Configurations of Preferences," September 24.
- Carrie Meyer*, George Mason University, "Political Economy of Information Sharing and NGOs," October 1.
- Tyler Cowen*, George Mason University, "The Economics of Norms," October 8.
- David Fand*, Center for Study of Public Choice, "German Unification and Monetary Union in Europe," October 15.
- Martin Paldam*, Aarhus University, "The Greenland Model Dutch Disease and Rent Seeking," October 22.
- Jerry Muller*, Catholic University of America, "On Schumpeter," October 29.
- Gregory LaBlanc*, George Mason University Law School and Duke University, "Tax Farming, Mercantilism, and Time Consistency," November 5.

*Susan Feigenbaum*, University of Missouri - St. Louis, "Capitalism, Freedom & Triplets," November 12.

*Richard Wagner*, George Mason University, "Fiscal Exchange and the Evanesence of Excess Burden," November 19.

*James C. Miller*, Center for Study of Public Choice, "Competition in Commercial and Political Markets," November 26.

*Katsuyoshi Okui*, Otemon Gukuin University, "Is Government Really Leviathan?," December 3.

## THE PUBLIC CHOICE OUTREACH PROGRAM

The Center hosted another successful Outreach Seminar in May. The Seminar brought thirty-one students from around the world to learn the basics of Public Choice. This year's group included students from the United Kingdom, Hungary, Kenya and Romainia. The disciplinary mix of specializations spanned economics, political science, philosophy and law.

The lectures included a mixture of old and new faces. We brought back Saul Levmore, who covered some of the topics on voting theory. He delighted and challenged the students once again. We also brought back our usual cast of characters: Bob Higgs, Ted Murphy, Carolyn Weaver, Bob Tollison, and Samson Kimenyi. The one completely new face was Bruce Yandle of Clemson University. Bruce is a truly gifted lecturer, with a wonderfully warm and witty way with students. He presented the theory of regulation in a way that the students will never forget. We also moved our old friend Richard Gamble into a lecturing role, to talk about the role of ideology in politics. Finally, Don Boudreaux did his usual fine job of kicking off and moderating the whole conference.

As always, the Public Choice Outreach Seminar is a pleasure for all who participated, students and faculty alike. We are grateful to the Scaife Foundation for its continued support of this program. A list of students and their fields of study are listed below.

Ms. Sheree J. Allen  
University of NC-Greensboro  
Economics

Mr. Peter Andreas  
Cornell University  
Government

Mr. Matthew J. Bader  
University of Colorado-Boulder  
International Affairs

Ms. Carrie Renae Booth  
Michigan State University  
International Relations

Mr. Justin M. Cassey  
Michigan State University  
Political Economy

Ms. Melissa J. Choi  
University of PA-Law School  
Juris Doctor

Mr. Todd Christensen  
Boise State University  
Political Science

Mr. Matthew Coffin  
Mount St. Mary's Seminary  
Theology

Mr. Terry F. Crawford  
University of Virginia  
Theory and Practice

Mr. R. Dean Davenport  
Georgetown College  
Philosophy/Bus. Admin.

Ms. Margaret Devlin  
University of Dallas  
History

Mr. Craig Donais  
Suffolk University Law School  
Juris Doctor

Ms. Julie Eckert  
University of Virginia  
Government

Mr. Johnny Goldfinger  
Duke University  
Political Science

Mr. Jason Haight  
Emory University  
Economics/Math

Rolf H ijer  
Nuffield College  
Politics

Mr. Stephen Huebner  
Washington University  
Economics/Pol. Science

Mr. Hatim S. Hussein  
Howard University  
Finance

Mr. Robert J. Johansen  
St. Charles Borromeo Seminary  
Master's of Divinity

Mr. Joseph Kieyah  
University of Connecticut  
Economics

Mr. Kurt Lewis  
Marquette University  
Economics

Mr. Christoher P. Meade  
Mt. Saint Mary's Seminary  
Master's of Divinity

Mr. Clinton Meinerding  
Ball State University  
Economics/Bus. Admin.

Mr. Elvino M. Mendonca  
Clemson University  
Pol. Science/Economics

Ms. Seta Pillsbury  
Gordon College  
Economics/Pol. Science

Mr. Christopher Rhoads  
Harverford College  
Philosophy

Mr. Scott Robinon  
University of Texas-Dallas  
Government/Politics

Mr. Kenneth F. Rossman  
GMU School of Law  
Juris Doctor

Ms. Sándor Szendi  
Eötvös Lóránd University  
Marketing/Trade

Ms. Christina Trent  
Emory University  
History/American Lit.

Mr. Catalin Vieru  
University of Nebraska-Omaha  
Economics/Public Finance

Mr. Daran Wastchak  
Arizona State University  
Public Administration

The formal Outreach program consisted of 15 lectures.

Lecture 1:	<i>Don Boudreaux</i>	What is Public Choice?
Lecture 2:	<i>Saul Levmore</i>	Two Voting Paradoxes
Lecture 3:	<i>Jennifer Roback Morse</i>	Vote Cycles, Tariffs & Taxes
Lecture 4:	<i>Saul Levmore</i>	Coping with Cycling
Lecture 5:	<i>Samson Kimenyi</i>	Federalist Options for Africa
Lecture 6:	<i>Ted Murphy</i>	Exchange of Sovereignty Rights & Use Rights: North American Indians
Lecture 7:	<i>Robert Tollison</i>	Anti-Trust: Theory & Policy
Lecture 8:	<i>Bruce Yandle</i>	Regulation, Rent Seeking & Interest Groups
Lecture 9:	<i>Robert Higgs</i>	FDA Regulation of Drugs & Medical Devices
Lecture 10:	<i>Carolyn Weaver</i>	The Politics of Social Security
Lecture 11:	<i>Bruce Yandle</i>	Bureaucracy
Lecture 12:	<i>Robert Higgs</i>	The Military and Its Budget
Lecture 13:	<i>Ted Murphy</i>	Welfare Economics & Decision Rules
Lecture 14:	<i>Richard Gamble</i>	The Role of Ideology in Politics & Institutions
Lecture 15:	<i>Jennifer Roback Morse</i>	What is a Constitution & Why do we Need One?

## THE VIRGINIA POLITICAL ECONOMY PROGRAM

The twelfth annual lecture in the Virginia Political Economy Lecture Series, sponsored by Dr. and Mrs. James M. Buchanan, was held at the McLean Hilton in McLean, Virginia, on March 15, 1995. Dr. Edgar K. Browning of Texas A&M University gave this year's lecture on "The Economics of Welfare Reform."

This program is intended to stress the distinctive contributions of the Virginia School of Political Economy. This School has its intellectual and geographic roots in Virginia, but its impact has been international in scope and reaches into the deepest parts of modern economics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. The scholars who labor in this tradition, typified by James M. Buchanan and his past and recent colleagues, are at the forefront of their disciplines and have been among the architects of modern economics and social science.

As an acclaimed economist and student of public choice and public finance, Professor Browning uniquely filled the tradition of our lecture series. In his lecture he explored the intricacies and impacts of the U.S. welfare system and various proposals to reform the same. The reader would find his conclusion intriguing.

There are now twelve Virginia Political Economy Lectures, copies of which are available from the Center on request.

<i>Dennis C. Mueller</i>	"The 'Virginia School' and Public Choice"
<i>William Breit</i>	"Creating the 'Virginia School'"
<i>Dwight Lee</i>	"Getting More with Less, with a Notable Exception"
<i>Leland Yeager</i>	"Ethics in the History and Doctrine of the Virginia School"
<i>Robert J. Mackay</i>	"Winston Bush's Contribution to Public Choice"
<i>H. Geoffrey Brennan</i>	"The Tale of the Slave-Owner"
<i>Charles J. Goetz</i>	"Uncommon Common-sense vs. Conventional Wisdom"
<i>Peter Bernholz</i>	"On the Political Economy of the Transformation of Political Economic Regimes"
<i>Mancur Olson</i>	"Why Is Economic Performance Even Worse after Communism Is Abandoned"
<i>Hartmut Kliemt</i>	"Virginia Virtue, Virginia Vice"
<i>Thomas Willett</i>	"The Public Choice Approach to International Economic Relations"
<i>Edgar Browning</i>	"The Economics of Welfare Reform"

The speaker for the coming year's program will be Professor Richard McKenzie of the University of California at Irvine. The lecture will be held on March 19, 1996, with further details forthcoming early in the new year.

## WORKING PAPERS SERIES

The working paper series is organized by David M. Levy. Copies of the papers are available upon request.

Author(s)	Title
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 1</i> Generality, Law & Politics
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 2</i> Majoritarian Politics
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 3</i> Eliminating the Off Diagonals
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 4</i> In Defense of Generality
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 5</i> Generality and the Political Agenda
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 7</i> Generality and the Welfare-Transfer State
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 8</i> Politics, Markets Restrictions and the Generality Norm
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 9</i> Deficit Financing and Intertemporal Discrimination
Buchanan	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 11</i> Generality and Redistribution
Buchanan	An American Evaluation of Europe's Constitutional Prospect
Buchanan	Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments
Buchanan	Beyond Science: The Economist's Enterprise
Buchanan	Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare?
Buchanan	Catalonia and the Constitution of Europe
Buchanan	Comment on Alesina "Political Economy of Macroeconomic Stabilization and Income Equality"
Buchanan	Comments on Barro and Bernholz papers
Buchanan	Constitution for Europe
Buchanan	Constitutional Economics of Ethics
Buchanan	Constitutions, Politics and Markets
Buchanan	Defense of <i>Noblesse Oblige</i> (Reluctantly Offered)
Buchanan	Democracy without Community
Buchanan	Dimensionality, Rights and Choices among Relevant Alternatives
Buchanan	Discovery Process in Economics, the Peculiar Science
Buchanan	Epistemological Feasibility of Free Markets
Buchanan	Federalism and the European Union
Buchanan	Individual and the Community in the Post-Communist Epoch
Buchanan	Majoritarian Democracy and the General Welfare
Buchanan	Majoritarian Logic
Buchanan	Metamorphosis of Western Democracies at the End of the Century
Buchanan	Political Economy of Birthing Choice
Buchanan	Profit Maximization as a Survival Strategy: Some Normative Speculations
Buchanan	Prolegomena for an Economics of Ethics
Buchanan	Prospects for European Federal Union, 1996: Regional, National and European Implications
Buchanan	Rule Feasibility and Rule Dominance
Buchanan	Value Pluralism: An Economist's Perspective
Buchanan	Virginia's Decade in Political Economy
Buchanan & Yoon	Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler's Theorem and Competitive Equilibrium
Congleton	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 6</i> The Political Efficiency of General Taxation
Congleton	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 10</i> Generality and the Supply of Public Services
Congleton	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 12</i> Generality with Uniformity: Social Insurance
Congleton	<i>Politics by Principle, Not Interest 13</i> Generality without Uniformity: Federalism
Congleton	Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort
Congleton	Altruistic Voting
Congleton	Conservation Regulation: Cyclic Demand, Externalities & Politics
Congleton	Constitutional Federalism and Decentralization
Congleton	How Encompassing Is a Dictator's Interest?
Congleton	Market for Politically Active Special Interest Groups
Congleton	Political Agency, Institutions and Constitutional Dynamics

Congleton	Politics, Annexation, Institutions, and Local Fiscal Choice
Congleton	Progressivity of Lotteries
Congleton	Rational Ignorance, Rational Expectations and Fiscal Illusion
Congleton	Rawlsian Bureaucracy: Deadly, Dull or Dynamic?
Congleton	Return to Rio: Agency Problems and the Political Economy of Environmental Treaties
Congleton	Substantive and Symbolic Environmental Treaties
Congleton & Steunenberg	Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Elections
Congleton & Tollison	Political Economy of Crime Waves
Congleton & Tollison	The Stability-Inducing Properties of Instability
Congleton & Vanberg	Joint Production, Exit, and Cooperation
Congleton & Warneryd	Political Agency, Institutions and Constitutional Dynamics
Congleton et al.	Intra-familial Contracts
Cowen	<i>Risk and Business Cycles</i>
Cowen	<i>The Enterprise of Arts: An Optimistic Perspective</i>
Cowen	Anti-Semitism as Anti-Capitalism
Cowen	Discounting the Restitution
Cowen	Should the Value of Life be a Function of Wealth
Cowen	What Do WE Learn From the Repugnana Conclusion
Cowen	Why Women Succeed, and Fail, in the Arts
Cowen & Glazer	More Monitoring Can Induce Less Effort
Cowen & Glazer	Shareholder Diversification and Joint Profit Maximization
Cowen & Grier	Do the Arts Suffer From a Cost Disease
Cowen & Sutter	Politics and the Pursuit of Fame
Cowen & Sutter	Why Only Nixon Can Go To China
Cowen & Tabarrok	An Economic Theory of Avant-Garde and Popular Art
Cowen & Tabarrok	Who Benefits from Progress?
Cowen et al.	Discretion, not Rules May Increase Credibility
Cowen	Why Women Succeed, and Fail, in the Arts
Cowen	Discounting and Restitution
Cowen	Anti-Semitism as Anti-Capitalism
Cowen & Grier	Do the Arts Suffer From a Cost Disease
Cowen	What Do We Learn From the Repugnant Conclusion
Cowen & Sutter	Politics and the Pursuit of Fame
Cowen & Glazer	More Monitoring Can Induce Less Effort
Crain	Interstate Tax Structure and Income Convergence
Crain	The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting
Crain & Staley	Deficit Announcements and Interest Rates
Crain & Sullivan	Congressional Committee Assignments & Election Outcomes
Crain & Tollison	Elvis Economics: Principles of Popular Music
Crain & Tollison	Pop Music Superstars
Crain & Verrier	Fiscal Consequences of Budget Baselines
Crain & Wagner	Politics, Public Capital, and the Structure of Production
Heiner	<i>Investigations of Imperfect Choice: Uncertainty and Dynamics</i>
Heiner	<i>Origins of Predictable Behavior</i>
Heiner	Causation and Subjective Rationality: A Synthesis for Game Theory
Heiner	Endogenous v. Exogenous Information: A General Theory of Nash Equilibria
Heiner	Game Theory Naturalized: Part I
Heiner	Pareto Superior Nash Equilibria with Almost Exogenous Information
Heiner	Rational Cooperation in One-Shot Simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma Situations
Heiner	Rational Selfish Cooperation in One-Shot Simultaneous Prisoner's Dilemma Situations
Heiner	Reinterpreting Risk and Utility Theory
Heiner	Self-Stabilizing Behavior
Heiner	Super-Exhaustive Rent Seeking
Levy	<i>Adam Smith's Lost Economics: Rational Choice Linguistics</i>
Levy	<i>Adam Smith's Lost Economics: Sharing the Lash from Carlyle's Whip</i>
Levy	Robust Utilitarianism and Redistribution
Levy	The Asymptotic Behavior of the Replication Set
Levy & Feigenbaum	<i>Fictional Science: Second Thoughts about First Impressions</i>
Levy & Feigenbaum	<i>Fictional Science: Toward a Positive Theory of Schools of Thought</i>
Levy & Feigenbaum	Likelihood-Increasing False Constraints
Levy & Holden	<i>Birth Control vs. Marxism: Masking Gender</i>
Levy & Terleckyj	Testing Endogenous Growth
Roback	<i>Public Choice History 1. Is a State a Person?</i>
Roback	<i>Public Choice History 2. Vote Cycles, Tariffs &amp; Taxes</i>
Roback	<i>Public Choice History 3. Coase, Condorcet, Buchanan &amp; Texas</i>



*Putting the Self into Self-Interest 1. Economists' View of Human Nature*  
*Putting the Self into Self-Interest 2. Who Puts the Self into Self-Interest?*  
*Putting the Self into Self-Interest 3. The Development of the Child*  
*Putting the Self into Self-Interest 4. Who is Rational Economic Man?*  
*Territories and Secession 1. Introduction*  
*Territories and Secession 2. Northwest Ordinance*  
*Territories and Secession 3. Louisiana Purchase*  
*Territories and Secession 4. Missouri Compromise*  
*Territories and Secession 5. The Annexation of Texas*  
 Expansion, Secession and Lawlessness  
 Philosophy and Economics of Slavery  
 Social Insurance in Ethnically Diverse Societies  
 The Glass Ceiling  
 Voting for Polygamy  
*Political Economy of Mercantilism*  
 Addiction and Tournaments  
 Are NBA Fans Racists?  
 The Integration of College Basketball  
 Moral Hazard in Basketball  
 Rent Seeking and Property Rights Assignments in Mesta Cartel  
 The Rhetoric of Antitrust  
*Economic Policy as a Problem of Constitutional Governance*  
 Common Law, Statute Law, and Economic Efficiency  
 Complexity, Governance, and Economic Policy  
 Does the WHO Return Good Value to American Taxpayers?  
 Fiscal Exchange and the Evanescence of Excess Burden  
 Interest Group Politics and the Rationality of Voting  
 Interest Groups and Income Redistribution  
 Parasitical Political Pricing, Economic Calculation, and the Size of Government  
 Property Rights, Death, and Democracy  
 Public Finance in Constitutional Perspective  
 The Taxation of Alcohol and the Control of Social Cost  
 Work to Live vs. Live to Work: A Reconsideration of the Income-Utility Construction

## PUBLIC CHOICE, THE JOURNAL

*Public Choice* continued under the joint editorship of Charles Rowley and Robert Tollison in 1996. The year was marked by the publication of a number of outstanding papers and book reviews (under the separate editorship of William F. Shughart II). A special issue on *Constitutional Political Economy*, edited by Charles Rowley, appeared in late 1996.

## CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE JOURNAL

*Constitutional Political Economy*, formerly published by the Center under the direction of James M. Buchanan, as advisory editor, Viktor Vanberg and Richard Wagner, as editors, and Monika Vanberg, as managing editor, was privatized in 1995. The journal will henceforth be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers and will continue under the editorship of Viktor Vanberg and Richard Wagner as editors, and Monika Vanberg as managing editor. Information on submissions and subscriptions can be obtained by writing to the editors.

## FINANCIAL SUPPORT

The Center for Study of Public Choice is an integral part of George Mason University. While maintaining its separate identity, the Center staff is part of the George Mason Economics Department.

Center activities extend well beyond those supported by the university. Funds for summer and sabbatical-time research, special programs, guest lectures, visiting scholars, graduate students, and

supplemental travel and operating expenses have been provided by various external supporters, to whom we are grateful.

## PERSONNEL

There were two important personnel changes in 1996. Dr. John H. Moore left the Center in July 1996 to become President of Grove City College in Grove City, Pennsylvania. We wish him the best in his new position and note that he remains on the Center's Board of Advisors. Also, Dr. Jennifer Roback Morse went on leave in September 1996. We look forward to her return in 1997. Center personnel are as follows:

**James M. Buchanan**  
Advisory General Director  
Nobel Laureate

**Robert D. Tollison**  
General Director  
Joint Senior Editor, *Public Choice*

**Richard E. Wagner**  
Editor, *Constitutional Political Economy*  
Educational Director and Senior Research Associate

**W. Mark Crain**  
Director - Center Graduate Students  
Director - Center for Economic  
Education and Senior Research Associate

**Tyler Cowen**  
Graduate Director - Department of Economics  
and Senior Research Associate

**Ronald Heiner**  
Senior Research Associate

**Roger Congleton**  
Coordinator Visitors Program  
Senior Research Associate

**David M. Levy**  
Director Brown Bag Luncheons  
Coordinator Working Paper Series  
and Senior Research Associate

**Jennifer Roback Morse**  
Senior Research Associate and  
Coordinator, Outreach and  
Diversity Studies Program

**Betty H. Tillman**  
Administrative Director

**Carol M. Robert**  
Executive Secretary Sr

**Janet M. Byrd**  
Executive Secretary

**Jo Ann Burgess**  
Librarian Archivist

*John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow*, James C. Miller III

*Distinguished Adjunct Associate*, Gordon Tullock, University of Arizona

*Visiting Fellow*, Gordon L. Brady

### *Adjunct Research Associates*

Peter Bernholz  
University of Basel, Switzerland

H. Geoffrey Brennan  
Australian National University, Australia

Hartmut Kliemt  
University of Duisburg, Germany

Dwight Lee  
University of Georgia

### *Associated Graduate Students*

Bryant Brooks  
University of Georgia, B.B.A., M.B.A.

Mark Broski  
Benedictine College, B.A.  
Kansas State University, M.A.

Joe Johnson  
Wheeling College, B.S.

Katherine Lee  
Boston College, B.A.  
George Mason University, M.A.

Parker Normann  
Lehigh University, B.S.

Samuel Papenfuss  
Brigham Young University, B.A.

## PUBLICATIONS OF CENTER FACULTY

*James M. Buchanan*

### Main Papers

- "Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century," special contribution to the inaugural issue, *Asian Journal of Business & Information Systems* 1(No. 1, Summer 1996): 5-10.
- "Federalism and Individual Sovereignty," *Cato Journal* 15(Nos. 2-3, 1996):259-68.
- "An Ambiguity in Sen's Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Libertarian," *Analyse & Kritik* 18(No. 1, September 1996): 118-25.

### Short Papers

- Contribution to "In Celebration of Armen Alchian's 80th Birthday: Living and Breathing Economics," *Economic Inquiry* 34(July 1996): 412-26.
- Op. ed., "...Here's His Take on the Flat Tax," *Wall Street Journal* 127(No. 21, Tuesday, 30 January 1996): A18.

### Translations

- Hranice slobody medzi anarchiou a Leviatanom*, Lubica Hábová (trans.), (Bratislava, Czechoslovakia: Archa Publishing House, 1996). Slovak translation of *The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
- The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). Korean translation (1996).
- The Academic World of James M. Buchanan*, Byeong-Ho Gong (ed.), (Seoul, Korea: Korea Economic Research Institute, 1996). In addition, Korean translation of selected papers including two previously unpublished papers, "Adam Smith as Inspiration" and "The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy."
- Ethics and Economic Progress* (Norman, Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994). Korean translation (Seoul, Korea: Korea Economic Research Institute, 1996). *Ética y progreso económico*, José A. García-Durán de Lara, trans., (Barcelona, Spain: Editorial Ariel, 1996), Spanish translation.
- "Comportamento indotto dalle istituzioni nel mercato e in politica," *Politeia* 10(No. 33/34, 1994): 4-17. Italian translation of "Structure Induced Behavior in Markets and in Politics." (Not previously reported.)
- "Kommentar," *Ethik des Kapitalismus*, ed. Peter Koslowski (Tübingen: Mohr, 1982), 69-80. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck, 1991), 81-92; reprinted, 1991. Chinese translation (1996). Japanese translation (1996). Russian translation (1996). English translation (1996).
- Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy* (with Gordon Tullock) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). *Calculul Consensului: Bazele logice ale democrației constituționale*, Paul Fudulu (trans.), (Bucharest, Romania: Editura Expert, 1996), Romanian translation.
- "Sociedad y Democracia," in *Democracia y Sociedad: Vías de renovación del Sistema Democrático*, (Madrid, Spain: Editorial Complutense, 1996), 39-49. Spanish translation of "Society and Democracy."

### Contributions to Edited Collections

- "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes" (with G. Tullock), in *The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence*, ed. Roger D. Congleton, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 31-42.
- "Economics as a Public Science," in *Foundations of Research in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics?*, eds. Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels, (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1996), 30-36.
- "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," in *The State and Its Critics*, vol. 1, *Schools of Thought in Politics* 3, ed. Andrew Levine, (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 3-16. Received in 1996.
- "The Threat of Leviathan," in *The State and Its Critics*, vol. 1, *Schools of Thought in Politics* 3, ed. Andrew Levine, (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 271-89. Received in 1996.
- "Beyond Pragmatism: Prospects for Constitutional Revolution," in *The State and Its Critics*, vol. 1, *Schools of Thought in Politics* 3, ed. Andrew Levine, (Hants, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 290-304. Received in 1996.

"Society and Democracy," in *The David Hume Institute The First Decade*, eds. Nick Kuenssberg and Gillian Lomas, (Edinburgh: The David Hume Institute, 1996), 25-33.

"Democracy and Keynesian Constitutions: Political Biases and Economic Consequences" (with Richard Wagner), in *The Politics of American Economic Policy Making*, 2d ed., ed. Paul Peretz, (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 249-61.

"Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance, and the Limits of Reason" (with Viktor Vanberg), in *The Constitution of Good Societies*, eds. Karol Edward Soltan and Stephen L. Elkin, (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University, Press, 1996), 39-56.

#### **Book Reviews**

Anderson, Elizabeth. *Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1993). "Reviews," *International Studies in Philosophy* 107-08.

Gray, John. *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age* (Routledge: London and New York, 1995). "The Metamorphosis of John Gray," *Constitutional Political Economy* 6 (No. 3, Fall 1995): 293-35. Received in 1996.

Wittman, Donald A. *The Myth of Democratic Failure* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). "The Best of All Possible Worlds? New Efforts to Prove That Political Institutions Work as Well as Markets," *Times Literary Supplement*, January 26, No. 4843, p. 13.

#### **Robert D. Tollison**

##### **Books**

*Thirty Year Index: 1966-1995* (with C. Rowley), *Public Choice*, September 1995. Not reported in 1995.

*Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm* (with R. Ekelund, R. Hebert, G. Anderson, and A. Davidson) (London: Oxford University Press, 1996).

##### **Contributions to Books**

"Introduction" (with C. Rowley and F. Schneider), *Thirty-Year Index: 1966-1995, Public Choice* (September 1995), pp. xi-xix. Not reported in 1995.

"Institutional Alternatives for the Regulation of Drugs and Medical Devices," in *Advancing Medical Innovation: Health, Safety, and the Role of Government in the 21st Century* (Washington, D.C.: Progress and Freedom Foundation, 1996), pp. 17-40.

##### **Main Papers**

"Residual Demand Analysis of the Carbonated Soft Drink Market (with R. Higgins, D. Kaplan, and M. MacDonald), *Empirica* (1995), 115-126. Not reported in 1995.

"Drafting the Competition: Labor Unions and Military Conscription" (with G. Anderson and D. Halcoussis), *Defence and Peace Economics*, 1996, pp. 189-202.

##### **Textbooks**

*Economics: Private Markets and Public Choice* (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, Fifth Edition, 1996).

#### **Richard E. Wagner**

##### **Books**

*Economic Policy in a Liberal Democracy*. Hants, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996.

##### **Main Papers**

"Who Owes What, and to Whom? Public Debt, Ricardian Equivalence, and Governmental Form." *Review of Austrian Economics* 9 (no. 2, 1996): 143-57.

"Federal Transfer Taxation: The Effect on Saving, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Dissipation." *Family Business Review* 9 (Fall 1996): 269-83.

##### **Book Reviews**

*The Myth of Democratic Failure* by Donald A. Wittman, reviewed in *Constitutional Political Economy* 7 (no. 2, 1996): 153-56.

*The Austrian School and Modern Economics: Essays in Reassessment* by Nicolai J. Foss, reviewed in *Constitutional Political Economy* 7 (no. 3, 1996): 239-41.

**William M. Crain**

**Main Papers**

"Committee Characteristics and Re-Election Margins: An Empirical Investigation of the US House," with J.T. Sullivan, *Public Choice*, in press.

"Economics and the Architecture of Popular Music," with R.D. Tollison, *Journal of Economics and Behavioral Organization*, in press.

**Tylor Cowen**

**Books**

*The Enterprise of Art: An Optimistic View*, Harvard University Press, forthcoming.

**Main Papers**

"What Do We Learn From the Repugnant Conclusion?," *Ethics*, July 1996, 106, 754-775.

"Does the Artist Suffer From a Cost Disease?," *Rationality and Society*, February 1996, 8(1), 5-24, co-authored with Robin Grier.

**Book Review**

"If Methodology Were Like Economics," A review of Uskali Mäki, Bo Gustafsson, and Christian Knudsen (editors), *Rationality, Institutions, and Economic Methodology*, *Journal of Economic Methodology*, 1995, 2:1, 154-8.

**Ronald Heiner**

**Contributions to Books**

"The Origin of Rules in Uncertainty," in *Social Rules: Origin, Character, Logic, Change*, edited by David Braybrooke, Westview Press, 1996.

**Roger D. Congleton**

**Books**

*The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence*. Edited with introduction by R.D. Congleton. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 289 pages (1996).

**Main Papers**

"On the Rationality of Mutually Immiserating Coercion," (with P. Fudulu) *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* (1996).

"The Economics of Ethnic Nationalism," in *Nationalism and Rationality*. Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., and Wintrobe, R. Eds. New York: Cambridge University Press (1995):71-97. Not reported in 1995.

"An Overview of the Political Economy of Environmental Protection," in *The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence*. University of Michigan Press (1996): 3-30.

**Contributions to Books**

"Political Institutions and Pollution Control," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 74 (August, 1992): 412-421. Reprinted in: *The Political Economy of Environmental Protection: Analysis and Evidence*. R.D. Congleton, Ed. Ann Arbor Michigan: University of Michigan Press (1996): 273-289.

**David M. Levy**

**Main Papers**

"What Economic Imperialists Can Learn from Conquered Disciplines," with Susan Feigenbaum. *Knowledge and Policy* 9:2 (1996).

"Research Bias: Preliminary Findings," with Susan Feigenbaum. *Knowledge and Policy* 9:2 (1996).

"The Technological Obsolescence of Scientific Fraud," with Susan Feigenbaum. *Rationality and Society* 8:3 (1996): 261-276.

"Listen Up, Humanists! An Economist's View of Ross' *Life of Adam Smith*," *Eighteenth-Century Scotland* 10 (1996): 12-16.

"Stigler's Revival of Mandeville: A Mistake-Free Theory of Society," *Journal des Economistes et des Études Humaines* 6:4 (1995): 655-668.

### Book Reviews

Peter Minowitz, *Profits, Priests, and Princes: Adam Smith's Emancipation of Economics from Politics and Religion*. In *Eighteenth Century: A Current Bibliography* (1996).

### James C. Miller III

#### Main Papers

"The Budget Deficit and the National Debt," forthcoming in a volume to be published by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

The Balanced Budget Amendment," *Slate*, December 9.

### Adjunct Professors

#### Gordon Tullock

#### Main Papers

"Legal Hersy," *Economic Inquiry*, Number 1, January, 1996, pp. 1-9.

"The Political Market Place," Keri Economic Research Institute (a proceedings volume edited by Iljoong Kim), *Regulation Study Series* 24, 1996, pp. 51-60.

"Corruption Theory and Practice," *Contemporary Economic Policy*, July 1996.

"Provision of Public Goods Through Privatization," *Kyklos*, Vol. 49-2, 1996.

"Economics and Psychology: Mediating the Conflict," *Taiwan Journal of Political Economy*, 1996.

"Origins of Public Choice," The Netherlands (Dr. A. Heertje), forthcoming.

"The Initial Emergence of States," forthcoming in Gerald Radnitzky's festshrift.

#### Book Reviews

*Alien Nation*, by Peter Brimelow, *Public Choice*, 1996.

### Peter Bernholz

#### Main Papers

"International Competition Among States: Minimal Coercion, Market Regime and Innovation: The Case of Antiquity," *Jena Lectures No. 6*, of the Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, 1996. 24 pp.

"A Proposal for a European Constitution." In: *After Maastricht: What Steps Next?*. Osservatorio "Giordano Dell'Amore." Milan: Relazioni 16 International Conference.

"Economic Laws and Bitter Truths," in the *Basler Zeitung*, Monday, November 4, 1996, No. 258, page 11.

#### Contributions to Books

"Causes of Changes in Political-Economic Regimes." In: Gerken, Lüder (ed.): *Competition Among Institutions*. Basingstoke/London: MacMillan, 1995, pp. 65-88.

"A Proposal for a European Constitution," In: *Ordnungspolitische Aspekte der europäischen Integration*. Freiburgs Botschaft für ein offenes Europa. 1. Freiburger Wirtschaftssymposium. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1996, pp. 67-72.

### Geoffrey Brennan

#### Main Papers

G. Brennan and A. Hamlin (1996), "Economic Constitutions," *Political Studies*, XLIV(3), 605-619.

G. Brennan and J.J. Pincus (1996), "A Minimalist Theory of Inter-Governmental Grants," *Journal of Public Economics*, 61, 229-46.

#### Contributions to Books

G. Brennan (1996), "Selection and the Currency of Reward," in R. Goodin (ed.), *The Theory of Institutional Design*, Cambridge University Press, 256-76.

G. Brennan (1996), "The Socialization of Commodities: A Revisionist View," in J. Casas Pardo and F. Schneider (eds), *Current Issues in Public Choice*, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar), 223-36.

G. Brennan and M. Brooks (1996), "On Family Taxation and Leviathan Government," in J.G. Head and R. Krever (eds), *Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale*, Australian Tax Research Foundation (1996), 123-42.

G. Brennan and A. Hamlin (1996), "Economic Constitutions," in R. Bellamy and D. Castiglione (eds), *Constitutionalism in Transformation*, Blackwells, Oxford, 194-207.

#### Articles Reprinted

G. Brennan (1972), "Pareto-Optimal Redistribution: The Case of Malice and Envy," *Journal of Public Economics*, 2, 173-83 in M. Casson (ed.) 1996) *Culture, Social Norms and Social Behaviour*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

#### Hartmut Kliemt

##### Books

*Peter Singer in Germany — Threats to Freedom of Discussion in Science* (edited jointly with Ch. Anstitz und Rainer Hegselmann), Frankfurt et. al.: Peter Lang. 462 pp. Second edition.

*Rationing Health Care* (edited jointly with W. Kirch), Regensburg: Publikationen des Forschungsverbundes Public Health Sachsen, Roderer Verlag. 74 Seiten.

##### Main Papers

"Life: What Is Worth Maintaining," in *Cardiovascular Risk Factors*, Vol. 5 No.4, 1995, 249-254.

"Rule of Law and the Welfare State," in *Philosophica* Vol. 56, 1995/2, S. 121-132.

"Simulation and Rational Practice," in Hegselmann et. al. (ed.), *Modelling and Simulation in the Social Sciences from the Philosophy of Science Point of View*. Theory and Decision Library. Kluwer 1996, 13-27.

"The Paretian Liberal, His Liberties and His Contracts" (jointly with Antony de Jasay) in *Analyse & Kritik* 18, 1996, 126-147.

"Reihard Selten Meets the Classics" (jointly with Werner Guth) in: *Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten*, (ed. by Wulf Albers et al.), Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 1996, 243-256.

"The Technological Challenge: On the Constitutional Political Economy of Organ Transplantation," in: *Herausforderungen für die Gesundheitspolitik*. Beiträge des 15. Hochschulkurses aus Gesundheitsökonomik (Band 214), herausgegeben von Engelbert Theurl und Josef Doszy, Universität Innsbruck 1996, 151-163.

"Rationing in Health Care as a Problem of the Ethics of Law," in: *Rationalisierung und Rationierung im Gesundheitswesen*, herausgegeben von Peter Oberender, Grafelfing, SMVerlagsgesellschaft 1996, 23-31.

"How to Ration if You Must," in: *Rationierung im Gesundheitswesen*. Regensburg: Publikationen des Forschungsverbundes Public Health Sachsen, Roderer Verlag. 21-43.

"Rational Choice Explanations?," in: Ulrich Druwe und Volker Kunz (Hrsg.), *Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie in der Politikwissenschaft: Eine Einführung in Konzepte und Forschungsstand*. Leke und Buderich: Opladen, S. 83-105.

"On the Influence of Morals in Politics," in: *Politik und Ethik*, herausgegeben von Kurt Bayertz, Stuttgart, Reclam (Nr. 9606), 1996, 168-193.

"The Paradox of Liberalism — An Introduction to the Topic," in: *Analyse & Kritik* 18, 1996, 1-19.

##### Short Papers

"Towards a Completely Indirect Evolutionary Approach - A Note" (jointly with Werner Guth), Discussion paper - Economics Series 82, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.

"Will It Be Necessary to Ration Public Health Services?" (jointly with W. Kramer and F.W. Schwartz), in: *Ethik in der Medizin* 8, 1996, 94-106.

"Solidarity with the Solidaric Could Enhance Willingness to Donate," in: *Handelsblatt* Nr. 139/30, Montag 22.7.1996, S.2, *Gastkommentar* (Guest comment in economic newspaper).

#### Dwight Lee

##### Contribution to Books

"Poverty vs. Politics in Pollution Abatement," in S.K. Majumdar, E.W. Miller, and F.J. Brenner (eds.), *Environmental Contaminants, Ecosystems and Human Health* (Easton, PA: The Pennsylvania Academy of Science, 1995): 450-63.

"Capital Mobility: Challenges for Business and Government," in Ken Chilton, Murray Weidenbaum, and Robert Batterson (eds.), *The Dynamic American Firm* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996): 89-102.

#### Main Papers

"Why Workers Should Want Mandated Benefits to Lower Their Wages," *Economic Inquiry* Vol. 34, No. 2 (April 1996): 401-407.

The Efficient Market Theory Thrives on Criticism," *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 1996): 35-40 (with James Verbrugee).

"The Political Economy of the Peace Dividend," *Public Choice* Vol. 88, No. 1-2 (July 1996): 29-42 (with Richard K. Vedder).

"Slope Versus Elasticity and the Burden of Taxation," *The Journal of Economic Education* Vol. 27, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 229-32 (with Philip E. Graves and Robert L. Sexton).

"Why is Flexible Employment Increasing?" *Journal of Labor Research* Vol 17, No. 4 (Fall 1996): 543-53.

"Sentencing Laffer Curves and Prison Space," *Social Science Quarterly* Vol. 77, No. 2 (June 1996): 269-72 (with Jeff Clark).

"Sentencing Laffer Curves: A Response," *Social Science Quarterly* Vol. 77, No. 2 (June 1996): 269-72 (with Jeff Clark).

#### Editorials

"Benefits and the Minimum Wage," *Investor's Business Daily*, My 8, 1996: p. A-2 (with Robert L. Sexton).

"The Turf Fight for Indoor Air Quality Protection," *Contemporary Issues Series 79* Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University (May 1996).

"Transfer Traps and the Poor," *Society* Vol. 33 No. 5 (July/August, 1996): 17-18.

"A Good Conversation and the Marketplace," *The Freeman* (October 1996): 663-66 (with Candace Allen).

"Hypocrisy," *Forbes* (November 4, 1996): 96.

#### Book Reviews

*Federalism and Free Trade* by Jean-Luc Mique, *The Cato Journal* Vol. 14, No. 3 (Winter 1995): 529-31.

## HONORS, AWARDS AND PRESENTATIONS

*James M. Buchanan*

#### Professional Affiliations and Awards

Honorary Professorship, Universidad del Pacifico, Lima, Peru, October 3.

Recipient, Lauria Honoris Causa, Valladolid, Spain, October 31.

#### Presentations

Brownbag Lunch, "Rule Feasibility and Rule Dominance," Center for Study of Public Choice, Buchanan House, George Mason University, February 6.

McMyler Lecture, "Democracy, Deficits, and Discriminatory Politics," Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, March 20.

Colloquium, "Is a Viable Federalism Possible?," Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University, March 28.

Lecture, "Clarifying Confusion about the Balanced Budget Amendment," Goldey-Beacom College, Wilmington, Delaware, April 2.

Participant, Public Choice Society Meetings, Houston, Texas, April 11-14.

Participant, *The Welfare State Reconsidered*, "Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare?," Social Philosophy & Policy Center, Chicago, Illinois, April 18-21.

Lecture, "The Pros and Cons of the Flat Tax: A Public Choice Perspective," Law and Organizational Economics Center, University of Kansas-Lawrence, April 22.

Interview, Jan Brogger, Norwegian periodical *Tidens Tgn*, Buchanan House, George Mason University, April 28.

Participant, Liberty Fund Colloquium, *The Political Economy of Karl Brunner*, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 3-6.

Lecture, "Constitutional Political Economy: The Emergence of a Research Program," Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany, May 7.



- Lecture, "Rule Feasibility and Rule Dominance," Research Seminar, University of Basel, Switzerland, May 8.
- Television Interview, with Jo An Lee, Seoul, Korea, May 27.
- Interview, *Joong-Ang* newspaper, Seoul, Korea, May 27.
- Lecture, "The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy," Korea Economic Research Institute, Seoul, May 29.
- Interview, *Korea Economic Daily*, Seoul, May 30.
- Lecture, "Adam Smith as Inspiration," Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Korea, May 30.
- Lecture, "The Political Efficiency of General Taxation," Korean Society of Public Finance, Seoul, May 31.
- Lecture, "The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy," Chiang Chen Studio Theatre, Hong Kong, June 3.
- Seminar, "Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century," Department of Accountancy, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, June 4.
- Lecture, "Adam Smith as Inspiration," Heritage Foundation, D.C., June 13.
- Taping with Anthony de Jasay, "Justice and the State," Buchanan House, George Mason University, June 18.
- Participant, *Federalism in the Twenty-first Century*, Cosmos Club, D.C., and the Buchanan House, June 21-22.
- Lev Dobriansky Distinguished Lecture on Political Economy, "Constitutional Constraints on Government," Georgetown University, D.C., June 26.
- Interview by Anna J. Bray, "Economist James Buchanan: Taking Off Rose-Colored Glasses to Study Government," *Investor's Business Daily*, pp. 1-2, August 26.
- Participant, Liberty Fund Conference, *Public Finance in a Free Society*, Potsdam, Germany, September 5-8.
- Participant, Mt. Pelerin Society meeting, Vienna, Austria, September 8-13.
- Scidman meeting, Memphis, Tennessee, September 24.
- Brownbag Lunch, "Majoritarian Rent Seeking under Alternative Configurations of Preferences," Center for Study of Public Choice, Buchanan House, George Mason University, September 24.
- Lecture, "The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy," Universidad del Pacifico, Lima, Peru, October 2.
- Seminar, "Generalized Increasing Returns," Universidad del Pacifico, Lima, Peru, October 3.
- Seminar, "Constitutional Economics," Universidad del Pacifico, Lima, Peru, October 3.
- Seminar (with Yong J. Yoon), "Generalized Increasing Returns, Euler's Theorem and Competitive Federalism," Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, October 16.
- Talk, "An Introduction to Public Choice," Center for Innovative Technology, Dulles, Virginia, October 18.
- Keynote Speaker, "Can Democracy Promote the General Welfare," *Rethinking the Welfare State: A Challenge for the Private Sector*, Circulo de Empresarios "Entrepreneurial League," Madrid, Spain, October 28-29.
- Lauria Honoris Causa in Law, "The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy," University of Valladolid, Spain, October 31.
- Lecture, "The Metamorphosis of Western Democracies at the End of the Twentieth Century," Sinclair House Debate, Bad Homburg, Germany, November 29-30.
- Talk, "Autobiographical Notes on the Origins of Theory of Public Choice," University of Rome I, Italy, December 2.
- Talk, "Implicit Debt," to honor Italian translation, *Democracy in Deficit*, Free University of Rome, Italy, December 3.
- Lecture, "Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century," *Ten Nobels for the Future*, Milan, Italy, December 5-7.

**Robert D. Tollison**

**Professional Affiliations and Awards**

- President, Public Choice Society, 1994-1996
- Board of Advisors, The Independent Institute
- Board of Directors, Citizens for a Sound Economy
- Editorial Board, *Constitutional Political Economy*

Joint Senior Editor, *Public Choice*  
Board of Editors, *Economic Series*, Texas A&M University Press  
Special Director, Japanese Public Choice Society

#### **Presentations**

- Paper, "Institutional Alternatives for the Regulation of Drugs and Medical Devices," Conference on Advancing Medical Innovation, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Washington, D.C. February 7.
- Lecturer, University of Kansas Law and Organizational Economics Center's Institute for State Judges, 3 lectures, Sanibel Island, FL, March 17-20.
- Speaker, "FDA Reform," PHRMA Science and Regulatory Section Meeting, Washington, D.C., March 25.
- Presidential Address, "The Interest Group Theory of Government," Public Choice Society, Houston, April 13.
- Brownbag Lunch, Center for Study of Public Choice, Buchanan House, George Mason University, "The Interest-Group Theory of Government," April 23.
- Board of Directors Meeting, Citizens for a Sound Economy, Washington, D.C., May 15.
- Speaker, "Antitrust," Outreach Seminar, Public Choice Center, George Mason University, May 29.
- Moderator, Conference on Federalism in the Twenty-First Century, Washington, D.C., and Fairfax, June 21-22.
- Advisory Committee Meeting, Progress and Freedom Foundation, Washington, D.C., July 11, 1996.
- Public Choice Seminar, "Mercantilism Revisited," Public Choice Center, George Mason University, September 4.
- Discussant and Paper Giver, Southern Economics Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., November 23-25.

#### *Richard E. Wagner*

##### **Presentations**

- Participant in Liberty Fund Colloquium on "Knut Wicksell's Contributions to Public Finance," Potsdam, Germany, September 1996.
- "Does the WHO Return Good Value to American Taxpayers?," Washington, D.C., Cato Institute, October 1996.
- "Complexity, Governance, and Economic Policy," Latrobe, PA: Center for Economic and Policy Education, Saint Vincent College, October 1996.
- "Fiscal Exchange and the Evanesence of Excess Burden," Fairfax, VA: Center for Study of Public Choice, Brownbag, November 1996.

#### *William M. Crain*

##### **Professional Affiliations**

Commission on Competitive and Equitable Tax Policy, Office of the Governor  
Governor's Advisor Board of Economists, Office of the Governor  
Transportation Revenue Advisory Panel, Virginia Department of Transportation  
Public Safety Policy Advisory Committee, Virginia Department of Public Safety  
Director, Center for Economic Education, George Mason University  
Graduate Coordinator, Center for Study of Public Choice  
Joint-Editor, *Journal of Cultural Economics*

##### **Presentations**

- "Fiscal Consequences of Budgetary Baselines," Public Choice Society Meetings, Houston, TX, March 1996.
- The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting," Center for Study of Public Choice, September 1996.
- "A Taxing Dilemma: Virginia's Looming Budget Crisis," *With Good Reason*, statewide broadcast on Virginia Public Radio, September 1996.
- "Economics and the Architecture of Popular Music," with Robert D. Tollison, Southern Economic Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., November 1996.

#### *Tyler Cowen*

##### **Presentations**

- "New and Old Austrian Theories of the Business Cycle," New York University, Fall 1995.
- "The Economics of Fame," Institute for Humane Studies, Fairfax, VA, Summer 1996.

"How to Publish," Institute for Humane Studies, Fairfax, VA, Summer 1996.

"The Economics of the Arts," University of Oklahoma, Spring 1996.

Moderator and Speaker, Liberty and Society conference, run by Liberty Fund, Airlie House, Virginia, Spring 1996.

"Why I Do Not Believe in the Cost-Disease," conference on Cultural Economics, Boston, Spring 1996.

"An Economic Theory of High and Low Culture," conference on Cultural Economics, Boston, Spring 1996.

"Discounting and Restitution," Center for the Study of Public Choice, Spring 1996.

"Do Economists Use Social Mechanisms to Explain?" presented at conference on social mechanisms, University of Stockholm, Sweden, run by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, June 1996.

#### *Ronald Heiner*

##### **Professional Affiliations**

Visiting Research Professor at the Universität des Saarlandes, Germany,  
May - July, sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation

##### **Presentations**

Seminar on, "Rationally Motivated Cooperation In The One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma," Department of Economics, New York University, March 1996.

Presented paper on "Exogenous versus Endogenous Information: A General Theory of Nash Equilibrium," at conference on Individual Decisions and Macro-Theory, at Universität des Trento, Italy, May 1996.

Discussant at the 14th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics about "Economics and Religion," at Wallerfangen/Saar, Germany, June 1996.

Seminar on "Forecasting Ability and Rational Cooperation In the One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma," Department of Economics, Mannheim Universität, Germany 1996.

Seminar on "The Meaning of Endogenous versus Exogenous Information In Game Theory," Business Administration and Economics, Universität des Hamburg, Germany, June 1996.

Seminar on "Game Theory, Self-Interest, and Rational Cooperation," at the Chamber of Commerce, Hamburg, Germany, June 1996.

Seminar on "Endogenous versus Exogenous Information and Rational Cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma Situations," Department of Economics and Center for Experimental Game Theory, Humboldt Universität, Berlin, Germany, June 1996.

Seminar on "Linking Subjective Rationality to Causation," Center for Decision Sciences, Universität des Trier, Germany, July 1996

Seminar on "Mechanism Design for Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemma," Department of Economics, Universität des Saarlands, Saarbrücken, Germany, July 1996.

Seminar on "Prisoner's Dilemma Research," Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, September 25.

#### *Roger Congleton*

##### **Presentations**

"The Political Economy of Crime" Public Choice Center Luncheon Seminar, January 31.

"Public Choice, Efficiency and Equal Protection" Public Choice Center Luncheon Seminar, February 13.

"Return to Rio: Agency Problems and the Political Economy of Environmental Treaties," Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, April 1996.

"Public Choice, Efficiency and Equal Protection," Public Choice Society, Houston, Texas, April 1996.

"Generality without Uniformity," Public Choice Center Luncheon Seminar, September 10.

#### *David M. Levy*

##### **Presentations**

"The Technological Obsolescence of Scientific Fraud," with Susan Feigenbaum. History of Economics Society, July 1996.

"Belief as Preference Over Theory," Center Brown Bag, August 1996.

"Listen Up Humanists!," American Eighteenth Century Society, September 1996.

Panel discussant on Larry Levine's *Opening of the American Mind*, George Mason University, November 1996.

"Sharing Lashes from Carlyle's Whip," Kress History of Economics Club, Cambridge, December 1996.

*Jennifer Roback Morse*

**Professional Affiliations**

Coordinator, Public Choice Outreach Seminar  
Advisory Board, Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty  
Advisory Board, Institute for Justice  
Founding Member, Women's Freedom Network

**Presentations**

- Lecturer, University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain, "The Problem: The Economists' View of Human Nature," "Who is Rational Economics Man?," and "The Changing Person," January 8-10.
- Talk, "Is a State a Person? A Public Choice Interpretation of the Annexation of Texas," Law & Economics Society, George Mason University School of Law, Fairfax, VA, February 15.
- Participant, "M.E. Bradford and the American Tradition of Liberty," Liberty Fund Colloquium, Columbia, S.C., February 27-March 3.
- Talk, "Is There a Catholic Economics," Natural Law & Modern Economics," Brent Society, Arlington, VA, April 16.
- Seminar, "Who is Rational Economic Man?," College of William & Mary, Department of Economics, Williamsburg, VA, April 26.
- Talk, "The Commitment to Freedom: Family Life & Libertarian Feminism," College of William & Mary, Liberal Society, Williamsburg, VA, April 26.
- Talk, "Natural Law & Modern Economics," Conference on Centesimus Annus and Human Personality, Acton Institute Conference, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., May 13.
- Lecturer, "Vote Cycles, Tariffs & Taxes" and "What is Constitution & Why Do We Need One?," Public Choice Outreach Seminar, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, May 27-31.
- Organizer/Coordinator, Public Choice Outreach Seminar, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, May 27-31.
- Lecturer, "Putting the Self into Self-Interest: An Economist Looks at Values," Russell Kirk Memorial Lecture, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. October 2, 1996.

*James C. Miller III*

**Professional Affiliations**

Counselor, and Member of the Board of Directors, Citizens for a Sound Economy  
John M. Olin Distinguished Fellow, Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation  
Senior Fellow (by courtesy), Hoover Institution  
Member, Council on National Policy  
Member, Board of Editors, *Regulation*  
Co-Chairman, Tax Foundation  
Member, Board of Directors, Progress & Freedom Foundation  
Member, Board of Trustees, Reagan Alumni Association  
Member, Board of Advisors, Consumer Alert  
Member, Advisory Committee, Cato Project on Social Security Privatization  
Member, Board of Directors, Voter Integrity Project

**Presentations**

- "The Dole Economic Plan," Council on National Policy, C-Span, August 21.
- "The Economic and Political Outlook," Pennag Industries Association, Hershey, PA, September 17.
- "The Future of the Public Sector, Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton, NJ, November 16.
- "Introduction of Congressman Phil Crane," Tax Foundation Annual Dinner, New York, NY, November 21.
- Testimony, "Regulatory Analysis and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs," Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, September 25.

### **Media Interviews**

- CNBC, Doles Tax Cut Proposal, August 5.
- Republican National Convention, numerous media, August 12-15.
- Dole-Kemp Campaign, three media presentations in Texas, September 27.
- Nostalgia TV, "Issues and Answers," September 30.
- MSNBC, "Dole's Economic Plan," September 30.
- Capitol Hill, press conference on "No-Tax Pledge," October 8.
- WMAL, election night commentary, November 5.

### *Adjunct Professors*

#### *Gordon Tullock*

#### **Honors and Awards**

- Special Award for Outstanding Contributions in the Field of Law and Economics, George Mason University, School of Law, May 14, 1996.
- Honorary Doctoral Degree, Philosophy-History Department, University of Basel, November 27, 1996.

#### **Presentations**

- European Public Choice Society Meeting, Bar-Ilan University and Tiberias, Israel, paper, chair, and discussant, March 1996.
- The Association of Private Enterprise Board Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, paper, March/April 1996.
- Public Choice Society Meetings, Houston, Texas, discussant, April 1996.
- Bailey, England, "Reflections on Redistribution," May 18.
- Rome, Italy, "Reflections on Redistribution" and "Where is the Rectangle," May 1996.
- Rome, Italy, "Federalism," May 1996.
- Wuerzburg, Germany, "Where is the Rectangle" and "Reflections on Redistribution," June 5.
- Western Economic Association International, organizer and chair of panel, "Sources of Economic Ignorance," June 28 - July 2.
- "The Relationship between Democracy and Progress," UCLA, November 22.
- Southern Economic Association, Washington, D.C., Chaired panel on "Bioeconomics," November 23-25.

### *Peter Bernholz*

#### **Professional Affiliations**

- Member, Scientific Advisory Council of the German Ministry for the Economy
- Member of the Board, Mont Pelerin Society

#### **Presentations**

- Max-Planck-Institute, Jena - Presentation of a paper "International Competition Among States: Minimal Coercion, Market Regime and Innovation: The Case of Antiquity," January 11.
- Participation in Discussions of the European Constitutional Group in Frankfurt, Germany, February 1.
- Presentation of paper on "Logrolling, Contracts, Cyclical Social Preferences, and the Coase Theorem" at the European Public Choice Meeting in Tiberias, Israel, March 11.
- Participation in Conference of the International Economic Association on The Political Dimension of Economic Growth, in San José, Costa Rica. Presented paper on "Causes of Changes in Political-Economic Regimes," April 1-4.
- Participation in Conference at Interlaken, Switzerland on Ideology and Analysis, May 3-5.
- Participation in Conference on Problems of the European Economic and Monetary Union, at the Europa Institute, Basel, Switzerland, May 31.
- Participation in Conference of the Kiel Institute of International Economics on Problems of European Integration. Comment on "Between Unanimity and Majority: Towards New Rules of Decision Making," June 26-27.

- Coorganizer of a Workshop on the Conditions for Innovation and Growth: International Competition of States and Ideologies. Presentation of a paper "International Competition Among States: Minimal Coercion, Market Regime and Innovation: The Case of Antiquity," August 7-9.
- Participation in Conference on Wicksell's Proposals for Voting on Public Finance Problems, in Potsdam, Germany, September 6-7.
- Participation in Meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in Vienna, Austria. Presentation of a paper "Necessary Conditions for a Viable Democracy, September 9-13.

*Geoffrey Brennan*

**Professional Affiliations**

- Constitutional Political Economy* Editorial Board
- Economics and Philosophy* Editorial Board
- Journal of Political Philosophy* Editorial Board
- Public Finance Quarterly* Editorial Board

**Presentations**

- April: RSSS, ANU: 50th Anniversary Address
- October: University of Tasmania, Hobart: Inaugural Giblin Lecture

*Hartmut Kliemt*

**Professional Affiliations**

- Editorial Board of *Constitutional Political Economy*
- Homo oeconomicus Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaft*

**Presentations**

- Rational Rationing - MEDICA, November 22.

*Dwight Lee*

**Presentations**

- "What's Good for the NEA is not Good for America," The Awakening, Sea Island, Georgia, January 6.
- "Sense and Sensitivity: The Moral Tensions Between Economics and Literature," Alaska Council for Economic Education, Anchorage, Alaska, February 21.
- "Sustainability: The Sad Case of Alaska," Environmental Ethics Meeting, University of Georgia, Ecology Building, February 27.
- "Mandated Benefits as a Tax on Employment," ALEPS-International Colloquium, Paris, France, March 25.
- "The Entrepreneur as Hero," Association for Private Enterprise Education Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 1.
- "Politics as the Art of Compromising the Public," Public Choice Meetings, Houston, Texas, April 13.
- "The Market as a Network of Communication and Cooperation," The American College in London, London, England, April 17.
- "The Future of the Flat Tax With a Perspective on Fiscal Federalism," Orange County Economics Club, Orange County, California, April 30.
- "The Future of Free Enterprise," Inaugural Lecture in the Henry Salvatori Lecture Series, Chapman University, Orange, California, April 30.
- "Commencement Address, American College in Atlanta, Georgia, May 23.
- "Ayn Rnad, Teaching Economics, and Classical Liberalism," Exploring Classical Liberalism, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, June 13.
- "Can Economics Teach Us Anything About Entrepreneurship?" Institute of Economic Affairs, London, England, June 25.