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THE FUTURE OF U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL

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APPARENCÉS

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The Future of U.S.-Russia Arms Control

(4:45 p.m.)

MS. OLIKER: Good afternoon. Thank you all for being here. I am Olga Oliker. I direct the Euro program at International Crisis Group. I am extremely honored to be moderating this session, no small part because we could not ask for two better speakers.


These men were among Russia's and America's top arms control negotiators for many years and are therefore fantastic choices to discuss the future of bilateral arms control between our two countries.

That future, I have to say, looks rather bleak just at present. The United States has started the clock on withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Russia has followed suit — which
means that unless something radical happens, this
treaty signed at the end of 1980s will be gone this
summer. It's not clear whether or not the New START
Treaty will be extended for another 5 years.

Meanwhile, new technologies are coming online
and they're getting integrated into weapon systems in
our countries and in other countries. They are not
bound by existing treaties, but they could threaten
nuclear forces, nuclear command and control, and they
could change conflict and assurance dynamics.

So what's desirable? What's possible? What
can we get done? I'm really looking forward to the
conversation we're going to have. Before we begin, if
you've been here all day, you know that if you're going
to ask questions, you need to do that by submitting
them through the app, or a paper form is available at
the back of the room. So please do that.

But I'm going to begin by asking Ambassador
Antonov does the end of the INF treaty mean the end of
U.S.-Russian arms control?

MR. ANTONOV: Good afternoon. Thank you very
much for inviting me. And it's a great honor for me to
discuss this issue with you. I can see that such a dialog is very important for the United States as well as for the Russian Federation.

We have a lack of context now due to some reasons. I hope you understand what I'm talking about. That's why I highly appreciate this opportunity to discuss the most serious problems we face today.

I can see that that international system of arms control is in a crisis. Just would like to remind you that Soviet-American negotiations as well as agreements had positive effect on Soviet-American relations, and then later on Russian-American relations. The same I can say about the international situation. Everybody has been waiting what kind of results we will put on the table after such negotiations -- because climate, international climate could become more attractive for continued dialog between various countries.

You see that, in 2002, the United States has decided to withdraw from ABM Treaty, and in that years, we made it clear to everybody that we will face bad consequences of such a decision. And on 1st of March
last year, President Putin announced about new Russian arms and armaments that we developed.

Some politicians and military officers were surprised to see what kind of weapons we created, but we tried to explain that it was just only simple answer from Russian side to the decision by the United States to withdraw from ABM treaty. We tried to confirm that if we see other unconstructive steps from the United States regarding international arms control system, we will face consequences not just only for Russian-American relations, but for international situation as well.

Now, we face a situation where the United States has decided to withdraw from INF Treaty. Of course in the beginning, they -- I mean, Washington decided to support this treaty because it met the national interests of the United States. Don't forget that we were forced to destroy more missiles in accordance with this treaty.

But after a few years, it was clear the technology, as you mentioned, has been developed and it was necessary for United States to make some amendments
to National (sic) Posture Review.

But I just would like to draw your attention that everything has been started since 1999 when United States tested combat unmanned aerial vehicles that have the same characteristics as land-based cruise missile banned by the treaty.

In October last year, United States, to my regret, decided to withdraw from the treaty. It was said publicly, by the way, that United States needs such missile to deal with China. It's very important to understand what is behind this decision of United States. But at the same time, United States wanted to find a pretext and a pretext was found. It was created a fairy tale about so-called Russian missile 9M729.

We did -- I would like to emphasize, we did everything possible we could to save the treaty considering its importance in terms of sustaining strategic stability in Europe as well as globally. The last attempt of this kind was undertaken in January 15 when the United States finally agreed to our request for holding consultations in Geneva.

And again, I would like to emphasize -- Olga
and Jim, you'll see that we proposed unprecedented transparency measures that went far beyond our obligations on the INF treaty in order to persuade United States that Russia was not in violation of these essential instrument. However, United States rejected and it was introduced ultimatum to us that we had to destroy not just only this missile that I mentioned, but launchers as well as equipment, related equipment. So we -- it's also clear that we decided to reject because it contradicts the INF Treaty in both letter and spirit.

I consider that consequences of the destruction of INF will be very grave for Russian-American relations as well as for international relations. Now, there is a question and I hope that we will discuss it: What will be with this START Treaty? For me, of course it's very difficult to speak about this treaty just because I was head of Russian delegation during those excellent time when we have brilliant relations with United States. I remember eyes of my colleagues from United States. We were
sitting; we spent so many hours per day. We slept just
only three, four hours conducting these negotiations.

But if START Treaty disappears, it means that
we will have nothing between the United States and the
Russian Federation in arms control. And there will be,
as I said you, the grave consequences of such a
situation. I don't want to elaborate because I spent
too much time to say about it.

It seems to me that I want -- I try at least
to persuade you that we are not enemies. I try to
persuade you today that we are not rivals. Please
don't forget about agreements endorsed by our
presidents a few years ago when we were named as
partners.

It seems to me that we have common challenges
to our security, and one -- the -- could I say that the
main threat that we face today is international
terrorism. Moreover, I consider that the most burning
or pressing issue is a potential nexus between weapons
of mass destruction and non-state actors.

We have elaborated excellent nonproliferation
safety net, but we have to improve it. We need full-
fledged dialog between the United States and the
Russian Federation. I'm sure of it. Not just only
because I'm bilateral ambassador, but because I spent
so many years discussing and trying to reach an
agreement with the United States on various issues in
arms control and on proliferation. Sorry, that I am so
lengthy. Thank you.

MS. OLIKER: Thank you.

MR. ANTONOV: But it's just only for the
beginning.

MS. OLIKER: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
I think it's very important actually to have the
historical context.

So, Dr. Miller, from the ambassador we
understand that dialog is necessary. Is it possible?

MR. MILLER: It is possible, it is necessary,
and it is often difficult, Olga, as you know. Let me
start by thanking you and thinking Carnegie for hosting
this event. Mr. Ambassador, it's a pleasure to share
the stage with you as it was to work with you on a
range of issues in government.

Having said that, you will not be surprised to
hear I have a somewhat different interpretation of what happened to the INF Treaty.

MR. ANTONOV: As usually.

MR. MILLER: As usually.

(Laughter)

MR. MILLER: President Putin put the knife in the INF Treaty. It took a long time for the United States to respond. We can argue whether this administration or the past administration responded in the most timely and effective way to raise the issue to try to save the treaty. But at this point in time it's clear, as you said, the battalions of the 9M729 are being deployed.

The treaty is for all intents and purposes dead. And it's unfortunate because it's been in the interest of the United States, of Russia and of not just our NATO allies, but other countries in Europe as well.

But I believe that's over and we need to look forward now to the type of dialog that cuts across a range of issues. And we can talk more about this, but I'll just maybe finish by making three key points. One
is that the New START Treaty, which you did negotiate very effectively -- and we saw Rose Gottemoeller earlier, as the lead American negotiator. Difficult negotiations on a timeline. Very well done by both sides.

Both sides' national interests are well protected by that treaty. Neither side has any view that the other side has cheated on that treaty, nor does either side have incentives to do so.

So the first task is extending the New START Treaty beyond its expiration date of 2021. The second -- and we can talk about whether that will happen in this administration or not. I'm not sure that it will. And there's only about a month after a first term of this administration before it would need to be renewed to meet the timeline of the treaty.

Second is that as we go forward after extension, we should look to "expansion of the treaty". And by that, I would include all means of deliveries of strategic systems. That would include the Status-6, which you referenced that President Putin essentially announced and was previously let out in a news
conference.

In my view, it should include nuclear cruise missiles clean off for submarines. Those may not come under numerical limitations, but having them as part of the accountability I believe would be a valuable next step.

I don't see that happening today. I don't see it happening literally tomorrow. But it's an important step and over time I'd like to see an expansion of the New START Treaty and its data exchange and verification provisions, in particular to all classes of nuclear weapons.

When the United States and Russia have 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world, it is reasonable for their citizens and for the rest of the world to say, "Hey, by the way, how many do you have of different types?" That's a reasonable suggestion and it's also a foundational element of going forward toward any world where nonproliferation is successful.

And then there are a range of steps as well that some of which could be considered confidence building measures, things like strategic stability
talks. Some of which could be bilateral steps. For example, both sides agreeing not to deploy space-based interceptors or directed-energy systems either for missile defense or ASAT or a range of steps that both sides should be discussing today. And although it will take time to reach an agreement, it's important to have those conversations underway.

MS. OLIKER: Thank you. Thank you very much. Ambassador, I would like to ask you how you feel about prospects for expanding arms control to more nuclear systems? I'm also -- the INF Treaty is not purely a nuclear treaty, so I also want to ask you what you think about the prospects for arms control in the non-nuclear realms?

MR. ANTONOV: You'll see that when we finished our negotiations with the United States, we agreed with Rose Gottemoeller that we had a lot of issues to be discussed between the United States and Russia. I remember that last day when we were sitting together and we send -- we were almost crying because we spent the whole year together. And then you'll see that even without instruction from Moscow, I proposed to continue
our strategic dialog regardless mandate we fulfilled.

But at the time, United States rejected my proposal.

Today I just would like to reveal you little

more secrets you'll see that regarding not our

negotiations, but regarding our relations with Jim

Miller. We were responsible for missile defense, one

of the burning issue, one of the irritant that is still

existing between the United States and Russia. And,

Jim, you'll see that -- I just would like to confirm

that we were very close to find a compromise. It's

just only because of your decision to leave Pentagon at

that time we failed to get a compromise. So I blame

you, I blame you you'll see that, because --


MR. MILLER: Even larger factors were at play

I'm afraid.

MR. ANTONOV: Yeah, I understand, I

understand, I understand. So I just would like to

emphasize today that we can find compromises on various

issues. Everything depends upon political will. If

there is a political will to find solutions of -- on

one issue or another one, it will be very easy to do

it.
As to START Treaty, please don't forget that we have some -- could I put in polite way? -- we have some questions regarding the implementation by the United States of some provisions. I'm talking about conversion of some elements, strategic elements from nuclear to non-nuclear purposes and a possibility to reconvert them to the initial stage.

We have problems. I consider they have to be discussed during our confidential consultations. At the same time, President Putin made it clear that it is high time for us to think about a future of this treaty and he said that we would be ready to start a dialog regarding extension of the treaty.

Today it's too premature to see what will be in the end of such discussion. If you permit me, I could be a little skeptical because there is not enough time for us to look at the substance of a potential new treaty. There are some problems we face.

First of all, it's not yet decided by this administration whether Washington needs such treaty. We remember some statements by very prominent political figures from Washington who made it clear that START
Treaty is not a good -- how to say? -- baby for this administration. And you'll see that we are looking for a final decision of United States whether Washington needs this treaty or not.

Then you'll see that it would be more easy for us to sit together and to discuss this issue. But at the same time -- and I would like to make it clear that I spent here already one year and half and every time I tried to send a signal to my American colleagues, not rivals, but colleagues, my partners -- that it's high time for us to restore a dialog on strategic stability where it would be possible to discuss any issues of concerns.

It's very important for us. But till now we have nothing, we have nothing. We are wasting time, we are wasting time. That's why, if you permit me, I prefer not to elaborate this issue.

And another bullet of my remarks could be: What about other nuclear weapon states in accordance with NPT? As you know that, for example, U.K. and France are allies of the United States and of course we have to take into account their capabilities for our
security. That's why we have some concerns regarding activities of United States as well as nuclear weapon states and accordance with the NPT who are living in Russia when we make some plans, defensive plans of the Russian Federation.

So we have to take into account many, many elements, but to try to find a solution. But first step should be normal legitimate dialog between official representatives of the United States administration and the Russian government.

MS. OLIKER: Ambassador, let me follow up on just one point that you made. You said that Russia is prepared to have a dialog about extension. Now, there is a scenario in which this administration does not sign an extension, does not enter into a dialog. A new administration comes in that is willing. But there's a very, very limited time, right, at that point, it's a matter of weeks. Would Russia be willing to sign the extension without first having a dialog under those conditions?

MR. ANTONOV: No. You'll see that it is clear for us that first we have to start a dialog. How it's
possible to extend this treaty you'll see that taking
into account some concerns we have regarding the
implementation by the United States of some provisions
of this treaty?

We have to find solutions before we put our
signature under any document. So maybe you'll see that
-- I have to elaborate just only one minute more.

You'll see that we have a special mechanism --

MS. OLIKER: Yeah.

MR. ANTONOV: -- for conducting discussions
regarding the substance of START Treaty. And I'm
talking about another mechanism to deal with strategic
stability where we can discuss any issue of your
concerns. I hope that Russian concerns have to be
taken into account.

But current START Treaty is about just only
certain types of nuclear weapons. This treaty does not
cover all existing types of nuclear weapons. And I'm
not sure to say that it will be very easy for us to
find a compromise on these issues.

Don't forget about missile defense. By the
way, there is a nexus in START Treaty between missile
defense and strategic offensive arms. Please, we are very much concerned what is going on in the United States regarding strategic offensive arms in non-nuclear configuration. Please -- what about a possibility to deploy weapons of any type in outer space? What about conventional armed forces that we have some concerns regarding your position in Europe? And other -- cyber security you have the same concern as well.

So all these issues could be a subject or could be the subjects for discussion on strategic stability. But as to START Treaty, we have to stick to the provisions of this treaty and we have to decide all concerns. Maybe United States have some concerns, but at least we have some concerns. We would like to solve them before a final decision regarding the extension of this treaty.

MS. OLIKER: Yeah.

MR. ANTONOV: I hope that I explained well.

MS. OLIKER: Thank you very much. Dr. Miller, do you have a response to that?

MR. MILLER: Yes. As I said, in my judgment
the New START Treaty is strongly in the interest of the United States. I defer to my colleague as to whether it's in the interest of the Russian Federation. But it appears given the signature and the continued adherence to it in all of its significant elements at least that is the case.

And I guess I would just make two points. One is, there's no certainty at all that this administration would agree to an extension of the New START Treaty. And I am slightly concerned that it would go further than that. And as it tries to use the New START Treaty as leverage for negotiations on Capitol Hill for strategic modernization, that it will essentially put a gun to the head of the New START Treaty.

If that occurs, I hope that Congress will stand up, I hope both Republicans and Democrats will stand up for what's in the U.S. national interest and will prevent that type of withdrawal from happening by blocking the funding for it to occur. And that will be -- if that occurs, that will be quite a fight.

But in any event, it should be simple from a
national interest perspective, set aside the domestic politics, to make the conclusion that the New START Treaty is in both sides' interest. The verification and data exchange provisions to me are the most important, more important than the numerical limitations frankly, and the ability to sustain those over time gives each side a degree of confidence in what forces the other side has.

Now, as new types like Status-6 are deployed, that begins to dilute that part of the value. And so bringing those strategic systems in would be important. And point two for Mr. Ambassador. It is quite possible given what you've said that the New START Treaty will expire then, and then whether a second term of this administration or a new administration would have the choice of whether to abide by its fundamental limits and including potentially to continue data exchanges and so forth.

And we've been in that situation before. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were in that situation before. And those will be important decisions.

And just to conclude, acknowledge it's a
challenging time. It would be less challenging if
Russia would cease and desist from its intervention in
U.S. domestic politics, including attempts to affect
electoral outcomes and to create fights among different
factions within United States. But there are bigger
issues at stake here. There are very significant
issues for nuclear weapons and stability.

And with all due respect, allies don't
negotiate arms control agreements or have to talk about
strategic stability. The reality that we're
competitors and that we have to look at scenarios where
we could be adversaries is the reason that we have
these discussions. And in that sense, it's one of the
reasons that it takes time to nail things down and get
them right.

But we both -- both sides need to be clear-eyed about what the current situation is and what can
be accomplished over the coming months and years.

MS. OLIKER: Antonov --
MR. ANTONOV: Excuse me?
MS. OLIKER: Yes.
MR. ANTONOV: I just -- maybe you will be
surprised, but I would like to support Jim in one sense only.

(Laughter)

MR. ANTONOV: I remember history of arms control. Every time it was very difficult to find a solution regarding a substance of this treaty or agreement or arrangement because we discussed a lot of whether one or another treaty should be legally binding or politically binding.

MS. OLIKER: Uh-huh.

MR. ANTONOV: Because every time it was very difficult to persuade your Congress to ratify compromise agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the United States and Russia.

So maybe you'll see that Jim helped me to give you answer whether United States is ready to elaborate a new treaty. Because for us, it is very important to see legally binding document that should be or could I say -- maybe not proper English -- must be ratified by Congress and by Russian Duma.

We don't want to see the same situation that we face today on JCPOA. Because of the change of
administration -- you'll see that current administration decided to withdraw from this arrangement.

So we are looking at our potential compromise very seriously because it affects stability not just only of the Russian Federation or United States, but stability of the whole world.

That's why for us it's very important to discuss this issue. And maybe our colleagues will help us to understand whether United States is ready to have a legally binding document with the Russian Federation.

MS. OLIKER: So if the United States is not, if this goes away, right -- because Dr. Miller laid out an option where people continue to abide by what's on paper even if it's not binding. You don't think that happens?

MR. ANTONOV: So what we are talking about, it means that today we have to concentrate just only on one issue: whether United States is ready or not to extend START Treaty as it is now taking into account Russian concerns regarding implementation of some provisions by United States. That's all.
But having said that, again I would like to confirm our readiness to deal with all issues in the format of strategic stability dialog that we proposed many times to our American colleagues, not rivals, not adversaries, but partners.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. I think I'm going to turn to some of the excellent questions that have already been proposed. One of them is precisely on the Ambassador's point. It's from Mr. Andrei Belitsky (phonetic), who is wondering if Dr. Miller knows or can speculate on whether it's plausible that the United States will do something about or at least acknowledge Russian concerns about heavy bomber and SLBM launch tube modifications?

MR. MILLER: So I've been out of government for five years.

MS. OLIKER: Uh-huh.

MR. MILLER: I have no --

MR. ANTONOV: It's not excuse. You know a lot of yourselves.

MR. MILLER: I have no intention of speaking for this administration on this issue.
MS. OLIKER: Okay. So we don't know.

MR. ANTONOV: But you see that -- I just would like to expand this question, because -- and I would like to draw your attention, because it's official information that we -- that United States has decided to remove from accountability under the treaty 56 submarines-based Trident launchers and 41 heavy bombers by declaring them converted into non-nuclear.

Moreover, in accordance with this treaty that a party has to persuade another party once converting these weapons cannot be reconverted back into nuclear arsenal. These problems have to be decided, have to be discussed before a final decision by our presidents to extend this treaty.

MR. MILLER: I will have to defer to the person who negotiated the treaty on the details associated with both heavy bomber conversion and essentially the decommissioning of tube and strategic submarines.

Frankly, my recollection was that, that party making that change made an assertion that this was to be undertaken and that the other party had an
opportunity to make not an inspection, but to request
data and to possibly have one visit.

If -- so I -- if you think about the broad
brush of the New START Treaty, let me acknowledge that
there are issues and there have been issues that the
United States has raised and I'm sure in the future
will raise about the detailed implementation.

My argument is that those can and should be
addressed in the context of the consultative body that
was set up by the treaty very intelligently and that
the broad strokes of the treaty in terms of the
numerical limitations, data exchange, verification are
in the mutual interest of the two countries and that
they should resolve any second order issues in order to
sustain the viability of the treaty for the long-term.

MR. ANTONOV: But, Jim, I hope that you can
agree with me that if, for example, Russia has some
concerns regarding implementation of this treaty, at
least we have a right to raise this issue during our
bilateral consultations.

And it's very easy to say that I am mistaken.

But it seems to me that a treaty is a treaty. And you
have to persuade me that I am mistaken or at least you have to prove that what you did is going in accordance with START provisions, what kind of treaty we have, if you consider that, for example, you fulfilled your obligations under this treaty and the opposite side says, "no, I'm not convinced." So we have to find a compromise on this issue.

MS. OLKER: Do you think the United States is out of compliance with START provisions?

MR. ANTONOV: I didn't stay in such way. Please don't make a trap to me. You'll see that I said --

MS. OLKER: I'm not trying to trap you. I'm just trying to clarify.

MR. ANTONOV: Please -- because I understand how many journalists are here, so I would like to be very careful of this issue. I said that we have some concerns, not more, not less, just only concerns. We have some questions to our American friends. And I hope that there is an opportunity for our bilateral teams to sit together and to deal with this issue without journalists.
MS. OLIKER: Okay, thank you.

MR. ANTONOV: And with due respect to journalists.

MS. OLIKER: Afterwards we all can --

MR. MILLER: Could I -- could I -- I'm sorry, could I just see if we agree on this point, that the Bilateral Consultative Commission under New START was indeed set up to address this type of issue --

MR. ANTONOV: I agree with you.

MR. MILLER: -- so that the issues could be discussed without necessarily taking them to the political level and raising questions of non-compliance --

MR. ANTONOV: Again, I share --

MR. MILLER: -- because it's below that threshold --

MR. ANTONOV: -- the same view, yes. Jim, yes, of course I'm with you.

MS. OLIKER: So this can be resolved through the Commission?

MR. ANTONOV: Can be.

MS. OLIKER: Okay --
MS. OLIKER: -- I'm relieved.

MR. MILLER: Mr. Ambassador, you remain a tough negotiator.

(Laughter)

MS. OLIKER: All right. And another question. This is from Mr. Gerald Kimball (ph). The INF days are numbered. A key question now is how to avert a new Euro missile race. President Putin said on February 2nd that Russian will only deploy new missiles if the U.S. does. But the Russian Federation has, at least according to the United States, already deployed INF missiles that can strike parts of Europe.

Would Russia agree to move all of its 9M729s east of the Urals in order to make a mutual no-first deployment pledge work even with the disagreement about what this missile actually does or does not do?

MR. ANTONOV: It's a very important, it's a very crucial question you'll see that to Russian side. And I would like to be precise. Again, you'll see that now I'm looking at the faces of journalist who are here and I have to look in my papers, to be very cautious to
give you answer on this issue.

President Putin explained Russian steps in this regard. He explained that all our steps will be symmetrical. Our American partners announced that they are suspending their participation in INF Treaty. And a few days ago, Mr. Putin signed a decree where we suspended it too.

"United States are engaged in research and in developed and designed war and we will do the same," said Mr. Putin. "We will create a land-based version of the Kalibr launches and work on a new project to develop the hypersonic intermediate reach" -- "range missile."

And one more very important sentence I would like to add, that, "We must not and will not let ourselves to be drowned into expensive arms race. It's a very crucial issue. Everything will be done with the limitation of existing budget allocations to the defense ministry for coming years."

And the final my remark, "We proceed from promise that Russia will deploy intermediate range or shorter range weapons, if we develop weapons of this
kind, neither in Europe, nor anywhere" -- I'm talking --
- I'm now talking about Ural --

MS. OLIKER: The Urals?
MR. ANTONOV: Yeah, Urals -- "else until
United States weapons of this kind are deployed to the

MS. OLIKER: Okay. All right, thank you.
(Laughter)

MS. OLIKER: This next question is from Alley Wong (ph) and -- who asks, with the collapse of the INF
Treaty, a questionable extension of New START, there is
some dialog around the idea that we're embarking on the
end of arms control. As signatories of the NPT, how
does the -- how do you, as the United States and
Russia, reconcile this with Article VI of the NPT on
the good faith of which nuclear weapons states are
entitled -- non-nuclear weapons states are entitled to.

Dr. Miller, first.

MR. MILLER: Well, again, acknowledging that
I'm not speaking for the U.S. government and certainly
I'm not speaking for the Russian government --
MR. ANTONOV: Don't be scared. We are together. You'll see that I have an umbrella.

(Laughter)

MR. MILLER: Thank you. That's a beautiful metaphor --

MR. ANTONOV: My -- we have an excellent umbrella.

MR. MILLER: -- that I'm literally not going to pick up. Thank you.

(Laughter)

MR. MILLER: So the question -- which question would you like me to answer?

MS. OLIKER: So the question -- so can you speculate on how government ought to be thinking about these commitments in the context of the collapse of arms control?

MR. MILLER: So I take Article VI of the NPT seriously and believe any responsible government official for the United States, Russia and for that matter any other country that has any current or potential nuclear capability should do so. That includes at a minimum a commitment to sustain the type
of agreement we have in the New START Treaty and in my
view not only to extend it, but to expand it in some of
the ways I alluded to before.

I will say this: to me that although the
obligation is to long-term goal of disarmament,
fundamentally the near-term to mid-term problem is not
one of disarmament, but is one of strategic stability.

And I don't know how we get to anything
approaching total disarmament, as President Obama had
said within his lifetime. Certainly, we've not gotten
closer since we've changed administrations.

To me, that's a -- it's a worthy goal, but we
need to focus very intently on strategic stability, and
in this regard, sustaining the New START Treaty and
having both internal U.S. governmental discussions
about the set of issues, including cyberspace, outer
space, missile defense, long-range strike. Then
discussing it with allies. Then discussing it with
Russian Federation and with China after we have our
ducks in a row in a way that I don't see as having yet
I think is fundamentally important.

And there are additional steps that are --
will be in our national interest. But step one is sustainment and extension of New START.

MR. ANTONOV: You have raised a very important issue. Please don't forget that next year there will be NPT Review Conference, where all nuclear weapon states in accordance with NPT have to report about their activities within five years.

And there is just only questions to myself and maybe to Jim to think about: What kind of results we can present to our colleagues, especially from non-nuclear weapon states? What kind of achievements we got with United States, with other P5 members in this regard? How could we insist to increase pressure on non-nuclear weapon states regarding nonproliferation regime? What could we say about the peaceful use of nuclear energy?

There are three pillars in NPT. So there is a very important issue: What about the future of CTBT? Where is the United States on this issue? And what should we say next year? What about zone free from weapons of mass destruction in Middle East? It is a decision of 2010 NPT Review Conference.
So it seems to me that there will be a lot of legitimate questions from non-nuclear weapon states and we have -- "we," I mean, P5 members have to be prepared for this difficult conversation. And again and again, I return back to my initial signal that -- could I say in such way? -- I'm sure that we are doomed for preparation with United States on these issues.

We have to think about the future of NPT regarding the NPT regime as it is now. It's very easy to destroy it and maybe suddenly we will see 30, 20 nuclear weapon states. It seems to me that it's not in the interest of the United States or on the Russian Federation. That's why I'm talking about the necessity to restart a dialog with the United States on strategic stability.

MS. OLIKER: Okay, thank you. A question from Madelyn Creedon (phonetic). In the U.S., there is an understanding that Russia will use nuclear weapons to prevail and win in a hitherto conventional conflict that it was previously losing. Is this an accurate perception, and if not, what is the Russian position on first nuclear use? And I'm going to add to Madelyn's
question to "first nuclear use with non-strategic weapons specifically."

MR. ANTONOV: It's another fairy tale. It's a lot of fake news on this issue, fake news, I would like to confirm it. There is no first strike concept in Russian doctrine. It is a clear reference in our doctrine when and under which circumstances we can use our nuclear weapons. When there is an attack on the Russian Federation, whether there's threat to -- for existence of Russian Federation, as well as our allies. That's all.

Please, we are not planning to use nuclear weapons. To prevent -- how to say? -- a regional war or -- I don't know how to call it in American version.

I just would like to say you please read all public documents on this issue published by the Russian Federation.

MS. OLIKER: Can I follow up, though? I have -- President Vladimir Putin has said several times that the only way Russia uses nuclear weapons is if there is a large scale incoming attack from the United States, which I think is a great answer to the question of how
Russia thinks about the use of strategic nuclear weapons. But it leaves open this question of what non-strategic nuclear weapons are for Russia?

MR. ANTONOV: Excuse me. But as I remember -- as I am aware, Mr. Putin didn't say that we are waiting or there is a potential attack from the United States. He said a potential --

MS. OLIKER: From anyone.

MR. ANTONOV: -- attack from --

MS. OLIKER: An adversary.

MR. ANTONOV: -- adversary. United States is not --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: An adversary.

MR. ANTONOV: Yes. United States is not our adversary. That's all. As I mentioned today many times, we consider United States as our partner.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. ANTONOV: It's up to you to decide who we are for you.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. But I still have the question about the non-strategic nuclear weapons.

MR. ANTONOV: You'll see that non-strategic
nuclear weapons is a part of nuclear capabilities of Russian Federation. And when we are talking about strategic nuclear weapons, the same application we have to the tactical nuclear weapons. That's all.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. MILLER: Could I just ask for a follow on?

MS. OLIKER: Yeah. Yeah, please.

MR. MILLER: Are you confirming that "escalate to deescalate" is not part of Russian thinking?

MR. ANTONOV: Yes.

MR. MILLER: We've seen --

MR. ANTONOV: Frankly -- frankly --

MR. MILLER: -- articles from --

MR. ANTONOV: -- whatever you say --

MR. MILLER: -- Russian Duma, from the Russian --

MR. ANTONOV: Maybe next time we will sit together --

MR. MILLER: -- state --

MR. ANTONOV: -- we will sit together and we will discuss what does it mean escalation for de-escalation? Frankly, I don't understand such
philosophy.

MS. OLIKER: Most escalation is for de-
escalation one way or another.

MR. ANTONOV: To increase escalation for what,
to use nuclear weapons? No, come on. No, I --
frankly, you'll see that -- maybe it's a third fairy
tale that I heard today.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. That was helpful actually.
I found that a very useful exchange. Dr. Susan Martin
(phonic) asks, the term "strategic stability" has
been thrown around a lot. Could both speakers please
define what strategic stability encompasses for them?
Dr. Miller, you want to go first?

MR. MILLER: Sure. In the U.S.-Russia context
strategic stability is -- has to be based on an
understanding that although neither side desires it, we
are stuck in a situation of mutual vulnerability or
mutual assured destruction.

And strategic stability exists when each side
understands that there are no advantages to be gained
by undertaking a strike against the other side's
nuclear systems and understands that the other side has
that understanding as well.

My -- I'll be -- I'm interested to hear the

Ambassador's. My sense of this is that Americans tend
to focus on what we call structural stability, the
force postures, the numbers and their survivability.

My understanding of Russian thinking is that it starts
much more from the basis of what is the political
relationship. I believe that both of those are
relevant.

It's difficult to imagine getting into a
thermonuclear war if there's not a little problem in
the political relationship -- or actually a much larger
problem. So while that's a factor, the most important
elements to me come on the -- on just a simple
calculation: both sides being confident that every day
the president of their own side and the other side will
accept -- and if any idiot walks in the room and says,
"Today is a good day to start a nuclear war," they'll
tell him to take a hike.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. Ambassador?

MR. ANTONOV: It seems to me that Jim's

remarks -- could I call you Jim? Because you called me
ambassador. You'll see that I'm a little offended.

Because for you, I'm Anatoly.

MR. MILLER: Anatoly.

MR. ANTONOV: We know each other for a long time, you see. So your remarks is a good starting point for our discussions on strategic stability and I'm ready to start it based on your remarks, first.

The second, you see that I can't see any necessity to make any divided line between political problems and economical as well as military problems.

For me, strategic stability, it's a combination of all of these elements, all elements that are affecting the security of United States as well as of the Russian Federation. And we ready to deal with all of these issues together.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. MILLER: I agree with that. And in fact I would just add, given the recent history --

MR. ANTONOV: The first time, by the way, Jim has decided to agree with me.

(Laughter)

MS. OLIKER: No, I think this is great we have
a wide agreement.

MR. MILLER: Now you've made me to think about whether I want to put the asterisk that I was about to put on the agreement.

(Laughter)

MR. MILLER: But if we look at the course of U.S.-Russian relations even over the last several U.S. administrations, with two, if not three, efforts at a reset, we need a strategic nuclear posture and a nuclear balance that is resilient to ups and downs in the political relationship.

Yes, the political relationship is a factor, but we need each side to structure its forces in ways that no matter how bad the political relationship gets, that nobody thinks it's a good day to start a nuclear war.

MR. ANTONOV: Yes, I would like to use this opportunity as well. I would like to send a very serious, a very important message. Sometimes when I read articles by some American politicians or admirals or generals, it seems to me that -- how to put it in a polite way? -- not a wise idea to get a victory in
nuclear weapon -- a nuclear war is still existing in some heads of politicians and generals of the United States and it's very dangerous for us.

We -- it seems to me that we have to understand it's not possible to win a nuclear war.

It's a very important assumption for any dialog on strategic stability.

MS. OLIKER: Thank you. Next question. So Dr. Miller has been very hesitant to speak for the administration he's not part of. I'm about to ask both of you to speak for a country neither of you represents. So that's going to be even harder.

So this question is from Mr. Masashi Marrano (phonetic), who asks about the influence of China on U.S. and Russian arms control treaties. Specifically, if Russia were to deploy SSC-8, RS-26 or Iskander-M in the eastern theater, east of the Urals, how you think it might affect China's strategic calculations? And I'll ask Dr. Miller to take a shot at this one first.

MR. MILLER: Well, okay. Well, I think the public response given the efforts on both the PRC and the Russian Federation to come together, as a recent
assessment by our intelligence committee noted had been occurring of late -- the public response by China in my judgment would likely be "meh" or even positive. My guess would be that their private response to that type of deployment would be more concerned.

And indeed, we've had Russian senior officials over a course of -- over the course of the last couple of decades occasionally raise the question of whether it is truly in Russia's and the United States' interest to stay within the INF treaty. You were not one of those officials that we stipulated it. But in private conversations asked that question. And the issue that they were raising was not about Europe. It was about the balance in Asia and the reality that China has, round numbers, 1,500 or so missiles that would fit into this category.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. Ambassador?

MR. ANTONOV: As to me, you'll see that I'm not authorized to speak on behalf of Chinese government. That's why it would be more wise for us to ask our Chinese friends as to the potential deployment of American missiles of medium range or shorter range
missile. And consequences for such steps, I already explained by giving you words by my president.

We are looking very attentively what kind of steps will be taken by the United States after formalization of the decision of Washington to withdraw from INF.

MS. OLIKER: So a question from Leon Ratz (phonetic). If there is one confidence building measure the U.S. and Russia could agree on in the next six months, what should it be? Ambassador?

MR. ANTONOV: How could we agree on anything if there is no any dialog? You'll see that even it is difficult to meet some officials from your administration. How can I speak about confidence building measures? You'll see that -- as to us, you'll see that we are open for a discussion. But it's not -- this question is not to me.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. MILLER: Do the doable, extend the New START Treaty.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ANTONOV: It's not a confidence building
measure, sorry.

MS. OLIKER: It might build some confidence.

(Laughter)

MR. ANTONOV: Of course you can --

MR. MILLER: It would build my confidence.

MR. ANTONOV: -- find something special you'll see that in arms control regarding confidence building measures. But you'll see that -- maybe it's my problem that I spent too many years in negotiating process and I have to be very cautious regarding definition what we are talking about.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. But -- all right, so let's not call them confidence building measures. Let's ask what could the U.S. and Russia do unilaterally or bilaterally and of course over the next six months that could improve the situation and the prospects for arms control?

MR. ANTONOV: Could I answer again just only using three sentences from Mr. Putin's statement? He said that all our proposals in this area -- I mean, in arms control, remain on the table just as before. We are open for negotiations.
But Russian president has mentioned -- Mr. Putin has decided not to initiate these talks in future. He suggested that we would wait until our partners are ready to engage in equal and meaningful dialog on this subject that is essential for us as well as for our partners and the entire world.

Again, you'll see that -- it seems to me that ball is on the United States court. It's up to administration to decide whether this issue is ripe for discussion, not even for negotiations or not. You'll see that at least -- you'll see that Russian President issued very strict order to Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense not to initiate any discussions or negotiations on this issue, because all of them -- all our proposals are on the table. It's up to the United States to decide.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. This question is from Tom Kalina (phonetic), who asks if either the United States or Russia genuinely thinks the other would launch a first strike, and if not, why are both sides planning for this? Why launch a warning, why -- at least in the Russian case I suppose. But, Dr. Miller?
MR. MILLER: I'll bet everything that I own and I'll borrow everything I can that Russia is not going to launch a nuclear strike on the United States today or tomorrow or the day after.

MR. ANTONOV: I promise you.

MR. MILLER: Thank you. The issue is, as I know Tom understands well, that in the event of a severe political crisis and should that get to war between the two countries, there is the possibility that nuclear weapons would be on the table, whether they're brandished, whether they're employed.

I'm glad to know it won't be through escalate to deescalate. But if it's escalate to escalate, that doesn't help either.

So -- and because of that and because we've been stuck for decades with a combination of a political relationship that is nowhere near good enough to have confidence, that the other side will not use coercion or use its military to advantage.

And on the other hand, with a military relationship in which each side has the capacity to destroy the other as a functioning economy and society,
we have been stuck with stability on the basis of mutual assured destruction.

How that is implemented does not necessarily require launch under attack. It could be implemented in other ways.

The Nuclear Posture Review in which I was involved attempted to move us away from launch under attack and did that in small ways. I think it's important to continue to make that effort.

So -- but the fundamental basis of mutual assured destruction is something I see no way that technology is going to be able to change within the coming decades and I see very little probability that the political relationship will evolve to the point where it's irrelevant.

So sustaining that balance, a secure second strike capability is fundamental -- and it's fundamental for United States, and I understand from a Russian perspective, it will be fundamental to the Russian Federation as well.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. ANTONOV: I can say just only one
sentence. A strategy of first use is not a part of Russian policy.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. But do you -- but the question was, do you honestly think the United States would strike first?

MR. ANTONOV: I don't know. You'll see that it's very difficult to predict.

MS. OLIKER: So you're not sure -- you're not confident?

MR. ANTONOV: You'll see that I'm not military officer. You see I'm diplomat. You'll see that I don't want to think about it. I prefer to think about tomorrow meeting with my colleagues from State Department, from White House. Or maybe there will be a possibility for me to see somebody at Congress.

MR. MILLER: If I could put it this way, the scenario where we're on the precipice of a nuclear exchange is extremely unlikely. One of the reasons -- one of the key reasons why it is so unlikely is that each side has a secure second strike capability. Until someone has a better model, we ought to reinforce that. And that's fundamentally -- or a fundamental purpose of
New START.

MR. ANTONOV: Maybe I will be criticized by some journalist or from -- or by maybe friends from non-nuclear weapons state, but MAD, mutually assured destruction, is still alive. And taking into account this concept, you'll see that I can't see any possibility for anybody to attack neither United States nor Russia, could I say in such way.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. This question is from Lena Markihillgerdich (phonetic) -- whose name I may have mispronounced, in which case I apologize -- who asks, how likely you assess the chances for constructive strategic stability talks between the U.S. and Russia if New START is not extended? And if New START is not extended, do you think there is any chance of concluding new agreements on the issues that you have discussed? Ambassador?

MR. ANTONOV: You'll see to that, as to me, I don't want to think about such not good idea. I consider that we have enough time to deal with this issue. And I'm sure that if we have political will, there will be wise decisions by Washington regarding
the necessity to discuss a problem of extension of 
START Treaty. And it's too premature to think about a 
potential or future agreement between the United States 
and Russia because we have to start from the scratch. 
You see that we have to identify what kind of issues 
have to be in the core of this potential agreement. 

MS. OLIKER: And how optimistic are you that 
it's going to be possible to have these agreements? 

MR. ANTONOV: I'm a diplomat. You'll see that 
that I'm optimistic. I hope that tomorrow I will wake 
up, everybody will smile me and everybody will be ready 
to discuss all these issues together. I see many 
friends you'll see that here. I hope that they 
understand. 

MS. OLIKER: Okay. 

MR. MILLER: Productive strategic stability 
talks will be challenging under the best of 
circumstances in part because of the complexity of the 
issues. It's not just -- the relatively simpler 
nuclear balance was challenging enough for New START 
treaty negotiations. It's the impact of capabilities 
in cyberspace, in outer space, of missile defenses, of
long range strike, potentially the impact of artificial intelligence over time as well.

It will be far more difficult in the absence of an extension of the New START Treaty than with that extension in part because the -- if New START is not extended, it's an indicator of a serious problem in the strategic calculation on the U.S. side.

It will take time -- it will take time once those talks start, and it's fundamental that whatever administration starts those talks, gets its ducks in a row first. It's not helpful if one side -- either side comes in and says 'A' on a Monday, then another group from another agency comes in and says 'B' on a Tuesday. Not that that would ever happen.

(Laughter)

MR. MILLER: But having the ducks in a row, explaining it to the -- from our side explaining what the approach is to the Congress and American people, explaining it to our allies and partners, and working then to discuss it with Russia and with China as well is fundamental. These are challenging -- the interaction of these issues, cyberspace, missile
defense, long range strike, et cetera, with nuclear
weapons is complex. It needs to be well thought out.

That said, I think that there are a number of
things that could be done relatively soon. I'll just
give one -- you know, quickly give an example.

Secretary Gates -- Secretary of Defense, Gates at the
time, said no to the Conventional Trident Modification,
the modification that would have made the D5 missile be
capable of carrying conventional warheads, although it
was the fastest way to get to a global strike
capability and the cheapest way to do so.

And he made that decision. And we informed
Congress of that, where -- if Madelyn (phonetic) is
still around, who had been one in Congress who would
raise concerns about it as well on the basis of
strategic stability. That's a unilateral step.

Both sides making a commitment not to go
forward with space-based interceptors or space-based
directed-energy systems for missile defense or anti-
satellite weapons would be a similar step. The
verification around that would be complicated. But
there are steps that can be put forward now.
I thank everybody in the audience here today who is involved in those useful track -- two discussions that have been taking place, U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China. I think there's some good ideas there and that will help inform a government when it's ready to put together a serious policy.

MS. OLIKER: Okay, thank you. We have three minutes left. So I'm going to ask one last question, which is a bit -- which we'll try to answer quickly.

This is from Elizabeth Platoff (phonetic), who knows that currently there is a proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty being discussed at the Conference on Disarmament. Under this treaty, nuclear weapon states will be required to have restrictions on their production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. What are the attitudes of the United States and Russia on this treaty? Dr. Miller?

MR. MILLER: I don't know what this administration is doing on this treaty at this point in time.

MS. OLIKER: Okay.

MR. MILLER: I hope that it's having
discussions with at least one of our non-NATO allies about this treaty and making the case that it's in the interest of that state to engage seriously in these discussions. I've used it in somewhat ambiguous terms. The people who are involved understand what I mean.

MS. OLIKER: Okay, thank you. Ambassador?

MR. ANTONOV: You'll see that cutoff treaty or potential cutoff treaty is a very essential mechanism in dealing with non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

This issue has been discussed for many, many years in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. And I remember even 15 years ago when I worked there, you'll see that our position was crystal clear. We're in favor to start such negotiations with Mandate -- so-called Shannon Mandate, if anybody remembers what does it mean -- I see -- what does it mean.

But today's situation in CD has changed. It's a lot of different views. What should be on the top of agenda of this conference? As to Russia, for example, if you ask me about the priorities, of course I would like to draw your attention to Russian idea to liberate
convention prohibition of deployment of weapons of any type in outer space. It's a very important issue to be discussed.

And maybe there is a question to you before our departure: Do we need a weapon of any type in the sky that we can see in Washington or in Moscow? It seems to me for me the answer is negative. We also have other ideas to negotiate in the CD. But as to cutoff treaty, it's a very important issue to be discussed in Geneva.

MS. OLIKER: Okay. So we are out of time. A big thanks to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for bringing us all together and giving us the opportunity to talk to these gentlemen and gain their insights in a really fascinating discussion.

Please join me in thanking them for taking the time.

(Applause)

MS. OLIKER: Okay.