## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part One</th>
<th>RESEARCHING DEFENSE AND MILITARY STRUCTURES</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part Two</td>
<td>THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Three</td>
<td>DEFENSE SECTOR ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Four</td>
<td>MISSIONS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGETS</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Five</td>
<td>THE ARMED FORCES</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Six</td>
<td>THE MILITARY AS A CAREER</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Seven</td>
<td>MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Eight</td>
<td>GENDER ISSUES</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Nine</td>
<td>FOREIGN MILITARY RELATIONS</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part Ten</td>
<td>SOURCES</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

This manual is designed to assist researchers studying defense and military structures in Arab countries. It does not cover the more “hardware” issues—notably equipment—which are adequately dealt with elsewhere, and are also relatively sensitive in many countries. Rather, it concentrates on more “software” issues, including the legal framework, organization, discipline, training, budgets, doctrine, and careers, as well as wider cultural issues, including gender, that affect the perception of the military, and its perception of itself.

The manual is organized according to a series of themes, but it begins by first discussing the generic problems of researching military organizations, especially in the Arab world, and suggesting potential solutions. For each main theme, the section contains:

- Brief description of the generic issue, including any relevant historical or comparative background.
- Any particular considerations related to the Arab world.
- Suggestions for potential research topics.

Suggestions for useful online and written sources, as well as generic advice about the utility of documents and interviews, are provided in the text as appropriate, and summarized in a separate section at the end.

The manual has benefited from many helpful comments during its preparation, from the CMRAS program team and others.

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Part One: Researching Defense and Military Structures

I: Research Methodology. Researching the military, and defense structures generally, presents particular challenges, even to those who have research experience elsewhere. Much of this activity falls under the heading of social science research, dealing with data that is qualitative rather than quantitative. Even where quantitative data is available (for example, numbers of soldiers, or content of legal texts) it requires careful interpretation, backed by a thorough understanding of the issues and the wider context. The following are some of the main challenges and potential solutions.

1.1 Complexity. There have been armies for thousands of years, and much military organization and culture is the result of an accretion of traditions over a long period of time. Modern militaries, in particular, are highly complex organizations, generally directed by well-trained professionals with a lifetime of experience. Because no two militaries have identical histories, and their past and current relations with the civil power can be very different, defense structures are extremely varied, and can change with political developments. In addition, issues such as the practical control of the military by the political leadership can be extremely complex and opaque, and may be based on personal, rather than legal or institutional arrangements.

1.2 Variety. Because of these and other factors, there is huge variation in the organization and structure of defense and the military: much more so, for example, than in the organization of Foreign Ministries or Finance Ministries in various countries. Assumptions about the defense structures of one country may be completely inapplicable to those of its neighbor. Although some features of military organization are effectively universal, or at least normal, given the nature of the military function, many others change with the context. Later sections expand on this in much more detail.

1.3 Traditions. One major explanation for this variety is the effect of different military, and to some extent political and cultural, traditions. Some of the cultural influences are discussed in more detail in Part Six. In addition, most militaries in the world have been influenced by foreign traditions, and the Arab world is no exception. These influences are very various, and can include precolonial structures, colonial influences, structures and cultures inherited from independence struggles or civil wars, superpower influences during the Cold War, and donor or military assistance influences up to the present day. These influences may show up in organization, structure, culture, doctrine, relations with the political leadership, and in many other ways. It is not uncommon for influences from different sources to coexist, with different generations of the military subject to different influences. A basic research challenge, therefore, is disentangling the layers of cultural, technical, and political influences in different organizations.
1.4 Incomplete or Missing Information. The administrative systems of different militaries vary in their sophistication and completeness. Issues such as military procurement, for example, are very complex, and even advanced nations may find it hard to provide detailed and complete information. Much information may be classified, or held at local level, and even centralized information may be unreliable. In addition, some administrative systems may create perverse incentives (such as falsifying the number of soldiers for personal gain) that make figures unreliable also. Likewise, many of the most important principles by which the organization works may be transmitted orally and culturally, and never written down.

1.5 Secrecy. Access to information about the military, like other sensitive areas of the state, will always be limited, because much of the information is classified. There are different classification categories (typically, unclassified, restricted, confidential, secret, top secret) that stipulate who can have access to classified information inside the establishment. For example, top-secret-classified information may need special personal clearances by subject, even for senior officers and government officials. A degree of secrecy is inevitable in defense issues, and to a greater extent than almost anywhere else in government. Few countries will openly discuss mobilization plans or the readiness of their forces (personnel, systems, and equipment), for example. It is important to understand what is realistically available, but also to understand that there are ways of making intelligent assumptions about things that are unknown, as discussed below.

1.6 Differences in Conventions. The extreme variety of military and defense structures, even between neighbors, means that many aspects of military organization and employment will be correspondingly different, and models from one country may not apply in another. Such questions as national military service, pension arrangements, or the involvement of the military in the economy vary enormously. Militaries may have taken over conventions as a result of foreign influence, but may apply them only partially, or even in name only.

1.7 Differences in Terminology. This is a more fundamental problem than may at first appear. Classically, names of military formations, from platoon to division, may vary substantially even between states with closely similar traditions. In different countries, a regiment may be anything from 1,000 to 5,000 strong, and ships called frigates may be anything from 2,000 to 5,000 metric tons. Likewise, different nations will use the same word to mean different things in different contexts. For example, the number of tanks in a battalion will vary between a tank battalion in an armored brigade and a tank battalion in a mechanized brigade. Further, what is described as an “antiterrorist” force in one country may be completely different in structure, missions, and capabilities from an “antiterrorist” force in a neighboring country. The problem is compounded by difficulties of translation, from and into various languages. (See paragraphs 1.13 to 1.15 for a longer discussion with examples.)

1.8 Sources. All research ultimately depends on sources, and good research depends on distinguishing good sources from poor ones. Because of the factors discussed above, research in the defense and military area can be especially problematic. It is therefore necessary to treat sources carefully, and it is useful first to be clear about when it is appropriate to use sources of various types. For example:
• Official sources will, by their nature, present the official view, and this will always show the government or the institution in the most favorable light. In addition, in an area as complex as defense, most data can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
• Political statements (such as to a parliament) are precisely that, and should not be confused with analytical materials or strategic doctrine.
• Foreign governments and think tanks may do their best to be objective, but do not necessarily have in-depth knowledge of the country, and may, on the other hand, have their own political agendas.
• International organizations will also usually try to be objective, but are often limited by the information available (which they may have to take on trust from the country concerned) and will always have a political agenda of some kind.
• The number of independent and reputable organizations in the world researching defense and military issues is not large, and there are none specifically concerned with the Arab world.
• Individual researchers often have highly developed expertise, but in certain, limited areas.
• NGOs are often issue-specific, and it is important to distinguish those that practice advocacy from those that do research. The majority are in any case funded by a small number of Western governments or private donors.
• Serving military or government officials will be very limited in what they can say, and any personal views expressed should be treated with discretion.
• Retired officials will always be good sources, as they will generally talk much more freely (though not always on the record), but their experience may be limited and their knowledge is not necessarily up to date. Trying to meet more retired officers to cross check information can always help.
• Former defense attachés or embassy staff are excellent sources for understanding how systems work in practice, provided their knowledge is reasonably current.

1.9 Evaluating Sources. There are a number of traditional and pragmatic ways by which sources can be evaluated. They include the following.

• Is it probable that the material you have found is correct, or largely so, based on your knowledge of the country, and your wider researches on defense and military issues?
• What is the record of the source you are using? Is it known for producing good quality analysis, or is it a new or obscure source?
• Is there any collateral for the material in places you would expect to find it? Does it conflict with what you have found elsewhere?
• What is the nature of the source? Is it an analysis by a recognized expert, drawing on a wide range of sources, or is it an anonymous allegation in a foreign newspaper? (Most sources, of course, are somewhere in between.)
• How reliable is the source, based on what you can find out about the individual or organization? How independent and objective is it?
• Has the same information been echoed by other sources? And, how often?
• Finally, what is the motive of the originator? Is it serious and scholarly, is it in pursuit of a political agenda, or is it designed to gain publicity and perhaps funding?

1.10 Avoiding Intellectual Errors. As in all complex and varied research areas, there are a series of intellectual errors to avoid. Among the most important are the following:

• **Cognitive bias.** Confronting institutions as large and varied as defense and the military, we tend to be most aware of issues that we understand because of our professional training, and to give them the most importance. So economists will see questions of finance and procurement as key, lawyers will put a great deal of effort into studying legal texts, sociologists will focus on the nature and functioning of the military organization, political scientists will be drawn to questions of the relationship between the military and the state, and so forth. All of these are legitimate areas of study, but researchers have to recognize that the subjects they are most familiar with may not necessarily be the most important.

• **Confirmation bias.** Otherwise known as finding what you expect to find, or confirming what you think you have already discovered, and dismissing or undervaluing evidence that points in other directions. This is a constant temptation in research. Thus, a researcher from a human rights background may, unconsciously, tend to believe what human rights groups in a country say rather than what the government says, whether or not this proves in the end to be justified.

• **Halo effect.** This is a particular risk with interviews, where someone who gives the researcher one particularly valuable insight is then assumed to have equally valuable insights about everything else. Similarly, a sympathetic and helpful interview subject may be pleasant to talk to, but not contribute very much.

• **Overton window.** In political science, this is the permitted area of debate on a given subject. Defense and the military is a highly complex area, and researchers will tend to debate certain parts of it only, or mainly, often for reasons related to cognitive bias. Thus, most of the research on a country’s defense budget might focus on corruption, but further consideration may show that this is objectively a less important question than, say, inadequate funding or poor management, even if little research has been done on those areas.

• **Nash equilibrium.** From games theory, it explains why decisions that are bad overall (for example, corruption) may result from independent decisions by individuals that they see as in their best interest. The system is “in equilibrium” because it is in no single person’s advantage to change it. Personal corruption, for example, is a logical strategy in a situation where everybody else is corrupt.

1.11 Interviews. Understanding how defense and the military work is almost impossible to do satisfactorily just from written sources. So much of what is important is based on culture, tradition, and interaction between individuals that personal contact and interviews are indispensable. There are, however, a number of points to bear in mind.
• **Variety of backgrounds.** Depending on the subject, interviewing only military or defense officials may not be enough. Diplomats and policemen, for example, may have valuable things to say about how the wider security sector works. Diversifying the levels of interviewees (officers and NCOs from different ranks) will also be useful. Likewise, in countries with military service, it will be useful to talk to a selection of former conscripts.

• **Serving vs. retired.** It is important to understand the very different status of retired and serving personnel. The latter will be restricted—often highly restricted—in what they can say, and will feel obliged to defend official policy. They are best used to establish basic facts, official positions, and further contacts and areas to research. “Off the record” comments should always be used as background only. Interview recording, always problematic, should not be used in such cases. Retired personnel may be able to speak more freely, but it is important to check how recent their knowledge is, and how extensive their experience actually was.

• **Professionalism.** Whether serving or retired, military and defense personnel will be professionals, and expect a similar professionalism from their interviewers. Preparation is essential, as is the tailoring of questions to the individual, rather than just arriving with a standard list. Arriving on time, looking decent, showing an awareness of background, understanding any limitations on the freedom of expression of the interviewer, structuring the interview, and keeping to time are all basic professional skills, as well as elementary politeness. Especially for serving officials, it is also important to ensure in advance that you are discussing the right subject with the right person.

• **Persistence.** Serving interviewees, in particular, are likely to be very busy, and may require repeated approaches, and confirming just before the interview. Many will want reassurances from the interviewer, and may seek to impose special conditions. This suspicion is not necessarily unreasonable: in most Arab countries, there will be intelligence officers looking for secrets and journalists looking for scandals. It is thus important to begin by carefully explaining what you are doing and why, and providing any assurances that are requested.

• **Snowball effect.** The best way of finding sources is through other sources. If an interviewee cannot help you, it is legitimate to ask whether anyone else can. It is also reasonable to seek further ideas for interviews, and ask for personal recommendations, which will facilitate further approaches.

• **Cultural understanding.** Not all interviewees will be the same, but military personnel, serving or retired, will often have certain cultural specificities. For example, they will tend to believe that they are doing (or have done) a job of intrinsic importance, benefiting the country as a whole, and at some personal sacrifice and danger. They may talk with pride and enthusiasm of their careers, in a way that one would not find interviewing, for example, an accountant or a property developer. They can also be very defensive against criticism. Whatever the public image of the military might be, and whatever the interviewer’s own private opinions, these cultural specificities must be
acknowledged. Diplomats, policemen, and civil servants will demonstrate cultural specificities as well, although usually to a less pronounced extent.

- **Special pleading.** Consciously or unconsciously, interviewees may seek to use the interviewer to promote ideas or grievances. The retired colonel who is convinced he was passed over for promotion because he was of the wrong ethnicity, or the technically qualified officer who saw less educated contemporaries get better jobs, may not be reliable guides to the actual management of the military. It is therefore necessary to ensure that an interview program includes subjects from a variety of backgrounds.

### 1.12 If This, Then That.

Particularly in areas such as defense and the military, information may be hard to find, and assertions may be hard to verify or disprove. This can be partly addressed using the “if this, then that” approach. Essentially, this approach suggests that (1) if a given statistic, assertion, or judgment is true, then all logical consequences of it should be true or (2) indirect evidence can often be traced backward to an important conclusion. Suppose, for example, that open sources publish a story suggesting the formation of special units for border security and counterterrorism. The government refuses to comment, but an experienced researcher, perhaps advised by a military specialist, will look for the logical consequences of such a decision: procurement of specialist equipment, training in or by foreign countries, recruitment and selection of personnel, changes in command structures, and so on. Some of these elements may come from apparently unrelated personnel moves or administrative changes, which may be announced openly. Others may come from abroad, such as an announcement that a foreign training team will go to the country concerned. The absence of such consequential information may in turn cast doubt on the original assertion.

### 1.13 Basic Organizational Building Blocks.

Military structures and organizations have historically adopted standard building blocks starting with a section (squad), and going up to army. The following are the most commonly used:

- **Section/Squad:** Comprises 7–10 soldiers/troops.
- **Platoon/Troop:** 3–4 sections (around 30 soldiers, usually commanded by a lieutenant).
- **Company/Squadron:** 3–4 platoons (around 100 soldiers, commanded by a captain/major).
- **Battalion:** 3–4 companies (400–500 troops, commanded by a major/lieutenant colonel).
- **Regiment:** Some Arab armies use the regiment in the organization of some branches of service. A regiment will usually comprise either a number of companies, or a number of battalions.
- **Brigade:** 3–4 battalions (1,000–1,500 troops, commanded by a colonel/brigadier).
- **Division:** 3–4 combat brigades, and combat and combat service support units (5,000–7,000 troops).
• Corps: The corps is traditionally used in certain countries that have large armies, and extensive geographic responsibilities, like the United States. Very few Arab countries use the Corps in their structures. When used, it usually comprised a certain number of divisions.

• Army: Countries that have more than one army may use the army as a structural block. In the Arab world, Egypt is an example. An army will comprise a certain number of divisions, or corps.

1.14 Sample Organizations. The division has historically been the basic army combat formation around which armies are structured, despite recent trends to have the brigade, or the brigade battle group, as the main fighting formation. Depending on the country’s doctrine and East/West affiliation, a division will traditionally be structured with three or four combat brigades, combat support units (a battalion supports a brigade), combat service support units (a company supports a brigade), and the headquarters elements. The following examples will shed light on some known standard organizations.

1.15 The Division. The organization of a division will vary based on its type (infantry, armor, mechanized infantry, mountain infantry, special forces . . . and so on), and will vary from a country to another, for the factors stated earlier, but it will more or less include the following main elements:

• Combat brigades:
  o Three, or four brigades, consisting of three or four battalions each.
  o Aviation brigade, depending on what kind of division it is (doesn’t exist in most Arab countries).

• Combat support and service support units:
  o Divisional artillery (one battalion in direct support for each brigade and one or two battalions in general support).
  o Air defense battalion.
  o Signals battalion.
  o Engineer battalion.
  o Military intelligence battalion.
  o Chemical (NBC) company.
  o Military police company.
  o Band (may not exist in some countries, or attached from HQ when needed).
  o Headquarters and headquarters company.

1.16 Career Progression for Officers and NCOs.

1.16.1 Officers. Officers are usually recruited after finishing high school or an undergraduate degree. They are inducted into a military academy or a military university to receive their basic qualification as an officer, graduating with the rank of second lieutenant. The qualification time varies from a country to another, and sometimes from one branch of service to another. Military academy programs are
usually one year for university graduates, or two years for high school graduates, and the curricula of these programs are often focused on military subjects, with some academic education. Military universities, into which high school graduates are inducted, would generally be a four-year program, after which cadets graduate with a bachelor’s degree, in addition to the military education and training they receive. It is important to understand that, in professional militaries, education and training for officers is a continuous process throughout their careers, and they have to receive the necessary education and training at each stage of their career to qualify for command and staff positions, and to progress higher in rank. After graduation as a second lieutenant, an officer in a typical army goes through the following ranking system. (Arrangements in the air force and navy will be broadly similar.)

- Second lieutenant to first lieutenant. An officer spends two to three years, during which he/she practices command of a platoon, and receives some education and training pertaining to their branch of service (minimum of officers’ basic course and the branch of service basic training).
- First lieutenant to captain. This generally takes two to three years, in which the officer continues to practice command, and possibly can become a company second-in-command. More specialty and generic training is also offered at this rank to prepare the officer for higher command and staff work.
- Captain to major. The officer can spend up to five years in this rank, and is expected to qualify for advanced training (officers’ advanced course), and also command a company/squadron, in addition to working as a staff officer in his unit (operations, training, administration, and the like). In some countries, senior captains can go to command and staff college.
- Major to lieutenant colonel. This is a very important phase of an officer’s career, in which some major decisions on his career advancement are made. The time frame is usually five years, in which the officer will be exposed to command at the battalion level, training at the command and staff college, and higher staff positions. These posts enable judgments to be made about prospects for higher promotions and whether the officer is suited more for command or staff positions.
- Lieutenant colonel to colonel. This is where the officer will be more exposed to working in higher and joint staff positions, including in bigger formations and higher headquarters. A lieutenant colonel can command a battalion, a regiment, a group, and, in some countries, a brigade.
- Colonel to brigadier. Time is usually five to seven years. As a colonel, the officer is expected to qualify through a war/defense college, and command at the brigade level, in addition to working at
high grade staff positions within his branch of service and in joint positions.

- Brigadier general to major general. The rank of a brigadier (or brigadier general) is considered a general’s rank in some countries (one star general). An officer can spend five to twelve years as a brigadier, in which he can command a brigade or division (depending on the country), or become a director, or assistant chief of staff at headquarters. The average number of general officers varies from a country to another, but the international standard is one general/1,000 troops.

- Major general (2 star) and above. Very few officers make it above this rank, as many countries have the chiefs of defense as major generals. However, some countries have division/military district commanders, and assistants to the chief of staff as major generals. In some cases, the chief of staff would be a lieutenant general or a full general (3 or 4 star).

1.16.2 Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs). NCOs are the backbone of any armed forces, and they should be viewed as such. Their training and education is also important for their progression in rank and responsibilities. NCOs receive specialty and leadership training, as they are also expected to assist officers in commanding their troops. NCOs are usually promoted starting from the rank of a private, however, some militaries have special programs to induct college and university graduates directly as NCOs (corporal or sergeant). NCOs, also have their own informal chain of command through what is called the “Sergeant Major Apparatus.” A sergeant major (an NCO), depending on the level he works at, is the link between the commander of the unit and its enlisted personnel. NCOs more or less go through the following ranking system:

- Private to lance corporal. About two years, in which they receive basic training, and start to qualify for their specialty (profession) and learn how to lead a section (in combat units).
- Lance corporal to corporal. Two to three years, in which they receive more training and practice leading a section.
- Corporal to sergeant. Two to three years, practicing their profession and leading a section.
- Sergeant to master sergeant (or sergeant first class). NCOs can spend five years as sergeants, and they can become a platoon sergeant, assisting the commander, in addition to performing their specialty. Many of them also work as instructors in their respective units, or in army schools.
- Staff sergeant to warrant officer. NCOs can also spend five years in this rank, and some get selected for Sergeant major of higher units. In countries that have NCO academies, sergeants and master sergeants usually go for leadership courses, in addition to their
regular qualification courses in their respective professions. They are always involved in training their enlisted personnel.

- Warrant officer and above. Warrant officers are the most senior NCOs, who have accumulated about twenty years of experience, which enable them to advise both junior officers and NCOs. In some countries, they can be promoted to officer ranks, while in others, they can only progress in different degrees of the same rank as NCOs.
Part Two
The Legal and Constitutional Framework

II. All countries have some kind of legal framework for their armed forces. This framework may or may not be complete, and may or may not correspond to what happens in reality, but it is important to be clear about how the system is supposed to operate before looking to see how it works in practice. Circumstances vary between countries, but some or all of the following will usually be found:

- References to the armed forces, defense, and national security in the constitution.
- Laws governing the organization of the security sector as a whole, including relations between the military and the police and other organized security forces.
- Laws governing individual branches of the armed forces.
- Generic laws covering, for example, public order.
- Laws on the organization and management of the public sector as a whole.
- Specific laws relating to the management of the military.
- Detailed decrees or orders issued by a minister or chief of staff.
- Internal regulations/instructions.
- Informal written or unwritten rules.
- International treaties and conventions.
- Constitutional articles or laws about emergencies.

Most of these documents will have the force of law, and be agreed to or ratified by parliament. Emergency and temporary laws may also be promulgated by the cabinet. In some cases, official decrees (sometimes called “subordinate legislation”) will be issued on points of detail, but generally with reference to the original laws. And as with any organization, there will be a large number of detailed regulations, although these regulations should not contradict or be an exception to any law, unless expressly allowed.

2.1 The Constitution. Most constitutions establish the existence of a military, set out its main tasks, and indicate who controls it. Constitutions are political documents resulting from negotiations and compromises, not operational instructions, and sometimes the actual functioning of the military is very different. Possible research questions include:

- Constitutional provisions for the direction of the military and its missions.
- Whether these have changed over time and, if so, how.
- Whether there are proposals for further changes.
- Written responsibilities of the president or other head of state and the prime minister, minister of defense, and chief of the armed forces, as well as relations between the two.
- How does the constitution structure the defense and security sectors?
- Does the constitution state anything regarding the political participation of active or retired military personnel?
• Whether other security organizations are treated together with the armed forces.

At a later stage, and after finishing the compilation of data, it will be useful to see whether the actual activities of the military, as reported in the open media, correspond to the tasks set out in the Constitution, and whether there is public discussion of the need for change. For example, if the defense of national territory is given as a task, does the military in fact hold regular exercises to practice it? Likewise, information may be available (for example from retired officers) about the practical relations between military and civilian decisionmakers, which may not be the same as those set out in the constitution.

2.2 Laws on the Security Sector. Many countries have laws establishing, for example, a national security council, chaired by the president or prime minister, often with its own staff, and theoretically, at least, in charge of making security policy. Possible research questions include:

- Does such an organization exist? What are its terms of reference? Who is in charge? What is its composition?
- Does it have any output (for example, security policy/strategy documents)?
- How often does it meet?
- Are there other bodies established at the strategic level, but without written and approved legislation?
- Are there duplications legally established?
- Is there a national command and control center from which crises are managed?
- Do exercises at the national level exist?

Retired officers will often be good guides to the practical working of the system. However, other retired security sector personnel (diplomats, policemen, and so on) may have important independent opinions on the role played by the military in such structures, or for that matter problems caused by the absence of such structures.

2.3 Laws on the Armed Forces. Most countries have a law, or laws, setting out the organization and tasks of the various armed forces. In countries with military service, there will be a law or laws setting out the length of service, liability to be called, exemptions, and so on. Particular responsibilities of the individual services may also be specified. Possible research questions include:

- What law or laws exist? When were they issued and are they still relevant? Are there any proposals for change?
- Procedures for military service, and whether they are respected in practice.
- Legal arrangements, if any, for deciding pay, conditions of service, pensions, and the like.
- Are there separate laws for officers and enlisted personnel?
In general, laws of this sort are published. In countries with military service, it can often be useful to interview a selection of ordinary people who have recently been in the military.

2.4 Laws on Public Order, Etc. As well as laws that specifically regulate the military, there are often laws that apply to them in certain circumstances. Most constitutions have a clause enabling the suspension of some or all rights in an emergency or in war. This often gives the military extra powers or responsibilities. Likewise, laws on public order, or laws relating to the powers of the police or internal security forces, may enable or require them to call on military assistance. Finally, laws setting out procedures for dealing with natural disasters may allow the government to make use of the military. Possible research questions include:

- Are there laws giving the military special tasks or powers in emergencies and war? Who decides whether these powers can be introduced?
- Are there formal legal arrangements for involving the military in public order duties and disaster relief? Who decides to involve them?
- Are there recent examples that show how the situation actually works in practice?
- Does the law define the command structure when the military is called to support the security organizations? And, what are the legal issues involved?

Normally, there are laws that set out emergency powers, although the detail of them is usually not made public. It is interesting to see whether the actual use of the military, as described in open sources, has followed the legal framework.

2.5 Laws on the Public Sector. The military is part of the state and the public sector. Even though special laws relate to them, it is an important research question whether general laws relating to the public sector (on recruitment, confidentiality, corruption, retirement and pensions, and so on) also apply to the military, or whether there are significant differences.

2.6 Military Law. While the military should always be bound by civilian law, it is also subject to further legal controls and restrictions to ensure discipline and organization. A typical example is laws that forbid military personnel to be absent from their unit without permission, which has no equivalent in the civilian world. There may also be laws preventing military personnel from acting in an unmilitary fashion, or bringing the military into disrepute. There will be laws requiring obedience to orders, but these days this obedience is usually qualified by the requirement that the orders themselves should be lawful. Likewise, military law should protect military personnel against illegal or inappropriate orders. From a research perspective it is important to see whether the code of military law or justice is published (it usually is), what it contains, and, perhaps through interviews, to what extent it is correctly enforced. Because codes of military justice are often quite old, there is pressure in some countries to revise them to bring them into line with modern human rights standards. The extent to which this is possible is debated (the right to life cannot be fully respected, after all). Military personnel, as citizens, are subject to civilian laws, but in some countries, they are subject to military codes of laws instead, and tried in military courts. Possible research questions include:
• What is contained in the code of military law, if it is published?
• Are there pressures to revise it: If so from where?
• Are military personnel tried in military or civil courts for civil crimes?

2.7 Decrees and Orders. It is normal today for laws passed by parliaments to be supplemented by detailed decrees and regulations issued by ministries or other organizations. These decrees have the force of law (and can often be challenged before special courts), but they should always be based on existing laws passed by parliaments. In some countries, all such decrees must be published in an official list, and it is normal for them to be examined by an independent organization to make sure that they do not contradict either national laws or international agreements to which the state is a signatory. Possible research questions include:

• What is said in primary legislation about the process for issuing decrees, regulations, and the like?
• Is there a requirement to publish them? Where and how?
• Who can issue them and under what circumstances?
• Are there collections or central repositories?
• Who is in charge of making sure that decrees are consistent with each other?

2.8 Internal Instructions. All organizations have internal procedures and instructions. These are often very detailed and specific to one part of the organization: they are rarely published. Such instructions are generally not legal documents (it depends upon the legal tradition), but they should be consistent with the laws and decrees that apply to the military. In some cases, some internal instructions may violate the law, creating anomalies, particularly when they have to do with serious issues like induction systems (recruitment).

2.9 Informal Written and Unwritten Rules. All organizations have rules they develop for their own purposes. Some are written (for example, behavior and dress in an officers’ mess) and some are unwritten. In so-called high-context cultures, where social and cultural assumptions are widely shared and trust is high, such rules may be largely unwritten, and may be enforced through social pressures (“we don’t do that.”) In low-context cultures, rules may be much more explicit and written down. Researching such rules is difficult, and can only really be done through interviews, but gives a good insight into the cultural norms of the military and their relationship to the written law.

2.10 International Treaties and Conventions. Like other parts of government, the military is also affected by treaties and conventions its government has signed. In practice, the way it is managed may also be influenced by declarations signed by their governments, which are politically, although not legally, binding. Some of these documents may be universal, while others may only apply within a region. The best-known examples are the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. These conventions, and their additional protocols, are signed by states but apply to individuals, and so states have to ensure that the provisions of the conventions are taught in military academies and enforced through the chain of command. However, there are also other legal controls on warfare, and these are conveniently summarized in the 1998
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to which most countries are now signatories. There are also specific treaties that affect the behavior of the military, ranging from the 1984 Convention Against Torture, to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or Ottawa Convention), to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict of 2000. In addition, the more detailed management of the military may be affected by all kinds of human rights and other treaties and declarations. Possible research questions include:

- What treaties and conventions has the state signed, and what declarations has it supported?
- Have laws been passed (for example, for the Geneva Conventions and the ICC Statute) to implement such agreements in domestic law?
- Have they been incorporated into military law where appropriate?
- Is there evidence that conventions relating to armed conflict are taught in military academies and enforced by the chain of command?
- What other treaties or declarations are affecting the management of the armed forces and how?
- Are there specific training programs related to IHL particularly in coordination with the ICRC?
- Do exercise scenarios usually include problems relating to IHL?

Much of the research will be through published texts (including lists of treaty signatories) and debates and speeches, but retired military lawyers may be able to offer a practical perspective on the problems of implementation.
Part Three
Defense Sector Organization

III. It has already been pointed out that the military is a very ancient institution, and in many cases was the first part of the state to be constructed. This is not surprising, since it was the basic means for any ruler to gain, retain, and then extend their power. For most of history (and in some places even today) the army was what stood between the ruler and the risk of their political, or even actual, death. So we would expect the history of the organization of defense and the military to be long and complex, as indeed it is.

3.1 Origins. In its earliest incarnation, the military was little more than all of the adult males in a community. We can still see traces of this pattern in tribal-based societies today, including some in the Arab world (like Yemen) where private ownership of guns is very common. As societies became larger and more complex, and an agricultural surplus was available to support a ruler and his (or occasionally her) household, protection of the ruler became a priority. Even today, a number of military units (often called “guards”) trace their origins to this practice, and in general it is a mark of honor for a military unit to mount protection over the presidential palace, or, still in some countries, the home of the monarch. Thus, the original identification of the earliest military forces was with the ruler, who was also the de facto commander in chief. Of course waging a war, as opposed to simply protecting the ruler, required much larger forces that had to be paid (the origin of taxation) and commanded (the origins of an officer corps). War was one of the so-called regalian functions (with diplomacy, justice, internal security, and so on), and, until very recently, wars were not between nations but between rulers, often competing to control territory and add to their domains. Possible research questions include:

- What was the historical military tradition of the country before colonization? Are there traces of that tradition today?
- What indigenous forces were created under colonialism? Are there any traces of such forces or their influence today?
- How far is the civilian population traditionally armed, and what are the effects if it is?
- Does any monarchical or aristocratic tradition survive in the military from earlier times?

3.2 Development. The military is only of any value if they can be employed in large numbers. You need far more soldiers than you need tax collectors or magistrates to be effective. Early on, therefore, states and empires began to develop administrative systems for raising and maintaining armies and navies, and expanding them in times of war. Indeed, the development of state structures in most areas of the world is very closely related to the development of larger and more powerful militaries. Of course, a military was also the ultimate arbiter of domestic power: indeed, this was always its principal function, and remains so today. So long as the military was the faithful tool of the ruler, commanded by
someone trustworthy (the ruler’s brother, for example) and staffed by those with an interest in the ruler’s welfare, this was not a problem. (We still see this logic at work in states where personal rule is exercised.) But with economic development, and consequential social and political changes, it became impossible for the regalian functions to remain entirely in the hands of the ruler. As monarchies gave way to republics, or adopted constitutions, the control and direction of the military was increasingly subsumed into the general principles for the management of the government as a whole. But this happened in different ways, in different speeds in different places. Possible research questions include:

- What are the arrangements for the command and control of the military today?
- In a republic, how direct is the influence of the president on the military?
- How far do personal, clan, and family ties affect the control of the military?

3.3 Variations. The dominant model in the world today, at least in terms of theory, is the developed Liberal State model, of which more in a moment. But other models exist also. In some countries, the military has remained significant political actors because it forms part of the traditional power structure, along with organized religion, the aristocracy, and financial and industrial elites. In others, the military has gained legitimacy as a force for secular modernization, and as a career open to all elements of society. In still others, the military is the descendant of those who conducted anticolonial struggles, and its legitimacy (and its influence) comes from its role as a liberator. In others, the military is respected and deferred to as the only structure capable of holding the country together or defending it from powerful neighbors. Finally, the military may be intimately connected to a ruling party or regime, helping to ensure its survival rather than serving the national interest. These models are not wholly distinct from each other: indeed, it is common to find elements of at least two of them together, in the Arab world as elsewhere. An important research issue is therefore to disentangle the various ways in which the military may seek, and be accorded, legitimacy and so a degree of influence and power.

3.4 The Developed Model. Almost all nations, and all security sectors, went through one or more of the stages described above; some have yet to emerge. What follows is the description of a general model, at which a number of nations in different parts of the world have arrived, with some variations, and which appears to work well. It is a model, however, that depends on a mature political system for its effectiveness, and has a number of preconditions described below. Essentially, at this point the defense function is integrated into the wider apparatus of government. In a democracy, or any other responsive political system, every aspect of government policy should have a political figure responsible to the public and parliament for the policy itself and its implementation. Defense is not an exception: indeed, it is one “sector” of government, part of the wider “security sector” and organized in much the same way. Although details vary, the normal pattern of a representative government sector is something like the following:

- A minister and personal staff, representing the party or parties in power, and answerable to the public and parliament. In some systems, the personal staff will be quite large, and come and go with the minister.
• Permanent officials, who are career specialists in the subject matter, and support the minister in making and implementing policy.
• Technical advisers, who are also permanent career officials.
• Operational units to carry out the policy.

Thus, an education ministry will have a political head and staff; permanent officials to help make and implement policy; experts on such issues as educational psychology, curriculum design, legal issues, and building regulations; as well as operational units, which are the schools and universities. Similarly, the operational units of the health ministry are hospitals and research institutes, just as the operational units of the foreign ministry are embassies and consulates. In the wider security sector, the operational units of the interior ministry may be (according to the country) the police, prisons border guards, and so on. In all cases, these operational units are needed in order to turn government policy into practice.

3.5 The Model in Defense. It is easy to see how this model is applied to the defense area. The defense function is in principle organized as follows:

• A minister and personal staff.
• Permanent officials, specialists in defense issues, to advise on and implement policy, and to manage the defense function as a whole.
• Specialists (some military, some civilian) on a range of technical, legal, intelligence, procurement, and other issues.
• Operational units—the armed forces and their headquarters and training organizations.

In most political systems, the military is the only part of the state that is established in a single command system on a national basis. For this reason, it is also normal to have a national military headquarters, as well as headquarters for the different parts of the armed forces. There will be a professional head of each of the armed forces, as well, in many cases, as a professional head of the armed forces as a whole.

3.6 Variations. Because many defense structures have a long and complex history, and have been subject to waves of transformation and reform, then, as already noted, defense structures can differ very substantially, even between neighboring countries. A defense ministry may resemble in every respect the organization of, say, a ministry of transport, or at the other extreme it may be no more than a military headquarters, with a minister and personal staff attached. In some traditions, the minister is himself a serving officer, and is less a political figure than the delegate of the military to the political power. It is therefore necessary to go behind the words used, often in several languages, and to look at the reality. Possible research questions include:

• Are there laws or statutes that establish the role of the defense minister, and the relationship of that person to the military commanders?
• How far, in practice, does the structure of the defense ministry (if there is one) resemble the structure of a typical ministry in the country?
• What, in theory and in practice, are the responsibilities of the chief of defense
  or the most influential military commander?
• Is there a direct link between the chief of defense and the president?

3.7 Preconditions. The structure described above is dependent for its effectiveness on the
whole political system working correctly. This is true of any sector, but especially important
in defense, which is powerful and usually has a relatively large budget. In particular, there
must be a clear distinction between public and private functions, a respect for the integrity
of government processes, and strict procedures to ensure the neutrality of government
officials, and thus avoid political interference with the military and its administration. The
health of the defense function cannot be separated from the health of the government
system as a whole. Thus, an important research question is the effectiveness, the health,
and the integrity of the government administration and the political system in general, since
the defense sector is likely to share most of the characteristics of the government as a
whole.

3.8 Sources. Much of the explanation for current defense structures lies in the past, so it is
essential to be familiar with the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial history of the
country, especially in the areas of political structures and defense organization. Other
sources include the following, which should, however, be treated with care because all
change will benefit somebody at someone else’s expense.

• Laws setting out the organization of defense as a function, compared with laws
  for other sectors.
• Reports, official and unofficial, into the effectiveness of the government as a
  whole, and any attempts at corruption or manipulation by political parties or
  outside actors.
• Reports from donors or international organizations working in the country on
defense reorganization.
• Speeches and official pronouncements from within government, suggesting or
  promising changes.
• Articles by former military personnel or government officials suggesting
  weaknesses and arguing for change.
• Interviews with retired military officers and former defense attachés.
PART FOUR
MISSIONS, PROGRAMS, AND BUDGETS

IV. So far, we have looked at the structures and building blocks of the military, and what the military is for. But to turn these structures and aspirations into a proper military capability requires definition of missions, management of programs and, most of all, a budget to fund them.

4.1 The Model. To begin with, it is useful to have a theoretical model of how the program and budget process should, ideally, work. Few countries manage the process optionally, and in a moment we will look at some of the inevitable difficulties, but it is helpful to start with the theory.

- Government policy should define, in general terms, a series of missions for the military, which in turn should reflect the government’s overall strategic vision for the country. Put simply, a small country in a peaceful region with a commitment to multilateral peacekeeping operations will give its military a different set of missions from those given to the military of a country facing external threats or internal conflict.
- In order for the missions to be carried out, the military will require certain capabilities to be developed or adapted. This should not be confused with the purchase of equipment, which is a subsidiary issue; frequently the development of capabilities is as much about training and reorienting forces as anything else.
- The development and maintenance of these capabilities requires a properly constructed and managed program to deliver the forces with the right structures, equipment, training, and logistics, as well as the right concept of operations.
- The approach to build these capabilities, will either be threat-based, capability-based, or a combination of the two approaches.
- The methodology of arriving at the required capabilities will include material, as well as nonmaterial, solutions. Before resorting to material solutions, which are more costly, nonmaterial solutions should be exhausted. These include doctrine, organization, training, leadership, personnel, and facilities and infrastructure.
- Finally, all this is impossible unless there is an adequate budget, and that budget is competently managed.

4.2 The Research Question. As indicated, this is an idealized model, but the sequence of steps described above should be found in any well-managed defense sector. The essential research question in this area is, therefore, the degree to which something like the logic set out above is actually respected, and, if not, whether that is attributable to some of the causes set out below.
4.3 Typical Strategic-Level Problems. In even the most mature and sophisticated structures, there are potential problems, which are impossible to avoid entirely. The most common are:

- Militaries, in general, have the tendency to fight the last war, as their readiness would usually be based on their most recent experience.
- Technology can drive doctrine and structures.
- Policy can be changed quickly, at least at the declaratory level, but programs are much slower to change. For example, a ground combat vehicle can easily take five years to define, purchase, and bring into service, after which, with regular upgrades, it may remain in service for twenty-five to thirty years. If it is the basic combat vehicle for the army, then the tasks that the army can carry out will be limited by what the vehicle can reasonably do. Thus, programs—the inertia of the equipment, training, and doctrine that already exists—can to a large extent determine what policies are feasible.
- Alternatively, there may be a disconnect between policy and programs precisely because policy can be changed very quickly. A government may announce policy changes for political reasons, which its military does not have the capability to respond to adequately, or even at all. There may be little coordination between the military and the political leadership, and the latter may have a poor idea of the military’s capabilities.
- As a rule of thumb, institutions, including the military, will never get all the resources they ask for. In many cases, budgets determine everything. Rather than being based on considerations of missions and capabilities, budgets may simply be decided for political reasons, without any idea of what they can purchase. This is often the case when policies of economic austerity are adopted, or where donor pressure forces cuts in the defense budget. Of course, no defense budget is ever large enough, and not all wants can be satisfied, but the key is that there should be a transparent and logical process by which priorities are set for the money available.
- If this does not happen, budgets become unrelated to programs, and programs have to be cut and adjusted, even if this makes no financial or operational sense. Sudden reductions in budgets, or unexpected pressure on the budget as described below, can lead to counterproductive and wasteful program cuts, which cost more money overall.

4.4 Research Questions. The issues above are essentially questions at the strategic level, involving the national and security policy of the government as a whole. Possible research questions include:

- Is there a clear security and defense policy articulated by the government from which missions can be deduced?
- In turn, does the military establishment have a clear set of basic missions?
- Is there a written strategic threat assessment, upon which capabilities are based and developed?
- Are there internal planning mechanisms to translate these missions into capabilities?
• Is there a clear link between the articulated security policy and the existing force structures and capabilities and plans to develop them?
• What approach does the military adopt to decide capabilities?
• How sophisticated is the budget-setting process, and how close is the working relationship with the finance ministry?
• How involved are field commanders at operational and tactical levels in drafting the defense budget?
• Who makes the final decision about the size of the defense budget? To what extent are donors or international organizations influential?

4.5 Typical Working-Level Problems. As in all organizations, there are also internal problems that make management more difficult, even if clear missions can be defined. Typical examples include:

• **Inter- and Intra-service Rivalries and Jealousies.** These exist in all organizations, but especially organizations with long and distinct histories. Often, individual services will try to retain capabilities, resist rationalization, and compete to provide new capabilities. This is inevitable to a degree, and understandable insofar as military personnel may be unwilling to trust their lives in combat to members of another service than their own. There are also rivalries within the same branch of service to compete for the preferred capability (for example, major weapon systems). However, unless strictly controlled, such tendencies will reduce the effectiveness of the military as a whole, and lead to money being wasted. In general, this problem can be addressed, largely ineffectually, by negotiation and compromise, but more effectively by a strong central staff able to direct planning.

• **Lack of expertise.** Program management is a highly complex and specialized area, which requires training and experience that not all nations have. It requires military, planning, financial, contractual, and engineering expertise, which may be in short supply.

• **Donor control and influence.** Donors may seek to put artificial controls on the size or composition of the defense budget. Donors themselves seldom have much expertise in program and budget issues, and frequently try to influence and subsidize spending toward areas they approve of, while discouraging investment in more politically difficult areas, such as internal security. Conversely, donors may persuade countries to take, often gratis, military equipment that they cannot support and do not really need, which will create financial, as well as other operational and logistical challenges.

• **Incoherent programs.** The result of the above, and similar problems, is often to produce programs that have no internal logic, and use money badly. Priorities may be decided by inter-service struggles and donor influence, rather than the needs of the country.

4.6 Research Questions. These issues have more to do with the internal functioning of the defense sector. Some are difficult to research from open sources, and in certain cases there will be different opinions about them. Retired military and civilian officials are a good source
of expertise for these questions, but the controversy that often surrounds them means that it is wise to seek as many different opinions as possible. Media stories can also be useful, accepting that journalists are primarily interested in scandals and controversy. However, possible research questions include:

- Does the budget and program give the impression of being organized and coherent? Does the government clearly state what the budget covers, and how it will be spent?
- Do the activities of the armed forces seem to be coherently organized? Are there obvious gaps in capability, or obvious areas of duplication? Are these officially admitted, or at least widely discussed?
- How often does the military establishment conduct a strategic review to assess and address the gaps in capabilities?
- Is there a clear methodology to conduct strategic defense reviews? Is there an institutional structure to do that?
- How is the defense budget prepared and allocated: between the services, and according to what proportions? Or in terms of capability and missions? Does the division, however it is done, seem sensible?
- Where does the budget department sit in the structure, and how connected is it to the planning department?
- How active are donors in influencing priorities and programs? What initiatives are they trying to encourage? Are these consistent with the nations' security interests?
- What can be said about the professional competence of budget and program managers? Are they specially recruited or trained? Are military officers, for example, sent without training to manage budgets?
- Are the financial allocations for internal security capabilities coordinated with allocations to security organizations?

4.7 Definitions and Coverage. There is no such single thing as the “defense budget” because of the complex history of the defense sector in most countries, and interactions with other security organizations. For example, some internal security tasks may be carried out by the military, while in other countries they may be carried out by a paramilitary force funded from the budget of the defense ministry, and in still other countries the same force may be funded from the budget of the interior ministry. Likewise, the budget of the intelligence services may be completely independent, may be part of the defense budget in some or all cases, or may come under the budget of another ministry entirely. Military pensions are a classic example where practice varies widely. It is useful to employ the NATO standard definition of defense expenditure, which is the most commonly used measurement. However, information is often not available at the level of detail required, and judgments and estimates have to be made.

4.8 Budget Problems. To add to the above uncertainty, the concept of a defense budget can itself be somewhat fluid. Special funds may be available for certain purposes, outside the normal defense allocation. Sometimes special budgets are created for new equipment programs. In some countries, the military is directly involved in the economy, and the
defense budget benefits from it. Similarly, some countries subsidize their defense budgets by sending contingents on UN missions, which are currently reimbursed for contingent-owned equipment (COE), and for troop costs at the rate of €1,300 per soldier per month, while the personnel themselves are paid far less. Some countries may receive military aid from donors either in money or, more usually, in kind. Conversely, the budget may pay for special items, such as houses and transport for retired officers, as well as subsidized or free housing and food for military personnel. In some cases, especially for subsidies, the economic effect is hard to measure. Possible research questions include:

- How clearly is the precise coverage of the budget made clear in official documents? Is it made clear (or even widely believed) that activities such as intelligence are hidden in the budget?
- What information is available about formal or informal subsidies to the budget (donor aid, supply of equipment free or at low cost, free or subsidized training programs by foreign government). What subsidies are received from the UN or other international organizations to cover deployment costs, and what happens to the money?
- What types of payment are made to military personnel in addition to their salaries, and which of their activities are subsidized or free?
- How are military pensions handled? Are they fixed and managed by the military as part of the defense budget, or by an external body?
- Is the military involved in outside economic activities? What advantages are there to the budget and to individuals?

4.9 Analytical Issues. The analysis of defense budgets is highly complex, and entails considerable research difficulties. However, there are certain generic problems that are relatively easy to describe and not too difficult to research. As well as the general danger of producing an incoherent program, there are also specific problems that are widely encountered.

- Very high percentage of the budget spent on personnel. In spite of the tendency to describe the defense budget of a country as its “arms bill,” for the vast majority of countries, the largest single item of expenditure is personnel, without which, inevitably, nothing can be done. In some cases, 90 percent of the expenditure is in this category, which is unsustainable.
- Consequently, expenditure on new equipment, as well as support and maintenance, may be so low that parts of the military are nonoperational. It is quite common for large numbers of armored vehicles, for example, to be unavailable for lack of spares. Thus, the theoretical capability of the military may be much greater than the actual operational capability. However, unless realistic salaries are offered, and actually paid, there will not be enough personnel either, particularly when the military competes with other organizations to attract good quality recruits. For many countries struggling with inadequate budgets, this problem has no solution.
- Inertia often rules when there is no proper budget setting mechanism. Programs, priorities, and division of the budget are continued from year to year.
because there is no consensus about the changes that need to be made, and no system for establishing priorities.

- A major problem is lack of an integrated approach. Typically, for example, equipment may be bought from the main equipment budget, but there may be inadequate funds set aside for such elements as spares and maintenance and training, which will be funded from other budgets. Thus, equipment may rapidly become unserviceable, or may have to wait to be put into service.

- Finally, the real value of the defense budget may not be the same as the advertised figure. In a country with high inflation, for example, the budget may be worth less at the end of the year than at the beginning. Fluctuations in exchange rates, changes in the price of oil, changes in taxation rates, and salary increases can all alter (mostly negatively) the purchasing power of the budget. Likewise, operations suddenly ordered during the year for political reasons may have to be funded by reductions in spending elsewhere.

Possible research questions include:

- What information is available on the distribution of the defense budget between areas? What are the trends over time? Are there proposals for change? Are there complaints in the open media or the military press that some areas are being neglected?

- Are there declared military modernization programs with announced costs? What percentage of the budget is allocated for this?

- What is the process for the military to secure local or foreign loans to finance defense contracts?

- Does the performance of the military give the impression that the defense budget is being spent sensibly, or are there scandals and allegations of shortages and mismanagement?

- What is the rate of inflation, and is the defense budget being properly compensated? If not, where are reductions being made? How far, if at all, is the budget protected against variations in exchange rates and raw material prices?

4.10 Corruption and Maladministration. In most countries, the defense budget is a relatively large proportion of government spending. In a society where corruption is widespread, defense is unlikely to be exempt from it, although the professional ethos of the military may limit its impact to some extent. In addition, temptation may be put in the way of individuals, as is true for any area where large projects are sometimes undertaken. Corruption is normally a response to circumstances, and a rational mechanism for individual and collective self-preservation, so studying corruption as a moral weakness or a procedural failure is unlikely to yield useful results. That said, it is also useful to collect information about anticorruption laws and institutions, as well as their origins (which often lie with donors).

4.11 Some Causes. The potential causes of corruption are numerous, and definitions change according to context: gift-exchange societies work differently from rigidly market-oriented ones, for example. But a few general factors are frequently found:
• **Environment.** Corruption may be deeply embedded in an economic system, because the state is organized on patrimonial lines or just because it is incapable of providing services. The state itself may not be trusted anyway, and citizens will instead look for favors from relatives and acquaintances in positions of influence. In countries with high rates of unemployment and poverty, a government job may be the only way of feeding an extended family. Defense is unlikely to be an exception to such problems, and individuals, no matter how honest they may wish to be, have little incentive but to comply.

• **Resentment.** Military personnel may feel they are badly paid for a job that is dangerous and unpleasant, and they may also feel neglected or disliked by the community. Individuals may feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have been passed over for jobs and promotion. Lack of proper pensions can be a major cause of corrupt practices, as individuals try to provide for themselves and their families. Corruption can more widely be seen as a form of revenge on a society and an institution that does not value them in status and financial terms.

• **Lack of competence.** When large projects are involved, the defense sector may not have the technical capability to make informed choices. This can lead to a reflexive purchase of the cheapest option, irrespective of performance (so, maladministration) but also to the option that will bring the greatest financial benefit to individuals.

• **Decisionmaking.** The problem of lack of competence manifests itself in decisionmaking mechanisms. A system that requires a high level of consensus from different actors with different interests is relatively robust against corruption. But a system where a single person—the chief of the army for example—decides is obviously open to abuse. Yet a system with multiple points of decisionmaking and “oversight” is equally prone to corruption, because there are many separate stages at which decisions can be changed, and so where the temptation for corruption exists. Parliament, for example, is notoriously the most corrupt part of any political system, and there will be fierce competition to be named to the defense committee because of the financial or other opportunities that may result.

4.12 **Research Questions.** Possible research questions on corruption and maladministration include the following, some of which will need to be answered through interviews, usually with retired officers or officials.

- How far is the system capable of taking intelligent decisions on important issues? Are there examples where it has not done so? Is there evidence of corruption, or just lack of capacity?
- How does this judgment fit in with what is known more widely about government procurement and financial management, and its problems?
- What information is available about popular attitudes to government, and beliefs about the honesty of its servants? How far do people trust the government?
• Are military and defense officials properly paid, and do they receive pensions? How does this compare with the treatment of government officials elsewhere?
• How are defense contracts handled? What’s the institutional structure to arrive at a contract? What is the legal code for contracts, and is it different from the rest of government? Are the users (field commanders and technical experts) involved in the process, and how? Are users’ committees a regular practice?
Part Five
The Armed Forces

V. The primary mission of the armed forces of a state is the support of the state’s foreign and domestic policy with force or the threat of force. However, the difference between a nation’s armed forces and a militia or criminal gang is (or should be) that the armed forces threaten or use force in a disciplined, organized, and controlled manner, as determined by the political leadership. In turn, this requires suitable training, structures, organization, doctrine, and equipment. As a secondary mission, the armed forces also perform important symbolic functions, including demonstrating the will and capability to protect national territory, and borders, and projecting influence abroad. Their organization, equipment, discipline, and readiness also make them useful in dealing, for example, with natural disasters.

5.1 Size and Structure. In theory, the size and structure of the armed forces should be directly related to national security policy, and to a clear set of strategic priorities. In practice, this almost never happens. There is always argument and disagreement about strategic priorities, and few nations have the resources to do everything, anyway. Professional armed forces are expensive to build and maintain, and modern combat aircraft and ocean-going warships are now beyond the ability of most nations to purchase and support. For most nations, therefore, the size and structure of their armed forces are limited by practical constraints (notably past investments) and do not always correspond to strategic needs. This also makes it difficult to change organization and doctrine when new security challenges arise, and the supporting structures may no longer be appropriate. Finally, the structure of the armed forces themselves may have been partly determined by others, typically, either a former colonial power or a Cold War patron. Thus, a number of nations that had close links with the Soviet Union have retained a separate air defense service, along the Soviet model.

The division of tasks, the relative size of the armed forces, and the internal structure of each service should, once more, be based on the requirements of national security policy. But in practice, it is hard to change these factors rapidly. Armed forces structures represent a considerable investment in recruitment, training, logistics, and equipment, and can be expensive and difficult to change. Military equipment is expensive to procure and maintain, and it is not unusual to find armed forces structured around the equipment they happen to possess, even if this is not ideal. Geographic and political factors, such as the historic importance, or the current need for one of the services, or rivalries between them, can also play a role. Possible research questions include:

- The link (if any) between the announced security policy and the size, structure, and capabilities of the armed forces.
- Size of the armed forces, including reserves.
- Organization of the armed forces (army, navy, and so on) and any information about their relative political importance.
What organized military operations, domestically and abroad, have been carried out by the armed forces and of what types?

Discussion (if any) of changes to the size and structure of the armed forces to cope with new security situations.

Who is involved in any such debates? Are foreign donors present? Who will make the final decisions?

Is the size and structure stipulated in a clear law?

Have the size, structure, and organization ever been reviewed?

5.2 Organization. Organization is the essence of any military force, and, throughout history in various cultures, certain patterns have been established by experiment and are frequently repeated. It is common to find units of 10–12 soldiers; 30–50 soldiers; 100–150 soldiers; 500–600 soldiers; 1,000–1,200 soldiers; 5,000–6,000 soldiers; and 10,000–12,000 soldiers. Most modern armies would have units of roughly these sizes, often called squads or sections, platoons (troops), companies (squadrons), battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions. However, military terminology is complicated in all languages, and as we have seen the same term may describe units of different sizes within different armies, or even different specializations within the same army. Again, the influence of colonial powers and Cold War patronage may also have had an importance. However, the purpose of these structures is to enable forces to be created from standard units, which are appropriate to the situation. A military commander presented with a mission can therefore analyze the requirement, and select personnel organized into units that can combine effectively into a task force to carry out the mission.

This is especially the case with an army, whose operational structure is essentially a pyramid. A division, for example, the traditional standard building block of an army, will contain two or more brigades, each of two or more regiments or battalions, as well as specialist support and service support units. As the character of war has changed due to the rise of asymmetric threats, special forces have gained more attention and have grown, in some countries, into a branch of service (special operations) with its own air capability. The building block of an air force is usually a squadron of 12–15 aircraft: sometimes two squadrons will be combined as a regiment, or a wing. Finally, the basic component of naval forces is the ship. The frigate, a vessel of typically 3,000–5,000 metric tons and a crew of about 200, is now the standard ship in most navies, and the smallest to deploy independently outside coastal waters. Naval vessels are often combined into larger task forces. Finally, these operational structures should not be confused with administrative ones. Most countries have military districts with commanders, but in many cases these are for purely administrative and logistic purposes, and operational command structures might be different, depending on the context. Likewise, naval vessels may be organized into squadrons for administrative purposes, but may actually deploy singly or in small groups. Units may be deployed geographically for all sorts of reasons, not necessarily based on military need. Internal security, employment, logistic convenience, and simple tradition may all play a role. Possible research questions include:

- The nature and origins of military structures in the country.
- The current structure of the military, and how it evolved.
• The balance in size among the branches of service, and its relationship to history geography, and doctrine and strategy.
• The effect of outside influences, if any.
• Geographic dispersal of military units and the rationale for it.
• Proposals, if any, for structural change
• Status of the special forces/operations, including counterterrorism.

5.3 Posture and Doctrine. Armed forces should generally be deployed, trained, and exercised according to some plan—in other words, there should be some shared expectation of what they are actually likely to be used for. In theory, this should, once more, be derived from a national security policy. It is more often a compromise between tradition, perceived threats, current problems, and political objectives. There are nonetheless certain patterns that can be anticipated. A country with a powerful or unstable neighbor would reasonably have forces capable of being deployed quickly in an emergency. A country with major offshore oil and gas reserves would normally be expected to have forces permanently deployed to protect them. A country with major internal security problems would be expected to have well-trained counterinsurgency forces, and to emphasize capabilities such as drones, intelligence, and special forces. By contrast, a country with peaceful neighbors and no internal security problems, but with a tradition of deploying as part of international missions, could be expected to have a completely different posture.

Doctrine is about how armed forces operate in practice, and exists at various levels. Some nations publish a national military doctrine, explaining the factors that influence their operations and how they intend to carry them out. Such documents can be useful, but the very fact that they are public means that they have to be written in politically acceptable terms, and will not cover sensitive areas. In general, more sensitive and classified versions of doctrine will also exist, and most militaries have departments responsible for reviewing doctrine as circumstances change. Again, outside influences can be important. Soviet doctrine, for example, influential in parts of the Arab world, emphasized attrition combat to destroy the enemy, and the widespread use of highly standardized maneuvers. In turn, this type of doctrine is often employed by conscript armies (as in the Soviet case) where the standard of training is relatively low and initiative is discouraged. Other militaries have pursued more complex ideas of “maneuver warfare,” which requires higher standards of training, and the use of initiative by quite junior commanders to achieve the ultimate strategic objective. Many countries are now confronted with internal security problems of different types, and have developed or borrowed their own doctrines to deal with them. Possible research questions include:

• Does the country have any type of published military doctrine?
• Are there other written strategic reference documents (threat assessment, strategic environment . . . ?)
• Are training documents used in military schools openly published (combat doctrine)?
• If so, are they up to date, and are there obvious outside influences?
• Do the publicized military activities and force postures of the state seem to correspond to any clear doctrine, even if that doctrine is not published?
• Does the doctrine reflect a joint approach between different parts of the armed forces?

Retired military officers are probably the best source for such insights. They are also more likely to have written articles or studies on the subject. Military colleges, particularly staff, and war/defense colleges, sometimes also publish articles on such topics, and are the best places to look for such information.

5.4 Civil-Military Cooperation. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is basically the coordination and cooperation between the military commander and civil actors, including the authorities and the population, as well as nongovernmental organizations, when applicable. Historically, military operations have never taken place in a vacuum, and commanders have always had to take account of the local population and local political and social structures to some extent. In recent decades, however, this requirement has become systematized under the heading of CIMIC. So, CIMIC is not a new phenomenon in sophisticated militaries, but it has traditionally been viewed as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. The environment in which military forces operate has lately become more complex and presented the military with new challenges, particularly with the presence of a plethora of international and nongovernmental organizations and the media in theaters of operations. Therefore, the interaction between military forces and the governmental and nongovernmental civil environment has become a requirement for successful military operations. This has caused many militaries to develop new concepts and structures, including dedicated units to deal with the challenges. The military commander views CIMIC activities as an integral part of his strategy and plan to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission, and the CIMIC staff is part of his headquarters to coordinate CIMIC activities in the area of operations.

Arab militaries vary in the way they view and deal with CIMIC. Some, particularly those that have become contributors to peace support and coalition operations, have adapted to CIMIC as an operational necessity and incorporated CIMIC staff in their structures at different levels (strategic, operational, tactical), in addition to the establishment of dedicated civil affairs units to implement CIMIC activities, while others have not.

Possible research questions include:

• Has the military developed its own CIMIC doctrine?
• Has the military established CIMIC staffs, and at what levels?
• Does the military have dedicated civil affairs units within its organization?
• Are there CIMIC training programs/courses conducted as part of the training scheme?
• If there are no dedicated CIMIC staffs or units, is CIMIC as a role given to other staffs/units?

5.5 The Wider Security Sector. The military is not the only part of the state that is trained to use or threaten disciplined force. There is a series of other tasks to be carried out, ranging from the protection of important personalities, public buildings and sensitive installations;
through control of demonstrations and ensuring public order; to countering violent extremists. States make different choices about how to manage such problems. Some militarize their police forces, while others create new paramilitary forces, or gendarmerie, which may have military status. In some cases, the military has been used directly for public order duties, but this requires special training and equipment. It can be very useful analytically to see whether the military is trusted with highly sensitive tasks such as these and, if so, which parts. Such information is not always easy to find, but, as well as the legal sources mentioned earlier, careful reading of the open media, and of publications intended for military personnel, can reveal a surprising amount. Former defense attachés will also often have a good feel for how responsibilities for sensitive missions are divided up.

Possible research questions include:

- Has the military been involved in public order duties, and with what result?
- Is there any evidence of the use of the military, or parts of it, against political opponents?
- What does the relationship between the military and other security institutions (intelligence, police, and so on) look like in practice? Are there clear spheres of influence and separate roles for each?
- Is there any evidence of links between the military and various paramilitary or militia forces that may be operating in the country? How do these links work in practice and what purposes do they serve?
VI. The military has certain unique features as a profession, including most obviously the greater risk of death or injury even than other parts of the security sector. But the necessary discipline of military forces also entails the loss of certain rights and freedoms that are normal in civilian life. In general, professional entrants (new recruits) are young and enter at the most junior level (the lowest rank in the ladder/private). They may have to spend some years accumulating experience and training before getting promoted to NCOs and be given real responsibilities. Likewise, officers enter as cadets, and have to work their way up through the officer ranks. In countries with national service, conscripts are also young when they join, and no matter what specialty they are trained in, they don’t get promoted to NCOs and so become professionals unless they commit to a career in the military, if laws permit.

Moreover, in all societies, the military has traditionally been ambiguous, both as an institution and as a symbol. This inherent ambiguity is overlaid with cultural, ethnic, religious, and gender differences, often present at the same time, in various different societies. These considerations affect how the population sees the military, who wants to join the military, how the military itself sees various groups, and ultimately shapes the strategic relationship between the military and the population, which is very important, particularly when the country faces a national crisis.

6.1 Recruiting. Recruiting such people, whether as officers or NCOs, is not easy, and persuading them to stay (retention), especially once they have families, can also be a problem. The armed forces increasingly seek graduates, or offer degree courses, and provide education and training that will be of value in finding a job after retirement. It is interesting to observe how militaries go about recruiting officers and NCOs and where this is done. In some countries, the prestige of the military may be high, often for historical reasons. In others the military may be a traditional career in certain regions or among certain groups. In others, unemployment and poverty may drive recruits toward what looks like a stable career. Salaries may or may not be competitive, and military personnel may be offered benefits in kind, such as free or subsidized accommodation, meals, medical insurance, and travel. In certain cases, there will be scope to profit personally from military status, especially where procurement is concerned. Recruitment is usually by competitive selection, and certain specializations (like paratroopers) may require a higher physical standard. Others, in the technical area, may require special training or qualifications. Possible research questions include:

- What is the image of the armed forces in the country, and does this vary at all?
- What message do recruiters for the armed forces try to convey in publicity?
- What information is available on why people join the military?
- How competitive is the military in attracting school and university graduates?
- Does the military compete with other security organizations for recruitment?
6.2 **Management.** Promotion is normally dependent on experience and training, as well as competence. Sudden (exceptional) promotion to high rank would be very unlikely, although it may exist as part of incentivization, particularly for NCOs. Thus, the commander of, say, a division would normally be expected to have commanded units at all levels from platoon upward, as well as to have worked in staff jobs. Similarly, a sergeant would be expected to have entered as an ordinary soldier and progressed from there. In any organization, criteria for promotion are partly subjective, and it is an interesting research question how promotion operates, how open and transparent the criteria are, and whether it is seen to be fair. In most armies, for example, high command positions are usually held by officers from combat branches. This can be justified, but there are other cases where officers from particular regiments, from certain regions of the country, or of certain religious backgrounds tend to be promoted more than others. In some armies, promotion to high rank can be influenced by the views of donors or outside powers, in addition to politics. In such cases, capable officers of other backgrounds may leave early, and the overall capability of the armed forces may suffer. Indeed, some groups may simply not join the military at all because they see little hope of advancement. Finally, it may be believed (and even be true) that the “best” jobs are reserved for certain groups, or allocated through patronage or personal relationships. In some countries, appointment as a defense attaché in a major country can be very financially rewarding, as can be membership in committees deciding purchases of equipment. There is often discussion of this kind of problem in the open media, and retired officers (making allowance for their background) are also good sources. Possible research questions include:

- Are there written rules, or a system for career planning?
- How are officers and NCOs evaluated?
- Are there institutionalized evaluation boards for officers at different levels, including a central board?
- How is evaluation documented, and is it secret or open to the evaluated?
- Are job descriptions in TOEs stipulated anywhere?
- How is leadership as a quality for officers and NCOs assessed?
- What information is available about military salaries?
- What benefits are active service officers entitled to (that is, free or subsidized housing or other)?

6.3 **Retirement and Subsequent Positions.** In general, armed forces prefer most of their officers and soldiers to leave at a younger age than in the civilian sector, because of the physical demands of the job. Senior commanders will generally remain in service longer, which makes decisions about promotion to senior command a potentially controversial issue. Armed forces personnel will generally accept retirement provided arrangements for pensions are satisfactory, and these arrangements may be similar, more generous or less generous than for the public service as a whole. In addition, some retired officers may benefit from privileges even after they retire: official cars, subsidized housing, and so on. There may be formal or informal arrangements for retired officers to take jobs with private companies or other government agencies, and networks of retired officers may be politically influential. Possible research topics include:
• Laws on retirement and pensions. How the conditions compare with other parts of the public sector.
• Privileges given to retired officers other than their pensions.
• Role played by retired officers in business and politics.
• Existence of veterans’ organizations and their roles and influence.

Many retired personnel, or those who have left the military early, may also have a reserve obligation. This is usually set down in law, and may be anything from a general requirement to be available for active service if needed, to a specific requirement to train for a number of days each year, and to have a specified task in the event of war.

6.4 National Service. Conscription, or national service, is less common than it once was, but is still found in many parts of the world. Usually, there are laws setting out who is eligible to be called, for how long they have to serve, and what responsibilities they have after their service is completed; these may or may not be observed: for example, in many countries not all of those eligible for military service will be called. Some may be excused on medical grounds, some because they are in full-time education, and so on. In addition, the armed forces may simply not require all of those who are theoretically available. The criteria for choosing who to take may or may not be transparent, and this itself can cause controversy. The structure of armed forces with national service is fundamentally different from that of a professional force, especially in the army, where the majority of conscripts usually go. The infrastructure will be larger, training will be a priority, and doctrine will have to reflect the lower training standards of conscripts. Conscripts join at the lowest rank in the enlisted ladder of military ranks, which is lower than a private, and the actual name of their rank varies from a country to another (recruit/private/conscript, for example). They don’t get promoted to NCOs, regardless of the training they receive, unless they convert to professional service (career), if the law permits. The period of national service itself is a complex question, and often a compromise between the needs of the armed forces and what is politically acceptable. Much of this information is publicly available, but interviews with retired officers and former conscripts are also valuable. Possible research questions include:

• Legal provisions for conscription: eligibility, duration, liability to be recalled in war, and the like.
• Policy on use of conscripts (for example, not employed outside national territory).
• Value of the current system and any pressures to change it.
• Popular opinions on the value of national service (for example, in some countries there is an outcry to adopt national service).
• Lessons learned from the experience of conscription.

6.5 Ambiguities and Perceptions. Public perceptions of the military have always been divided and contradictory, and these affect both the willingness of individuals to seek a military career, and also wider public attitudes to defense, and the acceptance of conscription. In principle, the military virtues—courage, self-sacrifice, discipline, loyalty—are regarded as
important in every society, and worthy of emulation. Traditionally, they were the virtues to which young men were encouraged to aspire, and young women to admire. In many societies, an induction to warrior life (not necessarily in a formal institution) was a coming-of-age ritual, marking the passage from child, and so in need of protection, to man, providing protection for others. Yet at the same time, the actual act of fighting and killing was often surrounded with fears and taboos, and in many societies warriors had to go through ritual purification before being allowed back into society. Likewise, the civilian population’s experience of actual soldiers in war was often far from positive. We can see distant echoes of all of these ideas even today, which means that attitudes to the military and conflict are often confused, especially when complex and controversial operations in support of peace initiatives are considered. Donors are as conflicted as anyone. The pacifism that typified the donor community in the past has largely vanished since the end of the Cold War, to be replaced by an often bellicose interventionism. But this coexists equally with ingrained suspicion of the military drawn from U.S. political science traditions, and the antimilitaristic concerns of human rights and transitional justice advocates.

6.6 History. No two militaries have the same historical context, and there is probably no case in which the military’s involvement in the country’s history is seen in the same way by all groups. More widely, and as with all other institutions, cultural factors mean that it is almost impossible to make general statements about “the military.” Conversely, military systems until recently have arisen very largely by trial and error, and in many cases, different cultures have found their way, independently, to relatively similar answers. The important differences that remain result partly from political factors but partly also from the circumstances of the creation of the national military in the first place. This is especially the case for former colonies, where colonial powers often tried to strengthen their hold on the territory by recruiting locally organized military forces. These forces were typically drawn from marginalized groups, or groups considered to have a strong military tradition. In some cases these same groups formed the nucleus of the postindependence army, while in others they became a symbol of the former power, and the new military would probably be formed from groups that had been involved in an independence struggle. Because these groups were seldom tidily distinguished from each other, the situation in practice after independence was even more complicated. In addition, not all members of groups that benefited under colonialism are necessarily supportive of the military, just as a military career might have become common in groups that had fought in an anticolonial struggle. Possible research issues include:

- Does the country have anything that could be described as a “warrior” tradition, and if so is it especially linked with a group or groups?
- What kinds of experiences have ordinary people had of the military in the past (war, revolution, colonialism, military government) and how does this affect perceptions of the military today?
- What is the overall perception of the military in the eyes of the ordinary people, compared to other governmental institutions?
- How far is the military seen either as a symbol of national unity or a factor of division? Do people respect and trust, or disrespect and distrust the military?
6.7 Representivity. For these and similar reasons, no military is ever going to be a statistical replica of the population distribution of the country. Only a minority of the population will ever be interested in a military career, and many who would make capable officers or NCOs may be more attracted by other careers, with more money and less danger. Military service is often a matter of tradition, among families as well as groups. Professional armies, for example, know that certain parts of the country have historically provided many recruits, sometimes because of the lack of alternative employment. Many army officers and career NCOs come from more traditionalist, rural backgrounds, while naval personnel frequently come from coastal areas with maritime traditions. Air force personnel are often more highly educated and technical, and may well have urban origins. The fact that in many countries communities are unevenly distributed between country and town and rich and poor areas, and may have different standards of access to education and different career traditions, means that geographical and economic differences may be mixed with ethnic or religious ones. Under normal circumstances, this does not matter too much, provided the population as a whole sees the military as a national institution: indeed, in some countries it may be the only institution trusted by all. Problems arise, however, when the military is too closely identified with a group or groups, especially when this is linked to the exercise of political power against other groups. Possible research topics include:

- How far are there links between individual communities, regions, religious groups, and so on, and careers in the military? How far is this perceived as a problem in practice?
- Is there a national policy, or regulation for geographic or demographic representation in the military?
- Is there any particular alignment of groups within the country with one or more of the armed forces, now or in the past? If so, what are the consequences?
- Are there any groups that feel excluded from the military?
- How far is the military conceived of as a national asset, and how far as an instrument at the service of a group or groups?

6.8 Selection. All organizations without exception select partly according to their own image. Once people have been recruited, especially for long-service organizations like the military, there is then the question of promotion and advancement, not simply to higher rank, but to the “best” jobs and the most influential positions. In all militaries, combat arm officers (including pilots in the air force) tend to predominate at senior level, and other sections of the military tend to accept this situation, though not always happily. Certain sections of the military (notably special forces and intelligence) may also have a different and superior status, and may be able to operate to some extent outside the normal chain of command. It is common for these types of selection to have at least some connection with regional, ethnic or religious differences. So long as the connection is not too direct, it can be accommodated within the grumbling that is endemic in any large organization about perceived injustices. However, when it becomes clear that, for example, officers of a particular ethnic group or from a particular region are being unfairly promoted, or unfairly marginalized, the capability and the morale of the military suffers, and it risks being seen as a political instrument at the service of a particular group. Attempts to remedy this kind of situation need to be handled carefully: some groups may just not be interested in a military
career, or feel unwelcome, and attempts to appoint or promote officers for ethnic or similar reasons often create more problems than they solve. Possible research questions include:

- Are the various branches of the military regarded as unduly dominated by one ethnic, regional, or religious group, or indeed by several? What, if any, are the consequences?
- Is there pressure from within the country, or from donors, to correct perceived imbalances? What has been the result?
- Are there links between dominant communities in the military and dominant communities in other areas, notably politics and government?
- Is there a policy, or a specific regulation on rotating senior military positions?
Part Seven
Military Education and Training

VII. As well as training, which equips the military to perform current and future jobs better, there is an increasing tendency around the world to provide education, especially for officers, at all stages of their careers. The distinction between education and training is not an absolute one, but broadly training is to equip members of the military to perform better in their military functions, while education is to give them a wider view of strategic and nonmilitary issues. Another way to look at education in the military is to divide it into professional military education (PME) that is directly linked to a military profession and usually conducted in military schools and colleges, and general academic education that members of the military can receive in universities to broaden their horizons and improve their career opportunities while in service, or after retirement. The balance between education and training is usually part of the organization's doctrine and strategy, and is linked to many factors, including history and tradition. As an officer progresses in their career, the balance usually shifts from largely training to largely education.

In some militaries, particularly all-volunteer professional militaries, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are also encouraged to pursue academic educational programs, in addition to their professional military education and training. Because NCOs are considered the backbone of professional armed forces, their education and training is just as important as that of officers for both technical and leadership skills. In professional armies, senior NCOs are expected to be able to replace junior officers in leadership roles, if needed. Many militaries have NCO academies to provide leadership education and training, and in some cases, these academies are totally commanded and managed by NCOs.

7.1 The Traditional Model. The traditional professional qualification for being an officer was to be able to lead soldiers in battle by setting an example of bravery and initiative. In most societies, officers were drawn from the aristocracy, and were trained in the use of weapons from childhood, since warfare between clans and families was often endemic. The personal characteristics of an aristocrat, or a relative of the king or emperor, were considered to be roughly equivalent to those needed by a military commander, so it was very much a matter of luck whether an individual given an entire army to command would make a success of it or not. In societies with low population densities, the more common model was the tribal militia, under the command of traditional leaders. For most of human history, forces were small, communications on the battlefield were poor, and much depended on the initiative of junior commanders. The few treatises on war tended to be very technical (on fortifications, for example), and there was little attempt in most countries to provide an intellectual framework for it.

7.2. This model began to change in Europe in the nineteenth century, when technology permitted the formation of larger armies increasingly made up of conscripts, and planning, supplying, and commanding them began to require special skills. The leaders in this field were the Prussians, who were the first to create a general staff—a body of well-trained
military officers capable of moving between command and administrative and planning duties. The defeat of the formidable French Army by the Prussians in 1870 aroused interest all over the world, and German officers were invited by many rulers—including the Ottomans—to come to train their officers. By the early twentieth century, any army that wished to be considered modern had formed a general staff after the Prussian (later German) model, with several years’ professional training for its officers. However, this training was, and continued to be until quite recently, essentially military and technical in its focus. There were few countries where officers were required to have a wide general education. Possible research topics include:

- What were the precolonial traditions of leadership, and do they have any impact today?
- Was there a professional officer class before the arrival of Western colonists, and if so what was it like? Does its influence persist?
- Have late Ottoman period reforms had any influence on military traditions?

7.3 The Development of Education. To a large extent, the lack of interest in military education was a feature of the lack of interest in education generally. Even in Western Europe, a very small proportion of young people attended university, and they mostly studied vocational subjects such as medicine, law and religion, as well, later, as engineering. Few such students wanted to join the military, and few militaries would have welcomed them, anyway. This began to change during the twentieth century with the introduction of longer periods of compulsory schooling, and a recognition of the advantages of university-level education, both ideas taken up enthusiastically by former colonies when they became independent. Progressively, staff colleges began to incorporate elements of higher education into their syllabuses, and the military as a whole began to demand that officers (and even NCOs) should have a good standard of general education. This was especially marked in the Soviet Union, where officer training at all levels included substantial education in political issues, and where military expertise as a whole was referred to as “Marxist-Leninist Military Science.” This tradition was exported to a number of countries supported by the Soviet bloc, or to those that sent trainees to the Soviet Union, including many in the Arab world.

7.4 Graduate Entry. This process led logically to a demand for more candidates for officer positions to have degrees already. By the middle of the twentieth century, it was already clear that technical officers (especially engineers) could only do their jobs if they had, or were given, degree-level qualifications. Some militaries opted for engineering colleges under military command, others demanded an engineering degree before considering prospective entrants. Air forces progressively moved to demand engineering qualifications for aspiring pilots, and even those who did not required pilots to follow advanced engineering training courses. Even in less technical areas, there is an increasing tendency worldwide to recruit graduates into the officer corps, or alternatively to combine basic officer training with academic training, in the form of a degree such as “Bachelor of Military Science.” Some countries today take high school graduates into an undergraduate program in a military university and graduate them as officers (lieutenants). Others take university graduates into a one-year program in a military academy and graduate them as officers. A
third way of inducting technical officers (engineers, doctors, nurses, accountants, and the like) is to have them undergo a relatively short course in one of the military schools, after which they are commissioned. Possible research questions include:

- What kind of induction systems does the country have for officers and NCOs?
- How are technical officers inducted? Do they receive the same induction training as line officers?
- Does the country have a military academy, a military university, or both to induct officers?
- Do the military services (army, navy, air force) have separate academies for induction?
- What percentage of entrants into the officer corps already have first degrees? Has this figure increased, or are there plans to increase it?
- Does the country have the practice of inducting university graduates directly into the NCO corps? How is this institutionalized? What rank are they given? What roles are they assigned to?
- Does the requirement for degrees only apply to technical officers or to all elements of the military?
- Does the military have in-service training establishments to degree level? If so, in what subjects? Do the establishments have a relationship with recognized civilian universities?
- What percentage of the officer corps received degree-level training abroad, and where?

### 7.5 Training Structure

The professional military education and training system needs to have a proper structure at different levels to manage it. At the headquarters level, you would expect to find a chief of staff for training, or an assistant chief of staff responsible for education and training (J/G-7), who will have a director of training reporting to him. Each military formation/unit will have dedicated staff to handle education and training, and it is the number one responsibility for a commander. All the training schools within the establishment and the training staffs will technically report to this directorate. It will usually develop and issue a training strategy/directive and monitor its implementation. Complementarity of the different education and training levels is also the responsibility of this directorate. In some countries, individual education and training is the responsibility of the human resources staff at headquarters, while collective training is tasked to the training staff.

### 7.6 Specialty Training

In most militaries, the different military services (army, navy, air force), and the branches within one service, will have their own schools, where they take care of the training requirements for officers and NCOs in the service or branch of service. So, armor officers and NCOs, for example, would go to an armor school to receive their training in armor courses, while air defense personnel will go to an air defense school, and so forth. Professional militaries will also have cross training, particularly for officers, whereby some from one service or branch go to courses in other branches to expose them and give them insights into the branch, as the different branches will ultimately have to fight together (combat, combat support, combat service support). Such training becomes
beneficial also when these officers go through higher level courses like the command and staff and war courses.

7.7 Leadership Training. Leadership education and training is a very important part of the qualification process for officers and NCOs. It is usually incorporated in the different level training courses and activities throughout their careers. However, some militaries will have dedicated schools or academies for teaching leadership, particularly for NCOs. Not all militaries focus on leadership skills for NCOs, but in most professional militaries, the NCOs will have an informal command structure called the “sergeant major apparatus,” whereby one NCO in a unit or a formation (the sergeant major) is the link between the commander and the enlisted personnel, and has specific tasks to perform. This makes leadership training for NCOs of paramount importance.

7.8 Higher Education. All militaries seek to identify officers capable of going on to higher command positions, usually at the level of captain/major or equivalent. At this point, after perhaps ten years or so of largely operational duties, a proportion will be selected for staff college training. As indicated above, such training increasingly includes academic subjects, sometimes taught by civilian academics. In turn, this reflects the military’s need to understand the much more complex world in which it now operates; and to know how to understand and work with diplomats, civil servants, and policemen from many countries, as well as international organizations and NGOs. Some militaries have gone so far as to introduce a master’s level degree in parallel to, or after, the military element of staff training. In other cases, military officers who have proved their intellectual capability may apply to do a master’s degree independently, either at a civilian university or at a service institution qualified to award degrees, with a syllabus tailored to military needs. Part-time distance learning courses are becoming increasingly common. Finally, many militaries have special training for the very few officers expected to occupy the highest positions in their service. Such courses often deal with national security strategy and politics at a very high level, and are taught in part by civilian academics. These courses are usually held at a war, or a national defense, college. The war course will mainly focus on strategy, and the operational art of war to qualify officers to deal with war campaigns and manage complex joint and combined operations (operational and strategic levels of war). In most cases, a war college course will have military officers but no civilians. A national defense course will usually be a mix of senior military officers, and civilian officials from different ministries, who will be earmarked to occupy policy level positions in their respective ministries. In most cases, it will also have foreign participants. The course is supposed to teach participants how to devise and implement national security strategy, in addition to several other subjects.

7.9. Not all capable officers, especially in the technical areas, will go on to staff training, particularly at higher levels. In many militaries, a certain number will be selected for more intensive specialist technical training, often at higher degree level, which will fit them, in turn, for specialist jobs in the future requiring deep technical expertise rather than the more general type of expertise gained from master’s degrees.
7.10 Benefits. In general, the military, and defense structures more generally, see three types of benefits in providing education, as well as technical military training.

- The complexity of modern military operations and the varied (and usually well-educated) range of people the military can expect to work with make widespread, graduate-level, intellectual training very important, if not actually essential.
- In an age when education is a continuing process, the military must be able to offer the same opportunities for such education as other employers with which it is competing.
- More specifically, since the military expect (and intend) a certain proportion of officers to leave before completing a full career, candidates are more likely to be attracted to the military in the first place if they know that they will receive recognized qualifications of use to them in a second career.

Possible research questions include:

- What proportion of officers have first degrees when they join? Is the requirement restricted to technical officers?
- Are there in-service first degree training institutions for officers? Is this training universal? What does it cover?
- Does the military have a joint command and staff college for all services? Do the services have their own command and staff colleges?
- Does the system require a postgraduate degree for officers to be promoted after a certain rank?
- Does a proportion of the officer corps study for a master’s degree? If so, in what subjects and under what arrangements?
- Generally, how important is it considered within the military that senior officers have received a solid intellectual training?
- Does the country have a war college, a national defense college, or both?
- Does the war/national defense college grant a master’s degree?
- Are civilians incorporated into the national defense program?

7.11 Regional and International Education. Finally, not all countries can provide appropriate education for their militaries, especially at higher levels, and not all wish to do so. There can be considerable problems in finding civilian academics with the necessary skills, and in external validation of courses taught at military institutions. Some smaller countries therefore have a history of sending selected officers abroad to study for higher degrees. Likewise, a number of donors organize master’s courses on a regional basis. Some of these courses will be full-time, while others will be part-time with an important distance learning component. In addition, donors may arrange short courses of a few weeks’ duration on more specialist subjects, often in countries undergoing political change. Possible research topics include:

- Is there a policy on sending officers and NCOs abroad for education and training?
• How is the training abroad organized in relation to national courses?
• Are there arrangements for some, or all, of the officers studying at different levels to do so abroad?
• Conversely, does the country invite officers from abroad to study at degree level?
• Do donors organize courses in the country or the region, and if so of what type?
Part Eight
Gender Issues

VIII. Until the twentieth century, women did not usually serve in the military. Under the pressure of two World Wars and widespread mobilization, and with the enormous increase in noncombatant roles brought about by technological advances, this began to change. From the 1930s, women began to join the military as a career in many Western countries, and were widely employed in the Second World War, but almost always in noncombat roles. During the Cold War, some countries also conscripted women into the military. Since the 1980s, and with United Nations calls for gender equality, there has been increasing pressure to open more roles to women and to promote them to higher rank. In some cases (for example, pilots), this has become accepted practice. More countries are introducing more women into their armed forces and allowing them to go into specializations that have been reserved for males. Some countries have institutionalized strategies for increased representation women in the military. Possible research topics include:

8.1 Laws and International Standards. Regarding legal frameworks, we know there is great variation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This is both in terms of legal restrictions to certain groups joining the armed forces and in terms of the positions they can occupy. A critical part of the comparative atlas CMRAS will be to capture these regional differences.

- Is discrimination within the armed forces legally prohibited? If so, on what grounds (gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and so on)? A useful starting point is to identify the extent to which there are antidiscrimination provisions in the law—for example, in the constitution or employment law. A follow-up consideration is whether there are any legal sanctions for noncompliance (for example, in the penal code or similar).
- Do national laws place any restrictions on the roles particular groups (for example, women or individuals from ethnic or religious minority backgrounds) can undertake within the armed forces? For example, in several countries across MENA, if not all, women are not legally permitted to serve in combat roles. In some countries, there may also be legal restrictions on the hours they are permitted to work. For example, in Algeria, women are prohibited from working during night hours, that is between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. although special exemptions can be made depending on the nature of the work and requirements of the job.
- Does the law prohibit discrimination in remuneration within the armed forces?
- Does the country have a National Action Plan (NAP)? This is a document outlining the actions that a government is currently taking to meet its obligations to the UN Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Resolutions. The presence or nonpresence of a NAP and what it contains will help us shed light on the country’s international obligations in relation to women in security institutions.
Finally, while most of these questions may lend themselves to focusing exclusively on women, researchers should also strive to gather data related to other marginalized groups in relation to the armed forces. For example, in some countries, individuals from certain ethnicities and religions may be prohibited from performing particular roles or accessing specific tiers of the military. Where possible, it would be beneficial to collect this information.

8.2 Institutional Policy and Procedures. Even among countries where there are legal restrictions to women or other marginalized groups serving in the armed forces, there is still value in gathering data related to diversity at the institutional level. Even militaries where women don’t serve should consider the impact of gender in their external operations and missions. Possible research topics include:

- Is the institution required to carry out a gender analysis in its operations?
- Does the institutional mission statement include a commitment to gender equality?
- Is there a clearly defined gender policy or action plan? If so, what does it include?
- Are sex-disaggregated data available on the composition of the armed forces?
- Does the code of conduct prohibit gender discrimination and sexual harassment?
- Is the institutional code of conduct adhered to in practice? Why?
- Are the armed forces required to report to the national policymaking arm for gender (for example, the ministry of women’s affairs or similar)?

8.3 Personnel. Personnel costs typically constitute the largest costs for the armed forces, and therefore its demographic composition is a critical area of study. This extends beyond simple recruitment, and should include questions related to career progression, development, remuneration, and retirement. Some possible questions:

- What is the demographic makeup of the armed forces (by gender, age, ethnicity, and so on)?
- What measures are in place to encourage and support female applicants to join the armed forces? What obstacles to recruitment exist?
- What sectors of the armed forces do women work in (land forces, navy, air force, and such)?
- What proportion of women serve in different ranks (officers, NCOs, privates, and the like)?
- Are there any differences in the recruitment criteria / process for men and women?
- Is there any unconscious bias training to counter potentially discriminatory attitudes in recruitment?
- Are men and women serving in the armed forces remunerated equally for equal positions?
- Are there any restrictions regarding the roles and assignments that (i) parents and (ii) married staff can undertake?
• Are women permitted to attain the highest-level positions (even if they are restricted to noncombat roles)?
• Do women and men have equal access to decisionmaking roles?
• Is data collected on staff turnover and retention (by gender and rank)?
• Is data collected on the promotion of staff (by gender)?
• Are there policies in place to allow staff to balance work and caring responsibilities?

8.4 Training and Institutional Culture. As with the question on legal restrictions, even militaries that place restrictions on women and other marginalized groups joining should be assessed on the extent to which gender is addressed in their training. Possible research topics include:

• Is any training on gender issues provided in the armed forces? If so, what does it cover?
  o Applicable codes of conduct
  o Equal opportunities
  o Sexual harassment and discrimination
  o Protection of civilians
  o Prevention of violence against women and girls
  o Protection of the rights and needs of women
  o UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1320 and 1820
  o Participation of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures
  o HIV/AIDS

• Are there proportionate numbers of men and women instructors delivering military training?
• Are military academies equally open to both men and women? Are there specific training programs for women?
• Is there a gender adviser or gender advisory body attached to the military?
• Is there a commitment to gender equality at the highest level within the armed forces?
• Are gender discriminatory attitudes and behaviors common within the institution?
• Is there an understanding among staff at all levels of why it is important to address gender issues?
• If there is a gender policy, are staff trained in this?

8.5 Infrastructure and Equipment. Where there are women serving in the armed forces, consideration needs to be made to ensure that infrastructure and equipment is suitable for and appropriate to their needs. Some possible questions:

• Are there appropriate uniforms for women personnel (including pregnant women)? Were women consulted in the design of the uniforms?
• Are there separate and secure sanitation areas for men and women in all the institution’s facilities?
• What provisions are made for women’s sanitary and toilet requirements on operations?
• Is there appropriate and secure accommodation for women in all training establishments?
• Is all equipment needed by personnel appropriate to the jobs they are expected to perform? This can include things like vehicle seat adjustability in armored vehicles.

8.6 Public Perceptions. Public perceptions of women serving in the armed forces is an important measure of social norms. These may help or hinder women’s ability to join and serve in the armed forces. Equally, perceptions of the military among staff, both among women but also among men, will shed light on any barriers or enablers to women serving in the armed forces.

• To what extent is the military perceived as a good employer?
• How do perceptions of the military differ between men and women?
• How is the role of women in the military perceived in society?
• Are there specific organizations within the country seeking to promote the rights and status of women working in the defense sector?
IX. It was noted earlier that the principal task of the military is to support government policies with the threat or the use of force. However, the military also plays a symbolic, and sometimes a practical, role in relations between states, and between a state and regional and international organizations. This section gives some examples of how this happens.

9.1 The Military as a Symbol. The very existence of a national military is a statement that the country will defend its borders and territorial integrity, and has the capacity and will to support its foreign and domestic policies with the use of force. The profile of the military, its doctrine, equipment, training, and deployments are all political statements, addressed to its neighbors and the wider international community. ( Needless to say, these statements can sometimes be wrongly interpreted.) A large nation with a large army will inevitably have a certain profile in its region, independent of the nature and policies of its government, since intentions can change much faster than capabilities. This can be a problem after political change, when a government might be trying to cultivate a new and more cooperative image. Likewise, such issues as conscription, new equipment programs, or participation in international missions have a political symbolism that cannot be avoided. Put simply, everything a country does with or to its military is of interest to others. Intelligent governments therefore try to use the military as a force multiplier for their foreign policies. Possible research topics include:

- How are the country’s military forces perceived in the region? Has this changed, or is the government seeking to change it?
- Has the government taken any recent initiatives with the size or capabilities of the military? If so, has this provoked any reaction with its neighbors?
- How is the country’s military perceived by international and regional organizations?

9.2 Neighbors. There are few areas of the world where states are all of equal size and their militaries are of equal capability. Imbalances of power are normal, and the question is whether this matters. Defense relations between neighbors, even friendly ones, can be very complex. A large conscript military may be perceived as less effective than a smaller professional one. Conversely, a large military may train and assist the militaries of its neighbors, who may have few other options anyway. A small nation may deliberately cultivate military links with a major power, to avoid becoming too dependent on its neighbor, or seek to play large neighbors or major powers off each other. This kind of use of the military is an important way of preserving and increasing the political independence of the state. Possible research topics include:

- What is the nature of the country’s military and defense links with its neighbors and with major powers?
- Does it have a clearly dominant or subordinate position?
• How is the nation’s military perceived compared to those of its neighbors?
• Does the country have a history of deploying military assistance missions to its neighbors?
• Has the country contributed to the establishment of armed forces in countries in the region?
• Does the country have military advisers from neighboring or major states?

9.3 Building Relationships. There are a number of ways in which the military can be used positively, to build relationships with neighbors and others. It is common for officer schools at all levels to invite students from other countries, and for militaries to send their own students abroad for training. Some countries also seek to become regional centers for one or another type of military training. Instructors are sometimes invited from abroad, and in turn the country’s own officers may be sent abroad to teach. Such initiatives are usually carefully considered politically, and form an important part of a country’s military relations strategy. Countries may take part in joint planning or joint exercises where they have a common security interest, and, beyond the practical operational advantages that result from working together, there are also political benefits to their bilateral relations. Similarly, ship visits, unit exchanges, or a presence at your neighbor’s national airshow are gestures of trust and good for building relationships. Allowing a warship from another nation into your territorial waters, for example, is a gesture of confidence with important political implications. Conversely, the cancellation of such a visit is also an important political message. Possible research topics include:

• Do military schools invite foreign students (officers and NCOs), and if so how many and from where? Is this the result of deliberate priorities, and are these priorities changing?
• Does the country send its officers/NCOs overseas for training? If so, how many and where to? Have there been changes in the countries chosen for training, or are there changes in prospect?
• Are there recent examples of joint/combined training and exercises, or reciprocal visits by military units? If so, which other countries are involved? How do these activities relate to the wider political relationships with the countries concerned?

9.4 Defense Attachés. It is normal for countries to send military officers abroad, to be accredited to foreign governments and with diplomatic status. A small country may have relatively few attachés, a larger country will have more, but the positioning, the number and the seniority of the personnel are important political statements. The actual functions carried out by attachés vary greatly, according to the political relationships between the two countries. At one extreme, an attaché in a friendly country may be fully involved in arranging visits, reciprocal training, and joint/combined exercises. At the other extreme, an attaché may be an intelligence officer, working against the interests of the host government. Possible research topics include:

• How many defense attachés does the country have accredited, and where? Has this pattern changed, or does it look like changing?
• How many foreign defense attachés are accredited to the country?
• Is there a clear strategy behind the choice of personnel for the jobs and the choice of countries?
• How are defense attachés from other countries viewed? How are they treated (for example, ease of access, controls on movement if any)?
• Are there specific or regular activities organized for the defense attaché community?

9.5 Wider International Considerations. In defense, as in all other areas, countries have to choose which profile to adopt, both in terms of their region and in terms of the international system as a whole. Some nations may choose to emphasize the purely domestic role of the military or its role in border protection. At the other extreme, some countries see international deployments and participation in peace missions as an important part of their foreign policy, and are prepared to invest in the necessary training and equipment. A willingness and capability to deploy overseas gives even a small nation influence in regional security questions and in international organizations such as the UN. Quality is probably more important than quantity here: a nation with small but capable forces, and with experience of successful overseas deployments, will have more influence internationally, as well as bilaterally with major powers, than a state with larger but less capable forces and no experience of international deployments. Likewise, nations with experience and capability are likely to be more influential in international missions and to have a greater share of key command appointments. Possible research topics include:

• In general terms, what kind of military profile does the country present to the region and the wider international community?
• Does the country have experience of international missions, including peace support missions? Has this experience been negative or positive, and how is it seen within the country?
• Do the armed forces contribute to peace support operations as one of their basic missions? If so, are they suitably trained and equipped?
• How are the technical and operational capabilities of the country’s military seen by its neighbors and the wider international community?

9.6 Defense Cooperation Programs. Defense relations between countries may result in programs that include certain activities conducted to strengthen cooperation and the ability to work together. In some cases, a program will have a clear annual implementation plan with specified activities to be implemented in each country. Possible research topics include:

• Are defense relations on a par with political ones?
• Does the country have any clear cooperation programs with neighboring countries?
• How many countries does the country have cooperation programs with?
• What kind of activities do cooperation programs with neighboring countries or major states include?
9.7 Defense Industry and Defense Relations. Some countries in the region have historically been keen on developing their own defense industry, and others have recently pursued such capabilities to cater for part of their defense requirements and promote their industry in other countries. Defense contracts are not common among countries of the region, however, if and when they happen, they can contribute in strengthening defense relations with neighboring countries, particularly when major defense contracts are awarded. Possible research topics include:

- Does the country possess its own defense industry, or a nucleus for it?
- What kind of organizational structure does the country have for its defense industry, and what is its relationship with the armed forces?
- What kind of major defense products does the country produce?
- Are there any defense contracts with neighboring countries?
Sources

X. Some guidance has already been provided on sources in the various sections above. The following list summarizes the most important kinds of sources and gives some indication of importance and priority, bearing in mind that this will vary somewhat between countries. The quality and timeliness of official documents can vary greatly between countries, and conventions and practices may well be different. Two countries may present information about their defense budgets in quite separate ways, for example, while an international organization may provide estimated figures in a different format, using a different price base, or making inferences about missing data.

In the case of official documents, it is important to check for differences between languages. In some countries there may be several official languages (such as French and Arabic), and documents in one may not entirely reflect what is in the other, or may have been produced at different times. Likewise, statements for international consumption (especially in English) may not completely represent the situation as presented domestically, in Arabic. It is not unknown for donor-funded publications (codes of conduct, for example) to appear only in the donor’s own language. In the case of statistics, great care should be taken that they are comparable. Such mundane questions as the rate of exchange of currencies, or assumptions about inflation, can substantially affect the conclusions.

10.1 National Legal and Constitutional Sources

- The constitution, laws on individual services, laws on the organization of the wider security sector.
- Laws on public order, emergency legislation, laws on military cooperation with other parts of the security sector.
- Subsidiary legislation and orders made by the government.
- Code of military law.
- Detailed regulations, like for recruitment or promotion.

10.2 Other Legal Sources

- Treaties, memoranda of understanding, or cooperation agreements with other countries.
- Regional treaties and conventions (such as the African Union) and bilateral or multilateral declarations.
- International treaties signed by the state and affecting the military.
- Customary international law.

10.3 Official Policy Sources.
10.4 Unofficial Secondary Sources.

- Interviews and informal speeches by government figures.
- Publications or interviews by retired politicians or diplomats.
- Memoirs of retired military officers.
- Reputable works of political and military history.
- Research interviews, especially with retired officers.
- Interviews with former defense attachés.
- Reputable media and NGO sources.
- Public statements by other governments where there is a defense relationship.
- Reports by the parliaments of major nations, including donors.
- Reports by the UN and other international bodies, and statistics published under various treaties and international agreements (for example, membership of the WTO).
- Reports in foreign and international media of military exchanges, joint exercises, and more.