Turbulent Peace

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The Challenges of Managing International Conflict

Edited by Chester A. Crocker,
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall

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Contents

Leadership and Human Agency

Foreword

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IN 1996, THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE published *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. The book's editors, Chester A. Crocker, (chairman of the Institute's board of directors), Fen Osler Hampson (a former Institute fellow), and Pamela Aall (then deputy director of the Institute's Education and Training program), sought to distill into a single volume some of the most insightful and instructive analysis of international conflict and its prevention, management, and resolution in the first years after the end of the Cold War. They succeeded admirably. Former secretary of state George Shultz commented that "the sweep, insight, and ideas presented in *[Managing Global Chaos]* make for genuinely rewarding reading." *Foreign Affairs* observed that the volume "represents the collective wisdom of a high-powered group of foreign policy practitioners and scholars." Readers agreed. The book sold remarkably well, especially to colleges and universities.

Now, five years later and a decade into the post–Cold War era, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall have taken a fresh look at the state of international conflict and its management. In *Turbulent Peace*, they have brought together nearly fifty top-flight scholars and practitioners and arranged their work to form a comprehensive, multifaceted assessment of the contemporary world and new perspectives on ways of preventing, containing, and resolving its conflicts. I am confident that readers of this new compendium will be impressed by the results of the editors' industry in updating their previous work. That said, some readers may question whether a sequel to the 1996 volume was really necessary. After all, only a handful of years have passed since the publication of *Managing Global Chaos*. How much could have changed?

"A week is a long time in politics," British prime minister Harold Wilson once remarked. In much the same vein, we may say that in the fields of international relations and conflict resolution, five years can bracket the transition

to a different era. Back in 1996, when *Managing Global Chaos* first appeared, we were more or less content to describe ourselves as living in "the post–Cold War world." It was evident, of course, that the world was no longer orchestrated according to the logic of the superpower standoff, but still we tended to contrast events in the mid-1990s with the relative stability that had prevailed until the Eastern bloc disintegrated at the end of the preceding decade. Hence our perception of the world of the mid-1990s was one of relatively unstructured conflict, or "chaos."

I would not say now that our perception was wrong. With one Cold War protagonist (the Soviet Union) having disappeared, the other (the United States) uncertain how to behave, several other actors (the European Union and China, for instance) edging their way toward center stage, and with numerous ethnic and religious conflicts or humanitarian crises born of failing states occupying the attention of policymakers in the world's major capitals, the era seemed truly chaotic.

Five years later, however, much has changed. If we have yet to find the right name with which to dub our age, we are profoundly uncomfortable referring to it merely as the postscript to a former era. "Post–Cold War world" no longer suffices. We know that we are in a new time and to some degree in unfamiliar territory.

Many features of today's international landscape would have been recognizable to earlier generations: violence and instability in the Great Lakes region of Africa; fighting in Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani forces; clashes between Israelis and Palestinians; China rattling its saber at Taiwan; the United States talking of putting up its own nuclear umbrella. Yet these enduring conflicts now coexist with other features that only *seem* to have been around for decades: Russia struggling to adapt to democracy and capitalism; NATO looking for a mission; Europe searching for the political will and military wherewithal to deal with

its own conflicts; the United Nations—indeed, the entire international community—wrestling *continually* with the contending principles of respect for national sovereignty and protection of human rights; and everyone trying to keep up with the information revolution and a globalizing economy.

Moreover, these post–Cold War phenomena have now been with us long enough that we have begun to plot their development and to discern patterns within them. We have, as it were, new historical reference points. We can now draw interesting comparisons with events as recent as 1995, as well as with those of 1985 and 1975.

Turbulent Peace presents ample proof of the ability to recognize trends in phenomena of quite recent vintage. Take, for example, the high incidence of intrastate conflict, which has been perhaps the most conspicuous feature and undoubtedly the most disheartening aspect of the recent international landscape. One author argues forcefully, however, that the skyrocketing course of intrastate conflict in the 1990s may now have not only slowed but reversed. Another sea-change, widely acknowledged, is that whereas the early 1990s witnessed an overly optimistic embrace of the possibilities of a "new world order," the years immediately thereafter saw an overly pessimistic retreat from the dangers of military intervention in failed and fractured states, a wariness that has since diminished to the extent that several new and sizable missions have been launched.

The past five years have added significantly to the rich if not always rewarding history of post–Cold War peace enforcement interventions: cases such as Kosovo, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been added to the roster of earlier ventures in places such as Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, and Bosnia (the full list now runs to more than forty). Thus the contributors to this volume can draw on a wealth of recent case material—a situation that does not necessarily lead to consensus, for although the contributors may cite the same

cases, they have very different assessments of the wisdom of these recent operations and very different conceptions of what circumstances, if any, justify intervention.

Our authors address many issues other than intervention, of course. For instance, proponents of reconciliation and promotion of the rule of law have watched truth commissions in South Africa and Guatemala complete their work. They have witnessed the creation (on paper) of a permanent international criminal court to deal with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. And they have seen General Pinochet and President Milosevic discover that those accused of human rights abuses are not always beyond the reach of justice, either at home or abroad.

In short, as the chapters in this volume attest, we have entered a new (albeit still evolving and nameless) era, and no one who wishes to understand the character of our times can afford to ignore the kind of analyses offered in *Turbulent Peace*. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall have assembled a truly impressive cast of writers. Eminent and influential figures from both the scholarly and the policymaking communities here present authoritative, often provocative, assessments of the fluid global scene. The coverage is extensive, the opinions varied. One need only look at, say, the chapters that make up part II, "Intervention Strategies and Their Consequences," to see the diversity of views and the dynamism of the debate.

Students of contemporary international relations and their professors will find *Turbulent Peace* indispensable. This one volume captures the state of the art in international conflict management. Each of the main schools of thought is represented, each of today's most pressing issues is addressed. Taken individually, the chapters offer penetrating, often passionate, analyses of specific sources of or solutions to violent conflict. Taken together, they form a comprehensive, well-balanced survey of the many causes of war and the many options for its prevention, management, or resolution.

By bringing the best in contemporary thinking on international conflict management to the attention not only of professional analysts, diplomats, and policymakers but also of students, scholars, and indeed all citizens interested in securing a more peaceful world, *Turbulent Peace* reflects and advances the fundamental mission of the United States Institute of Peace. Since its establishment in 1984, the Institute has supported research on an extensive range of subjects pertinent to international relations and conflict management, and has disseminated the fruits of that research to a remarkably wide range of audiences. In reaching out to varied groups, we do our best to present information in a form that meets the needs of both students and practitioners. For instance, in the field of education, the Institute disseminates resources that include teaching texts, collections of cases of peacemaking (see, for instance, *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*), and in-depth analyses of critical conflicts and issues, such as Ted Robert Gurr's *Peoples versus States*, John Paul Lederach's *Building Peace*, and Raymond Cohen's *Negotiating across Cultures*. The Institute also works directly with faculty both in the United States and abroad to improve teaching in the field of conflict analysis and management. We have been pleased to see the enthusiastic reception accorded *Managing Global Chaos* in colleges and universities throughout the United States and abroad. We trust that *Turbulent Peace* will likewise prove a valuable resource for educators and students.

Perhaps one of those students will finally coin an appropriate name for this new era, a time that has clearly outgrown the moniker "post–Cold War world." Or perhaps a scholar or policymaker will hit upon a suitable phrase. And maybe my insightful and productive colleagues Crocker, Hampson, and Aall have already found the right answer in "turbulent peace."

Acknowledgments

at the end of the Cold War was the inspiration for the first volume and we hope that this second volume provides some answers but also broadens and deepens your search. We are now beginning to understand the landscape and landmarks of peacemaking. This book can suggest their dimensions and define some obstacles, but the task of charting a reliable and appropriate path to peace is still a challenge for all of us.

Introduction

Chester A. Crocker,
Fen Osler Hampson,
and Pamela Aall

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, established by Congress in 1984, came into being just as the Cold War began to wane. By the early 1990s, the foundations of the former Soviet Union had cracked, shuddered, and finally collapsed with a rapidity that stunned experts and casual observers alike. The battle of the Titans—the organizing principle for international relations in the second half of the twentieth century—was over and the world anticipated an era of peace. Little thought was given to what peace entailed except that it meant the end of the perpetual state of tension and of the underlying threat of nuclear annihilation. With the end of the Cold War eastern European states would make peaceful transitions to democracy, African and Latin American states—freed from the demands of the ideological war between the two superpowers—would move ahead with peaceful economic development, and Asian countries would continue to ride the economic wave of the 1980s to a peaceful prosperity.

Within a few years, conflicts erupted in the Balkans, Nagarno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zaire, Liberia, and Haiti. Ethnic tensions intensified in other parts of Central Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Fighting continued in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, El Salvador, and Guatemala. It became clear that peace had not broken out; instead, the very nature of conflict had changed. Conflicts became internal, setting neighbor against neighbor, ethnic group against ethnic group, religion against religion. Breaking all accepted rules of war, these conflicts targeted civilians and slaughtered noncombatants—men, women, and children—just because they belonged to the wrong group. As focused as these conflicts were on their internal quarrels, they also spread like wildfire, threatening to produce regional conflagrations out of local ones. And sometimes it seemed that they were adopting one of the most pernicious characteristics of wildfire: spreading unseen underground only to ignite in another part of the forest.

xv

In this transformed world, the work of the Institute is increasingly wide ranging. Through its multidisciplinary and practical approach, the Institute seeks to understand the complex causes of present-day conflict and has focused on all aspects of the response to conflict—research and analysis; policy development and implementation; mediation, facilitation, and dialogue; peacekeeping and peace enforcement; rule of law and transitional justice; education; practitioner training; and the challenges of reconciliation. Taking seriously its mandate as an educational organization, the Institute has also looked for ways to present this understanding to the next generation of policymakers and practitioners and to the scholars who are teaching them in colleges and universities across the country. In 1996 we gathered the fruits of ten years' experience in analyzing conflict and designing strategies for its prevention and containment into one volume entitled *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict.* Our objective was to present much of the best thinking on our past experience and current options and to give shape to the field of conflict analysis and management—its new dynamics, security challenges, and actors.

Although many things have changed since we assembled the first edition, we considered retaining the title *Managing Global Chaos* for this new volume. The notion of chaos has not lost its power or relevance, bearing in mind the particular sense in which we use the term. In using "chaos," we are drawing by analogy on chaos theory in the natural and mathematical sciences. In this sense, chaos refers to the potential of even seemingly minor, distant events to have unpredictable and potentially dramatic effects on the security and stability of other places in a world that is both ever more tightly interconnected and, ironically, ever more differentiated and decentralized in its political, social, and economic structures. We do not argue that the world is already chaotic or doomed to descend into anarchy, as some observers claim.[1] Still less do we posit that cultural clashes,

irrational responses to globalization pressures, and the absence of structured underpinnings that make behavior comprehensible are causing new levels of vicious brutality in global conflict.[2] In fact, as Ted Robert Gurr's chapter in this volume argues, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic because both the frequency and the intensity of ethnic and intercommunal conflict declined during the past decade.[3] Another positive sign is that a significant number of the conflicts that did occur were settled through negotiation. It is too early to proclaim the easing of intergroup conflict and movement toward political settlement as trends. Nor do these happenings provide grounds for complacency, given the fragile nature of many of the negotiated settlements that were reached and the obvious potential for brewing discontent in some neighborhoods to erupt into violent conflict. It is for this reason that we have chosen to give this volume the new title of *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict,* a title we hope captures the changing circumstances of the world in which we live.

Vulnerability and sensitivity to political and security shock effects can be a function of this very diversity and lack of centralized authority structures. In the Middle East, for example, the unsettled nature of the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis, punctuated as it has been by the recurring eruption of violence, has consequences that go well beyond the region and the immediate interests of the parties to the conflict. One need look no further than the impact of the fortunes of the peace process on the price of energy and the pocketbooks of consumers in oil-importing nations to appreciate the considerable vulnerabilities that are involved when a peace process in a critical region of the world goes sour. Likewise, domestic and secessionist violence brought on by the collapse of authoritarian governments in Asia, such as Suharto's regime in Indonesia, contributed significantly to the growing instability of global capital markets and a rapid loss of investor confidence in what came to be known

as the "Asian crisis." Civil unrest in countries as near as Guatemala and Mexico and as far away as Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa prompted massive flights of refugees not just into neighboring countries but around the globe. And the United States has come to understand what many other countries have known for some time: the enormous risks and dangers that are posed by terrorist attacks on their military personnel, on their diplomats, and even at home as aggrieved groups and the criminal organizations they give rise to take out their frustrations on us.

Certain patterns of events—for instance, "failed" or "failing" states, warlord predation, and secessionism—also produce a pattern of responses, giving rise, in turn, to changed patterns of violence and conflict. Similarly, the success or failure of response mechanisms operating in the name of an amorphous "international community" can have decisive "feedback" effects—positive or negative—in regions beyond the locus of an immediate conflict scenario. As the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s reveal all too vividly, no region—in this case Western Europe—is immune to unrest along its borders, and "foreign wars" may be just hours away by air or road. Some regions and subregions may approach chaotic conditions right under the noses of others that are thriving in the newly liberalized global system, freed from the burdens of bipolar, East-West confrontation. The "chaos" phenomenon in security and conflict studies closely parallels the more widely recognized economic and political repercussions of globalization under the integrative influence of the new technologies combined with uneven local and regional capabilities to adapt to resulting change.

The sovereignty of individual states and the respect for the sanctity of state borders that characterized the fundamental nature of interstate relations over the past 350 years are also being eroded or, at the very least, redefined.[4] States are challenged from within as subnational groups declare their separate identities

and seek separate recognition. It is increasingly evident that this phenomenon is not confined to the "new" states of the developing world, but also affects some very old states in Europe and Asia. States are also challenged from the outside by supranational, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental bodies that have asserted the right to intervene—by force if necessary—in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in order to defend individuals from mass violence or to protect them from gross violations of human rights.[5] The extraneous and seemingly uncontrollable forces brought about by rapid technological innovation and change also challenge the authority of states in other ways. The "traditional" media—radio and television—also affect conflict processes and pressures for intervention through the so-called CNN effect.[6] But so too do new communications technologies. It is a cliché to say that the Internet has suddenly made us all—at least those of us who have access to computers—citizens of a global cyber-village where information and chat rooms are accessed at the mere click of a finger. The velocity of information flows, financial transactions, international investment, and even environmental change is not only changing our perceptions of how we see ourselves as citizens and how we relate to our own governments. It is also affecting the legitimacy of governments and the capacities and prospects of some states to thrive or even to survive. The point here is not to argue whether the change in national sovereignty is a good or bad thing, but to recognize that the diffusion of power throughout the international system has added whole new layers of complexity to efforts to maintain international order.

This diffusion of power in all of its varied meanings makes it all the more important that we take a multifaceted and multidimensional approach to conflict analysis and conflict management. This approach needs to recognize that states no longer have the legitimacy and the monopoly on power and the use of force

that they once enjoyed and that as some states break apart or are wracked by internal conflict the unsettling consequences and shock waves can spill across borders, infect the surrounding region, and even reverberate into the international system.

One of the challenges for both students and practitioners of international conflict management is to make intellectual sense out of all of this chaos and complexity and to understand that there are real alternatives and a wide range of potential response strategies to different conflict situations.[7] To point out that the world and its conflicts are complex is not very helpful if we stop there. The task of the policy analyst, wherever he or she sits—in the classroom, in the State Department, in the United Nations, or in the office of a nongovernmental organization in some war-torn society—is to understand what drives and sustains these seemingly intractable conflicts so that interventions aimed at helping the parties resolve these conflicts or assisting the victims do not make the situation worse or further exacerbate tensions.

The levels-of-analysis approach, developed in Jack Levy's opening chapter to this volume, offers a useful framework that gives some insight into the "causes" or "vectors" that influence conflict processes and contribute to the escalation of violence. In practical terms, no serious scholar or professional authority argues for a "single-factor" explanation of conflict and war. Leading scholars on war causation—from Geoffrey Blainey, Raymond Aron, and Bernard Brodie[8] to Michael Howard, whose classic essay is included in this volume—argue against single-factor analyses, which have never been useful in explaining war events except in terms of circular or tautological arguments (e.g., wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them). Still less are they useful today when political leaders in war-torn societies have become ever more entrepreneurial and creative in describing their struggles in terms that will "sell," shading the rhetoric to the market if need be. And just as there is no single cause of conflict,

there is no single solution. Understanding complexity and the dynamics of the various levels is as important to the analysis of conflict resolution as it is to the analysis of conflict.

A CHANGING LANDSCAPE

In this present volume, although we continue to use a multidimensional chaos paradigm, we do so within a geopolitical landscape that has changed markedly since the mid-1990s. Specifically, we are speaking here of five emerging dynamics that characterize the setting for conflict analysis and management in the current period and run through the different sections of this book.

The first of these is the return of geopolitics, those endemic and hegemonic conflict patterns between states that have long characterized the international system, together with rising concerns about how such contests will be conducted in today's technological environment. For much of the first post–Cold War decade, analysts focused, and not without reason, on ethnic and internal wars that have formed the overwhelming majority of contemporary conflicts. Like a pendulum, this focus may occasionally have gone too far, to the extent of obscuring the vital linkage between internal wars and the regional "bad neighborhoods" in which they occur and which often constitute the leading triggers of the conflict's outbreak or provide a lethal milieu for its spread. The concentrated focus on internal conflict may also have distracted us from appreciating the continued salience in certain regions of endemic, interstate rivalry or hostility based on the sorts of factors (concern for regional primacy, changing power relations, security dilemmas, regime legitimacy contests, the absence of universally accepted regional or subregional "rules of the game") that scholars have long recognized as conflict spurs or accelerants.

When combined with the recent attention in the scholarly and policy communities to

so-called rogue actors and the reality of continued, if not accelerated, diffusion of sensitive weapons technologies to unstable regions, the return of geopolitics points to a legitimate global concern for dampening regional interstate confrontations. Similarly, it points to the value of enhancing efforts to erect confidence- and security-building measures and antiproliferation regimes ranging from small arms to nuclear weapons. The return to open warfare and overt nuclear testing in South Asia is only the most dramatic illustration of this concern. In 1998–2000, the Horn of Africa witnessed the largest-scale and costliest conventional interstate warfare on the African continent since World Wars I and II, as the Eritreans and Ethiopians engaged in a seemingly pointless test of wills over an impoverished and barren landscape where the border was never demarcated. In the Taiwan Straits, the struggle for legitimacy and to decide who will set the terms for the ultimate reunification of China has produced open threats of the use of force on one side and of unilateral secession on the other. Accordingly, this new edition of the volume includes expanded coverage of the sources of and responses to regional conflicts that pertain to this pattern.[9]

The second emerging issue that we have chosen to highlight in the volume is that one-dimensional debates about interventionism and isolationism miss a much richer reality of challenges and trade-offs in conflict management revolving around questions of sociopolitical context, timing, sequencing, and grasping the stages and cycles in the life of a conflict. All too often, we believe, the intervention debate has been handled as if the only real issue is military intervention, as distinguished from other types of third-party-assisted processes by a range of external actors. Worse, within the ambit of the military intervention field, the debate has been framed as if the issue is simply a "yes or no" matter and, within that, an up or down vote on support for UN peacekeeping. This sort of framing of the question trivializes

the real issues of public policy choice. In this volume, we have insisted on a broader look at the concept of intervention, touching on issues of feasibility and strategic management; the concept of mediatory peacemaking as a strategic enterprise; ethical imperatives; the impartiality dilemma; the specific types of peacekeeping that have worked and those that have not; the phasing of intervention; the range of external, third-party, roles (official and nonofficial) in conflict management; and the problems associated with intervention that freezes or prolongs conflicts rather than actually managing or resolving them.[10]

Of particular importance in looking at this complex equation is the effort to pull together from case studies the lessons learned from post–Cold War experience. The purpose is to make a start in identifying certain principles and concepts that can lead to doctrines of best practice in third-party interventions (1) by different sets of actors, (2) by using different instruments and techniques, (3) in distinct types of societies, and (4) at various points in the conflict life cycle. Once again, the value of tackling the conflict management agenda in this way is that it links theory directly to practical application. In practice, the question most likely to arise is not, "Which kind of intervention works better, NGO-led track-two initiatives to open a channel between the sides or a big-power effort to summon the parties to a Camp David summit?" Rather, the question will likely be, "How do we know when the first option is needed or when only the second has hope of success?"

A third emerging theme this volume treats is the continuing and still unresolved dialogue among scholars and practitioners about the interaction between conflict management, on the one hand, and democratization, the rule of law, civil-society institution building, and other elements of what can broadly be called governance (or nation building), on the other hand.[11] Negotiated political transitions (e.g., from communist dictatorship, from apartheid, from

oppressive military or one-man rule) place a sharp focus on the significance of these issues since they impose on peacemakers and warring parties alike a seemingly stark choice between priorities (reconciliation, power sharing, justice, accountability to local or international authorities, adherence to democratic norms and universal legal principles, the quest for peace and stability). Given the predominant role of Western governments and publics and Western-oriented intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in the peacemaking field —and the reality that most violent conflicts occur in or between transitional or developing societies—the potential clash of values and priorities is further underscored. Western diplomats and activists naturally bring with them certain expectations about democratic practices and human rights standards. The idea that peace can and should be imposed by outsiders is itself derived from this set of Western-derived assumptions and priorities.

Increasingly, the scholar and the practitioner are beginning to ask awkward but essential questions about the proper sequence and priorities to be adopted in addressing these questions. Must basic governance questions be resolved and fundamental political or social change occur before there can be stability and peace? Or is the greatest source of contemporary chaos and political turbulence the weakening of state institutions and capabilities and their replacement by rival and even less legitimate power sources? If the former thesis is correct, then peacemaking and conflict management should consciously be placed on the back burner until political conditions ripen not for negotiated settlements but for legitimate governance, which will bring in its wake a just order. If the latter hypothesis is true, then the first order of business is for the international community to lend support to the strengthening of the sovereign and legitimate capacity of states in deeply troubled societies. Under this approach, it is democratic norms and Western sensibilities that must be placed on the back

burner in the interests of reestablishing political order and arresting unguided turbulence by keeping an external hand on the levers of power until local authorities can reassert themselves. We have not attempted to resolve this debate —a modern version of age-old debates in political theory—but rather try to reflect it fairly in the context of conflict management theory and practice.[12]

The fourth emerging theme is the need for more explicit recognition—by practitioners and scholars alike—that there is much truth to the nostrum "it depends" when analyzing conflict sources and appropriate remedies. The simple fact is that societies and polities differ dramatically in their capacity to cope with external or internal shocks and pressures. A typology of societies and conflicts could advance thinking in the academic and policy communities about what works, when and where. What triggers the outbreak of an uncontrollable conventional warfare in one context could inspire the launch of a fast and effective special mission by the European Union or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in another setting. Some regions are replete with security-related institutions and mechanisms adept at forestalling, preempting, and channeling conflicts before they turn violent. These security-surplus or security-exporting regions—sadly too few in number—stand in marked contrast to security-deficit regions where supplies of tinder and matches far outweigh the stock of fire extinguishers.

We believe it is becoming essential in the conflict management field to speak candidly about these distinctions. Erudite discourse on the limits of UN peacekeeping or the promise of nongovernmental initiatives for postconflict peacebuilding needs to be situated within typologies of conflict settings. To illustrate, peace initiatives that have borne fruit in Northern Ireland and South Africa would not likely gain the same traction in societies such as Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, where the vital infrastructure of civil society remains far less

xxi

developed and institutionalized. Remedies depending on the presence and conduct of stable, coherent actors make sense in places where such actors are the key decision makers.[13] Those remedies can lead, however, to illusions and wishful thinking when, literally, there is no one in charge. To take another example, in assessing the context for the insertion of peacekeepers, the policymaker needs the benefit of a plain-spoken analysis about the intentions and capabilities of local actors and, as Doyle suggests in his chapter, to weigh this judgment against the likely capacity of the outside force to cope over the lifetime of the intervention.

These four themes—the return of geopolitics, the debate on intervention, the push and pull between conflict management and post-conflict governance issues, and the recognition that different societies require different peace-making strategies—run through this volume.[14] Their presence testifies to the fact that we are only just beginning to understand how to reach peace. Some peacemaking efforts over the past dozen years have been successful: Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and even the seemingly intractable conflict in Northern Ireland, which yielded at last to the persistent mediation by three distinguished outsiders—former U.S. senator George Mitchell, former Finnish prime minister Harri Holkeri, and General John de Chastelain of Canada. Some efforts, however, have not met with the same success. Conflict reignited yet again in Angola despite the agreements that had been reached at Lusaka, despite UN engagement, and despite strong U.S. support for the UN mediator. The U.S. effort to broker peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the last days of the Clinton administration was badly derailed by the outbreak of violence in the region. And some efforts—involving the same region, the same players, and the same mediators using the same techniques—have produced very different results. In the Balkans, for instance, U.S. assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke, with the aid of NATO, used coercive peacemaking

to strong-arm the Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims into agreement. The same coercive approach failed, however, during the Serb-Kosovar Albanian negotiations in Rambouillet and as a result brought NATO into direct armed conflict with the Serbs. In general, the record over the past decade points to a highly mixed track record, with most cases falling somewhere in between pure success and downright failure.

With the passage of time, assessments of the record of international interventions become more, not less, problematic. For example, the lessons of Cambodia are more difficult to read than we initially thought. Did the collapse of the power-sharing arrangement between Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranarridh mean that democratic elections after conflict produce at best an unstable result, prey to renewed conflict? Or did the decision to include the Khmer Rouge in this early government leave gaping wounds that prohibited reconciliation? Or were these all necessary steps toward a sustainable peace—steps in a long, slow process requiring patience, persistence, and open-ended commitment by all concerned? Did the international community do too much or too little to make peace endure in Cambodia? Can outsiders help to bring peace at all, and if so, how can they help?

This brings us to our fifth overarching theme. Over the past decade, we have learned a great deal about the complications of reaching a negotiated agreement and of creating from that negotiated settlement a sustainable peace.[15] We have learned about the fragility of agreements, the difficulties in coordinating an international response, the challenges of implementation, the influence of spoilers, the unpredictable results that elections can produce, and the strong resistance to reconciliation. It is clear that we live in turbulent times and that a negotiated conflict settlement often leads to a turbulent peace. This peace is not an end state in itself but needs to be nurtured into its next phase: a stable, functioning government, society, and culture in which conflicts

are settled through negotiation rather than through violence.

This turbulence refers not only to postconflict situations. At the lower end of the conflict spectrum, we are reminded of an interesting feature of post–Cold War conflict events: the occurrence in places such as Central Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines, Central Africa, and the Balkans of violent, turbulent situations that hover somewhere between war and peace. We do not propose in this volume a new theory for explaining and responding to political violence below the threshold of outright war. A number of our chapters on conflict sources shed an especially bright light on the phenomenon of turbulence.[16] Managing such turbulence cannot simply be swept aside as somehow beneath the proper concern of the international community: this turbulence is the breeding ground for other phenomena that affect the health of the global system—criminality of all sorts, the rise of predators and warlords ("rogues," to some), environmental and health disasters[17]—and that postpone indefinitely vitally needed investment, growth, and improved standards of governance. Low-level violence of this sort is capable of dismantling and destabilizing negotiated settlements, reversing fragile progress. Yet the remedies for sustained turbulence in rough neighborhoods are by no means obvious in our postimperial and postcolonial age.

Christoph Bertram points out that it is impossible to recognize the full character of your own period as you live through it.[18] Living in a period of transition, as we do now, makes this recognition even more difficult. We do not have a term for our age beyond the weak description "the post–Cold War period." We do know, however, that our age is marked by change and by the roiling seas produced by change. We hope that the contributions in this volume serve to underscore the gravity of the challenge and the long road that still lies ahead in security and conflict studies.

STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK

As discussed above, there have been important developments over the past five years, both in the scholarly fields related to conflict management and on the ground where war and peace occur. This volume seeks to capture these changing dynamics. It includes some contributors to *Managing Global Chaos,* who have rewritten their chapters to reflect these changes. It also includes many new authors, who have been commissioned to treat new issues and to reflect the widened range of viewpoints in areas of lively debate. Unfortunately, the hard limits of space forced us to drop a number of excellent chapters, including the seven case studies, that were included in the earlier volume. For students interested in the evolution of thought and practice in the field of conflict analysis and management, these chapters are well worth seeking out from *Managing Global Chaos.*

This volume focuses on two dimensions of the conflict field: sources and responses. Of these two dimensions, the first has attracted the most attention from scholars within the field of international relations. In recent years, however, attention to responses to conflict has increased, driven by a growing desire among students and faculty on the one hand and policymakers and practitioners on the other hand to come up with workable solutions to seemingly intractable conflagrations. The unceasing explosions of internal conflicts in the 1990s may have presented very difficult challenges to practitioners but they also touched the lives of individuals around the world as the news networks reported on mass civilian killings in Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the face of these contemporary wars, student and faculty concern expanded beyond understanding the causes of these conflicts to identifying and applying solutions. This volume, as did its predecessor, dedicates a major part of its pages to the practical, political, ethical, and operational

considerations of conflict management. Recognizing that all sorts of diverse institutions play a role in responding to conflict, the book explores many different kinds of institutional capacities and devotes several sections to the use of both coercive and diplomatic methods of making or encouraging peace.

Analyzing conflict and peacemaking is not easy. Each conflict is unique and has its own set of causes and dynamics. Consequently, each response has to be unique. There are some tools —general though they may be—that can help to conceptualize the field and thereby increase understanding of these complex factors. It is to some of these tools that we now turn.

Table 1 ("Illustrative Strategies for Managing a Turbulent World") relates various conflict management strategies and techniques, including the use of force, negotiated interventions, and track-two diplomacy, to the discussion of sources of conflict. The first section of the book is based on the typology in Jack Levy's chapter, which is itself modeled on the work by Kenneth Waltz that defined a levels-of-analysis approach to the study of conflict.[19] Using Levy's three different levels of analysis —the systemic, subsystemic, and individual levels—the left-hand column of the table demonstrates that there is potentially a wide range of factors that can influence conflict processes and that for any given conflict a variety of different factors and forces can play out across these different levels. Using the same levels-of-analysis approach, part I of the volume captures the wide array of conflict sources from a rich variety of scholarly and disciplinary backgrounds and in some respects speaks to the left-hand column of the table. Although some of the writers in this section of the book stress the continued importance of systemic sources of conflict—that is, sources of conflict that arise from the anarchic nature of the international system and transnational forces and processes that increasingly operate at the global level— others point to the importance of subsystemic

factors, including the growing importance of culture, ethnicity, identity, and personality in conflict processes, especially within states.

Part II of the volume examines the ongoing debate about intervention, focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on the role of coercive versus noncoercive strategies and instruments of intervention. The essays in this section bring a diverse range of opinions and insights to the ongoing debate among scholars and practitioners about intervention methods, techniques, and timing, particularly when military intervention is an option. At one end of the spectrum is the viewpoint that international intervention to end intrastate conflicts is inconclusive and generally tends to be counterproductive. At the other end some argue that the international community has a moral commitment to intervene when confronted with evidence of genocide and massive human rights abuses. As the essays in this section demonstrate, these debates play out at different levels—the political, the moral, and the practical or expedient. As the introductory essay to part II argues, however, much of the debate tends to focus on the use of force, ignoring the fact that there are other strategies and instruments of intervention, ranging from formal diplomacy to a wide variety of track-two interventions. Furthermore, intervention strategies—whether they involve the use of (or the threat to use) force or diplomacy or some other method of negotiation and mediation (i.e., peaceful intervention techniques)—must be carefully tailored to the appropriate source of conflict or level of analysis, explicitly recognizing that many different factors and forces are at play in any given conflict.

In part III we focus on the role of negotiation, mediation, and preventive statecraft as specific tools and methods of conflict management. Negotiation is rightly viewed as a means to an end (diplomatic negotiations in the area of arms control, for example, are directed at developing new arms control regimes; a

Table 1. Illustrative Strategies for Managing a Turbulent World

Sources of Conflict (see Part I)	Coercive Strategies and Instruments (see Part II)	Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Political Instruments (see Parts II and III)	Institutions and Regimes of Security and Conflict Management (see Part IV)	Peacebuilding (see Part V)
Level 1: Systemic Factors				
Anarchy and changing balance of power, breakup of empires (e.g., Soviet Union)	Power balancing, alliances and alignments	Concert-based strategies of negotiation (e.g., Concert of Europe)	Collective security/cooperative security	Kantian confederation of democratic states
Regional and hegemonic rivalries	Power balancing, alliances and alignments, military-assistance programs, sanctions	Diplomatic engagement/isolation, pressures and incentives for adherence to arms regimes, engagement	Strengthened arms regimes, expanded/new collective security institutions	New/expanded institutions for regional economic cooperation and integration
Weapons proliferation and innovation that change existing power balances or lead to new sources of threat in the international system	New offense-defense strategies and technologies (e.g., missile defense, information warfare, high-tech weaponry)	Negotiated understandings and agreements (e.g., through the G–8 and other forums), preventive diplomacy	Arms control regimes and confidence-building measures	
Global nonmilitary security threats (e.g., transnational criminal networks, economic destabilization, environmental degradation, population pressures)	International criminal courts, Interpol, bilateral cooperation against criminal mafias	Negotiated understandings and agreements (e.g., through the G–8 and other forums), preventive diplomacy	International regimes and other kinds of international governance responses to enhance cooperation at both global and regional/subregional levels	

Level 2: States and Societies

Transitional states	Peace enforcement, conflict suppression, targeted sanctions, coercive diplomacy	Mediation, dialogue, track one and -two diplomacy, financial inducements, aid and trade conditionality	Collective security initiatives, regional organizations (membership inducements, threats of expulsion or nonmembership)	Good governance, reconciliation, reconstruction, development assistance, civil-society institution building, rule of law, truth commissions, preventive diplomacy
State collapse	Rapid reaction force, military protectorates	Multilateral and bilateral assistance programs, financial bail-outs, aid and trade conditionality, administrative/political protectorates	Temporary multilateral governance structures	
Ethnopolitical/religious extremism	Rapid reaction force, safe havens, coercive diplomacy, deterrence, preventive diplomacy	Negotiated autonomy, cross-cultural negotiation, circumnegotiation, minority rights protection policies, aid and trade conditionality	Constitutional and electoral reforms, power sharing, federalism, consociational democracy	Support for reconciliation measures (political, social, religious, etc.), strengthening civil society, strengthening minority rights protection, monitoring governance structures (e.g., autonomy or power-sharing arrangements)
Warlord economics	Targeted sanctions, boycotts, arms embargoes	External monitoring and transparency	Codes of conduct for multinationals	
Rogue states	Coercive diplomacy, deterrence, preventive diplomacy, support for armed opposition, sanctions	Isolation/engagement, support for nonviolent opposition	Institutional arrangements based on common interest (e.g., KEDO)	

Table 1. Illustrative Strategies for Managing a Turbulent World (*cont.*)

| Sources of Conflict (see Part I)	Coercive Strategies and Instruments (see Part II)	Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Political Instruments (see Parts II and III)	Institutions and Regimes of Security and Conflict Management (see Part IV)	Peacebuilding (see Part V)
Level 3: Leadership and Human Agency				
Bad leaders	Coercive intervention and diplomacy, targeted sanctions	Support for nonviolent opposition	Denial/expulsion for multilateral institutions	Criminal courts/tribunals
Spoilers	Military containment, legal threats, asset seizures	Engagement or isolation and delegitimization	Multilateral incentives and pressures	Power sharing or continued isolation
Elite cultural cognitive barriers to cooperation		Secret diplomacy and back channels, confidence-building measures, international support for risk taking by the parties themselves, track-two workshops		Conflict transformation initiatives, civil-society building

mediated intervention by a third party in an intrastate conflict is directed at ending violence and perhaps establishing a detailed road map that charts the way to a lasting peace settlement). However, such factors as the timing and sequence of negotiations, the choice of negotiating partners, the selection of a mediator(s), and the forum within which negotiations are conducted can exercise a decisive influence on outcomes, including whether a settlement or arms control treaty is reached or not. The essays in part III discuss the utility of different negotiation and mediation instruments at both diplomatic and unofficial levels and the impact different kinds of negotiated interventions can have on peace processes.

Table 1 illustrates that more than one set of intervention strategies or response mechanisms may be necessary to address sources of conflict at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, these different strategies and responses may, in fact, complement one another and therefore should not be viewed as mutually exclusive options. Part IV of the volume develops this theme, examining the role of international institutions and regimes in the conflict management equation. The essays in this section suggest that although international organizations such as the United Nations remain highly relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security, there is growing recognition that their activities and efforts must be complemented by an increasingly diverse portfolio of institutions, including regional and subregional organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The essays in this section also attempt to distill much of the knowledge and experience gained over the past decade about the utility of these different institutions and their comparative advantages in different conflict settings.

Once a negotiated agreement is reached, there may be the temptation to conclude that the job is done. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the essays in part V demonstrate, the challenges of consolidating the peace and moving from a settlement to a genuine process of reconciliation are as formidable as they are varied. During the consolidation phase of a peace process, important choices have to be made, such as whether to prosecute those accused of war crimes or whether to use other means (e.g., truth commissions) to achieve national reconciliation. There is no easy answer to, or ready-made formula for addressing, these challenges. However, in the five years since the publication of *Managing Global Chaos*, scholarly and policy understandings of what these precise challenges are and what the priorities should be in moving from settlement to reconciliation have grown enormously. The greatly expanded list of topics covered in this section reflects our enlarged understanding about not only the scope of these challenges but also the obvious limitations to social and political engineering carried out on a local or even a nationwide scale.

Figure 1 ("The Life Cycle of International Conflict Management") takes a different perspective, relating many of the different approaches to conflict management available to peacemakers to different points on the conflict cycle. It does not incorporate sources of conflict, as table 1 does, but instead focuses on the dynamics of conflicts and the timing of appropriate responses. The bell curve on the chart represents in idealized form the pattern of a conflict, showing how a conflict escalates toward the outbreak of violence and then de-escalates toward rapprochement and reconciliation. The curve also indicates the types of conflict management techniques that may be effective at particular points of the conflict cycle. For instance, at the bottom of the curve, before violence has broken out or after settlement has been reached, approaches that stress developing capacity to handle disputes peacefully—institution building, good governance, transparency, rule of law, fact finding, education, practitioner training, development assistance —may be not only appropriate but essential to the prevention of conflict or consolidation of peace. At the higher end of the curve, after

Figure 1. The Life Cycle of International Conflict Management

Source: Adapted from figure 2.1 in Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflict: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 38.

the outbreak of large-scale violence, the antagonists may be closed to these kind of approaches and respond only to strong incentives and disincentives of both a political and a more coercive nature: mediation, political and economic sanctions, and military engagement in the peace mission.

In looking at this curve, it is important to remember that individual conflicts rarely follow this idealized pattern. Some double back on themselves, swinging from tenuous settlement to renewed conflict, as happened in Angola in the 1990s. Some never quite develop into full-fledged conflicts, but simmer uneasily for years, as happened in Indonesia before the outbreak of fighting over East Timor. Even so, the chart does provide a useful means of understanding general conflict dynamics and identifying appropriate approaches to conflict management.

In these rapidly changing times, none of the essays in this volume can provide the last word on any given subject. But they do represent, in our opinion, some of the best thinking and research on the topics they address. Our basic aim for this book is to provide a closer representation of post–Cold War realities and

experience while also capturing some of what we are learning and offering some snapshots of a moving target: the full complexity of contemporary conflict management in a turbulent world. We hope that the essays and insights in this volume will therefore not only illuminate but also stimulate and provoke.

NOTES

1. For example, see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–76.

2. For a critical view of a range of writings on chaos and anarchy, see Yahya Sadowski, *The Myth of Global Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998). Sadowski argues that the end of the Cold War may have changed the world, its ills, and their remedies less than imagined by what he terms the optimists and pessimists.

3. See the chapter by Ted Robert Gurr (chapter 11) in this volume.

4. See, for example, J. A. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (January–February 1997): 51–66.

5. Kofi Annan, *Annual Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-Fourth Session, September 20, 1999.

6. See the chapter by Warren Strobel (chapter 40).

7. See the chapters by Bruce Jentleson (chapter 15), Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (chapter 21), Joseph Nye (chapter 22), Louis Kriesberg (chapter 25), Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (chapter 26), P. Terrence Hopmann (chapter 27), Raymond Cohen (chapter 28), Harold Saunders (chapter 29), Rolf Ekeus (chapter 31), and Alain Destexhe (chapter 38).

8. Geoffrey Blainey, *Causes of War* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966); and Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), esp. 276–340, "Some Theories on the Causes of War."

9. See chapters by Michael Howard (chapter 2), Charles Kupchan (chapter 3), Geoffrey Kemp (chapter 5), Michael Brown (chapter 13), Lawrence Freedman (chapter 20), Michael Krepon and Lawrence Scheinman (chapter 36), and David Yost (chapter 34).

10. See the chapters by Phil Williams (chapter 7), Paul Collier (chapter 10), Connie Peck (chapter 33), William Schabas (chapter 35), Mary Anderson (chapter 37), and John Paul Lederach (chapter 49).

11. On the challenges of democratization, see the chapter by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (chapter 8).

12. Among the chapters that deal with this tension between governance and conflict management are those by Edward Luttwak (chapter 16), Pamela Aall (chapter 23), Fen Hampson (chapter 24), Michael Doyle (chapter 32), William Schabas (chapter 35), Roy Licklider (chapter 41), Pauline Baker (chapter 44), Roland Paris (chapter 45), Timothy Sisk (chapter 46), and Neil Kritz (chapter 47).

13. On the role of leadership in peacemaking, see the chapter by Janice Gross Stein (chapter 12).

14. This volume makes its own contributions toward this agenda, but we also want to point interested readers to other work that shares the aim of deriving concepts of best practice, such as Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton, and Margaret E. McGuinness, eds., *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); and Barnett R. Rubin, ed., *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action* (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1998).

15. For a sampling of the breadth of lessons learned over the past decade, see the chapters by Chester Crocker (chapter 14), Stanley Hoffmann (chapter 17), Richard Betts (chapter 18), Richard Haass (chapter 19), Nicole Ball (chapter 42), Stephen John Stedman (chapter 43), and R. Scott Appleby (chapter 48).

16. See the chapters by Phil Williams (chapter 7), Mohammed Ayoob (chapter 9), Paul Collier (chapter 10), Ted Robert Gurr (chapter 11), and Michael Brown (chapter 13).

17. On criminality and other political economy pathologies of conflict, see the chapters by Jean-Marie Guehenno (chapter 6), Paul Collier (chapter 10), and Virginia Haufler (chapter 39). On the relationship between environmental degradation and conflict, see the chapter by Nils Petter Gleditsch (chapter 4).

18. Christoph Bertram, "Naming a New Era: The Interregnum," *Foreign Policy* (summer 2000).

19. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

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