# A Strategy for Stable Peace

Introduction

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA AND ALL THE NATIONS OF EUROPE can eliminate war as a means of settling disputes among themselves. It will not be easy but it is within their reach and it would have enormous global consequences—all good. We explain our reasoning in the chapters that follow and propose practical policies that will move the nations toward a stable peace. We present perspectives on a stable peace from the vantage point of Russia, the United States, and Western Europe.

Throughout our discussion, we use a few shorthand terms to describe our thinking. The nations of North America and Europe, including Russia, can collectively be described as a *system,* because of the powerful reciprocal influences they exert upon one another. Because of their geography, history, and culture, this set of nations can be called an *extended European system*. In parts of the system, particularly North America, Western Europe, and Northwestern Europe, war has been excluded as a policy option: peace has become *stable*. We assume that a Europe that is *peaceful, undivided, and democratic,* a phrase often used by former U.S. president Bill Clinton, is a close approximation of a system of nations under stable peace and therefore use the term "stable peace" in that sense. Former president George

Bush and President George W. Bush have invoked the vision of a "Europe whole and free," evidently to convey the same idea. Neither "undivided" nor "whole" implies homogeneity, only that transactions within the system do not make distinctions based on ideology, cultural differences, or military relations. The idea of diversity within a unifying framework was stressed by President George W. Bush when he spoke of "a Europe that is truly united, truly democratic and truly diverse, a collection of peoples and nations bound together in purpose and respect, and faithful to their own roots."[1]

In some parts of Europe, as in the Balkans, peace may still be *precarious;* war could be just around the corner. In most of the system, especially between Russia and the West, war has not yet been excluded and military deterrence remains a factor in interstate relations, even though war is a remote contingency. This situation can be called a *conditional* peace.[2] The question this book addresses is whether a stable peace could be extended beyond its present beachhead to include all, or nearly all, of the nations within the extended European system.

There is such a thing as a "just war." Wars to resist tyrannies and to stop genocide are in this category. When we write about stable peace in Europe it is essential for our readers to understand that we are not implying the triumph of pacifism. Nor are we thinking of a peace imposed by a dominant imperial power. Rather, we are visualizing a peace in which no state within a given system of states ever considers the use of military options against another state within the system to pursue or safeguard its interests, or even considers using threats of force in any dispute between them. Deterrence and compellance strategies backed by military force are excluded as instruments of policy within the system. Such strategies may very well be commonplace as instruments of policy when states deal with threats that arise outside the system. Serious disputes may occur within the system but they are dealt with by nonmilitary instruments of policy. Examples where stable peace has been achieved include the European Union and U.S. relations with Western European nations, Canada, and Mexico. Chapter 1 discusses how such circumstances may arise.

A stable peace of this sort within the extended European system would be far preferable to the historical norm, where wars within

the system have occurred regularly, interspersed with frequent war-threatening crises. Aside from releasing the members of the system for more productive internal activities, the absence of war within the system eliminates one key source of global armed conflict. An additional advantage would accrue to these nations if the absence of war made it possible for them to act harmoniously within the extended European system and with some coherence in global affairs.

The chances of Europe enjoying a stable peace may seem remote, but the reunification of Germany also seemed to be a dream until it happened. A stable peace throughout Europe is a serious strategic objective, well within the realm of reality. It is a practical and realizable goal that deserves concentrated and high-level attention. This goal must be explicitly identified as the central purpose of the nations within the extended European system and of plans prepared to achieve it. Key to a stable peace, inevitably, are those policies that will shape the relationships among the nations of the European Union, Russia, and the United States and this is what we discuss in this book.

The idea of a stable peace is closely related to another concept, that of a *security community*—another idea we use in our analysis. As defined by the U.S. scholar Karl Deutsch and others, a security community is a group of nations within which "there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way." We postulate that a security community is a rudimentary form of a stable peace. In this stage of development, we imagine that the differences, especially in value systems, between states within a security community would be more pronounced than in a system of nations that had achieved a stable peace.[3]

Many desirable attributes of a stable peace could be achieved among states whose values, forms of government, and economies differ in important respects. However, security communities may more easily disintegrate precisely because of their underlying differences. Therefore, we think that a stable peace is the right ultimate goal for the nations to pursue. The process of getting to a stable peace may be about the same as the process of getting to a security community. In the early stages, in particular, strategies aimed at moving beyond a

conditional peace would be the same, whether the nations think of themselves as working toward a security community or a true stable peace.

Treating a stable peace as a proposition meant to be taken seriously by governments is a good disciplinary framework for considering the future course of relations within an extended European system of nations. The euphoria of the early 1990s has given way to a more sober view of international relationships, but the present decade still is a hinge point in history, a time when relationships can be influenced in one direction or another. If ever there was a time for long-term analysis and strategic thinking, this is it. The upheavals associated with the end of the Cold War, for better or worse, have not yet given way to a settled international order. Closer cooperation between the European Union, Russia, and the United States could create a powerful and positive nucleus for the developing international order. This is what President George W. Bush endorsed as his own commitment: "A Europe and an America bound in a great alliance of liberty, history's greatest united force for peace and progress and human dignity."[4]

Only if governments have a clearer idea than they currently seem to have of where they would like European relations to be in ten or twenty years will it be possible to devise complementary strategies and plans to carry them out. This is easier said than done, for several very big and relevant questions will be answered only over the course of time. But governments can shape the answers to these questions, and their duty is to do so with a keen awareness of the stakes involved:

- ❖ Will the United States remain a major actor on the European scene or will economic and demographic factors lead it to focus its energies elsewhere?
- ❖ What are the prospects for Russia's seeing itself—and for others seeing Russia—as a "normal" member of an extended European system?
- ❖ Will the necessary overhaul of the European Union's decision-making process occur in time to permit the rapid and orderly

expansion of the European Union to the east? How will the different rates of adaptation to technology and globalization affect the prospects for an extended European system that is peaceful, undivided, and democratic?

❖ How might Asian power centers (China, Korea, Japan, India) relate to an extended European security community?

❖ Can Euroatlantic institutions evolve to support a security community centered on Europe that includes the United States and Russia?

These questions all fall into the category of imponderables at the moment, but this does not excuse governments from considering how the answers would advance the extended European system beyond its present state of conditional peace. We offer our opinions on many of these questions as a way of stimulating debate. After centuries of war in Europe, and with images of the latest ones still fresh, a stable peace may seem illusory. But we think that enough has changed in Europe and in the world—not least the fact that this kind of peace has materialized in places—to make the idea a practical one, one worthy of a central place in national strategic thinking. For the first time in history, it is worth remembering, the United States and Russia are both engaged in creating institutions that will link North America and *all* the states of Europe. The French financial expert and adviser to post–World War II French governments, Jean Monnet, conceived the idea of French-German reconciliation through economic cooperation and integration. Eventually, this idea led to a European Union that really is something new under the sun. Franco-German rapprochement teaches us that states with major cultural and political differences can move toward harmonious relations, building on issues of practical interest.

To begin the analysis of this proposition, we suggest in chapter 1 that underlying social and other factors within each nation will dictate whether a stable peace can be achieved. In common with many scholars and political figures, we assume that democratic values and a shared sense of identity are among the most important of these preconditions and we are optimistic that this requirement will be met. That said, we stress that concerted national strategies on the part of

the major nations within the extended European system are essential for progress toward a stable peace. Without concerted policies, neither globalization nor favorable internal developments will suffice to achieve a stable peace. The disruptive effects of residual adversarial attitudes within the system, and of quarrels injected into it from regional conflicts around its periphery, will hamper the consolidation of common value systems and cooperative practices. The major actors must consciously adopt policies aimed at overcoming these disruptive effects. Also in chapter 1 we suggest various structural forms that a security community centered on Europe might assume and conclude that the form most conducive to a stable peace would be a triad in which the main centers of gravity are the European Union, Russia, and the United States, with no one of them dominant. This structure is very different from the bipolar order of the Cold War period and, of course, also different from the benign American hegemony advocated by some and opposed by others.

Chapters 2–4 present perspectives from Russia, the European Union, and the United States. Each author is convinced that stable peace in Europe is a feasible and highly desirable goal. From a Russian perspective, presented in chapter 2, it appears that differences between Russia and the West are not fundamental. Partnership with the European Union and cooperative relations with the Atlantic Alliance would improve Russia's security situation. In the long run, the development in Russia of a civil society based on democratic principles will be necessary to establish qualitatively new links between Russia and the West.

From a Western European perspective, presented in chapter 3, the European Union has consolidated a stable peace in the western part of the continent. Now the Union is at a critical juncture. Can it make the leap forward in its internal structure that will be necessary to deal with expansion to the east without losing its cohesion as a community of values and pooled sovereignties? If the Union accepts new members in 2004 while avoiding significant internal reform, its contribution to a stable peace will be diminished. Thus the historic achievement of a stable peace through the efforts of the nations of the European Union depends heavily on the courage and vision of national

leadership in Western Europe in the next two to three years. The external policies of the Union toward Russia and the United States also are important, especially in fostering partnerships among all three parties; these policies could be focused more sharply than they are on a strategy for a stable peace.

Ambassador Yves Pagniez, writing from the perspective of long service as a French diplomat, offers his reflections on several of these issues in a commentary following chapter 3. He reminds us that common foreign policies still leave room for national differences and that this can foster innovation. His view of the European Union's role in Europe and the world underscores the Union's autonomy in a tripolar relationship with Russia and the United States. In harmony with the three authors, Ambassador Pagniez stresses the importance of democratic developments in Russia for a stable peace.

Chapter 4 provides a U.S. perspective, noting that U.S. public opinion is favorably inclined toward the kinds of cooperative policies necessary to promote a stable peace. This chapter argues that a security community centered on Europe is feasible because of historic and cultural ties and because of developments since World War II that may make it possible to overcome the divisions and hostilities of the past.

Broad cultural, geopolitical, regional, demographic, economic, and technological developments, some beyond the reach of governments, will affect the course of events. Nevertheless, governments can influence decisively the prospects for a Europe that is peaceful, undivided, and democratic. To do so, they must align national policies with fundamental trends in human affairs or must try to influence those trends that can be nudged one way or another. In chapter 5, taking account of attitudes within the European Union, Russia, and the United States, we seek to define parallel and complementary policies that, together, would constitute a coordinated strategy for a stable peace. These policies, including internal actions, are directed at building sustainable ties that will have some growth potential. We do not believe that a detailed "master plan" to achieve a stable peace is realistic. Rather, governments should work with building blocks already available to them, having their objective clearly in mind.[5]

Short- or mid-term initiatives that will serve long-term ends are proposed in chapter 6. They include cooperation in ballistic missile defense, export controls, preventive diplomacy to avoid regional conflicts, trade and financial dealings, and a series of proposals designed to engage a broad range of people directly in cooperative activities. Our purpose here is to set out an array of ideas that are responsive to current needs as we see them. Working together within the framework afforded by this pattern of cooperation will set the members of the extended European system firmly on the road to a stable peace.

The use or threat of military force in post–Cold War Europe has not been abolished. That has been established by several precedents, and these experiences have played a part in defining the community that will evolve in Europe. Whether the nations have intended it or not, these actions—and sometimes inactions—are creating a body of norms and expected rules of behavior. But are the norms and rules uniform throughout the whole system of nations? Experiences in the Balkans and in the North Caucasus illustrate the problems that arise when principles of international law are in conflict, as they were in the cases of Kosovo and Chechnya, where sovereignty and nonintervention in internal affairs came into conflict with human rights. In Yugoslavia the principle of nonintervention was sacrificed to reverse a massive violation of human rights; in Russia, a Chechen challenge to Russia's sovereignty was defeated by methods that violated basic norms of human rights. In both cases, military solutions were imposed instead of political solutions, which would have been preferable, setting precedents that will have long-term repercussions (and that have already had damaging short-term effects). These experiences have opened a breach between Russia and the West. Unless it can be repaired, not only will norms and rules be different in different parts of Europe, but the idea of a stable peace will face further obstacles. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, a gulf still exists between Russia and the West, and Europe is only conditionally at peace, a situation that must not be allowed to continue, not least because the struggle against a common enemy—terrorism—requires the unity of the Euroatlantic community.