Prime Time Crime

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Balkan Media in War and Peace

Kemal Kurspahic

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To Vesna, Tarik, and Mirza, with love

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Introduction

"Indifference is not a beginning, it is an end. And, therefore, indifference is always the friend of the enemy, for it benefits the aggressor—never his victim, whose pain is magnified when he or she feels forgotten. The political prisoner in his cell, the hungry children, the homeless refugees—not to respond to their plight, not to relieve their solitude by offering them a spark of hope is to exile them from human memory. And in denying their humanity we betray our own.

Indifference, then, is not only a sin, it is a punishment. And this is one of the most important lessons of this outgoing century's wide-ranging experiments in good and evil."

ELIE WIESEL[1]

IN THE FALL OF 2002, seven years after the Dayton Peace Agreement ended three-and-a-half years of war in Bosnia, the media and the public in countries engaged in that war—in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia—are still agonizing between the two extremes: denial or acknowledgment of the atrocities of the 1990s. A months-long debate rages in the pages of the Belgrade weekly *Vreme* (*Time*), with even the founders of that magazine finding themselves in the two bitterly opposing camps. One side criticizes the "moral fundamentalism" of those who argue for a full accountability for war crimes: They believe there is no point in debating "the tragedy for which there is no medicine." The other side insists that "tragedy" here is a euphemism for crimes against innocent people. They call for three levels of responsibility: criminal—for those who ordered and executed crimes; moral—for the creators of public opinion who initiated, condoned, and defended the crimes committed; and political-historical—for those who supported the criminals in power. The debate is not only about the past. It is very much about the future of the region as well. It reflects the basic dilemma over the war crimes issue even among the international sponsors of the Balkan peace process. Some of them believe that insisting on accountability for war crimes—in courts, in political life, in the media—might undermine the peace process. The others believe that acknowledging war crimes is the very essence of that process: to honor victims, to give survivors a sense of justice and closure, to create conditions for reconciliation among the innocent on all sides. Acknowledgment of war crimes and reconciliation depend very much on the media, most of which even seven years after the war remain in the trenches of nationalism they helped dig in the first place.

This book is the story of the media's role in the former Yugoslavia—first in Serbia, then in Croatia, and finally in Bosnia—in perpetrating lies about genocidal threats, awakening forgotten fears and hatreds, and preparing once peaceful neighbors to suspect, hate, confront, and finally, kill each other in the last decade of the twentieth century. Media controlled by the party and state—which in the former Communist countries controlled what the public was allowed to know and what the authorities wanted it to believe—played a major role in causing the Balkan bloodbath of the 1990s. In the hands of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian media systematically spread fear among Serbs concerning the genocidal threat of Croat "Ustashas" and Bosnian Muslim "mujahedeen,"

mobilizing the nation for what became a "preemptive" genocide: "If we don't kill them, they will kill us." In the hands of Franjo Tudjman and his ultranationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croatian state media were no more civilized in depicting Serbs and Muslims as arch-enemies. As a consequence, victimized by forces from both Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" and Tudjman's "Greater Croatia," Bosniaks developed their own brand of ultranationalist media, spreading anti-Serb and anti-Croat feelings. Once the demons of the Balkan myths and history had been unleashed, flooding the newspaper pages and radio and television programs with horrifying stories of once-good neighbors as dangerous enemies, the nationalist-controlled media became instigators—not just witnesses—of terror, killings, and exodus of genocidal proportions. The front pages of newspapers and evening television newscasts churned out a nightmarish years-long prime-time crime.

This book focuses on the role of the media in the three former Yugoslav republics that were engaged in a deadly war triangle in the early 1990s, Serbia–Croatia–Bosnia. It does not analyze the lower-scale conflicts of 1999 in Kosovo and 2001 in Macedonia. In those two cases, the conflict had the same roots: a failure to balance the integrity of the state and minority rights; conflicting ideas about how to preserve that statehood while recognizing and respecting different religious and ethnic identities; and each group's obsession with its own causes while ignoring the other's grievances. And in both cases, except for some notable exceptions, the majority of the media had been reduced to advocating their own groups' "patriotic causes." One such exception was Veton Suroi's *Koha Ditore* in Kosovo, which even in the worst days of terror argued passionately against blind hatred and revenge.

Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace is the story of media degraded by the very people who should have been passionate defenders—self-serving editors and writers, many of whom led the charge in manufacturing enemies, warmongering, and justifying war crimes. But it is also a story of the few media outlets and brave individuals who, at great personal sacrifice and risk, sometimes including even life itself, refused to be manipulated and used in war propaganda but instead maintained and defended ethical values and professional standards above the patriotic call of duty. This book honors those who knew, even in a country that was handed over from communists to

ultranationalists and thus missed the great opportunity for change in the late 1980s, that regardless of who was in power, journalism is a profession and journalists are witnesses, not warriors.

There may not be a balance between good and evil in this book, just as there was no such balance in the Balkans during the 1990s. The forces of evil dominated the decade. Nevertheless, I want to begin with a story about those who, despite everything, tried to practice journalism "pure and simple." Many of them waged exhausting battles against their oppressive regimes. Some were silenced only when cronies of nationalist governments took over their newspapers; some lost their jobs in endless, systematic purges; and very few managed to maintain their independence to the end of the wars, only to see their countries and their professional ideals shattered in a decade of nationalist crusades.

Two editors, Stanislav Stasa Marinkovic of the Belgrade daily *Borba (The Struggle)* and Josko Kulusic of *Slobodna Dalmacija (Free Dalmatia),* a daily in Split, Croatia, occupy a very special place in the story of the struggle for journalistic integrity in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1980s. I met both of them at the beginning of Yugoslavia's slide into chaos, shortly after Slobodan Milosevic seized power in Serbia. In late spring 1988, together with Zlatko Dizdarevic, my colleague from the Sarajevo daily *Oslobodjenje (Liberation),* I received *Slobodna Dalmacija's* invitation to a weekend cruise on the Adriatic. Kulusic brought together a dozen prominent journalists from all over Yugoslavia—including Jurij Gustincic and Jak Koprivc (Slovenes); Marinkovic, Zoran Jelicic, and Stevan Niksic (Serbs); and Drazen Vukov-Colic and Drago Buvac (Croats)—for a friendly, professional exchange of experiences with increasing political pressure against the media. The contrast couldn't have been more striking. In a setting that one could see only in exotic travel brochures, on the deck of a sailboat quietly navigating through the azure waters of the Kornati Islands off the Croatian Adriatic coast—with an abundance of the best Dalmatian prosciutto and cheese, local grape brandy, fishermen's catch of the day, and wine from local cellars—we shared stories about the challenges we faced in our respective republics.

Marinkovic had been the first to feel the heat of the ultranationalist offensive against the remaining liberal media. By the time we met, all the major Serbian media, from Radio-Television Belgrade to the papers of the Politika publishing house, were already in the hands of Milosevic

loyalists and busily promoting the Serbian nationalist agenda: blaming everyone else in the former Yugoslavia for Serbia's real or alleged grievances, producing and expanding daily lists of enemies, and projecting an image of a nation facing imminent danger and thus needing to unite around the leader. Marinkovic's *Borba* had resisted the call to serve the nationalist cause. There was some legal ground for its claim to independence from Serbian politics: *Borba* was a federal newspaper and in that sense all-Yugoslav, open to the whole country. In the decades of a strong central government and Tito's unchallenged rule, this had been the paper's curse. *Borba* was the most strictly controlled paper because its editorial line was supposed to reflect official Yugoslav policy, making it too formal, less interesting to read, even boring for a general audience. It survived only as required reading for the party and army cadre and was most carefully read by foreign diplomats and analysts looking for between-the-lines hints concerning developments in the country. The weakening of federal authority and the inter-republic quarrels in the post-Tito decade of the 1980s opened a window of opportunity for *Borba.* Under Marinkovic's leadership, the paper used its broad territorial status to present all sides of the debate. While each republic's press was obliged to present primarily the position of its own political leadership, ignoring or simply dismissing others' views and interests, Marinkovic offered his readers impartial reporting on the increasingly confrontational Yugoslav political scene.

Presenting the plain facts on who said what provided a rare treat for the public. Marinkovic went so far as to acquire and print, as a special supplement to *Borba,* the full transcripts of several meetings of the Serbian and Yugoslav party leadership. For the first time, the paper exposed the inner workings of the Communist hierarchy—with all its (until then) hidden rivalries and quarrels, accusations and denials, limitations and weaknesses. Suddenly, *Borba* became a sought-after commodity. The paper also invited some of the most controversial participants in those debates to explain, in interviews or through their own articles, their positions on Yugoslavia's hottest issues. *Borba's* new mission represented a reversal of roles in the Belgrade newspaper market because at the same time the once-liberal *Politika* became the propagandistic mouthpiece of the Milosevic regime.

The new Serbian regime, however, could not tolerate *Borba's* challenge

to its authority. During the Adriatic cruise, Marinkovic told us of the methods Milosevic's propagandists were using to bring him in line with the new patriotic journalism. Just before joining us in Split, he was summoned to a special session of the information section of the Serbian Socialist Alliance (of Working People) for "a democratic debate about some errors and mistakes in *Borba's* editorial policy." *Borba* was accused of "losing a sense of judgment and moreover losing its political and ideological orientation." Marinkovic was blamed for "undermining relations between *Borba* and Serbia"; "putting the Serbian League of Communists' Central Committee on trial"; and "being obsessed with criticizing Serbia"—a verbal artillery usually used in the final stages of the Party's drive to eliminate political opposition. Attempts by the paper's representatives to explain that the presentation of diverse views is not a symptom of loss of judgment but the very essence of professional, unbiased reporting were taken almost as self-incrimination, as just another piece of evidence that there was "not enough self-criticism" in *Borba* in facing its "errors and mistakes"—another curse in Party vocabulary. The Serbian Socialist Alliance publicly threatened to withdraw support for *Borba.* "Thank God they didn't support us!" Marinkovic told us half-jokingly.

Josko Kulusic, our host, was probably the most successful newspaper editor in prewar Yugoslavia. His paper was not federal, like *Borba,* nor republican like *Politika* in Serbia, *Vjesnik* in Croatia, and *Oslobodjenje* in Bosnia, but a regional daily based in the Adriatic coastal city of Split. It was Kulusic's vision and hard work during his ten-year leadership as editor-in-chief (1983–93) that had transformed *Slobodna Dalmacija* into the finest daily in Croatia. He was a born journalist, attracted to journalism in his teens, even before finishing high school. Kulusic was noticed in the paper's city section for bringing his editor more than twenty news items in a single day. In the 1970s he was named the first editor of *Nedjeljna Dalmacija (Sunday Dalmatia),* the paper's weekend edition, and he turned it into a respectable weekly with a circulation of more than 50,000. In 1983, even though the ruling Communist Party had its own candidate for the position, *Slobodna Dalmacija* journalists chose Kulusic as their editor-in-chief.

Kulusic set high professional standards and goals. He was the first to arrive at the office each morning and the last to leave at the end of the day, editing and laying out most of the pages himself. Most important,

he engaged some of the best writers in Croatia and Yugoslavia as columnists. *Slobodna Dalmacija's* reputation and circulation rose higher than *Vjesnik's*—reaching a circulation of well over 100,000—and the paper became a prosperous business: It bought the most modern printing press and newsroom equipment and developed its own network of kiosks throughout Croatia.

Those few days on a small boat sailing around Kornati engaged in endless professional dialogue with Marinkovic, Kulusic, and others influenced the way I managed the Bosnian daily *Oslobodjenje* in Sarajevo after I became the first editor to be elected by the journalists themselves in December 1988. The trip established bonds and the beginning of friendships that each of us would turn to for understanding and support during the battles that followed.

Sadly, both Marinkovic and Kulusic died untimely deaths of natural causes in the midst of their struggle for professional standards and values. Milosevic's "street revolutionaries," who swept moderates from power in Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, could not tolerate *Borba's* professed independence. Gordana Logar, another brave *Borba* editor, told me that Marinkovic had challenged Serb nationalism from the very beginning. "When Milosevic staged a Party *putsch,* at the infamous Eighth Session of Serbia's Central Committee in the fall of 1987, [Stasa] did something no other media outlet would do," Logar recalled. "He obtained and published a full transcript of the session, giving the public an exclusive opportunity to read what Milosevic's opponents had to say ['A Night of Rough Words']. All the other Serbian media gave only one side of the story—the Milosevic group's."[2] Milosevic loyalists charged with bringing the media into line called Marinkovic in for numerous sessions of ideological brainwashing, trying to intimidate him into obedience. Although they threatened him with a cut in newsprint subsidy and withdrawal of support for the paper, publicly called for his resignation, and cancelled the official subscription to *Borba,* he continued to resist "with occasional tactical retreats," as Manjo Vukotic, his friend and successor as editor, told me.[3] Marinkovic resigned as editor in fall 1989 after bringing Vukotic from Rome to replace him. Instead, he planned to go to Poland to report on the democratic processes there as *Borba's* correspondent. "That was his greatest professional wish," Logar said.

While undergoing a routine medical checkup required of any Yugoslav leaving the country for a long-term assignment abroad, Marinkovic discovered that he had colon cancer. He died a year later in December 1989. At about that time, *Slobodna Dalmacija* named *Oslobodjenje* the 1989 Newspaper of the Year in the former Yugoslavia in an annual poll among professional journalists—the honor *Borba* had received in 1987. Marinkovic's wife, Dragana, sent me a friendly letter, telling me, "Stasa would have been proud of you if he had lived to know this."

Vukotic and Logar continued Marinkovic's struggle. Under Vukotic's leadership, *Borba* became the voice of the moderate reformist forces in 1990 and reached a circulation of more than 100,000 when it covered the anti-Milosevic protests in Belgrade in 1991. Logar led *Borba's* defiance against the government's takeover in 1994–95 and started a new paper, *Nasa Borba (Our Struggle)*, which provided an alternative voice to the government-imposed official line for a full year before the paper was strangled.

Meanwhile in Croatia, open-mindedness was no longer tolerated after Franjo Tudjman won the presidential election in 1990. The Croatian media were expected to mirror the patriotism of Milosevic's press in Serbia. *Slobodna Dalmacija* and Josko Kulusic became a natural target of Tudjman's nationalist HDZ attacks. The paper's commitment to covering all sides of the debate on the future of Yugoslavia was billed as a lack of Croat patriotism and "Yugo-nostalgia." When the nationalist government mistreated non-Croats—establishing bureaucratic obstacles to Croatian citizenship and requiring a statement condemning the Croatian Serb leadership and a statement of loyalty to Croatia in order to keep jobs—the paper's coverage placed it at the top of the list of media that needed to be silenced. Tudjman used the same method that Milosevic used in silencing *Borba*. He annulled *Slobodna Dalmacija's* privatization and arranged for Miroslav Kutle, the newly promoted HDZ media tycoon, to "buy" the newspaper in early 1993. This led to Kulusic's dismissal. The finest Croatian daily became just another mouthpiece of Croatian nationalism.

Kulusic, arguably the greatest editor in Croatian journalism, found himself on the street, trying to create a new paper, *Dan (The Day*, but also an acronym for "Dalmatian Newspaper"). In the HDZ-controlled media market, however, there were too many obstacles. The ruling Party con-

trolled printing presses and distribution networks, deciding who got printed and at what price, which papers got distributed at kiosks, and which publishers received their money for copies that sold. Businesses owned by Party loyalists were instructed to advertise only in "politically correct" media, and Kulusic's new paper could never be on that list. Starting a new paper despite all those obstacles, first as a weekly and then as daily, took all Kulusic's energy. *Novinar (The Journalist),* the magazine of the Croatian Association of Journalists, praised publishing under such conditions as his "last act of defiance."[4] Josko Kulusic died of heart failure at his desk as he was editing the last issue of *Dan* during the night of February 20–21, 1998. The next day his paper ceased publication.

Two years later, following the victory of the democratic opposition in Croatia's elections, *Slobodna Dalmacija's* representatives—the same people who had led the HDZ takeover of Kulusic's paper—visited his grave, announcing this event in a note entitled "Pocast sjor Josku" ("In Honor of Mr. Josko").[5] Croatia's Constitutional Court declared the 1993 HDZ takeover of *Slobodna Dalmacija* unconstitutional and had Kutle arrested for his role in the officially sanctioned corruption. Kulusic remains, in the words of those who knew him, an editorial genius who died defending professional dignity in a decade of darkness.

There are other inspiring stories of journalists who maintained their integrity against all odds.

- In Serbia these include Nebojsa Popov's monthly, *Republika;* Veran Matic and Radio B92; the group around the *Vreme* weekly in its original form; the independent journalists who maintained solidarity as they lost their jobs in Milosevic's media purges; and courageous individuals, such as media analyst Petar Lukovic, who remained the most outspoken critic of nationalism despite all threats and intimidation. In post-war Serbia a new daily *Danas (Today),* started by some of those who fought to preserve *Borba* and *Nasa Borba*—Gordana Logar, Grujica Spasovic, Radomir Licina, Nikola Burzan, Bozidar Andrejic, and others—distinguished itself by opening its "Dialogue" pages to a free debate of the hottest issues of the recent past and of the future of the country. In addition, the *Monitor,* a weekly in Montenegro, represented one of the few voices of tolerance in that republic.
- In Croatia the most persistent critics of Tudjman's abuse of power were Viktor Ivancic, Predrag Lucic, Boris Dezulovic, and Heni Erceg.

Ivancic, Lucic, and Dezulovic were the founders of the *Feral Tribune*, a political-satirical weekly originally published as a supplement within Kulusic's *Slobodna Dalmacija*. Erceg was a former TV journalist. After the HDZ took over *Slobodna Dalmacija*, the Rijeka regional daily *Novi list (New Paper)* under editor Veljko Vicevic continued as the only independent daily in Croatia to challenge nationalist policies. The Zagreb independent Radio 101 irritated nationalists in power so much that it took mass street protests of citizens to prevent authorities from closing it.

- In Bosnia the honor of maintaining the tradition of tolerance in the worst days of the war belongs to my colleagues at *Oslobodjenje*, some of whom, including Kjasif Smajlovic and Salko Hondo, were killed while reporting. In the first five years following the war, Bosnian independent journalism had its best representatives in the Sarajevo weeklies *Dani* and *Slobodna Bosna*, whose editors, Senad Pecanin and Senad Avdic, respectively, regularly challenged the authorities despite intimidation, accusations, lawsuits, and physical threats and attacks. They were joined by the publisher and editor of the Banjaluka daily *Nezavisne novine (Independent Newspaper)*: Zeljko Kopanja lost both legs in a car-bomb blast in the fall of 1999 after his paper's courageous and path-breaking reports on Serb war crimes against Muslims.

Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace is the story of a historic episode in the eternal struggle between good and evil. While evil prevailed throughout most of the 1990s, those who fought for the good never gave up. In 2000 the people of the Balkans gained new hope with the fall of Milosevic in Serbia, the victory of the democratic opposition in Croatia, and the first signs of changes in Bosnia. This book is based on my lifelong experience as a journalist in the former Yugoslavia, research that includes dozens of books and reports from the region and abroad, interviews with some of the region's most respected journalists, and hundreds of newspaper articles and radio and TV news transcripts. While several excellent books have been published on the Balkan media during the 1990s, this is the first to cover the full cycle of media manipulation in the Balkans—from Milosevic's rise to power in 1987 to his fall at the end of 2000.

The book is structured into seven chapters. Chapter 1, "The

Yugoslav Media in Tito's Time," examines the developments of the Yugoslav media in what was a unique environment compared to other Communist countries in Eastern Europe: under Communist Party rule but constantly resisting Moscow's control. This special situation made for a more liberal and interesting press than the press behind the Iron Curtain. While in Tito's time there were forbidden subjects, with no room for questioning his or his party's control over society, some pages of the Yugoslav press—including foreign news, culture, and sports—could be compared with the best in the European press. Occasionally, during the "Croatian spring" and the "Serb liberalism" of the 1970s, the press in those two republics reflected new liberal tendencies, opening their pages to reformist ideas. But they were soon silenced in systematic ideological purges of disobedient party functionaries and those who supported them publicly. In this chapter, developments in the Yugoslav media in Tito's time are discussed by the most prominent journalists of that era in the three republics: Bozo Novak, editor-in-chief of Croatia's leading daily, *Vjesnik;* Aleksandar "Sasa" Nenadovic, editor-in-chief of Serbia's leading daily, *Politika;* and Rizo Mehinagic, editor-in-chief of the leading Bosnian daily, *Oslobodjenje.* They talk about the horizons and limits of press freedom in their time. Novak and Nenadovic lost their jobs in Party purges following Tito's crackdown against the Croat and Serb liberal leadership of the 1970s, while Mehinagic was sent—as a punishment—to be a correspondent in New York after his paper printed a cartoon questioning the unity of the country in 1968. The chapter also looks at those aspects of society under Tito that made it possible for his successors, Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia, to assume total control over the press and public life in their countries.

Chapter 2, "Serbia: Manufacturing Enemies," chronicles the rise of Serb nationalism and Milosevic's takeover of the Communist Party machinery, the state, and the media in the late 1980s, leading to the wars against Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Contrary to common wisdom, which says that Milosevic's first step on the road to unchallenged authority in Serbia was taking control of the Serbian media, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that it was the Serbian media that created Milosevic. Some of the key executives in Serbia's most influential media—such as the Politika publishing house and Radio and TV Belgrade—befriended Milosevic while working with

him in Party propaganda headquarters. They participated in behind-the-scenes maneuvers to remove his opponents and all obstacles to his rise to the top. It was Milosevic's televised promise to Kosovo Serbs, "No one is allowed to beat you anymore!" played over and over again on Belgrade TV, that catapulted him into the role of unquestioned leader of the Serb cause. Those media also played instrumental roles in manufacturing an ever-expanding list of Serb enemies from Albanian "Shiptar separatists" to the anti-Orthodox "Catholic alliance" (Slovenes and Croats), from Bosnian "Muslim mujahedeen" and "Jihad warriors" to "Western imperialists" intent on destroying Serbia. Projecting all "others" as enemies, Serbian media helped lay the ground for preemptive wars and even crimes, presenting the siege and bombardment of Croatian cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar as the "defense of Serbian ancient fireplaces."

Chapter 3, "Serbo-Croatian War: Lying for the Homeland," analyzes the rise of Franjo Tudjman and his party to power in Croatia; their conquest of all relevant media in the country; and their manipulation of radio, TV, and the press as an act of self-defense against Serbia and aggression against Bosnia. An analysis of Serbian and Croatian media during the Serbo-Croatian war in 1991 established "the same frameworks of propaganda on both sides, repeating: 'we' are the victims, 'they' are the culprits; there is no way to save 'ourselves' other than annihilating and vanquishing 'them'; it is 'us' who have been sanctified, while the 'others' have been satanised."[6]

Chapter 4, "Bosnia: Ground Zero," tells the story of the nationalists' three and a half years of systematic destruction in which they targeted, terrorized, and tore apart the most tolerant and open-minded media in prewar Yugoslavia, with its multiethnic editorial staff and tradition of respect for differences. This chapter is the most extensive, primarily because the conflict in Bosnia was the longest and the deadliest of all, involving both Serbia and Croatia. Although Milosevic and Tudjman were in a bloody war over the "Serb areas" of Croatia, they found common ground in their mutual aspiration to expand their countries by conquering and annexing huge parts of Bosnia. This chapter is the most personal because I not only researched but lived the years of the terror against that country. The chapter also offers documentary evidence of the manufacturing of "news" in both the Serbian and Croatian

media, aimed at stirring ethnic and religious hatred in Bosnia. The chapter provides an analysis of the gradual destruction of the multiethnic alternative in Bosnia, which opened the way for the rise of the extremist Muslim media in the country.

Chapter 5, "Balkan Media Post-Dayton: Missed Opportunities," provides a critical overview of developments in the media in the postwar period, 1995–2000. It includes the few successes and the major failures of international "media intervention" in the Balkans, in which bureaucratic methods and ignorance of local capacities undermined the stated goal of creating a civil society.

Chapter 6, "The Year 2000: The Beginning of Change," describes the dramatic events of the year 2000—the end of the Tudjman era in Croatia and the Milosevic era in Serbia and the rise of antinationalist alternatives in the mostly Bosniak-majority areas of Bosnia, and it looks at the impact of those changes on the regional media. Finally, the closing chapter, "Policy Recommendations," offers some thoughts about what the international community might have done better in its efforts to assist the development of a free media in the Balkans.

It is my hope that the record and recommendations of this book will prove relevant and useful not only to those trying to understand the forces behind the destruction of the former Yugoslavia but also to the people of other countries and regions—and especially to fellow journalists—struggling to make their own transitions to democracy.