
Fortifying Pakistan

The Role of U.S. Internal Security Assistance

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C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk



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For Christine's husband, Jeffrey Kelley,
and Peter's wife and son, Tasha Enemark and Corinth Enemark-Chalk

Contents

Foreword by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley	ix
Preface	xiii
A Note on Terms of Reference, Methods, and Sources	xv
Glossary of Acronyms	xvii
Maps	xix
Introduction	1
1. Pakistan's Domestic Threat Environment	9
2. U.S. Assistance Programs to Pakistan	45
3. Assessment of U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance to Pakistan	61
Postscript	81
Notes	83
Bibliography	121
Index	143
About the Authors	163

Illustrations**Figures**

- 1. Agency Administrative Structure in FATA* 11

Tables

- 1. Deaths Resulting from Sunni-Shi'a Sectarian Violence, 2002–2004* 27
- 2. Afghan Opium Statistics, 1994–2004* 30
- 3. Opiate Seizures and Drug Arrests in Pakistan, 1996–2004* 30
- 4. Most Corrupt Sectors in Pakistan according to Public Opinion* 38
- 5. Average Bribe per Sector* 39
- 6. U.S. Security Assistance and the Extant Pakistani Internal Threat Environment* 63

Maps

- 1. Pakistan* xix
- 2. Districts of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and FATA* xx
- 3. The Disputed Area of Jammu and Kashmir* xxi

Foreword

Over the past fifteen years a great deal has been learned about the critical importance of well-trained and -equipped police forces. They are indispensable in rebuilding failed states and preventing their collapse and in coping with powerful domestic and international organized armed criminal groups. Their responsibilities include helping to pacify various forms of terrorism and ethnic or sectarian militias and building durable police and judicial institutions for the rule of law. The United States Institute of Peace has been at the forefront in learning lessons about this process, applying them in practice, and understanding them in theory.

This volume by C. Christine Fair and Peter Chalk on Pakistan is the latest important contribution to the Institute's body of work. With a deep understanding of Pakistan's many security problems, the authors have undertaken a very impressive analysis based on years of painstaking research and make striking insights into how the problems might be addressed. They call the shots as they see them and tackle some highly difficult questions that do not lend themselves to easy answers.

The authors place the narrower issue of internal security reform and U.S. assistance in the broader context of Pakistan's external and internal security issues (e.g., relations with Kashmir and Afghanistan; global terrorism; and various Pakistan-based Islamic extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda). It is true that external and internal security issues cannot be separated. Nor can major progress be made in the reform of Pakistan's security forces without tackling the underlying problems caused by the activities and influence of these groups—some of which are threats to the Musharraf regime—on the internal security situation. Thus, the authors boldly call for closing down groups associated with the Kashmir resistance and those operating against Afghanistan out of Pakistani territory in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan as a prerequisite for fundamental reform of Pakistan's security and judicial sectors and for the ultimate success of U.S. assistance programs. A very tall order, this call raises questions about Pakistan's domestic and foreign political-religious-military dynamics and about the will, and even the ability, of the Musharraf regime to make a

full-scale break with the extremist groups and to replace the opaque, ambivalent relationship that currently exists.

Moving from macro-security issues, the authors then take a more limited, practical look at U.S. civilian assistance to Pakistani security. As Pakistan is an ally in the global war on terrorism and Islamic extremism, the United States does not have the luxury of requiring a solution to the basic problems limiting the efficacy of Pakistan's security forces as a prerequisite for its assistance. Thus, the authors look at U.S. assistance in light of what it has achieved and what it can realistically be expected to achieve given the underlying problems. An important consideration—noted but not dealt with in detail—is the role of Pakistan's military forces and military intelligence, which has a very significant impact upon internal security and the various extremist groups and which receives large-scale U.S. assistance. In addition to the extremist groups considered in the first part of the book, the authors examine in some detail other major problems facing Pakistan's security forces, such as narcotics and broader smuggling, corruption, sectarian violence, and the educational environment, which encourages Islamic extremism rather than an acceptance of law and order.

In the face of these problems, the authors observe, U.S. civilian security assistance is directed toward four interrelated objectives:

- ❖ Bolstering counterterrorism capabilities
- ❖ Reinforcing instruments to confront criminal and other organizations that support extremism
- ❖ Addressing the underlying dearth of security and governance enabling extremism
- ❖ Helping the government to project its authority and the rule of law throughout Pakistan's national territory

In this context, the primary functions addressed by U.S. civilian assistance are counterterrorism, law enforcement, and counternarcotics. Geographically, the programs are focused primarily upon FATA and Baluchistan, both of which are infested by terrorism and narcotics trafficking involving Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The U.S. programs are administered by the Departments of State and Justice, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Drug Enforcement

Administration. The civilian programs in these regions are coordinated to the degree possible with Pakistan's military programs, which are assisted by the U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency. Key U.S. objectives in the border areas are to assist Pakistan's military and civilian forces in combating terrorism and narcotics (including through road building) and to assist in community development projects that promote greater acceptance of and cooperation with Pakistani security forces (including through school building). As the authors point out, the efficacy of Pakistani (and U.S.) programs in both FATA and Baluchistan is open to question, particularly given the strength of the opposition.

On a national level, the United States has chosen not to tackle the huge law enforcement problems caused by decades of poor education, training, and discipline and corruption among Pakistani police forces. U.S. training programs have been more narrowly focused on achievable tasks, but they have helped alleviate somewhat these basic problems and encouraged the government of Pakistan to undertake more comprehensive, long-term reform. Indeed, some niche U.S. programs on the national level have had very positive results. One of these is the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement. It has not only enhanced the coordination of U.S. civilian security assistance but has also increased interagency cooperation among the several Pakistani internal security agencies.

Other useful programs are the Automated Fingerprint Identification System and the Personal Identification System. Both are computer-driven systems to identify persons entering and leaving the country or apprehended inside the country. Both have identified known and suspected terrorists—something that was previously more guesswork than science. Another successful U.S. innovation is the highly trained Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group, which is called upon by the government of Pakistan to investigate high-profile terrorist incidents (such as the attack on President Musharraf). Additional programs are still in the gestation phase.

In a concluding chapter, the authors review limitations on the reform of Pakistani internal security policies, programs, and practices. For example, they question the will at the top levels of government to deal with Islamist extremist groups and consider the problem of corruption within the bureaucracy. The authors also raise questions as to whether overall U.S. assistance to and policies toward Pakistan do enough to encourage

development of a democratic system and civil society. These questions go well beyond issues of assistance to Pakistan's internal security.

The volume is a well-researched, highly informative analysis of Pakistan's internal security problems and U.S. assistance programs. It both raises basic questions of the highest policy significance and provides a good picture of what U.S. programs have been able to achieve. On balance, one concludes that there has been substantial progress despite the problems; that there is still a very long way to go; and that the U.S. investment in dollars, equipment, and effort is justified and worth continuing. Given the stakes involved, including those related to the stewardship of Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, the United States must continue to help Pakistan in its struggle against extremism.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Washington, DC

Preface

The authors are first of all indebted to the numerous serving and retired officials, journalists, and analysts in both Pakistan and the United States who took the time to share their various insights and thoughts on the subject matter contained in this study.

A special debt of thanks is owed to Paul Stares, the director of the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention (formerly the Research and Studies Program) within the United States Institute of Peace, who supported this project from its inception and recognized its importance in the context of the global war on terrorism. The authors would additionally like to acknowledge a number of individuals who reviewed this draft and provided invaluable feedback on it, including Lt. Col. Kurt Meppen, a research fellow at the Institute; Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution; and Col. (ret.) John H. Gill. Additionally, the authors would like to express their gratitude to two individuals within the Institute's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention for their invaluable research and editorial support: Kerem Levitas, who is a program associate, and Isaac Congedo, who is a research assistant. Finally, the authors are grateful to Kurt Volkan, whose diligent editorial guidance did much to save them from their own prose. It goes without saying, however, that any omissions, errors, or deficiencies are the responsibility of the authors alone.

The intent of this study is to advance the interests of both the U.S. and Pakistan governments and to contribute to the development of a robust U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Equally, while aspects of this study are critical of both the United States and Pakistan, the authors trust the study will be recognized and understood as a good-faith effort to identify means to enhance the quality of life and governance of the people of Pakistan. The authors also hope that this study will be instrumental in stimulating further analysis and discussions of Pakistan's internal security reform.

A Note on Terms of Reference, Methods, and Sources

“Islamic” vs. “Islamist”

The popular press frequently conflates the terms “Islamic” with “Islamist.” For example, it is not uncommon to read or hear the expression “Islamic terrorism” or “Islamic violence.” This use is as unfortunate as it is erroneous. The term Islamist is an immediate derivation of Islamism, which is distinguished from the term Islamic by the fact that Islamic signifies religion and culture as it has developed over the last millennium of Islam’s history. In contrast, Islamism is first and foremost a religiopolitical phenomenon with moorings in significant events of the twentieth century, such as the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Thus, in this study, the terms Islamic and Islamist are not employed interchangeably. The term Islamic is used sparingly and only when specifically referencing cultural, religious, or artistic aspects of Islam. When describing religiopolitical phenomenon, the authors use the term Islamist. For example, it makes sense to use the expression “Islamic law” but not “Islamic militancy.”¹

Transliteration and Terms of Reference

This monograph discusses several militant groups that have been episodically proscribed only to emerge under new names, which are generally unfamiliar to most readers. For clarity, therefore, this study retains the original designations for these organizations. For example, although Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) now operates under the banner Jamaat ul Dawa, it is referred to throughout the study by the former name, as this is the most well-known and widely used name. Additionally, the study uses many Urdu and Perso-Arabic words that have different transliterations, most of which are equally acceptable. The authors have chosen to use spellings that are the closest to the Urdu pronunciation. Hence, “jihad” is chosen in preference of “jehad” and “Lashkar-e-Taiba” in preference of “Lashkar-e-Toiba.” In instances where two alternative transliterations are available, the authors have adopted the simpler of the two. Thus, Jamaat Islami is used in lieu of Jama’at-e-Islami and other such variants.

Methods of Research and a Caveat on Sources

Given the sparse literature on Pakistan's internal security, much of the information contained in this study is of a primary nature obtained from interviews and discussions with officials, analysts, academics, researchers, and journalists in Pakistan, the United States, and, where relevant, India. Interview data always suffers from inherent limitations, such as selection bias and perspective bias, which may limit the generalizability of the respondents' observations. For example, the respondents' political positions, professional equities, and other forms of institutional vestedness may affect the data they provide. Respondents may even deliberately mislead or misinform to affect the authors' analyses.


This study also draws upon a thorough review of the open-source literature, including South Asian media sources. Unfortunately, journalism—while vibrant in the region—is not always accurate. The authors have made every effort to corroborate sources as much as possible and to exclude information that does not appear to be credible or reliable. The authors have also made every possible effort to ensure that this study reflects an objective assessment of the current state of Pakistan's internal security environment and of the utility of U.S. support to the country's law enforcement and civil justice community. Whether the authors have succeeded in doing so will be judged by the readers and by the robustness of their analyses. This study generally takes December 1, 2005, as its information cutoff point.

Glossary of Acronyms

AFIS	Automated Fingerprint Identification System
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANF	Anti-Narcotics Task Force
ASS	Anjuman-e-Sipah-Sahaba
ATTA	Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CT	Counter Terrorism
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DS/ATA	Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance
ESF	Economic Support Funds
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crime Regulation
FIA	Federal Investigative Agency
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GT	Grand Truck
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HIV	Human Deficiency Virus
HM	Hizbol Mujahadeen
HUJI	Harakat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami
HuM	Harkat-ul-Mujahadeen
IB	Intelligence Bureau
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
IV	Intravenous
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
Ji	Jamaat Islami


JuA	Jamiat-ul-Ansar
JWG-CTLE	Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement
KESC	Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
MI	Ministry of the Interior
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
NAB	National Accountability Bureau
NACP	National AIDS Control Program
NCDB	National Criminal Database
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NOC	no-objection certificate
NWFP	North Western Frontier Province
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PISCES	Personal Identification Security, Comparison and Evaluation System
PML	Pakistan Muslim League
PO	Police Order
PPP	Pakistan's People Party
S/CT	Office of Counterterrorism
SCBA	Supreme Court Bar Association
SIG	Special Investigation Group
SIU	Special Investigative Unit
SMP	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan
SSG	Special Services Group
SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TI	Transparency International
TI-P	Transparency International-Pakistan
TJP	Tahrik-e-Jafaria
TNJE, TJF	Tehrill-e-Nafaz Fiqh-e-Ja'fariyya
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WAPDA	Pakistan Water and Development Authority
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Pakistan



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Districts of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and FATA



The Disputed Area of Jammu and Kashmir



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