BREAKING THE ICE



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Introduction

In the midst of the Cold War, three of the coldest relationships between nations underwent profound change. If none of the three became especially warm and friendly, each became at least notably less hostile and considerably more cooperative. East and West Germany, Israel and Egypt, China and the United States: in each case, old adversaries agreed to accept, and even to work with, each other. This book asks a simple question—but a question whose answer may have significant implications for the process of rapprochement generally: How did these transformations come about? How did nations locked for decades in a pattern of adversarial, sometimes violent, interactions break the ice of their mutual hostility and make cooperation the rule rather than the exception?

Answers to such questions usually begin, *and end*, with analyses of circumstances and situations. The improvement of hostile relationships is typically viewed as deriving more from changing circumstances than from arbitrary policy initiatives. According to this view, international relationships change according to the dictates of political and economic circumstances in the attempt to maximize national power, security, and welfare. If the leading decision makers in the governments of two hostile nations come to a mutual conclusion that it is to their advantage to achieve a more amicable bilateral relationship, the "will" will find a "way."

This view tends to underestimate the obstacles involved, however. Relationships marred by one or more wars, a high level of military tension, mutual recriminations, provocative propaganda,

and policies reflecting deep-seated animosity across a range of issues present barriers to cooperation that cannot simply be dismissed at will. Distrust, fear, anger, and prejudice form psychological barriers to change in the body politic. Uncertainty concerning the intentions of the other government, the intractability of specific disputes, differing perceptions of events, and so forth present policy dilemmas. Even given the existence of strong motivations to pursue better relations, therefore, the question of how to go about doing so is by no means of negligible importance.

In other words, an understanding of the structure of a relationship—of those international and domestic circumstances that motivate and constrain bilateral policy—is not sufficient to illuminate the path of improved relations between adversaries. A knowledge of process—of promising strategies to overcome the considerable obstacles to improved relations—is also necessary in designing a rapprochement initiative. The conditions that lead to a desire to help construct a house of peace are essential, of course, but the tools and knowledge of housebuilding are necessary to fulfill the desire.

Focusing on a subject that has so far received relatively little scrutiny, this book is an examination of the process of improving adversarial relationships. In this examination, I do not seek to suggest that structure is less important than, or unrelated to, process. Of course it is not. Indeed, in recognition of the difficulty of separating situational factors from the process of improving relations with an adversary, this book includes an analysis of international circumstances. But the primary quarry is process.

The Three Cases

The Choice of Cases

In addition to improving our understanding of the process by which the two Germanys, Israel and Egypt, and China and the United States began their rapprochements, I wanted to establish in this book whether any general principles can be distilled from these cases that might be used to enhance the prospects of other attempts to end adversarial relationships between nations. Fortunately, the three cases share certain characteristics that allow comparisons between them to be drawn and lessons to be learned.

To begin with, all three are relatively contemporary and thus minimize doubt about the applicability of conclusions reached in the course of this study. Although the Cold War is now over and each of the three cases was profoundly influenced by the Cold War, the world still contains a number of adversarial relationships—for example, the United States and Cuba, China and Taiwan, Israel and most Arab states, and North and South Korea—that mirror in significant ways the cases here examined. Furthermore, these ongoing instances of entrenched mutual hostility confront the student of rapprochement with two major problems: they offer few examples of serious attempts to improve relations (North and South Korea may be an exception in this respect), and there is a dearth of reliable information and detailed source material. Aside from what can be inferred from the public record of governmental activities, there is a relative paucity of knowledge on behind-the-scenes maneuvering and the intent behind specific acts. By contrast, a wealth of material—including firsthand accounts, official records, and expert analyses—exists for the three cases analyzed in this book.

All three cases also represent successful attempts at rapprochement. Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik initiatives resulted in the basic treaty between East and West Germany. The diplomatic and political moves by President Nixon and President Carter and their Chinese counterparts Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping led to the normalization of relations in 1979. The process initiated by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, joined in by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and encouraged by U.S. president Jimmy Carter led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

It can be reasonably objected that while this commonality of success may help highlight the factors that are necessary or desirable in the pursuit of improved relations, it does little to illuminate the reasons why other rapprochement initiatives fail. In short, one needs to look at cases of failure as well as of success, at the negative as well as the positive. To satisfy this justifiable criticism and strengthen this study, in this book I have analyzed "negative" cases found in the prehistory of each case. A number of attempts to improve relations with the respective adversary can be seen in periods prior to the commencement of the successful initiatives. Specific examples of these are the efforts of the Johnson administration to improve relations with China, the overtures of West Germany's Kiesinger-Brandt government to East Germany, and Anwar Sadat's hints of

a willingness to reach an accommodation with Israel in 1970–72. Where appropriate, the circumstances and attributes thought to have contributed to the success of the successful initiatives are compared with those of the failed initiatives.

The advantage of using previous attempts at rapprochement as negative cases is that doing so reduces the range of variability on other factors. In other words, the nations that constitute the cases remain the same, as do many circumstances and policies. Relevant changes in circumstances, policies, and policy responses are therefore easier to identify. In addition, the prehistories add depth to the analysis, rendering some inferences more robust. On the other hand, broadening the analysis to more cases would also strengthen inferences. Unfortunately, as noted above, most other contemporary instances of long-standing adversarial relationships feature few examples of serious attempts at rapprochement and offer insufficient material, especially on private negotiations, to permit thorough analysis. These contemporary cases certainly have their interesting aspects that deserve consideration, and some of these aspects are considered in the final chapter. The focus of this book, however, lies elsewhere—in the recent but well-documented past.

Another reason for selecting the three cases is that each involved an initiative designed to lead to normalized relations with an adversary government. *Normalized* is used here in the sense of international law; that is, when two governments that have been withholding recognition and representation agree to formally recognize each other and exchange ambassadors, their relations are said to be normalized. This admittedly arbitrary and limited operational definition of initiatives to improve relations with a national adversary has the advantage of providing a relatively reliable means of differentiating among the wide range of possible policy behaviors that could be called a rapprochement initiative—though by no means is there any implication that seeking normalized relations is a sufficient indication of an attempt to achieve improved relations, or that normalized relations constitute the substance of improved relations. The focus on the process of normalization provides a means to place boundaries on an initiative, to give it a beginning and an end, and to provide a readily identifiable indication of the success of an initiative. Determining the substance of improved relations is inherently interpretive, a matter of weighing the evidence of postinitiative developments and marshaling arguments to

support one's conclusion. Such an assessment is included in the discussions of the cases to bolster the contention of the substantive success of the chosen cases.

The absence of normalized relations is also a helpful criterion for identifying adversarial relationships, though other criteria must be applied as well. For example, many governments refused for decades to recognize either the People's Republic of China (PRC) or East Germany, but the relationships of most of those nations with the latter two lacked the competitiveness implied in the word *adversarial*. The essence of the word *adversary* is better captured when it is further stipulated that the relationship is characterized by military tension and a high level of military preparedness, diplomatic rigidity, and officially expressed hostility over a long time. The stipulation of long-term hostility is made to distinguish between short-term disruptions in bilateral relations in which hostile policies are still in the formative stages and those adversarial relationships in which hostility has become practically axiomatic. There is no obvious definition of *long-term,* but a period of a decade or more reasonably allows the assumption that policies of hostility have become routine and expected.

The Case of the Two Germanys

All three of the feuds examined in this study stemmed from the results of World War II, but the existence and the enmity of the two German states was a direct consequence of the war. The division of the Allies into East and West transformed the border between the East and West zones of occupation in Germany into a de facto interstate frontier, the most militarized frontier in the world. The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949 divided the German nation according to the dictates of geopolitical competition and ideological antagonism.

Despite some cooperation regarding trade and currency exchange, official relations between the two German states were virtually nonexistent; the dialogue between them consisted primarily of denunciations, threats, and complaints issued at a distance. They became the frontline states of the world's most powerful military blocs, and the frontier between them hardened into barbed wire, cement, and watchtowers. Compromise and cooperation were rejected by the West German government

as a betrayal of the goal of national unification; the East German leaders regarded hostility to the West as their state's raison d'être and therefore saw easing of tensions as a potential existential threat.[1] Ironically, the building of the Berlin Wall planted the seeds that were to lead to the Basic Treaty between the FRG and the GDR. The mayor of West Berlin and future architect of the new Ostpolitik, Willy Brandt, recognized in the wall the bankruptcy of the policy of relying on the power of the United States to force a change in the status quo.[2] Brandt's aide and confidant Egon Bahr began to speak publicly of easing tensions and reducing the division of Germany through a policy of *Annäherung* (coming closer). Brandt enunciated the strategy of "small steps" to ameliorate the suffering caused by the division and keep the idea of reunification alive through human contact.

When Brandt became chancellor in October 1969, he conceded for the first time the existence of "two states in Germany," which was the signal for the beginning of a new initiative to improve relations with the government of East Germany. By the spring of 1970, Brandt was holding talks with Willi Stoph, West Germany and the Soviet Union were negotiating a treaty concerning the non-use of force to overturn the status quo, and the Four Powers who shared responsibility for Berlin were negotiating an agreement to give West Berlin a more secure status. The treaty between Bonn and Moscow was signed in August 1970, and it was followed by a treaty between Bonn and Warsaw in December of that year. With the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin by the Four Powers in September 1971, most of the obstacles to a normalization of relations between East and West Germany had been overcome and a community of interest in improved relations had been forged.

After another year of difficult negotiations, Bonn and East Berlin finally signed the Basic Treaty on December 21, 1972. The treaty stipulated a de facto normalization of relations between the two governments and promised, in the words of Chancellor Brandt, to "end the time of hostility and begin a period of cooperation."[3] Until the fall of the hard-line Communist regime in 1989 there was no end to antagonism and controversy between the states, but cooperation on practical matters vastly ameliorated the effects of division.

There were many agreements on visits, traffic, trade and financial matters, mail, communications, health, environment, and border issues. Between 1949 and 1969, there had been only

fifteen formal agreements between East and West Germany.[4] During the Ostpolitik initiative, an additional fifteen agreements were achieved, most of which were comprehensive. In the eight years following the signing of the Basic Treaty, forty-three agreements helped ameliorate the conditions of division. What is more, there was a noteworthy continuity in the fulfillment of these long-term commitments.[5] In 1973 the West German minister for inter-German affairs could already report the "reversal of a decade of deterioration in the area of human relations."[6] The reversal proved durable. About eight million visits of West Germans to East Germany and some five million visits in the opposite direction were recorded between 1972 and 1975.[7] The visits of West Germans to the GDR rose to 3.2 million per year by 1978, sinking to a still respectable average of 2.15 million per year after 1981.[8]

Telephone and postal agreements greatly facilitated contact between citizens of the two countries. Calls from West Berlin to East Berlin were not possible in 1970; by 1980 such calls had risen to more than ten million.[9] Inter-German trade, though not dramatic, had more than doubled from the 1970 level by 1980.[10] The economic benefits to East Germany of its special relationship with West Germany in terms of credit, transit fees, access to technology, and its unique status as an "unofficial member of the Common Market"[11] contributed to making the East German standard of living the highest of any Communist country.

The Quadripartite Agreement and the Traffic Treaty concerning West Berlin greatly facilitated transit to and from the city.[12] The hopes expressed by Henry Kissinger that the Quadripartite Agreement would at least temporarily reduce tensions over Berlin were more than fulfilled. The situation of Berlin, once the perennial cause of tensions, remained relatively tranquil even when East-West tensions were rising. It was no small accomplishment to be able to say in 1986, "For the foreseeable future East-West tensions will not be synonymous with Berlin,"[13] though such statements now seem to belong to a curiously cautious and distant past.

The foundation of cooperation created by the complex of Ostpolitik treaties proved strong and durable, capable of withstanding difficult political disputes and icy blasts of rhetoric. By the time the Christian Democrats took power in Bonn under Helmut Kohl in 1982, there existed not only a complex of

treaties and agreements regulating the West German relationship to the East, but also traditions and institutions that the Kohl government could not easily change or ignore. As events demonstrated, the party that had castigated Brandt on his Ostpolitik in the early 1970s had grown to accept the goals and consequences of those policies.[14]

Despite cooperation in practical matters and a degree of convergence of geopolitical concerns, however, a wide gulf separated the two German states until the fall of Honecker in 1989. The areas in which cooperation proved relatively unproblematic were areas relatively free of ideological contention, such as trade and traffic. There was far less cooperation, if not adamant refusal, to cooperate on matters directly relating to the nature of the respective political systems.[15] Despite further negotiations in such areas as science and the environment, there was a perception that inter-German politics had for the most part been reduced to managing existing agreements; arrangements designed to raise the relationship to a higher level were lacking. This situation led to a charge by critics that Ostpolitik had brought "more formalization than normalization" to inter-German affairs.[16] In addition, the raising of the minimum daily currency exchange, tensions over border incidents, petty traffic controls, and the limitations on Western journalists by the GDR were constant sources of irritation for West Germans. The insistence of the FRG on extending citizenship to Germans in former German territories and attacks by the West German media angered East Berlin. Summit meetings were relatively rare and difficult to arrange, falling victim to both minor bilateral incidents and major international events.

Reunification remained a distant goal of Brandt's Ostpolitik, but East Berlin did its best to bury those hopes. The East German authorities vigorously pursued a policy of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation), constantly emphasizing the failings and dangers of the capitalist and imperialist West and the necessity for the existence of a socialist Germany. From 1971 to 1976 the East German Communist party strove to institutionalize its special relationship with the Soviet Union in its constitution, in treaties of alliance, and in party declarations of "eternal and indivisible friendship" in order to create impediments to reunification and emphasize the source of its claim to legitimacy.[17]

The perceived necessity of pursuing a permanent campaign of demarcation derived at least partially from the fear of

spreading dissatisfaction among the population because of increased contact with wealthier and more autonomous West Germans.[18] As subsequent events have proven, the fear was quite justified. To the surprise of virtually everyone, the Communist regime and the Berlin Wall fell to the building pressures. Despite Gorbachev's desperate attempts to avoid the humiliation of a united Germany in NATO, he finally settled for what he could achieve short of military intervention: a promise concerning borders, limitations on the size of Germany's armed forces, prohibitions against Germany's possession of nuclear weapons and the stationing of NATO troops in the East zone, and the maintenance of Soviet troops in Germany for four years.

Developments in the Soviet Union and their effects on their European allies were the proximate causes of the historic changes in Central Europe, of course, but I believe a strong argument can be made that West German hopes of an evolutionary process arising from the easing of tensions and fears brought about by Ostpolitik have been realized. There can be little doubt that the fear and mistrust of West Germany played a dominant role in determining Soviet foreign policy; indeed, the dispute over the future of Germany was the heart of the Cold War.[19] Thus the prevailing tensions in the heart of Europe during the sixties would have prevented even a Gorbachev from pursuing a policy of nonintervention in the face of a collapsing East German regime. The subsequent renunciation of force, virtual recognition of borders, close contact and consultation, economic and technical cooperation, and constrained and responsible behavior during times of tension grew out of Ostpolitik. The initiative built a foundation of precedents, and institutionalized arrangements and normal channels of communication on many levels, all of which provided the means to deal with problems and disputes in a far more constructive manner than was hitherto possible. The complex of agreements and treaties of which the Basic Treaty is the keystone significantly contributed to the reduction of military tension in Europe. Ostpolitik managed to reduce the fear of revived German aggression in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and managed to replace the diplomacy of threat with the diplomacy of dialogue. The inter-German relationship grew closer because the two German governments recognized that they shared a strategic interest in détente. Berlin went from a potential casus belli to relative tranquility. The breathtaking changes occurring in Eastern Europe

would hardly have been possible if these changes had not occurred. When the Berlin Wall fell, automatic enmity between a Germany anchored in the Western alliance and the Soviet Union was no longer assumed; Ostpolitik had undermined this assumption.

Regardless of the role played by Ostpolitik in ending the Cold War, its substantive success can be seen in the amelioration of the human costs of national division, the diminution of the constant threat of crisis, and the reduction of the obstacles to East-West communication and cooperation. These were the short-term goals of the initiative and, judged from the perspective of a quarter-century ago, the quest was noble and challenging. In both the ends and the means of Ostpolitik, Germany has provided a distinctive example of the art of peace. Such are the ironies of history.

The Rapprochement Between the United States and China

The frosty hostility that developed between the United States and the People's Republic of China was less structurally predetermined than in the German case, but the clash of perceptions and objectives was almost as fundamental. There was something of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Wars of Religion in the way each side projected stark images of evil on the other and repeatedly intoned the historical necessity of the other's demise. For those who remember the intense animosity of the fifties and sixties, even the present coolness in American-Chinese relations presents a startling contrast.

The refusal to recognize the PRC, the blocking of PRC representation in the United Nations, and the diplomatic and military support for Taiwan were not inevitable constants of U.S. foreign policy. But ideological animosity and clashing regional objectives were certain consequences of the 1949 Communist victory on mainland China. The Korean War, McCarthyism, and high-level forecasting of a titanic global struggle contributed to American animosity. These circumstances also had their Chinese counterparts, to which was added the determination to systematically eradicate the vestiges of a century of humiliation and forge national unity.

Chinese and American soldiers met and died on the battlefield in Korea. The Formosa Strait crisis in 1954–55 found the two countries once again close to military confrontation, and

the failure of talks to resolve the issue left a festering conflict that flared into crisis again in 1958 and 1962. The detonation of an atomic bomb by China on October 16, 1964, the intensifying conflict in Vietnam, and the confusion of the Cultural Revolution helped defeat the attempts made by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to reduce the enmity between the two nations.

The election of one of America's foremost Cold Warriors to the presidency in 1968 also seemed to militate against a change in the relationship. History has no lack of ironies, however, and the fierce ideological combatants came to the realization that their interests were converging toward the common ground of strategic expediency. Nixon and Kissinger began signaling interest in a new relationship with both rhetorical and substantive gestures. The Chinese leaders took note of these signals and slowly, cautiously, high-level communication was established between the two governments. The Chinese responded with an elliptical gesture of their own by inviting an American table tennis team to the People's Republic (thereby initiating what came to be called Ping-Pong diplomacy), and events moved quickly toward Kissinger's secret trip and the announcement of Nixon's historic trip to China.

These dramatic events, which shocked and excited the world, represented only a de facto change in the status of the relationship between the United States and China. Formal normalization was not officially achieved until January 1, 1979, and the event was sufficiently significant to be considered an additional watershed in Chinese-American relations. Both the thaw and the normalization were accompanied by significant increases in transactions and improved cooperation.[20] The 1971–72 thaw, however, provided the more dramatic strategic and diplomatic benefits. Direct and regular communication and consultation replaced the limited and sterile ambassador-level talks in Warsaw and the clumsy exchanges through intermediaries. The tacit understandings between the leaders of the two countries "provided the foundation for a common if informal strategy, by which different—even clashing—purposes produced an extraordinary parallelism in action."[21] The United States gained greater strategic and diplomatic flexibility; the path was cleared for China to complete its emergence from isolation.

The time between Nixon's trip and formal normalization was a period of coolness and lack of further progress, but the

fundamental improvement in relations survived leadership transitions in both countries. The negotiations between the Carter administration and the Chinese government led by Deng Xiaoping were more protracted and less dramatic than those conducted by their predecessors, but they were more substantive. They also ended up being conducted in a familiar manner: secretly. The announcement of the normalization agreement on December 15, 1978, surprised the world, including the U.S. Congress and the American public.

Whereas the earlier breakthrough had furthered geopolitical interests, the gains of normalization were for the most part in the flow of people, goods, and ideas. The number of Americans visiting the PRC increased sevenfold, the number of Chinese delegations visiting the United States increased fiftyfold, and student and scholar exchanges increased from a handful to thousands during the next two years.[22] The liberalization of bilateral trade by the United States through the easing of technology restrictions, the granting of Most Favored Nation status to China, and the extension of credit brought a quadrupling of trade in three years.[23] Academic exchanges have proven mutually beneficial in terms of exchange of specialized knowledge and university-to-university cooperation.[24]

Nonetheless, the 1980s brought a slowing or even a downturn in these trends, and official relations suffered the strain of recurring tension. President Reagan caused a stir in Beijing by vowing both before and after his election to upgrade relations with the government of Taiwan. Tensions increased over arms sales to that island. Beijing responded with threats and dire warnings, and the Reagan administration continued with confusing behavior consisting of acts of both provocation and conciliation.[25] The durability of the relationship, however, was once again demonstrated in the negotiations leading to the signing of the Shanghai II Communiqué on August 17, 1982. With this major hurdle cleared, relations returned to a business-as-usual basis.[26]

Yet the changes initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev have altered the basis of strategic cooperation that originally motivated the rapprochement. The mutual perception of the Soviet Union as a threat has been greatly mitigated, allowing a Soviet-Chinese détente and hastening the obsolescence of American containment policies. Even with less compelling reasons for good relations, however, the governments of the United States and

China have so far withstood the domestic pressures for a rupture in relations resulting from the events in Tiananmen Square and their aftermath. In fact, those very events and the extent of the attention and concern they caused in America demonstrate the remarkable changes that rapprochement has wrought. In some ways this change even overshadows the constraint shown by China in not exercising its Security Council veto during the Persian Gulf crisis.

The seventies and eighties have left a legacy of agreements, contacts, and interests that could be abrogated only at great cost. Those years in Sino-American relations have enriched the lives of millions of people and contributed to international stability; the world is better off for having experienced them, whatever the future may hold.

The Battle for Peace Between Israel and Egypt

The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 inflamed Arab nationalism, pitting an alliance of Arab states determined to regain the land of a displaced Arab people against a Jewish state determined to survive as the hope of the Jewish people. To this clash born of fervent nationalism must be added the ideological struggles between moderate and radical Arabs, regional superpower competition, violence between ethnic factions, and territorial ambitions that have characterized the region. All of these factors militated against an ending to the state of belligerency that existed from the beginning between Israel and Egypt.

The relationship between the two states was born in World War II, and war erupted between them in each of the following three decades. The Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 each left a legacy of bitterness. Moreover, between those wars violence continued in the form of artillery exchanges, commando raids, air strikes, and terrorism. In the best of years, the condition "no war, no peace" nursed a brooding threat of large-scale violence.

The Yom Kippur War, or October War, of 1973 left the door to peace slightly ajar. Anwar Sadat of Egypt agreed to direct negotiations with Israel over a cease-fire. Through the medium of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, Egypt and Israel achieved the first real progress toward a reduction of tensions in the area by agreeing to the Sinai I Disengagement Accord in 1974. After a lull and the failure of a second round of shuttle diplomacy in

March 1975, a second important step was taken with the signing of the Sinai II Disengagement Accord calling for further Israeli withdrawal in September 1975.

Sinai II was followed by another period of relative stagnation in the peace process, however. The change of administrations in Washington in January 1977 and the rise of the right-wing Likud to power in Israel in May of that year introduced more uncertainty and doubt concerning the prospects of further progress. All parties seemed willing to work toward convening a Geneva conference to reach a comprehensive regional settlement, but unresolved disputes and a lack of faith and enthusiasm by the major participants did not portend well for either the convening of the conference or its chances of success. It was under these circumstances that Anwar Sadat announced his willingness in November 1977 to present his conditions for peace to the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem. Much of the Arab world reacted with anger and dismay. The leaders and media of the Western world expressed delight and admiration. Sadat had thrown the dice of fate and transformed the verities of Middle Eastern politics.

Sadat's speech before the Knesset on November 20, 1977, brought a short period of euphoria to Israel and Egypt, culminating in the visit of Prime Minister Menachem Begin to Ismailia. Yet, though a new era of direct and intensive consultations began between the Egyptians and Israelis, the reality of political dangers, decades of mistrust, and mutually exclusive aims reasserted itself. By the end of July 1978 President Carter had decided on the dramatic but desperate expedient of holding a trilateral summit involving intensive negotiations at Camp David. These difficult negotiations, held in September, yielded a framework on which a peace treaty was to be based. The peace process had taken the largest step yet, but another six months of wrangling, misunderstandings, and accusations were to pass before President Carter finally brought the two parties to agreement with his own shuttle diplomacy in March 1979. The historic peace treaty between the two most powerful combatants in the Middle East was signed on March 27, formally ending thirty years of belligerency.

Of the three cases, the most contention concerning the value of normalized relations has surrounded the Egyptian-Israeli case. Despite stipulated talks on Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza (which quickly failed), the Egyptian-Israeli peace

treaty has had virtually no impact on the central issue of Arab-Israeli dispute: the Palestinian question. Syria and Jordan complained that the treaty sold out their interests by completely undercutting their ability to negotiate a return of their occupied territories, and critics of the treaty have argued that the Israelis, free from fear of a two-front war, were emboldened to follow a more aggressive policy on the northern border.[27] Such a judgment finds support in the fact that the invasion of Lebanon took place six weeks after Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai. Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian foreign minister who resigned when Sadat went to Jerusalem, claims that Sadat's initiative and the subsequent agreements closed the door on much more promising prospects of a Geneva conference and achieved highly unsatisfactory terms for Egypt.[28] Some Americans have agreed that Camp David and the peace treaty may have reduced the chances of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.[29]

Formal peace and normalized relations have brought only minimal trade and cultural exchange.[30] Many Israeli tourists have visited Egypt, but few Egyptians have traveled to Israel, and most of those who have were Palestinians visiting family and friends.[31] Diplomatic relations, with the exception of the temporary recall of the Egyptian ambassador after the invasion of Lebanon, have been cool though correct.

On the other hand, most of the criticisms leveled against Camp David and the peace treaty are based on hypothetical alternatives and questionable assumptions. The Arab rejectionist assumption—that continued belligerent solidarity would have eventually forced a more comprehensive and just settlement—faces a preponderance of contrary historical evidence. The hypothetical alternative of a comprehensive settlement is based on a weighing of motivations and bargaining power, all of which could be posited for the many years prior to 1978, during which even the step-by-step progress proved extremely difficult to achieve. The chances of a comprehensive settlement are indicated better by the posturing that defied all attempts to convene the Geneva conference than by the abstract exercises of the detractors of the peace treaty. The conference approach may yet produce some fruit, but only because of circumstances that have evolved since the peace treaty.

Noting that Egyptian-Israeli normalization failed to lead to a comprehensive peace, solve the Palestinian problem, end

regional violence, and substantially enhance trade and cultural contacts does not negate what normalization accomplished: a stable peace between Egypt and Israel. A "cold peace" it may be, but, as Menachem Begin pointed out, "One must remember that there has been no killing on the Israeli-Egyptian border, and this is the main point of any peace."[32]

When the events of the three decades preceding the treaty are considered, the lack of killing deserves emphasis. At the time of this writing, eighteen years have passed since the last bloodletting between Israel and Egypt, and war between them in the foreseeable future remains highly improbable. The treaty has proven durable, surviving rejection by most Arab states, the assassination of Sadat, the serious strains of Lebanon, the dispute over Taba, Israeli settlement policy, the annexation of East Jerusalem, the Intifada, and Saddam Hussein's rocket attacks. Though the original hopes that the treaty would serve as a precedent for similar accords between Israel and other Arab states have yet to be fulfilled, the durability of the peace between the two foremost powers of the region has nonetheless had an impact: "With the realization that Egypt's peace with Israel was likely to last came the awareness among most Arabs that the military option of confronting Israel was not very promising. As a result, it became commonplace for Arabs to talk of a political settlement with Israel."[33] A number of initiatives were undertaken in this regard in the eighties, all of which have so far been frustrated. Yet these steps have been taken in the peaceful terrain of diplomacy, without the frequent resort to threats of war that characterized pre-treaty rhetoric.

When Anwar Sadat stood before the Knesset and pledged "No more war!" he expressed the main promise of the eventual peace treaty. The peace has not brought harmony, it has not brought warmth, it has yet to see a process of growing closer. The main value of peace, however, often lies in the alternative.

The Strategy of Inquiry

Methodology

This study is structured according to what Alexander George has called the "method of structured, focused comparison."[34] This approach is well summarized by Richard Smoke:

> In essence, with this technique one performs case studies in moderate depth on a manageably small number of instances of a phenomenon, employing either qualitative or quantitative methods. One then compares the cases against each other with reference to explicit hypotheses or questions, which are applied in the same standardized way to each case study. (The hypotheses or questions may be derived from abstract models or from any source.) Some comparisons will suggest similarities among the cases, of course, which provide the basis for generalizations. But other comparisons will point out differences, which can lead to equally valuable generalizations when their context is well-specified and when the reasons for the variation are explicitly identified.[35]

The five hypotheses—or "assumptions," as they are called in this study—that I have applied to the three cases analyzed in this book are derived from a range of theoretical, experimental, and empirical studies. (For the sake of brevity, only a fraction of those studies are referred to in this section.) Each assumption stipulates certain conditions or behavior, and the basic logic of inquiry is to determine whether those stipulations are met in all three cases. If they are, then the proposition is sound. If they are not, then the proposition is rejected or modified so that its stipulations more accurately reflect the conditions and behavior found in the cases. In this way, it is hoped that the conclusions reached here may throw some light on the value of the existing literature in the field. Moreover, this approach not only allows conditions and behavior that are common to all three of the cases to be identified, but also suggests what conditions and behavior are conducive to rapprochement generally.

Unfortunately, most of the evidence available for judging whether or not the cases conform to the assertions does not lend itself to definitive interpretation. The evidence is not quantitative; indeed, much of it consists of opinions and perceptions. Furthermore, the evidence is of different kinds, from many different sources. Consequently, one must rely on informed and well-supported assessments in making judgments on the applicability of the various propositions.

Given the qualitative and subjective nature of the evidence, this study proceeds in the following fashion. First, a narrative is presented in which evidence, much of it summarized from many different sources, is presented for each case. This evidence consists in large part of the assessments of scholars and policy experts, the published revelations of participants and decision

makers (memoirs, speeches, interviews, and so on), and the texts of negotiating proposals and treaties. A judgment is then made on the basis of the evidence and an explanation given of the reasoning behind it. One criterion that is generally applied is that a rough consensus should exist among the experts and participants in regard to the existence and nature of an event or circumstance. In some instances, the public record is clear enough to support an independent assessment. Fortunately, the evidence for most of the stipulated conditions or behaviors is relatively clear-cut.

Three Areas of Inquiry

In this book I have pursued three areas of inquiry, suggested both by the logic of inquiry and by the areas of emphasis found in the literature of international relations. The first area of inquiry, the *circumstances* of rapprochement, is a search for the international circumstances that are most conducive to the successful timing of a rapprochement initiative. (This inquiry is chiefly an inquiry into structure.) The second area, *strategies,* is an inquiry into the best policies for achieving rapprochement (essentially an inquiry into process). The initial step of rapprochement, the ice-breaking phase, will be given special attention. The third area of inquiry, *formal negotiations,* is the stage at which the governments involved are actively seeking agreement on the conditions of normalized relations.

International Circumstances

A puzzling shortcoming in the literature of international relations is the relative lack of guidance on what structural circumstances are most conducive to the success of rapprochement initiatives. This lack is especially puzzling because structural circumstances are a traditional focus of inquiry. Rapprochement, it seems, has attracted less attention than war and peace.

Structural circumstances can be divided into internal versus external and domestic versus international. However, the primary focus of this study is on process, not on structure. Although a consideration of circumstances is deemed necessary because they are involved with the motivation to seek a rapprochement, a systematic inquiry into both domestic and international circumstances would have profoundly changed the focus

of this study. Therefore the examination of propitious circumstances was limited to international circumstances only.

The question of circumstances is essentially a question of the timing of a rapprochement initiative unless the circumstances are amenable to manipulation by the leaders of a state. The discovery of the existence of propitious circumstances addresses the question of timing. The question of manipulation is partly a question of process, of strategy.

Scholars of international relations have spent considerable effort to identify generalizable circumstances associated with war in general. Much less attention, however, has been given to rapprochements between long-term adversaries.

Theories concerning relations between nations have often been based on a consideration of their relative power. Consequently, one finds only the most general of guidance on structural considerations. The most useful guidance is provided by the realist tradition, the central thesis of which is that relations between nation-states usually are and should be determined by the configuration of power in the international system.[36]

This tradition argues that the necessity of self-reliance for one's security in an anarchic system, and man's natural proclivity to seek to expand his power, make national survival and welfare contingent on maintaining or achieving a favorable position in the configuration of international power. Consequently, if a state's national interests are believed to be better served by resisting or containing the attempts of another state to expand its power, adversarial policies will result. If the cooperation of another state is required to maintain or enhance one's strategic position, attempts to win cooperation will result.

However, this realist approach is prone to a great deal of ambiguity and confusion. For example, if foreign policy were primarily determined by power considerations, then changes in long-standing policies, especially in regard to an adversary, should reflect a change in the power environment. Yet power transitions, especially those of a systemic nature, are often seen as more conducive to war than to peace.[37] In other words, the very conditions that would supposedly motivate a rapprochement initiative might, according to prominent theories of international relations, work against the success of such an initiative. The extent of the disagreement that exists on the behavioral

implications of any particular distribution of power makes distilling a prescription difficult.

Similarly, many scholars have stressed that international circumstances other than those involving the configuration of power among nations play an important role in facilitating cooperation. The existence and prevalence of international regimes, for example, are credited with easing the dilemmas associated with cooperation in a politically anarchic state system.[38]

Kegley and Raymond stress the role of norms concerning alliance and treaty commitments in breeding either a culture of trust or a culture of mistrust.[39] Integration theorists have pointed to social and cultural homogeneity and expanding levels of communication as facilitating cooperation.[40] Stephen Rock found three conditions to be conducive to great power rapprochement: "heterogeneity in the exercise of national power, heterogeneity of economic activities, and homogeneity of societal attributes."[41]

The problem with these theoretical approaches is that they are based on a consideration of shared attributes among nations that are not very amenable to manipulation and therefore offer little insight into how to go about improving relations with an adversary who does not share the attributes in question.

A sizable percentage of the literature on conflict resolution uses game theory in an effort to capture the essence of the structure of bilateral relationships. Some version of Prisoner's Dilemma usually is used to mathematically model a relationship in which cooperation is desirable, but the fear of exploitation and the temptation of unilateral advantage present obstacles to cooperation.

According to the motivational scheme of the game, a "player" and an "opponent" determine moves on the basis of a calculation of relative "payoffs" (a hierarchy of values such as security and power), which can be represented in a "payoff matrix" expressing possible outcomes for each move. The actual outcome of each move depends on whether the opponent "cooperates" or "defects," the only two choices available.

The game is not inherently competitive, since the usual objective is to maximize one's own score rather than to score higher than the opponent. Thus a mutuality of interests is possible, and an initiative has a root source. The underlying structural assumptions of Prisoner's Dilemma can thus be seen as creating the possibility of cooperation as well as a successful rapprochement initiative. These assumptions are that neither side can hope unilaterally

to determine the outcome of interactions, and mutual cooperation benefits both sides more than mutual defection.

Charles Osgood, who has devised the most widely recognized strategy for ending hostile relationships—Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT)—sees the most propitious circumstances for an initiative when "an unsatisfactory status quo has become frozen."[42] Osgood argues that the essential condition in such a situation is a stalemate in which the prospects of success of coercive policies have virtually disappeared and the status quo has grown "too costly." But Osgood's condition of the status quo having grown too costly needs to be modified in order to avoid the problems of trying to define "too costly." The existence of growing costs is more readily identifiable and less dependent on arbitrary definition. The condition of stalemate can be expressed in terms of mutually diminishing prospects of gain.

The structure of game theory and the conditions mentioned by Osgood are some of the most directly relevant to the analysis of rapprochement initiatives found in the literature. They are directly linked to the phenomenon to be studied: tension-reducing or rapprochement initiatives.

The first of five assumptions with which I approach this study derives from this literature:

Assumption 1. Initiatives to improve relations with an adversary will succeed when the following conditions are present for both governments: First, the costs of maintaining hostile policies are growing or threatening to grow. Second, the prospects of gain through such policies are significantly diminished in comparison to previous expectations.

Strategies

Much of the relevant literature on conflict resolution deals more with factors to consider than with conditions and strategies conducive to a rapprochement. For example, the "orientation" of an adversary is seen as an important consideration. Leaders may be considered either "risk averse" or "risk acceptant."[43] The orientation to risk might determine in large part how an actor reacts to inducements involving risk.

Then there is the "bureaucratic inertia" argument: "Once officials have generated the necessary fears and expectations, have

perfected their arguments, and have honed their phrases to achieve the desired public response, they have no desire to desert what has required so much time and energy to create."[44]

Another argument states that decades of hostility imbue a relationship with the expectation of hostility, which complicates the task of communicating a desire to improve relations. Decision makers tend to exercise "selective perception," which means they see what they want or expect to see in the communication or act of an adversary.[45] Few theories, though, attempt to provide a strategy for overcoming the inherent obstacles of their approach.

In regard to a strategy capable of overcoming these obstacles, the discussion in the literature has tended to focus on two prominent methods of conflict reduction: tit for tat and Charles Osgood's GRIT.

The simplest form of tit for tat is strict reciprocity; a government always answers the acts of an opponent in kind. In other words, one rewards cooperative acts but punishes hostile or noncooperative acts. It may be, though, that a fixation on reciprocity is more a hindrance than a help in overcoming the barriers to cooperation. In other words, a general strategy of reciprocity can create the mutual desire to break the ice of hostility, but it does not necessarily provide the tools to do so.

Charles Osgood's GRIT, originally proposed in 1962 as a means for reversing the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, has enjoyed extensive recognition as a possible strategy for tension reduction in general. GRIT calls for an initial general announcement of conciliatory intent and a unilateral concession coupled with an invitation to reciprocate, the continuation of a planned series of conciliatory gestures until a pattern of mutually reciprocated concessions is established, and the expressed intent to meet exploitation with measured retaliation.

Osgood says that two of the aims of GRIT are "to reduce and control international tension levels" and "to create gradually an atmosphere of mutual trust within which negotiations on critical political and military issues will have a better chance of succeeding."[46] These aims are related to what Amitai Etzioni calls a "psychological theory of international relations."[47] The main tenets of the theory are that hostile actions will tend to result in a spiral of increasing tension and hostility, which will then generate "psychological blocks" to perceptions and

behavior more in line with objective international reality, leading in turn to the irrational perpetuation of hostile relationships.

GRIT has a number of properties that recommend it as a plausible therapy for hostility. First, in contrast to tit for tat, GRIT prescribes a program of individual initiative.[48] Although elements of reciprocity are retained, conciliatory initiatives can be designed and implemented independent of an opponent's actions on the premise that individual initiative can prescribe the behavior of both parties in a dispute.[49] GRIT does not presuppose improvement in a relationship or immediate cooperation from an adversary, which removes some of the hurdles of policy inertia and acts to increase the range of options available to a government.

In addition, GRIT calls for a precisely designed pattern of announcement and actions, which can overcome the distortions in perception of communicated intent.[50] Since the strategy is based on communicated and demonstrated conciliation, it is designed to change the entire atmosphere of a relationship,[51] which can eventually lead to restructuring of expectations on the basis of "friendship."[52] Perhaps more realistically, GRIT can remove enough mistrust and hostility to allow negotiated agreements.[53]

GRIT is also a plausible means for testing an adversary's orientation, since the response to an unambiguous invitation to establish a cooperative relationship can offer strong clues in this regard. Since the strategy calls for explicit emphasis on the future benefits of mutual cooperation, it might lead as well to a reassessment of the Shadow of the Future.

The explicitness of GRIT also demonstrates commitment in the sense that behavior that contradicts one's stated intent will incur costs in terms of reputation and public perception. Behavior consistent with the GRIT program, on the other hand, can enhance one's reputation for being willing to cooperate.

There is some support for strategies that involve various aspects of GRIT, although the strategy "has not been fully implemented in any case of international conflict deescalation."[54] A GRIT-like strategy was found to have been effective in achieving peace between China and Tibet in A.D. 783.[55] Amitai Etzioni found that the "Kennedy experiment," in which President Kennedy launched a series of moves leading to the Test Ban Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, was a successful application of the approach.[56]

GRIT is not without serious limitations and problems, however. Its usefulness may be limited to inducing movement toward cooperation rather than sustaining it.[57] Etzioni also came to the conclusion that psychological forces are most important in initiating a change but seem not to be strong enough to sustain the change when it is not supported by other factors. A more serious drawback is that political considerations may prevent the implementation of GRIT in the first place. Nincic points out that the requirement of unilateralism in GRIT may require "true courage" on the part of decision makers.[58] The "immense accumulation of ill will and mistrust" that GRIT is designed to overcome also defines the great political risk that is involved in a policy that can all too easily be attacked as appeasement.[59]

On the basis of the strong experimental and theoretical support for GRIT, the efficacy of the strategy is asserted in my second assumption:

Assumption 2. The initial strategy employed in a successful rapprochement initiative will be consistent with the central prescriptions of GRIT.

Although I am calling on the GRIT approach to guide my analysis of the three cases, I will be using a simple version of GRIT. Osgood's original proposal included fifteen stipulations, and some authors posit nine or ten stipulations,[60] but discussion in most of the literature has focused on only a handful of these.

Formal Negotiations

In a sense, all attempts of one state to influence the behavior of another state—at least those attempts that take into account one's dependence on the decisions of the other state to achieve one's goals—can be considered part of bargaining behavior. The term *negotiation,* however, usually denotes a formalized sort of bargaining behavior in which the rules of communication are more explicit. This is the sense in which Fred Iklé uses the term:

> As used here, *negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present.* Frequently, these proposals deal not only with the terms of agreement but also with the topics to be discussed (the agenda), with the ground rules that ought to apply, and with underlying technical and legal issues. It is the confrontation of

explicit proposals that distinguishes negotiation (as here defined) from tacit bargaining and other types of conflict behavior.[61]

In pursuing formal negotiations, the process of defining the issue or issues is the most functional starting point. Roger Fisher suggests "fractionating" issues.[62] He maintains that a reduction in the "size" of issues is helpful in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Fisher says five dimensions measure the size of a conflict issue and each is amenable to manipulation: (1) the number of parties on each side, (2) the immediate physical issue, (3) the immediate issue of principle, (4) the substantive precedent the settlement will establish, and (5) the procedural precedent that will be established.

The number of parties and the limitations placed on the physical issue of contention are obviously amenable to reduction, at least theoretically, but Fisher claimed that even principle and precedent can be reduced when neither side insists on formal recognition of a principle and delimiting the strength and scope of a precedent.

From this literature I derive the third of my five assumptions:

Assumption 3. Major issues are fractionated in negotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement between hostile governments.

The literature also finds merit with high-level control and back-channel communications during negotiations that are sensitive, as are most negotiations with an adversary on a change of status. Bureaucratic and interest-group resistance can be more effectively minimized, and personal diplomacy is given greater latitude.

One obvious reason for restricting the number of participants in a negotiation is that it reduces the number of actors who can exercise a veto over the achievement of an agreement. Thus, streamlining decision-making structures by bypassing bureaucratic actors and using secret modes of communication may improve the chances of agreement in negotiations. In addition, the extreme sensitivity of negotiations with long-term adversaries may leave little choice in the matter, for success depends on establishing an unaccustomed trust.

The back channel instituted by Nixon and Kissinger served these purposes. Steinberg, however, cautions that though streamlining decision-making structures by bypassing bureaucratic actors and using secret modes of communication may improve the

chances of agreement in negotiations, these devices are not without cost.[63] For example, secrecy breeds suspicion, and internal opponents often have access to enough information to cause embarrassing leaks.

Also, centralized decision making places a great burden in terms of time and effort on a decision maker. Secret and tightly controlled negotiations tend to exclude important actors and interests; as a result, the final agreement faces considerable opposition from the "losers" when it becomes known. The ratification battles in the U.S. Senate lend credence to this claim. The lack of expert input can also prove embarrassing when a government has to explain the weaknesses of an agreement. A more general criticism is that secrecy in government is democratically offensive.

From these approaches, I derive the fourth of the five assumptions I used to analyze the cases:

Assumption 4. Negotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement are conducted at a high level (senior government officials with direct access to the head of government), are nonpublic, and involve the fewest possible participants.

One of the central concerns in the study of negotiations, of course, is to determine which strategy is most likely to lead to a preferred outcome as defined by one or both of the participants. In the literature, there tends to be a focus on "hard" versus "soft" bargaining strategies. Hard strategies generally involve more extreme positions and resistance to compromise. Soft strategies employ moderate, equitable bargaining positions and call for flexibility and compromise. The willingness to reciprocate concessions is generally considered part of a soft strategy.

The most functional view, though, seems to be that the preferred strategy depends on the context and the opponent's orientation and that a mixed approach, strategically combining hard and soft approaches, may work best.

One of the reasons posited for the effectiveness of taking initially tough negotiating stances is that doing so helps to clarify positions and establish priorities. It also assures the opponent of the necessity of compromise. A process that follows this approach with the offering of concessions on a reciprocal basis is a plausible strategy for avoiding deadlock and achieving ultimate agreement. Finally, the literature suggests that ambiguity or avoidance helps reduce the difficulty posed by disputes over

matters of principle to the achievement of agreement. My fifth and last assumption is thus:

Assumption 5. The negotiating strategy employed in successful rapprochement initiatives is to initially take uncompromising positions on the major issues of contention, then offer concessions on a reciprocal basis, finally agreeing to disagree or seeking ambiguous formulations on matters of central principle.

These five assumptions help focus the examination and comparison of the cases under review, though the scope of this book is not limited to these propositions.

I turn now to the analysis of the cases.