



Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia. by Gershon Shafir

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central state led by the African National Congress.

Comparative analysis—as defined by the “method of difference”—requires bipolar opposing categories where shades of gray and nuanced understandings are pushed aside in the interests of clarity and precision. Greenstein has done an admirable job within the framework of his comparative approach. For this reason alone, *Genealogies of Conflict* is a thought-provoking, carefully argued, and valuable book.

Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia, by **Gershon Shafir**. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 279 pp. \$19.95 paper. ISBN: 0-7914-2674-2.

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The most difficult task of comparative-historical sociology is always to find a proper balance between the undifferentiated subsumption of particular cases into general theoretical models and the unmediated juxtaposition of historical narratives, which may be hermeneutically illuminating but fail to advance either general understanding or causal explanation. Shafir's study has achieved the right balance. It offers historically grounded and highly persuasive interpretations of each of the case studies, while also advancing relevant general sociological propositions.

Combining the well-known typology of “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism with liberal “assimilation-integration” theories of immigration and Marxist theories of labor market “segmentation,” Shafir has constructed a dual typology of nationalism in developed regions. “Hegemonic nationalism,” the type paradigmatically represented by Catalan nationalism, is characterized by a self-confident and modernizing strategy of at least partial assimilation of the immigrants by the host society. The self-confident hegemonic orientation is facilitated by the structuration of a horizontally segmented labor market. Under conditions of vertical segmentation, however, the nationalism of economically developed regions may become ethnically defen-

sive, resist the integration of immigrants who are viewed as a “denationalizing” threat, and turn into exclusionary “corporate nationalism.” This form of nationalism is typified by the first historical phase of Basque nationalism at the turn of the century, and partially as a tendency in the Baltic countries after independence from the Soviet Union. What distinguishes the process of modernization in Euskadi from that of Catalonia is the emergence of an internal division within the local Basque elites between a Castilianized, urban, modernizing, industrial-financial oligarchy and the traditional elites of the countryside and small towns. Here, unlike in Catalonia, a vertical segmentation of the labor market took place, pitting a modern Castilianized industrial sector against a traditional Basque sector. Soviet industrial policies produced a similar pattern of vertical segmentation in Estonia and Latvia. A large Moscow-controlled and Russian-managed heavy industrial sector was created side by side with a small service and light industrial local economic sector. In all four cases, there is sufficient evidence of the willingness of immigrants to be integrated into the host society. Shafir's conclusion is that “the causes of anti-immigrant hostility are usually found among the hosts,” (p. 5) and not in the attitude of the immigrants.

The conclusion, however, is problematic, and points to some weakness in the comparative-analytical framework. The choice of the four comparative cases is indeed justified. All represent economically developed regions within multiethnic states that naturally attracted immigrant labor from the less developed regions. Shafir also finds some “unexpected similarities” between Spain and Russia or the Soviet Union in the evident disjunction between state and nation formation in both cases. But the significantly different levels of economic, political, and cultural interregional integration within the states are not sufficiently taken into account. One cannot explain the attitudes of the hosts, much less the patterns of interaction between nationalists and immigrants, without looking also at the sender country. It is true that the early modern Spanish state failed to transform itself into a modern nation-state. The belated attempt of Spanish-Castilian fascism and of the Franco regime to impose such a construct by force also failed. But the

smooth democratic transition in Spain cannot be explained without taking into account that there did exist an all-Spanish civil society made up of social movements, parties, trade unions and business organizations, the Catholic Church, and all kinds of voluntary associations. Glasnost and perestroika gave ground to the incipient formation of separate civil societies in the republics but not to a single all-Union party, social movement, or trade union organization. The attempt to transform the imperial Soviet state into a democratic multinational state was indeed an impossible task. Moreover, the overlapping of Spanish and peripheral nationalist identities has no parallel in the Baltic republics. A

majority of Basques and Catalans have a dual national identity. Immigrants never viewed themselves nor were perceived by their hosts as "the Spanish other," but rather as people from other regions of Spain. Estonians and Latvians are unlikely to have dual (Baltic and Russian) national identities. Russian immigrants were perceived by their hosts as "imperial minorities" and are likely to be perceived as a denationalizing threat so long as the Russian state claims to represent the Russian minorities "in the near abroad." The comparative analysis of immigrants and nationalists cannot neglect to study the nature of the sender country or its state.