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Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education by Martin E. Marty; R. Scott Appleby; Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance by Martin E. Marty; R. Scott Appleby

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must be experienced in the ethical conduct and social relations of ordinary life. Rare and unpredictable encounters with the sublime were adjudged by the later Emerson to be insufficient anchors for character during the political turmoil of the 1850s, and in his writings of this period he is "best regarded as a moral or ethical philosopher" who was responding to the impact of rapid social change on the moral life (pp. 5-6).

Robinson quite successfully sustains a genuine polarity in Emerson's thought, indicating the dominance of "the private and visionary" or "the ethical and pragmatic" at different stages of Emerson's career while yet observing the continuing presence of the minor pole. But this interpretive strategy requires careful definition of the two poles and thorough exploration of the "magnetic field" that holds them together, and Robinson succeeds less well at these interpretive tasks. His contrast between young Emerson "the mystic" and "the pragmatic" later Emerson employs these terms very broadly and misleadingly in relation to their more specific meanings in the history of religion and philosophy. More important, although Robinson deftly portrays the early Emersonian emphasis on immediate, intuitive apprehension of the Whole as the basis of self-culture, he gives only passing attention (pp. 154-55) to the connections between this pole and the stress on the limits and possibilities of human power that figured so prominently in *The Conduct of Life*. There, Emerson's ethic stems from the convictions that power is universal and unitary and that right conduct arises when "my polarity" comports with the supervening power of the universe and is consequently "in the current of events, and strong with their strength." Ethics, therefore, in some sense depends on a true insight into the relation of the self to the Whole, and a more developed interpretation of this relationship would further strengthen Robinson's careful and nuanced treatment of Emerson's later work.

W. CLARK GILPIN, *University of Chicago*.

MARTY, MARTIN E., and APPLEBY, R. SCOTT, eds. *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. ix+592 pp. \$45.00 (cloth).

MARTY, MARTIN E., and APPLEBY, R. SCOTT, eds., *Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. ix+665 pp. \$45.00 (cloth).

These are volumes 2 and 3, respectively, of the monumental six-volume Fundamentalism Project. The entries to these two volumes are grouped into three parts each, dealing with the relationships and impact of various religious movements on science and technology, family and interpersonal relationships, education and media, law and politics, economic structures, and violence and militancy.

Religious fundamentalism, a term historically associated with a branch of American Protestantism and later applied to various Islamic movements, has been and is likely to remain a highly controversial and ambiguous concept, more often abused as an epithet for its pejorative connotations than properly used in social scientific analysis. The general essays introducing the subject matter of each part, while individually helpful in clarifying some aspects of the complex relationships between religions and the various spheres (science, family, education, politics, economics, etc.), do not jointly add up to a clear working definition of religious fundamentalism, much less to a general theory of modern fundamentalism.

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Most of the essays share a view of fundamentalism as antimodern and antiseccular, a characterization too broad and vague to help differentiate modern religious fundamentalism from cognates such as orthodoxy and conservative traditionalism, from revivalist and militant religious movements of the past, or from secular relatives such as nationalism or revolutionary Jacobinism. When almost anything can be depicted as fundamentalism, the term loses its relevance as an analytical category. From the hegemonic perspective of modern science as the true and positive form of knowledge, must every rejection of modern epistemological skepticism as well as every rejection of scientific absolutism in the name of a higher form of truth appear as religious fundamentalism? From a feminist or women's liberation perspective, must every religious defense of traditional gender roles appear as fundamentalism, so that fundamentalism can be defined primarily as "radical patriarchalism"? From the perspective of political liberalism, must every religious challenge to the boundaries between the public and private spheres, every rejection of the privatization of religion, or every religious intervention in the public sphere of modern societies appear as fundamentalism? Given that each of these questions can be answered in the negative, we need more nuanced definitions of religious fundamentalism. Externally, religious fundamentalism can only be defined as an antithetical reaction to modernity, and, therefore, such a definition will always contain some normative and ideological element borrowed from modernity's understanding of itself. Indeed, secularist, uncritical, and unreflexive fundamentalist readings of modernity must call forth antimodern fundamentalist reactions.

Perhaps wisely, the editors of the Fundamentalism Project did not place great emphasis on a precise definition of fundamentalism, which would have delimited unnecessarily from the start the phenomena under investigation, preferring to work with a vague category of "family resemblances." The result is a rich and variegated collection of monographic essays dealing with different aspects of contemporary religious movements in various parts of the world. Of the thirty-five monographic essays included in the two volumes, almost three-fourths deal with Islam (fifteen essays) and Protestant fundamentalism (nine), while the rest cover Judaism (three), Hinduism (three), Buddhism (two), and one essay each is dedicated to Sikh fundamentalism, Mormon fundamentalism, and the new religions of Japan. This very selection indicates that the concurrent public emergence of Protestant fundamentalism in the United States and the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 serves as the foundation for any general and comparative study of fundamentalism as a global phenomenon. Every other form of fundamentalism appears to be analytically derivative from these two foundational cases. But are they commensurable? Protestant fundamentalism refers to a very particular branch of Western Christianity practically circumscribed to the United States. The references to Protestant fundamentalism in Latin America are misplaced and misleading. Evangelical Protestantism in Latin America may be doctrinally fundamentalist but sociologically does not constitute a fundamentalist movement. When applied to Islam, by contrast, fundamentalism seems to refer to practically every aspect of contemporary Islamic revivalism throughout Islamic cultural areas, so that Islam itself appears as the fundamentalist religion par excellence.

There are other noticeable asymmetries in the localization of global fundamentalism. Why is it the case that among advanced Western industrial societies, only in the United States has there emerged a religious fundamentalist movement of societal importance? Can American Protestant fundamentalism serve as the paradigmatic form of all modern fundamentalisms? Even more puzzling is the

absence of any major Catholic fundamentalist movement given the fact that for centuries Catholicism had offered the most spirited, principled, fundamentalist, and apparently futile resistance to modern processes of secular differentiation in all the spheres. It militantly fought capitalism, liberalism, modern science, the modern secular state, the democratic revolutions, socialism, and the sexual revolution. In brief, it has been the paradigmatic form of antimodern fundamentalist religion. The clerical counterrevolutionary mobilization of Catholic peasants, Integralism, Action Française, Franco's Spanish "national-catholicism," all may be viewed as prototypes of the kind of fundamentalist movements flourishing today throughout the world. Why is religious fundamentalism also relatively absent from Confucian cultural areas?

Without addressing these questions, the Fundamentalism Project cannot offer a general explanation of modern fundamentalism. Fortunately, the scholarly quality and the relevance of the contributions both individually and as a collection surpasses their possible instrumental use for the development of a general theory of fundamentalism. These two volumes, like the first and, one might expect, like the remaining ones, are bound to become indispensable reference texts for the informed public, the specialist, and college students alike.

One may anticipate already that the six volumes of the Fundamentalism project, notwithstanding all the analytical problems and misgivings about the very term "fundamentalism," are likely to serve as the impulse and foundation for a revival of the kind of comparative-historical sociology of world religions and civilizations that was pioneered by Max Weber. The three published volumes prove, moreover, that such an endeavor can now proceed from an empirically sounder and hermeneutically less ethnocentric basis. But above all, these volumes make evident that one cannot hope to make sense of the ongoing global construction of a modern world order without taking into account the role that religious traditions continue to play in such a construction.

JOSÉ CASANOVA, *New School for Social Research*.

POWELL, H. JEFFERSON. *The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993. 292 pp. \$39.00 (cloth).

An intriguing book with a Perry Mason ending, *The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism* is useful both for those who seek some introduction to American constitutional argument and those so embroiled in it that they cannot see the moral forest for the theoretical trees. Powell relies heavily on John Howard Yoder's work for his apparent thesis that American constitutionalism is "a MacIntyrean tradition of rational inquiry that has entered into an epistemological crisis it is unlikely to overcome" (p. 274). He proposes that Christians must see even the most (purportedly) liberal and radical threads of constitutional theory as Constantinian—for example, self-interested domination by lawyer elites and legitimation of that domination through rights-talk. Moreover, he calls for Christians not to drop out but to respond with an argument embodying Christian moral commitments of equality and humility (in a revisable-democratic-political structure.)

Powell tells a fresh, persuasive story about the founding American tradition, reflecting conflicting threads of Enlightenment rational inquiry, civic republicanism, Protestant covenantalism, and the common-law tradition. While each of