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Roman and Catholic and American: The Transformation of Catholicism in the United States[1]

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Catholicism in what would become The United States of America has been shaped mainly by four determining facts:[2]

1) Catholicism in the United States has been a minority religion in a predominantly Protestant country. This means that, structurally, in terms of its relation vis-a-vis the hegemonic Protestant culture, Catholicism functioned as a sect and it was treated as such.

2) The Constitution, however, offered this minority religion, at least formally, equal protection under the law. This means that, systemically, in terms of the place of Catholicism within the pluralistic, free religious market, as regulated by the dual clause of "no establishment" and "free exercise" of religion, Catholicism would become just another, indeed the largest, denomination within the American religious market.

3) Internally, American Catholicism was shaped by the massive, consecutive waves of immigration of Catholics from various European nations. For the most part, the various Catholic immigrant groups, usually organized along national parish lines, kept their Catholic-ethnic allegiance while becoming amalgamated into a single American-Catholic ethnic group. This means that, congregationally, in terms of the associational type of membership, Catholicism in America functioned as a multi-ethnic, territorially organized national church.

4) Catholicism in the United States always had to live with the dynamic tension which resulted from being both "Catholic" and "American." This means that, ecclesio-logically, in terms of its internal doctrinal, ritual, and organizational structure the American Catholic Church has always been a member of the transnational, universal Roman Catholic Church. Consequently, American Catholics were always under the constraint of having to prove their absolute allegiance to the American civil religion in order

to be admitted into the national covenant, without putting, however, into question their equally absolute allegiance to Rome. It is not surprising that in the process of trying to perform this balancing act, the American Catholic Church became the most "American," i.e., patriotic, of all American denominations and the most Roman, of all the national Catholic Churches.

Thus, Catholicism in America functioned simultaneously in four different ways: structurally as a sect, systemically as a denomination, congregationally as a territorial national church, and, ecclesiologically as a member of the Universal Church.[3]

1) THE CATHOLIC MINORITY IN A PROTESTANT COUNTRY

The structural dimension of the church-sect typology refers to the position of any religious group vis-a-vis other religions and vis-a-vis the dominant culture. On both accounts, throughout most of its history, Catholicism in America has functioned structurally as a sect. Catholicism has always been a minority religion in a predominantly Protestant country, but the relative position of the Catholic minority vis-a-vis the Protestant majority and the relative position of the Protestant majority vis-a-vis American culture have changed dramatically from Independence to the present.[4] In 1789, the year when the United States Constitution came into effect and the first Catholic diocese was established in Baltimore, Catholics constituted less than 1 percent of the American population (there were apprx. 35,000 Catholics, mainly concentrated in Maryland and Pennsylvania, out of a population of 4,000,000).

Massive immigration, from the 1830s on, would change the relative size of the Catholic minority. By 1850, the Catholic population already stood at 1,700,000 making the Catholic church the largest religious denomination in the United States—slightly ahead of the largest Protestant denomination, the Methodist church, which had also been only a tiny religious minority at the time of Independence. By 1866, immediately after the Civil War, there were nearly four million Catholics in a population of over thirty million. By 1910, the Catholic population had quadrupled to 16 million, while the American population had tripled to 92 million. Just after World War II, there were 25 million Catholics in America, a number as large as that of the six largest Protestant denominations combined (Methodists, Southern Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, United Lutherans, Disciples of Christ). By 1980, the Catholic population had doubled to 50 million, while the total American population had reached 222 million.[5]

Membership comparisons between the various religious groups are problematic since the membership criteria may change through time, as

well as from denomination to denomination. Catholic figures often include all baptized Catholics, children and adults, whether church members or not, while Protestant counts may include only actual church members. However, using "Protestant" and "Catholic" as cultural-ethnic categories, it is evident that Catholics have always been, and still are a minority, but the ratio between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority has changed progressively. At the end of the Civil War, the Protestant/Catholic ratio was roughly 7:1. By 1910, at the time of the great modernist/fundamentalist split within Evangelical Protestantism, the ratio was greater than 4:1. After World War II, the estimates can be more accurate since longitudinal opinion surveys are available. According to AIPO surveys, the number of people declaring themselves Protestants declined from 69 percent of the American adult population in 1947 to 57 percent in 1985, while the number of Catholics rose during the same period from 20 percent to 28 percent.[6] Thus, the Protestant/Catholic ratio changed from 3.5:1 to 2:1. If recent demographic trends continue, Hispanic Catholic immigration and a higher birth rate among Hispanics and among Catholics in the "Baby Boom" generation, along with the decline of mainline Protestant denominations, then, the diminishing differential ratio between the two groups will also continue.

Numbers by themselves do not make either churches or sects. It is the attitudinal relations between the religious groups and the relations of those groups to the dominant culture which make the difference. Furthermore, at least in colonial America, the category "Protestant" masks fundamental differences and mutual intolerance between the various Protestant groups. But there was something which practically all Protestant groups, irrespective of doctrinal or ecclesiastical differences, shared, namely, a virulent anti-popery. Strict Calvinist and latitudinarian Arminian, High Church Anglican and antinomian sectarian, all viewed the Catholic Church as the "Anti-Christ" and the "Whore of Babylon." Indeed, at times, the external enemy, Catholicism, was the only thing that could cement internal Protestant unity.

In colonial America, the ebbs and flows of Anti-Catholicism usually moved in unison with developments in England. The "Intolerable" Quebec Act of 1774 at first exacerbated Anti-Catholic feeling. But Revolution and Independence actually brought a rare interlude in anti-popery. Catholic republican patriotism, the high profile of prominent Catholics like the Carrols, the alliance with Catholic powers (France and Spain), the campaigns for religious freedom, general religious decline and the spread of Enlightenment ideas were all contributing factors. President Kirkland of Harvard, in his 1813 Dudleian lecture, would express the startling view that "we may . . . abate much of that abhorrence of papists which our fathers felt themselves obliged to maintain and inculcate."[7] But this statement already came

at the end of the high point of republican deism. By then, the Second Great Awakening was well under way, leading up to the great Protestant crusade to Christianize America.[8]

President Timothy Dwight of Yale became the leader of the nativist phase of the Awakening. Concerned about the spread of deistic heresies among the younger generation, he began to attack antibiblical and anticlerical deism, linking it "to the worst excesses of the French Revolution and foreign conspiracy against the Republic."[9] By 1830, that peculiar fusion of evangelical Protestantism and American nationalism which Perry Miller called "romantic nationalist evangelicalism," was completed.[10] The Reverend Heman Humphrey, president of Amherst College, expressed the new national consensus when in 1831 he celebrated "the true American union, that sort of union which makes every patriot a Christian and every Christian a patriot."[11] Romantic evangelicalism soon turned into anti-Catholic nativism.

Lyman Beecher, the father of the "New School" of New England Calvinism, who pioneered the introduction of the new "method" of evangelical revivalism to protect the old, but newly disestablished, Congregationalism from Baptist and Methodist competition, became also the leader of anti-Catholic nativism. In 1830, the year in which the first anti-Catholic newspaper, *The Protestant*, appeared in New York, Beecher inaugurated his series of anti-Catholic sermons, linking Catholicism and despotism as the enemies of American republican principles.[12] In one of his sermons, while visiting Boston in 1834, the Reverend Lyman Beecher warned:

> The Catholic Church holds now in darkness and bondage nearly half the civilized world . . . It is the most skillful, powerful, dreadful system of corruption to those who wield it, and of slavery and debasement to those who live under it.[13]

Soon, thereafter, the Ursuline Convent school of Charlestown went up in flames.[14] As Irish immigration accelerated in the 1840s, Protestant nativism acquired social and political forms to become the American Republican Party of the 1840s and the Know-Nothing movement of the 1850s. The Reverend Horace Bushnell, the father of American liberal theology, warned Protestant America: "Our first danger is barbarism, Romanism next."[15] He could have added: "Both happen to be Irish." Following an American Republican Party rally in Philadelphia on May 3, 1844, the Irish industrial district of Kensington went up in flames. On August 6, 1855, in Louisville, Kentucky, election day turned into "Bloody Monday," after the Louisville Journal had called the Know-Nothings to "rally to put down an organization of Jesuit Bishops, Priests, and other Papists" and "to raise just as big a storm as you please."[16] A few weeks later, Abraham Lincoln warned that if the Know-Nothings came to power, the Declaration would

read "All men are created equal except Negroes, foreigners and Catholics." But the Know-Nothings soon disappeared as the moral energies of the Protestant crusade became absorbed in the anti-slavery movement and in Civil War.

Yet nothing illustrates better the sectarian isolation of American Catholicism than the fact that, with a few significant exceptions, Catholics preferred to watch the abolitionist debate from the sidelines, viewing it mainly as an internal Protestant problem, indeed as a dangerous Protestant crusade which was bringing the nation asunder. American Catholics failed to see the connection so clearly made by Lincoln between their status and that of the enslaved American Negroes. Some bishops, like John Hughes of New York, were impatient advocates of war, but only to teach the South a lesson, not to abolish slavery.[17] When Civil War arrived, the Catholic Church in the North and in the South supported loyally the respective patriotic causes. But unlike every major Protestant denomination, the American Catholic Church did not split into northern and southern branches.

From the 1880s to the 1920s a familiar combination of themes reemerged: foreign immigration at an even larger scale, this time mainly Catholics from Italy, and Catholics and Jews from eastern Europe; an evangelical revivalist crusade and a "social gospel" movement to once again Christianize America and save the world for democracy; progressive reform movements: temperance, woman suffrage, child labor legislation; anti-Catholic nativism, which found expression in the foundation of the American Protective Association in 1887, the expansion of the Ku Klux Klan in the South and the campaigns for new immigration-restriction laws. Catholics, not surprisingly, saw themselves as the targets of yet another Protestant crusade. Progressive Protestants, by contrast, tended to view Catholics as the main obstacle to reform. Revivalists like Billy Sunday never tired of warning their congregations of the menace which the "hordes" of "foreigners" were posing to Christian America and of blaming "the foreign vote" for blocking Prohibition. Only "a great Anglo-Saxon majority," he warned, could overcome this "foreign influence."[18] To understand the sense of menace felt by Protestant nativism, it is important to keep in mind that, as pointed out by Jay P. Dolan, "by 1890 the Catholic urban population was so large that it outnumbered the urban population of all other religious denominations combined."[19]

But the old Evangelical consensus around a Christian America had begun to dissipate. To the right, the Fundamentalists lost faith in America ever becoming Christian without apocalyptic divine intervention and adopted a radical version of pre-millennial sectarianism. To the left, liberal Protestants began to drop the qualifier "Christian" from the American mission and adopted a secular post-millennial theory of progress.[20] Evangelical

Protestantism lost its cultural hegemony and became disestablished, opening the way for the formation of a new national covenant, a new civil religion which eventually would incorporate Catholics, Jews and secular humanists. But before breaking apart permanently, the old Evangelical coalition came together again to win the last Protestant crusade, Prohibition. Like the Fundamentalist victory at the Scopes' trial, it turned out to be a pyrrhic victory. The divided Evangelicals came together briefly just one more time, at Al Smith's 1928 campaign, to block the entrance of popery into the White House.

For all practical purposes anti-Catholic nativism died with this election. To be sure, Protestant-Catholic conflicts flared up in the 1940s and 1950s. But those were no longer the clear church-sect, majority-minority conflicts of the past. They were the first signs of normal interdenominational conflicts.[21] Old Protestant prejudices have lingered on, particularly among fundamentalist and sectarian Protestants, and, as an atavistic intellectual prejudice, among liberal upper class Protestants in the Northeast.[22] But in a deservedly celebrated book in the mid-1950s, Will Herberg wrote that Protestant-Catholic-Jew had become the three denominational forms of being American.[23] The election of a Catholic to the Presidency in 1960 was the best confirmation of the thesis. Before being allowed into the White House, however, John F. Kennedy had to prove his worthiness before an association of Protestant ministers in Houston.

2) A CATHOLIC DENOMINATION IN A FREE RELIGIOUS MARKET

The instructions which Cecil Calvert, lord proprietor of the Maryland colony, gave to his Governor and Commissioners, as they set sail to America in 1634, were:

> that they suffer no scandall nor offence to be given to any of the Protestants, . . . and that for that end, they cause all Acts of Romane Catholique Religion to be done as privately as may be, and that they instruct all the Romane Catholiques to be silent upon all occasions of discourse concerning matters of Religion; and that the said Governor and Commissioners treated the Protestants with as much mildness and favor as Justice will permit[24]

Sailing for Maryland on the Ark and the Dove, the list of passengers on board included "three Jesuits, sixteen 'gentlemen-adventurers' most of whom were Catholics, and a host of servants, laborers, and artisans, the majority of whom were Protestants."[25] The Ark and the Dove could serve as befitting a symbol of Catholic colonial Maryland, as the Mayflower was of Puritan New England. While the covenanted Puritans were to be "A City on the Hill," Roman Catholics were to practice their religion "pri-

vately" and "be silent on matters of religion."[26] Not surprisingly, given the disabilities under which they had to function in most of the colonies, Catholics welcomed with enthusiasm the radically new constitutional arrangement inscribed in the First Amendment. In a letter to Rome in 1783, Catholic priests, meeting to discuss John Carroll's plan for a "Constitution of the Clergy," wrote:

> In these United States, our Religious system has undergone a revolution, if possible, more extraordinary, than our political one. In all of them free toleration is allowed to Christians of every denomination; and particularly in the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, a communication of all Civil rights, without distinction or diminution, is extended to those of our Religion.[27]

Catholics were now free to decide the way in which they would organize themselves in exercise of their rights. It is customary to distinguish the "republican" from the "immigrant" phase of American Catholicism and to attribute two radically different styles of Catholicism to both phases.[28]

Republican Catholicism was the natural style of a self-confident Catholic colonial elite which, well-versed in the "survival tactics" of Anglo-Catholicism, had learned to keep their private piety and their public affairs strictly separate.[29] The active participation of the Carrolls and other prominent Maryland Catholics in the American Revolution had served to reinforce this style. Respected by their fellow citizens for their public patriotism, their enlightened sense, and their republican virtue, those Catholics came to expect and demand that their private piety also be respected. John Carroll, the first American Bishop, reflected the consensus of the period when he drew a wall of separation between his role as a citizen and his role as the spiritual leader of American Catholics. "I have observed," he said, "that when ministers of religion leave the duties of their profession to take a busy part in political matters they generally fall into contempt."[30]

Catholic laymen drew a similar line between their public secular and their private religious roles. The characterization which David O'Brien has presented of the republican American Catholic is very much akin to B. Groethuysen's masterful characterization of the 18th century, self-made, French Catholic "bourgeois":

> The Republican Catholic tended to segregate rigidly religious and civil loyalties, urged the church to stick to religion, and engaged in economic and political life with no direct and little indirect reference to religious faith.[31]

It represented the style of successful Catholic laymen, faithful to the church, but fully at home in the world, who had learned to segregate rigidly, in the liberal tradition, their political, economic and religious roles.

Bishop John England of Charleston, in his address to Congress on 8 January 1826, offered the classic theoretical legitimation of liberal republicanism. Answering those Protestant critics who were proclaiming the in-

compatibility of republican and Catholic principles, by arguing that one could not be a good citizen, while professing to owe obedience to a foreign authority, Bishop England said:

> Our answer to this is extremely simple and very plain; it is that we would not be bound to obey it, that we recognize no such authority. I would not allow to the Pope, or to any bishop of our church, outside this Union, the smallest interference with the humblest vote at our most insignificant balloting box. He has no right to such interference. You must, from the view which I have taken, see the plain distinction between spiritual authority and a right to interfere in the regulation of human government or civil concerns. You have in your constitution wisely kept them distinct and separate. It will be wisdom, and prudence, and safety to continue the separation . . . You have no power to interfere with my religious rights; the tribunal of the church has no power to interfere with my civil rights. It is a duty which every good man ought to discharge for his own, and for the public benefit, to resist any encroachment upon either. We do not believe that God gave the church any power to interfere with our civil rights, or our civil concerns.[32]

He concluded by offering his vision of the place which he wanted Catholicism to occupy in the American republic and in the pluralist, denominational religious system:

> We desire to see the Catholics as a religious body upon the ground of equality with all other religious societies . . . We consider that any who would call upon them to stand aloof from their brethren in the politics of the country, as neither a friend to America nor a friend to Catholics . . . We repeat our maxim: Let Catholics in religion stand isolated as a body, and upon as good ground as their brethren. Let Catholics, as citizens and politicians, not be distinguishable from their other brethren of the commonwealth.[33]

But John England's vision would not be realized, at least not until the 1960s. Even if other Catholic bishops would not have stood in the way of John England's plans, historical developments would have undermined his vision. The competing vision of a Christian America, zealously pursued by Evangelical Protestantism, and the system of Protestant denominationalism that ensued did not allow for the acceptance of Catholicism as just another American denomination. As citizens, moreover, the massive immigration of impoverished Irish Catholics made them clearly distinguishable, by class and ethnicity, from their fellow citizens and presented the Catholic hierarchy with radically new challenges. A very different type of Catholic church, the immigrant church, with a new type of episcopal leadership emerged in the 1840s.

Most commentators have viewed Bishop John Hughes of New York as the most forceful and articulate representative of the new immigrant Catholic church. Two incidents, in particular, may serve to illustrate the immigrant style. Bishop Hughes was appalled by the passivity and seeming impotence of Bishop Francis P. Kenrick of Philadelphia during the "Philadelphia riots" of May and July 1844. When plans for a nativist rally in New York City at city hall were announced, Bishop Hughes demanded a meeting

with Mayor Robert Morris to warn him that, "if a single Catholic church is burned in New York, the city will become a second Moscow." He added: "We can protect our own . . . I come to warn you for your own good."[34] Thereafter, the Catholic bishop of New York—and of other cities where Catholic immigrants would constitute a majority of the working class—would be a power to be reckoned with by politicians and elected officials. It was John Hughes who inaugurated what Andrew Greeley has called "the self-image of the bishop as the father and protector, of a flock not able to take care of itself and surrounded by hostile enemies."[35]

The republican Catholic style had been based on the model of autonomous Catholic individuals, who entered the public sphere not as Catholics but as indistinguishable citizens, in order to participate in the advancement of the public good. The immigrant Catholic style, by contrast, was based on the premise of the collective organization and mobilization of Catholics as a group—distinguishable from other groups by religion, class and ethnicity—in order to advance their particular group interests. The church, with the bishop as "church boss," became a vehicle for the protection, self-organization and mobilization of Catholic immigrants. Once Irish-Catholics began to control the urban political machines of many cities, the power of the local bishop became naturally enhanced. While Bishop Hughes actually failed in his attempts to create a Catholic party under his control, nonetheless he taught the immigrants that a militant and politically united Catholic bloc, normally tied to the Democratic Party, could best defend their interests.

In 1841, Bishop Hughes decided to enter a "Catholic ticket" in legislative elections, urging all Catholics to vote for it. At issue was the city's public schools, which in New York were funded with public monies but were operated by the Public School society, a private, mainly Protestant organization, which promoted a non-sectarian, non-denominational religious education. Bishop Hughes objected to the use of the Protestant King James Version of the Bible in the public schools. When he failed in his efforts to get the Bible out of the public school, he campaigned for state funding of Catholic schools, provoking in the process a Protestant nativist reaction. When both major parties, Whigs and Democrats, refused to support his efforts, Bishop Hughes entered his own candidates, in support of state aid to Catholic schools. The Catholic ticket was defeated, but it obtained sufficient votes to persuade the New York state government to take over the administration of the city's public schools. If Bishop Hughes could not get state aid for Catholic education, at least he was able to evacuate Protestant education from the public schools. Moreover, a separate Catholic parochial school system now seemed more justified than ever and Hughes became its most decisive champion. "To build the schoolhouse first,

and the church afterwards," became Hughes' famous dictum. Many interpreters have seen the incident as a turning point in the history of American Catholicism. This is David O'Brien's view:

> Bishop Hughes used the conflicts to break the "wicked monopoly" of the Public School Society and to render the common schools less dangerous by excluding religion altogether, while he worked to establish parochial schools. He was pleased by the way the fight had unified the Catholic people against what they took to be bigoted opposition . . . In Philadelphia as in New York, the conflict stiffened Catholic cohesiveness and solidarity. From this time on, Catholics tended to separate themselves socially and culturally from the rest of the city.[36]

In any case, it marked a turning away from John Carroll's and John England's vision of a fully integrated and equal American Catholicism. Having himself exacerbated anti-Catholic nativism with his abrasive and confrontational style, Hughes now viewed American society as hostile, and American culture as a threat from which it was necessary to protect the Catholic faithful. Moreover, if bishop Hughes was prone to "take a busy part in political matters," it was not because he believed that Catholicism had a role to play in American public life. On this point, there was no disagreement between republican and immigrant Catholicism. Both tended to segregate rigidly private religious and public secular roles. As Bishop Hughes explained in self-defense against the critics, circumstances had thrusted the role of leader and champion of "his" people upon him:

> I had to stand up among them as their bishop and chief; to warn them against the dangers that surrounded them; to contend for their rights as a religious community; to repel the spirit of faction amongst them; . . . in short, to knead them up into one dough, to be leavened by the spirit of Catholic faith and of Catholic union.[37]

To keep the faith of the immigrants, protecting them from Protestant America, while helping them take their rightful place as a "separate but equal" ethnic and religious groups in American society, became the central task of the immigrant church. The repeated controversies surrounding public and parochial schools became the most evident signs of the different visions which Protestant and Catholic had of America and of the role which religion was to occupy in public life. The Protestant clergy active in the common school movement viewed the public school as a vehicle to Americanize, that is, Christianize religiously indifferent and immigrant Catholic alike, by teaching them personal morality and self-discipline, civic virtue and true Christianity. With the creation of the parochial school system, the Catholic Church was serving notice that it had its own agenda of Americanization. In 1884, at the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, the American Bishops promulgated a wide body of legislation which would set the direction of the Catholic Church in America for the next seventy years. Among the resolutions passed was a decree to establish a parochial school

in each parish, commanding the pastors to build them, the laity to finance them, and the parents to send their children to Catholic schools. Parochial schools soon multiplied.[38] In some cities the Catholic school population became larger than the public school population. The combination of unique constitutional arrangements giving the Catholic Church unusual operational freedom and the Catholic perception that the public school system was an agent first of Protestantification and, then, of secularization, led to the creation of a system of Catholic education unique and unparalleled in the entire Catholic world.

The church and all its institutions would play a crucial function in the assimilation, i.e., Americanization of the Catholic immigrant, but it was done on Catholic terms. The style and the determination with which the Catholic agenda was pursued tended to change from bishop to bishop, from region to region, and from ethnic group to ethnic group.[39] But the end result was everywhere the same, the formation of one single Catholic religious body out of the most varied national groups, which would stand distinctly apart from all other religious bodies and from the dominant American culture. At the end of the 19th century, "Americanists" such as bishops Gibbons, Ireland, Keane and Spalding resisted the separatist trend, but the conservatives were able to prevail with the aid of the Vatican. The Pope's condemnation of the Americanist heresy (1899), followed by the condemnation of the Modernist heresy (1907) had a chilling effect on an emerging liberal Catholicism and on all attempts to integrate American Catholicism into American culture.[40] The issues were similar to those which led to the split between fundamentalist and modernist Protestantism, but in the case of American Catholicism, Vatican intervention served to enforce unity within a divided hierarchy, while imposing the conservative position upon the entire church.

The first half of the 20th century marks the golden age of the "proud and glorious isolation" of American Catholicism from the contemporary world, a withdrawal into a separate cultural ghetto, not unlike the sectarian withdrawal of Fundamentalism from the emerging secular American culture. The Catholic counterculture and countersociety were built around the neighborhood ethnic parish with its distinct form of "devotional Catholicism," the Catholic school system (from parochial to college), a distinct Catholic world view based on a refurbished "Neo-Thomism" and a mythical view of the Catholic Middle Ages, separate Catholic mass media, and myriad Catholic voluntary associations (religious, professional and recreational). All of these Catholic institutions provided the illusion of a tranquil, self-sufficient Catholic fortress in the midst of a disillusioned and crumbling modern Protestant world. William Halsey has called this illusion "the survival of American innocence."[41]

The safe cultural haven lasted until the mid-50s, when some Catholic intellectuals became disaffected with the "intellectual sloth" and "complacency in mediocrity" of the Catholic intellectual ghetto.[42] But the carefully built Catholic subculture was undermined by more powerful structural forces. World War II, the G. I. Bill, and the general economic boom had set American Catholics on a new journey of emigration and geographical, educational and occupational mobility, away from the working-class, urban, ethnic neighborhoods, into higher education, higher income, and into middle class, all-American suburbs.

At last, after a long and unexpected detour, John England's liberal republican vision was being realized. American Catholics were joining the American mainstream. Indeed, they more than any other group were beginning to define middle America. They were entering public life not as Catholics, in defense of their particular group interests, but "as citizens and politicians" more and more undistinguishable from other Americans. Whether intentionally or not, John F. Kennedy's famous speech before the Protestant ministers in Houston was almost a replica of John England's address to Congress.[43]

Kennedy offered the classic liberal position of radical separation between the private religious and the public secular spheres. Indeed, for the liberal position, religious views are not only the individual's own affairs but, ultimately, they ought to be irrelevant in the exercise of public secular roles. Moreover, churches ought to stick to religion and not meddle in public matters. Actually, historical precedent, trends and pressures in this direction were such that, had the Vatican Council and developments in global Catholicism not interfered, probably this liberal position would be today the de facto official position of the American Catholic Church. Instead, we have witnessed in the late 1970s and 1980s a new style of "public Catholicism," which is clearly distinguishable from both the "liberal republican" and the "immigrant" styles. Indeed, such a style of "public" Catholicism is radically new and has no established precedent in the history of American Catholicism.

3) THE IMMIGRANT CHURCH: FROM A MULTI-NATIONAL TO AN AMERICAN NATIONAL CHURCH

Congregationally, the fundamental characteristic of a church is that it is, at least in theory, a territorially organized religious body which claims compulsory and universal membership. The sect, by contrast, is a religious association based on voluntary and selective membership. The compulsory attribute is a historically specific aspect of the post-Constantinian Christian

Church which was tied to a particular structural dualism of spiritual and temporal power, which de facto no longer exists in todays' Catholic world and in principle was abandoned by the Catholic Church with the Declaration of Religious Freedom in Vatican II.

The fundamental and remaining difference, therefore, is that the church aspires to universal membership and, consequently, welcomes saints as well as sinners, while the sect aspires to be an exclusive association of saints. Sociologically, this is translated into the principle that usually, under normal circumstances, individual members are born into the church or, more precisely, are incorporated into the church a members of a natural community into which they are born, i.e., family, ethnic group, nation, etc. The members of the sect, by contrast, join the sect qua individuals, after a selection process. It follows also that the church is always more than a mere religious association of individual salvation and functions also as a community cult, i.e., it has an intrinsic communitarian or ethical dimension which transcends individual morality.

The Catholic Church in the United States has always been a church in so far as its membership has been composed, for the most part, of individuals who were incorporated into the church as members of larger ethnic-national groups. Indeed, before it functioned as a national American Catholic church, the immigrant church functioned as a church of disparate ethnic Americans. Related with this immigrant nature of the Catholic Church in America, that is, with being the result of the transplantation of disparate parts onto a new environment, where those disparate parts had to form a new body, there have emerged recurrently in the history of American Catholicism four series of problems or tensions in need of constant resolution:

a) The tension between a multinational and an American national church.

b) The tension between the traditional church principle of prescribed membership and the voluntary denominational principle dominant in the American religious environment. This tension has also manifested itself as one between the communitarian and the individualist salvational dimensions of the faith.

c) The tension between the traditional hierarchical (episcopal), clerical, and authoritarian governance structures of the church and the democratic, lay, and participatory principles which permeate both, the American polity, and the governance structures of most American denominations.

d) The tension between episcopal sovereignty and the need for a centralized national church structure.

a) E Pluribus Unum

From the very beginning the fundamental problem of the Catholic Church in America was how to form a unified body out of disparate and scattered Catholic parts.[44] In order to maintain institutional growth and fulfill its pastoral duties, the Catholic church in America always had to cater to the most diverse linguistic, cultural, and spiritual needs of its people. In order to maintain institutional unity, however, the church hierarchy had to ensure that the most diverse Catholic groups would become one single American Catholic Church. John Carroll, already wrote of the need to

> lay aside national distinctions & attachments & strive to form not Irish, or English, or French Congregations & Churches, but Catholic-American Congregations and Churches.[45]

The tension between the pastoral and the institutional demands was not always easy to resolve and the history of the Catholic Church in America is full of related conflicts. There were the conflicts between the laity, which in colonial America had learned to organize its affairs with little clerical supervision or guidance, and the first immigrant priests sent from Europe. There were the more serious personality conflicts and doctrinal and ideological disagreements between, on the one hand, the French cultured, aristocratic clergy, which had come to America fleeing revolutionary France and which by the 1810s occupied most of the hierarchic positions in the church, and, on the other hand, new Irish prelates like John England and, later, la canaille irlandaise which was beginning to flood the country and, in the eyes of French-American bishops like Ambrose Maréchal of Baltimore, were a "foreign threat" to the American church. Maréchal's fears were justified for it would not be long before the Irish would take over the church and give American Catholicism its unique Irish imprint.

The same conflicts would be repeated with every new immigrant group. Jay Dolan has put it most concisely: "Brownson wanted the Irish to become American; Ireland cajoled the Germans; and Mundelein worked on the Polish."[46] The conflicts, naturally, changed depending upon the particular composition of the laity, the clergy, and the hierarchy at any given time and place. A few figures should serve to indicate the dimensions of the challenge. In 1886, the ancestry of the American bishops was as follows: Irish, 35; German, 15; French, 11; English, 5; Dutch, Scots, and Spanish, 1 each. By 1900 two out of three bishops in the country and three out of four in New England were of Irish descent. The Catholic population, however, was much more diverse. The 1916 religious census indicates that six national groups—the Irish, Germans, Italians, Polish, French Canadians,

and Mexicans—accounted for 75 percent of the 16 million Catholic population. Eastern European peoples —the largest being Slovaks, Czechs or Bohemians, Lithuanians, and Ruthenian-Ukrainians—made up most of the rest. All in all, American Catholics were organized along national parish lines, speaking twenty-eight different languages. There were, for instance, 1,515,818 Catholics worshipping in Italian-speaking parishes, 1,425,193 in Polish-speaking parishes, 1,026,066 in French-speaking ones, and 552,244 in Spanish-speaking parishes.[47]

In the context of the general American experience, immigration and national and linguistic diversity are per se not noteworthy. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that unlike every other major religious body in America, Christian or Jewish, which fell prey to the dynamics of American denominationalism and split along national, linguistic, doctrinal, regional, class, or racial lines, the Catholic Church in America was able to keep the overwhelming majority of Catholic immigrants and their descendants within one single American Catholic Church. This is perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the Catholic Church in America functions as a territorially organized universal church for all ethnic Catholics and, simultaneously, that the Roman Catholic Church transcends all national churches. Schisms, to be sure, occurred throughout the nineteenth century and into this century, particularly those of dissident parishes who fought with their bishops over ownership and governance. But, eventually, most of them rejoined the Catholic Church.[48]

With the immigration-restriction laws of the 1920s, the American Catholic church began to lose its immigrant, multinational character, giving way to a rapid process of Americanization and homogeneous assimilation of the various Catholic ethnics into one single Catholic group distinct from Protestants and Jews. Being overwhelmingly an urban population, American Catholics were particularly affected by the post-World War II process of suburbanization. They left in large numbers the ethnic neighborhoods and national parishes to join all-American suburbs and all-Catholic parishes. The demographic move to the West and the South had similar consequences. By the 1960s the Americanization of the Catholic church was nearly complete. Indeed, the church played a crucial role in the assimilation of Catholic Americans.[49] Yet it is important to keep in mind how recent that experience is. More than half of the Catholic population are still first and second generation Americans. Moreover, "the ethnics" have turned out to be much more unmeltable than the assimilation theories of the 1960s assumed.[50]

Furthermore, the immigrant experience is by no means over. After World War II, the American Catholic Church has continued receiving large influxes of Portuguese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Haitians and, above all, His-

panics. There are more than 10 million Hispanic Catholics, which constitute roughly 16 percent of American Catholics. They are facing the same problems which every other Catholic immigrant group encountered before them. But the American Catholic Church has become to such a large extent a white-European middle-class institution, that it is finding very difficult to meet the spiritual and social needs of Hispanics, in the same way in which it has been unable either to attract or to meet the needs of African-Americans. Nevertheless, in spite of being perhaps more unwelcome than any other Catholic immigrant group, 70 percent of Hispanics still cling loyally to their church. But a study of the New York Diocese estimates that up to 10 percent of Hispanics, probably at a much higher rate than any other immigrant Catholic group before them, convert to other religions, mainly Protestant sects, after immigration.[51]

b) Religious Community vs. Community Cult

All religions live with the tension between the need for individual salvation and the need for community. Churches offer salvation to the individual in and through membership in communal bodies and participation in communal rituals. Individuals join religious associations or sects for the sake of individual salvation. The emphasis is certainly different, but the difference is only one of degree. Against the communal structures of medieval Christendom, Protestantism emphasized individual salvation. Individualizing tendencies were enhanced further by emigration, by disestablishment and religious freedom, by religious pluralism, and by the denominational shape which religion took in America.

In Sidney Mead's classic analysis, the six elements characteristic of nineteenth-century American Protestant denominationalism were: historylessness, voluntaryism, the mission enterprise, revivalism, pietism, and competition.[52] As Catholicism immigrated to America it had both to compete with Protestant denominationalism and to adopt, at least partially, some of its principles in order to compete successfully. The uprootedness which accompanied emigration meant that "faith" could no longer be taken for granted. It had to be actively and voluntarily "kept" or "revived." In this respect, Catholicism in America also assumed, constitutionally and phenomenologically, the denominational shape of a "free church." On the other hand, uprootedness and a foreign environment only exacerbated the need for community. Moreover, the hostility of Protestant nativism served to reinforce ethnic and Catholic solidarity. For the immigrant, the national parish served to recreate, in fact, often to create for the first time, the lost world of the home country. Since historical continuity and tradition are

the distinguishing, self-defining characteristics of Catholicism, American Catholicism could not adopt Protestant historylessness. But it adopted the other four elements of denominationalism in order to be competitive in the American environment. In his study, *Catholic Revivalism*, Jay P. Dolan has identified the parish mission, the Catholic revival meeting, and sacramental evangelicalism, as vehicles for the transformation of Catholic devotion and piety in the second half of the nineteenth century. The fact that at first American Catholicism imported for this purpose European Catholic preachers, skilled in parish missions, indicates that these elements were not solely Protestant or exclusive of American denominationalism, but were rather forms of adaptation of institutional religion to the cultural conditions of modernity. Dolan, moreover, shows that evangelical Catholicism was both, individual—"by offering them (individuals) a unique experience of saving grace"—and communal, because it took the form of a parish revival and served to strengthen the parish community.[53]

Generalizations about the vast world of twentieth century American Catholicism have to be necessarily precarious. But it is possible, nonetheless to point to a few trends. Ordinary Catholicism was shaped, practically until the shock of Vatican Council II, by the persistence of devotional Catholicism. Catholic devotion, however, became less communitarian and more privatistic. The Depression and the New Deal created the conditions in the 1930's for the golden age of "social Catholicism."[54] But the religious revival of the post World War II era, which Catholicism shared with the rest of American religion, brought back an even more privatist, devotional, and legalist religion. Fulton Sheen was the great star of Catholic radio and television. The Evangelical star, Billy Graham, would call him "one of the greatest preachers of our century."

There were, however, some minoritarian countermovements. Catholic action movements were not as central or dynamic as in Europe, probably because the hierarchy was much less enthusiastic about them. But nonetheless they pointed to a new type of Catholicism, no longer centered around the parish. Only in the Chicago area would there emerge an important Catholic Action related movement, the Christian Family Movement. Noteworthy was its combination of family focus and social action orientation. A similar combination of individualist commitment, personal spirituality, communitarian orientation, and public philosophy is to be found in the most characteristically Catholic, but minoritarian and countercultural movements of renewal, such as the *Catholic Worker*, the liturgical movement around Father Virgil Michel, the reception of French personalism, Friendship House, and the contemplative activism of Thomas Merton.[55]

One can also observe a transformation of the Catholic community orientation towards progressively higher levels of generality. Indeed, one could easily trace the progress from the village community in the old world, to the ethnic neighborhood and national parish, to the American Catholic community, to the American national community, and after Vatican II to the world community. Following a Parsonsian framework, Joseph Varacalli has shown how conceptions of "particularity" and "universality" have been upgraded. The total commitment to America, which was once the hallmark of liberal Catholicism against the particularism of the national ethnic parish, later became characteristic of conservative Catholicism.[56] Precisely at the time when Catholicism had finally become American and American Catholics had become faithful followers of the American Civil Religion, transformations in world Catholicism offered broader, more universalistic perspectives which challenged the nationalist particularism of the American Civil Religion.

c) People of God or a Bishops' Church?

When in 1782 John Carroll called other members of the American clergy to convene in order to work out a "Constitution of the Clergy," that would serve as the organizational blueprint for the Catholic Church in America, there were Catholics in America, the Catholic people of God, but there was no church in the strict institutional sense of the term. There was no bishop, a figure which was anathema in colonial America. There were but a few priests, many of them old and ailing, for the Pope's dissolution of the Jesuit Order had practically destroyed the only existing clerical institutional backbone. There was practically no regular congregational life outside of Philadelphia and the plantation chapels of rural Maryland.

Any viable institutional structure for the Roman Catholic Church in America would have to take into account three determining factors: the American circumstance, appropriate relations between the three main actors—hierarchy, clergy, and laity—and relations with Rome. The American circumstance was naturally shaped by the two determinant experiences of independence and republicanism, experiences which inevitably had spilled over onto the sphere of religion. One ex-colonial church after another broke the remaining ties with the mother church in the European metropolis to establish themselves as independent American churches. All of them also made some, at least symbolic, concessions to republican principles in setting up their own system of internal church governance.

American Catholics, both clergy and laity, agreed on the need for independence from foreign domination, but disagreed on the kind of con-

cession they should make to republican principle. It was understood that the church would need some "spiritual authority." But a petition sent to Rome by Charles Carroll and other prominent lay Catholics explained that such authority could not be foreign. John Carroll added that "no authority derived from the Propaganda will ever be admitted here." And a letter to the Pope by American priests even objected to the appointment of a bishop as their superior.[57]

When John Carroll was named "Superior of the Mission" in the United States, he was not pleased. He objected to the procedure, still insisting that "it will never be suffered" that the appointment came "from a foreign state, and only hold it at the discretion of a foreign tribunal."[58] In his belated and blunt reply to Cardinal Antonelli finally accepting the prefecture, John Carroll wrote that the appointment of a bishop would have been more appropriate for the United States and that the priests "who have labored for so many years in this vineyard of the Lord" should be allowed "to propose to the Holy See the one whom they deem the most fit."[59]

The need to establish clear norms that would regulate the institutional relations between hierarchy, clergy, and laity became evident in the conflicts of "trusteeism" in St. Peter's Church in New York City between 1785 and 1790.[60] In his draft plan for a "Constitution of the Clergy," Father John Carroll had proposed the separation of the control of the church's physical and financial assets, which were to remain with the body of the clergy, from the episcopal spiritual authority. As he explained to Rome, "we sought in every way to obtain a law permitting Catholic priests to form a corporate body and to hold property in common."[61] Some members of the laity, however, had a different plan. The moment it became legally possible, lay Catholics in New York, Philadelphia and other cities, took the initiative in organizing themselves into Catholic congregations, obtaining funds for the building of churches, and recruiting priests who would take care of their spiritual needs. They usually instituted a trustee system. The trustees, normally elected by the pewholders, held title to the church property.

Such an arrangement was already in conflict with John Carroll's plan of clerical control. But the incorporated trustees of St. Peter's went further. Unsatisfied with the pastor they had recruited, Father Wheelan, the trustees voted to withdraw financial support from Wheelan, found another priest more to their liking, Father Nugent, and asked John Carroll to help them remove Wheelan, threatening to use civil legal means to do so. Furthermore, they claimed that the Congregation had a right not only to choose, but also to discharge the parish priest; and that the Ecclesiastical Superior could not hinder the elected priest from exercising the usual functions. The trustees legitimated their claims, moreover, not only on Ameri-

can revolutionary principles, "no taxation without representation." They also searched for old European historical precedents. In their arguments, they made use of the medieval separation of spiritual and temporal power and of the traditional jus patronatum. The right of patronage, traditionally vested on the lay prince, now ought to be vested on the new sovereign, "the people." Accordingly, those who built the church and financed the pastor ought to have right of election and presentation.

In his reply to the board, Carroll made clear that if such a thesis were accepted

> the unity and Catholicity of our Church would be at an end; and it would be formed into distinct & independent Societies, nearly in the same manner, as the Congregational Presbyterians of your neighbouring New England States[62]

Moreover, suspecting that Nugent had instigated the whole affair, Carroll warned him that if priests were to admit such claims they would become "victim(s) of the most capricious despotism."[63] Indeed, only two months after Nugent had replaced Wheelan as pastor, the trustees decided that he had become disagreeable to them. The congregation divided into two factions, the trustees' faction, made up of the more prosperous members, and the Nugent faction, made up of, in Carroll's opinion, "with one or another exception people of little importance and Irish."[64] When after "a quasi-ecclesiastical trial," Carroll revoked Nugent's faculties, Nugent and his faction denied Carroll's ecclesiastical authority, as well as access to the church they had occupied, arguing that "since Carroll's jurisdiction came from Rome (i.e., a foreign court), it was in conflict with New York civil law."[65] Carroll, who had earlier opposed the trustees' use of the civil courts to remove Whelan, now deemed it necessary to check this act of open clerical rebellion against ecclesiastical authority "even by recourse to civil authority."[66] The New York Court ruled that,

> since he [Nugent] was condemned by his ecclesiastical superior according to the precepts of our [Catholic] faith, he should no longer be deemed fitted for the pastoral office[67]

The ruling in fact recognized the right of the Catholic Church in the United States to establish its own internal ecclesiastical discipline. When this discipline failed, moreover, the church could make use of secular courts to remove a recalcitrant pastor. Later, in defending the American system of "no establishment" and "free exercise of religion" against European critics, American bishops would always argue that the system gave the church the kind of libertas ecclesiae it had never had when it was under the alleged protection and patronage of Christian princes. The St. Peter's trustee crisis made evident the need to set a proper Roman Catholic system of church governance. Four issues were at stake: the need to have a bishop ordinary,

not a pope's delegate, as the head of the church; the need to define who had the right to nominate bishops; the need to define who had the right to nominate pastors; and the need to define who had rights over church property.

After the consecration of an American Episcopal bishop in England had provoked no negative reaction, the clergy felt encouraged to petition Rome that a diocese be established, headed by a bishop ordinary, asking that, "at least in this first instance," the choice be left to the priests, with the future procedure to be determined later. After Rome granted the request, John Carroll was chosen as the first American Catholic bishop by a vote of 24 to 2. It was the first and the last time that American priests would elect their bishop. Carroll himself picked the first two auxiliary bishops, with little evidence that he had consulted the "older and more worthy priests." Thereafter, he would send one or more names to Rome, where the final selection would be made. Some years later, the secretary of the Congregation for Propagation of the Faith would inform Carroll's successor, Archbishop Maréchal of Baltimore, that "he had no right to be consulted in the choice of suffragan bishops."[68] From now on, Rome would reserve for itself the right to choose the American hierarchy.

Nothing would come of Carrolls' plans for a Constitution of the clergy. Trustee controversies would erupt in many cities in the various dioceses. When asked to intervene in the disputes, Rome's responses were at first often ambiguous, at times even appearing to support the trustees and the clergy against the bishops.[69] Only on one point was the Vatican adamant. Rome would not concede any right of patronage to the laity. It insisted that patronage had never been a right, but a privilege which it had conceded under special circumstances. Having suffered the ignominy of Caesaro-papist control, it was no longer willing to countenance lay patronage again. On other issues, Rome was less insistent or consistent. At times, Rome would even reinstate priests who had been suspended for refusing to obey their bishops. Only after repeated complaints from the bishops, insisting that at stake was nothing less than the whole hierarchic discipline of the church, did Rome close ranks in support of episcopal authority. At the end, both the clergy and the laity were left out of the system of governance of the American Church. Faced with a rebellion from their inferiors, the bishops were willing to accept the monarchical rule of the pope, in exchange for the pope's support of their own monarchical rule in their dioceses.

As Andrew Greeley has emphasized, Bishop John England of Charleston offered in the 1820s an alternative system of church governance more in affinity with the American circumstance. When he arrived at Charleston, fresh from Ireland, he had to confront one of the most

untractable of schisms. England realized that only a diocesan constitution which recognized the right of the clergy and the laity to participate in ecclesiastical governance could resolve the endemic problem of trusteeism. The constitution which was adopted in Charleston had three critical components. First, it gave the bishop ultimate control over church property. Secondly, it set up a general diocesan "fund" to finance and administer diocesan programs, under the supervision of a board of trustees made up of the bishop, the vicar general, five elected clergymen, and twelve elected laymen. Finally, it called for an annual convention made up of the bishop, the house of clergy, to which all clergymen belonged, and the house of lay delegates, made up of representative from all parishes and districts.

But, as Greeley points out, "his fellow bishops wanted no part of the scheme." Bishop Conwell of Philadelphia warned Rome that

> "if this constitution or democratic method of ruling the Church be approved by the Holy See, it might become necessary to extend it to all dioceses here . . . it would mean the quick collapse of the American Church."[70]

In similar tones, Archbishop Maréchal urged Rome not to approve the document.

Although some serious incidents of trusteeism erupted in the 1850s in Philadelphia and Buffalo, the laity's demand for control of church property and participation in church governance slowly dried out as the laity's composition was radically transformed by the massive influx of Irish peasant immigrants. The old Maryland Catholic elite had died out as their children married non-Catholics. Patrick Carey has shown that many of the earlier Irish immigrants who had led the trustee fights had been influenced by Enlightenment ideologies and were "either educated professionals or entrepreneurs." Most of the new Irish immigrants, by contrast, were uneducated and impoverished peasants

> who were incapable of contributing much financially to the new parishes, unable to manage ecclesiastical temporalities and unaccustomed to lay participation in ecclesiastical affairs.[71]

Not only did they not create problems for the bishops, but if and when conflicts emerged, they sided usually with the powerful bishop, since the absolutist, authoritarian bishop was also their paternalist boss. John Hughes of New York became the prototype of this new breed of diocesan monarchs. A committed republican in the secular political sphere, he was an even more committed defender of absolutist rule in the spiritual sphere.

The American Catholic Church became, to an extent unequaled in the entire Catholic world, a bishops' church. It is symptomatic of the bias

and the reality of this episcopally-defined church that much of the best historical research on American Catholicism is to be found in the biographies of prominent bishops.[72] It is no less symptomatic that the few non-episcopal towering figures of the immigrant church period had difficulties fitting in the Catholic scheme of things. The two outstanding lay figures of 19th century Catholicism, Orestes Brownson and Isaac Hecker, were "converts" from Brook Farm who created all kinds of problems for themselves and for American Catholicism. Greeley calls them "two strange visitors from another world." The two outstanding lay figures of twentieth century pre-Vatican II Catholicism were equally out of place in the Catholic cultural ghetto: Michael Williams, founder and editor of *The Commonweal*, the lay Catholic magazine, was a prodigal son who had returned to the fold; Dorothy Day, founder of *The Catholic Worker*, was also a convert. Outstanding priests also had difficult times. Father Edward McGlynn of New York, the campaigner for Henry George, was twice suspended by Bishop Corrigan and later excommunicated when he refused to go to Rome to answer charges. Many Catholics, even those who respected him, could simply not understand how Father John Ryan could sit on the national board of the American Civil Liberties Union. John Courtnay Murray, the only outstanding American Catholic theologian, was silenced for several years before being finally invited to Vatican II as an "expert" to help draft the Declaration on Religious Freedom.

Conflicts over church property are unlikely to reappear. But the central issues in trusteeism, the need to define the rights of the clergy and the laity in the system of ecclesiastical governance and in defining the Catholic tradition, remain unresolved and conflicts over them are likely to increase. Three developments have created the conditions for future tensions. The Vatican II's redefinition of the church as "the People of God"; the emergence of a highly educated Catholic laity (in fact, frequently more educated than the clergy); and the women's movement. It is on the role and place of women in the church that all three developments converge. Women have always been a majority of the people of God, yet they have been discriminated against; religious women have always been the backbone of the pastoral ministry of the church, yet they were and still are excluded from governance, doctrinal teaching and sacerdotal ministry; today, women religious are the most educated group within the American church. The proportion of women religious holding a Ph.D. degree is much higher than the proportion of priests and bishops holding such degree. It is not surprising, therefore, that the initial thrust, most, and the best feminist theology has been developed by Catholic women.[73]

d) Episcopal Sovereignty vs. National Synodic Church

The tension and conflicts between a monarchic and a synodic church are as old as the church itself. The tensions have reemerged ever anew with changing socio-historical circumstances. As a bureaucratic imperial system, the church has always been exposed also to the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces, which is typical of such systems. It was only natural that the project of building an American church, independent from foreign domination, would reopen these tensions. On the one hand, there was the American circumstance: the covenanted religious tradition, reinforced by republican congressional experiences and federal trends. On the other hand, there were Roman Catholic doctrinal and canonical traditions, tending to emphasize papal and episcopal sovereignty, a tendency which was magnified with the restoration of the centralized papacy in the nineteenth century.

John Carroll's plan for an American church had been that of a collegial body of the clergy under the spiritual authority of an ordinary bishop. However, even while he was in charge as the undisputed leader of the American church, there was little time or effort to implement the plan. The more daunting task of literally building the initial institutional structures (American bishops would always be primarily "brick and mortar" bishops) and the pressing need to reassert some episcopal hierarchic discipline frustrated the plan. After his death, he left a collection of mostly undistinguished prelates, narrowly absorbed in the problems of their own dioceses, who established the long-lasting tradition of a church based on local episcopal sovereignty, devoid of any collective, centralized or federated, national structure, authority, or vision.

John England proved to be the single exception. He founded the first national Catholic publication, the United States Catholic Miscellany. He constantly pressed upon his colleagues the need to develop a unified response to the nativist attacks. Above all, he kept insisting on the need to establish some form of collegial government, arguing that a National Synod was not only urgently required, but would be the most beneficial, the most traditionally Catholic, and the most American system of governance. But other bishops resisted all his plans and suggestions for, in the words of Bishop Kenrick of Philadelphia, "they dreaded lest his active mind and liberal views might lead them into the adoption of measures which might weaken their authority and disturb the repose of the church."[74] The First Baltimore Provincial Council met in 1829, after Maréchal's death, but England's proposal was never considered seriously.

Timothy Byrnes' analysis of the role of the Catholic bishops in American politics shows that the narrow local focus of the bishops' vision may

have been conditioned also by the very nature of the American political system in the nineteenth century. Since politics were centered on the local and state level—this being particularly the case of those issues like education, morality legislation and the like, which absorbed most of the bishops' attention—it is not surprising that even those bishops inclined to political activism tended to concentrate their efforts on the local and state level. It was also at this level that they had political clout.[75]

In this respect, the American Catholic church could be characterized as a diocesan rights church in a states rights political system. But even after the process of bureaucratic centralization and nationalization of government in Washington forced the Catholic hierarchy to establish there also parallel administrative, policy and lobbying agencies, most bishops continued resisting jealously any encroachment upon their local episcopal sovereignty. Indeed, as Dolan points out, the high point in the conception of the bishop as absolute ruler comes towards the end of the nineteenth-century, after the "symbolic apex" of papal absolutism with the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870. Following the legislation of the 1884 Baltimore Council, "each bishop became Pope in his own diocese," while at the parish level the pastor "enjoyed a supremacy over the laity not unlike that of the Pope over the entire church." These developments, according to Dolan, continued during the early decades of the twentieth century.[76]

It is also in the early decades of the twentieth century that the slow process of relocation of the Catholic church's attention from local to national politics begins. The turning point was the founding of the National Catholic War Council in 1917 as a contribution to the national war effort. It marks in many respects the beginning of "social catholicism," of an institutional commitment on the part of the church to social and political action. In 1919, the council released the Program of Social Reconstruction, an important text most of whose policy recommendations would be incorporated later into New Deal legislation. But this so-called "bishops' program" was in fact a text written by Father John A. Ryan, which was appropriated by the bishops as their program.[77]

In 1919 the national orientation and the new "social Catholicism" were reinforced by the transformation of the War Council into the National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), which in addition to creating a permanent administrative structure, called for annual meetings of all American bishops. But most bishops received the new structure with indifference and a group of influential conservative bishops made an almost successful appeal to Rome to kill the idea. They were able, at least, to change the name from Council to Conference, just to make sure and clear that it was not a synodic body that could encroach upon the episcopal sovereignty of the

individual bishops. It was only a deliberative body, which had no binding power and therefore could safely be ignored.

Nothing illustrates better than these two incidents the difference between the "social Catholicism" of the interwar period and the new form of "public Catholicism" which emerged in the 1980's. Social Catholicism emerged as the initiative of a minority of activist bishops and, above all, clergy who took the social doctrines of the church seriously and who, coming as many of them were from the progressive Midwest, found in those doctrines the source for a Catholic "Social Gospel." Most bishops, however, were only reluctantly tolerant of their activities. Ordinary "devout Catholics from childhood," like presidential candidate Al Smith, probably would have replied also that they "never heard of social encyclicals."[78] Father John A. Ryan, "the Right Reverend New Dealer" may have been well known and influential in the corridors of Washington and among ACLU members, but certainly he was less well known and much less popular among ordinary Catholics than his archrival Catholic social activist, pro-fascist corporatist Father Charles Coughlin.[79]

By contrast, the Pastoral Letters, *The Challenge of Peace* and *Economic Justice for All*, were collective texts of all the Bishops of the American Catholic Church, which represented a binding consensus reached after years of deliberations and consultations with experts, public figures, different groups of the Catholic clergy and laity, other churches and Rome.[80] There is also a difference of style and tone. The recent letters are less policy oriented and more calls to reflection and public deliberation. The earlier document shared the amelioration tone of the progressive reform era. The recent letters tone is more that of prophetic judgement and systemic critique. The underlying methodology is also different, less relying on ontological static natural law and more on the historist biblical tradition. But above all, the fundamental differences lie in the different theologies behind them, that is, different view of the church, of the world, and of the public place of the church in the world.

Ultimately, the principle of episcopal sovereignty had come from Rome, from the juridical-canonical structure of the church, and only a change in the self-conception of the church coming from Rome, could probably have succeeded, as it did, in changing the self-understanding of the American church. The experience of the Vatican Council itself, the Council's recommendation to establish national conferences of bishops, additional recommendations to establish avenues for participation of the clergy and the laity in the church's collective deliberations, all emphasized a synodic understanding of the church. The Bicentennial program, "A Call to Action," was the crystallization of this new understanding. The move to write the pastoral letters came out of resolutions taken in the "Call to Ac-

tion" program. One only needs to compare the laudatory, patriotic tone of the Catholic participation in the Centennial celebration, with the more critical, unfinished agenda attitude of the Catholic contribution to the Bicentennial reflections to realize that something had fundamentally changed in the old troubled relations between Catholicism and America.[81]

4) CATHOLIC AND AMERICAN

Taking into account the old patriotic fusion between Catholicism and Americanism, and the even older nativist treatment of Catholicism as un-American, one of the most striking things about the recent pastoral letters is the Catholic Bishops' self-confidence in publicly questioning essential aspects of what could be viewed as the two pillars of the American system during the era of American imperial hegemony. The pastoral letters question both, the injustices of the capitalist system at home and abroad, and the policy of nuclear deterrence, indeed the very right to use nuclear weapons.

Two explanations come easily to mind. The first is that, at last, Catholicism had become so unquestionably American in the minds of everybody that the Catholic bishops could afford to make public criticisms without provoking a nativist reaction or raising old suspicions about the ultimate incompatibility between Catholic power and American freedom. Undoubtedly in this sense the Americanization of Catholicism was the very precondition to ensure that the Catholic critique would be perceived as a friendly amendment to the system, and not as a hostile critique. In this respect the American Protestantism's loss of cultural hegemony was the very precondition for the Americanization of Catholicism.

There is, however, a second more complex explanation which takes the first one as its presupposition but expands it further. This second explanation takes a third factor, Rome, as central to the equation. Precisely at the very moment when Catholicism had finally become American, that is, when America had accepted Catholicism on its own terms and Catholics felt fully at home in America and, therefore, could relax, and free themselves from the old anxieties about conflicting loyalties, precisely at this moment eternal Rome decided to undergo its own "reformation." In the process, the unexpected Roman transformation reopened once again the old vexing question of the relationships between being Catholic and being American. Actually, now for the first time, American Catholicism could pose the issue openly and without subterfuge. It was the Vatican aggiornamento that forced American Catholicism to finally confront modernity. It was no longer a question of being simultaneously a traditional Catholic

and a modern American and, thus, proving pragmatically that there was no incompatibility between both forms of being. Now the question was how to modernize, how to update the old traditional Catholicism itself.

The fact that Catholicism could live so long and adapt so well to American conditions without ever confronting modernity is, indeed, a striking paradox. Tocqueville may have offered a real clue to the paradox:

> The Catholic priests in America have divided the intellectual world into two parts: in the one they place the doctrines of revealed religion, which they assent to without discussion; in the other they leave those political truths which they believe the Deity has left open to free inquiry. Thus the Catholics of the United States are at the same time most submissive believers and the most independent citizens.[82]

Catholics had learned, therefore, to compartmentalize rigidly two spheres of life, the religious and the secular. Both spheres could live well together as long as there was a clear wall of separation between them, so that the spirit of "free inquiry" did not enter the religious sphere and religious doctrines did not enter the secular sphere. American Catholics were never tired of explaining to other Americans that this is precisely what they did. Their Catholicism was restricted to the religious sphere and their Americanism was restricted to the secular sphere. They were Roman Catholics in church and ethnic Catholic Americans, i.e., Irish-American, German-American, etc., in the world. In other words, their Catholicism had two dimensions: the strictly religious one, that is, the sphere of revealed truth in which they were most submissive believers, and the ethnic one in which they were most independent citizens.

This compartmentalization seemed to be, moreover, fully in harmony with the alleged "wall of separation" established by the First Amendment. Actually, the First Amendment not only protected politics from Catholic interference—a principle which Catholics were mostly ready to accept without reservations—the amendment also protected Catholicism from any external interference, above all from the interference of free inquiry. When Catholics entered politics, they did so usually in one of two forms, either as ethnics and workers to advance their groups interests, in which case they proved to be fully American in their use of the system for their benefit;[83] or they entered politics as members of the Catholic church, to protect their rights to the free exercise of their Catholicism, for instance, their right to parochial schools. When they joined moral or social crusades, by contrast, they did so usually as Americans, that is, as trans-denominational members of the American civil religion.

One single thread runs through the persistent self-defense of American Catholics, from John England to John Kennedy, against the accusations of incompatibility of Romanism and Republicanism. As John England said to Congress, the answer was "extremely simple and very plain." There was

no incompatibility because American Catholics were Roman in spiritual matters, and only in spiritual matters, and republican, and therefore, American, in civil matters. Evangelical Protestants, who never made such a separation since their goal was to Christianize the Republic, remained unconvinced. They could only view such an argument as a contrived subterfuge. It was nearly unthinkable that "popery" which, for Lyman Beecher and other Evangelicals was so patently a system of "darkness," "bondage," "corruption," "slavery" and "debasement" could be contained in the private spiritual sphere of the conscience, or in the ritual spiritual sphere of the temple without affecting somehow the republican, civil sphere.

Protestant Evangelicals decided to challenge Catholics to a public debate about "Catholic religion" in which they could expose publicly popish dogmatic unreasonableness and superstition. In the 1830s, in the early stages of the nativist Protestant crusade, such "public duels" became very popular in New York, Philadelphia and other cities. Protestant audiences came expecting to watch the Protestant defenders of Christianity easily rout Catholic apologists. Father John Hughes of Philadelphia was one of those apologists who took gladly the public defense of the Catholic faith and proved to be a worthy contender. Indeed, Protestant leaders decided to discontinue the debates after it became clear that they were having unintended and undesirable consequences.[84]

Evangelical Protestants knew instinctively that there was something about "Romanism" that was ultimately incompatible with "modern" republican principles. But, not being fully "modern," they were unable to frame the issue in terms of the relationships between modernity, freedom of inquiry, and religious dogma, and kept repeating the old unfounded arguments about the threats of "foreign" Roman intervention to republican institutions or the incompatibility between Catholicism and democracy.[85] Indeed, Catholic apologists may have been on better argumentative grounds because they were under less illusions about their faith. They knew that Catholic dogma was a "faith" that they had voluntarily accepted. They believed, however, that once one accepted voluntarily, on faith grounds, the fundamental truths of Christianity, one could use human reason to show the reasonableness of the Catholic interpretation of those truths.

It is true that Catholics were dogmatic about the authoritative tradition of the Church. But nineteenth century Evangelical Protestants were no more willing to let free critical inquiry enter and question scripture than Catholics were ready to let free inquiry question the authority of tradition. At the turn of the century, when critical inquiry in the guise of the new school of biblical criticism finally entered the sacred realm of scripture, the evangelical illusion could no longer be maintained. Evangelicals were forced either to retreat into undisguised fundamentalism or to follow what

Hutchinson would call "the modernist impulse of American Protestantism" and begin the adjustment of their religion to modernity.

Bishop John Hughes saw clearly through the Protestant conceit. Precisely because he was a strict Catholic separationist, that is, somebody who was a committed republican on civil matters and a dogmatic absolutist on spiritual matters, he could not accept the American civil religion. He would not accept any of the Protestant claims about a Christian America, nor the attempt to teach Protestantism in the common schools through the subterfuge of non-sectarian Christianity. If America was to be Christian, then there was no reason why it should assume the Protestant rather than the Catholic version of Christianity. At least not for somebody who was convinced of the superiority of Catholicism on religious grounds. He asked:

> What, then, is the meaning of the words Protestant country, as applied to the United States? I suppose that, at last, it will come down to signify nothing more than that the majority of the inhabitants are Protestants.[86]

Moreover, Bishop Hughes was not afraid to challenge the Evangelicals to a missionizing duel on their home territory, while mocking the conspiratorial fears of Protestant nativists:

> There is no secret about this . . . Protestantism pretends to have discovered a great secret . . . Everybody should know that we have for our mission to convert the world, including the inhabitants of the United States, the people of the cities, the people of the country, the officers of the Navy and the Marines, commanders of the Army, the legislatures, the Senate, the Cabinet, the President, and all.[87]

Later, however, "Americanists" such as Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland, would find perfect harmony between Catholicism and the American Civil Religion. Their task, according to Archbishop Ireland, was that of "teaching laggard Catholics to love America, teaching well-disposed non-Catholics to trust the Church."[88]

Trying to convince laggard conservative bishops who could not swallow the notion that there was no tension between the Church and American civilization, in his speech at the 1884 Third Plenary Baltimore Council, Bishop Ireland said:

> There is no conflict between the Catholic Church and America. I could not utter one syllable that would belie, however remotely, either the Church or the Republic, and when I assert, as I now solemnly do, that the principles of the Church are in thorough harmony with the interests of the Republic, I know in the depths of my soul that I speak the truth.[89]

The conservative bishops did not doubt the sincerity of the "Americanists," but remained unconvinced. Bishops Corrigan and McQuaid knew the official Catholic doctrine on church and state and on religious freedom, and on this basis they could accept the notion that, "under the circumstances," the church could accommodate itself to American conditions. This

was known in Catholic parlance as "the antithesis." But "the thesis," the ideal situation, could only be an established church in a confessional state.[90] Moreover, as some bishops who tried to block the declaration on religious freedom at Vatican II were still arguing, "error has no rights."[91] The Church as the depositor of Divine Truth could not accept the notion that error has the same rights as truth. During the "Americanist" controversy, the issues were never discussed openly in those terms. But this was the central issue. Everything else was secondary.[92]

The "Americanists" held the American truths to be self-evident. But their great failing, indeed, the historical failing of American Catholicism, was their inability to offer reasoned intellectual arguments for those truths, arguments that could be translated into Catholic theological language and, thus, challenge directly the teachings of the church on this issue. They could offer only emotional arguments that came from the depths of their hearts, as when in one of his odes to the American Republic, Bishop Ireland sang:

> Thou bearest in thy hands the hopes of the human race, thy mission from God is to show to nations that men are capable of highest civil and political liberty. Be thou ever free and prosperous. Through thee may liberty triumph over the earth from the rising to the setting sun. Esto perpetua.[93]

Or they could defend the American proposition on pragmatic, utilitarian grounds, showing how beneficial the American system had been for the Catholic Church, how the Church had greater freedom and greater success in America than in alleged Catholic countries. Indeed, they would often tie the mission of the Republic to the mission of the Church. "The Church triumphing in America," Ireland said "Catholic truth will travel on the wings of American influence, and encircle the universe."[94]

When the condemnation of the Americanist heresy came, they fell silent. Publicly, having expected much worse, they felt exonerated and would repeatedly state that they never held the opinions condemned by the Holy Father in *Testem Benevolentiae* (1899). As far as they were concerned, therefore, "Americanism" was a non-heresy. But they never dared to defend publicly the truths they held so deeply. They knew there could be no tension between Catholicism and Americanism and this was sufficient for them. But the effects of the condemnation on American Catholicism were long lasting. It would be necessary to wait another fifty years until a Catholic theologian, John Courtney Murray, at last offered theological arguments for the American truths that challenged the Catholic "thesis."[95] At Vatican II all American Bishops stood up in unison to defend not only the practice but the principle of religious freedom.[96]

The Declaration on religious freedom came at a moment when the tensions of being both American and Catholic had totally disappeared. The anti-communist crusade had made this possible. This was a crusade

all freedom-loving people could join, those fighting for republican freedom and those fighting for the freedom of the church. Rome and the Republic could at last be allies.[97] Albeit for different reasons, Catholic liberals like John F. Kennedy and conservative Catholics like Cardinal Spellman, both shared the conviction that there could be no conflict between the Catholic Church and the American Republic. For President Kennedy because there was a wall of separation between private faith and the modern secular world. For Cardinal Spellman because Catholicism and American patriotism had become undistinguishably fused in the American Civil Religion.[98]

These were the two minds of American Catholicism entering the Vatican Council. As the Council concluded and the Roman aggiornamento reached American shores, it became obvious that both types of Catholicism were being challenged by a new understanding of the relation between church and world. Both the liberal wall of separation and the civil religion fusion were put into question. Private faith could no longer leave secular public matters alone. Nor could spiritual truths ignore the "signs of the times" or be immune to freedom of inquiry. But an eschatological dimension also warned not to identify any social order with God's Kingdom. A new tension between being American and Catholic would emerge. But now it would be a voluntary, purposeful tension so that Catholic faith for the first time could challenge publicly the American world. But in so doing, Catholic faith could no longer avoid exposing itself also to public scrutiny and public contestation

ENDNOTES

1. This paper serves as a preliminary study for an analysis of the public role which the American Catholic Bishops assumed in the 1980s. The analysis is part of a broader, forthcoming study, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, which includes also studies of Catholicism in Spain, Poland, and Brazil, and a study of Protestant Fundamentalism.
2. I find unfortunate the way in which people in the United States have appropriated, all too frequently with messianic and imperial overtones, the name of an entire continent, America, to designate the land and the inhabitants of one particular country of that continent. While I deplore the attitude behind this linguistic usage, I am uncertain about the desirability of changing the linguistic practice itself. The alternatives, Catholicism in the United States or The Catholic Church of the United States of America, are linguistically either unelegant or cumbersome. Somewhat reluctantly, therefore I will adhere to common practice and I will use the term American Catholicism to refer to Catholicism in the United States of America.
3. Most discussions and uses of the church-sect typology fail to distinguish these four dimensions.
4. Fortunately, there are available two excellent and complementary histories of Catholicism in America, on which I have relied throughout this study: James Hennesey, S. J. *American Catholics. A History of the Roman Catholic Community in the United States* (N.Y.: Oxford

University Press, 1981); and Jay P. Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience. A History from Colonial Times to the Present* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985). Hennesey offers an institutional and cultural history of American Catholicism. Dolan's is more a social history of the Catholic peoples. An earlier historical interpretative essay still worth reading is, Andrew M. Greeley, *The Catholic Experience. An Interpretation of the History of American Catholicism* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969).

5. These figures should be viewed as bare estimates. Every text I know offers different figures. The ones presented here are a composite of data taken from the sources mentioned above, and from Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) p. 18.
6. George Gallup Jr., and Jim Castelli, *The American Catholic People: Their Beliefs, Practices and Values* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987) pp. 2-3. Other longitudinal surveys offer different and divergent data. See, Andrew M. Greeley, *Religious Change in America* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
7. In Hennesey, *American Catholics*, p. 117.
8. Cf., Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Sidney E. Mead, *The Lively Experiment* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); and William G. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978).
9. In McLoughlin, *Revivals* p. 109-110.
10. Perry Miller, *The Life of The Mind in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).
11. In McLoughlin, *Revivals* p. 106.
12. Ray Allen Billington, *The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860: A Study of the Origins of American Nativism* (New York: Macmillan, 1938) p. 70 and passim.
13. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 119.
14. In addition to traditional Protestant prejudices and the beginning of Yankee-Irish conflicts, Billington linked the incident with a vogue of literary revelations of lascivious practices in popish nunneries and with lower class resentment against a Catholic school which drew its pupils "largely from the upper class families of Boston who had rebelled against the rigid Congregationalism of the public school system." Billington, *Protestant Crusade* p. 69.
15. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 119.
16. Ibid. p. 125.
17. In October 1861, after assuring Secretary of War Simon Cameron that Catholics were willing to die for "the constitution, the Government, and the laws of the country," Bishop Hughes warned: "But if it should be understood that, with or without knowing it, they are to fight for the abolition of slavery, then, indeed, they will turn away in disgust from the discharge of what would otherwise be a patriotic duty." In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 149.
18. McLoughlin, *Revivals*, pp. 140-178.
19. Dolan, *American Catholic Experience* p. 161.
20. Cf. George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture. The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), and William R. Hutchinson, *The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
21. See, Robert Wuthnow, *Restructuring of American Religion*.
22. Andrew Greeley is never tired of exposing the "ugly little secret" of anti-Catholic prejudices among liberal educated upper class groups. See, Andrew Greeley, *The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990); *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and *American Catholics Since the Council* (New York: Thomas More Press, 1985). All evidence to the contrary, 40% of liberal college educated Protestants from the Northeast (vs. 30% among general Protestant population, and 20% among Jews) still agree that "Catholics are afraid to think for themselves" and "Catholics tend to think the way their bishops and priests want them to think." For a classic exponent of liberal Protestant anti-Catholic

prejudices see, Paul Blanshard, *American Freedom and Catholic Power* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). For a more recent expression see, Lawrence Lader, *Politics, Power, and the Church. The Catholic Crisis and its Challenge to American Pluralism.* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1987).

23. Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).
24. In Dolan, *American Catholic Experience*, p. 74.
25. *Ibid.* p. 73.
26. American Catholics later would find gratifying to learn that when Catholics were briefly in power in Maryland and in New York they granted toleration to all (Christian) religions. But such a tolerant policy can be attributed more to the enlightened self-interest of patrimonial rulers, —the same enlightened self-interest which led Frederick II of Prussia to welcome "Turks and heathens" to his realm—than to the Christian, humanitarian feelings of a religious minority which had suffered persecution in England. See, John D. Krugler, "Lord Baltimore, Roman Catholics and Toleration: Religious Policy in Maryland During the Early Catholic Years, 1634-1647," *Catholic Historical Review* 65 (Jan., 1979).
27. In Hennesey, *American Catholics*, p. 68.
28. David O'Brien has offered the most systematic characterization of both styles of Catholicism. See, David O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1989).
29. Gerald Fogarty, S. J., "Public Patriotism and Private Piety: The Tradition of American Catholicism," *U.S. Catholic Historian* 4 (1982).
30. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 65.
31. O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* p. 5. See, Bernhard Groethuysen, *The Bourgeois*. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).
32. In Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 94. Bishop England was taking issue with some statements made by President John Quincy Adams about the Catholic Church.
33. In O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* p. 30.
34. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 124.
35. Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 107.
36. O'Brien, *Public Catholicism* pp. 46-47.
37. In Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 106.
38. At the time of the council, four of every ten Catholic parishes had primary schools. Following the council decree, the number of parochial schools grew from 2,246 in 1880, to 3,811 in 1900, to 4,845 in 1910; while the number of students rose from 405,234 in 1880, to 854,523 in 1900, to 1,237,251 in 1910. The figures are taken from Hennesey, *American Catholics* pp. 242-243.
39. For a detailed analysis see Dolan, *American Catholic Experience* pp. 262-293.
40. Cf. Robert D. Cross, *The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958); Thomas T. McAvoy, *The Americanist Heresy in Roman Catholicism, 1895-1900* (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963); Gerald P. Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 1965* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1985); and Bernard M. Reardon, *Roman Catholic Modernism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970).
41. William M. Halsey, *The Survival of American Innocence: Catholicism in an Era of Disillusionment, 1920-1940* (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980); on devotional Catholicism and the neighborhood parish see, Dolan, *American Catholic Experience*; on the middle ages and thomism see, Philip Gleason, *Keeping the Faith. American Catholicism Past and Present* (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
42. The debate was started by John Tracy Ellis's "American Catholics and the Intellectual Life," *Thought* 30 (1955).
43. See, Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 283, for the relevant sections of the speech.
44. See, Jay P. Dolan, *The Immigrant Church* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1970), and *American Catholic Experience* chapters V through XII, pp. 127-346.
45. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 79.
46. Dolan, *American Catholic Experience* p. 301.

47. The figures are taken from Hennesey, *American Catholics*, p. 194; and Dolan, *American Catholic Experience*, pp. 134-135, and 180.
48. There have only been two significant schisms within American Catholicism: the formation of the Polish National Catholic Church, which came to comprise at most five percent of Polish immigrants and the separation of a much larger number of Ruthenian-Ukrainians (up to 225,000) to join the Russian Orthodox Church. Both cases involved the combination of national churches under conditions of foreign occupation and partition in the home countries, and unhappy encounters with narrow, Americanizing bishops in America. In the case of the Ruthenian-Ukrainians there were two additional factors which the Irish-American church found unable to accommodate: the Eastern Rite and, above all, a married clergy whose presence, as stated by a 1893 archbishops' resolution, "is a constant menace to the chastity of our unmarried clergy, a source of scandal to the laity." In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 193. For a transcript of the calamitous encounter between Bishop Ireland and the first Ukrainian-Catholic priest, Father Alexis Toth, in Minneapolis in 1889, see Dolan, *American Catholic Experience* p. 187.
49. Will Herberg's *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* remains the classic statement.
50. See, Harold J. Abramson, *Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America* (New York: Wiley, 1973). Not surprisingly, Catholics—three priests among them: Andrew Greeley, Geno Baroni, and Silvano Tomasi—played a leading role in the "new ethnicity movement" of the 1970s.
51. On Hispanic Catholics see, Gallup and Castelli, *Catholic People*, pp. 139-148; and Antonio M. Stevens-Arroyo, ed., *Prophets Denied Honor: An Anthology on the Hispanic Church in the United States* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1980).
52. Mead, *Lively Experiment* pp. 103-133.
53. Jay P. Dolan, *Catholic Revivalism* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978) p. xviii.
54. David O'Brien, *American Catholics and Social Reform: The New Deal Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
55. Cf., Charles Meconis, *With Clumsy Grace: The American Catholic Left 1961-1975* (New York: Seabury, 1979); Mel Piehl, *Breaking Bread. The Catholic Worker and the Origin of Catholic Radicalism in America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982).
56. Joseph A. Varacalli, *Toward the Establishment of Liberal Catholicism in America* (N.Y.: University Press of America, 1983) p. 119.
57. Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 71.
58. *Ibid.* p. 72.
59. See Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* pp. 55-56.
60. See, Patrick W. Carey, *People, Priests, and Prelates. Ecclesiastical Democracy and the Tensions of Trusteeism* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1987).
61. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 76.
62. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 77.
63. Carey, *People, Priests* p. 11.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.* p. 14.
66. *Ibid.* p. 15.
67. *Ibid.* p. 15.
68. In Hennesey, *American Catholics* p. 91.
69. See Carey, *op. cit.*
70. Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 85.
71. Carey, *op. cit.* pp. 265-266.
72. Cf. Peter Guilday, *The Life and Time of John Carroll* (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1922); and *The Life and Times of John England* 2 Vols. (New York: The America Press, 1927); Patrick Carey, *An Immigrant Bishop: John England's Adaptation of Irish Catholicism to American Republicanism* (New York: United States Catholic Historical Society, 1982); Richard Shaw, *Dagger John: The Unquiet Life and Times of Archbishop John Hughes of New York* (New York: Paulist Press, 1977); John Tracy Ellis, *The Life of James Cardinal Gibbons: Archbishop of Baltimore, 1834-1921* 2 Vols. (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952); Robert Emmett Curran, *Michael Augustine Corrigan, and the Shaping of*

Conservative Catholicism in America, 1878-1902 (New York: Arno, 1978); Thomas W. Spalding, *Martin John Spalding: American Churchman* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1973); John Cooney, *The American Pope: The Life and Times of Francis Cardinal Spellman* (New York: Dell, 1984).

73. Anne Carr, Mary Daly, Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rosemary Radford Reuther are among the best feminist theologians. On Catholic women and the church, cf., Mary Jo Weaver, *New Catholic Women* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985); Marie Augusta Neal, *Catholic Sisters in Transition: From the 1960s to the 1980s* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1989); Karen Kennelly C. S. J., ed., *American Catholic Women* (New York: Macmillan, 1989); Madonna Kolbenschlag, ed., *Between God and Caesar: Priests, Sisters, and Political Office in the United States* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985); Andrew Greeley and Mary Durkin, *Angry Catholic Women* (Chicago: Thomas More, 1984).
74. In Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* p. 92.
75. Timothy A. Byrnes, *Catholic Bishops in American Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
76. Dolan, *American Catholic Experience* p. 190.
77. Cf. Aaron I. Abell, *American Catholicism and Social Action: A Search for Social Justice* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960); and Francis L. Broderick, *Right Reverend New Dealer: John A. Ryan* (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
78. In Hennesy, *American Catholics* p. 252.
79. O'Brien, *Catholics and Social Reform* pp. 150-181; and Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression* (New York: Knopf, 1982).
80. Cf., Jim Castelli, *The Bishops and the Bomb* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1983); Phillip J. Murnion, ed., *Catholics and Nuclear War* (New York: Crossroad, 1983); Thomas M. Gannon, S. J., ed., *The Catholic Challenge to the America Economy* (New York: Macmillan, 19887); Philip Berryman, *Our Unfinished Business: The U.S. Catholic Bishops' Letters on Peace and the Economy* (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1989).
81. On the Bicentennial Program. "A Call to Action," cf., Varacalli, *Toward the Establishment* and O'Brien, *Public Catholicism*.
82. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage, 1990) Vol. I, pp. 301-302.
83. See, for instance, Henry J. Browne, *The Catholic Church and the Knights of Labor* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1949).
84. See, Billington, *Protestant Crusade*.
85. At the time when those debates were taking place, Tocqueville already argued that "the Catholic religion has erroneously been regarded as the natural enemy of democracy." Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* Vol. 1, p. 300.
86. Quoted in Dorothy Dohen, *Nationalism and American Catholicism* (N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1967).
87. In Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* pp. 107-108.
88. Dohen, *Nationalism* p. 111. Ireland was prone to compose the most mellifluous odes and outright idolatrous hymns to the American Republic.
89. In Byrnes, *Catholic Bishops* p. 19.
90. For the most lucid exposition and the best internal critique of the traditional Catholic position see, John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom," *Theological Studies* 25 (1964) pp. 503-575.
91. John Courtney Murray, "The Issue of Church and State at Vatican II," *Theological Studies* 27 (December 1966) pp. 580-606.
92. Cf., McAvoy, *Americanist Heresy* and Fogarty *The Vatican*.
93. In Greeley, *The Catholic Experience* pp. 155-156.
94. In Dohen, *Nationalism* p. 109.
95. John Courtney Murray, S. J., *We Hold These Truths. Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960).
96. Vincent A. Yzermans, ed., *American Participation in the Second Vatican Council* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967).

97. Donald F. Crosby, S. J., *God, Church and Flag: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the Catholic Church, 1950-57* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Fogarty, *The Vatican*; and Dohen, *Nationalism*.
98. Cf., John Cooney, *The American Pope: The Life and Times of Francis Cardinal Spellman* (New York: Times Books, 1984) and Lawrence Fuchs, *John F. Kennedy and American Catholicism* (New York: Meredith, 1967).