



Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith



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The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) is a not-for-profit organization working at the intersection of religion and global development. Housed within Georgetown University's Berkley Center in Washington, D.C., WFDD documents the work of faith inspired organizations and explores the importance of religious ideas and actors in development contexts. WFDD supports dialogue between religious and development communities and promotes innovative partnerships, at national and international levels, with the goal of contributing to positive and inclusive development outcomes.

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Acknowledgments

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Cover: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. IHH relief effort in refugee camps in Somalia, August 2011.
Page 12: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. Kenya-Dadaab, August 2011.
Page 14: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. Kenya, September 2011.
Page 19: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation. Kenya, September 2011.
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FOREWORD

The number of refugees globally has reached its highest level in 60 years. Finding ways to resolve protracted displacement is an urgent priority even as global humanitarian institutions struggle to cope with present realities. Religious actors are vital players in systems of humanitarian response. Religious tensions play their part in the refugee and migrant flows, religious institutions support refugees at many levels, and religious beliefs, practices, and networks are central to the lives of refugees. Exploring these religious dimensions can offer insights in the search for solutions.

Kenya offers a telling example of the dilemmas. Refugee protection challenges there have already lasted more than three decades but progress toward lasting solutions is essentially stalled and resources (national and international) are stretched thin. Likewise global humanitarian institutions are struggling to cope with urgent present realities and to see more clearly toward longer-term solutions. These global challenges have often poorly explored religious dimensions, positive and negative, as religious actors are vital players in the systems of humanitarian response and religious tensions play their part in the refugee and migrant flows themselves as well as in the lives of refugees.

Kenya hosts the world's largest refugee camp (the Dadaab complex) and thousands more refugees live in urban areas and in the Kakuma refugee camp. Refugees continue to arrive at camps, fleeing Eastern Africa's complex conflicts. The camps have expanded far beyond the early nightmares of those who started them, with third generations growing up in camp settings, uncertain about their future. People surrounding the camps (who live in some of Kenya's poorest regions) swing between hospitable support to those in need and resentment at what appears often to be preferential treatment of refugees. Tensions are exacerbated by fears linked to successive terrorist attacks. Refugee populations in cities, official and unofficial, contribute to the Kenyan economy but, with acute pressures on Kenya's over-stretched social services and scarce jobs, they also face resentment and varying forms of discrimination and exclusion. On top of the refugee challenge, a large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) needs support, ranging from basic needs to resettlement and healing.

Faith plays important roles in this complex set of challenges. Most obviously, faith-inspired organizations are an important

part of the partnerships that run refugee camps and support refugees. This is also true for IDPs. Religious institutions, beliefs, and practices color refugee experience and prospects. Inter and intra religious tensions are evident within the camps, but still more, Muslim/Christian tensions in Kenya, accentuated by violent extremism and horrific terrorist attacks, are focused on the refugee populations and specifically the camps: after the April 2015 Garissa massacre various Kenyan leaders demanded that the camps be closed immediately and refugees repatriated. Meanwhile, religious leaders and communities can and often do provide active support and work to reconcile and look forward.

This report was prepared as part of the ongoing World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) and Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs research on Kenya. It forms part of ongoing research, supported by the Henry R. Luce Initiative on Religion and International Affairs, to map the religious landscape and development progress in four countries: Kenya, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Guatemala. The core research questions are how religion is linked to development agendas, why that matters, and what that implies for policy and programs. The project includes in depth reviews like this one of specific issues where faith and development are linked.

The report describes the work of a range of faith actors involved in refugee issues, exploring various roles that religious beliefs and institutions play. It also addresses, in less depth, parallel issues for Kenya's internally displaced people. It highlights the often poorly documented work of international, national, and community level faith actors and explores religiously linked benefits and challenges for Kenya's current refugee situation. It also addresses related issues for host communities and urban refugees. The hope is that this focus on the roles of faith actors and religious practice and beliefs can contribute to current reflections at national and international level on humanitarian and development challenges in protracted refugee situations.

Comments and feedback are welcome.

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Glossary

<i>Al-Shabaab</i>	Somalia based jihadist terrorist organization responsible for dozens of attacks in Kenya
<i>Dadaab</i>	Refugee camp complex in Garissa, Kenya. It is comprised of multiple sub-camps including: Dagahaley, Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo 2, and Kiamboos
<i>Dagahaley</i>	Sub-camp of the Dadaab refugee complex
<i>duksi</i>	Qur'anic preschool
<i>'Eid ul-Fitr</i>	Muslim religious holiday meaning 'festival of breaking the fast' which marks the end of Ramadan
<i>Garissa University</i>	Kenyan university targeted in an attack by Al-Shabaab in April 2015 that killed 147 people
<i>hadith</i>	Islamic religious texts which report the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and actions
<i>Hagadera</i>	Sub-camp of the Dadaab refugee complex
<i>Ifo</i>	Sub-camp of the Dadaab refugee complex. Ifo 2 is also a sub-camp.
<i>Kakuma</i>	Refugee camp in Turkana, Kenya
<i>Kambioos</i>	Sub-camp of the Dadaab refugee complex
<i>Maslaha court system</i>	Traditional justice system based on sharia law used in some Somali and Kenyan communities
<i>Ramadan</i>	Holy month of fasting in Islam that commemorates the first revelation of the Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad
<i>sadaqah</i>	Islamic term meaning 'voluntary charity' contrasted with zakat, which is obligatory charity
<i>seva</i>	Literally meaning 'service,' it is the concept of selfless service or volunteer work in Hinduism
<i>sharia</i>	Islamic religious law
<i>tzedakah</i>	Meaning 'righteousness' in Hebrew, it is the concept of charity in Judaism
<i>Westgate Mall</i>	Location of 2013 Al-Shabaab mass shooting attack in Nairobi, Kenya that resulted in 67 deaths.
<i>zakat</i>	A type of obligatory charitable giving or tithe in Islam

Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AJWS	American Jewish World Service
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
CBM	Christian Blind Mission
CICC	Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CWS	Church World Service
DCA	DanChurch Aid
FCA	Finn Church Aid
FGM-C	female genital mutilation-cutting
FIO	faith-inspired organization
HIAS	Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society
IDP	internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	Islamic Relief
IRCK	Interreligious Council of Kenya
JC:HEM	Jesuit Commons: Higher Education at the Margins
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
KCCB	Kenya Conference of Catholic Bishops
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
LGBTI	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
NCKK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NGO	non-governmental organization
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RRDO	Relief Reconstruction and Development Organization
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	water, sanitation, and hygiene

COUNTRY MAP: KENYA




Figure 1: Kenya: registered refugees and asylum seekers

Box 1. Kenya's refugees: facts and figures

Nearly 600,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons were counted in Kenya as of October 2015. About 530,000 were in camp settings, the rest are mostly in Nairobi or awaiting registration in other parts of Kenya.¹ The numbers are increasing; the camps are overcrowded and services are stretched thin. Some 42 percent of refugees are under 12 years old. In Dadaab, women outnumber men in the 18 to 59 group.²

UNHCR is the main coordinating organization for refugees in Kenya, working closely with the Kenyan government's Department of Refugee Affairs. UNHCR manages service delivery through a cluster system that assigns partner organizations to particular service areas such as food distribution, education, health, or water and sanitation. The 2015 UNHCR partners include 33 NGOs, four Kenyan government agencies, and 11 international organizations (for example: UN agencies, World Food Program, World Health Organization). The primary NGO partners are Care International and Kenya Red Cross Society.

There are six official refugee camps in Kenya, five of which are part of the Dadaab and Alinjugur refugee complex which is located in Garissa County, in Kenya's Northeastern region. In response to growing numbers of Somali refugees, UNHCR and the Kenyan government have successively established new sub-camps in Dadaab. These include Hagadera, Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo 2, and the newest, Kambioos. Within the sub-camps, refugees live in neighborhoods consisting of ten numbered blocks (see Figure 5), which often have their own public schools as well as privately run Islamic schools, mosques, and boreholes.

The Dabaab complex is the largest contiguous refugee camp in the world today, with almost 350,000 people.³ Some 95 percent of Dadaab's population comes from Somalia (see Figure 2).


Kakuma is Kenya's most diverse refugee camp, located in Turkana County in the northwestern corner of Kenya. During 2014, Kakuma received over 45,000 new arrivals from South Sudan as the conflict there escalated; the camp population totaled 182,312 in October 2015, with the South Sudanese accounting for over 50 percent.⁴ The camp has expanded to accommodate new arrivals with new sub-camps named Kakuma One, Kakuma Two, Kakuma Three, and Kakuma Four.

UNHCR assigns each refugee household to a particular plot of land based on the order in which they arrive. However, refugees from the same country tend to relocate from their assigned neighborhood in order to join fellow countrymen. The neighborhoods in Kakuma have become mostly divided by the national origin of the refugees.

UNHCR reported that 61,736 registered refugees lived in Nairobi as of October 2015,⁵ but it is well known that many more live in Nairobi unregistered. Smaller groups of refugees live in other Kenyan cities, notably Mombasa. The Nairobi neighborhoods of Eastleigh and South C are major hubs for Somali refugees, with smaller populations of Eritreans and Ethiopians. The Congolese tend to settle in the Kayole or Kawangware neighborhoods. Ethiopians, Burundians, and Ugandans also live in the Kawangware area.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that over 309,000 Kenyans are internally displaced as of 2015. Communal clashes, usually involving land disputes but also election related violence, cause displacement throughout Kenya. Climate factors contribute to displacement, notably drought and floods. Terrorist attacks in the Northeastern and Coast regions have triggered waves of internal displacement (see Figure 9). Many are still displaced following 2007-2008 post election violence.


Figure 2: Dadaab population by country of origin



Source: "Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers as of 01 October 2015." UNHCR Kenya, October 10, 2015.


Box 1. Kenya's refugees: facts and figures (cont.)

Figure 3: Kakuma population by country of origin (Oct. 2015)



Source: "Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers as of 01 October 2015." UNHCR Kenya, October 10, 2015.

Figure 4: Population of registered refugees in Nairobi by country of origin (Oct. 2015)



Source: "Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers as of 01 October 2015." UNHCR Kenya, October 10, 2015.

Box 2. Definitions

Refugee: As defined in the 1951 Convention on Human Rights a refugee is, "someone who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."

Asylum seeker: UNHCR defines an asylum seeker as, "someone who says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated."

Stateless persons: Article 1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a stateless person as, "a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law."

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): IDPs are people who have fled their homes for similar reasons to refugees but have not crossed an international border. Instead, they remain displaced in their own country (UNHCR).

Box 3. 2015 UNHCR Partner Organizations

IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

Government agencies: Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government (Department of Refugee Affairs), Ministry of Health, Ministry of State for Special Programmes

NGOs: CARE International, Danish Refugee Council, Don Bosco - Kenya, Fafi Integrated Development Association, FilmAid International, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), International Rescue Committee, Islamic Relief Kenya, Jesuit Refugee Service, Kenya Magistrates and Judges Association, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Kenya Red Cross Society, Legal Advice Centre (Kituo Cha Sheria) - Kenya, Lutheran World Federation, National Council of Churches of Kenya, Norwegian Refugee Council, Peace Winds Japan, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Relief Reconstruction and Development Organisation, Save the Children International, Windle Trust UK in Kenya

Others: UNV

OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

Government agencies: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NGOs: Action Against Hunger, Catholic Relief Services, Centre for Torture Victims - Kenya, Cooperazione e Sviluppo, GOAL, Handicap International, International Life Line Fund, International Service Volunteers Association, InterNews Star FM, Médecins Sans Frontières - Suisse, Terre des Hommes, Women and Health Alliance, World Vision International

Others: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Cooperation - GIZ), IOM, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNDSS, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP and WHO

REFUGEE CAMP MAP




Figure 5: Hagadera camp within Dadaab



INTRODUCTION

Kenya's refugee situation presents complex and fast-changing challenges. Nearly 600,000 refugees currently live in Kenya, the vast majority from Somalia with a growing minority from South Sudan. Kenya has hosted large refugee populations since the 1990s, putting continuing strains on Kenya as a host country. Dynamics constantly evolve. Refugees are drawn into broader social and political tensions, notably interreligious relations and rising concerns about violent extremism. There is little realistic prospect that these challenges will diminish in the foreseeable future.

Religious factors affect the lives of refugees in different ways. Faith actors and faith-inspired organizations provide substantial direct support to refugees in Kenya (as they do in many refugee situations). The scriptural imperative to care for the 'stranger,' common to all world religions, can be a powerful motivation that drives faith actors—local, national, and international—to support refugees. Religiosity is generally observed to be high among refugee populations, though research on the role of faith in the lives of refugees is

slim. Practitioners observe that religious faith can bolster a refugee's ability to cope with trauma and find hope in the face of uncertainty and adversity as their lives seem stalled in the camps. More tangibly, religious practices and beliefs affect the daily lives of refugees in countless ways. Examining the role of religion and faith actors in this context can help shed light on these issues and, potentially, inform new solutions.

There are less positive religious dimensions for refugee life in Kenya. Threats posed by the East African region's violent extremism accentuate ethnic and religious tensions, notably directing suspicion and hostility toward the Somali refugees who make up 71 percent of Kenya's refugee population⁶ and ethnically Somali Kenyans and other Kenyan Muslims. Tensions among Muslims and Christians (the majority in Kenya, over 81 percent)⁷ have long roots but take new forms in the contemporary situation. Al-Shabaab attacks, often targeting Christians, exacerbate tensions. Somali refugees bear the brunt of rumors about recruitment into and allegiance with terrorist organizations. These dynamics thrust Somali

refugees into the public eye, often in a negative light. Kenya's responsibilities as a host country give rise to tensions between host communities at the local level. Kenya closed the border to Somalia in 2007 and there have been vocal calls to relocate the Dadaab refugee camp after the Westgate (2013) and Garissa University (2015) attacks. Faith and secular actors are working to defuse inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions in Kenya through dialogue and peacebuilding efforts, but national cohesion is strained by fears of future attacks and the legacies of past violence.

As is so often the case, Kenya's refugee situation was initially seen as a temporary humanitarian crisis, but it has persisted and worsened over the years. Few are optimistic that it will end soon. Kenya thus faces what is known as a protracted refugee situation, with third and even fourth generations born and living in Dadaab. Ongoing conflict in Somalia, South Sudan, and other nearby countries bring new refugees to Kenya and prevent many from returning home. Meanwhile both Kenyan and international humanitarian resources are stretched thin.

A different set of issues (also with religious dimensions) confront Kenya's internally displaced population. The United

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that there are currently more than 300,000 IDPs in Kenya. Election violence in late 2007 into 2008 left a large population internally displaced, and more recent terrorist attacks in the Northeastern and Coast regions displaced tens of thousands of Kenyans. Dispersed throughout the country, IDPs often rely on local communities, many faith affiliated, for help and support.

Faith actors play important roles in the care and lives of Kenya's refugees but unraveling their distinct features is complex. FIO programs, especially those in the refugee camps, are generally quite similar to those of their secular counterparts. They may engage religious leaders more deliberately, approach issues through a faith lens, or focus more on spiritual support. Their most distinctive characteristics stem from their extensive local grassroots networks through faith communities as well as a conceptual narrative informed by faith traditions. These two features offer significant strengths in the Kenyan context, supporting local organizations and communities as they combat negative stereotypes toward refugees and advocate at national, regional, and grassroots levels to protect the 'stranger.'



CONTEXT

2.1 KENYA AS A LONG-STANDING HOST COUNTRY

Kenya's contemporary history as host to substantial groups of refugees (see Figure 7⁸) dates to the 1970s, when a wave of Ugandans fleeing civil violence found refuge in Kenya. No refugee camps were established at this time; refugees integrated into society and most were able to settle permanently in Kenya. This pattern was repeated quite smoothly until the early 1990s when large-scale refugee arrivals began, fueled by conflicts in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Integration into Kenyan society was impossible with over 100,000 new arrivals.⁹

Initially as a temporary measure, UNHCR and the Kenyan government established refugee camps along Kenya's borders. Since the 1990s, Kenya's refugee camps have grown and shrunk as conflicts in neighboring countries have evolved. Droughts have also resulted in mass refugee arrivals. Though many refugees have returned when circumstances permit, continuing influxes of new refugees have caused a steady growth in the refugee population over time. It has been clear for decades that Kenya's role as a host country is far from temporary.

As a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (among other relevant international agreements), Kenya has undertaken to uphold the responsibilities and duties of a refugee host country.¹⁰ These

Table 1: Ethnic composition of Kenya

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Kikuyu	17
Luhya	14
Kalenjin	13
Luo	10
Kamba	10
Kenyan Somali	6
Kisii	6
Mijikenda	5
Meru	4
Turkana	2.5
Maasai	2.1
Other groups > 1%	10.4

Source: Kenya Census 2009. Census reported 38.6 million people total; data on ethnicity is contested.

responsibilities include allowing any individual fleeing persecution to seek refuge in the host country without discrimination or infringement of rights, protecting the refugees and their families upon arrival, and allowing the refugees access to national welfare services.¹¹

The Kenyan government initially took responsibility for registering all refugees and facilitating access to basic services. However, the government's capacity was overwhelmed by new waves of refugees. In 1992 UNHCR accepted the role as the primary duty-bearer. UNHCR, as leader of a complex partnership, now oversees all services to refugees in camp settings including registration, water and sanitation, health services, education, shelter, and non-food and food items. Protection services, which include legally protecting refugees in their right to remain in the country of asylum and physically protecting them in the camp settings, are implemented by the Kenyan government in collaboration with UNHCR and its partner organizations.¹²

The location of Kenya's refugee camps presents special challenges. The camps are in the northwest Turkana (Kakuma camp) and northeast Garissa regions (Dadaab complex) where providing resources and services is complicated by remote location and harsh climate, a quite common feature of refugee camp locations internationally. Services even to Kenyans living there are sparse. Erratic weather patterns and food and water insecurity make for high vulnerability for refugees and

non-refugees alike. NGOs try to manage delivery of aid to minimize resentment from neighboring communities, but refugees are still perceived as privileged because they receive aid. Tensions around space and resources are also seen in urban neighborhoods with high concentrations of refugee populations. Minor outbreaks of violence between refugee and host communities as well as harassment of refugees by police are common occurrences.


2.2 CHALLENGES AND TENSIONS FOR REFUGEES IN KENYA

Refugee situations in Kenya are complicated by historical, political, and social dynamics, notably the religious and ethnic identity of the refugees, who are mainly Somalis, and historic tensions between Kenya's Christian and Muslim populations. Attacks by the Somalia-based Islamic extremist group, Al-Shabaab, strain the Kenyan government's willingness to serve as a host country.

Ethnicity and religion in Kenya


Kenya has enjoyed a mostly peaceful history as an ethnically and religiously diverse country; however, when conflicts erupt they are often along ethnic lines. This has various implications for refugees. The main ethnic groups, Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin,

Figure 7: Flow of refugees entering Kenya



Source: UNHCR Global Report 1999-2013 – Kenya

Figure 8: Map of Kenya ethnic groups



Source: "Kenya Diplomatic Push for Peace." BBC News. January 2008.

Luo, and Kamba (see table), are largely concentrated in specific regions. A significant population of ethnic Somalis are native Kenyans, a legacy of Africa's colonial partition that so often divided ethnic groups along national borders.

Religious identity often follows ethnic lines in Kenya. Kenya is majority Christian with a large Muslim minority (estimated, with contention, at about 10 percent of the population).¹³ Kenya's Muslim population is heavily concentrated in the Northeastern and Coast regions, with significant communities in Nairobi. Although they span many ethnic groups, Muslims in Kenya are divided between those who are viewed as belonging to Kenyan ethnic groups (Mijikenda, Taita-Taveta, Luo) or ethnic Somalis. Especially in the Northeast region (the counties of Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir) Kenyan Somali Muslims make up a large part of the population.

Secessionist attempts of the Northeastern and Coast provinces

Historical tensions in Kenya's Northeastern and Coast provinces are linked to colonial boundaries and unequal

national development. Located along the border with Somalia, the northeast (where the Dadaab refugee camp is located) is among Kenya's poorest regions. The 2010 constitution promotes equal distribution of resources and development as does the ambitious devolution of the national government to county-level government, but tangible results are still limited.

In 1963, a secessionist movement among ethnic Somalis from the Northeastern province grew into the Shifta War. In 1967 secessionists were forced to agree to a cease-fire, but skirmishes and outbreaks of secessionist violence have erupted periodically since then.¹⁴ The influx of Somali refugees to the Northeastern province since 1990 has renewed concerns about a secessionist effort, with fears that Al-Shabaab could gain support in that region if the Somali population increases, especially as its tactics include sowing divisions among Kenya's Muslims and Christians.¹⁵

Secessionist tendencies have also colored Kenya's Coast province, whose population is majority Muslim (though not majority ethnic Somali). The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), founded in 1999, aims to establish the Coast province as an independent country with the slogan Pwani si Kenya or the 'Coast is not Kenya.' Though refugees are not directly involved in these secessionist dynamics, they are nonetheless bound up in historical and contemporary Muslim/Christian divides.¹⁶

Somali refugees: repercussions in Kenya

Somali nationals account for 71 percent of Kenya's refugees,¹⁷ and Somalia's many problems overflow to Kenya. Somali refugees face perceptions or judgments often unrelated to them per se. Somali refugees are stereotyped and discriminated against based on their ethnicity, historical tensions, and suspicion of collusion with Al-Shabaab. Somali refugees' rights to protection and safety as refugees can be jeopardized, for example in recent government round-ups in Nairobi.¹⁸ The conflict they fled follows them to Kenya.




Source: Gado Cartoons, April 6, 2000, with permission to publish.

Rumors about Somali refugees' connections to Al-Shabaab heighten tensions between refugees and the Kenyan population. Based largely on rumor, many believe that Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups target the Somali refugee population for recruitment or that Somali refugees facilitate trade of small arms across the border.¹⁹ In contrast, the Kenyan government is rumored to recruit Somali refugees in Dadaab for military purposes; a 2009 Human Rights Watch report contended that the Government of Kenya recruited Somali refugees to fight against Al-Shabaab on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.²⁰ These claims, whether true or false, demonstrate the significant role Somali refugees are perceived to play.²¹

Particularly in Nairobi, Somali refugees are commonly suspected of terrorism and face discrimination from the police and the Kenyan population. Following the Westgate attacks many Kenyans would not allow Somalis to enter public buses or kept their distance from the specific cars (Proboxes) that are believed to be owned by Somalis (Al-Shabaab militants used Proboxes in the Westgate attack).²² Over time, fears and suspicions of Somalis decline but they spike with each terrorist attack. The Garissa University attack in April 2015, in particular, because of its size and targeting of students, was followed by harsh statements against Kenya's Somali population, both citizens and refugees. News articles reported inflammatory comments, for example, a Newsweek interviewee comment: "We Kenyans have made a mistake. We allowed Somalis into our country, and now they are killing us. Somalis are one, and every Somali is Al-Shabaab. Everybody thinks like that."²³ Practitioners observe that these sentiments were widespread among the Kenyan population.²⁴

The Kenyan government has responded to the Al-Shabaab attacks with efforts to restrict numbers of Somali refugees. When Kenya closed its borders with Somalia in 2007, UN agencies and refugee rights organizations reacted sharply to this violation of international refugee law. Despite border closures, over 80,000 Somali refugees entered Kenya between 2007 and 2008 as the Kenyan forces were unable to secure the entire border.²⁵ Following the Westgate attack, on September 30, 2013 member of parliament and chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Administration and National Security, Asmam Kamama advised that Dadaab refugee camp should be shut down because it functioned as recruiting grounds for Al-Shabaab.²⁶ After the 2015 Garissa University attack, Kenya's Deputy President, William Ruto, called for the UN to take immediate measures to relocate Dadaab outside of Kenya; if the UN refused to relocate the camp within three months, Ruto said, "we shall relocate them ourselves."²⁷ This threat was later retracted, but parliamentarians have also called for and begun construction of a wall along the Somali-Kenyan border to keep terrorist forces from coming to Kenya.²⁸ Construction began in early 2015 in Lamu County and

Figure 9: Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Global Terrorism Database. Accessed November 18, 2015.

was to be completed by the end of 2015.²⁹ Another controversial approach in late 2014 was a national security bill to cap Kenya's refugee population to 150,000 and give expanded powers to anti-terrorism forces.³⁰ After international protests the Kenyan government loosened the security bill and modified some provisions of the act, specifically removing the stipulations that persons arrested on suspicion of terrorism could be held for up to one year and giving intelligence agencies the power to tap phone lines and intercept communication without a court order.³¹ The final bill imposed further restrictions on refugee movement outside the camps. Parliament passed the amended bill in December 2014.³² In February 2015, the Kenya High Court nullified the 150,000 refugee cap but upheld the provisions restricting refugee movement outside the camps.³³

Restrictions on refugee movement and return of urban refugees to camps target Somali refugees. After the Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the Kenyan government issued directives ordering all refugees living outside the camps to return to the camps immediately or be arrested. A government encampment policy involves periodic round-ups of refugees in Nairobi—in 1996, 2007, 2012, 2014, and most recently in 2015—often following terrorist attacks and specifically targeting Somali refugees.³⁴ Refugees living outside of camps are sought by authorities and sent back to the camps. During

Box 4. Insecurity linked to violent extremism in Kenya challenge Kenya's development progress

Kenya has been the target of terrorist attacks by Islamist extremist groups over several decades. The 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi (and Dar es Salaam) by Al-Qaeda killed hundreds. Kenya's military entrance into Somalia in October 2011 prompted attacks by the Somalia-based group, Al-Shabaab.

Recruitment, infiltration, and planning for further attacks accentuate fear and suspicion across Kenya. As Al-Shabaab claims its actions are motivated by religion (attacks target Christians and spare Muslims), government security forces and average citizens suspect Somalis—both native Kenyans and refugees—and all Muslims in Kenya, fearing they may sympathize with religiously-framed radical ideas.³⁷

Since 2012, over 600³⁸ Kenyans have been killed in 22 attacks associated with Al-Shabaab or its sympathizers.³⁹ Most have occurred in the Northeastern and Coast regions that are majority Muslim and have large ethnic Somali populations. Dadaab refugee camp has been the target of some attacks.

Al-Shabaab's activities heighten tensions between Christians and ethnic Somali Muslim communities. Non-Somali Kenyan Muslims also come under suspicion. The Westgate Mall, Mandera, and Garissa University attacks have polarized Christian and Muslim communities. Kenyan government's efforts to clamp down on terrorism have included security raids on mosques, profiling of Muslims and Somalis by Kenyan police, and harsh security laws. Feeling targeted and profiled, various parties have retaliated by attacking (verbally and sometimes physically) Christian religious leaders, churches, Christian individuals, and moderate Muslims.

the 2014 round-ups dubbed 'Operation Usalama Watch,' the government asked Nairobi citizens to help identify refugees and launched a website where people could report individuals. This publicity added to suspicions and fears among both refugee and Kenyan populations. Human Rights Watch reports accuse the Kenyan government of forcibly deporting Somali refugees to their home country.³⁵ These claims are uncorroborated but have drawn international attention. Responding to the 2015 calls by Kenyan government officials to close the camps and increase anti-terrorist operations, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced on May 4, 2015 that the US will contribute US\$45 million to help Kenya cope with the ongoing refugee crisis, prompting President Kenyatta to assure partners that Dadaab will remain open while plans are implemented to make Somalia safe for the refugees' return.³⁶

Widespread Ignorance and misconceptions about Islamic beliefs and practices contribute to tensions surrounding extremism and between Kenya's Muslim and Christian populations. Kenyan faith-inspired organizations (FIOs) work to address these issues. National umbrella religious organizations like the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC), Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), and Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) as well as grassroots organizations

like ChemiChemi ya Ukweli promote interfaith dialogue to counteract negative beliefs about Islam and Muslims.

Because of their Muslim identity along with their Somali nationality, Somali refugees are especially blamed and resented. Consequences include border closure, forced encampment, and threats to relocate or close the Dadaab refugee camp. Stereotypes and misconceptions that all Somali refugees are dangerous, terrorists, or sympathizers of Al-Shabaab produce discrimination and violence by neighbors and authorities for Somali refugees, especially in urban areas.

The government aims to engage the Muslim and Somali populations more proactively. President Kenyatta urged "all my brothers and sisters in the affected regions, and across the country, to not allow those who hide and abet the terrorists to compromise and even destroy the development that is fast growing in your area."⁴⁰ Local government leaders organize meetings with Muslim religious leaders, elders, and women's groups to help build confidence and trust between the government and Muslim communities. Activists and international stakeholders have criticized harsh security tactics, arguing that they discourage people, particularly Muslims and refugees, from reporting on suspicious activity.⁴¹



FAITH AND REFUGEES IN KENYA

Religious beliefs play pivotal roles in the everyday lives of refugees in Kenya and a wide gamut of faith-inspired organization (FIOs) work with refugee and host communities. Religious tensions can affect and divide refugee communities. This section highlights FIO projects and approaches in their work with refugees, with a focus on innovative or controversial practices.

Faith factors in humanitarian approaches and refugee issues more specifically are an increasing focus of policy and research. UNHCR, for example, focused its 2012 annual dialogue on protection challenges on 'Faith and Protection.' A two day conference with religious leaders, faith-inspired humanitarian organizations, and secular actors highlighted historical and modern contributions of faith actors and urged greater awareness of faith's role and partnerships with faith actors in humanitarian work. A 2014 UNHCR 'Partnership Note' outlined strategies to engage FIOs and faith actors, with examples of how engaging faith communities at the local level can build greater trust and enhance their effectiveness.

Various academic research highlights faith actors and religious roles. The *Forced Migration Review*, for example, devoted its November 2014 issue to 'Faith and Responses to Displacement.' Articles spanned themes from the religiosity of refugees

during both asylum and resettlement, to the Jewish roots of humanitarian assistance, and the role of local faith actors in protection in complex and insecure environments. A *Journal of Refugee Studies* special issue in 2011 focused on 'Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement.' *The Refugee Service Quarterly* in 2007, the *Journal of Refugee Studies* in 2002, and the *International Review of the Red Cross* in 2005 addressed roles of faith and religion in forced migration and refugee situations.

3.1 FAITH INFLUENCES IN REFUGEE COMMUNITIES

Research on coping strategies of East African refugees⁴² highlights religious beliefs and practices as the 'backbone of refugees' beliefs about their situations, their futures, and their ability to make meaning out of events that affect their lives.⁴³ Especially in camp settings where many refugees can live for generations, faith can be an important source for hope, strength, and solidarity. Religious leaders are often influential, trusted, and well positioned to engage their community.

African people are known to be strongly religious and East Africans are no exception. The Pew Forum Global Futures project found that over 80 percent of Ethiopians, Congolese, and Ugandans say religion is ‘Very Important’ in their lives.⁴⁴ Anecdotal evidence from organizations working with the Somali and South Sudanese refugees in Kenya underscores the importance of religion.⁴⁵ A 2011 Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University study found that among Somali, Sudanese, and Ethiopian refugees, religiosity increased during their time as refugees.⁴⁶

Life in a refugee in a camp is harsh, physically and emotionally. All are affected, regardless of economic or social standing. Many were forced to leave property and businesses with few belongings. In the chaos of fleeing, families are separated; some die or are killed during the journey. Though basic needs are provided for in the camps, living conditions are starkly different from previous lives. Organizations try to create structures in camps that mirror normal societies, but refugees have very little agency and control. Especially in prolonged refugee situations, like those in Kenya, prospects of returning home are limited.

Faith can be a source of hope, giving meaning to what seems an unjust and unmerited situation. Belief in a deity who has a greater plan provides comfort to refugees.⁴⁷ The actions of praying, attending religious services, or practicing religious traditions lend structure and normalcy to life in the camps and can give some sense of control over the refugee’s future. Refugees form new friendships and communities in the camps, often through shared religious and cultural traditions. Faith communities can help to create a new sense of home in the camps as refugees support each other spiritually and emotionally. Access to psychosocial counseling and trauma healing in the camp settings is limited, notwithstanding widespread needs. Personal faith and faith communities often provide a much needed outlet for coping with trauma.

Faith-inspired organizations, especially, appreciate the importance of religion in refugee communities and collaborate with religious leaders as part of virtually all programs. A common strategy is a local leader driven approach. Community leaders are identified, often elected, by the refugee communities to be the main liaison with the implementing organization. These

leaders sit on committees or panels and engage the community directly in program activities. FIOs and secular organizations observe that refugee populations tend to select religious leaders to fulfill this community liaison role.⁴⁸

Religious and cultural norms can affect how refugees view development initiatives in the camps. In Dadaab, for instance, primary school enrollment is worryingly low at 42 percent.⁴⁹ Explanatory factors include low capacity in the schools and too few teachers but families often do not enroll their children. A 2012 Norwegian Refugee Council study interviewed 1,436 children to understand why they were not enrolled in school; the number one reason was a wish for religious education. On average, the children spent 20 to 30 percent of their free time studying religion.⁵⁰ A pilot Islamic Relief program works to integrate formal education into Dadaab’s Qur’anic schools to help address this issue through a religiously sensitive approach (page 25).

In health programs, religious beliefs and practices are often conflated with social norms. With high birth rates, limited use of health facilities for pre- and post-natal care, and contraceptive prevalence estimated at less than one percent in Dadaab, better health care is a priority.⁵¹ Health programs confront religious and cultural sensitivities that can challenge behavior change, for example on blood transfusion, caesar-

ian section, contraceptive methods, and sexually transmitted diseases. A USAID study on attitudes and perceptions about reproductive health and gender-based violence in Dadaab found that Somali refugees, in particular, held a deep mistrust of any non-Muslim or non-Somali health workers. The endorsement of Somali religious leaders for or against programs was influential.⁵²

Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) interventions face special challenges. Stigma influenced by religious and cultural norms prevents SGBV survivors from speaking openly about their experiences and often keeps survivors from reporting their cases. Refugees often prefer to use traditional justice systems (sharia ‘Maslah’ court system) to resolve family law issues and to prosecute SGBV cases. Survivors who use informal justice systems have less access to trauma counseling and protection from further abuse; in cases of spousal abuse the tendency is to favor keeping the family intact and unmarried SGBV women

“Religious leaders are one crucial thing that you are unable to ignore, especially in the setting of camps in Dadaab. Because they are one of the key opinion and decision makers within the communities. So it is very important and every time we want to do something in the camps we also involve the religious leaders.”⁴⁸

—*WFDD Interview with Kenya Red Cross*

survivors can be led to marry their perpetrator, especially when the woman becomes pregnant.⁵³

Kenya's refugee camps are in many ways microcosms of East African social dynamics so addressing faith factors is complicated by the intertwining of religious and ethnic influences. Divides can cause tensions and sometimes outbreaks of violence both among refugees in the camps and between refugee and host populations. Understanding both religious and ethnic dynamics helps to foster better relations and prevent violence. In the Kakuma camp, a myriad of different ethnic groups, nationalities, and religions are present. Refugees from both sides of the conflict in their home country can live in close proximity to each other in the camps. This is seen frequently with the South Sudanese and Sudanese in Kakuma who make up over 55 percent of the refugees.⁵⁴ With religion and ethnicity important factors in the Sudan/South Sudan conflict, the divides between the Arab Muslim and Nilotic/Bantu Christian Sudanese populations in the camp led to distinct neighborhoods. New waves of South Sudanese, though they share the same ethnic/religious divides, disrupt existing communities and complicate an already complex situation.

Tensions in Kakuma have led to violence. Conflicts between members of the South Sudanese refugee communities erupted in November 2014 following rumors and accusations about the attempted rape of a Nuer girl by a Dinka man. Eight people died.⁵⁵ In Dadaab, sympathizers of both the revolutionary movement and the current Somali government must coexist. Recruitment efforts and influences from outside groups such as foreign militias intensify divides. Although the Somalis share the same nationality, many distinct clans are represented in Dadaab, all with different cultures and traditions. Somali refugees are also divided doctrinally, mostly between Sufi and Wahhabi or Salafi Islam.⁵⁶ Conflict resolution and peacebuilding programs work to quell such tensions and foster inter-ethnic/religious ties.

Religious differences are rarely the main cause of conflicts in the camps but misconceptions and stereotypes about other groups can foster in-groups and stratification along ethnic or religious lines. A small population of Christians live in Dadaab, mainly from Sudan and Ethiopia. The primary Christian church in Dadaab (mainly for the small group of Christians from Sudan and Ethiopia) was set up by UNHCR within the police compound for security reasons, because of national and religious discrimination by the Somali population.⁵⁷ The Co-exist Initiative founded by Wanjala Wafula (a non-religious organization) engages religious leaders in Dadaab in dialogue and training aimed at diffusing ethnic/religious tensions and building peace.

In urban settings, misconceptions and stereotypes about the Somalis, both Kenyan and refugees, are palpable. The Somali-heavy Nairobi neighborhood of Eastleigh, in particular, is known to be fractious. The Eastleigh Fellowship Center, Mennonite founded, targets both Muslim and Christian, Somali and Kenyan youth in their sports-based peacebuilding programs. Its aim is to bring youth together and engage them in open dialogues about culture, religion, and life in general. These interactions help youth in Eastleigh overcome misconceptions about each other and forge friendships.

3.2 CARE FOR REFUGEES: FAITH-INSPIRED RESPONSES

As is true worldwide, faith-inspired organizations, both formal and informal, are prominent in Kenya's humanitarian sector. International, national, and grassroots FIOs are active across all sectors: care for refugees and IDPs in camp settings, peacebuilding and resilience building projects in host communities, work with urban refugees, and actions to prevent future displacement. This section reviews religious motivations for protecting and caring for displaced, then frames the humanitarian FIO landscape in Kenya, with specific attention to FIO activities within the Dadaab and Kakuma camps.

Faith-inspired organizations active in Kenya's refugee camps (Box 6), in urban settings, and with host communities engage on wide-ranging activities: health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, education, psychosocial services, food assistance, shelter, sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) response, spiritual support, child protection, and resettlement services. Specific motivations vary but all focus on helping society's most vulnerable. FIOs speak often about assuring the dignity of refugees, which can be easily lost in protracted refugee situations. A common mandate is to treat each and every individual equally and respectfully regardless of ethnicity, faith, or nationality. These values inform and shape their programs. Though the activities of their programs often closely mirror those of secular organizations, FIOs' extensive grassroots networks and emphasis on working through and within religious structures set them apart.

FIOs play central roles in camp management and refugee care in both Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. They represent nearly 30 percent (by number of organizations) of UNHCR's official implementing and operational partners in Kenya and are central to the camp management system. UNHCR bears the primary responsibility for refugee care and camp maintenance. Each year UNHCR allocates the program sectors (education, health, WASH, shelter etc.) among partner organizations working in the camps. The partner organizations are then responsi-

Box 5. Scriptural foundations for protection of refugees and asylum seekers

Motivations of faith actors and faith-inspired organizations working with displaced populations are often linked to core values of their faith and concepts of charity embedded in religious scriptures. Stories and texts of all the major world religions—Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—underscore the importance of caring for and protecting the stranger. The Prophet Mohammed, for instance, was himself a refugee who fled Mecca in 622 CE to escape persecution; Jesus was exiled to Egypt as a child. The concept of charity is important in many scriptures, though called by different names: tzedakah (or righteousness) in Judaism, zakat and sadaqah in Islam, seva (or service) in Hinduism.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, in opening remarks at the 2012 dialogue on Faith and Protection, highlighted these moral and religious imperatives:

All major faiths share common concepts that relate to protected *places* on the one hand, and to protected *people* on the other. The ancient Greek word “asylon” – or sanctuary – was a designated space in each city, often a temple or other sacred place, from which nothing could be taken and in which no one could be violated.

This concept is mirrored in the ‘cities of refuge’ mentioned in the ancient Jewish scriptures, and in the passages of the Holy Qur’an and the hadith that designate mosques and other holy places as ‘safe’ locations.

Flight from persecution and the search for a protected place are shared narratives of the three Abrahamic faiths. The Exodus of the people of Israel from slavery in Egypt is a central story of the Jewish faith. In Christianity, the Holy Family’s flight from Bethlehem is studied by all children in catechism. And for Muslims, the Islamic calendar begins with the year the Prophet (PBUH) travelled to Medina to seek protection when he and his followers had come under threat in Mecca. Similarly, Hindu mythology and Buddhist teachings and history include many stories of people finding safety in another location after having escaped mistreatment and discrimination.

The notion of the stranger who must be given protection is famously inscribed in many major religious texts. In the Torah, the book of Leviticus contains one of the most prominent tenets of the Jewish faith: “The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” (Leviticus 19:33-34) Jewish law also states that it is prohibited to surrender any innocent person if that is likely to put their life at risk. This is very similar to the principle of *non-refoulement*, one of the cornerstones of modern refugee law...

To summarize, all major religious value systems embrace humanity, caring and respect, and the tradition of granting protection to those in danger. The principles of modern refugee law have their oldest roots in these ancient texts and traditions.⁵⁸

Many stories inspire faith communities to take measures, sometimes extraordinary, to help those who need protection. One example tells of Buddhist King Sibi, known for his philanthropy. The gods Indra and Agni tested King Sibi’s charity, posing as a hawk and a dove. When the dove sought asylum in King Sibi’s house, the hawk demanded that the King surrender it. He refused because the dove came to him for protection. Compromising, the hawk agreed that he would leave the dove if the king surrendered an amount of his own flesh equal to the weight of the dove. As the king carved his flesh and placed it on the scale, the dove mysteriously grew so the king was forced to surrender more flesh. The king eventually surrendered his entire body to the scale, at which point the gods revealed their true identities.⁵⁹

ble for the activities in the camp related to their assigned sector. This system is reevaluated every year by UNHCR to determine if partner organization contracts should be renewed or new organizations brought in. Thus FIOs work alongside both international agencies and secular organizations; no specific distinctions are made among them as to faith affiliation.

FIOs are thus UNHCR implementing partners and support other partners in the camps through funding. For example, in Kakuma, Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) have principal responsibility for the sectors of camp management, community services, education, protection, and care for survivors of gender-based violence. In

Dadaab, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) provides water and sanitation, health, HIV/AIDS prevention and care, and protection services. These FIOs receive the majority of their funding through UNHCR but supplement their programs through support from outside sources, including international congregations. Other FIOs are not operational but provide funding to organizations working in the camps. The Relief, Reconstruction, and Development Organization (RRDO), a local secular Kenyan NGO that implements environmental programs in Dadaab, receives funding from CRS, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, and American Friends Service Committee. *The following sections profile FIO projects within the refugee camps, highlighting innovative approaches or work that fills often unmet needs.*

Kakuma, refugee workers knew what was happening, identifying reasons for the conflict and the parties involved so they could begin targeted conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts.⁶⁰

Faith affiliation and openness to work through religious systems and communities are widely seen as a strength for FIOs, although programs are almost never explicitly faith-based. Most refugees in Kakuma are Christian and those in Dadaab are overwhelmingly Muslim. FIOs provide services equally to refugees of all faiths but when the refugee and the organization share a faith background, FIO staff argue that trust and respect come more readily, particularly with religious leaders.⁶¹ **Islamic Relief** cites their Islamic principles as a crucial factor in their high acceptance in the Ifo sub-camp, the oldest and most tumultuous camp within Dadaab.⁶²

“Understand, though, that they are unable to recruit those children in school or those who have been here for a few years because they have developed a different mentality. Anyone who has received even a little education doesn’t go with them. So they target the older kids who arrived here post-2007, those who are too old to go to school here and were never able to attend school in Somalia. Al-Shabaab goes to those kids sitting under a tree and bullies them, asking them what they are doing with their life, if they do not want to be real men and fight to provide for their families, rather than just wait for a U.N. handout.”

—*Head of UN vocational programs in Dadaab*

In the refugee camps, FIOs commonly operate through extensive networks of refugee staff and connections to local religious leaders. A key aspect of refugee camp programs is the training and employment of refugee ‘incentive’ workers. Refugees cannot legally earn an income but they can be employed as ‘incentive’ workers in the refugee camps, paid a small salary or with extra supplies and food items. These refugee staff hold many positions, from security officers to teachers and even managers of programs or sub-camps. Refugee organizations educate and train refugee workers so that they develop life skills that increase their quality of life in the camp, but that can also be useful if or when the refugee returns to their home country. **LWF** employs over 2,500 refugee staff and more than 400 camp staff between Kakuma and Dadaab; **Islamic Relief Kenya** employs 2,000 refugee incentive workers in Dadaab as support staff for their extensive education, health, micro-finance, and one-to-one orphan sponsorship programs. Refugee workers are vital to program implementation and in community outreach. They help organizations to be better connected to evolving needs. For most FIOs, refugee workers are the foundation of their grassroots networks in the camps.

When conflicts erupt in the camps, refugee workers are often the best source of information. During the November 2014 events where conflict among the Nuer and Dinka led to eight deaths in

Youth radicalization in Dadaab is a pressing concern that calls for innovative solutions. A study conducted by the Belfer Center at Harvard University explored suspicions of recruitment and radicalization of youth by Al-Shabaab in Dadaab. Counter to popular thinking, vocational programs and employment opportunities were not the most effective ways to deter youth from joining radical groups. Rather, access to education appears to be most successful (see quote). With primary school enrollment in Dadaab at only 42 percent⁶³ and the majority of children missing school because they want religious education,⁶⁴ integrating religious education and formal education can help to increase school enrollment and, potentially, counter radicalization of youth.

Lutheran World Federation was not immediately accepted by the Dadaab refugee community but built on a genuine understanding and respect for the faith of others in establishing relationships. In 2011 and in the years since, LWF has helped refugees organize a large celebration for the Muslim holiday Eid ul-Fatr that marks the end of the month of Ramadan. The 2011 celebration was special because over 20,000 Somali Muslims had recently arrived in Dadaab so this was their first Eid in the camp. Immediately before Eid, the new refugees heard that they would be moving from temporary housing into a

new area of Dadaab. It was important to them to complete the move before Eid began, so LWF helped to expedite their move. Fred Otieno, LWF emergency coordinator explains, “Around 20,000 Somali refugees are celebrating Eid in Kenya for the first time. Faith is often a binding factor in a community, and celebrating Eid in the new camps will help refugees re-establish their communities in these new places.”⁶⁵ When the moon rose and Eid began, the refugees broke the fast with a traditional meal and celebrated in their new camps.

Faith affiliation can sometimes impede FIO effectiveness.

Christian FIOs are sometimes distrusted, especially by Muslim refugees. Suspicions of a ‘hidden agenda’, either of proselytism or attempting to instill Western values, occasionally breed distrust among the refugee population. A USAID study reported rumors circulated among the Somali population in Dadaab that Kenyan Christian health providers promoted family planning in the camps to keep numbers of Somalis low.⁶⁶ The highly coordinated and regulated environment of the camp disallows overt proselytizing efforts but outside the camp settings oversight is less strict, opening space for other smaller FIOs and faith actors, some of which do proselytize, to operate. Information about such activities is poor.

Faith actors may carry special weight (positive or negative) on sensitive issues like family planning, early marriage, and FGM-C, because these issues often are informed by religious practices and beliefs. Here, the picture is mixed as some organizations are reticent to engage on controversial issues because of hierarchal constraints within their churches or because they actually support traditional practices (against international human rights consensus). Controversy arose in Kakuma refugee camp about providing contraceptives to youth due to a disagreement between the two organizations assigned to family planning services, one secular, the other faith-based. The secular organization wished to start a jointly implemented program targeting youth for sexual and reproductive health education, training refugee community health workers on issues such as sexually transmitted diseases, safe-sex practices, and family planning. Holding different beliefs regarding premarital sex, homosexuality, and contraceptive use among youth, the FIO disagreed with the approach, preferring not to broach the subject of premarital sex and to focus on teaching abstinence until marriage.⁶⁷

Even FIOs inclined to act outside formal faith teachings can be unwilling to do so openly. As an example, most organizations that work with LGBTI refugees in Kenya are faith-inspired but many are uncomfortable speaking about their programs because they fear backlash from their own communities or from the general population. They thus forgo chances to influence policies and attitudes in positive directions. Mainline churches (Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian etc.) are especially affected

Box 6. FIO Partners of UNHCR in Kenya

- Salesian Missions of Don Bosco
- Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS)
- Islamic Relief
- Jesuit Refugee Services
- Lutheran World Federation
- National Council of Churches of Kenya
- Catholic Relief Services
- International Service Volunteer Association (AVSI)
- World Vision

Other FIOs doing Refugee and Humanitarian Work in Kenya

- Church World Service
- DanChurch Aid
- Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops
- Habitat for Humanity
- American Jewish World Service
- World Renew
- Amani Ya Juu
- Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
- American Friends Service Committee
- Christian Blind Mission (CBM)
- Trócaire
- Cordaid
- Presbyterian Disaster Assistance
- Finn Church Aid
- World Relief
- Muslim Hands
- Food for the Hungry
- Adventist Development and Relief Agency
- Christian Aid
- Caritas
- Lutheran World Relief
- Diakonia Sweden
- Anglican Development Services
- Eastleigh Fellowship Center
- Norwegian Church Aid (maybe)
- FECCLAHA
- Concern Worldwide
- JC:HEM
- The Salvation Army
- Samaritan’s Purse
- Diocese of Lodwar
- World Concern
- Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
- Heavenly Treasures

*This list is not comprehensive but illustrates the large and diverse set of organizations working in Kenya in this field.

due to their extensive hierarchical systems. Individuals within the church may want to launch progressive programs but fail to secure organizational approval and funding. Evangelical churches can more easily explore programs that may not align exactly with doctrine because of their diffuse structure; however, they often lack broad networks, financing, and coordination mechanisms.

Religious leaders are widely respected for their influence among the refugee population and are actively engaged in programs by secular and faith-inspired organizations; however, involving religious leaders comes with its own challenges. Selecting appropriate religious leaders to participate in projects is difficult as hierarchical inter- and intra-faith politics can cause disputes among the religious leaders. Especially when implementing sensitive programs such as family planning, the religious leaders who are willing to participate are often not the most influential in the communities.⁶⁸

FIO Projects in Dadaab

Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is the most active FIO in Kenya's refugee camps. In both Kakuma and Dadaab, LWF acts as the main NGO in charge of camp management. In Dadaab they are active in education, community services, and protection.

AVSI (Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale) works as an official UNHCR partner, active in the education sector. An Italy-based Catholic humanitarian organization founded in 1973, AVSI has worked in Dadaab since 2009 and currently implements several education initiatives through the Support to Education for Refugees in Dadaab project (SERD) which rehabilitates and constructs primary schools and offers teacher training courses allowing refugees to earn primary school teaching certificates. The project organizes specialized courses for existing teachers to continue their education. As of late 2014, AVSI had rehabilitated and built over 300 classes and trained around 600 teachers, benefiting over 25,000 children.⁶⁹

Christian Blind Mission International (CBM) operates an eye hospital the Hagadera sub-camp in Dadaab. Founded by a German pastor in 1908, CBM has over 100 years of experience in caring for the blind and disabled. Active in 65 countries they reach over 14 million people annually. In Dadaab, their eye hospital is run in partnership with the International Rescue Committee and is dedicated to restoring sight through eyeglasses and cataract surgeries. CBM works to improve eye care service capacity in Dadaab's health centers and, with health providers in the camp, to reduce stigma and care for refugees with disabilities. CBM operates eye care and ear, nose, and throat units at a local hospital in Garissa for the host commu-

nity near Dadaab. It targets the disabled among the nomadic Somali Kenyan host population through programs to increase access to food and health services.⁷⁰

Islamic Relief has integrated formal education components into the Qur'anic *duksi* preschools in Dadaab, working closely with Qur'anic teachers and the Somali community to design programs that are acceptable to all parties. Previously, children began attending *duksi* schools as early as age three and remained until they were able to fully recite the Qur'an. Some children would finish at the *duksi* as late as 10 years old, delaying their entrance to primary school. Behind in the curriculum, they often struggled to complete primary school. By integrating formal education into the *duksi* schools, students are prepared for primary education, but also master the Qur'an faster and graduate from the *duksi* schools more quickly. This program is being piloted in seven *duksi* schools in Dadaab.

The **National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK)** has worked since the 1990s to foster a culture of peace among Dadaab refugees through its Peace Education Programme (PEP). The program has reached hundreds of thousands of refugee children.⁷¹ Various activities are geared to encourage peace between the different clans and groups among the refugees and also to ease tensions between the refugee and the surrounding communities. NCCK targets youth by training school teachers in peace education and refugees as PEP workers who host peace clubs and activities aimed at both boys and girls. NCCK hires and trains refugees as peer mediators who are then stationed to schools in Dadaab.

In the new sub-camp of Kiamboos, **Catholic Relief Services (CRS)** has built 3000 household latrines, over 600 showers, and several public hand washing stations to improve health and sanitation for the camp's 25,000 residents. CRS hired local residents and worked with local faith communities to construct the WASH infrastructure, also training refugees to be solid waste managers, latrine attendants, hygiene promoters, and community sanitation officers. CRS employed a variety of hygiene promotion strategies such as hosting a 'global hand-washing day' celebration complete with role-play skits and performances from the refugees. This grassroots approach infuses money into the local economy and creates local ownership of the program that has led to successful uptake of safe hygiene practices and a decrease in hygiene related illnesses such as diarrhea and cholera.⁷²

FIO projects in Kakuma camp

LWF's Community-Based Psychosocial Support program in Kakuma provides psychosocial assessment of new arrivals and identifies especially vulnerable arrivals such as the mentally challenged, aged, disabled, survivors of sexual violence, and

separated children. LWF sports and adult education programs help create a routine for the refugees and provide stability. Trauma healing counseling is offered and refugees can attend professional training courses on a variety of issues like psychosocial care, conflict resolution, and women's and human rights as well as livelihood workshops that all aim to revitalize the self-worth and restore agency to the refugees. They also provide community services, education, protection, food, and water and sanitation programs.

Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) is active in community services, education, protection, and supporting survivors of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). Their 'Safe Haven' Protection Center founded in 2000 is the main shelter for survivors of SGBV in Kakuma camp. It provides psychosocial support in addition to livelihood training and the basic material support needed by the survivors. The protection center is guarded at all times, offering survivors safety and security. Early childhood education programs are available for children. For the larger camp community, JRS offers counseling services and care for those with mental disabilities. Refugee staff are trained in basic counseling, community-based counseling, alternative healing services, and mental health care.⁷³ In addition, JRS increases access to education for deaf, blind and physically disabled students by sponsoring their education in specialized boarding schools throughout Kenya. JRS recently expanded into Kakuma 4 to spread its counseling and early childhood education services to new arrivals, mainly from South Sudan.⁷⁴

The National Council of Churches in Kenya, the largest umbrella faith organization in Kenya, is the only Kenyan national organization providing services to refugees in Kakuma camp. NCCCK is in charge of shelter there. Over 30 years, NCCCK has constructed public infrastructure, led reproductive health programs including HIV/AIDS awareness and mitigation efforts, promoted safe sanitation and hygiene practices, and created livelihood initiatives that target the most vulnerable refugees.⁷⁵ Following heavy rains in October 2014, NCCCK conducted an initial rapid assessment of the damage to public buildings and houses and constructed 500 new houses for the people affected, repaired public infrastructure, and engineered a new drainage system to stop flooding.⁷⁶ UNHCR has reported that it is 'extremely pleased' with NCCCK's work in the camps.⁷⁷

Jesuit Commons: Higher Education at the Margins (JC:HEM), offers a unique tertiary education program in Kakuma. Kenya's refugee camps traditionally focus solely on primary education. Efforts to expand secondary education in the camps are beginning, but enrollment rates are very low (3 percent in Ifo 2,⁷⁸ 14.8 percent in Hagadera,⁷⁹ and 2 percent in Kakuma).⁸⁰ JC-HEM is the first organization to offer tertiary education programs in Kakuma. They offer both a diploma in liberal studies and certificate courses: Community Service Learning Tracks in psychosocial case management, community development, business, primary teacher education, training of trainers, English language learning, or entrepreneurship.⁸¹ Refugees receive diplomas or certifications that are valid internationally. The diploma is completed through online undergraduate courses contributed by Jesuit Universities; the degree is conferred by Regis University. Certificates are awarded by supporting universities in conjunction with JRS and JC:HEM. After graduation, students often become refugee 'incentive' workers for one of the international organizations or schools in the camp. Others go on to start their own businesses or community-based organizations in the camps. A select few find opportunities to continue their higher education outside of the camp. The program provides structure and routine to the students and prepares them for future livelihood generating activities in the camp or home country.⁸²

The **Salesian Missions of Don Bosco** have been active in Kakuma for over 10 years in education and livelihood skills training. Founded in 1859 by St. John 'Don' Bosco, the Society of St. Francis of Sales, popularly known as the Salesians, is a large mission organization active in over 130 countries. Its work mirrors St. Don Bosco's passion for educating and helping poor and disadvantaged youth.⁸³ The Salesians have two main programs in Kenya's Kakuma refugee camp: Empowering Girls Through Education and Teaching Agriculture Skills. Refugee girls follow livelihood training courses and enroll in a microfinance program to help them start their own small businesses within Kakuma. Girls earn an income both as a form of empowerment but also to help their families return to their home countries. The agricultural training program helps to improve food security within the camp; at a demonstration farm refugees can learn first-hand how to grow produce in the harsh semi-arid environment. Fresh fruit and vegetables produced supplement food rations and provide a source of income.⁸⁴



FIO WORKS IN NON-CAMP SETTINGS

Mapping FIO activities within the camp settings is feasible given the organizational structure of the UNHCR camp management system. FIO work to support refugees outside the camp settings, in host communities, and with internally displaced people, is more difficult to map. This section focuses on these three vulnerable populations in Kenya, with examples of selected FIOs and their activities. It does not purport to be a comprehensive list of faith actors or their activities.

4.1 URBAN REFUGEES

The situation of urban refugees in Kenya is contentious and presents difficult policy and humanitarian questions. The largest population of urban refugees is in Nairobi: just over 60,000 were officially registered with UNHCR (as of October 2015) but many more are known to be there unregistered (some estimates are as high as 100,000).⁸⁵ Most registered refugees, over 33,000,⁸⁶ come from Somalia and live in specific neighborhoods of the city, mainly Eastleigh and South C. The Eastleigh neighborhood has become such a hub for the Somali population and is often called ‘Little Mogadishu.’

Controversy is primarily connected to the large Somali community in Nairobi. Al-Shabaab attacks and concerns over the

allegiance of the Somali refugees generate fear both among the Kenyan population and in government circles. Some Nairobians see the refugees as taking their economic opportunities. These dynamics result in discrimination and harassment of the urban refugee community, especially the Somalis, by both urban populations and police authorities.⁸⁷

Encampment policies

Before 1990, refugees were spread around Kenya, outside any camp setting. However, from the early 1990s refugee camps were established, due to mass influxes, and refugees were required to stay there. Any refugee wishing to leave the camp needed signed permission from the appropriate authorities.

Various laws shape the Kenyan government’s encampment policy but enforcement is limited. The 1973 Aliens Restriction Act makes any ‘alien’ (not a citizen of Kenya), who is in Kenya without proper documentation liable to penalties such as fees, arrest, or deportation.⁸⁸ The Refugee Act of 2006 gives the Minister responsible for refugee affairs the power to designate areas where refugees should live, such as the refugee camps. However, no areas have ever been officially designated.⁸⁹ Refugees with specific health needs, seeking higher edu-

cation, or with particular security concerns are legally allowed to live in Nairobi but they must register with UNHCR and obtain the proper documentation. In practice, many refugees in Nairobi do not have official permission from the Kenyan government.

In December 2014, following two Al-Shabaab attacks, Kenyan members of parliament proposed a new security bill that would extend the powers of anti-terrorism forces and impose harsh restrictions on refugees.⁹⁰ As noted above Kenyan judges struck down the provisions capping refugee numbers in February 2015, but the effort underscores tensions surrounding the urban refugee population.⁹¹

Since the mid-1990s, the Kenyan government has engaged in several waves of action designed to enforce encampment policy including large round-ups. The 2014 ‘Operation Usalama Watch’ was sparked by March grenade and gun attacks in Mombasa and Nairobi, by unknown perpetrators, that killed 12 and injured eight.⁹² In April 2014, 6,000 Kenyan police officers were deployed to arrest anyone suspected of links to terrorism as well as any foreign national without proper documentation. Hundreds of refugees were removed from Nairobi and sent back to the refugee camps. Thousands more were detained in Pangani police station and in Kasarani stadium. Human Rights Watch reported that Kenyan authorities denied UNHCR as well as other refugee organizations access to the detainees.⁹³

FIOs working closely with Nairobi’s urban refugee population report that many clients were either detained or sent back to the refugee camps with no warning.⁹⁴ Hundreds of refugee children were left behind as their parents faced arrest or relocation. FIOs and faith communities helped to find emergency care solutions for the children left behind and to reconnect the refugees with their families and reestablish their lives when they were able to return to Nairobi.⁹⁵

Support to urban refugees

Until the early 2000s, UNHCR provided limited assistance to urban refugees. When a refugee came to register as an urban refugee, they signed documentation stating, “_____ is a refugee recognized by UNHCR and is not entitled to any assistance in Nairobi.”⁹⁶ With increasing numbers of urban refugees facing dangerous living conditions, limited access to services, and varying degrees of discrimination, UNHCR launched the Nairobi Initiative in 2005 and has since dedicated resources and programs to it. However, many needs are not met. The Government of Kenya also offers some assistance to the urban refugees but these programs can be unpredictable due to changing views and policies affecting the urban refugee population.

Faith-inspired organizations work to fill the gaps left by UNHCR and government for urban refugee communities.

International FIOs like Church World Service (CWS), Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS), and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) as well as smaller local FIOs like the Eastleigh Fellowship Center and national FIOs, such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), play important roles for Nairobi’s refugee population. American Jewish World Service and the Primate’s World Relief and Development Fund have no operational staff but support smaller local urban refugee organizations like Heshima Kenya.

Box 7. Eastleigh Fellowship Center

Founded in 1978 by Mennonite missionaries, the Eastleigh Fellowship Center is located in the Somali majority and refugee dense neighborhood of Eastleigh in Nairobi. For almost 30 years, the Center has been dedicated to fostering peace between the Christian and Muslim populations of Eastleigh, whose tense relationship is known to spark conflict.

The main program engages both Christian and Muslim youth in sports in order to build relationships across ethnic and religious divides. Basketball is particularly popular with both girls and boys because the Center also serves as the practice space for a national basketball team. During sports activities, time is always taken to discuss peace and rumors or misconceptions that the youth may have about each other. Religious leaders come to speak with the children and teach about peace from their particular tradition. The Center runs after school programs in local public and private schools geared toward peace education. Over the years, the Center has become a safe space for youth and adults alike in Eastleigh. In fact, Muslims in the community often prefer to hold their weddings in the Center’s large event space.

Many FIOs offer specialized services for the urban refugee communities and work together as a network to refer refugee clients to other FIOs and NGOs based on their needs. NCCCK, for instance, focuses on health services, working with county government clinics in and around Nairobi to ensure that their urban refugee clients can access primary healthcare services free of charge. When more serious medical attention is needed, they facilitate access to secondary and tertiary care centers. Where clients are especially vulnerable, they provide financial or food assistance.

Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) offers food assistance, psychosocial support, scholarships for education, vocational skills training, and facilitates access to legal assistance. JRS, along with other organizations, works to combat negative stereotypes about refugees and Somali Kenyans by dispelling rumors and raising awareness at the grassroots level, speaking to churches and local community members.

Church World Service (CWS) is deeply involved in refugee resettlement. They facilitate the entire process of application, adjudication, and relocation to the US through their Nairobi office. Refugees who are resettled often have special circumstances like extenuating health conditions or critical protection needs. CWS also works in the refugee-heavy neighborhood of Eastleigh to ensure School Safe Zones. This neighborhood experiences outbreaks of conflict, so healthy relationships between students, teachers, and parents are crucial to the students' success and to the school overall. CWS engages all parties in dialogue and helps establish mechanisms so that they can interact successfully even when there is tension. CWS helps schools institute safety procedures that shield students and the school grounds from strangers. To help keep girls in school, separate facilities are built for both boys and girls. Teachers are sensitized to the special circumstances and needs of the refugee students, who can make up 75 percent of the schools in Eastleigh. Together, these activities help create a safe and supportive learning environment for refugee and Kenyan children alike.

The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) provides comprehensive health services to refugees in Nairobi through its Urban Refugees Assistance Program (URAP). It handles referrals to services in Nairobi for refugees from Dadaab and Kakuma with special medical needs. NCCCK's program provides refugees with all levels of medical services including primary, secondary, and tertiary care as well as reproductive health services. URAP hosts events to raise awareness about issues like HIV/AIDS. A forum for urban refugees on World AIDS Day 2014 focused on supporting others living with HIV and AIDS brought together over 200 refugees from all over Nairobi.⁹⁷

4.2 HOST COMMUNITY DYNAMICS

Kenya's two major refugee camps, Kakuma and Dadaab, are located in Turkana and Garissa counties, respectively, where poverty rates are high and climate conditions are harsh. Traditionally inhabited by pastoralist communities, these remote semi-arid counties experience erratic weather conditions including prolonged droughts and flash floods which heighten food insecurity. Access to government health services is limited by the remote locations, and the popula-

Box 8. HIAS Kenya

The Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) has operated in Nairobi since 2002. They focus on caring for the vulnerable urban refugee population by offering psychosocial services, some financial assistance, and protection services for refugees with heightened security needs: survivors of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) and vulnerable children.

HIAS has three field offices in the refugee-dense neighborhoods of Kayole, Eastleigh, and Kawangware. There they work closely with the refugee communities, establishing refugee led committees on issues of child protection, persons with special needs, and gender-based violence. Committee members are elected by the refugee communities and often have strong representation from religious leaders.

In its psychosocial programs, HIAS engages survivors of SGBV in individual as well as group therapy. An established program for survivors works to develop skills, create business plans, and begin income-generating activities.

tion suffers high morbidity due to malaria and other diseases. These factors are especially strong in Turkana (see Table 2).

UNHCR provides for the basic needs of refugees living in the camp. The rationale for such support is partly because refugees are not legally allowed to seek employment in the host country. UNHCR and its partners deliver food and supplies in addition to contracting skilled personnel to care for medical needs. Supplies are intended to provide adequate support, but food rations often do not meet the needs of refugee families. As a result, many refugees seek ways to supplement their diet by venturing outside the camp to local markets or foraging for food. Historically, the host communities have received virtually no support—yet, given their isolated locations, they too have extremely limited access to essential services, livelihoods, and infrastructure.

Tensions can arise as communities near the refugee camps witness constant deliveries of supplies and services to the camps. The surrounding communities assume that the refugees live better, more privileged lives than they do. Such perceptions generate conflict between the host community and refugee populations. As there are no walls surrounding the camps, refugees and host communities interact frequently. Theft of livestock, supplies, housing materials, and food items is common and conflicts occur when thieves are discovered or

Box 9. No home, no security: challenges facing LGBTI refugees in Kenya⁹⁸

Within the large, diverse group of refugees in Kenya, a small but particularly vulnerable group—persons who identify as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, or Intersex (LGBTI)⁹⁹—face special challenges.

Spurred by Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Act, hundreds of Ugandan LGBTI refugees have fled to Kenya. Passed by the Parliament of Uganda on December 20, 2013 and signed into law by the President on February 24, 2014, the Anti-Homosexuality Act criminalizes homosexuality, which is punishable with life imprisonment; the courts have declared the law invalid but the issue persists. A small number of LGBTI-identifying persons claimed refugee status¹⁰⁰ before 2013; an estimated 200 LGBTI refugees have registered in Kenya, around 90 percent from Uganda, since 2013. Others come from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

LGBTI refugees come to Kenya for safety, but widespread homophobia and anti-homosexuality laws in Kenya put LGBTI refugees and the organizations that work with them at a heightened security risk. A 2013 Pew study indicated that 92 percent of Kenyan residents believe that homosexuality should not be accepted in society¹⁰¹ and the Kenyan Penal Code criminalizes homosexual behavior with up to 14 years in prison.¹⁰² No one has been convicted under this law since it was passed in 1950 but stronger Kenyan Anti-Homosexuality legislation is being considered, echoing similar action in Uganda.¹⁰³

Because of security concerns, the refugee organizations working with the LGBTI refugees aim to resettle all their clients to a Western country, typically the US or Canada. They argue that LGBTI individuals cannot be safe anywhere in Kenya, or even Africa.¹⁰⁴

Anti-homosexual rhetoric in many African countries, including Kenya, is often expressed in religious terms. However, religious values are also employed to promote equality and encourage allies to help LGBTI refugees. Among the handful of organizations helping LGBTI refugees, most are faith-based. Some organizations engage faith leaders in discussions about diversity and inclusivity as a way of combating homophobia. Several religious leaders support, often discreetly, the LGBTI refugee community in some way. These 'secret' faith allies have been instrumental in protecting the LGBTI refugee community in Nairobi, for example by informing organizations of impending attacks or police raids. Working through a religious lens can help to combat homophobia and promote tolerance. LGBTI activists in Kenya look to faith efforts and leaders to welcome and affirm LGBTI persons to their community and leadership and to embrace or blend cultural norms with religious practice.

items are missing. Entire shipments of supplies have been hijacked. Particularly surrounding Dadaab, vehicle hijackings, banditry, and kidnapping oblige support organizations to employ security details while traveling to and from the camp.

Refugee camps are not, by their nature, environmentally or economically sustainable—particularly in semi-arid contexts like Kenya. To establish and expand the camps, land must be cleared, which means deforestation of an already fragile environment.¹⁰⁶ Host countries, Kenya included, typically choose remote, often undesirable land on which to build the refugee camps. Refugees, therefore, have little capacity to care for themselves or their families independently. Almost all supplies must be trucked in because of limited natural resources around the camp. Water can be accessed through boreholes and firewood can be found, but the quantities are rarely sufficient to support both refugees and the local community. In the case of firewood, refugee collection exacerbates deforestation

around the camps, diminishing reserves for both the host community and the refugee population. Additionally, water and sanitation facilities in the camps can be poorly maintained, degrading the further environment still further.¹⁰⁷

In Turkana and Garissa counties, organizations focused on direct work with refugees in the camps have largely ignored host communities' development needs. With the prolonged existence of and need for the camps, more attention and research is going to host community/refugee relations. Several new projects target host communities. Faith-inspired organizations play significant roles in addressing the imbalances between refugee and host community assistance.

FIO response in host communities

Host communities in Turkana and Garissa counties face food insecurity, disease, and limited access to education. Human-

Table 2: Development indicators in Turkana and Garissa counties

	Poverty Rate	Rural Households Access to Piped Water	Rural Households Access to Electricity	Morbidity Rates (Male)	Morbidity Rates (Female)
Turkana	92.9% (2006)	4.2% (2009)	0.6% (2009)	41.6% (2005)	48.2% (2005)
Garissa	54.5% (2006)	9.1% (2009)	0.5% (2009)	15.5% (2005)	22.4% (2005) ¹⁰⁵

Source: "County Data Sheet Indicators 2005/2009." Kenya Open Data. Transparent Africa and the Government of the Republic of Kenya.

tarian organizations like UNHCR and OCHA rarely address needs of these communities because they fall outside the purview of refugee care. Responsibility falls to the Kenyan government, but limited resources reach Turkana and Garissa.

With refugees expected to be in Kenya for a long time, **many organizations that have traditionally cared for refugees, including many FIOs, are now implementing programs in the host communities.** UNHCR's approach to protracted refugee situations is shifting, encouraging integration of refugees into the surrounding economies. This involves providing skills training with the goal of self-reliance. Dadaab's internal economy, according to a 2010 study, amounts to US\$25 million and contributes \$14 million to the host community's economy through trade and labor.¹⁰⁹ By integrating the refugees and the host communities in the same economic space, more income will be generated on both sides and both groups have opportunities to interact and work together. The Dadaab host community and refugee population often share common identities of clan, ethnicity, religion, or language. By facilitating greater interaction, the hope is that the communities will be more peaceful. This plan is being implemented slowly but it aims to address the root causes of conflict with host communities. It promises a better quality of life for both the refugees and the surrounding population.

LWF focuses on decreasing conflict around Kakuma by engaging host communities in climate resilient agriculture and new methods of managing livestock. Turkana County's population is traditionally nomadic pastoralists. However, with more frequent droughts (seen to be due to climate change), the people of Turkana struggle to survive on pastoralism alone. Instances of cattle raiding both by refugee communities and host communities fuel conflict. LWF has developed simple solutions to cattle raiding by branding the cattle as well as vaccinating the animals. The branding simply marks each livestock as belonging to a particular group or person, thus deterring theft. Vaccinations increase livestock resilience so that they survive better in times of drought, which means greater food security for the Turkana. LWF teaches the host community to diversify their food sources by establishing an crop base rather than relying solely on livestock, using drought resilient crops, water conservation, rain water col-

lection, and irrigation. These can enhance food security and keep people settled in a particular place rather than roaming.

FIOs draw on their networks to appreciate changing dynamics in the camps and address evolving concerns. For instance, through work in the camps and with the host community, **LWF** realized that children from the host community were coming into the camp to find work. A common job was transporting heavy rations to refugees who would pay the children. In most cases the refugees were elderly or had large families and could not easily transport the rations themselves. However, it involved child labor. Host community children were not going to school so they could work in the camps. **LWF** designed a program to target these children and allow them to return to school.

DanChurch Aid (DCA) supports rights of the host community by helping to protect their resources from exploitation by middle-men and other communities. Especially around Lake Turkana, near Kakuma, DCA is active with the local fishermen. They engage different fishing communities in dialogue and environmental conservation by hosting festivals and events aimed at building peace among local communities. DCA also teaches the fishermen how to avoid middle-men by creating collaborative local networks that can reach buyers directly. This increases local incomes, creates resilience to shocks, and empowers communities to work together to build their economies.

Church World Service (CWS) works to decrease conflict in the Turkana host communities by increasing access to water, supporting girls' education, and strengthening livelihoods. CWS's Water for Life program establishes two water sources within each targeted community. The increased water access allows girls, who typically spent the majority of their day searching for and carrying water, to go to school full-time. No longer dependent on going long distances to search for water, the local populations face less conflict over water. Community Water Committees assure equal access to all community members and help maintain and regulate water sources. The program builds resilience to climate shocks and supports development of sustainable livelihoods.

World Renew is not active in the refugee camps but works closely with Turkana communities to help them develop ways to address their needs. Dedicated to sustainable development through community driven programs, it helped one Turkana community build and start-up a local school. Children previously had to walk for hours through a forest to reach the closest school. Because of the arduous journey, young children could not start school at the normal age and when they could make the journey, they were already significantly behind in their education. World Renew supported the community in building their own school and helped them engage the government to register the school as a public institution and receive trained teachers.

Perhaps the most active FIO in the areas surrounding Dadaab, Islamic Relief (IR) offers orphan sponsorship, micro-credit, emergency relief, and medical service programs. Of 2,800 orphans sponsored by Islamic Relief, 500 are in host communities. IR follows the Islamic definition of an orphan, meaning a child who has lost one or both parents or their parents are unable to care for them adequately due to health, financial, or other reasons. Their orphan sponsorship program support allows orphan families to secure food, shelter, and education for themselves and the orphan. IR is operating and managing a level-five district hospital that cares for both refugees and the host community around Dadaab. IR helps the host community build their capacity and livelihoods through their Sharia Compliant Micro-Finance program, working with a local Kenyan bank to offer sharia compliant banking options for the local Muslim community. This allows the local population to start-up their own businesses, build local economies, and create more sustainable livelihoods. IR provides emergency assistance to host communities in the Dadaab area of Garissa County during times of drought and flash flooding. Active in Dadaab only since 2012, IR sees their refugee programs as incomplete without support for the host community.

Working in the drought, famine, and conflict prone Turkana region that surrounds Kakuma refugee camp, **Trócaire** has adopted a program approach focusing on decreasing vulnerability to crises through building sustainable livelihoods and fostering peace in the host community. Trócaire, founded in 1973 by the Catholic bishops of Ireland, is active in 17 countries across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. In Kenya, they work primarily through local church partners including the Catholic dioceses, Medical Missionaries of Mary, Holy Ghost Fathers, and individual churches like the Christ the King Catholic Church in Kibera. Their Turkana programs focus on helping agro-pastoral communities develop climate conscious agricultural practices, providing improved seeds, alternative crops, and cattle and goat breed improvement.

Trócaire supports the **Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution**, founded by Irish priest Fr. Patrick Devine, which is dedicated

Box 10. Host community dynamics in Nairobi

Competition for resources also occurs in urban settings where some refugee communities are concentrated, particularly in Nairobi. The Kenyan government officially requires that all refugees live and remain in camps, the only exceptions being refugees with serious health conditions, particular education needs, or special protection concerns that can only be attended to in urban centers. Many Kenyans thus assume that all refugees outside the camps are there illegally, and therefore, are encroaching on their land, economic opportunities, and unrightfully accessing public services such as health centers or schools. These perceptions cause tensions between host and refugee communities that run high in refugee-concentrated neighborhoods of Nairobi like Eastleigh, Kawangware, South C, and Kayole.

In Eastleigh, nicknamed ‘Little Mogadishu, Somali refugees and ethnic Somali Kenyans have created a bustling business hub where many Kenyans come to shop and do business. The Eastleigh malls are estimated to contribute US\$7 million annually to Kenya’s economy.¹⁰⁸ Although they interact in business settings, resentment and suspicion between the ethnic Kenyans and Somalis, both refugee and not, have sparked some violence.

to fostering peace in the Turkana region. The Centre engages community and religious leaders from all sides in candid dialogue sessions that explore root causes of local conflict, which are mainly scarce resources and land disputes. Father Devine and his trained peace mediators emphasize the social and religious values of peace, justice, and truth in order to foster a ‘positive peace.’ The Centre has trained over 120 community and religious leaders in conflict resolution and prevention; the program has received national and international acclaim. Another program focuses on building schools and equipping them with solar technology. The schools provide education for the children and serve as an open community space that encourages neighboring communities to come together.¹¹⁰

The Garissa University attack traumatized Kenya, particularly the population of Garissa County where Dadaab is located. In an effort to ease tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities of Garissa, **Finn Church Aid** together with the **Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM)**, the **Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK)**, and the **Garissa Pastors Fellowship** organized a dialogue event for local religious leaders. This allowed the various imams,

sheikhs, and pastors who attended to address the palpable tensions between Garissa's Muslim and Christian communities. Candid discussions dispelled fears that local Muslim communities supported Al-Shabaab and that a religious war between Christians and Muslims was brewing. The coordinating organizations facilitated training sessions on how to be community peacemakers and emphasized the importance of religious leaders in encouraging dialogue around contentious issues. Results included a local interfaith forum that is to serve as a platform for future dialogues and a campaign aimed at countering negative stereotypes and rumors about each other's faith communities.¹¹¹

4.3 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN KENYA

Kenya has faced the challenge of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at different points since independence in 1963, with numbers as high as 664,000.¹¹² The scale of internal displacement reflects significant social tensions and a persisting challenge.

Responsibility for IDPs falls to the Kenyan government (unlike refugees and asylum-seekers). Several legal instruments are directed at responding to the IDP challenge. Following the 2007-2008 post-election violence (1,300 killed, over 664,000 displaced),¹¹³ various actions were taken including a national Protection Working Group on Internal Displacement in 2009, a Parliamentary Select Committee on the Resettlement of IDPs established in 2010, and the 2012 Prevention, Protection, and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act. Policy frameworks on disaster management/response were developed. National land acts included plans to prevent and respond to internal displacement.¹¹⁴ Together, these actions represent a relatively robust institutional framework for the management, protection, and resettlement of IDPs. However, implementation is a problem, and many IDP needs go unmet.

IDP statistics are incomplete because roughly half live in IDP camps while others live informally across Kenya.¹¹⁵ Some data is available about individual waves of IDPs, but overall magnitudes and demographic information are poorly documented, especially for 'integrated IDPs' in urban or semi-urban environments and others who are unregistered and, therefore, are nearly invisible to the state.

Causes for displacement

Ethnic clashes surrounding elections have occurred since the Kenya's first multi-party elections in 1992. Between 1991

and 1996, an estimated 15,000 people were killed and 300,000 displaced in ethnic clashes and political violence. Before the 1997 elections, violence along the Coast displaced 100,000. Incidences of politically motivated and ethnic violence erupted between 1999 and 2005, especially in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western provinces.¹¹⁶ Brewing tensions culminated in the post-election violence of 2007-2008 when over 600,000 Kenyans fled their homes. Ethnic and clan conflict led to further displacement in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013.^{117 118}

Land disputes and natural disasters (including drought and floods) also cause displacement. During the colonial period, many indigenous communities were evicted, especially in the Rift Valley, Nyanza, Coast, Western, and Central provinces. After independence, the colonial title registration system that favored title-holding land owners was retained and original inhabitants did not regain their land. Resettlement programs existed, but ethnic tensions, corruption, and competing political interests stymied implementation. Periodic disputes among communities are a continuing result. Natural resource issues accentuate land disputes and internal displacement. Development and environmental conservation projects displace people and compensation or resettlement plans have often been flawed; examples include Mau Forest evictions in 2005 and 2009,¹¹⁹ displacement of informal urban settlements, hydro-power dam construction, and, in prospect, the Lamu Port and Lamu-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor.¹²⁰ Baringo, Laikipia, Turkana, Samburu, Narok, Kajiado, Marsabit, Isiolo, Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, Tana River, Kilifi, Kwale and Taita Taveta are most affected as they are areas with majority pastoralist communities. Food insecurity pushes communities to leave their normal areas searching for better land, sparking new conflicts between groups.¹²¹

Violent extremism is a new cause of displacement, affecting primarily the Northeast and the Coast. After the 2014 attacks locals fled their homes in search of safety, sometimes in nearby forests. As the Coast is a tourism hub, sharp declines in international tourists led to economic crisis and further displacement.

Religious dimensions of displacement

Religious and ethnic divides play roles, often complex, in internal displacement. These divides explain many large and small-scale internal displacements in Kenya. The 2007-2008 election violence is the most vivid example, when violence erupted after Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) was declared the winner of the presidential election and hastily sworn in, leading to questioning of the election's integrity. The opposition candidate, Raila Odinga, and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party disputed the election. Party followings fell along on ethnic lines, the PNU being pri-

marily Kikuyu and the ODM drawing supporters mainly from the Luo, but also from the Luhya, Kalenjin, and the Muslim coastal population. The violence following the election was as much between ethnic groups as political parties. A Kenya National Commission on Human Rights report estimated that over 1,100 people were killed in the ensuing violence¹²² with over 660,000 displaced.¹²³


Kenyan churches are not inherently ethnic-based, but religious denominations often follow ethnic lines (a legacy of colonial missionary patterns). Thus, for example, some churches are viewed as Kikuyu or Luo. This contributed to attacks on churches during the 2007-2008 violence that led to widespread internal displacement. An Assemblies of God church in the village of Kiambaa was burned in 2008, along with around 50 women and children who sought refuge inside. The town and church in the area were predominately Kikuyu but the greater region is largely Kalenjin.¹²⁴ The church and town are believed to have been targeted because of their Kikuyu identity. Specific conflicts in some areas have led to Christian flight to other parts of Kenya.

Kenyan religious leaders quite often openly support political candidates and parties from their own ethnic groups.¹²⁵ Kenyan religious leaders and faith institutions were heavily criticized for adding to tensions rather than staying non-partisan during the 2007-2008 violence. The National Council of Kenya Churches secretary general at the time, Peter Karanja, in a public statement, observed that “Religious leaders failed to stay on the middle path, they took sides and were unable to bring unity needed when the crisis arose.”¹²⁶ Trust in religious leaders declined dramatically as a result; a 2010 survey indicated that 38 percent of Kenyans did not trust religious leaders at all; in contrast, only 22 percent said they did not trust politicians.¹²⁷ Thus post-election violence was not religiously based, but religious and ethnic lines are blurred in the Kenyan context and can potentially spark conflict and, therefore, displacement.

FIO response to IDPs in Kenya

Faith-inspired organizations support IDPs in various ways, including direct emergency assistance, conflict prevention, fundraising and advocacy, and efforts to build resilience to climate shocks. National and international faith-inspired organizations often work through local congregations that have extensive grassroots networks. Local congregations also organize themselves to help their neighbors, especially when crises emerge. These efforts are not well cataloged or understood because of their spontaneous and grassroots nature. Parsitau’s dissertation, “The Role of Faith and Faith-Based Organizations Among Internally Displaced Persons in Kenya” (Box 12) outlines the efforts of four churches in the Nakuru and Nairobi areas immediately following the 2007-2008 election violence. These churches provided physical, emotional, and spiritual

Figure 10: IDPs in Kenya



Source: UNHCR Global Report 2008-2012 – Kenya; and “Municipalities and IDPs Outside of Camps: the Case of Kenya’s Integrated Displaced Persons.” Brookings Institution, May 2013

support to IDPs, including using church buildings as places of refuge. Church members opened their homes to women, children, and elderly IDPs who were particularly vulnerable. Parishioners and clergy cooked meals in nearby IDP camps, provided medical supplies and treatment, led prayer services, and offered counseling.¹²⁹ There are undoubtedly many other such examples. Mary Gakembu, bishop of the BCC church in Kayole slum, observed in an interview that her congregation has sheltered and cared for various groups of Congolese and Burundian refugees.¹³⁰

This section highlights FIO projects that focus on IDPs in Kenya, focusing on direct assistance of IDPs and prevention of future internal displacement. It is illustrative rather than comprehensive.

During and after the 2007-2008 election violence international, national, and local faith actors worked directly with UN agencies, notably UNHCR, and the Kenya Red Cross. Support included providing safe spaces, shelter, food, supplies, and blankets. NCKC, Organization of African Instituted Churches, Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, CRS, and many local churches including the African Gospel Churches, Deliverance Church Nakuru, Nairobi Chapel, Faith Evangelistic Ministries, and the Redeemed Gospel Churches in Nairobi were active.¹³¹ This support was similar to that provided by non-religious organizations, though the FIO capacity to draw on their extensive grassroots networks made a difference.

The Kenyan Council of Catholic Bishops (KCCB), the main development and peacebuilding structure of the Catholic Church in Kenya, has long supported IDPs through their Commission on Refugees, Migrants, and Seafarers. After the 2007 violence, the Catholic Church provided food and non-food items, health services, placement in schools, psychosocial support, and spiritual support to IDP populations. The Commission focuses on spiritual and pastoral care to migrants and IDPs, but have also provided di-

Box 11. Faith and coping for IDPs

Damaris Seleina Parsitau (“The Role of Faith and Faith Based Organizations among Internally Displaced Persons in Kenya”) has explored coping mechanisms of Kenyan IDPs during the 2007-2008 election violence. Faith was the foundation of IDPs’ strength in the Mau Mahiu IDP camp. Women survivors of sexual violence organized daily self-led Bible study groups where they read passages, shared their concerns, and comforted each other. One woman interviewed said, “Look at us, we have lost everything we had, we don’t even have shelter, we have been rejected by our neighbors while we are forgotten by our government. God is all we have now and we are going to call upon his name and he will hear us.”¹²⁸ Taking on the names of strong Biblical women, for instance the Deborah Women’s Group, these Bible study groups relied on their faith for hope and strength during their displacement. They helped establish new support systems and community relationships.

rect support in select instances; in 1997, the Church bought land so a group of IDPs could settle permanently. The Commission educates clergy on the special needs and situations of vulnerable groups through their ‘Pastoral Care and Services to all the Itinerant People’ weeklong workshops, and through speaking to local congregations. They work through local bishops and priests to raise awareness about refugees, IDPs, and migrants while encouraging parishioners to extend Christian charity to those in need.¹³²

Faith-based media organizations, such as Fish FM and Radio Rahma launched fundraising and emergency relief programs for the IDPs after the 2007 election violence. Fish FM’s program called Satui ya Pwani (Voice from the Coast), organized relief aid, food, and shelter. The crew of Radio Rahma distributed food to several IDP camps and mobilized humanitarian assistance to build new homes.¹³³

Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) partnered with local Seventh-Day Adventist churches, the Kenya Red Cross, and local governments in providing emergency assistance to IDPs after the 2007-2008 election violence. Together, they distributed over 320 metric tons of food to 81,000 IDPs in the provinces of Nairobi, Rift Valley, and Nyanza. Water and sanitation facilities were built for 30 orphanages. The coalition distributed WASH supplies, clothing, blankets, medicine, and psychosocial counseling and helped displaced persons as they returned home.¹³⁴

Habitat for Humanity has been active in Kenya since 1982, facilitating the construction of shelters for over 6,000 families

through a micro-mortgage loan approach.¹³⁵ A main focus is supporting IDPs to rebuild their houses. After the 2007 election violence, Habitat partnered with the Mai Mahiu community to help the build 335 houses for the 335 households in their community that lost their houses due to the violence. Habitat helped organize local fundraising, using Family Media, a Christian radio station.

Between 2006 and 2008, violent clashes in the Mt. Elgon area of Northern Kenya along the Uganda border were ignited by long standing land disputes. Over 15,000 people were displaced and some 300 people were killed. Seven Nairobi mega-churches united with **World Relief**, an international evangelical humanitarian organization, to host clothing and blanket drives for IDPs as winter approached. The coalition engaged **NCKK** to determine the 700 most in need and coordinated aid distribution to those families.¹³⁶

After Al-Shabaab attacks in Lamu in 2014, **World Renew** became aware of people hiding in forests and organized emergency support, including insecticide treated nets, solar-power lanterns, water tanks, and other necessary items. IDPs had left their homes with enough food to last for a while, but they asked for help in rebuilding their farms. World Renew provided farming supplies and seeds so they could rebuild their farms and also brought in food aid when their supplies ran out. The IDPs moved back to their homes and are currently working to rebuild their lives.

FIOs are deeply involved in efforts to address several root causes of displacement, namely climate shocks, development works, ethnic violence, and land disputes. **World Vision, Caritas, the Aga Khan Network, LWR, LWF, and ADRA** work to strengthen food security in affected and vulnerable regions. Similarly, **CRS, Christian Aid, LWF, and DCA** are involved in disaster risk reduction through climate sensitive agriculture programs including helping pastoralists diversify their livelihoods.

Many FIOs address ethnic and religious tensions through dialogue and inter-community projects. The **Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims, Kenyan Council of Catholic Bishops, Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, Friends Church Peace Teams, Interreligious Council of Kenya, and NCKK** are all involved in efforts to bring different ethnic and religious groups together in dialogue to foster peace. They teach alternatives to violence and dispel misconceptions through media campaigns, group meetings, and youth programs.

American Jewish World Services (AJWS) supports the Friends of Lake Turkana Initiative which successfully halted construction of a dam that would have significantly depleted Lake Turkana and probably displaced a large population. AJWS also

supports the Kenya National Resources Alliance which fights for the sustainable and just use of natural resources.

Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI), established in 1997 in Mombasa, fights for just land rights through its Land Advocacy Project which addresses historical land allocation injustices. MUHURI has stopped multinational companies from evicting communities, and politicians from repossessing public land. MUHURI assists individuals from the Coast communities in securing title deeds to land in order to protect against future evictions. MUHURI works with the Lands Ministry and National Land Commission in these activities. It is dedicated to combating terrorism in the Coast region, serving as a bridge between the community and the security authorities as misunderstandings can cause conflicts.

FIOs contribute to research on emergency preparedness.

Concern Worldwide, an Irish non-denominational humanitarian organization, works with the Kenyan Ministry of Health to develop a new tool for understanding urban emergencies. Many benchmarks used to declare humanitarian emergencies are based on rural settings. Concern has found that urban emergencies require a different set of indicators, informed by food crises in Nairobi in the 2007 post-election. Malnutrition rates in the slums rose to four percent and local clinics were overwhelmed with sick children. Concern

worked to rally an international response but the threshold for a food emergency is 15 percent malnutrition, so aid actors denied funding, saying four percent was too low to start a response. Concern is conducting research in Nairobi's slums to determine early warning signs and define new thresholds for urban emergencies. During nine rounds of data collection in the slum of Korogocho, they noted that conditions had slightly worsened between rounds. The final data collection showed that indicators of poverty and malnutrition had worsened significantly. Through this early warning system, Concern was able to respond quickly and provide 2,000 vulnerable households in Korogocho with cash transfers that allowed families to weather the difficult time and kept them from falling deeper into poverty.¹³⁷

In sum, FIOs play crucial roles for IDPs in Kenya. Their efforts support existing government structures and they often work as partners. The current robust legislative, legal, and governmental mechanisms for the care and protection of IDPs are likely to generate more information about IDPs and their needs. However, response and program implementation will be slow. It is important to recognize the large role FIOs play in IDP care. Along with the extensive church networks in place around Kenya they help the government identify, protect, and assist Kenya's IDPs. They will be valuable assets to IDP care going forward.



LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

Responses to Kenya's refugee crisis are broadly limited to four sets of actions: continued adherence to encampment policies, facilitating refugees to settle in Kenya, voluntary repatriation, and resettlement to third countries. Though these options are no different from any other protracted refugee situation, each comes with its own challenges and repercussions specific to Kenya.

Encampment policies

Over the past decade, the Kenyan government has become increasingly adamant about ensuring that refugees remain in camps, reflected in arrests and deportation of urban refugees to the camps. These actions aim to decrease security risks and isolate the refugees in defined areas where they are under the care of humanitarian agencies. Unintended consequences include heightened tensions between the refugee and

Kenyan communities, especially in regards to both refugee and Kenyan Somalis. Ethnic Somali Kenyans are mistaken for illegal immigrants and sent to the camps along with others. Furthermore, isolating the refugees to camp settings prevents them from contributing to Kenya's economy and development.

Kenya's refugee population is highly mobile; organizations report that most clients relocated to the camps return to their urban homes within a few months. This illustrates that enforcement of these policies is largely ineffective. Additionally, some scholars argue that enforcement of the encampment policies increases rather than decreases security risks to Kenya because the refugee and Somali populations are further marginalized from Kenya society, heightening tensions. This suggests the encampment policies may contribute to destabilization rather than national security.

Local integration

Local integration could have positive and negative effects. If allowed, local integration would provide the refugee population with either Kenyan citizenship, or full rights to work, move freely, and live anywhere in Kenya while maintaining their native citizenship. Integration of the refugees could lead to increased economic gains, especially since refugee communities in Nairobi have proven their entrepreneurial abilities, but could also exasperate tensions between Christian and Muslim or Kenyan and refugee communities. Local integration by granting Kenya citizenship is a highly unlikely solution; however, allowing for refugees to move freely and work may be slightly more feasible. UN agencies along with NGOs and FIOs are working to advocate for these rights, but more work is needed to ease tensions between the Kenyan and refugee populations.

Voluntary repatriation

Voluntary repatriation is generally held up as the ideal solution to any refugee situation, if conditions in countries of origin are suitable. In the Kenya case, many refugees, have chosen to go back to their countries of origin once conflict subsides. This can be seen most dramatically with the South Sudanese population in Kakuma after independence. However, the Somalia conflict has persisted for decades and a resolution does not appear to be imminent. Generations of Somalis have lived their entire lives in Kenya and many identify more with Kenya than Somalia. Thus some refugees do not want to return to Somalia. Others want to return but are concerned about the ongoing conflict and fear the prospect of completely rebuilding their lives with few resources.

In December 2014, UNHCR launched a pilot program to help Somali refugees who wished to voluntarily repatriate by providing them with a starter package of goods, connections to humanitarian and development organization in Somalia, as well as a few months of unconditional income. The program is in collaboration with the Kenyan government, Somali government, and UNHCR and targets a group of 10,000 Somali refugees in Kenya who wish to return to their homes. In December 2014 a group of 400 Somali refugees returned to their counties in South-Central Somalia, areas which are generally stable. Although large-scale repatriation of Somali refugees is not feasible due to continued security concerns, this program is the first to support Somali refugees successfully in restarting their lives.¹³⁸

Resettlement

Although resettlement to a Western country is highly desired within the refugee communities, it is not a feasible solution for most refugees. Of the 10.5 million refugees in the world,

only one percent are submitted for resettlement.¹³⁹ Those chosen for resettlement usually have special protection or health needs which give them priority over the rest of the population. Special circumstances can include women and children at risk of violence, serious health conditions needing advanced medical treatment, or persons targeted by outside groups (for instance, Iraqis who helped US forces). Resettlement is treated as a last resort because of its expense and time intensiveness. Large-scale resettlement, though often preferred by the refugees, is not possible due to mostly to the absence of countries willing to except mass numbers of refugees.

LOOKING AHEAD

At a critical juncture in Kenya's history, regional instability, inter-ethnic and religious tensions, and the large refugee population threaten progress. Better appreciation of religious dimensions of these challenges can help in the search for solutions. Faith actors are pivotal players in Kenya's humanitarian and development landscape, offering distinctive and often innovative approaches to problems. They also face distinctive challenges and barriers. Religion is a powerful force among refugees, influencing how they relate to humanitarian programs and organizations as well as how the Kenyan and refugee population interact. Religious beliefs, practices, and communities play positive roles as a source of strength for refugees and IDPs. The following ideas emerge from this review.

Better knowledge about religious dimensions of tensions surrounding refugees and IDPs in Kenya could strengthen policy responses, by the Kenyan government and its partners.

Past research and practice has focused on ethnic divisions, largely ignoring religious dynamics that accompany many of them. Ethnicity has been the primary source of conflict in Kenya but the rise of violent extremism and specifically Al-Shabaab changes the picture, with spillover effects to other economic, social, and political forces. While much focus goes to Islamic extremism, little is known about its Christian counterpart and about the interlinkages of both with broader social and economic trends.

National Kenyan religious organizations and faith-inspired organizations have substantial potential to advance interreligious dialogue among and between Christian and Muslim communities, including inter-ethnic dialogue and peacebuilding activities specifically with the Somali and Kenyan communities. Perceptions and misunderstandings contribute to mounting tensions amongst the Kenyan population and surrounding refugees. Al-Shabaab attacks targeting Christians accentuate religious and ethnic divides. Though faith actors and organizations are involved in efforts to quell tensions, more work is needed, at the national and grassroots level. They

need to transcend denominational boundaries and reach out to those in their communities who propagate negative perceptions. Involving only those who agree cannot spur meaningful change. National cohesion will be a crucial factor in combating the effects of terrorism and in maintaining Kenya's positive development trajectory. Moreover, as sustainable solutions are slim, the humanitarian community is increasingly advocating for local integration (to whichever extent). This will not be possible without first addressing the current tensions. Faith actors can be powerful allies and should be engaged.

Faith leaders can emphasize the moral arguments for protecting refugees and migrants to their parishioners. Their influence can be crucial to mobilizing community resources toward responding to protection needs. Many in the Kenya population view refugees as living privileged lives, better off than Kenyans. Rhetoric that refugees are 'stealing Kenyans economic opportunities,' smuggling weapons, or terrorist sympathizers leads to tense relations both in urban areas and host communities. The reasons why they are refugees can be forgotten. Preaching the moral imperative to protect the stranger could temper the harsh rhetoric and engender more positive attitudes and behaviors. Messages like that of Catholic Pope Francis who called on every Catholic parish to house a refugee family could have impact. Kenyan faith communities have proved powerful allies in organizing protection and care to those in need, as seen with the IDPs following the 2007-2008 election violence. They have great potential to help support the refugee population especially if local integration becomes more feasible.

Humanitarian and development practitioners can learn from FIO models and approaches in navigating the religious beliefs and practices of both the refugee and IDP populations in Kenya. Examples include resistance to efforts to promote gender equality, family planning, youth approaches, health, and school attendance, all of which can have religious dimensions. Understanding these dynamics can enhance program success. Willingness to engage religious leaders and promote religiously-sensitive approaches help build trust among the refugee communities and enhance sustainability. Humanitarian and development actors can learn from FIOs' strong grassroots connections and community-based approaches vis a vis IDPs and

host communities. As FIOs are some of the most established and trusted organizations in Kenya, actors hoping to engage more effectively at the grassroots level or with religious leaders can learn from the faith-inspired organizations. FIOs can be valuable partners in programming as well as facilitators in helping other organizations engage grassroots community groups.

Local faith communities and grassroots faith-inspired organizations are active in caring for and protecting refugees and IDPs, but more research is needed to understand the extent and nature of their roles. The erratic and dispersed nature of IDPs makes programming especially difficult. Narrow case studies confirm that local faith actors have been crucial to caring for Kenyan IDPs during waves of displacement but there is no real mapping and little is known about scope or approaches. Likewise, little is known about interactions with refugee communities outside the camp setting. More research could help shed light on how humanitarian organizations can support and utilize existing efforts in order to provide more wide-reaching and comprehensive care to refugees and IDPs.

With no end in sight to Kenya's refugee situation, new approaches and ideas are needed to improve the lot of refugee populations and ease the burden on Kenya as a host country. Treating Kenya's refugees as a purely humanitarian matter no longer fits the current situation. What is needed is an approach that incorporates longer-term perspectives and development. As FIOs are major actors in Kenya's humanitarian sector, they can be resources in finding new solutions and important allies in advocating for policy changes at the national level. Their grassroots connections and decades of experience make them important players who can identify flaws in the current system, propose plans for more sustainable interventions, and implement new approaches. Work is being done to make Kakuma and Dadaab more self-sustaining through developing the local economy to include both refugee and host communities, but this will be a slow process and tenuous. FIOs and faith actors can be strong partners in this endeavor and in potential future transitions toward greater local integration. As the global refugee landscape evolves, Kenya's experience may offer lessons for implement humanitarian work in other large-scale, prolonged refugee situations.

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