Strategies for Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Diverse World

2011 – 2012 UNDERGRADUATE FELLOWS REPORT
About the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs

The Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University, created within the Office of the President in 2006, is dedicated to the interdisciplinary study of religion, ethics, and public life. Through research, teaching, and service, the center explores global challenges of democracy and human rights; economic and social development; international diplomacy; and interreligious understanding. Two premises guide the center’s work: that a deep examination of faith and values is critical to address these challenges, and that the open engagement of religious and cultural traditions with one another can promote peace.

About the Doyle Program

The Doyle Engaging Difference Program is a campus-wide collaboration between the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, the Center for New Designs in Learning and Scholarship (CNDLS) and Georgetown College, designed to deepen the university’s own commitment to tolerance and diversity and enhance global awareness of the challenges and opportunities of an era of increasing interconnectedness. The Doyle Program is made possible by a generous gift from alumnus and Board of Directors member, William J. Doyle (C’72).

About the Doyle Seminars

The Doyle Seminars support students pursuing research around issues of difference at the intersection of religion, culture, society, and politics. Students enrolled in the seminars engage in enhanced research and writing projects guided by faculty, discuss their research with guest experts visiting the classes, and produce a report documenting their research projects.
About the Project

From January through May 2012, a group of 15 Georgetown University students met weekly for a course titled “Peacebuilding Strategies.” This course aimed at bridging the gap between the variety of theoretical models for resolving conflict and real-world practices for establishing post-conflict security. This project examined tough questions like the following: Which theoretical models and approaches work in the field? Conflict resolution theories, including various peacemaking approaches and transitional justice, are often lumped together into a single field; what distinguishes different approaches? What are the best practices in engaging difference that are likely to lead to understanding? This class evaluated theories and models, including the “responsibility to rebuild” doctrine and US government frameworks for reconstruction and stabilization, with particular attention given to the efforts of religious actors engaged in peacebuilding. Over the course of the semester, students interviewed experts in government, academe, and the NGO community on the elements of pursuing and securing peace. Our findings are available in the second half of this report.

We gratefully acknowledge the participation in this project of dozens of interviewees from in and out of government as well as the guest lecturers who came to our class, including USAID’s Stacia George, former World Bank executive and World Faiths Development Dialogue Executive Director Katherine Marshall, and retired State Department arms control negotiator Joseph Smaldone. This report would be impossible without the support of the Doyle Initiative and the Berkley Center, and we consequently thank those responsible for supporting our study and research.

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Executive Summary

In the year preceding the writing of this report, a second Arab Spring pressed democracy across the greater Middle East, the Sudans parted ways with far less violence than anyone could have expected, coalition forces departed from Iraq, and female activists and political leaders shared the Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen seemed to become more violent, regimes in Bahrain, Syria, and elsewhere violently cracked down on the opposition, and drug cartels visited horrific violence on Mexico and its Central American neighbors. In short, the global political context of this report is one of upheaval, transition, and violence. Nevertheless, brave individuals like Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani as well as a host of institutions, from NGOs to the US government to the United Nations, daily invested in and worked toward peace.

This report is the result of a semester’s worth of reading, investigation, and research into strategies for establishing durable peace and security in this context. More specifically, 15 Georgetown graduate and advanced undergraduate students investigated the question, “What works in peacebuilding?” Our findings are the substance of this report.

The report begins with a survey of the debates among social scientists, economists, political leaders, and practitioners about how to understand the contemporary context of global conflict. We define conflict as an instance when two or more parties have real or perceived differences in interests that result in violence that is sustained and collective. We found that there are a few key debates that shape thinking on conflict and its resolution. One such debate, rooted in how the Cold War ended, is whether the basic assumptions of international affairs have substantively changed from the past: Have we moved beyond a world of inter-state wars to one dominated by failed states and civil wars? A second debate has to do with the factors driving conflict: Do collectives fight, steal, and kill out of greed or are they motivated to engage in hostilities due to a real or perceived grievance, including an affront to their religion or ethnicity?

The evidence seems to suggest that there are more intra-state conflicts today than in the previous century, with the caveat that most civil wars draw in outside parties, thus making them hybrid intra- and inter-state wars. Moreover, many conflicts include both greed and grievance factors, although the mechanisms for resolving the particulars may be quite different.

The next section of the report deals with the multifaceted literature on peace and security. Our first finding was that there is a cacophony on this topic, with everyone from military generals to politicians to peace activists using the same words (e.g. “peace,” “security,” “reconciliation”) with different definitions and radically contrasting policy prescriptions. We found that there is a significant debate about whether, at war’s end, it is best to simply let bygones be bygones and move forward or whether it is better to resurrect the past—such as through truth commissions—and publicly call to memory the violence. Again there seems to be a difference between inter-state war and intra-state violence. In the former, peace settlements between governments typically halt the bloodshed and everyone goes home, whereas in civil wars it may be necessary to deal with past wounds in a more profound way because the former belligerents now live as next door neighbors.

The literature suggested that there are often tensions between efforts at a basic level of peace and wider efforts at accountability and justice. Many cite the draconian punishment visited on Germany at the end of World War I as a cause of World War II. However, most of the interviewees agreed that the real key to overcoming many of the impediments to durable peace comes from an appreciation for the specific conflict’s context. Efforts at collective reconciliation and political forgiveness may be possible in some contexts, often due to the critical role of key leaders like Abraham Lincoln or Nelson Mandela, whereas such may be destabilizing elsewhere. The interviewees also tended to agree that the best approaches are comprehensive, drawing together the energies and expertise of local stakeholders, domestic political actors, and political elites from the national and international stage.

In other words, the respondents repeatedly said that integrated efforts by governmental and non-governmental agents are most likely to buttress peace. Finally, most respondents suggested that there are social actors outside the traditional process, such as women, religious leaders, and faith-based organizations that may have a unique and critical role to play in mitigating some conflicts as they are not seen as tied to the traditional structures of political power, but have novel, inherent mechanisms for authority and persuasion.
There are a variety of definitions and meanings for the terms peace, conflict, reconciliation, and justice, especially in the sub-disciplines of security studies, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding studies. Defining the terms is critical lest we stretch the concepts to the point of meaninglessness.

For this report, the term conflict refers to an instance when two or more parties have real or perceived differences in interests that result in violence that is sustained and collective. This definition bounds our research to group forms of violence with explicit political overtones; we did not focus attention on the many tragic forms of individual violence (e.g. domestic violence, individual criminality). Peace can be defined in many ways, but for the purpose of this report we recognize that many conflict resolution experts distinguish negative peace (security) from positive peace (peace with justice). A negative peace is based on an absence of armed conflict and direct violence, where there is an emphasis on preserving the status quo and on negotiations between major actors. Negative peace is often the security found when warring actors quit the battle in international life and there is little talk about reconciliation and forgiveness for the belligerents’ return home across national borders. In contrast, the notion of positive peace goes beyond simply the absence of direct violence, and includes addressing the needs of all levels of civil society in terms of economic, social, and political justice and respect for human rights. The concept of positive peace underlies political efforts—usually at the end of a civil war or communal conflict—to rehabilitate a society and its institutions, seek justice in some form, and pursue reconciliation and even forgiveness between groups and individuals. In practice, real-world peace lies along a spectrum between negative and positive peace.

There are a number of approaches for accomplishing peace, among which are many terms of art including conflict transformation, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Conflict transformation does
not aim to eliminate conflict, but works with it and transforms it constructively. It works toward reducing violence, increasing justice, and transforming human relationships. Behaviors, perceptions, relationships, and the culture of violence all get transformed. The aims of conflict resolution are to get to the heart of what is fueling the conflict in order to figure out the best ways of resolving the conflict and getting rid of the destructive aspects of conflicts. Peacekeeping focuses on outside intervention by a third party that puts an end to violence and aims at separating the parties in conflict. Military disengagement, insertion of troops on the ground for security, and humanitarian assistance are the main actions that peacekeepers are involved in. This results in a traditional approach to security closer to the negative peace end of the spectrum. In peacemaking the aim is to resolve an ongoing conflict, mainly through negotiations, mediation, dialogue, and problem solving workshops. Peacebuilding focuses on restoring normal relations between people through development, promoting human rights, all forms of justice, and democratization, which empowers civil society, and works toward reconstruction. The end product of peacebuilding is a positive peace.

In order to reach a sustainable and stable peace, issues of justice and reconciliation must often be addressed. Justice is a tricky subject, for justice means different things to different people. At a minimum, justice implies “just deserts” and retribution, but there is an increasing emphasis in scholarly work as well as in the field on restorative justice: economic justice, social justice, and political justice as the foundations for societal reconciliation. Reconciliation, in its collective political sense, implies that parties of a conflict have come to terms with the past and decided to move forward and try to live together. Forgiveness literally means the lifting of a debt, and in our interviews and readings we found that this term is usually reserved for individual relations rather than the interactions of societies or governments.

We found that the literature on peace and security as well as our interview respondents often used these terms interchangeably and with a variety of unspoken assumptions. In part this was due to their different perspectives, for we interviewed diplomats, NGO employees, academics, faith leaders, and community activists. But it was also confusing because some focused on peace as village-level reconciliation while others used the word peace to mean the treaty that ends an international war. We found that using the international relations construct of three levels of analysis when considering war and peace helped provide conceptual clarity. Conflict causes can be found at the international level, the domestic political level, and/or the individual or local political level. The international level of analysis focuses on the power of states, with reference to the international system, which includes multilateral organizations such as the UN and NGOs that can marshal a variety of tools, including persuasion, public opinion, and money. The domestic politics/societal level focuses on matters that happen within state borders. The local, individual level concentrates on how individuals engage in conflict and how can they participate in its resolution. Most conflicts have elements of all three levels, but many diplomats, aid experts, religious authorities, soldiers, and NGOs tend to focus their attention on one of the three levels based on their professional expertise.

A variety in approaches to conflict and peace as well as different levels of analysis have led to the expansion of the literature. Among the most pressing questions in this literature, which have consequences not only for theory but also for real-world practice, are the following:

- Is the trend in global conflict one of continuity or change?
- What are people really fighting over? Is it greed or grievance?
- What is the relationship of justice to peace? Can there be peace without justice?
- Is individual reconciliation possible? Individual forgiveness? Are reconciliation and forgiveness possible for collectives: is there political reconciliation?
- What are we to make of the disparate theoretical approaches to ending conflict? Is there a core theory of conflict resolution?
- Is there a difference between government-led (Track 1) and non-governmental approaches (Track 2) to security and peace?
The seven decades since WWII have been referred to as the long peace due to the absence of great power warfare. But, while hot wars between the great powers have been on the decline, the level of inter-state conflict, primarily between religious and ethnic opponents, has increased. Political scientist Jack Levy notes that the ratio of intra-state to inter-state wars doubled after World War II. This distinction between classical wars between states and civil war points to a theoretical question for contemporary international studies: Is today’s international security environment qualitatively different from the past, and if so, do these changes impact how we engage in and recover from war? Many scholars suggest that although there is some continuity in balance of power and resource struggles among states, recent decades have seen changes characterized by globalization, the influence of technology, the increasing influence of non-state actors, and the failure of post-colonial states.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICT AS A POLITICAL STRUGGLE CONTINUES TO BE A REALITY TODAY, BUT THE DEFINITION OF POWER AND THE MEANS AVAILABLE FOR ATTAINING IT HAVE CHANGED.

The classical view of war, associated with Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, is that war is politics by other means. The perspective of conflict as a political struggle continues to be a reality today, but the definition of power and the means available for attaining it have changed. Instead of a mercantilist or realist conception of power as measurable in square acres or number of subjects, power can also be defined in terms of persuasive ideas that motivate action, including ideological, religious, and ethnic dogma.

Political scientist Michael Brown agrees that contemporary notions of power are expanding. He argues that the actors, capacities, and tactics of political competition in international affairs have changed. While national governments continue to be central to international politics, transnational actors have unprecedented access to advanced military capabilities, ranging from the Taliban’s attempts at cyber-warfare to Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical attacks in Japan. Indeed, as Martha Crenshaw argues, contemporary terrorism attacks ideas and the status quo rather than physical territory, breaking previously-relied upon conventions of war in the process. In traditional great power warfare, rules of engagement provided parameters for every aspect of conflict. Today’s terrorists have the firepower of small national armies, yet refuse to adhere to the laws of armed conflict, often directly targeting civilians.

The increase of terrorism is just one element of the changing international system. It suggests a deeper change: the failure of governments to provide security and governance for their populations. For one reason or another, new states (particularly in Africa, Latin America, and Asia) were prone to insurgency and civil war throughout the 1960s-1980s. Much of Africa faces similar challenges to this day. Some scholars point to the breakdown of colonial empires, particularly in Africa, as one of the historic causes of prolonged contemporary conflict. Many of these new states did not have sufficiently robust political and economic structures when the colonial apparatus was swept away, nor have they been able to develop them in the hurly-burly of democratic competition. Jack Levy observes, “The result is a collection of states that have the formal trappings of sovereignty... but not the functional capacity required to integrate their disparate parts into an effectively functioning political system.”

In brief, international security can be explained in terms of continuity as well as change, particularly when one distinguishes between the international and domestic levels of analysis. While the level of intra-state war has increased, the threat posed by twenty-first century military technologies in the hands of non-state actors means that any state, whether it be a great power or not, must be vigilant in promoting security, both domestically and internationally. The international community, be it comprised of states or NGOs, has become increasingly interested not just in peace treaties between states, but in helping societies overcome the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction in order to break cycles of violence over time. Moreover, as conceptions of power and legitimacy evolve, hegemons such as the United States are confronted with the dilemma of how to wage wars against enemies whose demands seem impossible to satisfy and who do not abide by the law. As a result, and armed with the tools of globalization such as cheap travel and advanced communication technologies, there is a greater space today for non-state actors and civil society to pursue Track 2 (non-governmental) diplomacy in the service of peace outside of formal state-to-state channels. This sentiment is echoed among the respondents of this study, with many of them attesting to the valuable work done by non-state actors in conflict regions.
The polarization of greed versus grievance serves a useful heuristic purpose in examining motivations for conflict. The distinction offers competing explanations for the root cause of war as it relates to collective violence, particularly in cases of civil war. Although there is a robust debate over whether greed or grievance is the primary driver of conflict, a more nuanced explanation of conflict seeks to understand that greed and grievance are intertwined in many of today’s conflicts, particularly in civil wars in post-colonial states.

The greed paradigm is one rooted in the self-interest of rational actors, deriving from an economic theory of conflict that emphasizes private or individual motivation as the principal cause of conflict. According to this argument, wars create new economic incentives and opportunities such that the net economic advantage of war for some individuals motivates them to engage in violence. Writing on the economic causes of civil conflict, Paul Collier argues that the “feasibility of predation,” or the ability to use force to extort money or goods from their legitimate owners, explains conflict: “Rebellion is large-scale predation of productive economic activities.”4 Violent expression of such predatory behavior occurs only when rebels believe they can benefit from war, such as by controlling mineral, narcotic, or petrochemical wealth.

Proponents of the grievance explanation for conflict counter that civil wars simply cannot be reduced to resource wars sparked by predatory designs of governments and the actions of greedy, loot-seeking rebels. Instead, their view is that people go to war originally over the perception of identity-based economic, political, or cultural injustices. Interpreted as such, rebels are public-spirited heroes fighting against injustice, rather than self-aggrandizing villains competing for loot. As such, grievance-based theories contend that group motives, rather than individual interests, are the source of conflict.

Collier argues that, other than in “situations of ethnic dominance,” a rebel today is most likely a greed-motivated “rebel without a cause.”5 However, as Frances Steward and Graham Brown note, leaders “cannot create an identity out of nothing.”6 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, various ethnic and religious groups had lived together without violent conflict for many years, however, religious and ethnic cleavages still existed during this time. The 1991 census of the former Yugoslavia showed ethnic relations further deteriorating due in part to worsening economic conditions. Soon after, war broke out, with the respective leaders mobilizing populations along ethnic and religious lines—Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslim Bosniaks. The Yugoslav Wars were cases of nationalists using these ethnic and religious identities as a means of rallying support in pursuit of power and resources, but such mobilization could not have occurred without pre-existing resentments in society between different ethnic and religious groups.

Determining whether a conflict is rooted in greed or grievance is further complicated by the often cyclical nature of conflict, as conflicts can and do breed future conflicts. As Gurr notes, resentment about past wrongs, fear of future losses and hopes for relative gains for particular groups are all motivations for conflict.7 These can fester over many generations, and, therefore, a conflict that may have originally started out as driven by greed can, in a subsequent breakout of violence, have more to do with grievances or vice versa.

It is clear that current institutional approaches to post-conflict, for example those used by the World Bank, the UN and USAID, reflect assumptions from these two paradigms, although most policies take one view at the exclusion of the other. One example is embargos on conflict goods such as blood diamonds or other commodities. In some cases, the UN Security Council and international community hopes to undermine the financial resources of the belligerents. Other cases focus on the nature of the grievance, such as through post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions, which are designed to air grievances and set a historical record.

The motivations for conflict are complex and diverse and subject to change. While many conflicts can be explained primarily in terms of either greed or grievance, our interviewees tended to argue that the political economy of conflict requires a more nuanced paradigm that embraces elements from both greed and grievance-based theories.
A key debate in security and peace literature revolves around the definition of justice and the various mechanisms for implementing justice. Although most scholars agree that some form of justice is important for wars to end well, the nature of that justice is debated. Traditional views of justice have typically focused on punishment for wrongdoers and restitution for victims. The reasons for seeking punitive or retributive justice are understandable. Through juridical and criminal proceedings, victims of a conflict can achieve closure, psychological release, acknowledgement of their suffering, and a sense of justice for the crimes committed against them. Setting a precedent for the future and establishing an element of the rule of law are also reasons cited for prosecutions. Moreover, the aggrieved may receive some form of compensation for what they have lost, usually in the form of a modest financial remittance. In these ways punitive justice can be linked with other post-conflict efforts at peace through the principles of moral accountability, restitution, security through sidelining or imprisoning aggressors, and closure for those who have suffered loss. The never-ending debate across Latin America regarding justice for the misdeeds of 1980s-era authoritarian regimes suggests that the legitimate claims of victims and survivors can last for decades if not appropriately dealt with.

However, others argue that relying on judicial proceedings is simply not enough to establish sustainable justice or peace in a country. This seems to especially true in civil wars. Furthermore, formal justice proceedings raise numerous questions regarding victim’s justice, including who to prosecute, who not to prosecute, which legal code to employ and how to determine punishment and reparations. Debates over prosecutions can take valuable time, energy, and resources away from measures that are more productive at creating peace and keep the focus of the people on the past. The UN-authorized International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda seems to be a case in point: a lumbering, grossly expensive proceeding that has taken more than 15 years to try less than four dozen genocidaires at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. Few would argue that this tribunal has been effective at punishing a critical mass of wrong-doers or of substantively contributing to peace in post-genocide Rwanda.

Desmond Tutu says, “…peace is more important than fulfilling the niceties of punitive justice.” In other words, simply seeking punishment will not necessarily lead to justice. The degree to which punishing perpetrators under the law effects sustainable peace depends upon whether the punitive process creates space for communities to begin to reconcile with one another. In fact, under certain circumstances, qualified amnesty is more strategically just than traditional legal justice because it does specifically create space.

Charles Villa-Vicencio defines political reconciliation as the “minimal level of political harmony and cooperation between former enemies [to create] a basis for pursuing holistic justice…” In this sense, political reconciliation is a minimalist approach to an extremely daunting mandate to create peace in neighborhoods that through, intra- or inter-state conflict, eliminate the space necessary to maintain peaceful coexistence. David Crocker notes that reconciliation starts with “simple coexistence” and eventually moves towards “the reconstruction of social bonds between victims and perpetrators.” As John Paul Lederach argues, actors rooted within communities, including mediators, religious leaders, respected elders, and social workers have the capacity to build this space, as seen in the grassroots reconciliation efforts in Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere.

Many interviewees concurred with the practitioner literature that individual and interpersonal reconciliation must precede political reconciliation, at least in cases of civil war. In the South African example of ubuntu and the Rwandan example of gacaca (grass) courts, local justice forums, though imperfect like any justice institution, created safe spaces for the expression of individual testimony and festering grievances. But in other cases, according to Jean Bethke Elshtain, victims must practice “knowing forgetting: …[individuals] choosing to recollect the past, but not being so wholly defined by it that one’s only option is to be executioner or victim…rather than an accountable human agent….”

Can individual reconciliation and forgiveness scale up to collective forms of reconciliation? The academic literature and our respondents expressed a variety of positions on this issue. But what many agreed on, in cases of civil war or gross war crimes at home, is that collective forms of political reconciliation are typically concerned with how these events are remembered and framed within the collective memory. Collective forgiveness, therefore, represents a process, not an event, to overcome attitudes of victimization that allows people to move from victim to survivor. This principle underscores the notion of restorative justice: efforts to create a better society by rebuilding relationships among human beings.
One could easily become bewildered by the wide range of schools of thought about how to establish security and promote peace: security studies, peace studies, conflict resolution, transitional justice, economic and political development, conflict management and transformation, etc. One critical question that all of these schools attempt to answer is, “why is there such diversity of cause and outcome among various cases of conflict?” Efforts at conflict resolution, which for our purposes we will generically label as “conflict resolution approaches,” pursue practical answers to this question and are not afraid to test and evaluate ways in which to best mitigate sources of conflict in discrete situations.

In approaching the question of causality, there is general consensus among conflict theorists and practitioners about the primary importance of analyzing the context within which a conflict progresses. Due to the degree of divergence, striking a balance between universality and sensitivity to context in applied conflict resolution approaches has been a challenge. One of the leaders in analyzing the dynamics of conflict is Johan Galtung, Norwegian sociologist and founder-emeritus of the discipline of peace and conflict studies. Galtung argues that in order to really deal with conflict, one must consider the pre-conflict and post-conflict phases as well as what happened during the violence. He is also famous for his idea of a “violence triangle” that categorizes types of violence into three types: direct-behavioral (he hit her), cultural-socially constructed (it is appropriate in that culture for men to strike women as a matter of course), and structural (the society’s socio-economic building blocks include social regimentation by class, ethnicity, and gender that are long-standing, deeply ingrained, and invisible to the citizenry). The triangle as a shape suggests the positive-feedback loop created by these types of violence and how they self-propagate.

Another critical peace theorist is John Paul Lederach, who has studied and worked in scenarios of cyclical violence. Lederach argues that “transcending violence is forged by the capacity to generate, mobilize, and build the moral imagination” by 1) understanding why constant violence so brutally challenges constructive social change, 2) exploring creative means and processes, and 3) contemplating peacebuilding as a vocation. Out of his exploration of creativity in peacebuilding, Lederach develops the idea of “horizontal capacity,” meaning the ability to engage “across all lines of division,” much like a spider builds a web. More specifically, he argues that elites, mid-level leaders (e.g. religious authorities, NGO leaders), and average citizens all need to participate in order truly build peace.

Galtung and Lederach are the most prominent examples of the nexus between the academic literature and practice. More recently, US government agencies have developed toolkits for analyzing conflict in the field. One such tool is the US Department of State’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The ICAF assesses context, core grievances, social and institutional resiliencies, drivers of conflict, mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing the intensity or magnitude of the conflict. This methodology is based on the theory that conflict is caused by key actors that mobilize social groups around core grievances, which creates a holistic driver of conflict. This includes the theoretical assumption that key actors have a set of means and motivations that enable them to mobilize the social group towards violent ends.

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation at the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has published a Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) and provides training to some of its employees on conflict assessment. This method of analysis is based on a theory that the causes of conflict manifest themselves in clusters:

“These are: 1) causes that fuel incentives or motives for participation in violence; 2) causes that facilitate the mobilization and expansion of violence; 3) causes found at the level of state capacity to manage and respond to violence; and 4) regional or international causes. If all of these are in place, there are also likely to be windows of vulnerability — moments when events such as highly contested elections, natural disasters, economic shocks, or riots — can trigger the outbreak of full-scale violence.”

US government approaches are thus rooted in the literature on conflict resolution theory and demonstrate advances in how conflict can be analyzed and dealt with.
Governmental vs. Non-Governmental Approaches: Similarities and Differences

Government and non-governmental approaches represent two different methods for peacebuilding. In an ideal world these approaches work in concert with each other to build peace on multiple levels, including international, domestic, and societal levels. There are numerous ways to resolve violent conflicts, yet the tools that are used will vary depending on the actors and parties involved in the peacebuilding process. Consequently, an enhanced understanding of governmental and nongovernmental approaches is necessary to assess the effectiveness of peacebuilding practices. Governmental or Track 1 approaches refer to governments: the leaders of political institutions involved in the conflict and outside governments intervening in a conflict or post-conflict situation. Non-governmental or Track 2 refers to a range of actors outside the government, which can be either domestic or international. These actors typically include local community groups, NGOs, and religious organizations. Some scholars distinguish different sectors of non-governmental activity as being on different numbered tracks (e.g. Track 3, Track 4, etc.), but for our purposes Track 2 refers to any non-governmental action in pursuit of peace. Though governmental and non-governmental actors can be complementary to one another, they often have different interests or objectives which can set them at odds.

State approaches to peacebuilding aim to broker peace by applying pressure on the parties in conflict. This is often done through traditional mechanisms of state power: sanctions or incentives. Thus, the advantage of governmental approaches is the capacity of state actors to use formal measures to persuade. However, state actors do have a number of limitations in intervening on behalf of peace: they may suffer from poor credibility due to a lack of capacity; their own self-interest may defeat efforts at balanced conflict resolution; and they may have a poor understanding of the real drivers of conflict due to lack of cultural literacy.

In contrast, Philpott and Cox assert that Track 2 efforts gain traction by being "unchained from official objectives and national interests." Chester Crocker, in an interview with one of our team, dubbed Track 2 actors as potential "insiders" due to their understanding of the logic and desires of local communities in conflict. Many believe that this is why religious and grassroots organizations demonstrate some successes in local conflict resolution.

Religious actors offer a particularly interesting contribution. In El Salvador, Mozambique, Nigeria, and elsewhere, faith-based initiatives have played a constructive role in facilitating peace negotiations. David Smock observes that "religious leaders are particularly effective in working together for peace" because they can draw upon common values and faith interpretations to encourage compromise and peace and because they are often deeply rooted in the local community.

However, Track 2 is not without flaws. A lack of bias is not always assured, particularly in regard to local NGOs or religious/grassroots organizations that maintain close ties with one particular community. The narrow scope of their interactions impedes the possibility of building credible bridges with people from the opposite side of the conflict. Peacebuilding is often expensive, and Track 2 diplomacy, often lacking focused attention or legal jurisdiction, attracts far less financial resources than state-led efforts. And, in cases of hot war or sustained human rights violations, it is simply unclear that Track 2 can stop the killing and ameliorate suffering the way that government/international intervention can.

Neither approach to peacebuilding, Track 1 or Track 2, operates perfectly in all cases. The ideal framework for conflict resolution involves a combination of powerful, resource-rich state interveners and on-the-ground, legitimate non-state actors.
MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS

One of the issues too rarely raised in the peacebuilding literature has to do with evaluations of success. More specifically, how can one measure whether or not peacebuilding interventions of any kind are successful? On the one hand, there are those who argue that such measurement is not necessary because the ideals of the participants are a good in and of themselves—measurement is unnecessary. There are a variety of other objections to measuring conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts, such as “Peacebuilding is too difficult to measure” and “Efforts to assess peacebuilding are smokescreens to undermine programming.” A less paranoid, but nonetheless negative view of assessment is that evaluating peacebuilding will inflate expectations in ways that will discourage donors from long-term commitments. Nevertheless, there are increasing efforts in the field to measure not only the inputs (e.g. dollars, man-hours) spent on peacebuilding activities, but also track outcomes.

The following blogpost was written by a program manager and published on an online discussion about how to develop and utilize indicators to assess changes in peace and security. The NGO referred to, Mercy Corps, is a humanitarian organization that began in 1979 to provide services to refugees in conflict zones.

Over the course of Mercy Corps’ Evaluation and Assessment of Poverty and Conflict/Fragility Interventions (EAPC) research project, we developed a number of indicators to measure peacebuilding and stability promotion outcomes. We grouped these indicators into three broad categories or baskets focused on three dimensions of peacebuilding outcomes, including:

1. changes in security and violence;
2. relationships between conflicting communities; and
3. dispute resolution capacity.

A key product of this research project is a menu of stability indicators that we can use across Mercy Corps programs and countries. These indicators will allow us to measure the impact of specific programs as well as to compare impacts across programs. Illustrative indicators include:

**Security & violence**
- Percent change in reported incidents of violence
- Percent change in movement in previous ‘no-go’ areas
- Percent change in number of places considered safe/unsafe
- Percent change in perceptions of peace and security
- Percent change in willingness to engage in direct acts of aggression against community X

**Relationships**
- Percent change in type and frequency of interaction between members of conflicting communities
- Percent change in willingness to interact with members of conflicting communities
- Percent change in negative relationships between divided communities
- Percent change in inter-community trust
- Percent change in negative perceptions of members of conflicting communities
- Percent change in feelings of exclusion by members of conflicting communities

**Dispute resolution**
- Percent increase in peace agreements that are perceived as fair by parties
- Percent change in satisfaction with local conflict resolution mechanisms
- Percent change in institutional conflict management capacity
In order to develop an understanding of how to obtain peace in a post-conflict situation, the class engaged in research through reviewing the academic literature and interviewing experts. We began with in-depth consideration of the primary literature on war, peace, and security including the works of Michael E. Brown, Paul Collier, Martha Crenshaw, Chester Crocker, David A. Crocker, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Johan Galtung, Ted Robert Gurr, John Paul Lederach, Charles King, Jack Levy, Edward D. Mansfield, Eric Patterson, Charles Villa-Vicencio, and many others. We also investigated reports and documents from the US Institute of Peace, the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development, and a variety of NGOs.

In addition, we conducted interviews with religious and civil society leaders, foreign policy practitioners, national security experts, academics, and peace activists. We created a master list of over 500 potential interviewees and contacted nearly all of them. Due to the condensed nature of the academic semester, we spent about eight weeks interviewing individuals, transcribing interviews, getting clearance from interviewees on the transcripts, and then sharing and reading them within our research team. In the end, this report is heavily informed by 108 interviews conducted between March 1 and May 1, 2012. A vast majority of interviews were conducted in person, although those outside of Washington, D.C. were conducted via telephone. Each interview began from a short list of prescribed questions, and then proceeded in an open-ended fashion. Those prescribed questions include the following:

- What do you think are the most effective peacebuilding strategies and why?
- What is the most important aspect or element of a post-conflict situation to avoid the resumption of violence?
- From your perspective, are there important differences between government-to-government efforts at conflict resolution and non-governmental or Track 2 approaches? Are the two complementary or in conflict?
- What doesn’t work? In other words, are there government-to-government or Track 2 approaches to peacebuilding that really don’t seem to bear fruit or are counter-productive?
- Are there real differences between religiously-inspired peacemaking and non-religious approaches?
- What are the qualities of a good peacebuilder or negotiator?

Because of the size and composition of our set of interviews, we do not claim this data set to be fully representative of either the US interagency or the diverse constellation of voices in civil society. Nonetheless, on some of the key questions there was considerable continuity of answers. From the short list of questions, many interviews then proceeded to wider discussions based on the interviewees areas of expertise and experience. Many of those more specific comments and recommendations are captured below. We are grateful to all those interviewed, including those who spoke off the record, for assisting us with their expertise. A number of the interview transcripts are available at: http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/projects/undergraduate-fellows-seminars.
What do you think are the most effective peacebuilding strategies and why?

An overwhelming majority of respondents answered this question by emphasizing that conflict resolution and peacebuilding should be context-specific, executed differently on a case-by-case basis. As such, international mediators must be flexible in their approaches. On one hand, the tremendous stress placed on case-by-case specificity may be interpreted as a palpable aversion to making definitive statements on clear-cut tools or strategies available for peacebuilding. On the other hand, recognizing the macro- and micro-level contextual factors at play in each conflict case can be a valuable insight in itself, as respondents tended to equate knowledge and understanding with a principal prerequisite for peacebuilding measures. Some respondents emphasized precise timing of international peace efforts as a key component of this contextual approach. By this logic, only when a third-party actor recognizes a window of opportunity in which belligerent parties exhibit a possible willingness to pursue negotiation (facilitated by stalemate and/or mutual exhaustion) is a peace negotiation successful. Others, more broadly, stressed asking the right questions of local populations facing conflict: what do they want? How do they feel? This understanding of the underlying dynamics including emotions, political and economic circumstances, among others, contributes to cultural reciprocity and thereby strengthens the likelihood of conflict resolution. In fact, many respondents felt that a successful peacebuilding program should incorporate a strong element of local involvement, through consultation and dialogue with the local community, in order to ensure that it was both tailored and effective to the conflict in question. An example given was a program with the best intentions to provide education that built a school before realizing that the community did not have the teachers to fill it. Furthermore, relationships with the local community allow for the gathering of information and help understanding this information in the context of their lives and culture. Different respondents emphasized different aspects of this recommendation, such as underlining the importance of engaging women due to their keen understanding of the underlying tensions of the conflict and their network within the community, or the need to work with community members to make sure any peacebuilding strategy is sensitive to and acceptable to the local culture, or the importance of opening dialogue between different parties in a dispute, and particularly the different levels among and within the actors active in the peacebuilding at the grassroots, institutional and elite levels. These different prescriptions illustrate a divergence in what key actors are considered the most constructive to the peacebuilding process. Ultimately, the choice depends on the specific situation and the social and cultural structure it exists in.

Not all respondents addressed this question only in terms of context. The dozens of interviews yielded a widely diverse collection of useful strategies that may be applied universally. In an immediate conflict resolution (or peacemaking) context, several respondents emphasized the need for aggressive, competent, third-party
infrastructure, the ability to transport goods throughout the country, emphasized the importance of economic development, in terms of resumption of tensions or conflict. These respondents also often necessities—jobs and services—are most critical in preventing the agreement. To the latter group, government provisions of basic improvement in quality of life or do not understand the context of if people living in post-conflict environments do not see a noticeable elections, etc.); other respondents asserted that institutions mean little consideration of each local community’s needs and concerns, must be addressed. Others framed peacebuilding in terms of Galtung’s “positive peace,” focusing on physical and institutional development, inclusive (though not necessarily democratic) governance, and provisions of basic services, which include food, shelter, and security, to local communities as preconditions for lasting and progressive peace. Underlying all of these strategies is the development of mutual trust, both in terms of reconciliation between competing parties and cooperation and coordination between local, national, and international parties. Reconciliation allows people to find a common ground and work on building relationships of exchange and trust, reducing tensions and the probability of future conflict. For example, an organization in Mumbai supported reconciliation in a community by having the women work together to lobby the local government for sanitation services, in a project that benefitted them all and wasn’t related to the conflict, allowing them to start working together for a common goal. In this part of peacebuilding, relationships with community leaders are very important because of their role in interpreting external circumstances and directing action within their network. Furthermore, the relationships between parties in the conflict have to be developed progressively through programs that do not necessarily start with the cause of the conflict itself, but are build on commonalities, including the affirmation of a common humanity. These principles, though expressed in different manners on a case-by-case basis, help form the basis of a potentially universal basic framework for approaching peacebuilding.

**What is the most important aspect or element of a post-conflict situation to avoid the resumption of violence?**

While many respondents emphasized that strategy and policy depend largely on context in a post-conflict environment as well, they did on the whole provide much more concrete and consistent answers to this question than for question 1. Good governance, reconciliation, economic and social development, transitional justice, and security guarantees were the most predominant themes. However, there was considerable difference in opinion on the manifestation, timing, and relative importance of these five tenets. Often respondents provided differing definition on what these components of post-conflict peace entail. For example, with regard to the somewhat ambiguous concept of good governance, some respondents argued for the necessity of good governance structures with a focus on institutions (constitution, elections, etc.); other respondents asserted that institutions mean little if people living in post-conflict environments do not see a noticeable improvement in quality of life or do not understand the context of the agreement. To the latter group, government provisions of basic necessities—jobs and services—are most critical in preventing resumption of tensions or conflict. These respondents also often emphasized the importance of economic development, in terms of infrastructure, the ability to transport goods throughout the country, entrepreneurship, and trade. Education, particularly on business skills and civic engagement, serves as an important complement to economic development.

Highlighting another fault line, emphasis on transitional justice was mixed. Naysayers argued that international involvement in justice proceedings or truth commissions has actually served to alienate many domestic and foreign observers (e.g., ICC indictment of Omar al-Bashir in Sudan). Pursuit of punitive measures against violent perpetrators can be difficult or even counterproductive immediately following conflict, potentially sparking deep (maybe violent) passions among a divided populace. Most respondents, however, agreed that some form of justice is necessary in the long term to provide closure on emotional wounds of war.

One point of virtual consensus, however, was respondents’ agreement on the importance of security guarantees to parties involved in an agreement. Third parties play a crucial role in ensuring that former warring factions and communities feel safe and comfortable in a post-conflict environment. Some potential suggestions to achieve this objective include: integrating rebel forces into the national military, creating and training a professionalized national security force, seeking some form of eventual disarmament, and establishing a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire. All of these measures are again predicated on a fostered culture of renewed trust, trust between all parties—local, national, and international—involved.

**From your perspective, are there important differences between government-to-government efforts at conflict resolution and non-governmental or Track 2 approaches? Are the two complementary or in conflict?**

Nine in ten respondents agreed that government efforts at concluding conflict differ from NGO efforts at conflict resolution, but the interviewees also overwhelmingly agreed that government and non-government approaches can and should be complementary. Governments are extremely important when it comes to peace because they have resources, security forces, diplomatic power, and international credibility. However, governments are often less flexible and have to work within given parameters, particularly public opinion at home, which limits the time and finances available to peacebuilding. In addition, outsider governments may not fully comprehend social dynamics that take place on the ground.

NGOs differ from governments in not having the kinds of restrictions that governments have. They do not need to act on behalf of the national interest, but rather can take an intermediate position of acting on behalf of the common interests of all parties involved. They have the flexibility of not having to be accountable via elections or polls. In addition, NGOs may understand local dynamics better than governments, generally because they have been on the ground longer, and they may take a stance of neutral
Non-governmental approaches to peacebuilding may have longer time horizons than governments worried about annual budgeting and the next election cycle. As Georgetown University Professor Sarah Stiles, an expert on social entrepreneurship and political activism, said, “I think Track 2 approaches hold more merit over just government-to-government approaches to peacebuilding. We cannot just have government officials at the table making the decisions. The people are the best way to facilitate peace.”

Yet non-governmental approaches also have limits. Many NGOs are constantly worried about funding, and it is often the case that peace and development NGOs compete with one another for scarce funding. Additionally, NGOs lack the legitimacy of national sovereignty, and therefore they have to work hand in hand with the state in order for final negotiations or peace agreements to be successful. Finally, in some cases state use of force is important to guarantee the peace: NGOs simply do not have this resource at their disposal.

Most respondents said that the best way forward is for non-governmental actors and national governments to work together. Each has strengths that can be brought to bear on different parts of the conflict cycle and the two can be mutually reinforcing.

Some respondents gave special attention to the role of women in peacebuilding. Kim Weichel, co-founder and co-director of the Institute for PeaceBuilding, remarked on the distinctiveness of women peacebuilders, stating that some women, due to their involvement at the grassroots level, engagement in communities and role in the family can “sense misunderstandings and tension before they erupt into conflict and violence.” Women’s voices can be extremely important in addressing the underlying tensions of a particular conflict, and empowering women to take part in the peace process at all levels of a conflict increases the possibility for sustainable peace agreements that serve the ends of both peace and justice. As Stewart M. Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations notes, women “devote 90 percent of their incomes to health, education, and food security, which underpin the sustainability of peace in post-conflict zones.” In Liberia, recent Nobel Peace Prize winner Leymah Gbowee rallied women across religious lines, successfully pressuring Charles Taylor and regional warlords to reach a resolution to the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003. Such activism by women is an important component of effective peacebuilding strategies in some contexts.

Are there real differences between religiously-inspired peacemaking and non-religious approaches?

Approximately three-quarters of the interviewees affirmed that real differences exist between religiously-inspired peacemaking and consciously secular approaches. Proponents of the value of religiously-inspired peacemaking argued that religious voices could appeal to local community’s faith, emotions, and religious values in pursuit of peace. Religious messages of peace can serve as an antibody against extremist voices, particularly those that attempt to use religious justifications for violence. Peace efforts led by religious leaders and religious institutions, such as local churches tied to global denominational support, are more sustainable, holistic, and willing to invest for the long-term. In contrast, many secular peacebuilding projects are short term, relying on government grants or foundation donations to operate. Moreover, religious peacebuilders are motivated by a religious vocation or inspiration that provides the long-term grit to keep trying for peace, despite disheartening circumstances.

Many respondents suggested that one does not need to be a person of faith to take religion into one’s security calculus. If one or both sides of the conflict understand the conflict to have religious overtones, such as in Kashmir, Israel, or Lebanon, then religious issues may have to be addressed in attempts at conflict resolution, even if outside mediators are secular in nature.

What doesn’t work? In other words, are there government-to-government or Track 2 approaches to peacebuilding that really don’t seem to bear fruit or are counter-productive?

All respondents agreed that there are many practices within peacebuilding that do not seem to bear fruit or are counter-productive, though they somewhat differed in their responses.

Many interviewees stressed the fact that peacebuilding efforts are likely to be counter-productive if they are not specifically tailored to the situation in question. This is important in all stages of peacebuilding, from conflict assessment and background knowledge of the conflict and of the local context to not having good local stakeholder input on the effectiveness of the programs. Furthermore, trying to apply lessons from other countries and imposing external practices were identified as potentially doing more harm than good. This specificity should be accompanied by a certain level of transparency, to avoid having the actions and intentions of one or more of the parties be misconstrued or misunderstood.

Some respondents warned strongly against international military intervention, expressing strong feelings about recent conflagrations in Iraq and Afghanistan. For some of those interviewed, military intervention often does not incorporate a holistic view of conflict.
causes and possible solutions because it focuses primarily on traditional hard power rather than the underlying political, social, or economic conditions. That being said, some respondents pointed out that hard power can be necessary to stop massive human rights violations as well as to provide the security guarantees essential in post-conflict settlements because economic development and democratic governance are unlikely without a basic level of security. This is a lesson the United States learned in Iraq and elsewhere. Respondents also addressed the concept of leverage in peacebuilding, saying that while sanctions can be used to effect, third parties should be cautious and not focus too heavily on sticks at the expense of building trust with the parties involved in conflict.

Certain interviewees felt that peacebuilding will be unsuccessful if the emphasis is put on justice first, in a rush to address the issues of contention, without some work on reconciliation and establishing channels for dialogue and trust. Similarly, there is a danger of doing development work without incorporating it into the dialogue, as it may be counter-productive or even cause more conflict. Overall, there was an emphasis on addressing both structures and attitudes, as one might draw the other back into conflict.

Respondents also indicated that peacebuilding tends to be unsuccessful when the parties involved are unwilling or unable to address the true root issues of the conflict, leading to wasted time and resources and often a resumption of violence. This can take the form of the parties involved or a third party settling the conflict in accordance with a certain dogma or pre-conceived solution, without making sure that it is feasible and has a relatively high probability of success.

Peacebuilding programs also face certain shortages. These can be a question of time, as many outside actors and donors have a very short time frame (between six months and two years) while the conflict and rebuilding process may span decades. This can cause training or resources to be offered without the required follow-up or opportunities to use them, particularly in building relationships between parties in conflict. This can also result in shortages of financial and other. Since the field of peacebuilding has greatly expanded in recent decades, not all of the actors involved have the ability to fulfill their programs.

The interviewees observed that an additional challenge is when Track 1 and Track 2 approaches deliberately refuse to communicate or complement one another. This may be caused by dismissive government representatives or NGO programs driven by the egos or personal objectives of their leaders. It may be caused by the competition for funding, resources, and recognition, or by a lack of trust across sectors. This variety of barriers and elements that could go wrong highlights the complicated nature of peacebuilding projects and the delicate balance needed to successfully accomplish their goals.

Peacebuilding’s mixed historical record, with some successes and some failures, has demonstrated the enormous difference that third-party mediators’ inherent qualities make in determining the outcome. An important question to ask is: what are the necessary features of a successful peacebuilder? Though not a primary question asked during our interviews, respondents repeatedly emphasized certain traits of the negotiators or mediators themselves that help facilitate peace efforts. However, there was again wide variety in opinion on this subject. Several respondents noted that third-party actors should be impartial. By not exhibiting bias toward one side or the other (see Lederach’s “outsider-neutral” description), the external actor is able to garner greater legitimacy from all competing parties as a viable mediator. As a corollary to this, many respondents noted that the presence of ulterior motives (economic, geopolitical, ideological, etc.) may threaten to derail this legitimacy; third-party mediators should have little interest in the outcome aside from achieving lasting peace and stability. On the other hand, however, maintaining neutrality is extraordinarily difficult. State actors, particularly superpowers such as the United States, almost always incorporate certain key interests into bilateral relationships and peace efforts. Additionally, Track 2 actors, especially local community leaders or NGOs, often struggle to maintain neutrality as they often work exclusively with one side in the conflict. This perception of bias may tarnish a third party’s image, causing peace efforts to collapse.

Therefore, with consensus unclear on impartiality, one might turn to other (and perhaps broader) traits for greater clarity. One common response was that third-party actors should be well-respected and trusted by both sides, characteristics emanating not from impartiality but from competence and reliability. Fostering this image requires diplomatic skills, training, persistence, and the patience to hear and understand the voices of all parties in conflict. Several respondents noted the importance of attentive listening to fully understand perspectives. This also involves a degree of humility, as peacebuilders should delve deeper to comprehend the viewpoints of factions of the conflict whose actions on the surface appear irrational or immoral. Understanding both sides requires the suspension of the peacebuilder’s own absolute morality for the purpose of understanding the interests and subsequent actions of perpetrators. Finally, although third-party actors are often international, many respondents emphasized the importance of homegrown solutions (e.g., “African solutions to African
The opportunity to meet with senior scholars, diplomats, aid workers, and activists and learn from them directly was a novel and stimulating experience for everyone on our research team. Among the many constructive recommendations provided by respondents, three prevailing themes stood out for the US government and the international community:

- Promote peace and security by embracing a greater degree of communication and collaboration at the local community level.
- Cultivate a greater sense of empowerment and partnership with and within civil society.
- Commit the resources necessary to reach the end goal.

Building on the work of peace scholars like John Paul Lederach, we echo the recommendation of many of our interviewees that long-term peace is most likely when all levels of society are engaged: elites, mid-level and community leaders, and individual citizens at the grassroots level as well as sympathetic outside support. Consequently, top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace are simultaneously important in most contexts, and the United States and the international community should not focus their funds and attention only on a small coterie of elites, but also buttress civil society efforts as well. It is only when the citizenry, across lines of ethnicity, religion, and class, feels that their interests and identities are protected in the evolving settlement that peace is really likely to take root.

In addition, any peacebuilding initiative must be strategic in taking the long view of things and investing appropriately. Many respondents expressed frustration at the downside of the CNN effect: media generates interest in a tragic problem overseas, but it is only a short time before media shifts its attention elsewhere. Government and individual donors often follow suit, leaving immature efforts at enhancing security, governance, and development only partially funded on an abbreviated timeline. Instead, strategic peacebuilding should plan and budget for the long-haul, investing in initiatives and organizations that have a proven track record of commitment and excellence over time. This recommendation also suggests that perhaps donors and third-party interveners focus their attention on deep investment in fewer cases rather than frenetic, shallow involvement in many contexts. Finally, whereas it is governments who can intervene military in times of gross human rights violations to stop the killing, we recognize that civil society, particularly faith-based actors rooted in local communities, are often the first ones on the ground to assist and the last ones to leave in conditions of insecurity. Consequently, such organizations may be the best implementing partners for long-term security at the local level when the shooting stops.

Finally, the literature and our interviewees suggest that real training in peacebuilding is required for government officials and civil society actors who are involved in conflict and security initiatives. Such training should be mandatory, focusing on how to analyze the root causes underlying the conflict and the appropriate tools available for engagement. We found that considerable training mechanisms already exist, including at USAID and elsewhere, but that often training and education are not taken advantage of. In sum, the past decade has seen increased attention on these issues and an increasing connection between academic theory and real-world experience, but much work lies ahead to strategically build peace around the globe.
Research Team Biographies

Eric Patterson, Ph.D. is the course advisor for this project. Patterson is Associate Director of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs and has a visiting appointment in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. His work focuses on ethics and international affairs, religion and contemporary statecraft, and just war theory in the context of ongoing conflict. He is the author or editor of nine books, including most recently Ending Wars Well (2012), Ethics Beyond War’s End (2012), Politics in a Religious World (2011), and Debating the War of Ideas (with John Gallagher, 2010). Prior to coming to Georgetown, Patterson spent three years working for the federal government. He served as a White House Fellow and before that was William C. Foster Fellow in the State Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs.

Holly Lopez Long is the graduate student advisor for the course. She completed her M.A. in Linguistics from Georgetown University in May 2012 and holds a B.A. in Communication from Vanguard University. She is a discourse analyst whose research examines the areas of computer-mediated-communication, institutional discourse, and identity construction.

Ana Cenaj is a senior at Georgetown, majoring in Government and minoring in History. Originally from Tirana, Albania, she is committed to studying conflict resolution, law, and peacekeeping. Upon graduation, Ana will be teaching secondary English in the Rio Grande Valley, Texas through Teach for America. As an Undergraduate Fellow she contributed to the reports on the future of Track 2 diplomacy, law, religion, and liberty of conscience and peacebuilding strategies.

Federico del Bono is a senior at Georgetown University majoring in Government with a double minor in Economics and Theatre and Performance Studies. Born and raised in Milan, by an Italian father and a Panamanian mother Federico began to have a strong passion for global affairs. While studying at Georgetown, he has had the opportunity to intern for the White House Correspondence Office and the Embassy of Panama. After graduation this May, he plans to work and live in Washington, D.C. as a global citizen, aspiring to lead a life of public service.

Michel Djandji is a senior International Politics major in the School of Foreign Service, concentrating in international law, norms, and institutions. His preoccupation with human rights and humanitarian action stems from a background living in socially turbulent countries. His primary research interests concern the interactions between domestic and international law. In this regard, his thesis reconceptualizes the classical model of Westphalian sovereignty, by examining the incorporation of European Convention rights in the United Kingdom. Michel worked as the Global Systems intern in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs at the State Department, and is currently establishing a peacebuilding initiative in Israel that incorporates fine arts as a mediation tool between Israeli and Palestinian children. After graduation, he will pursue a M.Sc. in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford.

Lindsey Doyle is a junior in the School of Foreign Service majoring in Culture and Politics with a concentration in violence and conflict behavior. She currently works for the State Department in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Lindsey studied abroad in Argentina and has guided Georgetown Outdoor Education trips to Nicaragua for the past two years. She aspires to work internationally at the community level.

Manuel Figueredo is a junior in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He is majoring in International Politics with a concentration in international law, norms, and institutions. He is from Caracas, Venezuela, and plans to return home after he graduates to work in development. Currently he is focusing on his work with CIMA, an NGO.
founded by Figueredo and a group of his fellow students, which aims to improve the quality of life in the poorest communities in Caracas. He also enjoys politics and learning about other cultures.

Peri Gustafson is a senior at Georgetown University majoring in Government with a concentration in international relations, focusing particularly on sub-state violence, conflict behavior and resolution. She was raised and still currently lives in Potomac, Maryland. Her deep passion for international affairs and politics stems from growing up in the French educational system and her constant travels abroad with her family. She aspires to continue her frequent travels and immersion abroad after graduation, volunteering with various international organizations and initiatives, before returning to live in Washington, D.C. to work within the foreign policy field.

Nicola Skye Oudemans is a senior in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, majoring in International Politics with a concentration in international law, norms, and institutions. She grew up in Singapore and France and has interned with several humanitarian groups focused on human rights and development. After graduation, she is returning to Singapore where she hopes to work in corporate social responsibility or humanitarian efforts.

Katarina Pedersen is currently a graduate student at Georgetown University completing her M.A. in Conflict Resolution. She works as a research assistant for Dr. Charles Villa-Vicencio and has been focusing on studying the Middle East, especially transitional justice in Libya. Prior to attending Georgetown University, she received a Masters degree from Oxford University in Japanese Studies. For her undergraduate education she attended St Andrews University in Scotland, where she studied International Relations and Arabic.

Justin Pinn is a senior in the College. He is working toward obtaining a double major in English and Government. He is from Springfield, Ohio and has a deep passion for American politics and interacting with different cultures worldwide. He is currently a Rising Leaders Fellow through Teach for America and a Young People for Social Justice Fellow. Additionally, he serves as the CEO of a start up non-profit named Lifelong Education for the Achievement of Dreams (LEAD) where he and some fellow social entrepreneurs are targeting educational inequity in urban city youth. Justin aspires to one day represent the United States of America as a loyal public servant.

Kevin Preskenis is a senior in the College pursuing a degree in Government. He became interested in peacebuilding tactics and strategies through his coursework on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During his senior year, Kevin joined the staff on Newt Gingrich's presidential campaign.

Federico J. Rivas is a senior at Georgetown University studying Government, Economics, and Theology. He is from the Republic of El Salvador, where he founded his own advertising company at the age of 12. Federico studied for a year at the School of Foreign Service in Qatar, and has worked in New Delhi and Kolkata, India, as an intern in the Salvadoran Embassy and as a volunteer with the Missionaries of Charity. At Georgetown, he enjoys studying political theory, and is an avid golfer. After graduation, Federico will be moving to Cambridge, Massachusetts to study Management at Harvard University.

Carly Timm-Bijold is a senior at Georgetown University and is majoring in Government, with minors in History and Justice and Peace Studies. Originally from Duluth, Minnesota, her academic areas of interest include international political economy, health equity, and the intersection of gender and human rights. After graduation she hopes to pursue a career in international law with a focus on refugee, migrant, and internally-displaced persons.

Anamaria Trujillo is a Masters student in Georgetown University’s Conflict Resolution Program. She was born and raised in Medellin, Colombia. Her interest in conflict resolution is fueled by her upbringing in Colombia. Her experience in conflict resolution includes work at Colombia’s Ministry of Defense and Amnesty International. Currently, she is working on research concerning forced migration. She hopes to work in the field of peacebuilding in Latin America.

Andrew Wojtanik is a graduating senior and International Politics major with a security studies concentration as well as an African studies certificate. His academic interests include civil conflict, terrorism/insurgency, conflict resolution, humanitarian intervention, and grand strategy. His senior thesis focused on foreign intervention in African civil wars. Additionally, his experience includes work at the US Department of State, Council on Foreign Relations, and National Defense University. He hopes to pursue a career in international diplomacy or defense and will continue his work on international security topics as a research assistant for the director of the Belfer Center in Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government following graduation.

Josh Zeitlin is a junior at Georgetown majoring in Government and minoring in Justice and Peace Studies. Josh attributes his interest in peacebuilding to his Jewish heritage and his experience growing up at the time of conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Darfur.
NOTES


5. Ibid.


9. See Endnote i. pp. x.


Find interview transcripts as well as more information on this report at:
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