



205 S. Stricker Street

BOARD OF INQUIRY

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Table of Contents


<i>Executive Summary</i>	1
<i>Message from Dr. Niles Ford, Chief of Fire Department</i>	4
<i>Lieutenant Paul Butrim- Truck Company # 23</i>	5
<i>Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler- Engine Company # 14</i>	6
<i>FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo- Engine Company # 14</i>	7
<i>Overview</i>	9
<i>Experience and Training</i>	10
<i>Neighborhood Profile</i>	12
<i>Vacant Buildings</i>	14
<i>Arson/Incendiary</i>	16
<i>Code X-Ray</i>	20
<i>Structure</i>	24
<i>Incident Background Information</i>	35
<i>Incident Details and Investigation</i>	41
<i>Fire Classification</i>	108
<i>Injury Report</i>	108
<i>Findings and Recommendations</i>	109
<i>Since the Incident</i>	154
<i>Moving Forward</i>	160
<i>Equipment</i>	162
<i>Appendices</i>	182

Executive Summary

On January 24, 2022, the Baltimore City Fire Department suffered its most tragic event since the Tru-Fit Fire on February 16, 1955, where six members were killed in a building collapse. At 05:51 hours, Baltimore City 911 dispatchers started receiving numerous calls for a reported dwelling fire. Several addresses were reported, and one caller stated that there were three children trapped inside the home. Baltimore City Fire Communications Bureau dispatched Box Alarm 55-10 at 05:53 hours. The initial alarm consisted of Engine 55, Engine 14, Engine 23, Engine 36, Engine 47, Truck 23, Truck 10, Rescue 1, Battalion Chief 6, Battalion Chief 3, and Medic 21. At 05:55 hours, just two minutes after dispatch, Engine 14 arrived on location and reported a three-story middle of the group with fire showing from the second and third floors. The address of the dwelling involved was 205 S. Stricker Street.



The remaining first alarm companies arrived on location as Engine 14 prepared for an interior attack. Truck 23 started raising ground ladders. Engine 36 pulled a second attack line from Engine 14. Engine 23 arrived on location as the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)¹ positioned on Side Alpha. Meanwhile, Engine 55 and Truck 10 were beginning operations on Side Charlie of the dwelling. At 05:57 hours, Battalion Chief 3 arrived on location, assumed Incident Command, and requested a Working Fire. The members of Engine 14 removed the plywood from the front door and encountered fire conditions on the first floor. They began extinguishing the fire on the first floor and advanced into the dwelling. The Lieutenant of Truck 23 also entered the dwelling to begin a primary search. Engine 36 had their attack line stretched to the front door and were waiting for the line to be charged.



At 06:00 hours, just three minutes after Battalion Chief 3 assumed command, and five minutes after the arrival of Engine 14, there was a catastrophic interior collapse of the original fire building. Three members from Engine 14, one member from Truck 23, and two members from Engine 36 were inside of the dwelling at the time of the collapse and were trapped. The two firefighters from Engine 36 were quickly removed from the building with no injuries. A Mayday was declared, and the Rapid Intervention Team was activated. The other members of the first alarm and Working Fire assignments heroically pushed into the burning building to begin rescue efforts. There was still a large volume of fire surrounding them as they worked to gain access to the trapped firefighters. Members reported that they could hear bricks and other debris falling as

¹ Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) – A dedicated crew that is on standby as a rescue team for firefighting personnel who may need immediate assistance. Their responsibilities involve search and rescue of any missing, trapped, injured or unaccounted for firefighter(s).

they made their way further into the building. By that time, fire was extending to 203 S. Stricker Street (3-story vacant dwelling) on Side Bravo and 207 S. Stricker Street (3-story occupied dwelling) on Side Delta. At 06:07 hours, the Incident Commander (Battalion Chief 3) requested a second alarm. At 06:09 hours, members inside of the dwelling reported that they had made contact with Engine 14's pipe firefighter, FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo, who was trapped by multiple layers of heavy debris. Meanwhile at 06:14 hours, Engine 23 (RIT) reported that they were removing Engine 14's lead off firefighter, EMT/FF John McMaster, from the building. EMT/FF McMaster was placed in the care of BCFD EMS personnel and transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma. For almost ninety minutes, the members worked under adverse conditions, to free FF/PM Lacayo from the debris. At 07:39 hours, Rescue 1 reported that FF/PM Lacayo had been removed from the building. He was placed in a medic unit and transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma. Once FF/PM Lacayo had been removed, the members worked to remove the officer of Engine 14, Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler. Acting Lieutenant Sadler was trapped under the same type of debris that made FF/PM Lacayo's removal so difficult. At 08:18 hours, the Incident Commander (Car 5-Shift Commander) reported that Acting Lieutenant Sadler had been removed from the building. Acting Lieutenant Sadler was placed in the care of BCFD EMS and transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma.

Due to the unstable conditions of the building, and concerns of a secondary collapse, the Incident Commander (Car 5), evacuated the building and declared that operations would be shifting to a recovery mode at 08:18 hours.

Heavy construction equipment was moved into position and utilized to remove the front wall of the building and large amounts of debris inside. After several hours, members were allowed back in the building to finish digging by hand to search for Lieutenant Paul Butrim, Officer of Truck 23.



At 16:08 hours, Incident Command (Car 5) reported that the final member, Truck 23 Lieutenant Paul Butrim had been removed from the building.

EMT/FF John McMaster was treated for his injuries at Shock Trauma and on January 27, 2022, he was released. Several days later, EMT/FF McMaster was admitted into the Johns Hopkins Adult Burn Center for further treatment of his burns. EMT/FF McMaster has been released from Johns Hopkins and continues to recover from his injuries.

Tragically, Lieutenant Paul Butrim of Truck Company 23, Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler of Engine Company 14, and FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo of Engine Company 14 did not survive and were all killed in the line of duty serving the citizens of Baltimore City.

On February 7, 2022, the Board of Inquiry (BOI) met with representatives from the National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) at the Under Armour Headquarters in Baltimore City. For two weeks, the BOI and NIOSH performed interviews, collected, and reviewed data, as well as examined pictures and videos.

Over the course of the next eight months, the BOI continued to meet and communicate with NIOSH representatives to collect information on the incident. The BOI also worked with the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and other agencies to gather additional evidence.

The BOI began the difficult task of writing the report. This effort required extensive research and constant review. The data and evidence collected was used to create findings and recommendations that are shared in the main body of the report.



December 2, 2022

On January 24, 2022, while bravely battling a multiple alarm fire in the 200 block of S. Stricker Street, Lieutenant Paul Butrim, Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler, and Firefighter/Paramedic (FF/PM) Kenneth Lacayo tragically lost their lives, and Emergency Medical Technician/Firefighter (EMT/FF) John McMaster suffered critical injuries. The City of Baltimore will forever be indebted to Lt. Butrim, Lt. Sadler, FF/PM Lacayo and EMT/FF McMaster for valiantly and unselfishly risking their lives for our community. Not just on January 24th, but for what they did every day for our community.

When someone joins the Baltimore City Fire Department (BCFD), they instantaneously become a part of the BCFD family. We, literally and figuratively, have each other's backs. When a member loses their life, whether in the line of duty or not, it impacts our entire BCFD family. It was imperative that we consider the potential psychological trauma of our members and their families. Following the incident, we immediately activated the BCFD's Critical Incident Stress Management Team (CISM) and Peer Support Team (PST) to help any member in need, and also ensured that members had access to BCFD's Employee Assistant Program (EAP), the BHS "Live Well" program. The International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) activated their peer and professional support teams and dispatched them into the City. The IAFF team partnered with the Department's internal teams and took residence in a downtown hotel, providing confidential assistance to all members who sought emotional support. In addition, the IAFF along with the Maryland State Incident Management Team (IMT) offered vital support to the City and BCFD in assisting with the homegoing celebration that honored the fallen members. I am extremely grateful for partners like the IAFF, State IMT and also the many fire departments that came in to assist us through this vastly difficult time.

Shortly after this tragic incident, I commissioned a panel to serve as a Board of Inquiry (BOI) to focus on investigating this incident and to make recommendations that could potentially prevent this type of incident from occurring again. The BOI Report is not an investigation or determination of cause or origin of the incident. Rather, the BOI was tasked with conducting a thorough review into the circumstances surrounding the S. Stricker Street fatal fire and offered recommendations based on their review; in order to assist the BCFD in making informed decisions to further protect all members and the community.

The BOI consisted of experienced fire service representatives from both inside and outside of the BCFD. The BOI conducted its process in tandem with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Maryland Occupational Safety and Health

(MOSH). This was done to reduce repeated interviews of members to minimize reliving the emotional trauma of the loss of our fellow brothers and sister in the service.

A few months after commissioning the panel, I requested a meeting with the BOI to obtain a progress report and to discuss any issues that they gleaned from their work at that point. After receiving the BOI's preliminary update, I took two actions. First, I requested the BOI to refocus specifically on recommendations related to the particular incident at hand. Secondly, although some of the recommendations outlined by the BOI were outside the original scope placed before them, I directed the BCFD's leadership to address those tangential issues that were raised by the BOI.

On behalf of the BCFD and the Baltimore community, I would like to express our profound gratitude to everyone who participated in any capacity in the review and recommendations process, with a special level of gratitude to the members of the BOI.

Below is a brief synopsis of some of the recommendations from the BOI that the BCFD has implemented to date (identified by topic and page number in the attached BOI report):

- Work Group Creation (pg. 112 & pg. 116) – Many of the work groups already exist, although interest in participating in them had severely waned for many reasons. Accordingly, a bulletin was forwarded to the field to solicit new interest and greater participation in these groups.
- Risk Assessment (pg. 113) – BCFD's Manual of Procedures (MOPs) were modified or added to the 600 series of Fire Ground Operations that focused on risk management, scene size-ups, reports from the rear, roof reports, survivability assessment, and member safety. BCFD initiated a new officer training program that focuses on many issues including leadership, risk assessment, operations, tactics, and reiterating not just situational awareness but encouraging a culture of bold safety.
- Vacant Buildings Inspection, Marking & Notification (pg. 114) – Units conduct ongoing surveys for unsafe vacant structures in order to continue to record this information in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) (as we have done historically). In addition, members also now place a reflective red diamond placard on the front and rear of unsafe vacant structures. This new process provides members an additional tool in case they are unable to access information from the CAD.
- Vacant Buildings Mitigations & Tracking (pg. 115) – Units currently enter locations into our Fire Records Database. That information is linked to our CAD where the vacant status is added to any incident. BCFD also has engaged in a partnership with the Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) whereby they share information about vacant structures on a real time basis. Immediately after the incident, Mayor Scott initiated the Mayor's Vacant Workgroup which includes several City agencies with the goal to identifying vacant structures and developing ways to prevent buildings from becoming vacant structures.
- Vacant Buildings Operations (pg. 116) – The practice of updating the correct address by first arriving units has always been in practice at BCFD. This practice is being reinforced in current progressive training.

- Incident Command Technician (pg. 117) – MOP 601-5 Accountability Unit was created to ensure an established mechanism for tracking and accounting for all personnel on emergency incidents are being utilized consistently and correctly. Per the MOP, a sixth engine/squad will be dispatched as an accountability unit, to assist the Battalion Chiefs with tracking the accountability of all units and personnel. The MOP provides the Battalion Chief the latitude to put the sixth unit back in service if the scope of the incident makes this unit unnecessary.
- Incident Command System (pg. 118) & Incident Command – Incident Action Plan/Operational Risk Assessment (pg. 119) - All members are trained in the Incident Command System (ICS) as part of recruit training at the Fire Academy. ICS is and has been a component of promotional exams and ongoing training. BCFD also rolled out a new Officer Development Course (ODC) this year. One of the topics emphasized in this training program is to expand, enhance and re-emphasize members' knowledge, skills, and capacity to utilize ICS. The grant funding that made the ODC possible was released January 21, 2022 – three days prior to the tragic incident.
- Incident Command Post (pg. 120) – BCFD Battalion Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs have had command boards for a while. On October 12, 2022, updated Command Boards were issued to all seven Battalion Chief vehicles. The five Deputy Chiefs and the Chief of Operations were equipped with the new boards as well. As of October 17, 2022, all engine companies also were issued the same boards. MOPs and training pertaining to operating in the hot zone is being reiterated and clarified.
- Incident Command – Unified Command (pg. 121) The following agencies responded to the incident: Baltimore Police Department (BPD), DHCD, Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms (ATF), and Mayors Office of Emergency Management (MOEM). These disciplines are often a common part of BCFD multi-agency ICS structure. We also have had continuous active shooter training among most of these represented agencies. Nonetheless, moving forward inter-agency training should remedy any type of miscommunications between agencies during incidents. For instance, in February 2023, members of BCFD, OEM, and BPD are participating in joint training on ICS/EOC in Texas. It is also worth noting that the fire departments of Anne Arundel, Howard and Montgomery Counties sent their accelerant dogs up to assist BCFD's Fire Investigation.
- Incident Communications (pg. 122) - The incident commander is responsible for assigning incident operations to alternate talk groups. This is outlined in several MOPs. There are also policies in place for Fire Communications personnel to monitor the assigned fire ground channels. One dispatcher is assigned to fire ground 1 (A16) solely to monitor fireground activity and the Captain of Fire Communications also monitors this activity. In the instance of additional box alarms or rescue alarms, a dispatcher is reassigned to monitor radio traffic on the designated channel. Also, additional radios may be issued to chief officers. This practice currently is being evaluated for effectiveness.
- Incident Command – Mayday Chief (pg. 123), RIT Bag (pg. 127), RIT Training (pg. 128), Second RIT (Pg. 129), Roles & Responsibilities (pg. 130), RIT Equipment & Staging Area (pg. 132) – Historically, the department has provided training on MAYDAY and RIT along with Safety & Survival classes. Updates were made to existing MOPs focusing

on Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) and MAYDAY and released on April 20, 2022. These policies delineate the operations of declaring a MAYDAY and deploying a RIT to mitigate the MAYDAY. The policy also details dispatching of RIT Task Force. This is additional assignment of four engines, two truck companies, Rescue 1 (or closest Squad), two Battalion Chiefs (1 suppression & 1 EMS), one EMS officer and one ALS Medic Unit to assist with mitigating a MAYDAY. On April 21, 2022, BCFD issued a Bulletin regarding the new RIT Bag and detailing all equipment that it encompasses. The Bulletin demonstrated through images and written instructions the exact configuration in order to facilitate standardization. The bags were issued to every truck company on April 22, 2022. BCFD Logistics is currently in the process of equipping all suppression companies with RIT bags.

- Incident Command Advisory Role (pg. 124) – Further training on Incident Command is currently occurring through the Officer Development Training and Command Staff Level Training. The BCFD also recently purchased a training simulator which will assist with ongoing training and retraining.
- Incident Command Specialized Resources and Mutual Aid (pg. 125), Aerial Ladder as High Directional (pg. 133), Special Operations Command (pg. 144) – Prior to January 24, 2022, BCFD leadership began the process to re-structure and re-vamp the BCFD Special Operations Command (SOC) program. This process was expedited after the Stricker Street incident. The changes included the restructuring of SOC. It was determined that Battalion Chief 6 would become the on-duty SOC resource leader and team members were selected and trained in all aspects and disciplines of SOC. Partnerships with DHCD and FDNY/SOC have also been established. Also, BCFD applied for and was awarded funding for additional SOC-related training and equipment through the FY21 Assistant for Firefighter Grant (AFG) [award was issued in August 2022]. Policies are still in discussion of more extensive utilizations of Tower 1. One concern is the availability of this one resource that is also a response unit in a very busy system.
- Safety Officer (pg. 126) – The on-duty safety officer (SO) has been instructed to monitor the radio and has been granted the authority to self-dispatch on any incident that they deem necessary. The expansion of on-duty SOs is currently being assessed.
- MAYDAY/RIT Roles & Responsibilities (pg. 130) – The additional resources have been addressed in the MOPs which were updated on April 20, 2022.
- Equipment (pg. 134), Portable Radios (pg. 135), Electronic Accountability Program (pg. 138) – BCFD logistics is in the process of securing additional equipment that performed effectively (e.g. angle grinders) and other battery-operated equipment. BCFD is also testing personal thermal imaging cameras and radio software with enhanced accountability capabilities. Further we are in the process of rolling out a three-step training platform for the ADASHI Firefighter Accountability Systems. This system will give the Incident Commander (IC) and other chief officers a comprehensive view of the entire incident structure including full accountability of on-scene responders. This program was funded, in part, through an FY19 AFG (Assistance to Firefighters Grant) that BCFD applied for and was awarded. In FY20, BCFD applied for an AFG and was


awarded funding for personal safety/bailout systems to help members escape dangerous situations. In addition, in FY21 BCFD applied for an AFG and was awarded funds to purchase SOC equipment that included technical rescue harnesses, rescue stabilization struts, hydraulic rescue struts, and LAD Cells.

- Supplied Air Connections (pg. 136) and SCBA Accessories (pg. 137) – The Fire Department’s Respiratory Apparatus Officer is working with Fire Operations to identify proper connections and conduct training.
- Fire Communications Bureau (pg. 139-140) – Fire Communications fireground policies and procedures are continuously under review by communications training personnel. This includes the standard dispatch vs. the routing assignment. The use of utilizing the routing assignment has been addressed in training. Additional training has been initiated to reinforce adherence to policies and procedures including incident timer and dispatch procedures. Also, officers assigned to Fire Communications will participate in the fire simulator segment and will participate in the entire Officer Development Course (ODC). Additional staffing for Fire Communications is also currently being evaluated.
- Radio Transmission and Fire Ground Talk Groups (pg. 142) – Training will be accomplished through company and battalion level training in addition to simulated training through the ODC.
- Staffing (pg. 143) – The FACETS report issued November 2021 determined that BCFD satisfies National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards. If BCFD adopted the recommendations by the BOI with the current resources, there could be a permanent disbanding of 9 to 15 suppression units.
- Training (pg. 145-149) – As stated earlier, SOC training has been ongoing since the restructuring of that unit. There are numerous training events planned, including but not limited to: structural collapse training in Virginia; an advanced structural collapse course in Texas, and SOC training course at FDNY training. In addition to weekly training at the Fire Academy, there will be ongoing training sessions in soon-to-be-demolished structures in order to receive hands-on building construction training covering topics such as building types, tactics, strategies, damage, loads, stress and hose movement in structure. Beginning in March 2020, BCFD established a grant-funded Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI) Firefighter Rescue and Survivor Training certifications for members in the field. This course focuses on Maydays and rescuing our firefighters, and was offered for our employees to voluntarily register for. Currently, 569 of our members in the field have received the certification. In October 2020, this training was incorporated into recruit training. Accordingly, moving forward, any employee hired will receive the MFRI training and certification.
- Potentially Traumatic Events (pg. 150), Human Performance Under Stress (pg. 151), Empowerment (pg. 152), Culture (pg. 153) – For the past 5 years, BCFD has contracted with Business Health Services (BHS) a locally owned and operated Employee Assistance Program (EAP) provider to provide all BCFD employees as well as their household members with access to BHS’ “Live Well” program. The resources offered to members 24/7 includes but is not limited to counseling services, PTSD support and resources, as well as self-care; it is confidential and free. BCFD also has a departmental Peer Support

Team (PST) which provides emotional support for members anonymously and confidentially including a 24/7 hotline for members and links to resources for members and their family. BCFD also has an active Critical Incident Stress Management Team (CISM). PST and CISM provide support and education to members on the specific symptoms of PTSD, among other support. Lastly, the Officer Development Course is working to infuse a culture of safety into the company officers and Battalion Chiefs. It is our plan that in this peer-to-peer training environment of the ODC we can instill an expectation and culture of being aggressively safe.

The process of analyzing what happened during the January 24th Stricker Street incident and learning from it is going to be a long-term and ongoing process. We all owe that to the memories of Lt. Butrim, Lt. Sadler and FF/PM Lacayo, and in honor of EMT/FF John McMaster. We also owe it to all the current and future members of the BCFD family.

Sincerely,



Niles R. Ford, PhD

FIRE CHIEF

BALTIMORE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT

Lieutenant Paul Butrim- Truck Company # 23

Excerpts from Memorial Service Remembrance

Paul was born September 2, 1984, in Harford County, Maryland. He grew up with his brothers, RJ, and Cory, and graduated from Edgewood High School in 2002.

After graduating high school, Paul became a member of the Joppa Magnolia Volunteer Fire Company. There, he learned the basics of fire protection and realized that the fire service was his passion. He began his professional career as a firefighter in 2006, when he graduated the Baltimore City Fire Department Academy. Paul was always willing to learn and continued to grow. In his attempt to master the craft of firefighting, he studied hard and earned the promotion to Lieutenant in 2016.



Throughout his career, Paul worked tirelessly and was dedicated to those he served. This was never more evident than in 2015 when he rescued a four-year-old unconscious child from an apartment fire. He performed one-person CPR until he was able to get her to safety. Paul was awarded the Exemplary Performance Award for his actions that day. He didn't seek praise or recognition for his action- truly a quiet professional.

Paul was dedicated. His impact on the Department as a mentor, friend, and brother has been expressed by so many throughout his career and remains unwavering in his loss.

BCFD Highlights

Entry Dates	9/19/2005
Assignment dates	2/13/2006 (Truck 10)
Transfer dates	4/8/2007 (Truck 15)
Approval Dates (EVD) Tiller	7/8/2007
Approval Dates (EVD) Driver	8/25/2007
Transfer dates	10/25/2011 (Truck 29)
Acting Lieutenant Position	10/25/2011
Promotion dates - Lieutenant	11/16/2016 (Engine 57)
Transfer dates	9/1/2021 (Truck 23)

Citations & Medals

Exemplary Performance Award	2015 Apartment Fire - 806 Dartmouth
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Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler- Engine Company # 14

Excerpt from Memorial Service Remembrance

Kelsey was born July 28, 1988, in Baltimore, Maryland. The daughter of Jerome Norman and Pamela Hopkins and sister of Lacey Marino, Kelsey grew up in Harford County, Maryland. She graduated from Fallston High School in 2006, then began her career with the Baltimore City Fire Department.

She had a passion for helping others and she built meaningful relationships. Kelsey's loving spirit led her on a journey that has touched so many lives. She will be remembered by everyone who has seen the beauty and dedication in how she lived her life.



On January 24, 2021, EMT/FF Kelsey Sadler was posthumously promoted to Lieutenant.

BCFD Highlights

Entry Dates	11/13/2006 (FA)
Assignment dates	5/13/2007 (Engine 35)
Transfer dates	7/5/2007 (Engine 36)
Approval Dates (PO)	6/1/2008
Transfer dates	7/22/2009 (Engine 14)
Approval Dates (Acting Lieutenant)	6/10/2010
1 st Acting Lieutenant	7/21/2015
Promotion dates - FFPM	FFPM - 11/25/2009
Promotion dates - Lieutenant	Lieutenant 1/24/2022 (posthumous)

Citations and Medals

Certificate of Appreciation	West Baltimore Citizens July 18, 2009
Distinguished Unit Citation	G.O. 53-10 Dwelling Fire - 4408 Adelle Terrace

FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo- Engine Company # 14

Excerpts Memorial Service Remembrance

Kenneth Antonio Lacayo, age 30, of Silver Spring, Maryland passed away on Monday January 24, 2022. Kenneth was born on May 14, 1991, in Washington DC.

Kenneth was a Montgomery County native who graduated from Wheaton High School in 2009. Kenny joined the Wheaton Volunteer Rescue Squad in May of 2011 and steadily advanced through the ranks. He became a firefighter in 2012, a paramedic 2014 and a founding member of the Honor Guard in 2017. Among his many awards, he received the Rescue Squad’s award for Paramedic of the Year in 2016 and was recognized as a top 10 responder in 2015 and 2016. He also received a unit citation in 2018 for his life-saving actions in responding to a pedestrian struck by a car. He joined the Baltimore City Fire Department in October of 2014 and was assigned to Engine 14 on August 4, 2021. His exceptional skills as a firefighter and paramedic were matched by his bright smile and unfailing good nature.



BCFD Highlights

Entry Dates	10/15/2014 - EMS
Assignment dates	5/5/2015 (Medic 22)
Entry Dates	7/12/2017 Suppression
Assignment dates	3/6/2018 (Engine 58)
Transfer dates	8/4/2021 (Engine 14)
Approval Dates (PO)	4/22/2019
Approval Dates (Acting Lieutenant)	3/15/2021
Promotion dates - FFPM	FF/PM 7/12/2017

Board of Inquiry

Board of Inquiry Members

Members of the Baltimore City Fire Department

Battalion Chief Louis R. Lago, Baltimore City Fire Department, Chair

Battalion Chief Jacob VanGelder, Baltimore City Fire Department

Captain Thomas Scott Lake, Baltimore City Fire Department

Captain Michael Winn, Baltimore City Fire Department

Captain Brian Minutoli, Baltimore City Fire Department

Lieutenant Safety Officer Tyuana Spencer, Baltimore City Fire Department

Emergency Vehicle Driver Gerard Smith Jr., Baltimore City Fire Department

Representatives from Surrounding Jurisdictions

Assistant Fire Chief James McClelland Jr., Prince George's County Fire and EMS

Battalion Fire Chief William Simister, District of Columbia Fire and EMS

Battalion Chief Lisa Smeltzer, Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services

Overview

City of Baltimore Profile

Baltimore is a port city located along the Chesapeake Bay in Central Maryland. It is an independent jurisdiction (not located within any county) and is the largest municipality and the cultural center of the State of Maryland. The population of Baltimore City is estimated at 585,708 (April 1st, 2020, US Census Bureau estimate). The city has a total area of 92.1 square miles, of which 80.8 square miles is land and 11.3 square miles is water.

Baltimore City Fire Department Profile

The Baltimore City Fire Department (BCFD) has more than 1600 employees, the majority of whom are assigned to Operations. The Chief of the Fire Department oversees all facets of the Department's Operations. The Executive Assistant Fire Chief is the next line of command, overseeing three Assistant Chiefs. The Assistant Chief of Operations commands Field personnel (suppression and EMS). An on-duty Deputy Chief (Shift Commander) is assigned to each shift, and functions as a city-wide tour commander. Seven on-duty Battalion Chiefs (six in suppression and one in EMS) and members assigned to Telestaff (department staffing) report directly to the Shift Commander. The Shift Commander indirectly supervises the operational activities of 32 engines, 3 squads (rescue engines), 17 trucks, 1 heavy rescue, 2 fire boats, 6 EMS district officers, 21 medic units (ALS), 7 ambulances (BLS)² and various support units.

The Shift Commander responds citywide on all Working Fires, additional alarms, and incidents of an unusual or serious nature (hazardous materials, building collapses, mass casualty incidents, technical rescues, dive rescues, widespread utility outages, extreme weather events, etc.), and assumes command as necessary.

The department is divided into six suppression battalions and one EMS battalion, on four shifts. All field personnel work a schedule that repeats every eight days. The work schedule for suppression is comprised of twenty-four hours on, twenty-four hours off, twenty-four hours on, five days off cycle. The work schedule for EMS is comprised of a 4-days on, 4-days-off rotation, where the first two days on are 10-hour day shifts, and the second two days are 14-hour night shifts, which are followed by four days off. Minimum staffing for engines, trucks, squads, and the rescue is four personnel per unit. Minimum on-duty staffing for the department is 292 members per shift.

² Medic unit is an advance life support transport unit staffed with a least one paramedic. The Ambulance is a basic life support transport unit staffed with two Emergency Medical Technicians.

Experience and Training

The Baltimore City Fire Department currently requires all firefighters to complete a basic 22-week firefighting training program which includes Maryland Certification Emergency Medical Technician (EMTB), Firefighter I, and Firefighter II, Rescue Technician, Hazmat Technician, and Emergency Vehicle Operator. The personnel involved in this incident had various degrees of training determined by the time that they entered the Department. In 1997, the department created a Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Program. These recruits were required to be cross trained in all aspects of the fire service. This included the completion of advanced life support certification as a Cardiac Rescue Technician, Emergency Vehicle Operator Class, Hazardous Material Operations, Hazardous Material Technician Training, Aerial Operations, Pump Operator Training, Sprinkler, and Arson Detection Training.

Incident Commander (Battalion Chief 3)

Battalion Chief 3 has approximately 28 years of experience as a professional firefighter. He entered the Fire Academy on February 22, 1994, was promoted to Emergency Vehicle Driver on April 14, 1999, promoted to Lieutenant on January 1, 2003, was promoted to Captain on March 7, 2007, and promoted to Battalion Chief on July 1, 2015. He academically achieved an associate degree in Fire Science and a bachelor's degree in Emergency Management. He has completed Emergency Management Training (FEMA) in ICS 100, 200, 700, and 800. He attended the University of Maryland, Maryland Fire, and Rescue Institute, completing courses in Nuclear Biological Chemical Awareness, Instructor I, Incident Safety Officer, Command and General Staff Functions in the Incident Command System, Incident Leadership, and All-Hazards Incident Management Team (FEMA Level III).

Incident Commander (Car 5)

The Deputy Chief/Shift Commander has 28 years of experience as a professional firefighter. He entered the Fire Academy on March 15, 1993, promoted to Pump Operator on June 28, 1995, promoted to Lieutenant on July 1, 1999, promoted to Captain on August 31, 2005, promoted to Battalion Chief June 17, 2015, and Deputy Chief/Shift Commander February 5, 2020. He is trained through the University of Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute in Essentials of Firefighting I-IV Equivalency, Command and General Staff Functions in the Incident Command System and Fire Safety Officer.

Initial Incident Safety Officer (Battalion Chief 6)

Battalion Chief 6 has over 34 years of experience as a professional fire fighter. He entered the Fire Academy on July 20, 1987, promoted to Lieutenant on July 1, 1992, Promoted to Captain July 17, 2002, and Battalion Chief on April 13, 2011. He has training and certification through the University of Maryland, Maryland Fire Rescue Institute, including Fire Officer I, Hazardous Material Operations and Technician, Fire Department Safety Officer, Incident Safety Officer, Firefighter Survival and Rescue, Trench Rescue, Petroleum Tank Emergencies, Rescue Technician and National Incident Management Systems 100, 200, 300.

Lieutenant Paul Butrim

The Lieutenant of Truck 23, Paul Butrim, had approximately 16 years of experience as a professional firefighter. He entered the Fire Academy on September 19, 2005. Lieutenant Butrim was part of the Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Program. He was promoted to Lieutenant on November 4, 2016. Lieutenant Butrim has training through University of Maryland, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, including Firefighter I and II, Fire Officer I, Instructor I, Rescue Technician Site Operations and Vehicle and Machinery Rescue, Pump Operator, Emergency Vehicle Operator, and Aerial Apparatus Operator.

Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler

The officer of the first arriving unit, Engine 14, Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler, had approximately 15 years of experience as a professional firefighter. She entered the Fire Academy on November 13, 2006. Upon graduation she was assigned to Engine 35. Firefighter Sadler was part of the Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Program. Firefighter Sadler has extensive training from the University of Maryland Fire Rescue Institute. She has Firefighter I and II, Hazardous Materials Awareness and Operations, Rescue Technician Site Operations and Vehicle and Machinery Rescue, Truck Company Fireground Operations, Engine Company Fireground Operations, Pump Operator, Aerial Apparatus Operator, Emergency Vehicle Operator, Instructor I and Fire Officer I. On February 13, 2010, she transferred to Engine 14, and was elevated to the senior member on the shift, designated as the 1st Acting Lieutenant. This position is the senior firefighter on the shift and will be first to act Lieutenant when an officer is not assigned to the position.

FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo

The pipe firefighter on Engine 14, Kenneth Lacayo, had approximately 7 years of experience as a professional firefighter. He entered the Fire Department on October 15, 2014, as a Paramedic. He attended the Fire Academy and trained under the University of Maryland, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, in Firefighter I and II, Emergency Vehicle Operator, and Rescue Technician: Site Operations and Vehicle and Machinery Extrication. Additional Training from University of Maryland, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute, including Protective Envelope Foam, Hazardous Materials Operations, Public Safety Life and Safety Educator I, Firefighter Survival and Rescue, and Fire Officer I.

EMT/FF John McMaster

The lead-off firefighter on Engine 14, John McMaster has approximately 6 years of experience as a professional fire fighter. He entered the Fire Academy on September 23, 2015. He received training from the University of Maryland, Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute including Firefighter I and II, Emergency Vehicle Operator, Hazardous Materials Operations, Public Fire and Life Safety Educator I, Fire Officer I, Instructor I, and Firefighter Survival and Rescue.

Neighborhood Profile

Demographics

New Southwest/Mount Clare is one of the most impoverished neighborhoods in the City of Baltimore, with a poverty rate of more than double the 20% average of the city. Census tract 1903 which includes the Mount Clare neighborhood reports a population of 2,047 for the year 2020. Its racial make-up is primarily black at 65% with 30% white and 4% Asian reported. 51% of people survive below the poverty line with an average per capita income of just \$12,926 and a median household income of \$14,269. 71% percent of the children in the area are listed as impoverished. Only 54% of residents, 25 years and over, reported having graduated high school. (U.S. Census)

History

The Mount Clare neighborhood sits on land that was originally part of an 800-acre plantation owned by Charles Carroll, called Georgia Plantation. The Plantation was purchased in the early 1700's and primarily produced fruit, wheat, and tobacco. Portions of the property were used to form the Baltimore Iron Works which produced pots and skillets. In 1828 property was donated to the B&O Railroad for Mount Clare Station which would be positioned along a rail line from Baltimore to Washington D.C. mountclare.org

By the mid 1800's Mount Clare and the surrounding area were heavily industrialized requiring housing for workers. The row homes in Mount Clare were originally built during the early-mid nineteenth century to accommodate this labor force that was responsible for establishing, supporting, and working in the rapidly growing industry of the first commercial railroad in America. Mount Clare has historically been a working-class immigrant community with Germans being the largest portion. *Southwest Partnership*

From the mid 1800's to 1946 the population continued to grow due to the industrialization of the city and surrounding area bringing in many Irish families who worked on the expansion of the B&O Railroad. The start of World War 2 and the need for new workers, brought migration to Baltimore from rural areas as people sought good paying jobs. Mount Clare became an area settled by poor people from Appalachia who were seeking higher wages. As the closest industrialized city east of the Shenandoah from West Virginia, it was a logical first choice for these people (Simmon, 2013).

The influx of so many poor Appalachians toward the end of the war began to destabilize Mt Clare and some neighborhoods in the southwest portion of the city. The last years of World War 2 can be noted as the beginning of the decline of Mt Clare and the surrounding neighborhoods.

Post war suburbanization started a Citywide population loss that has not abated. With a peak population of 949,700 in 1950. The city recorded a loss of 10,000 residents during the latter part of that decade. The 1960's and especially the '68 riots accelerated this loss with 35,000 residents leaving in that decade. This loss and a newly completed beltway (1962) caused business and factories to follow their employees and customers to Baltimore County and surrounding areas, leaving sprawling factories and shopping districts vacant.

By the late 1980's Baltimore had lost more than a third of its peak population and had gone from the 6th largest U.S. city by population to the 30th. This created a strain on the City's shrunken tax base to maintain basic services. Poverty, drug abuse, homelessness, and crime, which included a surge in arson, began to take their toll. Neighborhoods, such as Mount Clare in the southwest section of the city were hit hard. *U.S. Census Bureau*

The 1990's brought limited revitalization to the area east of Mount Clare, with the development of Oriole Park at Camden Yards (1992) and then the construction of M & T Bank Stadium (1998) home of the Baltimore Ravens. The stock market severely declined in the early 2000's and brought a cancellation of new luxury townhomes and a loss of hope for any revitalization. Eventually, the projects resumed with much of the development occurring on the east side of the stadiums and in Mount Clare's sister neighborhood, Pigtown. The separation of the stadiums, along with the main throughway, Martin Luther King Boulevard, seem to detach the Mount Clare area from new development.

References

<https://swpbal.org/neighborhoods/mount-clare/>

https://www.mountclare.org/history/industry_baltcompany.html

The Corner; A year in the life of a city neighborhood David Simon

205 S. Stricker Street is found within the historic Mount Clare neighborhood of Baltimore City. This neighborhood is situated in the southwest portion of the city and is included in the 21223-zip code. It is bordered by S. Carey St. to the east, Carroll Park to the south, Fulton Ave. to the west and Pratt St. to the north. It is considered a sister neighborhood to Carroll Ridge, Pigtown, Booth-Boyd, Union Square, and Poppleton. Fire protection for Mount Clare is primarily provided by Engine 55, Engine 14, and Truck 23.

Vacant Buildings

The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that vacant buildings account for over half of all buildings in the City of Baltimore. Many have been empty and open to the elements for decades. It is not uncommon for multiple fires to take place in the same building creating dangerous conditions and collapses. Information obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau reports 547 vacant buildings in the Mount Clare area. The City of Baltimore uses a different classification system and lists only 265 vacant properties via OpenData.com.



Figure 1 Block of vacant row homes in West Baltimore (BCFD Member)

Location of Vacant Buildings in New Southwest




Figure 2 Data courtesy of <https://data.baltimorecity.gov/>



Figure 3 Example of previously burned vacants (BOI)



Figure 4 Appears vacant but is occupied (BOI)

Arson/Incendiary

The City of Baltimore suffers from an arson/incendiary fire problem. Both terms classify fires that are intentionally started; however, arson requires proven criminal intent. This issue is compounded by the high number of vacant structures. Vacant buildings burn in the City of Baltimore at twice the national average, with many of the buildings being host to repeated fires. The Baltimore Sun reported that between 2017 and 2022 there were ninety-five reported instances of repeat fires in vacant buildings, some addresses listing as many as four different fires. The City of Baltimore's definition of "vacant" buildings, as well as inconsistent data collection methods, leads to underreporting or misclassification of fires that are marked as "trash" or left "undetermined". It is believed that most fires in vacant buildings are intentionally set, as these buildings have no operating systems to fail, and acts of nature can be ruled out. These vacant properties are commonly used for drug activity and are illegally occupied by the homeless who light small fires for heat or cooking. These buildings have little monetary value and safety concerns often prohibit investigative access.




Figure 5 Vacant row home fire in Baltimore (BCFD Member)



Figure 6 Vacant row home fire in Baltimore (BCFD Member)

Baltimore vacant building fires

From Jan. 2017 to mid-March 2022, over 445 building fires were reported for addresses of city vacants. Ten West and Southwest Baltimore neighborhoods accounted for over half of them.



Note: Analysis considered only properties that were on the city's list of registered vacants at the end of the period studied.

Map: Baltimore Sun • Source: Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development • [Get the data](#) • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 7 Green box highlights area surrounding 205 S. Stricker Street (Picture courtesy of Baltimore Sun)³

³ Source: Opilo, Emily and Price, Lilly. “Baltimore’s vacant homes burn at twice the national rate, but gaps in records, systems limit what firefighters know before going inside.” *Baltimore Sun*, 15 June, 2022, <https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-ci-baltimore-vacant-fires-20220615-gxr53pj5sfdqzlewum6dzkmaeu-story.html>.

Incidences of Arson in Baltimore City

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Jan	17	12	6	5	8	7
Feb	19	12	4	7	5	9
Mar	19	12	14	11	8	6
Apr	27	13	6	5	9	11
May	25	9	12	8	9	
Jun	29	9	9	14	9	
Jul	20	9	9	4	5	
Aug	25	10	10	7	7	
Sep	22	8	8	13	14	
Oct	12	12	7	14	17	
Nov	18	9	7	6	13	
Dec	12	7	17	7	9	

Figure 8 Data provided by BCFD IT

FIB Cause Analysis Zip Code 21223




Figure 9 Data provided by BCFD IT

Fire Dept Activity

Data pertaining to responses is collected and can be sorted in several different ways. Below is a sample of fire department activity and is shown by neighborhood.




Figure 10 Data provided by BCFD IT



Figure 11 Vacant fire Engine 14's area (BCFD Member)

Code X-Ray

Pilot Program

On November 30th, 2010, Departmental Order 102-10 created a pilot program to mark vacant buildings that are unsafe for interior firefighting:

BALTIMORE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT	Departmental Order 102-10
Subject: Marking Unsafe Vacant Buildings	November 30, 2010

Subject: Fire Fighters Safety: Marking Unsafe Vacant Buildings

OVERVIEW

The purpose of this program is to reduce the risk of Fire Fighters from injury and death posed by a serious known threat: Unsafe Vacant Buildings.

The Fire Department shall attach temporary placards to mark vacant buildings that are unsafe for interior fire fighting purposes. The placards shall be attached to the **front and rear** of these structures in accordance with guidelines that are being provided with the materials to be used for installation. Note that spray painting of brick and formstone exterior walls or any other practice that defaces the appearance of a structure is not authorized.

Units are to report the addresses of where each placard was installed in the format and on the form that will be provided.

OPERATIONS

Units responding to fires in buildings with the "X" placard displayed on front or rear shall call in on the appropriate tactical talkgroup the following: **"CODE X-RAY."** Fire Communications shall sound the intermittent tone signal (Tone Signal 3) followed by the announcement:

"On Box Engine 1 reports Code X-Ray"

Fire Communications may also alert responding units that a building is a "Code X-Ray" when information is provided from a data base or premise file in CAD.

Units are to use **Exterior Operations Only** unless otherwise directed by the Incident Commander. The use of this mode of tactical operation may require the use of large hand lines, master streams and extreme methods of ventilation. Exposure protection and anticipating collapse should be factored into size-up, developing strategy, objectives and tactics.

PILOT PROGRAM

This program shall be piloted in designated areas in the Second and Third Battalions beginning December 6, 2010.

Source: Suggestions from members and Fire Service Best Practices for Safety	By order, Donald W. Heinbuch, Assistant Chief - Operations
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The temporary placards, referenced in the document above, were red in color and constructed of corrugated plastic. White reflective tape was used to create a large X across the surface of the placard. These placards were consistent with International Fire Code to indicate a dangerous structure. Companies utilized staples, nails, and/or screws to attach the placards to the buildings that they determined to be unsafe.



Figure 12 Example of temporary Code X-Ray placard attached to the rear of a dwelling (BCFD Member)

The BOI could find very little written information pertaining to the guidelines for the Code X-Ray pilot program. The availability of signs to post on unsafe buildings decreased quickly after D.O. 102-10 was released. By April 21, 2011, according to Operations Memo 07-11, the Department was attempting to identify funding sources to procure additional signs. The BOI discovered that a draft policy and procedure was created in 2013, however, it was never officially implemented.



Operations

**Baltimore City Fire Department
Operations Memo**

**No. 07-11
April 21, 2011**



From: Donald W. Heinbuch, Assistant Chief of Operations
To: Operations
Subject: Windshield Damage, Hose Test, Code X-Ray

WINDSHIELD DAMAGE

Helmets, clipboards, map books, and other items are NOT to be carried on the dash. Officers shall take immediate steps to remove such items which have caused damage to windshields and could become missiles in the event of accident.

TESTING HOSE

Hose testing shall resume.

Code X-Ray

Signs will be provided as funding sources are identified. Revised guidelines will be provided.



Assistant Chief - Operations

Even though signs were not readily available for posting, the pilot program was never officially shuttered. Therefore, members in the field continued to use the term, "Code X-Ray" when referring to an unsafe vacant building. Fire Communications Bureau also continued to acknowledge the Code X-Ray designation and made the "Exterior Operations Only" announcement.

Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) and Mobile Data Terminal (MDT)

Every address in the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) program has a premise file attached. The premise file contains specific information for that address. Fire Communications Bureau will enter any premise information that they receive into the CAD. Code X-Ray information that was entered in a premise file remains there unless it is deleted. If available, premise information would appear on the dispatch screen of the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) in the unit. However, the location of the premise information on the dispatch screen was not quickly identifiable and easily missed.

There is no evidence that 205 S. Stricker Street was ever designated as a Code X-Ray during the pilot program. Therefore, there was no information in the premise file.

CAD creates a separate file for every incident. An incident file is different than a premise file. Notes or comments made during an incident are saved in the incident file, but they are not automatically saved in the premise file. Therefore, a unit may have reported dangerous conditions during their final incident disposition report, such as a complete burn-out or collapse, but that information was not entered into the premise file for the address. In addition, information from old incident files is not listed on the dispatch screen of the MDT.

In the case of 205 S. Stricker Street, the Mayday, collapse of the second floor, and request for a building inspector from the previous fires in 2015 and 2016 were noted in the incident files, but were not integrated into the premise file.

205 S. Stricker Street

On the morning of January 24, 2022, the dispatch screen on the MDT did not provide any information about 205 S. Stricker Street being an unsafe vacant building. There was also no visible indicator on the building at the time of the fire.

Structure

The fire building was a three-story, brick, single family, vacant residential row house. There were three floors above ground level with approximately 1,570 square feet of living space and one floor below grade. It was located on the east side of S. Stricker Street, comprising of twelve attached row houses that spanned a city block. The fire building was positioned between 203 S. Stricker Street, a boarded vacant, and 207 S. Stricker Street, which was occupied. The structure was originally the third building from the north side of the continuous row of similar style buildings. The first building on the block, 201 S. Stricker Street, reportedly collapsed in 1997.⁴




Figure 13 Google Map aerial view of 200 block of S. Stricker Street (Google Maps)

Built in the late 1800's, the structure was of ordinary construction (NFPA 220 *Standard on Types of Building Construction* Section 4.1.1 Type III)⁵. It was three stories in height, approximately twenty-nine (29') feet. The interior of the structure was approximately thirteen feet six inches (13'-06") wide (Side Bravo to Side Delta) and twenty-six feet six inches (26'-06") deep (Side Alpha to Side Charlie). There

⁴ Information regarding the structure including diagrams was obtained from ATF and NIOSH.

⁵ Ordinary construction is designed with non-combustible exterior walls and combustible interior walls.

was a one-story kitchen “bump out” on Side Charlie, which was nine feet (9’) wide by twelve feet (12’) deep. The structure had an addition attached to Side Charlie nine feet wide by nine feet deep (9’-9’).




Figure 14 Diagram courtesy of ATF

The exterior of Side Alpha was a masonry brick front façade with a form-stone covering.⁶ The exterior of Side Charlie was masonry brick façade with a cement parging.⁷ The exterior walls of Side Bravo and Side Delta were masonry brick load bearing party walls. Typically, party walls⁸ contain two or three wythes of brick. However, the party walls that separated the adjacent structures on Side Bravo and Side Delta contained only one wythe of brick. The structure contained a flat roof, sloped from Side

⁶ The artificial stone swept through many working-class Baltimore neighborhoods in the post-World War II years. The brand Formstone was patented by Baltimorean L. Albert Knight in 1937. Formstone was meant to be a maintenance-free alternative to the low-quality brick that many early Baltimore rowhouses were constructed with. Formstone is applied in three layers, anchored by a perforated metal lath attached to the underlying brick with nails. Galvanized mesh was used in many instances to reduce the likelihood of rusting. The three layers are cement-based concrete. The first layer of cement mortar is 3/8” to 3/4” thick and it is scored before it dries. The second layer is between 1/4” and 3/8” thick. The top layer, or finish layer, is also between 1/4” and 3/8” thick and is applied while the second layer is still plastic. While the finish layer is still wet, it is hand-sculpted into the shape of stones. The finish layer contains the coloration used to imitate stone and is textured using waxed paper and an aluminum roller.

⁷ Parging is a construction technique used to finish the surface of a masonry wall. It is similar to stucco, but uses a masonry-based mortar rather than a traditional stucco mixture.

⁸ A party wall is a dividing wall shared by two buildings. The party wall in row homes are typically made of brick, load bearing, and support floor and roof joist.

Alpha downwards to Side Charlie. The roof assembly consisted of two (2) layers of mineral/tar paper over underlayment paper covering one-half inch by twelve inch (1/2" x 12") solid wood decking on three and one-half inch by four inch (3 1/2" x 4") solid wood roof joists. The roof joists spanned from Side Alpha to Side Charlie and were spaced anywhere between twenty-two inches to twenty-six inches (22" to 26") on center.

The roof assembly over the Side Charlie bump-out and Side Charlie addition was built up over the years and consisted of a rubber membrane over metal (tin) roof panels on wood strips over tar/pitch on asphalt paper over solid wood decking and solid wood joists.

In the center of the roof there was a roof scuttle, that was opened during a fire in 2015. The scuttle appeared to be left open throughout the years, allowing the elements to enter the structure. The exposure to the elements added to the deterioration of the interior of the structure.

The interior of the structure contained three inch by seven and 3/4 inch (3" x 7 3/4") Southern Yellow Pine solid pocket-floor joists, with "fire cuts"⁹ that spanned between the Side Bravo and Side Delta. The finishing on the interior flooring consisted primarily of vinyl, linoleum, or asbestos tile; or carpet over luan plywood underlayment on wooden tongue-and-groove decking. Some areas had a second installation of tile and luan plywood over the original assembly. The basement floor was poured concrete and the crawlspace floor beneath the Side Charlie kitchen "bump-out" was dirt.



Figure 15 Example of joist pocket from 205 S. Stricker Street (BCFD Member)




Figure 16 Example of fire cut from 205 S. Stricker Street (FIB)

⁹ Fire Cut is a diagonal cut along the end of a joist or beam where it enters a masonry wall. If the joist burns through the fire cut allows the joist to slide out of the wall pocket and prevents the joist from damaging or collapsing the wall. A joist pocket is an opening in the masonry wall to allow the joist to be positioned inside the opening. The joist is supported by the masonry wall.



Figure 17 Diagram Courtesy of ATF

Owners claimed that the foundation of 205 S. Stricker Street was affected by the collapse that occurred to 201 S. Stricker Street in 1997¹⁰. It was noted that the fire building contained unusual structural components that may indicate an attempt to improve stability. There was a steel I-beam extending across Side Charlie of the building, which tied into the Side Bravo and Side Delta brick walls. There was CMU¹¹ block along the Side Charlie wall that replaced the poured concrete foundation. (see Appendix #34)

¹⁰ Source: Fenton, Justin. “Family that owns home where firefighters died speaks out for first time, illustrates city’s challenges with vacants.” *Baltimore Sun*, 17 Feb. 2022 <https://www.thebaltimorebanner.com/community/housing/family-that-owns-home-where-firefighters-died-speaks-out-for-first-time-illustrates-citys-challenges-with-vacants-KVGLHYS3CRGSBIRLI6WV7A4NNQ/>

¹¹ CMU concrete masonry unit, made of Portland cement and aggregate, usually sand and fine gravel. CMU blocks are typically 16 inches (410 mm) long and 8 inches (200 mm) wide. Common component for constructing load-bearing walls.



Figure 18 Steel I-beam running across Charlie Side rear wall (FIB)



Figure 19 One wythe party wall separating the adjacent structures (FIB)

205 S. STRICKER STREET




Figure 20 Diagram courtesy of ATF



Figure 21 Side Alpha brick façade with a Formstone covering
(Google Maps)



Figure 22 Side Charlie brick façade with cement parging (FIB)




Figure 23 205 South Stricker Street, roof of fire building showing a scuttle opening from previous fire in 2015 (Google Map)

The fire building was vacated by the owners in 2008 and sat unoccupied up until this incident. There were multiple reports of trespassing and vandalism to the home. In 2010, the Baltimore City Housing Department inspected the property. The Code Enforcement Inspector determined the property was unfit for human habitation or other authorized use and declared the building vacant. (See Appendix #33)



Figure 24 205 South Stricker Street December 2007 (Google Maps)




Figure 25 205 South Stricker Street June 2011 (Google Maps)




Figure 26 205 South Stricker Street August 2015 (Google Maps)

On October 28, 2015, a serious fire occurred in the structure. A portion of the second floor, rear bedroom collapsed, which resulted in a Mayday and injured three firefighters.



Figure 27 Fire Building after fire in October 2015 (Stanley Jaworski)

205 S. STRICKER STREET

On March 21, 2016, a second fire occurred at this location. Exterior operations were used to attack the fire that was contained to the rear addition of the structure.



Figure 28 Fire in the Rear Bump Out of 205 South Stricker Street on March 21, 2016 (BCFD Member)



Figure 29 205 South Stricker Street November 2016 (Google Maps)




Figure 30 205 South Stricker Street July 2019 (Google Maps)

Incident Background Information

Inspection Districts

The geographic area protected by the Baltimore City Fire Department is divided into different inspection districts. These differ from box areas. Each suppression unit (Engine, Truck, and Rescue 1) has their own district in which they are responsible for daily activities such as hydrant inspections, building inspections, and home safety inspections.

205 S. Stricker Street falls into the inspection district of Truck Company #23.

Prior to July 2018, home inspections were not documented in an electronic database. In July of 2018, the Baltimore City Fire Department started using the FireRECORDS program to document home inspections.

There is no electronic documentation of any home inspections to 205 S. Stricker Street from July 2018 to present. However, it must be noted that Truck Company # 23 was part of the Mayor's Agency Collaboration Effort (ACE) Initiative that was in effect from approximately November 2017 to January of 2020. During that period, Truck 23's home inspections were focused mainly on the streets within the Southwest grid of the ACE Initiative. 205 S. Stricker Street does not fall within the Southwest grid.

First-Due Response Districts and Box Areas

The geographic area protected by the Baltimore City Fire Department is also divided into different first-due response districts. Generally speaking, response districts are divided according to what firehouse would be "first due" to that area. However, the districting process isn't an exact science. Districts were roughly designed and running routes were not taken into consideration. The first-due districts are then divided up into smaller box areas. Response districts are labeled using the engine company from the firehouse in that district. If no engine is assigned to the firehouse, then the first-due response district and box areas are named after the truck. For example, Truck 20 has a first due district and all box areas within in that district begin with T20-.

Dispatch- Standard versus Routing

The Baltimore City Fire Department Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) uses a Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) program when assigning units to a response. Once an incident is selected by FCB, the CAD program will make two assignment suggestions.

The first suggestion is the "Standard" assignment. This suggestion takes the call type and all available units into consideration, then recommends an assignment based off all units responding from their station to the center point of the box area where the incident is reported.

The second suggestion is based off "routing". All suppression and EMS units in the Baltimore City Fire Department are equipped with Automatic Vehicle Locators (AVL). CAD uses real-time information collected from each unit's AVL, as well as information about response routes, to suggest an assignment based off a unit's location at that moment to the actual incident address.

Water Supply and Fire Hydrants

The primary fire hydrant used during this incident was located on the northwest corner of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street. It is a city hydrant with the hydrant ID of 114C001079. The hydrant is connected to Baltimore City’s public water grid and is supplied by a six-inch cast iron water main that runs east and west through the center of W. Pratt Street.

The last fire department inspection of the hydrant prior to this incident was on October 11, 2021. No issues were reported during that inspection. There have been no issues reported with Hydrant ID 114C001079 since the BCFD first started using the electronic database in the FireRECORDS program to track hydrant inspections. The hydrant was marked as “In-Service” in both the BCFD database as well as the DPW database.




Figure 31 Water Main Grid. (Baltimore City Utility Viewer)

Weather Conditions

Weather Report from Weather.com: Baltimore, Maryland January 24, 2022					
Time	Temp.	Alt.	Wind	Vis.	Cloud Cover
5:54 AM	32.0°F	29.90 inHg	6.90 mph, NW	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Cloudy (6,500 ft)
6:54 AM	30.9°F	29.92 inHg	3.45 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Partly Cloudy (4,700 ft)
7:54 AM	28.9°F	29.94 inHg	0 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Clear (4,900 ft)
8:54 AM	33.1°F	29.94 inHg	5.75 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Clear (4,900 ft)
9:54 AM	35.1°F	29.94 inHg	6.90 mph, NW	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Clear (5,000 ft)
10:54 AM	37.0°F	29.93 inHg	4.60 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Partly Cloudy (25,000 ft)
11:54 AM	36.0°F	29.90 inHg	0 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Partly Cloudy (25,000 ft)
12:54 PM	39.9°F	29.87 inHg	5.75 mph, SW	≥ 10.00 mi	Partly Cloudy (25,000 ft)
1:54 PM	41.0°F	29.85 inHg	6.90 mph	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Cloudy (20,000 ft)
2:54 PM	39.0°F	29.83 inHg	10.4 mph, SE	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Cloudy (20,000 ft)
3:54 PM	37.9°F	29.83 inHg	9.21 mph, SE	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Cloudy (20,000 ft)
4:54 PM	37.0°F	29.84 inHg	9.21 mph, SE	≥ 10.00 mi	Mostly Cloudy (13,000 ft)

Standard First-Alarm Assignment

At the time of the incident, the standard first-alarm assignment for all reported dwelling and building fires (<7 stories) was in accordance with MOP¹² 515-11 *Dispatch Procedures*:

Five (5) Engines

Two (2) Trucks

Two (2) Battalion Chiefs

One (1) EMS unit

*Rescue 1

*Rescue 1 does not respond citywide on all first-alarm assignments. The CAD recommends Rescue 1 on the first-alarm assignment in a pre-determined area based on box areas.

All units dispatched on the first-alarm assignment operate according to the Standard Operating Procedures outlined in the MOP 602 *Fireground Operations* series. (See Appendix #14)

CitiWatch Cameras

CitiWatch is a unit that monitors a network of over seven-hundred CCTV cameras positioned throughout Baltimore City. The center is monitored 24/7 by employees of the Police Department and contractors. Due to staffing, not all cameras are monitored at the same time. The cameras can point, tilt, and zoom. Operators have the ability to take control of a particular camera when needed.

There is a CitiWatch camera located at the intersection of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street. The camera is attached to a streetlight on the southwest corner of the intersection.

The CitiWatch camera rotates around in a clockwise direction, recording as it turns.

The CitiWatch camera captured valuable footage before and after the collapse. However, the camera had rotated away from the building just before the collapse occurred.

¹² MOP – Manual Operation Procedures is the policies and procedures adopted by the Department that provide uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of procedures.

205 S. STRICKER STREET



Figure 32 Street view of CitiWatch camera (Google Maps)




Figure 33 CitiWatch camera location and views (Google Maps)

Incident Review by Board of Inquiry

The Board of Inquiry (BOI) focused on examining all information and facts that were available at the time of the investigation. The BOI's investigation, findings, and recommendations are all based on the information gathered, reported, and verified.

The BOI worked diligently to ensure the accuracy of the information provided by cross-referencing data between different sources. In instances where conflicting information, insufficient information, or differing accounts occurred, the BOI attempted to research and determine what caused the discrepancies. Any information that could not be confirmed was omitted from the report.

During the investigation, the BOI cooperated and shared information with NIOSH, who will complete their own independent report into this incident.

Incident Details and Investigation

All calls made to the Baltimore City 911 Center are answered by a 911 Specialist. Once the 911 Specialist identifies the type of incident, they ask additional questions and enter a call type into the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD).

Fire and EMS related calls entered in the CAD are then dispatched by Baltimore City Fire Department Dispatchers at the Fire Communications Bureau. Fire Department Dispatchers will verify the information entered by the 911 Specialist and dispatch the appropriate units according to the call type entered in CAD.

All Baltimore City Fire Department responses are dispatched on the dispatch channel (A2 Dispatch). Incidents involving more than two suppression units are assigned their own talk group (fire ground channel) to utilize during the incident.

This incident was dispatched on A2 Dispatch. Once the dispatch was completed and units were en route, they switched their radios over to the fire ground channel (Fireground 1- A16) and operated on that channel for the duration of the incident.

The radio system utilized by the Baltimore City Fire Department allows units operating on the fire ground channel to contact Fire Communications Bureau directly on that channel. Fire Communications Bureau has a dispatcher monitoring the fire ground channel and will handle any requests made from the incident.

In addition, any radio within the system can monitor the fire ground channel and hear the incident as it progresses.

When additional units were requested, those units were dispatched on A2 dispatch. The units then followed the same procedure and switched over to the fire ground channel once they were en route.

There were a total of nine (9) phone calls made to the Baltimore City 911 Call Center reporting this fire.

(See chart on next page)

205 S. STRICKER STREET

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CAD NUMBER</u>	<u>OPERATOR</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL COMMENTS (Paraphrase)</u>	<u>LOCATION GIVEN</u>	<u>Box Area of Location Given</u>
5:51:15AM	97	1120	REPORTED BUILDING/STRUCTURE FIRE	I live on 208 S. Norris and its directly behind me. Right there by Mission (Pizza). Burning on the wires.	200 BLK S. Stricker S. Stricker and Pratt	14-30
5:51:49AM	101	1119	REPORTED BUILDING/STRUCTURE FIRE	*Juvenile caller *Language barrier Accident next door. House is on fire.	S. Stricker St./ W. Pratt St.	14-30
5:51:45AM	95	1141	HOUSE ON FIRE	Huge Fire, Electrical Fire. Kids in the House. The building is almost gone and there are kids in the house. 2 stories. 3 kids.	206 S. Norris St.	55-10
5:51:58 AM	*93	1108	HOUSE ON FIRE	Vacant house. People live next door. 2nd Floor. Flames shooting out the windows. Stuff flying everywhere.	201 S. Stricker St.	55-10
5:52:15AM	94	1115	HOUSE ON FIRE	It's on Fire. Real bad	S. Stricker St./ W. Pratt St.	14-30
5:52:56AM	99	1124	REPORTED BUILDING/STRUCTURE FIRE	House on Fire. Vacant house. 3 floors. Boarded up. Fire on 2nd floor but spreading.	200 BLK S. Stricker. Pratt and Stricker	14-30
5:53:10AM (553 not 530)	**96	1107	HOUSE ON FIRE/CORNER	In the rear of the 200 block of S. Norris Street. Sees flames and smoke. 3 stories. 2nd and 3rd floor engulfed in flames	200 S. Calhoun St. Pratt/Calhoun or 1400 BLK W. Pratt	14-31

- CAD screen # 93 was the case used to dispatch the incident.
- CAD screen #96 reported time of 05:30 hours, but it was in fact 05:53 hours.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>CAD NUMBER</u>	<u>OPERATOR</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL COMMENTS (Paraphrase)</u>	<u>LOCATION GIVEN</u>	<u>Box Area of Location Given</u>
5:53:42 AM	102	1112	HOUSE ON FIRE	See flames from top of buildings. See flames and smoke. Embers. Top of the building is lit up. 2-3 floors.	On Stricker. Stricker and Parrish. By Mt. Clare Junction. Look up Ramsay and Parrish St.	14-40
5:54:12AM	98	1115	HOUSE ON FIRE	I work for the Fire Department. I'm on my way home. No idea if anyone is inside. Its fully involved. Let them know it's in both exposures.	S. Stricker St./ W. Pratt St.	14-30

The intersection center of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street creates the boundary line between box areas 55-10, 14-30, and 14-31. Therefore, different box areas were recommended by the CAD for different 911 calls depending on how the location was reported and entered in the system.

CAD screen #96 had a CREATE time of 05:30:55 hours. Originally, there were concerns that a 911 call may have been missed and the incident was not dispatched immediately. The investigation revealed that the incorrect CREATE time was a dispatcher error. The dispatcher who took the 911 call that created CAD screen #96 more than likely failed to close out the previous unrelated 911 call that they handled at 05:30:55 hours properly. Therefore, when the 911 call came in at 05:53:10 hours, the dispatch program used the CREATE time for the previous call. The CitiWatch footage combined with the details provided by the 911 caller reporting, “the whole front of the building is engulfed in flames at the moment,” further supports the fact that this call was made at 05:53:10 hours, not 05:30:55 hours.

CitiWatch Camera

The first documentation of smoke from the building was caught by a CitiWatch camera located on the corner of S. Stricker Street and W. Pratt Street. Due to the time of day, the smoke went unnoticed before the fire was reported.




Figure 34 CitiWatch camera screenshot, smoke visible from Side Alpha prior to arrival of Engine 14

CitiWatch Camera (Approximately 05:51 hours)

This still photo from the CitiWatch camera along with times and information from 911 reports indicate that there was a drastic change in fire conditions at approximately 05:51 hours. One caller stated, “Flames shooting out the windows, and stuff flying everywhere.”

Prior to the arrival of BCFD units, there was a large burst of pressurized smoke followed by a shower of embers that projected from the Side Alpha windows. This was immediately followed by a heavy volume of fire from the second floor, third floor and roof. This occurred approximately four minutes prior to the arrival of the Engine 14.




Figure 35 CitiWatch camera screenshot at approximately 0551 hours

Dispatch (05:53:33 Hours)

1st Alarm Assignment

Assignment	Unit	Dispatch Time	*En route Time
1 st Assigned Engine	Engine 55	0553:33	0553:52
2 nd Assigned Engine	Engine 14	0553:33	0553:55
3 rd Assigned Engine (RIT)	Engine 23	0553:33	0554:39
4 th Assigned Engine	Engine 36	0553:33	0554:18
5 th Assigned Engine	Engine 47	0553:33	0554:29
1 st Assigned Truck	Truck 23	0553:33	0554:15
2 nd Assigned Truck	Truck 10	0553:33	0554:01
1 st Assigned Chief	Battalion Chief 6	0553:33	0555:00
2 nd Assigned Chief	Battalion Chief 3	0553:33	0554:19
EMS Unit	Medic 21	0553:33	0553:39
Additional Units	Rescue 1	0553:33	0554:36

*En route time is based off the time that the “En route” button was depressed on the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) inside of the unit.

Fire Communications Bureau dispatched the box alarm using the Standard Suggestion for Box Area 55-10 consisting of: E55, E14, E23, E36, E47, T23, T10, R1, M21, BC6, BC 3.

The Routing Suggestion for Box Area 55-10 suggested the following units: E14, E55, E23, E36, E30, T23, T10, R1, M21, BC3, BC 6. Although the routing algorithm was not utilized, it does not appear that the order of arrival for the first arriving units would have changed. Units arrived on location to this incident in a similar order that is typically observed on incidents in this immediate area.

All units were in service and in the station at the time of dispatch. The only unit not available for the Standard Recommendation for Box Area 55-10 was Engine 8. On January 24, 2022, Engine 8 had been closed for 11 consecutive days prior due to apparatus issues and a lack of reserve apparatus in the city. Engine 8 would have been assigned 4th due according to the Standard Suggestion for Box Area 55-10 when all units are in service and available.

Units En Route

While units were still en route to the location, Fire Communications Bureau broadcasted an initial update on the fire ground talk group, Fire Ground 1, reporting that they were also receiving 200 S. Calhoun Street and 206 S. Norris Street. A second update from Fire Communications Bureau reported that there were persons trapped at 206 S. Norris Street.

Note: All the radio transcripts provided in table format throughout this report were provided by Fire Communications Bureau.

Fire Communications

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
5:55:00	FCB	UNITS RESPONDING ON BOX ALARM 55-10 also receiving 200 S Calhoun 206 Norris St. Units responding reports of person trapped at 206 Norris St.

First to Arrive (05:55 Hours)

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
5:55:47	E14	E14, HYDRANT, PRATT AND STRICKER

Engine 14 responded from station and approached from the west via W. Pratt Street. Although they were assigned second due, Engine 14 arrived first. They stopped at the hydrant on the northwest corner of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street. EMT/FF John McMaster, Engine 14’s lead off firefighter¹³, exited the engine and proceeded to lead off.

Engine 14 did not announce that they had arrived first and were assuming first due engine responsibilities.

Size-up (05:55 Hours)

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
5:55:55	E14	E14, I’M ON THE SCENE, I GOT A 3 STORY MIDDLE OF THE GROUP FIRE SHOWING 2 ND AND 3 RD FLOOR. MAKE ME COMMAND.

Engine 14’s Pump Operator positioned the apparatus on the southeast corner of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street. The engine was positioned at a slight angle along the curb of the odd side of S. Stricker Street, facing south. The officer in charge of Engine 14, Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler, provided the initial size-up of the building from the front seat of the apparatus and assumed command.

¹³ The lead off firefighter exits the apparatus at the hydrant and is responsible for connecting the 4-inch supply line to the hydrant.




Figure 36 CitiWatch camera view at approximately 0555 hours

FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo, Engine 14's pipe firefighter¹⁴, exited the engine on the driver's side and proceeded to pull the 250 foot 1 ¾ inch cross lay. Meanwhile, Acting Lieutenant Sadler proceeded to the sidewalk to flake out the attack line and don her SCBA.



Figure 37 CitiWatch camera view at approximately 05:55 hours

¹⁴ The pipe firefighter is responsible for advancing and operating the nozzle on attack line.

The Lieutenant, who worked on Engine 14 the night before the incident and had been relieved only a few minutes prior to the box alarm, responded on Engine 14 as an extra person riding in the jump seat. He was not included in Engine 14's crew accountability. The Lieutenant was in full PPE when he exited the apparatus. However, he did not have a portable radio. He proceeded to use Engine 14's Dewalt angle grinder, with a wood blade attached, to remove the plywood from the front door of the fire building.




Figure 38 Off-duty Lieutenant from Engine 14 cuts plywood from front door (BCFD Member)

After the plywood was removed from the front door, significant fire conditions were present on all three floors. Engine 14 proceeded with an interior attack.

Note: Figure 35 shows existing cornice damage to the roof of the Side Bravo exposure building. This was an indicator of the previous fire(s).

Arrival of Additional Units, Transfer of Command, Initial Firefighting Operations (05:56-06:00 Hours)

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
5:56:07	E55	E55, HYD STRICKER AND MCHENRY
5:56:10	FCB	UNITS ON BOX ALARM 55- E14 ON THE SCENE 3 STORY MIDDLE OF THE GROUP FIRE SHOWING 2ND 3RD FLOOR E14 S STRICKER ST COMMAND
5:56:32	T10	T10 ON SCENE ASSUMING 1ST TRUCK. DISREGARD THAT
5:56:39	BC3	BC3 ON LOCATION SAFETY
5:56:45	FCB	BC3 ON SCENE SAFETY, 05:56
5:56:55	BC3	IS BC6 ON LOCATION?
5:57:00	FCB	THAT'S NEGATIVE, HE HASN'T CALLED IN YET
5:57:00	T10	T10, FIRE SHOWING ALL 3 FLOORS IN THE REAR
5:57:05	BC3	OK GO AHEAD AND MAKE BC3 COMMAND UNTIL BC6 SHOWS UP, 3 STY MOG FIRE SHOWING ALL 3 FLOORS, GO AHEAD AND MAKE THIS A WORKING FIRE
5:57:20	FCB	UNITS ON BOX ALARM 55-10 BC3 ON SCENE FIRE SHOWING ALL 3 FLOORS, BC3 WILL ASSUME COMMAND UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF BC6, WORKING FIRE 05:57
5:57:37	E36	E36, I GOT 14'S PLUG
5:57:45	T10- P1	10 TO COMMAND LOOKS LIKE EXTENSION BOTH WAYS CHARLIE SIDE
5:57:53	SO2	SO2, I'M ENROUTE
5:58:04	DC3	CAR5 ENROUTE
5:58:10	BC3	COMMAND COPIES, UNIT IN THE REAR YOU HAVE A LINE IN SERVICE? IF YOU DO GO AHEAD AND OPEN UP ON THAT BRAVO EXPOSURE
5:58:23	E55- P1	55 I COPY
5:58:27	BC3	WE DON'T HAVE ANYBODY IN THAT BRAVO EXPOSURE YET. COMMAND TO 23 MAKE SURE WE GOT EVERYBODY OUT OF DELTA EXPOSURE, COMMAND UPDATE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING APPEARS TO BE VACANT; DELTA EXPOSURE IS OCCUPIED I'M GONNA GET UNITS TO SEARCH THAT NOW
5:58:52	E36	36 CHARGE THE SECOND LINE
5:59:07	BC3	COMMMAND TO UNITS OPERATING IN THE BACK I HAVE UNITS GOING IN THE FRONT I DON'T WANT ANY LINES OR WATER GOING IN THE CHARLIE SIDE OF THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING IF YOU ARE OPERATING IN THE REAR, I WANT YOU TO PUT WATER ON THE BRAVO EXPOSURE
5:59:25	T10- P1	T10 TO COMMAND WE COPY THAT NOBODY IS GOING IN THE REAR OF THE

205 S. STRICKER STREET

		ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING WITH A HAND LINE
5:59:32	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND WORKING FIRE UNITS ARE E30 M12 E13 T8
		SO2 CAR5 FIB
5:59:43	BC3	COMMAND COPY, COMMAND TO T8 UPON ARRIVAL I WANT YOU TO ENTER THE BRAVO
		EXPOSURE CHECK FOR EXTENSION, COMMAND TO T23 I NEED THAT ROOF OPENED UP
6:00:03	E36-P1	E36 to 14.....CHARGE THE SECOND LINE
6:00:20	BC6	BC6 ON THE SCENE ASSUMING SAFETY
6:00:29	FCB	BC6 ON THE SCENE ASSUMING SAFETY 600 HOURS

The remaining first alarm units continued to arrive on scene. Truck 10 arrived from the west via W. Pratt Street. Initially, Truck 10 began to make the right hand turn onto S. Stricker Street as the officer in charge reported on Fire Ground 1 that they were going to assume the first-due truck position. However, the driver and officer of Truck 10 then saw Engine 55 and Truck 23 arriving on location from the opposite end of the street at the intersection of McHenry Street and S. Stricker Street. They decided to continue to their original assignment on Side Charlie.

At 05:56 hours, Battalion Chief 3 arrived from the west via W. Pratt Street and parked facing west on Pratt Street on the southwest corner of W. Pratt Street and S. Stricker Street. Battalion Chief 3 initially designated himself Incident Safety Officer in accordance with the initial dispatch. He then made an inquiry to Fire Communications Bureau to determine if Battalion Chief 6 was on the scene. Once he received a response that Battalion Chief 6 had not arrived, he assumed Command “until Battalion Chief 6 shows up”. He gave a size-up and upgraded the incident to a Working Fire¹⁵ at 05:57:05 hours. No staging area was identified. The planned transfer of command to the first assigned battalion chief, Battalion Chief 6, never occurred due to the severity of the incident and the ensuing collapse and Mayday.

¹⁵ Working Fire indicates the incident is escalating. All personnel on the 1st alarm will be engaged for 30 minutes or longer and additional units are needed. Units dispatched are one engine, one truck, AIRFLEX unit, CAR 5, FIB, and Safety Officer.




Figure 39 CitiWatch camera view of Battalion Chief 3 exiting his vehicle

Battalion Chief 3 positioned himself in front of the building so he could have a clear view of the dwelling. However, no official command post location was identified or announced.

The span of control for the Incident Commander at this time was ten units (5 Engines, 2 Trucks, 1 Rescue, Battalion Chief, and a Medic Unit).

AIRFLEX 1¹⁶ was dispatched at 05:56:19 hours.

The Working Fire Assignment was dispatched at 05:57:32 hours. Fire Communications Bureau dispatched Engine 30, Medic 12, Engine 13, Truck 8, Safety Officer 2, Car 5 (on-duty Shift Commander), Fire Investigation Bureau (FIB) on the Working Fire Assignment. This is not the standard assignment for a Working Fire Dispatch. It is unclear why FCB dispatched the additional units.

Truck 10 proceeded east on W. Pratt Street and made a right hand turn into a parking lot adjacent to Side Charlie. From that vantage point, and while still in the unit, the Lieutenant of Truck 10 gave his size-up reporting fire showing from all three floors in the rear.

¹⁶ There are two first-line AIRFLEX units that provide city-wide coverage. The term AIRFLEX is derived from the three primary operational components: Air cascade system and spare air cylinders; Floodlights, light tower, electrical power generation; Hi-expansion foam generators and supply of hi-expansion foam concentrate.



Figure 40 Conditions on Side Charlie upon Truck 10's arrival (BCFD Member)

Truck 10 had a fifth member riding on the truck during the previous evening's shift.¹⁷ This member was still riding on the truck when the incident was dispatched and operated as an additional firefighter. Once in position, the members began raising ground ladders to the exposures while the officer proceeded to the rear of the fire building to continue his size-up. Fire was extending to both exposures. 203 S. Stricker Street was the Bravo Exposure that was vacant and had prior damage from the 2015 fire. 207 S. Stricker Street was the Delta Exposure and was occupied at the time of the fire.

Engine 55 called in the hydrant at McHenry Street and S. Stricker Street. The members of Engine 55 proceeded to stretch their 400-foot 1 ¾ inch pre-connect across a vacant lot and down the alley to Side Charlie. Meanwhile, Truck 23 positioned their apparatus just short of the fire building facing north on S. Stricker Street and performed the duties of the 1st due truck.

¹⁷ Due to apparatus and staffing issues, the Department sometimes had additional personnel during a shift. When available, the extra personnel are placed on Truck 1 and Truck 10 to ride as a 5th member.




Figure 41 Members preparing to enter Side Alpha (BCFD Member)

FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo E-14 initiated a fire attack on the first floor from the base of the front steps using the reach of the stream to extinguish most of the visible fire on the first floor prior to entering.




Figure 42 Prior to interior attack (BCFD Member)

Between 05:57 hours and 05:58 hours, FF/PM Lacayo E-14 entered the dwelling through the front door followed by Acting Lieutenant Sadler E-14 and Lieutenant Paul Butrim T-23. EMT/FF John McMaster E-14 also entered the dwelling after donning his SCBA.



Figure 43 Crews enter the dwelling on Side Alpha (BCFD Member)

As Engine 14 entered Side Alpha, the observation from the exterior was that they appeared to be making progress and the fire was being quickly extinguished.

Battalion Chief 6 arrived on location at 05:58:18 hours according to his Mobile Data Terminal (MDT).

At 05:59:32 hours, Fire Communications Bureau provided the Incident Commander with a rundown of the Working Fire Units. No staging area was identified for the Working Fire units. The Incident Commander instructed Truck 8 to gain entry into the Bravo Exposure (203 S. Stricker Street) to check for extension upon their arrival.

Once the Working Fire units arrived, the span of control for the Incident Commander increased to over fifteen units.

Although the incident was expanding, the Department-issued Tactical Worksheet and/or tablet/computer were not being used by the Incident Commander, or any designee, to outline unit assignments, maintain accountability, and assist with transfer of command.





Figure 44 Conditions prior to interior attack (BCFD Member) Figure 45 Conditions after interior attack initiated (BCFD Member)

The crew of Engine 36 stretched a 150 foot 1 ¾ inch back-up line off of Engine 14 to the front door. At 05:58 hours, the officer from Engine 36 called on the radio for the 2nd line to be charged. The back-up line did not get charged right away because the supply line from the hydrant had not been turned on yet.

Initially, there was a 2 ½ inch cap missing from the fire hydrant that Engine 14 led off from. The lead off firefighter from Engine 14 and the Pump Operators from Engine 36 and Engine 14 worked quickly to overcome the problem by using a spare 2 ½ inch nozzle from Engine 14's apparatus before turning the hydrant on.

Between 05:59 hours and 06:00 hours, the pipe and lead off firefighters from Engine 36 were standing just inside the front room of the dwelling waiting for their hose line to be charged. The Lieutenant of Engine 36, who had been behind them flaking out hose, met them at the threshold of the front door. The Lieutenant of Engine 36 stated that he had tried to transmit over his portable radio several times but was unsuccessful as there was too much radio traffic at the time. At 06:00:03 hours, the Lieutenant of Engine 36 keyed up his radio again and requested that the 2nd line be charged. After ensuring he had a water supply coming from the hydrant, the Engine 14 Pump Operator charged the back-up line.

Around this time, it is believed that the pipe firefighter from Engine 14 was positioned close to the base of the staircase that led from the first floor to the second floor. The Acting Lieutenant from Engine 14 was behind him followed by the lead off firefighter from Engine 14. The Lieutenant of Truck 23 was believed to be in the front room closer to Side Delta performing his primary search.

The pipe firefighter from Engine 36 stated in his interview that he realized the dwelling was in poor condition around the same time that the 2nd hose line was charged. The Lieutenant of Engine 36 also

stated that when he got his first view of the inside of the dwelling, he had a gut feeling that something wasn't right.

At 06:00:20 hours, Battalion Chief 6 assumed the role of Incident Safety.

Due to the Incident Commander's proximity to the building, and the heavy radio traffic, the Lieutenant of Engine 36 ran down from the top of the front steps and had a face-to-face conversation with the Incident Commander (Battalion 3). Between 06:00:03 hours and 06:00:33 hours, the Lieutenant of Engine 36 told the Incident Commander to, "Get them out."




Figure 46 Officer of Engine 36 on his way to report interior conditions to the Incident Commander (CitiWatch)



Figure 47 Conversation between Officer of Engine 36 and Incident Commander (CitiWatch)

After the face-to-face conversation, the Lieutenant of Engine 36 turned around and headed back to meet up with his crew at the front door.

Collapse and Mayday (06:00-06:01 Hours)

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:00:33	BC3	BACK OUT..BACK OUT.. BACK OUT.. DO WE HAVE ANYBODY IN THERE?...WE JUST HAD A COLLAPSE...MAYDAY,MAYDAY,MAYDAY
6:00:50	BC6	SAFETY TO COMMAND I'M CHECKING THE REAR NOW
6:00:56	FCB	UNITS RESPONDING ON BOX ALARM 55-10, BC6 REPORTS MAYDAY 6:01
6:01:13	BC6	[BC6-P KEYS UP - UNREADABLE TRANSMISSIONS IN BACKGROUND]
6:01:13	BC3	COMMAND, AT THIS TIME WE HAVE AT LEAST 2 PEOPLE INSIDE THE BUILDING, COMMAND TO ALL UNITS STOP ALL RADIO TRAFFIC ON THE ORIGINAL FIRE GROUND CHANNEL, WE ARE ACTIVATING THE RIT AT THIS TIME
6:01:53	E55-P1	55 CHARGE THAT 4 HUNDRED
6:01:56	BC3	COMMAND TO THE SAFETY OFFICER COME TO THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING
6:02:18	BC6	SAFETY TO COMMAND WORKING ON REAR TRYING TO GET ACCESS TO THE MEMBERS

According to statements made during his interview, the Incident Commander was about to key up his radio and order an evacuation of the fire building immediately after his conversation with the officer from Engine 36.

At some point between 06:00:03 hours and 06:00:32 hours, prior to the Incident Commander being able to announce an evacuation, there was a catastrophic collapse of the interior of the dwelling. The Incident Commander immediately announced the collapse and reported a Mayday at 06:00:33 hours. The Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was activated.




Figure 48 CitiWatch camera view of conditions immediately following collapse

Engine 23, the assigned Rapid Intervention Team, and other members of the 1st alarm units immediately began rescue operations. Two members of Engine 36, pipe and lead off, were quickly removed from the building without injuries. The Incident Commander reported that they had at least two personnel inside the building. It was unknown at the time the extent of the members' entrapment.

At approximately 06:01 hours, Engine 30 and Truck 8, dispatched on the Working Fire, arrived on the scene. The members of Truck 8 reported to the Bravo exposure and began attempts to reach the trapped firefighters from that location. Members of Engine 30 worked with the RIT, removing debris blocking their access on Side Alpha of the building.

The Incident Commander attempted to initiate some of the Mayday procedures listed in Manual of Procedure (MOP) 602-13 *Mayday*, such as gaining control of the radio system and attempting to assign a Rescue Group Supervisor. However, non-emergent radio traffic continued on the fire ground channel and Battalion Chief 6 remained on the Charlie Side of the dwelling. In addition, no Personnel Accountability Report was performed in accordance with the parameters set forth in MOP 602-09 *Personnel Accountability Report (PAR)* and MOP 602-13 *Mayday*. These facts along with interviews and radio logs indicate that the Incident Commander was overwhelmed and had reached task saturation. (See Appendix #20 &17)

Rescue Operations

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:02:18	E23-P1	E23 TO THE REAR..YOU GUYS HAVE ACCESS?
6:02:34	T23-P2	ROOF TO COMMAND I'M GONNA NEED A LINE UP HERE
6:02:37	BC3	OK, COMMAND COPIES..COMMAND DISPATCH AN ADDITIONAL MEDIC, EMS OFFICER AT THIS TIME
6:02:50	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED ADDITIONAL MEDIC EMS OFFICER 6:02
6:02:57	E55-P1	55 CHARGE THAT LINE
6:03:13	BC3	COMMAND CHARLIE SIDE, DO YOU HAVE ACCESS TO THE REAR? I HAVE REPORTS THERE MY BE A MEMBER TRAPPED IN THE REAR
6:03:23	E55-P4	55 CHARGE THE LINE...55 CHARGE THE LINE
6:03:27	BC6	COPY THAT WE ARE WORKING ON TRYING TO GET IN THERE
6:03:32	E55-P2	55 MOBILE TO 55, I AM HAVING PROBLEMS WITH MY PUMP YOU DON'T HAVE WATER RIGHT NOW.
6:03:47	BC3	COMMAND TO E14 DO YOU COPY MY TRANSMISSION?
6:03:56	BC6	CHARLIE TO COMMAND WE HAVE FIRE IN THE BRAVO SIDE NOW UP IN THE 2ND FLOOR REAR, LOOKS LIKE THAT'S VACANT ALSO
6:04:06	BC3	[MIC KEYS UP]
6:04:21	BC6	UNIT SUPPLYING THE REAR I NEED WATER NOW

6:04:32	E55-P2	55 MOBILE TO 55, I GOTTA HAVE 47 HOOK UP MY 400 HUNDRED AND PUMP IT
6:04:39	BC6	COMMAND TO 55 GET WATER IN THAT LINE NOW
6:04:45	BC3	COMMAND TO CHARLIE, DO YOU HAVE ACCESS TO THE REAR ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING?
6:04:52	BC6	I DO WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO GET IN
6:04:56	BC3	OK COPY
6:05:03	T8-P1	T8 TO COMMAND, WE SEE THE MEMBER, THEY HAVE FIRE AROUND THEM
		WE'RE GONNA GET SOME WATER ON THEM, WE ARE TRYING TO GET THEM OUT NOW
6:05:12	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND SEND THE LINE IN THE CHARLIE SIDE WITH ME AND MY MEMBERS
		WE MADE ENTRY DOWN A LADDER
6:05:21	BC3	OK COPY, COMMAND TO THE FIRST MEDIC, I WANT YOU TO REPORT TO THE CHARLIE
		SIDE, APPEARS THEY ARE GOING TO BRING THE MEMBERS OUT THE CHARLIE SIDE
6:05:36	T23-P2	COMMAND FROM ROOF, CAN I GET A WATER CAN OR LINE UP HERE PLEASE
6:05:41	BC3	COMMAND TO CHARLIE, I WANT YOU TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE RESCUE
6:05:59	BC6	COPY
6:06:13	T8-P1	T8 BRAVO EXPOSURE, WE LOCATED THE MEMBER, THEY ARE STILL TRAPPED, THERES
		POSSIBLY 2 MEMBERS INSIDE, WE ARE TRYING TO STILL GAIN ENTRY, WE ARE
		TRYING TO DO IT FROM THE BRAVO EXPOSURE BY BREACHING THE WALL
6:06:31	BC3	OK COPY, AT THIS TIME I THINK THERE ARE 2 MEMBERS FROM E14 STILL INSIDE THE
		ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING
6:06:43	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND GIVE ME A SECOND RIT TEAM IN THE REAR
6:06:50	BC3	OK, I DIDN'T COPY THAT
6:06:57	FCB	REQUESTING SECOND RIT TEAM IN THE REAR

At 06:03:47 hours, the Incident Commander attempted to contact Engine 14 via portable radio with no response. It was later discovered that both the lead off and pipe firefighters from Engine 14 did not have their portable radios with them. Both radios were found in the apparatus.

At 06:05:41 hours, the Incident Commander placed Battalion Chief 6 in charge of the rescue operation.

Members entered the still burning dwelling from Side Alpha to begin searching, unaware of the severity of the collapse and in zero visibility conditions. The massive amounts of debris from the collapse severely hampered interior rescue operations. Large pieces of debris filled the front doorway requiring the members to line up in a bucket brigade to pass debris out of their way. The Incident Commander was attempting to determine access points into the building and the status of trapped members. Members described this point in the incident as hectic, filled with urgency and confusion.

The Captain of Engine 23, operating as RIT, quickly located EMT/FF McMaster. He was found lying on his stomach, pinned by large pieces of burning debris. Simultaneously, Truck 8 entered the Bravo exposure building to locate alternative means of ingress to the trapped members. They initiated a breach in the brick party wall between the two dwellings through a fireplace in the front room. At 06:06 hours,

the Lieutenant of Truck 8 reported, “they located the member (EMT/FF McMaster), and they were breaching the Bravo exposure wall to make entry into the fire building.” This opening placed members in close proximity to EMT/FF McMaster.

As the breach was being opened by Truck 8, members from Truck 10, Engine 55 and Rescue 1 had already entered the original fire building from the Charlie Side. The collapse was so severe on the Charlie Side that there was a significant drop from the threshold of the rear door down to the debris pile. Initially, they attempted to use a sixteen-foot extension ladder to climb down into the rubble. However, the extension ladder was too long. Members retrieved the seven-foot straight ladder from Truck 10’s apparatus and used it to climb down onto the rubble inside. Members began searching for the trapped firefighters in zero visibility. Utilizing the thermal imaging camera, the Lieutenant from Truck 10 quickly recognized the outline of a trapped member. Truck 10 and Rescue 1 worked their way through the burning debris towards the member. When physical contact was made, they were able to determine it was Engine 14’s pipe firefighter, FF/PM Lacayo. Per interviews, FF/PM Lacayo was found in a seated-like position with his legs out in front of him. He was trapped and entangled by the heavy structural components of the building. An immediate request was made for a second RIT Team.

At an undetermined time, and with the success of the first breach, a second breach was created further back in the Bravo Exposure. The second hole provided additional access to the trapped members. In the end, the location of these breaches proved to be instrumental as they were all made in close proximity to EMT/FF McMaster, FF/PM Lacayo, and Acting Lieutenant Sadler.



Figure 49 Breaches in the Bravo exposure wall (BCFD Member)



Figure 50 View of breaches from the Bravo exposure (BCFD Member)

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:07:00	BC3	COMMAND COPIES, STRIKE OUT A 2ND ALARM
6:07:05	FCB	2ND ALARM 6:07
6:07:21	CAR5	CAR5 ON THE SCENE
6:07:25	FCB	CAR5 ON THE SCENE 6:07
6:07:34	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND SEND THE STOKES BASKET CHARLIE SIDE DOWN OUR LADDER
6:07:42	BC3	COMMAND COPY
6:07:52	CAR2	CAR2 YOU CAN PLACE ME ENROUTE
6:07:56	FCB	CAR2 6:07
6:08:03	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND SOMEBODY GRAB THE SAWZALL OFF TRUCK T10 IN THE REAR
		BRING IT DOWN THE LADDER
6:08:12	BC3	OK I GOT THE STOKES BASKET COMING AROUND I STILL CAN'T MAKE OUT WHAT YOU ARE SAYING AGAIN
6:08:18	T10-P1	THROW A SAW IN THE STOKES BASKET
6:08:25	CAR5	CAR5 LETS GET THE COLLAPSE UNIT COMING
6:08:30	T10-P1	T10 THROW THE SAW IN THE STOKES BASKET ALONG WITH THE SPARE RIT AIR CYLINDER
6:08:39	BC6	I HAVE THE STOKES ON ITS WAY IN WORKING ON A SAW
6:08:44	CAR5	CAR5 COMMUNICATIONS, YOU COPY THAT GIVE ME THE COLLAPSE UNIT

6:08:47	FCB	COLLAPSE UNIT 6:08
6:08:50	T8-P1	T8 TO COMMAND WE ARE STILL IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE, LOOKS LIKE THEY ARE TRAPPED BETWEEN THE 1ST AND 2ND FLOORS, THEY ARE ABOUT 10-15 FEET INSIDE THE FRONT DOOR
6:09:02	BC3	OK COPY THAT I HAVE UNITS TRYING TO GET IN THE FRONT DOOR, DO YOU HAVE A LINE WITH YOU?
6:09:09	T8-P1	YES WE HAVE A LINE WITH US, I'LL MAKE A CORRECTION BETWEEN THE 1ST FLOOR AND THE BASEMENT
6:09:18	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND WE GOT E14'S PIPE MAN, HE'S TRAPPED BY A LOT OF DEBRIS, WE ARE TALKING TO HIM, SEND THE RIT AIR CYLINDER TO THE CHARLIE SIDE WITH STOKES AND A SAW, HE'S COVERD UP IN A LOT OF DEBRIS
6:09:38	BC3	OK COPY THAT, I HAVE A STOKES BASKET AROUND THERE, COMMAND TO T8 ASSIST ALSO WITH THE AIR BOTTLE AND HELP THOSE MEMBERS
6:09:55	SO2	SO2 I'M ON THE SCENE AS SAFETY
6:10:00	FCB	SO2 ON THE SCENE, SAFETY 6:10
6:10:04	OEM1	OEM1 ON LOCATION
6:10:08	FCB	OEM1 6:10
6:10:12	DC8	DC8 PUT ME ENROUTE
6:10:16	FCB	DC8 6:10
6:10:29	SO2	SO2 YOU CAN PUT ME ON THE SCENE, I'LL HAVE SAFETY
6:10:35	FCB	SO2 ON SCENE SAFETY 6:10

After Truck 10's request for a second RIT Team, the Incident Commander requested a second alarm at 06:07 hours. No staging area was identified for second alarm companies. At 06:09 hours, the Lieutenant of Truck 10 reported, "We got Engine 14's pipeman, he is trapped by a lot of debris, and we are talking to him."

At 06:08:25 hours, Car 5 was on scene but had not assumed Command. However, he made the request for a collapse response directly to Fire Communications Bureau.

At 06:09:55 hours, Safety Officer 2 announced his arrival and immediately assigned himself "Safety".

At 06:10 hours, the Director of Office of Emergency Management (OEM 1) announced his arrival on scene. In the past, OEM 1 oversaw the Baltimore City Fire Department's Special Operations Command (SOC). OEM 1 was not dispatched on the incident but used his own discretion to respond to the incident from his office.

Deputy Chief 8, from the Office of Fire Investigation and Prevention, called en route to the incident at 06:10 hours on the Fireground channel. He was not dispatched on the incident but used his own discretion to respond.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:10:36	CAR5-P1	CAR5 GO AHEAD MAKE ME COMMAND, BC3 IS GONNA BE OPERATIONS, BC6 GONNA BE SAFETY FOR NOW
6:10:50	FCB	UNITS ON BOX ALARM 55-10 CAR5 ON THE SCENE WILL ASSUME S STRICKER ST COMMAND BC3 WILL BE OPERATIONS BC6 WILL BE SAFETY 6:10
6:11:11	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND, YOUR 2ND ALARM UNITS E2 E58 T16 BC2 PIO OEM10
6:11:29	T16-P1	T16 COMMAND I'M GONNA NEED A LINE DELTA EXPOSURE 1ST FLOOR FIRE IN THE CEILING
6:11:37	BC3	COMMAND COPIES CAN YOU GIVE ME A RUN DOWN ON MY ENGINE COMPANIES AGAIN
6:11:46	T10-P1	T10 TO CHARLIE GET US SOME SPARE AIR BOTTLES SET UP ON THE CHARLIE SIDE OUR MEMBERS ARE GOING TO NEED THEM IN A SECOND
6:11:56	BC3	ALSO OPERATIONS TO COMMAND, WE'RE GONNA... LETS ASK FOR 2 MORE MEDICS

At 06:10:36 hours, Car 5 assumed Incident Command. He then expanded the Incident Command System by making Battalion Chief 3 "Operations". During the transfer of command, Battalion Chief 6 was re-assigned to Safety even though he had been assigned to the Rescue by Battalion Chief 3 previously. Safety Officer 2 arrived on location and announced himself as Safety just prior to Car 5's transmission.

The Aide to Car 5 removed the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) from Car 5's vehicle to utilize in assisting with incident command. However, the MDT battery died almost immediately after it was removed from the docking station rendering it useless.

Battalion Chief 3, now assigned as Operations, continued to refer to himself as "Command" when contacting Fire Communications Bureau. His span of control was still greater than fifteen units.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:12:09	E23-P1	E23 TO COMMAND WE GOT E14 P4, WE ARE REMOVING HIM FROM THE DEBRIS
6:12:09	FCB	2 MORE MEDICS 6:12
6:12:20	BC3	OK UNITS OPERATING THE [BOX] WANT YOU TO OPERATE THAT HAND LINE ON THE 2ND FLOOR
6:12:30	E30-P1	30 ENGINE WE GOT CONTACT WITH THE DOWN MEMBERS MAKING GOOD PROGRESS GETTING THEM OUT NOW, I'LL ADVISE WHEN WE HAVE THEM OUT
6:12:43	T16-P1	16 TO OPERATIONS WE FIRE 2ND FLOOR DELTA EXPOSURE AS WELL
6:12:49	BC3	COMMAND COPIES
6:12:53	SO2	SO2 THERES LIVE WIRES DOWN REAR OF DELTA EXPOSURE, DON'T ENTER THE BACK YARDS
6:13:02	BC3	OPERATIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS, MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT, STAY OUT OF THE REAR YARD ALSO REQUEST BGE ELECTRIC SIDE
6:13:16	FCB	"TONE3" UNITS ON BOX ALARM 55-10 STAY OUT OF THE REAR YARD LIVE WIRES (REPEATS)
6:13:29	BC3	OPERATIONS TO MY FIRST ENGINE COMPANY ON THE SECOND ALARM NED YOU TO

		LEAD OFF FROM THE SOUTH SIDE OF STRICKER ST
6:13:46	T10-P1	T10 TO CHARLIE CAN YOU SEND IN THE ANGLE GRINDER AND THE SAWZALL
		WE HAVE A CHAIN SAW, WE NEED AN ANGLE GRINDER AND A SAWZALL ALSO
		SEND IN THE RIT AIR PACK
6:14:03	E23-P1	E23 TO COMMAND E14 P4 IS BEING REMOVED FROM THE FRONT..BEING REMOVED
6:14:12	BC3	OPERATIONS TO MY 1ST IN ENGINE COMPANY, I NEED YOU TO LEAD OFF FROM THE
		HYDRANT AT MCHENRY AND STRICKER COME UP BEHIND T23, NEED YOU TO ADVANCE
		A
		LINE INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE AND TAKE ANOTHER LINE UP THE LADDER FOR T23
6:14:34	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND, URGENT MESSAGE...SEND IN THE RIT AIR PACK FROM THE TALLEST
		LINE AND THROW US AN ANGLE GRINDER AND A SAWZALL IN THE (UNREADABLE)
	ENTRANCE.....(UNREADABLE)
6:14:51	BC3	COMMAND TO THE MEDIC UNIT COME UP TO THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING
6:14:56	OEM1	OEM1 TO OPERATIONS

Even with members trapped and fire extending into three dwellings, all radio communications for the incident remained on Fire Ground 1. This led to almost constant radio traffic on Fire Ground 1. In several instances, important reports and requests associated with the rescue were followed by units calling en route, radio traffic concerning water supply, and suppression activities in the exposure dwellings. The issue of increased and unnecessary radio traffic was prevalent throughout most of this incident.

Radio data (See Appendix 35) provided the number of times a user attempted to key up on their portable radio but received a busy signal. Between 06:00 hours and 07:00 hours, there were 185 subscriber rejects, meaning that 185 times someone tried to transmit a message but were rejected due to other radio traffic. No transmissions were made or attempted by any of the trapped members.

At 06:12 hours, the Captain of Engine 23 (RIT) made a transmission stating, “We have E14 Portable 4 and we are removing him from the debris.” This was EMT/FF John McMaster, who was located along the Bravo wall a short distance from the front doorway. He was conscious, with no helmet, facing the rear of the building. It was unclear to the BOI if his facepiece and hood were still in place. The members worked quickly, using only their gloved hands to free his arm and legs from the large pieces of burning debris.

The members involved with EMT/FF McMaster’s removal were attempting to pull and drag him out of the rubble by any means possible. The Drager SCBA harness is rated for 750lbs pounds of stress on the top yoke and 600lbs of stress on the handles for pulling and dragging. In EMT/FF McMaster’s case, members were unable to lift him. Members resorted to pulling on the shoulder straps and waist strap of the harness. These forces being exerted on the straps caused them to tear during the rescue efforts. After several attempts, EMT/FF McMaster was pulled free of the debris.

At 06:14 hours, EMT/FF John McMaster was successfully removed through the Alpha Side of the fire building. He was then placed in the care of awaiting BCFD EMS personnel and transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma by Medic 21.



Figure 51 CitiWatch camera view as EMT/FF McMaster is removed from building

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:15:02	T10-P3	WHOEVERS IN THE FRONT WATCH THE LINE
6:15:05	BC3	COMMAND TO T16 HAVE 2 OF YOUR MEMBERS BRING AROUND A STOKES BASKET
6:15:14	T16-P1	16 COPIES, 16-1 TO 16-2 AND 4 CAN YOU HANDLE THAT
6:15:21	BC3	COMMAND TO SAFETY THE MEDIC YOU HAVE ON THE CHARLIE SIDE SEND THEM AROUND TO THE ALPHA SIDE WE BROUGHT THEM BOTH OUT THE FRONT
6:15:32	R1-P1	R1 TO COMMAND GOT ONE MORE OUT WORKING ON GETTING ANOTHER
6:15:37	BC3	OK, COPY
6:15:59	E30-P1	(UNREADABLE)...SIDE ALPHA
6:16:03	BC3	OPERATIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS ALSO MAKE SURE WE HAVE BCEMS
6:16:15	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED BCEMS 6:16
6:16:18	CAR5	COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS GO AHEAD AND STRIKE OUT THE REST OF THE UNITS ON THE COLLAPSE
6:16:27	BC3	OPERATIONS 23 I NEED YOU TO OPERATE THAT HAND LINE AND CONTINUE TO PUT THAT FIRE OUT ON THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING
6:16:42	E2	2 PLUG...STRICKER AND RAMSAY
6:16:57	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND
6:17:01	CAR5	AIDE TO CAR5 TO COMMUNICAIONS, GIVE ME A COLLAPSE RESPONSE WITH ALL SQUADS

6:17:12	BC3	OPERATIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS, GIVE ME A RUN DOWN OF MY ENGINE COMPAINES ON THAT 2ND ALARM
6:17:20	FCB	2ND ALARM E2 E58, E2 E58 T16 BC2 PIO 2 MEDICS M15 AND M4
6:17:30	BC3	COPY, OPERATIONS TO E58 I WANT YOU TO LEAD IN FROM THE SOUTH SIDE OF STRICKER ST ALSO I WANT YOU TO ADVANCE A LINE INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE WE HAVE EXTENSION INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE
6:17:47	E58- P1	58 COPIES
6:17:50	T16- P1	16 COMMAND GOT FIRE 3RD FLOOR DELTA EXPOSURE NOW

Since the Incident Command System had not been further expanded, the arrival of second alarm units only placed more stress on the already overwhelmed Operations Chief. The span of control increased, with some second alarm units self-deploying. The fireground channel continued to be inundated with normal suppression-related reports during the rescue operation.

Battalion Chief 2 arrived on location at 06:15 hours. However, he did not report to any fixed command post or notify the Incident Commander of his arrival.

06:15:55 hours marked twenty minutes since Acting Lieutenant Sadler performed her Brief Initial Report. However, Fire Communications Bureau did not notify the Incident Commander that they were twenty minutes into the incident in accordance with MOP 602-16 *Emergency Incident Time Management*. (See Appendix #21)

Once EMT/FF McMaster was removed, rescue efforts focused on the pipe firefighter from Engine 14, FF/PM Lacayo. As previously stated, he was heavily trapped by large amounts of debris. During interviews, members described the conditions as, “digging through black sand” which resulted in very little progress. His upper body was quickly uncovered, however, his lower torso remained trapped. The heat and smoke from the fire added to the difficult task of operating in the interior.

Crews operating hose lines had the difficult task of attempting to extinguish the active fire without further complicating the rescue efforts. Hose streams were striking members and dislodging loose bricks from upper portions of the building. There was also concern about flooding possible void spaces that may be located lower in the pile, as there were still members that were unaccounted for.

Suppression activities continued simultaneously with the rescue efforts as engine and truck companies worked together to extinguish pockets of fire and keep it from spreading past the Bravo and Delta exposures.



Figure 52 Fire Conditions are still visible (CitiWatch)

At 06:16 hours, the Incident Commander requested a collapse assignment, which summoned units from Special Operations Command (SOC), Squad 26, Truck 6, and the Collapse Rescue Unit¹⁸.

At 06:18 hours, the Incident Commander requested a response of all Squads, which summoned units from Special Operations Command (SOC), Squad 40 and Squad 54.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:18:03	CAR5	AIDE TO CAR5 COMMUNICATIONS
6:18:34	FCB	AIDE TO CAR5
6:18:37	CAR5	DID YOU COPY THAT REQUEST PER OEM
6:18:45	FCB	THAT'S NEGATIVE
6:18:47	CAR2	CAR2 PUT ME ON LOCATION
6:18:52	FCB	CAR2 ON THE SCENE 6...
6:18:52	CAR5	PER OEM1 GIVE ME A COLLAPSE RESPONSE WITH ALL SQUADS
6:19:02	FCB	THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE WE HAVE THAT

¹⁸ The Collapse Rescue Unit is an unstaffed unit, assigned to Rescue 1. The unit is a commercial box truck that carries equipment to support collapse and trench rescue incidents.

6:19:05	CAR5	COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS, WE ARE GONNA MAKE OEM1 RESCUE BRANCH
6:19:11	FCB	OEMS1 RESCUE BRANCH 6:19
6:19:15	BC3	UNITS OPERATING THE DELTA... 2 ENGINE BRINGING A LINE UP TO YOU NOW
6:19:41	OEM1	RESCUE BRANCH TO OPERATIONS, I NEED ANOTHER RIT PACK TO THE ALPHA SIDE
		OF THE BUILDING
6:19:49	M4-P2	M4 WE ARE ON SCENE WHERE DO YOU NEED US

At 06:18:47 hours, Car 2, the Assistant Chief of Operations, announced his arrival on the fire ground channel but did not assume a role in the Incident Command System.

At 06:19:05 hours, Incident Command made OEM 1 the Rescue Branch. No units were formally assigned to the Rescue Branch. Therefore, the span of control for Operations did not change. Additionally, there was no request for a separate talk group.

Truck 10, Rescue 1, and Truck 8 were attempting to maintain continuous air supply to FF/PM Lacayo. His air supply was being rapidly depleted by using RIT bags and SCBA packs removed from the backs of rescuers. The Rescue Branch Supervisor identified that additional air supply would be needed for this operation and requested another RIT bag to Side Alpha. During interviews, members repeatedly expressed concerns about the limited number of RIT bags available on the first alarm as they are only carried by truck companies and Rescue 1. Members assigned to engine companies also expressed a lack of familiarity with RIT bags during interviews.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:19:52	BC3	OPERATIONS, EVERYBODY OPERATING ON THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING I DON'T WANT ANY UNNECESSARY PEOPLE THERE, I'M CONCERNED ABOUT A SECONDARY COLLAPSE
6:20:09	E2-P2	E2-P2 TO P4 YOU CAN CHARGE THE PLUG
6:20:17	E2-P4	COPY
6:20:20	CAR5	OPERATIONS TO T16 ON THE DELTA WE GOT 2 ENGINE COMING TO YOU WITH A LINE
6:20:27	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND, UPDATE FROM THE INSIDE STILL WORKING ON THE PIPE MAN FROM 14. HES PRETTY HEAVILY ENTRAPPED
6:20:38	BC3	OPERATIONS TO RESCUE BRANCH HAS PEOPLE MADE CONTACT WITH THE MEMBERS TRAPPED YET OR WE STILL LOOKING FOR THEM
6:20:50	OEM1	YOU HAVE CONTACT WITH ONE IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE THEY ARE ALSO DOING A WALL BREACH TO TRY MAKE A SECONDARY CONTACT LOW UNDERNEATH, I'LL ADVISE YOU ON ANY PROGRESS, ANY SOC UNITS THAT ARE INBOUND, YOU NEED TO COME TO PRATT AND STRICKER WE WILL DEPLOY FROM THERE.
6:21:13	T8-P1	T8 TO COMMAND, WE ARE IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE COULD YOU HAVE A COMPANY BRING US A ROPE TO TRY AND ACCESS. BRING THIS MEMBER OUT WITH
6:21:27	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO OPERATIONS
6:21:32	E58-P1	58-1 TO 58-2 LEAD OFF FROM THERE

6:21:40	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO OPERATIONS
6:21:43	BC3	OPERATIONS
6:21:45	FCB	YOU WANT THE SRO TEAM ACTIVATED?
6:21:57	T6-P1	T6 OPERATIONS SOC UNITS ON THE SCENE T6 SQ26 AND COLLAPSE
6:22:10	BC3	OK OPERATIONS IT APPEARS WE HAVE ENOUGH SRO ¹⁹ MEMBERS ON THE SCENE AT THIS TIME
6:22:20	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS COPYS THAT
6:22:21	BC2	BC2 TO COMMAND
6:22:25	BC3	BC2
6:22:41	BC2	BE ADVISED COLLAPSE WAGON ON LOCATION TRYING TO MEET UP WITH THE RESCUE
		AND COMMAND SEE WHAT THEY WANT THEM TO DO
6:22:41	BC3	OK COPY...COMMAND.

At 06:19:52 hours, Operations expressed concern about a secondary collapse.

At 06:20 hours, the Lieutenant of Truck 10 reported, “Still working on the pipe man from Engine 14, he’s pretty heavily entrapped”.

Initial attempts to cut and remove the large wood structural members with gas-powered tools were ineffective due to the oxygen deficient environment, causing the tools to stall. Members were also dealing with the “black sand” referenced previously. The decision was made to utilize DeWalt battery-powered tools such as sawzalls, angle grinders, cut-off saws and chainsaws.

At this point in the incident, there was still confusion about which members were still trapped or missing. A Personnel Accountability Report still hadn’t been performed.

Fire Communications Bureau contacted Operations directly and asked if they wanted the Special Rescue Operations (SRO) Team activated. Due to the timing of several radio transmissions, which caused some miscommunication, Operations stated that they had enough SRO members on scene.

While additional resources from the SRO team were not requested, interviews with members identified that there were issues with the existing procedures for requesting and notifying members of the SRO Team. Many team members do not have a Department issued pager and rely on group messaging applications for informal notifications.

At 06:22:41 hours, Battalion Chief 2 reported that the Collapse Rescue Unit was on scene trying to meet up with Rescue 1. During this incident, which occurred close to shift change, oncoming shift members from Steadman Station made the decision to staff the unit. This action brought much needed SOC personnel to the scene. While beneficial, these members were not integrated into the accountability system.

¹⁹ Special Rescue Operations (SRO) Team - is one of two specialized teams that support Special Operations Command (SOC). The team’s core mission includes specialized water rescue, urban search and rescue-collapse, environmental rescue, and industrial rescue. When an Incident Commander is confronted with an event that exhausts normal SOC resources or requires an advanced level of knowledge, the Incident Commander (IC) shall request the SRO Team to assist.

Aside from being positioned with Battalion Chief 6 on Side Charlie, Battalion Chief 2's role was not clearly defined at this incident.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:22:48	E58-P4	[BROKEN TRANSMISSION]
6:22:52	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E58 ALSO NEED YOU TO BRING A LINE DOWN THE ALPHA SIDE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING
6:23:03	E58-P1	58 COPY WE ARE IN THE REAR RIGHT NOW, WANT ME TO BRING IT THROUGH THE REAR OF IT?
6:23:15	BC3	NO, I WANT YOU TO BRING IT TO THE ALPHA SIDE
6:23:19	E58-P1	OK
6:23:25	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E58 JUST BRING YOUR MANPOWER AROUND WE GOT A LINE
6:23:30	E58-P1	COPY I GOTTA A WATER SUPPLY AND WE LOCATED...LOOKS LIKE BY WHOEVER OPERATING OUT OF T33
6:23:38		OPERATIONS TO E2 WHAT KIND OF PROGRESS ARE YOU MAKING ON THE DELTA EXPOSURE AND DO YOU NEED ANY ASSISTANCE
6:23:50	E2-P1	WE ARE MAKING OUR WAY UP TO THE 3RD FLOOR NOW
6:23:54	BC3	OK DO YOU HAVE A TRUCK COMPANY UP THERE; I'M CONCERNED ABOUT THE 3RD FLOOR ALPHA BRAVO CORNER OF THAT BUILDING I THINK YOU HAVE EXTENSION UP THERE
6:24:06	E2-P1	[UNREADABLE]
6:24:12	T16-P1	T16 TO E2 WE HAVE HOT SPOTS ON THE 1ST FLOOR I WANT YOU TO FINISH UP THERE
	T23-P2	T23 TO COMMAND P2 YOU HAVE FIRE IN THE DELTA ON THE 3RD FLOOR COMING THROUGH THE ROOF NOW
6:24:29	BC3	OK COPY THAT
6:24:42	BC3	COMMAND I WANT A SPECIAL CALL ANOTHER ENGINE AND A TRUCK
6:24:49	FCB	SPECIAL CALL 1 ENGINE AND 1 TRUCK 6:24

Fire continued to burn in both exposure buildings. Hose lines were being advanced, and companies were chasing fire on different floors. At 06:24 hours, Operations, misidentifying himself as Command, requested an additional engine and truck directly to Fire Communications Bureau instead of going through Incident Command.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:24:55	SQ26-P4	26 P4 TO26 P2 WHERE DO YOU WANT ME TO PUT THE WAGON
6:25:02	SQ26-P2	LEAVE IT THERE COME TO THE FIRE GROUND

6:25:07	BC3	OPERATIONS TO ALL MEMBERS I WANT AS FEW MEMBERS OPERATING IN THE FRONT OF THIS BUILDING AS POSSIBLE, IF YOU ARE NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED, I WANT YOU TO SET UP A COLLAPSE ZONE AND STAY AWAY FROM THE FRONT OF THIS BUILDING
6:25:26	DC9	DC9 PLACE ME ON THE SCENE
6:25:39	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND SPECIAL CALL UNITS E5 AND T25
6:25:45	BC3	COPY, OPERATIONS TO E5 NEED YOU TO LEAD OFF FROM MCHENRY SIDE BRING A LINE UP STRICKER ST AND GO UP T23'S AERIAL
6:26:01	T16-P1	T16 E2-P2 GONNA NEED MORE LINE ATTACHED
6:26:10	BC3	OPERATIONS TO T16 DO YOU NEED SECTIONS ADDED TO E2'S LINE?
6:26:20	T16-P1	THAT'S CORRECT CHIEF
6:26:28	CAR5	COMMAND TO T23 I NEED THAT LADDER MOVED
6:26:43	DC8	DC8 SHOW ME ON LOCATION
6:26:48	FCB	DC8, 6:26
6:26:52	E5-P1	E5 COPIES THE ASSIGNMENT
6:26:56	E2-P2	E2 P2 I'M ADDING LINE SO I'M SHUTTING DOWN E2'S LINE
6:27:06	BC3	COPY THAT
6:27:11	BC3	COMMAND TO E58 COME AROUND FRONT FOR A SECOND GET 2 PEOPLE TO ADVANCE THAT LINE INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE, AND THEN BRING 2 PEOPLE AROUND TO THE FRONT I'M GOING TO HAVE YOU GO UP 23'S AERIAL
6:27:32	E58-P1	CHIEF YOU WANT ME TO THE CHARLIE OR DELTA EXPOSURE
6:27:37	BC3	I WANT YOU TO ADVANCE A LINE IN THE DELTA EXPOSURE FROM THE CHARLIE SIDE THEN SEND 2 OF YOUR MEMBERS AROUND FRONT
6:27:46	E58-P1	COPY THAT
6:27:48	T23-P3	T23 ROOF DON'T GET TRAPPED ON THAT OUTSIDE ROOF COME AROUND WE GOTTA MOVE THE AERIAL COME BACK TO THE LADDER
6:27:58	BC3	OPERATION 23 TRUCK, I NEED YOUR DRIVER AROUND REPLACE YOUR AERIAL
6:28:10	T23-P3	YEA WELL I GOT A GUY ON THE ROOF SO THE LADDER'S NOT MOVING UNTIL I CAN GET HIM OFF
6:28:15	BC3	YEA THAT'S FINE LET'S GET HIM DOWN OFF THE ROOF WE ARE GOING TO REPOSITION THAT
6:28:23	T23-P3	OK COPY THAT HE'S ON HIS WAY DOWN

During this time, concerns about a secondary collapse continued. At 06:25:07 hours, Operations requested that a collapse zone be set up in the “front of the building”. A collapse zone was not cordoned off and members, including Chief officers, continued to operate within that area.

At 06:25:26 hours, Deputy Chief 9, Acting Deputy Chief of Safety, announced his arrival on location. He was not assigned a formal role in the incident command system.

At 06:26:43 hours, Deputy Chief 8, Deputy Chief of Fire Prevention, arrived on location and was not assigned a role within the Incident Command System.

Many of the senior Chief Officers do not have a Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) in their vehicle and must announce their arrival on an incident verbally. During this incident, these arrivals created unnecessary radio traffic on an already busy fire ground channel.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:28:29	BCEMS	BCEMS TO COMMAND, I'M ON SCENE ASSUMING EMS BRANCH DIRECTOR, ON SCENE
		YOU HAVE MYSELF, EMS6 M15 M4 AND M12. MYSELF AND M4 ARE LOCATED AT MCHENRY AND STRICKER
6:28:48	T16-P1	T16 TO OPERATIONS DELTA EXPOSURE, WE GOT FIRE 3RD FLOOR RUNNING THE ATTIC
6:28:59	BC3	OK COPY THAT I CAN SEE FIRE ON THE 3RD FLOOR, DO YOU HAVE HOOKS UP THERE
		I HAVE 2 ENGINE IN THERE, E58 I NEED YOU ON THE 3RD FLOOR OF THE DELTA EXPOSURE TO ASSIST PUTTING THAT OUT
6:29:15	E58-P1	COPY ON IT NOW CHIEF
6:29:18	T16-P1	16 TO OPS I HAVE 2 ENGINE HERE, AS SOON AS THEY GET WATER BACK I'M GONNA HAVE ANOTHER ENGINE COMPANY COME BEHIND US AGAIN...IS COMING BEHIND US AGAIN
6:29:30	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E5 WHEN YOU ARRIVE HERE, NEED YOU TO TAKE A LINE 23'S LADDER ALSO, OPERATION 58 ENGINE HOW ARE YOU MAKING GETTING THE HOSE UP 3RD FLOOR?
6:30:01	T16-P2	T16-P2 TO COMMAND ROOF ON BRAVO SIDE IS STABLE, 3RD FLOOR COMPROMISED, IF I HAD A LINE UP HERE YOU COULD HIT A BUNCH OF IT
6:30:13	BC3	OK COPY THAT
6:30:18	E58-P4	58 WATER COMING
6:30:22	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E47 WHERE YOU LOCATED
6:30:29	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND, LETS GET A NEGATIVE PRESSURE FAN IN THAT FRONT DOOR IT WILL HELP CLEAR THIS UP TO HELP US SEE A LITTLE BETTER
6:30:48	CAR4?	CAR11 IS ON THE SCENE

At 06:28:29 hours, Battalion Chief EMS attempted to expand the Incident Command System by assigning herself the EMS Branch Director position and notifying Command of the EMS units operating on scene. The EMS Battalion Chief was never acknowledged by Command or assigned a separate talk group. An EMS staging area was not designated.

At 06:30:48, Car 11, the Executive Assistant Fire Chief, utilizing the CAR4 radio, arrived on location but was not assigned a role in the Incident Command System.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:30:52	T8-P1	T8 COMMAND, UPDATE WE 1 MEMBER ON AIR VIA RIT BOTTLE. 2ND MEMBER WE STILL HAVEN'T FIGURED THAT OUT YET
6:31:07	BC3	OPERATIONS 47, WHAT IS YOUR LOCATION?

205 S. STRICKER STREET

6:31:15	E47-P1	47 I'M IN THE REAR WITH BC6
6:31:19	BC3	OK SEE IF WE CAN GET 1 OF YOUR MEMEBRS OR 2 OF YOUR MEMBERS TAKE A LINE UP T16 ASSIST WITH THIS ROOF
6:31:32	E47-P1	COPY
6:31:34	E30-P1	TURN THE FAN OFF IN THE FRONT...TURN THE FAN OFF IN THE FRONT
6:31:40	E58-P1	E58 TO COMMAND WE ARE GONNA BE UNBLE TO ACCESS THE REAR OF THE DELTA THERES A DOWN POWER LINE OUT HERE
6:31:53	BC3	OK THAN COME AROUND FRONT I NEED THAT LINE UP THE 3RD FLOOR ON THE DELTA EXPOSURE
6:32:00	E58-P1	COPY
6:32:03	T16-P1	16 TO OPS, WE GOTTA LINE FROM TO 2 ENGINE NOW ON THE 3RD FLOOR. WORKING ON HITTING THE FIRE NOW, YOU CAN GET 58 TO MOP UP BEHIND US AND KEEP THAT AS BACKUP
6:32:17	BC3	OK COPY
6:32:20	R1	R1 TO COMMAND, CAN WE GET ANOTHER RIT BAG TO THE REAR ENTRANCE
6:32:36	SQ40-P1	SQ40 ON SCENE CALHOUN AND PRATT, REPORTING TO CHARLIE SIDE WITH EQUIPMENT
6:32:48	T23-P3	T23 WE GOT OUR LADDER POSITIONED WAITING FOR A LINE
6:33:08	E5-P1	E5 HYDRANT GILMOR AND MCHENRY, WE WILL BE ON THE FIRE GROUND MOMENTARILY T23
6:33:26	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND, HOW MANY ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR?
6:33:54	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E5, WHATS YOUR LOCATION
6:34:01	E5-P1	5 WE ARE AT STRICKER AND MCHENRY
6:34:06	BC3	OK GET A LINE OFF E2, BRING IT UP TO THE FRONT, I WANT YOU TO TAKE IT UP THE AERIAL LADDER ON T23, OPERATIONS TO E2 HOW YOU MAKING OUT ON THAT DELTA EXPOSURE?

At 06:30 hours, the Lieutenant of Truck 8 reported, “we have one member on air via the RIT bottle”. At this point in the incident, one of the RIT bags was connected and supplying air to FF/PM Lacayo.

Rescue 1 then requested an additional RIT bag to Side Charlie of the main fire building as the demand for additional RIT bags continued.

An attempt was made to improve ventilation and visibility of the interior by using negative pressure fans but quickly halted by members from the interior of the building. The negative pressure fans introduced additional air into the building and increased the intensity of the hot spots.

205 S. STRICKER STREET

The Lieutenant from Truck 10 attempted to get the number of members still unaccounted for but did not receive a reply.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:34:21	OEM1	OEM TO OPERATIONS "URGENT"
6:34:28	E2-P1	WE ARE MAKING OUT ALRIGHT CHIEF GOT THE 3RD FLOOR KNOCKED WE KEEP GETTING STUF MOPPED UP BEHIND US
6:34:36	BC3	OPERATIONS OEM, GO AHEAD
6:34:41	OEM1	MY APOLOGIES, RESCUE BRANCH I NEED ALL AVAILABLE RIT BAGS INTO THE BRAVO EXPOSURE, SEND 1 COMPANY TO THE DELTA EXPOSURE AND SEE IF WE CAN MAKE A BREACH FROM THAT WALL TO THE FIRE BUILDING, JUST HAVE THEM ASSESS IT AND LET US KNOW
6:35:12	OEM1	RESCUE TO OPERATIONS DO YOU COPY?
6:35:17	BC3	OPERATIONS COPY, E14 GOING INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE TO ASSESS
6:35:30	BC3	OPERATIONS TO T16 CAN WE GET A FAN AND SMOKE EJECTOR IN THE FRONT WINDOW OF THE ORGINAL FIRE BUILDING, IF YOU CAN'T DO IT SEND 2 MEMBERS AROUND TO GET THE SMOKE EJECTOR OFF T23
6:35:52	R1	R1 TO COMMAND, IS THERE ANY BASEMENT ACCESS FROM THE ALPHA SIDE?
6:35:59	BC3	THEY ARE ASSESSING THAT RIGHT NOW
6:36:04	BC6	CHARLIE TO COMMAND, DO WE HAVE BASEMENT ACCESS FROM THE ALPHA SIDE?
6:36:18	BC3	OPERATIONS....
6:36:25	T16- P1	T16 E2 I NEED THAT LINE BACK ON THE 3RD FLOOR REAR
6:36:34	SQ54- P1	54 RESCUE BRANCH, WHAT'S YOUR LOCATION
6:36:40	BC3	OPERATIONS TO LAST TRUCK COMPANY ON THE 2ND ALARM, I WANT YOU TO GATHER UP YOUR RIT BOTTLES AND GO TO EVERY OTHER TRUCK ON LOCATION AND FIND THOSE RIT BOTTLES AND TAKE THEM TO THE BRAVO EXPOSURE TO RESCUE BRANCH
6:37:06	T25- P1	T25 WE HAVE OUR RIT EQUIPMENT WE ARE MAKING OUR WAY AROUND TO YOU NOW
6:37:12	BC3	OK MAKE SURE YOU HAVE YOUR RIT BOTTLES AND GATHER UP EVERY ONE ON YOUR WAY HERE
6:37:22	SQ54- P1	54 RESCUE BRANCH, YOUR LOCATION
6:37:27	BC3	RESCUE BRANCH IS IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE
6:37:46	PIO	PIO ON SCENE
6:37:52	FCB	PIO 6:37
6:37:57	E58- P4	58 YOU WANT ME ... <i>ADD THAT OTHER LINE...?</i>
6:38:05	T6-P1	T6 CANCEL THAT FAN
6:38:32	T16- P2	16-P2 WE DO HAVE SOME EXTENSION INTO THE BRAVO AT THIS TIME
6:38:39	BC3	OPERATIONS TO SHIFT COMMANDER AIDE, COME TO THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING

205 S. STRICKER STREET

6:38:46	CAR5 AIDE	COPY
6:38:56	E58- P4	58 STOP WITH THE LINE I HAVE TO HOOK IT UP.
6:39:03	E58- P1	58 BRING THAT ROLLED UP SECTION TO THE FRONT OF THE HOSE LINE...DON'T HOOK IT UP
		TO THE PUMPER
6:39:12	E58- P4	58 I OPENED THE LINE I HAVE TO HOOK IT UP YOU TOOK MY INCH
6:39:18	E58- P1	BRING THE ROLLED-UP HOSE TO THE FRONT...THE PIPE...WILL ADD IT UP HERE THAT WAY WE
		DON'T HAVE TO DRAG IT ALL THROUGH THE HOUSE
6:39:29	E58- P4	<i>COPY BUT YOU TOOK MY LINE FROM THE [UNREADABLE]</i>
6:39:39	SQ26- P1	SQ26 STOP BAILING WATER INTO THE 2ND FLOOR
6:39:46	T23- P3	E5, "SHUT YOUR LINE DOWN!!!!!"
6:39:49	BC6	CHARLIE TO THE UNIT OPERATING THE 2ND FLOOR, SHUT THE LINE DOWN YOU ARE
		SOAKING US
6:40:08	OEM1	RESCUE TO OPERATIONS
6:40:13	BC3	OPERATIONS
6:40:23	OEM1	TRY TO USE MINIMAL WATER PLEASE YOU ARE FLOODING THIS OPERATION OUT HERE
6:40:23	BC3	OPERATIONS COPY THAT, WE'RE JUST TRYING TO KEEP THE FIRE DOWN ON THE 3RD FLOOR
		OF THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING, OPERATIONS TO E5 LETS USE MINIMAL WATER
6:40:41	E5-P1	E5 COPY

During this period, The Rescue Branch created a RIT staging area in the Bravo exposure where RIT bags and other equipment could be staged. Operations also requested Truck 25 to collect any available RIT bags.

Rescue operations were hampered by the continued efforts of engine companies to knock down fire above. While necessary for fire suppression, the hose streams were knocking down debris and reducing visibility.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:41:03	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO OPERATIONS, HAVE ALL UNITS STAND BY FOR A PAR
6:41:29	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5, E55 - PAR
6:41:41	E55- P4	55- 1 AT THE PUMP PANEL, 1 IN THE REAR, 2 IN THE BUILDING
6:41:48	CAR5 AIDE	E14.....
6:41:55	T8-P1	T8 TO THE UNIT ON THE ROOF YOU ARE ON THE BRAVO EXPOSURE CUTTING A HOLE
		WE DON'T NEED A WHOLE ON THE BRAVO EXPOSURE CUT, SHUT IT DOWN
6:42:05	BC3	COMMAND T25, AFTER YOU ARE DONE DELIVERING THOSE RIT BOTTLES, I WANT YOU

205 S. STRICKER STREET

		TO GO INTO THE DELTA EXPOSURE ASSIST E2 PULLING CEILINGS
6:42:19	T25-P1	T25 DIRECT
6:42:22	T25-P1	T25 TO P2,(UNREADABLE)
6:42:31	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO E23, PAR
6:42:37	E23-P4	E23 1 IN THE BUILDING, 3 OUT THE FRONT
6:42:44	CAR5 AIDE	E36
6:42:47	E36-P1	E36 PAR ALL 4 MEMBERS
6:42:55	CAR5 AIDE	E47
6:42:59	E47-P1	47 WE GOT ALL 4 MEMBERS
6:43:04	CAR5 AIDE	T23
6:43:12	T23-P2	T23-P2 AND T23-P4.....(UNREADABLE)
6:43:22	CAR5 AIDE	T10
6:43:39	T10-P1	T10 YOU CALLING.....T10 PAR ALL 4 MEMEBERS WORKING ON TRYING TO GET THIS
		MEMBER FREE
6:43:49	CAR5 AIDE	E30
6:44:07	CAR5 AIDE	E30, PAR
6:44:14	E30-P4	30 GONNA BE PAR OPERATING IN THE FIRE BUILDING AND THE BRAVO EXPOSURE
6:44:21	E58-P1	E58-P1 MOBILE CHARGE THAT LINE
6:44:30	CAR5 AIDE	T8
6:44:33	T8-P1	T8 PAR BRAVO EXPOSURE ALL 4 MEMBERS
6:44:42	CAR5 AIDE	E2
6:44:46	HZM1-P1	AF TURN THAT LINE ON
6:44:51	E2-P1	E2 PAR, 1 MEMBER PUMP PANEL, 2 MEMBERS OUTSIDE, 1 MEMBER INSIDE 3RD FLOOR
6:45:01	CAR5 AIDE	E58
6:45:01	E58-P1	58 I'M PAR I GOT 3 MEMBERS IN THE DELTA EXPOSURE, 1 AT THE PUMPER, ALSO GOT
		1 MEMBER E2 WITH ME AND 1 MEMBER 16 TRUCK HERE
6:45:39	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E2 HOWS THE DELTA EXPOSURE LOOK?
6:45:51	E58-P1	58 COMMAND, DELTA LOOKS GOOD GOT ALL THE CEILINGS PULLED ALL THE FIRE IS
		KNOCKED, GETTING SOME HOT SPOTS GOT 25 TRUCK WITH US NOW

6:46:04	BC3	OK COPY
6:46:09	CARS AIDE	AIDE TO CAR 5, E58 PAR?
6:46:14	E58- P1	58, PAR 3 DELTA, 1 AT THE PUMPER, GOT A MEMBER OF 2 ENGINE AND A MEMBER OF
		16 TRUCK
6:46:28	CARS AIDE	COPY, T16 - PAR
6:46:33	T16- P1	T16, 1 MEMBER DELTA EXPOSURE 1ST FLOOR , 1 MEMBER DELTA EXPOSURE 3RD FLOOR
		2 MEMBERS ON THE ROOF, PAR
6:46:44	CARS AIDE	COPY, R1 - PAR
6:46:51	R1-P1	R1 2 MEMBERS IN THE FIRE BUILDING WORKING, 2 MEMBERS IN THE DELTA
6:46:59	CARS AIDE	SQ26
6:47:16	CARS AIDE	SQ26 - PAR?
6:47:20	SQ26- P1	26 PAR
6:47:25	CARS AIDE	SQ40
6:47:29	SQ40- P1	SQ40 PAR - 4 MEMBERS ALPHA
6:47:36	CARS AIDE	SQ54
6:47:40	SQ54- P1	SQ54 PAR, 3 MEMBERS SIDE ALPHA , 1 CHARLIE
6:47:48	CARS AIDE	E5
6:47:54	E5-P1	E5 2 MEMBERS ON THE AERIAL T23, 2 AT THE PUMPER
6:48:16	CARS AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO OPERATIONS, I BELIEVE....SPOKE TO ALL UNITS BESIDES FOR 14
		I BELIEVE, EVERYONE ELSE WAS PAR
6:48:32	BC3	OK COPY THAT

At 06:41 hours, forty-one minutes after the collapse, the first Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) of the incident was conducted. The Aide to Car 5 announced that all companies should standby for a PAR. Engine 55 reported that they were PAR. The PAR request for Engine 14 was interrupted by other radio transmissions. When Truck 23 PAR was requested, Truck 23 Portable 2 answered. The message was unreadable, and no clarification was requested by the Aide to Car 5 or Fire Communications Bureau. Radio records indicate that there was no response to the PAR by Truck 23 Portable 1, Lieutenant Butrim. The PAR continued with numerous radio interruptions. At 06:48 hours, the Aide to Car 5 completed the PAR and stated, "I believe I spoke to all units besides Engine 14, I believe, everybody else was PAR."

The duration of the PAR was seven minutes and did not accurately account for all members operating on the scene. Members from Truck 23, Truck 25, Engine 13, and the Collapse Rescue Unit were missed when the PAR was conducted. Additionally, responding staff chiefs and several off-duty members who were operating on the scene were not accounted for.

At 06:44:46 hours, the request was made for AIRFLEX 1's long air line to be turned on. This transmission was made on the fire ground channel while the PAR was being conducted. The air line was never utilized to supply air to trapped members due to incompatible connections.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:48:37	OEM16	OEM16.....(CUT OFF)
6:48:42	FCB	OEM16, 6:48
6:48:48	SO2	SO2 I'M ON SIDE CHARLIE, BGE ELECTRIC IS BACK HERE DISCONNECTING THAT SERVICE DROP
6:49:25	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO T25, ARE YOU PAR?
6:49:35	T25- P1	T25 PAR DELTA EXPOSURE ALL MEMBERS...
6:49:45	CAR5 AIDE	COPY
6:49:51	E2-P1	E2 TO T25, ANY OF YOUR MEMBERS HAVE A HALLIGAN ON THEM
6:50:01	T25- P1	T25 REPEAT
6:50:04	E2-P1	DO ANY OF YOUR MEMBERS HAVE A HALLIGAN ON THEM WE COULD USE IT ON THE 3RD FLOOR
6:50:11	T25- P1	THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE WE WILL MAKE OUR WAY UP
6:50:15	E58- P1	E58 P3 AND P4 RELOCATE THAT LINE TO THE 1ST FLOOR AND SEND ME ONE OF THOSE GUYS FROM T25

At 06:49:25 hours, the Aide to Car 5 identified that Truck 25 was not included in the initial PAR. He initiated contact and determined Truck 25 was PAR. No further radio attempts were made to track units or members for the duration of the incident.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:50:30	BC2	BC2 TO COMMAND, GIVE ME A MEDIC TO THE CHARLIE SIDE
6:50:38	BC3	COMMAND COPIES, COMMAND TO EMS DISPATCH A MEDIC TO THE CHARLIE SIDE OPERATIONS TO COMMUNIATIONS DISPATCH AN ADDITIONAL MEDIC UNIT
6:50:54	FCB	ADDITIONAL MEDIC 6:50
6:50:56	EMS6	EMS6 COPIES MOVING AROUND CHARLIE SIDE
6:51:07	SO2	SAFETY TO OPERATIONS LIVE WIRES ARE CLEAR, UNITS CAN OPERATE IN THAT AREA
6:51:16	E58- P1	58 WE GETTING TO IT NOW, RELOACTING THAT LINE AND GOT A HOOK COMING WITH ME
6:51:29	FCB	COMMUNICATIONS TO COMMAND ADDITIONAL MEDIC UNIT IS M27
6:51:36	CAR5	COPY
6:53:28	T16- P2	T16-P2 TO MEMBERS WORKING INSIDE, BE ADVISED THE BRAVO SIDE PARTY WALL BRICKS WERE SEPARATING AND COMPROMISED

6:53:41	T16-P1	T16 I COPY
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At 06:53:28 hours, the driver of Truck 16 reported structural concerns with the party wall on Side Bravo. Members operating inside the main fire building were faced with the heightened risk of a secondary collapse.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:53:47	T10-P1	T10 TO COMMAND
6:53:55	T10-P1	T10 TO OPERATIONS
6:54:01	CAR5	COMMAND GO T10
6:54:04	T10-P1	T10 HOW MANY FROM 14 ARE WE STILL MISSING? WE ARE WITH ONE STILL 1ST FLOOR
		REAR
6:54:14	CAR5	YOU SAY YOU GOT 1 FIRST FLOOR REAR, IS HE TRAPPED OR IS HE OUT?
6:54:19	T10-P1	STILL TRAPPED BY A LOT OF DEBRIS, HOW MANY MORE ARE WE STILL MISSING IN ADDITION
		TO HIM?
6:54:25	CAR5	(TRANSMISSION CUT OFF)
6:54:34	BC3	OPERATIONS TO BC2, GIVE ME AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE REAR
6:54:41	BC6	BC6 AT THIS TIME WE HAVE A RESCUE LINE SET UP, STOKES BASKET IS INSIDE, NUMEROUS MEMBERS WORKING INTERIOR, MEMBER STILL TRAPPED AROUND THE
		HIP AREA
6:54:59	BC3	OK LET ME KNOW IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON THAT SIDE, I'M SENDING
		SOME HELP AROUND NOW
6:55:12	BC6	BC6 TO COMMAND HOW PEOPLE DO WE HAVE UNACCOUNTED FOR
6:55:31	BC3	OPERATIONS TO SHIFT COMMANDER'S AIDE, GIVE ME A TOTAL OF PERSONNEL MISSING
		ACCORDING TO THE PAR
6:55:46	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5, FROM WHAT I GATHER I DID'T HEAR ANYTHING FROM 14, SO I BELIEVE
		IT MIGHT BE ALL 3 OR 3 MEMBERS
6:55:59	BC3	OK, WE BROUGHT 1 MEMBER FROM E14 OUT THE FRONT AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS
		OPERATION

At this point in the incident, there was still confusion about how many members were unaccounted for. The Lieutenant of Truck 10 continued to attempt to get an exact number of members still trapped or missing. However, the inaccurate information from the PAR did not provide a clear picture. EMT/FF McMaster was the only member from Engine 14 who had been removed from the building.

Members inside were still attempting to free FF/PM Lacayo. A stokes basket and haul system were set up on Side Charlie as an attempt to aid in removing him. Members needed to continue digging and clearing debris before he could be removed.

205 S. STRICKER STREET

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
6:56:18	OEM1	RESCUE BRANCH TO CHARLIE DIVISION
6:56:30	OEM1	RESCUE TO CHARLIE
6:56:37	OEM1	RESCUE TO OPERATIONS
6:56:42	BC3	OPERATIONS
6:56:44	OEM1	ADVISE ASAP THAT 54 AND 40 ARE GONNA BE USED ON THE CHARLIE SIDE, I NEED TO KNOW THAT AS SOON AS YOU CAN
6:56:55	R1	R1 TO COMMAND
6:57:00	BC3	R1 OPERATIONS, GO AHEAD
6:57:06	R1	IF WE CAN'T GET ACCESS FROM THE MAIN BUILDING WHERE WE ARE AT, CAN WE GET ACCESS TO THE BASEMENT FROM THE EXPOSURE OR BREACH THE WALL, WE ARE STARTING TO SEE SOME BURNING UP UNDERNEATH IT
6:57:18	BC3	OK, ARE YOU SAYING YOU NEED A LINE?
6:57:37	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS, WE ARE GOING TO WORK OUR WAY FROM THE DELTA EXPOSURE BASEMENT SEE IF WE CAN ACCESS THAT WAY
6:57:46	BC3	OK UNIT REPEAT YOUR MESSAGE, OPERATIONS TO ALL MEMBERS OPERATING ON THE FIRE GROUND, WE HAVE A LOT OF PERSONEL, STEP AWAY FROM PEOPLE IF YOU ARE TRYING TO MAKE A TRANSMISSION, MOST THESE TRANSMISSIONS ARE COMING IN BROKEN UP
6:58:17	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS
6:58:21	BC6	BC6 TO COMMAND, CAN WE GET A LINE OR A HOLE OPENED UP IN THE FRONT OF THE BASEMENT
6:58:36	R1	R1 TO COMMAND 14 ENGINE SAID THEY ARE GONNA TRY TO COME AROUND THE FRONT, IF THEY COULD GET SOME ASSISTANCE WITH PUTTING A HOLE IN THE FLOOR AND BAIL SOME WATER INTO THIS THING THAT WOULD HELP A LOT
6:59:10	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS
6:59:27	E2-P1	E2 P1 TO 3 AND 4, WHEN YOU COME BACK IN BRING SOME HOOKS WITH YOU
6:59:52	BC6	BC6 NEED SOME BATTERIES EITHER TO THE BRAVO OR THE REAR
7:00:00	BC3	OPERATIONS TO ALL PERSONNEL OPERATING THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING, CLEAR THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING
7:00:09	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS
7:00:35	SOC1	SOC1 TO OPERATIONS, I'M ON THE SCENE, I'LL BE REPORTING TO RESCUE BRANCH
7:00:46	E58-P1	E58 TO COMMAND I GOT BGE IN THE REAR SHUTTING DOWN THE ELECTRIC TO THE BUILDING, DELTA SHUT DOWN, WORKING ON DELTA 1 RIGHT NOW
7:01:03	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS
7:01:10	T16-P1	T16 RESCUE BRANCH

7:01:28	T8-P1	T8 TO COMMAND HAS THE GAS SIDE BEEN NOTIFIED?
7:01:43	T16-P1	T16 TO COMMAND
7:01:48	BC3	OPERATIONS GO AHEAD
	T16-P1	T16 TO OPS, DELTA EXPOSURE LOOKS LIKE A RECENT REHAB SO WE HAVE CINDER BLOCK IN
		HERE PROBABLY BE ABLE TO BUST THROUGH THE EXPOSURE WALL TO BETTER ACCESS TO
		THE DOWN FIREFIGHTER

At 06:57:46 hours, Operations addressed that there were numerous radio transmissions being made and many of them were broken up. Suppression and rescue operations were still occurring on the same talk group. Between 06:57 hours and 07:00 hours, there were ten Subscriber Rejects²⁰ on Fire Ground 1. The failure to assign units to divisions/groups and no command presence inside of the main fire building may have contributed to the increased radio traffic.

At 06:59:52 hours, Battalion Chief 6 requested additional batteries. Members inside were still using angle grinders, sawzalls, and other battery-operated handheld tools to cut full dimensional structural members, electrical conduits, and heavy roofing material.

At 07:00 hours, Operations continued to attempt to keep members away from Side Alpha of the building due to the front wall appearing unstable.

At 07:00:35 hours, one hour into the incident, SOC 1²¹ advised Operations that he had arrived on the incident and would be reporting to the Rescue Branch.



Figure 53 Conditions on Side Alpha at approximately 07:00 hours (Howard Meile)

²⁰ Subscriber Rejects are when a user is already keyed up on that talk group and another user tries to key up. Stealth reject is issued when 2 radios on the same talk group key up about the same time. The first radio is granted the call, the 2nd radio gets a stealth reject.

²¹ SOC 1 is the radio designation for the Battalion Chief that oversees all Special Operations Command (SOC), which encompasses all SOC units, personnel, equipment, training and operational activity.



Figure 54 Side Alpha at approximately 07:01 hours (Howard Meile)

Also, during this time period, Truck 16 reported about a potential breach through the party wall on Side Delta in an attempt to access trapped members. This message was not acknowledged.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
7:03:09	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO SO1, MEET ME OVER HERE BY AIRFLEX
7:03:38	E5-P1	E5 TO COMMAND
7:03:41	E5-P1	E5 TO OPERATIONS
7:03:44	BC3	OPERATIONS GO AHEAD
7:03:47	E5-P1	THE FACADE AND PARAPET WALLS ON THE MAIN FIRE BUILDING AND DELTA EXPOSURE ARE REAL BAD RIGHT NOW, MEMBERS USE EXTREME CAUTION OPERATING IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING
7:04:03	BC3	I COPY THAT, IM TRYING TO KEEP EVERY MEMBER FROM OUT IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING AS POSSIBLE
7:04:13	E5-P1	COPY THAT, WE GOT A SMALL AMOUNT OF FIRE IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE ROOF LINE, WE CAN KNOCK THAT WHENEVER ITS SAFE TO DO SO
7:04:13	BC 3	YEA LETS HOLD OFF UNLESS YOU ABSOLUTELY HAVE TO, I GOT A COUPLE PEOPLE WORKING INSIDE FROM THE ALPHA SIDE, I DON'T WANT ANYMORE DEBRIS COMING DOWN ON THEM
7:04:36	E5-P1	COPY
7:05:45	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO COMMUNICATIONS

7:05:51	FCB	AIDE TO CAR5
7:05:54	CAR5 AIDE	IF YOU CAN, CAN YOU START THE COMMAND VEHICLE TO THIS LOCATION?
7:06:02	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED 7:06

The Lieutenant of Engine 5 was concerned that the Formstone attached to the Side Alpha wall of main fire building and Delta exposure was unsafe to be operating around. Operations concurred and attempted to keep members from operating in that area.

The Aide to Car 5 requested that the Mobile Command Unit be dispatched. It arrived on location but was not utilized as a command post.

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
7:08:49	E5-P1	E5 P1 E2 MOBILE, SHUT DOWN MY LINE
7:09:03	E30-P1	T23 DRIVER MAKE SURE YOU DO NOT TOUCH THAT FRONT WALL WITH THAT AERIAL
7:09:13	E2-P2	E2 MOBILE TO E5, YOUR LINE IS SHUT DOWN
7:09:44	OEM1	RESCUE TO OPERATIONS
7:09:50	BC3	OPERATIONS
7:09:53	OEM1	DO WE HAVE AN EMS CREW ON THE CHARLIE SIDE?
7:10:00	BC2	BATTALION CHIEF 2 THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE WE HAVE AN EMS CREW BACK HERE
7:10:57	OEM1	RESCUE TO OPERATIONS, CORRECTION OPERATIONS
7:11:02	BC3	OPERATIONS GO AHEAD
7:11:05	OEM1	DO YOU HAVE BASEMENT ACCESS FROM THE ALPHA SIDE?
7:11:19	BC3	TO THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING?
7:11:22	OEM1	YEA THAT'S RIGHT, I DON'T KNOW IF WE CAN STICK A LINE IN THE WINDOW TO THE BASEMENT, THEY GOT FIRE UNDERNEATH THEM
7:11:32	BC3	OK THERES A LINE GOING IN THE FRONT WITH MEMBERS OPERATING IT RIGHT NOW
7:11:46	BC3	COMMAND TO E2, IF YOURE DONE ON THE DELTA EXPOSURE BRING YOUR LINE DOWN WE'RE GONNA PUT IN THE WINDOW ON THE ALPHA SIDE OF THE ORGINAL BUILDING
7:12:02	E2-P1	2 COPIES
7:12:58	E2-P2	E2 MOBILE TO E5, YOU WANT THAT LINE CHARGED AGAIN?
7:13:12	E5-P1	E5 GO AHEAD
7:14:22	E2-P1	E2, P3 AND P4, WE GONNA PULL THE LINE TO GET IT THROUGH THE FRONT DOOR
7:15:39	SQ54-P1	SQ54 P1 TO P2
7:16:19	T23-P4	T23-P4 TO P2, START MAKING YOUR WAY DOWN THE AERIAL
7:17:16	E2-P2	E2 MOBILE TO E2-P1 DO YOU WANT THAT LINE CHARGED
7:17:24	E2-P1	HOLD OFF FOR NOW
7:17:36	E30-P1	E30 TO T23 START SETTING UP THE....AERIAL DROP SOME ROPE DOWN FOR US
7:17:55	E5-P1	E5 OPERATIONS
7:18:00	BC3	OPERATIONS GO AHEAD
7:18:03	E5-P1	WE MADE ACCESS IN THE MAIN FIRE BUILDING TO THE BASEMENT BUT DEBRIS IS BLOCKING ANY CHANCE, WE CAN PUT WATER ON IT
7:18:14	BC3	OK COPY, COMMAND TO CHARLIE DO YOU HAVE ACCESS OR ANYWAY TO PUT WATER

205 S. STRICKER STREET

		ON THE FIRE THAT RESCUE IS CONCERNED ABOUT?
7:18:28	BC6	WE ARE TRYING TO OPEN AIN THE BACK HERE NOW
7:18:33	BC3	OK COPY
7:18:38	CAR5	COMMAND TO E58 E2, WHATS YOUR LOCATION, NEED THE OFFICERS TO MEET ME
		IN THE FRONT OF THE BUILDING
7:18:45	E58-P1	58 REAR BUMP OUT DELTA EXPOSURE
7:20:37	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO E5
7:20:44	E5-P1	E5 GO AHEAD
7:20:47	CAR5 AIDE	ARE YOU COMMITTED?
7:20:51	E5-P1	AT THIS TIME, WE ARE WAITING FOR DEBRIS TO BE CLEARED SO MAYBE WE CAN GET
		SOME WATER ON THE BASEMENT
7:21:02	SOC1	SOC1 TO E23 ON THE LADDER BACK DOWN
7:21:14	R1-P1	R1 TO T10, IM DROPPING THE ROPE RIGHT ABOVE YOUR HEAD
7:21:22	T10-P1	WE COPY
7:21:24	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1 ON THE STICK, HAVE E23 BEHIND YOU BACK DOWN THE LADDER
7:21:39	CAR5 AIDE	AIDE TO CAR5 TO E2 AND E58, START PUTTING UP
7:21:53	R1	R1 TO THE CREW ON THE LADDER BE PREPARED TO HAUL
7:22:01	R1-P1	STAND BY LET ME GIVE YOU A LITTLE MORE SLACK I GOTTA REPOSITION UP HERE
7:22:40	R1	HAUL CREW LET US KNOW WHEN YOUR READY
7:22:46	T25-P1	T25 IN THE REAR TO COMMAND, BGE BACK HERE NOTIFIED THEY CUT DOWN FROM
		CORNER HOUSE TO 4 HOUSES UP, DO YOU WANT HIM TO CONTINUE TO CUT DOWN
		THE REST OF THE BLOCK AND JUST HAVE IT ALL DOWN? REPEATS X2
7:23:31	R1	HAUL TEAM WHATS UP
7:24:02	R1	R1 TO THIS LADDER CREW WHEN ARE WE READY TO HAUL
7:24:09	R1-P1	STAND BY HEADING DOWN TO THE BOTTOM.....(BROKEN UP)
7:24:54	R1	HAUL TEAM ARE WE READY
7:24:58	R1	HAUL TEAM PULL WHEN YOU'RE READY
7:25:09	SOC1	SOC1 TO RESCUE BRANCH THEY ARE SETTING UP QUICK HAUL SYSTEM AT THE BASE OF
		THE LADDER
7:25:16	BC6	BC6 TO THE TOWER, ARE YOU ON SCENE
7:25:22	OEM1	RESCUE BRANCH TO SOC1 SAY YOUR MESSAGE AGAIN
7:25:36	E30-P1	HAUL TEAM QUIT....
7:25:51	SQ26-P1	HAUL TEAM HAUL
7:26:08	R1	THE HAUL TEAM ON THE AERIAL WE NEED YOU TO START PULLING
7:26:14	SOC1	SOC1 STAND BY THEY ARE GETTING READY TO HAUL NOW
7:26:32	BC3	OPERATIONS TO T23, RAISE THE STICK
7:26:39	R1	ALRIGHT HAUL TEAM LISTEN CLOSELY YOU GOT SLACK UP, GO AHEAD AND START TO
		PULL, IF I YELL STOP, STOP
7:26:45	R1-P1	I COPY, WE'RE ABOUT TO START PULLING RIGHT NOW
7:26:51	SOC1	SOC1 TO RESCUE BRANCH THEY ARE DOING A MANUAL HAUL WITH THE ROPES THEY
		ARE NOT USING THE STICK AS MECHANICAL
7:27:00	OEM1	OK I COPY

205 S. STRICKER STREET

7:27:03	R1	STOP PULLING STOP
7:27:06	R1-P1	OK STOP HAULING
7:27:09	OEM1	RESCUE BRANCH TO SOC1 AND RESCUE OPERATIONS, THERES GONNA BE 2 CALLS
		HERE, LT WALSH FROM INTERIOR, CHIEF PARKER FROM THE EXTERIOR. MAINTAIN
		RADIO SILENCE OTHERWISE UNLESS YOU HAVE AN EMERGENCY
7:27:26	R1	HAUL TEAM GIVE SLACK
7:27:29	SOC1SLACK
7:27:39	R1	UP
7:28:05	R1	HAUL TEAM HAUL
7:28:08	SOC1	SOC1 COPIES HAUL
7:28:23	R1	UP
7:28:25	SOC1	STOP
7:28:29	R1	GIVE IT SLACK
7:28:33	SOC1	GIVE IT SLACK
7:28:39	R1	NEED ABOUT 4 FEET OF SLACK
7:28:43	SOC1	SLACK COMING TO YOU
7:31:07	R1	HAUL TEAM GIVE ME 2 MORE FEET OF SLACK
7:31:11	SOC1	HAUL TEAM COPIES 2 MORE FEET
7:31:48	HZM1-P1	YOU GOT YOUR SLACK PULL IT
7:31:53	SOC1	SOC1 PULL YOUR SLACK
7:31:59	R1	COPY
7:32:55	R1	HAUL TEAM PREPARE TO HAUL.....HAUL
7:33:01	SOC1	COPY HAUL
7:33:21	R1	CONTINUE HAUL
7:33:23	SOC1	STOP, COPY STOP
7:33:34	R1	CONTINUE TO HAUL
7:33:36	SOC1	COPY HAUL
7:33:51	R1	STOP
7:33:53	SOC1	COPY STOP
7:34:31	RA	CAN WE GET A FOOT OF SLACK?
7:34:35	SOC1	COPY SLACK
7:35:10	R1	HOLD WHAT YOU GOT
7:35:13	SOC1	COPY YOU WANT US TO TAKE UP SLACK OR CONTINUE HAULING
7:35:19	R1	TAKE UP JUST A LITTLE BIT OF SLACK
7:36:20	R1	HAUL TEAM I NEED 3 FEET OF SLACK
7:36:23	SOC1	COPY 3 FOOT SLACK COMING YOUR WAY
7:36:35	HZM1-P1	TAKE YOUR SLACK
7:36:39	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1, REPEAT YOUR MESSAGE
7:36:46	R1	TAKE UP YOUR SLACK
7:36:51	R1	COPY THAT'S GOOD, PREPARE TO HAUL

7:36:51	SOC1	COPY PREPARE TO HAUL
7:37:02	R1	HAUL TEAM HAUL
7:37:05	SOC1	COPY HAULING
7:37:07	R1	STOP
7:37:09	SOC1	STOP
7:37:49	R1	GIVE ME A FOOT OF SLACK
7:37:52	SOC1	COPY 1 FOOT OF SLACK COMING YOUR WAY
7:38:00	R1	PREPARE TO HAUL
7:38:04	SOC1	PREPARING TO HAUL
7:38:07	R1	HAUL
7:38:10	SOC1	COPY HAUL
7:38:21	R1	STOP...GIVE IT SLACK...SLACK
7:38:26	SOC1	COPY SLACK COMING YOUR WAY
7:38:32	SQ26-P1	SQ26 COMMAND
7:38:42	SQ26-P1	SQ26 RESCUE BRANCH
7:38:48	BC6	SQ26 GO WITH YOUR MESSAGE
7:38:51	SQ26-P1	WE HAVE 1 MEMBER EXTRICATED
7:38:56	T10-P2	T23 HAULING GET ABOUT A FOOT SLACK ON THAT LINE
7:39:03	SOC1	COPY SLACK COMING YOUR WAY
7:39:15	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1 PULL THE SLACK TOWARDS YOUR WAY
7:39:20	R1THAT LINE
7:39:25	R1	R1 SOC1 GO WITH WHAT YOU GOT
7:39:31	SOC1	SOC1 COPY HOLDING WHAT WE HAVE
7:39:35	R1	R1 1 VICTIM REMOVED, WE LOCATED THE OTHER VICTIM, THEY ARE HEAVILY ENTRAPPED WE GONNA HAVE TO START HAND DIGGING AT THIS TIME

Shortly after sunrise, a member from Truck 23 reported verbally that his Lieutenant was unaccounted for. A verbal message was sent to the personnel inside of the structure inquiring if Lieutenant Butrim was participating in the rescue. It was relayed that he was not involved in the rescue operation, and therefore was identified as the fourth trapped member.

Suppression activities continued as engine companies attempted to extinguish tough to reach hot spots burning below the rescue efforts.



Figure 55 Members attempting to extinguish fire below rescue efforts (Howard Meile)



Figure 56 Side Alpha of the dwelling (Howard Meile)

At 07:17 hours, under the guidance of SOC, Truck 23 repositioned their aerial ladder over the center of the fire building. This allowed a member of Rescue 1 to lower a life safety rope from Truck 23’s aerial to the awaiting members on the interior. Members on the exterior assembled a 3 to 1 haul system with mechanical advantage and while utilizing Truck 23’s aerial ladder as a high directional²², they were able to lift and ultimately free FF/PM Lacayo.



Figure 57 SOC 1 assisting with the high directional
(Howard Meile)



Figure 58 Truck 23 being used as high directional (Howard Meile)

Clear and direct communication played a key part in the success of this operation. At 07:27:09 hours, the Rescue Branch supervisor took control of the fireground channel by ordering for radio silence. This was required due to the challenge of coordinating the lifting operation without a direct line of sight. The Lieutenant of Rescue 1 had to oversee the lifting operation from the interior of the fire building, as SOC 1 had to direct the hauling operation from the exterior of the building. At 07:38:51 hours, Squad 26 reported that FF/PM Lacayo was extricated and at 07:39:35 hours, Rescue 1 reported that he had been removed from Side Alpha of the building. FF/PM Lacayo was then transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma by Medic 1.

²² Specific to this incident, the high directional is indicative of using an aerial ladder with a rope system, which utilizes a change of direction (using a pulley) in the system that is placed at the tip of the aerial ladder.



Figure 59 Side Alpha as FF/PM Lacayo is removed (Howard Meile)




Figure 60 CitiWatch Camera view of FF/PM Lacayo in stokes basket

The removal of FF/PM Lacayo created access to Acting Lieutenant Sadler, who was located partially beneath him. Rescue 1 reported that she was heavily trapped. Members started to dig through the debris by hand.

205 S. STRICKER STREET




Figure 61 ATF Diagram showing approximate locations

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
7:42:02	CAR5	COMMAND TO BCEMS AS SOON AS M4 TRANSPORTS LETS GET ANOTHER MEDIC IN PLACE
7:42:09	BCEMS	2ND MEDIC ALREADY STANDING BY SIR AND WAITING
7:47:03	OEM1	RESCUE TO BC6
7:47:08	BC6	BC6
7:47:11	OEM1	COMMAND IS GONNA SEND FRESH BODIES TO THE CHARLIE SIDE, START RELIEVING SOME OF THESE GUYS INSIDE ON THE PILE BUT OUT OF THE CHARLIE DIVISION SEND THEM OUT THE BACK
7:47:23	BC6	COPY
7:47:32	BC3	OPERATIONS TO THE CHARLIE SIDE, DO YOU HAVE FRESH BODIES ON THE REAR DID WE SWITCH OUT?
7:47:42	BC6	AFFIRMATIVE
7:47:48	OEM1	CHARLIE DIVISION DO ONE FOR ONE SWAPS, DON'T ADD ANY ADDITIONAL PEOPLE
7:47:57	BC3	COMMAND TO T16 ARE YOU ON THE CHARLIE SIDE?
7:48:11	BC3	COMMAND TO R1 ARE YOU INVOLVED WITH THE RESCUE OR ARE YOU ON THE EXTERIOR
7:48:23	BC3	COMMAND TO T25 ARE YOU IN THE DELTA EXPOSURE? I NEED YOU TO REPORT TO

205 S. STRICKER STREET

		THE FRONT OF THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING
7:48:32	T25-P1	T25 WILL BE MEETING YOU IN FRONT OF THE FIRE BUILDING
7:48:37	BC3	COPY
7:48:40	BC6	BC6 TO COMMAND HAVE 14 ENGINES LINES SHUT DOWN 1ST
7:48:48	BC3	OK THE PUMP OPERATOR IS DOING IT RIGHT NOW
7:49:02	BC3	T16 T25 JUST STAND BY AND WAIT ON ORDERS FROM COMMAND
7:49:15	T25-P1	T25 DIRECT
7:49:34	T16-P1	T16-1 T16-P4
7:49:48	BC3	COMMAND TO T8, WHATS YOUR LOCATION?
7:49:55	T8-P1	T8 WE ARE IN BRAVO EXPOSURE
7:49:59	BC3	OK COPY THAT
7:51:10	R1	R1 TO OPS, CAN I GET SOME MEMBERS TO BRING US TRENCH SHOVELS TO THE REAR
7:51:38	T16-P1	T16-1 TO T6-4
7:51:46	OEM1	RESCUE TO BC6 "REPEATS"
7:52:00	BC6	BC6
7:52:04	OEM1	I'M SENDING SOC PERSONEL BACK TO YOU, I WANT THEM TO BE SENT IN
7:52:13	BC6	I GOTTA GET OTHER PEOPLE OUT
7:54:50	R1	RESCUE1 HAUL TEAM, WE STILL ANYBODY ON LINE
7:54:55	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1 HAUL TEAM IS HEADING BACK TO THE TRUCK
7:55:02	T6-P1	NEED SLACK ON THE HAUL LINE
7:55:07	SOC1	COPY SLACK WILL BE COMING TO YOU SHORTLY
7:56:05	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1 DO YOU HAVE SLACK
7:56:12	R1	THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE
7:59:02	R1	R1 TO THE HAUL TEAM, I WANT YOU TO HAUL BUT HAUL SLOW
7:59:08	SOC1	COPY HAUL BUT HAUL SLOW
7:59:21	R1	STOP
7:59:28	SOC1	COPY STOP
7:59:32	R1	GIVE ME SLACK HAUL TEAM.....4 FEET
7:59:38	SOC1	COPY GIVING YOU SLACK
7:59:46	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1 YOU WANT US TO HAUL?
7:59:52	R1	NEGATIVE NEED MORE SLACK
7:59:55	SOC1	COPY MORE SLACK COMING TO YOU
8:03:16	SOC1	URGENT, EVERYBODY IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING BACK AWAY
8:03:30	FCB	"TONE3" UNITS ON BOX ALARM 55-10 ALL UNITS IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING BACK AWAY [REPEAT]
8:04:19	R1	R1 TO THE HAUL TEAM GIVE ME ABOUT A FOOT SLACK
8:04:25	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1, REPEAT YOUR MESSAGE
8:04:30	R1	WE'RE GOOD
8:05:10	CAR5	COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS, CAN WE GET A BUILDING INSPECTOR TO MY LOCATION
8:05:17	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED BUILDING INSPECTOR 8:05

205 S. STRICKER STREET

8:06:16	R1	R1 TO SOC1 PREPARE TO HAUL
8:06:22	SOC1	COPY PREPARING TO HAUL
8:06:26	R1	HAUL SLOW I'M GONNA KEEP AN OPEN MIC SO IF WE YELL STOP, STOP IMMEDIATELY
8:06:35	SOC1	SOC1 TO BC6 ANY PERSONNEL WHO ARE NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED PULL THEM OUT OF THE CHARLIE SIDE
8:06:45	R1	STOP
8:06:47	SOC1	SOC1 STOP
8:06:55	R1	3 FEET OF SLACK
8:06:58	SOC1	SOC1 COPIES SLACK
8:09:12	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1, WHATS YOUR ETA TO GETTING THE TRAPPED FIREFIGHTER OUT?
8:09:22	R1	WE GOT THE MAJORITY OF THE UPPER BODY EXPOSED WE ARE JUST TRYING TO GET THE HEAD EXPOSED SO WE CAN HOOK HER UP
8:09:28	SOC1	COPY
8:10:32	SOC1	SOC1 TO THE CAPTAIN OF T6, ANY PERSONEL WHO ARE NOT ACTIVELY ENGAGED DIRECT THEM OUT THE BACK
8:10:43	T6-P1	COPY
8:11:34	CAR5	COMMAND TO BC6 IN THE REAR I WANT THOSE PEOPLE OUT OF THAT BUMP OUT
8:12:56	BC6	BC6 TO OPERATIONS LOOKS LIKE THEY ARE GONNA BRING A VICTIM OUT THE REAR GONNA NEED A MEDIC BACK HERE
8:14:16	R1	R1 SOC1 PREPARE TO HAUL
8:14:21	SOC1	SOC1 COPIES PREPARE TO HAUL
8:15:27	SOC1	SOC1 TO R1
8:15:31	R1	1 WE ARE GETTING ANOTHER POINT OF CONTACT, GIVE US 1 SECOND
8:15:38	CAR5	COMMAND TO OPERATIONS, NEED YOU IN THE FRONT
8:16:14	R1	R1 TO SOC1 HAUL SLOW
8:16:17	SOC1	COPY HAULING SLOW
8:16:20	R1	(OPEN MIC...GET THAT STOKES BASKET....)
8:16:41	R1	STOP
8:16:43	SOC1	COPY STOP
8:17:02	R1	SLACK 2 FEET
8:17:06	SOC1	COPY SLACK COMING TO YOU
8:17:16	R1	1 MORE FOOT OF SLACK
8:17:21	SOC1	COPY YOU HAVE SLACK COMING TO YOU JUST PULL IT
8:18:14	CAR5	*COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS, 205 S CALHOUN ST WE HAD A 3 STY BRICK FULLY INVOLVED, WE HAD A COLLAPSE, 4 INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE TRAPPED, WE HAVE 3 OUT, 1 STILL UN ACCOUNTED FOR, WE ARE EVACUATING BUILDING AND IT WILL BE RECOVERY MODE

*Car 5 incorrectly reported the incident address.

Efforts to remove Acting Lieutenant Sadler were similar to those used to free FF/PM Lacayo. Many of the members dispatched on the first alarm had been working for over two hours to remove the trapped members.

At 07:47 hours, requests were made to Incident Command to relieve exhausted personnel that had been operating since the collapse occurred. Additional personnel were sent to Side Charlie of the fire building to effect relief.

At 07:51 hours, the Lieutenant of Rescue 1 called for trench shovels to assist in the hand digging and clearing of debris. Members worked for approximately forty minutes to free Acting Lieutenant Sadler. The haul system with the high directional was used again to assist in lifting Acting Lieutenant Sadler from the debris pile. She was placed in a stokes basket and removed from Side Charlie of the building.

At 08:18 hours, the Incident Commander reported that Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler had been removed from the building. She was transported to University of Maryland Shock Trauma by Medic 4.



Figure 62 CitiWatch camera view of Acting Lieutenant Sadler being placed in medic unit

Daylight allowed Incident Command to get a clear view of the damage. The structural stability of the building was extremely compromised. It was then decided to allow rescue personnel to quickly assess the area to determine if there was any sign of Lieutenant Butrim. There were no visible indications of his location. After a short period, Incident Command ordered all members to evacuate the building; declaring that the rescue operation had concluded and would be transitioning to recovery mode. This decision was supported by the partial collapse of the rear Delta party wall.




Figure 63 The rear Delta Side party wall prior to collapse looking in from front door on Side Alpha (FIB)




Figure 64 The rear Delta Side party wall presented significant bowing (FIB)



Figure 65 The rear Delta Side party wall after secondary collapse looking in from front door on Side Alpha (ATF)

Over the course of the incident, multiple outside agencies had been arriving on scene. It was not clear to the BOI how these agencies fit within the Unified Command System.



Figure 66 Representatives from the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) on scene (Howard Meile)

205 S. STRICKER STREET

TIME	UNIT	TRANSMISSION
8:18:34	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED COMMAND 8:18
8:19:55	BC3	OPERATIONS TO RESCUE, CAN YOU MEET ME IN THE BRAVO EXPOSURE
8:21:17	OEM1	RESCUE TO BC6
8:21:24	BC6	BC6
	OEM1	OTHER THAN THE CREW THAT IN THE ALPHA SIDE DOORWAY WORKING PULL EVERYBODY OUT, EVERYBODY OUT THE CHARLIE SIDE THAT'S NOT COMMITTED
8:23:33	CAR5	COMMAND TO SAFETY
8:26:21	BC3	OPERATIONS TO R1 GOING TO NEED YOU MOVE YOUR ROPE RIG FROM THE AERIAL 23 TRUCK, WE ARE GOING TO REPLACE AND START MOVING AROUND APPARATUS WE HAVE TO MAKE ROOM FOR HEAVY EQUIPMENT COMING DOWN FROM THE SOUTH SIDE OF STRICKER ST
8:26:40	R1	R1 I COPY
8:28:31	CAR5	AIDE TO CAR5 TO ALL 2ND ALARM COMPANIES, START PACKING AND GO IN SERVICE
8:30:00	BC3	OPERATIONS TO EVERY OFFICER OPERATING ON THE FIRE GROUND MEET ME BY AF1 AT THE TABLE, WE ARE GOING TO REGROUP, I NEED THAT TO HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY
8:37:45	CAR5	COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS, DISPATCH BOX 414 THEY ARE ON THE SCENE MCHENRY AND STRICKER ST
8:39:03	BC3	OPERATIONS TO EMS6 I'M GONNA NEED YOU TO RELOCATE YOUR VEHICLE
8:43:37	SOC1	SOC1 TO THE OFFICERS OF SQ26 SQ54 SQ40 T6 R1, REPORT TO THE FRONT OF T6
8:53:03	DC9	DC9 TO BCEMS
8:57:22	CAR5	COMMAND TO OPERATIONS
8:57:27	BC3	OPERATIONS
8:57:30	CAR5	LET'S GET ALL THE REMAINING MEMEBERS ON THE FIRE GROUND TO MEET CHIEF FORD AT STRICKER AND WEST PRATT, ALL MEMBERS
8:57:41	BC3	OPERATIONS COPY, OPERATIONS TO ALL MEMBERS MEET CHIEF FORD AT STRICKER PRATT, PUT DOWN EVERYTHING YOU ARE DOING AND MEET IN THAT INTERSECTION
9:15:49	BC3	OPERATIONS ALL UNITS OPERATING ON THE FIRE GROUND, THE RETROGRADE PLAN WE ESTABLISHED ABOUT 40 MINUTES AGO WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE WITH THAT AND COMPLETE IT
9:43:41	BC3	OPERATIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS SPECIAL CALL TW1 HAVE THEM RESPOND TO OUR LOCATION NON-EMERGENCY COME IN FROM THE S SIDE OF STRICKER ST, STRICKER ST AND MCHENRY THAN COME UP TO THE ORIGINAL FIRE BUILDING
10:05:26	SQ26-P4	26 P4 RELOCATING YOUR VEHICLE SO EQUIPMENT CAN GET PASSED
10:07:25	BC6	BC6 TO COMMAND, I HAVE A TRACK HOE COMING UP THE STREET, YOU WANT THEM IN THE REAR OR IN THE FRONT
10:07:34	CAR5	WE WANT THEM IN THE FRONT ALPHA SIDE

205 S. STRICKER STREET

10:07:4 1	BC6	OK, WE NEED R1 TO MOVE, R1 AND COMMAND 1 MOVED
10:07:5 9	CAR5	BRING THEM UP MCHENRY ST
10:10:0 5	BC3	OPS TO TOWER 1
10:10:0 9	TW1	TOWER 1
10:10:1 1	BC3	PROCEED TO THE FRONT
10:35:4 3	BC6	BC6 TO T23, CAN YOU SEND 1 OF YOUR MEMBERS DOWN TO YOUR TRUCK
10:35:5 1	T23- P3	COPY
10:44:0 5	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 RAISE THE BUCKET AND STAND BY WE GOING TO HAVE GET E14 MOVED
		AFTER WE...SHORT INVESTIGATION
10:46:4 3	SQ54- P1	ROOF TO SOC1 I'M IN POSITION
10:49:2 2	TW1	TW1 SOC1 ARE WE GO
10:49:3 0	SOC1	SOC1 TW1 THAT'S AFFIRMATIVE YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND START
11:00:0 7	SQ54- P1	ROOF TO SOC1
11:00:1 0	SOC1	SOC1 GO AHEAD
11:00:1 3	SQ54- P1	THEY HAVE NO STABILITY ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE SECOND FLOOR, SO WHEN THEY
		PULL IT THEY ARE GOING TO PULL A WHOLE SECTION OF IT
11:00:2 1	SOC1	COPY ARE YOU ADVISING US 3RD AND 2ND FLOOR ARE GOING TO GO?
11:00:2 6	SQ54- P1	WHEN THEY PULL IT THE FRONT SECTION ALL THE WAY DOWN TO THE 2ND FLOOR
		JUST ABOVE THE 2ND FLOOR IS GOING TO COME DOWN WITH IT
11:00:3 4	SOC1	SOC1 TO TRUCK 1 YOU COPY
11:00:3 9	TW1	COPY
11:01:0 2	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 JUST MAKE SURE YOUR BUCKET NOT GONNA GET CAUGHT IF THE TOP
		OF THAT THIRD COMES OUT
11:04:3 0	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 STANDBY
11:05:0 4	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 YOU THINK WE MAKE A CUT ON THE BRAVO WALL

205 S. STRICKER STREET

11:07:3 2	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 GO AHEAD AND RAISE YOUR BUCKET ABOVE THAT ROOF LINE AND THEN
		HOOK AND PULL AWAY, MAKE SURE THAT BUCKET IS CLEAR OF THE BUILDING
11:10:0 2	SOC1	SOC1 TO TW1 KEEP WORKING YOUR WAY DOWN
11:11:4 0	SQ54- P1	ROOF TO SOC1 WE HAVE MOVEMENT ON SIDE BRAVO FRONT WALL
11:29:5 7	SQ54- P1	ROOF TO OPERATIONS
11:30:0 4	BC3	OPS GO AHEAD
11:30:0 6	SQ54- P1	WE ARE WORK ON GETTING A LINE UP T16 STICK GOT ACTIVE FIRE IN THE ROOF LINE SHOWING
11:30:2 4	BC3	OPERATIONS TO E36 ARE YOU IN A POSITION TO GET A LINE UP T16 AERIAL
11:30:4 0	E36- P1	COPY
11:36:3 7	BC3	OPS TO 36 TRY TO KEEP THAT HOSE STREAM AWAY FROM THEM WORKING IN THE FRONT
11:40:4 8	BC3	OPS TO T16...REPORT TO THE FRONT WITH HOOKS, PROBABLY GONNA NEED THE
		8 OR 10 FOOT HOOKS
11:41:0 8	T16- P1	COPY
11:48:5 5	BC3	OPS TO 36 YOU GOTTA GET OFF THAT ROOF
11:53:0 2	BC3	OPS TO FIRE ACADEMY VAN, COME OVER TO THE FRONT
12:15:2 2	SOC1	SOC1 TO SQ54 P1 CAN YOU GO BACK UP TO YOUR POSITION?
12:58:5 4	BC3	OPERATIONS TO ALL UNITS OPERATING ON THE FIRE GROUND, SHUT DOWN YOUR
		APPARATUS UNLESS YOU REALLY NEED IT
13:26:4 8	BC3	OPS TO T16 GOING TO NEED YOU TO MOVE
13:27:0 0	SQ54- P1	ROOF TO OPERATIONS YOU WANT ME DOWN 1ST?
13:27:1 1	CAR5	COMMAND TO ROOF, YEAH WE WANNA CLEAR THIS BUILDING ON THE BRAVO SIDE
13:27:1 9	SQ54- P1	WE ARE GETTING READY TO TAKE IT DOWN
		COPY THERES TOOLS AND HOSE UP HERE YET
13:27:2 3	CAR5	OK WE GOT TIME LETS PULL ALL EQUIPMENT AND GET IT ALL OUT OF THE WAY AND
		SET UP A COLLAPSE ZONE BECAUSE ITS GONNA GO TOWRDS PRATT STREET WHEN
		THEY TAKE IT DOWN

205 S. STRICKER STREET

15:14:06	R1	R1 TO COMMAND, WE CAN START TO HEAR THE PASS DEVICE NOW
15:31:09	SQ54-P1	SQ54 TO THE ENGINE WITH ALLEY LINE SIDE CHARLIE CAN YOU GIVE ME A LITTLE BIT OF PRESSURE ON THAT LINE?
15:31:20	R1	54 HOLD UP ON THAT LINE
15:44:14	R1	R1 SOC1
15:44:19	SOC1	SOC1
15:44:22	R1	1 SENT OUT TO GET A HAULING SYSTEM DO YOU KNOW THE PROGRESS ON THAT
15:44:28	SOC1	HE'S STANDING IN FRONT OF THE BUILDING
16:08:53	CAR5	COMMAND TO COMMUNICATIONS, AS REPORTED BEFORE 205 S STRICKER ST HAD A COMPLETE BURN OUT, 3 STORY WITH COLLAPSE, WE HAD 4 MEMBERS TRAPPED, LAST MEMBER HAS BEEN EXTRICATED; YOU CAN PLACE THIS INCIDENT AND FIRE UNDER CONTROL
16:09:13	FCB	MESSAGE RECEIVED FIRE UNDER CONTROL 16:09

Requests were made for heavy construction equipment to respond to the scene. At 08:26:21 hours, heavy equipment started to arrive. At 09:43:41 hours, Operations requested that Tower 1 respond to the incident. This required the relocation of Truck 23 and other Fire Department units to create access on Side Alpha of the building.

Beginning at approximately 10:50 hours, these resources were used in the complete removal of the Side Alpha wall of the original fire building and the chimney from the Side Delta exposure building. This was a slow meticulous process, which took the better part of an hour. Members assisted with hooks in pulling down the final sections of the Side Alpha wall.



Figure 67 Tower 1 in position to assist with removal of Side Alpha while. Member was positioned on the aerial of Truck 16 as another set of eyes (Stanley Jaworski)



Figure 68 Contractors working on cutting through bricks on Side Alpha (Stanley Jaworski)



Figure 69 Hooks were used to remove large sections that were cut with saw (Stanley Jaworski)



Figure 70 Bricks from third floor Side Alpha have been removed (Stanley Jaworski)



Figure 71 Bricks from second floor Side Alpha removed (Stanley Jaworski)



Figure 72 Members work on removing bricks from first floor of Side Alpha (Stanley Jaworski)




Figure 73 Large pile of bricks and debris on Side Alpha (Stanley Jaworski)

An excavator was then used to pull back large pieces of debris from the first floor of the original fire building. At approximately 12:06 hours, SOC personnel deployed a search camera into void spaces located near the front door in an attempt to locate Lieutenant Butrim.




Figure 74 Removing large sections of debris from the interior of the structure (CitiWatch)



Figure 75 Void space at front door that was searched with camera (FIB)

Concerns remained regarding the structural stability of both the original fire building and the exposures. At approximately 14:06 hours, the excavator was again used to remove the damaged cornice from the Side Bravo exposure roof. This was done to reduce the overhead hazard in anticipation of search operations resuming in the main fire building.




Figure 76 Removal of sections from the Bravo Side exposure (Stanley Jaworski)

Shortly after 15:00 hours, Incident Command allowed members back into the fire building to recover Lieutenant Butrim. This resulted from consultation with SOC and SRO Team personnel. Using the bucket from the excavator as overhead protection, members continued to work in an area with the potential for additional collapse. At 15:14:06 hours, the Lieutenant of Rescue 1 reported, “We can start to hear the pass device now”. Members worked arduously to cut and hand dig through the final layers that trapped Lieutenant Butrim. Once completely freed, Lieutenant Butrim was placed into a stokes basket and passed by members to the exterior. He was then transported to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner by Medic 27. At 16:08:53 hours, Incident Command reported the last member had been extricated. At 16:09 hours, Incident Command reported “You can place this incident and fire under control.”



Figure 77 Members gather in front of dwelling awaiting the removal of Lieutenant Butrim (Stanley Jaworski)

Operational Times for the Rescue & Recovery

The following is the order and duration of time to remove the trapped members from the fire building. The challenges that BCFD Members faced this day were extreme and never experienced in over 65 years of Departmental history.

1. The duration of EMT/FF John McMaster’s rescue was approximately 14 minutes.
2. The duration of FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo’s rescue was approximately 90 minutes.
3. The duration of Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler’s rescue was approximately 130 minutes.
4. The duration of Lieutenant Butrim’s recovery was approximately 10 hours and 8 eight minutes.

Fire Classification

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Baltimore Field Division, along with partners from the Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore City Police Department, and Maryland Office of the Fire Marshal investigated the origin and cause of the fire. The fire has been classified as incendiary.²³ The ATF identified a person of interest and at the end of the BOI's investigation, the criminal investigation was ongoing.

Injury Report

EMT/Firefighter John McMaster suffered numerous injuries, including a severe concussion and burns to his neck, back, right leg, and chest. In addition, he registered high levels of Carbon Monoxide.

The Board of Inquiry was not provided with any official documentation regarding injuries/cause of death for Lieutenant Butrim, Acting Lieutenant Sadler, and FF/PM Lacayo.

²³ Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearm's News Release Wednesday, April 13, 2022. (See Appendix #32)

Findings and Recommendations

On February 7, 2022, at the request of Chief Ford, the Board of Inquiry (BOI) began their investigation into the Stricker Street incident. Over the course of eight months, the BOI worked to develop recommendations for change within the Department. The BOI's goal was to learn from the incident and define specific recommendations that could be shared with the Department.

The BOI focused on several areas during the investigation. First, we worked on identifying current policies and procedures that were not followed or carried out during the incident. The BOI also identified new policies and procedures that should be implemented because of the incident.

After the initial two weeks of interviews and investigation, at the request of Chief Ford, the BOI provided the Department with a list of immediate recommendations. The immediate recommendations were based directly on the information obtained from the interviews and information obtained during those first two weeks of the investigation. The BOI presented these immediate recommendations to Chief Ford and the Command Staff on March 22nd, 2022.

The BOI's final recommendations are based off interviews conducted with members who were on the incident, 911 calls, transcripts from the incident, videos, and still photos from the incident. The goal of this investigation was not to find fault, but to better prepare for the future and prevent a tragedy like this from reoccurring.

The recommendations address key issues within the Department that include Operations, Communications, Technology, and Special Operations Command (SOC).

Moving forward, the Department faces the major challenge of successfully implementing these recommendations and helping the Department and its members grow and heal from this incident. Some of the recommendations will require great change, culturally and operationally. The BOI has recommended changes that affect members at every level of the Department. Many of the recommendations found in this report can also be found in past reports about close calls and line of duty deaths in the Baltimore City Fire Department. **The BOI urges all members to review and familiarize themselves with these reports (See chart on next page).**

There must be a renewed commitment to leadership, accountability, safety, and professionalism at every level of the Department to bring these recommendations to fruition and solve some of the chronic issues the Department has been dealing with for years.

COMPARISON OF PREVIOUS BCFD REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 205 S. Stricker Street Incident	FACETS Report November 2021	Glover Street Near Miss February 27, 2019	LT James Bethen Line of Duty Death November 12, 2014	3908 Liberty Heights Near Miss April 7, 2010	East Avenue Near Miss January 15, 2010	Rachel Wilson Line of Duty Death February 9, 2007	Alan Roberts Line of Duty Death October 10, 2006
Recommendation: Incident Command Technician (Aide)	X	X	X	X	X		X
Recommendation: Portable Radios - Technology, Capability and Accountability		X		X	X	X	X
Recommendation: Incident Command - Command Post		X	X	X	X		
Recommendation: Accountability and Electronic Accountability Program	X	X	X		X		
Recommendation: Staffing	X		X	X	X		
Recommendation: Rapid Intervention Team - RIT Training	X		X	X	X		
Recommendation: Incident Command - IAP / Operational Risk Assessment	X		X		X		
Recommendation: Safety Officer	X		X				X
Recommendation: Vacant Building - Inspection, Marking and Notification	X	X	X				
Recommendation: Mayday/Rapid Intervention Team - Roles and Responsibilities	X	X			X		
Recommendation: Training - Professional Development		X	X		X		
Recommendation: Incident Command - Advisory Role		X	X				
Recommendation: Empowerment	X					X	
Recommendation: Incident Command - Specialized Resources and Mutual Aid	X						
Recommendation: Training - Thermal Imagine Camera Training					X		
Recommendation: Training - Special Operations Command (SOC) Training	X						

The chart above depicts similar findings from previous Departmental reports that investigated close calls and line of duty deaths in the Baltimore City Fire Department. The chart highlights common themes within the Department and could be used as a tool for prioritizing future action plans.

The BOI understands that the amount of work associated with each recommendation is enormous. Therefore, our first recommendation includes the creation of several different work groups to assist in assessing, planning, developing, and implementing many of the recommendations in this report. However, the success of those work groups depends greatly on the level of cooperation they receive from the different divisions within the Department. Once again, a renewed commitment from everyone in the Department is vital.

Finally, the BOI is fully aware of all the hard work and effort that has occurred since the incident on January 24, 2022. The Department acted on several of the BOI's immediate recommendations, and they continue to work on rolling out information related to others. Additional information about the Department's efforts can be found in the section titled *Since the Incident*.

WORK GROUP CREATION

Findings

Through our investigation, the BOI found that there are several areas that could benefit from the creation of work groups, involving members at all levels of the Department, to evaluate the status of resources in the Department and provide recommendations for improvement.

Recommendations

- Create the following work groups to assist in assessing, planning, developing, and implementing many of the recommendations listed below:
 - After Action Review - The mission of the work group would be to comply with MOP 602-13 and assist the Chief of the Fire Department in conducting investigations of Near Miss, Mayday, and any other incident the Chief deems necessary for the purposes of assessing and improving Fire Department operations and member safety. Also, the work group could be responsible for completing the detailed Post Incident Analysis and alleviate Incident Commanders of this task. (See Appendix #20)
 - Technology - The mission of the work group would be to assess the effectiveness of the technology and systems currently used, identify areas where improvement is needed, and research existing and evolving technology to determine whether investing in new technology would improve operational safety, efficiency, and effectiveness.
 - Communications - The mission of the work group would be to create a joint effort between Fire Communications Bureau and field personnel to review and improve existing and future technologies of the Motorola radio system as well as ensuring operational procedures are aligned.
 - Special Operations Command - The mission of the work group would be to review the performance of the Special Operations Command (SOC) units and members following this incident. All phases of the incident should be evaluated for future best practices, specifically how the rescue and recovery operations were conducted.
 - Manual of Procedure (MOP) - The mission of the work group would be to assess the effectiveness of the current MOPs used in the Department and identify areas where improvement is needed.
 - SCBA - The mission of the work group would be to review the performance of the current PSS7000 SCBA system following this incident. The work group can evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, as well as identify areas where improvement is needed in the current Draeger system. The work group can also research what existing and evolving technology is available to assist the Fire Department in the future purchase of a new SCBA system.
 - Fire Prevention and Investigation - The mission of the work group would be to have each division collaborating to address issues with unsafe vacant buildings, data collection, prevention, and investigation.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Findings

After the plywood was removed from the front door, significant fire conditions were present on all three floors. The report from Side Charlie supported that the building was fully involved. There were also signs of a previous fire and structural instability. Units continued with an interior attack despite these conditions being present.

Recommendations

- Utilize NFPA 1500, *Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program* Section 5.1, to develop and train members on the elements of a risk management plan that applies to all Departmental operations and activities.
- Utilize USFA *Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service* (January 2018) as an additional reference for the development of the plan.
- The Department should ensure a proper scene size-up is completed prior to interior firefighting operations.
- Scene size-up should include a 360-degree size-up or a detailed report from Side Charlie when a 360-degree size-up is not possible.
- As part of the strategy and incident plan, Incident Commanders should ensure a detailed size-up and risk assessment occurs during initial fireground operations, including the deployment of resources to Side Charlie.
- Risk versus benefit analysis should be an ongoing assessment during all incidents.
- Consider providing training that promotes situational awareness for our members when operating on the fireground.
- Consider providing training related to occupant survivability profiling.
- The initial Incident Commander, as well as Chief Officers who assume Command, should ensure that the strategy and tactics (incident action plan) match the conditions encountered during initial operations and throughout the incident.
- Develop and implement a standard operating procedure, tactics, and training program for responding to incidents in vacant buildings.
- Policies and training should reinforce the different operational modes as well as withdraw and evacuation procedures.

VACANT BUILDINGS – INSPECTION, MARKING & NOTIFICATION

Findings

There was no program or policy in effect that addressed notification to members of dwellings which were vacant and unsafe. The pilot program for Unsafe Vacant Buildings, established in 2010 by Departmental Order 102-10, was not continuously supported and never fully implemented throughout the Department. The absence of critical building information to responding units and the lack of a visual cue on the building was detrimental to the outcome of this fire.

Recommendations

- Implement a program/policy that requires units to do visual inspections in their districts to identify properties that may be considered unsafe, unstable, and a hazard to emergency personnel and the public. This program should include re-inspection criteria.
- Create an organized and systematic approach to inspections to ensure total coverage of each inspection district. Plan should initially focus on streets and areas with the greatest number of unsafe buildings to ensure they are documented.
- Reinstate the Code X-Ray program or a similar program that includes a marking system to warn members of dangerous buildings.
- Recommend using the standardized information found in Chapter 3 of the International Fire Code as a guide when developing a marking system. These markings are already cited in MOP 695-1 *Structural Collapse Incidents*. (see Appendix #27)
- Premise files in the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) program should have information of buildings that meet the criteria for “Unsafe Buildings”²⁴ and previous fires and should be relayed to companies during dispatch.
- Ensure all features and applications on the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) are available to units to assist in decision making and risk assessments.

²⁴ MOP 606-10 *Unsafe Buildings*, is an existing procedure, which directs the Safety Office to establish a list of unsafe buildings and to inform responding units of unsafe conditions existing at the location to which they are responding.

VACANT BUILDINGS – MITIGATION & TRACKING

Findings

The City of Baltimore has a high frequency of fires, many of them incendiary, in vacant buildings.

Recommendations

- Review current MOP 606-2, *Procedure for Dealing with Fire Damaged Buildings and Debris*. (See Appendix #22)
- Continue to work with other city agencies to develop strategies for the prevention and remediation of vacant/abandoned structures.
- Continue to work with other city agencies to develop strategies for arson prevention in vacant dwellings.
- Collaborate with other city agencies, using inspection data, to prioritize the mitigation of dilapidated buildings that pose a threat of exterior and/or interior collapse.
- Develop an accurate list of vacant buildings, both private and city owned. This list should accurately classify the buildings as vacant, unsafe or both.
- Continue to work with other city agencies to ensure that all vacant non-boarded buildings identified by suppression units are properly secured. Consideration should be given to securing roof openings that allow the elements to enter the building causing further damage.

VACANT BUILDINGS - OPERATIONS

Findings

There is no policy in place to address emergency operations at or within a vacant building. Members interviewed reported that they often face situations where they need to operate in and around unsafe vacant buildings not only on suppression responses but EMS responses as well.

Recommendations

- Develop a strong policy on emergency operations at and within vacant buildings. This policy should address firefighting, emergency medical services, and any other emergency and non-emergency operations.
- Ensure that all vacant buildings that members encounter are identified, reported, and marked.
- Follow existing procedures in MOP 602-13 *Unsafe Buildings*. (See Appendix #20)
- Units should provide Fire Communications Bureau the corrected incident address, as stated in MOP 601 *Fireground Operations and Command*, during the brief initial report. Fire Communications Bureau should then update the incident address in the CAD in order to allow the proper premise information to be viewed and provide pertinent information to units operating at such address. (See Appendix #10)

INCIDENT COMMAND TECHNICIAN

Findings

Battalion Chief 3 stated in his interview that he was task saturated. He was unable to read the MDT for any additional comments while responding to the incident. He also did not utilize a tactical worksheet/command board. For a significant period, he attempted to manage the suppression efforts, rescue operation, and maintain accountability without any assistance and exceeding the span of control. During interviews, Battalion Chief 3 reported feeling very overwhelmed, knew he was missing radio transmissions, and had a difficult time organizing the incident.

A single individual cannot effectively perform all tasks associated with Incident Command and Management, especially initially. Responsibilities for Incident Management begin at dispatch and include determining a response route, driving, accessing MDT for list of responding units and critical data such as unsafe building information, managing dynamic arrival of responding assets, formulating an action plan, tracking initial incident progress and unit accountability. These tasks cannot be performed safely or efficiently without support or while driving.

The lack of immediate assistance placed the Incident Commander in a compromised position due to missed critical information, observations, and actions. This resulted in the degradation of firefighter safety.

Technology creates additional demand on the Incident Commander. Monitoring this information will remove focus from continued safety assessments and often exceeds the abilities of even the most trained and experienced Chief Officers.

Per the National Fire Academy library, it is not practical or efficient to obtain a trained Incident Command Technician after arrival at an incident scene. On-scene firefighters are untrained and more importantly inexperienced. Their involvement in tasks such as accountability, while well-intentioned, cannot always be trusted.

Recommendations

- Comply with NFPA 1710 *Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments* by providing dedicated and assigned “Incident Command Technicians” to Battalion Chiefs. Establish a job description and training program in line with NFPA Standard 1710 Section 5.2.2.2.5, which states, “Supervisory chief officers shall have staff aides deployed to them for purposes of incident management and accountability at emergency incidents.” (See Appendix #30)
- Ensure that an immediate resource in the form of a dedicated “Incident Command Technician” is assigned to respond and arrive with the Incident Commander to initiate command support activities.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Findings

The Incident Command System was not utilized to its full potential leading to confusion regarding incident priorities, objectives, and leadership responsibilities. The Incident Commanders failed to provide assignments to arriving Chiefs resulting in self-assignment. This self-assignment led to an inefficient gathering of resources without knowledge of the Incident Commanders. This contributed to confusion, freelancing, and compounded the lack of accountability.

Recommendations

- The Incident Command System is a component of the National Incident Management System and should be utilized to expand the organizational structure of incidents based on size and complexity as well as operating environment.
- Ensure Incident Commanders are trained and familiar with the Incident Command System and its use. Periodic refresher training should be provided to Chief officers at every level.
- ICS should be routinely expanded to ensure that functional responsibilities are delegated and addressed in line with the objectives of the Incident Action Plan. ICS should be used on “minor” incidents to create familiarity and normalize its use.
- Ensure that a manageable span of control can be maintained by expanding the ICS with Branches, Divisions and Groups per MOP 611-1 *National Incident Management System (NIMS)*.
- Reconfigure and add a response profile including a recall policy for the BCFD Incident Management Team which will assist Incident Commanders with the management of large scale or complex incidents.

References

NFPA 1561 *Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* Sections 4.5.2 & 4.5.7, MOP 611-1 *National Incident Management Systems NIMS* (See Appendix #31&24)

INCIDENT COMMAND- INCIDENT ACTION PLAN/OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

Findings

The initial operational risk assessment missed key components that may have skewed a risk/benefit analysis affecting the Incident Action Plan. These components include structural damage/deterioration from previous fires, the building's extended time being vacant, and exposure to the elements. Additionally, it is unclear if members considered a survivability profile of the reported trapped occupants.

Recommendations

- Responding members, especially Incident Commanders, shall evaluate operational risks with respect to the purpose and potential results of their actions and incorporate this evaluation into the Incident Action Plan.
- Incident Commanders should perform a risk assessment and an ongoing risk/benefit analysis during incident operations and/or transfer of command to include structure age, type, construction, size, pre-existing structural damage/deterioration, occupancy, life hazards, value, extent of structural damage due to fire duration, fuel loads, probability of fire extension, effects of existing openings or ventilation. Significant attention must be given to the survivability profile of trapped occupants, structural integrity, and exclusion zones.
- All officers, and those members approved to act in that capacity, should be provided with ongoing training in critical thinking/decision making, risk assessment, and building construction with an emphasis on local features.
- All Chief officers, including the Command Staff, should receive training specific to their duties on response strategy and incident decision-making using simulation.

Reference

NFPA 1561 *Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety*
Section 5.3.18. NIOSH Row House Firefighting Tactics (see Appendix #31)

INCIDENT COMMAND- COMMAND POST

Findings

It was determined that a stationary, expandable command post was not established. Several senior Chief Officers, including the Incident Commander and Operations Chief, operated in and around the hot zone, including the collapse zone.

Recommendations

- Adhere to NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety*. (See Appendix #31)
- The Incident Commander must establish and maintain a command post outside of the structure to assign companies, delegate functions, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain of continued firefighting efforts.
- The command post should be in the cold zone and should be placed to establish presence and provide visibility per NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety*. (See Appendix #31)
- The Incident Commander should have the ability to monitor three radios at the fixed command post location per NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* Section 5.3.3. (See Appendix #31)
- Follow existing MOP's by establishing and identifying a fixed command post location per MOP 601 *Fireground Operations and Command*. (See Appendix #10)
- The Incident Commander, or his/her designee, should always be present at the command post.
- Mobile command boards should be provided to Battalion Chiefs and Car 5.
- Training should be provided to utilize the mobile command boards.

INCIDENT COMMAND- UNIFIED COMMAND

Findings

During interviews, members reported a lack of Unity of Command with multiple agencies operating on the scene. Individuals from partner agencies were attempting to lead specific rescue and recovery operations and provide direction of a technical nature with unknown credentials.

Recommendations

- Establish a Unified Command when incident complexity indicates the need to interact with multi-agency or multijurisdictional units.
- Ensure that a senior member of cooperating agencies reports to the command post and fully understands the IAP per MOP 611-1 *National Incident Management System (NIMS)*. (See Appendix #24)
- Ensure that operational boundaries are communicated to assisting agencies.
- Provide opportunities for command personnel from partnering agencies to meet and train regularly providing for better organization on actual incidents.

INCIDENT COMMAND- COMMUNICATIONS

Findings

Incident Commanders did not utilize additional talk groups to relieve congestion on the main fire ground channel. This contributed to task saturation and caused the Incident Commander to completely miss or mis-prioritize critical information. For instance, at 06:08 hours, there were nine radio transmissions, and five subscriber rejects in one minute on Fire Ground 1. (See Appendix #35)

Recommendation

- Follow existing procedures by assigning incident operations to a different talk group when deemed necessary, per MOP 602-13 *Mayday Procedures*. (See Appendix #20)
- Establish policies to ensure that FCB is monitoring important traffic such as PAR's and verifying that the correct units are answering via the push-to-talk identifier.
- Follow current procedures by ensuring that a Fire Communications Bureau supervisor is monitoring fireground talk group to provide backup for dispatcher and identify missed transmissions per MOP 602-13 *Mayday Procedures* and MOP 515-1 *Radio Operational Procedures*. (See Appendix #2)
- Provide Chief Officers with additional portable radios so that they can monitor talk groups in compliance with NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* 5.3.8.1 (2) stating, "The command post includes radio capability to monitor and communicate with assigned tactical, command, and designated emergency traffic channels for that incident." (See Appendix #31)

INCIDENT COMMAND- MAYDAY CHIEF

Findings

During interviews, it was determined that the initial interior rescue operation on Division 1 was unorganized. The lack of a command-designated supervisor assigned to the Interior Division created confusion over the operational rescue plan. The absence of a strong interior command presence led to a lack of accountability and increased risk taking during this highly emotional and dangerous rescue operation. Orders to reduce manpower or calls to evacuate were ignored which contributed to reduced member safety. It was also found that Interior Division access was at times unregulated at both Side Alpha and Side Charlie. This allowed an uncontrolled flow of members both into and out of the structure, which further degraded accountability. RIT operations are intense and require command, control, discipline, and skill to conduct properly. A strong command presence is necessary to marshal the efforts of those attempting the rescue. Chief Officers are a critical part of the RIT/Mayday incident and must take control of the operation.

Recommendations

- Ensure that MOP 602-13 *Mayday Procedures* is modified to include assigning a Battalion Chief to an interior division to better manage the RIT/Mayday operation, streamline communication, and assure accountability when multiple units are involved in rescue operations. (See Appendix #20)
- Comply with NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* 4.6.3 to ensure that MOP 602-13 *Mayday Procedures* is modified to include assigning an Access Control Officer to points of ingress or egress at an extended Mayday operation. (See Appendix #31)
- Ensure compliance with NFPA 1561 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* 4.6.7, “Supervisors assigned to specific geographical area shall be located in areas that allow each supervisor to maintain accountability of assigned resources.” (See Appendix #31)

INCIDENT COMMAND- ADVISORY ROLE

Findings

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and MOP 601-1 *Fireground Operations and Command* provide a provision which allows a ranking superior officer to forego assumption of Command. At 06:07 hours, Car 5 arrived on scene, made requests to Fire Communications Bureau and transmitted orders but did not immediately assume Command. This resulted in the Rescue Branch Chief being re-assigned to Safety leaving a critical role unfilled and confusion about who was designated as the formal Incident Commander. (See Appendix #11)

Recommendations

- Ensure that ranking officers are fully trained in the provisions of ICS and comply with MOP 601-1 *Fireground Operations and Command*. It must be clearly understood when incident complexity or severity indicates that the advisory role should be terminated.
- When superior officers assume an advisory role, they must resist the urge to give orders and make radio transmissions that would be misinterpreted by those on scene as coming from Incident Command.
- Provide training relating to situational awareness, critical thinking, and the Incident Management System tailored to the specific job of Staff Chiefs.

INCIDENT COMMAND- SPECIALIZED RESOURCES AND MUTUAL AID

Findings

Incident Commanders failed to recognize that the need for trained collapse technicians exceeded those that were on-scene during the rescue effort. Additional trained collapse technicians, who were off-duty, remained staged at Steadman Station and were not initially utilized. Interviews found that on-scene commanders neglected to call in off-duty collapse technicians. The need for collapse technicians exceeded the limited resources available internally. This need could have been satisfied by requesting mutual aid early in the incident. The failure to recognize these needs reduced options for building stabilization and limited operational depth as no relief could be provided for on-scene collapse technicians.

Recommendations

- Ensure that the Incident Commander recognizes the need for specialized disciplines and the possibility of limited resources available internally.
- Incident Commanders should request specialized mutual aid resources early into an incident to allow for operational depth and relief for initial specialized responders.
- Incident Commanders should be trained to recognize the need for specialized assets during low frequency events such as a building collapse.
- Special Operations Command (SOC) should provide the Incident Commander with a designee from SOC to assist in an advisory role.
- Include Incident Commanders in regular training conducted with mutual aid partners.
- Develop a formalized recall policy for off-duty members of SOC.
- Provide Incident Commanders with regularly updated information on available Departmental and regional assets.

SAFETY OFFICER

Findings

The BOI found that there were several issues with the current procedure of having the second-assigned Battalion Chief assume the role of Incident Safety Officer. At one point in the incident, Safety Officer 2 had assumed the role of Safety Officer, but the Incident Commander assigned the role back to the second-arriving Battalion Chief. Additional Safety Officers arrived on location but were not incorporated into the Incident Command System. Operations attempted to designate a collapse zone, but the orders were not followed or enforced. No additional safety officers were assigned to oversee suppression, rescue, and Special Operation Command (SOC) activities.

Recommendations

- Expand the staffing of the Fire Department Safety Office to provide a second on-duty safety officer to ensure a dedicated Safety Officer is on location in an acceptable time frame.
- The roles and expectations of the Safety Officer at an incident should expand as additional members of the Safety Office and SOC arrive on location.
- At a minimum, all shift Safety Officers should be trained to the site operations level of all SOC disciplines.

RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT) - RIT BAG

Findings

Members, especially those assigned to a single engine firehouse, reported being unfamiliar with RIT equipment because it is not readily available to them. Currently, only truck companies and Rescue 1 carry RIT bags. A total of five members were initially trapped by the collapse with only three RIT bags available on scene.

Recommendations

- Provide each suppression unit with their own RIT bag.

RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT) - RIT TRAINING

Findings

During interviews, members reported the need for more RIT training, specifically the need for more advanced RIT packaging and removal skills.

Recommendations

- Support a regularly conducted RIT Training Program for all members, to include MOP 602-13 *Mayday*. (See Appendix #13)
- The program should address the Incident Command Level and the Operational Level, specifically organization and management of RIT/Mayday operations.

References

NFPA 1407 (2015) *Standard for Training Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crews* establishes guidelines for annual training in RIT and mayday operations. NFPA 1407 (2015) *Standard for Training Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crews* Section 4.4.1 Rapid Intervention Training Policy and Procedures outlines that annual performance evaluations of RIT operations be conducted.

RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT) - SECOND RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM

Findings

A second Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was not immediately assigned after the activation of the first team.

Recommendations

- Ensure that a secondary RIT is assigned to the Rapid Intervention Group after the first RIT is deployed per MOP 602-08 *Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)*. (See Appendix #16)
- Deploy additional Rapid Intervention Teams by location or function based upon the complexity, magnitude, configuration of the structure, or geographical layout of the incident.

MAYDAY/RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT)- ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Findings

The collapse of the fire building resulted in the entrapment of Fire Department members. The Incident Commander declared a “Mayday” and immediately dispatched the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) to enter the fire building. With assistance from other units, the RIT removed the lead off firefighter from Engine 14. However, three additional members remained trapped inside the fire building. This resulted in multiple first alarm units being committed to the rescue effort. Command and control of the incident became extremely challenging.

Recommendations

- Consider having FCB automatically upgrade an incident to the next greater alarm or equivalent when a Mayday has been declared. A RIT operation is labor intensive and may require multiple units to complete the rescue.
- Update Command Board to include resources that may be required when members in distress are involved in specialized circumstances such as collapse (i.e. Airflex, Collapse Rescue, SRO Team, Mutual Aid, etc.)
- Consider when a Working Fire Dispatch is declared by the Incident Commander, automatically dispatching additional units (i.e. Truck Company, SOC Company) to reinforce the stand-alone RIT Engine Company in an effort to bolster RIT resources when an incident has expanded in size and severity.
- Consider assigning a Battalion Chief to the interior division to assist in managing the RIT operation as well as streamline communication when multiple units are involved. RIT operations are intense and require command, control, and discipline by all those involved. The Battalion Chief can ensure a strong command presence and marshal the efforts of the units performing the rescue.
- Consider defining an appropriate level of span of control for a member in distress (i.e. 2 units/8 firefighters to 1 member in distress). The effort is to monitor the number of members operating at one time, limit the members’ exposure to the inherent dangers of the event, and have the ability to perform member relief throughout the duration of the incident.

MAYDAY/RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT)- ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES (continued)

Findings (Repeated)

The collapse of the fire building resulted in the entrapment of Fire Department members. The Incident Commander declared a “Mayday” and immediately dispatched the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) to enter the fire building. With assistance from other units, the RIT removed the lead-off firefighter from Engine 14. However, three additional members remained trapped inside the fire building. This resulted in multiple first alarm units being committed to the rescue effort. Command and control of the incident became extremely challenging.

Recommendations

- Consider defining specific roles and responsibilities for each member of RIT, similar to the EMS Pit Crew model for CPR. Members’ duties could include maintaining the members head and airway, monitoring the RIT Air supply, and packaging.
- Consider assigning a Paramedic(s) to the RIT when a member is in serious distress. This would be an additional component to the RIT. The Paramedic would be responsible for the assessment and treatment of the member in distress.

RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT)- RIT EQUIPMENT AND STAGING AREA

Findings

During interviews, it was identified that additional equipment was needed early in the incident. As the incident progressed, a RIT staging area was created in the Bravo exposure which created a centralized location for equipment to be easily passed in and out of the dwelling. This proved to be an important aspect of the rescue.

Recommendations

- Create and identify a formal RIT staging area in the event of a complex incident such as a major collapse or involving a large geographic area. The purpose of this staging area is to allow for additional equipment and/or specialized equipment to be staged and accessible in an expedient fashion.
- Consider a second RIT staging area in order to effectively cover all sides of the building when access is limited.
- Consider assigning a unit to Logistics to assist in gathering the necessary equipment as well as track what is being used, damaged, or requires replacement.

AERIAL LADDER AS HIGH DIRECTIONAL

Findings

Truck 23's aerial ladder was successfully used as a high directional to assist rescuers in the extrication and packaging of trapped members. During interviews, members expressed concern regarding the ladder working angle and extension as well as ladder tip load rating.

Recommendations

- Consider defining a high directional operation a Special Operations skill. It requires strong familiarity with aerial ladder specifications and technical rope knowledge.
- Consider utilizing Tower 1 for incidents that would require a high directional to be deployed. The aerial platform has a 1000-lb payload capacity, at full extension 360°. Refer to TM 306 *Effective Tower Operations*.
- Consider calling Tower 1 early-on during incidents.
- Review manufacturer specifications for existing Fire Department aerial ladder devices.
- Consider developing a procedure in the Training Manual for utilizing Department aerial apparatus as a high directional for a rope operation.

EQUIPMENT

Findings

Interviews identified that gas-powered saws were ineffective due to the oxygen-deficient atmosphere within the building. The use of battery-operated tools was instrumental in the rescue. However, units did not have enough replacement batteries or capabilities to recharge their batteries on such an extended operation. There were some compatibility issues with different types of battery-operated tools used by the units. It was also found that the search camera available on scene was not properly maintained.

Recommendations

- Consider expanding the cache of battery-operated tools and batteries available to the Department.
- SOC should assess and update search camera and equipment to include a regular replacement plan.
- Focus should be put on SOC to ensure meeting current and future needs, especially in an urban setting that has an increased likelihood of utilizing SOC resources such as building collapse.
- Consider mutual aid for additional resources when deemed necessary.

PORTABLE RADIOS- TECHNOLOGY, CAPABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Findings

Members were not fully aware of the radio system's capabilities. In several instances, the Emergency Activation Button (EAB) could have been used to transmit critical information regarding changing incident conditions. It was also discovered that two of the trapped members were not in possession of the portable radios assigned to their riding position. The radios were later found in the apparatus.

Recommendations

- Strict enforcement of members wearing assigned portable radios by unit and Chief Officers per MOP 515-2-3 *Radio/Accountability*. (See Appendix #6)
- Educate members on the understanding and capabilities of the portable radios, to include allowing live use of the Emergency Activation Button during training.
- Review and update MOP 515-5 *Emergency Button*. (See Appendix #8)

SUPPLIED AIR CONNECTIONS

Findings

During interviews, members reported that they were unable to utilize the onboard long air line from the AIRFLEX due to lack of knowledge and non-compatible air connections.

Recommendations

- Ensure the correct connections are provided to both AIRFLEX units.
- Ensure the RIT training program covers the use of long air lines and air connections.
- Ensure air connections are brought to the RIT Staging Area.

SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS FEATURES & ACCESSORIES

Findings

Interviews with members who operated during the rescue operation discussed the difficulty identifying which member was trapped due to zero visibility and the physical position of the trapped members.

Recommendations

- Reprogram all SCBAs so the unit and riding position are displayed on the Sentinel, which is the Draeger datalogger.
- Continue the practice of providing and replacing the leather reflective SCBA identifiers.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ELECTRONIC ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM

Findings

After the collapse occurred, a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) was not completed for 41 minutes and not all members were accounted for at the conclusion. When the verbal PAR was conducted, it took approximately seven minutes to complete with Truck 23 Portable 1, Truck 25, Engine 13 and off-duty members being missed. The current procedure of having to respond verbally to a PAR request leaves the possibility of human error.

The current Accountability System is not set up to track off-duty members. It was determined that members self-dispatched on the incident and therefore were not accounted for through the duration of the incident.

Finally, after the collapse and subsequent Mayday, accountability tags were not collected.

Recommendations

- Comply with MOPs that are already in place:
 - MOP 602-9 *Personnel Accountability Report*
 - MOP 602-12 *Accountability Cards*
 - MOP 602-16 *Incident Timer*
(See Appendix #17,18&21)
- Ensure all personnel are accounted for prior to completing their unit's PAR.
- Change PAR requirement in MOP 602-16 from 40 minutes to 20 minutes.
- Pursue new technology to track and locate lost firefighters on the fire ground, such as an electronic firefighter accountability system.
- Consider utilizing Fire Communications Bureau to assist with initiating a PAR.
- Evaluate and implement current BCFD-owned electronic PAR's radio capabilities to increase accuracy of PAR and reduce radio traffic.
- Create a policy addressing off-duty members riding and/or responding to emergency incidents.
- Provide SOC members with a specialized accountability card when recalled off-duty.

FIRE COMMUNICATIONS BUREAU (FCB)

Findings

Fire Communications Bureau used the Standard Assignment instead of Routing Assignment when dispatching the first alarm. This caused units, including the Battalion Chiefs, to arrive out of order of dispatch. The routing assignment would have dispatched the closest units, which would have provided a more accurate arrival order of units.

Fire Communications Bureau incorrectly dispatched two engines, one truck, and a medic unit on the Working Fire. The Working Fire Dispatch also resulted in the Second Alarm Assignment being altered.

In addition, Fire Communications Bureau did not notify the Incident Commander that they were twenty minutes into the incident. According to MOP 602-16 *Incident Timer*, the twenty-minute timer prompts a reminder about situational awareness, personnel accountability reports, reassessment of tactical decisions, structural integrity, and rehabilitation.

Recommendations

- Ensure a written procedure is in place to form consistent dispatch procedures that dispatches the closest appropriate units.
- Ensure the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) program recommends the appropriate units in accordance with policies and recommended units are dispatched.
- Adhere to MOPs that are already in place:
 - MOP 602-16 *Incident Timer*
 - MOP 515-11 *Dispatch Procedures* (See Appendix #9&21)
- Update the following MOPs to reflect correct Talk Groups and Procedures:
 - MOP 515-2 *Dispatch Procedures*
 - MOP 515-2-1 *Sample Incidents*
 - MOP 515-2-2 *Talk Group Assignment Policy* (See Appendix #3,4&5)
- Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) should consider developing a formalized training program including ride-alongs, to enhance dispatcher awareness/understanding of Department operations.

FIRE COMMUNICATIONS BUREAU (FCB) (continued)

Findings (Repeated)

Fire Communications Bureau used the Standard Assignment instead of Routing Assignment when dispatching the first alarm. This caused units, including the Battalion Chiefs, to arrive out of order of dispatch. The routing assignment would have dispatched the closest units, which would have provided a more accurate arrival order of units.

Fire Communications Bureau incorrectly dispatched two engines, one truck, and a medic unit on the Working Fire. The Working Fire Dispatch also resulted in the Second Alarm Assignment being altered.

In addition, Fire Communications Bureau did not notify the Incident Commander that they were twenty minutes into the incident. According to MOP 602-16 *Incident Timer*, the twenty-minute timer prompts a reminder about situational awareness, personnel accountability reports, reassessment of tactical decisions, structural integrity, and rehabilitation.

Recommendations

- Consider increased staffing to reduce task saturation on FCB personnel.
- Consider adopting the EMS MDO Model and have a representative from suppression working in FCB to assist dispatchers with accountability, decision making and act in an advisory role when a complex event/incident takes place.

FIRE COMMUNICATIONS BUREAU (FCB)- MAYDAY

Findings

During the incident, a Personnel Accountability Report was not completed in a timely manner. Once initiated, the PAR was interrupted by unnecessary radio traffic and inaccurate.

Recommendations

- Establish policies to ensure that FCB dispatcher and Dispatch supervisor monitor important traffic such as Maydays, Urgent messages, and PAR's to verify that the correct units are answering via the push to talk identifier. During a PAR, FCB personnel can easily identify via CAD, if on-scene units have been skipped, misidentified, or have not answered.
- Provide FCB with a Mayday check off sheet and direction to prompt the Incident Commander when critical actions may have been overlooked or when specialized resources may be required (I.e., AirFlex, Collapse rescue, SRO Team, Mutual Aid, etc.). FCB personnel should consider prompting the Incident Commander to request additional talk group(s) at his/her discretion when the talk group is being over utilized.

RADIO TRANSMISSIONS AND FIRE GROUND TALK GROUPS

Findings

Members interviewed stated from the onset of this incident there was a large amount of radio traffic. Radio data indicates that there were 185 Subscriber Reject events from 0600-0700 hours. The entire incident remained on the single talk group- Fire Ground 1 (A16). (See Appendix #35)

Currently, a Battalion Chief does not have the proper compliment of radios available in their possession to monitor all three channels in a Fire Ground Talk Group.

Recommendations

- Adhere to current MOPs:
 - MOP 515 *Radio Facilities*
 - Mop 515-1 *Radio Operational Procedures*
 - MOP 515-4 *Terminology*
(See Appendix #1,2&4)
- Update following MOPs to reflect correct Talk Groups and Procedures:
 - MOP 515-5 *Emergency Button*
(See Appendix #8)
- Train members on proper radio discipline.
- When necessary, the Incident Commander should utilize additional channels within the same Fire Ground Talk Group to reduce radio traffic and move non-essential radio traffic to another channel.
- Comply with NFPA 1561 Section A.6.3.4 *Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System and Command Safety* by providing supplemental radios to the Incident Commander. (See Appendix #31)

STAFFING

Findings

The existing compliments for Engine and Truck Companies leaves the unit officer in a position of task saturation having to perform both supervisory roles and operational tasks. Additional staffing would allow the officer to perform a proper size-up and robust risk assessment. Additional staffing would also allow the first arriving officer to assume command and focus on formulating an incident action plan to include accountability.

Recommendations

- Consider the recommended staffing found in NFPA 1710 *Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments* in dense urban areas (2020 Edition).

References

Engine Companies

- **1710 Section 5.2.3.1.2** In first-due response zones with a high number of incidents, geographical restrictions, geographical isolation, or urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five on-duty members.
- **1710 Section 5.2.3.1.2.1** In first-due response zones with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, or dense urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of six on-duty members.

Truck Companies

- **1710 Section 5.2.3.2.2** In first-due response zones with a high number of incidents, geographical restrictions, geographical isolation, or urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five on-duty members.
- **1710 Section 5.2.3.2.2.1** In first-due response zones with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, or dense urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of six on-duty members.

Definitions

- NFPA 1710 Section 3.318 Dense Urban- An incorporated or unincorporated area with a population of over 200,000 people and/or a population density of over 3,000 per square mile. (See Appendix #30)
- Per US 2020 Census data, the total Baltimore City population is 585,708 with 7,428 persons per square mile.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOC)

Findings

SOC 1, the Chief of SOC, did not arrive on location until one hour after the collapse. Before his arrival on scene, there was confusion over what SOC assets were on scene and the need for additional SOC and SRO Team resources. The timely presence of a Chief officer from SOC would have assisted the Incident Commander with formulating a coordinated rescue plan.

SOC members operating on the incident were unaware of a Technical Safety Officer.

Recommendations

- Consider having a dedicated Special Operations Command (SOC) Battalion Chief on duty at all times.
- Comply with MOP 695-1 *Structural Collapse Incidents*, a Technical Safety Officer should be designated on all special operations incidents. (See Appendix #27)

TRAINING

Special Operations Command (SOC) Training

Findings

During interviews, SOC members indicated that there was a lack of proper staffing, training, and resources. For example, two members who were assigned to Rescue 1 on the date of the incident were not adequately trained. It was also discovered that members of SOC units are not trained in all disciplines and that regular competency verification does not occur. This resulted in a lack of knowledge and expertise in advanced operations, equipment capabilities, technical rescue skills, and procedures.

Recommendations

- Consider an increase in the annual SOC budget and pursue expansion of grant opportunities that supports all aspects of Special Operations.
- Provide each member of the Special Operations Command the opportunity to be trained and certified in all special operations disciplines.
- Provide annual refresher that includes accomplishing minimum satisfactory performance measures.
- Prior to assignment to Special Operations Command, personnel should be trained to a considered specified technical level.
- All Safety Officers participate in regular scheduled Special Operations Training.

Building Construction Training

Findings

There were several indicators related to building construction that could have been used during the initial scene size-up to alert members of existing hazards:

- Existing cornice damage
- Exposed burning floor joists
- Multiple burning floors

Recommendations

- Ensure that all members, especially Incident Commanders, are trained to understand the collapse hazards of the various types of building construction found in the city.
- Training should include understanding the following:
 - Influence of inherent building performance characteristics
 - Unique rowhouse variations (modifications and construction)
 - Structural collapse
 - Defensive operations when dilapidated/previous fire conditions are encountered
 -

Battalion Training

Findings

During interviews, members at every rank expressed concern that the Department needs to do more operations-related training. Currently, the Department's daily activities schedule is based off of an Operations Memo from 2012, when suppression personnel were working a day-day night-night (4 on 4 off) schedule. According to the Operations Memo from 2012, formal Battalion Training is only scheduled for Sundays. Under the current schedule, shifts may go weeks without formal Battalion Training.

Recommendations

- Consider revising the daily activities schedule to reflect the twenty-four-hour shift model and ensure that Battalion Training is being performed on a more frequent basis
- Consider providing formalized training materials to ensure the content is consistent and accurate across the entire Department

Thermal Imager Training

Findings

The thermal imaging camera was a valuable tool used by the Lieutenant of Truck 10 to quickly locate one of the trapped firefighters.

Recommendations

- Consider expanding the Fire Academy's training related to the thermal imaging camera
- Consider thermal imaging camera training as an annual training topic

Professional Development

Findings

Currently, Chief Officers receive minimal training and development following promotion. Chief Officers report that they have not received formalized training pertaining to the Chief Officer position.

Recommendations

- Consider mandatory training for all Chief Officers
- Consider the creation of a command competency program
- Consider providing professional development opportunities for members of every rank to maintain knowledge, skills, abilities, and competencies for emergency response
- Professional Development topics should include:
 - ICS Refresher Training
 - Risk vs. Benefit Assessment
 - Updated Fireground Strategy and Tactics
 - Simulation Training

POTENTIALLY TRAUMATIC EVENTS (PTE)

Findings

All members that operated at this incident were exposed to a Potentially Traumatic Event (PTE). Common examples of PTE's are a line of duty death, critical injury of a member, suicide of a member, mass casualty event, dead or severely injured children, Mayday or near-miss event. It is vital the Department recognizes these incidents can be potentially stressful to personnel and that every member has a different reaction to such events. Therefore, behavioral health support should be offered to all members operating on the incident in a consistent manner. It is important that member participation is voluntary and not mandated.

Recommendations

- Consider developing a Potentially Traumatic Events (PTE) Program for the Fire Department. This program will provide Assistant Chiefs, Battalion Chiefs, Suppression and EMS unit officers the knowledge to identify PTE's. It will also indicate what assistance should be provided to the members post incident.
- Consider providing behavioral health education and resources (such as peer support) to all affected personnel in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
- Consider back-filling units involved in the PTE with mutual aid resources to allow members an appropriate timeout period.
- Consider cautioning members of the Department to avoid self-dispatching to a PTE because of the elevated levels of emotional stress at such incidents, which can result in negatively impacting the member mentally and physically.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE UNDER STRESS

Findings

From the interviews conducted, it was evident every Chief Officer, Company Officer and Firefighter navigated uncertainty, time pressure, and was subject to considerable levels of operational stress. This incident involved a catastrophic collapse and multiple trapped firefighters which created inordinate levels of physical, mental, and emotional stress for our members. Effects from such heightened mental and emotional stress can lead to impaired senses and communications, premature fatigue, stifled decision-making processes, and diminished situational awareness (i.e., perceptual distortion in the form of tunnel vision, auditory exclusion, poor acute memory). Examination of communication transcripts and various interviews suggested that fireground officers in particular suffered from task saturation and other operational stressors mentioned above. The psychophysiological (mental & physical) and cognitive demands placed on our members at such fires and emergencies should be appreciated.

Recommendations

- Consider developing a Human Performance Training Program (HPTP) for the Baltimore City Fire Department. The program will educate members on the effects of operational stress on human performance to ensure that members of the Department, particularly leaders, possess a solid understanding of human performance under stress.
- Equip members with tactical skills as well as mental skills that have proven valuable in combatting operational stressors at fires and emergencies. Consider specifically focusing on mental conditioning skills, concepts and practices that extend an individual's tolerance to stress and foster resilience.
- Ensure that Department tactical and operational policies and procedures align with a scientific understanding of human performance under stress, particularly at fires and emergencies where members are in distress.

EMPOWERMENT

Findings

Several of the members interviewed stated that they did not feel comfortable speaking up and sharing their knowledge or expertise with senior members and officers to include safety and accountability issues.

Recommendations

- Foster a culture that allows members to speak up about personal and organizational safety; without negative consequences for doing so, and without decentralizing the authority of the formal leader.
- Train members at every rank to report interior, exterior, and/or dangerous conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and on a regular basis.

CULTURE

Findings

Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have prevented these fatalities, interviewed members expressed their concern regarding the competitive culture within the Fire Department. The perceived culture oftentimes creates a sense of urgency in execution of duties.

Recommendations

- Define and advocate for a cultural change within the Department related to safety, while maintaining an aggressive approach to incident mitigation.
- Incorporate leadership, management, supervision, accountability, and personal responsibility into the push for cultural change.

Since the Incident

In the weeks immediately following January 24th, the Baltimore City Fire Department began the process of identifying areas regarding member safety and operational proficiency that required improvement. With the assistance of the immediate recommendations provided by the BOI, the Department started creating policies, revising procedures, adding equipment, and introducing new training and personnel support.

Dispatch Procedure

Prior to the incident, on June 29th, 2021, the Department instituted a pilot dispatch program, which only alerted units with a single dispatch message. Shortly after the incident, using feedback from the BOI and Officer Development Program, the Department reinstated the original dispatch procedure of alerting units twice on all responses.

Fireground Operations Vacant Buildings (MOP 601-6) (See Appendix #13)

The Department requested the BOI create a draft policy regarding operational procedures in vacant buildings. As a result, MOP 601-6 *Vacant Buildings* was released. The policy provides guidelines to firefighting personnel for improved size-up and decision-making when faced with a fire in a vacant structure. It also identifies considerations that the first arriving unit and Incident Commander should examine and factor into tactical considerations.

Accountability Engine (MOP 601-5) (See Appendix #12)

The Department implemented MOP 601-5 *Accountability Unit*, which is a new policy aimed at providing the Incident Commander with increased operational support. This policy adds an additional engine to box alarms (6th engine). This additional engine will split the crew into two separate assignments, reporting to the Incident Commander and the 2nd assigned chief in the Charlie Division (rear).

It is the Board of Inquiry's opinion that, while well intentioned, the sixth engine policy does not address some of the root problems associated with incident command and accountability on the fire ground. The BOI agrees with the research performed at the National Fire Academy that supports the fact that, it is not practical or efficient to obtain a trained Incident Command Technician after arrival at an incident scene. On-scene firefighters are untrained and more importantly inexperienced. Their involvement in tasks such as accountability, while well-intentioned, cannot always be trusted. Simulations, including a sixth engine for accountability, performed at the BCFD Fire Academy since the Stricker Street incident have further supported this research.

Special Operations Command (SOC)

Beginning in February 2022, Special Operations Command entered a transition of leadership that reformed previous doctrine. The newly assigned Chief of Special Operations Command (SOC) has focused on organizational structure, staffing, training, response parameters/profiles, logistics, as well as research and development.

SOC members have been granted permission to network directly with the Department of Housing and procured several vacant homes for the purpose of collapse training. In the upcoming months, twenty SOC members are slated to attend the Virginia Beach Task Force 2 FEMA Structural Collapse Technician Course and the Advanced Interior Structural Collapse located at TEEX (Texas A&M).

The Chief of SOC has prioritized the updating of search cameras, purchasing of stabilization alerting devices such as transits, fostering mutual aid partnerships, and the implementation of Tower 1 (elevated platform) into the SOC program.

Accountability System Procedure

The Department has reemphasized the use of PAT tags and the existing accountability system with a newly issued handheld accountability board. As part of the 6th engine pilot program, members are required to collect tags from each piece of apparatus on the fireground and place them on the board.

The reemphasis on PAT tags as a backup to the electronic sign in program was provided to the Department by the BOI as an immediate recommendation in March of 2022. Since the recommendation, the Department has directed members to comply with MOP 602-12 *Accountability Cards* and is using the tags as a primary accountability system. It is the opinion of the BOI that a greater emphasis should be placed on the utilization of accountability technology that the Departments owns but has not implemented. This technology would provide a more effective, efficient, and accurate method of accountability. (See Appendix #18)



Figure 78 Accountability Board

Rapid Intervention Task Force (MOP 602-8) (See Appendix #16)

The Department has formalized a policy that automatically dispatches additional resources to an incident that involves a Mayday in the form of a Rapid Intervention Task Force. The Rapid Intervention Task Force consists of four (4) engines, two (2) trucks, Rescue 1 or squad, Battalion Chief (suppression), Battalion Chief (EMS), EMS Supervisor, and one advance life support transportation unit. Additionally, the policy adds additional equipment and responsibilities to the original assigned Rapid Intervention Team.

Mayday Policy Revised (MOP- 602-13) (See Appendix #20)

The Department's Mayday policy has been revised to add additional procedures for members in distress, actions by the Incident Commander, and Fire Communications Bureau.

Bodyguard 1000 Safety System (MOP 622-03) (See Appendix #26)

All firefighting positions have been assigned a Bodyguard 1000 Pass Device to utilize when not wearing SCBA. This standalone Pass Device provides a clear, distinct, and easily recognized alarm signal that indicates the wearer has stopped moving.

Officer Development Program

The initial round of the Fire Department Leadership Program was hosted by the Baltimore City Fire Academy. The program was in development prior to and at the time of the Stricker St. Incident. The curriculum is an all-encompassing overview of Leadership, Operations, Administration, Communications, and Logistics. The overarching goal of the program is to improve officer performance in both administrative efficiency and operational decision making. Two of the program highlights are a presentation on human performance/leadership by the cadre from Leadership Under Fire and incident simulations featuring the SIMSUSHARE command simulation software.



Figure 79 Officer Development Program

Safety Officer

Prior to the incident, the Safety Officer was alerted on all Working Fire Dispatches and would monitor box alarms for self-dispatch. The Safety Officer is now dispatched automatically on any incident where Fire Communications Bureau receives multiple calls and can continue to self-dispatch at their discretion.

Electronic Database


The Baltimore City Fire Department Information Technology (IT) Department has been working on improving the documentation of inspections performed by units in the field to ensure the inspection data can be effectively used during a response. Since the incident, the IT Department has created several new inspection dispositions within FireRECORDS, the electronic database currently used by the Baltimore City Fire Department. These dispositions allow units to document if a building is reported as unsafe or Code-X. Units can also document which buildings need to be boarded up by the Housing Department.

All the vacant, unsafe, and boarding data entered in the FireRECORDS program is available in several different reports that were created by the IT Department. These reports are then used to enter unsafe building information into the CAD premise files so it is available to dispatchers. The information entered in the premise files is also sent to the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) onboard each unit when dispatched.

It is the opinion of the Board of Inquiry that the Department should provide parameters that clearly defines each inspection disposition.

Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) Display

Feedback provided to the Board of Inquiry and shared with the IT Department stated that the dispatch information found on the MDT screen was sometimes difficult to read and important information was not in plain sight. The IT Department took this feedback and has been working to improve the dispatch screen to ensure the most important information can be found quickly.



In addition, the IT Department has been working to integrate vacant building data provided by the Housing Department into the dispatch screen.

Training

Fire Academy: Mayday Training

There is a renewed emphasis on Mayday and Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) training at the Fire Academy. The “Truck Class” and “2&1 Training” are two programs that specifically address the Firefighter Mayday. The content of the programs includes lessons learned from the Stricker Street incident and a review of Mayday/RIT procedures. It also reviews the PSS7000 Draeger SCBA and the updated RIT Bag, which contains the Anderson Rescue Solutions Multi-Loop Rescue Strap. Each program has a practical component, specifically a floor drop prop simulating a floor collapse in the fire building and a simulated basement fire with collapse trapping a firefighter below grade.





Moving Forward

History and Culture of the Department

When discussing the culture in the fire service we first have to understand how the firefighter is viewed. The image is of a selfless hero who is always ready to face risk. One of the contributing factors to risk behavior can be influenced by society. Communities expect highly trained specialists to respond quickly and perform dangerous tasks. The perception is firefighters are daring individuals who are willing to risk their lives for a total stranger therefore they are viewed as heroes. Many of the awards presented to firefighters are elevated based on the amount of risk and danger associated with their actions.

Also, culture is a result of tradition, which is viewed as a “how it has always been done approach”. The tradition of aggressive firefighting has always been entrenched in the Baltimore City Fire Department. Therefore, the goal of the Department should be to employ aggressive firefighting tactics that are performed in a smart and calculated manner. Our members require education and training to help them understand how to face the difficult and timely decisions demanded of the fireground. In addition, teaching members how to quickly analyze and process the many contributing factors that are presented on an incident and calculate the risk vs. benefit.

We are taught in the fire service that the responsibility of a firefighter is to protect life and property. Then we are told no property is worth saving at the expense of a firefighter’s life. One would ask the question of why we risk anything to protect a building? The decision to enter a structure is one of the critical moments in guiding the direction of a fire incident. Many tactical decisions are based on this defining



moment. In low-income urban settings, much of, if not all the occupant’s possessions are contained in the home. They rarely have the funds to purchase insurance and protect their possessions. The mindset of the Department’s members is

the long-standing tradition to preserve as much of these possessions as possible. In many instances, the most effective way of protecting the spread of fire is the interior attack. Row house fires pose



considerable risk to fire spread due to the buildings being attached. The damage to these attached buildings is less severe when a quick interior attack is made on the initial fire building. This is certainly the case when fires involve vacant row houses that are attached to occupied row houses. The approach to a vacant structure fire must be well calculated, organized and managed with good strategy and tactics. It must also include the possibility of entrapment. Per the Baltimore City Fire Department Office of the Fire Marshal, approximately fifty percent of fire deaths in 2021 occurred in illegally occupied vacant houses. Balancing the difficult approach

in firefighting with these many variables requires efficiency on all levels of the organization.

The Baltimore City Fire Department has a long history of pride, dedication, aggressive fire tactics and spirited rivalry. Today there remains a sense of rivalry and a competitive culture in the Department. The satisfaction of arriving first to the scene of a fire has a rewarding effect on the members. Currently, many of the personnel have described the competition as reaching a point of distraction from the focus of the important tasks presented at a fire and the importance of good decision making. Pride and dedication are the cornerstone of a successful unit; however, it is the responsibility of the unit's officer to control the competition and rivalry. The importance of a strong incident assessment and team approach cannot be neglected.

The Department's Officer Development Program addresses the ongoing responsibility entrusted in the Company Officer. The concept of the program includes developing effective risk benefit assessment and operational decision making. The main goal is for our members to embrace risk but realize to do so, we must become proficient, solid decision makers.

The improvement of situational awareness, understanding of individual responsibility, and the importance of strong leadership will aid in understanding and addressing culture in the fire service and maintaining aggressive professional firefighters.

Reference:

U.S. Fire Administration National Safety Culture Change Initiative

Fire Department Issues: Dichotomy of Attitudes, Behaviors, and Culture. Dan Landrigan

Equipment

Motorola Portable Radio and Talk Groups

Manufacturer: Motorola

Model: APX 6000

Every member working in the field is assigned a portable radio that corresponds to their riding position in accordance with MOP 515-2-3 *Radio Accountability*. MOP 515-2-3 also requires members to always have the portable radio in their possession while on duty to assure safety and accountability. (See Appendix #6)

The Motorola portable radios are programmed with numerous channels/talk groups which allows members to monitor the dispatch channel for responses and then switch over to the correct channel/talk group once they are dispatched.

MOP 515-2 *Dispatch Procedures* and MOP 515-2-2 *Talk Group Assignment Policy* are both outdated and do not provide information about the current Talk Groups programmed into the portable radios. (See Appendix #3&5)

In accordance with MOP 515-2, a talk group is assigned whenever the response involves more than two suppression units. (See Appendix #3)

There are several “Fire Ground” Talk Groups programmed into the portable radios. They include Fire Ground 1, Fire Ground 2, Fire Ground 3, and Fire Ground 4. Each of these Fire Ground Talk Groups can be expanded should the incident size or complexity warrant. The Fire Ground Talk Group for the Stricker Street incident was Fire Ground 1. Although the channels listed in the current MOP are not correct, MOP 515-2-2 does specify what the additional channels in a talk group should be used for. (See Appendix #5)

Fire Ground 1 can be expanded in the following manner:

TALK GROUP	CHANNEL	USE
Fire Ground 1	A16	Tactical
Fire Ground 1-1	A15	Pump Operators and Safety Officers for Accountability
Fire Ground 1-2	A14	EMS
Fire Ground 1A*	A13	Announcement

*The announcement channel is programmed to transmit and receive on all four channels in the Talk Group. It should only be used by the Incident Commander or designee during an emergency situation such as an evacuation or roll call.

If Fire Ground 1, 1-1, and 1-2 were all being used, and additional channels were needed, then a second Fire Ground Talk Group such as Fire Ground 2 would have to be requested and monitored as well.

Apparatus- Engine Company # 14 (First Line)

Year: 2008

Make: Pierce

Model: Enforcer

On January 24, 2022, Engine 14 was operating in their first line engine. Preventive maintenance for the first line was up to date as well as the pump test.

No mechanical or pump issues associated with this engine were reported during this incident.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

TURNOUT HELMET

Manufacture: Cairns

Model: 1010

TURNOUT COAT

Manufacture: Lion

Model Design: V-Force® Bi-Swing Coat LION® Turnout V-Force® Bi-Swing Coat

Drag Rescue Device: BHS020 (Std) DRD: Firefighter Recovery Harness with 2" welt and 4.5x3.25" flap with rounded corners. 1-piece 1x2" loop for harness storage. 2 pieces 1x2" loop on shell flap closure, 2 pieces 1x2" hook on flap. 1 piece 1.5x2" hook on harness. 1-piece 2x2" loop underneath chest trim for harness storage, 1 pair 1x3.5" self-fabric straps with 1x2" hook and loop. The loop handle shall have a silver retro-reflective LION logo patch.

TURNOUT PANTS

Manufacture: LION

Model: Super Deluxe 7oz PBI Max

TURNOUT HOOD

Manufactures: LION and Majestic Fire Apparel

Model: RedZone Particulate Blocking (LION)

Model: PAC II (Majestic Fire Apparel)

TURNOUT BOOTS

Varying manufacturers

PPE Performance

All members were properly donned in the appropriate PPE. Because the turnout gear was not considered a contributing factor to the fatalities in this incident, no further evaluation or testing of the turnout gear was conducted.

EMT/FF McMaster PPE





FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo PPE





Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler PPE





Lieutenant Paul Butrim PPE





Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Overview: Meeting NFPA STANDARDS 1981+1982 (2007)

The members involved in the Stricker Street building collapse on January 24, 2022, were all wearing Draeger PSS 7000 self-contained breathing apparatus. The SCBA is an open circuit, positive pressure device designed to allow for a constant flow of air in the event of failure. An integrated PASS device is contained within the Sentinel. In addition to the PASS device, the Sentinel continuously monitors the air cylinder capacity, main battery condition, and end-of-service time (EOST).

The Baltimore City Fire Department purchased the 2007 model from Draeger in 2012. By 2024 this model will need to be phased out and replaced with a newer edition SCBA.

The facepiece used is the Model #FPS 7000. They were also manufactured in 2007, and possess the thermal rated lens required at the time of production.

The harness, made from carbon-fiber composite material, is labeled the PSS 7000. It has an integrated PASS device and datalogger contained within the Sentinel. The harness is designed to withstand handle stress of 600lbs for pulling and dragging, while “top of the yoke stress” is rated for 750lbs for pulling and dragging.

The air cylinder is a carbon composite unit that holds 4500 psi, rated for 45 minutes with a breath rate of 45 liters per minute. Each cylinder has a 15-year life cycle.

For additional information on the Draeger PSS 7000, please reference the Baltimore City Fire Department Training Manual TM101.

The following SCBAs were inspected by the Baltimore City Fire Department Air Mask Repair Office:

The PSS 7000 Serial Numbers referenced in this report are as follows:

<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>MEMBER</u>
BRDD 2683	E14	OIC	LT Kelsey Sadler
BRDD 2381	E14	PIPE	FF Kenneth Lacayo
BRDD 2393	E14	LO	FF John McMaster
BRDD 0662	T23	OIC	LT Paul Butrim
BRD 2698*	E36	**	**
BRD 1960*	E36	**	**

*Delivered to AMR by BCFD to download data - worn by uninjured member

**Approximately one week after the fire, Air Mask Repair was notified that two SCBA's from Engine Co. #36 were worn by members who were briefly trapped in the collapse. Since neither member was injured at the time, the SCBA's were not handed over as evidence for data collection. It was at this time the data was downloaded from the Sentinel devices, and records were gathered for further review.

Most Recent Annual Preventive Maintenance for the PSS 7000:

<u>SERIAL NUMBER</u>	<u>LAST TEST DATE</u>	<u>RESULT</u>
BRDD 2683	02/11/2021	PASSED
BRDD 2381	02/11/2021	PASSED
BRDD 2393	02/11/2021	PASSED
BRDD 0662	11/26/2021	PASSED
BRDD 2698	04/26/2021	PASSED
BRDD 1960	11/24/2021	PASSED

Most recent FIT TEST performed at AIR MASK REPAIR:

MEMBER	UNIT	FIT TEST DATE	RESULT
LT Kelsey Sadler	E14	11/3/2021	PASSED
FF Kenneth Lacayo	E14	11/3/2021	PASSED
FF John McMaster	E14	11/9/2021	PASSED
LT Paul Butrim	T23	11/3/2021	PASSED

Incident Overview Regarding SCBA Handling

According to records obtained from Air Mask Repair, Pre-Shift Checks were performed on 3 of the 6 SCBA units. Due to the early morning dispatch of this incident coinciding with relief time, it is not uncommon for members to check their SCBA levels once on the scene.

As each of the members were removed from the building, Safety Officer 2 seized their SCBA and face piece. He placed an I.D. tag on each item, took photo evidence of each, and separately bagged them. Once he was finished collecting his field data, the items were turned over to the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) investigators on scene for further evidence collection. The Baltimore City Police Department (BPD) gathered the SCBA's to safely secure them on behalf of the ATF. On January 28, 2022, BPD brought all four SCBA units to Air Mask Repair for further data collection. Each SCBA was documented, photographed, and downloaded. Once all four SCBA's were completely processed, they were returned to BPD.

According to data retrieved from the Sentinel, all four SCBA's functioned properly. Damage as evidenced in the following pictures, is most likely the result of extrication efforts performed by the rescuers on scene following the collapse. Data shows that all PASS devices activated after the collapse, however according to witness accounts, it was difficult to determine which PASS device was sounding during rescue efforts.

Note: Since the onset of the investigation, the Board of Inquiry (BOI) has worked in conjunction with NIOSH to review SCBA datalog records obtained from Air Mask Repair and Draeger. The review of the detailed SCBA data was outside the area of expertise of members from the BOI. Therefore, the BOI decided to defer all SCBA findings to the expert analysis provided by NIOSH.

Photographs of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

Note: The following pictures do not include either SCBA from Engine Company #36. Since both members were uninjured, and the units were not preserved for evidence at the time of the incident, they will not be included in the photo description section of this report.

Lieutenant Paul Butrim Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Photos



Acting Lieutenant Kelsey Sadler Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Photos





FF/PM Kenneth Lacayo Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Photos






EMT/FF John McMaster Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Photos





Appendices

Appendix # 1 MOP 515

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE POLICY</p>	MOP 515
	<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMMUNICATIONS</p> <hr/> <p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">RADIO FACILITIES</p>

SCOPE

The primary objective of radio communications' procedures is to insure rapid, accurate and concise exchange of information between Fire Communications Dispatch Center and units and between individual units without unnecessary repetition or delay.

The Baltimore City Fire Department has provided User Guides with detailed information concerning the proper operation of the Communications equipment (Mobile and Portable Radios, and the Fire Station Signaling Unit). All members shall familiarize themselves with these User Guides.

The 800 MHz communications system uses digital trunked technology utilizing 28 channels and numerous talkgroups and consists of the Fire Station Signaling Unit (F.S.S.U.), two way mobile radio units, pager units, portable radios, station printers and computer terminals in each station. The Emergency Communications Center (ECC) is located in the Police Building, 601 East Fayette Street, 4th floor 911 center. The Alternate Communications Center (ACC) is located on the 12th floor of the Wolman Building. The ACC serves as a back up center for the ECC. The 800 MHz Communications System utilizes nine (9) antenna sites located as follows:

<i>Location</i>	<i>Antenna Type</i>
The Towers at Harbor Court	Roof Top
Curtis Bay Elementary School	Tower
DPW's Lombard St. Sign Shop	Tower
Lake Clifton High School	Tower
Good Samaritan Hospital	Roof Top
WBFF	Shared Tower
Northwest Police District	Tower
Edmondson High School	Tower
St. Agnes Hospital	Roof Top

MOP 515	
SECTION COMMUNICATIONS	SUBJECT RADIO FACILITIES

The nine antenna sites provide a total blanketing of the City of Baltimore with the radio signals. Only a few locations lacked total coverage. The Aquarium, center section, failed due to the amount of concrete in the tanks. The basement of the Convention Center also could not be penetrated because of construction. Some basements in outlying areas also exhibited difficulty but often coverage is possible by simply moving a few steps in a different direction. Even in those areas where coverage may fail, the radio will signal the user with a low-pitched tone when the Push-To-Talk (PTT) button is depressed. Portable to portable communication on one of the designated talk around talkgroups is still possible. The reason for the superior coverage with this system is that transmissions are "simulcast" from all nine of the antenna sites at once. This is accomplished in the following manner. When you press the PTT button and transmit, your signal is received at the closest antenna site to your location. The signal is relayed by a fiber optic ring to the other sites and a central controller times the transmission so all nine antennas broadcast the signal at the same instant. The whole process takes less than a second. You will notice the slight delay when you broadcast near another radio. It can be distracting at first so practice focusing on your words and not listening to the playback.

Another feature that increases the efficiency of the radio system is trunking. The 800MHz system uses 28 frequencies for all the agencies that occupy the system. Trunking means that the central controller selects an available channel for the user and automatically groups together radios tuned to the same talkgroup. This makes the best use of all the channels available and is transparent to the user. The comparison has been drawn to the single bank line that feeds into multiple tellers. This is the same principle.

Ours is a digital communication system. This new technology takes the voice and breaks it into data for more efficient transmission and reassembles the voice when received. The results are cleaner, without a lot of background noise and the sizzling and popping that conventional radios have. This also means a scanner cannot tune into the channel and hear voice traffic. To accommodate those who requested the ability to monitor our activities (Box 414, off duty members, media), we also transmit on some of our old VHF frequencies.

Because the system is controlled by a computer, the ability to program radios with many talkgroups is possible. The Fire Department has numerous talkgroups at our disposal. Not all radios have all the talkgroups and most routine operations will utilize the frequently used talk groups. But direct communication will be possible with other City agencies, surrounding Counties, BGE, EMRC, and others. The central controller is capable of processing hundreds of users on the system and keeping different users from interfering with one another. The central controller keeps you in touch with others in your talkgroup and pulls them together when you transmit. Long radio transmissions can be delivered on a different talkgroup to keep main talkgroups open.

		MOP 515
SECTION	SUBJECT	
COMMUNICATIONS	RADIO FACILITIES	

Talkaround is a feature that allows radios to communicate directly with one another instead of operating through a repeater tower. In this mode radios are transmitting and receiving on the same frequency. Keep in mind that radio talkaround is radio-to-radio communication only, with range limitations dependent upon radio wattage, power and location.

Talkaround would be beneficial if:

- The system was totally down.
- The repeater towers were disabled.
- Units were in a subway tunnel, basement area or obstructed from the repeater tower for some reason.
- Units are out of range of the system.

TALKAROUND CHANNELS

- A13 TALK1
- A14 TALK2

IMPORTANT: If the radio is in "talkaround", it is off of the 800 MHz trunked radio system and is operating in a conventional, non-repeater mode, in radio to radio mode. Features such as the emergency button, status and message buttons and various other features will not work. For these reasons, **DO NOT USE TALKAROUND UNLESS YOUR RADIO CANNOT REACH THE SYSTEM (OUT OF RANGE).**

These talkgroups will eventually be used for data and other agencies in the system.

For unit-to-unit non-emergency communications when the units are in range of the system utilize the talkgroup A15 Latrl. This "lateral" talkgroup keeps the units within the system and allows full functionality. Also A16 Admin can be used by radios equipped with that talkgroup.

MOP 515	
SECTION COMMUNICATIONS	SUBJECT RADIO FACILITIES

Direct Radio contact is possible with Police and Department of Public Works personnel. To accomplish this, you must request, through Communications, to meet the other agencies on either:


B12FDDPW for Public Works (Building Inspector, Forestry, Neighbor Services etc).

B11FDPD for police (District Officer, Crime Lab etc).

B10CITY for all 3 agencies (Fire, Police, DPW).

Fire Department Dispatchers will notify the dispatchers of these other agencies to meet you on the designated talkgroup. Incident Commander, at major emergencies, may instruct responding agencies to monitor appropriate Talkgroup (B10, B11, or B12) when they report on the scene.

System Busy Signal - With the addition of several hundred radios to the system there is a possibility of getting a "system busy" signal when attempting to transmit. This would occur if all 27 of the 800 MHz frequencies were being used at the same moment. User will hear a "busy signal" similar to a phone sound. The radio will "call back" with a ring when an open frequency is available. Simply depress the **push to talk (PTT) button** at that time to transmit your message. Fire Department and Police radios have a higher level of access than DPW radios. In an emergency situation, if a busy signal is received, depress the **emergency button** and a talkgroup will be assigned immediately.

MOP 515-1	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION COMMUNICATIONS
	SUBJECT RADIO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

Members should understand that these procedures are not expected to cover each specific situation that may arise in the discharge of their duties. Good judgement is also necessary by individual members.

1. Personnel shall keep the fire station signaling unit (FSSU) radio, apparatus, vehicle, or portable radio, whichever is applicable, turned on, set to the proper talkgroup, with volume set to hear any transmissions.
2. While on call, administrative personnel may utilize alphanumeric pagers in lieu of having a radio turned on.
3. All personnel, regardless of rank, shall promptly comply with any order given over the radio.
4. All radio communications shall be brief, concise and to the point. All members shall use proper fire department terminology.
5. Long communications should be conducted on a talkgroup other than A1 MAIN, A2 DISP or A3 EMS, except in an emergency.
6. Radio equipment shall be kept in reliable operating condition. Portable Radios that become extremely wet, not working, will be reported to Fire Communications immediately for further instructions
7. There shall be absolutely no profanity used over the radio. All radio transmissions shall be handled in a professional manner. There shall be no disputes, displays of attitude or arguments carried on over the radio.
8. No person, with the exception of those authorized, shall modify or attempt to repair radio equipment, other than normal adjustments to volume, talkgroup selection, private call, etc. All problems with radio equipment will be reported to Fire Communications.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	RADIO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

9. Each member of the department shall be familiar with all policies and procedures governing the use of radio equipment, and shall abide by same.
10. It shall be the responsibility of the officers in charge to enforce the radio policies and procedures, and to see that personnel under their command consistently follow them.
11. Only communications personnel, or those persons authorized by communication supervisory personnel, shall operate any equipment in the communications center.
12. In order to maintain confidentiality, no information related to the name of an injured or deceased individual, either firefighter or civilian shall be transmitted over the air except on a talkgroup that is not rebroadcast on a conventional channel.
13. Communications between units and dispatch shall utilize common language. Use of codes, signals, etc. is prohibited except for the following as approved by the Chief of Fire Department [MOP [515-4](#)].
 - **MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY** - Signal reserved for the most critical of situations - a fire fighter is down/missing/trapped - Dispatcher will sound the special tone (intermittent series of beeps) and repeat any helpful, relevant information. All units without critical information will monitor, but keep the air clear for the emergency.
 - **SIGNAL 99** - Used by the dispatcher as the reply to the sounding of the Emergency button. Non-provocative, neutral approach is meant to minimize the possibility of making a bad situation worse. If alarm has been activated accidentally, member must notify dispatch immediately to cancel. If you have sounded an emergency accidentally **NEVER** turn off the radio or ignore the dispatcher. All emergencies must be assumed to be legitimate unless you indicate otherwise [MOP [515-5](#)].
 - **CODE F** - A fire fatality. Before giving detailed information, request Fire Communications to assign a talkgroup that is not patched into a conventional channel.
 - **SIGNAL 40** - To be used when a member is under physical assault or under threat of being assaulted [MOPs [515-5](#) & [602-7](#)].
 - **Code 5 Response:** To protect the confidentiality of patient related information, Fire Communications shall not announce over the air that patients are HIV, Hepatitis "B", or Hepatitis "C" positive. Fire Communications will refer to all known positive bloodborne pathogens patients on the air as a "**Code 5 Response**".

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	RADIO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES


- **Code 6 Response:** To protect the confidentiality of patient related information, Fire Communications shall not announce over the air that patients are positive with tuberculosis. Fire Communications will refer to all known positive respiratory pathogens patients on the air as a “Code 6 Response”.

14. **SECURITY PORTABLE RADIO**

The security of the Portable Radio is of the utmost importance. Each individual charged with the responsibility of a radio will be held fully accountable for its safekeeping. Should a member be found negligent in the loss of a radio, the member will be responsible for up to full reimbursement of its cost. The oncoming shift member will check that the radio is in proper operating condition. Loss or damaged Portable Radios must be reported immediately per Fire Department procedures.

While working, the most obvious place for the Portable Radio is on your person. If the need arises to remove the radio, it must be kept in a secure place. **Under no circumstances should the portable radio be left on the front seat of any apparatus, medic unit or car in or out of station.**

15. Members shall be familiar with Federal Communications Commission rules per [MOP [515-6](#)].

MOP 515-2	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURES</p>	SECTION COMMUNICATIONS
	SUBJECT DISPATCH PROCEDURES

DISPATCH OPERATIONS

The Fire Station Signaling Unit (FSSU) that replaces the Watch Desk is equipped with an 800MHz radio that is programmed with only the dispatch talkgroup (A2 DISP).

Units will receive emergency calls from Fire Communications, when in station, by activation of the following:

- Station printer (separate printer for Medic)
- Computer Terminal
- FSSU Radio on A2 DISP
- Portable Radio on A2 DISP
- Pager for Suppression and Medic units
- Station Gong/Buzzer
- Lights in affected areas
- Speakers at watch desk and other appropriate areas

If a Medic Unit is not in their station, as indicated by computer aided dispatch (CAD), no alerts will sound in the station; but the printer in Medic area will receive incident information for use upon their return. Therefore it is very important that Fire Communications always knows the correct status and location of the medic unit.

All calls will be dispatched on A2 DISP to units on the street, including medic calls. It is imperative that all units who are available (Fire and EMS) monitor A2 DISP. A2 DISP should be reserved for **Dispatches Only**. Any units requiring additional information or providing updates should use the talkgroup assigned or A1 MAIN or A3 EMS.

The "Home" button on mobile radios returns you to A2 DISP.

- All dispatches will include:
- Location (including cross streets)
 - Type of call
 - Units to respond
 - Box Area (Map Book Reference)
 - Talkgroup (if other than that routinely used for that type response)

Units should switch immediately to the talkgroup assigned on their portable and mobile radios. The DEK status unit (MODAT replacement) will operate on all of the "in the system" talkgroups.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

On one or two unit responses (single Engine or Truck, Engine and Truck, etc.), the units will operate on A1 MAIN. This will cover most routine calls (e.g. trash, auto, spill, etc.). For responses with more than two units (Tactical Box, Rescue Alarm, Box Alarm, etc.), a fireground talkgroup will be assigned by the dispatcher. Fireground talkgroups can be expanded should the incident size and/or complexity warrant. They will generally be assigned in the following order:

First Incident	C1 FGC1	Can expand to C2 FGC2, C3 FGC3, and *C4 FGC1A
Second Incident	C5 FGC5	Can expand to C6 FGC6, C7 FGC7, and *C8 FGC5A
Third Incident	B1 FGB1	Can expand to B2 FGB2, B3 FGB3, and *B4 FGB1A
Fourth Incident	B5 FGB5	Can expand to B6 FGB6, B7 FGB7, and *B8 FGB5A

*B4, C4, B8, C8 are “**Announcement Groups**”. Radios tuned to B4 will scan B1, B2, & B3. If that radio transmits, the message will go out on B1, B2, and B3. C4 works the same with C1, C2, and C3. B8 works the same with B5, B6, and B7. C8 works the same with C5, C6, and C7.

All units dispatched on an incident (first through additional alarms) will be assigned to the original fireground talkgroup, unless the Incident Commander orders otherwise. When operating on a fireground talkgroup, units should conduct conversations direct to the other units on their incident.

If you need Fire Communications you must state, “Engine ___ to Fire Communications” etc.

Dispatchers can only monitor a limited number of talkgroups, so some flexibility in assigning talkgroups may be necessary based on the number of incidents being handled simultaneously.

Medic Calls, Medic standby, Medic only responses, etc. will be assigned to talkgroup A3 EMS. The second talkgroup, A4 EMS, should be used for communicating longer messages or more involved incidents (patient information, multi-casualty incidents, etc).

Because the CAD system relays the DEK information directly to the dispatcher’s monitor, it is not necessary to report most status changes. **Medic Units are required to report verbally the number of the hospital to which they are transporting patients.**

SECTION COMMUNICATIONS	SUBJECT DISPATCH PROCEDURES
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Limit radio transmissions to information updates only. If you are dispatched to an incident and the call is as dispatched, there is no need to repeat the dispatch information back to the dispatcher. If location or nature of the call is different than the original dispatch indicated, inform Fire Communications. If all information is the same just depress the in-service button. Calls to dispatch should only report changes, or requests for additional information, assistance, etc.

On multiple unit responses, unit handling incident will report, by radio, disposition of the call, which unit is handling the incident and the unit responsible for completing and forwarding the Fire Incident Report [MOP [631-3](#)].

All spill incidents require Fire Communications be notified of the type and amount of spill, whether the spill has entered a sewer or waterway, etc. per [MOP [625-2](#)].

AUTOMATIC VEHICLE LOCATORS (AVL)

All Medic Units and Red Alert Units are equipped with Automatic Vehicle Locators. The purpose of these devices is to give the dispatcher more accurate information on which unit is closer to the scene of a medical emergency. The AVL unit sends a signal to a satellite at approximately 2-minute intervals, reporting the units longitude and latitude. These coordinates are used by CAD to display the location on the maps in the dispatch center and also calculate the distance between the units and the location of a call. The dispatchers will get two recommendations from CAD for each EMS call: the closest unit by station assignment; and the closest unit by actual distance. The dispatcher will be able to select the unit based on the urgency of the call.

The AVL technology has some limitations. All distances are measured in a straight line. Therefore, dispatchers have to consider geographic barriers (harbor, streams, parks, etc.) or lack of roadways. Large concrete buildings, hospital canopies, etc. can also block the transmitters. CAD will hold the unit at the last position received until a new signal is received. The units do not function when the Medic Unit is turned off.

The AVL unit can also be used to fix the position of a Medic Unit if they activate their emergency button, but cannot give a verbal message. Tampering with the AVL equipment is strictly prohibited.

SECTION COMMUNICATIONS	SUBJECT DISPATCH PROCEDURES
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DISPATCH PROCEDURES

1. There are four methods of dispatching companies to an incident when the units are in station. The methods are by **radio (in the FSSU), station printer, computer terminal (in designated office) and by pager.** The station telephone serves as an additional back up to the system.
2. When a response for a Unit in station is received through the Fire Station Signaling Unit (FSSU), the large red mushroom button should be pressed to acknowledge the response. No verbal acknowledgement is necessary. This action is indicated on the dispatchers CAD screen. If the button cannot be pressed (Unit on ramp, etc.), pressing the “en route” (ENRT) status button will notify the dispatcher that you are responding. **Do not** give base station call letters when transmitting from the Fire Station Signaling Units.
3. If the (FSSU) activates and the station printer prints a dispatched run, but no radio dispatch is received, units must notify Fire Communications on talkgroup A2-DISP immediately to advise and/or verify information.
4. In the event of a failure of the (FSSU), the portable radio must be set to the dispatch talkgroup A2-DISP.
5. Units will utilize appropriate status and message buttons when applicable.
Note: If a unit is going to be assigned a reserve apparatus or replacement portable, the company officer shall inform the Communications Center so the dispatcher can enter the new radio I.D. into the CAD. This will allow personnel to use status and message buttons as normal.
6. The dispatch is to be brief and concise using the following format:

Type of response, Box Area, Talkgroup (if other than that normally used for that type response), Units to respond, Location (including cross streets where possible).
7. Dispatch shall notify unit/command of responding units after additional resource requests have been dispatched.

Example: Battalion 3 requests additional companies, or units. After dispatching the additional units, dispatcher will contact Battalion 3 and inform him of the specific companies and support units responding.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

8. The verbal dispatch will be announced **twice**. When a unit reports that they “will handle” an incident and to “return other units”, Fire Communications will repeat this announcement on the fireground talkgroup to assure that all units receive the transmission.
9. Dispatchers are responsible for contacting units in the event of delayed acknowledgement from the unit. Talkgroups A1 MAIN and A3 EMS will be used for routine events that will not require lengthy radio traffic (trash fires, investigations, etc.) If the call escalates, the dispatcher will assign the unit to a fireground talkgroup. If a consultation is necessary, units will request another talkgroup to relay the information.
10. All units are encouraged to handle as much unit to unit traffic as possible without going through communications to relay the information. If the information is of a long nature, request the use of a talkgroup other than A1 MAIN or A3 EMS.
11. It is not necessary to give status changes verbally if the DEK system is operating. To go in service, simply switch to A2 DISP by pressing the “Home” button on the mobile and then press the INSV button and watch for the DEK to acknowledge. The portable radio should also be switched to A2 DISP.
12. Medic Units must call Communications on A3 EMS and give the hospital number to which they are transporting the patient. After this verbal report, they press the TOHO (To Hospital) DEK button on the mobile unit. No other verbal announcements are necessary, only the DEK status changes.
13. Personnel will be contacted by unit number. The use of proper names (Example: Bill, Tom, Larry, etc.) is prohibited.
14. To rectify an error in a transmission over the air, state the word “**correction**” and continue with the transmission.
15. Units going “on the air” for training, inspections, etc.; shall call Dispatch on A1 MAIN (for suppression) or A3 EMS (for Medics) and report the type of activity and location. The new CAD can develop statistical reports based on these activities.

Example: Engine 6, (announces on A1 main) on the air for Building Inspection.

Both portable and mobile should be set on A2 DISP talkgroup.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

16. Since Engine and Truck Companies are assigned two portable radios, the radio listed as Portable 1 should be the one assigned to the Officer position and Portable 2 used by the P.O., E.V.D. etc.
16. Members **are not to alter the settings on the fire dispatch printers.** Doing so causes failure of the printer to receive dispatches.
17. Use of radio tones when dispatching units shall be as follows:
- Medic Unit only – One (1) signal tone (#1).
 - Dispatch involving Suppression Unit(s) – Two (2) signal tones (#1).
 - Dispatch involving Battalion Chief or any other dispatch to an incident above the box alarm level – Intermittent up and down tones (#2).
 - Emergency Traffic – Intermittent single tones (#3) [MOP [515-4](#)].
 - Information – One (1) tone (#1).

TRANSFERRING UNITS/MUTUAL AID [MOP 609]

Units transferring to a different station within the City will be placed out of service by Fire Communications. Upon leaving the station the unit will contact Fire Communications verbally, via mobile radio, to confirm transfer. Transferring units will activate their INSV button when ready to be placed in service in the response area of the station to which they are transferring, and press their INST button when in the transfer station.

Units transferring to Anne Arundel, Howard or Baltimore Counties will switch to the talkgroup directed by Fire Communications. Our radio system allows for the sharing of designated talkgroups between Mutual Aid Counties. When city units switch to a County talkgroup they will actually leave the Baltimore City radio system and will be on the respective County's radio system. **The Unit's Emergency Button will not work. The unit's status head will not work.** Therefore city units must activate their status heads or verbally contact Fire Communications before they switch to the County's talkgroup. Units responding to a county location from a City station will activate "**en rout**" on the status head before switching to the County talkgroup. Units transferring to a County Station will verbally contact Fire Communications to confirm transfer before switching to the County talkgroup. All status changes must then be made verbally with respective county. Units should direct all communications to the respective county for the duration of the incident/transfer and will notify City Fire Communications when released from the county. Baltimore County Fire Dispatch is referred to as "DISPATCH". Anne Arundel County Dispatch is referred to as "FIRE ALARM".

SECTION COMMUNICATIONS	SUBJECT DISPATCH PROCEDURES
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TALKGROUP POSITIONS

TALKGROUP SELECTOR SWITCH	A	B	C
	TALKGROUP	TALKGROUP	TALKGROUP
1	A1 MAIN	B1 FGB1	C1 FGC1
2	A2 DISP	B2 FGB2	C2 FGC2
3	A3 EMS1	B3 FGB3	C3 FGC3
4	A4 EMS2	B4 FGB1A	C4 FGC1A
5	A5 CLL21	B5 FGB5	C5 FGC5
6	A6 MED22	B6 FGB6	C6 FGC6
7	A7 MED23	B7 FGB7	C7 FGC7
8	A8 SUPRT	B8 FGB5A	C8 FGC5A
9	A9 TRN1	B9 DYNAMIC REGRP	C9 AADISP (ALPHA)
10	A10 TRN2	B10 CITY	C10 AACO BRAVO
11	A11 HOWARD 1	B11 FDPD	C11 AACO ECHO
12	A12 HOWARD 2	B12 FDDPW	C12 AACO FOXRTROT
13	A13 TALK1	B13 NPSC1	C13 AACO KILO
14	A14 TALK2	B14 NPST1	C14 AACO LIMA
15	A15 LATRL	B15 NPST2**	C15 BCO 1
16	A16 ADMIN	B16 PATCH	C16 BCO 2

****B15 will remain INVESTIGATION for FIB radios**

NON-EMERGENCY DISPATCH

When dispatched to non-emergency incidents, units are to immediately proceed to the incident without audible or visual warning devices and are to obey posted speed limits and comply with traffic control signs and devices.

Classification of incidents in terms of emergency or non-emergency may be changed by Fire Communications with updated information.

If during the non-emergency response, units encounter unusual delays caused by traffic or some other reason where an emergency response would result in a more timely arrival at the scene, the unit officer may change to an emergency response. In every such instance the unit officer(s) shall notify Fire Communications of the change in response status.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Example: **Engine 1:** Engine 1 to Communications
 Fire Communications: Engine 1
 Engine 1: Engine 1 responding - emergency conditions due to heavy traffic.
 Fire Communications: OK, Engine 1 responding - emergency conditions (time)

Non-emergency incidents may include:

- Water leaks
- Alarm devices sounding with no smoke or fire evident
- Spills from accidents
- Patient assists
- Private alarm activations where information indicates a non-emergency incident.

		MOP 515-2-1
SECTION	SUBJECT	
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS	

Routine Call (Auto Fire)

Dispatch: “Engine 13 respond Box Area 13-15 North and Pennsylvania Avenues for an auto fire, (repeat). End with the time.

Mach Alert System

receives dispatch information on:

- Monitor (Located in E13 the Bay and or Common Areas)
- Engine 13 MDT
- Engine 13 pager (worn by officer)
- Over the Base Station and portable on A2 DISP.

Engine 13: presses Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Engine 13: presses ENRT (en route), switches mobile and portable to A1-MAIN

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene) If situation is as described, no need for radio traffic

Engine 13: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile), then presses INSV (in service).

Engine 13: presses INST (in station) button.

NOTE:

- **If incident is different than dispatch information (different type call, location, etc.) notify dispatch on A1 MAIN so CAD can be updated.**
- **Suppression units will request additional help (information or units) on A1 MAIN.**
- **EMS Units will request additional assistance on the EMS talkgroup (A3 EMS).**

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

Routine Call (Medic Alarm)

Dispatch: Engine 13, Medic 1 respond Box Area 13-15 North and Pennsylvania Aves. for an injured person on the street. Repeat then give determinant 30-Delta-3 response. End with the time.

Mach Alert System

receives dispatch information on:

- Station Monitor (In E13 Bay and or Common Areas)
- Engine 13 MDT
- Station Monitor (In M1 Bay and or Common Areas)
- Engine 13 pager (worn by officer)
- Medic 1 pager (worn by PM)
- Over the Base Station and portable on A2 DISP.

Engine 13, Medic 1: press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Engine 13, Medic 1: presses ENRT (en route), switches mobile and portable to A3-EMS

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene)

Engine 13: calls Dispatch on A3 EMS and requests Medic 1 come up on A4 EMS for patient information

Dispatch: Medic 1 switch to A4 EMS for patient information from Engine 13

(or)

Engine 13, Medic 1: switch to A4 EMS

Engine 13: relays patient information

Medic 1: advises pre-care and ETA

Engine 13, Medic 1: switch back to A3 EMS

Medic 1: Consults with the MDO on A4 EMS for hospital status

Medic 1: switches to A5 CLL21 to contact EMRC for consult

Medic 1: Advises dispatch on A3 EMS "transporting to hospital 204"

Engine 13: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile) presses INSV (in service)

Medic 1: presses TOHO (to hospital)

Medic 1: presses ATHO (at hospital)

Engine 13: presses INST (in station) button.

Medic 1: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile) presses INSV (in service)

Medic 1: presses INST (in station)

NOTE:

If incident is different than dispatch information (different type call, location, etc.) notifies dispatch on A3 EMS so CAD can be updated. Request additional help (information or units) on A3 EMS.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

Building Fire

Dispatch: “Box Alarm 13-80, units respond on talk-group Fireground 1, Engine 13, Engine 8, Engine 52, Engine 36, Engine 20, Truck 16, Truck 10 and Battalion Chief 3, Battalion Chief 6 respond North and Pennsylvania Avenues, for the report of a Building Fire. (All pertinent information will be given by FCB on dispatch, including premise file information).

Mach Alert System

receives dispatch information on:

- Station Monitors (Located in Bays and common Areas)
- MDTs of units dispatched
- Pagers (worn by officers) of units dispatched
- Over the Base Station and portable on A2 DISP

Engine 13 (T-16), Engine 52, Engine 19, Engine 8 (T-10.), Steadman

(BC-5) press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Units responding: press ENRT (en route), switch mobile and portable to A16-FG1

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene)

Engine 13: reports conditions “fire showing 2nd floor, hydrant North and Pennsylvania, command”.

Dispatch: acknowledges E13 repeats transmission (omitting hydrant location), memos entire transmission on the case, incident timer started (ends with time).

Other arriving units: press AT (at scene) and give information as needed

Batt. Chief 3: presses AT (at scene) takes command, give initial report “3 story brick storefront, fire showing 2nd and 3rd floors. Make this a working fire”.

Dispatch: OK Command, “copy working fire”.

Dispatch: “Working Fire, on Box Alarm 13-80 operations on talk group B - 1 Bravo 1, Battalion Chief 3, Rescue 1, Air Cascade 1, Medic 4, and FIB 2 respond to North and Pennsylvania Avenues.

Fire Station Signaling Units

receives dispatch information on:

- Computers (Located in offices)
- Printers in Watch Room at stations of units dispatched
- Pagers (worn by officers) of units dispatched
- Over radio on FSSUs and portables on A2 DISP

BC-3, Steadman, and M-4: press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

BC-3, AC-1, Medic 4: press ENRT (en route) and switch to B1 FGB1

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

NOTE:

- **ONLY** the Incident Commander makes the decision to switch to additional talkgroups, Fire Communications or others may suggest.
- On “working fire” or other major events, if staffing/conditions permit, a dispatcher will be dedicated to that incident. However, if you are unable to raise communications on the incident talkgroup - there will always be someone monitoring A1 MAIN.
- If the Incident Commander assigns units to an additional talkgroup (B2 FGB2 or B3 FGB3 in this example) he must assign someone (Battalion Chief, Staff Personnel or Unit Officer) to coordinate their communications on the additional talkgroup.
- All requests for additional units must be made through or on the authority of the Incident Commander.
- A dispatcher may not be monitoring additional talkgroups (B2 FGB2, or B3 FGB3, in this example) so the Incident Commander should inform Dispatch which talkgroup they should monitor.
- As units arrive at the incident, they report their location to the Incident Commander.

Air Cascade 1: “Air Cascade 1 to Command, located at Pennsylvania and Cumberland”.

Batt. Chief 5: “OK Air Cascade 1”. *Dispatch does not repeat this information unless requested.*

Batt. Chief 3: “Battalion Chief 3 to Command. I’m on the scene, located in rear of the fire building”.

Batt. Chief 5: “OK BC-3. We have units operating on the second floor. Check the conditions in the rear and advise”.

Batt. Chief 3: “message received”. *Dispatch does not repeat unless requested.*

IMPORTANT

All fireground communications should be direct, no dispatch intervention unless requested, however Fire Communications will monitor when possible and assist whenever possible.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

Routine Call (Auto Fire)

Dispatch: “Engine 13 respond to North and Pennsylvania Avenues for an auto fire, Box Area 13-15.

Fire Station Signaling Unit

receives dispatch information on:

- Computer (Located in Engine 13 office)
- Engine 13 printer in Watch Room
- Engine 13 pager (worn by officer)
- Over radio on FSSU and portable on A2 DISP.

Engine 13: presses Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Engine 13: presses ENRT (en route), switches mobile and portable to A1-MAIN

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene)

If situation is as described, no need for radio traffic

Engine 13: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile), then presses INSV (in service).

Engine 13: presses INST (in station) button.

NOTES: If incident is different than dispatch information (different type call, location, etc.) notify dispatch on A1 MAIN so CAD can be updated. Suppression units will request additional help (information or units) on A1 MAIN. EMS Units will request additional assistance on the EMS talkgroup (A3 EMS).

		MOP 515-2-1
SECTION	SUBJECT	
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS	

Routine Call (Medic Assist)

Dispatch: Engine 13, Medic 1 respond to North and Pennsylvania Aves. for an injured person on the street. Box Area 13-15.

Fire Station Signaling Unit

receives dispatch information on:

- Computer (Located in Engine 13 office)
- Engine 13 printer in Watch Room
- Medic 1 printer in Medic area
- Engine 13 pager (worn by officer)
- Medic 1 pager (worn by PM)
- Over radio on FSSUs and portables on A2 DISP.

Engine 13, Medic 1: press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Engine 13, Medic 1: presses ENRT (en route), switches mobile and portable to A3-EMS

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene)

Engine 13: calls Dispatch on A3 EMS and requests Medic 1 come up on A4 EMS for patient information

Dispatch: Medic 1 switch to A4 EMS for patient information from Engine 13

(or)

Engine 13, Medic 1: switch to A4 EMS

Engine 13: relays patient information

Medic 1: advises pre-care and ETA

Engine 13, Medic 1: switch back to A3 EMS

Medic 1: switches to A5 CLL21 to contact EMRC for consult

Medic 1: Advises dispatch on A3 EMS "transporting to hospital 204"

Engine 13: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile) presses INSV (in service)

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

Medic 1: presses TOHO (to hospital)

Medic 1: presses ATHO (at hospital)

Engine 13: presses INST (in station) button.

Medic 1: switches to A-2 DISP on portable and mobile (or presses HOME on mobile) presses INSV (in service)

Medic 1: presses INST (in station)

NOTE: If incident is different than dispatch information (different type call, location, etc.) notifies dispatch on A3 EMS so CAD can be updated. Request additional help (information or units) on A3 EMS.

Building Fire

Dispatch: "Box Alarm 13-15, operations on talkgroup B - Bravo 1, Engine 13, Engine 52, Engine 19, Engine 8, Truck 16, Truck 10 and Battalion Chief 5 respond to North and Pennsylvania Avenues, for a reported Building Fire.

Fire Station Signaling Units

receive dispatch information on:

- Computers (Located in offices)
- Printers in Watch Room at stations of units dispatched
- Pagers (worn by officers) of units dispatched
- Over radio on FSSUs and portables on A2 DISP

Engine 13 (T-16), Engine 52, Engine 19, Engine 8 (T-10), Steadman (BC-5) press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

Units responding: press ENRT (en route), switch mobile and portable to B1-FGB1

Engine 13: presses AT (at scene)

Engine 13: reports conditions "fire showing 2nd floor, hydrant North and Pennsylvania".

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

Other arriving units: press AT (at scene) and give information as needed

Batt. Chief 5: presses AT (at scene) give initial report “3 story brick storefront, fire showing 2nd and 3rd floors. Make this a working fire”.

Dispatch: OK Battalion Chief 5, “working fire”.

Dispatch: “Working Fire, Box 13-15 operations are on talkgroup B - 1 Bravo 1, Battalion Chief 3, Rescue 1, Air Cascade 1, Medic 4, and FIB 2 respond to North and Pennsylvania Avenues.

Fire Station Signaling Units

receive dispatch information on:

- Computers (Located in offices)
- Printers in Watch Room at stations of units dispatched
- Pagers (worn by officers) of units dispatched
- Over radio on FSSUs and portables on A2 DISP

BC-3, Steadman, and M-4: press Acknowledgement button on FSSU (Mushroom Button)

BC-3, AC-1, Medic 4: press ENRT (en route) and switch to B1 FGB1

NOTE: ONLY the Incident Commander makes the decision to switch to additional talkgroups, Fire Communications or others may suggest.

On “working fire” or other major events, if staffing/conditions permit, a dispatcher will be dedicated to that incident. However, if you are unable to raise communications on the incident talkgroup - there will always be someone monitoring A1 MAIN.

If the Incident Commander assigns units to an additional talkgroup (B2 FGB2 or B3 FGB3 in this example) he must assign someone (Battalion Chief, Staff Personnel or Unit Officer) to coordinate their communications on the additional talkgroup.

All requests for additional units must be made through or on the authority of the Incident Commander.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	SAMPLE INCIDENTS

A dispatcher may not be monitoring additional talkgroups (B2 FGB2, or B3 FGB3, in this example) so the Incident Commander should inform Dispatch which talkgroup they should monitor.

As units arrive at the incident they report their location to the Incident Commander.

Air Cascade 1: "Air Cascade 1 to Command, located at Pennsylvania and Cumberland".

Batt. Chief 5: "OK Air Cascade 1".

Dispatch does not repeat this information unless requested.


Batt. Chief 3: "Battalion Chief 3 to Command. I'm on the scene, located in rear of the fire building".

Batt. Chief 5: "OK BC-3. We have units operating on the second floor. Check the conditions in the rear and advise".

Batt. Chief 3: "message received".

Dispatch does not repeat unless requested.

All fireground communications should be direct, no dispatch intervention unless requested, however Fire Communications will monitor when possible and assist whenever possible.

MOP 515-2-2	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION COMMUNICATIONS
	SUBJECT TALK GROUP ASSIGNMENT POLICY

Fire ground communications will be broken down utilizing all talk groups within the announcement group. This procedure is being instituted to address radio congestion on the tactical channel and to aid in the accountability process. The following assignments will be initiated when a box assignment is dispatched.

The first talk group in each announcement group will be the tactical talk group i.e. C1, C5, B1 and B5.

The second talk group in each announcement group will be used for pump operators and safety officers for accountability. If the incident commander initiates a roll call, all unit officers are to switch to the pump operator/accountability talk group i.e. C2, C6, B2 and B6. They will account for their personnel and report their status to the safety officer.

The third talk group in each announcement group will be used for EMS operations i.e. C3, C7, B3 and B7.

The fourth talk group in each announcement group is programmed to transmit and receive on all talk groups within their announcement group i.e. C4, C8, B4 and B8. This talk group is to only be used by the incident commander in the event of an emergency i.e. evacuation or initiate an accountability roll call.

Communications will announce the assigned talk groups at the time of dispatch until units become familiar with the procedure. After which communications will return to just announcing just the tactical talk group.


- C1- Tactical
- C2- Pump Operators/Accountability
- C3- EMS
- C4- Incident Command (ONLY)

- C5- Tactical
- C6- Pump Operators/Accountability
- C7- EMS
- C8- Incident Command (ONLY)

- B1- Tactical
- B2- Pump Operators/Accountability
- B3- EMS
- B4- Incident Command (ONLY)

- B5- Tactical
- B6- Pump Operators/Accountability
- B7- EMS
- B8- Incident Command (ONLY)


Appendix # 6 MOP 515-2-3

MOP 515-2-3	
 MANUAL OF PROCEDURE DETAIL PROCEDURE	SECTION COMMUNICATIONS
	SUBJECT RADIO/ACCOUNTABILITY

All positions on the apparatus are issued a portable radio. Radios are assigned to each position as follows:

- Position 1 – Unit Officer
- Position 2 – Driver
- Position 3 – Pipe/right step
- Position 4 – Lead off / Tiller/ left step

Members are to adhere to all FCC regulations as well as [MOP 515-1], and are mandated to keep the remote microphone on the radio. It is the responsibility of the Unit Officers to assure that all members are electronically signed in and are in possession of the corresponding portable radio at all times while on duty to assure safety and accountability.

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>		MOP 515-4
		SECTION COMMUNICATIONS
		SUBJECT TERMINOLOGY

TERMINOLOGY

"Box Area" - (29-5, an area within Engine 29's first-due district) A map page corresponds to this area. Every dispatch includes the Box Area in which the incident is located. This will be the Engine number in most stations. Where only a Truck is housed, a "T" will precede the number. Ex.: T15-5

"Silent" - still used for documentation (journal, etc.) for one or two piece responses.

"Tactical Box" - To be used by Fire Communications only (not to be used as a request for additional units). A Tactical Box = 2 Engines, 1 Truck (and possibly a BC).

"Box Alarm" - Full box assignment.

"Rescue Alarm" - Assignment being dispatched for a rescue situation

"HazMat Box" - Hazardous Materials assignment - (exact units dispatched can vary based on incident).

"Urgent" - Means, "I need your attention, dispatcher, for an urgent message."

"Emergency traffic" - "I need everybody on my incident to listen carefully right now to critical information."

Examples: "Command to communications, sound Emergency Traffic". Dispatcher then sounds a special tone reserved for only that purpose (a series of intermittent beeps). Dispatcher then announces "Unit with Emergency Traffic, go ahead. - "Command to all units on, evacuate the building immediately, roof collapse imminent!"

Or

Truck 15 to Command, Emergency Traffic - Command to Communications, sound emergency trafficetc. Truck 15, advise all units that a large crack has developed in the rear wall (side 3), have all units withdraw from that area immediately!

The message is critical for those operating on the incident to hear.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	TERMINOLOGY

"Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!" - Reserved for the most critical of situations - a fire fighter is down, trapped, missing. Dispatcher will sound the emergency traffic signal if appropriate and repeat any helpful, relevant information. All units without critical information will monitor, but keep air clear for the emergency.

"Switch to" or **"Respond on"** - means to set your radio to the talkgroup position instructed.

"Come up on" - means to set your radio to the talkgroup position indicated and announce that you are there (ex. "Engine 4 on A-15")

SIGNAL 99 – Used by the dispatcher as the reply to the sounding of the Emergency button. Non-provocative, neutral approach is meant to minimize the possibility of making a bad situation worse. If alarm has been activated accidentally, member must notify dispatch immediately to cancel [[MOP 515-1](#)].


CODE F - A fire fatality. Before giving detailed information, request Fire Dispatch assigns a talkgroup that is not patched into a conventional channel.

Signal 40 – To be used when a member is under physical assault or under threat of being assaulted [[MOP 602-7](#)].

Correction – to rectify an error.

Code 5 Response: To protect the confidentiality of patient related information, Fire Communications shall not announce over the air that patients are HIV, Hepatitis "B", or Hepatitis "C" positive. Fire Communications will refer to all known positive bloodborne pathogens patients on the air as a **"Code 5 Response"**.

Code 6 Response: To protect the confidentiality of patient related information, Fire Communications shall not announce over the air that patients are positive with tuberculosis. Fire Communications will refer to all known positive respiratory pathogens patients on the air as a **"Code 6 Response"**.

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>MOP 515-5</p>
	<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMMUNICATIONS</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EMERGENCY BUTTON</p>

EMERGENCY BUTTON

All 800 MHz portables and mobiles are outfitted with an emergency button. On mobile radios, the button is labeled “Emer” and is located on the upper left side above the display window. On the portable radio, it is the orange button located on the top of the radio, near the base of the antenna.

To activate, simply press the button and the emergency signal will be sent to Dispatch. This feature only operates when you are “in the system”. This means:

1. You must be in the coverage area.
2. You must be on a talkgroup within the system (Not on Talkarounds or other non- system talkgroups).
3. The system must not be in Failsoft.
4. The radio must be turned on.

When you activate the emergency button several things occur:


1. The consoles in the communications center sound an alarm.
2. Your radio ID is displayed on each console with your talkgroup.
3. You are immediately given priority for channel assignment and need only press the PTT button to transmit you message.
4. All radios in your talkgroup (or fireground talkgroups) will hear your message.
5. Radios on talkgroups within “announcement groups” (e.g. B1, B2, B3) that sound an emergency will cause all radios on B1, B2, B3 to go to B4 (the announcement group) for the duration of the emergency. This insures all units on the scene will be aware of the emergency.
6. Emergency signal will continue until it is reset at your radio and in the Communications Center.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	EMERGENCY BUTTON

Accidental activation of the emergency button must be reported to Communications immediately. Do not turn off the radio. Advise dispatch that it is an accidental alarm so they may reset the system. If you are not aware you have activated the alarm, dispatch will call your unit and state "Signal 99". At this time, if you do not have an emergency, simply report "accidental activation" and reset your radio by holding in the emergency button until it beeps. When a "Signal 99" is accidentally activated, note which radio has sounded the alarm. That is the radio that needs to be reset. Attempting to reset the wrong radio will send in an additional emergency alarm. Also, when an emergency is activated on a talkgroup, all radios on that talkgroup will see the words "emerg. Recd" on their display. This message is different on the radio that has activated the alarm. That radio shows the word "emergency" only. Do not attempt to reset an emergency until Fire Communications has indicated the unit showing the alarm.

Emergency activation of the button should only be used for life threatening situations, trapped on fireground, under attack, lost in fire building, injured, etc. The emergency button is not to be used to request additional alarms, report routine information, jump over another radio user. If you activate the alarm for a true emergency, dispatch will call your unit and report "Signal 99". If you are able to provide further information, press the PTT button and describe the situation. If answering the call would put you in more danger (violent person in area, etc.) do not reply or reply "AFFIRMATIVE" if that is all your situation will allow you to say. Dispatch will announce the "Signal 99" twice, if you do not reply, they will dispatch police and additional support.

Appendix # 9 MOP 515-11 (Previous and Current)

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	MOP 515-11
	<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">COMMUNICATIONS</p> <hr/> <p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DISPATCH PROCEDURES</p>

FIRE SUPPRESSION

Previous Policy

Silent Alarm

One (1) Engine or one (1) Truck, or one (1) Engine and one (1) Truck, as deemed appropriate by Fire Communications Bureau.

Trash, vehicle, brush, utility pole and other outside fires; minor investigations; reports of fires extinguished; automatic alarms without confirming telephone report; etc.

Task Force Alarm

Two (2) Engines and one (1) Truck

Household appliance, trash compactor, free-standing garage, shed, utility/office trailer, exterior storage, chimney, pot-of-food, and large vehicle fires; more significant investigations (smoke inside a structure, report of fire without more specific information); etc.

Note: tactical and procedural responsibilities for units responding on silent and task force alarms will be according to standard operating procedures for first and second Engines and first Truck. Command responsibilities will follow [MOP 601, Item VI **Transfer of Command** and Item VII **Command Responsibilities**].

1st Alarm

Five (5) Engines/Squads, with the 5th due Engine/Squad designated as the Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) [MOP 602-8]; two (2) Trucks; two (2) Battalion Chiefs; one (1) Medic Unit; Safety Officer 2.

Working Fire*

EMS-1, One (1) Breathing Air Support Unit, Fire Investigation Bureau.

*A "Working Fire" shall be declared by the incident commander whenever it is anticipated that all hands on the 1st alarm will be engaged for **30 MINUTES** or longer.

2nd Alarm

Four Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, Rescue 1, one (1) EMS District Officer, one (1) Medic Unit (for Rehabilitation Group [MOP 808-5]).

If no Squad was dispatched prior to the 2nd alarm, the 2nd alarm will consist of three (3) Engines **and** one (1) Squad to ensure that at least one (1) Squad is included on any incident that goes to two alarms.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

3rd Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, one (1) Tower type apparatus, Division Chief, Medic Unit, Mobil Comm Unit.

4th Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, Deputy Chief - Operations

5th Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, one (1) Battalion Chief

6th Alarm or greater

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks

Chief Officers

Assignment per [MOP 105]

Automatic Alarms

- Automatic Alarms followed by confirming telephone report - Standard 1st Alarm Assignment.
- Automatic Alarms without confirming telephone report - Silent Alarm

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS**Hazmat Task Force**

Assignment per [MOP 625-1]

Chemical spills/releases, fires involving chemicals, train derailments/accidents, explosions, Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents, etc.

Decon Box

Two (2) Engines, One (1) Truck, Battalion Chief 6, Hazmat 1

Natural Gas Leaks

One (1) Engine, one (1) Truck (unless report indicates a serious natural gas leak, in which case a complete 1st alarm assignment will be dispatched).

Carbon Monoxide Detector Responses

Closest Suppression Company to investigate*

*upon report of illness or injury, add one (1) Medic Unit

Chemical/Biological Incidents (suspicious substance or package)

Closest Suppression Company and Hazmat 1

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Hydrocarbon (Oil, Gasoline, Diesel, Heating Oil) Spills

- Less than 20 gallons, Closest Suppression Company
- 20 gallons or more, assignment per [MOP [625-1](#)]

RESCUE

Rescue Assignment (persons trapped “in,” “on,” “under” or “between”)

One (1) Engine, one (1) Truck, Rescue 1, one (1) Battalion Chief, one (1) Medic Unit, EMS-1, one (1) EMS District Officer, Safety Officer 2

Dive Rescue Team

Assignment per [MOP [620-6](#)]

Special Rescue Operation (SRO) Team

Assignment per [MOP [616](#)]

Cave-in /Confined Space/Building Collapse Incidents

One (1) Engine, one (1) Truck, Rescue 1, Battalion Chief 6, one (1) Medic Unit

Note: Mutual Aid Cave-in Unit may be requested as needed.

Elevator Alarm (person(s)* trapped within a stalled elevator)

One (1) Engine, one (1) Truck, Rescue 1.

*upon report of illness or injury, add one (1) medic unit

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

Basic Life Support Incidents

One (1) Medic Unit

Advanced Life Support Incidents

One (1) Medic Unit

Suppression Company assignment per [MOP [575-1](#)]

Highest Priority Incidents

One (1) Medic Unit, one (1) EMS District Officer, one (1) Suppression Company

Non-breathing, full cardiac arrest, shooting, cutting, stabbing, pedestrian struck, etc.

Mass Casualty Incident (more than 10 patients)

Assignment per [MOP [808-15](#)]

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Red Medic AlertAssignment per [MOP [575-23](#)]**Patient Assist Incidents**

One (1) Suppression Company

OTHER INCIDENTS**Bomb Incidents**Assignment per [MOP [535-1](#)]**Floodings/Water Leaks/Pumping Basements**

- Dispatch closest Suppression Company to investigate and secure utilities.
- Discontinue service of pumping basements and refer to Public Works [MOP [603-6](#)]

STAFF RESPONSES**2nd Alarm**


Public Information Officer

3rd AlarmSafety Officer 1, Chaplain Corps [MOP [650-1](#)], on-call Division Chief**4th Alarm**

Fire Marshal, Fire Apparatus Coordinator

5th AlarmMedical Director, EMS [MOP [810-2](#)], Division Chief Administrative Services

The officer in charge of field operations may alter response assignments by Fire Communications as required to maintain an adequate level of coverage to all areas of the City.

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION	COMMUNICATIONS
	SUBJECT	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

FIRE SUPPRESSION

The officer in charge of field operations may alter response assignments by Fire Communications as required to maintain an adequate level of coverage to all areas of the City of Baltimore.

Private and Commercial Alarms

One (1) Engine/Squad and one (1) Truck. If confirmation on an accidental alarm is confirmed by the 911 Specialist or Fire Communications Dispatch prior to the unit/s going in route the case will be cancelled. If the assigned unit/s are enroute they will report in non-emergency.

Single Unit Response

One (1) Engine or Squad

Examples:

Trash, vehicle, brush, utility pole and other outside fires; minor investigations; reports of fires extinguished; etc.

Tactical Box

Two (2) Engines/Squad and one (1) Truck

Examples:

Household appliance, trash compactor, free-standing garage, shed, utility/office trailer, exterior storage, chimney, pot-of-food, and large vehicle fires; more significant investigations (smoke inside a structure, report of fire without more specific information); etc.

Note: tactical and procedural responsibilities for units responding on single unit responses and tactical boxes will be according to standard operating procedures for first and second Engines and first Truck. Command responsibilities will follow [MOP 601, Item VI Transfer of Command, and Item VII Command Responsibilities]. **RIT and Accountability will be activated on any HOT ZONE Operations.**

1st Alarm

Six (6) Engines/Squads, with the 3rd due Engine/Squad designated as the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) [MOP 602-8] and 6th due Engine/Squad designated as the Accountability Unit [MOP 601-5]; two (2) Trucks; two (2) Battalion Chiefs; one (1) Medic Unit; Safety Officer (as deemed by Fire communications based on the information received for the call).

Note: When a box assignment is reporting hazardous materials involved, hazmat units will be dispatched as per [MOP 525-11]

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Working Fire*

One (1) Engine or Squad and 1 Truck, Rescue 1, SO # 2 (**if not on the initial dispatch**), Air flex, CAR5.

*A "Working Fire" shall be declared by the incident commander whenever it is anticipated that all hands on the 1st alarm will be engaged for 30 MINUTES or longer.

2nd Alarm

Four (4) Engines or Squads, two (2) Trucks, one (1) Battalion Chief, one (1) EMS Officer, one (1) Medic Unit (for Rehabilitation Group [**MOP 808-5**]).

If no Squad was dispatched prior to the 2nd alarm, the 2nd alarm will consist of three (3) Engines and one (1) Squad to ensure that at least one (1) Squad is included on any incident that goes to two alarms.

3rd Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, Tower1, Medic Unit, BCEMS.

4th Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, Fire Marshall, Apparatus Coordinator, CAR2

5th Alarm

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks, one (1) Battalion Chief, CAR3, CAR4, Medical Director

6th Alarm or greater

Four (4) Engines/Squads, two (2) Trucks

Chief Officers

Assignment per [**MOP 105**]

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS**Hazmat Box**

One (1) Engine [**will be assigned Accountability Unit by BC 6**] , Engine 23, Squad 26, Squad 54, Squad 40, Engine 57, one (1) Truck, Truck 6, Rescue 1, Hazmat 1, ALS Medic Unit, Battalion Chief 6, one (1) Battalion Chief, one (1) EMS Officer, Hazmat Coordinator, Air Flex

Assignment per [MOP 625-1]

Chemical spills/releases, fires involving chemicals, train derailments/accidents, explosions, Weapons of Mass Destruction incidents, etc.

Hazmat Tactical

One (1) Engine, two (2) Hazmat Units, Hazmat 1, Battalion Chief 6

Note: In addition to the Hazmat Tactical assignment the Fire Boats will be added to a Hazmat Tactical 2 (**Coastal**). The Fire Boats and a medic will be added on a Hazmat Tactical 3 (**Coastal with injuries**).

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Hazmat Silent

One (1) Engine, one (1) Hazmat unit, Hazmat 1

Natural Gas Leaks

Closest Suppression Company (unless report indicates a serious natural gas leak, in which case a complete 1st alarm assignment including Hazmat 1 will be dispatched).

Carbon Monoxide Detector Responses

Closest Suppression Company to investigate* *upon report of illness or injury, add one (1) Medic Unit

Chemical/Biological Incidents (suspicious substance or package)

One (1) Hazmat unit, Hazmat 1, Battalion Chief 6, Hazmat Coordinator

Hydrocarbon (Oil, Gasoline, Diesel, Heating Oil) Spills

- Less than 20 gallons, Closest Suppression Company
- 20 gallons or more, assignment per [MOP 625-1]

RESCUE**Rescue Assignment (persons trapped "in," "on," "under" or "between") Vehicle Extrication, Person vs. Machine, High Angle**

Closest one (1) Engine, one (1) Truck, one (1) Squad, Rescue 1, one (1) Battalion Chief, one (1) ALS Medic Unit, one (1) EMS officer, Battalion Chief EMS, Safety Officer 2, MD1, MD2

Cave-in /Trench/Confined Space/Building Collapse Incidents****Report of/Investigate**

Closest one (1) Engine and one (1) Truck.

****Confirmed -SOC-BOX**

Squad 26, Squad 40, Squad 54, Truck 6, Tower 1, Rescue 1, **Closest Engine (non-SOC) assigned as Accountability Unit**, Battalion Chief 6, one (1) Battalion Chief, Safety Officer 2, Hazmat 1, one (1) ALS Medic Unit, one (1) EMS Officer, Battalion Chief EMS, Air Flex, SOC 1, MD1

Note: Notify SOC 1

Note: Mutual Aid may be requested by the Incident Commander or SOC 1 as needed.

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Dive Rescue Team

Assignment per [MOP 620-6]

Swift-Water / Large Area Flooding [MOP 695-2]****Report of / Investigate**

Closest one (1) Engine, one (1) Squad, and one (1) Truck.

****Confirmed -SOC-BOX**

Squad 26, Squad 40, Squad 54, Truck 6, Tower 1, Rescue 1, **Closest Engine (non-SOC) assigned as Accountability Unit**, Battalion Chief 6, one (1) Battalion Chief, Safety Officer 2, Hazmat 1, one (1) ALS Medic Unit, one (1) EMS Officer, Battalion Chief EMS, Air Flex, SOC 1, MD1

Note: Notify SOC 1**Note: Mutual Aid may be requested by the Incident Commander or SOC 1 as needed.****Elevator Alarm: Report of/Investigate Disabled Occupied Elevator**One (1) Engine/Squad or One (1) Truck. If from a double station the Truck is the preferred unit for dispatch unless in station with a Squad.**Elevator Alarm: Confirmed (person(s)* trapped within a Disabled Occupied Elevator)**

One (1) Engine or One (1) Truck, Rescue 1 or closest Squad. If from a double station the Truck is the preferred unit for dispatch

****Upon report of illness or injury, add one (1) medic unit*****EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES****Basic Life Support Responses**

BLS - One (1) Medic Unit

BLS1 – One (1) Medic Unit and one (1) Suppression Unit

BLS2* – One (1) Medic Unit, one (1) Suppression, one (1) EMS Officer

Advanced Life Support Responses

ALS - One (1) Medic Unit

ALS1 – One (1) ALS Medic Unit and one (1) Suppression Unit

ALS2* – One (1) ALS Medic Unit, one (1) Suppression, one (1) EMS Officer

Suppression Company assignment per [MOP 575-1]

Response Level Two Incidents

Non-breathing, full cardiac arrest, shooting, cutting, stabbing, pedestrian struck, etc.

Critical Alert

Assignment per [MOP 684-1]

SECTION	SUBJECT
COMMUNICATIONS	DISPATCH PROCEDURES

Citizen Assist Incidents
One (1) Suppression Unit

Bomb Incidents
Assignment per [MOP 535-1]

Floodings/Water Leaks/Pumping Basements [Residential / Buildings]
• Dispatch closest Suppression Company to investigate and secure utilities.
• Discontinue service of pumping basements and refer to Public Works [MOP 603-6]


STAFF RESPONSES

2nd Alarm
Public Information Officer

3rd Alarm
**Safety Officer 1, Chaplain Corps [MOP 650-1], on-call Shift Commander [report to SCO],
Battalion Chief FCB**

4th Alarm
Fire Marshal, Fire Apparatus Coordinator

5th Alarm
Medical Director, EMS [MOP 810-2], Assistant Chief Support Services/Community Risk Reduction

MOP 601	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND</p>

OBJECTIVES

Command procedures are designed to accomplish the following objectives:

- Fix the responsibility for Command on a certain individual through a standard identification system depending on arrival sequence of units and officers.
- Ensure that strong, direct and visible Command will be established as early as possible in the operation.
- Establish an effective framework outlining the activities and responsibilities assigned to Command.
- Provide a system for the orderly transfer of Command to subsequent arriving officers.

I. ACCOUNTABILITY

All units will utilize the departments' electronic accountability program. Unit officers will verify members are properly signed in at the start of every shift and during periods when members rotate from locations throughout the shift. Battalion Chiefs will provide oversight daily with their assigned units. The Shift Commanders Office will verify units and chief officers are in compliance. The Personal Accountability Card (PAT) [MOP 602-12] system serves as a back up to the electronic system in place and will be utilized and checked at the start of every shift by the unit officer. Battalion Chiefs will provide oversight during daily station visits. The importance of the PAT backup system cannot be overstated. In the event of a failure with the electronic system, the PAT system provides the Incident Commander or their designee the ability to track and account for all members working on an incident.

Personal accountability is everyone's responsibility. Personnel accountability lies directly with Supervisors, Chief Officers and Incident Commanders. The importance of self-discipline, following order of dispatch, assigned primary and secondary responsibilities, utilizing correct talkgroups, establishing Initial Rapid Intervention Teams (IRIT) and Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) [MOP 602-08], etc., cannot be overemphasized. Accountability of all assigned personnel must be verified and maintained at all times while on duty.

II. ESTABLISHING COMMAND

The member in charge of the first suppression unit to arrive at the scene of multiple unit responses shall assume Command until relieved by a higher-ranking officer, Battalion Chief's arrival, or until the incident is terminated. In some instances, the Battalion Chief may assume a supporting role on arrival when conditions present the ability to do so. [MOP 601-1]

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

If the conditions warrant "FAST ATTACK MODE" prior to the arrival of a chief officer, Command could be presented with limitations regarding some prescribed command functions. These limitations require self-discipline and strict adherence to the order of dispatch, primary and secondary responsibilities and the use of good judgement by all units assigned. [MOP 602, 602-01, 602-02, 602-06, 602-08] This is covered in detail in IX COMMAND OPTIONS.

- **Limitations with some prescribed command functions** - This allows the first arriving unit officer on an incident to establish a command presence and initiate a "Fast Attack." This does not relieve the first arriving officer from using good judgment and deploying the appropriate tactics given scene size up and available knowledge upon arrival. This requires all units to adhere to the order of dispatch, and primary and secondary responsibilities. When the first Battalion Chief arrives, they will communicate with the officer in command by radio and assume Incident Command.

III. INITIAL REPORT

The member in charge of the first suppression unit to arrive shall immediately transmit a brief initial report via radio on designated talkgroup. The initial report shall include the following:

1. Unit identification on the scene.
2. Building description (occupancy, size, arrangement, construction, and corrected address if needed).
3. Identify conditions encountered and relay credible reports of persons trapped.
4. Assume command

The terminology used in this report is identified in the Communications Procedure [MOP 515-2-1].

IV. BATTALION CHIEFS

When arriving on the scene of an incident Battalion Chiefs will notify Fire Communications on the designated talkgroup of the following:

1. Report arrival on the scene.
2. Establish or assume command of the incident, if determined necessary to do so. Identify Command Post location "Side Alpha, Lobby of..."
3. Transmit updated size-up report within 5 minutes after assuming command of the incident.
4. Give a status report at ten-minute intervals until the incident is placed under control.

V. RADIO DESIGNATION

1. The radio designation "COMMAND" will be used with a brief description of the incident location. (i.e., "North Avenue Command;" "Hopkins Command" etc.). This designation will not change through the duration of the incident.
 - a. Incident Commanders are encouraged to designate assignments (i.e., Operations, Roof Division, Medical Group) in order to maintain a manageable and effective span of control.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

- b. On large scale incidents **ALL** members are reminded to utilize NIMS guidelines, practices, and terminology, when communicating. Members shall refrain from unintentionally calling for Command when they should be contacting Operations or their specific Group Supervisor.
2. Except in cases of urgency, all transmissions from fireground to Fire Communications will go through Command.
3. At any point when an urgent item is transmitted and missed by Command, communications will immediately notify Command of the missed transmission. At no time will a missed transmission concerning urgent situations, (MAYDAY [MOP 602-13], loss of water supply, missing or trapped firefighters, collapse or dangerous conditions, etc.) not be repeated to Command with acknowledgement of same from Command.

VI. TACTICAL WORKSHEETS

1. Incident Commanders or their designee will utilize the department issued Tactical Worksheet, or provided tablet / computer, to outline unit assignments, maintain accountability and assist with the transfer of Command.
2. On larger scale incidents, members in command, in charge of operations, supervising groups or divisions, or their designee, will utilize the department issued Tactical Worksheet or provided tablet / computer, to outline and record informational needs such as, but not limited to:
 - a. Assignments and locations of all units.
 - b. Assist in the transfer of command.
 - c. Provide accountability of all members.
 - d. Tracking of work assignments and progress.

The department issued Tactical Worksheets are a set of two rugged double-sided work sheets that provide information for all types of emergency incidents. They provide benchmarks and checkpoints to assist the Incident Commander with successfully mitigating the emergency incident.

Personal worksheets or other personal make-shift means for tracking **will not be used**. This centralization of tracking will promote consistency throughout the battalions as it relates to command, control, and accountability, on emergency incidents.

VII. TRANSFER OF COMMAND

The officer of the first suppression unit to arrive on the scene will assume Command until relieved by a ranking officer within the following guidelines:

1. When dispatched by Fire Communications:
 - a. The officer of the first arriving unit will assume Command until relieved by a higher-ranking officer, Battalion Chief's arrival, or until the incident is terminated.
 - b. The first arriving Battalion Chief may assume Command upon arrival if they determine it is necessary to do so.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

- c. The Deputy Chief Operations may assume Command upon arrival if they determine it is necessary to do so.
 - d. When chief officers do not assume command upon arrival, they will provide support, assistance, and/or guidance as needed/required, until their departure or a decision is made to take command. **[MOP 601-01]**
2. The above guidelines under transfer of Command do not preclude the response of any chief officer to an incident for observation or informational purposes. Assumption of Command in these situations would be discretionary.

NOTE: When chief officers assume Command, Fire Communications will make an announcement on the assigned fireground talkgroup confirming same and identifying the location of Command (i.e., "North Avenue Command;" "Hopkins Command" etc.).

Within the chain of command indicated above, the actual transfer of command will be regulated by the following procedures:

1. Arriving ranking officers assuming Command will communicate with the officer being relieved preferably by face-to-face or by radio if necessary, upon arrival.
2. Except in cases related to Fast Attack Mode, where it established as permissible to do this via radio, the officer being relieved will position them self on side Alpha and brief the officer assuming Command with the following information:
 - a. General situation status.
 - b. Deployment and assignments of operating units.
 - c. Appraisal of needs for additional resources at that time.
3. The officer being relieved will review the tactical worksheet or provided tablet / computer with the transfer of command. This mechanism provides the most effective framework for transfer of command. It provides the location and status of resources in a standard format that should be well known to all members.

All members in leadership roles must clearly understand, as command is assumed, transferred, and delegated through demobilization, their level of responsibility for the incident and all members operating there. As units are demobilized and clear the incident, the officer will call command and announce their departure and that all members are accounted for on their unit. Command will ensure they have accounted for every unit on the scene prior to transmitting their incidents final disposition. **[MOP 602-04]**

The arrival (in itself) of a ranking officer on the fireground does not mean Command has been transferred to that ranking officer. Command is transferred only when the outlined communication functions have been completed. A chief officer may assume a supportive role to assist the IC if the incident does not warrant transfer of command. **[MOP 601-01]**

VIII. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

Commands responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following tasks:

1. Assume an effective Command position.
2. Transmit a brief initial radio report.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

3. Rapidly evaluate situation (Scene size-up).
4. Develop Incident Action Plan and determine the best suited command option.
5. Ensure Rapid Intervention Team and a Safety Officer is in place.
6. Provide progress reports and continue to re-evaluate scene size up until situation is normalized.
7. Maintain accountability: incident will dictate need for assignment of accountability officer.
8. Management of Span of Control "Divisions and Groups":
 - a. **DIVISION:** The separation of an incident into GEOGRAPHIC areas of operations. Divisions are established when the number of resources exceeds the manageable span of control of the Operations Chief.
 - b. **GROUP:** Established to divide the incident management structure into FUNCTIONAL areas of operation. Groups are composed of resources assembled to perform a special function not necessarily within a single geographic division.

Reference to the fire building will be by letter in clockwise rotation (side) and number according to floor height (story) as follows:

- Side **Alpha** - front of building
- Side **Bravo** - left side of building (**when facing front of building**)
- Side **Charlie** - rear of building
- Side **Delta** - right side of building (**when facing front of building**)

Exposures will be referenced as follows:

- First exposure will correlate with the side referenced: **Exposure Bravo**.
- The ensuing exposures will have the appropriate numerical designation attached:
Exposure Bravo 1.

9. Review and evaluate attack efforts and revise the Incident Action Plan as needed.
10. Request and assign additional units as necessary.
11. Establishment of a designated staging area when additional resources are requested.
12. Return units to service as soon as practicable.
13. Record/track accountability as incident demobilizes.

IX. COMMAND OPTIONS

In cases where the initial arriving officer is a Chief Officer, their efforts should be automatically directed towards the listed functions. However, an initial arriving unit officer assuming command must decide on an appropriate commitment for their unit consistent with the particular circumstances encountered. Generally, these can be categorized into three broad areas:

1. **Investigative Mode:** These incidents generally require investigation by the first-arriving engine and truck companies. Normally the initial Incident Commander can go with the company to check while utilizing the portable radio to continue Command.
2. **Fast Attack Mode:** Incidents where immediate action is required to stabilize the situation such as:
 - Interior fires within occupied residences, apartments, or small commercial businesses, which have not gained considerable headway.
 - Where a fast interior attack is critical and serves a purpose to save life and/or rescue trapped occupants.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

- Where a quick “Indirect Attack” stabilizes the interior conditions and provides ability to transition into a Fast Attack in order to facilitate the attempt to save life and/or rescue trapped occupants.
 - **Indirect Attack-** Training regarding such has been provided and made available to all members within the Fire Academy training platform. The BCFD developed training and direction regarding best safe practices as presented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) concerning basement and compartmentalized type fires.

NOTE: A quick “Indirect Attack” shall not be confused with initiating **Exterior Operations** due to untenable conditions present at time of arrival as described in Command Mode.

The Fast Attack Mode will not last more than a few moments from its initiation, and will end with one of the following:

- Situation is stabilized.
 - Battalion Chief arrives and Command is transferred. The Fast Attack Mode is able to transition into an interior attack when the Battalion Chief assumes command and deems it prudent and consistent with conditions encountered.
 - Situation is not stabilized, and units must evacuate and reassess tactics prior to the arrival of the first Battalion Chief.
3. **Command Mode:** Incidents that will require a dedicated, uninterrupted, and continuous command presence. These situations are usually recognizable immediately given the volume of the fire, complexity and/or potential of the occupancy, or the possibility of extension well beyond initial involvement. In many instances these situations will require an immediate establishment of Exterior Operations with possible utilization of master streams, water curtains, supply augmentation and/or relays. These incidents will require a strong, direct, and clear command presence prior to the arrival of the first chief officer. In such cases, the unit officer assuming command will establish a command post and maintain that position until relieved. These incidents will include but are not limited to: Haz-Mat situations, fully involved structures, large warehouse complexes, and all situations where the possibility of crew integrity is compromised. Exposures must be protected when present.

NOTE: While the initial arriving unit officer assuming the role of IC has a choice of modes and varying degrees of personal involvement in the attack; they continue to be responsible for the identified tasks assigned to the command function. In all cases knowledge, initiative and judgement, of the officer are of critical importance. The modes identified are not strict rules, but rather general guidelines to assist officers in their actions to mitigate the incident. The choices selected require self-discipline, good judgement and self-control of all officers reporting to the incident.

X. **ADDITIONAL RESOURCES**

Initial arriving unit officers assuming Command must begin to establish clear mechanisms to mitigate the incident. In addition to the selection of the best suited Command Option, they must also request additional resources whenever necessary.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

Whenever conditions are evident for prolonged operations, Command must consider requesting additional resources. Command has the latitude to request additional resources whenever they deem it appropriate. Failure to initiate the request for additional resources can/will overwhelm the incident and destabilize conditions rapidly. This request must include a clearly defined staging area for the requested resources. This action will provide the initial arriving chief officer additional resources with an established location for them to report to.

A Working Fire notification by Command requests additional units to provide reinforcement of the initial arriving box assignment. This request also provides support units to assist Command and the incident. The request of a second alarm after a working fire is requested will only dispatch the remaining units required to fill out the second alarm. A Working Fire will be requested whenever all units on an incident are expected to be continuously engaged with incident mitigation and stabilization for longer than 30-45 minutes. The fatigue and exhaustion of members working during extended operations must be considered during all emergency incidents. Rotation, hydration and evaluation, of members in an established Re-Hab will occur on all extended operations.

This should not be confused with an incident that involves a small trash fire within a structure or a small room type fire that has not grown beyond the incipient stage and is quickly extinguished with a single attack line being reinforced by the second due engine. These incidents may have personnel on site longer than 30-45 minutes. However, the incident is mitigated / stabilized in far less time with minimal effort. Units will still provide labor to conduct minimal overhaul and hot-spot extinguishment, but the continuous intense and exhaustive attack operation has ceased prior to the benchmark of 30-45 minutes. In most cases, depending on weather conditions, additional resources beyond specialized requests are not necessary in these circumstances.

RELATED MATERIAL:

MOP 515-02-01 – SAMPLE INCIDENTS

MOP 601-01 – REINFORCEMENT OF COMMAND

MOP 602 - FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND- STAGING

MOP 602-01 – STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE ENGINE/SQUAD

MOP 602-02 – STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE TRUCK

MOP 602-04 - RADIO COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

MOP 602-06 - FIREGROUND EVACUATION PLAN


MOP 602-08 – RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM

MOP 602-09 - PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

MOP 602-12 - ACCOUNTABILITY CARDS

MOP 602-13 – MAYDAY

MOP 602-16 - EMERGENCY INCIDENT TIME MANAGEMENT

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>MOP 601-1</p>
	<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EMERGENCY SERVICES</p> <hr/> <p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">REINFORCEMENT of INCIDENT COMMAND</p>

OVERVIEW


The importance of reinforcing Incident Command and supporting the Incident Commander by utilizing a higher ranking officer in the role of “Incident Advisor” is discussed in NFPA 1561 (2014) Annex G.6 and G.7. The following procedure shall be followed on all emergency incidents where “higher ranking” officers are mandated to attend.

A Deputy or Battalion Chief will be the “Higher Ranking” officer that most commonly fills these support roles. However, all officers and members acting as such shall be familiar with this policy in its entirety. Emergency incidents are dynamic and fluctuating by nature. The combined efforts of Incident Command and Incident Support will assist and promote the likelihood of quick scene stabilization

INSTRUCTION

On any emergency incident that escalates to the point where “Higher Ranking” officers are summoned to attend, these officers shall make a determination upon arrival either to assume Incident Command or assign themselves in a supporting role. When the decision is made to assume a support role and/or act as an “Incident Advisor”, they will conduct a 360 of the scene when feasible. This support role can play a critical function for the success of the operation. The “Higher Ranking” officer’s responsibilities should include, but are not limited to:

- Upon arrival announce presence on scene.
- Initial briefing from Incident Command regarding Incident Action Plan.
- Make a determination regarding command or support role and announce on talkgroup.
- Reconnaissance of incident scene (complete 360 on incident) when feasible.
- Safety assessment (establishment of Hot & Warm Zones, Members PPE, Apparatus Placement, Ground and Aerial Ladder Placement, utilized Hydrants and units covering properly, overall incident conditions) **NOTIFY INCIDENT COMMAND OF ALL UNSAFE FINDINGS IMMEDIATELY VIA RADIO AND INTERVENE.**
- Assess current tactics. (Determine during 360 or after updates from Charlie, Delta & Bravo, if the deployed tactics are effective).
- Identify and assess available resources on scene.
- Conduct a follow up with Incident Command.

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE PROCEDURE</p>		MOP 601-5
		<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EMERGENCY SERVICES</p> <hr/> <p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCOUNTABILITY UNIT</p>

PURPOSE

To ensure the established mechanisms for tracking and accounting for all personnel on emergency incidents are being utilized consistently and correctly.

OVERVIEW

An initial alarm assignments operations will begin prior to the accountability unit arriving to the scene. [MOP 601]

This requires all officers and members in operations to practice diligence and consistency with respect to ensuring their Personal Accountability Tag is on the unit and that they properly sign in and sign their relief out of the MDT. [MOP 602-12][MOP 601-4]

The sixth assigned engine/squad on an emergency incident will call the first assigned Battalion Chief on assigned talk group and confirm they will assume Accountability upon arrival.

Any changes made by the battalion chief for first arriving engine/squad requires them to identify and re-assign the ACCOUNTABILITY UNIT.

If an engine/squad requests to be added to a box assignment [MOP 601-3] and will not be the first arriving engine/squad, the battalion chief will add them as the 6th engine/squad and assign them as the Accountability Unit if the battalion chief permits them to be added.

This will be completed on the assigned talk group when the battalion chief advises the units addition to the box assignment. The officer of the engine/squad will acknowledge their assignment as Accountability Unit and follow all established procedures.

Identified HIGHRISE BOX Assignments will continue with pre-established accountability assignment as trained on / stated within the MOP 624 series.

PROCEDURE

The sixth assigned engine/squad will function as an accountability unit. The units assigned personnel will report to Incident Command and Incident Safety with identified equipment and assist with tracking the accountability of all assigned units and personnel.

The Officer and Pump Operator will report to the Incident Commander on side Alpha and receive a report from the IC. They will then begin tracking/identifying assigned units/personnel working on side Alpha and any adjacent exposures on Bravo/Delta sides from the front. They will utilize the IC's

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	ACCOUNTABILITY UNIT

Command Board and MDT to assist with identifying/tracking all units/personnel, location/position/tasks on side Alpha and adjacent sides. [MOP 602-1]

The Personnel assigned to the Pipe and Lead Off position will report to the Safety Chief on side Charlie with their units assigned MDT and utilize it and the Chief Officers Command Board to assist with identifying/tracking all units/personnel, location/position/tasks on side Charlie and adjacent exposures on Bravo/Delta sides in the rear. [MOP 602-1]

Emergency Incident Accountability

The first alarm units Personal Accountability Tags (PAT) [MOP 602-12] will be collected by the Sixth Engines:

- **Pump Operator** Side Alpha (*1st Truck, 1st Engine/Squad, 4th Engine/Squad*) and the
- **Lead Off position** side Charlie (*2nd Truck, 2nd Engine/Squad, 5th Engine/Squad*).
- **The 3rd assigned Engine/Squad [RIT] will bring their PAT Tags to side Alpha and present to the Pump Operator for check in.**

Officers of units assigned on working fires or additional alarms will present their units PAT tags to the identified person depending on the assignment from Incident Command.

No personnel assigned on working fires or additional alarms will begin operating until the PAT tags have been presented to the assigned individual for accountability.

The PAT tags will be verified against the MDT sign in by the Pump Operator and the Lead Off person of the sixth engine. Issues will be noted and reported.

All members operating at an emergency incident shall actively participate in the Personnel Accountability System without exception.

Crew integrity and safety must be paramount in all decisions made on emergency incidents. Accountability of all personnel on emergency incidents establishes locations and functions of everyone working within an identified HOT ZONE [MOP 601-2] in the event of a MAYDAY [MOP 602-13] or other incident altering action occurs.

Related Information

[MOP 601] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND

[MOP 601-2] ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL ZONES ON EMERGENCY INCIDENTS


[MOP 601-4] MOBILE DATA TERMINAL SIGN IN

[MOP 602] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND- STAGING

[MOP 602-1] STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE- ENGINE/SQUAD

[MOP 602-4] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

[MOP 602-12] Accountability Tags

MOP 601-6	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES
	SUBJECT FIREGROUND OPERATIONS VACANT BUILDINGS

OVERVIEW

Vacant buildings present an immediate “Life Safety” concern to firefighting personnel due to weakened and unstable floors, walls, and roofs, due to previous fires, exposure to weather, age, neglect, and vandalism.

The Baltimore City Fire Department defines a VACANT BUILDING as a structure that is not maintained, in an obvious state of disrepair or neglect, and has no legally connected operating utilities. Vacant buildings are not legally occupied however, they may be occupied by unauthorized persons.

POLICY

The **Life Safety** of its employees is a primary concern for The Baltimore City Fire Department. With that in mind, an interior attack of a known vacant building **will not** be commenced until the following have occurred:

- A proper size up and report of conditions on Side Charlie. If a 360-degree size-up can be performed by the initial Incident Commander, these findings will be reported via radio and an interior attack can commence. Fire Suppression should not be delayed during this time with an exterior, indirect or transitional attack being used.
- **At no time will an interior attack of a known condemned building or a building identified as CODE X be initiated except in the instance of persons trapped.** If a credible report of people trapped exists, the incident commander may choose to limit the number of members on the interior of the building.

PURPOSE

This policy and related procedures are established in order to better prepare for, respond to and recover from incidents occurring in vacant buildings. It will be the responsibility of each member to exercise the appropriate discipline and control dictated by their rank in the implementation of this policy and procedure.

The Life Safety concerns firefighters face in vacant structure fires cannot be overstated. Strict adherence to this policy will be strongly enforced. Incident Commanders, Company Officers and those Acting Officers that choose to deviate from this policy will be required to complete a Special Report with thorough details of the incident and the reasons involved with their decision to deviate. This Special Report will be addressed to the Assistant Chief of Operations.

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT FIREGROUND OPERATIONS VACANT BUILDINGS
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The report will then be reviewed and investigated by the Assistant Chief of Operations who will decide whether the deviation was warranted. Initial deviations that are deemed to be unwarranted can result in coaching, evaluation and/or training. Multiple unwarranted deviations to this policy can result in disciplinary action up to and including demotion.

Company Officers or Incident Commanders will be subject to immediate suspension for a Severe Safety Violation, if they fail to comply with this policy and that failure is a result of negligent decisions or actions as determined after the immediate preliminary suspension hearing [MOP 312-1].

COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS

The member in charge of the first suppression unit to arrive at the scene of multiple unit responses shall assume Command until relieved by a higher-ranking officer, Battalion Chief's arrival or until the incident is terminated. [MOP 601]

Appropriate transfer of Command is crucial to the safety of members operating at the scene of incidents involving vacant buildings. The initial Incident Commander must ensure that all pertinent information is passed on to the ranking officer who is assuming Command. This is often missed if the initial unit initiates a Fast Attack Command Mode.

The Incident Commander must be mindful of the possible need for special resources in the event of a collapse or MAYDAY situation.

It is important when the fire involves a vacant structure to slow down and assess all the variables to allow for good strategic and tactical decisions. Prior to making a tactical decision the initial Incident Commander will evaluate the following:

- Stability and condition of the structure
- Smoke and fire conditions to determine survivability of an occupant
- Openings for security devices to include plywood, metal screens, metal bars or VPS systems. Security devices can delay ventilation and contribute to rapid fire progression.
- Conditions on Side Charlie

INITIAL REPORT

The initial report will be in accordance with **Fireground Operations and Command [MOP 601]**

SIZE UP

Vacant buildings require a thorough more cautious risk assessment and size-up. Below will be considered before initiating an interior attack and if identified, will be reported via radio.

1. The presence of a CODE X indicator [MOP 606-10-1]
2. Exposed wood joists that are free burning, sagging, or pulled away from the walls.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS VACANT BUILDINGS

3. Roof cornices that are missing, cantilevered, or not level.
4. Exterior walls that are out of line, cracked, bowing, bulging, or that contain loose brick.
5. Indicators of previous collapse
6. Signs of previous significant fires that may have involved floors, the roof, or structural members.
7. Obstacles to egress (Bars, security devices, plywood)
8. Condition of exposures (Code X, previous collapse, dangerous conditions)

SIDE CHARLIE REPORT

The first unit to arrive on Side Charlie will provide a detailed size-up utilizing considerations listed above and report findings via radio. [MOP 602-1] This report **must** include:

1. The number of floors including basement. (Example: 4 floors in the rear with a walkout basement)
2. Fire conditions (including the burning of exposed wood joists if identified)
3. The presence of a CODE X indicator [MOP 606-10-1]
4. Obstacles to access/egress (Bars, security devices, plywood)
5. Basement openings or lack of.
6. Condition of exposures.

ROOF REPORT

1. A report from the roof will be provided to include fire conditions, previous openings, and evidence of previous fires. This will not delay an interior attack but may be cause for a change of strategy.
2. The roof condition of the exposures will be reported if pertinent.

General Considerations:

- **Life Safety** must be the first consideration when building the strategic direction during size-up. Vacant buildings are less likely to involve occupants; however, these buildings are a safe haven for many citizens that are homeless. Every consideration must be evaluated to make a good judgment to determine if the structure is occupied. The first arriving unit has the greatest opportunity to perform a rescue, but the initial tactics selected will set the direction of the incident. One of the observations that must play a strong influence in the initial strategic decision is the chance for survival of an occupant. The survival evaluation will be based on fire and smoke conditions. If the conditions have reached a

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT FIREGROUND OPERATIONS VACANT BUILDINGS
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point that there is no chance for survival, the benefit is significantly reduced and the risk to firefighting personnel must not be elevated.

- **Risk Assessment** will be performed by the initial Incident Commander and/or ranking officer on scene to ensure that the appropriate fire suppression strategy is being utilized (offensive, defensive, transitional). This includes selecting appropriate initial fire suppression attack. Consideration should be given to attacking with a 2 ½ (blitz) handline, RAM XD portable monitor pipe [TM 228-1, 418], or unit mounted monitor pipe. The level of risk assumed shall be directly related to the potential to save lives and property. Structural stability and fire condition/location in the building will be continuously evaluated by unit officers and the Incident Commander.
- **Personnel Safety** must be the highest priority when conducting the risk-assessment during size-up. There is additional consideration when confronted with a fire in a vacant building. Any concern that the fire conditions or the stability of the building could jeopardize the life or safety of a member will necessitate a defensive strategy.
- **Accountability** of members operating in, and around vacant buildings is paramount. Unit officers must maintain strict accountability of members and report progress and movement throughout the structure to incident command. A PAR must be conducted every forty (40) minutes during the duration of the incident. [MOP 602-9]
- **Structural Stability** is the major concern during the duration of the fire. Vacant buildings that were involved in a previous fire should be considered unsafe and provide an increased possibility of collapse. The observation of all exterior components must be conducted prior to selecting the best option for fire suppression activities. Every incident commander should have a strong knowledge of building construction. Members must establish a collapse zone during the early stages of fire operations, and the Incident Commander shall ensure that the Incident Command Post is outside of the collapse zone.
- **Fire Behavior** is of utmost importance, an understanding of the stages of fire progression should be added to tactical and strategic considerations. Smoke conditions play a vital role in how the fire is progressing and how the fire may expand. A rapidly evolving fire in a vacant building has the potential to spread to adjacent structures. Exposure issues should be protected, and the focus of suppression tactics should be directed to the adjacent buildings.
- **Communication** is imperative. Any immediate life hazard identified during operations must be immediately reported to the Incident Commander. This is not limited to unit officers. Any member who identifies an immediate life hazard will report it via radio at once. Members will utilize their emergency button if they are unable to get through due to heavy radio traffic.


SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS VACANT BUILDINGS

Definitions/Examples

- **Immediate Life Hazards-** Any condition that creates a present, extreme, and immediate danger to life. Examples include change in the stability of the building, rapid progression of fire etc...
- **Risk Assessment-** A process to identify potential hazards and analyze the outcome of operating with that hazard(s) present.
- **Survivability Assessment-** Assessment in which a range of conditions are evaluated indicating if a specific entity could survive. Three descriptors are used during this assessment likely, marginal, and unlikely.
- **Vacant Building-** A building that is not maintained, in an obvious state of disrepair or neglect and has no operating utilities. Vacant buildings are not legally occupied however, they may be occupied by unauthorized persons.

RELATED MATERIAL

- [MOP 312-1] FILING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS
- [MOP 601] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND
- [MOP 602-1] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS Standard operating procedure-Engine
- [MOP 602-2] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS Standard operating procedure-Truck
- [MOP 602-1] CODE-X UNSAFE STRUCTURE

MOP 602	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE POLICY</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND- STAGING</p>

The objective of the staging procedure is to provide a standard system of initial placement for responding apparatus, personnel, and equipment and to provide direction for management of additional resources requested should they not be immediately assigned a task by the Incident Commander.

Effective utilization of this procedure:

- Prevents excessive apparatus congestion at the scene
- Allows time for command to evaluate conditions prior to assigning units
- Places apparatus in an uncommitted location close to the immediate scene to facilitate more effective assignment by command
- Produces more effective communications by virtue of reducing radio traffic during the critical initial stages of fire operations
- Allows command to formulate and implement a plan without undue confusion and pressure.

Staging will involve two levels: LEVEL I AND LEVEL II

1. LEVEL I - STAGING

This procedure will automatically apply to all **BOX ALARM** type responses and will involve:

- A. The first engine/squad and truck will initiate the proper fire fighting tactics to immediately attack the fire and/or cover exposures. The position of the first due engine/squad and truck will generally be at the front/Side Alpha of the location. If conditions dictate a change in this primary location, other responding units must be immediately notified by radio.

The engine/squad will lead off from a hydrant, spot pumper and be prepared to supply handline, deluge stream, etc. Report by radio location of hydrant used [MOP [602-1](#) & [602-8](#)].

- B. The second engine/squad and truck will cover the rear/Side Charlie of the location and update command on conditions. The second engine/squad will lead off from hydrant, spot pumper and be prepared to supply handline, deluge stream, etc. Report by radio location of hydrant used. [MOP [602-1](#) & [602-8](#)]
- C. The third engine/squad will secure equipment and report to the Incident Commander and relieve the Initial Rapid Intervention Team. [MOP [602-8](#)]
- D. The fourth engine/squad will respond to location of the hydrant that the first engine/squad led off from and report to the location of the first engine/squad. [MOP [602-1](#)]
- E. The fifth engine/squad will respond to location of the hydrant that the second engine/squad led off from and report to the location of the second engine/squad. [MOP [602-1](#)]

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND - STAGING

F. The sixth engine squad will be assigned as the Accountability Unit. [MOP 602-1, 605-1] |

If any of the above units are delayed, they will notify the **FIRST ASSIGNED** Battalion Chief via assigned fireground talkgroup of the delay. Fire Communications will verify that the Battalion Chief has received this message. The next due responding units will fill in as necessary for the delayed unit.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF UNITS RESPONDING WILL BE IN THE ORDER OF DISPATCH. IF CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT A UNIT MUST DEVIATE FROM THIS PROCEDURE, THE OTHER RESPONDING UNITS WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS CHANGE. NOTIFICATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA RADIO ON THE ASSIGNED FIREGROUND TALKGROUP.

All other units responding to this incident (regardless of alarm) will stage in their direction of travel, uncommitted, approximately one block from the scene until assigned by command, unless a specific staging area has been designated.

Staged companies or units will, in normal response situations, report unit designation, standing by and their direction. ("E-1 standing by South") It may be necessary to be more specific when reporting standby positions in extraordinary response situations. An acknowledgement is not necessary from either Fire Communications or command. Staged companies will stay on the air, but not transmit except in an emergency until orders are received from command. After a reasonable lapse of time, they will contact command and advise him of their standby status.

These staging procedures attempt to reduce routine traffic, but in no way should reduce effective communications or the initiative of officers to communicate. If staged units observe **critical** tactical needs, they will advise command of such **critical** conditions and their actions.

Pre-fire planning will identify exceptions to level I staging with regard to the special functions that must be performed in that particular occupancy. In the absence of such tasks, regular Level I staging procedures automatically apply.

2. LEVEL II - STAGING

When level II staging is activated, the staging area will be under the command of the officer of the last assigned engine company. This unit will be designated by Fire Communications while units are responding. The officer of the last assigned engine company will be designated "staging officer" and will remain at the staging area with the apparatus until relieved or the staging area is deactivated. The other members responding with and riding on the unit designated "staging officer" will remain in the staging area and serve as a manpower resource. The pump operator of said unit will serve as staging area mobile communications.

Unit designated "staging officer" may be relieved by first available staff officer designated by command.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND - STAGING

Level II staging will relate to large, complex-type field situations requiring an on-scene reserve of units and will involve formal staging in an area designated by command. The staging area should be away from command and from the emergency scene in order to provide adequate space for assembly and for safe and effective apparatus movement. When command announces the location of a formal staging area, all responding companies will report to and remain at the staging area until assigned. The staging area will be under the command of the officer of the last assigned engine company. When going to Level II, command will formally announce: "Level II staging." This will automatically supersede Level I staging. Units already staged in Level I will notify Level II staging officer of their availability.

The first ranking fire officer arriving at the staging area will assume command until the arrival of the designated staging officer.

In some cases, command may ask the staging officer to scout the best location for the staging area and report back to command.

The radio designation for the staging officer, area and function will be "staging." All communication involving staging will be between staging and command. All responding units will stay on the air but not transmit except in an emergency, respond directly to the designated staging area and report (in person) to the staging officer. They will stand by their unit with crew intact and warning lights turned off.

When requested by command, the staging officer will verbally assign units to report to specific Divisions, telling them where and to whom to report. Staging officer will then advise command of the specific unit(s) assigned. The Division Supervisor may then communicate directly with the unit by radio.

The staging officer will also be responsible for the following functions:

- A. Coordinate with police to block streets, intersections and other access required for the staging area.
- B. Ensure that all apparatus is parked in an appropriate manner.
- C. Maintain a log of units available in the staging area and inventory all specialized equipment that might be required at the scene, using tactical worksheet (form 28-2100-0002).
- D. Review with command what resources must be maintained in the staging area and coordinate the request for these resources with Fire Communications.
- E. To assume a position that is visible and accessible to incoming and staged units. This will be accomplished by leaving warning lights, of the staging officer's unit, operating.
- F. In some cases, the staging officer may have to indicate best direction of response and routing for responding units to get into the staging area.


SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND - STAGING

- G. Medic units responding to incidents where level II staging has been established that have not been otherwise directed by Incident Command, will be dispatched to the staging area. The staging officer will acknowledge the arrival of the medic units with Communications and will give instructions to the medic unit personnel as requested by command.
- H. A major medical emergency may require a separate staging area for medic units. In such cases, the staging officer will so designate and relay this information to Communications and command.
- I. Unless otherwise instructed by command, staging will advise command when the level of resources in the staging area is depleted to two engines and one ladder truck or less and when all resources have been depleted. Command will make a decision whether or not to call for additional units or additional alarm(s).
- J. Command may instruct staging to maintain a base level of resources until further advised. In such circumstances, staging will communicate directly with Communications to request additional units.
- K. In the event of a second emergency in the vicinity of the original incident, Fire Communications may contact the fireground commander to ascertain if any staged units can be used for dispatch. If the fireground commander complies with this request, he will advise Communications if he requires replacement units in the staging area. After clearing the second incident, further assignment for previously staged units will be under the purview of the officer in charge of operations.
- L. When command deems the staging area is no longer required, command will notify the staging officer and Fire Communications that Level II staging is deactivated and advise staging as to the disposition of the remaining units.

The foregoing instructions are given as a basic plan to acquaint all members with general staging operations. The incident commander will, at all times, have the option of modifying this plan to provide for more effective use of the manpower and equipment resources available at each situation.

RELATED POLICIES

- [MOP 105] Chief Officers Duty Response
- [MOP 602-1] Fireground Operations Engine
- [MOP 602-2] Fireground Operations Truck
- [MOP 602-8] Rapid Intervention
- [MOP 605-1] ACCOUNTABILITY UNIT

MOP 602-3	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>FIREGROUND OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE RESCUE 1</p>

SCOPE

Rescue 1 is a multi-dimensional resource unit that provides a wide range of specialized services during fireground operations with an emphasis on search and rescue of civilians and/or trapped firefighters. The unit is staffed with a minimum of three (3) SOC trained personnel and outfitted with specialized equipment.

Incident Commander's must take into consideration the abilities and resources that Rescue 1 provides to fire ground operations when they are requested or dispatched on the initial assignment. It is recognized that having trained and competent members on location during a Mayday event decreases extrication time and increases the likelihood of survival.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this procedure is to identify and clarify Rescue 1's abilities and functionality as it pertains to fire ground operations:

- To promote and maximize uniformity of Rescue 1's operations on the fireground.
- To clearly define Rescue 1's functions and abilities.
- To identify areas of Rescue 1's responsibility.

PRIMARY & SECONDARY FUNCTIONS

Primary and Secondary functions will be dictated by this MOP and/or the needs of the incident as dictated by the Incident Commander. Members of Rescue 1 are prepared to meet any requests made and remain committed to a regimented training cycle that ensures a current knowledge base of all primary and secondary Truck and Engine functions. [MOP 602-1, 602-2]

Upon arrival at a fire incident, Rescue 1 will announce their presence and report to the front of the building during which time the officer will perform a visual assessment utilizing his or her enhanced knowledge of forced entry and building collapse. This assessment may include structural stability of the fire building and exposures, current and projected fire conditions, and barriers to entry or exit for members involved in fire attack or that become trapped. Any issues noted will be immediately communicated to the Incident Commander.

In the absence of specific orders from Incident Command, Rescue 1 will deploy and begin providing assistance to Truck companies emphasizing search and rescue on and above the fire floor. [MOP 622-01]

Additional duties may consist of horizontal and vertical ventilation, advancement of hose lines, and/or searching for extension or hidden fire.

Appropriate breathing apparatus and protective clothing must be utilized by all members. It should be noted that good practice dictates that members work in teams of at least two (2) [MOP 602-8].

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT FIREGROUND OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE RESCUE 1
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ACCOUNTABILITY OF ASSIGNED MEMBERS

The Unit Officer and members will remain in contact with each other through visual and radio transmissions if required. Radio traffic between members will be kept to a minimum unless emergent in nature. Personnel from Rescue 1 generally work in teams of two that consist of the OIC/Junior member and the EVD /Senior member.

ASSIGNMENT OF TOOLS

Needs of the incident and/or orders of the Incident Commander will dictate the specific tools necessary to complete the task assigned. Members deploy with two Thermal Imaging Cameras, one of which is assigned to the OIC position and the other to the Senior position. Each team will select tools that are appropriate for the individual incident and will always carry a set of Irons and Ceiling Hooks.

UNIT STATUS AND PLACEMENT

Rescue 1 should be considered always available and as such, apparatus will be positioned within proximity of the incident and in such a manner that it will not become blocked in by responding units. Communications **will** notify the Incident Commander requesting release of Rescue 1 for the following incidents:

- *Heavy or Technical rescues including confined space, trench, and high angle.*
- *Confirmed entrapment due to a vehicle accident **after arrival of BCFD units.***
- *Working Haz-Mat incidents dictating the need for additional trained personnel.*

MAYDAY INCIDENT

Should a MAYDAY incident occur during fireground operations, Rescue 1 can be immediately re-deployed as a component of the Rapid Intervention Group. [MOP 602-8]

Personnel are trained in a variety of technical rescue disciplines including confined space/structural collapse and have experience with shoring, tunneling, breaching and breaking as well as patient packaging and removal.

Rescue 1's apparatus carries a variety of gas and battery powered metal cutting saws, battery powered Holmatro cutters and spreaders, an oxy acetylene torch, air operated PARATECH Pakhammers as well as other various "non-standard" equipment. In addition, an inventory of structural support shoring is carried on the apparatus that can be deployed to provide an area of refuge for downed/trapped firefighters.

Should the extrication of the downed firefighter become extended, members are able to deploy the Air Cart which provides an unlimited and uninterrupted breathing air supply via a 300' airline that is compatible with the current Draeger buddy breathing system.


RELATED MATERIAL

[MOP 602] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND- STAGING

[MOP 602-8] RAPID INTERVENTION

[MOP 606-1] OVERHAUL

[MOP 622-1] SEARCH AND RESCUE

MOP 602-8	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)</p>

INFORMATION

OSHA regulations require that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) be in place any time members enter an IDLH atmosphere. The sole purpose of the RIT is to standby in a constant state of readiness in order to assist and/or rescue any firefighter who may become injured, lost, or trapped. While RIT is often associated with structure fires, a RIT will be established on all IDLH incidents including special rescue operations and hazmat incidents.

OSHA Standard 29CFR1910.134 states, “in interior structure fires, the employer shall ensure that at least two employees enter the IDLH atmosphere and remain in visual or voice contact with one another at all times. In addition, at least two employees are located outside the IDLH atmosphere, and all employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs. One of the two individuals located outside the IDLH atmosphere may be assigned an additional role, so long as the individual is able to perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at the incident. Furthermore, “nothing in this section is meant to preclude firefighters from performing emergency rescue activities before an entire team has assembled.”

In order to comply with OSHA regulations, a RIT will be dispatched/identified on all Box Alarm Assignments and Tactical Alarm Assignments. An Initial RIT (IRIT) or RIT shall be in place any time members enter an IDLH atmosphere, to include tactical assignments dispatched in lieu of a BOX ALARM

Any deviation from the RIT (two in / two-out) policy will require a Special Report from the unit officer with additional comments from Incident Command concerning same. The respective Deputy Chief will review, comment and determine if further investigation is required.

For purposes of continuity and consistency concerning IRIT and RIT, any references concerning fire grounds will be associated with all types of IDLH incidents. Good judgement and common sense require all concerned to understand slight alterations of RIT (requirements/PPE/equipment) will be essential during various operations. Two examples would be members operating in or around Swift Water Incidents and Haz-Mat Incidents. Technical experts will be an intricate part of established needs in these situations.

RIT DISPATCH

During the initial dispatch, communications will announce the third due Engine Company as the RIT. Once en route, the third due Engine Company will announce their acknowledgement of the RIT assignment on the proper fireground channel.

“Engine Company # 36 acknowledges the RIT”

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)
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If necessary, the first assigned Battalion Chief will verify that the third due engine is responding and aware of their assignment on the appropriate fireground channel.

“Battalion Chief 3 to Engine Company # 36 acknowledge the RIT”

The engine company assigned RIT will then acknowledge the Battalion Chief on the proper talkgroup.

In any instance where the third assigned engine company is not able to perform their RIT responsibilities, (accident while responding, unit becomes disabled, etc.) they will immediately notify the first assigned Battalion Chief on the fireground talkgroup. In this case, the first assigned Battalion Chief shall make a determination as to how the assignments will be modified if necessary. The first assigned Battalion Chief will always ensure a RIT is assigned.

INITIAL RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM

At a minimum, four properly trained firefighters must be assembled on the fireground before any member enters an IDLH atmosphere. Once on scene of a fire that has grown beyond the incipient stage, the engine company officer and firefighter riding in the pipe position of the first assigned engine will advance the proper sized hose line into the structure. After leading off from a hydrant, the lead off firefighter on the first assigned engine company shall proceed to the fireground and meet up with the pump operator of the first assigned engine company. The pump operator and lead off firefighter of the first assigned engine company will make up the Initial Rapid Intervention Team (IRIT). Both members will have all PPE donned and SCBA in place and ready. The lead off firefighter will be responsible for monitoring the fireground talkgroup and tracking the location of the officer and firefighter within the building. These members will gather the suggested minimum equipment as listed below. [MOP 602-1]

Unless there is a known life hazard, a truck company that arrives prior to an engine company will adhere to the two-in two-out policy.

OSHA standards permit deviation from the two-in two-out policy when initial attack personnel encounter an immediate life-threatening situation where immediate action could prevent the loss of life or serious injury. Generally speaking, the Baltimore City Fire Department’s standard for deviating from the two-in two-out policy shall be based on the receipt of:

1. A radio report from Fire Communications Bureau stating that a person has been reported trapped inside the IDLH atmosphere.
2. A credible report from a civilian on the scene that a person is trapped inside the IDLH atmosphere.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)

RIT RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE FIREGROUND

Upon arrival on the fireground, the engine company assigned as RIT shall attempt to position as close to the incident as possible without impeding access for later arriving companies. All four members will ensure they have full PPE, SCBA, thermal imaging camera, and radios on the proper fireground channel. The officer in charge of the RIT company shall report to the incident commander, or operations chief if so established, and gather information on current tactical operations. The OIC of the RIT shall conduct a size-up of the fire building, viewing as many sides of the building as practical. Special consideration should be given to the presence of: locked or heavily fortified doors; barred or bricked over windows; DAWGS, VPS, or other vacant property security systems; as well as any signs of imminent collapse or unusual danger to units operating on the interior.

While the OIC is conferring with the incident commander and performing their size-up, the remaining three members of the RIT should immediately report to the truck company positioned closest to the front of the fire building. Here, they will immediately retrieve the following equipment:

- Stokes Basket
- Rapid Intervention Team Bag
- Halligan Bar and Flat Head Axe
- Large Area Search Ropes
- Firefighter Hauling System
- Mansack
- Thermal Imaging Camera (**From RIT Engine**)

NOTE: On first-line apparatus, the required rapid intervention equipment (minus thermal imaging camera) will be pre-positioned inside the stokes basket to facilitate ease of removal. Due to storage issues with second-line apparatus, the stokes basket may be stored vertically without the equipment inside. If this is the case, unit commanders will ensure that the appropriate RIT equipment is stored in the same cabinet as the stokes basket.

Depending on size-up, building construction, fire conditions present, and specific details surrounding an activation of the RIT, additional equipment may be required. These included, but are not limited to:

- Chain saws and metal cutting saws
- Aerial, portable, or attic ladders
- Charged hose line
- Hydraulic Rescue Tools
- Hydra-Ram
- Air Cart
- Each AIRFLEX will have four 60-minute air cylinders available for use by RIT personnel.

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)
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RIT Officer will confer with Command and/or Rescue Group Supervisor prior to retrieving the additional equipment.

One aspect of RIT operations that is often overlooked is the process of “Softening the Building.” This process includes creating opportunities for firefighter extraction and/or self-rescue before they are needed. Examples of “Softening the Building” that RIT members can perform when ordered by Command include:

- Providing additional means of egress
- Removing security bars/devices
- Coordinating the opening of doors and windows
- Throwing additional ground ladders
- Providing lighting
- Assessing for fire extension
- Assisting in attack line deployment (straighten hose lines, chase kinks, push hose into building)

NOTE: These actions can be performed ONLY if they will not hinder the response to a firefighter in need of assistance. Accountability of the RIT must be maintained at all times.

CRITERIA FOR RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM DEPLOYMENT

The RIT will only be deployed by the Incident Commander or Operations Chief. Studies have shown that approximately 20% of firefighters who attempt to rescue a downed firefighter find themselves in trouble as well. Therefore, accountability must continue to be maintained during RIT activations. “Freelancing” and “self-deployment” will not be tolerated. There must be a dedicated Accountability Officer assigned by Command during these deployments.

Examples of when the RIT could be deployed include but are not limited to:

- A Mayday is transmitted. [MOP 602-13]
- A lost or missing firefighter. [MOP 602-09]
- Reported/confirmed SCBA malfunction or loss of air.
- A firefighter is seriously injured or incapacitated.
- A firefighter reported to be trapped or entangled.

RAPID INTERVENTION TASK FORCE

Upon transmission and confirmation of a MAYDAY with RIT activation, Fire Communications Bureau will dispatch a Rapid Intervention Task Force to supplement resources on scene. The task force will be composed of the following:

- 4 Engine Companies (1st Assigned Engine Replacing RIT Team)

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)

- 2 Truck Companies
- Rescue 1 (If Rescue 1 is on scene or unavailable, the closest squad will be dispatched in their place)
- 1 Battalion Chief (Rescue Group Supervisor)
- Battalion Chief EMS
- 1 EMS Officer
- 1 ALS Transport unit

Communications will announce the first assigned engine company on the Rapid Intervention Task Force as the RIT. Once en-route, the officer of that engine company will verbally acknowledge their assignment on the fireground channel. Upon arrival of the first engine, they will retrieve a complete second set of RIT equipment from the truck company on the RIT task force and report to the front of the building unless otherwise directed by command.

The battalion chief assigned to the Rapid Intervention Task Force will assume the position of Rescue Group Supervisor upon arrival on scene. They will report in full turnout gear with SCBA to the incident commander for deployment.

Other suppression units will stage in an area designated by command and await direction from the incident commander and/or rescue group supervisor. Additional EMS units will stage in an appropriate area that allows them to exit from the scene in the event a member requires transport to a hospital.

MANAGEMENT OF RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM OPERATIONS

Studies have shown that it can take up to 12 firefighters over 20 minutes to find and remove a single firefighter who is trapped inside a building. Incident commanders must anticipate an extended RIT operation and integrate the RIT operation into the Incident Command System. If not already staged sufficient additional resources must be requested immediately and staged. **[MOP 602]** Incident Command will assign a Rescue Group Supervisor. A new RIT must be designated and established. If necessary, additional supervisors can be assigned to ensure that firefighting operations continue during rescue efforts. Other tasks such as ventilation and lighting are extremely important and must not be overlooked. Incident commanders should use the initial fireground talkgroup as the dedicated fireground channel for RIT operations and move all other operations to a separate talkgroup when separate talkgroups are warranted.

RAPID INTEVENTION TEAM OPERATIONS

In the event of a mayday or RIT activation, the officer of the RIT shall assume the position of Rescue Group Supervisor until the arrival of the battalion chief on the Rapid Intervention Taskforce.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)

The first RIT to deploy shall enter the building with the primary objective of locating the downed firefighter. The RIT should carry a limited number of tools, based on conditions, to locate and stabilize the downed firefighter. The Rapid Intervention Team Bag must be taken on every deployment. The RIT should conduct an organized search of the building, beginning at the last known or reported location of the downed firefighter. Areas most threatened by fire conditions should be thoroughly searched as soon as possible. Once the downed firefighter has been located, the RIT should conduct a thorough assessment of the firefighter. This includes their level of consciousness/medical condition, integrity of their PPE and SCBA ensemble, available air supply, level of entrapment, and the likely actions and resources needed to remove the member. This size-up should be immediately relayed to the Rescue Group Supervisor and Incident Command. If warranted, the RIT should take immediate action to supplement the downed firefighter's air supply utilizing the Rapid Intervention Team Bag. Shut down any PASS alarms that may have been activated [TM-101].

Search considerations should include, but not be limited to: last known location, sounds of SCBA or PASS Alarm, flashlight beams, information from trapped or lost member and visible sighting of member. All doors must be opened and a complete and thorough search must be performed.

When it comes to the removal of a downed firefighter, safety and imagination are the only limiting factors when extricating the firefighter in an expedient manner. Constant communication with Operations and/or the Incident Commander is extremely important to ensure that additional resources are requested, organized, and delivered in a timely manner.

RIT members must monitor their own air supply and give themselves enough time to exit the IDLH atmosphere safely. Relief crews should be on standby during extended operations.

In some instances, sheltering the downed firefighter in place until conditions improve may be the best plan of action. In other cases, immediately removing the downed firefighter may be the only alternative. In all cases, the officer of the RIT, the Rescue Group Supervisor, Operations Chief, and Incident Commander must work together to affect a safe and efficient removal.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

More than one RIT may be necessary on large scale incidents. When more than one RIT is used, each team should be assigned a name based on geographical location such as "Alpha Division RIT" and "Charlie Division RIT".

The RIT will assemble one floor below the fire and report to Operations on all high-rise fires. Incident Commanders should consider the fact that the removal of a down firefighter from the upper floors may require extra resources and additional RIT should be designated when deemed necessary.

Additional resources such as the Collapse Unit, Hazmat, Special Operations Command, and OEM may be necessary. The need for these resources should be identified early on in order to facilitate rapid responses.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	RAPID INTERVENION TEAM (RIT) (TWO-IN TWO-OUT)

RITs should also be established on Special Operations Incidents and Hazardous Materials Incidents. Members of these RIT's should have equal or greater training than the members entering the IDLH atmosphere.

It is necessary to note on occasion a member that may be reported trapped, lost or missing, may appear, be removed by self-evacuation, or with the aid of members in the HOT ZONE, prior to all elements of RIT being activated as outlined. In these instances, the Incident Commander will give a brief report to communications and continue with incident mitigation efforts. The Incident Report will contain further details surrounding the event.

RELATED MATERIAL

TM 101 - DRAEGER BREATHING APPARATUS


TM 101-08 - RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM BAG

MOP 602- FIREGROUND OPERATIONS & COMMAND - STAGING

MOP 602-1 - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE- ENGINE/SQUAD

MOP 602-09- PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (PAR)

MOP 602-13 – MAY DAY

MOP 602-09	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT</p>

OVERVIEW

A Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) is an organized approach to account for all members operating on an emergency incident. A PAR shall be requested and conducted by the Incident Commander or their designee. This process/rollcall will also assist with a rapid identification of a trapped or missing member. **The Safety Officer will not be assigned to conduct a PAR.**

PROCEDURE

After notifying communications to announce the PAR, the IC or their designee will initiate contact on the assigned talkgroup and conduct the PAR. **When prompted, the officer/supervisor will transmit the Unit ID or Division/Group ID, verify the members assigned are accounted for (PAR), and provide their location on the assigned talkgroup.** This process/rollcall will continue until all units/members have been contacted and accounted for. When completed communications will be updated on the assigned talkgroup. The order of contact will be dependent upon the situation and cause for the PAR.

If a member cannot be accounted for, immediately notify officer conducting the PAR and give the members' unit ID, radio designation, and last known location. No one will begin a search for missing personnel and the Rapid Intervention Team [MOP 602-08] will not be deployed until ordered to do so by Incident Command. If unaccounted members cannot be located Incident Command will take appropriate action. [MOP 602-13]

Unit officers and supervisors will account for their assigned personnel. This will be accomplished through sight, radio communications, deployment control, and tracking of personnel operating in a/an HOT ZONE/IDLH environment. All members must be knowledgeable of their assignments and primary/secondary responsibilities with respect to their assigned apparatus and position on that unit. [MOP 602-1, 602-2] On large incidents, supervisors have the latitude to acknowledge for their Division/Group, rather than single unit contact. This action will reduce radio traffic significantly.

Whenever units are demobilized from an incident the unit officer will notify Command verbally on the assigned talkgroup that all members are PAR prior to placing their unit in service.

Instances when a PAR will be requested include, but are not limited to:

- Report of a missing or trapped firefighter.
- A change from offensive to defensive operations.
- A sudden hazardous event at an incident.
- At the 40 minute Incident Timer notification of an ongoing operation **within** an IDLH environment. [MOP 602-16]
- At regular intervals (40, 80, 120...minute notifications) whenever prolonged operations exist **within** an IDLH environment.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

- Inability to raise a unit or member by radio.
- An unexplained activation of the “Emergency (Red) Button” of the portable radio.

PAR Radio Communication Examples

- Command to Officer of Engine 7 in staging, you will be the Accountability Officer “Conduct a PAR”
- Accountability Officer: “Accountability Officer to Fire Communications, alert units operating on the fireground that a PAR will be conducted momentarily on (designated talkgroup).”
- Fire Communications: (Evacuation Tones) “All Units operating on Fire Box (box number), a PAR will begin momentarily.”
 - *Accountability Officer: “Engine 24”(Single Unit)*
 - *Engine 24 OIC: “Engine 24 PAR-3 members located on side Charlie and 1 member at pumper.”*
 - *Accountability Officer: Copy*
 - *Accountability Officer: “Roof Division”(Division/Group)*
 - *Roof Division: “Roof Division PAR- Truck 17, Truck 14 and Engine 1 located on exposure Bravo and Bravo 1 Roof.”*
 - *Accountability Officer: Copy*
 - *Accountability Officer: “Truck 7”(Missing Member)*
 - *Truck 7 OIC: “Truck 7 Portables 1, 2, and 4 PAR Side A, Portable 3 unaccounted for, last known position Side Charlie Roof.*
 - *Accountability Officer: “Accountability Officer to Roof Division, Truck 7 Portable 3 is unaccounted for, last known position Side Charlie Roof.”*
 - *Roof Division: Truck 7 Portable 3 is working with Truck 17 Bravo Exposure Roof.*
 - *Accountability Officer: (Once missing member is located and roll call is completed) “Accountability Officer to Command, all personnel accounted for.”*
 - *If member is still unaccounted for and confirmed missing, Incident Command shall determine if a MAYDAY and RIT activation is warranted and take appropriate action.[MOP 602-08, 602-13]*

RELATED MATERIAL


[MOP602-1] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE- ENGINE / SQUAD

[MOP 602-2] FIREGROUND OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE- TRUCK

[MOP 602-8] RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM

[MOP 602-13] MAYDAY

[MOP 602-16] EMERGENCY INCIDENT TIME MANAGEMENT

MOP 602-12	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES
	SUBJECT ACCOUNTABILITY CARDS

Information

The Fire Department has issued every member in Suppression and EMS an accountability card [[MOP 602-12-1](#)], ring and carabineer as part of the department’s accountability system. Officers were issued red carabineers and members below the rank of lieutenant were issued black carabineers. Upon reporting for work, each member will attach their carabineer containing their accountability card on their unit’s master ring located inside the apparatus on the officer’s side. Members will remove their accountability cards at the end of each shift when relieved.

When operating at an incident, accountability cards will remain in the apparatus cab. The incident commander may designate one or more members to retrieve the rings with cards from units on the scene, as necessary, to assist with the personal accountability report (PAR) process [[MOP 602-9](#)].

Issue and Replacement

Accountability Cards will be administered by Deputy Chief, Training, at Fire Academy.

Accountability Cards will be issued to newly-hired members as soon as possible after date of hire.

In the event Accountability Card is lost, it will be replaced without charge to the individual on the first occurrence. On the second occurrence, a \$5.00 fee will be assessed against the individual. For the third occurrence, a fee of \$15.00 will be assessed against the individual. For the fourth and each subsequent occurrence, a fee of \$35.00 will be assessed against the individual. Loss of Accountability Card will be reported via a Special Report [28-2100-0033] through normal channels to the Deputy Chief, Training, indicating first, second or third, etc., occurrence and accompanied by the appropriate fee by check or money order, payable to “Director of Finance, City of Baltimore.” Members are to present documentation indicating completion of the above when they report to the Fire Academy for a replacement Accountability Card.


Accountability Cards in a deteriorated condition will be presented to respective Battalion Chief who will determine need for replacement. Condemnation of Accountability Card will be documented on Clothing Report/Receipt of Property Report (28-2100-0026) [[MOP 363-5](#)]. Replacement will be accomplished at Fire Academy. Members will present original copy of Clothing Report/Receipt of Property Report signed by respective battalion chief when they report to Fire Academy for a replacement Accountability Card. Members receiving replacement Accountability Card will surrender old Accountability Card to Fire Academy personnel at the time of issue. There will be no charge for the replacement of deteriorated Accountability Card.


		MOP 602-12
SECTION	SUBJECT	
EMERGENCY SERVICES	ACCOUNTABILITY CARDS	

Retirement, Resignation or Dismissal


When members resign, are dismissed or start their leave time prior to retirement, respective Unit Officer will forward a Special Report with Accountability Card stapled to it. Report will be forwarded to the Deputy Chief, Training, stating all pertinent information [[MOP 366-2](#)].

Retired members are not permitted to retain an Accountability Card.

 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES
	SUBJECT ACCOUNTABILITY CARD SAMPLE

F H O T D	Baltimore	
	City Fire	
	Department	
	Fred W. Fireman Jr	
Accountability Card		


© Local Postage Dept. at my U.S. Mailbox Forum Postage Company Baltimore City, Inc., Baltimore 6730 Palaski Highway Baltimore, MD 21217

MOP 602-13	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES
	SUBJECT MAYDAY

PURPOSE

To provide the Incident Commander with a guideline to assist in effectively mitigating MAYDAY situations encountered during emergency incidents.

All reports of MAYDAY will be addressed immediately. In some situations it may be determined quickly by Incident Command that what was perceived to be a MAYDAY at first may be mitigated almost immediately after the initial call for MAYDAY. In these situations the procedures listed below may not materialize due to the almost instantaneous mitigation of the incident. When this occurs the IC will transmit a detailed update on the assigned talkgroup and announce the MAYDAY is resolved. The Incident Commander will also document the situation within the Incident Report and a Post Incident Analysis Report.

TERMINOLOGY

MAYDAY – The term used in radio transmissions when a member becomes trapped, incapacitated, critically injured, distressed, lost and/or otherwise in need of immediate assistance on a fireground.

LUNAR – The acronym utilized to remember the critical information necessary when transmitting a MAYDAY. Location, Unit, Name, Assignment and Air Supply, Resources needed.

PAR – Refers to a Personnel Accountability Report [MOP 602-09] during which command contacts units and ensures immediate accounting for personnel. [MOP 515-2-3]

RIT – Refers to the Rapid Intervention Team. A crew of four or more firefighters assembled and equipped for the specific purpose of being prepared to conduct search and rescue/extrication of emergency services personnel. [MOP 602-8]

PROCEDURES

Transmitting a MAYDAY

Any member becoming aware of or involved in a MAYDAY situation will **IMMEDIATELY** transmit a MAYDAY by radio on the fireground talkgroup. If the Incident Commander becomes aware of a MAYDAY situation that has not already been transmitted, they will transmit a MAYDAY without delay. The message shall begin with “MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY” followed by a **LUNAR** report to include:

- **L**ocation of member by floor, side, room, etc.
- The **U**nit and **N**ame of the member in distress
- **A**ssignment & **A**ir Supply
- **R**esources Needed: Hose line, ladder, tools, etc. Problem(s) encountered: trapped, lost, out of air, etc.

Actions by the Member in distress

		MOP 602-13
SECTION	SUBJECT	
EMERGENCY SERVICES	MAYDAY	

After transmitting a MAYDAY message by radio, the member (if able) in distress shall:

- Activate PASS device [TM 101]
- Reassess situation and surroundings
- Depress “emergency button” on the portable radio [MOP 515-5]
- Attempt to signal others on exterior or interior of building using lights, noise, hose stream or other extraordinary measures.
- Remain as calm as possible and quickly review basic life saving techniques such as conserving air, closing doors, staying low, using a window hang and maintaining radio contact with command.

Actions by Incident Commander

Immediately upon receiving a MAYDAY message, the Incident Commander shall:

- Gain complete control of the radio system by instructing all personnel to cease normal radio traffic by transmitting “Command reports a MAYDAY from (identify person and unit, if known). Emergency traffic only on this talkgroup.”
- Have Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) repeat the MAYDAY announcement.
- Ensure dispatch of rapid intervention task force and assign staging area.
- Deploy the RIT to the reported location and ensure engine on rapid intervention task force acknowledges RIT assignment. [MOP 602-8]
- Establish a Rescue Group and assign a supervisor.
- Assign initial resources to the Rescue Group.
- Reassign the incident operations to a different talkgroup (if necessary) and have FCB acknowledge, sound emergency tones, and repeat new operations talkgroup. Rescue Operations shall continue on the original fireground channel.
- Reestablish a command presence on new operations talkgroup (if designated), conduct a PAR and establish accountability of all units involved with initial incident operations.
- Continue incident mitigation already under way to reduce the risk to the member in distress and rescuers.
- Assign member to monitor MAYDAY talkgroup and keep them at your location.
- When MAYDAY is resolved have communications make the announcement.

Actions by Rescue Group Supervisor (depending on scope of incident, may develop into a Branch)

Immediately upon assignment as Group Supervisor:

- Initiate an Incident Timer and establish accountability for all units assigned.
- Request additional resources as needed through Incident Command.
- Request dedicated Medic to stand by.
- Evaluate and initiate tactics necessary to address the MAYDAY, which may include but are not limited to:
 - Deploying additional RIT and/or other resources to the last known location of the member in distress.
 - Requesting the Special Rescue Operations (SRO) Team, Rescue and/or other specialized units to assist.
- Maintain radio communication or another form of contact with member(s) in distress to calm, reassure, and provide, them with updates on the progress of rescue efforts.

MOP 602-13	
SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT MAYDAY

- Provide regular updates to Incident Command.
- When appropriate, notify Incident Command that the MAYDAY is resolved and request to begin demobilization of the rescue group.

Actions by Fire Communications Bureau (FCB)

Upon receiving a MAYDAY message, FCB personnel shall:

- Immediately notify Incident Command of any missed communication that may be associated with a MAYDAY situation. [MOP 515-1]
- Inform all FCB personnel, regardless of position or responsibility, that a MAYDAY has been received.
- Assign a supervisor to directly and continuously supervise the radio position responsible for the MAYDAY talkgroup
- Ensure that the Rapid Intervention Task Force has been dispatched.
- Closely monitor the MAYDAY talkgroup for any radio transmissions from members in distress
- When directed to do so by the Incident Commander, rebroadcast the MAYDAY message preceded by the Emergency Traffic tone signal (Tone #3).
- Remain aware and vigilant for the possibility that the member(s) in distress may transmit on unexpected talkgroup(s). When this occurs communications will relay information to IC and Rescue Group Supervisor if established.
- Ascertain if trapped member is able to adjust radio to correct channel.
- Notify Incident Command and Rescue Group Supervisor if member cannot adjust radio channel and inform of channel in use by member.


AFTER ACTION REVIEW

The Chief of Fire Department may appoint one or more chief officers to investigate MAYDAY incidents for the purposes of assessing and improving operations and safety. The scope of the investigation will be determined by the Chief of Fire Department. Alternatively, the Chief of Fire Department may appoint representative(s) of an outside agency to investigate.

The Incident Commander will prepare a detailed Post Incident Analysis that will include a detailed report concerning the MAYDAY. If a Rescue Group Supervisor is assigned they will assist with this report.

Related Material:

- MOP 602-08 RAPID INTERVENTION TEAM
- MOP 602-09 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
- MOP 602-16 EMERGENCY INCIDENT TIME MANAGEMENT
- MOP 515-01 RADIO OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
- TM 101- DRAEGER BREATHING APPARATUS

MOP 602-16	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>EMERGENCY INCIDENT TIME MANAGEMENT</p>

OBJECTIVE

To assist the Incident Commander with time-based prompts while operating on an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) Incident. [MOP 601] These time-based prompts will provide a reminder for, but are not limited to: situational updates, Personnel Accountability Report [MOP 602-9], reassessment of tactical decisions, structural stability, and rehabilitation needs.

INFORMATION

Fire Communications will initiate the Incident Timer on all incidents that involve IDLH Operations including, but not limited to: Box/Rescue/Tactical Alarms, Mass Casualty Incidents, Active Assailant Incidents, Hazardous Materials Incidents, and Dive Incidents.

It is not necessary for Fire Communications to initiate the incident timer for a single suppression unit response to support an EMS unit, or a single/double suppression unit response on ancillary requests for service. Whenever units arrive on incidents and find an IDLH incident to be present that was not dispatched as such; the first arriving unit will take all appropriate actions and upon their brief initial report to communications the Incident Timer will be started.


PROCEDURE

After the first arriving suppression unit transmits their Brief Initial Report and assumes command, Fire Communications will initiate the Incident Timer. This begins a reoccurring notification to command every 20 minutes. This will assist command with identifying the time lapse of an incident and serve as a measure to examine the continued sustained operations of an incident. Notifications will continue until either the incident is placed under control or command notifies Fire Communications to discontinue. Fire Communications will automatically discontinue the Incident Timer when the initial response quickly reduces to a 1 or 2 unit ancillary type call such as a pot of food, fire extinguished prior to arrival, etc.

Incident Command has the latitude to adjust the time intervals for notification on long-term incidents.

REFERENCED MATERIAL:

- MOP 601 – FIREGROUND OPERATIONS AND COMMAND
- MOP 602-9 – PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT

MOP 606-2	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH FIRE DAMAGED BUILDINGS AND DEBRIS</p>

INFORMATION

In dealing with fire-damaged buildings and debris the Fire Department has the responsibility to insure that:

- The Department of Public Works removes fire debris from public streets, alleys, other City property and private yards and lots.
- The Housing Authority of Baltimore City issues notices of violation of fire debris on or in private property.
- The Housing Authority issues orders to board fire damaged buildings and maintain such buildings until they are rehabilitated or razed.
- The Health Department inspects fire or water damaged food items and determines disposition of same.
- A building inspector is summoned to the scene if a building’s structural integrity is in question.
- The proper utility companies are notified when utilities cannot be secured by fire department personnel or when their expertise is needed.

INSTRUCTIONS

In order to successfully accomplish this mission, the following responsibilities are assigned:

Suppression

- Incident Commander will immediately notify Fire Communications when it is apparent that debris removal will be necessary and whether or not the debris is blocking and/or impeding the sidewalk or roadway.
- Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications if boarding is needed.
- Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications when occupant relocation assistance is required.
- First-due units on the fireground will be assigned by respective Battalion Chief to periodically spot check fire-damaged buildings to see that they have been properly boarded and that fire debris has been removed.
- Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications when a Health Department representative is required.
- Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications when a building inspector is required.
- Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications when a utility company representative is required.

Fire Communications shall:

- Immediately notify the Department of Public Works upon notification that debris removal will be necessary and automatically on all second or greater alarms.
- Notify Housing Authority when Incident Commander advises boarding is required.
- Notify Neighborhood Services when fire involves occupied dwellings.
- Notify Building Inspector on all third or greater alarms or when requested by the Incident Commander.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH FIRE DAMAGED BUILDINGS AND DEBRIS


- Notify Health Department when its services are required.
- Notify appropriate utilities when a representative is required.
- Maintain a record of all requests for debris removal and boarding, and **forward duplicate copies to the Office of the Fire Marshal.**

Office of the Fire Marshal

- After a copy of request for debris removal and boarding is received at the Office of the Fire Marshal, from Fire Communications, the Fire Marshal will dispatch an inspector to determine that the fire debris has been removed and will issue Fire Prevention and Building Code Violation Notices if required.

RELATED POLICIES

- [MOP 606-7] Safety Zone - Barricade Tape
- [MOP 606-9] Establishment and Maintenance of Safety Zones
- [MOP 606-10] Unsafe Buildings

 <p style="text-align: center;">MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p style="text-align: center;">POLICY</p>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; width: fit-content; margin-bottom: 5px;">MOP 611</div> <p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)</p>


BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2003, the President issued **Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD—5)**, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a **National Incident Management System (NIMS)**. The resulting system provides a set of consistent, nationwide methods and procedures to enable Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity, including acts of catastrophic terrorism.

NIMS sets forth a set of standardized concepts, principles, terminology and organizational structures to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management across jurisdictional lines. All Federal agencies are required to adopt and use NIMS in their emergency preparedness and response plans. Furthermore, HSPD—5 requires the adoption and use of NIMS by State and local jurisdictions in order for those jurisdictions to be eligible to receive Federal preparedness financial assistance (through grants, contracts and other activities).

POLICY

All agencies of the City of Baltimore have adopted and will comply with the standards set forth in NIMS, to include adapting Fire Department terminology and procedures to bring all activities into compliance.

MOP 611-1	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)</p>

INFORMATION

Developed by the U. S. Secretary of Homeland Security at the request of the President, the **National Incident Management System (NIMS)** integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. NIMS will enable responders at all levels to work together more effectively to manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size or complexity. This system will be adhered to by the Baltimore City Fire Department.

NIMS is based largely on various incident command systems (ICS) that fire and police departments, including the Baltimore City Fire Department, have been using since the 1970s. Most of the terminology chosen for NIMS was taken from West-Coast based National Forest Service units who have vast experience with large-scale forest fires. The need for a National Incident Management System was made evident by the events of September 11, 2001, in New York City and Northern Virginia.

IMPLEMENTATION

It is important to note that **NIMS is not an operational plan**. In other words, NIMS does little to alter the procedures that our Department uses to extinguish fires, provide emergency medical services and abate hazardous materials incidents, etc. It is simply a method for managing incidents. There is, however, a **National Response Plan (NRP)** that is designed to support response by all agencies to all hazards. This procedure does not address the National Response Plan as it pertains to the City of Baltimore.

Many chief officers view NIMS as a toolbox that they have at their disposal. Some components of NIMS, including some of the standardized terminology for resources and incident management, will be used on every response [[MOP 611-1-1](#)]. Other components will only come into play when the Fire Department is confronted with large-scale, long-term incidents. The degree to which NIMS is implemented remains the discretion of the Incident Commander. The system is designed to be scaleable so that it can be instituted at any size incident and upgraded and downsized as the Incident Commander deems appropriate. It is important for members of all ranks to keep in mind that only the Incident Commander will specify the complexity of the NIMS implementation. Nonetheless, all members must be familiar with NIMS structure and terminology so that they are capable of functioning at whatever level of sophistication the Incident Commander selects [[MOP 611-1-2](#)].

NIMS is designed so that major incidents can be directed via a **Unified Command** structure, meaning that representatives of various agencies from within one jurisdiction as well as those from other jurisdictions can function under the leadership of one Incident

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)
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Commander. In a unified command scenario, the ranking Fire Department officer may or may not be the Incident Commander.

INCIDENT COMMAND STRUCTURE

The Incident Command component of NIMS is designed to 1) assure that certain fundamental responsibilities are met at every incident, and 2) limit the span of control that any one supervisor has. NIMS prescribes how the workforce at an incident should be divided if the decision to delegate supervisory responsibility is made by the incident commander.

Organizational Element	Title of Person in Charge of Element
Incident Command	Incident Commander
Command Staff	Officer
Section	Section Chief
Branch	Branch Director
Division and Group	Supervisor
Unit	Unit Leader

Individuals assigned to an incident are typically organized into **Units** under the direction of a **Unit Leader**. On small incidents, units, through unit leaders, may report directly to the incident commander.

DIVISIONS AND GROUPS

An incident commander may choose to organize units into one or more **Divisions** and/or **Groups**. As each division or group is organized, the incident commander will create a radio ID and designate a **Supervisor** for it. When units are organized into a division, it is understood that they are physically located in the same place, but may be performing more than one task at that location. When units are organized into a group, it is understood that they are all performing the same function, but may be located in multiple places.

Examples

An incident commander may have 7 units performing various tasks on the 5th floor at a building fire. At the same time, there may be 5 units performing ventilation at different locations throughout the building. The incident commander may choose to organize the units operating on the 5th floor into a division, with the radio ID "Division 5" and the unit leader of one of the units designated as its supervisor. At the same time, the incident commander may organize the 5 units performing ventilation into a group with the radio ID "Vent Group" with another unit leader designated as its supervisor. In doing so, the incident commander has only two direct subordinates (Division 5 and Vent Group) instead of the 12 individual units contained within them.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)

SECTIONS AND BRANCHES

As an incident becomes more complex, the incident commander may choose to implement two or more **Sections**, which would each supervise some divisions, groups and/or units. If the number of divisions, groups or units functioning in any one section becomes unmanageable, the incident commander may choose to subdivide that section into two or more **Branches**. The five major functional areas of an incident, as outlined in NIMS, are **Command, Finance/Administration, Logistics, Operations and Planning (C-FLOP)**. It is suggested that finance, logistics, operations and planning each be designated as a section, when needed. It is noted that command and operations are required at virtually every incident whereas logistics, planning and finance are generally not required unless an incident gets more complex or longer in duration. Normally, divisions and groups as described above are placed under the Operations Section (or under branches that may be created under the Operations Section).

Example

At the Howard Street Railroad Tunnel fire of 2001, using the NIMS model, the incident commander may have organized the incident into 4 sections ("Finance/Administration Section," "Logistics Section," "Operations Section," and "Planning Section"). The Operations Section may have been divided into 4 branches, "Lombard Branch," "Camden Yards Branch," "Mount Royal Branch," and "McComas Branch." The Lombard Branch may have been divided into 3 groups, "EMS Group," "Air Monitoring Group," and "Ventilation Group." The Ventilation Group may have consisted of Engine 6, Engine 20, Truck 3, and Truck 29 with the captain of Engine 20 as its supervisor.

COMMAND STAFF OFFICERS

NIMS stipulates that certain command staff positions report directly to the incident commander. The incident commander can designate as many of these positions as necessary, but typically they might include **Safety Officer, Public Information Officer, Liaison Officer and Intelligence Officer**.

For more detailed information on incident command structure, refer to the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency's website, www.fema.gov/nims.

TASK FORCES AND STRIKE TEAMS

A **Task Force** is a combination of various resources designed to accomplish a specific mission. A **Strike Team** consists of a set number of like resources that have an established minimum number of personnel assigned to them.

Examples

Engine 2, Engine 26 and Truck 6 might be organized into a Task Force to investigate an odor of smoke inside a dwelling. Engine 4, Engine 33, Engine 42 and Engine 43 might be organized into a Strike Team to fight a brush fire.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)

FIREGROUND LAYOUT


NIMS sets forth standards for labeling various physical locations at an incident. To avoid confusion, it is strongly suggested that divisions operating in these physical locations be given the radio IDs that correspond with these locations (see table below).

Sides of a Building

The sides of a building are given letter designations, beginning with the “front” of the building which normally bears the address numbers and faces the street to which it is addressed. The front of the building is designated “Side Alpha.” Going clockwise around the building (from an overhead perspective), the side to left of the front is designated “Side Bravo,” the rear is designated as “Side Charlie,” and the side to the right of the front is designated as “Side Delta.”

Quadrants within a Building

Each floor of the building is divided into four quadrants. The area where sides alpha and bravo intersect is designated “Quadrant Alpha.” The area where sides bravo and charlie intersect is designated “Quadrant Bravo.” The area where sides charlie and delta intersect is designated as “Quadrant Charlie.” The area where sides delta and alpha intersect is designated as “Quadrant Delta.” Any reference to a quadrant should include a reference to a floor number, such as “Floor 2, Quadrant Bravo.”



Exposure Buildings

Exposure buildings are given designations that correspond to the side of the fire building where they are located. For example, the exposure on side bravo is designated “Exposure Bravo,” while the opposite exposure is designated as “Exposure Delta.” Exposures further away from the fire building are given a combination letter and number designation. For example, the exposure building one building farther away from the fire building than Exposure Bravo is designated “Exposure Bravo 1.” The exposure building one farther

SECTION EMERGENCY SERVICES	SUBJECT NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS)
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away from the fire building than Exposure Bravo 1 is designated "Exposure Bravo 2," and so on.

Exposure Bravo 1	Exposure Bravo	Fire Building	Exposure Delta	Exposure Delta 1
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Floors of a Building

Floors within a building are designated by their number above the ground, beginning with the ground level floor designated as "Floor 1." The first floor below grade (on side alpha of the building) is designated "Basement." If there is a second story below grade, it is designated as "Sub-Basement."

Fireground Layout	Corresponding Division Radio ID*
Side Alpha	Division Alpha
Floor 5	Division 5

*Note: a division does not exist and should not be referred to until it is established by the incident commander.

TRAINING STANDARDS

Members of the Baltimore City Fire Department will maintain NIMS training levels as specified by the United States and Maryland governments. Specifically, this will include:

- Training **all members** to ICS 100, 200, 700 and NIMS 800 levels.
- In addition, training all **captains and above** to the ICS 300 and 400 levels.
- In addition, training **all chief officers** in Unified Command and NIMS Incident Command theory and practice.


Much of this training can be accomplished via the Internet through self-paced distance learning. It will be the responsibility of Director of Training to administer and maintain records of all NIMS-related training.

INTERAGENCY RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

During a regional (multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency) response, Fire Communications will be identified as, referred to, and addressed as "Baltimore City Fire" on departmental radios.

Related Materials:

[\[MOP 625-1\]](#) Hazardous Materials Task Force

MOP 616	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE POLICY</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TEAM (SRO)</p>

SCOPE

The Special Rescue Operations Task Force (**SROTF**) is a group of specialists who can act as a force multiplier, and when directed, function as a team of rescuers capable of mitigating complex multi-hazard incidents. The primary mission of the SROTF is to rapidly plan and execute specialized rescue techniques in support of the Baltimore City Fire Department. The team’s core mission includes: specialized water rescue, urban search and rescue-collapse, environmental rescue, and industrial rescue.


The objective of the **SROFT** is to assist person(s) trapped in situations where conventional rescue techniques may not be appropriate. These responses are often high-risk/low frequency events that include, but are not limited to:

1. Assisting on-scene SOC units that are limited by staffing and/or equipment.
2. A window washer stranded on the side of a building, out of reach of aerial equipment.
3. A worker who requires assistance or lowering from a crane, tower or antenna.
4. Confined space incidents (shipboard, subway, etc.).
5. Swift water rescues/flood evacuations/static water rescues.
6. Trench and structural collapse.
7. Any incident where extensive rope work or technical rescue expertise is needed.
8. Incident Management Support
9. Mutual Aid and Emergency Management Assistance Compact Requests via OEM/ Maryland Department of Emergency Management/FEMA
10. Team members may also be called in as logistical support for rescue units on protracted rescue incidents. (Technical Rescue often has extended Operational Periods)
11. Extensive R.I.T. operations
12. Natural or Manmade Disasters
13. Highrise fires where the evacuation of building occupants could present a problem.
14. An event that requires advanced skill or a group of advanced specialists to assist in the mitigation of the event.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TEAM (SRO)

STRUCTURE

SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TASK FORCE



OPERATIONS

SRO Team operations fall into two categories, as defined below.

- **Tier 1 Incident:** Specialist group and on shift **SROTF** members.
- **Tier 2 Incident:** Full **SROTF** response and to possibly include mutual aid response of tactical rescue personnel from other jurisdictions (Baltimore County, Anne Arundel County, and Howard County).

When an incident commander is confronted with an event that exhausts normal SOC resources or requires an advanced level of knowledge, the Incident Commander (IC) shall request a TIER 1 response from the **SROTF**.

When the first **SROTF** Specialist arrives on the scene he/she will assess the incident and make recommendations to the Incident Commander on the need for a Tier II (full task force) activation or advise upon a scalable response.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TEAM (SRO)

Should the IC be confronted with a large-scale incident or multiple incidents (as in the case of flooding, large or multiple collapsed structures) he or she will have the authority to activate the **SROTF** in its entirety by requesting a **SROTF** Tier II activation. SOC 1 and/or the senior SOC officer at the scene of an incident may recommend to the IC the need for an **SROTF** activation due to SOC staffing levels and/or SOC unit availability.

Note: Most Technical rescue incidents require systematic procedures and progress slower than most emergencies. Shoring, excavating, advance rope systems, area searches, and HAZMAT responses are all examples of events that require methodical processes. Swiftwater emergencies are time critical. In any case, as soon as it is determined that additional rescue resources are needed, the Incident Commander should activate the **SROTF** as soon as possible.

The Incident Commander shall be cognizant that technical rescue “Operational Periods” may last for twelve (12) or more hours. This must be taken into consideration when determining the need for additional resources.

The Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications of the following when requesting the SRO Team:

- The type of incident (high angle, collapse, etc.).
- The level of response required (low or high level).
- The location of the incident.
- The number of victims.
- The nature of any injuries.
- The height of the building or structure involved.
- Any further information that may be of use to the SRO Team.

In situations where the Incident Commander does not need the SRO Team immediately but can anticipate the possibility of its use, the Incident Commander will notify Fire Communications to activate the SRO Team on a standby basis. By placing the SRO Team on standby, response time will be substantially reduced.

- **Response time for a High-Level Incident can be as long as one hour.**

NOTIFICATION

When the SRO Team is required, the level of the incident will determine response and notification. Fire Communications will immediately notify personnel as follows:

When the **SROTF** is required, the level of the incident will determine response and notification. Fire Communications will immediately notify personnel as follows:

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TEAM (SRO)

- Special Operations Commander (SOC1)
- Battalion Chief 6
- The SROTF Leader/Assistant Leader (Designated SROTF member)
- HAZMAT Coordinator(s)
- O.E.M.
- Fire Academy (Emergency contact)

*If the Incident Commander does not provide a staging area for inbound **SROTF** members, Fire Communications will ascertain direction and convey that information to the **SROTF** leader (or designee).

Disaster/Weather Activation

When the National Weather Service has issued a weather advisory, watch, or warning, the Special Operations Commander (SOC1) may authorize the “emergency stand-by activation” of the **SROTF** for the duration of the storm. This may be warranted when confronted with flooding, wind, or heavy snow. The emergency stand-by will be proportionate to the threat and be directed by the Special Operations Commander (SOC1)

When the City is threatened by an event that has the potential to impact the overall safety of the population (ex: hazardous materials leak, civil unrest, etc.) after conferring with the Officer in charge of Field Operations, the Special Operations Commander will have the authority to activate the **SROTF** or a proportionate component thereof.

Special Events

The **SROTF** or a proportional component may be utilized for special events that are being hosted by the City of Baltimore. The **SROTF** may be used for safety patrols, logistical purposes, and/or stand-by for possible emergencies. (Example: Fleet Week, Preakness, concerts, festivals, etc.)

Mutual Aid/ Emergency Management Assistance Compact

The **SROTF** will respond to Mutual Aid requests and requests made via the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The Shift Commander (Car 5) or his/her designee will be authorized to confirm or deny Mutual Aid requests based on the needs of the City. A current assessment of weather conditions and/or pending weather threats must be considered when determining technical rescue resources. (The storm affecting surrounding jurisdictions may have an effect on fire department resources and assets)

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests will be made via the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and be approved by the Chief of Fire Department or his/her designee. EMAC requests are based on FEMA resource typing. The **SROTF** Leader will establish, maintain, and inform SOC 1 of current resource levels and how they align with the FEMA typing model. (This list will be fluid based on staffing and equipment.)


SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	SPECIAL RESCUE OPERATIONS TEAM (SRO)

*All regional deployments of the **SROTF** will be approved by the Chief of the Fire Department and coordinated by SOC1.

ADMINISTRATION

Special Rescue Operations Task Force Membership

All members of the **SROTF** are appointed by and approved by the Special Operations Commander (SOC1). The Special Operations Commander oversees the Special Operations Rescue Task Force in its entirety and as such has the authority to appoint and dismiss members based on established parameters, procedures, and measures.

MOP 622-03	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE POLICY</p>	<p>SECTION</p> <p>EMERGENCY SERVICES</p>
	<p>SUBJECT</p> <p>PERSONAL ALERT SAFETY SYSTEM (PASS DEVICE)</p>

INFORMATION

The Bodyguard 1000 is a battery powered Personal Alert Safety System that provides audible and visible alarm signals. The unit provides clear, distinct and easily recognized alarm signals that indicate wearer immobilization, a call for help or attention, or warn of excessive thermal exposure. Distress alarms can be used by rescue teams to pinpoint the position of the source of the alarm.

Audible signals are loud and easily recognized with varying alarm patterns to distinguish between different warning conditions. The alarm is from an electronic sounder that uses the tally slots as amplification chambers to provide clear and loud alarm signals.

Visible signals are provided by red, blue, green and amber LEDs on the casing. During use the unit displays a flashing green LED that indicates active mode and pulsing blue LEDs that are used as a visual identification signal (Buddy Beacon) for fellow team members.

The unit is configured with a Tally Key with button cancel. The tally is removed to arm the alarms. Alarms are cancelled by inserting the tally or by pressing the buttons on the side of the unit.

The main function of the unit is to provide automatic and manual distress alarms. The automatic distress alarm uses an internal motion sensor and timer to measure the time the wearer has been motionless, in order to indicate that the wearer may be unconscious or trapped. The automatic distress alarm activates a pre-alert and a full alarm at a predetermined timed interval when the wearer does not move in excess of normal breathing movement. The manual alarm is operated by pressing the yellow button to allow the wearer to signal for help or attention.

A limitation of the automatic distress alarm is that the motion sensor detects movement or vibration to which the wearer is subjected and may not activate if the wearer is motionless on a moving platform (ex. vibrating machine).

OPERATION

Sleep Mode: When the unit is switched off it enters a sleep mode. The automatic alarms are disabled and all LEDs are off. The Manual Distress Alarm CAN BE activated from sleep mode.

Active Mode: When the unit is switched on and passes the self-check a start-up signal occurs (four beeps and a brief illumination of all LEDS) and then enters the active mode indicated by a flashing green LED (every second). Automatic Alarms are enabled and the buddy-beacon signal is on.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	PERSONAL ALERT SAFETY SYSTEM (PASS DEVICE)

Error Alert: If the unit fails the self-check during start-up or if a hardware failure occurs during use, the error alert activates (five beeps plus high frequency flash of the amber LED).

Pre-Alert: No movement sensed for 21-25 seconds. Activates a repeating, increasing-volume, triple beep alarm tone accompanied by alerting red and blue LEDs.

Automatic distress alarm: No movement sensed for 8 seconds of pre-alert. Activates the full alarm signal.

Manual distress alarm: Pressing the button activates the full alarm signal.

Low battery Alert: Flashing amber LED and beep every 5 seconds.

Buddy Beacon: Blue LED pulsing at low frequency.

Full Alarm signal: A high pitched pulsating alarm signal accompanied by alternating red and blue LEDs.

PRE-SHIFT CHECK

- 1) Check the Bodyguard 1000 is clean and undamaged.
- 2) Switch on the unit. Pull Tally Key from unit.
- 3) Ensure start-up signal occurs (four beeps and brief illumination of all LEDs) and then green (active) LED and the blue (Buddy Beacon) LEDs operate.
- 4) Immobilize the unit and check that the pre-alert starts in 21 to 25 second. Move the unit and cancel alert.
- 5) Immobilize the unit again and ignore the pre-alert, check that the full alarm starts approximately 8 seconds after the pre-alert.
- 6) Cancel the alarm.
- 7) Operate the manual alarm.
- 8) Cancel the alarm by holding both buttons.
- 9) Return Tally Key.

PROCEDURE

One Bodyguard 1000 will be issued for each SCBA assigned to a Unit. Each unit will have a Tally Key and Lanyard.

The Bodyguard 1000 will be activated and worn when operating in emergency situations I.E. (Fireground, Haz-Mat, Rescue, cave-ins, etc.) once the approval from the Incident Commander has been given to dispense with the wearing of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).

When members return the SCBA to the apparatus the unit will be activated and placed on members Turn Out coat using alligator clip.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	PERSONAL ALERT SAFETY SYSTEM (PASS DEVICE)


RESPONSIBILITY

Each member assigned a Bodyguard 1000 will be responsible for the device during the shift. At the change of shifts, the device will be passed to the member who is relieving that position on the apparatus. The unit officer will be responsible for any spare devices assigned to the apparatus.

Repairs

If the device does not function properly, Fire Supply shall be notified. Only approved batteries will be used.

Repairs and battery replacement on the devices will be made by Air Mask Repair.

MOP 695-1	
 <p>MANUAL OF PROCEDURE</p> <p>DETAIL PROCEDURE</p>	SECTION
	EMERGENCY SERVICES
	SUBJECT
	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

SCOPE

Rescue incidents involving Structural Collapse demand technical expertise to reach a safe and successful outcome. **NFPA 1006 – Standard for Rescue Technician Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1670 – Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents** outline response levels, training and other requirements for jurisdictions and personnel who respond to and mitigate such incidents.

DEFINITION

A structural collapse shall be defined as any building or structure, natural or manmade, that has potential to collapse or has collapsed that involves life hazards or presents significant hazards to the mitigation process. Incidents that require the positioning of individuals in a potentially unsafe area should be considered for a collapse response or a structural scene evaluation from the Special Rescue Operations team leader or their designee.

INCIDENT OPERATIONS

Command must consider the fact that if strong control of an incident is not gained quickly, the incident may easily escalate to an out-of-control situation. Typical structural collapse incidents have unorganized, well-intentioned efforts by civilians, and at times, fire service personnel to aid the trapped or injured, often placing themselves at great risk. This situation may subject trained rescuers to additional, unnecessary risks, making the entire operation unsafe. Command must focus attention early on to building a strong “Command” presence and structure that will support an extended operation.

To ensure for the safety of all personnel, the incident command system will be used on all structural collapse regardless of emergency or non-emergency incidents. If units have arrived and the incident meets the above definition(s) command will implement the following:

- Request the Special Rescue Operations Team for a structural collapse rescue assignment.
- Establish operational control zones consisting of Hot, Warm, and Cold.
- Assure that all personnel are wearing the proper PPE.
- Remove surface victims.
- Remove civilian and non-essential rescue personnel from hazardous environments and the hot zone.
- Secure utilities and other hazards.
- Survey the extent of the incident, i.e., single or multiple sites.
- Determine construction type.

SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

- Estimate casualties.
- Consider potential for further collapse.
- Consider secondary explosives or threat problems.
- Consider request for outside resource local and state.
- Complete a Preliminary Hazard Assessment of the scene. This assessment is a perimeter walk around to identify the following:
 - Size/height of the structure or structures.
 - General conditions such as debris areas, obvious wall misalignments or other structural instability, hazmat issues, etc.
 - Identification of points of entry. (No entry should be made at this time)
 - Location of visible trapped victims.
 - Utility hazards not under control.

SAFETY CONCERNS

During each incident a member who meets the requirements to operate as a Structural Collapse Technician will be appointed as Technical Safety Officer for the Rescue Group and oversee ALL safety aspects of the incident as it relates to the technical rescue operation(s).

Minimum appropriate PPE includes but may not be limited to the following:

- Helmet
- Gloves
- Safety glasses
- Safety toe boots
- Long sleeve shirts/coats

COMMON TERMINOLOGY

In order to facilitate communication of tactical planning and decisions, incident participants must understand the common terminology used at Structural Collapse Incidents. The following terminology will be used during such incidents:





Operational control zones shall be defined as:

- **HOT Zone** – defined as a distance of one and one-half (1 ½) the height of the structure involved. NOTE: If multiple building involved consider zone as a geographic area.
- **WARM Zone** – defined as a distance of 500 foot. If multiple buildings involved consider increasing the distance.
- **COLD Zone** – Defined as the area outside of the warm and hot zone. This zone is where non-equipped, non-trained personnel and civilians must be located


SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

Structure/Hazard Evaluation Marking System

Structural hazards identified during initial size-up activities and throughout the incident should be noted. A structure/hazards mark should be made on the outside of all normal entry points. International Orange spray paint is the most easily seen color on most backgrounds and line marking (or downward spray cans) apply the best paint marks. Lumber chalk or lumber crayons should be used to write additional information inside the mark itself. (Duct tape and black magic marker work also.) Chalk or crayons are used as they are easier to write with than spray paint.

-  Structure is relatively safe for SAR operations. Damage is such that there is little danger of further collapse. (Can be pancaked building.)
-  Structure is significantly damaged. Some areas might be relatively safe, but other areas might need shoring, bracing, or removal of hazards.
-  Structure is NOT safe for rescue operations and might be subject to sudden collapse. Remote search operations can proceed at significant risk. If rescue operations are undertaken, safe haven areas and rapid evacuations routes should be created.
-  Arrow located next to the marking box indicates the direction of safest entry to the structure.
- HM** Indicates hazmat condition in or adjacent to structure. SAR operations normally will not be allowed until condition is better defined or eliminated.

Example:



SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

Search Assessment Marking System

A separate and distinct marking system is necessary to denote information relating to the victim location determinations in the areas searched. This separate Search Assessment marking system is designed to be used in conjunction with the Structure/Hazards Evaluation marking system. The Search Team will draw an "X" that is 2' X 2' in size with International Orange color spray paint. This X will be constructed in two operations - one slash drawn upon entry into the structure (or room, hallway, etc.) and a second crossing slash drawn upon exit.

WHEN YOU ENTER


Single slash drawn upon entry to a structure or area indicates search operations are currently in progress.

- * Search Team Identifier ⇔
- * Date of Entry ⇔
- * Time of Entry ⇔


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6/1/09
1143



WHEN YOU EXIT – INCOMPLETE SEARCH



WHEN YOU EXIT - COMPLETED SEARCH




SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

Victim Location Marking System

During the search function it is necessary to identify the location of potential and known victims. The amount and type of debris in the area may completely cover or obstruct the location of any victims. The victim location marks are made by the search team or others aiding the search and rescue operation whenever a known or potential victim is located and not immediately removed. The victim location marking symbols should be made with orange spray paint or orange crayon.

US&R VICTIM MARKING SYSTEM


Make a large (2' x 2') "V" with orange spray paint near the location of a potential victim. Mark the name of the search team or crew identifier in the top part of the "V" with paint or a lumber marker type device.



Paint a circle around the "V" when a potential victim is confirmed to be alive either visually, vocally, or hearing specific sounds that would indicate a high probability of a live victim. If more than one confirmed live victim, mark the total number of victims under the "V".




Paint a horizontal line through the middle of the "V" when a confirmed victim is determined to be deceased. If more than one confirmed deceased victim, mark the total number of victims under the "V". Use both the live and deceased victim marking symbols when a combination of live and deceased victims are determined to be in the same location.



Paint an "X" through the confirmed victim symbol after the all victim(s) have been removed from the specific location identified by the marking.



An arrow may need to be painted next to the "V" pointing towards the victim when the victim's location is not immediately near where the "V" is painted. Show distance on arrow.




SECTION	SUBJECT
EMERGENCY SERVICES	STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE INCIDENTS

REQUESTING ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE

Additional City of Baltimore resources such as lighting, heavy equipment, lumber, Police department for crowd control or assistance with witnesses can be requested.

Trained Collapse Rescue Teams from surrounding jurisdictions are also available if the duration, area or level of the incident requires.

Maryland Task Force 2 - Urban Search and Rescue is available if needed.

 <p style="text-align: center;">TRAINING MANUAL</p>	<p>TM 306</p>
	<p>SECTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">APPARATUS</p> <hr/> <p>SUBJECT</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS</p>

This aerial platform is a mid-mounted apparatus with front and rear outriggers. The platform reach is 95 feet above ground, as determined by NFPA 1901. The platform has a 1000-lb payload capacity, at full extension 360°.

This category of fire apparatus is commonly used in the firefighting service as a supplement to standard fire pumpers and ladder trucks. The main potential is assumed as an elevated base for a large nozzle to be employed in water tower service, and a means for rescue from upper floors of a building. **Tower 81 is not equipped with a pump and cannot function as an Engine.**



connections to supply or advance hose lines for use on upper levels of a building.

APPARATUS FOOTPRINT

- The apparatus is 8’ wide without outriggers deployed
- Each outrigger extends a maximum of 6’ when fully extended
- When the bed section of the aerial is perpendicular to the chassis, the foot print extends to 30’

		TM 306
SECTION	SUBJECT	
APPARATUS	EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS	

APPARATUS SPECIFICATIONS

- Overall Travel Height: 10' 7.75"
- Length: 46' 1"
- Width: 8'
- Length Behind Rear Axle: 16'6"
- Gross Weight: 84,000lbs / 42 tons

AERIAL SPECIFICATIONS

The aerial has the following construction specifications:

- Five-section steel lattice aerial ladder, with a safety factor of 2:1 of the rated load and a stability factor of 1-1/2:1.
- Each ladder section is trussed vertically and diagonally with round steel tubing.
- Ladder extension and retraction motion is provided by dual hydraulic powered cylinders and a cable/pulley system.
- Rotation motion is provided through a 54-in. swing bearing/spur gear, driven by two planetary hydraulic drives.
- Elevation motion is generated through two double acting lift cylinders, giving the ladder the capability of 8 degrees below horizontal to 75 degrees above horizontal.
- The ladder is equipped with holding valve cartridges and a rotational brake to restrict ladder movement when system hydraulic pressure is not present.

The aerial has the following ratings:

- 95' foot maximum height
- 1000lbs maximum dry rating on basket
- 500lbs when flowing water
- 2000gpm waterway

Outriggers

It is absolutely necessary to extend and set the outriggers firmly to insure safe operation. These stabilizers provide necessary additional platform-bearing areas to take some load off the truck chassis and to help effect a leveling of the platform on uneven terrain.

The vehicle itself should be positioned to be as level as possible prior to deploying the outriggers. If the truck is on a sloping surface, deploy the outriggers on the low side to level the platform as effectively as possible first and then deploy the outriggers on the high side. When the outrigger stroke is too short to permit the legs to set firmly on the ground you must place blocks between the outrigger and the ground.

		TM 306
SECTION	SUBJECT	
APPARATUS	EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS	

Points to remember when setting outriggers:

- If outriggers are not fully extended, computer will only allow rotation 5 degrees off center to effected side.
- Short-jacking is not a procedure to be used for setting up the apparatus.
- Do not deploy outriggers down without extending them away from the chassis first.

When it is necessary to set the outrigger(s) on a curb or side of a building you must take into account the shortened fulcrum point caused by the inability of the leg to extend out as far as usual. When this occurs you must reduce the maximum load capacity by a minimum of 300 pounds.

Much like all aerial apparatus, it is imperative the driver and officer always account for and consider:

- Purpose for the apparatus
- Identify all overhead and surrounding obstructions
- All life safety concerns
- Positioning the apparatus for the best utilization

The Tower can be positioned facing uphill or downhill. There are advantages and disadvantages to both positions. The Tower must be capable of being leveled to within safe operating limits regardless of direction positioned.

- The area around the unit must be clear for outrigger extension
- Full outrigger extension is **REQUIRED**
- The outrigger "Ground-Pads" **MUST** be utilized when outriggers are deployed. The ground must be solid/firm and capable of supporting 75 pounds per square inch.

NEVER deploy outriggers over manhole covers, storm drains or underground parking facilities or any areas that cannot support these requirements.

POSITIONING UP HILL

Advantages:

- Extending the rear stabilizer jacks will raise the rear of the truck, thereby reducing the grade
- In the setup position, the front tires will still be in contact with the ground.
- Raising the rear axle(s) off of the ground adds to the truck's ballast weight offering greater stability
- The rear tires can be left on the ground if no grade correction is required, to offer more resistance to sliding

SECTION	SUBJECT
APPARATUS	EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS

Disadvantages:

- With the rear tires off the ground, the truck has less resistance to sliding downhill.
- Because of the added height, access to storage compartments is more difficult.

POSITIONING DOWN HILL**Advantages:**

- Storage compartments are closer to the ground for easier access.

Disadvantages:

- The stabilizer jacks cannot be extended to reduce the downhill grade without raising the front tires off the ground
- There are aerial device reach limitations when operating over the front of the truck.

WATER TOWER OPERATIONS

- 5" waterway rated for 2000gpm
- Two monitor pipes mounted on bucket – both capable of individually flowing full rated capacity of tower
- One monitor pipe is smoothbore nozzle and manually controlled
- Second monitor pipe is fog nozzle and electronically controlled
- 4" Storz Intake is located mid-point on each side of apparatus (2 Intakes)
- No valves in waterway, so Intake on opposite side must be closed or a second water source hooked up
- Shower nozzle located on underside of bucket to provide protection when operating over heat sources
- 2 ½ " connection for flying standpipe on front of the bucket- this enables a portable standpipe to be set up as well

NEVER RETRACT TOWER WHEN WATERWAY IS CHARGED**LIFTING EYES**

- Tower equipped with two anchor points on underside of bucket
- Each Lifting Eye is rated for a maximum load of 500lbs
- Lifting Eyes are designed to be used as an anchor point for a single rope in a rope rescue scenario
- Pulleys and block and tackle will not be used, as they may allow the maximum load to be exceeded
- Once load is anchored to the tower, the boom should be utilized to raise or lower loads

SECTION	SUBJECT
APPARATUS	EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS

Table 2-2: Standard Load Chart

WATERWAY DRY and 50 MPH WIND CONDITION							
Degree of Elevation	-8 to 9	10 to 19	20 to 29	30 to 39	40 to 49	50 to 59	60 to 75
Basket	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
Fly	—	—	—	—	—	250	250
Upper Mid	—	—	—	—	250	250	250
Center Mid	—	—	—	250	250	250	250
Lower Mid	—	—	250	250	250	250	500
Base	—	250	250	250	500	500	750

WATERWAY CHARGED and 50 MPH WIND CONDITION							
Degree of Elevation	-8 to 9	10 to 19	20 to 29	30 to 39	40 to 49	50 to 59	60 to 75
Basket	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Fly	—	—	—	—	—	—	250
Upper Mid	—	—	—	—	—	250	250
Center Mid	—	—	—	—	250	250	250
Lower Mid	—	—	—	250	250	250	250
Base	—	—	250	250	250	500	500

Reduced loads at the basket can be redistributed in 250-lb increments to the fly, mid sections, or base sections as needed.
 Capacities are based on the following conditions:
 — Apparatus is set up according to the operator's manual and leveled to within safe operating limits.
 — The ladder is fully extended and unsupported, 360° continuous rotation.
 — For icing conditions, refer to separate load chart in this operator's manual.

Rated:

Vertical height: 95 ft
 Horizontal reach: 0° = 88 ft, 6 in.
 45° = 83 ft, 6 in.
 75° = 24 ft

Monitor Nozzle Positions			
Degrees of Elevation	GPM	Horizontal	Vertical
-8° to 75°	0 to 1500	Unlimited Positions	
-8° to 75°	1501 to 2000	Unlimited Positions	

1294


SECTION	SUBJECT
APPARATUS	EFFECTIVE TOWER OPERATIONS

NOTE: The following capabilities shall be based upon continuous 360° rotation and aerial at full extension with 0.25 in. of ice buildup.

Table 2-3: Ice Condition Load Chart

WATERWAY DRY and 59 MPH WIND CONDITION							
Degree of Elevation	-8° to 9°	10° to 19°	20° to 29°	30° to 39°	40° to 49°	50° to 59°	60° to 75°
Basket	750	750	750	750	750	750	750
Fly	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Upper Mid	—	—	—	—	—	250	250
Center Mid	—	—	—	—	250	250	250
Lower Mid	—	—	—	250	250	250	500
Base	—	—	250	250	500	500	750

WATERWAY CHARGED and 50 MPH WIND CONDITION							
Degree of Elevation	-8° to 9°	10° to 19°	20° to 29°	30° to 39°	40° to 49°	50° to 59°	60° to 75°
Basket	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Fly	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Upper Mid	—	—	—	—	—	—	250
Center Mid	—	—	—	—	—	250	250
Lower Mid	—	—	—	—	250	250	250
Base	—	—	—	250	250	500	500

Monitor Nozzle Positions			
Degrees of Elevation	GPM	Horizontal	Vertical
-8° to 75°	0 to 1500	Unlimited Positions	
-8° to 75°	1501 to 2000		

1294

Appendix # 29 MOP Draft Code X-Ray

Code X-Ray Program (MOP DRAFT)
7-30-13

BACKGROUND

Fires and other emergencies in vacant structures pose unique challenges for firefighters and EMS providers. Firefighters are more likely to be injured fighting a fire in a vacant structure than in an occupied one. The principal hazard associated with vacant structures is structural deficiency caused by weather damage, neglect and/or vandalism.

In spite of the dangers, there are times when entering vacant structures to extinguish fires, search for transient occupants, and care for the sick and injured is prudent. The challenge is determining whether entry is advisable. Often firefighters arriving at the scene of a fire in a vacant structure find it difficult to determine from the exterior whether the structure's condition can reasonably be expected to permit a safe entry. The Code X-Ray program is intended to help members make better decisions regarding entering vacant structures.

OVERVIEW

Suppression units will inspect all vacant structures to determine whether they appear safe for interior firefighting. Those structures deemed unsafe will be marked with a placard. A database of placarded structures will be maintained. Units responding to known unsafe vacant structures will be given information by Fire Communications Bureau (FCB) prior to arrival. In general, units encountering a structure bearing a placard will initiate only exterior firefighting and rescue operations.

IMPLEMENTATION

Inspections

Suppression companies will canvass their assigned inspection districts and document the location of each vacant structure in same. Unit commanders will set an inspection schedule so that all blocks in their districts are inspected for vacant structures at least once each year.

The locations of all vacant structures will be noted during inspections for later entry in BCFD Journal.

Criteria

For the purposes of this procedure, structures will be considered **vacant** if they are boarded or closed up with wood, metal, or masonry materials (windows and doors), or if they appear to have been unoccupied for an extended period and/or their condition is poor enough that they could not be occupied without significant rehabilitation.

A **Code X-ray** placard will be placed on vacant structures that present with one or more of the following characteristics:

- Large cracks or undesigned holes in load-bearing walls (including foundations).
- Bulging, sagging, twisting, bowing or collapsed load-bearing walls.
- Gaps between floors/roofs and walls.
- Missing interior stairs.
- Broken or missing joists or rafters
- Large or multiple holes in floors
- Plants growing within the building's interior
- Missing roofs, or roofs with holes.
- Rotted structural components
- Unsecured pits, shafts or chases
- Other unusual hazards that would pose a life-safety hazard

Installing placards

Units will keep 5 placards on their apparatus at all times. Battalion offices will maintain an inventory of 50 placards. Battalions will restock as necessary by obtaining placards from the Shift Commander's Office.

When a structure meets the criteria for placarding, units will affix one placard on the front (Side Alpha) of the structure using wood screws, nails or staples. Care should be taken to limit damage. Ideally placards will be attached to window boards or trim, preferably on the first floor. If no wooden surfaces can be accessed, members may attempt to affix placards to masonry facades. Only one (1) placard will be affixed to each structure, however, placards currently on Sides Bravo, Delta and Charlie of structures will not be removed (unless placarding is no longer warranted due to rehabilitation – see below).

Re-inspection

Subsequent inspections are intended to provide a systematic review of structures to determine whether they are occupied or vacant, and if vacant, whether they should be placarded.

If a unit encounters a previously placarded structure that is missing its placard, a new one will be installed.

If a previously placarded structure has undergone rehabilitation and no longer meets the criteria for placarding, it shall be properly noted (see below).

Record keeping

Unit officers will enter the locations of all vacant structures on the xxxx page of the electronic BCFD Journal, which is available via the desktops of all BCFD computer workstations. Those vacant structures that are placarded will be so noted.

Previously vacant (and currently occupied) structures will be removed from the BCFD Journal page.

Structures that no longer meet the criteria for placarding (due to rehabilitation) will be updated in the BCFD Journal (removed altogether if occupied or changed to vacant but not placarded, whichever is appropriate).

Notifying Fire Communications Bureau

FCB will maintain a record of all placarded structures in the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system.

To help maintain accurate CAD records, units will notify FCB via email when a placard is installed or a structure no longer meets the criteria or placarding. To accomplish this, email will be sent to fcf@baltimorecity.gov. FCB personnel will check for messages daily and update CAD as soon as possible.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Fire Communications Bureau

These procedures shall apply to all responses, including EMS.

FCB will dispatch a company on all EMS incidents reported in structures tagged in CAD as Code X-Ray.

When BCFD units are dispatched to an address where CAD indicates a placard was installed, FCB will announce same twice on the assigned talkgroup.

Examples:

- “On Tactical Box 31-5, Code X-Ray. Code X-Ray on Tactical Box 31-5.”
- “Medic 14 Code X-Ray, a company will be dispatched. Medic 14 Code X-Ray, a company will be dispatched.”
- “On Box Alarm 58-25, Code X-Ray. Code X-Ray on Box Alarm 58-25.”

If FCB announces a Code X-Ray based on CAD information and the structure presents without a placard, units will proceed as if it were placarded.

Structure fires

The first unit arriving at the scene of a reported structure fire and encountering a placard on the subject building will include “Code X-Ray” as part of its size-up.

In general, units will not enter Code X-Ray structures to fight fires within them. They will instead take up defensive positions on the exterior and bail water in through structural openings via master streams positioned outside the collapse zone.

No roof operations will be conducted on Code X-Ray structures.

Units may enter non-Code X-Ray exposures to contain fires advancing from original fire buildings.

Exceptions

If members, from an exterior position, make visual contact with a viable person trapped inside a burning Code X-Ray structure, and it appears probable that they could make a rescue, they may attempt same. The intent to enter must be announced by radio prior to any attempt. Ex: “Engine 13, we see a man trapped on the second floor, Side Alpha. We are entering via a second-floor window to attempt a rescue.” Once the rescue is 1) successfully effected, or 2) determined to be impossible, members will immediately evacuate the structure and remain outside.

A chief officer (including an acting battalion chief) may, after a thorough inspection of conditions, order members inside a Code X-Ray structure for fire suppression operations.

Operational considerations

- Consider risks versus benefits of making entry into a Code X-Ray structure. Putting members at risk in an attempt to save worthless structures must be justified.
- Choose personnel for entry carefully. Select experienced, level-headed members who will make good decisions once inside a Code X-Ray structure.
- Limit the number of members allowed to enter to the bare minimum required to successfully carry out objectives and tactics.
- Consider establishing additional RIT units before entry is attempted.
- Establish and charge back-up lines.

Each member who enters a Code X-Ray building will write a special report detailing his/her role in operations. Should a chief officer direct members to enter, she/he will write a special report summarizing conditions and explaining his/her rationale for same.

NFPA 1710

5.2.2.2.5* Supervisory chief officers shall have staff aides deployed to them for purposes of incident management and accountability at emergency incidents.

5.2.2.3 An incident safety officer shall be deployed upon confirmation of a structural fire, at special operation incidents, or when significant risk is present to the member due to the nature of an incident.

5.2.2.3.1 The incident safety officer, meeting the requirements as specified for the incident safety officer in NFPA 1521, shall have the expertise to evaluate hazards and provide direction with respect to the overall safety of personnel.

5.2.3.1.2 In first-due response zones with a high number of incidents, geographical restrictions, geographical isolation, or urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five on-duty members.

5.2.3.1.2.1 In first-due response zones with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, or dense urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of six on-duty members.

5.2.3.2.2 In first-due response zones with a high number of incidents, geographical restrictions, geographical isolation, or urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five on-duty members.

5.2.3.2.2.1 In first-due response zones with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, or dense urban areas, as identified by the AHJ, these fire companies shall be staffed with a minimum of six on-duty members.

5.2.4.1.1* The initial full alarm assignment to a structure fire in a typical 2000 ft² (186 m²), two-story single-family dwelling without basement and with no exposures shall provide for the following:

- (1) Establishment of incident command outside of the hazard area for the overall coordination and direction of the initial full alarm assignment with a minimum of one member dedicated to this task (1)
- (2) Establishment of an uninterrupted water supply of a minimum of 400 gpm (1520 L/min) for 30 minutes with supply line(s) maintained by an operator (1)
- (3) Establishment of an effective water flow application rate of 300 gpm (1140 L/min) from two handlines, each of which has a minimum flow rate of 100 gpm (380 L/min) with each handline operated by a minimum of two members to effectively and safely maintain the line (4)
- (4) Provision of one support member for each attack and backup line deployed to provide hydrant hookup and to assist in laying of hose lines, utility control, and forcible entry (2)
- (5) Provision of at least one victim search and rescue team with each such team consisting of a minimum of two members (2)
- (6) Provision of at least one team, consisting of a minimum of two members, to raise ground ladders and perform ventilation (2)
- (7) If an aerial device is used in operations, one member to function as an aerial operator to maintain primary control of the aerial device at all times (1)
- (8) At a minimum, an initial rapid intervention crew (IRIC) assembled from the initial attack crew and, as the initial alarm response arrives, a full and sustained rapid intervention crew (RIC) established (4)
- (9) Total effective response force with a minimum of 16 (17 if an aerial device is used)

NFPA 1561

4.5.2 The incident management system shall be designed to meet the particular characteristics of the incident based on its size and complexity, as well as the operating environment.

4.5.7 The incident management system shall be utilized at all emergency incidents.

5.3.3* The incident management system shall clearly identify who is in overall command at the scene for the duration of the incident.

5.3.8* Command Post.

5.3.8.1 In establishing a command post, the incident commander shall ensure the following:

- (1) The command post is located in or tied to a vehicle or physical location to establish presence and visibility.
- (2) The command post includes radio capability to monitor and communicate with assigned tactical, command, and designated emergency traffic channels for that incident.
- (3) The location of the command post is communicated to the communications center.
- (4) The incident commander, or his or her designee, is present at the command post.
- (5)* The command post is located in the cold zone of an incident.

5.3.18* The incident commander shall evaluate the risk to responders with respect to the purpose and potential results of their actions in each situation.

4.6.3 The system shall include a specific means to identify and keep track of responders entering and leaving hazardous areas, especially where special protective equipment is required.

4.6.7 Supervisors assigned to specific geographic areas shall be located in areas that allow each supervisor to maintain accountability of his or her assigned resources.

6.3.4* "Emergency Traffic" or "Mayday" shall be declared by an incident commander, branch director, division/group supervisor, or any member that needs to address an emergency condition, or is aware of an emergency situation that hasn't been broadcast on the radio channel.

A.6.3.4 The term “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” should be used to alert responders that a responder(s) needs immediate assistance. Once a “Mayday” condition is broadcast on the radio using the distinctive emergency traffic alert tones, the IC and/or the dispatch center is responsible to take action to clear the radio channel and to determine the member’s location, situation, and resources needed to facilitate assistance. The term “Mayday” could occur following a personnel accountability report (PAR) that fails to locate or account for a suspected lost member. Some agencies have adopted the term “LUNAR” — location, unit assigned, name, assistance needed, and resources — to gain additional information in identifying the assistance to the responder(s) in need of assistance. It is possible that the responder who is in trouble will not have the time to complete this report. The responder might only have

time to say "Help" on the radio. The IC and all responders need to understand the seriousness of the situation. It is very important to have the resources on scene and a plan established prior to the emergency condition to address the situation and to clear the "Mayday" or other "Emergency Traffic" condition as quickly and safely as possible.

Upon notification of a "Mayday" situation, it is imperative that the incident commander (IC) remain in control of the entire incident and not become overly committed to the rescue activities. *The most important task is to find and rescue the member(s) in a life-threatening situation that triggered the Mayday situation.* The IC should consider assigning a supervisor to manage the Mayday by establishing a rapid intervention group supervisor. By establishing this higher level position early, this enables the incident commander to have the rapid intervention group supervisor to enhance the overall management of the Mayday situation. Most members in a Mayday situation are rescued by other members in proximity to member(s) in trouble.

When managing an incident involving a Mayday, the incident commander may be faced with a dynamic or complicated situation. For members not in the immediate area of the Mayday, then the IC may decide to move these noninvolved members or companies to another tactical channel.

Incidents are not one size fits all. The IC has the overall responsibility when or if to implement moving nonessential members or companies to a different tactical channel. It is imperative that the IC not reassign companies to a different tactical channel who are operating in the immediate area or probable area of the lost, missing, or trapped member. The IC should not move noninvolved members or companies to another tactical channel involving a Mayday of a noncomplicated incident or situation such as a single-family dwelling fire.

Ideally, an IC should have the ability to monitor three radio channels at the fixed location command post: a dispatch channel to agency dispatch center, a tactical channel to assigned resources, and a command channel to enable communications with assigned divisions, group supervisors, and branch directors when assigned. Avoiding moving members or companies to another tactical channel during a Mayday situation ensures the IC can communicate with division/group supervisors or branch director on a designated command channel during a dynamic or complicated situation. This also ensures that the incident commander can effectively continue to manage other areas of the incident during a Mayday situation.

8.8 Rapid Intervention for Rescue of Members.

8.8.1 The fire department shall provide personnel for the rescue of members operating at emergency incidents.

8.8.1.1 Personnel assigned to perform the function of the initial rapid intervention crew (IRIC) or the rapid intervention crew (RIC) shall be trained on the requirements of NFPA 1407.

8.8.2* In the initial stages of an incident where only one crew is operating in the hazardous area at a working structural fire, a minimum of four individuals shall be required, consisting of two members working as a crew in the hazardous area and two standby members present outside this hazardous area available for assistance or rescue at emergency operations where entry into the danger area is required.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

ATF

News Release



Baltimore Field Division

Contact: Amanda M. Hils
443-965-2006
@ATFBaltimore

For Immediate Release
Wednesday, April 13, 2022

ATF Classifies Fatal Stricker St. Fire as Incendiary

BALTIMORE, Md. – The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Baltimore Field Division has determined that the fire that killed three Baltimore City Fire Department firefighters is being classified as incendiary.

“Thoughts of Lt. Butrim, Lt. Sadler, and Firefighter/EMT Lacayo have been present in our minds every step of this investigation. We would like to thank members of the community who contacted ATF and our partners with information, as well as for their outpouring of support for Baltimore City Fire Department and the loved ones of these fallen heroes,” said ATF Baltimore Special Agent in Charge Toni M. Crosby. “The incendiary classification is an important step forward in this investigation. We will continue to work alongside our partners to ensure a complete and thorough investigation is completed.”

On January 24, 2022 at approximately 5:53 a.m., Baltimore City Fire Department responded to a two-alarm fire at 205 S. Stricker St. in Baltimore. A partial building collapse occurred and four firefighters became trapped inside the vacant home. Firefighter/EMT John McMaster was immediately pulled out and transported to Shock Trauma, where he was treated and released. Rescue efforts continued until first responders were able to remove the remaining three firefighters who died in the line of duty: Lt. Paul Butrim, Firefighter/EMT Kelsey Sadler (posthumously promoted to Lt.), and Firefighter/EMT Kenneth Lacayo.

ATF Baltimore Field Division Certified Fire Investigators, working alongside our partners in the Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore Police Department, and Maryland Office of the State Fire Marshal, have been conducting the investigation into the origin and cause of the fire. It is now classified as incendiary. ATF currently defines incendiary as a fire that is intentionally ignited or spread into an area where the fire should not be, and involves a violation of federal, state, local, or tribal law. Incendiary fires may also include fires that are not necessarily intentional, but directly result from other criminal activity.

Images and video of a person of interest were released early in the investigation. That individual has been identified and no additional tips from the public are needed. This remains an ongoing investigation and no additional information will be released at this time.

Baltimore Field Division

Appendix # 33 Baltimore City Code Violation 205 Stricker



CODE VIOLATION NOTICE AND ORDER
By Authority of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

BRANDON M. SCOTT
MAYOR

ALICE KENNEDY
COMMISSIONER

Notice Number: 564823A-2

Page 1 of 5

2/3/2022

████████████████████
0205 S STRICKER ST
BALTIMORE, MD 21223-3113

Inspector:
Name: ██████████
Phone: (410)396-7736
Area Office: 417 E Fayette RM 202
Baltimore, MD 21215

Location of Violation:
Address: 205 S STRICKER ST
Block: 0264 Lot: 010

Violation:
Issued: 05/05/2010
Number: 564823A-2

A Housing Code Enforcement Official inspected the property listed above and determined the property was in violation of the Building, Fire and Related Codes of Baltimore City. You are hereby ORDERED to obtain all required permits and to correct all the items cited on this notice on or before June 04, 2010. Individual items on this notice may require earlier completion as noted.

Violation

Item # 1: Complete within 30 Days

Location: THROUGHOUT THE PROPERTY

Violation: A Housing Code Enforcement Official inspected the property listed above and determined the property was unfit for human habitation or other authorized use pursuant to sections 115 – 121 of BFCBC. You are hereby ordered to:

- A. Secure all accessible openings within five (5) days of the issue date on this notice and notify inspector when this is completed. Keep all openings secured until the building is razed or rehabilitated.
- B. Remove all trash, debris, high grass and weeds from premises, including but not limited to: abutting sidewalks, gutters, and alleys within five (5) days of the issue date on this notice and notify inspector when this is completed. Keep premises in clean and sanitary condition at all times.
- C. Rehabilitate or raze building, within 30 days, after securing approval from the building official. The Housing Code Official for your area may extend the time within which to comply with any item on this notice.
- D. Obtain an occupancy permit before using or occupying the property.



417 East Fayette Street Suite 202 Baltimore, MD 21202

Baltimore Housing reflects the combined efforts of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City and the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community De



CODE VIOLATION NOTICE AND ORDER
By Authority of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

BRANDON M. SCOTT
MAYOR

ALICE KENNEDY
COMMISSIONER

Page 2 of 5

Notice Number: 564823A-2

2/3/2022

If you intend to rehabilitate this property for homeownership, please note that significant tax credits from the City of Baltimore **MAY** be available to benefit the future homeowner. Go to <http://www.baltimorecity.gov> and search "Finance / TaxCredits" to learn more about the "Vacant Dwelling Property Tax Credit" the "Home Improvement Tax Credit" and the "Newly Constructed Dwelling Property Tax Credit" (which applies in part to certain rehabilitated structures). Or call the Baltimore City Revenue Collections Call Center at 410-396-3971.

If you need further help or information please telephone the inspector listed above.

Authority Of Commissioner To Order Repairs At Your Expense

If the premises are not kept clean, the building is not kept secure, and/or the building is not rehabilitated or maintained in accordance with minimum maintenance standards as ordered, or the property presents a health hazard, or nuisance as defined in the Baltimore City Health Code section 5-101, the city is authorized to do all or any part of the required work, or to demolish and remove the building or any part thereof, the cost of which will become both a lien against the property and a personal debt owed by all persons having an interest in the property.

Penalties

Failure to correct each violation in the time and manner prescribed is a criminal misdemeanor subject to a fine of up to \$500 per day. A violation may also be enforced by Court Order and civil penalty. In addition to initiating prosecution or other legal enforcement proceedings the Commissioner or an authorized representative of the Commissioner is authorized to complete all required work without further notice. The expense of the work will be both a personal debt and a lien against the property.

Certain violations of the BFRCBC and Zoning Code carry penalties that exceed the \$500 fine per day and in some cases may include incarceration.

Abatement Procedure

Work must be inspected and approved before this notice will be abated. Contact your area housing office at the number listed on page 1 to schedule an inspection when corrections have been completed. An abatement letter will be sent upon verifying satisfactory completion. All repairs, maintenance work, alterations, or installations must be done in a workmanlike manner. The Housing Code Official for your area may extend the time within which to comply with any item on this notice.



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MAYOR

ALICE KENNEDY
COMMISSIONER

Notice Number: 564823A-2

Page 3 of 5

2/3/2022

Administrative Review

Violations of the Zoning Code of Baltimore City:

An appeal of a zoning violation must be requested within 10 business days from the date of service upon you, on forms provided by the Zoning Administrator. Forms and assistance may be obtained at 417 E. Fayette Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202, Room 100, 410-396-4126.

Appeals of a zoning violation are heard before the Board of Municipal Zoning Appeals.

Violations of the Building, Fire and Related Codes of Baltimore City:

You have the right to request an administrative review of any violation notice and order of the BFRCBC. Your request must: 1) be in writing; 2) be made within 10 days of service upon you; 3) set forth in full the reasons for review; and 4) be mailed certified or registered mail, return receipt requested to Deputy Commissioner, Permit and Code Enforcement at 417 E. Fayette Street, 3rd Floor, Baltimore, Maryland, 21202.

A request for a review of a condemnation or other notice or order with a completion date of less than 10 days must be made before the expiration of the notice. In emergency situations this review procedure may not be available.

Separate appeal request must be made if you are appealing violations of both the Zoning Code and the BFRCBC.

Lead Warning Statement

Many homes built before 1978 were painted using lead-based paint. Lead-based paint is particularly dangerous if it is chipping or peeling. If a home has been cited for chipping paint and this paint is lead-based paint, it places young children at risk of developing lead poisoning. Lead poisoning in young children may produce permanent neurological damage, including learning disabilities, reduced intelligence quotient, behavioral problems, and impaired memory. Lead poisoning also poses a particular risk to pregnant women. In certain circumstances you must employ lead-safe work practices to correct paint violations. If you would like more information on lead poisoning prevention and lead-safe work practices, contact Department of Housing & Community Development Light Program at 410-396-3023 or the Baltimore City Health Department Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program at 443-984-2460 or the Green & Healthy Homes Initiative by e-mail at marylandprograms@ghhi.org or by telephone at 410-534-6447 or 1-800-370-5323.

Property Registration

All non-owner occupied residential dwelling units and rooming units must be registered with the Commissioner of Department of Housing & Community Development. The Baltimore City Code, Article 13, Subtitle 4-2, requires every owner of a non-owner occupied dwelling



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Page 4 of 5

Notice Number: 564823A-2

2/3/2022

unit, "whether occupied or vacant, whether it is producing revenue or not producing revenue, whether habitable or not habitable" shall file a registration statement with the Housing Commissioner. This must be done upon any transfer of the property and by December 31st thereafter. Failure to register your property in the time and manner prescribed is a criminal misdemeanor subject to a fine of up to \$500 per day. A violation may also be enforced by Court Order, civil penalty and environmental citation. More information on Property Registration is available online at <https://dhcd.baltimorecity.gov>. The Property Registration & Licensing Office is located at 417 E. Fayette Street, Room 100 and they are open Monday - Friday, 8:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.

For your reference:

- BFRCBC - Building, Fire and Related Codes of Baltimore City
- PMCBC - Property Maintenance Code of Baltimore City
- FCBC - Fire Code of Baltimore City
- NEC - National Electric Code
- Zoning - Zoning Code of Baltimore City
- ART. 13 - Article 13 of the Baltimore City Code
- Ann. Code - Annotated Code of Maryland
- ORD - Ordinance
- BCPC - Baltimore City Plumbing Code
- HE - Health Article
- IMC - Mechanical Code of Baltimore City

Go to <http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/CityCharterCodes.aspx> to view many of these codes.



417 East Fayette Street Suite 202 Baltimore, MD 21202

Baltimore Housing reflects the combined efforts of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City and the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community De

Appendix # 34 Baltimore Banner Article

Family that owns home where firefighters died speaks out for first time, illustrates city's challenges with vacants

By **Justin Fenton**

Published on: February 17, 2022 at 8:00 am EST

Updated on: June 13, 2022 at 8:41 am EDT



A gap between homes in the 200 block of S. Stricker St. marks the spot where a vacant home burned and collapsed, killing three Baltimore firefighters.. (Justin Fenton)

Robert Shore Jr.'s family no longer wanted their home on South Stricker Street in Southwest Baltimore. And as the taxes accrued and the city put it up for auction, neither did anybody else.

The family had long ago relocated to a sleepy town in the hills of central Pennsylvania, and shut off the utilities to the home. For a time, they leaned on a relative still in the area to make sure the property was boarded up.

“We did what we could to keep it secured, but when shit happens, shit happens,” Shore said in a phone interview from Huntingdon, Pa.

On Jan. 24, the home went up in flames, and three firefighters died battling the blaze: Lt. Paul Butrim, Lt. Kelsey Sadler, and firefighter Kenny Lacayo. A fourth, John McMaster, was hurt. It was at least the second fire at the property in seven years, the previous also injuring four firefighters. Sadler had been at the first fire, too.

“It’s a bad thing that happened, but the fact of the matter is, it wasn’t nobody in my family that started the fire,” Shore said, in the family’s first comments since the tragic fire.

The blaze, whose cause remains under investigation, has revived a decades-old debate about how the city should tackle its scourge of vacant homes. The city estimates that there are at least 15,032 vacant homes, though the number could be much higher. The majority of the verified number - about 13,560 - are privately owned.

Each has its own journey of ending up boarded up, crumbling, unwanted. This is the story of 205 S. Stricker Street - one window into the challenges the city faces in dealing with them.

The small row home is listed as being built in 1900, and encompassed three stories and 966 square feet in the Mount Clare neighborhood, a historically working-class immigrant neighborhood just west of the Inner Harbor and which rose in the mid-19th century to accommodate the labor force for the railroad industry. Locals refer to the area as “the Lumberyard.”



The site of a vacant home that burned and collapsed in the 200 block of S. Stricker St., killing three Baltimore firefighters. (Justin Fenton)

According to a classified ad in *The Baltimore Sun* from 1900 and the Polk's city directory, the home appears to have initially operated as a barbershop.

Over the past 90 years, it was in the hands of only two families, records show.

It was owned by a former Baltimore sandlot star who had seven at-bats with the Boston Braves in 1928 before going on to work for Bethlehem Steel. He sold it in 1933 to carpenter Walter J. Stansbury. Stansbury owned it until his death in 1979; his siblings sold the home in 1988.

That's when the Shore family acquired it. The first generation of Shores moved to Baltimore from the Pennsylvania hills a few decades earlier. "We're country hicks who came here and took jobs," one relative told *The Sun* in 2000.

That article described a couple hundred Shores living in Baltimore, "self-employed welders, house rehabilitators or produce sellers," with "few holding steady jobs" and "many on

disability.” A 1999 police blotter item described two Shores beating a man with a shovel for trying to steal their pigeons.

“You say the name Shore and people think, ‘They’re rough characters,’” Wendell Shore said at the time. “A lot of us are like that because then people don’t mess with us.”

Members of the Shore family owned several homes in the 200 block of South Stricker Street alone: across from 205, Shores owned three adjoining rowhomes, and a property down the block is still listed as owned by a Shore.

The home where the firefighters died was put up for sale in early 1997 at a price of \$22,500, with a real estate listing falsely claiming it was once “home of H.L. Meinken,” an apparent reference to the famed journalist H.L. Mencken, who lived from 1883 until his death in 1956 in a home two blocks north that is on the National Register of Historic Places.

Later that year, the home two doors down from 205 S. Stricker St., at the end of the block, collapsed.

Robert Shore recalls that their home and the house in between were shifted “right off the foundation,” and the city wanted them to leave.

“They tried to put us out on the streets,” he said. “They offered \$1,000 cash and to put us in a hotel for three nights. They didn’t want to take it off our hands, they just wanted to kick us out.”

His family fought back, but in 2008, they decided to relocate to Huntingdon, a small town on the Juniata River about three hours northwest of Baltimore.

A relative who remained in the city tried to look after the Stricker Street home, including changing the locks. But people kept breaking in, and vandalizing the home, Shore said.

It was declared vacant by the city in 2010. That same year, the Shores moved one step closer to having the property taken off their hands when it was sold at public auction to First National Assets, a company that buys tax liens. FNA foreclosed on the property in August 2013.

But the city moved to overturn the foreclosure one year later, saying that FNA had failed to pay the back taxes, interest and penalties, according to court records. FNA didn’t respond, and the judgment was overturned.

It would be listed on 2013, 2016 and 2019 tax sales, and has accrued \$50,000 in liens. No one has wanted to take that on.

Mayor Brandon Scott has ordered a review of all procedures related to how city government deals with vacant homes, calling it “one of the most consequential undertakings of my administration.”

Samuel B. Little, a University of Maryland School of Social Work professor and former city Housing Authority associate deputy director, said the city needs to focus on creating a pathway for owners out of such entanglements, before properties begin to decay.

“We have to recalibrate how we think about it, instead of just punitive actions,” Little said. “Sixteen-thousand vacant homes is unheard of. That’s a crisis.”

A fire at the home in 2015 injured four firefighters. According to an incident report obtained by The Baltimore Banner, the rear of the home was not secured, and the fire was the result of “homeless activity.”

Meanwhile in Pennsylvania, Robert Shore Sr. died in 2016 at age 54, according to an online obituary. He left behind his wife and nine children, and the property went to his wife.

Investigators, led by the ATF, have said little about the fatal January fire. They released a picture of a “person of interest,” and a \$100,000 reward is being offered.

In the meantime, 205 S. Stricker has been demolished. As a result of the fire damage, so too were 203 and 207.

At the southern end of the block, the corner home is listed as owned by Wendell Shore. For years, he maintained a garden on an adjacent lot where two homes had been torn down, and it overflowed with flowers, tomatoes, cucumbers, old tires and pink plastic flamingos.

Shore died in 2019; there are no flowers or vegetables, just trash and debris. A neighbor who moved in not too long ago said he hasn’t seen anyone coming or going.

It is scheduled to be offered at an upcoming tax sale.

justin.fenton@thebaltimorebanner.com

Appendix # 35 Subscriber Rejects

Time	Message	UnitID	UnitID Alias	TG Alias
[01/24/22 06:00:10]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260184	Trk 8*RT46	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:00:35]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262617	E36-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:00:36]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262617	E36-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:00:41]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260184	Trk 8*RT46	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:01:15]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:02:40]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:10]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:13]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262674	E55-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:17]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262707	T10-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:23]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:25]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:03:27]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262674	E55-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:04:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:04:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705	T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:04:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545	Rescue 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:05:13]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:06:18]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262673	E55-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:06:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705	T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:06:35]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705	T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:06:35]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262768	BATT 3-P5_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:07:36]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262673	E55-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:07:40]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262673	E55-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:07:53]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:08:18]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:08:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:08:44]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:08:44]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262701	T08-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:08:50]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:09:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:09:21]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:09:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:09:36]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:10:30]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262838	CAR5-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:11:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262652	E47-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:11:40]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705	T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:11:40]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262601	E30-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:11:56]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262577	E23-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:11:59]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262577	E23-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:12:21]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545	Rescue 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:03]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262481	EMS06-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:45]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260109	Engine 2	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:47]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262577	E23-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16

[01/24/22 06:13:55]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262577 E23-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:13:55]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261591 Squad 26	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:02]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:04]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261591 Squad 26	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:04]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:33]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260109 Engine 2	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262838 CAR5-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:45]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:48]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:49]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262707 T10-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:52]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261591 Squad 26	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:54]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262707 T10-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:57]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262707 T10-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:59]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262853 R1-P1 *Loan	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:14:59]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262707 T10-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:02]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:07]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261591 Squad 26	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:13]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262853 R1-P1 *Loan	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:16]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262716 T16-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:28]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260040 COLPS 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:15:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262714 T16-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:16:06]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261591 Squad 26	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:16:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:17:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262701 T08-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:17:02]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262562 E13-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:17:14]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545 Rescue1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:17:30]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:17:47]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:18:18]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262839 OPEN2839	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:18:21]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262839 OPEN2839	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:18:47]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262839 OPEN2839	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:19:17]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262562 E13-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:19:49]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:27]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:28]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:43]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262426 M 13-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:49]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:51]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:20:53]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:21:18]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2224814 ZCS2224814	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:22:10]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262838 CAR5-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:22:21]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262591 SQ26-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16

[01/24/22 06:23:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:24:13]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262730 T23-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:24:14]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262730 T23-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:24:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262592 SQ26-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:25:45]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:25:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:26:01]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262553 E05-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:26:10]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262553 E05-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:26:43]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262553 E05-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:26:52]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:26:53]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262546 E02-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:06]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:16]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:33]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:41]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262593 E27-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:48]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:48]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:27:55]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:28:15]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262424 M 12-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:28:16]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545 Rescue 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:29:08]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:29:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:29:12]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:29:13]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:29:15]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:30:05]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705 T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:30:18]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:30:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262701 T08-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:30:56]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:11]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262649 E47-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:28]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262601 E30-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262601 E30-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262601 E30-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:54]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262592 SQ26-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:56]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:31:58]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:32:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:32:03]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260088 SQ 40*RSQ75	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:32:04]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262553 E05-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:32:20]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262731 T23-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:34:06]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:34:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:34:27]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:35:17]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545 Rescue 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:36:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262588 E23-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:36:08]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262417 M 08-P2	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:36:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16

[01/24/22 06:36:55]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262545 E02-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:37:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262733 T25-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:37:23]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545 Rescue 1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:38:34]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:07]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262688 E58-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262688 E58-P4_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262983 M 07-P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:34]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262731 T23-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:38]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705 T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262731 T23-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705 T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:41]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:41]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262731 T23-P3_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262705 T10-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:43]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262589 SQ26-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:47]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:39:50]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262697 T06-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:40:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262544 BC2*P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:40:34]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572 OEM09-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:41:56]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262566 E14-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:43:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797 BC6-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:44:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262839 OPEN2839	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:44:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262544 BC2*P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:12]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685 E58-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262562 E13-P2_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:43]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262481 EMS06-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:45]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262481 EMS06-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262481 EMS06-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:50:48]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262481 EMS06-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:54:41]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262544 BC2*P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:54:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262544 BC2*P1	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:57:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260272 SOC 5-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:57:03]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753 AF1-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:57:38]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:58:08]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:58:08]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753 AF1-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:58:17]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753 AF1-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:58:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713 T16-P1_NEW	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:58:46]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262909 CAR2-P2	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:59:56]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16
[01/24/22 06:59:58]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794 BC3-P	FG 1 * A16

Time	Message	UnitID	UnitID Alias	TG ID
[01/24/22 07:00:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262797	BC6-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:02:01]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2225944	ZCS2225944	80009014
[01/24/22 07:03:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713	T16-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:03:49]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262589	SQ26-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:03:53]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262715	T16-P3_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:04:01]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:04:30]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262553	E05-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:09:14]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262730	T23-P2_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:09:15]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262730	T23-P2_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:17:20]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262545	E02-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:18:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262685	E58-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:20:44]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:20:51]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:21:21]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:21:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:21:30]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262853	R1-P1*Loan	80009014
[01/24/22 07:21:54]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545	Rescue 1	80009014
[01/24/22 07:25:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262589	SQ26-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:25:10]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262601	E30-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:25:11]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262589	SQ26-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:25:16]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:25:33]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262988	A 25-P1	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262853	R1-P1*Loan	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:12]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262853	R1-P1*Loan	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:32]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:40]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2261545	Rescue 1	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:45]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:26:59]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:27:00]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:27:02]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:27:04]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:27:09]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:28:26]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:35:19]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262713	T16-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:06]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:22]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262807	SOC1-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:42]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262794	BC3-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:47]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262858	Trk 10-P2*L07	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:51]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:38:52]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014
[01/24/22 07:39:15]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:39:31]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262753	AF1-P1_NEW	80009014
[01/24/22 07:48:38]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262617	E36-P1	80009014
[01/24/22 07:48:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2262617	E36-P1	80009014
[01/24/22 07:51:39]	Radio Status Traffic - Subscriber Reject	2260572	OEM09-P	80009014