

*The best read, in the Atlantic Monthly, June 1879.*

*entire description of the*

General Loberg, who obliged the enemy (as he says) to quit a redoubt made to cover their retreat. This alarming fire proceeded from part of our light troops, commanded by Col. Laurens, consisting of 248 men only, which were posted there as an advanced picket, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to retreat, and draw them on to the main army, if possible; the two redoubts he tells of were some slight works, thrown up during the siege, but never had any artillery in them, nor was there an idea of the American army retreating, when they were constructed, nor did Col. Laurens place a single man in them, to make the least attempt to defend them, in the morning of the action. So that Gen. Loberg, with his large body of troops, joined by Fanning's corps, obliged 248 men to obey the order they had before received for joining the main army, and took two strong redoubts, which no person attempted to occupy or defend. He then goes on to inform Gen. Clinton, that towards evening the rebels having made an attempt to surround and cut off the Hessians, who were advanced on the left, the regiments of Fanning and Hayne were ordered up to their support, and after a smart engagement with the enemy, obliged them to retreat to their main body on Windmill-Hill. The fact was exactly the reverse: The Hessians made an attempt to turn the right of the American army, as the time ships began their fire on that flank, and were driven back in great confusion to their works on Turkey-Hill. So far was the American army from being driven, that the first line was advanced half a mile further at the close of the day than it was in the morning, and our pickets at night were stationed beyond the field of action; and the same Col. Campbell, on whom he lays the weight of the action, came the next day with a flag, to obtain permission to go on the field of battle, in search of the dead body of his nephew, Enrique Bullace, who he told Col. Sherburne and Col. Henry tell by his side, and that our troops pressed them so hard on their retreat, that they could not bring off his body. Sir Robert forgot to mention, that his Britons on the right advanced up almost abreast with Windmill-Hill in the morning, and were beat back by Gen. Glover's brigade to Quaker-Hill; and that brigade remained, through the whole day, half a mile advanced of where the British troops had taken post in the morning. In short, the falsehoods and misrepresentations in this letter have no example but in those accounts with which British Commanders have long been endeavouring to deceive mankind. It is surprizing that any officer, who has the least regard for his own honor, should give an account which both armies must agree has no foundation in truth. The account of the killed, wounded and missing, is still more erroneous, if possible: He makes the whole loss but 256, when, from the best authority, we know the loss (including the deserters which came off while our army was on the island) amounts to 1023; but this is not to be wondered at, when we consider, that Gen. Howe informed the ministry, or rather the ministry informed the world, that at the battle of Trenton, the loss in killed, wounded and missing, was between six and seven hundred, when it was notorious, that we took upwards of a thousand prisoners, exclusive of killed and wounded; and at the battle of Princeton, he informed the ministry, that the loss in killed, wounded and missing, was between two and three hundred, when the prisoners taken amounted to upwards of five, besides a considerable number of killed and wounded; and Sir Henry Clinton, to excuse his flying at midnight from the plains of Monmouth, to avoid Gen. Washington, tells the ministry, that he did it to take advantage of the moon-light to join Gen. Kniphausen; but unfortunately for Sir Henry, there was no moon, of which he could avail himself at the time, he having charged but three days before. Those matters being considered, they may in some measure excuse Sir Robert, and prove that he is only following the example of his superiors. His description of the retreat of the American army is truly striking; he says, that by means of the great number of boats, the enemy retreated in the night over Bristol and Howland's Ferry. The vigilant Sir Robert ought to have recollected, that the army was posted with all its stores near two miles from the ferry, where it crossed, and that the multiplicity of boats could be no advantage in moving all the artillery and stores of the army near two miles by land, before they came to the place of crossing; or if writing the truth is admissible in a British army, it might be as well for him to have said, that he was so severely punished, for attempting to molest the American army in their retreat, that he did not chuse to hazard another attempt. But to crown the whole, and to prove to Sir Henry Clinton what important advantages were gained by the American army's retreat, he concludes the narrative by assuring him, that the enemy, by retreating off the island, relinquished every hold on it, and resigned to them the entire possession. This reasoning inference never could have been drawn by Sir Henry, if Sir Robert had not afflicted his reasoning faculties, by reminding him that an army, by retreating from an island, relinquishes the

Though he has taken great pains to paint the very and good conduct of his troops in their engagement with our advanced corps, he might have given a more striking description of his own retreat, and that of Generals Smith and Loberg, with his brave troops under their command, by adopting Addison's description of the battle of the Pygmies, with some small alterations.

Nor left on earth the Pigmy fury glows,  
Whose chiefs for fight the martial troops disclose,  
Direct the war, and as the foe draws near,  
Each grips his sword, and eager shakes his spear,  
While closely wedg'd, and deadfast to the foe,  
Their double battle hides the plain below:  
And now the Gen'l of this Pigmy throng,  
Advancing, stalks with ample strides along;  
Slowly he moves, majestically tall,  
Tow'r's o'er his troops, and overlooks them all;  
A giant Pigmy, whose high plights swell,  
Blat with the size of half an ell.  
Stern was his visage, for his face all o'er  
Of relief claws the dire impressions bore,  
And cam'd with ghastly wounds, his massy breast  
Still own'd the foe, and all their nails confest.  
To quell those rebels that his fall confid'd,  
Who join'd in arms his fury to restrain,  
Whet keen their claws, and plunge their beaks in vain,  
O'er as his sword its edge in battle shows,  
To lop a plume and retard his foes,  
What heaps of dead, what mountains of the slain,  
What slaughter reddens all the slippery plain!  
While fighting o'er Sixty-man lake alone,  
Sad widow's languish and sad orphans moan.

An AMERICAN OFFICER.  
Providence, February 18, 1779.

*The several Printers in the United States are requested to publish (with General Pigot's Letter to Sir Henry Clinton of the 31st of August) the following Observations.*

**W**HETHER this letter was (in fact) written by Sir Robert Pigot, or framed by the British Ministry, is hard to determine. The letters of the British Commanders in America have ever appeared replete with falsehood and misrepresentation, but in no instance have they equalled the gross misrepresentations and palpable falsehoods in this. Either the British Ministers alter the letters, and fashion them to their own taste, before they suffer them to be published, or the Commanders are as intent upon deceiving the Ministers, as they are upon cajoling their Sovereign and the people.

Sir Robert says, that Capt. Christian, Lieutenantis Forest and Otway, returned the fire of the French fleet, both in coming in and going out, with great spirit, and in a good direction; but fortunately not one man was killed on his side, or any injury done, except to some houses in town. He might have added, with equal truth, that not a single shot of their's struck a vessel in the French fleet, notwithstanding their good direction; and that much ineffectually could not be shewn by officers commanding in batteries, where the enemy's balls never reached.

In order to account for his slow and timid movements on the 29th of August, he says, the rebels made a stand, and were in great force on Quaker-Hill, which occasioned him to send a number of troops to sustain General Smith; but that his perseverance had gained that strong post before they arrived. Perhaps it may be necessary to remark here, that the great force which appeared on Quaker-Hill, was part of our light troops, commanded by Col. Henry B. Livingston, which amounted only to 256 men, and that corps had orders to retreat, and if possible to draw the enemy on to the place where our army was formed, which was at Butts's or Windmill-Hill. Sir Robert ought also to be reminded, that the strong post he paints at Quaker-Hill was never discovered but by himself, for every other person who has viewed the ground must confess, that in coming from Newport it is a perfect level for two miles before the ground descends towards the north. The post is indeed advantageous against an enemy advancing towards Newport, but not so against an enemy coming from thence to the north end of the island. Those light troops did retreat from Quaker-Hill, agreeable to order, covered by a small regiment commanded by Lieut. Col. Sprout, and brought off with them a British Lieutenant and several other prisoners, and retreated in the best order, *without standing* the great intrepidity and perseverance of General Smith.

Sir Robert then was alarmed with a smart firing on