Choreographing Problems
Performance Philosophy

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Choreographing Problems
Expressive Concepts in European Contemporary Dance and Performance
Bojana Cvejić
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This series is published in association with the research network Performance Philosophy (http://performancephilosophy.ning.com/), which was founded in 2012. The series takes an inclusive, interdisciplinary and pluralist approach to the field of Performance Philosophy – aiming, in due course, to comprise publications concerned with performance from a wide range of perspectives within philosophy – whether from the Continental or Analytic traditions, or from those which focus on Eastern or Western modes of thought. Likewise, the series will embrace philosophical approaches from those working within any discipline or definition of performance, including but not limited to, theatre, dance, music, visual art, performance art and performativity in everyday life.

In turn, the series aims to both sharpen and problematize the definition of the terms ‘performance’ and ‘philosophy’, by addressing the relationship between them in multiple ways. It is thus designed to support the field’s ongoing articulation of its identity, parameters, key questions and core concerns; its quest is to stage and re-stage the boundaries of Performance Philosophy as a field, both implicitly and explicitly. The series also aims to showcase the diversity of interdisciplinary and international research, exploring the relationship between performance and philosophy (in order to say: “This is Performance Philosophy.”), whilst also providing a platform for the self-definition and self-interrogation of Performance Philosophy as a field (in order to ask and ask again: “What is Performance Philosophy?” and “What might Performance Philosophy become?”). That is to say, what counts as Performance Philosophy must be ceaselessly subject to redefinition in the work of performance philosophers as it unfolds.

But this does not mean that ‘anything goes’ or that the field of Performance Philosophy is a limitless free-for-all. Rather, both the field and this series specifically bring together all those scholars for whom the question of the relationship between performance and philosophy and, therefore, the nature of both performance and philosophy (including their definitions, but also their ‘ontology’ or ‘essential conditions’), are of primary concern. However, in order to maintain its experimental and radical nature, Performance Philosophy must also be open to including those scholars who may challenge extant concepts of ‘performance’ and
‘philosophy’. In this sense, ‘What is Performance Philosophy?’ could be considered one of the field’s unifying (or at least, shared) questions, just as the question ‘What is Philosophy?’ has been a shared question for philosophers for centuries. This is not mere circularity, but an absolutely necessary methodological reflexivity that must constitute an aspect of any field, which otherwise leaves its own axioms and premises un-interrogated. Indeed, the very vitality of a field of knowledge lies in its willingness to persistently question its own boundaries rather than rule anything out once and for all. The intention is not to police these boundaries, but to provide a public forum where they might be both stated and contested.

The absolute timeliness of Performance Philosophy – both as a field and as a book series – is four-fold. In the first instance, it coincides with a (self) re-evaluation of Performance Studies as having long since come of age as a discipline. Secondly, it takes place in the context of the increasing importance of the notion of ‘practice as research’ in the arts. Thirdly, it reflects an increased engagement with Philosophy across performing arts scholarship. Finally, it is emerging simultaneously with an intensification of the questioning of what counts as Philosophy and what form philosophical thinking might take – for instance, in the context of new work emerging from object-oriented ontology (Harman, Brassier et al.) and non-philosophy (Laruelle, Mullarkey et al.). Specifically, philosophy is becoming increasingly interested in its own performance and performativity, and in looking to the arts as a source of models for itself as it moves away from traditional metaphysics. This series is uniquely positioned to explore these currents.

We might note here that a certain anti-performance bias that has been constitutional in the history of philosophy, as either demonstrated or criticized by virtually every philosopher of note from Plato to Nietzsche, from Kierkegaard to Sloterdijk, Derrida, Weber et. al., is clearly part of the inherited academic terrain. The purpose of the series is not to offer yet another “introduction” to these philosophers by re-stating what they have already said, but to engage with the pedagogic, political, practical and theoretical potential of the questions that are raised, not least as they concern the academy. This resonates in turn with what is currently being addressed in Europe, Australia and elsewhere over what constitutes “Practice as Research” (which itself relates to long-standing debates within Social Research). This engagement also helps to explain, at least partly, why in recent years Philosophy Departments in universities world-wide have become increasingly dominated by those schools of philosophy that stem from the analytic, or language
centred traditions of philosophy, to the virtual total exclusion of those equally well-founded phenomenological and hermeneutic strands of philosophical enquiry for which the body, corporeality and materiality are of central relevance.

In seeking to foster a platform for the publication of research findings in which a plurality of notions relating to Performance Philosophy may be addressed and negotiated, the series hopes to claim back for philosophy some of the valuable approaches that have in recent years gradually become woefully underrepresented within philosophy departments, while at the same time bringing fresh philosophical perspectives to bear on the cultural practices of performance. For this reason we do not consider the series as belonging exclusively to the realm of either Performance Studies or Philosophy, for its purpose is precisely to contribute to the process of defining Performance Philosophy as a field of its own.

Laura Cull, Alice Lagaay and Freddie Rokem
Acknowledgements

This book derives from my research and dramaturgical involvement in contemporary dance and performance since 1999. I would like to thank Peter Hallward, and Joe Kelleher, who encouraged me to publish this. I am also grateful to Éric Alliez, as well as Peter Osborne and other members and students of the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy for their support in discussions during my doctoral research in 2007–2012. I am especially grateful to the choreographers for generously providing me with insight into their work: Jonathan Burrows, Boris Charmatz, Mette Ingvartsen, Xavier Le Roy, Jan Ritsema, Eszter Salamon, and Jefta van Dinther. I cannot thank Jan Ritsema enough for the years of sharing his fire, for his unabating support and true comradeship. This project also developed thanks to three institutions I have been affiliated with: the project 6M1L (initiated by Xavier Le Roy in 2008) at Centre Choréographique Nationale de Montpellier, Languédoc-Roussillon, P.A.R.T.S. school where I have been probing my ideas against actual dance practice since 2002, and Utrecht University where I developed some of these themes in lectures (2009–2013). Laura Cull’s editorial comments proved very helpful in finalizing the manuscript. Finally, I likewise must thank friends who commented on various versions of this text: Ana Vujanović, Annie Dorsen, Goran Sergej Pristaš, Mårten Spångberg, Christine De Smedt, Stefan Hölscher, Tom Engels, former students at P.A.R.T.S. (Brussels), and my brother Žarko Cvejić. A special thanks goes to William Wheeler, for refining my English.
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations of references to the works of Gilles Deleuze, Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson and seven performances are used in citations embedded in the text and footnotes.


Abbreviations


h-é *héâtre-élêvision* performance by Boris Charmatz (2002)


IITA *It’s In The Air* by Mette Ingvartsen and Jefta van Dinther (2007)


Nvsbl *Nvsbl* performance by Eszter Salamon (2006)


SU *Self Unfinished* performance by Xavier Le Roy (1998)

U *Untitled* performance by anonymous (Xavier Le Roy) (2005)


50/50 *50/50* performance by Mette Ingvartsen (2004)
This book explores a recent set of practices that originated in European contemporary choreography between 1998 and 2007, practices distinguished by a kind of thought that they both arise from and give rise to. It is an attempt to account, under the philosophical theme of “problems,” for the thought that differentiates specific practices of making, performing, and attending in seven works of dance. *Self Unfinished* (SU) and *Untitled* (U) by Xavier Le Roy, *Weak Dance Strong Questions* (WDSQ) by Jonathan Burrows and Jan Ritsema, *héâtre-élérision* (h-e) by Boris Charmatz, *Nvsbl* by Eszter Salamon, *50/50* by Mette Ingvartsen, and *It’s In The Air* (IITA) by Ingvartsen and Jefta van Dinther can be singled out and assembled into a varied yet coherent selection when we consider their creation of a method that we might call, after Gilles Deleuze, “choreographing problems.”

The reasons for focusing on these performances in particular are manifold. In the first place, and in a broader sense, their authors belong to the most distinguished voices in the renewal of European contemporary dance over the past two decades, which has been characterized by experiment and by the conceptualization of working methods and of the medium of the dancing body, as well as by a proximity to performance art. But within the body of work authored by these choreographers, the seven works selected here stand out as the most striking specimens of the method of posing problems, which, in consequence, reinvents choreographic relations between the body, movement, and time in the legacy of the Western art of dance. They won’t be treated as case studies whereby each work is supposed to exemplify a pregiven method. As the philosophical argument will show here, these seven choreographies unfold a practice of thought rooted in the problematization of specific concerns of contemporary dance, such as the body-movement bind with respect to expression and form, or improvisation
and processuality. Most importantly, their forte lies in introducing a method of creation by way of problem-posing, which merits philosophical attention. This is where our inquiry begins.

For the purpose of providing an opening definition here, we will regard problems as a method of creation by posing questions that differentiate terms and conditions under which the creation of a material object—such as, in the cases examined here, the composition of a bodily movement—unfolds. In Deleuze, problems are objects of “Ideas,” as they characterize the relationship between forms of thought and forms of sensibility as one of difference, rather than identity. Deleuze writes: “In so far as they are the objects of Ideas, problems belong on the side of events, affections, or accidents rather than that of theorematic essences” (DR: 187). As we shall discuss and demonstrate further in a number of chapters that follow, problems in the sense proposed here offer us an insight into a coextensive parallelism between thinking and the practices of making, performing, and attending the choreographies under question. Thus, the parallelism accounts for their dual status: the problems stem from the very process of creation, as they express the thought that guides the choreographers in their decisions; and the problems are also given by the performances, as they further provoke us, who observe the work post hoc, to account for them conceptually by a philosophical method. Thus, when we confer upon the choreographic practices discussed here the capacity to engender thought, we mean that they contribute to a philosophical rethinking of the relationship between the body, movement, and time and, consequently, give rise to distinctive concepts of their own.

This book focuses on the problems that critically address the prevailing regime of representation in theater dance, a regime characterized by an emphasis on bodily movement, identification of the human body, and the theater’s act of communication determining the reception of the audience. Before we properly unpack the main claim of this project, we will briefly lay out the arguments of the discussion that follows. In the works considered here, we witness a break between the synthesis of the body and movement—as the relation of movement to the body as its subject or of movement to the object of dance—upon which modern dance in the Western tradition is founded. In particular, choreographing problems involves composing these ruptures between movement, the body, and time in performance such that they engender a shock upon sensibility, one that renders many aspects of these choreographic performances hard to identify, recognize, or accommodate within the horizon of expectations of contemporary dance. These problems “force”
thinking as an exercise of the limits of sensibility that can be accounted for not by representation, but by the principle of expression that Deleuze develops from Spinoza's philosophy in his pivotal books on ontology, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1968b/1992a) and *Difference and Repetition* (1968a/1994). “Part-bodies,” “part-machines,” “movement-sensations,” “head-box,” “wired assemblings,” “stutterances,” “power-motion,” “crisis-motion,” “cut-ending,” and “resonance” are proposed in these works as expressive concepts that account for the construction of problems and compositions that desubjectivize or disobjectivize relations between movement, body, and time as regards the constitution of the dancing body and between performing and attending (to) performance with respect to theater dance.

As we go on to elaborate the main concerns of our inquiry in this introduction, a few more remarks are needed to better explain the character of the project. While it significantly draws on the philosophy of Deleuze, alongside Spinoza and Henri Bergson and a few other commentators whose theories are crucial for constructing the philosophical method we will deploy here, this book makes no attempt to stage a comprehensive encounter between Deleuze and dance in the manner recently achieved within Deleuzian scholarship (e.g. Zepke and O’Sullivan 2010; Cull 2009; Buchanan and Swiboda 2004; Buchanan and Marks 2000). My reading of Deleuze remains purposefully partial, or restricted to his theory of Ideas, problems, and concepts as developed in two registers: the ontology of difference and expression (*Difference and Repetition* and *Expressionism in Philosophy*) and cinema theory (*Cinema I: Movement-Image, Cinema II: The Time-Image*), which arguably, or primarily, are also studies in Bergsonian metaphysics.

Secondly, in probing and adapting these philosophical arguments in the matters of analysis proper to each of the seven choreographies, we won’t be seeking yet another Deleuzian ally in dance. In sharp contrast to the proverbial attempts of philosophy to usurp dance as a philosophical problem while ignoring the problems that dance poses itself (Badiou 2005), which is notably—and we might add, fortunately—missing from Deleuze’s writings, dance here isn’t a metaphor in universal abstract singular form, an ahistorical conduit for a general ontology. In particular, my interest lies in the specific discipline of theater dance, in whose history these seven works are embedded and whose themes, techniques, and apparatuses they share. Therefore, the expressive concepts will arise from a discussion that entangles topics, viewpoints, and debates from dance criticism or other contemporary dance practices, usually in a tenor of critical dissent. Likewise, my analysis of the choreographic
compositions will entail an unusual amount of intricate detail in an attempt to unfold, as concretely as possible, the stuff of choreographic problems, which might prove beneficial to readers unfamiliar with the practice of dance.

In doing so, I won’t conceal the other, more complicit side of my approach here, which, aside from a commitment to philosophy, involves my dramaturgical experience in making dance and theater, having accompanied some of these works as a distant observer in the studio or as a passionate attender in the audience. Experiencing how some of these works have been made and/or received in their relatively long life has provided this study with an invaluable source of practical insight into the matters of choreography, dancing, and performance. Despite my being witness to their creation and/or reception, my association between Deleuze and these choreographers doesn’t follow from my knowledge of their occasional and inconsistent references to Deleuze and a whole other array of philosophers and theories. Affinities between artists from various disciplines and Deleuze have been affirmed in the last two decades, yet they don’t legitimize per se or determine the ways that Deleuzian thought might matter for contemporary choreography. While we won’t privilege the authorial recourse to philosophy and take its cue for the expressive concepts, we shall take the choreographers’ writings into full account, besides other sources of vast documentation on these practices, because, as Efrosini Protopapa lucidly notes about Jonathan Burrows and Xavier Le Roy, “these artists consider writing, reading, and discussing a method of practice within choreography” (Protopapa 2004: n.p.). But, as with Deleuze, we will read them selectively and with caution, and with a particular focus on the questions that guided these choreographies in their experiments. Lastly, if this book is to contribute to the emergent field of performance philosophy, it will do so in line with the parallelist expression of Deleuzian problems, Ideas, and concepts, and choreography and performance, situating both in a genealogy of their distinct fields before conjoining them in pursuit of choreographing problems.

Works of choreography and contemporary dance

*SU* and *U* (Xavier Le Roy, 1998 and 2005), *WDSQ* (Jonathan Burrows and Jan Ritsema, 2001), *h-é* (Boris Charmatz, 2003), *50/50* (Mette Ingvartsen, 2004), *Nvsbl* (Eszter Salamon, 2006), and *IITA* (Ingvartsen and Jefta van Dinther, 2007) have been presented as works of “contemporary dance.” This determines their historical and institutional
affiliation with the art discipline of theater dance, as part of which “contemporary dance” entails a vague and undetermined concept. The term “contemporary dance” has replaced “modern dance” since the 1990s and circulates as a putatively more neutral denominator than “modern” and “postmodern dance,” which are marked by disputes about modernism in Anglo-American dance criticism and history (Manning 1988; Banes 1989). “Contemporary dance” serves merely to distinguish the present-day production of dance from the coexisting historical or canonical forms and styles of—originally West-European— theater dance (ballet, “classical dance,” also referred to as “academic dance”), or from other non-Western dance traditions as well as dance forms geared to non-art purposes (social, therapeutic, entertainment, etc.). Its widespread usage nonetheless indicates the current pluralism in performing arts, where no movement or style vies for critical dominance.

Despite its widespread and generic usage, “contemporary dance” appears as a secondary term, a less specific denomination than “choreography” and “performance,” which are the terms more readily associated with the works considered here. There are several reasons for the mistrust and hesitation inspired by the label “contemporary dance.” Firstly, critics have pointed out that the name “contemporary dance” promotes a defiance of historicity through an obsession with contemporaneity, or “presentism” and novelty under the capitalist logic of exhaustion and renewal, or, as Ramsay Burt explains it, a “dialectic of exhaustion and reaction” (Burt 2004: n.p.). Similarly, Helmuth Ploebst remarks that “yesterday is being deleted in order to be able to rewrite it according to today’s intentions” (Ploebst 2001: 274). Secondly, the usage of this term is more evaluative than classificatory, where the attribute “contemporary” synthesizes the characteristics of the modern as bearing a disruptive relation with the past, and the avant-garde as a novelty ahead of its time, and it is used in masterly judgments of “contemporary” vs old-fashioned, outdated, passé, déjà vu (Kunst 2003).

Thirdly, “contemporary dance” doesn’t resolve the controversy about what postmodernist, as opposed to modernist, dance is, despite its intention to accommodate a pluralism. Instead it implicitly retraces the same kind of debate in the context of a new term: “conceptual dance” (Le Roy, Cvejić and Siegmund 2008). Looking at the work of the earliest date in this selection—Xavier Le Roy’s SU (1998)—critics have raised the question of whether this performance should be called dance, in spite of its being intended as contemporary dance. Often associated with another French choreographer of the same generation—Jérôme Bel—
Le Roy has been accused of “non-dance,” “anti-dance,” and, most conspicuously, “conceptual dance.” The charges of “non-dance” and “anti-dance” imply that so-called conceptual dance repudiates the essence of dance, a gesture that broadly relates back to the argument of “pure dance” within a line of American dance criticism influenced by the Greenbergian conception of modernism (Greenberg 1961; Fried 1998). The opposition between “conceptual dance” and its Other—“pure dance,” colloquially referred to as “dancy dance”—became the topic of much public discussion over the past decade, but was eventually rejected by choreographers as well as dance scholars and critics as an inadequate misnomer. In a series of talks called Parallel Voices, curated by Burrows at Siobhan Davies Studios in London in 2007, one talk was dedicated to the works of Bel and Le Roy, and included a conversation between Burrows, Bel, Le Roy, and myself under an oxymoronic title: “Not Conceptual: Investigating the Thinking behind the Most Influential Movement in Dance of the Past Ten Years” (Burrows 2007). The debate went on for a few years in European journals and magazines that specialized in the performing arts (Frakcija Performing Arts Journal, Maska, TkH Journal for Performing Arts Theory, Ballet-Tanz International, Mouvement, Etcetera, and others) and came to the conclusion that “conceptual dance” designates no movement, poetics, style, or genre. Instead, it symptomatically evidences a problem of qualifying as choreographies those performances that contest the foundational characteristics of dance as a historical art discipline. From the perspective of the Anglo-American dance scene and its scholars, the works of the choreographers discussed here, as well as that of a number of other choreographers and dancers associated with them—Bel, Vera Mantero, Juan Dominguez, La Ribot, Antonia Baehr, Boris Charmatz, Thomas Plischke (and Kattrin Deufert), etc.—have been viewed under the banner of a European dance movement, or European “experimental theater dance” (Burt in Briginshaw and Burt 2009: 204). Drawing on various writings of André Lepecki, the dance and performance scholar who initiated one such discussion on the emergence of a separate movement, Protopapa (2004) provides a comprehensive overview of its characteristics:

A reduction of “theatrics”, of expansiveness, of the spectacular, of the unessential, which brings [the choreographers] work formally closer to performance art (Lepecki 1999a: 129–30), a critique of representation and an interrogation of choreography’s “political ontology” as Lepecki names it (2006: 45), often through the performance of still-acts, rather than continuous movement, so that what is enabled is a
rethinking of action and mobility within dance (Lepecki 2006: 15), as well as the shattering of (dance) techniques and the privileging of the dancer as co-author. (Lepecki 1999b: Sarma website)

While some of these characteristics, such as stillness and the critique of representation, will be explicitly discussed later on, Protopapa’s remark about the “shattering of dance techniques” captures the betrayal of dance connoted in the derogatory term “conceptual dance.” It also explains why the authors examined here prefer framing their works as “choreographies” rather than “dances,” (with the exception of WDSQ, where the title manifests a nervous reluctance to call itself “dance”).

From the viewpoint of the authors of these works, the denomination “choreography” suggests an insistence on the authorial position of the choreographer whereby the choreographer distinguishes her work from a traditional notion of craftsmanship in composing bodily movement. Dance criticism as well as the recent curatorial interest in importing works by choreographers into the context of visual arts (performances in exhibitions)\(^2\) has contributed to the currency of this term by referring to a large part of contemporary dance, and specifically to a few of the works discussed here, as “new choreography” or “choreographic performance” (Ploebst 2001, 2009: 164). The upsurge of publications that investigate the changing meaning of the word “choreography” in terms that are both historical and relevant to contemporary practices testifies to the term’s prominence (Parker 2009; Burrows 2010; Sabisch 2011). Among these are Petra Sabisch’s monographic study foregrounding the choreographic practices of Le Roy and Salamon as “practical philosophy” in her book *Choreographing Relations: Practical Philosophy and Contemporary Philosophy in the Works of Antonia Baehr, Gilles Deleuze, Juan Dominguez, Félix Guattari, Xavier Le Roy and Eszter Salamon* (2011). Another significant example is a recently established academic programme, the MA in Choreography and Performance (CuP) at The Institute for Applied Theater Studies in Giessen, Germany, which deliberately excludes disciplinary closure of dance studies by combining training and scholarship.

A recent inquiry into what choreography is marked a surge in the term: the open call of the Austrian dance web journal *Corpus Web* elicited a wide variety of responses from choreographers, dancers, theoreticians, presenters, and dramaturges working in contemporary dance in Europe, signaling a pluralistic and indeterminate definition (*Corpus Web* 2011).\(^3\) Many respondents agreed on a generic determination of
choreography as the organization of movement in time and space, each placing accents on a different term or relation within the statement. William Forsythe's proposition of choreography as “organizing things in space and time” in 1998 (Ploebst 2009: 165) anticipated later definitions that significantly omit any mention of the human body or movement, or that don’t ascribe movement to the human body. The definitions of three authors featured here belong to the same vein. Hetemsta states that “choreography is thinking about the organization of objects and subjects in time and space on stage” (added emphasis). For Le Roy, it is “artificially staged action(s) and/or situation(s).” Burrows’ answer goes even further in delinking choreography from the body in movement: “Choreography is about making a choice, including the choice to make no choice” (Corpus Web 2011: n.p.). These definitions’ open-endedness as regards the concept “choreography” could be attributed to the current condition of indeterminacy in art as a post-conceptual and post-Fordist development of “art in general,” as Stewart Martin suggested. Art’s indeterminacy entails the dissolution of traditional delimitations of (fine) art, the arts, and non-art; and whereas it began as a critical and emancipatory move with respect to the art institution and market in the 1960s, it is now “normal,” a consequence of an expanded commodification and subsumption of art and life under capitalism today (Martin 2007: 17). If capitalism in its current formation is “the medium of art’s indeterminacy,” as Martin argues (ibid.), the sense of art’s open-endedness is entangled with the sense according to which anything might be commodified.

The condition of art’s indeterminacy applies to choreography as well, albeit in a different fashion. The world of dance doesn’t share the artworld’s strong awareness and concern regarding the capitalist, free-market economic model of production because of the lower commodity status of performance in comparison to works of art, which are traded as objects even when they are immaterial. Dance also cherishes a set of values originating in the Neo-Avantgarde era of “critical art” and “liminal” performance (McKenzie 2001) through which choreographers and other performance makers experiment with modes of production and audience reception in efforts to resist the “spectacle” of theater, a line of thinking correspondent with what Lepecki notes as the reduction of “theatrics” and “the spectacular” (Lepecki 1999a: 129–30). Therefore the pursuit of the definition of choreography discussed above still points to the emancipatory urge to expand the notion of choreography and legitimize the pluralist performance practices of choreographers and dancers today under the name of choreography. This means that
the assertions made by neo-avant-gardist performance practitioners of the 1960s (e.g. the Judson Dance Theater) claiming that any movement, any body, or any method whatsoever could be dance (Banes 1987: 6) haven’t been fully accommodated and accepted in contemporary dance, for the question of ontological status—“is this dance”—has still too often been at issue in the past decade. Unlike the art world, which nominally endows any “candidate” with artwork status, choreographers are still struggling against essentialist resistances (exerted by the argument of “pure dance,” for example) by means of new choreographic propositions. The struggle to expand the meaning of choreography is still linked to the critical analysis of the institutional mechanisms of theater, exemplified in the critique of theatrical representation with respect to spectatorship. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the critique of theatrical representation enables the choreographies examined here to invent new theatrical apparatuses, but it doesn’t go as far as to reject or revolutionize the material conditions of theater production in the manner of an institutional critique of theater. In these works, the preference of “choreography” over “contemporary dance” unravels a nominal divergence from contemporary dance in so far as contemporary dance historically leads back to modern dance, or more specifically to its essentialist relation to the medium of dance as an ongoing movement of the body, intentionally regulated by rhythmic, gestural, or other kinds of patterns. We could refer here to the canonical, albeit laconic, definition of dance as “any patterned, rhythmic movement in space and time” (Copeland and Cohen 1983: 1).

The relationship between the choreographic practices examined here and the work of the 1960s Judson Dance Theater by choreographers Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, and Steve Paxton, to name a few whose influence can, as we will see, be traced in Le Roy’s, Ingvartsen’s, and Burrows’ work, invites comparison with the relationship between the historical avant-garde and the Neo-Avantgarde in art history and criticism—only to reveal irreducible differences. Explicit comparison arises in the cases of 50/50—Ingvartsen’s reference to Rainer’s No Manifesto—and WDSQ, in which Burrows and Ritsema consider the 1970s legacy of contact improvisation. Unlike the art movements of the 1950s and ’60s, which are argued to have either inverted or redeemed and extended the project of the prewar avant-garde in a kind of “deferred action” (Bürger 1984; Foster 1996) that expanded from Europe to North America, these works of European dance have a more loose and complicated rapport with the Judson period (1962–4) with which they are compared, whereby the Judson period is synonymous
with American Post-Modern dance and historically equivalent to the Neo-Avantgarde in art. The analogy between these two pairs—prewar historical avant-garde and postwar Neo-Avantgarde, on the one hand, and the Judson Neo-Avantgarde in the 1960s and certain tendencies in contemporary European dance—doesn’t hold, simply because the history of dance in the twentieth century can’t be congruently translated by the art historical narrative. The break with romantic—conceived, in actuality, as classical—ballet in the German expressionist dance (Ausdruckstanz) and American “modern dance” of the beginning of the twentieth century doesn’t share the prewar historical avant-garde’s project. There are too few works of dance, in collaborations with artists from that period, that come close to the aesthetics of Dadaism, Futurism, Constructivism etc. to maintain any comparison (most notably, Parade from 1917 by Erik Satie, Jean Cocteau, and Pablo Picasso; Relâche from 1924 by Francis Picabia, Erik Satie, and Man Ray; and Oscar Schlemmer’s Triadic Ballet as well as similar Bauhaus dance works from 1922). However, if we measure the Judson Dance Theater against the Neo-Avantgarde art scene in New York, we will find some resonances in the procedures of happenings, Neo-Dada readymades and collages in choreography—for instance, in the critique of the trained and specialized dancing body through pedestrian movement—thus evidencing Judson’s primarily ideological proximity with the Neo-Avantgarde in visual and performance art.

The influence of the Judson Dance Theater in European dance is belated, since most of the work of the Judson choreographers reached Europe in the 1980s, when it was already recuperated into American mainstream modern dance (see the forum debate “What Has Become of Postmodern Dance?” by Daly et al. 1992). Sporadic initiatives to reconstruct Neo-Avantgarde works from the 1960s can be noted in European dance in the 1990s, such as Continuous Project Altered Daily by Yvonne Rainer (and other Judson choreographers later known as the Grand Union collective), which was reconstructed in 1996 by the French group Quatuor Albrecht Knust, a reconstruction which Le Roy took part in (see interview with Christophe Wavelet in Cvejić 2005, 68–70). The European choreographic practices of the last two decades in focus here acknowledge some heritage of the Neo-Avantgarde of the 1960s, but also distance themselves politically by probing the conventions of theater within the institution itself (Spångberg 2001, and Le Roy, Nachbar, and Spångberg 2001). Their political “ambition” lies in critically and experimentally examining the ideological effects exerted by the socioeconomic consensus of contemporary capitalism on the
theatrical apparatus of representation, as I will show in the cases of $U$ and $h\-\hat{e}$. The historicity of the critique and experiment in these choreographies could be interpreted through the relation Deleuze draws between history and experimentation when, in an interview with Toni Negri, he states that “without history, experimentation would remain undetermined, unconditioned.” Yet history, Deleuze adds, cannot but be seen as a “set of negative conditions which enable experimentation” as production of something new (Deleuze 1990, n.p., my translation). We are to understand “negative conditions” here as an explicit critical departure from the given institutional framework and from the discourses in contemporary dance and theater that the experiments of these choreographers had to take.

In conclusion, these seven works are considered choreographies because their link to dance is nominal and historical: they don’t uphold the image of the body engaged in dancing, but in the most radical instances dispose of movement or of human bodies altogether. The betrayal of “purity” in dance, conceived as a purified notion of mobility described above, also entails appropriating elements from other performing arts genres and media: 50/50 deploys elements of the rock concert, opera, pantomime, and social dancing; in $h\-\hat{e}$, film, television, installation, the contemporary music concert, and theater dance are entangled. As choreographies, these works aren’t enclosed within the composition of the body and/or movement exclusively, but instead expand to include whatever expression arises in their making. Thus, they are nominally aligned with the discipline “dance” through historical residues of movement and the human body, but factually they are indeterminate and heterogeneous: the bodies and/or movement can be composed with expressions from any other art or non-art. Here, choreography’s indeterminacy entails that its specification remain contingent on the procedure that each work constructs in response to the problem that it poses.

**Choreography and performance**

It is common yet unreflected for these choreographers as well as their critics and theoreticians to consider the works discussed here as “performances,” or even “choreographic performances,” thus exhibiting a certain avoidance of the term “dance.” “Performance” indicates that the works belong to the performing rather than the plastic arts, but unlike “performance art” (or “live art” in the British context, Heathfield 2004), which historically distinguished performance as single, un reproducible,
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autographic events opposed to permanent material objects or allo-
graphic, interpretable scores in music and dance, they are conceived
to be performed repeatedly in theaters. Like “choreography,” “perfor-
mance” here isn’t just a technical term, reduced to the aspect of execut-
ing a choreography in a live spatio-temporal event; rather, it allows for
the indeterminacy and heterogeneous expressions of the medium in a
way similar to performance art. This is confirmed through the affin-
ity of dance scholarship and artistic practice for performance theory,
relating the concept of performance with dance. Ploebst refers to the
works of Le Roy, Ingvartsen, Charmatz, and of Burrows and Ritsema
as “choreographic performances” (Ploebst 2009: 164). In a similar
fashion, the titles of two books by Lepecki dedicated to contemporary
dance—On the Presence of the Body: Essays on Dance and Performance
Theory (2004) and Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of
Movement (2006)—not only juxtapose “dance” and “performance”
within the same object of study, but also, as the second book shows,
subsume “dance” under “performance” as a wider term. Therefore, we
would like to ask: what interests has performance theory pursued in
the field of dance over the past decade? Our answer will begin with an
elaboration on a prominent performance thesis shared by both dance
and performance theory scholars regarding the presence of the body.
The theme that has most markedly shaped performance theory since
the 1990s is Peggy Phelan’s ontological claim of the disappearance of
performance, according to which performance is considered an event of
evanescent presence, condemned to loss and repetitions of memory (Phelan
1993: 148–52). Although Phelan’s claim is focused on works of perfor-
mance art, arguing for their resistance to reproduction and hence to
the reification of identity politics in the 1990s, her disappearance thesis
has had a significant impact on a segment of dance scholarship aligned
with Lacanian and Derridian discourses on presence, writing, subjec-
tivity, the gaze, and history (Kruschkova ed. 2005; Siegmund 2006;
The ephemerality of movement in dance, also described as the body’s
self-erasure in the “fading forms” of movement, features as a paradigm
of the fundamental condition of performance. Phelan’s recourse to eva-
nescence in dance may figure as a metaphor in her performance theory,
extending to her meditations on writing history in general:

History writing and choreography reflect and reproduce bodies
whose names we long to learn to read and write. Our wager is if we
can recall and revive these fading forms, our own may be recalled by
others who will need us to protect themselves from fading. This repetitious dance assures our continual presence: We are the characters who are always there disappearing. (Phelan 2004: 209)

Even if it was only metaphoric, Phelan’s thesis on the ontology of disappearance had a strong impact, as it resuscitated the metaphysics of presence in dance theory, which since the late eighteenth century has contributed to the formation of the art of dance. In one of the foundational texts for dance in modernity, Jean-Georges Noverre’s treatise on dance and theater published as Lettres sur la danse et sur les ballets in 1760 (Noverre 2004), dancing is defended against choreography by virtue of its resistance to vision and inscription. Dance has ever since been conceived as the fleeting trace of an always irretrievable, never fully translatable motion, always in excess of choreography (as its writing). Disappearance, loss, lack, and absence have been the notions through which dance scholars in the past decade have examined movement with bodily presence, regarding it as that which disappears and marks the passing of time, or as Lepecki puts it, “choreography has the capacity to invoke absent presences” (Lepecki 2006: 28). However, absence and invisibility’s haunting of presence and obstruction of scopic control have the effect of reinforcing movement as the essence of dance, albeit in an unstable sense of the ephemeral, often accompanied by the ineffable. The notions of the ephemeral and ineffable are easily mistaken for the romantic inexpressible that arises from the inadequacy of writing and inaccuracy of vision in dance, making it ontologically inferior to the dance event, or performance.

Associating movement with the body’s presence/absence casts choreography in a binary opposition to dance, whose being putatively consists of performance that eludes or exceeds choreography in lack and abundance at the same time. The account of movement’s ephemeral nature consolidates the notion of choreography as the writing that follows and documents the vanishing trace of dancing, even if the writing, as poststructuralism established, always already precedes it. It relegates choreography to a technology of composing movement, which ostensibly excludes the temporal subsistence and transformation of choreographic ideas during and beyond the performance event. My point is that the differentiation between choreography in its making and choreography in its performance shouldn’t ontologically favor performance as the “mode of being” of dance just because performance supposedly erases choreography in terms of excess/lack.

The relationship between choreography and dance is sometimes also cast as a binary opposition between the abstract and the concrete. In
a recent Deleuzian study of the relation between the abstract thought of the digital medium and the choreography without human body, Stamatia Portanova advocates

choreography as a possibility to abstractly compose, or to give form to, patterns of movement in thought. As such, choreographic thought will also be distinguished from performance, or the physical execution of dance by one or more bodies. A body performs a movement, and a mind thinks or choreographs a dance. (Portanova 2013: 15)

Arguing that dance favors a phenomenological perspective based on an embodied kinesthetic experience whereas choreography is the “event of the mind” which can metamorphose “a simple pavement walk into dance” (Portanova 2013: 14) reiterates the mind–body division between performance and choreography as a division between the body and thought. This book will try to show how choreographic thought pervades through all modes of performance, be it making, performing, or attending performance. Choreography doesn’t merely precede a performance as the creative process that then culminates in an event, nor can it be reduced to a technical, craft-oriented definition: the spatial composition of movement visually retraced in post hoc notation. The making continues to operate in the performing in the sense that its problems persist and give rise to different solutions in the performing of, attending to, and also thinking beyond the spatio-temporal event of the performance. Likewise, the performance virtually exists in the making; the thought of the body is present in the conception of choreographic ideas as in every rehearsal. Therefore this book puts forward choreography and performance as two different but closely related modes of the same endeavor, which, when called “choreography,” is specified as the process of making and, when called “performance,” is determined as the object of the making.

Choreographic performance after Deleuze: expressive concepts

This book researches how the performance of choreography gives rise to its own concepts that are specific to the processes of making, performing, and attending choreographic performance. The claim that choreographic performance is capable of its own distinctive kind of conceptual practice is partly developed after Gilles Deleuze's theory of
cinema. In *Cinema I: The Movement-Image* (1983/1986) and *Cinema II: The Time-Image* (1986/1989), the philosopher explores images in cinema and derives cinematographic concepts from them, positing that these images are “given” in cinema but require philosophical theory to be properly constructed as concepts (*C2*: 280). In devising movement-images of classic cinema and time-images of modern cinema, Deleuze conceives of image under a dual aspect: as “pre-verbal intelligible content” (*C1*: ix) in which filmmakers think and compose cinema, and as a metaphysical concept grounded in Henri Bergson’s theory of image in *Matter and Memory* (1896/1991).

Although he adopts a historical, linear perspective to show the correspondence between the shift from classic to modern cinema and the progression of time-images from movement-images—an evolution in which, according to him, cinema historically mutates to reach its essence, revealing its mission to be the conception of time—his two-volume study isn’t a history of cinema, nor does it seek, despite its abundant analyses, to interpret films for the sake of their specific poetical and technical terms. Deleuze’s theory is primarily philosophical, having found in cinema a practice and a medium that expresses and technically specifies a number of ontological theses about the relationship of image, movement, memory, perception, and duration descending from Bergson’s philosophy. However, as we will explicate in the next chapter, Deleuze’s cinematographic concepts also provide evidence of and methodological insight into a kind of thought which is both generative of an art practice and of philosophical concepts. Therefore, our proposition of “expressive concepts” draws on several points from Deleuze’s methodology. First, it adopts the view that these concepts are peculiar to, or acquire a specific meaning in, particular performances and that their relation to these performances is constitutive rather than interpretative, being of and not about the performances. Although they arise in the very practices of making, performing, and attending performance, they aren’t fully “given” in them, nor do they originate from or belong to the choreographers’ poetics. What is given in making, performing, and attending is related to the problem that the choreographer, who is, in most cases, also the dancer in her work, poses.

To give an insight into the method developed here, I will briefly illustrate the relationship between formulating problems and the concepts which account for that formulation in one of the seven performances, *SU*. The performance ensues from an experiment conducted in a previous work, *Narcisse Flip* (1997), in which Le Roy explored transformations of the image of the human body by fragmenting and disfiguring
his own body by way of movement. When Narcisse Flip was interpreted as an image of a “schizophrenic body,” the choreographer posed the question: “How to escape metaphor, if metaphor is the product of recognition, is recognition the dominant, if not the only, mode of attention?” (Cvejić 2008a: n.p.). He then reformulated the question into a problem dealing with perception instead of its object: “How will I not decide what is to be seen?” (ibid.). Solving the problem consisted, in Le Roy’s words, in constructing situations where movement could be perceived and described in opposite senses, never characterizing an identifiable body. The “zones of undecidability,” as Le Roy refers to them, give ground for the idea of affirming non-identity and desubjectivizing the performer in new conjunctions between the body and movement. Having conceived this idea in relation to the choreographer’s problem, I seek to show how the idea is differentiated within two concepts in the performance: “part-bodies” in the process of becoming many unrecognizable non-human “creatures,” and “caesuras,” or tableaus of stillness, in which the process of becoming is temporally suspended.

The concepts are hence products of theory’s undertaking: in my study of each performance, I shall begin by discerning the problem that initiated the making of the performance, or that defines the performing of the work, and thereafter expand the idea underlying the problem. This leads me to the creation of concepts that aren’t the thought of the choreographer or dancer who interprets the work, in spite of their being related to it, but rather the thought of the performance. In other words, the claim that a choreographic performance gives rise to its proper concepts entails that it produces thought which exists in choreographic and philosophical articulation at one and the same time. Hence the method of creating these concepts involves showing analytically how they are made, performed, and attended, that is, how they are expressed. Stating that the concepts are “expressive” assumes a certain ontological stance from which they are created—the ontological principle of expression that Deleuze adapts from Spinoza. Let us briefly clarify what the focus of the first chapter will be: expression embraces both the way things, that is, bodies and movements, are actualized in choreographic performance and the way they are perceived and known in thought. In constructing “expressive” concepts, I will draw from Deleuze’s theory of ideas and its complicated relationship to the problem (DR). My approach is largely rooted in Deleuze’s (and Spinoza’s) philosophy, first and foremost regarding their understanding of expression and difference as ontological principles, and secondarily, regarding several ideas and concepts found therein that relate to expression, such as the agency of
assembling (*agencement*), becoming, affect, and sensation, all of which will be evoked in the chapters that follow. Even if one of the aims here is to propose a distinctive kind of concept, thereby eventually informing philosophical engagement by means of art practices other than dance, my approach isn’t strictly philosophical. As they account for choreographic problems, expressive concepts are destined for the practice of choreography: they philosophically articulate and therefore reinforce creation that is peculiar to the choreographies in question. In partial difference to Deleuze, who instrumentalizes cinema to elaborate image, movement, and time as philosophical concepts, I attempt to go from choreography to philosophy, mutually adapting the discursive apparatuses of both practices of thought, as my aim is to show how singular inventions of the body and movement in the seven choreographies contribute to a philosophical thinking of body and movement. While the concepts themselves don’t extend beyond these works, they play a part in illuminating a recent shift in the history of Western theater dance that calls for a reconsideration of the definition of performance. Two more claims follow from this, which can be concisely outlined thus: the disruption of the body-movement bind in dance, and the expression of performance in three modes.

**Rupture of the body-movement bind**

Belonging to creations of choreography, the expressive concepts here are associated with choreographic ideas, which aren’t ideas in general, but must be seen, as Deleuze proffers regarding cinema (HIC), as differential relations of dance and its technique, dance being a field that must be considered in its historical constitution. Ideas of choreography are inventions of the body and/or movement in performance as well as of time that is coextensive with the body and movement in performance. The idea which constituted modern dance in the first decades of the twentieth century is the synthesis between the body and movement under two operations: subjectivation of the dancer through (emotive) self-expression, and objectivation of movement through the physical expression of the dancing body. The seven works I shall analyze dissociate choreography from modern dance by disrupting the onto-historically foundational bind between the body and movement, which is then accounted for by other arrangements between the body and movement. The claim requires that we briefly look into what constitutes the synthesis of the body and movement in modern dance.
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The idea of mobility with which the art of dance developed over a period of three centuries in Western Europe, before modern dance, wasn’t necessarily bound up with the body of the dancer as its subject. Numerous dance manuals from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries show that choreography was to be conceived in writing first, without the presence of a dancing body, before it was to be danced, if at all (Arbeau 2012; Feuillet 2007). Dancing bodies assumed the role their social rank prescribed (e.g. the royal body of the Sun King); or later, when classical ballet became a professional art at the end of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century, dancers were trained to embody a figure that represented a character in a story. The presence of the body was symbolic and secondary to the choreography, and no site was envisaged for the spontaneous expression of the individual dancer (see Franko 2000: 36). Movement in ballet during those three centuries was regulated by mimesis as a rhetorical frame of iconic and symbolic representation, which in the beginning of the twentieth century was rejected by the pioneers of modern dance, Mary Wigman and Martha Graham, who sought to free movement from what they regarded as mimetic representation in ballet. Thus, modern dance was constituted according to the idea that the specific essence of dance is the movement of the body bound up with bodily consciousness, physical and emotional experience.

The dance critic and historian John Martin, the most—but not only—instrumental person in designating modern dance in the contexts of the US and Europe, justified modern dance’s opposition to the classical form of dance, that is, ballet, by means of a new beginning in the new ontological grounding of dance. “This beginning was the discovery of the actual substance of the dance, which it found to be movement” (Martin 1989: 6). Martin’s postulation—that only when it seeks its true being in movement alone does dance acquire the status of an independent art—is comparable to Clement Greenberg’s later modernist ontology of art, conceived as the purification of the medium (Greenberg 1961). While Martin’s ontologization of a purified notion of mobility in modern dance could be regarded in the vein of American theorization of modernism linked to abstraction, it also accommodates notions of “absolute dance” based on bodily expression of subjective, emotive experience in Europe, which the following statement by Mary Wigman best summarizes: “The absolute dance is independent of any literary-interpretative content; it does not represent, it is; and its effect on the spectator who is invited to experience the dancer’s experience is on a mental-motoric level, exciting and moving” (Wigman in Cohen...
1992: 149–53). Grounding modern dance in a pure, “absolute” expression of human experience in bodily movement enabled the emergence, from the twentieth century onwards, of choreographers as authors. Self-expression, as argued by Andrew Hewitt (Hewitt 2005), marks the aesthetic ideology of modern dance, which proclaims emancipation through the body’s experience of its own truth as its nature. The purity of movement is staked out through its origin or source: the body of the dancer. Therefore, we suggest that self-expression is the ideological operation that secures the necessity of the movement in the body’s urge to move and express its inner (emotional) experience, in its nature that “cannot lie,” as in Graham’s famous dictum. Movement becomes ontologically bound to the body, ontologized as a minimal resting place of “noncompromisable subjectivity” (Hewitt 2005: 18).

Self-expression accounts for the subjectivation process in early modern dance, linking the body and movement by subjective experience. However, another ideological operation of modern dance arose in departure from self-expression, one that could be conversely qualified as objectivation of dance. I propose the term “objectivation” based on Susan Leigh Foster’s account of the so-called objectivized dance of Merce Cunningham, and of choreographers from the Judson Dance Theater who underwent Cunningham’s influence (Foster 1986: 46–57). Objectivation, as I conceive it, presupposes another relationship between movement, the body, and the subject in the expressive act: dancing is foregrounded, or even in the most rigorous claims, reduced to a physical articulation of the movement, whose meaning lies, tautologically, in itself. Movement is not the bodily expression of the subject of dance; movement is created as an object in itself that engages bones, muscles, ligaments, nerves, and other body parts of the dancer in strictly physical activity. Chance, indeterminacy, and other constructivist procedures of Cunningham (and Yvonne Rainer, Trisha Brown, and Lucinda Childs in their “analytic,” structuralist or minimalist dances) are meant to prevent or eliminate all effects of self-expression in the composing as well as dancing of movement. They guarantee the “self” of the movement, its self-referentiality, the articulation of which becomes the task of the dancer. Hence objectivation of the movement by self-referentiality renounces the expression of the self in the movement—the “outwarding” of an inner experience—but it still relies on the body–movement bind. The function of the body shifts from being an autonomous subject to being an instrument of movement, a “doer” of the action or task of movement. Or as Rainer recommends, “ideally one is not even oneself, one is a neutral doer” (Rainer 1974: 65). Nonetheless, like self-expression,
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the objectivation of movement reasserts movement as the “actual sub-
stance” of dance, as Martin professed it, despite its production of move-
ment through the body’s physicality alone. Admittedly, as is the case
with every attempt to formulate an ideology, these two operations are
necessarily schematic reductions that serve to highlight two ideal poles
between which the synthesis of the body and movement is naturalized.

The subjectivation of the body through movement and the objecti-
vation of movement through the body constitute the organic regime
dance, comparable to Deleuze’s identification of the sensorimotor
scheme in classic cinema as the “organic representation” of action-
images (C1: 142). They connect the body and movement in one organic
whole, which in the former case is comprehended by inner (emotional)
experience, and in the latter, by physical activity (task, action). These
seven choreographies break the organic regime by dispensing either
with the body as the source of authentic movement or with the object
of movement to which the body is physically tied. The shift described
here has been discussed as the exhaustion of dance’s relation to move-
ment. Lepecki (2006) has convincingly argued that “recent choreo-
graphic strategies” in European dance betray the modernist conception
dance as “an uninterrupted flow of movement” by inserting long
lapses of stillness or slowing movement down, thus undermining the
“kinetic spectacle of the body” (Lepecki 2006: 1–18). Among the works
of the European choreographers Juan Dominguez, Vera Mantero, La
Ribot, and Bel—all contemporaries of Le Roy, some of whom have also
collaborated with him on a few choreographies (Dominguez, Bel)—Le
Roy’s SU is Lepecki’s case in point. He writes:

In his radical use of choreographic solipsism Le Roy exhausts the
being-toward-movement. For what matters in Self Unfinished is never
the spectacle of kineticism, but the pack of affects and precepts
unleashed by the many stillnesses, repetitions, reiterations, humorous
images, and unnamable forms that Le Roy presents us with.
(Lepecki 2006: 43, emphasis added)

This book lays a slightly different claim: it is not the “being-
toward-movement” or dance’s ontohistorical relation to movement
that is, as Lepecki argues, being exhausted in SU and in the other six
works, since movement and bodies abound in the choreographies stud-
ied here. It is the relation of movement to the body as its subject, or of
movement to the object of dance, that is broken in these works. Once
movement and the body are no longer entangled in an organic regime
defined either by unity in the act of expression or in the form of the object, their relationship does not exist by nature, nor can it be claimed as natural. It remains disrupted and hence constructed or reinvented by various procedures of conjunction between the body and movement rather than through the body-movement synthesis.

As the postulation of a rupture of the body-movement bind resembles Deleuze’s division between classic and modern cinema, based on the break of the sensorimotor scheme constituting the movement-image in cinema before World War II, the question arises as to what socially and politically precipitates the body-movement break in the 1990s and whether this break should be accounted for as modernist in the familiar sense of the word. No historical event since the 1990s has transported a shock to perception that could revolutionize the expression of choreography in a way that could be compared to what Deleuze argued as the impact of World War II on cinema, constituting its time-images:

Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is that, in Europe, the post-war period has greatly increased the situations which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces which we no longer know how to describe. (C2: xi)

Briefly summarized, postwar modern cinema yields time-images, in which time is given directly rather than being derived from the movement of played action. Among Deleuze’s numerous accounts of the post-WWII shock that precipitates the shift from movement-images to time-images, two are telling. The first is a narrative rationale, explaining the passage from the figure of the actor to the figure of the seer in Rossellini’s Europe S1, where a bourgeois woman, after a devastating shock, stops acting and learns to see slums and factories around her (C2: 2). The second is an ideological rationale, where Deleuze describes the break caused by a sensorimotor scheme that leads to optical and sound images as man’s delinking from the world:

The link between the man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible which can only be restored within a faith. Belief is no longer addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link. (C2: 171–2)
The recent shift from a so-called natural and organic regime, which was introduced in the 1920s and prevailed as the mainstream of modern dance throughout the twentieth century, to the constructed conjunctions of the body and movement of the last two decades cannot be attributed to the effect of any major historical event, not even the aftermath of the end of the Cold War in 1989. Instead, this shift could be historically accounted for by the logic of cumulative changes or effects in the history of dance. Although first impulses to nonhuman movement are already envisioned in historical avant-gardes (the few works in which these ideas pierce through include Oscar Schlemmer’s *Triadic Ballet* (1927) and Edward Gordon Craig’s thesis on *Übermarionette* (1908)), they have been explicitly foregrounded in dance in Europe only over the past two decades. From the perspective of dance history, this shift could be considered in relation to the changing technology of choreographic production. If the use of the video image in creating movement helped assimilate improvisation into the creation process in the 1980s and helped disseminate the new studio practices of bodywork, then editing the electronic image on personal computers has altered movement composition and staging since 2000, providing choreographers with a tool to compose movement that is delinked from the body. This, however, doesn’t mean that the seven works discussed here use digital technology as part of their theatrical apparatus. Even if they don’t engage with new media tools, their compositional habitus has necessarily undergone the effect of new technological conditions. With regard to the history of modern dance, which is born of a separation from ballet in search of an organic, natural expression of the body, or an immediate physical expression of movement, desubjectivation and disobjectivation in these works cannot be understood as modernist types of disruption, nor as part of the “deferred action” of the Neo-Avantgarde from the 1950s–’60s, as elaborated earlier. Perhaps they might come closest to postidentitarian and posthumanist perspectives on the body and movement, guiding dance out of modernity, or in other words, out of the organic bond between the body and movement.

**Performance beyond disappearance: making, performing, and attending**

The term “performance” in “performing arts” (theater, music, and dance) or in “performance art” or “live art” commonly signifies a live event with spatio-temporal coordinates, implying a process of carrying out an action. Although the distinction between production process,
performing technique, and reception may be acknowledged outside of the event, a performance of choreography is approached from a unitary perspective, as being one with the live event and not diverging into three versions of the same work synthesized from the distinct viewpoints of maker, performer, and spectator. The differences in views, processes, and experiences between maker, performer, and spectator are relegated to matters of difference in experience, be they personal or a reflection of the position and competence of each of these roles, but they remain exterior or subordinated to the kind of performance referred to as the live event. In addition, the apparatus of theatrical representation as well as the theater institution deploy mechanisms to unify or subsume the different activities and faculties of making, performing, and being a spectator of performance under the act of communication. The process of making is thus usually regarded with respect to its terminus, or objective—the live event—and reception is framed by the various functions of the theatrical apparatus (staging, the contract of address-response, etc.) that conditions the live event. In sum, performance entails that making and performing, performing and attending performance be bound up with one another or synthesized in the event. Even a modernist definition of theater performance confirms this view, as in the famous phrase from Peter Brook: “I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A man walks across this empty space whilst someone else is watching him, and this is all that is needed for an act of theater to be engaged” (Brook 2008: 9). Or, in a more recent statement from Tim Etchells that echoes Brook’s assertion, “theatre is a frame (game) constructed so that people can look at other people” (Etchells 2004). The statements agree in implying that the co-presence of a human actor performing and a human spectator attending this act of performance is both the necessary and sufficient condition for theater.

In three of the seven performances examined here, performing and attending are disentangled. H-é by Charmatz is a performance for one spectator, without performers performing live before the spectator, hence liveness based on the co-presence of the performers and spectator(s) is suspended, as is the notion of audience as a community of witnesses. U, bearing no title, no signature of the author, and no program notes, takes place for the most part in darkness; the stage is obscured and no clear view of action or figures is given to the audience. Nvsbl by Salamon stages movement of four figures that is made invisible, or remains hardly visible for the audience for 80 minutes. Furthermore, the making-of-performance that unfolds in performing
WDSQ by Burrows and Ritsema as well as in Nvsbl is inaccessible to the spectators, and is often described as perplexing to the audience (Cvejić 2008b and 2008c: n.p.).

These brief descriptions, which will be elaborated extensively in the following chapters, point to a radicalization of differences between attending, performing, and making a performance. The differences encompass different activities and processes that aren’t only separated in time (or place, for that matter), but that also constitute every performance. In the case of these seven performances, making, performing, and attending are disjointed, that is, differentiated to the extent that they demand to be considered as distinct and parallel modes of performance. Therefore, I will suggest (and argue in the following chapter) that they be regarded as three modes of performance in the Spinozan sense of enabling various modifications of the same thing under different faculties, or three differential structures that condition the genesis of performance in three divergent temporalities and processes. The implication of this claim is that the concepts are specific to the modes in which they are expressed and that they therefore cannot be transferred from one mode to the other. For example, the process of performing in Nvsbl is considered through the concept of the “becoming-molecular” of the internal space of the body in which performers localize and feign minute, intrabodily sensations in order to initiate hardly visible movement. The conjunction of “becoming” as a process of nonidentitarian transformation and “molecular” as a figure of myriad minute differences conceptually qualifies a set of compositional procedures for constructing invisible movements. Becoming-molecular is thus a concept of performing which cannot account for how the spectators attend this performance. Another example can be found in the concept of “resonance,” which expounds how the expression of the performance is prolonged and transformed within the spectators’ activity. Resonance results from implicating the spectators in the time after the event, so it arises from the situation to which making and performing have no access. What makes these concepts expressive is that they don’t explain or interpret a performance as such, or judge what it represents; they account for that which is generated (i.e., expressed) either in the making, in the performing, or in the attending of performance.

In denomination of the three modes, “attending” appears as a peculiar term that accounts for the activity of the spectator. To summarize what will be unpacked later, performance is attended when it is approached from the aspect of time conceived as Bergsonian duration: a “succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another”
(Bergson 2002: 61), an indivisible continuous multiplicity. As opposed to disappearance, which was discussed above, the seven choreographies counter the perception of movement’s ephemerality or bodily presence/absence by sustaining motion and stillness, by persisting in the transformation of movement and the bodies into the future, by exploring sensations and affects in processes of becoming, by implicating the spectators in processes beyond the actual performance, by manipulating performers’ memory of past movements in the present. These strategies all point to the importance of duration, or time in which change is created and perceived, and becoming, through which the bodies and movements transform. Concomitant with performance’s differentiation of making, performing, and attending is the third argument, which asserts that performance is better approached as a transformation process rather than as a fleeting act—hence my third claim, which locates the genesis of performance in process and duration, in the nexus of different time dimensions that making, performing, and attending possess, rather than in an act whose meaning transcends or lies outside of duration.

Structure and method

This book is structured in six chapters followed by a conclusion. The first chapter lays out the methodological framework of the study by defining a distinctive kind of concept by which the seven works are best accounted for. Drawing on Spinoza’s ontology of expression and Deleuze’s theory of ideas in *Difference and Repetition* as well as on his theory of cinema, the opening chapter explores the relation between problems and concepts and posits “problem” as a logic of creation in the seven performances. Each performance is briefly presented through the problem that it poses. These problems concern making, performing, and attending performance and, as the next chapters will elaborate, will give rise to a variety of expressive concepts. Each of the following five chapters therefore focuses on one or more concepts and one or more performances. The method of creating these concepts from the analysis of performances is devised from the main claim of expression and could be referred to as a theorized description. I demonstrate how the way a certain performance is made, performed, or attended generates a certain concept, one that involves the differentiation of the body, movement and/or time, and their relations, either for making, performing, or attending. Evoking something that in the theory of literature and poetics has been referred to as *ekphrasis*—the genre that offers a verbal rhetorical description of a work of art (Mitchell 1997: n.p.), where “vividness”
and “clarity” are supposed to guarantee the truth of a description (Kelleher 2013: n.p.)—the theorized description enacts a performance, but from the multiple perspectives of how it is made, performed, or attended. Furthermore, it simultaneously develops that which is made, performed, or attended into a concept singular to that performance. No one concept is expressed in more than one performance, as it is a specific creation of the choreography in question. However, a single performance, like SU, Nvsbl, or U, could be discussed in two or three chapters, but in such cases the performance is recreated in that it engenders another concept.5

The chapters and the expressive concepts they elaborate implicitly follow the order of the second and the third claim as well as the order of making, performing, and attending. Hence the second chapter, “Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement,” examines how movement no longer presents the object of choreography, produced by the body as its instrument, but is caught in a composition with the body, in which both the body and movement transform as separate terms. SU, IITA, and Nvsbl are focused on within an analysis that gives rise to the following concepts: “part-bodies,” “part-bodies and part machines,” and “movement-sensation.” The third chapter, “Theatrical Apparatuses of Disjunction,” tackles the problem of theatricality in making performance. Here, the elaborations of U and h-é engender concepts of the transformation of the theatrical apparatus, whereby the disjunction between the body and movement transfers to the relationship between stage and audience.

The fourth and fifth chapters involve concepts of performing and examine the rupture of the body-movement bind with respect to the subject’s self-expression. Chapter 4, “Repetitions and Subtractions: Against Improvisation,” opposes differential repetition to improvisation’s claim on the production of the new in self-expression. WDSQ produces “stutterances,” the concept which accounts for how dancing in a state of questioning ungrounds the body and movement in improvisation. Chapter 5, “A Critical Departure from Emotionalism: Sensations and Affects in the Mode of Performing,” handles yet another prominent theme related to performing and self-expression in dance: it seeks to distinguish affect from emotion and suggests kinesthetic transference as opposed to kinesthetic empathy as they arise in 50/50. Apart from arguing for a construction of affects which, contrary to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim in What is Philosophy? (1991/1994), reconfigures affects into concepts, this chapter also examines the composition of face and Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of faciality/defacialization in
50/50 in the genre of solo, which is traditionally regarded as a vehicle of self-expression.

The final chapter, “During and After Performance: Processes, Caesuras, and Resonances,” shifts attention from performing to attending. It distinguishes three different processes of becoming in the ways IITA, SU, and Nsbl are performed and attended. The argument for temporalizing performance by conceiving it as a process—which is held by my claim that performance is better approached as process with duration rather than as a momentous act—is supported by procedures that extend the performances h-ê, U, and WDSQ beyond the event. “Cut-endings” and “resonances” in these three works arise as concepts which affirm an attending that is detached from the performance—prolonging its effect after the event—for they account for the expression that implicates the audience alone.

The preceding overview shows that a few more of Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattarri’s concepts, outside of the main claim of expressive concepts based on the principle of expression in Deleuze and Spinoza, will be invoked along the way: becoming, assembling (agencement), affects, faciality (visagéité), stuttering, and caesura. Mindful of the danger of exemplifying philosophical concepts through performance and jargonized Deleuzian interpretations of art, I resort to these notions only when they are an indispensible consequence of the claims of the body-movement disjunction and of the temporalization of performance. Their function in the formation of expressive concepts should be regarded as prosthetic: they assist in scaffolding that thought which is peculiar to each performance. On that account, we might conclude that this book stands in between three distinct fields, going from performance and dance studies toward philosophy while always keeping the concerns, as well as the terms, of choreographic and performance practices central. In other words, while it addresses dance and performance theorists who seek out philosophical theorizations of the problems of dance and performance, it also attempts to provide practitioners—choreographers, dramaturges, performers—with a philosophical explanation of the thinking processes involved in the creation, performance, and reception of choreography.
1
Problems and Expressive Concepts

This inquiry begins with one characteristic that sets a group of seven works apart within the field of contemporary dance: each work analyzed here poses or formulates a “problem,” and the thorough interpretation of each work requires a distinctive kind of conceptual practice to which that problem gives rise. My claim is based on the study of three varieties of sources: firstly, I draw on the documentation of all seven works’ creation process, on the scores, notes, and essays written by the choreographers during their making of these works. The second source is a series of public interviews with the choreographers that I conducted during a research residency project (*Six Months One Location*) at the Centre Chorégraphique National de Montpellier Languedoc-Roussillon from July to December 2008, as well as additional recorded conversations and written interviews with the makers about all seven works. The public interviews with Xavier Le Roy, Eszter Salamon, and Mette Ingvartsen involved examining *Self Unfinished* (*SU*), *Untitled* (*U*), *Nvsbl*, *50/50*, and *It’s In The Air* (*IITA*) on the basis of published documents, unpublished notes, and frame-by-frame analysis of video recordings of the works while these were projected before an audience. The third kind of insight is provided by my having been witness to the making of *Weak Dance Strong Questions* (*WDSQ*), *50/50*, and *IITA*, which I accompanied either as observer (*WDSQ*) or in the role of dramaturgical assistant (*50/50* and *IITA*). We will set out by briefly outlining the arguments of the main claim which will unfold in this chapter.

The creation of all seven performances begins by critically revealing the conditions which structure the field of dance as problematic: the synthesis of the body and movement and the entanglement of performing with attending performance in theater. At the outset of the creation process, the choreographers explicitly state their intention...
to examine the regime of representation in contemporary (theater) dance through the following aspects: the genesis and perception of bodily movement, the identification of the human body, and the represented subject matter or (thematic/conceptual) “aboutness” established through the reception of the audience. Thanks to various procedures of their own development, designed to disjoin the body and movement, disrupt co-presence and communication in theater or render perception difficult, these works explore the limits of sensibility by inhibiting recognition. The procedures arise from experimentally setting up the constraints in which a new field of experience is conceived, one that can’t be subsumed under knowledge, but should instead be regarded as a problematic encounter. With the notion of “encounter,” we draw on Deleuze’s critique of representation in Difference and Repetition as the most appropriate framework to interpret the critical departure of these works. According to Deleuze, the encounter with a sensation that is a limit-object of sensibility engenders a sort of violence on recognition, a “discordant play” of perception, memory, imagination, understanding, judgment (DR: 139–40). The encounter with that which can only be sensed and not recognized from the point of view of common sense—understood as the harmony of all the faculties of the thinking subject that agree upon the form of the same object (DR: 133)—gives rise to a problem and an “act of thinking in thought itself,” or in Deleuze’s own words:

Do not count upon thought to ensure the relative necessity of what it thinks. Rather, count upon the contingency of an encounter with that which forces thought to raise up and educate the absolute necessity of an act of thought or a passion to think [. . .]. Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. (DR: 139, emphasis added)

The problems posed by these works entail a critique of representation, which can be demonstrated both in the registers of theater dance and also in relation to thought. Thus their creation can be appropriately accounted for by what Deleuze describes as “the destruction of an image of thought,” which is the very same condition “of a true critique and a true creation” (ibid.). As we will elaborate in detail in the following sections, the genetic account of thought posits thought as a result of forces that act upon it from the outside, hence not resulting from a natural, a priori disposition to think under the model of recognition, but from the impossibility of recognition, which the seven works here explore.
If these performances succeed in undermining representation, as I will argue and demonstrate—in problems that “force” thinking as an exercise of the limits of sensibility beyond recognition—then they cannot be accounted for by representational notions of thought. Conversely, it can be argued that these problems involve another logic of creation, one of “expression,” as developed by Deleuze in his reading of Spinoza’s philosophy. Our task will be to conceive of the creation of performances as a logic of expression by way of problems in the sense that Deleuze broaches in *Difference and Repetition*. Thus we will explicate problems under concepts that don’t interpret these performances by drawing a correspondence between certain forms of movement or bodies and a meaning: in short, by representational thought. As the objects of these concepts are problems, the concepts refer to performance-related things (i.e., inventions of the body, movement, time, relations between performing and attending, etc.) only indirectly, via problems that share certain properties with these inventions as a result of thinking and doing at the same time. The existence of an indirect link is evidenced in the names of these concepts, which due to the assembling of two terms often take the form of portmanteau words: “part-bodies,” “part-machines,” “head-box,” “stutterances,” “power-motion,” “crisis-motion,” and so forth. The relation between a concept, the problem it refers to, and something of the performance that it includes is an agreement based not on representation, but on adequation—the principle Deleuze develops from Spinoza in his own theory of Spinozist expression (*EP*) which will be explicated later. In a brief example to explain and illustrate the philosophical term invoked above, adequation supposes the equivalence and parallelism of two dissimilar things, for instance, as in *WDSQ*, bodily movement and the thought of a movement without origin or destination (“movement neither from nor to”). Thus, the movement in which Burrows and Ritsema dance isn’t similar, representative, or exemplary of cognitive interrogation. It is parallel, adequate, and therefore expressive of the idea of a movement that doesn’t originate or aim for anything via the problem of questioning movement by movement itself that this dance tries to solve. The approach to art that the logic of expression in Deleuze implies, which will also be my main methodological reference here, can be succinctly explained through a shift of the question posed to the work of art from interpretation (“What does it mean?”) to experimentation (“How does it work?”). In sum, the “expressive” concepts that we propose here explain the power of problems to produce thought in experimentation, which then creates these choreographic performances.
In this chapter's first section, we will consider Deleuze's critique of representation in *Difference and Repetition* as a condition that paves the way for an expression of problems. The second section will focus on Deleuze's "expressionist" philosophy, mostly derived from Spinoza's conception of thought and adequation. The third section first expounds Deleuze's theory of problems and Ideas as developed in *Difference and Repetition* and then briefly presents how the seven works pose problems in this theoretical frame. Taking into account how Deleuze's attitude toward "concept" evolves from *Difference and Repetition*, a capital study of metaphysics in which he substitutes ideas for concepts, to later books in which he affirms philosophical concepts about art or cinema (as in *Cinema I: Movement-Image* and *Cinema II: The Time-Image*), we will try to carefully elaborate how "expressive" concepts whose objects are problems stand in relation to Deleuze's Ideas/problems and his later cinematographic concepts. The last section of the chapter discusses how these problems cause a differentiation of three constitutive dimensions, or, as we will propose here, "modes" of performance—making, performing, and attending—to which the concepts pertain.

**Thought beyond recognition**

The seven choreographic works discussed here belong to the Western tradition of theater dance and are conceived to be re-presented in theater in two respects: first, they are reinstantiated more than once, and second, this must involve a set of specific functions of representation proper to the apparatus of theater. The latter is our concern here. The following various functions of theatrical representation are undermined by these works: the recognition of the staged object of perception (*SU*, *Nvsbl*, *U*, *WDSQ*, *50/50*); the stability of the position of the spectator, whose faculties allow her to see and identify the object of perception (*U*) or mirror herself as a subjective correlate of the staged object through identification and empathy (*50/50*); address and response (*U*) and the evidence of the co-presence and community of audience (*hêatre-élévision* (*h-é*)); and the name of the author, who provides the ground for the judgment of the work (*U*). All these elements appear subsumed under the model of recognition that Deleuze associates with theater, which explains, as Laura Cull remarks, why theater and performance are excluded from Deleuze's wide interests in the arts in favor of cinema. Cull's edited volume of essays, *Deleuze and Performance* (2009), forwards the claim that although Deleuze (and Guattari) "seem to have had a complex, even troubled, relation to performance," they "adopted
the language of performance,” as is also evident in the conceptual sig-
nificance of Antonin Artaud (Cull 2009: 1). Deleuze’s only text explic-
itly and programmatically dedicated to theater, “One Less Manifesto” (Deleuze 1997b: 239–58), is on the art of the Italian theatermaker Carmelo Bene and, as Cull notes, presents “the potential importance of all of Deleuze’s philosophy for Performance Studies” (Cull 2009: 3). Hence, the alliance between Deleuzians and performance studies schol-
ars could be built on shared concerns, negotiated with the notions of process, relations, movement, affect, event, and liveness, as essays by Maaike Bleeker, Cull, Edward Scheer, Anna Hickey-Moodey, and others testify (Cull 2009). Cull concludes that the implications of Deleuze’s ontology of difference, process, or becoming is worth being pursued by performance scholars. In order for performance studies’ engagement with Deleuze to go beyond the recognition of shared concerns, the encounter with Deleuze requires of performance studies that it radically examine its disciplinary objectives and techniques, such as interpreta-
tion by means of case studies, culturalist quests for identity, and repre-
sentational thinking in general. Perhaps at this stage we can content
ourselves with a selective identification of those practices that not only merit but also necessitate a specifically Deleuzian discussion because of their tendency to “misperform” in the more standard, poststructuralist and culturalist methods of performance studies.

A closer look into the matter of Deleuze’s aversion to theater and his preference for cinema will acquaint us with the “camera consciousness,” which allows inhuman and unnatural perceptions, while the stage is marred by a representational frame that makes theater human (C2: 162, 178, 202). What makes cinema a definitive critical alternative to theater for Deleuze is that it allows a rupture with the phenomenological concept of perception that rests on human consciousness. Post-World War II modern cinema, “cinéma du voyant,” “a cinema of the seer and no longer of the agent” (C2: 2) offers an interior subject-
less vision (“voyance”) that, according to Deleuze, is adequate to the condition of man’s delinking from the contemporary world. Rescuing Henri Bergson’s metaphysics from phenomenology, Deleuze attempts to further Bergson’s ontological equivalence between image, movement, matter, and light (from Matter and Memory) when he posits that modern cinema unravels the pure optical situation in which the object and the subject coincide in pure quality, abstracted from spatio-temporal coordi-
nates, or in “pure impersonal expression that is highly singular” (Alliez 2000: n.p.). As Eric Alliez has pointed out, modern cinema in Deleuze gives the “most contemporary image of modern thought,” a thought
in movement that creates by construction and expression at the same time, dissociated from the thinking subject. Herein lies Deleuze’s adamant opposition to theater—associated as it is with representation and phenomenological notions of real presence, natural perception, and human consciousness—in favor of cinema.

In the fourth chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, “Ideas and Synthesis of Difference,” Deleuze makes his critique of the theater of representation explicit when he calls for a new non-Aristotelian kind of “theater of problems,” or

a theatre of multiplicities opposed in every respect of the theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity of the thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead, a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves. (*DR*: 192)

How the works investigated here critically tackle the elements Deleuze invokes above is the subject of the following chapters. For now, it can be stated that they point to a critique of representation with which the problems they formulate are intimately linked. This critique particularly targets that which Deleuze defines as the “model of recognition” (*DR*: 133–4)—the harmonious exercise of faculties on an object (here performance) that is identical for each of these faculties, in theater constituting a “sensus communis” of the audience manifested in communication and consensus. As Deleuze’s critical undermining of recognition is rooted in his critique of Kant’s theory of knowledge, we must first unpack Deleuze’s exegesis of the model of recognition in Western philosophy. The following discussion will prove to be the indispensable ground for understanding how the choreographers of the works studied here conceive of their intention to part with recognition of the dancing body, or with reception as a unified judgment of cognitive faculties.

Deleuze defines recognition as one of the postulates of what he calls the “image of thought,” which, according to him, dominates both the pre-philosophical form of common popular reason, or *doxa*, and Western philosophy in its major authors—Plato, Descartes, and Kant—who are his primary addressees in his critique here. The “Image of thought” is a subjective, widely shared implicit presupposition about thought as
in a formula Deleuze proposes here: “everybody knows what it means to think.” This doxa is “universalized by being elevated to the rational level” (DR: 134) in Descartes’ *Cogito* as the unconditioned identity of the thinking subject as a principle that defies all the objective presuppositions in the forming of clear and distinct ideas about things. As a moral and humanist model of thinking, the image of thought further comprises two postulates from which recognition follows. According to the first, thinking is regarded as a natural exercise of a faculty, a universally held capacity whose nature is good, characterized by an innate affinity for truth and the good will of a thinker to think (DR: 132). Deleuze here implicitly refers to the very beginning of Descartes’ *Discourse on Method*:

> Good sense is the best distributed thing in the world: for everyone thinks himself so well endowed with it that even those who are the hardest to please in everything else do not usually desire more of it than they possess. In this it is unlikely that everyone is mistaken. It indicates rather that the power of judging well and of distinguishing the true from the false – which is what we properly call ‘good sense’ or ‘reason’ – is naturally equal in all men, and consequently that the diversity of our opinions does not arise because some of us are more reasonable than others but solely because we direct our thoughts along different paths and do not attend to the same things. For it is not enough to have a good mind; the main thing is to apply it well. (Descartes 1985: 111)

The second postulate posits the ideal of common sense, the harmonious collaboration of faculties toward an object, first conceptualized as Descartes’ *Cogito* and then further developed by Kant. Thus “good sense” and “common sense” constitute the two “halves of doxa” (Deleuze) and the two sides of the philosophical image of thought: the subjective identity of the self and its faculties, and the objective identity of the thing (and world) to which these faculties refer (DR: 133). The two are then joined in the model of recognition, which isn’t a particular empirical faculty, but rather the unity of consciousness that provides the foundation for sensibility, imagination, memory, understanding, and reason as a principle of their harmonious accord:

> An object is recognised, however, when one faculty locates it as identical to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object.
Recognition thus relies upon a subjective principle of collaboration of the faculties for ‘everybody’ – in other words, common sense as a concordia facultatum; while simultaneously, for the philosopher, the form of identity in objects relies upon a ground in the unity of a thinking subject, of which all the other faculties must be modalities. (DR: 133)

For Deleuze, the unifying ground of the thinking subject refers to the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The “I think” in Kant is the self-consciousness which accompanies and unifies all cognition. “I think” is a transcendental principle, that is, an a priori condition which makes knowledge possible. Kant introduces it in the first book of Critique of Pure Reason (Analytic of Conceptions):

The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. [. . .] but this representation, I think, is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical, or primitive apperception, because it is a self-consciousness which, while it gives birth to the representation I think, must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our representations. (CPR: 76)

Kant defines cognition as an “objective perception,” distinguished from “sensation” as a modification of the state of the subject. It belongs to the category of conscious representations, where Kant understands representations (Vorstellung) as “internal determinations of our mind in this or that relation of time” (CPR: 132). Cognitions are divided into intuitions and concepts; the former are immediately related to objects and hence are “singular and individual,” while the latter’s relation to objects is mediated “by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things” (CPR: 201). From the latter can be deduced the function of representational concepts in general, where a concept accounts for what is common to several things and thus determines them as particular instances of a kind. According to Kant, we form “empirical” concepts of our intuitions in understanding, thanks to a priori forms of knowledge called “pure concepts” that “have origin in understanding alone” (ibid.). Understanding consists of subsuming
intuitions of particular objects under pure concepts, which is equivalent to the ability to judge, that is, apply rules derived from the pure concepts related to time to empirical intuitions. The source of the pure concepts of the understanding is thus the “I think” of transcendental apperception: an act of spontaneity which allows representations to belong to a subject and provides the ground for the unity of concepts and intuitions in judgment. Deleuze therefore posits that recognition leads to a “much more general postulate of representation” (DR: 137), where representation depends on the recognition of the form of the Same with regard to concepts:

With representation, concepts are like possibilities, but the subject of representation still determines the object as really conforming to the concept, as an essence. That is why representation as a whole is the element of knowledge which is realized by the recollection of the thought object and its recognition by a thinking subject. (DR: 191)

In his critique of the model of recognition in Kantian terms, Deleuze proceeds by defining the logic of representation in the unity of four operations: firstly, the identity of objects in the identity of the concept, constituting the form of the Same with regard to recognition; secondly, the opposition by which a concept is determined through the comparison between possible predicates and their opposites in memory and imagination; thirdly, the analogy between pure and empirical concepts, or between empirical concepts and their objects; and fourthly, the perceived resemblance in the relation between an object and other objects. The “I think” guarantees the source of these four faculties and their unity as the most general principle of representation:

I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember and I perceive – as though these were the four branches of the Cogito. They form quadripartite fetter under which only that which is identical, similar, analogous or opposed can be considered different: difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude. (DR: 137)

Representation is, as Deleuze concludes, a reductive model of thinking, because it subordinates difference to identity and thus never allows the thought to begin anew, to create anything but the recognizable and the recognized. In other words, that which isn’t recognized and cannot be recognized is either dismissed by the representational image
of thought, or, as we will explore here, forces thought to invent itself and affirm difference prior to identity.

If we turn to the seven works here in order to explicate how representational thinking would inhibit both a creation and reception of these performances, \( U \) would be a case in point. While this performance will be discussed at length in Chapter 3, let us succinctly describe the event in which \( U \) undermines theatrical representation. The performance is announced as an untitled work whose author is anonymous, and for the majority of its duration the stage remains dark, inhabited by an uncertain number of human-sized puppets, a commingling of inanimate dummies and human performers disguised as puppets, in barely discernible movement. The spectators are given small battery-powered flashlights with which they can illuminate the stage. In a talk that simulates the so-called artist’s talk after the event, but that is also part of the performance, the audience interrogates a “representative” of the performance as to the meaning of what they saw. Their questions are driven by anger, and can be summed up in one sentence—“Could you please tell us what we saw?”—but they also reveal a feeling of shame regarding their own behavior in the role of spectator, as they have taken over the role of the performers, yet they are performing inadequately, either too little or too much. The shock of depriving the audience of a scene presenting clearly distinguishable figures in movement, the difficulty arising from the loss of a clear object of perception in the indiscernible meshes of puppet-figures, completely destabilizes them in their role of a spectator who perceives, imagines, conceives, judges, and so on. Their questions and remarks testify to an inability to generate a new experience from the impossibility of recognizing the event. A few voices, however, reported that the performance was too short for them to learn how to sense it. In that way, they may have been at the threshold of creating a new experience in duration, had their thought not been shackled in the representation of a non-recognizable object. From the perspective of the choreographer of \( U \), there was nothing represented in this performance that the audience failed to recognize. His idea was to explore the relations between the living beings (performers dressed as puppets and spectators) and inanimate objects (puppets, strings, flashlights etc.) as relations of weight, color, motion, rest, and attention in a situation radically obstructive to vision.

As this example demonstrates, if we are to account for a creation of a new experience beyond recognition, we must seek an alternative to representational thinking, which can be found in Deleuze’s anti-representational conception of thought. Deleuze assigns to thought a
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power of creation: “to bring into being that which does not yet exist” (DR: 147). But to do so, thought must take as its point of departure a radical critique of representation, a destruction of the image of thought as a violence or shock to sensibility that disjoins the subject–object unity of faculties and thus, as “something in this world,” “forces us to think” (DR: 139). This doesn’t happen by means of any method, or as a natural possibility of thought, but through a fortuitous encounter with a “sign,” that which can only be sensed and not be perceived or grasped by other faculties. The sensible of the “sign” isn’t a quality of an object of recognition, or even a purely qualitative being, as Daniel Smith explains; it is “the being of the sensible” (sentiendum) (Smith 1996: 34). From the point of view of the empirical exercise of recognition and common sense, the sign is imperceptible (insensible); from the point of view of a transcendental exercise of sensibility, it is a “bearer of a problem” (ibid.), because it forces sensibility to confront its own limit and therefore can be felt or sensed as its limit-object. The encounter with a limit-object of sensibility is exactly the problem posed by Nvsbl: how to synthesize two contrary sensations, stillness and movement, in a movement which cannot be seen from the empirical point of view of extension (shape, size, trajectory)—as the displacement of a mobile—but can only be sensed as a transformation of the body in time, as change in duration. Performers’ generating and spectators’ sensing the invisible, excessively slow movement confirms Deleuze’s point here: no form of movement is given here with an identity prior to change; rather, change or the self-differentiation of the performer’s body—in what we will analyze here as a partitioning of “movement-sensations” from within the internal space of the body—is what engenders movement.

By deploying a discord of the faculties that arises from sensibility exercised to the point of reaching a limit, Deleuze critiques the doctrine of faculties in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a “tribunal” that judges their legitimate use within the fixed boundary of their possibility as well as within their collaboration under the model of recognition and common sense. Deleuze recommends a “study” of each faculty, sensibility, imagination, thought, and so forth that would push the limit of each toward dissolution and renewal—a research whose outcome would be uncertain. “It may turn out, on the other hand, that new faculties arise, faculties which were repressed by that form of common sense” (DR: 142). However, in spite of his critique of Kant’s model of common sense, Deleuze finds a possibility for a “disjunctive” theory of faculties in Kant’s third critique. In note 10 of the chapter
“The Image of Thought” (DR: 321), Deleuze briefly mentions Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime,” which accounts for the cases in which imagination undergoes its transcendental exercise, and summarizes his view on the dissension of faculties in the judgment of the sublime in his earlier book on Kant (1963/1984). Christian Kerslake points out the importance of Kant’s Critique of Judgment in the foundation of Deleuze’s notion of immanence upon the non-hierarchical “transcendent use” of faculties, “since it is precisely this that will critically reveal the ‘problems’ (the ‘Ideas’, to use Deleuze’s explicitly Platonic language) that really structure the progress of experience” (Kerslake 2009: 69–70).

Kant describes that when we face something “great beyond comparison,” an immense or a powerful object—a mountain, an abyss, or a storm at sea—our imagination has to extend toward its own limit, unable to comprehend these sensations in their totality: “For there is here a feeling of the inadequacy of [one’s] imagination for presenting the ideas of a whole, wherein the imagination reaches its maximum, and, in striving to surpass it, sinks back into itself” (CJ: 91). The sublime is initially a feeling of pain, because the subject experiences a disjunction between what can be imagined and what can be understood. As Deleuze explains, in the experience of the sublime, imagination communicates its constraint to thought, which makes the two faculties enter into discord. Their “reciprocal violence [. . .] conditions a new type of accord” and “a quite different conception of thought” beyond recognition and common sense (DR: 321). By referring to this different kind of thought, Deleuze alludes to the transcendental ideas, or concepts of reason, which Kant had introduced earlier in his classification of representations in the first critique: “A concept [. . .] which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a concept of reason” (CPR: 201). Or in Deleuze’s own words,

When imagination is confronted with its limit by something which goes beyond it in all respects, it goes beyond its own limit itself, admittedly in a negative fashion, by representing to itself the inaccessibility of the rational Idea, and by making this very inaccessibility something which is present in sensible nature. (K: 51)

In the attempt to reflect the immense and unlimited power of the sensible, reason intervenes with its own concepts, with the idea of infinity, of that which can only be thought but not imagined or understood through empirical concepts. Smith demonstrates how Kant’s judgment of the sublime acts partly as a source for Deleuze’s argument of
disjunction between sensibility and understanding in a transcendental exercise beyond the empirical use of common sense:

[Imagination] presents to itself the fact that the unpresentable exists, and that it exists in sensible nature. From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and unimaginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that which can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its transcendental exercise. (Smith 1996: 33)

In the judgment of the sublime, the initial pain of the impossibility of representation is overcome by a realization of the unbounded power of reason in the idea of infinity, which, according to Kant, reinforces the vital powers of the subject of judgment. Deleuze explains that in the judgment of the sublime, pleasure arises from the pain, from a newly engendered accord, a “discordant concord” between imagination and understanding where the “soul” finds its “focal point” in the suprasensible (K: 51).¹

However, the kind of thought that Deleuze strives to distinguish from representational thinking, and that bears on our discussion of choreographing problems, proposes a relationship between sensation and thought which remains problematic. And, unlike the experience of the sublime in Kant, it is not resolved by strengthening and satisfying the subject’s sense of self. On the contrary, the transcendental exercise of sensibility destabilizes the identity of the subject outside of knowledge. Therefore, Deleuze warns that “it is not enough to recognise this in fact, as though problems were only provisional and contingent movements destined to disappear in the formation of knowledge, which owed their importance only to the negative empirical conditions imposed upon the knowing subject” (DR: 159). He stresses, as we will soon demonstrate, that a real problem doesn’t disappear from the proposed cases of solutions, but must continue to transform itself and force thought to learn beyond knowledge.

If we return to the seven performance works again, we can conclude that the problems they stem from and pose to spectators have very little to do with Kant’s judgment of the sublime. By contrast, the operation of the sublime in dance has another and much longer history in illusionist virtuosic movement that defies gravity and conceals the “inhuman” efforts it requires. The distinctive characteristic of these seven works is the material literalness in which movements and transformations of the body are effectuated, without the employed techniques inspiring awe
and a feeling of the infinite power of movement transcending the imag-
inable. The problem concerns the impossibility of recognizing what
these compositions represent. Instead, they provoke the spectators, and
performers, to explore how to sense and think in a series of questions
in a minor key—how, how many, in which case, why, how long—that
replace the representational “what is” in a major key (D1: 94). In that
sense, these problems are different from Kant’s transcendental ideas,
as in the idea of infinity regulating the experience of the sublime:
they don’t function to unify, totalize, and transcend a possible experi-
ence, but rather to generate a new experience. In sum, the critique of
representation is only the first step, a necessary condition toward the
thought as an act of thinking within thought itself, engendered by
problems and accounted for by Deleuze by expression, the ontological
principle that he draws from Spinoza’s philosophy. Our next step here
will be to define how the expression of problems, as opposed to repre-
sentational thinking, in Deleuze methodologically frames the objects
of the so-called expressive concepts, as opposed to representational
thinking. In other words, we will now elucidate in philosophical terms
how choreographing problems is a matter of expression rather than
representation.

The logic of expression

Deleuze introduces the notion of the problem in *Difference and Repetition*
as a genetic element of thought, because the problem determines the
relationship between sensibility and thought. In other words, this rela-
tionship is not one of representation (i.e., subsumption of intuitions
under pure concepts of the understanding as in the model of recognition
and common sense that we expounded earlier in Kant), but instead one
of expression, which Deleuze derives from Spinoza’s univocal ontology.
Expression is the ontological principle by which Deleuze explains the
noncausal parallelism between thought and extended things in Spinoza.
This noncausal parallelism determines the relationship between think-
ing and acting (making, doing) in the performance practice examined
here. It will help us illuminate how problems are conceived in Deleuze
as objects of ideas that are in turn adequate to, or expressive rather than
representative of, performance compositions. This requires considering
the logic of expression and its concomitant concepts of parallelism and
adequation in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza.

In *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1992a), better introduced in its
more precise original title, *Spinoza et le problème de l’expression* (1968b),
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Deleuze foregrounds “expression” as the central idea, or, more accurately, problem, in Spinoza’s philosophy. The emphasis on “expression” is regarded as particular to Deleuze, since expression in substantive form is never explicitly pronounced in Spinoza’s Ethics, occurring less than forty times in various forms of the verb exprimere (Macherey 1998: 122). The first instance of the use of exprimere determines all the others, as it stems from Spinoza’s main ontological principle, the definition of substance, or God: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza: ID6, emphasis added). According to Deleuze, Spinoza doesn’t define expression, because expression is the definition itself which concerns the internal constitution of substance (EP: 18). Expression stands for a monistic conception of being, where the verb to “express” can comprehend the multiplicity of modes in which substance is (i.e., manifests itself). The infinity of the single, unique, indivisible, and self-caused substance is expressed in the infinity of attributes (Spinoza: ID3, ID6), of which we, given the constrained nature of our actual existence, know only two: thought and extension. Attributes constitute the essence of substance (ID4) and are in turn expressed in their modes, understood as the affections of substance (ID5). The body and the mind are modes, or in other words, expressions of the infinite attributes of extension and thought: one and the same thing conceived under two attributes of one substance. From this follows Spinoza’s parallelist view of the mind–body problem as the relation of no interaction where “the body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)” (IIIP2).

The noncausal relation between the modes of thinking and modes of extension comes from the distinction of attributes as causal orders or laws that underlie every modification of substance. Thus Spinoza contends that so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, must be explained through the attribute of thought alone (by laws of logic and psychology); and insofar as they are considered modes of extension, the order of the whole of Nature must be explained through the attribute of extension alone (by laws of geometry and mechanics).

In order for the relation of noninteraction between modes of thinking, or ideas, and modes of extension, or material things, to be parallel, there has to be a correspondence between the two autonomous, independent causal orders, as Spinoza formulates in IIP7: “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”
Spinoza indicates that the parallel order and connection of ideas and things follows from his conception of adequate knowledge (IA4) where “the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.” To know something adequately involves not only grasping a thing’s causal connections to other objects, but also understanding how the given thing is a mode in which the attributes of God are expressed. The mind perceives adequately when it sees a thing necessary from the same logic, that is, the laws that underlie the attribute of thought expressed in the mode of the given thing; or in Spinoza’s own words, the mind is “determined internally” from the order of causes that are the same as the order of causes that determine the object of knowledge. The parallel correspondence between the idea and the thing implies the equality of the power of thinking and the power of acting in God: “whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature follows objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection” (IIP7Corr.).

Spinoza illustrates the parallelism of thought and extension with the paradigmatic geometric example of a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle. Like other geometrical examples drawn in his Ethics, the idea of the circle is adequate, perfect, and faultless, because it expresses every possible circle in any possible size by its very definition—the locus of all points in a plane at a constant distance, called the radius, from a fixed point, called the center. One and the same order or connection of causes expresses the idea of a circle and the thing of a circle. Parallelism excludes all real causality, and henceforth any analogy, eminence, or transcendence between the idea and the thing that the object of the idea refers to. It supposes, conversely, a “constant relation,” as Deleuze remarks, an “isonomy” between two modes of different attributes that results from an equality of principle. The idea and the thing are “taken together” because “they form equal parts or halves of a whole” (EP: 107). The “whole” here refers to the self-caused substance, or God, which is equally expressed in every mode as its immanent cause.

Spinozist univocity of being, supposed by the immanent causality in the parallelism between thought and extension is, in the first place, an ontology that posits an absolute power of thinking and of acting (doing, making, etc.) as autonomous and equal on the same plane. What concerns us here is how it permits the logic of expression, as opposed to representation, to account for the correspondence between ideas, problems, and performance-related “things,” or, as they will be referred to here, performance compositions. Two lines of argument are relevant
here, the first addressing how Spinoza’s theory of adequate ideas departs from (Cartesian) representation, and the second describing expression as a practical orientation of thought. We will unpack them briefly here.

In Spinoza, the idea is, firstly, a concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing, and so it is an action of the mind and not a perception where the mind is being acted upon (IID3); and second, an idea is adequate not because it agrees with its object, but because “insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, it has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea” (IID4). The attribute of “intrinsic” is intended to counter the “extrinsic” agreement between the idea and the object. In her account of Spinoza’s preference of the “intrinsic” over the “extrinsic” denomination of idea, Genevieve Lloyd claims the following:

Spinoza’s point is that the more determinate we make the object of our definition, the more evident it is that here the issue of truth matters – the more our definition “ought to be true.” The more determinate an object is – the more attributes it has – the more committed we are to its being something that really exists. (Lloyd 1996: 25)

The idea will be adequate insofar as it is a mode of thinking by which God constitutes the essence of the human mind. If the idea is inadequate, God has it “insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human mind” (IIP11C). This implies, according to Daisy Radner (1971), a distinction between the object of an idea and the thing represented by an idea, between objective and formal reality, which Spinoza’s principle of adequation introduces. Formal reality supposes that a thing exists in itself, and objective reality means that it exists insofar as it is thought of. The idea relates to the thing it represents objectively, or, in other words, via its object, whose relation with the thing represented in turn by the idea is explicated in terms of agreement. Thus there is not a one-to-one correspondence between ideas and the things they are supposed to represent. One and the same idea may refer to two different things, and it may be adequate insofar as it represents one, but inadequate in its representation of the other. Radner (1971: 348) explains that the distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas enables Spinoza to depart from Descartes’ theory of representative ideas, which purports a kind of resemblance between an idea and the thing, ideas being “like [pictures or] images” of their objects (Descartes 1997: 149).

The version of representation that Spinoza offers instead, as Radner posits it in contrast to Deleuze and Macherey, who consider it
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“expression” (Radner 1971: 348), is a matter of something making itself known to a knower, where “making itself known” is synonymous with affection. Cartesian representation is dissolved in Spinozist affection, as Alliez contends, making it specifically a matter of practical philosophy: “We know nothing about the body until we know what it can do, what its affects are, how it can or cannot enter into composition with other affects. The representation (Descartes) is dissolved by the affection (Spinoza), leading to the specific question of a practical philosophy” (Alliez 2003: n.p.). The mind is the idea of the body in the sense that it knows itself and external bodies by means of its ideas of the affections of the human body. According to the principle of immanent causality, that which is in the effect must first be present in the cause; since an affection of the human body has the external body as its cause, the idea of this affection must have something in common with the external body. It involves the nature of an external body only partially—through the part by which the external body determines the human body in a certain fixed way. Deleuze rephrases this as “implicating” the nature of the external body without “explicating” it (SP: 68). The mind will form an idea of the external affecting thing as if it had a reality independent of its immediate perception of it. However, the external body is independent in the sense that it is composed of parts that are not related in the affection of the body. Since “the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (IIP7), the idea whose object is the bodily affection (of an external thing) and the idea whose object is the external thing must partly agree, correspond, that is to say, have something in common. Only of “those things which are common to everything, and which are equally in the part and in the whole” (IIP38) can we have adequate knowledge, since our ideas of them are the same as God’s.

Despite the fact that most human knowledge is inadequate, according to Spinoza, it is nonetheless a kind of thought that forces a practical path in which ideas in the form of problems and compositions arise in parallel, noncausal correspondence. “If we then ask what concept can account for such a correspondence, that of expression appears to do so” (EP: 326–7), Deleuze contends. Expression is a logic opposed to representation; it is a certain way of thinking and forming ideas outside of analogy and eminence that govern relations of agreement between the idea and the object understood to be a thing. Macherey distinguishes movement’s immanence in the logic of expression from the static quest of identity, which, because it is always threatened by negativity, seeks dependence on a transcendent principle. “Expression
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embraces both the way things come to be in reality and the way they are known in thought, since the act of thinking something is the same act that produces it, by which it comes to be” (Macherey 1996: 146). If the relations of being and thought are not representational, then they are not, Macherey states, merely “theoretical,” but have to be considered as practical relations. Thus the logic of expression orients a “path” and an “experience of thought” where ideas and things are dynamically integrated by the same movement which gives rise to them (Macherey 1996: 147). Our next task is, following the practical orientation of Spinozist expression, to determine Deleuze’s conception of problems and Ideas as it lays the ground for choreographing problems here. This stage of our discussion will demonstrate, first, how Deleuze departs from Spinoza’s rationalist philosophy in order to account for a dynamic, nonmechanist differential genesis of Ideas and problems. Secondly, we will unfold the practical path of problems and Ideas in the seven choreographies.

Problems and Ideas

After establishing the principle of expression that opposes representation in Spinoza, Deleuze develops his own immanentist view on thought and creation in his theory of problems and Ideas with a capital I in *Difference and Repetition*. The place that was ontologically assigned to the expression of substance in his reading of Spinoza is now taken by the expression of difference, whose genetic power is conferred upon Ideas. Deleuze’s Ideas are problematic and differential: they engender thought in the form of problems and conceive or express the sensible through difference rather than identity. They are explicitly distinguished from rationalist conceptions of ideas, such as Spinoza’s adequate ideas, as their function isn’t to explicate a thing in its essence formulated in the question “what is it,” but rather to generate variable multiplicities. Hence, in the context of theorizing Ideas with a capital I, Deleuze seems to distance himself from rationalism when he remarks that it ties “the fate of Ideas to abstract and dead essences” (*DR*: 188). The predication in the formula “what is it” gives way to a complex of questions—how, how many, in which case, and so on—that constitutes the object of the Idea as a problem. This makes Ideas inessential, as Deleuze writes: “In so far as they are the objects of Ideas, problems belong on the side of events, affections, or accidents rather than that of theorematic essences” (*DR*: 187). How does Deleuze’s definition of the problematic Idea frame the creation of problems in the performances undertaken here?
Three defining characteristics of an Idea are comprehended by the following concise phrase: “An Idea is an n-dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity" (DR: 182). First, multiplicity supposes an organization of differential elements as a heterogeneous mixture rather than a unity. The elements are unidentifiable n-dimensional variables, because they have no prior sensible form, conceptual signification, or function. Second, the elements that are undetermined by and in themselves are then determined reciprocally, by a set of relations between changes in them. Deleuze describes the reciprocal relations as non-localizable ideal connections between variable elements. In the third step, the set of such reciprocal relations must actualize itself in spatio-temporal relations, and the elements of that particular multiplicity must be incarnated in real terms and forms. An Idea thus involves a movement of genesis from the virtual to the actual, as Deleuze explains:

It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualization—in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. (DR: 183)

An Idea as a virtual differential structure is distinguished from an actual, incarnated, and specified multiplicity, as a problem is distinguished from its solutions. The virtual–actual pair replaces the possible–real because the relation between the possible and the real is one of resemblance: on the one hand, the possible preexists the real by negating its existence, or, on the other, the real becomes the possible by adding existence to it. The possible is then said to have been “realized” in the real, which “condemns” it to be “retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it" (DR: 212). The crucial distinction between the possible and the virtual for Deleuze is that the possible refers to the form of identity in a representational concept—as discussed earlier under the critique of the model of recognition—whereas the virtual designates a multiplicity that prioritizes difference over identity. Deleuze's Ideas aren't possible, awaiting their realization, but virtual, which means fully real. They are, on the one hand, immanent to the intensive processes of genesis, or in Deleuze's famous phrase borrowed from Proust, “real without being actual,” and, on the other, transcendental to the actualized things, or “ideal without being abstract" (DR: 214). The actualization of
a virtual Idea occurs through divergence and difference, thus breaking with the representational logic of identity and resemblance that limits creation by a preexisting possibility. The distinction between virtual and actual fields in which the principle of difference operates is registered orthographically. The problem differentiates itself as the virtual content of the Idea (note the spelling of “differentiation” with “t”). It is progressively determined in its conditions and terms, in a selection, distribution, and evaluation of singularities which specify a region of real relations and terms. The problem is then actualized or differen-ciated in solutions that don’t reflect or resemble the problem which gave rise to them (DR: 207) (note the spelling of “differenciation” with “c”). In the case of these performances, how are we to distinguish the virtual operation of differentiation of an Idea from its actualization as a differen-ciation of a problem? Let’s briefly look at what this means for WDSQ.

Burrows and Ritsema state that the creation process of WDSQ was sparked off by an idea of “movement neither from nor towards.” T. S. Eliot’s poem “Burnt Norton” from Four Quartets leaped out as an event among several other poems they were reading, because it gave Burrows and Ritsema an Idea of a movement which seemed paradoxical or unthinkable from the viewpoint of their dance experience. In short, this Idea couldn’t be represented in a movement they could imagine, or strive to find as if it were a possible way to “dance” it. The Idea began to structure their creation in determining its object as a problem. The problem was posed in a series of questions, starting with “how to dance a question” and ending with “how to move by questioning movement through movement itself” (Burrows and Ritsema 2003: n.p.).

The problem of questioning movement by movement, or also, as they referred to it, as “dancing in the state of questioning,” involved a set of differential elements and relations between these elements. First of all, it brought them to dance improvisation, a vast field of dance and performance today in which they progressively delineated their area of inquiry. The problem therefore required an ungrounding of improvisation by selecting from and eliminating a number of habits: gestures, formal-abstract movement, task-oriented movement, personal dance style, action-reaction patterns. These are differential elements of the Idea qua multiplicity, variables relating also to two different performers, their histories, and all other factors that govern their disposition to move and improvise. The aforementioned elements virtually stand in reciprocally differential relations such as self-expression of the dancing subject, objectivation of self-referential movement, and communication with the audience, because they ideally connect through such
regimes of dance improvisation. However, the determination of the problem—how to question movement through movement itself—is complete only when it is made actual in specific settings or arrangements of space, time, and relation between the two bodies, as well as between the performers and the audience. The actual spatial, temporal, and relational terms entail differentiating more concrete constraints that could then engender and severely condition real movement. Burrows and Ritsema refer to them as “rules”: do not negotiate with space, do not negotiate with time, relate to each other (as well as to all surrounding things and people) without physical or verbal contact, and atomize or fragment movement by continuously questioning it. What these rules concretely assign and how they operate in order to differentiate, or actualize, their movements is presented and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. It is important to underline here that they are conditions or constraints that don’t just exist in the heads of Burrows and Ritsema, but that are also objective in the sense that they produce certain compositions of the bodies and movement. In that way, they confirm one of the main aspects of Deleuze’s definition of problem that we draw on here—they are part of the invention of the problem, of its posing as “positioning” in space (Macherey 1996: 145). Or in Deleuze’s own words,

The positivity of problems is constituted by the fact of being “posited” (thereby being related to their conditions and fully determined). It is true that, from this point of view, problems give rise to propositions which give effect to them in the form of answers or cases of solution. These propositions in turn represent affirmations, the objects of which are those differences which correspond to the relations and the singularities of the differential field. (DR: 266)

The invention of the problem by which an Idea operates entails experimentation, the probing of a path in which new compositions of movement and body are differentiated. This experimentation inserts time into the construction of the problem, which is doubled by a sensorial and affective experience of the experiment parallel to the thought. This time could be regarded as a time of learning, which involves unlearning or undoing, ungrounding the knowledge of possibilities that reproduce rather than create new movements, bodies and their relations. Such learning implies “violent” training without a general method, but with a dedication to the problem that, as Deleuze describes, “demand[s] the very transformation of our body and our language” (DR: 192). Le Roy
explicitly refers to learning as the process of a removal of habit under the construction of constraints:

I always worked with constructing constraints in order to produce “new” movement or to transform the perception of the body in a situation. What can you do when you cannot do this or that; you have to look for another way, and you have to go around habits. In a way, it’s making things difficult in order to explore ways outside the power of habits. (Cvejić 2009a: n.p.).

The emphasis on the constructivist approach to experimentation in these seven works affirms the position that Alliez proffers about Deleuze’s philosophy—the equation of “expressionism” and “constructivism” (Alliez 2004: 104). The claim posits that Deleuze translates Spinozist expression into constructivist terms, drawing out of Spinoza’s “geometric method” a genetic principle of difference. Identity between expressionism and constructivism is relevant for our investigation of choreographing problems, because it calls for a nonhuman artifice of composition, one that battles against the organic regimes of dance and theater in disjunction of bodies and movement, performing, and attending performance.

As outlined in the introduction, the rupture of the onto-historical bind between the body and movement, as well as of the act of communication in theater, runs as an Idea through all problems posed by these choreographies. This, as will be demonstrated in the next chapters, points to the last important aspect of Deleuze’s theory of Ideas/problems: “[The problem] is solved once it is posited and determined, but still objectively persists in the solutions to which it gives rise and from which it differs in kind” (DR: 280). In the case of WDSQ, “questioning movement through movement itself” stopped acting as a problem once a style of particular mannerisms, consolidated and mechanically repeated “solutions,” set in. The life of this improvisational performance ended when Burrows and Ritsema could no longer persist in their questions, in dancing in the state of questioning. Thus, in an unusual gesture for the field of dance improvisation, the two authors decided to abandon this work despite the continuing demand to have it presented. A converse perspective on the persistence of a problem will be shown in the case of Le Roy’s two works examined here, where the later work (U) strives to further the unresolved problem of an earlier one (SU). Our next task will be to unravel how this occurs as we introduce the remaining six works through the problems they pose.
The process of making these performance works begins with choreographers posing questions that sweep away any presuppositions to be had about given or familiar conditions or terms. However, these questions relate to a past, in the sense of problematizing the knowledge in which the bodily movement can be perceived and recognized, one that the choreographers identify in the field of contemporary dance and/or in their previous works. In the case of SU, we already observed in the introduction how Le Roy came to formulate his inquiry “How will I not decide what is to be seen?” The question arose in relation to his previous experiments with separating and isolating body parts, which were characterized as the creation of a “schizophrenic body.” It concerns the audience’s recognition of the human body and movement—a composition of this body, its movements, and space-time, which will elude any identification of the body as a representation of something, as a creature or a state of being that could be compared by way of a metaphor.

Nvsbl starts with a question that upsets the perception of bodily movement:

I set out from the false dilemma of two possible ways of looking: one based on believing in what is seen . . . and the other on vision as tautology, meaning what I see is what I see . . . . I sought a different form for creating another perception, one that wasn’t the simple opposition of the two. (Demaria 2006: n.p.)

Salamon seeks another sensibility here, one that critically departs from a vision that either asserts the subject in her faculties in the recognition of the perceived object as a believable, that is, identifiable, movement of the body, or that satisfies the subject by accepting the perceived without understanding what it is.

Ingvartsen’s inquiry in her solo 50/50 started from the movement of an expression that is faster than the identification of its form and purpose. In her duet with van Dinther, the question is how to destabilize the agency of body in movement, how to subject it to a severe external, machinic conditioning that forces the two dancers and choreographers of that performance, IITA, to reconsider all their empirical knowledge about the weight, shape, gravity, direction, rhythm, and flow of the dancing body.

Charmatz’s question in h-é was how to bypass the limits of staging dance movement in the familiar architectural apparatuses of theater and make a path for dancers to invade all those spaces at once by dancing “in the head” of a single spectator.
When stated in this order, these questions beg for further specification, which is in fact part of their operation. However, stating them as such here attests to a lack of image of thought, or of the kinds of movements, bodies, compositions, situations, and relationships with the spectator that the creations of these performances begin with. In other words, these questions weren’t deduced in retrospect so as to give significance to the performance interpreted from the viewpoint of the author. They were the real point of departure for these performances, and they immediately orient thought toward constructing a situation in which the problem will be determined. Now I will demonstrate this performance by performance.

The first constraint that Le Roy imposed on himself in the creation of SU was to work entirely alone, without an outside eye whose commentary could precipitate and fixate movements by giving them names. A more self-reliant method was to use a camera to record the processes of bodily transformation in movement. In the recording of these processes, “zones of undecidability” emerged where movement could be perceived and described in opposite senses: the body moving both forward and backward, right and left, up and down, one and two bodies, man and woman, human and nonhuman entity, living being and inanimate matter, or a multiplicity of unidentifiable monstrous creatures. These zones, as they came to constitute the performance, appear as slices of the transformation process in which the spectator is caught in the perception of a paradox. In those moments, the object of perception is no longer at stake; it is the very mode of perception, the modality of one’s viewing, that is the focus of attention. The answer to the first question (“How will I not decide what is to be seen?”) was to determine and solve the problem of the idea of affirming non-identity through the very mode of perception. SU is the subject of Chapters 2 (“Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement”) and 6 (“During and After Performance: Processes, Caesuras, and Resonances”), where the concepts “part-bodies,” “caesuras,” and “resonances” will account for the problems at issue.

Questioning the sensibility of movement led Salamon in Nvsbl to additional questions that would disorient the boundary between visible and invisible bodily movement: what is the movement that can be sensed and experienced without its mode of execution being seen? When there is almost no movement to see, what states of the body can become visible and sensible? (Salamon 2006: n.p.) In search of an answer to these questions, Salamon attempted to reverse the relationship between bodily movement and sensation: if displacement is rendered
invisible by an excessively slow movement, then visibility gives way to
the sensations that develop in duration as a process of ongoing changes
in the body that result in movements but are not perceived as move-
ments. The problem of a genesis of invisible yet sensible movement was
fully determined in this last condition: how to convert the external into
the internal space of bodily movement and make it inaccessible to the
spectatorial gaze. Inaccessibility here implies the imposition of a limit
onto the gaze, the constraint or deprivation of the control of the body's
source of movement from the viewpoint of the spectator. The tech-
niques Salamon developed with four performers in order to produce
a radically slow movement—a traversal of 4.5 meters in 80 minutes—
point to the cases of solutions to the problem. They are discussed in the
concepts of movement-sensation and becoming-molecular in Chapters 2
(“Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement”) and 6 (“During
and After Performance: Processes, Caesuras, and Resonances”).

The initial question of 50/50 defined a problem in relation to two
well-established territories in dance: the modernist tradition of subjectiv-
ist, emotional self-expression dating from the 1930s and its repudiation
by the conceptualist methodology in dance in the 1990s. Selecting and
discarding various elements of these two antagonistic conceptions of
dance, as well as taking into account the spectacular cultural expres-
sions outside the high art of dance, Ingvartsen combined several
compositional procedures (doubling, appropriating, decomposing,
manipulating the intensity) and materials from disparate performance
genres and styles of expression. The problem was determined in the fol-
lowing terms: how to deepen the gap between the form and the effect
of expression in order to contract that expression into a difference of
intensity. The affects constructed by way of this problem are discussed
under the concepts of “power-motion” and “crisis-motion” in Chapter 5
(“A Critical Departure from Emotionalism: Sensations and Affects in the
Mode of Performing”).

In IITA, the question of destabilizing the agency of the human body
as the source of voluntary movement defined the problem in its initial
setup: the conjunction between the performers’ bodies and trampolines
and the relations of passivity and activity arising from that conjunction.
Specifying a process of differentiation of intensity allowed for the further
differenciation of body-machine assemblings in movement. This prob-
lem is reflected upon under the concepts “part-bodies,” “part-machines,”
in Chapter 2 (“Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement”).

In the case of h-é, the initial question of avoiding the choice
between possibilities of theatrical representation already meant the very
invention of a new apparatus which differentiates relations between television, musical concert, visual arts installation, living room space, and dance in many theatrical spaces. But the problem was specified when the live presence of the dancers and of a community of spectators, as well as the law of address and response of theater, were subtracted in a prerecorded performance for a single spectator. Despite this “solution,” the problem of dancing in the head of one spectator returned, transformed, under the guise of a new question: how to dissuade the spectator from the illusion of regarding her own embodied presence as performance. These questions are elaborated upon under the concepts “head-box” and “wiring” in Chapter 3 (“Theatrical Apparatuses of Disjunction”).

Like \( h\ell \), \( U \) is a performance produced by the persistence of the problem of \( SU \), that of the hindrance of recognition in the service of an expression of non-identitarian difference of the body in movement. In the composition of the paradoxical body-movement perceptions in \( SU \), the identity of the human body was shaken by undecidability, yet there was still a figure that the spectators could try to identify. Thus Le Roy decided to go further in frustrating any attempt at identification: he subtracted the title of the performance (hence “untitled”), the name of the author (anonymous), and program notes about the performance as well as the illumination of the stage. Undecidability gives way to the indiscernibility of a multiplicity of puppets, a mixture of dead dummies and humans disguised as puppets in an obscured, rather dark theater in which the stage becomes inaccessible to the view of the audience. While the problem seems to be solved by defiguring the stage, it still persists in the question of how to engage the audience beyond the mirroring relationship of stage–auditorium, address–response, which they experience as lacking. The question–problem complex of \( U \) is reflected upon under the concepts “defigurement of the stage,” “wiring,” and “resonance” in Chapters 3 (“Theatrical Apparatuses of Disjunction”) and 6 (“During and After Performance: Processes, Caesuras, and Resonances”).

Expressive concepts

Now that the inventions of problems and their decisive role in these seven works have been expounded, we are in a better position to elucidate the initial claim of this project, namely, that due to the problems they formulate, these works require a distinctive kind of concept to account for them. I will present the claim concisely before unpacking it argument by argument: the concepts account for the problems posed by
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the performances. The determination of the problem through its conditions and terms extends into its actualization in a certain performance composition (an invention of a relation between the body and movement, or between attending and performing). The relation between the concept, the problem, and the performance composition is one of expression in Spinozist terms. First, the problem and the performance composition arise in a parallel process of thinking and doing at the same time. Second, the concept explores the logic in the path of thinking and experiment under the aegis of the problem. Third, the relation between the concept and the performance composition is mediated by the problem, and thus involves an agreement between something included in the performance (specific to a relation between the body and movement, or between attending and performing) and the problem as its object. Hence the concept doesn’t directly correspond to, in the sense of interpreting, the entire work: it expresses it from the viewpoint of the problem. Therefore, I will call these concepts “expressive,” whereby I indicate their distinction from representation based on conformity, analogy, resemblance, or eminence between the concepts and the performances their objects refer to.

With respect to Deleuze’s theory of Ideas, problems, and expression, discussed in the previous sections, the claim of expressive concepts requires the further clarification of two points. Firstly, expressive concepts posit a relation between “concept” and “problem,” instead of a relation between “Idea” and “problem,” which Deleuze develops in Difference and Repetition. This is linked to the second possible point of inconsistency of this theorization with respect to Deleuze’s philosophy, the question of how expressive concepts precisely relate to performances: if they are “of” these works, do they “belong” to the performances, or are they an undertaking of a theory of performance?

The first question (that of determining a relation between “concept” and “problem” instead of “Idea” and “problem”) arises because in Difference and Repetition, as in Deleuze’s concomitant and more—strictly speaking—ontological works from the same period (Logic of Sense, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza), Deleuze deliberately expels “concept” from the logic of expression, favoring “Idea” instead. Concepts are condemned to representation in the tradition of Kant and Hegel, according to Deleuze. They are general and abstract, subordinating difference to identity, whereas Ideas are the differential structures that can account for the production of the new, for a genesis of both thought and sensibility under the principle of difference. A telling and often-invoked example from an early text on Bergson demonstrates Deleuze’s critique of the representational
concept with relation to color. In “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” \((DI: 32–51)\), Deleuze takes Bergson as a precursor to his conception of Idea, using the domain of color as a qualitative multiplicity. One way of determining what colors have in common is to extract from particular colors an abstract and general idea of color, “effacing from red what makes it red, from blue what makes it blue, and from green what makes it green” \((DI: 43)\). The other way, the way that Deleuze prefers instead, is to “send the colors through a convergent lens that concentrates them on the same point” and thus obtain “pure white light” that “makes the differences come out between the shades” \(\text{ibid.}\). In that case, the different colors are no longer subsumed under one concept, but become degrees of difference that participate in an order of mixture—a qualitative multiplicity—in coexistence and succession within the Idea. The Idea internalizes the state of difference between the concept and the object. In sum, the Idea here appears to be of a higher order of genesis than the concept, since it is prior to concepts, whose function is in turn relegated to understanding, knowledge, and interpretation.

Alliez offers an alternative, vitalist view on Deleuze’s “conceptology” \((\text{conceptologie})\) that centers on Deleuze’s “Bergsonism,” or how Deleuze adopts intuition from Bergson as a method of precision and fluidity, of approximating the immanence of thought and univocity of becoming by way of duration, where, for instance, colors are nuances of one and the same fluid, differential concept. Thus he claims that Deleuze’s “bastardization” of Bergson consists in developing Bergson’s odd mention of the concept as a “fluid being” into a general theory of problem that operates by the genetic principle of difference and individuation \((\text{Alliez 1998b: 243–64})\).

As a seeming contrast to this, in his late work co-signed with Félix Guattari, \textit{What is Philosophy?} \((1994)\), Deleuze forcefully reaffirms concepts, assigning their creation exactly (and exclusively) to philosophy. The definition of the concept here reinstates some of the characteristics of his earlier conception of the Idea. Thus a concept is “distinctly featured,” self-positing a “multiplicity” or “assemblage” of components that condense like singularities which compose a thing. For example, the concept of a bird isn’t a species or a genus, but a certain composition of postures, colors, and sounds that is indiscernible \((\text{WIP: 15–22})\). Hence the concept is self-referential, since its creation coincides with the creation of its object \((\text{WIP: 22})\). In his compelling reading of Deleuze’s distinctive concern with ontology here, Alliez proposes calling it “ontothology,” which establishes “a plane of immanence such that, \textit{becoming and multiplicity being one and the same, becoming no longer has a subject}
distinct from itself and carries thinking along with it as the heterogenesis of nature: a plane of nature” (Alliez 2004: 76–7). The “onto-ethological” position in What is Philosophy? allows for, as Alberto Toscano argues, a reactivation of the “expressive potential” of the concept, an entry of its “non-philosophical outside” (Toscano in Alliez 2004: xvi). The concept is thus refashioned according to the same ontological concerns as Deleuze’s earlier theory of Ideas. What Deleuze entrusted Idea with for the purpose of his conception of thought in Difference and Repetition he readmits to concept in What is Philosophy? He therefore also links concepts with problems in the following way: “A concept requires not only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts” (WIP: 18). Problems may not seem to strike out here with the same importance they had in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, yet they are assigned the function of being a motor of conceptual rearticulation. This allows for an association of concepts, in lieu of Ideas, with problems and compositions that is not inconsistent with Deleuze’s late writing about the concept, nor with his earlier conception of the Idea to which we owe the principles of expression and difference, because these two theoretical positions in Deleuze aren’t contradictory, but continuous. However, our approach here still needs to be determined as to how far it agrees with the rest of Deleuze’s later claim about concepts per se: that they are a matter of the invention of philosophy, but not art.

One of the crucial arguments of What is Philosophy? is that the division of philosophy, science, and art should be strictly maintained through their distinctive domains of creation: concepts for philosophy, functions for science, and percepts and affects extracted as blocks of sensations for art. This doesn’t exclude the possibility that these disciplines interfere with each other, but according to the firmly defended view on their distinction here, they do so only by the logic of creation in their own domain, which Deleuze laconically expressed in a talk addressed to cinema students in 1987, “Having an Idea in Cinema (On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet)”:

I say that I do philosophy, which is to say that I try to invent concepts. What if I say, to you who do cinema: What do you do? What you invent are not concepts—which are not your concern—but blocks of movements/duration. (HIC: 15)

While keeping with the same distinction between disciplines as in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze uses the comparison above to stress additionally
that philosophy is no less a practice than cinema, because “concepts must be made” (ibid.). But as creation equals a thinking practice in expressionist ontology, both cinema and philosophy “have” their own “ideas.” Thus the concept of “idea” is resuscitated in the field of art, but with a lowercase letter:

Ideas must be treated as potentials that are already engaged in this or that mode of expression and inseparable from it, so much so that I cannot say that I have an idea in general. According to the techniques that I know, I can have an idea in a given domain, an idea in cinema or rather an idea in philosophy. (HIC: 14)

The characteristically cinematographic idea that he explores here is the dissociation between sight and sound in the cinema of Straub-Huillet, Duras, and Syberberg. Considering it in relation to Deleuze’s books on cinema, which, as we will shortly clarify, devise “cinematic concepts,” rather than ideas, the idea of audiovisual disjunction seems to act like a problematic knot. In the analysis of the seven performances discussed here, I explore a comparable disruption that conceptually distinguishes these works from contemporary dance—a rupture between the body and movement, whose synthesis gave birth to modern dance, and between the modes of performing and attending to performance, which historically constituted theater. As will be elaborated in the next chapters, this rupture involves a break with the sensorimotor patterns of movement and perception which, according to Deleuze, frames the shift from classical to modern cinema. Around this point of rupture, as in a knot of several problems, expressive concepts related to these seven works converge. We will now examine what the methodology of expressive concepts proposed here owes to Deleuze’s theory of cinema.

The titles of Deleuze’s two volumes on cinema (Movement-Image and Time-Image) expose his concern with cinema as a philosophical task of exploring the images given in cinema by creating their concepts. The image here figures under a dual aspect: it is that which cinema is composed of, a “pre-verbal intelligible content” in which filmmakers “think” prelinguistically, but it is also a metaphysical concept linked to the central thesis about image and movement in Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896). Deleuze uses the basic cinematographic elements—frame, shot, and montage—to substantiate Bergson’s argument for a conception of movement different from the common notion of translation of an object in space. As developed by Bergson in Matter and Memory in his theories of image (MM: 17–76) and definition of
movement (MM: 188–218), “true” movement is a transformation of relations rather than displacement. Movement is equal to image, “a set of actions and reactions” of which the world is made up in a flow where things moving or moved can’t be distinguished from executed and received movement (C1: 58). Movement, or Bergsonian image, is a slice of duration, a mobile section of time for which the cinematographic shot is a palpable model. Because it frames the view, the shot is “the translation of the parts of a set,” or a fixed arrangement of elements extended in space. But because it includes a mobile viewpoint (of the camera), and cutting (of the frame, as well as montage between the shots), the shot is also “the change of a whole which is transformed in duration” (C1: 20).

Cinema therefore provides Deleuze with the synthesis of image and movement, epitomized in “movement-image,” a concept whose image is given in cinema, but constituted by Bergsonian conceptions of image and movement. From this initial postulation of a concept that is at once philosophical and cinematographic, Deleuze develops a prolific taxonomy of concepts spanning the whole century of the art of cinema, which he regards as “a natural history rather than an historical history,” a kind of biological classification of images as living forms. But it is also, he contends, “a logic of the cinema” (N: 47), as concepts are sought which are adequate to the images, so as to offer a scheme to organize what is articulated by filmmakers in a non-philosophical manner. A peculiar relationship between philosophy and cinema is at stake here, because Deleuze’s concepts are not historical, critical, or technical and don’t seek to interpret or be “about” cinema, yet they take into account some of the technical and historical determinations of cinema as a practice of images. In this regard, his closing statements in Cinema 2: The Time-Image are illuminating:

A theory of cinema is not “about” cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others, any more than one object has over others. The theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema, but on the concepts of the cinema, which are no less practical, effective or existent than cinema itself. Cinema’s concepts are not given in cinema. And yet they are cinema’s concepts, not theories about cinema. So that there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, “What is cinema?” but “What is philosophy?” (C2: 280)
If we consider the double status of his cinematic concepts with the statement above, we can deduce that Deleuze's priority is to write philosophy with cinema, which should be carefully distinguished from philosophy instrumentalized to “reflect upon” cinema, or upon anything else, for that matter. Deleuze is adamant about there being no value in the philosophical method that pretends to “reflect upon” something. Instead, philosophical thought creates its object (Cf. HIC: 14–15). This confirms that Deleuze's stance on philosophy has to seek its non-philosophical outside: it leads him here to a collaboration with cinema's own terms, one geared to producing an ontology, or rather an onto-ethology, in Alliez's terms, of cinema.

The main difference between this project and Deleuze’s onto-ethology of cinema lies here, in the question of methodological priority. I don't deploy an analysis of a choreographic practice to reassert an onto-ethology of performance or choreography, whose concepts would then be primarily philosophical and fleshed out by the expression specific to the choreographic field. My priority is the opposite: to seek out an appropriate methodology to account for what distinguishes this particular choreographic practice. Because the act of creation of the new field of sensibility of the bodies, movement, their relation and a time involves a parallelist view of thought and practical experiment, a characteristic logic of problem-posing, Deleuze's theory of Spinoza's expressionism as well as of problems, Ideas, and concepts, yields the most adequate theoretical framework here. What my methodology draws more specifically from Deleuze is closest to the framework that Deleuze develops for his theory of cinema. Two points have been significant here: the break of the sensorimotor mechanism and the related lost “link with the world” as the problem that modern cinema “thinks” (C2: 171).

The first entails a changed relationship between movement and time to describe the evolution from classic to modern cinema. At the base of the movement-image is the sensorimotor schema, which links received action (perception) and reaction as an action ensuing from this perception into an organic whole, and where time is a consequence of movement. In modern cinema this link is broken with a gap opened up between perception and motor action, where the latter is replaced by a situation of perception, a time-image that optically or auditably describes what the actor perceives, and where time is given directly. Turning to our seven choreographies, we observe a comparable shift manifested in several elements: exploration of stillness, slowness, invisibility of movement as an unextended interior sensation, the body as a blurred agency of movement, and a human body-object relationship.
These are discussed in the next chapters as cases of desubjectivation and disobjectivation in movement-body relationships.

The second point addresses a recurrent (and earlier discussed) theme in Deleuze: thought as an encounter, or a shock of sensation. The composition that cinema creates in the very form of communicating movement in images implies a shock for Deleuze, as the flow of images with their continuities and cuts forces the spectator to think the whole. Yet the problem that modern cinema thinks is more precisely linked to the disbelief in the world as a “fact” of modern life, or, in Deleuze’s own words: “The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film” (C2: 171). So, “provided that it’s good,” Deleuze says (C2: 168), the modern cinema has to “think” the loss of the “link between the man and the world” as a problem of choice between disbelief (non-choice) and construction of new connections (belief as a matter of choice). This observation, supported by examples of radical editing procedures in the films of Godard, is important for our investigation, because it foregrounds the constructivist vein that characterizes the posing of problems in the seven choreographies. These works reveal a “fact” that is no longer self-evident, namely, that bodies should move from an urge or inner compulson, a will of the subject to affirm itself through movement or produce a form of movement, or that movement is something which is presented on stage in the live co-presence of the audience. The broken bind between the body and movement, between the stage of performance and the auditorium of its attending, needs to be rethought or constructed anew. The consequence of the constructivism in these works is that they reconstitute performance in “making,” “performing,” and “attending” as separate modes of expression, which we will explore in the next section.

In conclusion to this section of the chapter, let us summarize what expressive concepts adapt from the two strains of Deleuze’s philosophy: on the one hand, the principle of expression vs representation as well as thought bound up with problem in Expressionism in Philosophy and Difference and Repetition and, on the other, the theory of concepts “of” cinema in Cinema 1: Movement-Image and Cinema 2: Time-Image. The primary function of expressive concepts is to account for the consistency by which the act of creation in the seven works is based on posing problems. Expressive concepts articulate the logic by which problems are determined and experiments are conducted in parallel. In doing this, they also affirm a kind of thought that is distinctive for these
Choreographies: problematization replaces the more common kinds of thought in dance-making, such as the reliance on personal impressions, recollections, or opinions, which orient many choreographers in a search for “themes” and which also represent those themes by dance movement.4 By contrast, problem-posing begins with dismantling the givens of representation in theater dance and develops by disciplining its own path of thinking and doing toward an ever clearer, more differenciated composition as a temporary solution to the formulated problem.

What expressive concepts share with Deleuze’s cinematic concepts is that their objects constitute the sensible of the compositions in concrete details of performance-related “things.” Hence, expressive concepts depend on a minute analysis of the works that is situated in relations with other ideas that characterize the field. For example, “head-box” and “wiring” (elaborated in Chapter 3) imply intervention into the apparatus of theatrical representation founded on the ideas of presence and communication; “power-motion” and “crisis-motion” (Chapter 5) are concepts related to affects in contradistinction to the idea of empathy and to emotive presuppositions of self-expressive movement. Devising expressive concepts entails a kind of theorized description or re-enactment of the performance that carefully assembles and unknots the performance’s composition. The function of this method is not to signify and reinscribe a different meaning as a matter of interpretation. Its working would be better described in French as *recoupement, regroupement*, or even as theoretical *re-agencement*: the expressive concept cross-checks, re-cuts, or recomposes the performance according to new differential elements and relations that may not have been foregrounded as identifying features of the work in performance and dance criticism.5 The last section of this chapter focuses on the differentiation of the modes of expression that arise in these seven works. The disentanglement of making, performing, and attending partitions the field in which the expressive concepts will be differentiated.

**Making, performing, and attending**

In aesthetic theories from the 1980s onwards, largely informed by phenomenology and analytic philosophy, the work of performing arts is considered to have a special ontological status. This status presupposes a duality between the “work,” which here would be dance, and the spatiotemporal event due to which the work appears in multiple instances, that is, “performances” (see Davies 1991, Ingarden 1989, Osipovich
While the first notion implies the artifactual and nominal status of the work by which it circulates in the performing arts world, the second is regarded as its “real” existence or “substance” in colloquial terms. Thus a peculiar distance is interposed between the work as an ideal “type” or kind and its performance as its instantiation—a gap that is supposed to be bridged by representational ideas like authenticity of performance or authorial intentionalism (see Kivy 1995, Hamilton 2001, Saltz 2001). This dualistic view can be summarized in the following definition stated by Marvin Carlson in his authoritative performance studies textbook: “all performance involves a consciousness of doubleness, through which the actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an idea, or a remembered original model of that action” (Carlson 1996: 5). The representational perspective on the so-called problematic duality of the performance-work is reflected in presentation protocols, such as the now almost expected artist’s talk after a dance performance in which the choreographer engages, with or without the dancers, in a dialogue with the audience. The implicit aim of this theatrical convention is to compensate for the understanding which a reception of dance is feared to lack in comparison to text-based performance in theater. But this convention is not reserved exclusively for dance either; instead it reveals the representational regime under which the diverging viewpoints of maker, performer, and spectator regarding “what is a performance” are to be unified under the act of communication. The identitarian approach has it that various views are compared with respect to their relevance and relativeness as several facets of the same performance work.

Instead of the aesthetic judgment of an identity of a work from the perspective of its multiple interpretations, the ontology of expression in the choreographic practices here suggests the coexistence of different, relatively independent modes in which the same performance is expressed. Making, performing, and attending are three parallel and distinct modes in which these performances are constituted; in other words, the problems by which they are created pertain to different activities, temporalities, and situations of expression. While “performing” might seem redundant with respect to performance, the term is appropriated from the actual practice of performers and is deployed here to dispel the dualist perspective and thus separate this activity from the “interpretation” (in French, interprétation) or “execution” (in German, Aufführung) of a work, whose identity the performance should be subordinated to. “Making” refers to the act of creation in which the author is primarily involved, and it may also implicate performers
and/or collaborators. “Attending” accounts for the activity of the spectator, or the recipient of the work. An elaborated definition of the three terms will follow shortly. Let us first consider why this differentiation is necessary.

The differential and differentiating relations between making, performing, and attending should be undertaken outside the poststructuralist critique of identity, which regards these differences primarily in relation to the discursive production of meaning and intentional fallacy, as in the paradigm of Derrida’s concept of *différance*, where textual meaning is deferred through a chain of signifiers, always in need of an additional reference, as well as his critique of J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts in “Signature, Event, Context” (Derrida 1984: 1–24). By contrast, the relations distinguished here involve a radicalization of a mutual differentiation, even, in some of the works here, a disjunction between stage and auditorium, or between the thought that conceives the work and the work’s reception. The differentiation of making, performing, and attending implies three distinct modes of expression that are only somewhat connected with one another and are for the most part parallel to each other. The action of one mode on another isn’t denied, but isn’t constitutive of the performance either. This means that the problem that the choreographer poses in the making of a work is not the same problem that the performer is caught up with during the event of performance, and it is also still different from the problem that the spectator encounters during (and after) the performance. Yet we are speaking about one work that exists on three problematic planes at the same time. The maker, the performer—who, here, might also be a maker, but recast in a different role—and the spectator combine different faculties in their respective processes. For example, performing *Nvsbl* mixes the perception of external events such as the composition with other bodies in space, the feigning of intrabodily sensations and the recollection or imagination of bodily states in concrete situations from the lived past or from fantasy. However, in the making of *Nvsbl* the problem of the perception of movement was first conceived in thought, in questions that eliminated the habitual patterns of recognizing movement in order to explore a mixture of stillness and motion, where displacement would be an invisible process. Therefore the modes of making and performing *Nvsbl* differ according to their respective activities around problems, to how they combine thought, perception, imagination and so forth.

The priority of making over performing in this example supposes a time sequence of action which suggests that making determines performing and thus stresses the position of choreographer qua author as superior
to that of performer. This brings forth a question that has been lurking in the discussion until now and that deserves clarification: to what extent does the theory of expressive concepts developed here privilege a strong authorial position? If it appears to over-stress authorship, the objection might arise that it seems to restore the status of the author prior to the 1970s debate surrounding the death of the author and the end of the subject, which critically undid the modern notion of the genius artist. It is true that the questions through which problems are discerned are attributed to choreographers, who are the nominal authors of the performances. At the same time, the problems these choreographers pose include undoing the aesthetic categories of signature, style, and language that determine the traditional view of authorship in dance. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next chapters, they enact desubjectivation or disobjectivation in the relationship between the body and movement, ungrounding self-expression of the subject in movement or self-referentiality of the movement as the object of dance.

It is also worth noting that in these performances the choreographers are also the performers: SU and 50/50 are solos and IITA and WDSQ are duets involving both makers; Nvsbl, h-ê, and U include other performers as well as the choreographer. That the “makers” are also the ones who perform what they make here has to do with what we earlier determined as a practical orientation or experience of thought. Posing problems as “positioning” problems in space requires learning through one’s own body, movement, and duration, alone or in relation to other bodies. The exclusion of movement transmission from choreographer to dancer, which also applies to the three works involving other performers, is a political choice, because it implies disruption of the oral mimetic regime in the “show-copy” formula, an inheritance of ballet that still rules in dance culture. Or as Protopapa stresses with regard to European experimental dance, it also involves “the shattering of (dance) techniques and the privileging of the dancer as co-author” (Protopapa 2004: n.p.). Therefore, when authorship is concerned here, it would be more accurate to approach these choreographers in terms of la politique des Auteurs, the phrase François Truffaut (Truffaut 1954) coined for what would later be used to distinguish le cinéma d’auteur from mainstream film production. La politique des Auteurs is a mode of film criticism developed by a group of young filmmakers in France—Eric Rohmer, Jean-Luc Godard, Jacques Rivette, and François Truffaut—in the pages of Cahiers du Cinéma and Arts between 1951 and 1958. They sought to assert the status of the filmmaker as artist, an auteur who, for them, was the equivalent of a novelist, poet, painter, or composer. This claim led
to the development of a new paradigm, the cinéma d’auteur or “art cinema,” where film is considered as a medium which reflects the poetics of the author, not simply a product of mass entertainment. Curiously, in concluding Cinema 2 Deleuze mentions this practice: “Godard likes to recall that when the future directors of the New Wave were writing, they were not writing about cinema, they were not making a theory out of it, it was already their way of making films” (C2: 280). This quote adds self-reflection to the elements of thought we distinguished earlier when discussing problem methodology. Although the distinction of “auteur film” may no longer apply to film as much as it did in the 1960s and ’70s due to many borderline cases today, the label remains in circulation, and, as a matter of fact, is appropriated in French performing arts discourse as “danse d’auteur.” For example, the festival Faits d’hiver in Paris defined its profile in 2010 as “danse d’auteurs.”

The choreographers here are authors in the sense that their work involves problem-posing, which delinks them from authors whose work stems from and emphasizes individual taste, freedom of will, memory and a sense of self. However, this doesn’t mean that the problems they pose have their origin “in” their mind as the agency of an autonomous, self-determined subject. The authors rather act as singular crystallization points for the ideas whose “potentials” are engaged in the very modes of the expression of the choreographic field. The ensuing chapters will unfold the discussion of ideas constitutive of the field of contemporary dance and performance in which the choregraphic problems are embedded. And these ideas entail a differentiation of making, performing, and attending, the disjunction of which is taken to the limit by these choreographers’ works.

Making denotes the process prior to the public presentation of the performance, when the performance nominally obtains its status of a work of theater dance. Calling it “making” is a choice of preference over “conception,” which prioritizes the activity of the mind—conception as a product of thought. “To conceive” deals with something that already exists but needs to be caught or grasped, while “to make” stresses the work of construction without the importance of a given material. It has become common to refer to “authors”—choreographers, theater or film directors—as “makers.” An interesting piece of evidence is Ingvartsen’s manifesto-like “Procedure for Overproduction” (Ingvartsen 2005a: 51–2), which lists a series of “makings:” “you make something, you make something out of the something you have just made, you make something which cannot be bought, you make a gift. You make something which is the opposite of what you have just made, you make fake money and
you sell it for real,” and so forth. While the distinction between the two terms echoes a Duchampian shift from the artist as craftsman to the artist as author of concept, we certainly do not aim here to revert to the pre-modern notion of the artist prior to the age of mechanical reproduction. When we insist that problems are “made,” we underline that thinking involves acting in parallel (i.e., inventions of the bodies, movement, and duration at the same time).

Another aspect of the conventional understanding of “making” emphasizes its instrumental character: making is a process of working the means toward the final product—performance—which itself hides the traces of this work and doesn’t point to any time outside of the present of the event. Recent tendencies in dance and performance to recuperate the creation process, either by opening the so-called research or “work-in-process” to public view or by publishing writings or films about the creation of a performance, are defense strategies deployed by non-mainstream art to reclaim its relevance in the wake of public funding cuts (Cvejić 2006). Making as a mode of expression has nothing to do with the aforementioned agenda that promotes performance methodology in order to increase the public value of an underrated art practice. Making doesn’t just yield to performance the temporal dimension of the past process of creation. Firstly, the past process is contained in every present, “here-and-now” event of performance in the memory of the author-performers. The reliance on the memory of the creation process is evidenced in the extensive practices of archiving performance creations by the highly acclaimed and subsidized dance companies of choreographers such as Pina Bausch and William Forsythe (Servos 2007 and Groves et al. 2007). In the cases of Bausch and Forsythe, the intention is to preserve the link between the resulting form of dance and the knowledge about its creation in order to be able to transmit it to new performers. This attributes an ontological status to the making process as the mode which coexists with every performance.

Secondly, in addition to the perspective of preserving the process in performance, making expresses a problem whose solutions are temporary. Even when the work is no longer performed, its problem continues to operate into an indeterminate future in which it will articulate a new question and then a new problem of a new performance. Thus problems posed in the making separate making as a mode from performing. While the chain of questions and problems has already been elaborated in the case of three consecutive choreographies by Xavier Le Roy (Narcisse Flip, SU, and U), the consistency in the making of the other works will be addressed in the next chapters.
According to the perspective of performance studies, performing is conflated with the ontology of performing arts, which defines performance as the act or live event that occurs in an actual place and time in front of an audience. This meaning derives partly from the theory of performatives or speech acts that J. L. Austin introduced as a development of analytic philosophy of language (Austin 1962). A thoroughly revised concept of performatives from the perspectives of poststructuralism, feminism, and cultural theory established the notion of performance qua act in performance studies in wide-ranging topics and approaches, from body/textuality to various culturalist approaches to identity (Butler 1988, Sedgwick and Parker 1995, Schneider 1997, to mention only a few seminal works). Today the notion of an action with an effect incorporates the second meaning of the word “performance,” according to the Oxford English Dictionary (the first meaning being the act of presenting a timebased work of performing art or interpreting a role in it): “the action or process of performing a task or function” and “a task or operation seen in terms of how successfully it is performed.” Performance is here conceived as an act whose effect is judged as an accomplishment or failure. Performing implies a competence related to the ability to achieve something or have an effect. The conjunction of competence and effect plays an important role today in the widespread usage of the word performance outside the performing arts—as Jon McKenzie suggested by unfolding it in his book Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance as a conceptual triad of efficiency, efficacy, and effectiveness, of cultural, organizational, and technological performance in late capitalist society (McKenzie 2001).

However, the performances studied here disclose another view on performing, the emphasis of which is on the duration of action rather than the effect always considered as past. “Performing” suggests a frequentative form of doing which provides or generates something in time rather than being reduced to a felicitous or infelicitous act that achieves, fails to achieve, or transgresses a certain expected effect. This definition doesn’t exclude the effect that performing or performance must have, but shifts the constitutional bias away from it—from act with effect to temporal process. This deviation from the meaning of the performative act is suggested by the choreographies studied here. Three of them differentiate performing as a separate mode of expression by processualization of movement and change. Although performing in every performance can be argued to have an autonomous reality, Nvsbl and IITA make this difference radical in an assymmetry toward the co-present spectators, in the first case (Nvsbl) by a hallucinatory
inaccessibility of the process that engenders slow movement, and in the second case (IITA) by the opposite operation, by displaying how the two performing bodies are conditioned and affected by a machinic process. The problems these performances pose pertain to performing itself and will therefore be accounted for by concepts in the mode of performing.

Performance's third mode of expression is, like performing, related to the event of performance, but concerns spectatorship; however, the way that these choreographies transform it into a separate mode requires that we re-examine whether the concept of “spectating,” inherited from the history of theater, still applies to it.

The equivalent of the English word “performance” in the Romance languages originates from the Latin “spectaculum” (a spectacle that emphasizes the activity of looking, viewing, or beholding in the frequentative form). The connection between ancient Roman spectacles, such as circus, games, and fights, and the first courtly spectacles of dance, the ballet de cour of Louis XIV, consists in a comparable political function of representation, where control was exercised by the power of the visual. To attend the spectacle, starting with the Sun King, means to occupy a position, a seat that accounts for social rank and offers a perspective from which a gaze may observe and survey the stage as the ground of action. This yields the first historical condition of the spectator in Western theater: her looking implies a co-presence of other beholders as witnesses who not only watch the spectacle, but also keep an eye on each other’s appearance.

The second condition of the activity of the spectator in theater was established with the building in of the distance of observation in the auditorium. The spectators hold the privileged center of perspectival vision, which implies a division between stage and auditorium. Thus the perspectival space or the auditorium signifies a loss of participation that festivals and other ancient and medieval plebeian forms of entertainment had in favor of the disembodied gaze of observation. The Greek term for the “viewing place,” theatron, originally referred to the audience space of the Greek theater but later became synonymous with the entire auditorium, including both audience and stage. We will return to the function of distance in spectatorship in the discussion of the theatrical apparatus of representation in Chapter 3 (“Theatrical Apparatuses of Disjunction”). Observation maintains the centrality of vision in the parallel histories of Western theater and philosophy from Plato through Descartes to Diderot, where the rationalist meaning of the Cartesian contemplation of ideas in the I/eye of the mind defines the relationship between the beholder and the spectacle as a specular dialogue: the
gaze of the beholder is reflected from the viewed object back into the subject’s consciousness. Spectating rearticulates vision towards looking in order to be looked at or to have the look returned. The dominance that vision bears upon the ideological and epistemological in Western culture—or, in a word, ocularcentrism—has been critically examined in twentieth-century French thought (Jay 1993). More recently, Bleeker has argued for transforming the perspectival, ocularcentric gaze in contemporary theater into an event of visuality, which suggests a more ideologically complex process taking place in theater (Bleeker 2008). Yet, despite its departure from the straightforward critique of the rationalist model of vision in representation, Bleeker’s notion of visuality still reasserts the visual primacy of spectatorship.

In sum, the dominance of vision in spectatorship is grounded in two conditions: the co-presence of a community of onlookers and the dialogic specularity of the perspectival and disembodied gaze in address and response. All seven choreographies develop various ways of undermining it, but here I will briefly state only the most extreme cases. Nvsbl challenges vision by minute change. The image as a tableau—of four figures enduring an imperceptible movement of 4.5 meters—remains roughly the same, yet it is temporalized and intensified by detail and by an equally slow change of light from complete darkness to full light and back to complete darkness over 80 minutes. Thus there are long passages of darkness and silence where spectators remain in obscurity. U acts even more systematically upon invisibility. The stage is dark for almost the entire performance and spectators are given flashlights to illuminate it. Vision as such isn’t denied, but its objects are missing. There seems to be nothing to see, but the potentiality to not-see prompts the spectators to engage in other activities that become as significant as what is happening on the obscured and defigured stage. Their gaze isn’t embodied, but their whole presence is embedded in a “blind” performance, multiplying heterogeneous connections in between spectators, stage, performers, and their tools. While U seeks to blur the live action on stage, h-é counteracts the liveness of performance. The latter subtracts from the event both the stage with live performers and the audience, folding it into an environment of audiovisual connections with one spectator embedded in it.

Prioritizing time over space, temporalizing vision while engaging other senses, and embedding the spectator in choreography that no longer rests on the mirroring division between stage and auditorium are all reasons to introduce another concept that more accurately describes the activity of the spectator here: “attending.” The significance we attribute
to the term doesn’t derive from the history of theater, but is instead motivated by the works explored here, as well as by Bergson’s concept of attentive recognition as related to them. When a choreography is conceived as an assembling of heterogeneous movements and connections between the bodies of performers, spectators, objects, situations and so forth, then the performance “ex-tends” to include the presence and movement of those for whom the performance is presented in a non-dialogic relation. Performance is also attended when it is approached from the aspect of time. Time becomes that which prevents everything from being given at once. Attending a performance that involves the perception of bodily movement entails an experience of attuning, to performers’ movements, one’s perception and capacity to perceive. A great difference between the movement performed and the movement perceived by the seated attender may engender an asymmetry by which attending gives rise to its proper problems. The asymmetry between performing and attending could be considered within the distinction that Bergson makes between “automatic” (or “habitual”) and “attentive recognition” (MM: 98–104). Let us briefly discuss how automatic and attentive modes of recognition bear on the perception of movement. When performing, the performer’s perception is usually subtractive, that is, it extends itself into those movements which will have useful effects: they are the sensorimotor mechanisms enacted to produce certain bodily movements in space, the habits which are constituted and accumulated in practice and repetition. When in the very movement of performers the sensorimotor mechanism is broken, as is the case in Nvsbl, which thrives on a non-habitual, extremely decelerated movement, then the performer becomes perceiver of her own body, and the attender the perceiver of this perception. Attentive recognition occurs when the perceiver can’t extend her perception into habitual movements. The movements of the performer become more subtle and revert to the inside space of the body so as to extract sensations from it. The attender’s gaze is attentive because it returns to inspect the body again and again, in search of a perceptible change. Thus the attender seems to describe the experience of the same movement and bodies over and again, picking out different features, attuning to the detail—but the status of her perceptions is provisional, in question, for she can’t anticipate any movement and registers them only as they have lapsed.

In Deleuze’s ontology of cinema, the constitution of “time-images” in postwar auteur cinema as it deploys Bergson’s notion of attentive recognition is provoked by the shock-effect of World War II, which narratively explains why actors can no longer act, becoming perceivers of
situations they find themselves in. This gives rise to images which are 
restrained but have become richer by bringing out the singular char-
acteristics of the object. Deleuze calls them “pure” optical, auditive, 
or tactile “descriptions” (C2: 19–44). The break of the sensorimotor 
scheme in attending movement in these choreographies isn’t rooted 
in the form of representing everyday life, but in the gap between the 
attender’s own experience of motion, energy, and displacement and the 
staging thereof. Since she can’t recognize and identify with what and 
how the dancer moves, because it radically diverges from her horizon 
of expectations and threatens her own sense of difference between still-
ness and motion, the attender is caught in the duration of experience: 
a succession of qualitatively heterogeneous minuscule events that melt 
into one another, without distinction.

Apart from the concepts that pertain to attending during the event 
of performance, such as “becoming-molecular,” which accounts for 
the above-described experience of duration in Nvssl (and will be 
elaborated in Chapter 6), attending as a mode of expression is pro-
longed temporally after the event as well, thus once again challenging 
the centrality of the event and asserting its proper modal autonomy. 
“Resonance” is the concept which refers to this problem, and will be 
one of the arguments to support the claim of performance as a process 
rather than an act.

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Each of the following six chapters focuses on one or more problems 
that pertain to one of the expression modes of performance—making, 
performing, or attending. The central part of the chapter theoretically 
re-enacts the choreographies by unfolding the logic of problems that 
create them. When the path of formulating the problem in thought is 
constructed in parallel to that of the composition of the performance, 
the expressive concept is devised on the basis of the adequation between 
the problem, as its object, and the analysis of performance composition. 
In a few words, we will follow how these expressive concepts make up 
a chain of problems related to the very field of choreography: through 
disjunctions between the body and movement, or between performing 
and attending, or through a processualization of the body and move-
ment. Our first task will be to find out how the body and movement 
separate from each other and yet compose nonorganic relations, in 
contrast to the identity of the subjective or objective “self.”
This chapter focuses on the rupture of the body-movement bind, or the synthesis between the body and movement through the self-expression of the subject of dance or through the physical articulation of movement as the object of dance. In particular, I will explore the forms of corporeality that defy “the predication of embodied subjectivity” (Rothfield 2011: 204), which significantly marks the modernist legacy in contemporary dance. Modern and contemporary dance have served as prime metaphors for a phenomenological understanding of embodied experience and consciousness, emphasizing the subjectivist and personal attributes of movement (see Sheets-Johnstone 1966; Kozel 2008). As Stamatia Portanova remarks, “to retain the body as the basis of knowledge and experience means to pay repeated attention to the I: the lived experience is always his or her experience, and the approach is always in the first person” (Portanova 2013: 4). Although the choreographies we will discuss here don’t replace the body with a nonhuman agent, such as a digital system as in Portanova’s approach, but “retain” the body as the physical prop of movement, I will demonstrate how the relationship between the body and movement is rendered impersonal, desubjectivized, or disobjectivized on the basis of a deliberate disruption of the subjectivist/objectivist bind between them.

As elaborated in the introduction (“Rupture of the Body-Movement Bind”), movement became ontologically bound to the body in modern dance thanks to two distinct operations of conjoining the body and movement in an ostensibly necessary relationship. Subjectivation posits the body as the source of self-expression, where movement springs from the body’s urge to express its inner (emotive) experience. Objectivation conversely restricts the body to being an instrument of physical articulation of movement “in” and “for” itself. Both constitute the organic
regime of dance, as they link the body and movement in one organic whole guided by the identity of the subjective or objective “self” predicated on the body or movement, respectively. The synthesis between the body and movement is more than just the choreographic idea that historically established modern dance in the early twentieth century; it also continues to regulate recognition in the creation and reception of contemporary dance. Hence the moving body in contemporary dance elicits the following questions regarding its identification: who or what this body or movement is, why the body moves as it does, what characterizes such movement or what it expresses, and so on. Such questions frame representation in Deleuze’s sense of the model of recognition discussed in Chapter 1 (“Thought beyond recognition”): the body and movement stand in relations in which the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (in the body) is mirrored and represented in the objective identity of the movement (by the means of the body).

*Self Unfinished* (SU), *It’s In The Air* (IITA) and *Nvsbl* call forth an inquiry altogether different from the representational “what-is” question: how this is a body, if it is a body, how the body moves as it does, if it moves at all, if there is movement to perceive, where the movement comes from if it doesn’t seem to originate from the body or extend in space, et cetera. Recognition here is hindered by the disruption of the subjectivizing or objectivizing relations between the body and movement. The body and movement enter compositions in which they coalesce into each other but also differentiate from themselves. They are caught in disjunctive captures that cannot be qualified by the organic disposition of subject and object accounted for by self-expression or the autonomy of movement qua object. By “capture” we draw on Deleuze’s concept of a process of convergence of two terms that transforms them as disparate entities—here the body and movement—in a joint becoming. The graphic illustration of a disjunctive capture in Deleuze is the encounter between the orchid and the wasp as one of a transformative relationality, in which the two disparate, heterogeneous terms “capture” and “steal” from each other that which then makes them evolve in “a-parallel” ways (*DII*: 2–7). In other words, the relation between the orchid and the wasp doesn’t define them by a mutual and common attribute, but is a third instance in which the two terms participate differently. The captures we shall be analyzing here are disjunctive, as they arise from choreographic compositions that partition the body and movement. In doing so, they also differentiate agencies between part-bodies, part-machines, movement, and sensation. The focus of our analysis is to unravel how, and by the means of which questions,
conditions, terms, and compositional procedures, are conjunctions between the body and movement rendered nonorganic and defiant of subjectivist self-expression or instrumental objectivation.

**Self Unfinished: part-bodies**

Let us begin here with the problem Xavier Le Roy poses at the outset of his creation, as briefly indicated in Chapter 1 (“Problems and Ideas”): how will he not decide what is to be seen? This question gives rise to the idea whose object is the problem of affirming non-identity, a multiplicity beyond the dichotomy of the One and the Multiple, but also outside of the transcendental sense of arbitrary openness of interpretation. In *SU*, Le Roy is determined to construct neither a body, nor a movement of a “schizophrenic body,” but rather a performance involving the very modes of perception. Hence, the thought from which the performance will rise is an Idea in the Deleuzian sense we defined in Chapter 1: the Idea whose object isn’t a known possible expression of the body in movement, but a problem that will generate a new composition. The idea of non-identity then forces a series of divergences from the habitual points of identifying the moving body in performance, which the following analysis will unravel.

The performance begins with dismantling the beginning as the empty stage on which the movement of the body will emerge *ex nihilo*. Everything that for now appears as actual—a white space, a man sitting on a chair at a nondescript square table, and a ghetto blaster—is exposed to the view of the audience entering the theater. Looking attentively at the spectators, Le Roy enjoins them to look back and identify a casually dressed man sitting nonchalantly—an image of the ordinary. This beginning is either a demystifying encounter whereby the distinction of roles between the performer and the spectators is acknowledged, or it is not a beginning at all, suggesting, as the end will confirm, the time before (and after) the event. The opening encounter based on gazing ends when the man stands up, walks to press the button on the ghetto blaster and returns to the table. Even though no change occurs in terms of sound or anything else, pressing the button signals that the “program begins.” The sitting posture is now very different: the way his hands rest on his thighs, his straight-backed way of leaning against the chair, and so forth, pronounces the contact between the body and the furniture as distinct yet connected elements. This image endures for nearly one minute, after which the body leans slowly forward while making a robot sound and then freezes for a moment. A robot-like, mechanical motion
is established: the body moves one separate body part at a time at a slow and even pace while producing the sounds of a robot at work in a rhythm of motion-freeze-motion-freeze. The robot walks two diagonals, marking the points in space that will be revisited, and during the third line walks out toward the ghetto blaster in a pedestrian manner, as he did at the beginning, and presses the button. Hence the signal of the button brackets off the scene as another false beginning, as the infantile mimetic logic that will be abandoned immediately. Le Roy’s walking out of this imitation-shtick—and the transformation process on which the body will embark—suggests an ironic dismissal of a false change: the anthropomorphic image of the machine, that is, the robot (see Figure 1).

As he presses the button to silence a fake source of sound against the evidence that he was the one producing both the robotic sound and the movements, the man begins to walk backwards, facing the audience with the front of his body, but moving toward the wall. A loop of slow-paced walks evolves, a sliding continuum of steps from the ghetto blaster to the wall and between the wall and the table, interposing long moments of stillness at two spatial points: standing with the back turned to the audience (or lying motionless) against the back wall, and sitting at the table. The moment he touches the chair, he changes the direction of the movement, rises, and continues to walk backwards. The back and forth movement between the two points that have already been established in the space confuses any spatial and chronometric-temporal direction that could be measured and visualized through the trajectory of walking; in a word, it frustrates any linear progression of time.

![Figure 1](image)

**Figure 1** Still images from the video recording of *Self Unfinished* © Xavier Le Roy/ in situ productions, 1998
The question arises as to whether the loops of backward walks are the reverse of a past act which was never present. If there was the “here and now” of an act that the audience could hitherto witness, now it is suspended and distributed between a present and another line of time. The time no longer progresses linearly, but bifurcates in two series: an actual present (i.e., the walking backwards in slow motion) and a past that still needs to be actualized (i.e., the walking forward). The durations of still poses in which the face is hidden or the head disappears from view appear indeterminate, once the orientation in space is lost due to the walking loops. The body lies motionless in the fold between the wall and the ground long enough for its actual image—the man imitating the robot—to begin to decenter from itself. One can no longer only see that body, whose motion and liveness we have just experienced. Instead we see a cloud of other images begin to hover over it, images of a dead body, a body with undeterminable characteristics, unknown age or gender, organic remains, a bundle of cloth, and probably many more (see Figure 2).

After another walk backwards in slow motion to the chair and then to the ghetto blaster—closing a triangle of the three paths—the man pulls his shirt over his head and bends his torso so that the inside of the shirt covers his arms and head. The flipping of the costume splits his body in two. Two pairs of “legs” seem to appear—one masculine, the other feminine—even though the audience is always aware that in actuality these “legs” are two arms and two legs belonging to the same male body. The shirt acting as a skirt helps to convert the arms of the male into the legs of a female body, but the illusion is nonetheless voluntary. It is not by resemblance between these limbs that the body is halved.
and doubled and then split into two genders. The mimicry is a voluntary act of the spectator, who can choose to interfere with her own perception: she can see it as the man moving backwards with a bent body, or as two bodies entangled to move together in opposite directions—the lower half of a man in trousers pushed to walk backwards by the lower half of a woman wearing a skirt and moving forward. The body divides into two dissimilar entities. Their relation is a constructed bifurcation rather than the necessary result of an interaction between the two parts “male” and “female.”

The spatial reversal of the loops of walks changes the linear into a non-chronological time by splitting it into a present and a memory of a past that didn’t previously exist. Likewise, the body that we first identified as a man now appears as a two-body, and the facility with which this transformation occurs makes the two-body equal to the initial appearance of a man. The two asymmetrical units—the male and the female body parts—are entangled in reciprocal, contrary motion along the same path of walks. Passing under the table on the way to the position of lying, it leans and moves against the wall where its shape changes again by virtue of adjusting perception and multiplying the image of the figure. The pair of male legs in trousers leans on the wall, while the pair of female legs, or the arms, moves along the border of the wall, supporting the legs. A third image emerges beside the man and the entangled double: the human figure whose limbs have exchanged place and function and who has no head (see Figure 3).

In the lying position, it again becomes another arrangement of limbs that makes the figure indiscernible, its characteristics even less determinable than before. In the next loop of walks between the table and the

*Figure 3* Still images from the video recording of *Self Unfinished* © Xavier Le Roy/in situ productions, 1998
lying position, the body fluctuates between the two: the entangled double, where the female part pushes the male part and the man dressed in black, who goes back to sitting on the chair and then lying as a man, flipping the skirt into a shirt. The loop ends with a walk to the corner on the opposite end of the diagonal, downstage left, where the man takes his trousers off and pulls the shirt into a dress. The same man now walks back to the table dressed as a woman, so the change is now a matter of cross-dressing. The doubleness of the split body now spreads in a succession and oscillation between three figures: the entangled double, the man in trousers, and the man in drag wearing a woman’s dress.

This perpetual oscillation between the three figures described above marks the beginning of yet another process in which it is no longer possible to delimit the form of figures or their relationship, or single out one without taking the others all together at once. The awareness of the male body never disappears, but the characteristics by which it can be described and recognized, the morphology of the body, the functions of its members, its movement and displacement, posture, and behavior, are dislocated and decentered, moving away from the image of the man. Two procedures precipitate this effect: the substitution of the horizontal for the vertical axis (uprightness) of posture and displacement, and the “beheading” of the body, achieved by turning it upside down and eliminating the head from view. However, these procedures only provide the condition—abolishing the human configuration of the body—for a journey of expressions that bear little resemblance to real or fictional beings, to the animals or monsters of a bestiary. For the sake of comprehension, the differentiations could be likened to “headless creatures,” indicating a divergence from anthropomorphic figures, even though no stabilization or consolidation of corporeal form beyond a moment of passage would allow this qualification. The moments determine a zone of proximity between elements of many disparate, unidentifiable bodies without composing a new creature, a monster, that could be identified by the relation between these elements. The moments are differentiated by changes that constitute the process of production rather than a destined end. Their materialization can be technically described in terms of how the human body is modified, or what it has to do in order to unmake its recognizable image. I will list them here in their order of appearance: clasping hands and feet into two circuit-limbs and rolling in this configuration around the space; headless, overturned upside-down body with circuit-limbs; exchanging the functions of arms and legs; arching the arms above the uplifted bottom in place of the missing head; facializing the fists and palms in the air as sensors; rotating arms
as legs on the floor by almost 180 degrees, thus canceling the distinction between the front and the back of the body; lifting the body on four limbs without the head (see Figure 4).

These moments are the singular points of a continuum, singled out as actualizations of different kinds of multiplicity. They are perceived as different moments of exchange between the actual configuration of the body and the human figure that subsists in it like a virtual image. In other words, the multiple and the one in the body are recomposed according to differing “captures”—continually different relations of convergence between many unidentifiable part-bodies. These points occur on the border or limit, in the in-between of the disparate part-bodies. Between the singular points, the differenciation continues in duration where time qualifies the change. The importance of duration cannot be stressed enough, for it is not the still poses, the images, that accompany the description here and demonstrate unrecognizable reconfigurations of the human body; it is by the process of becoming that the

Figure 4 Still images from the video recording of *Self Unfinished* © Xavier Le Roy/ in situ productions, 1998
Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement

heterogeneous series of captures unfolds. The capture here involves elements of the disparate bodies via movement—the movement divides one body into parts of disparate bodies, connects them, hence making them coalesce in a new multiplicity. If capture is the manner in which an assembling (agencement) creates a zone of proximity between several heterogeneous elements, then in SU it is the mode that operates the connection between the body and movement in becoming multiple. The body and movement do not serve each other as within the synthesis of representation, where a body is qualified by the way it moves or where the form of movement requires a certain stylistic adjustment or modification of the body. They conversely interpenetrate each other and coalesce without constituting the form of an organic whole, the organism of the body and its movement. They are inseparable from the block of becoming in which they converge as disparate parts. The process of becoming develops on a level before or below the consolidating and representing of an individual body and its movement—regardless of whether the kind of body or form of movement that would represent this individual is human or nonhuman. The failure of attempts to name these headless creatures can be compared to the projection of intelligible, often anthropomorphic forms into nebulous phenomena, such as clouds or foam. The projections can only be voluntary approximations reflecting the spectator’s need for recognition. Critics’ remarks about recognizing “mollusks,” a “chicken,” a “spider,” or even a “body without organs”\(^1\) manifest the force of representation, which conflates sense with the recognition of a possible, that is, an already existing being or concept to be represented. The scarcity of attributive nouns proves the inadequacy of accounting for a process of becoming by qualifying subject-objects.

By consequence, the disjunction of the body-movement bind yields “part-bodies” that enter into composition with movements, which are also transformed by and inseparable from their fusion with the part-bodies. “Part-body” does not designate a body lacking completeness, but rather signifies the composition of one or more bodies with movements in which one or more part-bodies keep the double status of the one and the multiple. The concept of “part-body” is akin to “partial objects,” which Deleuze and Guattari adapt from Mélanie Klein’s psychoanalytic term and redefine in terms of anoedipal desiring production. While Klein relates partial objects to an original, ideal, unified, and totalized whole from which they are derived (préllevés), therefore continuing to represent the lacking totality (e.g., mother’s breast, phallus, etc.) (Klein in AO: 37), Deleuze and Guattari conceive of them as primary agents
of “production of production and antiproduction,” or of a nonpersonal continuous flow from which they are drawn or “detached” as fragmentary, nonrepresentative agents (AO: 42–9). What makes them agents are the connections, conjunctions, and disjunctions in which they partake. Part-bodies are hence partial objects in Deleuzo-Guattarian conception, because they constitute the nonpersonal “break-flow” of transformations, in conjunction with movement that produces multiple reconfigurations of the body and the inanimate objects it enters into composition with. Thus in those configurations that are referred to here, for convenience, as “headless creatures,” the man is just one part-body oscillating between being the actual object or a virtual image in relation to other part-bodies.

The section of “headless creatures” discussed above comes as the fourth in a five-part structure where the fifth and last section reverses the actions that mark the spatial points (table, wall, ghetto blaster, and downstage left corner) in triangular loops. The performer rearranges the objects in the space according to the first scene, in the reverse order of how these actions occurred at the beginning: putting his clothes back on, rearranging the table and the chair, assuming the sitting position from the first scene, lying against the wall, walking the loops forwards between the two spots, pressing the button on the ghetto blaster (which, unlike the same action at the beginning of the piece, now triggers music) and eventually leaving the stage. The reversal suggests a palindrome, that the performance ran backwards, rewinding a past whose farthest moment is reached in the end, which is simultaneously the beginning of the performance. But the palindrome is incomplete, and it confuses the order between the first and the fourth and fifth parts as if it were a recollection of a lived past, or the memory of a past that never was.

In addition to confusing the relationship between the past and the present time of this performance, all five sections foreground different oscillations of the body-movement on the actual/virtual axis. Although the first section seems to toy with the logic it will abandon—imitation—the division of the actual/virtual rests on the cause–effect relationship between the robotic sound and the robotic movement: which of the two is automatic and involuntary; does the sound trigger the movement, or vice versa? The loops of backward walks, intercut with the body lying on the floor and becoming nonspecific, divide the time into a circuit between the present and a past that was never present, but that now actualizes itself somewhere between the living and the dead body. The third oscillation involves a bifurcation of male and female part-bodies. The fourth drifts the farthest into a desubjectivation where
the actual object of the body of the man now becomes the virtual image in a proliferation of actual becomings-multiple. The order of the movements suggests that desubjectivation proceeds in phases that successively treat diverse dimensions: from live-automatic action, through present-past body (alive-dead body), man-woman disjunction and connections of part-bodies, to the idea of nonhuman part-bodies in many becomings-multiple. The fifth and last stage of the desubjectivation process is marked by the human body doubled as an image from memory. Thanks to the movement of reversing the present of the performance into its own past, the body of the man that appeared in all its ordinariness, as recognizable in the beginning, positions itself as the past of the performance in the present.

**It’s In The Air: part-bodies, part-machines**

As we have seen in *SU*, one way of constructing a multiplicity of part-bodies is to repartition the human body and recompose its parts in a process of becoming many different unrecognizable nonhuman part-bodies, avoiding stabilization and unification into one figure that is complete and total in its form and image. Another way is to bring the human body into composition with a machine where both will act toward one another as heterogeneous part-bodies and machines, detachable parts of part-bodies, and machines of machines. The connections between these part-bodies and machines confirm their status as partial objects, as Deleuze and Guattari define them:

Partial objects are only apparently derived from (*prélevés sur*) global persons; they are really produced by being drawn from (*prélevés sur*) a flow or a nonpersonal *hyle*, with which they re-establish contact by connecting themselves to other partial objects. (*AO: 46*)

These connections constitute heterogeneous assemblings (*agencements*) of part-bodies and machines qua partial objects or agents, whose productivity lies in grafting the process of production—through various conjunctions and disjunctions in motion—onto them, never deriving or slicing off a body or a movement as a destined product.

In *IITA*, at least four such connections can be discerned at the outset. The first occurs when the performer steps onto the trampoline in the first ten minutes of the performance. All movement will be determined by this attachment—body-trampoline—about which it can also be said that the body *plugs* into the trampoline.
The doubling of this attachment in a man and a woman joining two separate trampolines deviates from the attempt to reproduce the same in “unison” synchronicity, but also from the disjunction of two autonomous, unrelated body-trampolines. Hence the second connection, which occurs next, is formed between two body-trampolines. Becoming a machine of two machines, the two body-trampolines develop rhythms of syncopation, convergence, and divergence, a process in which the machine of the two co-acting machines becomes different from itself.

The two bodies of the man and the woman also act and subject toward each other, complicating the parallelism of the body-trampoline connection. This connection develops from being inside the two separate body-trampolines, to coupling the two part-bodies and plugging their new becoming into one trampoline.

A fourth connection unfolds between the two part-bodies and the two body-trampolines only once, when jumping extends across the trampolines (“squaredance”).

These connections can be schematized as follows:

- A body-trampoline machine
  \[A-X_1 \text{ or } B-X_2\]

- A machine of two body-trampolines
  \[A-X_1 \text{ – } B-X_2\]

- A machine of two part-bodies-trampolines
  \[A-B \text{ – } X_2\]

- A machine of two part-bodies-body-trampolines
  \[A-B \text{ – } X_1-X_2\]

Within each body-trampoline, be it a machine or a machine of machines, the point of contact and type of attachment between the body and the trampoline varies. Depending on the number of contact points and body parts or regions used for them, a variety of verbs is needed to describe how jumping or bouncing evolves. Jumping on two feet develops into arching with two points of contact (listed here in their order of appearance): feet and bottom, feet and back, and adding a third point, the knees, in a threefold jump. Two points of contact involve two different kinds of motion, a jump and a bounce, when the bodies support their jump on their toes while bouncing off their knees or when they flip from their backs to their knees towards the end of the performance.
The bodies oscillate from left to right shoulder, using the right leg as a third point of contact, as if the vertical pull-force of gravity makes them hang in the air and swing like a pendulum (near the end). The use of feet, which prevails in the body-trampoline, yields to different kinds of motion, none of which can be reduced to a jump (listed in their order of appearance): pivoting on one leg, vibrating from a frozen body, skipping across the trampolines, stepping or sliding forward and backward, or running or sliding. Bouncing transforms into other kinds of motion as well (listed in their order of appearance): using all four limbs for what could be either a jump or a bounce, grabbing the net with the hands and moving about the horizontal surface, ejecting the whole body by propelling the legs into the air while holding onto the net, first with two hands and then with one, bouncing in the sitting position and moving about by pushing the body with hands against the net, moving about on all fours as points of contact.

The intricate complexity of the ways that the bodies plug into the trampolines, compounded by several machinic connections in which the two bodies and two trampolines conjugate, attests to a constructivist vein of composition. The choreographic composition of IITA amounts to a construction of constraints in which movement and the body, as well as their relation, constantly change. These constraints also clearly indicate that the trampoline here is not utilized as a device of mechanical extension whose main purpose would be to amplify the capacity of the body in jumping. The function of satisfying the wish to jump higher, faster, longer, or stronger or fly in the air as a matter of illusionistic virtuosity is soon enough expunged. The trampoline becomes the choice of severe limitation, a radical physical constraint on movement production, as it substitutes a resistant surface for the stable ground of the dance floor. The elastic surface of the net reflects the smallest motion and thus makes absolute stillness impossible. Applying the force of pressing with the mass of the body and bouncing off the net triggers the binary motion of jump-bounce. The authors stress that “the trampolines don’t jump us unless we jump them” (Ingvartsen and van Dinther 2007: 4). But when they jump, or when they attempt to move on the trampoline surface in any other way, this jump or movement will not be fully under their control, but will be shaped by the resistance coming from the resilience of the net. The force to move is initiated by their will, yet they are not the exclusive agents of the movement. Every jump contains a moment of rest where the body is riding on the effort it has already produced. In that moment, the body undergoes the momentum in the physical sense and becomes a patient of the movement, that is, a body that is merely
reactive to the movement that arose by the external force. This contributes to the sense of effortlessness and “naturalness,” as if the movement were a mechanical effect entirely caused by the trampoline alone. **IITA** is composed on the basis of this relation between active effort and passive effortlessness, between the visible and invisible initiation of movement. Movement is a product of the combined, heterogeneous agency and assembling of body-trampoline, or **agencement machinique**. It is an instance of the cofunctioning of two terms, the body and the trampoline, and the heterogeneous forces they involve: motion out of intention and force to move, momentum as the product of the mass and velocity of the body, the pull-force of gravity, and the elasticity of the springboard.

The question as to how movement and body are conceived in the shared agency of the body-trampoline begins with why they initially sought this connection. That it is a matter of conditioning the body, or “violent training,” as Deleuze would have it (DR: 165), rather than reinforcing its habitual knowledge, is revealed by the following statement:

> We are not looking for what we can do on a trampoline but rather for what a trampoline can do for us . . . . By introducing the trampolines as a resistance to the movement production we force ourselves to reconsider everything we know about the dancing body, in relation to weight, shape, gravity, direction, rhythm and phrasing. (Ingvartsen and van Dinther 2007: 1)

By capturing the heterogeneous forces of impulse, momentum, resilience, and gravity, the body-trampoline assembling also captures the body and movement in a composition of variable relations that transform them without mutually identifying them. The body and movement are heterogeneous, yet caught in reciprocal modulation. They are involved and complicated by each other in so far as it is impossible to extract the form or trajectory of the movement independent of the transformation of the body. In that sense, movement is synonymous with transformation and change where the distinction between the process of the movement and the moving agent or patient has to be abandoned. Experimenting with the mechanical conditioning of motion on the vertical axis of jump/bounce contests the functions of object and subject in dance as they have conventionally been understood since the beginnings of modern dance. To move is not to go through a trajectory which can be decomposed and reconstructed in quantitative terms; to move is to undergo the transformation of the body in the Bergsonian sense that makes movement a qualitative change. The conjunction of
the body and movement in alternating functions of object/subject is broken, delinked, and replaced by a continuum of body and movement as two heterogeneous terms caught in a bloc of becoming where both transform without merging.

*IIITA* does not represent a machine or movement rendered mechanical due to the intervention of the trampoline. Ingvartsen and van Dinther compose their bodies with the trampolines, whereby the human body becomes a component of the machine or combines with the trampoline and the other body and body-trampoline to constitute a machine of machines. The composition unfolds a machinic process in which the body becomes other than itself, opening the subjective “I”—the knowledge of habitual and preferred ways of moving—to new affective connections with the nonhuman thing. This machinic process explores the physical limits of the dancing body’s capacity to change within the machinic body-trampoline agencement.

**Nvsbl: partitioning and adequation between movement and sensation**

We have seen how the body-trampoline agencement renders movement initiation ambiguous. Now we will explore the problem of rendering the genesis of movement invisible—in *Nvsbl*—raising the question of which terms are best employed to qualify body, movement, and their relation. The mission of *Nvsbl* was to alter the perceptibility of movement—from visibility to kinesthetic and proprioceptive sensibility. The performers develop sensations from their own body from which will be issued a movement hardly visible in its outer shape, a movement that the spectators can sense and experience without seeing how it is being executed. As briefly discussed in Chapter 1 ("Problems and Ideas"), this problem entailed contesting the very logic of moving as well as the fundamental assumptions of choreography, such as the spatiotemporal structure of movement and the distinction of the subject–object relationship between the body and the movement it executes. We will now untangle how this appears in the experience of the attender and how it is constructed in performing.

*Nvsbl* evolves in a process of drastically slow movement by which four female performers gravitate from four points at the outer edge (four corners) of the stage to the center, traversing 5.5 meters during a period of about 80 minutes. The trajectory they effectuate is so convoluted and extended in duration that neither spectators nor performers themselves can fully grasp it. While spectators can register transformation
in retrospect—by looking away and then looking back to verify if any change has occurred—they can hardly discern movement. Sabisch describes it as an experience below the threshold of perception:

One might think that the few movements of the four extremely slow-moving performers cannot escape the attentive eye, but the opposite is the case: precisely because the movements are extremely decelerated they pass beneath the threshold of perception, where it seems impossible to retain the movement-images, so that the retention itself becomes porous. (Sabisch 2011: 186)

Contrary to Sabisch, who in her reading of Nvsbl argues for a lack of continuous qualitative transformation, we want to suggest that movements, bodies, and duration here act upon each other in such a way that they compose a heterogeneous capture. The result of such composition is that movement cannot be discerned as displacement operated by the body. All parameters by which movement is habitually perceived and recognized in shape and size are suspended. Firstly, no one element can be singled out—such as a step, gesture, or movement of a certain body part. The four bodies move in a continuum without discrete units, as in one-bound motion—the opposite of sequencing or phrasing. This continuity is achieved by eliminating rhythmic or thematic patterns, strictly avoiding accents and the distinction of what in dance language is referred to as vocabulary.2 Secondly, when the observation of this motion is tuned to its slow pace, it appears that the whole body is involved in movement, wherein the many different parts are simultaneously engaging diverse processes. Multiplicity results from the impression that the body is not moving in one direction, subordinating and actuating all body parts to reach one goal, peak or end by which the movement would be completed. Instead, many body parts are entangled in endless divergent paths, which nevertheless seem to coalesce in one motion, grouped in one body. In addition to the lack of one channeling direction, the performers neither predispose themselves to the presentation of movement as an object distinct from their bodies—the one-bound motion cannot be separated from the bodies—nor does this movement inscribe itself on the neutral ground of the stage. Rather, the movement affects or shapes the space that envelops the body. It cannot be extracted from the body or objectified in a form or trajectory which could be decomposed and recombined in spatial patterns and quantitative terms. Rather than contending that “this body moves,” it is more accurate to describe it as folding in and unfolding, or opening,
constantly trying to gain and enhance the space within itself. The body is not deployed as an instrument. It becomes the internal space which substitutes for the projecting and drawing of movement in geometric planes, the latter being a process which often accounts for the activity of dancing (Forsythe and Bürkle 1999).\(^3\) This becomes more evident when the recorded performance is sped up mechanically—a passage of about 20 minutes accelerated to 5 minutes exhibits a rather convoluted journey of bodies sinking, which could not be discerned as such in real time (see Figure 5).

The spectator’s perception of the body not in movement but in an involution, where a sense of stillness obscures transformation, is the result of a principle of movement thoroughly different from either Western theater dance or everyday movement. The four performers developed this principle on the basis of Body-Mind Centering® (BMC®), by interpreting this kinesthetic discipline of anatomic and physiological aspects of embodiment.\(^4\) A widely used body practice, applied not only in dance but also in many kinds of bodywork, yoga, psychotherapy, child development, athletics, music and so forth, BMC® is “an experiential study based on the embodiment and application of anatomical, physiological, psychophysical and developmental principles, utilizing movement, touch, voice and mind” (Cohen 1993: n.p.). The starting point of BMC® lies in the possibility of developing a correspondence between sensations of the body and action expressed in movement, touch, or voice. Thus BMC® explores how awareness of various systems of the body (fluids, tissues, organs, skeleton, the senses, the neuroendocrine system) can motivate action based on perception. In a nutshell, BMC® is founded on the claim that a movement can be initiated in those places in the body the awareness of which has not

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Figure 5  Nvsbl © Eszter Salamon/Botschaft Gbr, 2006. Photography © Alain Roux
been scientifically proven, and that the nature of the location the movement is initiated in will be reflected in the quality of that movement.\(^5\)

Whether the knowledge of the nature of this movement, how that movement is caused and what its quality depends on is adequate or rational, is not the issue here. The initiation of movement from a sensation of a place in the body has its stake in reversing the habitual mode of the production of movement. The end in performing dance is usually considered to be movement of a certain shape, size, effort, direction, and other characteristics. Movement as the end then defines the means by which it will be caused, how it will be danced, or the technique required for it to be executed to obtain certain qualities. Performers learn to imagine the movement they wish to produce, and bearing the image of the movement in their mind, they develop bodily awareness and control of the means to produce it. Repetitions of the same movement fix a coordination between the technique of moving and the form of movement so that the technical process can automatically trigger a certain movement. Hence the movement becomes the effect of the technique. By applying the BMC® principle of initiating movement from a sensation, the performers in Nvsbl attempt to “unlearn” the conscious, yet automatic habitual mechanism of imagining and performing motion. This effectively means that they shift focus from movement as an effect to its cause. They move attention from an achievement of a certain image and form of movement to an exploration of a place inside the body, a sensation of physiological processes, which they vaguely imagine. I will illustrate what this shift of focus entails with an analysis of the beginning of Nvsbl.

The task that the performers share in the beginning is to “initiate” movements from two fluids, both occurring at the same time. The intercellular fluid, a gel-like liquid or connective tissue surrounding all the cells in the body, designates a constant movement throughout the whole body. While in BMC® the characteristic qualities of intercellular fluid are “vitality, strength, fluid musculature, sensuous, spongyness, peripheral pump, activity-oriented, active involvement with the outer environment” (Cohen 1993: 71), all derived from reading the function of transporting nourishment and waste in and out of the cells, the performers in Nvsbl refer to it as the principle of “organic fluidity” (Salamon 2006: n.p.). To invoke the sensation of it, they translate the physiological account above into metaphors expressed in verbal images: being immersed in the ocean, being the container in which everything moves, while the container also moves, and so on. Whereas the intercellular fluid provides the basic matrix for the whole piece, a focus on
the lymph glands determines their coming onto the stage. The purifying function of lymph glands, whose movement is upward, against gravity, calls for the qualities described by BMC®: “specificity, clarity, directness, a continuous steady flow of delineation, boundaries/limits, defense, clear focus, fine, delicate, detailed, crystallization, spider’s web” (Cohen 1993: 77). The performers translate these into similar directives: “crystal precision, clarity in tendencies, moving front” (Salamon 2007: n.p.). But their motion does not follow the exploration of the movement initiation that BMC® recommends: “Become aware of your present situation and feel what you would like to do next. Once you have decided, do it with directness and clarity—no hesitation or wobbliness. Now engage in any movement with that same quality of directness and clarity and specificity” (Cohen 1993: 77).

Comparing this movement task with the description of the qualities of lymph glands raises the question as to why the performers invest in imagining the physiological process where they could more easily follow the aforementioned instruction, readily available in BMC®, which specifies the quality of movement and gives the performer concrete tasks regarding how to move. The answer lies precisely in inverting the habitual logic of the production of movement: if they were asked to translate the qualities of lymph glands into movement, they would seek images of movement from dance history or anything else they might know. Specificity, clarity of lines, and clear focus could lead to a comparison with the style of Merce Cunningham or another modernist dance style, but if an analogy should be drawn between a BMC task and a movement style, then the production of movement would become, contrary to its initial motivation, mimetic. Shifting focus from the image of the movement-effect to the imaginary cause of it breaks with the mimetic operation by which movement is generated and transmitted in Western dance tradition. The imagining of the place within the body—a fluid or a tissue or an organ—is not based on a certain knowledge. There are no ways to ascertain objectivity and measure qualities of performers’ perceptions. Imagination involves constructing metaphors, such as those described above, that help to invoke a sensation. “Invocation” resounds with the jargon of BMC®—“calling” or “contacting” sensations as something already existing in and of the body—while a more adequate term would be “feigning,” or pretense of affection. The sensation turns out to be a product of a voluntary action: a will to imagine and strive to sense and feel movement within the body. The striving is what takes time and differentiates duration, hindering the image of movement or preventing everything from being
given all at once. Invoking is then the process of giving rise to sensation and movement at the same time.

The procedure that the performer engages in in order to construct a relation with the imaginary place in her own body could be qualified as a partitioning of the body. To locate, detect, and build a sensation from a specific body system (e.g., lymph of the system of fluids) the performer differentiates, separates out the perceptions she associates with other parts of that system (e.g., arterial blood). Precision involves a relentless division and splitting in order to go further and acquire more specific sensations. The specification of a sensation progresses from partitioning to the infusion of many body parts with the movement of that sensation. This is how the performer “composes,” whereby composition involves analytically partitioning the sensation and synthetically filtering the whole body with it. But this represents only the inward side of composition, as each performer is facing three other bodies involved in the same process and is encouraged to compose relations “with” other bodies. The relations between the bodies are not predetermined, so there are no choreographed configurations of four bodies in space that need to be fulfilled at any moment. The only exceptions are the beginning and the end—the departure from the farthest possible distance between the bodies on the stage to their spatial convergence in the end—as well as two more moments when all four are turned in different directions or are facing the same direction, front (towards the end). As these are so stretched in time, they cannot act as goalposts to which all movement tends. A third outward element represents the composition of the face. Knowing that even if it is excluded from movement the face will reflect mental self-absorption during the partitioning of the sensation, the performers instead actively compose movement in the face. The tasks include conjuring memories of the dynamic of certain moods and emotions, and placing the sensation-movement into another environment, with a quality that it could not actually have, for instance, how it would feel to do this slow, imperceptible movement while running, recalling the sensation of running, while not running. The expression-conjuring technique changes in correspondence to the focus of sensation-movement invoked. For instance, when the bodies are rising, the expression on their faces can grow in volume or size. Or towards the end when three of them are manipulating a banknote, the strategy of diverting attention from this action lies in exaggeration through extreme facial expressions (see Figure 6).

The construction of a radically slow one-bound motion attests to the principle of overriding the effect of the form (the movement) with the
cause (the sensation). For the performers, implementing this principle, however it targets sensation, is intentional and controlled. The spectators, on the other hand, are denied access to this process. What they can see gives them no insight into the intricacies of partitioning and manipulating sensations from which the motion is initiated. The process of invoking sensation as a cause for invisible movement remains inaccessible, and its effect is not a discrete form. The spectators discern the motion in tendency, and not as a difference that could be qualified and quantified in form, size, and space. The motion expresses itself as a tendency before being the effect of a cause. Some tendencies can be discerned as sinking or rising, but without ascertaining that to sink or rise would be the definite goal of the experienced change. The spectators witness motion as real transformation and change which abolishes the distinction between the moving body and the movement itself. The transformation pertains to the bodies primarily, but also affects the relations between them and the changing configuration of the bodies in the space. At the core of the transformation is a coalescence of movement and the body in a capture between sensation and movement. Again—albeit not by machinic agency as in IITA, but caused by its own means—the body is caught in transformation which is its own movement. The slow one-bound motion is not a natural continuum. It is the result of capturing a sensation from within the body and adequating movement to it. This capture is disjunctive, as it constructs an external link between the body and movement by way of imagination and invocation, a kind of feigning of sensation. The adequation between sensation and movement distinguishes itself from the representation of sensation through a certain kind of motion by way of invocation that conflates sensation and movement into one process, the cause (sensation) being immanent in the effect (movement).
Although the performers in Nvshl draw their technique from BMC®, whose assumptions are holistic, the movement they create is nonorganic. The organic basis of the continuous transformation of the body is not a natural, spontaneous, or automatic tendency, but a constructed manipulation of the performer, who uses imagination to physically justify a mental striving. For, as Salamon reports (Salamon 2007: n.p.), the wish to make movement imperceptible could have been addressed as a negative, “fascistic” task of elimination (of space), abstraction (of the form of movement), and reduction (of the size of movement). By operating a link between movement and sensation of a place in the body, the performers are constructing an expression that sensorially affirms the gained space within the body. The event of sensation, movement, and change coalesces with its place, the body, which dissolves the form of movement. The performer drives her imagination toward plugging into a sensation that in turn shapes the movement. Distinguishing the categories of the subject and the object here seems inadequate, because both the body and movement have coalesced in mutual transformation, whereby they act as part-objects of the same process.

* What conclusions can we draw from the comparison of the compositional procedures and the respective problems from which they arise in these three choreographies? Disjunct from the organic subject-object bind of modern dance, the body and movement in the three performances construct three types of heterogeneous continua, each pertaining to a different register of the organic bind: the identity of the dancing subject, the agency (action/passion) of movement, and the object (form) of movement. The first type entails that movement splits the body into double and multiple virtual-actual images, thus disidentifying its subject, the man who persistently differs from our expectations of his bodily image, who can no longer coincide with his actual body (SU). The second type shows how desubjectivation proceeds by joining the bodies with trampolines in several part-body-part-machine connections so that the movement becomes the product of shared agency, shared between the body and the trampoline, between voluntary action and undergoing passion (IIITA). Such movement resulting from the body-trampoline cannot be objectified and consolidated in a form for itself, but is the function of the differentiation of the agency itself, transforming the capacity of the two performers’ bodies. The third type arises when movement fuses with sensation within the body and disobjectivation consequently extends to its extreme (Nvshl). The
continuum here is a veritable coalescence of the body and movement, where movement seeks to expand space in the body by way of a composed sensation. Thus it loses any form, giving way to a heterogeneous duration where the bodies are folding in and unfolding, transforming themselves by involution.

The concepts of disjunctive captures—part-bodies, part-machines, and sensation-movements—arise from the problems of desubjectivation and disobjectivation. What makes these concepts “expressive,” in the sense that I expounded in Chapter 1 (“Expressive concepts”), is that their reference to the actual compositions of bodies and movements is indirect, mediated by the third term of the problem each work is driven by. This also explains why, despite the similar problems that they pose, the three performances don’t resemble each other aesthetically. The procedures don’t result in comparable stylistic idioms of movement and embodiment, but strike out as different.

Lastly, it must be noted that the elucidation of these compositional procedures remains within the institutional framework of theater. Although it undermines the humanist horizon of expectations, the denaturalization of the rapport between the body and movement rests on the theatrical apparatus. In the next chapter, the focus of our discussion will shift to the problems of theatrical representation, where the issues of perception and recognition in the face of the body-movement rupture are linked with a disjunction between the audience and the stage.
Before our inquiry continues with the theatrical aspects of representation, we need to explicate the term “theater dance” within the Western-centric (West European and North American) tradition within which the choreographies considered here are made and presented. The attribute of “theater” means more than an institutional distinction from nonartistic dance practices such as social dancing or traditional folkloric dance. Since its modern professionalization in the eighteenth century, dance as an art discipline in the Western tradition has taken place within the theater, whereby most of the aspects of its production and presentation have been regulated by the apparatus of theater. Like other performing arts in the period of the Neo-Avantgarde of the 1960s–70s, experimental practices in dance, most famously those of the choreographers of the Judson Dance Theater, contested theater under the principle of fusing art and life or temporarily abandoned it for other ideologically or physically more suitable performance sites—galleries, or the street and other sites of everyday life. In the 1990s and 2000s, when Jonathan Burrows and Jan Ritsema, Xavier Le Roy, Boris Charmatz, Eszter Salamon, Jefta van Dinther, and Mette Ingvartsen entered the field of contemporary dance and performance, their work fully resided in the institutional framework of theater, yet it incorporated the historical experience of Neo-Avantgarde performance art, which renounced theater and theatricality in the name of the everyday and art-into-life. As has been mentioned and will be illuminated further in the chapters that follow, there are some affinities and explicit references that our choreographers draw on from the work of the 1960s–1970s—in particular Le Roy and Yvonne Rainer, Ingvartsen and Rainer, Burrows and Steve Paxton—as discursive points of continuity alongside experiments with the body and movement in the Neo-Avantgarde. But the
decisive difference lies in their readmittance of institutional support to reconfigure the experiment.

If regarded as part of the wholesale return of the performing arts to theater, the theatrical institutionalization of the experimental practices in dance in the 1990s must be understood as a critical turn, a deliberate strategy of what Bleeker termed as a “re-theatricalization” (Bleeker 2008: 7) that critically exposes the workings of theater. The relation between stage and audience is the foremost focus of this critical exposure, but it then goes on to include other aspects I will examine as the “apparatus of theatrical representation.” Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s Neo-Avantgarde tendencies attempted to detheatricalize dance, theater, and music, seeking to produce the “real” in performance art, re-theatricalization rejects the performative promise of the real in liveness and presence as an illusion always already produced by theater. Instead, it reorients its focus on the theater as an apparatus whose givenness should be explored, altered, and even undone. Being a construct, the apparatus can be transformed, reinvented according to its power to produce performance and its subjects.

Thus far, the thought of “choreographing problems” has shown that the problems necessarily take into account the position of the attender, especially with respect to perception and recognition. However, two of these seven works—héâtre-élévision (h-é) and Untitled (U)—are conceived in themselves with the intention to transform the apparatus of theatrical representation. This entails the subtraction of three elements constitutive of theater in the Western tradition: liveness, audience as community (h-é), and the contract of address-response that determines the relationship between stage and audience (U). Before we go further to examine the operations of h-é and U, we need to unpack the concept “apparatus of theatrical representation” in a varied selection of theoretical approaches to the term as well as to the notions of liveness and the contract of address-response constitutive of theater.

What is the apparatus of theatrical representation?

The explicit variation on Deleuze’s and Giorgio Agamben’s question1 evoked in the title here demands that in addressing the concept “apparatus” we expose its genealogy as well as the English translation of the French “dispositif” as “apparatus,” and other less-established terms (such as “device,” “mechanism,” “arrangement,” “situation”) that suggest definitions of the concept at variance. Two distinct theoretical lines can be drawn: one from the influence of Althusser’s “Ideological State
Apparatuses,” abbreviated as ISA (Althusser 1971), which had a significant impact on the cinema theory of “apparatus” (Baudry 1978) and where the comparison with the theater apparatus will be particularly relevant, and the other referring to “dispositif,” with which Foucault rephrased his earlier concept of “discursive formation” (Foucault 1980). Although the Althusserian and Foucauldian lines diverge mainly in their conception of power, their definitions of “appareil” and (Foucault’s) “dispositif,” translated as “apparatus,” partly overlap.

Briefly summarized, Althusser’s concept of ISA derives from his theory of ideology, which is premised on two theses: firstly, that ideology is the imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence, and secondly, that it is a material practice whereby the ideas of belief are enacted through material actions governed by rituals. The material practice of the rituals is established and guarantied by ISAs, which operate through distinct and specialized institutions in plural, such as family, church, and education; “communications,” or what Althusser calls the media of information; and “culture,” in which he includes literature, the arts, sports, etc. (Althusser 1971: 141–70). Hence theater is mentioned as one of the many “cultural” (Althusser’s quotation marks) ISAs (Althusser 1971: 151). In the theory of the cinematic apparatus, which largely rests on Althusser’s theses on ideology (Baudry 1978), the term “apparatus” refers to the base or infrastructure (appareil de base) that underscores the mechanics of producing and screening a film, the socio-technical division of labor and relations of production, of which the “dispositif” designates only one part, namely, the viewing situation. The Marxian perspective behind Althusser’s cinema theory explains how the cinematic apparatus in a system of material operations (scenario, camera shooting, editing, screening) produces ideology as the distortion of “objective reality.” By contrast, Foucault’s “dispositif” appears as a more heterogeneous set of elements whose relations are variable rather than scientifically conditioning or determinative as in the Althusserian cinematic apparatus, which reaches from the basic apparatus (machinery, hardware) to ideological discourse.

In Agamben’s concise summary (Agamben 2009: 3) the “dispositif” in Foucault consists firstly of a network of discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, measures of force, and philosophical propositions. Its second and third characteristics are that it is a historical formation that intersects powers of relation and types of knowledge in a strategic function as a “response to an urgency,” an intervention either to develop certain relations of forces “in a particular direction or to block them, stabilize them or utilize them” (Foucault 1980: 195). The heterogeneity of the
elements in this definition doesn’t only imply a mobility of relations, but an expansion of the concept which Agamben takes to mean “literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings” (Agamben 2009: 14).

Unlike Agamben, who stresses the logic of power capture by which apparatuses (“dispositifs”) produce subjects or, as he claims today, serve to desubjectivize them, Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s “dispositif” privileges transformative potential whereby a certain degree of “newness” and “creativity” define the apparatus, “its ability to transform itself, or indeed to break down in favor of a future apparatus” (F: 164). Deleuze’s emphasis on creation as transformation offers a perspective that can account for the apparatuses that h-é and U construct; it can explain the apparatuses of these as operations which are at once critical and transformative. Thus the “apparatus” in the following analysis will rely on Foucault’s definition while taking on a Deleuzian bent.

My task now is to define what specifically makes theater an apparatus that the two performances will dispose (of). Both within and outside the discourses of theater studies, theater is regularly associated with two mechanisms or sets of ideas, laws, and conventions which can be considered as either disparate or synonymous: representation and spectatorship. I will treat them as distinct yet complementary sets of ideas in a brief discussion purposefully restricted to the question of the relationships between the viewer, stage, and represented figure in theater. The theories of theater that focus on representation tend to prioritize staging over viewing, but in so doing they detach representation from mimesis, as Bleeker remarks (Bleeker 2008: 9–12). Representation in theater can’t be reduced to the imitation of reality with its various forms of resemblance and analogy, the so-called mimetic dramaturgy of realistic performance (Pavis 1998: 309), but instead should be examined through the law of staging understood as construction rather than mimetic reflection (see Freedman 1991). Staging here might be thought of as comprising two procedures: cutting out that which will be seen, or framing a scene, a tableau, and organizing the vantage point (in the audience) from which that tableau will be seen. Roland Barthes describes the act of cutting out (découpage) in theater and cinema as “direct expressions of geometry,” a practice which calculates the place and shape of things as they are observed from somewhere (Barthes 1978: 69–78). The geometrical is linked to the rationalist foundation of discourse, where “to discourse (the classics would have said) is simply to ‘depict the tableau one has in one’s mind’” (Barthes 1978: 69–70) as a clear and distinct idea of a
thing represented in the intellect. Barthes’ conflation of the geometrical and the rational sense evokes the “image of thought” in *Difference and Repetition*, where “good sense” or the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (perception, understanding, etc.), and “common sense” or the objective identity of the object are supposed to mirror each other. The stage frame in theater, regardless of how remote it may be from classical drama, is not just the theatrical equivalent of the Albertian *finestra aperta*; as the theorist who coined “post-dramatic theater,” Hans-Thies Lehmann, posits, it is “a mirror that allows a homogeneous world of the viewers to recognize itself in the equally coherent world of the drama” (Lehmann 2006: 150). We might conclude from this view that even when drama is absent, the law of staging is enforced on the horizon of the viewer’s expectations and hence must invoke the stage as a mirror at first, even if only to undermine it.

Once it frames the tableau, staging introduces the body into it. One of the concepts under which modernity’s staging of the body in painting and theater is discussed in French thought is the *figure* (Francastel 1967, Barthes 1978, Pavis 1998, Fischer-Lichte 2000). Drawing on various overlapping theatrical terms such as dramatic character, role, and “figurability” as a visual representation of the fantasy (*Darstellbarkeit* or the “dream form” in Freud), the figure is the subject of a unification of the world which substitutes, or stands for, the world of the viewer. Even when its representative function of portraying a dramatic character is weakened, as in avant-garde theater, or voided later through the “death of the character” (Fuchs 1996), the function of the figure still enforces the transcendence of the meaning of embodiment through the notion of presence. As Lehmann remarks (Lehmann 2006: 169) presence isn’t the effect of perception but of the desire to see. When performance breaks down the unity of the theatrical figure in order for the body to perform as the body in an immanent sense—as the literal material and object of action—the fantasy of presence, now opposed to representation, isn’t abolished, but reinforces an obsession with the real. The fantasy of presence sustains transcendence in the absence of the figure as well. This will be an important element in the operations of *h-é* and *U*.

When the avant-garde theories of theater of the beginning of the twentieth century call into question certain aspects of representation, such as mirroring and figurability of the staged body, the main claim about the theater apparatus shifts from the staging to the relationship between the stage and the audience. The discovery of the spectator in Brecht’s “epic theater” and Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” doesn’t content itself with disclosing the workings of the theatrical apparatus,
but invests in a utopian project of transforming the viewer, or producing a new subject and a new community by either critical observation or mystical experience of the senses. These two avant-garde models still operate as implicit political demands on theater today, as Jacques Rancière argues in “The Emancipated Spectator” (Rancière 2009: 1–24). According to Rancière, they shift the axis of the theatrical apparatus to spectatorship and the birth of community it should yield. Widely recognized as marking the period from the 1970s until now, the paradigm of post-dramatic theater, according to Hans-Thiess Lehmann, reinvests in the dialogic structure as “a new emphasis between stage and audience” (Lehmann 2006: 58). Although Lehmann attributes to the paradigm shift an impact of performance art, a performative Setzung (positing) whereby theater focuses on the “real” of the theater situation itself (i.e., on the process between stage and audience that avant-garde theater failed to tackle), he claims that post-dramatic theater recuperates theater in its foundation. According to Lehmann, the act of viewing has always been an essential condition of theater—which is supported by the etymology of theatron, which means ‘the viewing place’ in Greek. Now, however, viewing becomes constitutive for theater as an “act of communication” where the presence of the performer unavoidably implicates the spectator as a co-presence (Lehmann 2006: 61, 137). The theatrical act of communication, in the conventional sense of the term, retains a significant aspect of representation with which theater was established in the first place—understanding as a form of recognition in reception. I will argue that the role that communication plays in the given apparatus of theatrical representation can also be a target of intervention, a departure point for a construction of new apparatuses that will distinguish the performances examined here from the tacit essentialist claims about the restored theatricality of post-dramatic theater.2

The other theoretical perspective which bears upon our analysis of disjunctive operations on the theatrical apparatus builds on the bias of spectatorship in theater, as elaborated in Lehmann’s act of communication, and conceives of theater as an interstitial event of visuality. According to Bleeker, theater is a specific “vision-machine” that intricately intertwines the one seeing and what is seen. She argues on the basis of theater and dance performances made in the 1980s and ’90s that the apparatus of theater no longer operates with the disembodied notion of the vision of a Cartesian I-Eye, but that it relocates “just looking” in a “necessarily impure and always synaesthetic event that takes place in a body” (Bleeker 2008: 7). The relationship between the seer and the seen in theater has the relational dynamic
of address and response. That the theater addresses us by an invitation to see something that is being done for us doesn’t necessarily allocate a position of viewing that the viewer will identify with. The address can cause a sense of displacement in the response of the viewer, who cannot identify as the subject of the performance. Bleeker introduces “focalization” as a concept which allows for an understanding of the interaction between viewers and the visions produced by the apparatus of a performance. Focalization is then a “dynamic process of address and response in which the address presented by the theatre mediates in an event that, for its actual ‘taking place,’ depends just as much on the response of a particular viewer” (Bleeker 2008: 10). It describes the relationship between “visions” of the object and subject of viewing rather than prioritizing the determinism of the perspective of either seen object or “seer.” Thus the concept of focalization can account for distance in lieu of identification and is moreover intended to substitute the staging of the culturally conditioned construction of the real for representation. It stresses the agency of the seer as opposed to the so-called passively represented spectator. Although focalization won’t be the key for describing the dissent from theater’s representationalism in our choreographies, what we can conclude from Bleeker’s term is a more sophisticated and processualized notion of communication. Yet the very insistence on interaction here implies a relationship of representation in the co-presence of two sides of the event. It implies another historically foundational bind—comparable to the synthesis of the body and movement in modern dance—now between stage and audience, performance, and spectators. The stake of representation in this model lies in constituting performing and spectating as standing in for each other, and hence being bound up with each other. Breaking this bind by way of a disjunction, or subtraction of the performance from the spectators, or the spectators from the performance, counts as a violent disruption, the consequences of which will be shown in the audience’s behavior. The following analysis will detail the practical path of the problems which led h-ê and U to experiment with the theatrical apparatus.

Subtractions within the theatrical apparatus

Before the performance of U actually begins, the subtraction of its apparatus of theatrical representation has already begun. The performance is announced without a title, without the name of its author, without notes about its so-called content (“subject matter”) or a statement of
intent by the author. In other words, the performance is presented as “untitled,” made by an “anonymous” author, and with no further information except for the names of its producers. This is an unprecedented gesture for dance—not only because historically it has no predecessor—but because the way in which a work of theater dance is announced plays a substantial role in its presentation. The centrality of the play in the Western theater tradition provided the title of the play as a self-evident frame of aboutness, and with the deconstruction of drama in post-dramatic theater, the title as an instance of verbal language promises that it will thematically fulfill the vacant function of a staged literary work. In the tradition of theater dance, the title is even more charged with the function of providing meaning to a silent play of bodies in movement. This, of course, applies to the modernist tradition of ballet and dance, which established its specific medium by renouncing the spoken word on stage. After modern dance ousted musical works, in which the regulatory function of the score is comparable to the script in dramatic theater, the significance of the title and the text that verbally describes the upcoming event increased, gaining the function of guaranteeing sense, even as a vague, often metaphoric conduit of aboutness. As Foster posits, the title together with the program notes belong to one of five categories of “choreographic conventions”—the frame defined as “the way dance sets itself apart as a unique event” (Foster 1986: 59). I will refer to it as the “nominal frame,” consisting of the title, the signature of the author and the brief program outline to be read before the event: the frame which represents a choreography and inscribes it into the world of dance.

The nominal frame in *U* is intentionally voided but isn’t and can’t be fully removed. If the performance is to partake in the institutional context of contemporary dance and performance, it has to abide by at least a minimum of its conventions. To counteract the nominal frame, the author subtracts its content, leaving it as an empty, vacant function. Since there is neither an author to refer back to, nor a title to associate with a definite subject or theme, the audience is confronted with a void, an emptiness. This intervention into the apparatus of theatrical representation weakens one of its elements—the nominal framework—which, as we will see, provokes a violent response from the audience.

Extracting the common letter “t” in the title *héâtre-élévision* (from “théâtre-télévision”) indicates—just like a (fake) portmanteau word—a subtraction which is accompanied by an addition, a new hybrid conjoining the “crippled” relatives, theater and television. The performance doesn’t blend theater and television as mediums so much as it conjoins
choreography and film in an installed performing space. The full characterization of this operation is given in the author’s program note:

A choreographic piece in the manner of Russian dolls, héâtre-élèvision is a performance reduced to a film, which is itself reduced to a television and shown in an installation. It is a kind of decoction, perhaps a suicide of live performance: what will be left of the smell of the work of the dancers after the anaesthesia of the screen and pixels? (Charmatz 2002: 1)

The protocol of the invitation to a performance of theater dance is installed with a minor modification: the viewers are asked to reserve an hour, during which only one person can attend the performance. The usher who hosts the spectator and instructs her in how to attend the performance is the only person present, apart from the spectator. She returns after the performance ends to offer the spectator a drink and a visitor’s book of impressions in which the spectator can leave notes. For the duration of the performance, the spectator remains alone in a room with a video-monitor and other sound and light equipment that run the “show.” H-é could be easily dismissed as a video installation were it not for, firstly, the protocol that is theatrical and places the event in theater, and secondly, its construction as a live event, intertwining the real space of the spectator and the spaces of the dancers in the film by way of light and sound changes and other effects. H-é is designated for theater, and the fact that it has recently been presented in the context of museum exhibitions of dance and performance only attests to the difficulty theater venues have when it comes to agreeing to present it.

Three constitutive elements of the conventional theater apparatus are eliminated here: the audience as a community, the stage that frames the view and thus positions the spectator(s), and the live presence of the performers. Eliminating the live co-presence of (at least one) performer and (here reduced to one) spectator perturbs the apparatus of theatrical representation to the extent that it confers on it the status of a “pseudo-performance,” as critics have suggested. The dynamic of address and response in the live theatrical event is disabled. Focalization is derailed, for the effects of address and response are displaced from the course of the event to its aftermath. But it isn’t that the spectator can do nothing. To stop the running of the installation would mean refusing to attend and, to an extent that will soon be determined, co-create the performance. Such an act would matter only for the spectator who was the
cause of it. It would have no physical, public, or social consequences on the performance and other (missing) viewers.

The operations of subtraction in $U$ and $h$-é described above raise the question of their nature. Are they aiming to extinguish and negate performance? Or do they subtract those elements of theater that hinder another kind of creation, actualizing themselves elsewhere by other than traditionally theatrical means and needing new and precise apparatuses to do so? The answer begins with an analysis of $h$-é.

**Head-box: an apparatus of flight and containment**

In $h$-é, eliminating confrontation with the stage entails a proliferation of many more spaces than a performance happening on a theater stage would permit. These spaces all, curiously, take the shape of a box, a spatial device that contains movement and presence. Charmatz explains how he was initially interested in investigating theaters, “especially big black boxes,” but how he simultaneously tried to circumvent a decision in favor of one space, one apparatus that would capture spectators in all too familiar situations:

[A] small kind of venue, or a big one, a tower or a metallic green island . . . it became very clear that *Con forts fleuve*³ was opening a set of questions about the phantasm spaces of theater (among other phantasm spaces), and that the ideal way to go on was to invest in a mental theater that would be a mental black box, or more precisely, a series of intertwined boxes that would symbolically echo the black box of the theater and the plastic one of the TV furniture and media. (Cvejić 2009c: n.p.)

For the mental box to appear as the place that gives rise to the performance, a series of boxes that vary in architectural shape, function, and appearance had to be assembled and interconnected. The space of the installation is a room, which appears like a black box when the spectator is admitted to it. In other words, it is a smaller box within the bigger box of the theater building. The spectator is shown a large form in the shape of a concert piano which appears to be a construction of loudspeakers in the form of boxes covered with black cloth. Above the “piano,” as I will refer to these boxes, a small TV monitor is hung, tilting toward the piano at an angle that recalls the TV set installation in a cheap hotel room, to be watched only from a certain recumbent position. A cushion with a pair of headphones and a blanket suggest
further that lying on the piano will prove to be the best posture, a sort of vantage position for viewing the TV, as shown in Figure 7.

The film that is shown on the TV evolves as a sequence of several boxes and viewing situations. All scenes are shot from a fixed position, thus simulating the vantage point of the spectator. Changing the viewpoint, angle, and size of the shot within one scene is clearly avoided, so the shooting reinforces the sense of performance, rather than a film that would involve camera movement and editing. The first scene shows five dancers in a space enclosed on three sides, high and wide enough to fit five bodies but small enough to prevent them from taking more than just a few steps. The walls reflect light, thanks to their surface that is made of fractured, blurry mirrors, a material resembling a kind of metal. The mirror-box can be seen at its actual size in a medium shot tailored to the height of the tallest dancer and the width of the assembled group of five.

The next space, cut in after a long lapse filled by a colorful TV test pattern, is a wide-shot view of a proscenium stage suggestive of a baroque theater, with a stylized stage frame from which lamps are hung. It is a silent glimpse of a familiar scene that lasts only a few seconds: perhaps a general meeting of the large crew of a performance production. Among about thirty people, all dancers in unitards, the five seen previously might be present, but the scene is shot from too far away, from farther than the audience’s normal vantage point would be in this theater. So it is difficult to discern any particular bodies.

The third space is not clearly recognizable because of the grainy image and darkness. Two walls suggest a sombre corridor, perhaps backstage, where two dancers are visible in a narrow medium shot, which wouldn’t be discernible from a theater seat, but rather only by peeping into a smaller space.

*Figure 7  héraître-élévision © Boris Charmatz/Edna Association, 2003. Photography © Anna van Kooij*
It takes several appearances for the fourth space to unfold. It is a black space in which two male dancers face each other at a distance of five or six meters. The space appears void of a ground or a stage frame, so it is framed only by the TV set, as a medium shot. Its size refers to a small black-box theater, which is confirmed when its two framing sides are later revealed.

The fifth space is a box larger than the mirror-box. It contains a metal scaffold in the shape of a cube, but without any surfaces to support. As it resembles a skeleton of a stage set whose construction is laid bare, it's unclear if it stands on, under or behind the stage. Every time it reappears, the space with the scaffold is lit differently by strong film studio lights from the back, theater spotlights from the front and the sides, general work lights, flickering neon lights from above, or a lamp hanging as a shining bulb in the circle of dancers under the scaffold, and mostly in various combinations of these possibilities.

The sixth space is a large-sized multipurpose hall in the style of halls built in the 1970s that can transform and adapt from functioning as a theater for a large spectacle to a cinema, or from a cinema to a symphony orchestra concert hall. It first appears in a wide shot, showing three dancers moving about on a black cloth that extends into the auditorium. The second time it is shot from a farther and higher angle, as if from the central position of the technician's booth. The light progressively dims while the dancer on the stage remains luminous. Fading the light out erases the image of the hall, as if the frame were swallowed by the black void while a striking focus remains on the very small figure of the dancer, who also disappears into darkness in the end.

In the last third until almost the end, three smaller boxes unwrap, one after another, each featuring one dancer gazing at the camera, or in its direction but slightly past the camera. Their box-structure is the most evident of all the spaces thus far, because their size matches a shrunk appearance of the body in close up. In scene 13 a female dancer seems stuck in a narrow passage that due to its black texture and visible stack of chairs resembles the space between rows of seats in the auditorium. She has just enough space to try several sitting positions, hinting at yoga or similarly trained extensions of legs on the floor. She is constantly adapting herself to the strange shape of this small space, as if she is coping with discomfort from the confinement she finds herself in.

Inserted in the last third, the next scene first shows a tall man in a similar sitting position to that of the aforementioned female dancer, but from a close medium shot. The size and shape of the space is difficult to grasp. It is light beige and the walls form a right angle behind the
man, like in a studio. The corner is cut with a frame of the same light beige color, making it hard to discern the whole structure, to connect the space before the frame with the corner behind it. The male dancer is moving back and forth, in front of the frame and behind it, thus changing his body position from sitting to standing, back and forth, also changing the size of his figure against the background and the size of the shot. His movement creates a variable and illusive sense of space and its confinement of figure, making ambiguous what is affecting the size, the space, or the figure, and obscuring whether the corner-box is shrinking/enlarging the figure or whether the movement of the figure causes the corner-box to expand or contract (see Figure 8).

The last box we see is the smallest, and it can only contain a cramped body, a male dancer sitting with legs bent at the knees, holding a piano stool in order to fit into the small container. The view is ambiguous, also perhaps an illusion, since the close-up excludes the parameters that would enable us to orientate the position of the figure against gravity. It remains unclear whether it is the position of the box or the filming perspective that causes ambiguity. Either the man is sitting on the floor on the axis of gravity, using his body to support the stool whose feet are perpendicular to the wall, or the perspective of the image is rotated 90 degrees clockwise, and the chair is placed on the axis of gravity, supporting the body of the man sitting perpendicularly on the side wall. Although the latter is more likely, since it would be easier to manage, the movements of the man suggests the opposite. He is constantly adjusting himself, and when he tries to lift his body and place it between the legs of the chair and the wall, the effort is greater than it should be, as if he were confined to sitting perpendicular to the vertical axis and hence forced to use strength against gravity.

*Figure 8*  *héâtre-élèveision* © Boris Charmatz/Edna Association, 2003. Photography © Marie-Lou Burger
Two more situations evoke a box, not as a concrete object in the shape of a cubicle, but in the functions and movements that it can carry out. The box is a container that can expand, blow up, or be penetrated. In scene five, a bizarre duet unfolds between two women dressed in the same dancer uniform, blue leotards, where one of them appears pregnant, leaning against the wall of the corridor with her head and torso as if she was asleep. Her face, leaning on the wall in sleep, and her pregnant belly are sticking out in this dark space. The other dancer is squirming around the pregnant one in movements and grimaces that combine dog-like and ballet movements. She tries to stand on a small prop, a box, perhaps a yoga brick. Then she approaches the pregnant dancer, takes her head in her hands. She mimes removing it from her body and placing it on the floor. Then she mimes blowing air into it. She puts the invisible object (head) in the middlespace between the pregnant dancer and herself and licks it. She stretches her hand into a shape of a knife with which she mimes piercing into the invisible object (i.e., what hitherto appeared as the head that she was playing with). All the while she fixates her gaze on the pregnant woman who is wriggling in her sleep, as if she were checking what her hand’s penetration of the imaginary head is doing to the sleeping woman, what the woman might be feeling or dreaming. The dancer attaches the imaginary head to the back of the pregnant woman and mimes pulling a thread from it.

This scene cuts into the next scene with the two male dancers standing in profile for the camera on the void stage and facing each other. In the space between them, a film image looms in which the same pregnant woman from the previous scene, projected at a size slightly larger than either of the two men, is seen dancing. She faces the camera front as if she were moving in the air above the voided stage. While she is moving, the male dancers begin to make pumping motions as if they were blowing air into an invisible string which doesn’t transport air as a tube but holds the film image representing the aforementioned woman. Hence, one film scene is imbricated into another film scene by means of a framed image. Then this scene cuts to a scene of the same setting, except that the moving image is now replaced with a photographic image in which the pregnant dancer is diminished in size, standing with her leg in the air. The men begin to pull the image each to the opposite side, so that now it is the picture, and not the woman in it, that “dances”—the woman in the picture is jumping thanks to them moving a string.

This sequence of actions remains metonymic, as if it’s one part that stands for the meaning of the overall composition in which live
elements will travel through and change the surrounding space, their image, and their size. The question arises—what does the inflated object represent here, the body of the pregnant woman pumped with a baby, or her sleeping head pumped with something else (dreams?); or perhaps it points to the head of the spectator, filled with images and sounds. The question will be answered after the second situation is unraveled.

The piano also figures as a box, but not only the box simulating the concert piano that the spectator is lying or sitting on. It is the resonance box of the piano in the film, opened and tuned. The blind tuner, dressed like the other dancers, in a blue leotard, is tuning the piano, viewed from a medium shot focusing on the piano strings. His eyes seem half-closed in blindness, and his whole head seems enwrapped with sounds, as if the tones of the piano strings are entering his head. He then turns the tuning pin, tightening or loosening the string to get the right intonation. The scene recurs three times in image and sound, or in sound alone, and twice mixed with other kinds of sounds but separated from the image of the tuner tuning the piano. At first the sound appears typical of tuning: oscillations in nuances of pitch, checked within harmonic chords; systematic movement in a scale of half tones. From the moment the sound of tuning begins to mix with noises which resemble grumbling and impeded speech, production of these noises is taken over by a chorus of five dancers and they acquire a rhythmic and melodic pattern. Apart from the piano heard making its tuning sounds, other instruments are now heard, a piccolo and a tuba. Contours of a composition are heard in fragments—the instrumental trio *Dona Nobis Pacem I* by Galina Ustvolskaya. The repeated tones of tuning dissolve into the piano part of the trio, as if they had had the function of setting the intonation and thus preparing for the composition before it began. But the musical composition doesn’t only derive from Ustvolskaya’s score. Some parts of it are doubled or imitated by dancers in grumbling and squeaking vocal expressions. It is difficult to extract and hear the music as separate from the voices of the dancers and the tuning sounds. All manipulations are related to the piano tuning, the only sound source visible in the image. The musical composition figures like a box connected with the piano box, mixing with the chorus of dancers standing and singing under the scaffold-box. The composition invites the comparison with the box, because it figuratively contains smaller boxes and likewise can be contained in larger ones. This is expressed in the way that the music is interfered with, allowing dancers’ voices to infiltrate and extend it, or in the way it blends with or is swallowed by the piano tuning before it begins, while it is occurring, and after it ends.
The movement by which the performance spaces in the model of multiple boxes fold in and out of each other points to a “vertigo of immanence,” which recalls Cull’s argument in her *Theatres of Immanence*:

Immanence creates immanence in a ceaseless production of processes that interfere in one another – encapsulating one another, each within another like a proliferating series of Russian dolls. Yet just when we think that we have found the largest or smallest doll, we see that it is part of another series, in the midst of another expanding and contracting process. (Cull 2013: 12–13)

There is no one stage which presents the dancing bodies in the present, not even in the surrogate TV monitor that the spectator is gazing at, which would frame her view; the swiftness by which multiple frames change and bend into each other dissolves representation. The spectator, together with all the instruments she is connected with, is also swallowed by the series of boxes, as the room in which she is sitting begins to swirl with all the other boxes: emerging and disappearing lights and sounds swing back and forth between the spaces shown on the screen and the physical room, sharing the same rhythm as the dancing bodies in the film. And while the shocks of unpredictably shifting sources of stimuli affect the attender’s body, which might be lying on the piano-like box or inhabiting the room in whichever way she pleases—because she is alone—, the linkages and jumps between the invented spaces are made by the mind. In that sense, the assembling of the TV image, with a three-dimensional physical space of a room, as an inside of the theater-corpus, is destined to find its unity in the head of the attender. It is the head whose thought is put in motion by a choreography that doesn’t only move the bodies, but that is also the movement of the times and spaces in which the bodies emerge, as well as their vertiginous relations. One might call it instead “the brain as a screen,” as in Deleuze’s famous statement by which he explains his interest in cinema that “puts the image in motion” as it traces “the circuits of the brain” (Deleuze in Flaxman 2000: 366). Yet the decisive difference here is that *h-é* links thought and space-time by the bodies present and absent and hence sets theater in motion. This is why we would insist, contrary to Deleuze’s repudiation of theater in favor of cinema, that it is the thought from the head caught up in a concrete, three-dimensional dance of images.

Two terms emerged in this analysis, both of which describe how another theatrical apparatus is born from their disjunctive synthesis: the box and the head. In *h-é* the theater and its spectatorship are
I didn’t want to make one more performance, but to make ten performances reduced into one mental one, being not the one we do perform in the TV during the show, but the relation between one’s head and the TV full of our bodies, gesticulations and rictus. In fact, to move from real spaces (tower of Aatt…enen…tionon, big cathedral-theater of Con forts fleuve) to assumed mental spaces as such. And from the “doing” of a performance to organizing a relation to make a potential performance appear, if viewers would be willing to accept this low tech kind of hypnosis that is necessary to let something happen between their head and the little TV box. Because a head is the only body part that fits really in a TV set, isn’t it? (Cvejić 2009c: n.p.)

Two of Charmatz’s observations are striking for our discussion here. He conceives h-é as more than one performance occurring at once. Mounting many performances simultaneously decenters and dislocates the presence of the performers, who appear in many performances at once. The here-and-now presence of a performing body wouldn’t permit its being in different places at the same time. In h-é the same bodies traverse various metonymic spaces of theater, thanks to film montage. By “metonymic space,” I refer to Lehmann’s definition of a scenic space, which isn’t primarily defined as a symbolic stand-in for another fictional place, but is instead highlighted as a part and continuation of the real theater space. The multiplicity of scenes is carefully sewn into a patchwork of interpenetrating heterogeneous durations. This is achieved by extending the sound of one scene into another, suggesting that the two might be separated by space but happening at the same time. The structure of several performances going on in several places simultaneously invokes the historical models of the open work
(opera aperta), as in the stream-of-consciousness novel, or so-called “integrated theater,” in which actions run parallel in separate spaces, compartmentalizing the performance through multiple perspectives so that no single spectator can see everything that occurs at the same time. The simultaneity of many performances in h-é is brought into the linear course of the film, the unity of one spectator attending the show. The cuts in which the dancers leap into boxes of various sizes and where the image and sound split, phase-shift, subsist, and join again, make this flow heterogeneous. The durations create contrasts and overlaps of disparate rhythms and paces of expression. The scenes never begin or end, nor do they develop through or link by cause and effect. They coexist, permeate, and melt into each other, thus affecting the thickness of the indivisible qualitative multiplicity of duration (Bergson’s durée).

The second observation concerns the tête-à-tête rapport between the spectator's head and the TV box hinted at in the end of Charmatz’s statement: “A head is the only body part that fits really in a TV set, isn’t it?” The similarity of the size is a cynical reproach to consumerism, alluding to the opinion that the most global, most efficient, and cheapest hypnotizer today is the TV set in the living room. Charmatz is toying with the habits of the theatergoer, for whom TV experiences are probably more common and everyday than going to the theater. Television can replace the identification process of theater, or “TV-hypnosis” is a matter of absorption, which is opposite to that practice of theatricality that discloses the relationship between what is seen and who is seeing. Re-theatricalization in theater today highlights mediation, while television succeeds in suspending disbelief. The distance of the TV image is virtual, thanks to the invisibility of the mediating frame. It enables the paradox of here-and-elsewhere at the same time due to an intensified sense of directness, closeness, and immediacy. While the TV frame smoothes the mediation of various spaces and bodies in h-é, it is also apostrophized by the lights and the sounds in the actual installation space. Thus the spectator can allow herself to be absorbed, as when her gaze glues itself to the TV at home; but she will be reminded every now and then of the theatricality of the situation, of the discontinuity in time and space between the film and her presence in theater.

Now we can answer the question of whether the subtraction of the head-box is a negative or a vitalist operation, a “suicide” of the live performance or its virtual “decoction,” as Charmatz calls it. He describes the logic of Russian dolls as a “strange trick” of producing “a
huge performance, reduced to a film itself reduced to a cheap installation for only one viewer” (Cvejić 2009c: n.p.). This move of reduction counter-actualizes the performance as a live event marked by the live co-presence of performers and audience. By counter-actualization of the event, I refer to reversing the process of actualization in space and time in Deleuze: the performance is liberated from the stage in order to transfigure it and enable the imagination of the spectator to get beyond the limits of the stage. Thus it dematerializes and disembodies dancers and the spaces they inhabit by turning them, to quote Charmatz, into odorless “pixels” with “anaesthetic” effects. But the flight from the actual stage and here-and-now reality of the bodily expressions in theater has another direction. “The phantoms of the artists on the screen will take shape [prendrons corps] inside the head of the spectator, finding there a new projection space infinitely more open than it appears” (Charmatz 2002: n.p.). The performance has to withdraw from the actual theater in order to enable the emergence of another, mental space. This space isn’t only contained in the “head” of one spectator. It is a virtual event that arises as an assembling of the performance in the TV monitor, and its extension through light and sound into the real space of the installation and into the body of the spectator. This justifies, perhaps, the word that Charmatz used to qualify the event—a decoction—which, in Deleuzian terms, reads as an extraction of actual points toward virtual movements, or, as the choreographer determined in his own words, a potential performance emerging in a relation between the box and the head.

De-figurement of the stage

Now we will return to a seemingly more conventional set-up of a theater divided into the physical spaces of the stage and the auditorium, which is the point of departure for $U$. The process of subtraction in $U$ extends from the nominal frame to the actual theatrical event of the performance. For the most part, $U$ is dark, and the figures on stage, their presence and movement, are barely discernible, vague, or sometimes even invisible. The light and sound are, at the outset and for long intervals later on, subtracted, which produces an environment of intensive sensory deprivation. The audience are confronted with a black void in lieu of the stage.

As with the name and the title, the stage isn’t entirely removed, but rather concealed. The characteristic operation of the theater—the play of hiding and showing—is reinstated to an extreme. There are no stage lights to illuminate the stage. The audience are given flashlights at the
entrance of the performance space so that they can find their seats, like latecomers in a cinema. In these first minutes, nothing appears to be visible on the stage. The spectators are adjusting to the situation, to darkness, and are fidgeting with the flashlights. It seems that the performance hasn’t begun yet. Amidst the audience’s casual preparation for the show, music begins (4’52”). The second movement of Béla Bartók’s *Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta, Allegro* is heard, which bears the tone of mystery and comedy characteristic of some neoclassical modern music. This same fragment appears in the film *Being John Malkovich* (1999), when the famous actor, John Malkovich, playing himself in the film, performs a fantasy virtuoso dance as a puppet whose members move against human anatomy. Although this reference has a semiotic import, it may pass unnoticed in the performance. The music sounds sufficiently like film music, supposed to raise cinematic suspense in a generic manner. The music indicates the actual beginning of the performance, after which, however, no change on the stage is apparent. The spectators understand that they can use their flashlights to illuminate the stage. What follows is their search for action, or, more precisely, for figures in action. The concentration of many feeble lights forming vague zones of visibility on the stage does reveal the presence of two, and then perhaps three puppets clad in dark grey, almost black, costumes that cover the whole body and face of the figures. Their postures in sitting or lying on top of each other, and later the physical contact between them, the nature of their movements and displacements, are unclear. Many factors in the perception of the situation remain obscured: how many figures there are and whether they are identical or somewhat different; whether these figures are only puppets or whether there are also humans among the puppets, disguised as human-like puppets; whether the puppets are moving alone or if they are (and in what ways) manipulated by the humans. As this analysis will prove further, uncertainty overshadows almost all perceptions; and although these perceptions are distinct, they remain unclear. Ambiguity and illusion are necessarily part and parcel of the performance.

Though the stage is obscured, it isn’t completely devoid of activity. Something seems to be happening on the stage, just enough to maintain the curiosity of the spectators. They continue to inspect the stage, but what they find is stillness and slowness, not inactivity. Two puppets are lying on each other motionlessly. A third identical one moves his head slowly. Then he appears to be sitting with uplifted torso, and moves rapidly from left to right. But it isn’t clear whether he is moving by himself, or if his displacement is manipulated. He might just as well
be a human, moving by himself but feigning a manipulated displacement. The fact that we are in a theater increases the suspicion of illusion. This is all that appears to happen on the stage in the first quarter of an hour. The time is long enough for the spectators either to attune to the low level of sensory stimulus or to grow impatient, producing a general atmosphere of approval or discontent. However, the prevalence of one attitude over another in an audience that is most likely comprised of individuals with divided views doesn’t color the nature of subtraction here. How the audience reacts doesn’t determine whether the subtraction is negative—an extinction or death of the stage—or whether it derails the performance in order to affirm it offstage.

Subtraction here entails diminishing, shrinking action on the stage. The lack of light and of the figures’ discernibility, their inanimate presence or motion, weakens the sense of address from the stage. The stage remains indifferent to the auditorium. It does nothing to address the spectators; it neither demands their gaze nor responds to it. It acts as if it were blind, deaf, and faceless toward the audience. Not being addressed by a performance that shows it is made for them, the spectators find themselves in a strange disequilibrium—an inversion of the theatrical contract of address-response. When the stage issues no address that would ask for a response from the audience, the expectations of the spectators turn into the wishes and demands that they address back to the stage. Thus, the asymmetry in the division between the stage and the auditorium is enhanced by reversal.

The instance of the stage refusing to fulfill the demands of the audience occurs three more times. At the end of the first third of the performance a fog gushes onto the stage, covering it in white. It acts like a white curtain, not just separating the stage and the auditorium but slowly diffusing into the whole space. The fog immediately reveals many lamps projecting onto it nervously in all directions as if it were a curtain that now separates the stage from the viewers. Now only the movements of the flashlights are visible, while absolutely nothing is visible on the stage. Unlike the darkness that absorbed them until then, the white curtain now reflects back the flashlights. The same fog reappears at the end of what could be described as the silent, non-speaking part of the performance. The third time the stage is completely erased is when the music of Bartók is resumed and white stage spotlights from above the stage point into the eyes of the audience in full light. The shock is all the greater due to a long exposure to darkness, and the effect blinds the audience for a moment. All three moments cut the course of a slow, silent, dark, and seemingly uneventful performance with
aggressive gestures that point to, and thus address, the spectators. What they address the spectators with is an explicit non-response. However, these gestures also reassert theatricality, for the audience is aware of the practical function the “white-outs” could have in concealing changes on the stage that the performance doesn’t want them to see.

What can be concluded from this account is that although the stage remains in this performance, a strong frame of representation is subtracted from it. The stage doesn’t provide a scene, a tableau, in which the appearance of the figure would grant the possibility of mirroring a world in the I/Eye of the spectator. The stage and the auditorium are mutually detached, thus presenting two distinct realities that are, to a large extent, ignorant of one another. Contrary to the belief of those spectators who project the cause of their impressions on the intentions of the (missing) author, thus turning causation into accusation, the performers operating the puppets on the stage are also uncertain about what is perceivable, what the stage looks like, what the audience can see, and how they respond to it. Le Roy states that the decision to work with eyes closed in the preparation of the performance was important in order to construct the situation in which he could never see what the spectators saw. As I will elaborate in the next section, the performers in $U$ constructed their own blindness as well. As a result, the stage is de-figured, because it isn’t conceived as a tableau that cuts out an image unified by the figure whose meaning transcends its presence. I intentionally use “de-figure” in order to devise a concept different than the meaning of the correct English equivalent of the French “défigurer”: “disfigure.” While “disfigure” emphasizes damage to the surface, shape, appearance, or attractiveness of something, “de-figure” indicates the removal of figure and figurability, and depersonalization. The puppets in $U$ are faceless, impersonal. They are like phantoms who have evacuated the function of figure. The figure is subtracted from the apparatus of theatrical representation, but this doesn’t amount tout court to a negation. Instead, the situation between the spectators, the flashlights they manipulate, and the performers and the puppets they manipulate configures another theater apparatus, which we will now explicate.

**Assemblings of bodies and things**

$U$ constructs a new apparatus by connecting four terms: the puppet in the shape of the human body, the human body of the performer disguised in the human-like puppet, the spectators, and the flashlights. The situation is more complex than the binary opposition between
the stage and the auditorium, or one single mirroring bond between two sides. More than the two-way relation of address and response, it involves four different relations constituting a heterogeneous network. The perspective I am suggesting here is revealed in the duration of the performance, when the audience take time to explore the attachments and motion of the phantom puppets on the stage, as well as how their own looking, extended by the flashlight, contributes to the situation. What distinguishes their gaze from the disembodied vision in theater is that it inserts itself in the environment. Looking isn’t just inspecting the stage to find its object of vision. It creates a hole of vision for the looking of other spectators (and performers), so it interferes in the situation. Looking, rather than the gaze that hints at objectification, is also an actor—as are the puppets—which contributes to the network of relations.

The above reference to actor-network theory, the approach in social science which posits the agency of nonhumans within networks as a model of heterogeneous relations, partly comes from my insight into the research Le Roy undertook prior to the creation of U. He was interested in exploring the interdependency of the environment and the body, whereby the environment is regarded as an extension of the body and the body an extension of the environment. In terms of dance experiment, Le Roy observed how a body in contact with an object makes another body, or another entity with specific ways of moving and being:

A person walking with a heavy bag elicits the observation that “the bag seems to be heavy” more often than that “the person seems to make a bigger step with her right than with her left foot” or “what a tense right side.” Maybe these remarks could extend as much to the performer as to the spectator. (Cvejić 2009a: n.p.)

From these observations, Le Roy began to investigate the material effects that objects of various weight, density, fluidity, elasticity, and rigidity have on the body. The objects were the things left over in the studio from an earlier performance project with a large collective: plastic bags, tubes, balls, boxes, and foam. He reports that he spent hours lying around in the middle of these things, observing how he could move them and how they could move him. He soon decided to try the same with a human-like object that he would construct by stuffing clothes with different kinds of material, whereby various qualities would materially affect the movement as a connection between the body and the human-like object. From there on, three types of manipulation of the
puppets arose: direct contact with the hands, intermediate contact using the puppet’s strings, and body-to-puppet contact whereby the mass of one’s movement would make the puppet move. While the first and the second kind of manipulation can mostly be recognized, however, when a puppet uses his hands to move the head of another puppet or when a puppet is standing and holding strings by which he makes another puppet dance, the third type prevails; and this explains much of the uncertainty of perception in the performance (see Figure 9).

At a certain point, in the last third of the silent part of the performance, a puppet is sitting and bending its upper body over another puppet lying underneath it. Who is manipulating whom is ambiguous—whether the puppet on top is a human or the puppet underneath is a human moving by himself, or whether even a third combination is possible, namely that both are humans. The problem of agency is at stake here: the action blurs the source of movement, the distinction between a subject-body whose movement is perceived as the cause for the movement of another identical body and an object-body whose movement is only an effect of the other (subject-)body. The causal relationship between human agency and the inanimate material thing appears reversible, at least during the moment that this situation allows us to perceive. What the human and nonhuman puppet produce is a heterogeneous mixture, a hybrid between neither a subject nor an object. The assembling of the human and the nonhuman redirects attention to their relation, the gray middle zone across their bodies that appears as a continuum, although it is a constructed conjunction. Le Roy mentions that the concept of the quasi-object that Latour develops in *We Have Never Been Modern* influenced his procedure here (Latour 1993: 51–5). The nonhuman puppet in Latour’s terms would be seen as

Figure 9  Still image from the video recording of *Untitled* © Xavier Le Roy/in situ productions, 2005
a quasi-object: a hybrid between a nonhuman real thing and a human construction that is transmitted, punctuated, and reified through a heterogeneous network of material things and concepts. But what about the two other actors in the situation? In the next section I will consider how the audience perceive their actorship in both performances, U and h-é.

**Wiring spectators**

The apparatuses of h-é and U both reconsider their contract of address-response with the spectators. The outcome of this operation in the audience’s reception doesn't always meet the choreographers' authorial intentions. In the case of h-é, Charmatz rejects the idea that the spectator should regard her position as a shift to that of the (theatrical) actor. A misunderstanding arises because of an imbalance in stakes between the imaginary invasion of phantom dancers on the screen and the live presence of the spectator. He explains:

I thought we could form a little tribe of dancers that would be the big “other” in those symbolic spaces [the spaces inaccessible for dancers like television]. And being the wild invaders we would allow ourselves to perform like we wouldn't dare in another situation. So we didn't play with the mirroring image of the viewer, half asleep in his/her daily clothes on the piano, but were really the phantom dancers, ridiculous maybe but full of absent life. We wanted to “pretend” we would endlessly perform “for” the viewer, at any time! I hoped that if the piece would succeed, viewers could describe a “real” performance, *un vrai spectacle, comme si nous étions là*. But in fact the reactions read in many comments in the heavy guest books showed that the viewers felt themselves as part of the performance, being the single performer of *hâtre-élévision* ... this I didn't expect at all! We do not pretend that there is “nothing” and that the dance has to be taken in charge by the viewers. This is why the performance happens “between” the viewers and us in the boxes: in a relation with a strong smell of alterity. (Cvejić 2009c: n.p.)

The remarks of the spectators reveal that they took the physical absence of dancers during the live event as a lack. The performers weren’t co-present with one spectator, but were locked in the past of a film. According to the judgment of the spectators, the stakes of the live and the recorded action in the performance are unequal. They
underestimate the impact of what the dancers actually do in the film and how their action extends into the space of the installation. Experiencing it as a lack of live action that has to be compensated for by themselves, the spectators regard that their role shifts to one of actor. However, h-é didn’t conceive a stage for the spectator to act on. As the spectator is alone, her action doesn’t have any witness, any audience. Nor is the solitary spectator a passive viewer of television. A meticulous apparatus of loudspeakers, headphones, and lights amplifies the film, prolonging its spaces and times into the here-and-now reality of the spectator.

The sound that travels from the loudspeakers to the headphones, and the lights that turn on and off in the room in relation to the film, create an enviroment in which the body of the spectator is literally embedded. The apparatus is like a prosthesis that “corrects” the spectator’s perception by rearranging her senses, translocating the source of the stimulus, intensifying or lowering it. Therefore, the gaze of the spectator is necessarily embedded in the performance space, wiring other senses to the sources of sound and touch which are all part of the event. Connections between the spectator’s room and the film are established through metonymic props that appear in both “boxes”—the television and the room—such as the “piano” covered with black cloth on which the spectator is lying, or the bulb that hangs under the scaffold in the center of the circle of dancers and the bulb that hangs between the TV monitor and the spectator’s head. These objects are metonymic of the theatrical live event, because they come out of the TV box in lieu of the dancers and take the real volume in the presence of the spectator. In the series of solo close-up scenes in boxes towards the end one of the three male dancers appears in a room like the room of the installation that the spectator is in. He is half naked with his penis sticking out of the leotard in erection. He steps onto the “piano.” His movements appear aimless and idle, without any particular rhythm or drive: he stands up, sits down, stands up again, walks on the surface of the “piano,” reaches onto it with his leg, and so on. This contributes to an intensified sense of alterity, as Charmatz sees it: “If I consider that not many people can fuse with such character as Nuno’s, with a hard dick, dancing on the piano” (ibid.).

Wiring the spectator in a prosthesis of the event and corporalizing her presence reframes her body. It emphasizes that the sensations are issued and amplified to be transported from elsewhere to here, into the body of the spectator, making this body not just the recipient of, but also coterminous with, the stage. This operation is different from turning
the spectator into the actor. To support the claim that the performance happens in between them, Charmatz has to construct the continuum between two dislocated situations—the film and the installation—and this is done by wiring her body into the apparatus of *h-é* that acts at the same time as the prosthesis for the spectator's perception. Let's turn now to *U* to examine how the spectator is wired there.

The second instance of fog in *U* at the end of the silent part acts like the closing curtain. The end is only temporary, since the curtain serves to hide an action. A performer slips out of the puppet costume and invites the audience to take a break while the fog clears and thereafter come back for a discussion (Figure 10). He leaves the stage and returns after ten minutes to introduce his name and function: “My name is Geoffrey Garrison and I’m here to represent this untitled work.” All subsequent quotes are from the recording of the performance presented at Tanz im August, Berlin, held in August 2005. Viewed on another occasion, in Espace Pasolini, Valenciennes, France, in 2005, Garrison’s dialogue with the audience was similar, though it didn’t use exactly the same words. What follows is a conversation between the audience and the representative, supposed to fulfill the conventional format of the artist’s talk after the show. The talk expressly acts out that which the performance has avoided until then: a face-to-face confrontation between (one of) the performers on the stage and the spectators in the auditorium. Now the dramatic, agonistic aspect of theater emerges in its most conventional form of dialogue. The “authorless” performance acquires a face, albeit not of the still-anonymous author, but of an unmasked performer acting as the author’s representative. The dialogue becomes the occasion to realize the conflict that was missing on the stage, give vent to the frustration caused by the broken communication

![Figure 10](image.png)
between the stage and the auditorium during the performance, and manifest it in the motion of speech shifted to the quasi-juridical debate about the legitimacy of authorial decisions.

The dialogue evolves as a trial in which the intentions of the author and the effects of the performance are judged by the spectators. That the talk turns into a “trial” seems not to have been planned by the anonymous author, since his/her representative is disturbed by the audience’s reactions. The spectators’ questions aim to interrogate the representative about what happened and why, as if the performance they attended was a criminal deed for which responsibility should be determined. The representative proceeds by explicating the performance from the perspective of the author and his collaborators. He describes it in terms of connections between the puppets and the human performers, but also between the audience and the performers, underlining the reciprocity of the relationship between them. The action can be divided between the “puppets which the actors are affecting” and the puppets that are “affecting the actors.” Although most of this is choreographed and cued, “a lot of it has to change according to how the objects—puppets—react,” depending, for instance, on whether “the puppet is going to roll on a right moment” (Garrison’s words). In addition, the performers, he reports, cannot see much, which sometimes causes them to end up going in the wrong direction. He explains that the movements of neither the human performers nor the puppets are completely independent, “free and his own. It’s the connection, just like the way my relationship to you is a connection.” The audience members also admit that the performance implicates them, however their comments reveal that they don’t share the understanding of their part in the connection with the representative.

According to what I witnessed in three instances (two live performances and the recording of the discussion) and what was then confirmed by Le Roy, the audience members state during the talk that they felt provoked but didn’t understand how they were supposed to react to this provocation. When the representative asks them to explain what they were provoked by, no reason is given, as if it were self-evident that the subtraction of (visible) action on stage requires action on the part of the audience. A spectator said that he expected more movement in the auditorium than on the stage, as this was the tradition of the festival (Tanz im August, Berlin) in which the performance was presented. Another found that the hissing, laughter, singing, tapping of the feet, and dancing of the audience was celebratory rather than aggressive, and that the audience could have been more active. To his statement,
"Have you ever thought that it would be better if the audience would be able to move around? It’s just a little bit [sic] that the audience has flashlights, etc. We experienced tonight that the audience wanted to move, and look around,” the representative answered laconically, “Why didn’t you?”

The representative nevertheless refutes provocation as the motive of the performance. Instead, he explains that the wish of the makers, in plural “we,” was for the audience to “come along with it”:

It’s really about coming into this slowness, in this moment where there is nothing really happening. There’s something there that I can really see. It’s really not about trying to make you angry or feel cheated . . . You go to a Hollywood film, and the action goes boom-boom-boom-boom-boom, and you go to a Tarkovsky film and the action is really slow. And I think, I’m so bored, and it’s been three hours and nothing’s happening; this guy’s looked into the horizon. And then five days later that film sticks with me. It is about not being a spectacle in the most heavy-handed sense.

Only a few voices confirmed that they appreciated _U_ as a “meditation,” and that “if you have to get angry to get into that state, then it takes longer for the audience to realize what is wanted from them.” In sum, the audience received the performance with a mixture of contrasting feelings. The unease about the lack of address from the stage in the beginning caused excitement about the possibility of acting together, which shortly afterwards turned into embarrassment regarding the silly spontaneous expressions of the crowd. The spectators who allowed themselves to explore the situation of multiple connections between their flashlights and the puppets in silence, stillness, and darkness were an overruled silent minority. The majority of the audience members behaved as if the performance was stolen from them, and they expressed their judgment through a feeling of being dispossessed. The performance wasn’t given to them in the way they had expected: with a clear representation of the stage that would allow them to be looking and nothing more, as well as with the name and face of the author, the performers, and the subject matter or theme reflected in the title. Confronted with an experience of a dance performance that didn’t have an objective they could recognize—a figure whose movement could be considered as a distinctive form or an expression of her body—they pronounced a judgment of refusal and negation. In short, the experience for many
spectators, as witnessed in the aftertalk, didn’t make sense, and hence, the many sensations it was composed of couldn’t justify the event.

*  
The two apparatuses we’ve considered here—the head-box of \( h-\dot{e} \) and the wired assembling of puppets, spectators, and flashlights of \( U \)—emerge out of problematizing the rapport between the stage and the auditorium that constitutes the contract of theater: the address and the response by which performing and attending performance are bound up with one another. As we have regarded this relationship to be ontologically foundational for the European tradition of theater, since it constitutes its chief operation, representation, we might now evaluate the effects the procedures of its disjunction have on theatricality. Thus I want to underline that the two apparatuses in question aren’t attempts at entirely removing representation as the stake of theatricality in theater. The rupture of the bind serves to demonstrate that it is a constructed conjunction and can as such be broken and transformed into other constructs. The subtractive procedures examined in the two performances aim to separate performing and attending in order to install something other than a mirroring rapport between them. Hence both performances emphasize an odd condition opposite to the claim of theatricality: the independence between performing and attending the performance. The apparatuses make these performances seem independent of the spectators, not by the as-if clause of illusionist representation via the fourth wall, but by being inaccessible to the audience, hardly perceivable (\( U \)), or unaffordable by the audience (\( h-\dot{e} \)).

However, these apparatuses don’t reject the presence of the audience. Instead, they demonstrate that the spectators can’t perform their own role without constructing a conjunction. This entails a mode of activity that we have here called “wiring,” which means to establish a connection that makes the body or the action of the spectator coterminal with the action of performing. A wired attender doesn’t take over the role of the performer—she doesn’t become an actor in lieu of a missing one. The attender actively assembles herself with the other heterogeneous parts of the assembling: objects, live or phantom bodies, lights, and sounds. As if she connects to an electrical circuit that epitomizes the performance event, her “wiring” amounts to plugging vision and voice into the performance that sensorially shapes the event. This activity is a matter of constructing an encounter that captures the heterogeneous forces of expression of this assembling.
Our inquiry will continue by considering what will seem to be the radically different theater setup of an incontrovertible, self-professed dance, in which the authors are not only present as performers on a fully lit stage, but also encounter the audience members in a deliberate address, looking in and through their gaze. Unlike h-être and U, where the problems were created in the making of the theatrical apparatuses of the performances for the audience, Weak Dance Strong Questions will take us to problem-posing as a method of generating movement in a dance that produces itself while the audience watches.
Reaching the halfway point of our discussion, this chapter will examine what might be one of the most contentious topics in the history of Western philosophy and dance criticism and at once an important question raised by the concept of “choreographing problems”: can dancing be equated with thinking, and if so, under which conditions and terms? The topic of the relationship between dance and thought is further complicated by claims related to improvisation, the mode of generating dance movement in the moment of its execution, with which the so-called thinking body is often identified. Before we try to answer this question on the basis of exposing the problem-method of Weak Dance Strong Questions (WDSQ), a few preliminary remarks about the context of dance improvisation and its theory are needed to better situate the scope of the topic “improvisation” and the problem that WDSQ poses to it.

Since modern dance’s rupture with ballet in the early twentieth century, improvisation has held a special promise of the invention of new movement. The expectation that new movement is born of improvisation is founded on assumptions and ideas that were first formulated by modern dance pioneers such as Isadora Duncan, then renewed and cultivated from the 1960s and ’70s onward: freedom in spontaneous self-expression, the body-mind holism, and the primacy of the physical, sensorial, and emotional nature of movement. An abundant vocabulary widely shared by practitioners across the field of contemporary dance since the 1960s rephrases these ideas in the following terms, as Sally Banes lists it: “Spontaneity, self-expression, spiritual expression, freedom, accessibility, choice, community, authenticity, the natural, presence, resourcefulness, risk, political subversion, a sense of connectedness, of playfulness, child’s play, leisure, and sports” (Banes in
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Albright and Gere 2003: 77). The ideas of spontaneous self-expression, the holistic concept of a thinking body, and the primacy of physical sensations and emotions as the meaning and value of dancing movement conform to the principles which were discussed in the previous chapters as the subjectivation of the dancer through bodily expression or the objectivation of movement by the dancer’s body. They constitute an exaggerated expression of the organic vitalism which has reinforced the ontological foundation of modern dance in the presence, in the movement of the body as the evidence of the living substance. Therefore, in this chapter I will discuss the problems and concepts that arise from a critique of the organic regimes of self-expression and movement-objectivation within improvisation itself. My aim is to show how WDSQ, a performance by Jonathan Burrows and Jan Ritsema based on improvisation, examines the paradox of the “unknown” in improvisation, or the discovery and surprising experience of new movement and presence, in relation to the “known,” given or trained capabilities of moving. The “unknown,” “unexpected,” “surprise,” or “discovery” are the terms of a doxa, a common-sense jargon of practitioners with which improvisation is negotiated. WDSQ explores improvised movement with the constraints that undermine the subjectivist or objectivist grounds of the organic, holistic body-movement bind. The problem that gives rise to WDSQ is how to question movement by movement itself. Since this involves an immanent critique of the aforementioned ideas as promoted by practitioners and theorists of improvisation, I will first unpack the discourses of improvisation in the field of contemporary dance on their own terms, which thoroughly disagree with the logic of creation as expression that the theoretical approach explored here, based on Deleuze and Spinoza, advances. Hence my first task will be to expose and examine the theoretical underpinnings of practitioners’ discourses on dance improvisation—which are implicitly phenomenological, favoring the self-consciousness of the dancer—in order to demonstrate, in the next step, how WDSQ departs from them toward an expressive and constructive practice of movement genesis.

Improvisation in lack of philosophy

Since its rise to prominence in the 1960s and ’70s, the field of dance improvisation has been invested in primarily by practitioners—dancers, choreographers, and “bodywork” researchers—who have also framed its topics, problems, and terms in writings published in non-academic journals, the predominant references being the American
Contact Quarterly and the British New Dance. The pioneers and veterans of improvisational practices, such as Steve Paxton, Nancy Stark Smith, or Lisa Nelson, in the case of Contact Improvisation, or Simone Forti as one of the earliest maverick improvisers, have established a discourse based on the reflection of firsthand experience. The tone of inquisitive, albeit often uncritical affirmation in these empirical “reports” has led prominent dance scholars like Susan Leigh Foster or Ann Cooper Albright to prioritize an experiential approach over theoretical conceptualization without the experience of improvisation, thus settling a tacit rule of entitlement for discursive engagement in this field.

Cynthia Novack has contributed greatly to the discourse on improvisation with her book Sharing the Dance: Contact Improvisation and American Culture (1990), and like Foster and Albright, she was a practitioner of the improvisational dance whose study is, in part, an analysis on the basis of personal experience. Foster participated in the improvisational dance led by Richard Bull, and Novack, his spouse, recounted her experience of this in her book Dances that Describe Themselves: The Improvised Choreography of Richard Bull (2002). With a few exceptions, the most significant being Banes, who published extensively on Judson Dance Theater and what she introduced as “Post-Modern Dance” in America (her publications included discussion of improvisation in the works of Simone Forti, Trisha Brown, Steve Paxton, Yvonne Rainer, and Grand Union (Banes 1987; 1993; 1994)) there is hardly any writing on the subject of dance improvisation which does not ground itself in the evidence of personal experience. The reasons for this aren’t entirely surprising: if improvisation is rooted in bodily experience, then the knowledge of it must be empirical, born out of experiment and practice; secondly, the mistrust of verbal language among improvisers further hinders debate by regarding improvisers’ statements and definitions as documents with truth-value, while these formulations may involve a considerable degree of mystification. Thus in one of the few recent studies on improvisation, edited by Ann Cooper Albright and David Gere, Taken by Surprise: A Dance Improvisation Reader (2003), Gere remarks that

the rhetoric of magic runs throughout the discussion of improvisation: to theorize about improvisation is to theorize about consciousness, and to theorize about consciousness is to push the boundaries of physical discourse toward consideration of the spirit, the divine, the unfathomable, and the unimaginable. (Gere in Albright and Gere 2003: xiv)
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The consequence of the “monopoly” of practitioners’ knowledge in the field is a lack of proper theoretical study, of a comprehensive systematization and historicization of diverse improvisational dance practices of the twentieth century, and of, quite simply, consistent academic work dealing with the subject. Improvisational dance since the 1960s has been “manifesting itself on the basis of how various artists understood it” (Lycouris 1996: 7), which has resulted in the circulation of many terms for notions that have not been precisely distinguished or theorized. In the 1960s improvisation was called “indeterminate choreography,” “open choreography,” “situation-response composition,” “in situ composition,” “spontaneous determination” (Banes 2003: 78). The same practices are now referred to as “open” or “total improvisation” (Lycouris 1996: 6). When an improvisation practice gains prominence, its author profiles it by giving it another name, as for instance in the “Open-Form Composition” of the American choreographer Mary (O’Donnell) Fulkerson, a prominent figure in British nonmainstream dance in the 1980s, or more recently in “Real-Time Composition” by the Portuguese choreographer João Fiadeiro (2007: 101–10). The “Cognitive Dance Improvisation” and “emergent choreography” of the Dutch choreographer Ivar Hagendoorn provide us with another lesser known yet thoroughly self-reflected example that contributes to the variety of self-termed practices (Hagendoorn n.d.: n.p.). However, the most elaborated and widespread improvisation practice and technique has kept its name, Contact Improvisation, since its foundation in 1972 thanks to various efforts to institutionalize it through regular international meetings attended by a community of practitioners, through dance studies curricula and through the journal Contact Quarterly. The constant definitional rubric defined in the journal accounts for the possibility of reflecting transformations throughout the practice of Contact Improvisation, yet an analysis of definitions pronounced during a period of upwards of thirty years attests to a stability of characteristics. They can be paraphrased as follows:

Contact Improvisation is a “duet movement form,” where two people maintain a “spontaneous physical dialogue” through shared weight, support, common or counterpoised momentum; it deals with organic body movement in response to the physical forces that surround it, gravity being the major one; it guides the body to an awareness of “its own natural movement possibilities,” and engages its senses “in the effort of survival.”
In a myriad of self-fashioned improvisation practices that have arisen and vanished with their founders, Contact Improvisation has sustained itself for more than three decades due to its reliance on physical laws of gravity and momentum, which brings it close to an athletic discipline. The strong emphasis on technical ability, on training, and on improving and expanding existing possibilities of the body in relation to given physical forces have contributed to its development as a dance technique in addition to its existence as a mode of performance. Thus Contact Improvisation engages two of the three registers of improvisation in dance. First, it is a mode of performance in which movement is spontaneously generated as it is performed before an audience and where making and performing coincide in the event of performance, and secondly it is a specific dance technique included in the training of contemporary dance. The third register in which improvisation in a general sense is used in contemporary dance is as a tool for the spontaneous generation of movement that is then set and reproduced as a kind of composition that privileges the indeterminate, spontaneous, self-expressive, or unconscious in performing as a source of movement. This might be the most widespread and common method since the German choreographer Pina Bausch championed it as a primary source of movement material in her dance theater (*Tanztheater*) in the 1970s and '80s. This method of improvisation won't be considered in this discussion, as its function is to generate performance material which is subsequently set and performed as choreography.

I would like to make clear that my concern here lies in the first register only: the discourse of improvisational dance performance, which I will expose from two perspectives. The first perspective is rooted in Contact Improvisation, in the voice of its founder, Steve Paxton, who, as the living apogee of the American liberal tradition or “culture of spontaneity” (Belgrad 1998), will serve as its main representative, along with a few other related voices. The liberal strand of improvisation in spontaneity will be countered by a newer, analytic, research-oriented perspective proper to the choreographer William Forsythe known as “improvisation technologies,” which in its compositional rigor seems closer to WDSQ but, as I will argue, conversely aims to affirm, rather than problematize, a certain kind of movement in abundance and excess.

**The holistic ground of improvisation**

Contact Improvisation is one of many improvisational practices which have developed from the legacy of American modern dance as
epitomized in its early beginnings (Duncan) and in the period of the 1960s and '70s (Halprin). The latter can be situated as part of what Daniel Belgrad defined as the culture, aesthetic, and style of spontaneity in the arts in postwar America, along with action painting, bebop jazz, the second generation of American modernist poetry from the Black Mountain School (Charles Olson, Robert Creely, Mary C. Richards), and beat poetry (Belgrad 1998). As a third alternative opposed to mass culture and corporate liberalism as well as the established high art of the postwar period, improvisation embraces, Belgrad argues, two sets of ideas: body-mind holism and intersubjectivity as a model of democratic interaction. The two lines of reasoning form the basis of self-expression, movement objectivation, and communication in the act of theater, which are contested by Burrows’ and Ritsema’s improvisation in WDSQ. I will examine them here respectively.

The holistic approach to the body, betokening not only the dance but also the poetry of this paradigm, celebrates the unconscious. Modeled after psychic automatism, it presupposes a free flow of subjectivity, which in dance manifests as a form of visceral thinking opposed to the rational control of mind and thought expressed in language. “Improvisation is a word for something that can’t keep a name,” writes Paxton (Paxton 1987: 126). Firstly, this “something” of improvisation conflates improvised dance movement with a necessarily, if not also exclusively, bodily experience of a self alone or a sensation shared by individuals in contact. Secondly, it is claimed that this experience is irreducible to verbal language, and Paxton, like many other improvisers, reinstates the inadequacy of language in apprehending movement:

I would bet that no dancer ever reviewed, however positively, has ever felt their dance captured in print. . . . The further it goes from the source of the experience to a verbal or printed version, the less recourse we have to elaborations or answers to our questions. (Paxton 1987: 127)

Thirdly, the pronounced fear of the impoverished language “versions” of bodily experience places bodily movement close to the Romantic transcendent notion of the ineffable, that which eludes the mind’s rational grasp. The notion of the ineffable is echoed even by younger improvisers who, like João Fiadeiro, assert that the final goal of improvisation is to “let go of wanting to produce meaning” (Fiadeiro 2007: 104). The idea of sensation resisting meaning points to the dichotomy in which the terms “mind” and “body” stand in for the gap between the “known” and the “unknown.” Foster remarks that the common definition of
improvisation as the “process of letting go of the mind’s thinking so that the body can do its moving in its own unpredictable way” is an inaccurate and unhelpful obfuscation (Foster in Albright and Gere 2003: 7). Instead of denying the mind–body dichotomy, she tries to resolve it by attributing to the improvising body a specific “bodily mindfulness,” a kind of hyperawareness in the body and of the body. In escaping language, the body is regarded as a reservoir of the unconscious, whose unleashing is uncovering the unknown, the unselfconscious as a truer reality than the performance of intended and determined movement. This improvisation is close to the definition of “spontaneous composition” in beat poetry: “an unselfconscious process of fitting the body-mind’s subjective apprehensions to a communicative medium” (Belgrad 1998: 201). The ideal of spontaneity in dance, similar to the logic of bebop and beat prosody, revels in a unitary view on the relationship between the unconscious and the consciousness, in search of a whole self, as Forti’s reflection on her method of “logomotion” exemplifies here: “I started speaking while moving, with word and movement springing spontaneously from a common source. This practice has been a way for me to know what’s on my mind. What’s on my mind before I think it through, while it is still a wild feeling in my bones” (Forti 2003: 57). The “common source” of thought and movement lies in the body-movement bind, where the process of making conscious the unconscious by way of bodily movement affirms the self-consciousness in the logocentric, Kantian sense we discussed in Chapter 1: as a given faculty of the mind that spontaneously accompanies and unifies all sensible perceptions.

Fourthly, no matter how diverse their practices may seem, improvisers highlight that their motivation lies in “discovery.” For Forti,

The performance should be full of discovery. Yet even as it requires an unobstructed carrying through on impulse, it also requires keeping an outside eye. A complex of judgments regarding what it is that is evolving, an awareness that there is something that you are making. Is it fresh? Is it going somewhere? Is it accessible to the audience? (Forti 2003: 56)

Hence the “discovery” recounted above implies a constant fluctuation between the conscious and the unconscious in a search for the “unexpected” and “unknown”:

Although the “unexpected” is extremely rare to an experienced player, it is precisely for that moment that I work—to see a good player in
suspense before an “unexpected,” “intriguing” and “enigmatic” move from his opponent. I truly believe that it is exactly in that void, the time parentheses where life stays on hold for a brief moment, that art (like the game) becomes sublime. (Fiadeiro 2007: 108)

The “sublime moment” described above seems like an interposition of the “unexpected” and “unknown” in which the improver as a player is experiencing a loss of control, and the time aspect implied above relates to the etymological meaning of *improvviso ex tempore*, which in dance, as well as in music, implies composition outside the predetermined and fixed time of a written score. Movement without a pregiven rhythm and time frame becomes open-ended and thus “unforeseen.” This, according to Paxton, calls for an interpretation of “out of time” (*ex tempore*) in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, the time of improvisation should be equated with human experience of duration, which he defines as the experiences accumulated in life. “‘Out of time’ means that, out of experience (conscious or not) there is material for making something” (Paxton 1987: 129). Improvisation supposes that the body generates movement out of itself—out of the experience of its own time, that is, out of duration. On the other hand, Paxton cautions against the habits that may result from such self-absorption. So, he suggests that “out of” should also simultaneously be “construed as ‘aside from.’ We have to use what we have become in such a way as to not be so controlled by it that it is automatically reproduced” (ibid).

Regarding the question of the origin and place of the tropes of the unconscious, unexpected or unknown, two strands of improvisation can be distinguished. The genealogy of the first can be traced back to the origins of modern dance, where the idea of freedom meant the emancipation of the self of the dancer, as the following remark reveals: “Movement improvisation had shifted from being looked upon as a throwback to Isadora Duncan to being regarded as a very contemporary way to get in touch with oneself” (Ross 2003: 50). Ross confers responsibility for the legacy of improvisation on modern dance, but her statement also unravels the core ideological assumption that improvisation is a way of expressing the self of the dancer. The self is expressed through a sensorial experience, which is at the same time considered an emotional experience. The body-mind holism in the aesthetic of spontaneity presupposes a tapping into the emotional life of the artist, as the painter of abstract expressionism, Robert Motherwell testifies: “The content of art is feeling . . . feelings are neither ‘objective’ nor ‘subjective,’ but both, since all ‘objects’ or ‘things’ are the result of an interaction
between the body-mind and the external world” (Motherwell in Belgrad 1998: 122). Forti expounds this as a method of personal response that she learned from Anna Halprin, whose workshop in California led other choreographers of the Judson Dance Theater to explore improvisation in the 1960s and ’70s:

One of the instructions Anna sometimes gave was to spend an hour in the environment, in the woods or in the city, observing whatever caught our attention. Then we would return to the workspace and move with these impressions fresh in our senses, mixing aspects of what we had observed, with our responses and feeling states. (Forti 2003: 54)

Halprin’s teaching of improvisation resonates with similar ideas of the emancipation of the self to those that guided poets in their quest for an open form, as the following statement from a poet from the Black Mountain School, Mary Cline Richards, confirms:

I believe that the squelching of the “person” and his spontaneous intuitive response to experience is . . . at the root of our timidity, our falseness . . . . The handicrafts stand to perpetuate the living experience of contact with natural elements—something primal, immediate, personal, material, a dialogue between our dreams and the forces of nature (Richards in Belgrad 1998: 157)

Self-expression in improvisational dance is considered not as a solipsistic act but as a “conversation” between the self and the natural or physical environment, or with another body, as in Contact Improvisation. Thus the idea of intersubjectivity, conveyed in jazz as a dialogue, the antiphony of call-and-response between musicians playing together, or in the visual arts as a “plastic dialogue” with materials, is coupled with the centering of the self, as Albright explains: “If the world is already inside one’s body, then the separation between self and other is much less distinct. The skin is no longer the boundary between world and myself, but rather the sensing organ that brings the world into my awareness” (Albright and Gere 2003: 262). Since it was introduced as an approach that deals with dancers as people, “well-trained holistic dancer-performers” who integrate physical exploration and emotional life, or anyone, also non-trained dancers, interested in exploring their feelings, sensations and images (Worth and Poynor 2004: 54), improvisation accommodates another idea developed in body-mind
holism—healing—and therefore suggests itself as a model for the physical treatment of social illnesses. Contact Improvisation is thus compared with the activity of “encounter group” therapy with which it shares many characteristics: self-expression in a group situation, a continuum of mind and body, and a process of risk-taking, reality-testing and trust (Belgrad 1998: 162–3). As one practitioner of Contact Improvisation as a “group process” remarked, “Often, what unfolds is deeply connected to one’s own intricate patterns of relating and being in the world (in fact it will be if it is authentic)” (Needler in Belgrad 1998: 163). The therapeutic dimension of improvisation has developed into a widespread variety of somatic practices—also popularly known as “bodywork”—that emphasize the aim of self-realization and operate both inside and outside of dance. It can be concluded that this strand of improvisation that examines emotional life and the relationship between the unconscious and consciousness posits a phenomenological and psychologically determined subject whose whole sense of self is rooted in self-consciousness. As we will see, this will be one of the crucial points of dissent in Burrows and Ritsema’s approach.

The opposite strand uses improvisation as a way out of the self, yielding the possibilities of movement and sensation in and through the body as detached from the subject. The objectification of movement through improvisation can be illustrated by Paxton’s *Small Dance*—an exercise widely used in teaching improvisation today (Albright in Albright and Gere 2003: 261) and whose partial influence on the notion of the impersonal Burrows has acknowledged (Cvejić 2008c: n.p.). Paxton explains it as a method of “detraining”: “getting rid of the masks that we have, the social and formal masks, until the physical events occur as they will” (Paxton 2004: n.p.). Detraining consists in standing still, eliminating any conscious muscular action until the dancer begins to feel her skeletal muscles holding the body upright. Its goal is to achieve a balance in which the forces of the body are equalized. Paxton describes its occurrence as “such a delicate moment that if you even think ‘Ah, it’s happened,’ it pushes you out of it, so you have to suspend your thinking” (ibid.). The process of detraining involves relaxation, which is, according to Paxton, a voluntary act of a certain kind:

An act of “Won’t.” That is, I won’t hold this tension any longer. It’s not a negative. It’s the opposite of insisting that you have to be what you are in terms of the tensions that have arrived within your body. That insistence is very much some part of the body that says “This is me, this is myself.” (Ibid.)
For Paxton, detraining means to peel off the social, historical, stylistic, formalist skin-layers of the body so as to reach “masses and bodies and sensations”:

I stress that the dancers are people not in the social sense but in the animal sense in this kind of dancing, that they should not smile, should not make eye contact, should not talk, that they should just be there as animals, as bundles of nerves, as masses and bones . . . touching the other bundle and letting that be the work. (Ibid.)

An exercise of the emancipation of the physical self, detraining has the purpose to reach what improvisers deem the deepest hidden ground of the body—its automatic unconscious movements and sensations as its primal nature and essence. Or, in other words, detraining should enable a kind of existence which appears truer and more essential than the truth of the subjective experience of a particular self. Paxton suggests that this ground is the physical essence beyond consciousness. And, *Small Dance* is an improvisation that realizes it as a capacity which resides within every human body.

In sum, both strands of improvisation—self-expression as an embodiment of a particular self where the subject coincides with her body, and objectivation of the movement in and for itself to which the body subordinates itself as an instrument—are internalistic; in other words, they refuse externally posited constraints and instead operate within the internally given limits of the body, its experience of time, space, and contact with the other. This conclusion follows from the neo-avant-garde perspective of “dance as/into life,” inherited from the 1960s, and still pervades improvisational dance as an ideological precept of the embodiment of freedom. Improvisation becomes the method of uncovering that which inheres in the body per se or is triggered by the situation that the body finds itself in. When considered under the recurrent themes of the unconscious, “unexpected,” and “unknown,” the method involves a manipulation and a negotiation of false opposites: the known and the unknown which only the known can make possible. The unknown is supposed to be an already existing possibility but hidden from consciousness and knowledge. This explains the experience of a “discovery” whereby the new surprises the improviser as something that she didn’t know until then, but which might be new to her alone. Hence improvisers are often warned of the dangers of self-indulgence (Banes 1987: 67), where improvisational dance affords a self-contained event of participants with no interest in observation.
Still grounded in knowledge: improvisation as composition

Improvisation technologies developed in the field of ballet by the choreographer and dancer William Forsythe deserve our attention here, specifically because Forsythe’s practice of improvisation thoroughly distinguishes itself from the self-expressionist/objectivist organic and holistic regime. Although Forsythe seems to cultivate ideals similar to those of other improvisational practices, such as “surprise” and “visceral thinking,” or as Gerald Siegmund refers to it, “thinking in movement” (Siegmund 2004), his method and its aims set him apart from the main tradition. Forsythe’s method in the first place emphasizes its foundation in a specific knowledge—in this case, ballet training:

My basic method, developed over a period of fifteen years, is to find ways to use what my dancers already know. Since I work primarily with ballet dancers, I analyze what they know about space and their bodies from their intensive ballet training. I’ve realized that in essence ballet dancers are taught to match lines and forms in space. (Forsythe and Kaiser 1998, n.p.)

Observing the model of the kinesphere, developed by Rudolf Laban, which centralizes a point in the body from which all movement emanates and through which all axes pass, and which accounts for classical ballet as well as for modern dance, Forsythe came to the idea of extending it beyond one center situated in the body. Thus he multiplied the centers within the body, but also transposed them into the space surrounding the body, using not only points, but also lines or entire planes on or in which to issue or lodge movement, which particularly builds on Laban’s geometrical foundation of modern dance (Laban 1984 and 2011; Preston-Dunlop and Sayers 2010; Servos 1998; Baudoin and Gilpin 1991). The result of exploding the Euclidian geometry of classical ballet was a breaking up of the coherent and coordinated physical identity of the dancing body, which Peter Boenisch characterized as a dissolution of “the traditional coupling of body and subjectivity” (Boenisch 2007: 23). Forsythe conceives of it as a creation of a “many-timed body, as opposed to a shaped body,” folding and unfurling towards and against itself. Until now, the method reads as an account of composition, so the question arises as to how and why Forsythe deploys it as a spontaneous genesis of movement in performance. Instead of writing out movement based on an expanded and decentered model of multiple kinespheres, Forsythe chooses to assign “algorithms” to the dancers in order for
them to create a choreography in real time. He explains his method thus: “Some choreographers create dance from emotional impulses, while others, like Balanchine, work from a strictly musical standpoint. My own dances reflect the body’s experiences in space, which I try to connect through algorithms. So there’s this fascinating overlap with computer programming” (Forsythe and Kaiser 1998, n.p.). In the case of the performance ALIE/N A(C)TION (1992), the algorithm is called the “iterative process” in which the dancers examine their spatial location and movement, and redescibe it, folding the results back into the original movement material, lengthening the movement phrases with the new inserts and repeating the process several times (see Caspersen 2004, and Fabius 2009).

The recursive process has two aims that explain Forsythe’s preference for improvisation instead of the reproductive execution of set movement. Firstly, this method involves ballet dancers in composition beyond the customary competences of dancer qua interpreter required by ballet and even contemporary dance performance. This involvement has the peculiar effect of dismantling the laws of mimesis that have guided the execution of movement since ballet. Forsythe explains it as follows:

My dancers have no idea what they look like. On the other hand, they have to want to know, but I’m trying to put the testimony of their senses into question . . . . What it actually does is to make you forget how to move. You stop thinking about the end result, and start thinking instead about performing the movement internally . . . . When the force of gravity throws them into another configuration, for example, they have to analyze themselves and their current state in relation to the entire piece. In this sense, they are always in a “possessed” state. (Forsythe and Kaiser 1998: n.p.)

Hence, the first aim is to hinder the representational logic by which dancers are directed by an image as the end result of movement. Once this is achieved through the focus on the beginning of a new movement on the basis of a preceding movement, more complex choreographic structures can arise. The second aim of this method of improvisation is to complexify composition beyond a closed, predetermined structure conceived by one authority. Forsythe shares the task of composing movement with the dancers, because, as he argues: “I don’t want to know what’s going to happen. I want to be ambushed by the results” (ibid.). If we analyze Forsythe’s method from the perspective of the
division of labor, then his use of improvisation can also be explained by a post-Fordist exploitation of creativity in collaboration and teamwork as opposed to the traditional hierarchical division of roles between the choreographer and performer in the discipline of ballet (see Cvejić and Vujanović 2010: 4–6). Improvisation serves to accelerate and improve, or as Boenisch suggested, thoroughly “update,” “rewire,” and “redesign the ballet code into a dance form for the twenty-first century” (Boenisch 2007: 23).

To conclude, Forsythe’s practice of improvisation isn’t grounded in self-expression or the objectivation of universal movement that inheres in the body as such, unlike the prevalent practices of improvisation. Yet, as a technology for an improvement of composition based on manipulating traditional ballet technique, it strongly relies on knowledge and strives to advance the cognitive and sensorial abilities of performers by building on that knowledge. It doesn’t emotionally reassert the individual self of the performer as the subject of dance, but in effect reinforces the performer’s identity through a body-movement synthesis founded on the cognitive and sensorial unity of faculties—an approach that integrates the mind and the body. Forsythe’s stance is opposed to the liberal idea of spontaneity cultivated by improvisers such as Forti or Paxton because it claims that “visceral thinking” is acquired through training a bodily technique which involves a high degree of cognitive control. The resulting aesthetic of complexity, richness, and sophistication affirms Forsythe’s method as a technology of composition rather than improvisation. However, in Forsythe’s own understanding of his method, the purpose of improvisation is “to defeat choreography, to get back to what is primarily dancing” (Forsythe and Bürkle 1999: 24), because “the whole point of improvisation is to stage disappearance” (Forsythe in Baudoin and Gilpin 1991: n.p.). Hence the function of improvisation is to restore the elusive essence of dance movement, ephemerality arising paradoxically from an excess of kinesthetic and visual information. As Fabius remarks, “The spectator is dealing with a continuous sense of loss, the incapacity to absorb the excess of impressions. From this follows the qualification of Forsythe’s work as embodying the poetry or architecture of disappearance” (Fabius 2009: 341).

Forsythe’s algorithmic logic of improvisation doesn’t operate by creating a problem that would thoroughly question or transform it. Algorithms organize a complex set of tasks within given “building blocks” (Forsythe 1999: 16) of composition: balletic elements of circles, points, lines and planes in multiplied kinespheres. Operating these programs, dancers are managing many tasks at once, the outcome of which is an unforeseen
Exhausting Improvisation: Stutterances

combination, always a new variation of movements that gives a dancer a gratifying sense of expanding her own capabilities to move. Another argument against qualifying it as problem-posing is that these “building blocks” are derived from Forsythe’s own art of dancing, as he contends: “My body has determined a lot of our dancing because I sense the body a certain way and it informs me a certain way. So it’s a very personal view of the world, and that’s the nature of choreography” (Forsythe 1999: 22). Thus Forsythe’s improvisation technologies yield the aesthetic which owes its unity to the point of origin in the author’s body. As he links his concern with a many-timed body with multiple centers of movement in and out of the body to his own movement style, Forsythe suggests that his improvisation technologies result from extending and amplifying knowledge from an individual authoring body. Improvisation in WDSQ begins exactly by dismantling the function of the body as the source or point of origin of movement, and this is part of the problem that gives rise to this performance.

What follows is a discussion of the method of problem-posing in the making and performing of WDSQ, as rooted in the Deleuzo-Spinozan theory of “choreographing problems” we have developed here. But before we continue with a detailed account of Burrows and Ritsema’s thinking process and improvisational procedures, two important remarks need to be made. In an interview by Christel Staelpart conspicuously titled “Becoming Ritsema,” Ritsema as a theatermaker “becoming-dancer” mentions that he feels “akin to” and “inspired by the post-war generation of French philosophers such as Baudrillard, Guattari, Deleuze” (Staelpart and Ritsema 2002: 58). Thanks to this interview’s having featured at a conference as a key case of a theater practice involved with Deleuzian thinking (Deleuze Revisited: Contemporary Performing Arts and the Ruin of Representation, Ghent, 2001), Ritsema acquired the reputation of a theatermaker whose ideas and methods are in close dialogue with the theories of Deleuze (Bleeker 2004). Firstly, I would like to point out that after gauging the theoretical relevance of his statements about his own work, Ritsema seems to show an erratic and notional connection to an eclectic range of theories, from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Niklas Luhmann, or from Baudrillard to Deleuze. This attests more to a general affinity of artists today with the reflection of abstract thought as such, and particularly to philosophy’s and critical theory’s position as revered sources of knowledge in recent performance practices and other art practices, than to a consistent engagement with certain theoretical concepts and texts. Thus it comes as no surprise that, as Bleeker argues, Ritsema’s understanding of the thinking body in dance
echoes a confused and contradictory notion of presence, understood both as a “ground zero” of “pure” expression and as an intense experience of multiplicity and uncertainty (Bleeker 2004: 136, 147). My second point here is that regardless of inconsistency and confusion in referencing philosophical sources of his poetics, Ritsema’s affinity with Deleuze doesn’t prefigure and determine my reading of WDSQ with the Deleuzian concept of creation through problems. As I explicated in the introduction, although authors’ intentions, wishes and notions are of crucial importance for our inquiry into a practice-oriented kind of thinking, the way these authors attempt to associate them with philosophical theories is not only insignificant, but can also be dangerously misleading. Therefore, the ensuing discussion of problem-posing with respect to Deleuze is unrelated to Ritsema’s or Burrows’ alleged “inspiration” from Deleuze.

Ungrounding possibilities

WDSQ is an improvised duet made and performed by a dancer and choreographer, Jonathan Burrows, and a theater director without professional dance training, Jan Ritsema. Improvisation was given as a necessary condition of the choice of their collaboration, since the “non-dancer” wasn’t capable of repeating the same movement; hence, improvisation here stands for no more than working with non-set movement. Moreover, the initial constraint of improvisation couldn’t be a sufficient departure point for the two to begin to move together. What they clearly didn’t want to fall back on were their individual habitual ways of dancing, one formed over a long period of dancing professionally in classical ballet and contemporary dance, and the other informed by an amateur vision about what he considers dance to be. An idea about movement that would determine how, where, when, and why they were to dance still had to be invented. The idea slowly began to emerge in discussions, during which a poem, “Burnt Norton” from T. S. Eliot’s *Four Quartets*, lent the notion of a movement “neither from nor towards.” Burrows and Ritsema quote this excerpt from the poem as a common reference for their wish to move neither from nor towards, but in the middle of movement (Burrows and Ritsema 2003: n.p.):

At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards,
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where.
(Eliot in Ritsema and Burrows 2003: n.p.)

The poem “Burnt Norton” brought the thought of a dance for which
they couldn’t envisage a possible movement. Burrows introduces it as
the inconcrete nature of time that they couldn’t grasp through move-
ment. Movement outside of time was impossible to think, and this
impossibility forced them to eliminate all possibilities they could rely
on in improvisation. In other words, the fantasy of movement that
has neither spatial nor temporal structure, a movement that internal-
izes “the still point,” created—what I will consider here—a problem.
The problem led WDSQ to diverge from improvisation conceived as
an exploration of the conditions of possible movement based on the
capabilities of dancers.

In Deleuze’s ontology, the concept of possibility entails that every-
thing is already given and has been conceived:

To the extent that the possible is open to “realization,” it is under-
stood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to resemble
the possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence
[possibility] adds to the concept when all it does is double like with
like. Such is the defect of the possible; a defect which serves to con-
demn it as produced after the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the
image of what resembles it. (DR: 212)

In terms of dance, physiology and physics provide the general condi-
tions or the ground for possible movement of the human body in a
concrete time and space. The conditions and limitations that each body
in given circumstances disposes are particular and depend on its train-
ing in movement, or lack thereof. Realization of the given conditions
is the process of adding existence or reality to the given possibility—a
process that isn’t driven by difference or change, for it reinstates that
which was already present. This is why the real is supposed to resemble
the possible, on the one hand; while on the other, not every possibility
is realized, but only certain possibilities pass into the real while others
are excluded. Realization involves resemblance and limitation, which
hinders creation and novelty.

When improvisers explore the possibilities for their bodies to move
in a certain way, their realizations begin to resemble each other out of
a search for a balance, a ground between the possible and the impossible, or that which is beyond the physical or physiological limits. The ground of the body that coincides with the self, or of movement that is considered to essentially reside in the human body as such, determines their work as self-realization, as we have seen in the cases of other improvisation practices. By contrast, the movement that Burrows and Ritsema were eager to find was fundamentally problematic, as it appeared impossible at the outset and produced a disequilibrium out of its own paradox. Their problem was formulated when Burrows asked Ritsema, “Can you dance a question?” as Ritsema reports:

It began very soon, when Jonathan asked me, “can you dance a question.” It was a way to make me dance. I didn’t ask much, I tried to dance a question. We then talked about what it means to dance a question, because you cannot dance a question. This “dancing a question” boiled down to we don’t dance a specific question, we dance the state of questioning. (Cvejić 2008c: n.p.)

How to dance a question gave them a problem, which begins first with the relation between movement and natural language, as the following questions from the notes of Ritsema highlight:

He [Burrows] says that I [Ritsema] should not want to prove anything with the movement, that I just ask questions, but how can one ask a question by moving? This is impossible. Every movement is a statement, this is what I learned when I started dancing. And unlike speech, movements are never something else than they are, they do not pretend. So how can I doubt about a movement which can only be clear to me? (Ibid.)

Second, in order to dance a question, neither Burrows nor Ritsema could find an adequate form or equivalent style. This is precisely why their creation began with a thought without an image, which could determine itself only as a problem. After frequent inquiries from the spectators into the semantic content of the questions they were supposed to be dancing, Ritsema rephrased “dancing a question” as “dancing in a state of questioning,” as cited above. The latter formulation had the purpose of preventing a simple equation between movements and questions, which the dancers ruled out from the outset. “Dancing in the state of questioning” couldn’t be subject to a process of realization, as there would be no preexisting forms that could resemble it. The
movement abilities that the two dancers call on seemed only to be an obstacle to a quest for a dance in a state of questioning, or for movement that would be outside of time. Dancing and questioning outside of time implied divergence from the habits of improvisation, as well as from their habitual styles of dancing. In other words, for dancing in the state of questioning to become a problem that will create the performance, it had to be determined; that is, Burrows and Ritsema had to invent its terms and conditions, which would act as selective and differentiating operators in the creation of movement.

The problem in WDSQ is posed in three terms. The first is how to prevent movement from slipping into gestures, where it takes on the shape of communicating meaning. The second is how to turn away from another habit whereby the avoidance of gestures and formalization frames movement as a task and performance as an execution of a task. The third is how to remove the movement “defaults” of the two dancers—the tendencies, preferences, and mannerisms—especially those they weren’t fully aware of. The first term already presupposed setting up a constraint:

Don’t make gestures, let the skeleton make the movement, and don’t lead your moving with your eyes from one point to another; then you try to rescue your body and there is no rescue. (Ibid.)

The second term was expressed in questions:

Is it the fascination for shameless emptiness then? What some people call “courage” of being on stage without being covered by a context of meaning? Without what we call being under the roof of a task? (Ibid.)

Ritsema and Burrows knew they had to renounce the task method if they were going to pursue dance in the state of questioning. Tasks turn every movement into a statement of self-reference, meaningful to itself and its maker. “Doing” a movement that follows the function of a task, rather than being expressive of the self or of a form, creates a certain automatism where the cause for movement isn’t questioned.

The third term is most significant and difficult to sustain. For Burrows, it meant undoing his dancerly disposition to shape movement and for Ritsema, striving not to dance unconsciously—in Ritsema’s words, “with my mind in the clouds” (Cvejić 2008c: n.p.). Or as Burrows noted, “he wants to dance but gets stuck in an image of what he thinks dance is” (Burrows and Ritsema 2003: n.p.).
The three terms imply divergence from the available devices of improvisation, and thus require a rigor in making difference. The rigor of subtraction could be compared with Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's double negation—"everything which can be denied is and must be denied" (DR: 55)—which enables a repetition of difference rather than a return of the same, the habitual or reproduction. In addition, they invented three conditions that enabled the "active forgetting" of their initial predisposition to improvisation. These conditions were supposed to unground the possibilities and limitations of their own moving bodies in the situation of improvisation. For Burrows it meant "unlearning" the habits of a spectrum of techniques his body had been trained in over decades. Ritsema had to undo his untrained, spontaneous, and "natural" inclinations to move. These conditions appear as solutions to two distinct but related problems: how to dance in the state of questioning—the problem from which WDSQ stems—and how to avoid improvisation as a process of self-realization—the critique of improvisation that the problem of questioning movement entails.

All three conditions have the purpose of diverging from the common maneuvers of improvisation. The first one concerns the space: "When we walk in, and also during the performance, we should not negotiate the space, nor the time. To walk in and wanting to possess the space is a negotiation" (Cvejić 2008c: n.p.). This principle is supposed to prevent negotiation with space, which entails, on the one hand, disrupting the direction of movement as its telos; and on the other hand, it is supposed to abolish any mise en scène. Operating this rule diminishes displacement. Once they enter the stage, Burrows and Ritsema don't "travel" across the stage by movement. Their few displacements involve erratic steps around a spot, as far as a short movement utterance requires. How they direct their bodies in relation to the audience or between themselves is equally inconspicuous. An amendment to the rule of not negotiating with the space involved avoidance of the tendency to move toward the middle of the stage. The stage center was defined as a "forbidden place," although the dancers didn't apply this interdiction strictly. The sheer pronouncement of this condition indicates their wish to remain always off center, and thus get rid of the central view on two bodies that essentializes their presence on the stage.

The dancers clearly avoid facing the audience or each other in a straightforward or significant manner. Their gazes wander throughout the space, dissociated from the directions of their bodies. The two bodies never enter into physical contact or acknowledge each other's presence, yet the dancers are careful not to stand in each other's way.
They seem to be neither together nor ignorant of each other—the same attitude they entertain towards the audience. This doesn’t exclude that the dancers practiced exactly the opposite: how to “stay together.” Ritsema explains how their objective was to develop the awareness of the presence of one another, “but also the presence of all that was there, the walls, the audience, the ceiling, the pillars,” in order to frustrate self-indulgence or self-absorption, so common to performers engaged in improvisation. About how awareness of the things in space is expressed in their dancing, Burrows and Ritsema say, “We could see it in the video recording of a rehearsal, but couldn’t explain what it precisely was, and how it could be proven” (Cvejić 2008c, n.p.) (see Figures 11 and 12).

The second condition forbids negotiation with time, or, in other words, it is meant to hinder the strongest patterns that occur in “extemporization”: rhythms, accents, and patterns of action–reaction.

Figure 11 Weak Dance Strong Questions © Jonathan Burrows Company, 2001. Photography Hermann Sorgeloos

Figure 12 Weak Dance Strong Questions © Jonathan Burrows Company, 2001. Photography Hermann Sorgeloos
or question–answer. If these patterns do appear sporadically, they are abandoned abruptly before they become a tendency. For instance, Ritsema sometimes bursts into sequences that combine running, jumping, and turning in a simple manner. These short outbursts last only long enough to break the medium-slow speed of hesitation and loitering in a spot. Burrows’ outbursts have the same purpose of disruption, yet yield a more irregular rhythm, as if the dancer knows how to efficiently prevent stabilization of a comfortable pace of movement.

As an antidote to the array of time-related clichés, the third condition is supposed to help the dancers explore duration. Unlike Paxton, who favors a synthetic approach to the psychic nature of duration as the experience from which improvisation should spring, Burrows and Ritsema go into a process of atomization, of dividing each movement into ever smaller and unequal movements. Ritsema explains it with a metaphor:

> Usually I am not interested in what happens between departure and arrival, reaching the goal seems to be the only importance. I have to change this. I have to split big distances into tiny ones. Going to Moscow starts with locking my apartment door, taking the elevator, opening the outside door, walking to the railway station, and so on. This takes the fear out of the big trip. This is how I have to dance, from movement to movement and all the time face every change. At first only the bigger ones, and then slowly on, going more into details. (Burrows and Ritsema 2003: n.p.)

Unlike dancers in Forsythe, who focus on the beginning of movement instead of its accomplishment in a form, Ritsema and Burrows strive to be in the middle of it (“neither from nor towards”), thus complicating it or splitting it into ever smaller movements—or what I will refer to as “stutterances.”

**The Weak Dance of stutterances**

Burrows observes that “the process of questioning led to such a short time of thought or expression that we were almost dealing with interruptions only” (Cvejić 2008c: n.p.). Several difficulties arise when one tries to describe the dance in *WDSQ* accurately. The first difficulty concerns the object of observation—whether movement can be distinguished from behavior, and if it is movement that we are observing, how this movement could be qualified. The most appropriate term
for it is an utterance that breaks at the point where its shape tends to acquire the sense of a gesture that communicates meaning, a functional everyday (“pedestrian”) movement, or an abstract form of a dance-movement. Qualifying this movement as “utterance” involves a linguistic term, thus drawing an analogy between dancing and speech. The analogy enables one characteristic: the movement begins as a voluntary action to move, without its being a statement motivated by something to express. The will to move is an intention to dance in the state of questioning, which is itself not doubted; it hence operates automatically. However, it can’t sustain itself for long, and implodes. The utterance is cut short at the moment when it might resemble an intelligible form, something that the dancers recognize as such to the extent where they could repeat or vary it. Their intention to move is countered by the urge to stop movement from ever becoming subsumable under the given categories of gesture, pedestrian, task-based, or formal abstract movement. The two contrary desires—to move and yet not produce a cognizable movement—constitute the paradox as a matter of disequilibrium between, on the one hand, the possibilities that have to be eliminated, or “forgotten,” and, on the other, dancing in a state of questioning.

The second difficulty occurs in demarcating where the utterance begins and ends, as well as in defining how parallel or disjunct the temporal structures of thinking and moving are. The performance invites us to wonder about what causes a movement to stop, if it is a particular question which arrests movement in that moment. Thirdly, it is difficult to discern what should be perceived and attended to and to find suitable words to describe the movement that refrains from a cognizable form or meaningful gesture. The spectator is at odds with a discrepancy between an excess of perceptible details and the poverty of available terms to qualify them. The following descriptive account in a review I wrote unravels the type of questions that watching this performance might raise:

He draws his legs together, how will he undo the knot now? He could probably shift with the right foot forward, but what is he doing, he begins jumping with both feet glued together and suddenly stops and looks at the hands he held his legs with. Now my gaze passes over to the other, who is fumbling with his fingers to his back pocket and clinging to it as if all his body had to turn to his bottom. Does he stop because he realizes what he is doing or because he knows how this feels so his body ventures in a move forward and stumbles once, twice? Is he frustrating his own move, or this occurs before he could control and stop it? (Cvejić 2002: 28)
The fragment above demonstrates how a spectator might be prompted to wonder how movement emerges and why it stops. Formulating dance and questions on one and the same level in the title of the performance creates the problematic relationship between dancing and questioning. At first, it might appear that the dancers question movement in thought first, before they dance it. This is suggested by the dissociation between the head and the rest of the body. The position of the head and the pensive look disconnect the head from the body, as if the head resists being organically included in the posture or kinetic flow. It is more common in contemporary dance that the dancer strives to incorporate her head in the movement. The head is equated then with the other body parts, and exudes an air of commitment and belief held by the performer fully immersed in performing. In WDSQ, the heads of the dancers stick out, stand apart from the rest of the body. Their eyes wander, and the faces neither affirm nor negate the movement in which the whole body may be implicated. Soon enough, the extent of differentiation, in the sense of the actualization of the problem we explained in Chapter 1, and the priority of physical activity provide evidence that the dancers aren't verbalizing questions to the movement, but instead bringing their bodies to a state in which they make the movement question itself through itself. This process results in persistent cuts and interruptions in movement that could be compared with stuttering and stammering (see Figure 13).

Each movement is a different utterance, a difference between differences that form the discontinuous flow of a stutter. The flow of interruptions is, nevertheless, itself unstoppable—it has interiorized cuts. The comparison with stuttering in language presupposes an approximation between two disparate expressions—movement and speech—which is here mediated through the notion of a syntax of dance movements.

Figure 13  Weak Dance Strong Questions © Jonathan Burrows Company, 2001. Photography Hermann Sorgeloos
As discussed earlier, contemporary dance is judged by one of the foundational ideas of modern dance—mobility and kineticism—which yields an uninterrupted flow of movement. This idea has developed into dance techniques of continuity, among which “phrasing” is the most prominent. Phrasing results from connecting movements, gestures and postures in a continuous line, defined by geometrical (spatial) and/or dynamic (energetic) aspects. The term “phrase” is analogous to “sentence,” from which it borrows the logic of “sense,” even if the sense in dance can’t be compared with linguistic meaning. Hence, the comparison can hold only for the syntactical dimension of language; and if we follow the analogy with language, WDSQ develops a special syntax that strongly contrasts the imperative of kinetic flow. This syntax comprises a series of “stutterances,” utterances that are cut before they can develop into a sequence comparable to a phrase. Each utterance appears like a new beginning and thus affirms the power of beginning and beginning again. These beginnings are the stutterances in which the problem of questioning movement by movement itself persists, as the following instruction from the notes of Burrows and Ritsema requires: “go from one moment to the next and ask question after question; question continuously” (Burrows and Ritsema 2003: n.p.). There is no semantic content to the questions that the stutterances seem to parallel. Dancing in a state of questioning expresses a distinctive syntax that underlies a series of stutterances, and this syntax is precisely defined by the terms and conditions of the problem.

The figure of stuttering deployed in coining the term “stutterance” comes from two sources that don’t relate to each other beyond coincidence: Ritsema’s theater poetics and Deleuze’s writings on minor language. Ritsema often refers in the poetics of his theater to “stammering,” which applies both to speech on stage and to all the other elements of theater, without making a reference to Deleuze. He writes:

And it is necessary to eliminate all the aimed-at-one-effect techniques, strategies, aesthetics, manipulations of the old theatre aside, because they are implicitly made to be used to suck the audience in, repress them, and that is not what we want, we embrace a critical distance between what is offered from the stage and the audience. This does not mean that lights, sets, costumes, narratives, representations, expressions etc. can’t be used, but always in such a way that they are juxtaposed, superimposed, deconstructed, stammered [emphasis added], interrupted never to support any other object or subject but always from their full being-there as one of the proposals, attempts,
propositions that are offered in order to keep in existence all possible combinations with all the other objects and subjects that are presented. (Ritsema 2001: 43–4)

In “Lecture on Improvisation” (2004) Ritsema invokes stammering again, this time in relation to another dance performance he was making at the time (Blindspot, in collaboration with Sandy Williams, 2005): “We should not make a performance about something, but the thing itself needs to be interpellated by itself. We have to find a language in which we stammer ourselves” (Ritsema 2004: n.p.). His insistence on stammering suggests comparison with the “stuttering in language” that Deleuze develops in his writings on the literature of Kafka, Céline, Melville, and others. In the essay “He Stuttered,” Deleuze defines stuttering as making “the minor use of the major language” (CC: 109). The minor/major opposition indicates power relations in representation, where the literary canon is the major, normative language of a nation. Resistance to the major mode of language, for instance, in the writings of Kafka as a Czech Jew, a double-foreigner in the German language of Goethe, manifests itself in the variations in which literary language merges with speech (CC: 108). Although these variations, which he also calls modulations and bifurcations, relate to the content of expression, to the becomings of characters or situations in the novels that he discusses, Deleuze ascribes their workings to the very grammar of the language. The syntax becomes affected by a disequilibrium between the expressed and the expression, which is comparable to the problem that causes stuttering in speech. “Stuttering” in Deleuze is but a trope for a transformation in language: “When language is so strained that it starts to stutter, or to murmur or stammer . . . then language in its entirety reaches the limit that marks its outside and makes it confront silence” (CC: 113). The silence of movement here is stillness, the still point of the movement “neither from nor towards.”

What does it mean exactly to stammer in movement, to become a stutterer in dance in the case of WDSQ if we think it in terms of the Deleuzian notion of “stuttering”? It implies a disjunction between the times of thinking and moving, whereby the problem of dancing and questioning are two divergent series. Although they must run parallel, they also try to interfere with each other without ever achieving the equation of movement = question. This destabilizes every utterance as a new beginning in which two disjunct series attempt to converge in vain. Movement stutters because it reaches its limit—in the stops, in the moments of stillness, when the dancer realizes that the movement may
yield to the habits, “the don’ts” specified by the terms and conditions. The movement stops when the dance can no longer maintain its questioning through itself, when the dancer recognizes any of the pitfalls he was trying to avoid: *mise en scène*, temporal pattern, gesture, and so forth. The problem of dancing and questioning dancing at the same time persists in its solutions, in the stutterances, because it maintains the paradox of a movement that grows from the middle, neither from nor towards, outside of psychological duration of the body and impulse of direction.

What constitutes the weak dance is a movement qua question, the problem of integrating two parallel but disparate processes: dancing and questioning. In *WDSQ*, stutterance is the problematic structure of the movement. It can also be regarded as a reinvented syntax of movement, in the sense that Deleuze attributes it to an invention of art: “A work of art is a new syntax, one that is much more important than vocabulary and that excavates a foreign language in language” (Deleuze in Flaxman 2000: 370). In the syntax of stutterances, Ritsema and Burrows render each movement “problematic” because they issue it and abort its development at the same time. My point is that such a process of creation isn’t natural, isn’t always already governing everything that disintegrates in time. It happens only by the force of a problem that makes their dance improvisation stutter—by the constructivist effort with which the two dancers persist with the constraints.

**To repeat and to rehearse**

*WDSQ* could hypothetically continue ad infinitum, were it not for the endurance of the dancers and the audience, and conventions with which this performance complies. As Deleuze would say, the problem “objectively persists in the solutions to which it gives rise and from which it differs in kind” (*DR*: 280). The dancers don’t pursue an ultimate form which is supposed to equate movement with a form of questioning. In order to move in the middle, neither from nor towards, they need to question every utterance, preventing its development towards a goal. This makes the weak dance open-ended, capable of renewing itself ad infinitum. In order to present it as a performance before an audience, Burrows and Ritsema bracket its duration. At the beginning, Burrows addresses the audience with these words: “Good evening, this performance is called *WDSQ* and lasts fifty minutes.” The frame is predetermined, the arbitrary length preset, and after 50 minutes, the two dancers walk off stage, cutting the performance off as abruptly as they
began it. In that way, it is a provisional goal of a countdown of time, if only for the audience.

Apart from announcing the length of the performance in advance, at the beginning Burrows addresses the fact that the door (or in some venues the windows) will remain open during the performance, which can affect the temperature in the performance space. His comment draws attention to a deliberate decision to let in the theater’s outside, with the street noises appearing almost intrusive. The frame of the performance is thus weakened, suggesting that this dance should be placed in a continuum with non-theatrical, chance-oriented, everyday movements, sounds, and sensations. The extreme reduction of the technical means of the theater apparatus—a bare studio-like space; general, unchanging “wash” light; the absence of intentionally added music/sound; and the functional, everyday clothes of the performers, down to the shoes they wear—points to a minimum of difference between a rehearsal as a non-staged everyday reality and a performance as a fiction of staging. The difference lies in having an audience before whom the dancers will dance. Certainly this isn’t just a minor detail, but also at least a nominally constitutive difference; yet, for an audience, the performance with its “poor” aesthetics might look like an open rehearsal. Once they invented their dance in the state of questioning, or stutterances, Burrows and Ritsema practiced WDSQ in the same way that they presented it before an audience. As a result, the rehearsal and the performance of WDSQ are brought close together by the process that always engages the same idea but differentiates itself anew. Thus the process of differenciation doesn’t depend on the presence, i.e. absence, of the audience; it sustains itself through a production of always new stutterances. At the same time, the stutterances actualize the same procedure of questioning, enacting in each one a new beginning, a new trial.

In WDSQ, the notion of repetition can be approached in two senses: the technical sense of repeating as a reperforming of the same performance, and the philosophical concept of repetition. In his ontology of difference, Deleuze couples repetition with difference as its necessary counterpart, which is the main thesis of his seminal book on metaphysics Difference and Repetition. Second, but not any lesser in importance, is the register of repetition specific to performance, such as rehearsing and performing again. These two registers—a metaphysical and an empirical one, both related to the medium of an art—aren’t only disparate and seemingly incompatible, but also diametrically opposite concepts. Deleuze conceives repetition as differential, producing difference in and through itself, while repetition in rehearsing and performing dance,
theater, or music implies an object that is being reproduced, or, in other words, a *mise en œuvre*. WDSQ is a case which requires that the relation between the two registers and two contradictory accounts of repetition be considered. The first of these accounts will be the concept of repetition in Deleuze, particularly drawing on the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, titled “Repetition for Itself” (*DR*: 70–128).

Deleuze’s project in *Difference and Repetition* is to argue that repetition, as it figures in Nietzsche’s idea of “eternal return,” isn’t a matter of the same thing occurring over and over again. Repetition and difference are two forces of creation, entwined in a process that produces variation in and through every repetition. Deleuze entangles difference with repetition in order to affirm the power of the new and the unforeseeable. To repeat is to begin again, and to regard each beginning as an experiment. There is no originary point out of which repetition can generate itself. Repetition doesn’t involve a model, or any identity, but instead sustains itself in perpetual change. Repetitions don’t form a linear sequence with a direction or a final goal; they coexist, renewing an open whole. Hence, Deleuze’s differential repetition is distinguished from what is usually understood as the repetition of the same, or what he considers as the actual, material, or bare repetition, which is static and ordinary, belonging to the representational order of concepts. In contrast, the repetition of difference is clothed or enveloped, as it is interior to the Idea; it is dynamic and excessive. Resemblance implied by reproduction appears only as a secondary effect, an illusion that is functional in the need to produce identity. Considering what this notion of repetition means for the different arts, Deleuze writes that

> each art has its interrelated techniques or repetitions, the critical and revolutionary power of which may attain the highest degree and lead us from the sad repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and then to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played out. (*DR*: 289)

To illustrate his claim about each art having its own interrelated “techniques or repetitions,” Deleuze goes on to offer three sundry examples from music, art, literature, and cinema in the twentieth century: the leitmotiv technique in *Wozzeck*, the Alban Berg opera from 1922; Andy Warhol’s series of celebrity portraits from the 1970s; and the novel and film *L’Année dernière à Marienbad* (1961), which explicitly short-circuits the present and the past, life and death, in memory. The three examples are disparate, indeed, but point to Deleuze’s general understanding
of repetition in the arts. His idea of repetition here encompasses those procedures that are specific to each art medium and tradition and that technically seem to repeat, but actually generate difference. Warhol’s technique of incorporating photography in painting for a series of copies of the copies of famous people is a controversial example, since it is based on mechanical reproduction, which in Deleuze’s terms would be the negative kind of bare repetition. Yet for Deleuze the Pop Art series is “remarkable,” as it pushes the copy of the copy to the extreme at which it reverses the original and becomes a simulacrum. The point here are the figures of the portraits, whose presence and meaning in Western culture make Warhol’s “serial series” such that “all the repetitions of habit, memory and death are conjugated in it” (DR: 293).

If we search for the function and meaning that “repetition” as a technical term has in performance, we are confronted with one of the basic production techniques of the performing arts, be it dance, theater, or music. Répétition is the French word for “rehearsal,” and denotes the preparation prior to performance, in which certain, if not all, elements of a performance are defined, planned, or “blocked” (i.e., fixed in space and duration, and perfected as to their way of execution). Repetition is also the fundamental method of generating dance movement: for a movement to be singled out, referred to, discussed, or learned, it must be repeated. Word and image provide ways of “translating” movement, but they can’t enact it. Hence dance training to a large extent consists of learning how to repeat a movement. Or, as Forsythe explains the oral mimetic mode of transmission of movement through repetition, “we all pass on dancing primarily through imitation, visual exchange. We demonstrate for each other, that is the way our language is communicated” (Forsythe 1999: 22). Rehearsing a dance implies learning and perfecting movement in repetition.

The etymology of the English word “rehearsal” is telling here. To “rehearse” was derived from the French rehercier (ca. 1300), which signifies to “go over again, repeat,” “rake over.” The French verb rehercier originates from two Latin terms with distinct meanings, hirpex, hirpicis, which means a harrow, and hercia, the church chandelier. The French etymological dictionaries explain the morphology of herse, which in French means harrow, by way of an onomatopoeic expression of the effort of harrowing (le hersage). In 1765, the French herse acquired one more meaning: “a framework for carrying lampions to light a scene,” drawing on the Latin hercia. In English, the designation of “hearse” as the vehicle for carrying a coffin was coined in 1640, whereas the meaning of the verb “rehearse” as in “practice a play, or a part in a play” was established earlier, in 1570. Both designations retain the image of
carrying a tool, the harrow or the hearse. The origin of harrowing in *rehercier* stresses repetition as a loop: in the return to the former beginning and the progression to the end, as in the image of harrowing the same field over and over again. Repetition appears cyclical here, and the etymological meanings recall the idiomatic expressions about various kinds of repetition in rehearsal—like “run through” or “top to tail”—that use a spatial model for an object to be repeated, rehearsed.5

The conventional notion of rehearsal involves repetitions as trials in striving to reach an ideal form that the performance is supposed to take. Thus, rehearsal installs the regime of representation, in the repetitions that re-present the same work over and over again toward its perfection. The work in such kinds of rehearsals is considered to exist already in a materialized form or as an ideal type—like a play, or a musical or dance composition. Its conception also contains the possibilities of its interpretation, as they are considered to reside within the work. Rehearsal and performance are, then, two different situations in which the same work is reinstatied, and its reinstatitions vary in function and in degree of success, in their proximity to the ideal form. In rehearsal the work is practiced or exercised towards the ideal form or the goal that is then reached in the performance that is the presentation of the work. Yet, as Peter Brook pointed out, rehearsals at best carry a process of creation with little or no “bare” repetitions. In his encyclopedia definition of rehearsal, Patrice Pavis singles out a remark of Brook about the French word répétition, which “evokes a mechanical kind of work, while rehearsals are always different and sometimes creative. Otherwise, if they become mired down in infinite repetition, it is soon clear that the theatre has gone out of them (Brook 2008: 154).” Pavis then adds that the German *Probe* (“test”) “gives a much better idea of the experimentation and the trial-and-error process involved before a final solution is adopted” (Pavis 1998: 308). Choosing to quote Brook, Pavis notes the tendency in theater and performance culture from the 1960s and 1970s onward to transform repetition in rehearsal into a process of creation. Today’s legacy of the 1960s and ’70s is recognized in the format that aims to conflate rehearsal and performance in one process and event, the so-called demonstration or performance of a “work in progress” or “work in process,” which results from the practice of orienting performance toward research, which began in the 1990s. “Progress” or “process” here still reveals the intent of completion, even if the final form of the work might never be attained.

With regard to the aforementioned conceptual distinctions and practices, *WDSQ* involves repetition on two levels. On the first level,
the performance is presented over and over again, and is, as a work of
dance, nominally reproduced. \textit{WDSQ} isn’t a one-off event or happen-
ing, but a performance that is running over a period of time. This level,
in Deleuze’s terms, corresponds to bare repetitions, by which the same
situation, involving two performers and the problematic of dancing
in the state of questioning, is repeated, reinstatated every time the
performance is presented. On another level, no movement in its shape
or duration and no spatial configuration of the two bodies is ever liter-
ally repeated. Each stutterance is a differenciation, or a singular solu-
tion by which the problems of questioning movement by movement
and neither moving from nor to a place are “posited and determined”
(\textit{DR}: 280). This isn’t merely the consequence of not setting movement,
or of improvisation—because improvisation would engender personal
manners and styles, as earlier shown; it is instead the result of severe
constraints by which the dancers question and stutter in their move-
ment. If certain movement patterns were to emerge, and with them
the consciousness that they could be repeated due to the pleasing effect
they had on the audience or because the dancers Burrows and Ritsema
enjoyed dancing them, \textit{WDSQ} would fail in its mission to problemat-
ize or question movement. The dancers were aware of the pitfall of
emergent mannerisms, and so they strived to maintain the discipline
of questioning. Dancing in the state of questioning often seemed like a
struggle rather than the ludic exercise that improvisation often resem-
bles. The frequent stops, cuts and silences, aborted beginnings, and the
very syntax of stutterances manifest the edge of this struggle, where
dance in the state of questioning falls silent.

Dancers who practice improvisation in performance rarely define the
period that limits a certain improvisation practice. Quite the contrary.
They aim to develop a method that can be regularly invoked on many
occasions and that seems to run limitlessly, that is, until it transforms
itself imperceptibly into something else. In 2004, three years after its
creation, Burrows and Ritsema stopped performing \textit{WDSQ}. Despite the
strict frame of the constraints that they exercised, performing \textit{WDSQ} in
front of an audience time after time also bore the danger of consolidat-
ing new habits, finding ease in difficulty, and forming patterns. Hence
performing \textit{WDSQ} was a process that reached its end when Burrows and
Ritsema began to affirm certain qualities of movement. This fact is sig-
nificant because it shows that although the performance was made and
presented as an open-ended process, its process did reach an end. The
end lies at the critical point where “dancing in the state of questioning”
stops being a problem. The problem is exhausted once the stutterances
no longer engender differenciation and begin to consolidate a ground of movement or expression held by the bodies of the dancers, an idiom that begins to reproduce itself in mechanical repetitions, at the point when “stutterances” acquire the look of personal mannerisms. This could explain why Burrows and Ritsema abandoned the performance of WDSQ.

* Now I would like to conclude the discussion that began by situating WDSQ within improvisation as an odd opponent to the main assumptions, motivations, and values thereof. Among the seven works discussed in this book, in WDSQ we encounter an exemplar of a creation by problem that operates in several registers: the object of an Idea of movement, the form of which seems impossible; a procedure constraining a process by conditions and rules for questioning movement, which results in the invention of a new syntax, a differenciation generated through repeating the same set of questions, rules, and terms; and a problematic relationship, and not an analogy, between sensibility and thought, dancing and thinking, the times of which are incommensurable and divergent. While we sought here to conceptualize the thought that arises parallel to movement, in the next chapter we will focus on sensibility and affect, which, unlike thought which questions, ungrounds, and denaturalizes spontaneous expressions of dancing, are considered essential characteristics of bodily movement in dance.
The goal of Chapters 2 and 3 was to expound concepts of a kind of choreography-making that revolves predominantly around the idea of disjunction between the body and movement and between performing and attending. There I discussed concepts such as “part-bodies” and “part-machines” as well as theatrical apparatuses of disjunction such as the “head-box,” “de-figurement” of the stage, and heterogeneous “assemblings” (wirings of bodies and things). In Chapter 4 “stutterance” was examined as a concept in which making and performing coincide due to Burrows’ and Ritsema’s critical departure from dance improvisation. The present chapter will further develop the mode of performing from Chapter 4, but its aim is to explore the problems that are proper to performing alone—associated with producing affects and sensations—and to discuss the theoretical terms on which affects and sensations are shared with, confused, or mistaken for the property of attenders.

Although I will elaborate the affects and sensations of performing in the theoretical tradition of Deleuze-Spinoza, my position contrasts with Deleuze’s chief ontological claim about art, formulated in What Is Philosophy? (co-authored with Guattari 1994), namely, that art’s domain of creation is exclusively found in affects and sensations, and not in concepts (whose construction is reserved to philosophy). Deploying Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) theory of composition in art, exposed in the same book under the chapter titled “Percept, Affect, and Concept” (WIP: 163–99), I will demonstrate how Ingvartsen’s solo performance 50/50 engages ideas of expression that guide her experimentally in problematizing emotionalist precepts of movement and composing motion-affects as (temporary) solutions to these problems. As the composition of these affects involves problematizing expression in
bodily motion by way of a meticulous construction, I suggest that the problems which create the affects and sensations in 50/50 be accounted for by concepts of these affects, concepts that express performing in a constructivist manner.

Our task of theorizing affects under the concepts of performing involves a critical divergence from the modern dance tradition, in which performing and attending to movement is necessarily rooted in emotion while the resulting kinesthesia causes empathy in the spectator. As in Chapters 3 and 4, where the discussion departed from the representative views and notions on theatricality and improvisation in the fields of theater, performance, and dance studies, this chapter will also follow a tripartite path. Starting from a critique of emotionalism as a, broadly speaking, phenomenological and psychological ground of self-expression in dance, we will move to discuss the concept of affect in Spinoza and Deleuze, and eventually, in the third step of the argument, propose and analytically unfold the procedures of constructing affects. Along the way, two more concomitant topics will be interwoven in the discussion. The differentiation of a constructivist and externalist composition of affects from emotionalist dancing will be supported by a comparison with a Deleuzian reading of affective rather than subjectivist acting in Beckett (Uhlmann in Cull 2009). And secondly, while examining how 50/50 partitions the self-identity of a body dancing solo and isolates each part as a shifting surface of expression, I will explore faciality as a regime of subjectivation and signification in Deleuze and Guattari (ATP) in relation to the genre of solo dance.

The distinction between affect and emotion also invokes the historical context in which 50/50 must be situated; this work is an attempt at resolving two antagonistic views in contemporary dance: the modernist self-expression and emotionalism against which American “Post-Modern” dance arose in the 1960s, and the conceptualist strategies of the 1990s that completed American postmodern dance’s intention of banishing expression from dance altogether. Confronting Ingvartsen’s “YES Manifesto” with Rainer’s “No Manifesto” will serve as the crucial point of that debate. In order to draw arguments for an externalist constructivist notion of expression as opposed to individualistic, subjectivist self-expression, we must first account for two things: how did movement become bound up with emotion in modern dance, and what are the ontological claims on which the emotional nature of movement was predicated.
Binding movement with emotion, kinesthesia with empathy

From the early stage of the rebellion against ballet to the choreographers who pioneered a new, anticlassical dance form in the first half of the twentieth century, modern dance was conceived according to the view that it arises from the expression of an inner compulsion of the dancer and choreographer. Looking at the painting and music of the same period, “inner compulsion” or “necessity” is the argument that several artists in the period of expressionism—Kandinsky developing abstraction within the Blaue Reiter group and Schoenberg advocating atonal music—used to justify their radical break with tradition. Schoenberg’s statements, such as “I am being forced in this direction, I am obeying an inner compulsion which is stronger than any upbringing,” are exemplary beyond the realm of music, as they articulate the rationale that combines the seemingly opposite stances of the individual, personal inner drive, and historical necessity (Schoenberg in Ashton 1991: 104–6). Under the common style of expressionism in music, art, and Ausdruckstanz, the German musicologist Carl Dahlhaus termed this poetical position as “aesthetic theology,” a kind of “art religion” where the telos of creating art transcends the individual being, the “vessel” of its inner calling (Dahlhaus 1987: 81–93). In particular, the argument with which the “expressionistic” dance of Mary Wigman and her American counterpart, Martha Graham, was advocated in the 1930s by its chief critic and promoter, John Martin, operated by predicing the concept of modern dance on the connection between movement and personal feeling. As in the comparable essentialist claims in the purist conception of modernist art (Greenberg 1961), the definition of modern dance isolates bodily movement as the “actual substance” and essential medium of dance. This essence was, in Martin’s view, emotive.

The peculiarity of Martin’s theory was to forward emotion as the cause, meaning, and effect of movement in its aesthetic form, which he defined with the term he coined as “metakinesis” (Martin 1965: 1989). In movement, or kinesis, lies a necessary correlation between the physical and the psychical as “two aspects of a single underlying reality.” In Martin’s theory, metakinesis explains how “authentic movements” are produced through the intuition of the choreographer, who externalizes her individual experience, her process of feeling through with a sensitive body in an aesthetic form that must provoke a reaction in the beholder. Martin founds the causal relation between the performer’s feeling, her movement, and the feeling it arouses in the recipient of the
movement upon a speculation about the muscular isomorphism in the body of the performer and the spectator (Martin 1965: 61–70). As a consequence of metakinesis, the dancer executing the movement, and the attender viewing it, must share the same experience and understanding of movement as an expression of emotion (Martin 1989: 13–16). Foster suggests that invoking an empathetic bond between dancer and audience was a “rationale for the new modern dance” that Martin had to provide to champion the novel form (Foster 2010: 249). According to Martin, uniting viewing with performing dance was based on the “inner mimicry” of movement as a necessary response by the movement’s recipient:

We shall cease to be mere spectators and become participants in the movement that is presented to us, and though to all outward appearances we shall be sitting quietly in our chairs, we shall nevertheless be dancing synthetically with all our musculature. Naturally these motor responses are registered by our movement-sense receptors, and awaken appropriate emotional associations akin to those which have animated the dancer in the first place. It is the dancer’s whole function to lead us into imitating his actions with our faculty for inner mimicry in order that we may experience his feelings. (Martin 1965: 53)

The grounds for Martin’s arguments such as metakinesis and inner muscular mimicry have been contested in contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, and dance practice as well, yet his chief claim about the psychological and emotional nature of bodily movement still holds a place of firm belief among dancers and dance audiences. This claim—that dance is born of self-expression based on a personal feeling that binds the spectator to it by way of empathy—operates as an ideology in contemporary dance. It promotes the ideas of freedom and individualism, which—understood as an emotional experience of one’s own body and its freedom of movement—are traded as a value that dance holds for its audience.

The variety of idiosyncratic approaches to self-expression and empathy in contemporary dance can be subsumed under two categories, one set of approaches that emphasizes the psychological source of self-expression in dance and everyday movement, and the other that explores the emotional response in the spectator. I will briefly observe here two paradigmatic cases of these categories: “Authentic Movement” and “qualitative audience research.” These two practices
frame emotionalism in dance from two opposite ends of the same ideological spectrum: the psychotherapeutic and the popular sociological interest.

Authentic Movement bears upon the legacy of Graham and Wigman in their disciple, Mary Starks Whitehouse (1911–79), who associated modern dance’s practice of self-expression with Jungian psychotherapy in group processes where participants engage in spontaneous expressive movement exploration. Movement that arises in self-expression was designated “authentic” by Whitehouse’s follower, Janet Adler, who developed the discipline of Authentic Movement on the following premise: “When the movement was simple and inevitable, not to be changed no matter how limited or partial, it became what I called ‘authentic’—it could be recognized as genuine, belonging to that person” (Adler 2002: xii).

Whereas Authentic Movement explores the relation between emotion and movement in its genesis, the project “Watching Dance: Kinesthetic Empathy” investigates kinesthesia from the perspective of the audience. A multidisciplinary project involving the collaboration of performance and dance theorists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and other experts across several academic institutions, it “uses audience research and neuroscience to explore how dance spectators respond to and identify with dance.”¹ The research is based on two essentialist premises: that “dance, although it has a visual component, is fundamentally a kinesthetic art” (Reason and Reynolds 2010: 50) and that the experience of pleasure, which this research shows to be rooted in kinesthetic and, to a lesser extent, cognitive empathy, motivates “people to seek out dance performances to watch” (Reason and Reynolds 2010: 49). The scientific truth of the claims of this research can be contested for two reasons. Firstly, it conflates audience reception with consciousness and opinion, excluding other modes of attending to dance; and secondly, by privileging pleasure based on kinesthetic empathy it promotes a dangerous teleology where the purpose of dance is to be judged by public consensus about dance’s purportedly essential characteristic: the ability of movement to arouse feeling.

Both teachings are representative of extreme emotionalism, which implies an isomorphism between movement and emotion in order to ontologically reinforce the bind between the body and movement. The ideological fallacy of emotionalism is that it instills a unilateral determination of cause and effect in the genesis and the reception of dance. The argument can be summarized as follows: one moves out of feeling. And because one is moved by a certain feeling when watching dance,
the movement must be expressing that feeling. Movement is predicated of the body that feels. And because it arouses the feeling in its beholder, it is believed to be a medium for the transference of an aesthetic and emotional concept from the consciousness of one individual to that of another. Such a belief is the very essence of an aesthetic ideology, as Hewitt argues in *Social Choreography: Ideology as Performance in Dance and Everyday Movement* (2005), because it idealizes the body as a locus of truth. Hewitt notes that a strong tradition of modern dance thinking on the body—from François Delsarte to at least as far as Graham (Hewitt 2005: 18), and I would extend it to a present-day doxa of contemporary dance—shares the belief that the body cannot lie.

Since it acquired the role of the arbiter of true consciousness in modern dance, the body has been understood as the means for expression of individual freedom and for resistance to order and tradition. Dance is thought to offer a physical experience of transcendental subjectivity, which, on one side, suppresses the contingencies that structure experience, and on the other, reduces the expression of movement to the individual self, or to the form that reassures its identity. However, in order to explore movement’s expression in its own right, movement must be detached from its subject. My next task will be to demonstrate how the composition of movement in *50/50* relies on another understanding of expression, one that does not belong to the individual self of the performer, or to its attender, or to the relation between these two terms, but that instead arises in performance in and for itself and has an existence of its own. Such expression of movement, I suggest, is best accounted for by a composition of affects and sensations in the theory of Deleuze (and Guattari) and their commentators. Hence, the following section will elaborate the concepts of affect and sensation in a genealogy from Spinoza to Deleuze and Guattari and then probe it as the conceptual framework for my analysis of the compositional procedures in Ingvartsen’s *50/50*, where I will construct affects as Spinoza’s adequate ideas, or “actions of the mind.” The reason for my engaging with a philosophical exegesis of the concept of affect in Spinoza’s *Ethics* instead of relying on the abundance of secondary Deleuzian literature on the subject is in order to reconsider the extension of the concept of affect as a product of rationalist thought aside from its received interpretations in art theory today, which emphasize sensibility (Zepke and O’Sullivan 2010). Only when the rationalist Spinozan background of affects as passions and actions is fully constructed will we be in a better position to argue for a constructivist composition of affects, an externalist expression which gives rise to concepts.
Affect and sensation in Spinoza and Deleuze

In Spinoza's mind–body duality, affection is a form of inadequate knowledge that belongs to the body, as opposed to understanding, through which we form ideas or the knowledge of the causes of actions. The existence of our body, of external bodies, and of our mind alike is known to us only through the external affections our body undergoes, so long as it endures. This affection is a modification of our body, a change on the surface of the body by the impingement of other bodies, which is accompanied by the idea of this modification, or by the affect. Thus, affectio or “affection” is a state of the affected body implying the presence of an affecting one, and affectus or “affect” is the transition from one state to another felt by the affected body. Each state of affection is in relation to the preceding state and determines a passage to a “more” or a “less,” an effect that is experienced as an increase or a decrease in the body's capacity to act, by which affects can be distinguished as positive (joys) and negative (sadnesses). Spinoza's full definition in Ethics includes one more difference:

By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.

Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the affect an action; otherwise, a passion. (Spinoza IIIID3)

Although he regards most affects as passions to be managed and dispelled by reason, Spinoza acknowledges—and affirms—the affects of a kind that approximate or coincide with adequate ideas of the mind, or actions, as is confirmed in IIIP58:

Apart from the joy and desire which are passions, there are other affects of joy and desire which are related to us insofar as we act.

Dem.: When the mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it rejoices (by P53). But the mind necessarily considers itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by IIIP43). But the mind conceives some adequate ideas (by IIIP40S2). Therefore, it also rejoices insofar as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by P1), insofar as it acts. (Spinoza IIIIP58)

Spinoza claims here that the mind can be the cause of an active affect—an action of the mind, or an adequate idea—when it imagines itself and
considers its own power of acting (IIP53). Such affects are conceived by the mind solely from the dictate of reason and not from encounters with other bodies that affect us.² Spinoza’s distinction between passive and active affects is crucial for understanding the affects that Ingvartsen aims to produce in 50/50. Although the production of affects here involves the performer’s body and not the self-consideration of the mind alone, it results from a rational construction, which problematizes emotional expression through experimenting with ways of composing affects from bodily motion. Power-motion and crisis-motion will be regarded as “actions” in the Spinozist sense, because they imply the self-caused act of construction of the problem by means of which these affects are composed. They are self-affections that explore agreements and disagreements between the performer’s body and other things—sound, light, image—with which the body enters into composition.

The distinction between affects and affections in Spinoza is significant because it parallels the difference between affects and emotions. Affections are emotions in so far as they involve the affected body and the imagining of the cause of the affecting body, as Spinoza contends in IIP17, Scholium: “the affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, though they do not reproduce the figures of things.” The mixture of an affect (the sensation of a change in our own body affected by an external body) and an “imagining” (the image of the external body causing the change) gives neither the knowledge of the external body nor an understanding of our own body. It involves the nature of an external body only partially—the part by which the external body determines the human body in a certain fixed way. Our mind will form an idea of the external affecting thing as if it had a reality independent of our immediate perception of it. But the external body is independent in the sense that it is composed of parts that are not related in the affection of our body. Therefore, affections give rise to inadequate ideas. Empathy, which the emotionalist conception of bodily movement in dance is predicated upon in modern dance and beyond, belongs to the same kind of affection, because it involves imagination from identification, or even imitation of affects, as Spinoza explains in IIP27:

If we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected with some affect, we are thereby affected with a like affect.

Dem.: … if we imagine someone like us to be affected with some affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like this affect. And so, from the fact that we imagine a thing like us to
be affected with an affect, we are affected with a like affect. (Spinoza IIP27)

From Spinoza’s differentiation between affect and affection, Pierre Macherey and Deleuze derive one more characteristic that distinguishes affect from emotion. Macherey emphasizes an excess of information in affection (*excès de réalité*) beyond the lack of knowledge of the causes in the knowledge of the effects. There are always too many things, too many ideas, an uncontrolled richness in our mind’s opening to the world, which causes perception, even if it lacks comprehension, to be by no means more simple than understanding. Moreover, Macherey underlines that perception is a positive exercise of the mind’s capacity to perceive more things at the same time. It is more an accomplishment than a deficiency, provided it is not regarded as a source of knowledge (Macherey 1997: 165 footnote 1). Hence he links this *complex perceptif* with the *complex corporel* produced by a kind of bodily event in affection. Affection is therefore a process that belongs neither to the acting body nor to the body which is acted upon. In Macherey’s reading of Spinoza, affect is an interstitial event, formed in the intersection of an action and a reaction:

[It] does not find itself neither in the affecting body nor in the affected body, nor in the parts or in the parts of the parts of the bodies, but produces itself somewhere between these elements. The corporal event can be neither localized nor analyzed in regard to the bodies, or their parts or the parts of their parts; it is impalpable, evanescent, tied to the fleeting character of the occasion that provoked this event or affection. (Macherey 1997: 217–18)

Thus affect, as conceived in Spinoza, and interpreted by Macherey here, isn’t a quality or a predicate of a body, but an effect of modification of experience as an independent thing of existence. Its main characteristic is that it is impersonal, divorced from the dynamic of the interiority of a subject. Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s notion of affect stresses that affect shouldn’t be confused with feeling, which arises from a subjective appropriation of affect through the image of affection:

It is certain that the affect implies an image or idea, and follows from the latter as from its cause. . . . But it is not confined to the image or idea; it is of another nature, being purely transitive, and not indicative or representative, since it is experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states. (*SP*: 49)
What is distinctive about Deleuze's version of Spinozist affect is the emphasis on duration in framing affect as a transition between two states of affection, which enables Deleuze to posit a gradual process of transformation from passions or positive affects of joy to actions. While Spinoza suggests, but doesn’t fully explicate the causal connection between the bodily experience of joy and action of the mind, Deleuze describes a process of becoming-rational from bodily passions to actions of the mind. The process is to conclude with a genuine “leap” from passions to actions where we appropriate to ourselves the status of determining cause. The shift in the location of causal determination from an external body as the cause of the first joyful passions to ourselves becoming the cause of joys as active affects is the moment in which we understand and act. Although they are self-caused joys, these actions aren’t subjectivist feelings, since they don’t arise from the affection of the subject. Instead, active affects arise from the subject’s increased power of acting (puissance), of forming compositions or agencements in which they emerge. The distinction between affect and feeling in Deleuze is further explicated as one between desire and pleasure:

Pleasure is an affection of a person or a subject; it is the only way for persons to “find themselves” in the process of desire that exceeds them; pleasures, even the most artificial, are reterritorializations. But the question is precisely whether it is necessary to find oneself. (ATP: 156)

In the pair desire–pleasure, analogous to affect–affection, desire is synonymous with agency split from subjectivity. Studying situations of extreme affects, such as rage and panic, John Protevi has interpreted Deleuze’s notion of affect as a power of evacuating the subject and desubjectivizing the body (Protevi 2011: 395). Using one of the key terms of Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Protevi associates affects with “becomings”—“capacities to produce emergent effects in entering assemblages” (ibid.). The notion of “assemblage” or agencement³ is significant for us here, for it precipitates the question of the relationship between art and affect. In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari explicitly assign to art the role of extracting affects from affections as well as percepts from perceptions. Wresting the percept from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject entails an act of rendering perceptible (sensible) “the imperceptible (insensible) forces that populate the world” (WIP: 182). Deleuze and Guattari elucidate the process as one of extracting affects from affections, which seizes effects of sensory becomings where “something or someone is
ceaselessly becoming-other while continuing to be what they are” (WIP: 177). The act and aim of art here is to compose sensations as a double, complementary capture of forces as percepts and becomings as affects.

Deleuze and Guattari consider how art composes sensations in two somewhat different ways. In the first conception, sensation is described as synonymous with affects and becomings as if it is in no way different from the events of nature:

[Sensation] is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernability, as if things, beasts and persons, endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation. This is what is called differentiation. This is what is called an affect … (WIP: 173)

In his reading of What Is Philosophy?, Alliez expounds composition by “vectorizing matters of expression rather than (always) already formed contents.” He stresses that the “principle or plane of composition” implies that it is perceived simultaneously with what it composes, or in other words, with sensations and affects—we would add, immanently—“in the ontological identity of the form of expression and the form of content” (Alliez 2004: 13).

In the second conception, Deleuze and Guattari invoke the metaphor of “house,” suggesting that this metaphor would better describe the composition of sensation than the phenomenological notion of “flesh” because “art begins not with flesh but with the house” (WIP: 186). In contrast to the first image of self-caused, effortless expression, here they confer a constructivist sense on composition, which includes the technical aspect, or the functional limitations of the material, although it also, paradoxically, differs from the aesthetic dimension of composition:

Technical composition, the work of the material that often calls on science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, anatomy), is not to be confused with aesthetic composition, which is the work of sensation. (WIP: 186)

Here I would like to highlight that the comparison of composition with the construction of a house opens up the possibility of arguing for a more heterodox reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari insist that sensation has an absolute ontological status because “even if the material lasts for only a few seconds it will give sensation the power to exist and be preserved in itself in the eternity that coexists with this short duration” (WIP: 166), the material from which the sensation arises must be contingent upon a specific
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(historical, political, cultural, etc.) situation, which also must limit the
effect of the sensation to that specific situation. My aim is to show that
the contingencies that are abstracted by a forcefully ontological import
of sensation for art are necessary arguments to explain how and why
certain compositional procedures are devised in the first place. The spe-
cific genesis and effect of these compositions cannot be divorced from
the specific givens of the field of contemporary dance that the choreog-
rapher renders problematic. Our discussion will proceed to show this by
unpacking the problems at work in the composition of 50/50.

50/50: the problem of composing affects

The creation of the performance 50/50 in 2004 was accompanied by two
texts by the choreographer, the first of which was a published program-
matic statement, “YES Manifesto” (Ingvartsen 2004), and the second
of which is the score of the choreography that Ingvartsen provided me
with for this research. These two pieces of writing evidence the author's
intentions and thoughts and, as we will now see, offer insight into
those compositional procedures concerned explicitly with the notions
of expression and affect. At the same time, these texts must be read as
documents of the discursive debates that marked the end of the 1990s
in the European contemporary dance scene. “YES Manifesto” invokes
an implicit dialogue with Yvonne Rainer's “No Manifesto” from 1965,
whose brevity allows me to quote it here in its entirety:

No to spectacle no to virtuosity no to transformations and magic
and make-believe no to the glamour and transcendency of the star
image no to the heroic no to the anti-heroic no to trash imagery
no to involvement of performer or spectator no to style no to camp
no to seduction of spectator by the wiles of the performer no to
eccentricity no to moving or being moved. (Rainer 1965: 178)

Ingvartsen begins her manifesto with a clear reference to Rainer:

To say yes instead of no as a strategy is about defining an area of
interest as a positive—of rather than a negation, we live in the times
of “everything is possible,” so why not spectacle, virtuosity, glamour,
style, involvement a.s.o. why not moving and being moved as long as
it is a choice and not simply an affirmation of the conventional pro-
cedures we already know how functions [sic]. In spite of manifestos
belonging to the past—here comes another one. (Ingvartsen 2004: 74)
If we closely examine the two manifestos, it becomes clear that the reference to Rainer’s serves as a critical relay for Ingvartsen to argue not against Rainer directly, but against the so-called conceptual dance of the 1990s, which in certain ways resumes Rainer’s principles 30 years later in Europe. But before we illuminate the real target of Ingvartsen’s dissent, let’s first unpack her departure from Rainer’s aesthetics. In only 18 items, Rainer manages to denounce practically everything that didn’t belong to the Neo-Avantgarde art scene in New York, or more specifically, to Cage’s experimental music circle, early happenings and events, Minimal Art, and Conceptual Art. However, the confluence of these eloquent, lapidary attributes points to a variety of expressions in the New York theater scene—in ballet (“virtuosity”), American modern dance (“heroic”), Cunningham’s high modernism (“eccentricity”), Broadway theater entertainment, camp, and so on. The point of Rainer’s critique can be summarized in two statements—“no to involvement of the performer or the spectator . . . no to moving or being moved”—revealing her stance on neutral performance as the action that appropriates or simulates the functional, ordinary, pedestrian movement. While some of Ingvartsen’s statements explicitly invert Rainer’s, such as “YES to redefining virtuosity, expression, style,” most of them are more sophisticated propositions to deviate from the unspoken claims of conceptual dance:

Yes to “invention” (however impossible)
Yes to conceptualizing experience, affects, sensation
Yes to materiality/body practice-investment
Yes to un-naming, decoding and recoding expression
Yes to non-recognition, non-resemblance (could this be some sort of first degree referentiality)
Yes to non-sense/illogics
Yes to organizing principles rather than fixed logic systems
Yes to moving the “clear concept” behind the actual performance of . . . .

(Ingvartsen 2004: 74)

“Conceptual dance” in Europe in the 1990s arose from a critique of representation in theater, taking Rainer’s debunking of spectacle further into a deconstruction of theatricality in self-referential speech acts and procedures with readymade, citation, and collage, as prominently featured in the work of Jérôme Bel. Ingvartsen seems to partly share the antirepresentationalist stance of Bel, Tino Sehgal, Mårten Spångberg, and other choreographers representative of conceptual
methodologies, especially when she calls for nonrecognition, non-resemblance and non-sense, yet she pinpoints another way to achieve it: through experimentation with materiality and the body, or through a kind of conceptualization of experience, affects, and sensations, whose origin lies in cultural expressions. The sources for these expressions in 50/50 are an opera and hard rock music. They represent two antipodal types of spectacle belonging to, on one side, high art that preserves nineteenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois traditions and, on the other, popular mass cultural entertainment. The explicit choice of extremes comes from Ingvartsen’s conviction that spectacular culture is what we inhabit, and that the “affective levels of expression [that] are working on us whether we want that or not” cannot be denied, but need to be “navigated” (Cvejić 2009b: n.p.). She explicitly sets her intention apart from what she sees as “conceptual methodologies” that remove bodily, emotional, and affective expression through “reductionism.” The term “reductionism” denotes a certain economy of style, an antiaesthetic attitude whereby the manner of performing is functional to the meaning of action. Moreover, specifically, “conceptual methodologies” in choreography entail a poststructuralist approach to the body and movement as a signifier of cultural codes often conceived in chains of smooth sliding signifiers in the form of shifting appropriated codes of movement that resist the desire for individualistic subjective expression. Choreographies by Bel, such as Jérôme Bel (1995), Shirtology (1997), Le Dernier spectacle (1998), Xavier Le Roy (2000), The Show Must Go On (2001), Sehgal’s Twenty Minutes for the Twentieth Century (1999) and Spångberg’s Powered by Emotion (2003), and Le Roy’s Giselle (2001), exemplify the procedure of appropriating coded movements rather than creating original movements. The multiplicity of movements and gestures is structured as a “text” which the spectator as a reader should find pleasure in decoding. Ingvartsen reflects what prompted her to deviate from this method:

I remember thinking about Giselle and how I would like to do something that was not only about showing the body as a reproducer of the codification of the body. I was interested in finding out how to be on the limit of language, in a space where people on one hand would feel “at home” and at the same time without tools to place the expressions that they would be experiencing (Cvejić 2009b: n.p.).

With the intention of exploring affect, which she states both in the manifesto and in the score of 50/50, Ingvartsen speculated about the
possibility of constructing an expression that would be “moving faster or more intensively” than the “speed of rational reasoning” (Cvejić 2009b: n.p.). Her speculation could be compared to Brian Massumi’s claim that the primacy of the affective arises from a gap between content and effect of expression, between cognitive and sensorial registers in perception. Massumi infers from a few case studies in cognitive science that affect is based on the intensity of resonance between multiple sensorial stimuli. He fashions intensity as a different order of connection operating in parallel to the signifying order while being disconnected from it. Affect emerges as an autonomous relation between resonating sensations and is, he notes, synesthetic, implying that senses participate in one another. Hence, it is a capacity: “the measure of a living thing’s potential interactions, its ability to transform the effects of one sensory mode into those of another” (Massumi 2002: 35). Within this line of thought—on affect as a matter of synesthetic transversal and transformative power of intensity—50/50 sets out to explore the composition of affects. “YES Manifesto” states a series of questions by means of which Ingvartsen programmatically determines the research tasks to be tackled in 50/50:

What are affects and how can they be an object of investigation, can they be produced/constructed or are they a kind of by-products? What is the difference between affect and affections/emotions? Is it possible to decompose expressivity in such a way that it recomposes itself outside of the usual categories of expression. So, using the old to make the new?

(Ingvartsen 2004: 75)

In the following I will engage in a detailed description of the performance throughout its course of unfolding. My account will attempt to retrieve the construction of situations in which the qualities of sensations change according to how they are perceived and according to the means by which they are performed.

**Constructing expressions**

Before the performance has begun, the audience are already given an image, a tableau. While entering the theater, they can see a naked performer standing downstage left, relatively close to the first row, in a strong general (“wash”) light. Though there could be a doubt about the sex of this body, which seen from the back appears androgynous, the
program note explains that it is a solo made and performed by a woman. She is standing *contrapposto* with her back turned to the audience, and her head is covered with a vivid orange wig of the color and shape usually worn by clowns. When the recording of a drum beat begins playing, with the first beats the dancer shifts her balance from the left to the right foot to and fro. The drum beat develops into a drumroll solo in cycles of accelerated and decelerated tempi and rhythms, revealing a concert routine characteristic of hard rock. The rock music formula is used to manipulate the audience’s attention: it is supposed to tantalize them by suspending the song with a virtuoso expression of bare rhythm. During the whole drum concert cadenza, the dancer stays in the same place, moving her buttocks in the rhythm of the main beats, sliding and shifting her balance from left to right. The duplication of the rhythm is so meticulous that it gives an illusion that the buttocks are the surface on which the drummer beats the rhythm. During the acceleration of the roll, the movement of the buttocks turns into a kind of vibration of the flesh, which clouds the shape of this bodypart. The image is like a static tableau, animated from the inside. Only one element—one body part quivers—while everything else, the light and the figure, remain still, unchanged. The performer doubles the rhythm by reflecting it in motion, in the body part that serves to embody the musical instrument.

The visual concentration on the pulsating buttocks during three and a half minutes blurs the chain of stimulus and reaction, and motion seems no longer an effect of sound, but merges with it, or may even appear to cause the sound. Thanks to the fastidious embodiment of the rhythm, the sound is visually amplified, which transduces one sensory event into another while duplicating it at the same time. The effect of intensification is produced by the mixture of two heterogeneous expressions. While the drumroll clearly comes from the rock concert, it is more difficult to identify the genre from which the movement of shaking and vibrating naked buttocks is acquired; perhaps it points to “go-go” dancing, a form of social dance whose purpose is to entertain and seduce spectators. No matter what the movement might seem to resemble, this composition draws two culturally and semiotically unrelated expressions into a synesthetic movement, a capture of a sound and a visual rhythm in one (Figure 14).

The drumroll slides into the full song, as if it had suspended it until then, and now the song can be resumed or even released again with the entrance of the guitars and the voice in scene two. The song is entitled “Strange Kind of Woman,” which can only be identified by those
familiar with the band Deep Purple. The title doesn’t display itself in the short excerpt and hence has no specific significance in the scene. The song appears as a generic sample of hard-rock music from the 1970s. The scene changes abruptly. The lighting shifts from the front to the back wall (upstage), from which three strong spotlights beam into the audience. The dancer takes off her wig and begins to dance with her back to the audience. Her movements simulate the concert behavior of the main singer. While she is a silhouette turned with her back to the real audience of her performance, she addresses an imaginary concert audience in the back (upstage wall). The inversion of audience address is carried out thus: the dancer mimics the singer’s game of call–response that can be discerned from the recording, where the singer prompts the audience for an ever louder and more enthusiastic reaction. Whereas the sensation in the previous scene was built upon intensity that suppressed recognition, the situation here exposes the full-fledged context of a rock concert. The context that was missing in the first scene is now recuperated in representation. The dancer inserts herself in an entirely appropriated milieu; her embodiment consists in lending the body to the voice, as in a lip-synch imitation. In apparent contrast from the first image, this image operates by imitation rather than through a

Figure 14 50/50 © Mette Ingvartsen/Great Investment, 2005. Photography © Peter Lenaerts
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composition of a sensation from a clash of diverse, somewhat unrecognizable cultural expressions.

At the sound of the applause from the concert, the scene shifts again abruptly. The dancer slowly turns to face the audience frontally, but as the lights suddenly dim, her body remains a silhouette. The concert music stops and is immediately replaced by a new voice, this time the dancer singing live. The melody and its harmonic patterns vaguely indicate an operatic aria from the nineteenth century, for which the dancer’s voice seems insufficiently high and imprecise in pitch, untrained for the technical requirements of the style. The sense of inadequacy is enhanced through the same voice doubled in recording. The live and recorded versions of the same voice melt into each other, and it is unclear whether the recording echoes the voice live or the live voice actually follows and reproduces itself recorded. The melody sounds deliberately poor, false, and rudimentary, and the language of the sung text is incomprehensible. The orchestral accompaniment that would help identify the musical source is missing, and the singing sounds as if someone was “singing along” in an unknown language—a spontaneous trial of copying an aria without competence and preparation. Ingvartsen notes in the score that she is singing here the aria “Un tal gioco, credetemi” from Pagliacci, a verismo opera from 1892 by the Italian composer Ruggiero Leoncavallo.

While singing, the dancer moves in a diagonal from upstage left to downstage right. Although she addresses the audience frontally—like in an opera staging—her face remains dark until she reaches the front of the stage. Like the figure, the source of the opera is obscured, the melody and the text unintelligible. This is the effect of a twofold reproduction: the dancer is doubling the same recorded voice that attempted to reproduce the operatic voice singing the aria. She sets herself the task of accurately copying her own singing with all technical inaccuracies relative to the original. Thus the mixture of the recorded and live singing of the same voice functions like a double imprint: a spontaneous “impression” or echo of the original aria is accompanied with its own immediate live echo or shadow. The aria transfers from the fetish-voice of opera to the dancer, who uses her voice as just one of the many organs of the body capable of movement. In the vocal transference, all that makes the voice of the opera extraordinary is lost. The dancer’s voice subtracts the motion of the melody without the exact intonation or the technique which sustains the operatic manner and tone. The greatness and splendor of bel canto is diminished in a simple extension of the melodic contours. Opposite to the first scene, where a sensation
was composed from amplifying the sound with a visual rhythm, the third scene contracts its source—an operatic aria—by decreasing its original intensity. It draws a contrast with the previous two scenes, which were invested in spectacular hard rock expressions: the vocal subtraction of melody as a linear motion from the original aria as well as the double reproduction that emphasizes the inadequacy and inaccuracy in the copy produces a sense of shrinking and confusion.

A new, fourth scene evolves through another procedure of composition, but in seamless continuation from the moment the dancer reaches the end of the diagonal, downstage right. Now the lights from the back dim while the front lights fade in, illuminating the dancer’s body standing close to the audience. The dancer continues to sing for a minute, but as she sings, her face begins to make exaggerated expressions that suggest correspondence to the emotional significance of her singing. A correlation between facial expressions and emotional tone of the music is at first suggested, thanks to the convention of emphatic acting and sustained facial grimaces in opera, but isn’t subsequently confirmed. The expressions of the dancer’s face, including also the body that molds with them, evolve in another logic, divorced from operatic acting. The face and the body fold in and out in extremes of expressions in a slow motion that exhibits the material processuality of these changes. At first, the dancer’s body and face freeze in an expression indicating a strained, high-pitched voice: the mouth is open and stretched in an effort to sing in a high register. The dancer then stops singing, the recorded voice also stops and the expression on the face freezes for about ten seconds. It then begins to change slowly towards its opposite: the mouth drops low, opening in a cry of anguish, and eyebrows frown. A series of expressions slowly unfolds in silence. Eyes, mouth, and nose cramp inwards, an expression which at first vaguely resembles the grotesque grimace of a sad clown, but then as the hands close in fists and the body squats, the whole expression of the body becomes unrecognizable. While still squatting, the face begins to thaw into a more joyful expression, which ends with the tongue coming out of the mouth. Hands, mouth, and eyes open slowly, while the tongue is still sticking out as a stiff object. And the body stands up with arms in an open embrace. When the body reaches an upright position, the expression of the face and arms will have modulated again, from expressing joyfulness to gaping in wonder or fear; hands, eyes, and mouth wide open in astonishment. This expression intensifies toward panic, and when it reaches its physical zenith, it slowly modulates into a clownesque expression of sadness, the mouth stretching in an arch downwards, making a triangular face
with arms and shoulders sagging downward. The expression continues to modulate with eyes opening wide in amazement, as if something dreadful is approaching the dancer from above.

As the description of the evolutive sequence of grimaces above shows, scene four is built through the physical modulation of facial expression. The face moves persistently, and no one expression is arrested long enough to sustain a state of emotion, which would psychologically designate the behavior of the dancer and thus represent her as a character. All expressions are constructed on the surface of facial muscles and head movements, engaged in a kind of affective athleticism that affirms the malleability of the grimace through tensions and contractions of the muscles and skin of the face. These expressions modulate, which in other words means they are physically varied and intensified to the extent that they change the image of affection: from exaltation to anguish, from sadness to joyfulness, from joyfulness to fear, from fear to panic, from panic to sadness, from sadness to amazement. The designation of these emotions—or affections, in the sense of Deleuze and Spinoza—are only the singular points in which a physical movement of intensification of the face reaches a climax, after which it shifts or deviates in tendency. The emotions are thus images through which the face travels yet which it never fully inhabits. Modulation is driven by a physical sense of transformation rather than a narrative sequence of signs. If these expressions originate from opera at all, as the beginning of the scene suggests, they are detached from the opera once the music stops and are furthermore manipulated in duration independent of the time of an aria. The facial transformations wrest movement as the force of affection, thereby composing a sensory becoming of the face.

In scene five the composition of the facial and bodily expressions continues towards a divergence between the two body parts. The face and the body are now desynchronized; the body transforms before the face, anticipating its expression. The sound from scene three returns; the only difference is that the voice is now doubled in recording and the dancer doesn’t sing. This enables the dancer to fully embody the motion of double transformation, of the face and the rest of the body, which is perceived as deformations, disarticulations of the gesture and facial expression. As the sound goes on, she stretches upright, in a posture of dancing with arms above the head, which recalls the “go-go” dancing from the first scene, now reversed from back to front. Keeping her eyes closed, she slowly moves sideways from stage right to stage left, wiggling her buttocks. About 20 seconds later the moving posture begins to deform itself. The dancer fills her mouth with air and moves
her arm and trunk as if air, or another kind of invisible matter, were being pumped into her body. This renders her movement more pantomimic, plastic, slowed down. When she reaches the edge of stage left, she ends in a posture of noble grace, as a servant humbly bowing before a noble. As before, this posture is just a matter of passage in continuous motion. She bends in a squat, turns to the other side, stage right, and opens her face and arms towards the audience in what first seems an expression of happiness but then immediately proceeds to modulate to its opposite. She stands up again, and the arms that opened in a happy bow now rise above her head in an expression of defense, while the face slowly transforms into a cry of horror. She recoils backwards, pointing her arms in anger and closing the face in a grimace similar to the grotesque sadness of a clown that we saw before. She withdraws her head and shoulders and moves her arms downwards in order to lift them again in a posture of addressing the sky—the gesture of ballet pantomime signifying despair. The expression modulates towards anger as she moves backwards in a diagonal toward upstage-right, the reverse of the displacement in scene three.

The divergence between the face and the rest of the body is brought to another level when the aria “Un tal gioco, credetemi” appears in the original interpretation of the tenor Luciano Pavarotti, famous for the excellence of his voice and perhaps recognizable for a wider audience as well. The melody with the full orchestral accompaniment emerges as the musical source for the recorded singing in previous sections. The music contrasts the stage action with its orderliness, thus emphasizing the disconnection between the movement expressions and the narrative musical “roof” that covers them. It is difficult to place the dancer’s body as a character in the aria. In the aria the main character of Pagliacci, a clown, warns the audience that while everything on the stage is an illusion, life is reality with serious consequences. During the aria the dancer develops a new sequence of deformations in which all previously seen postures and grimaces are reversed and remodulated in continuity. All expressions tend toward extremes—they involve stretching the mouth, arms and the whole body folding inside-out, outside-in, upwards, and downwards. Although they don’t seem to directly correspond to the expression in the music, the pathetic tone of the final cadenza matches the grimace of the clown’s expression of sadness and crying.

Scene five ends with the dancer lying down on stage and putting the orange wig over her head and face, as if she is preparing herself to enter the opera as a character, a clown. Consequently, scene six begins by presenting the music from the opera, now an excerpt from the overture,
complementing it with the corresponding action excerpted from the same scene. Ingvartsen notes that she reconstructed the opening in *Pagliacci*, where the performers of a comedy troupe enter the village. The music in the *verismo* style of 1890s Italian opera typically lumps diverse images and atmospheres into a condensed form, fulfilling the function of a prologue that dramaturgically summarizes the plot. The overture represents several dramatic situations: the preparation of a burlesque or circus-like show, the moods of excitement and dramatic suspense, comical effects in the orchestra suggesting dramatic twists, a lyrical motif suggesting the pathos of sad love, a slow tragicomic waltz, scale passages imitating the sound of fanfare announcing the burlesque. These musical elements are heterogeneous and combined in a mosaic of rapid shifts, providing an introduction of the main musical and dramatic motifs in the opera. The dancer stands up with the wig covering her face and inserts herself into the action of the music in a burlesque manner, using exaggerated gestures of pantomime. At the moment when the music suggests dramatic confusion, she whistles as if she is summoning a gang, then approaches the audience, turns her head toward them, and mimes watching them, while her eyes and the whole face remain covered by the wig. She counts the audience using her index finger, and then gesticulates a sign of catastrophe towards them. The scene continues with a similar variety of pantomimic gestures, ending with the dancer suddenly falling on the floor, as if she is now going to act like she's dying, but instead she shakes her head and leg from the heat of emotion (see Figure 15).

The composition of scene six is comparable to scene two, which is based on reconstructing the scene of a rock concert. In contrast to the principles of dissociation and divergence that Ingvartsen uses to decompose expressions from hard rock in scenes one and seven (“go-go” dancing in scene one, and opera, operatic acting, and clown pantomime in scenes three, four, and five) this section is built by appropriating the music and stage action from the original source of *Pagliacci*. However, since the music is instrumental, including no text, and the stage action is a straightforward pantomime, the signs float outside a particular narrative, revealing only the generic structure of signification, an empty form of narrative movements and sounds. Thus the appropriation is less obvious and recognizable than in lip-synching to the rock singer in scene two. In addition, the fact that the figure is defacialized—its face being masked by the orange wig—is incongruous with the proper scene from *Pagliacci*. The montage principle of lumping heterogeneous motifs into one musical composition, matched by an analogous collage
Figure 15  50/50 © Mette Ingvartsen/Great Investment, 2005. Photography © Peter Lenaerts
of gestures, adds to the sense of exhibiting the principle of expression tied with representation. The aim of the scene is to show the regime of expression that 50/50 critically departs from: a correspondence between the form and the meaning of expression that traditionally unites pantomime with music. However, the convergence of the musical and bodily signs is counteracted by the speed of zapping from one gesture to another, condensing the scene into only two and a half minutes.

The seventh and last scene returns to the compositional procedure of scene one. The music suddenly shifts from opera to a deathmetal hardcore sequence based on repetitions of rough guitar riffs and drum beats. As in scene one, the dancer embodies the instrument—here a combination of guitars and drums—by doubling its rhythm. The music is now reflected in the motion of the front side of the body: the dancer uses arms to help her breasts move and vibrate in a manner similar to that of scene one, where the buttocks from the back side of the body simulate the surface on which the rhythm of the drums beats. The sound is transduced into bodily motion that visually amplifies—intensifies—the expression of the rhythm, the only difference from scene one being that the effort to move the breasts to the rhythm of the music is visible, thus making the movement derive from, rather than merge with, the sound. While doing this, the dancer walks in a diagonal towards a position downstage left, the place where the performance began. The overall trajectory of displacements on the stage seems to close in on itself. In retrospect, it shows that each scene developed in another part of the stage, circumscribing it in four apexes of its rectangular shape as well as in the inner space of the rectangle, as is shown in Figure 16:

Figure 16  Trajectory of displacements in Mette Ingvartsen’s 50/50, B.C.
The traveling of the body throughout the scenes displaces the material of the composition through diverse contexts of reference, or genres and styles of expression, but it also divides the stage into various zones. A binary order often sieves through the diversity in these displacements: between upstage and downstage, facing the audience front or back, illuminated from front or behind, in full light or in semi-darkness. The displacements of the body on the stage reframe the perspective of the spectators, allowing them to zoom in on a part of the body (as in scenes one, four, five, and seven) or zoom out for the view of the whole figure and the environment that it circumscribes with its movements (as in scenes two, three, and six).

While thus far the primary aim of the descriptive account was to trace the course of modulations and other procedures of transformation, including their composition of space and light, now the focus of this analysis will shift to the effects the compositional modulations described above have on the body featured as the instrument of Ingvartsen’s solo.

**Defacing the self in a solo**

*50/50* is a dance solo made and performed by the same artist. A solo in the context of Western contemporary dance is both a mode of production and an intensive expression of individualist ontology. Its deployment brings forth a relation with the genre that preserves the function of self-expression from early modern dance. The coincidence of the body that is both the source, the material, and the instrument of movement binds the subject to her sense of self-identity through physical, emotional, and spiritual experience. Throughout the twentieth century, the solo has become a standard format in dance education through which dancers and choreographers are trained to use their own body as an instrument of expression that refers to their individual self; the focus of expression may vary from formal, stylistic, and technical to any other concerns understood as relating or belonging to the individual self of the dancer. Traditionally, dance solo raises the expectation that it will serve the dancer to present her “art” of dance, where art bears a sense of craftsmanship, original invention of movements, and bodily expression. The dance solo foregrounds the body in a relation of self-identification with the dancer, the body thus being vehicle, site, and effect of the individualistic, subjective self-expression.

Theater possesses no format analogous to the dance solo. A monologue in which an actor performs her own text would be the equivalent
of a dance solo, but it is a rare performance format compared to the status of solo dance in contemporary dance. Yet, as Anthony Uhlmann has shown in his essay on expression and affect in Beckett, individualistic subjectivism reigns in theatrical acting, not unlike the way in which self-expression haunts contemporary dance (Uhlmann in Cull 2009). Uhlmann associates Beckett’s critique of individualistic subjectivism with Deleuze’s concept of expression, thereby devising a specific meaning of Deleuzian-Spinozist expression in performance. Let us briefly examine here how Uhlmann’s reading of expression in Beckett poses a problem similar to Ingvartsen’s problem in 50/50.

In his discussion of why Beckett exercised an authorial control over the staging of his plays, incorporating in his writings a choreography of word and gesture, sound and silence, movement and stillness, Uhlmann highlights the reference that Beckett made to Kleist’s parable “On the Marionette Theater” as well as Beckett’s reading of Spinoza’s Ethics. Analyzing the impact these texts had on Beckett’s poetics, Uhlmann proposes a distinction between two concepts of expression in acting: individualistic subjectivism, or self-expression, and “external” expression. In the first, expression always proceeds from inside to outside, requiring interpretation of the text by the actor to proceed contrariwise from the outside (or from the text which assigns her a character to play) to the inside (or the emotion she identifies as the motor for the character’s action). Uhlmann explains how Beckett developed a method of eluding actors’ questions regarding the meaning which their actions and words should interpret, a method that served as a way to hinder any psychological self-expression that might interfere with the univocal expression of the work of the text. The following account summarizes Beckett’s approach:

The emotions that the actor brings to bear in performing can behave as a kind of interference to this process [the process of creation of affects in art – B.C.]. They are interferences because they do not relate to the affects which the work itself is seeking to convey . . . . An affect here refers to an external expression while an emotion refers to an individualistically subjective expression . . . . Therefore a performance might require an actor to suppress extraneous emotion so that an audience might be carried along by the external affects produced by the work as a whole. (Uhlmann in Cull 2009: 60–1)

In contrast to self-expression based on psychological inquiry and the interiorization of emotion, Uhlmann argues for another concept of
expression that stems from the work itself—in this case, Beckett’s text—as an “interconnected, complicated, single expression” whose staging requires the externalization of meaningful elements interconnected by an infinity of causal relations. Uhlmann’s argument is relevant for our discussion because his notion of externalist expression seeks to substitute the tradition of acting with a mode of performing that is close to a dancerly embodiment of a prescribed choreography. Beckett’s definitive authorial position can only be defended by the claim that the actual staging of the play is virtually written into Beckett’s text. “Externalization” in performing Beckett’s texts in his own staging would mean adherence to the text as a program that actors, like Kleist’s puppets, automatically play. The text is meant to be actualized—not interpreted—in speech and the movement of bodies in real space and time. Beckett defined his acting ideal during the rehearsals of his production of Happy Days in 1971 as follows: “Precision and economy [that] would produce the maximum of grace [of actors performing the play]” (Beckett in Uhlmann in Cull 2009: 56). Apart from its association with puppets, Beckett’s staging method invites a comparison with ballet, or the attitude by which classical dancers submit to the most rigorous language of ballet: with grace. The only difference may be that classical ballet configures the body of the dancer according to the transcendental ideal of the Romantic sublime, which ideologically contrasts with the immanence in Beckett by which text and the bodies that perform it comprise one expression, one and the same plane of composition.

In Ingvartsen’s solo, the coincidence of performer and choreographer in the same body facilitates an externalist constructivist approach to expression. Here, however, the body is only one component of sensation rather than being the subject of emotion. In 50/50 externalist expression, as opposed to “outwarding” an internal sense of being in the body as in self-expression, is reassured through the procedure of doubling, appropriating, and manipulating readymade cultural expressions. The idea of navigating through various spectacular expressions involves an attempt at becoming different bodies that represent these expressions. Thus, performing nude was the only solution to the problem of “going through so many different bodies” without getting “more connected to one than to another.” As Ingvartsen told me in an interview about 50/50, “I could not be a character, a rock star or an opera singer. I had to stay somehow on a surface and in a way the skin is the perfect surface for such projections” (Cvejić 2009: n.p.).

The preparation of a body as a surface for expression begins by covering its face with a wig, which turns the head into one undifferentiated
object. In the first two and the last two scenes of 50/50, Ingvartsen wears the orange, clownesque wig. Not only does the wig cross her face out; it serves as a shield of intensive color—orange—that deflects the spectator’s gaze and prevents her from the usual comparison between the expression of the body and the expression on the face whereby the face is the checkpoint of recognition. The face is supposed to tell us what the body articulates in movement. This is the reason why contemporary dance, after the influence of Cunningham and Rainer, has established the convention of a neutral face, a face that withdraws from signification in order for the movement to emerge in its autonomy (see Launay and Charmatz 2003: 150–1). In scenes two, three, and four, the face is uncovered so as to assume the role of the prime instrument of expression. It then moves and produces sound or modulations of grimaces. In scenes one and seven the main instruments of movement are buttocks and breasts, respectively. In scenes two and six the body appears as an instrument of gesticulation, deploying gestures of singing with the microphone, or the hand gestures of a clown.

A systematic overview of the body parts engaged in movement throughout the seven scenes testifies to the partitioning of the body. Each scene focuses movement on one body part, which has the consequence of reorganizing the figure. The body becomes the surface whose movement always zooms in on a different zone, like a close-up shifting between buttocks, breasts, mouth, face, hands, and gesticulating body. But the reorganization proceeds by the logic of the organ which is, in the first scene, suppressed: the face. I am not suggesting here that buttocks or breasts start to resemble a face through a kind of anthropomorphism, although the first scene invites such an image, as if the face on the other side of the head and the buttocks swap places. It’s not the face, but the buttocks that are watching us, the spectators. They aren’t watching us as a face. The movement that differentiates the speed of this part of the body draws our gaze.

The regime that organizes movement in each scene is, as Deleuze and Guattari define in A Thousand Plateaus (ATP: 167–91), faciality. Faciality is a specific semiotic regime that intersects signification and subjectivation beyond the face of the human individual. In other words Deleuze and Guattari use the face as the metonymy for a mechanism that operates upon the entire body, that is not limited to the body while it may also involve any object. The operation of facialization is double. Firstly, it entails biunivocal differentiation of one unit in relation to another, the constitution of a surface—or as Deleuze and Guattari picture it—a “white wall,” frame or screen that “reflects” signifiers, structuring them
Choreographing Problems

by difference. Facialization is an abstract machine that determines, by opposition, an x or a y. Secondly, faciality situates a passion and a consciousness. It acts as a filter that selectively responds and absorbs what acts upon it; thus, in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s description, it is a “black hole of subjectivity” (*ATP*: 168) that guides choices or makes judgments. Facialization doesn’t proceed by drawing or imposing a face upon a surface, but by composing a surface according to “the black hole/white wall system” (*ATP*: 177) the double operation of reflection and absorption, signification and subjectivation.

Although the face is produced in social culture and is a part of every regime of signs, an instrument of power that reinforces every discursive practice with gestures, expressions, and gazes that accompany verbal enunciations, the face isn’t human, Deleuze and Guattari argue; but, on the contrary, it is “inhuman in human beings” (*ATP*: 171). Facialization presupposes a system larger than, or prior to, the constitution of the human face. The white wall/black hole system creates a “holey surface” (*ATP*: 170) of which the human face is only a part. Hence the face isn’t an expression of a subject, nor is it a signifier; instead, it is that which underlies or provides the substance necessary for a subject or a signifier. It operates like an abstract machine that can decode the body—dismantle the human head—and overcode it in becoming-nonhuman. Hence facializing the entire body and even objects—Deleuze and Guattari’s list of examples includes hand, breast, stomach, penis and vagina, thigh, leg and foot, house, utensils, clothes—is only a stage in the process of dismantling the face, making faciality traits “elude the organization of the face,” getting out of the black hole or passing through the white wall toward an “asignifying, asubjective and faceless” realm of sensations (*ATP*: 171). Deleuze and Guattari proffer that the “destiny” of human beings is to escape the face, become inhuman, clandestine, and imperceptible. We will now see how this tendency expresses itself through a series of facializations and defacializations which compose the body in 50/50.

**Power-motion and crisis-motion**

The evidence to support the claim of the inhumanity of facialization is the mask, for the mask is the operator of abstraction, of deviation from the given “natural” human face. The mask assures the construction of the face that escapes the human, or its becoming-nonhuman (*ATP*: 181). In 50/50 the orange wig operates as the mask that dismantles the face of a woman, at the outset. It decodes the body of a human,
in relation to a musical instrument and then a clown and a puppet, and, at the same time, the mask begins to overcode other body parts, submerging them in operations of reflection or absorption. Buttocks are facialized through their yielding of a surface for the beats of the drum to bounce off of. They merge the sound rhythm with a visual rhythm of bodily motion, which deterritorializes the music from the image of a concert and transduces its sensory stimulation into a force that revamps the body. The invisible drum is hitting the body, or it is the quivering of the buttocks that creates a sound. Certainly, all dancing to music can do this; it is only a matter of intensity in merging sound and bodily movement as two kinds of motion and two kinds of rhythm. Here the reflection of rhythm in the skin and flesh of the buttocks is so precise and strong that it facializes the buttocks as a drum. A similar process of reflection is enacted in the last scene, when breasts facialize through a more complex instrumentalization of rhythm—of guitars and drums—, reinforcing the deathmetal hardcore sound of the rhythm through violent shaking of the breasts. Neither of these body parts can move “by themselves,” that is, by the voluntary sensorimotor action of the body. They need to be externally moved—and Ingvartsen uses the rest of the body to move them in such a manner that they merge with the sound, and are moved by the rhythm which they reflect. Reflection intensifies the rhythm, as it connects its sound with the visual motion of the body. The result is an affect of augmentation, a *power-motion*. The reason for determining this change of intensity as an affect, and for calling it “power-motion,” is that the conjunction between the sound and visual rhythm releases a third, relational, interstitial, augmented motion, an expression in which sound and bodily movement reciprocally partake. The affect is an increase in the intensity of expression.

In scene three, the mouth acts as a hole that first absorbs the operatic aria and then selects from it a melody to sing. Before it enters the game of doubling (whereby the priority of the live or the recorded voice is confused), the voice subtracts from the musical source the tones it is able to reproduce. This operation consists of two steps: listening that absorbs melody by selecting it from the aria and singing which reflects the subtracted part. It is again a matter of transduction: one sensory event is decoded—the original aria sung by the opera singer—and then it is used to overcode the body of the dancer. One could say that the melody simply travels from one voice to another, two organs of the same kind, were it not that in this transference the melody gets abstracted from its original context and distorted. A close-up that contorts the original tune to the extent of nonrecognition recalls Deleuze and Guattari’s
description of the face as a megaphone (ATP: 179). The megaphone here not only increases the volume of a version of the original melody by doubling it in the live and recorded voice; it also deforms it, impoverishes it by removing its orchestral accompaniment, as well as the brilliance and virtuosity of the operatic voice. Ears and mouth, hearing and singing of the dancer, operate as the holes of subjectivation, which render a new particular version of the sound. Through the facialization of the voice, scene three diminishes the movement in relation to the previous sections, where it amplified the sound visually. The body moves as a silhouette in darkness, like a cave that echoes a distorted sound. What is extracted in this operation is an affect of diminution, a crisis-motion. The juxtaposition with the rock-concert in scenes one and two and the vocalization in scene three, entail a shift from more to less—from enhancing a spectacular expression to reducing all spectacularity. Singing operatic music falsely displays an inadequate voice in mainstream performance culture, a voice whose melody the spectators cannot trust or follow, a voice that shrieks crisis. Substituting, for a brightly illuminated scene, a sombre one in which the body appears for the first time with its face facing the audience frontally, like a silhouette, contributes to the passage from more to less. Thus, the power-motion is succeeded by a crisis-motion.

In scenes four and five, the organ of defacialization is the face itself. Right there, where the face and the body could unify in the expression of the human figure, Ingvartsen seeks to dismantle the human face and defacialize the figure. The expressions of the face disjoin from the bodily gestures at divergent speeds and intensities. The face is treated as a surface with lines, wrinkles that fold in and out, holes that open and close, muscles that contract and stretch. The individual characteristics of Ingvartsen's face are blurred, or they eventually dissipate without being replaced with any other grimace as an alternative. The facial movements occur in a slow, steady process of transformation, without anchoring points that would characterize an emotion, a mood, or a behavior of the character. What happens in the modulations of the expressions of the face and bodily gestures cannot be qualified as affective production in the vein of power-motion or crisis-motion; these scenes rather study the micro-mechanics of indexes or images of emotion. Bringing the signification to the surface of the face, they liberate the face from being a site of psychological inquiry and divest it from any state of affection; in short, they turn the face into a zone of intensity. The process of facial modulations runs without a reason or goal that could be attributed to it. Unlike the affects that arose from assembling
the motion of sound and the body, the series of facial expressions is self-propelled. The result is an abstracted body, defacialized so that it can become a surface of multiple possibilities of affectivity.

The co-working of heterogeneous categories—from faciality to procedures of embodiment and sources and modifications of expression, to the address towards the attender—makes the composition of affects in motion a complex choreographic affair, which can be best summarized in Table 1 (pp. 192–3).

* In the analysis of 50/50, we have seen three instances in which affects are produced. Production here describes their genesis and nature, according to which “power-motion” and “crisis-motion” are constructed responses to the problems Ingvartsen formulated at the outset of her research. Seeking how to dissociate affects from affections or emotions, several choices have determined the composition. A solo invokes the dancer’s subjectivation through her body’s self-expression, or through the expression of her (psychological) interiority—hence the first decision to counter these expectations by working solely with multiple appropriated styles of performance (rock concert, opera, pantomime) externally in such a way that their sensorial materials appear as agents that manipulate the dancer’s body. In addition to refusing to be “one character” and going instead “through many bodies at the same time,” the second decision is to partition the body and consistently shift the focus of motion from one body part to another (buttocks, voice, mouth, face as disjunct from body, body minus face, hands, breasts). What we conceive as “power-motion” and “crisis-motion” are compositions in which a body part that doesn’t move by itself is moved by rhythm and other sensorial stimuli of sound. The intensity by which buttocks in the first scene or breasts in the last scene embody the rhythm of the drumroll or the guitar riffs of the hardcore music sequence turns them into the surfaces that express the motion of these instruments and that consequently separate from the body as a whole, dismantling its figure. The expression amounts to a transduction whereby the aural sensation of rhythm is converted into a kinesthetic event on the surface of the skin.

However, this expression isn’t a passion in a Spinozist sense. It doesn’t arise from the body undergoing the affection of something other than itself by virtue of an encounter, but is a matter of the mind transforming its body through an agencement, through entering a composition with a sensorial material, such as the drumroll, as a source of disparate sensations. The performer acts in such a way that she seems to affect
### Table 1  Overview of compositional parameters in Mette Ingvartsen’s 50/50, B.C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCENE 1</th>
<th>ACTION, PROCEDURE</th>
<th>GENRE AND STYLE OF REFERENCE</th>
<th>EXPOSURE/MODIFICATION OF THE SOURCE</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>AFFECT, SENSATION, MOTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Body turned back</td>
<td>embodiment of the drum doubling the rhythm = reflection in motion</td>
<td>Rock music (solo drums, drum roll) &gt; go-go dancing (entertainment)</td>
<td>Drum-roll fully revealed (excerpt of a song by Deep Purple)</td>
<td>Inversion: back is front</td>
<td>Transduction of sensory stimulation sound &gt; motion Visual amplification (intensification) <strong>POWER-MOTION</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SCENE 2**

Body turned back, sillhouette

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION, PROCEDURE</th>
<th>GENRE AND STYLE OF REFERENCE</th>
<th>EXPOSURE/MODIFICATION OF THE SOURCE</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>AFFECT, SENSATION, MOTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lending the body to the voice appropriation</td>
<td>Hard rock concert (cadenza, vocal solo)</td>
<td>Recorded hard rock concert fully revealed (Deep Purple, excerpt of a song)</td>
<td>Inversion: back is back (addressing imaginary audience in the back)</td>
<td>Simulation (appropriated situation) – signs and habit in affection</td>
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</tbody>
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**SCENE 3**

Voice-mouth, body turned front, silhouette

<table>
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<th>ACTION, PROCEDURE</th>
<th>GENRE AND STYLE OF REFERENCE</th>
<th>EXPOSURE/MODIFICATION OF THE SOURCE</th>
<th>ADDRESS</th>
<th>AFFECT, SENSATION, MOTION</th>
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<td>Vocal disarticulation doubling the doubled (spontaneously, wrongly reproduced voice)</td>
<td>Melody and language unintelligible</td>
<td>Obscured source of opera</td>
<td><strong>Voice-face</strong></td>
<td>Subtraction and reproduction <strong>CRISIS-MOTION</strong></td>
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<td>SCENE 4</td>
<td>face-body in conjunction, turned front, fully visible</td>
<td>folding in and out the face and the body in extreme expression detachment and manipulation in time</td>
<td>Facial expressions from opera</td>
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<td>SCENE 5</td>
<td>face and body in disjunction, turned front</td>
<td>desynchronized facial expressions</td>
<td>Deformation of facial expressions from opera</td>
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<td>SCENE 6</td>
<td>hand gestures, bodily postures</td>
<td>appropriation of pantomimic gestures montage</td>
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<td>SCENE 7</td>
<td>Breasts facialized body turned back</td>
<td>embodiment of the drum doubling the rhythm = reflection in motion</td>
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<td>Death Metal Hardcore (excerpt from a song by Cornelius)</td>
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herself. The affect created here bears the attribute of power-motion, for it amplifies the motion in a synesthetic conjunction of visual, aural, and kinesthetic sensations. Crisis-motion results from a subtractive transduction of an opera aria into a double-reproduction of the voice alone, which absorbs the original source (aria) as well as the rest of the sensorial environment of the previous scene, thus marking a decrease in power in relation to the previous scene. Here, as in other scenes, the performer’s body is defacialized and dismantled by focalizing only one organ, the black hole of the mouth.

By disposing her body toward agencements that defacialize it and dismantle the figure, Ingvartsen creates active, self-caused affects that separate the body’s agency from its subjectivity. These affects are relational, interstitial and synesthetic events that exist autonomously, neither only in the body of the performer, nor only in the perception of the attender. Yet, without performing they wouldn’t come into existence: they depend on sensorial experience but cannot be identified with it, for they aren’t a predicate of a body or an object, or the property of the perception of the performer or spectator. As a mixture of percepts and sensations, they isolate what Ronald Bogue calls a “milieu component that is at once property and quality” (Bogue 2003b: 206). Because they arise from the thought which problematizes the relation between the body and affection, I account for these affects by the concepts of performing. Power-motion and crisis-motion are thus actions of the mind, in the Spinozist sense, which expound problems that give rise to affects. That we couldn’t arrive at this conclusion by way of a shortcut, without an extensive description of all the stages and changes they bring throughout the process of this composition, points to what will be the focus of the last chapter: the temporality of performance qua process.
Many concepts devised throughout this book, all of which arise from the seven performances under consideration here, possess a dimension of time by which they are determined. The multiplicity instantiated in the becoming of the performer’s body in *Self Unfinished* (*SU*); the modulations of the body-trampoline *agencements* in *It’s In The Air* (*IITA*); the involution of movement coupled with sensation in radical slowness in *Nvsbl*; the syntax of stutterances in *Weak Dance Strong Questions* (*WDSQ*); the transitions from power to crisis-motion in *50/50*; the simultaneity of several performances in the head-box in *héâtre-élévission* (*h-é*); the wiring of attenders, the bodies of human performers, and phantom-puppets, lights, and voices in *Untitled* (*U*)—all these entail various compositions of time. If we were to ask what would be left in these performances if time was evacuated from them, the answer would confirm the indispensable function of time. None of the problems could be divested of the durations which their operation constitutes.

This shouldn’t be dismissed as a generic condition of the performing arts as a so-called time-based art, a condition which dance shares with music and film, for instance. The problems posed by these performances determine their temporality and require that we engage the philosophical conceptualization of time in Deleuze and Bergson as constitutive of expressive concepts. Formalist and structuralist analysis of bodily movement, or the discursive analysis of subject-formation in the expression of the body, or conceptualist analysis of performed statements and speech acts would yield concepts and objects whose necessary feature wouldn’t be their temporality. By contrast, my concern here is to show that it is the way time is composed in three choreographies among the seven works that gives rise to different experiences of time. *IITA* and *Nvsbl*, as well as *SU*, are intentionally choreographed
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as processes of becoming where time qualifies the change as processuality. Thus it involves the temporalization of becoming-intense (*IITA*), becoming-molecular (*Nvsbl*), or becoming qua multiplicity (*SU*). I will try to unpack how these becomings—in the sense of the concept that pervades the whole *oeuvre* of Deleuze, and especially as Deleuze and Guattari develop it in *A Thousand Plateaus*—synthesize the dimensions of present, past, and future in the event of performance. The synthesis of time differs for each of the three works. Intensifying the past and future dimensions of the living present; or dilating the present that conserves the past; or emptying out and releasing, in Deleuzian terms I will explicate in the present chapter, “nonpulsed floating time” in sustained movement and stillness—these are the three distinct strategies that characterize processes of becoming in which movements and bodies subsist and insist beyond the notion of human-centered presence, and beyond the lack thereof. This claim draws on Bergson’s theories of perception and memory in *Matter and Memory* and Deleuze’s reading thereof in *Difference and Repetition* (in Chapter 2, “Repetition for Itself”: 28–69). Towards the end of this chapter the focus will shift from the temporality in the modes of attending and performing to the time outside of it. The procedures of formally framing the time of performance in *WDSQ*, *h-é*, and *U* engender cuts and resonances during the spatio-temporal event of the performance, but also prior and posterior to it.

As with the discussions in all the preceding chapters, this one will also begin by taking into account the meanings and usage the term “process” has had in performance practices and studies, and how the definitions of “process” in those fields bear on the processes of becoming in the choreographies here when related to Bergson’s and Deleuze’s philosophies of time.

**Process in performance studies**

Process came to be regarded as a prominent concept in the history of European and North and Latin American performance since the 1960s. An interest in process and performance emerged thanks to actions, happenings, events, and performance art of the 1960s and ’70s, or, more precisely, due to the merging of art and life beyond modernism’s special autonomy of the arts. In terms of art history, processuality brought about the dematerialization of the art object in performance, thus destabilizing certain ontological categories of a work of art, such as the relationship between conception and realization of the work, between
attending and participating in the performance of it, between the event and posterior forms of its existence (documentation, history, memory). This was particularly reflected in the aesthetic theory of open work and open form in the 1960s and ’70s, which discussed the Neo-Avantgarde poetics of open-endedness and indeterminacy (Eco 1989; Tormey 1974). One of its distinctive traits regards the conception of time: performance art coming out of visual arts, music, poetry, and theater substituted the literal and “real” duration of actions in everyday life for the “fictional” time of traditional aesthetic forms and representational regimes of narration. Process acted as a middle term between the quotidian and the aesthetic, non-quotidian temporality for performance works (actions, events, happenings). Aligned with John Cage’s definition of experimental action associated with indeterminacy—namely, that it is an action whose outcome is unforeseen (Cage 1961: 39)—performance works were often conceived and regarded as open-ended processes. A notable example of open-ended process in choreography, which was earlier briefly mentioned as an important encounter between Le Roy and the Judson choreographers, is Yvonne Rainer’s Continuous Project Altered Daily (1970). The title, borrowed from a work by the visual artist Robert Morris, indicates its distinctive processual character. The objective of the work wasn’t only to remake itself in every performance on the basis of structured improvisation, but also to demonstrate the difference between the processes of rehearsing and performing choreographed material, inventing, and learning new material during the performance itself (Rainer 1974: 129–58).

The juncture between transitoriness, as well as open-ended processuality of performance, and the Neo-Avantgarde’s claims of art-into-life also had an impact on theater practices at the time, prompting them to conceive and reflect on the creation of performance as a life process. Two concepts of process were distinguished in the practice and theory of theater anthropology, which are relevant for our consideration of the process. The first was proposed in Richard Schechner’s 1970s theory of the phases in the process of performance (Schechner 1985: 35–116). Although it is in many ways tailored to the Neo-Avantgarde practices of the Living Theatre, Grotowsky’s Theater Laboratory, and Schechner’s own Performance Group, Schechner’s ideas about the creation process still more broadly inform the debates about the creation process in performance (see Jovičević 2010: 9–26). His theory posits that performance develops and transforms in a continuous creation process which begins with training, workshop, and rehearsal and goes on to the last instance of its performance. The continuity is based on a practice of “restored
behavior” by which actors reproduce or re-enact “things, items, ‘material’ of longer duration, or things as short as a ‘gesture’” (Schechner 1985: 35). For Schechner the creation process is extended into “open rehearsals: where the public actually sees a work in process” and “finished performances” in which he tries to “include ‘raw elements’” as if the finished performance continued the same process of making (Schechner 1985: 104–5). Performance, according to Schechner, continues to make or “reconstruct” its process of creation after the premiere until the last show, which terminates it. Unlike Rainer, who analytically juxtaposed multiple performing processes in order to explore their discreteness and their constructedness, Schechner sought the continuity of one linear process of creation in which performance “lives,” resembling ritualized forms of human behavior. Affiliated with Schechner’s “theater anthropology” is Eugenio Barba’s conception of performing as a process of “scenic bios” (Barba 1995). The scenic bios is performance centralized on the acting of its performers, which combines the techniques of everyday behavior and “extra-daily” techniques that change the use of the body on stage. Not only does it reference life as a process, by revealing a life of apprenticeship, a lifelong process of learning and developing diverse performance techniques, but it is also guided by the logic of process, “where the various levels of organization must blend into an organic unity, must reconstruct the believability of life by means of the artifices of art” (Barba 1995: 108).

Whether it imitates life by artifice or is isomorphic to it, the anthropological theory of theater conceives of process as the organic continuity of life with a linear view on time—a concept that was thoroughly contested in the 1990s, when performance studies underwent the influence of poststructuralist, Lacanian, and Derridian critiques of representation (Phelan 1993; Reinelt and Roach 2007). The elusive time of performance was an important implication of the theories that argued for the ephemeral nature of performance: time in excess or lack, disappearing or spilling over the here-and-now act. As a consequence, the linear perspective of the temporality of performance was undone, which was explicitly echoed in the term “post-linear performance.” Thus, Kozel suggests an opening to the times outside the spatio-temporal event of performance:

The play plays on after the curtain goes down and began long before the audience took their seats. . . . The power of live performance is the friction between the undeniable material presence of the actors and dancers, and the elusive nature of the alternative presences that are
opened up. These alternative presences can be future utopias, histories revisited, imaginative constructs or hints of the unconscious. Live performance is never simply present in the here and now. It arcs and swings across a range of temporal and spatial registers. (Kozel in Goodman and De Gay 2000: 261)

While this account relativizes the condition of liveness and plenitude of stage presence in the temporality of the passing moment, as Barba’s scenic bios implies, it also undermines the organic continuity of the creation process that culminates in the event, the “finished performance,” as Schechner would have it. Yet because such a conception of time still revolves around the event as an act, around change as disappearance, and around the binary oppositions of presence/absence and life/death, it doesn’t yet engage with various “temporal registers” that would recast the temporality of performance through another kind of process, divorced from the anthropocentric view of human life. For a processual concept of time in performance whereby the perception of change isn’t entangled with the past that disappears, but that is instead joined with the past that persists in the present (because the performances construct a continuum of the past into the present, implicating its deferred action into the future), we will consider what bearing Bergson’s concept of duration and Deleuze’s becoming have on our analysis. This will prove more adequate to our discussion than the familiar approaches to temporality in performance; for, the compositions of time in IITA, Nvsbl, and SU drastically diverge from the human experience of time in everyday life. Thus they are neither open-ended nor variable from one instance to another, but are choreographies whose time is set as if by a musical score, engendering a sense of evolution that incorporates the continuity of a past, present, and future created for the attender—ultimately a matter of meticulous construction, one which could be compared with film editing. What follows is a selective reading of Bergson’s notion of duration and Deleuze’s notions of process and becoming in which we will focus on aspects helpful to us in accounting for the nonorganic constructions of time in the three performances.

Duration, process, and becoming

An oft-cited early account of Bergson’s key concept, durée, states that it is

a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to
externalise themselves in relation to one another, without affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity. (Bergson 2002: 61).

In this early definition from *Time and Duration*, qualitative changes relate to states of consciousness and can thereby be understood as a psychological concept of duration that describes the inner psychic life, or “the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, where the present distinctly contains the ever-growing image of the past, or . . . by its continual changing of quality . . . attests rather the increasingly heavy burden dragged along behind one the older one grows” (Bergson 2002: 179). However, in the later writings of Bergson (*Matter and Memory* and “Introduction to Metaphysics”) duration is no longer a psychic phenomenon, but a fundamental trait of Bergson’s metaphysics: “Duration is the very stuff of reality, which is perpetual becoming, never something made” (Bergson 1911: 287). As John Mullarkey has argued (Mullarkey 1996), it makes Bergson a veritable precursor of the ontology of difference of Deleuze, who conceives of reality as an “unceasing creation, the uninterrupted upsurge of novelty in which things undergo internal modification” (Mullarkey in Bergson 2002: 18). Duration, perception, and memory are no longer predicated upon subjective experience, but are ontological principles of things and processes, or what Bergson refers to as “images,” the ontological unit of matter in his *Matter and Memory* that can exist independently of human consciousness, itself an image among images. This doesn't imply an ontological objectivism, however, as Mullarkey notes: “objectivity exists, but it is not as we might think it to be: it is less an entity than an aspiration, an attitude towards entities” (Mullarkey 1996: 373). It means that matter, or reality, is always richer than its perception in consciousness, which selects and subtracts from the object according to an interest. Or as Deleuze puts it: “perception is not the object plus something, but the object minus something, minus everything that does not interest us” (B: 24). This is why we may perceive things either superficially or profoundly; or, to put it in a more ordinary sense, we can have more than one image of a perceived object. Perception is an act of subtraction, or, in Mullarkey’s reading, an act of condensation: “any one world is the sum or level of existence we choose to condense or contain in an act of perception,” or that we refract by a perspective into a “seeing-as” (Mullarkey 2004: 469). Perception can be enriched by attuning to change, minute events, becoming, thanks to time as

what hinders everything from being given at once. It retards, or rather it is retardation. It must, therefore, be elaboration. Would it
then be vehicle of creation and of choice? Would not the existence of time prove that there is indetermination in things? Would not time be the indetermination itself? (“The Possible and the Real” in Bergson 2002: 224)

As it is contemporaneous with the making of memory, perception doesn’t completely coincide with an immediate present, the here and now. Bergson’s present is, rather, ambiguous or difficult to distinguish from the past and the future, Mullarkey contends, “because the singularity of its various co-referents, perception, the body, or the material world, have themselves already been dispersed amongst a diverse range of forms” (Mullarkey 1996: 374). Here he quotes a famous adage from Bergson:

An attention which could be extended indefinitely would embrace, along with the preceding sentence, all the anterior phrases of the lecture and the events which preceded the lecture, and as large a portion of what we call our past as desired. The distinction we make between our present and past is therefore, if not arbitrary, at least relative to the extent of the field which our attention to life can embrace. (Bergson in ibid.)

Mullarkey concludes that the perception of the present doesn’t depend on the portion of the past which is retained, “but rather [on] which present is being attended” (ibid.). It follows that directing attention is a possibility or a contingency—either something we choose or an event that happens to us. Here “us” means spectators whom some performances turn into attenders, when their duration requires that our perception short-circuits with memory, and when perception and recollection become indiscernible. Deleuze describes this kind of attention as the “movement by which we emerge from our own duration, by which we make use of our own duration to affirm and immediately recognize the existence of other durations, above or below us” (B: 33). We will analyze how, or by means of what kind of composition, such movement happens in the three performances.

Conceived as a qualitative multiplicity that cannot be divided without transformation, or that ceases to be what it is, duration is coextensive with becoming, the notion Bergson uses as a synonym to durée, as we have seen. A pervasive concept in Deleuze’s (B, DII) and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings (AO, ATP), becoming designates differentiation and change; transformation which is qualitative; the creation of a difference
in kind and not in degree; the Spinozan *natura naturans* that holds the ontological precedence of processes over positions, things, creatures, or *natura naturata*, everything that is a momentary determinate product of perpetual production or indetermination.

Four characteristics in Deleuze's (and Guattari’s) concept of becoming will be important for our account of the processes that the three works compose. Firstly, the process of becoming implies a certain temporal coherence and unity of a complex of distinct phases, a continuity which is not found but achieved. Secondly, it is the gradual transformation and change that has, both ontologically and epistemically, priority over entities—such as qualities of bodies and movement, and the positions of their extension in space. The latter will always be secondary: extracted or derived from the process of becoming. The third characteristic of process—that it is a complex with a structure, a formal generic format by virtue of which every concrete process acquires a shape—will be contingent on the specific configuration of becoming in each performance separately. Fourthly, becoming isn’t identical with a given flow of nature, but it is a matter of composition, constructed continuity and problem expressed “in terms of time rather than space” (*B*: 31).

Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari reject the naturalist connotation of evolution in becoming and rephrase it as “involution” (*ATP*: 238), which is an *agencement* between heterogeneous terms, also referred to as a “marriage against nature,” an “unnatural nuptial” (*ATP*: 241). Becoming is a creative involution or monstrosity that cannot reproduce itself as a new kind (*genus*), that is neither regressive nor, as they explain, moving “in the direction of something less differentiated” (*ATP*: 239). Its logic isn’t one of progress either, but rather of immanence—not on a spiral of changes but on a horizontal plane “upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of movement” (*ATP*: 255, italics added). The metaphor of dance emphasizes the movement by which *agencements* and becomes occur. In what follows, I will revisit *IITA*, *Nvsbl*, and *SU*—the performances we discussed in Chapter 2—from the perspective of the sensorimotor breakdown resulting in desubjectivizing or disobjectivizing relations between the body and movement. Even if it might seem to be starting all over, zooming in once again on detail, our analysis builds upon the previous discussion of disjunctive captures of movement and the body. Now the same procedures will be regarded from the perspective of time, that is duration, in which part-bodies, part-machines, movement-sensations engage
various processes of becomings. While in Chapter 2 they seemed to be posited in terms of space, the problems here are “stated and solved in terms of time,” to quote Deleuze once more (B: 34). Hence this account will, just like Bergson’s subtractive/condensing perception, select and cut out yet another entire order of events and differenciated qualities.

**It's In The Air: processes of a constructed continuum**

Each of two human bodies attaches to one of two trampolines. By already stepping on the elastic surface, the bodies cause a feedback bounce from the trampoline. If they manage to stay still—or in other words not renew the initial impulse of the feedback—the bounce will expire after a short while, perhaps never reaching absolute stillness, but an approximate one, one we will consider a stop. This is an account of a natural process in which the human body does nothing to sustain the motion of the body-trampoline, passively succumbing to the sheer force of gravity, weight and mass, elasticity, and inertia. However, *IITA* doesn’t run through a single linear, natural process; it seeks, for about 40 minutes, to maintain and vary the speed and rhythm, the type of contact between the body and the trampoline, the pattern of resultant movement, the change, and many more parameters already discussed in Chapter 2. Linearity is disrupted by juxtapositions and superimpositions of various patterns, their speed and rhythm.

The experimentation consists in searching for a wide range of movements, rhythms, and sensations that could be generated from the machinic *agencement* between the two bodies and two trampolines in various part-body-part-machine couplings. All differences arise within the basic loop that is composed of a jump and a bounce and whose speed is correlative of breathing and of the performers’ capacity to accelerate it. In other words, when the binary loop of jump-bounce stops, the performance also ends. Each paired jump and bounce contracts a present instant and, the passing of that instant being replaced by the new instant, a repetition while constituting the expectation that the jump-bounce will continue, that the jump and the bounce appear one after the other in a binary rhythm. Deleuze explains the contraction of the habit of living as the process of passive synthesis that constitutes time as a living present, and the past and the future as dimensions of this present (*DR*: 74–6). The present, past, and future instants may not vary in themselves—their contraction entails a movement from the past in which the preceding instants are retained as particulars of the future as a general field of expectation. The difference doesn’t lie between
the instants; it is produced in the mind, Deleuze posits. The difference here is the habit or “generality in so far as it forms a living rule for the future” and thus constitutes the present as that which passes (DR: 71). The basic loop provides a continuity from past to future in the very paradox of the present, which constitutes time while it passes in the time constituted.

Unlike minimal composers and choreographers who experimented with the illusion of a perpetual present, a present that seems not to pass but to be sustained in a stasis or in processes that dissimulate change—as, for instance, in early musical compositions by Steve Reich, and choreographies by Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker, such as Fase, Four Movements to the Music of Steve Reich (1981), or Drumming (1998), after the same composition, Drumming, by Steve Reich (De Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012 and 2014)—Ingvartsen and van Dinther rely on the continuity given by the pulsed time, the binary tick-tock, in order to unfold the process of change in perception. Another distinction from the minimalists is that Ingvartsen and van Dinther don’t establish difference out of identity, by degrees of variation of the same, but through differences in kinds of movements, rhythms, sensations, and body-trampoline conjunctions. Hence for IITA the famous minimalist slogan of Mies van der Rohe, “less is more,” would have to be modified into “more is more different.”

Two main types of processes are at stake here: modulations, where every single jump implies a slight change in the long run of the process; and shifts, or “jump-cuts,” when performers change the movement pattern abruptly within one jump, as if they have skipped a part of the modulating sequence. Inside these processes the performers build microprocesses, deploying all aforementioned parameters to generate change. Van Dinther enumerates the following processes (Cvejić 2010: n.p.): succumbing to gravity (“blocking”), succumbing to gravity gradually (“syncopation”), jumping down (“beginning”), extending in the air (“airbag,” “jumping on the back,” “pushing through the head”), closing in toward the center (“ball”), blocking joints (“blocking” and “table”), allowing residual movement (“residual”), pressing into the surface (“earthquake”), listening (“syncopation,” “pendulum”), producing sound by friction with surface (“sliding,” “running,” “grabbing”), pulling (“grabbing”), etc. These processes are all “willed and driven,” van Dinther explains (ibid.), although the effect of bodies active or passive within them may vary. Some imply a kind of mechanics in which the body has learned to accommodate change. “Arc,” “pendulum,” and “rhombus” “feel [to the dancers] and seem [to the audience] very
natural," van Dinther says (ibid.), because of the economy and efficiency of movement, as if the body-trampoline turns into a toy with few specific functions. Patterns that seem to be rather passive while requiring a specific activity of movement, invisible for the spectators, fall into a second category. “For instance, ‘residual’ movement looks like dead meat but is much and uncomfortable work” (ibid.). The discrepancies between the actual effort behind movement and perceived effect prove that the effortless, natural, or organic are effects of surface, to use the famous Deleuzian proverb. Practice here is the artifice of naturalizing construction. Part of naturalization is to interweave heterogeneous movement patterns into one process, which Ingvartsen and van Dinther describe in their project outline:

Imagine a series of different movement principles that are sliding into each other. You don’t see the moment the principle is changing but only the effect of the shift having taken place already. Your understanding is in a certain way one step behind your perception. The moment you register a change the next might already have begun. This means that the material moves throughout the time of the performance, up and down but also intrinsically, around itself in an evolution that does not offer linearity. (Ingvartsen and van Dinther 2007: 4)

In the same paragraph, the authors state their intention to work with the idea of continuum. They define it as “a link between two things, or a continuous series of things that blend into each other so gradually and seamlessly that it is impossible to say where one becomes the next” (ibid.). This points to their understanding that differenciation has to be composed as a univocal plane of consistency, as Deleuze and Guattari would have it:

A pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition . . . upon which everything stirs, slows down or accelerates. It is a question not of organization but of composition; not of development or differenciation but of movement and rest, speed and slowness. It is a question of elements and particles, which do or do not arrive fast enough to effect a passage, a becoming or jump on the same plane of pure immanence. (ATP: 255)

The continuity established by the habit of the basic bounce underlies all changes but cannot be responsible for smoothing transitions between
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divergent processes. The role of physical exhaustion as to the effect of organic continuity is ambiguous, as van Dinther testifies: “The performance follows what we can do, and when we can do it. It takes care of our necessities, but only just, and we do ‘exhaust.’ It is maybe simple in that way: our exhaustion determines the consequences, consequences that ‘make sense’” (Cvejić 2010: n.p.). Once again, the statement shows that although reliance on physical capacity is necessary for enabling a smooth operation of heterogeneous processes, the order and networking of these processes is, in the first place, constructed. Consequentiality, whereby processes follow as each other’s consequence, is an effect which the bodies accommodate by practice. Thus the time of the practice, as well as the duration of the performed process, effectuate multiplicity as a becoming with consistency. The next section will explain how.

Composition as a distribution of intensities

Ingvartsen and van Dinther liken the processes of IITA to an evolution. In strict Deleuzo-Guattarian terms the composition of IITA cannot resemble an evolution, since filiation between the bodies and trampolines is impossible; rather, as expounded in Chapter 2, it is temporary agencement (assembling and agency) that conjoins two heterogeneous terms in movement. Becoming in Deleuze and Guattari has no subject that becomes or term in which it becomes. It necessarily involves the cofunctioning of two or more terms that don’t identify with each other and that aren’t interchangeable. They are captured in an asymmetrical bloc which changes each term to the same extent, but differently, according to their different natures. How the trampoline bends under the weight of one or two bodies or throughout a large variety of patterns is divergent from the transformation the bodies undergo. Yet, another question remains to be resolved: not why and in which way IITA’s composition is a becoming, but how it should be accounted for. Can it be counted at all, especially as each bounce can be regarded as a discrete unit? Let us consider for a moment, counterintuitively, whether IITA operates as a punctual system rather than as a process.

In her self-interview Ingvartsen states that in IITA the two dancers were working on the “differenciation of perception.” She draws the following image to illustrate this notion:

Imagine you are listening to rain, a sound that you have heard a million times before but that you have no detailed perception of.
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You don’t have, like Eskimos, twenty different names for snow. At best you have four. Rain, snow, hail and fog (which by the way is no longer rain). Now imagine that you start to be able to distinguish one drop of rain from another, the kind of surface on which it falls, its speed and texture, all of a sudden rain is no longer one whole but a conglomerate of millions and millions of differnciated drops. In a way it is this kind of microscopic perceptive activity we try to achieve when working on looping the materials we address. (Ingvartsen in Ingvartsen and Chauchat 2008: 60)

The example makes two points. First, the perception of change requires that spectators attune their senses to a scale to which they are unaccustomed because it isn’t useful for habitual perception. Second, once they attune their senses to that scale, they might perceive each actual drop as singular, unequal, or irregular as compared with what they observed as the pace or sound of the beat of rain. Drops, in terms of singularities, form rain as a multiplicity. In Bergson’s concepts, rain would be an extensive multiplicity, since its elements—drops—can be quantified. Such could be an account of repetitive loops in which the performers try to reproduce each jump with same qualities. However, there is only one exceptional loop process of this kind in IITA—“squaredance”—where the two dancers must sustain an exact size, energy, and shape of jump in order to traverse and exchange places between two trampolines (see Chapter 2 for a detailed description). All the other loops modulate, which means they change by intension. Each jump is individuated by a degree of force, speed, height, and so forth. Rather than self-sufficient or necessarily determined, its form is, as Deleuze and Guattari would have it, “accidental.” The accidental form is an intensity produced by a process, a line that takes priority over points. The process or the line doesn’t result from the addition of the points, or jumps, since the subject of jumping is also part of this production; her desires and capacities, in relation to the jumping partner, co-function with gravity, weight, mass, momentum, inertia, and other factors.

The moment the bodies step on the trampolines is by no means originary. Already in that moment we are in the middle of a process, a line of becoming, as we can’t determine where the motion began, when residual bounce gave way to a voluntary push. The point of origin is lacking, and the end of the performance will be an arbitrary cut, brought about by the sudden extinguishment of the lights. Becoming is a paradoxical line, Deleuze and Guattari write, “that passes between the points and comes up through the middle” (ATP: 293). In other words,
each singular jump redistributes intensities, not in a binary difference between two consecutive jumps but in their in-between or border. The becoming in IITA is the modulation produced between the bounce and the jump, somewhere in the air where change is felt but not yet observable. The work of IITA consists in composing a string of multiplicities in one stroke, as if it were one indivisible movement, one macroprocess. Breaking, stopping, or any other interference would affect not just the macroprocess but also each microprocess participating in it. Therefore the construction of the continuum has the purpose of turning an extensive multiplicity of discrete jumps into an intensive one, a process of becoming-intense.

Nvsbl: durations outside of the sensorimotor present

IITA’s process of gradual transformation synthesizes the present that links the perception of the immediate past with the determination of the immediate future. It intensifies the sense of the passing present through change operating within the habit. The habit entails the association of sensation and movement, which is at work in any automatic, habitual action. In IITA, the action is new for the dancers; it is invented by way of the body-trampoline agencement. Being an entirely new physical experience for them, it nevertheless relies on the same joint system of sensations and movements. While in everyday habitual actions the sensation is a source of movement, here it coincides with movement triggered by the double agency of the body-trampoline. This sensation is proprioception—the interoceptive sense of position, location, direction, balance, and movement in the body. Here proprioception is partly a source, partly a control device, since it often informs the body about the movement once movement has lapsed or is happening. As in a feedback loop, the proprioception that results from a jump is the output that feeds back as an information input for the next jump. Therefore it could be argued that the sensorimotor causality in IITA isn’t broken, but somewhat destabilized.

At its starting point Nvsbl breaks with the sensorimotor habit by installing a radically slow pace of movement. Movement is no longer part of an action directed and extended in space: it doesn’t primarily serve to displace the bodies or to shape a pattern (form), nor does it allow the bodies to manipulate objects. It is far removed from the experience of everyday action, not only dispensing with utility or efficiency, but being hardly discernible. While the extreme slowness persists, the movement also subsists within the internal space of the bodies, but its genesis in the present remains imperceptible for the spectators. The
movement is perceived as a transformation of the body in duration; the change is registered in retrospect, once it has occurred. The rupture of the sensorimotor mechanism is replaced by a search for an alternative continuity, one which subsists internally in the bodies, albeit without being useful or worthy of consciousness. The continuity is constructed as a coalescence of bodily sensation and movement where the invoking of a sensation merges with the initiation of movement from that sensation.

Radical slowness of the four bodies is superimposed with three kinds of events of varying speed. A few sudden and rapid events cut into the durations of the four bodies, lasting from a few to ten seconds; these are (in order of appearance): a balloon being blown up and flying away, a ping-pong-like ball that rolls onto the stage, the burning out of a piece of paper, the popping out of a magician’s trick bouquet of flowers.

All but the ping-pong ball are manipulated by the four dancers in slowness, but because of the difference between the events’ speed and the slowness of the bodies, the events come as a surprise. Three additional actions with props are registered as they slowly but steadily progress: the dancer in green blows air into the balloon; a white stripe moves slowly from downstage right to downstage left parallel to the proscenium; and there are two interactions between the dancers at the very end, where one “steals” a €50 banknote from the other’s pocket while the third one is touching the behind of the fourth one. The third type of events are liminal events—their beginning and end are hardly perceptible—some of which have the quality of hallucinatory apparitions: the appearance of a fifth figure in an obscured zone upstage right (at the beginning) and in the left wing (towards the end) and the humming of melodies (in the last quarter of an hour). The function of these events is to frame the slowness as a speed relative to our common perception: they establish the link with the spectator either by refreshing her habitual perception or by disturbing her attention, which is attuned to the slow durations.

Apart from the aforementioned events, which are, peculiarly, associated with objects rather than the human bodies, suggesting that things here are faster or more agile than humans—or that they don’t command their own time like humans do—a female voice is heard uttering word after word in intervals of between five and eight minutes. The words form a sentence whose meaning is a tautology. The sentence is spread out over almost 80 minutes, from the beginning till the end of the performance:

Since the beginning I speak to tell that this is the end
0'06  8'11  15'10  21'42  28'08  34'10  41'35  46'45  53'35  1h 11  1h7'33  1h16'12
The word-utterances form a grid-structure of chronometric time. They don’t function as cues to trigger the future actions of the dancers, but as markers of the time that has passed. Salamon explains that it is difficult not to “get lost in such an extreme duration” (Cvejić 2008b: n.p.), that the word-utterances help the dancers recover the sense of the living present at regular intervals.

From the perspective of the whole, summarized in the tautological statement—“Since the beginning, I speak to tell that this is the end”—Nvslb is a macroprocess juxtaposing and superimposing multiple times, slownesses and speeds, divergent durations of the four moving bodies and actions with objects. Thus, it emerges as a complex with a formal generic format indicating the work of choreography as a composition of movement in time and space. Unlike composition in the traditional sense, this choreography doesn’t fix any one movement, posture, position, or relationship of the four bodies in duration, except for the initial four positions at the outer edge of the stage. It defines an approximate path from the initial positions, a constant direction towards the center, and the convergence of the four bodies in the middle. The light forms a global arc-structure of gradual transformation over the whole length of the performance: from fading into full brightness, to fading out into complete darkness.

There is a structure in the development of movement and bodily transformation on the macroscale as well. In the beginning, the dancers’ transformations involve extremities—arms and other ends of the body in the extremely slow but elaborated convolution of the figure. The closer they come to each other center stage, towards the end, the less the changes occur in the outer bodily movements and the more they are found in the faces and hand gestures, thereby additionally zooming in on the microscale of change. At the very end, the dancers even seem to interact, touching each other, albeit always with the same slowness. The choreography of the macroprocess draws a line of involution, of folding in from the extension of larger movements and changes in the extremities into an intension, a condensation of smaller expressive gestures and movements. It suggests that the perspective of the spectator changes over time, from a wider shot to a close-up.

Tuning vision takes time. The durations of the moving bodies are radically different from the durations of the spectators’ bodies. Adjusting, in terms of synchronizing one’s perception of change with the change of the perceived bodies, that is, of their durations, takes time. The spectator
needs this time to learn how to focalize her attention, to invoke Bleeker’s notion of focalization here (Bleeker 2008: 10), and zoom in on the ever smaller movements that, in the end, appear in obscurity.

**Molecularization and memory**

The macroprocess in Nvsbl comprises four processes for the four dancers that further differenciate in an indeterminate number of microprocesses that each dancer is running in her own body simultaneously. Salamon notes that for the most part each dancer composes her own path, which includes an individual choice of either trying to repeat movements from rehearsals or previous performances or unfolding new movements. Relationships between the four bodies are an additional and optional source of complication: the dancer may choose whether to relate to other dancer(s) or to echo their movements. Many sections involve sharing a task and an idea related to BMC® and two other techniques (composing faces and recalling real-life situations in imagination). For instance, in the fifth section, marked by the word “speak”, the tasks that the dancers tackle are the following: the body is to sink in a convoluted line, since to descend directly would be difficult with such slowness; each dancer invokes sensations of the intercellular fluid and cerebrospinal fluid as well as those of the organs on the side, the ovaries and arms; and from these sensations, they initiate movements of spiraling, folding in, and opening and gaining space in the body.

Partitioning and refining a sensation in search of its precise location—a labor prolonged by uncertainty—unfolds a microphysiology of becoming, even if its medical ground is dubious, even if it is a pseudoscience. In this process, the dancer regards her body as a multiplicity—“a thousand of rhythms to dee-jay” as Salamon told me (Cvejić 2008b: n.p.)—rather than a “molar” entity. “What we term a molar entity is, for example, the woman as defined by her form, endowed with organs and functions and assigned as a subject,” Deleuze and Guattari write (*ATP*: 275). In Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary, the molecular is an antipode to the molar, something that is too rough, determined, leaving all the details of the real out. Molecularization is Deleuze and Guattari’s revolution that extends becomings to animals, plants, and minerals, different from “molar subjects, objects, or forms that we know from the outside and recognize from experience, through science, or by habit” (*ATP*: 275). Molecularization brings becoming close to a chemical process, as the following definition shows: “Becoming is to emit particles
that take on certain relations of movement and rest because they enter a particular zone of proximity. Or, it is to emit particles that enter that zone because they take on those relations” (ATP: 273). The zone of proximity or approximation, in which small elements assemble and become indiscernible, corresponds to the imagination of the location and size of sensations that the dancers invoke. Since the dancers claim these sensations, they must be distinguished, and yet they remain obscure and inaccessible, especially to the observers outside. Their existence might be regarded as fictional, fabricated in the imagination of the dancers, or, in Deleuze’s terms, ideal, having the status of “distinct yet obscure ideas” (DR: 214), problems that each dancer must solve alone.

The last remark leads us to consider the temporal dimensions in Nvsbl. In her instructions to the dancers, Salamon often reminds them to focus on the past of their movement. This contrasts with the usual common-sense advice to performers to concentrate on the present, the here-and-now moment, lest they become self-conscious, which may disturb their performance. It certainly would disturb the dancers of IITA if they reflected on their movements, their jumps, as they pass. The case of Nvsbl is different: the duration of the bodies’ movements, or the slowness, which at first makes motion hardly perceptible, gives the impression that the dancers are locked in the past. There is no metaphor here, for the expression comes from the experience of the spectator who registers movement in retrospect, not as it happens before her eyes, but as it has happened. No sense of elusion, lack, or loss of present, just the perception of movement unfolding backwards into the past. How could this experience be accounted for? And in which way does it implicate the activity of the dancers?

Instead of directing attention to the trajectory their movement makes in the present, the dancers attend to the path they have already effectuated. This can be explained as the active synthesis of memory. Reading Bergson’s theory of time in Matter and Memory, Deleuze argues that for the present to pass and be stored or embedded (enmagasinée, in Bergson) in the past, it requires reflection which renders it a conscious state. The present present reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present. This process, which Deleuze calls “the active synthesis of memory” (DR: 81), constitutes the principle of representation under the aspect of the reproduction of the former present and the aspect of reflection of the present present. It explains the functioning of fundamental cognitive faculties such as remembrance, recognition, and understanding. When the dancers in Nvsbl focus on their immediate past instead of anticipating their immediate future, they prolong the
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reflection of the present as it moves into the past. They cease to exist in their habitual, sensorimotor present and come to resemble what Bergson calls “dreamers” who live in the past, persons of no impulse, unfit for action in the present situation (MM: 153).

The attention that stalls movement, preventing it from progressing into the future, cannot entirely account for the dilation of time here. Apart from invoking sensations and initiating movements in bodily fluids and organs according to BMC®, the dancers conjure emotional states, the images of facial expressions, and the memory of the dynamic of certain moods in concrete lived situations from the past. Through the exercise of memory, the dancers try to place themselves in past situations as they “really” were, as they can sense them now, not only as retrievable but also as continuing to exist in the present. Bergson describes this work of memory, of recollecting the past that is present in the present, as an expansion of past in the present by memory:

The work of localization consists, in reality, in a growing effort of expansion, by which the memory, always present in its entirety to itself, spreads out its recollections over an ever wider surface and so ends by distinguishing, in what was till then a confused mass, the remembrance which could not find its proper place. (MM: 133)

But our recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its outlines become more distinct and its surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception. (MM: 171)

In his famous diagram of the memory cone (MM: 162), Bergson claims—we will paraphrase his argument—that the entire past must be conserved in the present as the ground which makes the storing of particular memories and their subsequent recollection possible. Each present is just the most contracted state of an ever augmenting past, the apex of the cone from which tissues of memory expand in ever larger concentric circles. Deleuze interprets Bergson’s claim of the preservation of the past as a threefold paradox, which could be briefly presented as follows. For the present to pass, it must be contemporaneous with the past: the past must be “at the same time” present in order for the present to be constituted as the past. “Every present passes, in favor of a new present, because the past is contemporaneous with itself as present” (DR: 81). Secondly, from the paradox of each past being “at the same time” as the present that it was, it follows that the whole past
must coexist with the new present in relation to which it is now past. Thirdly, because the past is no more in this second present than it is after the first, Deleuze concludes that the entire past not only coexists with every present present, but that it also must preexist it as a ground, “a pure, general, a priori element of all time” (ibid.). Bergson’s memory cone represents the second passive synthesis of past, which is primary in relation to the syntheses of the present (habit) and of the future, which are only its dimensions. The synthesis of the living present constitutes time by habit, but its foundation needs the ground of the pure past, or memory, to make it pass. The pure past in itself was never present and isn’t itself represented; instead it plays the role of ground upon which the former and the present present can be represented. Deleuze reinforces Bergson’s metaphysical concept of the pure past by stressing that it is virtual: “We cannot say that it was. It no longer exists, it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it is. It insists with the former present, it consists with the new or present present. It is the in-itself of time as the final ground of the passage of time” (DR: 82).

The passage of memory from the virtual state of pure past, as the general ground on which it is stored and appears vague and indiscernible, to the actual state of a recollection in the present presupposes that the memory is retrieved from a former past that existed. In Nvsbl this accounts for the reminiscences of lived emotional states, coupled with the present sensations of fluids and organs. The Bergsonian co-acting of memory and perception, past into present, is at work in the very procedures by which the four dancers unfold the microprocesses of duration and minuscule movements. They attend to the micromovements of their inner body—and whether these sensations are real or feigned isn’t important; they combine them with recollected states, sensations, and movements which are no longer present—and whether these recollections point to a real or imagined past isn’t important either. The outcome is a thoroughly disoriented sense of present, dragging a past and sliding into a future, impossible to reduce to an instant.

**Self Unfinished: caesuras in becoming**

In the analysis of SU in Chapter 2 five sections were identified as phases of becoming where the image of the man is doubled and multiplied with other images—of a man-table, a man imitating a robot, a composite two-body of male and female-like lower bodies, a cross-dressing man, and a multiplicity of headless creatures. Each of these becomings is a block-capture of one or more part-bodies that by movement are
disjoined from the figure and organic structure of the man, whose image oscillates with these becomings. Their order suggests a logic of proliferation and difference in number, kind, and dimension. One body splits into a two-body. Then the two-body oscillates with the body of the man and the body of the man in drag until it multiplies into assemblings of part-bodies whose species and number can no longer be discerned. All the changes comprise a descent: from the erect figure that exposes all three axes of posture, (standing/walking, sitting, lying) through the halved and tilted two-body, to horizontal assemblings that contract and spread out ever more widely on the floor or against the wall.

Such a description that takes no account of time would indeed imply a destiny in the transformation from a man to a becoming-woman and, at last, becoming-animal or monstrosity. Also, it would conflate differentiation with mimesis, which is contradictory to becoming, were it not for the durations, insertions of stillness and stasis, that upset the course of progress. The total series of becomings is interspersed with three postures in three fixed points in the space: sitting at the table, standing in front of the wall with the back to the audience, and lying along the line between the surface of the wall and the floor.

These postures recur in each of the five processes of becomings, as if they were checkpoints through which the body in its many transformations has to pass: as a man in an everyday outfit, as a two-body with the black shirt covering the upper part and thus joining the lower bodies of a female and a male body in one, as a man in drag, or as the naked body of a headless creature.

Sitting at the table is the point of departure, when Le Roy waits for the audience to enter before the performance actually begins. When he returns to sit at the same table after having pressed the button on the ghetto blaster, the posture of sitting is different, because, as described in Chapter 2, the points of contact between the man’s body and the table and the chair are highlighted. They suggest connections from the opposite direction, as if the body adapts its parts to prolong the chair and the table, instead of only supporting itself through the props. The paradox lies in entertaining both senses: sitting on the chair and resting his hands on the table exposes the man’s legs as adjuncts of the legs of the table and chair, his arms and the rest of his body as extensions of the furniture. The body stays immobile in this posture for 40 seconds, in silence, contrary to the expectation that the ghetto blaster will emit sound to accompany the image. The same tableau—slightly varied through a downward tilt of the head—appears seven more times in loops of walks, in a going and a reversed order, suggesting a palindrome.
The same series of becomings is interrupted by two more tableaus in which the body remains absolutely still, standing or lying down with its back turned to the audience. They both occur in the same place on stage—against the wall upstage right—marking the station around which the loop of walks meanders towards the table. In the first instance, the first slow-motion backwards walk ends with the man turning his back to the audience and standing against the wall for about 50 seconds. The still pose reveals no resemblance to a behavioral gesture, and there is almost something cleanly geometric about the straight vertical line of the body parallel to the wall. The duration of this posture optically renders the body two-dimensional, an image that implants itself on the surface of the white wall. (The same posture is reprised at the end as part of the palindrome recapitulation.)

In between the two instances of the standing tableau, the same spot is revisited five more times when the body lies on the line separating the floor from the wall. The expression of the horizontal line is striking, as the man tucks his head, arms, and legs in and his body elongates as an unrecognizable object. The line is even more pronounced when the naked body, in the fourth section of headless becoming-multiple, spreads both legs in a split, flipped above the head, and the body prostrates with its face glued to the ground. Thus the body shows that it strives to join with the fold between the floor and the wall.

In all these compositions of sitting, standing, or lying, movement stops and nothing unfolds within the duration of the pose. Each tableau is longest upon its first appearance, which lasts for about 40 to 50 seconds. This makes the tableau necessarily static. In the series of becomings, the static tableau is an interruption, a caesura, separating the movements and transformations that precede it from those that follow it. The rupture has the effect of dislocating and disorienting the bodily figure in both time and space. The sheer length of the still poses, some of which have also already occurred in slow motion, erases the sense of direction and orientation of the moving body and raises the questions of where the body came from and where it will go. Is the man being played backwards in time, since he is facing the audience and walking backwards? Or is he just doing a reverted walk in the present? What is the dimension of time of these durations when he is sitting or standing or lying motionless? Do these caesuras belong to the unfolding present, or is time stalled as well, the movement put on hold? Time here is clearly no longer subordinated to movement—there is no movement to pace it; and even if the process up to the suspension, and resumed after it, unfolds as a qualitative heterogeneous multiplicity
rather than as a progression of quantifiable changes, it is still filled with movements.

The caesuras break the timeline of becomings, which means they upset the syntheses of the past and the present that make change possible. Instead of being instants, they have a duration in which time is emptied of content that would give it pulse. “We may define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the function of a caesura” (ATP: 267). The notion of nonpulsed time in the serial, aleatory, or chance-operated music of Pierre Boulez and John Cage, or in the dissolving images in Jean-Luc Godard’s films, is an example of Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of freeing time, making it “float on a fixed plane of composition,” be it musical, visual, or cinematic (ibid.). Their idea is close to the concept of “empty” or “pure time” that Deleuze develops earlier in Difference and Repetition, in which time, freed from events, or the “empirical content” which comprised and conditioned it, presents itself as “an empty and pure form” (DR: 79). Time becomes an event in itself that divides and subsumes a before and an after as its unequal, asymmetrical parts. Deleuze borrows Hamlet’s expression “time is out of joint” to endow this event with the power to trigger drama that the return of the king’s ghost has in Shakespeare. The event has the impact on both the past and the future that it changes, or as Keith Robinson remarks in reference to Deleuze’s notion of empty time, “it divides time such that a drama is required to encompass this division” (Robinson 2009: 91). Hamlet, Oedipus, and Hölderlin’s Empedocles are Deleuze’s figures of drama where the event they undergo undermines, or “fractures,” the I: “The caesura, along with the before and after which it ordains once and for all, constitutes the fracture in the I (the caesura is exactly the point at which the fracture appears)” (DR: 89). Deleuze goes on to define his third synthesis of the future in relation to the event of empty and pure time, where the event that fractured the I of the subject urges the subject to an act which will unify time in a totality and a coherent series, but in which the subject will disappear. “There is an experience of death which corresponds to this third synthesis,” as Deleuze concludes the drama of the fractured I (DR: 114).

If the static tableaus in SU are considered Deleuzian caesuras, the effect they have on the whole of the performance must be examined. As instances of pure stasis and duration, they don’t reinforce the presence of the figure (contrary to expectations and conventions in performance), which would absorb the attention towards the interior individual subjective self. Nor do they suggest the absence of the human figure; instead they use the immobility of the body as an instrument of
indetermination. The tableaus carefully compose the head out of the body, decentering the spectator’s view from the figure, or zooming it out from the figure towards the relations between the figure and the space and its objects—the body’s extensions of the table and chair, or of the vertical plane of the wall, or of the horizontal plane of the floor. The temporalization of the image has the effect of weakening the body’s primacy within these extensions. What disappears isn’t the body, but its function of being the conduit of a subject. Hence the tableaus are events in which the self is desubjectivized so that the becomings that form a series before and after these caesuras can create a multiplicity as an infinite open-ended series.

Cut-endings

SU ends abruptly: the interruption of the series of headless becomings in the middle of its unfolding is by no means expected. The following section resumes the walks and tableaus in the manner in which they occurred at the beginning, in what now seems to be the right direction and pace of movement, thus closing the circle of the end as the beginning rewound. The circle doesn’t continue to play the performance backwards, however. When the arrangement of the space is restored to its initial configuration, the man walks to the ghetto blaster and pushes the button, as if to stop the sound which was never anything but silence. At that moment, a song begins playing with the lyrics, “Upside down, boy you turn me, inside out, and round and round.” The man exits in the same movement of turning the music on. He doesn’t return to bow before the audience, and the applause takes place during the song.

To end with a cut that literally stages the disappearance of the man has a particular temporal function here. The performer dresses up in the same clothes in which he “welcomed” the audience before the music started, but he avoids looking at the spectators and thereby resuming the reality of his ordinary existence as a man. This would mean to step back, outside of the process that can still continue, and to declare all that happened during the performance as a fiction, a theatrical metaphor rather than a real becoming. But to leave the stage without a bow and abandon the audience in the space, which was hitherto inhabited by a series of becomings and is now empty, suggests two processes. The audience is given the duration of the song to reflect on what they saw, as if the song has frozen the image of the room that is left, empty, evacuated by the figure whose transformations we have followed thus far. The fact that he is away doesn’t mean the process of becoming is over, but
that the performer might carry on the unfinished process into a future we no longer witness. As a gesture of pointing into the future, the performance might be viewed as a temporary end to a process that continues into life, a process of undoing the identity of the self, or of a desubjectivation whose becomings still call for imagination and experiment.

It is no surprise that the other six performances are also concluded with a cut-ending. Let us first observe those which are, like SU, conceived as processes. IITA stops amidst one of the loop-processes where the two bodies bounce with a flip between the back and the knees. The intensity of flipping makes it a rather fatiguing jumping pattern, yet there is nothing about it that precipitates the end, which is done as a blackout in the moment when the dancers are in the air. The difference that the intensity generates doesn’t amount to a final outcome of the macroprocess, and the basic loop could continue as long as it is sustained by the performers’ force, their will and their capacity to differentiate each jump-bounce. To entertain its virtual open-endedness, the performers decide to stop the loop before it physically exhausts them. Avoiding a physiological reason to terminate the process in a natural end, whose most drastic instance would be death, is significant because it reasserts the constructivist character of the process. The structure of the macroprocess in Nvshl accommodates a seemingly natural end: the convergence of the four figures in the middle fades into darkness. However, as the light fades out slowly, the figures also turn away from the audience; the last visible constellation consists of the four bodies from the back, as if they were on their way to disappearing into the deep darkness of the space, which resembles the void they emerged from in the beginning. The lighting and centralization of the figures are only conventional means to attenuate a cut-ending, extinguishing only our view of the durations that continue.

WDSQ goes the furthest of all in internalizing cuts and endings into the very syntax of stutterances, as I have shown in Chapter 4. Announcing to the audience at the beginning that the performance will last 50 minutes serves two functions. It emphasizes a predetermined frame of time for an event that aesthetically doesn’t differ much from a rehearsal. As discussed in the same chapter, the theatrical frame is deliberately weak, or not obviously differentiated from what might look like a rehearsal, so as to suggest that this dance coexists with the chance-oriented everyday movements, sounds, and sensations that an audience can perceive outside of theater. The performance of WDSQ may be understood as a slice of time dedicated to the intensification of the problem that the two dancers are grappling with during their process of
making. The performance is the duration which privileges insight into this making process. And the information about its length orients the spectators toward the future of a process with a terminus, which expires in a countdown. Contrary to Bergson’s insistence on time as duration, the performers invite the audience to enter the time of their performance as if it were a space, a container for their temporary cohabitation and attention, but this gesture doesn’t necessarily preclude the experience of the time within the performance as duration. Instead, it structurally grips a genesis of movement, one which constitutes the most discontinuous, irregular, and uncertain of all the processes examined here, and which was accounted for in Chapter 4 by the concept of “stutterance.”

Implicating the attender with resonance

The endings of \( U \) and \( h \cdot é \) are peculiar to the theatrical apparatuses these performances construct. As argued in Chapter 3, the disjunction between the stage and the auditorium resulting from the rupture in the contract of address-response requires that the connection between the spectators and the performance be constructed differently. Both performances wire the spectators in the sense of embedding their gaze and other senses into the performance space. The head-box in \( h \cdot é \) or the heterogeneous assembling of objects, human and puppet bodies, lights, voices, and sounds in \( U \) constitute an environment of networked human and nonhuman agents. Attending doesn’t only imply an attunement of the senses to perception but also sensorially shapes the performance itself, as demonstrated most concretely in \( U \), where the extension of an individual gaze through the light beam of the lamp illuminates the stage. The question arises as to whether wiring the spectators spatially during the event prolongs the expression of agencement between the spectators and the performance in the time after the event. Both performances intervene in the theatrical apparatus by way of reconfiguring the place of the spectator and her activity in the performance itself. The intervention also tweaks two protocols of audience reception that take place after the performance. In \( h \cdot é \) the single spectator is invited to write her impressions in a guestbook once she leaves the head-box; this replaces the social gathering after the performance with a unidirectional response. In \( U \) the artist’s talk is incorporated in the performance, when lights suddenly reveal the hitherto obscured stage and a man springs from a puppet costume to act as the representative of the performance, proposing a dialogue with the audience.

My point is that these interventions don’t have the purpose of making the spectators participate. Participation, as argued recently under a topic
of curatorial discourse in the visual arts,\(^1\) comprises various strategies of provocation, interaction, relationality, and collaboration, the goal of which is to interpellate the recipient into an activity (Bourriaud 2002; Rogoff in Butt 2004; Von Hantelmann and Obrist 2010). The activity is supposed to partake in the artwork, although it doesn’t have to formally constitute or complete the work as in the process of open work in the Neo-Avantgarde of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s. Its status is ambiguous: participation isn’t necessary, but it is desirable according to a political hope that the experience of physical or symbolic participation in the artwork will not be merely consensual, but will provoke or empower the subject to determine her own social and political reality (see Bishop 2012: 27). Participatory strategies therefore seek legitimacy in the claim of a causal relationship between the aesthetic experience of an artwork and individual/collective agency. \(U\) and \(h\)-\(é\) project no explicit social and political cause of emancipating the spectator in her activity. The detachment of the performers from the audience—by subtracting the live event of a community (\(h\)-\(é\)), or the nominal framework (“Untitled” by “anonymous”), or by defiguring and defacing the stage (\(U\))—exhibits an attitude of indifference toward the spectators; hence no call to participate is made. Rather than making them participate, the two performances implicate them.

At first, implication may seem to consist of provoking the spectators to insert themselves into what they understand to be missing from the performance, and to take charge of the event. Both Charmatz and the representative of \(U\) rule out any possibility that this is their intention. They both regard the shift of role from spectator to actor as a misunderstanding, which explains the rejection of these performances on the part of some audience members. Moreover, Charmatz clarifies that the dancers of \(h\)-\(é\), including himself, pretended to act as phantoms who would endlessly perform “for” the viewer without the viewer having to feel interpellated to replace them in their absent liveness. Likewise, the representative of \(U\) doesn’t confirm the audience’s quest for participation, or their discontent at not getting a clearer call to activate themselves and hijack the performance. He explains that instead of provoking or deceiving the audience, the performers wish to draw them into slowness and darkness. To make the experience more palatable, he compares it to the difference between the impact of a Hollywood action movie that “goes boom-boom-boom-boom” and a Tarkovsky film which seems to show no action—“nothing’s happening”—and yet “sticks with” the viewer. He says, “We want you to come along with it” (emphasis added). The expression “to come along with” laconically defines this activity. The two performances refuse to communicate by refusing various protocols in theater that establish the relationship between the audience and the performers/
performance on stage (i.e., the acknowledgement of a beginning and end; the exchange of gazes, at least in a bow during applause; etc.), and they go blind to or become indifferent towards the spectator(s) for the larger part of the event. In doing this they nevertheless expect to resonate with the audience. A contradiction lies in the very expectation of being caught by silence and stillness, or by the absence of live performance.

With resonance I am referring here to the acoustic term: the tendency of an object to reinforce or prolong a sound by synchronously vibrating with the sound source. The resonator echoes a sound, or a part of it, because it is able, thanks to its material, to reverberate, store, and transfer certain sound waves from the neighboring sound source. From Charmatz’s perspective h-é happens between multiple boxes, those of the dancers, and the head of the spectator contained in another box, the room of the installation. U gives flashlights to the audience to light the space and make the figures therein appear. The relations that the single spectator in h-é or the assembly of individuals, each holding a torch, in U establish with the performance have a “strong smell of alterity,” to use Charmatz’s words (Charmatz 2002: n.p.); the partiality of resonance, and the alterity it produces, account more adequately for these relations than any mirroring reflection based on sameness or similarity. Resonance, unlike its optical counterpart, reflection, entails the time of delay and isn’t given all at once. If U and h-é “resonate,” this means that these performances engage spectators in such a way that they prolong their effect, reverberate after the spatiotemporal event.

The few voices that expressed their appreciation of U as “meditation” admitted that they could use more time to overcome the anger of provocation and realize how they could attend the performance. This shows exactly how the two performances implicate their attenders. While they don’t demand that attenders become actors, they also don’t allow them to just observe. The function of the spectator as witness shifts to that of accomplice: the involvement of an implicated attender assumes the quality of complicity, bearing some, but not all, responsibility for the very act of perception, which in turn effects a direct sensorial consequence of the event. The somewhat criminal connotation of the notion of being implicated—as in being involved in a crime—points to the problem that the performances “give” to their attender(s). Suspending her habitual activities—of attending a live dance in the company of other spectators, or of having an object of vision identifiable by name and origin—renders the position of the attender qua spectator problematic. The problem she has to solve is to account for her activity and position in this particular situation, and not in the world outside of it. The
shock from the denial of the habitual role needs time to be processed. If the attender doesn’t solve this problem during the performance, she is given the protocols to manifest and work on it afterwards. The contentious debates with the representative in U and the messages each attender left in the heavy guestbooks after h-é attest to the resonance of the question about what happened, or what happened “to” or “with me,” the attender of this performance. Thus these performances ensure that their problem will be articulated, verbalized, whether spoken or written, but surely memorized so as to “last,” or continue to operate beyond the event. The resonance of the question is how the expression of the performance endures, is prolonged and transformed in the mind of the one who attended it. It synthesizes the time after the performance in which the attender places herself in the past, reflecting on what she did or could have done differently.

* It is time to recapitulate the long path the discussion in this chapter has had to take: from distinguishing a processual temporality of performance beyond the anthropocentric and antihumanist views about a process as a natural given, to how Bergsonian duration, and its problematic sense of present, conceive of the time in which choreographing problems operates. Along the way, we have observed how IITA and Nvsbl construct a continuum for a macroprocess from microprocesses (of body-trampoline agencement, of movement-sensations and movement-recollections). The composition of IITA turns the extensive multiplicity of a binary loop into an intensive one. Becoming-intense here gives an intensive experience of the synthesis of the present, or how the present passes through change. Nvsbl’s composition consists of multiple durations of the four bodies, the slowness of which is inhuman. The molecular process of becoming through the microsensations and micromovements from within the body makes present the dimension of the past, because the perception of the passing present—or change—is rendered so difficult, indiscernible from the point of view of habitual perception. In SU the process of becoming-other, nonhuman, that the man’s body undergoes through movement ceases in tableaus of stillness. The caesuras suspend movement in order to release nonpulsed free-floating time, but they also suspend the human subject who undergoes transformation. WDSQ’s stutterances comprise a series of caesuras, interiorized cuts, which orient movement from present into future. By aborting movement soon after its initiation, they separate it from habit as the movement’s known past in favor of an indeterminate future, in favor of movement which questions itself by itself.
All four cases of analysis show how processes differentiate the experience of time, which, contrary to the claims of movement’s ephemerality and elusive temporality, doesn’t escape, but makes the present of the performance more complex, thicker, and in the cases of Nvsbl and SU, ambiguous, dilated, or contracted in an inclusion of the temporal dimensions of past and future. The enclosure of experience is suggested, yet not totalized, by sustaining the continuity of processes. The contractions and dilations of the present diverge here, because the way time is experienced depends on how movement and body join/disjoin—according, in the distinct cases of each of these performances, to a different problem of composition, a different process of desubjectivation. The experience of time certainly also relies on the attender’s current disposition to perception and sensation, but in the light of the distinctions between how each of these performances conceives time, the personal differences of attenders are secondary (i.e., derived from the more powerful impact of the sensorimotor disruption of the movement-body bind that the performances incur). Furthermore, cut-endings in the performances attest to the constructedness of the process: the process can subsist only if it resonates, if it implicates the attender with a problem, but it isn’t open-ended and doesn’t continue beyond the fixed plane of composition. Although the disappearance of the performer at the end of SU confronts the attenders with the question “could this becoming-other continue after the stage, into life?”, the processes that these performances compose don’t extend into life on the condition that they are lifelike, human-like. By contrast, the more artificial and unrecognizable from the viewpoint of human experience they are, the greater their problems’ force of resonance in implicating the attender can be.

An objection might be anticipated here in the form of a commonsense question: don’t all good performances and artworks in general implicate the attenders because of something that makes them memorable? A discriminating answer would be that there are performances which are remembered as good examples: ideal images that help us consolidate ourselves in a worldview. And there are those other performances that continue to trouble us, as they unground the knowledge of our worldview: our expectations of what the human body is, looks like, what it desires, how it can move and communicate, the time it lives and shares with others, the time of our perception and memory. What this chapter has tried to show is a transference and continued operation of problems: how the choreographies studied here can make these problems become the problems of their attenders.
A Post Hoc Conclusion: An Expanse of Choreography

After observing closely how the seven works examined in the preceding chapters “choreograph problems,” two more questions remain to be answered by way of conclusion. Firstly, how has the rupture of the organic regime in dance that these choreographies achieved impacted more broadly on the field of dance and performance? And then, if these works succeeded in philosophically reconceptualizing the body, bodily movement, and the temporality of performance in their performed and constructed conjunction of the body and movement, are we forced to reconsider contemporary dance in the light of its capacity to engender thought? To start answering the latter, the relationship between dance and theoretical abstract reflection has, traditionally, been vexed, with dance either having been denied philosophical attention (Sparshott in Copeland and Cohen 1983) or having been condemned to the status of a metaphor of thought as “a wheel that turns on itself” (Badiou 2005: 58) and that thus represents lightness, mobility, namelessness, and self-referential enclosure. This book has examined the kind of thought that, in order to be specific to dance, has to structure both the creation of dance in the concrete materialization of how/when/where/in which case, and so on, but also with regard to its proper genesis. Therefore we staked out choreographic ideas that generate performances by way of problems in experiments that critically depart from the given conditions and conceptions of bodily movement and practically determine those conditions’ and conceptions’ problematization. We have seen choreographic ideas express perceptual paradoxes, inorganic arrangements of bodies, and constraints of movement against habits, framing these expressions as the problems these works attempt to solve. The problems at issue here were spawned by some of the following ideas: the non-identity of the body (*Self Unfinished* (SU)); the agency of movement
Choreographing Problems

compounded of body and machine (*It's In The Air* (*IITA*)); imperceptible movement (*Nvsbl*); indiscernibility between stillness, motion, and inertia, between live bodies or inanimate objects (*Untitled* (*U*)); the idea of motion and sensation that is faster than the recognition thereof (*50/50*); the idea of “movement neither from nor towards” (*Weak Dance Strong Questions* (*WDSQ*)); and the ideas of mental theater and dance in the head of the spectator (*héâtre-élêvisión* (*h-é*)).

Problem-posing is a matter of invention that entails a time of unlearning and ungrounding the knowledge of possibilities that reproduce rather than create unforeseen movements, bodies, and relations. Invention out of a problem necessarily implies difference produced out of a critical rupture with common assumptions. The transformation of the body as well as the perception of movement that the constraints of each experiment induce can’t be emphasized enough. In this regard, the claim that expression in Deleuze is identical to construction was crucial for this method insofar as it oriented our analysis towards exhaustive detail, looking into the techniques of performing as well as those of attending the performance.

The outcome of this method of inquiry wages another epistemological battle in the field of dance practice and education, which needs to be stressed here. It is the technocentric formalism and phenomenological notion of embodied experience in modern dance, supported by the dominance of the aesthetic categories of style and language, which keep dance hermetic, away from anybody who doesn’t have the empirical privilege of access, that is to say, the know-how and experience of training, dancing, and watching dance. To put it more bluntly, in this book I have been poised between the demand for a concrete and palpable characterization of the matters of composition, on the one side, and on the other side, an entanglement with a broader context of formulating a choreographic idea qua problem with its logic of questions, conditions and terms, and temporary solutions. Not shying away from meticulous descriptions, I tried to precisely walk, without approximation, the steps that I attributed to choreographers, dancers, and attenders of these works, imagining the reader as part of my choreography.

Now we can address the first question, which inquires into the broader implications of the body-movement rupture we have theorized here. Expressive concepts account for the consistency in which problems compose performances from a certain point of view. By a “certain point of view,” I would like to underline that these concepts express a certain composition of the performance, rather than its totality. It would contradict the genetic nature of thought to claim these concepts
as total and definitive interpretative accounts of the seven works. Part-bodies, part-machines, movement-sensations, head-box, wired assemblings, stutterances, power-motion, crisis-motion, cut-ending, and resonance are concepts that account for the singular processes of experimentation in the seven works alone. Therefore, they refer to the compositions of the body, movement, time, performing, and attending, and so forth only via problems that share certain characteristics with these compositions as a result of thinking and doing at the same time. Since they affirm problematization and yet practically orient thought towards an experiment, they are linked with the performances whose given problems they consider. In other words, trying to subsume any other performances under the same concepts as these particular cases or “examples” would require modifying the concepts altogether. But this should not isolate the seven works as islands of choreographic ideas in a sea of purportedly non-thinking dances. There are still a few more choreographers and performances who have contributed to the same critical and experimental departure from an essentialist tradition of modern dance in Europe over the last two decades. Hence a broader context of choreographies that, like the works considered here, have broken through the epistemic horizon of formal abstraction and phenomenological embodiment towards more constructed, heterogeneous, pluralist practices of performance would include a selection of works made since 2000 and, in some cases, since the mid-1990s by Jérôme Bel, Juan Dominguez, Vera Mantero, La Ribot, Antonia Baehr, BADco, and Mårten Spångberg. Although these choreographers also part with the organic body-movement bind in favor of artificially constructed expressions of the body and/or movement, the question is whether the problem-posing was the method that created their works, and consequently, whether they would best be accounted for by concepts rooted in expression, since their interventions into the field of contemporary dance were associated with poststructuralist critique and deconstruction (for a Derridian or Lacanian analysis, see Kruschkova 2005, Siegmund 2006).

However, the seven works in question here were specifically singled out for their power of disrupting the synthesis between the body and movement through the two opposed principles in the legacy of modern dance: self-expression as a mode of subjectivation which binds the body to movement as its origin, and objectivation of movement through an exclusively physical articulation of the body as its instrument. Desubjectivation and disobjectivation presented themselves as points of breach with that which I have termed the foundational synthesis of
the body and movement in modern dance. If we were, in retrospect, to encapsulate the upshot of criticality that marks off this period, then it would be to contend that after these works, dancing can hardly be conceived as a natural, spontaneous, organic, and thereby self-evident expression of the body in movement. It conversely implies a choice predicated on the thought that constructs the expression of movement and the disposition of the body to move, and thus constructs their conjunction as an artificial rather than a given bind. We might consider this as the legacy of a new condition with which contemporary dance is confronted—the set of minor questions as to how, why, when, and in which case the body should move, if it is to move at all—which is conspicuously at odds with the prolific dance culture of self-expression and auto-affection in entertainment and social media. Yet this kind of persistent questioning throughout the very process of making provides for each work of contemporary dance a genuine occasion to distinguish thought in experiment, and to contribute to more differentiated and heterogeneous expressions of the body, movement, and duration.

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As I write these lines six years after this project began, I would like to gauge the effects of what I have referred to here as choreographing problems, measuring them according to recent developments in choreography's expansion that explore the practice of choreography beyond the human body or its live presence. In undertaking the analysis of seven performances in a quest for a theory of problems and expressive concepts in choreography, I have focused on the operations of works of contemporary dance viewed through artwork's relative autonomy, thus privileging works as the object of my analysis. Admittedly, I have argued for the temporal expansions of these works in their making, performing, and attending. Yet these dimensions or modes of performance do derive from the performance event inasmuch as they serve to relativize its exclusive conceptual significance for the art of choreography and the fields of contemporary dance and performance. In order to pursue further implications of the rupture between the body and movement or in the live co-presence of a performance in the context of contemporary capitalist production modes, we might have to shift attention from the work of performance to an expanded notion of choreography and performance, which may include its own self-theorization as a poetics and a practice. Such a thinking wouldn't only involve activities that bring performances into existence, or sustain them, but would also have to consider which forms of labor and life choreography as a practice depends on and gives rise to, while also
considering—outside the disciplines of dance and performance—other media, situations, and modes of attention to the moving body.

Two lines of development seem prominent, as they address the technological and social aspects. Firstly, the familiar notion that performance extends beyond theater, which some performance scholars, like Herbert Blau, have taken to the extreme, exclaiming that “the notion of living theater seems the merest anachronism” (Blau in Reinelt and Roach 2007: 542). While such a judgment is arguable in the light of theater’s long history, it succeeds in making a point about the extension of performance, including dancing, into the digital realm, and the radically changing experience, place, and function the moving body might thereby have in daily life beyond art. What has been discussed as “electronic presence” in digital and Internet performance (Auslander 2008) and what is known as the cinematic mode of choreography are no longer in the shadows of the live event’s reproduction, but are instead the mode of performance’s existence vying for a primary rather than surrogate status. Thus, coinciding with and after h-é, which contested the purported intensity of live bodies by dancing through a logic of immanent mediations for one spectator, not only do choreographers explore the cinematic techniques in performances (e.g. Ingvartsen in Why We Love Action, 2007); they also create hybrid formats such as film installations in exhibitions (see “Responsibility for Things Seen” by BADco at the Venice Biennale 2011, Croatian Pavillion) or combined live- and web-streamed performances (e.g. the program of the Tate Live Performance Room with Daniel Linehan’s untitled duet) that have begun to rival theater presentations of dance.

After lecture-performances and score publications, books and objects are now programmatically promoted as the medium of choreography and performance in various spatial and temporal forms of appearance and distribution. Choreographies have therefore also been conceived in the format of books that explore the temporality beyond the performance event. Such is the Norwegian choreographer Mette Edvardsen’s Time Has Fallen Asleep in the Afternoon Sunshine, where dancers memorize and recite novels and other texts in the intimacy of a performance for one spectator. Linehan explains how his book-choreography A No Can Make Space has the structure of choreography, on the one hand, and the durability and time-based experience that a book or a sculpture yields, on the other hand: “A book reveals itself to me over time, just as a performance does” (Linehan 2013: n.p.).

Folding out an earlier dance performance, which was also recorded as a film by Thierry De Mey, One Flat Thing, Reproduced (2000), William
Forsythe has developed a cross-disciplinary research called *Synchronous Objects* (2009) in which his choreography is translated into various kinds of computational models, such as mathematics, geography, architecture, and design, which are then transformed into a series of objects. With regard to *Synchronous Objects* and more than 20 other works of his exhibited in the medium of installation or video in museums, Forsythe introduces his concept of “choreographic objects”:

Could it be conceivable that the ideas now seen as bound to a sentient expression are indeed able to exist in another durable, intelligible state? A choreographic object is not a substitute for the body, but rather an alternative site for the understanding of potential instigation and organization of action to reside. Ideally, choreographic ideas in this form would draw an attentive, diverse readership that would eventually understand and, hopefully, champion the innumerable manifestations, old and new, of choreographic thinking. (Forsythe 2008: 7)

The development of choreographic objects, books, and video and film installations is stimulated by the current expansive interest on the part of visual art venues in choreographic works and forms of display in exhibition. It has prompted a number of choreographers, Le Roy and Charmatz, among others, to seek out different modes of attention and temporality in the event of theater performance. Le Roy’s “Retrospective” (2012), an exhibition conceived as a perpetual performance machine displaying live, variously treated fragments of Le Roy’s choreographies (*SU* and *U* included), and Charmatz’s project *Dancing Museum* (*Musée de la danse*, 2009) and its exhibition-choreographies (*expo-zéro, brouillon*) are both consistent with the quest for extended duration, where expressions are prolonged not virtually, but actually, in the duration of exhibitions that visitors choose to attend at their will. While the advantage that these choreographers seek to explore lies in an entirely new set of possibilities for organizing time and encounters between the dancer, the dancing movement and body, and the visitor outside the protocol of theater, the question arises as to the effects that the disjunct bodies and movements, dissociated from the theater stage, incur upon the apparatus of the museum. Rather than fetishizing the dancing body as a kind of vitalist object for contemplation, choreography here amounts to another operation of problems, expressing movement that demands attention, time, and response from visitors. In doing so, choreography encompasses modes of expression that exceed making,
performing, and attending performance, as they implicate visitors in a flux of unbounded dispersive motion.

In spilling over into more indeterminate forms of merging work and non-work off the theater stage and outside the autonomous realm of art, the multiplicity that arises from expanded practices of choreography doesn’t only ask us to account for the thought born from perceptual shocks of nonrecognition in places and situations where dancing isn’t foreseen. Finally, the choreographic ideas shift their objects out of dance, and so we might be forced to think another problem that the expansion of choreography choreographs for us: the new forms of entangling life and work that contemporary dance expresses once it leaves the theater that protects its relative autonomy as an artform. Dance would no longer be usurped as a metaphor of thought, but could lend itself as a method for analyzing the place of movement and the body in current freelance forms of labor. This would mark a step beyond the specific problematization within contemporary dance and performance by virtue of philosophical thought, where the inorganic regimes of dance and choreography might help us formulate, and attempt to solve, if only temporarily, problems which socially and politically structure everyday life. And this, this would call for yet another, larger expanse of thought in and of performance.
Notes

Introduction

1. The titles of some reviews are eloquent enough: “Performances pour contredanses: Retour en force du ‘happening’, qui questionne chorégraphie et en repousse les limites” and “L’antispectacle, de saison à Paris” in Libération, November 11, 2000; “Danza o non danza?” and “Si può ancora chiamare danza?” in Corriere Romagna, June 6, 2004. The other six performances were received after the debate about dance, “non-dance,” “anti-dance,” “conceptual dance,” had been long under way. Their status as dance “pieces” has not been doubted, since choreographers like Xavier Le Roy and Jérôme Bel, whose work was often assessed as “non-dance” along with Le Roy’s, had gained renown in the international contemporary dance scene.

2. The following exhibitions and programs are just a few among many that testify to a keen interest in choreographic performance in the contemporary visual arts context: the exhibition “Move: Choreographing You” at the Hayward Gallery, London, autumn 2010; the program of performances and lectures “Characters, Figures and Signs” at the Tate Modern, London, in February 2009; the “Choreography: Experiencing Space, Time and Ideas” workshop at the Tate Modern in autumn 2011; The Performance Exhibition Series, featuring primarily dance, at MoMA, New York, from January 2009.


4. Although it may appear redundant and misleading that as well as “making” and “attending,” “performing” partakes in “performance,” no other term could be a more adequate synonym. “Acting,” “doing,” “undertaking,” or “playing,” for that matter, all stress aspects alien to the mode I discuss in the first chapter.

5. For example, IITA is considered twice for two different concepts: part-body-part-machine assemblings (Chapter 2) and the process of becoming-intense (Chapter 6).

1 Problems and Expressive Concepts

1. In an article published in the same year as his book on Kant (1963), “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics” (Deleuze 2004b: 56–71), Deleuze advances his claim that Kant’s third critique lays the ground for the harmony of faculties in the other two critiques, thanks to the free spontaneous agreement of which the faculties are capable themselves without the intervention of understanding or reason as in logical or practical common sense. The ground is to be found in the indeterminate free agreement of the imagination and reason in the experience of the sublime. The sublime enables the extension of imagination thanks to infinity as the idea of reason. In addition to the transcendental ideas of reason, Kant seeks a principle of genesis of “aesthetic
ideas” as “intuitions without concepts” that “produce another nature than the nature given to us.” The source of aesthetic ideas is, in Deleuze’s reading of Kant, “genius,” “the gift of the artistic creator” (Deleuze 2004b: 68), which provides the agreement between the imagination and reason by expanding both imagination and understanding in the “creation of the work of art.” This overly romantic stance on “aesthetic ideas” born of the artist-genius isn’t supported in later references Deleuze makes to genesis in art, and contradicts my viewpoint here on artistic creation based on desubjectivation/disobjectivation.

2. The language deployed in Deleuze’s definition of Idea points to mathematics, to the exemplary model of the differential calculus, from which Deleuze draws concepts like differential relations, singularities, and multiplicities. Cf. Smith 2007a: 1–22. However, the same definitional terms of Ideas and problems, as Deleuze illustrates, apply in other domains, to an organism as a biological idea, for example, or to “abstract labor” as a Marxist social idea (DR: 185–7).


4. The distinction between problem-posing and impressions, perceptions, opinions, and imagination is comparable to Spinoza’s kinds of knowledge. In Spinoza, perception and imagination are inadequate kinds of knowledge, because they result from affection that doesn’t yield the knowledge of the cause in the effect. Nonetheless, they are two phases on the path from inadequate to adequate knowledge, which is, for Spinoza, reason and intuition, or the intellectual love of God, and which, in contrast, rests on understanding or knowing the cause of an effect.

5. Cf. Chapter 2, note 1 on SU.

6. The theories are founded mainly in analytic aesthetics, as in the following articles and books whose titles I quote for illustration: Dipert (1988) “Toward a Genuine Philosophy of the Performing Arts”; Davies (1991), Definitions of Art; Thom (1993), For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts; Osipovich (2006), “What is a Theatrical Performance?” The duality in the ontological status of the work which involves performance, such as music, was first posited by phenomenological aesthetics, as in the work of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden (1989), Ontology of the Work of Art: The Musical Work, the Picture, the Architectural Work, the Film.

7. The only exception is Nvsbl, where Salamon performs only as a replacement when one of the five performers isn’t available. In h-é, Charmatz is one of the eight performers dancing in the film. Due to the subtraction of the nominal apparatus, the number of live and inanimate performers in U is unclear and undisclosed.

2 Disjunctive Captures of the Body and Movement

1. Of the performance at Tanzplatform Germany in 2000, the German dance theorist Gerald Siegmund writes, “Le Roy walks on his shoulders, his arms flapping like chicken wings, his naked back to the audience [. . .]. Le Roy
evoked images of sculptured bodies and of bizarre animals that propel themselves forward in the most imaginative way” (unknown publication, archive X, Le Roy). Many reviews grapple with giving the body in SU a name, as the article titles testify: “Wie man Huhn wird. Metamorphosen: Xavier Le Roy in Strassburg” [How to become a chicken: Metamorphoses – Xavier Le Roy in Strasbourg], *Badische Zeitung*, November 2003; “Kopfloses Krabbelwesen Xavier Le Roy” [Headless Crawling Creature: Xavier Le Roy], *Berliner Morgenpost*, April 8, 1999.

2. Foster defines vocabulary as a “lexicon of movements based on a principle by which the human body is conceived in movement.” Movements are accordingly distinguishable by “strong visual design, a clear simple rhythm, recognizable dramatic gesture; discreteness of everyday movement; bracketing by breathing” (Foster 1986: 88). It would be difficult in *Nvsbl* to discern the visual shape of movement or the rhythm or to delineate gesture or everyday movement, nor does breathing play the role of a distinctive parameter, since its speed is drastically differentiated from the imperceptible motion in *Nvsbl*.

3. The geometric system can be best illustrated in the sophisticated explorations of William Forsythe’s *Improvisation Technologies* (2000), where he demonstrates various techniques of drawing movement in points, lines, shapes, volumes, multiple planes, etc. The complementary principle to geometry, which is historically allied with ballet, is the dynamics that corresponds to the energy expenditure in movement, which was originally recognized in early modern dance as what Rudolf Laban referred to as “effort” (and the study of Eukinetics, Laban). The nature of movement is seen in terms of effort, intensity, and velocity, rather than through the Cartesian mechanics of extension.


5. Cohen demonstrates how shifting focus from one place to another in initiating movement can be observed as a qualitative change in movement. Cf. *Dance and Body-Mind Centering, with Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen*, DVD (Cohen 2004).

6. In the same year that *Nvsbl* was made, the French choreographer and dancer Frédéric Gies presented a solo performance called *Dance* (2006). In the performance’s score, he calls for analogies between canonical dance styles and principles of BMC®: “These different places of initiation of movement create different forms and patterns, different speeds, different movement qualities that have to be clearly recognizable, though the form has to remain a side-effect of the activity. Each of these qualities can refer to different dance styles. Nevertheless, the performer has to take care not to reproduce the forms of the dance styles that he has identified” (Gies 2007: n.p.). The ambiguity of the instruction to identify but not reproduce a dance style can be read either as an arbitrary attribution of historical value to BMC® as a body practice or as a quest to underlie the Western history of dance with an organic and naturalistic argument.
3 Theatrical Apparatuses of Disjunction


2. In contrast to the stance of Lehmann’s contemporary post-dramatic theater, associated with communication, Rancière maintains the importance of the artificial distance of the stage in theater for his practice of equality. In Rancière’s “theatocratic” conception of politics, the theater stage is the site of political deregulation where the repartitioning of roles and functions, of unauthorized speech in the name of others, occurs by exception. Peter Hallward compares Rancière’s recourse to theater as a model for politics with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s antifoundationalist “staging of mimesis” as linked with disidentification and depropriation. Cf. Hallward 2006b and 2003a.

3. Con forts fleuve is a choreography by Boris Charmatz from 1999.

4. Aatt…enen…tionon is a choreography by Charmatz from 1996.

5. The last remark about the head as the only body part that could fit in a TV set refers to the size of TV apparatuses from the 1970s–’80s, when the TV became a standard household item, but nowadays, as TV screens become ever larger and flatter, it appears anachronistic.

6. “In a metonymically functioning space the distance covered by an actor first represents a reference to the space of the theatre situation, thus referring as pars pro toto to the real space of the playing field and a fortiori of the theatre and the surrounding space at large” (Lehmann 2006: 151).

7. I am here referring to Jean-Luc Godard’s notion of “ici et ailleurs” which he developed in the film of the same title from 1976. “Here and elsewhere” exposes a Benjaminian conception of history as an accumulation of catastrophes by juxtaposing documentary footage made by the Palestinian PLO fighters and the TV-viewing perspective of a mixed French-Palestinian family in Paris.

4 Exhausting Improvisation: Stutterances

1. Mary (O’Donnell) Fulkerson claims authorship for “Release”—a movement improvisation principle attributed to a more renowned choreographer, Trisha Brown. Her own teaching endows improvisation with a spiritual dimension to a significant extent, articulated in the concepts Fulkerson programmatically states: “Responsible Anarchy” and “Ethical Reformation” (Fulkerson 2004).


3. In an issue of Contact Quarterly focusing on “sexuality and identity,” Cynthia Rounds contends: “We in the C[ontact] I[mprovisation] community have profound body wisdom, resources unavailable to the culture at large. It behooves us to use them!” Cynthia Rounds, “Dancing with the Moon: Contact Improv with a Female Body.” Contact Quarterly 21/2, Summer/Fall 1996, 55. The view
of improvisational artists as “healers” isn’t only characteristic of dance, but has its roots in the “alternative metaphysics” that Belgrad discusses in *The Culture of Spontaneity*. He quotes the poet Olson: “Any kind of healing, like any kind of usable discovery, starts with the human body, its complicated and animal structure . . . . To heal, is also how you find out how—somehow—to maintain your resistance . . . how to act fiercely but, with dignity” (Belgrad 1998: 160).

4. A succinct definition of “phrasing” can be found in Yvonne Rainer’s essay “A Quasi Survey of Some ‘Minimalist’ Tendencies in the Quantitatively Minimal Dance Activity Midst the Plethora, or an Analysis of *Trio A*” (Rainer 1974: 63–59), where she compares formal-structural categories of traditional and minimalist dance and sculpture. Phrasing presupposes an organic arch form, with a beginning, development, and climax in the middle and end, arising from the organic distribution of energy, often manifested in breathing and contraction-release. She seeks to substitute it with a series of unitary forms, whose energy is evened out through repetition and neutral task-like performance equivalents of factory fabrication and modular structure in minimal sculpture.

5. The etymology of the word is evoked in a choreography by Boris Charmatz entitled *herses (une lente introduction)*, 1997, which isn’t included in the works discussed here. Three compositional elements of this choreography relate to the two meanings above (*herse* as a lighting framework of a scene, and *rehercier* as “to harrow”): first, a stage constructed as an irregular platform, framed by sound sources and lights; second, a sequence by which two male-female couples roll over the platform slowly, as if their bodies in contact make up a wheel that works and harrows the soil; and third, the dance is conceived as an introduction to a concert-like performance of a musical piece (*Pression* for cello by Helmut Lachenmann), where dancers move in a musical environment created by numerous CD players simultaneously playing a selection of Lachenmann’s pieces. Their dance to this music acts as a preparatory rehearsal, a probing of the audience’s attention to the musical concert which will take place after it.

### 5 A Critical Departure from Emotionalism: Sensations and Affects in the Mode of Performing

1. The research was carried out from 2008 to 2011 by the University of Manchester, the University of Glasgow, York St John University, and Imperial College London, see http://www.watchingdance.org, accessed in 2011.

2. Spinoza’s examples are “tenacity” and “nobility” related to the strength of character that understands itself and thus strives to preserve its being alone, and in friendship with others (IIIP58Schol).

3. As in Chapters 2 and 3, “agencement” is translated into two terms: “assembling,” when we emphasize the connection of two or more actors, and “agency,” for the effect of their cofunctioning.

4. *Giselle* is a solo created by Le Roy and Salamon in 2001 in which Salamon dances sequences of movement and gestures from a variety of movement codes: ballet, modern dance, folk dance, sports, pedestrian movement, scenes from films, pop music.
5. The experiments were based on the measurement of autonomic physiological reactions to external stimuli, and one experiment focused on examining affective responses to complex stimuli, based on various coordinations between image and story.

6. The story of Pagliacci evolves from a play in a play, in which Canio plays the foolish husband, to a play of reality, in which he pursues his treacherous wife in order to kill her and her lover in the end with the words: “La Commedia è finita!”—“The play is over!” After a villager makes a joke about flirting with Canio’s wife Nedda, Canio warns everyone that while he may act the foolish husband in the play, in real life he will not tolerate other men making advances to Nedda.

7. Ingvartsen doesn’t document in the score of 50/50 which staging of the opera she reconstructed. Despite having consulted several sources, I haven’t managed to locate the scene that Ingvartsen claims to have recreated.

8. As evidence, a MA program entitled SODA (Solo Dance Authorship) was founded at the University of the Arts (UDK) in Berlin in 2008, thus explicitly advancing this genre.

6  During and After Performance: Processes, Caesuras, and Resonances


A Post Hoc Conclusion: An Expanse of Choreography


Dance in America: Beyond the Mainstream. PBS TV series, 1976.
Deleuze, Gilles (1968a) Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF.


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