FEMINIST, QUEER, CRIP

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Contents

5 The Cyborg and the Crip

Critical Encounters

> Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival.
>
> —Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*

CONTROVERSY CAME QUICKLY to the cyborg. In 1983, *Socialist Review* invited several feminist theorists, among them Donna Haraway, "to write about the future of socialist feminism in the context of the early Reagan era."[1] Haraway responded with "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," framing the cyborg as a figure of feminist critique.[2] Her cyborg was a radical border-crosser, blurring the boundaries between human and animal, machine and organism, physical and non-physical.[3] Such a cyborg, she argued, could "guide us to a more livable place," an "elsewhere," in which "people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints."[4] This potential arose from the cyborg's hybridity, its transgression of boundaries and categories; because it does not, or cannot, privilege unity or sameness, it offers "a way out of the maze of dualisms" that characterize Western thought.[5]

Haraway positioned her cyborg as an intervention not only in Western dualism but especially in Western feminism, and her critique was focused along two fronts: first, feminist dismissals of science and technology, and second, feminist reliance on "universal, totalizing theory."[6] She argued that the cyborg's non-innocence—its origins in a militarized and colonizing technoscience—was precisely what made it a potentially productive tool for feminist analysis. It could lead to "the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet" or to a feminist politics in which we take pleasure and responsibility in technology; the key is to recognize this risky dual capacity as opening new possibilities for resistance.[7] The fragmented cyborg pushes us to see from

multiple perspectives at the same time, stressing that every perspective "reveals both dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point."[8] Capable of "holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary and true," the cyborg rejects binary logic and embraces contradiction.[9]

Nowhere is its contradictory stance more apparent than in terms of science and technology. As Haraway describes it in an interview, the manifesto is "neither technophobic, nor technophilic, but about trying to inquire critically" into the assumptions, uses, and implications of technoscience; it urges feminists to engage in and take responsibility for "the social relations of science and technology."[10] Thus, she warns against feminist approaches that serve only to heighten the dualism between science and nature by rejecting technology outright. Her manifesto is an alternative to those feminisms that "have insisted on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body."[11] The feminist task, then, is not to plot some escape from technology, or to map our return to a preindustrial Eden, but rather to contest for other meanings of, or other relations with, technoscience. The cyborg serves as a theoretical framework for such contestations.

Haraway describes her project as a challenge to "versions of Euro-American feminist humanism" that assume "master narratives deeply indebted to racism and colonialism."[12] The valorization of nature and the desire on the part of some feminists to cast all technology as phallocentric is one such master narrative; another is the development of a universalizing feminist theory dependent on monolithic ideas of "woman," articulations that prioritize gender over race and class. Haraway's second intervention, then, was in "some streams of the white women's movement in the United States" that naturalize "woman."[13] For Haraway, the boundary-crossing cyborg could be a productive intervention in such debates, shifting the terrain of feminist thought and practice from monolithic identities to shifting affinities. Drawing on Chela Sandoval's work on women of color and "oppositional consciousness," Haraway pushes for a feminism not "on the basis of natural identification, but . . . on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of political kinship."[14] Through her cyborg figure, she suggests that "the future of socialist feminism" requires a politics open to the possibility that "[g]ender might not be a global identity after all, even if it has profound historical breadth and depth."[15]

Although Haraway explicitly positioned both the cyborg and its manifesto as feminist, not all readers shared that interpretation. Reflecting on the history of the manifesto, Haraway recalls that the *Socialist Review*'s East Coast Collective found the essay politically unsuitable, antifeminist, and devoid of critique; like many readers since then, they found the piece a naïve embrace of technology and urged that it not be published. The Berkeley Collective disagreed, ushering the piece into publication.[16] But the questions raged: Was the cyborg figure emancipatory or reactionary? Was the manifesto based in critique or was it an undertheorized celebration of technology? Could the cyborg figure point to a socialist feminist future? Were we all cyborgs, as Haraway claimed?[17]

These questions linger over twenty-five years later. Ecofeminists, queer theorists, and historians of new reproductive technologies, among others, continue to debate whether the cyborg figure provides a potentially emancipatory vision for the future.[18] Even theorists who dismiss the cyborg as passé engage in versions of this question; their challenge to the cyborg's continued relevance is only the latest iteration of the questions that have faced the figure from the beginning.[19] It is this question of the cyborg's efficacy in imagining different futures that leads me to take up the figure: Can the cyborg offer an effective model for disability theory and politics? Is it a useful figure for analysis? Is its usefulness tied to its status as metaphor, or should we approach it more literally? In other words, are disabled people cyborgs, and, if so, what can be gained through such an identification? What, finally, is the relationship between disability and the cyborg?

Haraway herself initiated a focus on disability. In the manifesto, she suggested that "[p]erhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization" because of their reliance on machines and prosthetics.[20] Other theorists quickly followed Haraway's lead, using disability and disabled bodies as illustrations or examples of cyborgism in their own articulations of cyborg theory.[21] Disability studies scholars joined the conversation as well, exploring the possibility that the cyborg as boundary-blurring hybrid could be a useful model for conceptualizing disabled bodies and theorizing disability.[22]

Even with all this attention given to the cyborg, however, there are few disability studies pieces that focus exclusively on the figure; the cyborg appears in passing as part of a larger exploration of disability and postmodern body theory, contemporary performance, or technological advances. The article-length analyses that do exist tend to focus on a specific cyborg technology, such as cochlear implants, or on a specific cultural representation, such as the Bionic Woman, rather than on the manifesto itself or on the cyborg as a political figure.[23] As a result, the cyborg's feminist histories are downplayed or ignored; the cyborg as a critical intervention in feminist theory is often not the cyborg that appears in disability studies.[24] Yet it is this cyborg we most need. Consider this chapter, then, an intervention in disability studies, one that recognizes key texts and terms in feminist theory, such as feminist commentary on the cyborg, as part of the archive of disability studies.

Of course, cyborg theory requires an intervention as well, for, far too often, disability functions in cyborg theory—including Haraway's manifesto—solely as an illustration of the cyborg condition. Markedly absent is any kind of critical engagement with disability, any analysis of the material realities of disabled people's interactions with technology. Disabled bodies are simply presented as exemplary, and self-evident, cyborgs, requiring neither analysis nor critique. If, as Haraway insists, cyborg bodies are not innocent, but are "maps of power and identity," then a close crip reading of the cyborg is long overdue.[25]

The cyborg figure certainly holds much promise for a disability politics; from its suspicion of essentialist identities to its insistence on coalition work to its interrogation

of ideologies of wholeness, the cyborg offers productive insights for developing a feminist disability vision of the future. Its disinterest in and refusal of temporalities ruled by "salvation history," "oedipal calendar[s]," and "rebirth without flaw" suggest the possibility of crip futurities, futurities grounded in something other than the compulsory reproduction of able-bodiedness/able-mindedness.[26] Moreover, Haraway's desire for a politics based on political affinity rather than biological identity can be a useful resource for disability studies scholars and activists crafting a movement among people with different impairments. A cyborg politics would not require an amputee, a blind person, and a psychiatric survivor to present their identities and experiences as the same, or even all amputees' experiences as the same, but rather would encourage the formation of flexible coalitions to achieve shared goals. Finally, Haraway's manifesto marks one of the first moments that disability and disabled people appear in feminist critical theory, and although that appearance leaves much to be desired, it serves as a vital opening into feminist and queer thought.

Rather than abandon the cyborg because of its ableist rhetoric and manifestations, I argue for a continued struggle with the figure, using it to stage our own blasphemous interventions in feminist theory. This struggle entails not only reimagining the cyborg from a critical crip position but also engaging seriously with existing critiques of the figure. In other words, what might disability studies learn from criticisms of the cyborg by women of color, by antiracist scholars, or by activists working to contest globalization? How can we use the figure of the cyborg not only to imagine disability differently but to imagine a cripped coalition politics? Thus, this chapter has two goals: first, to trace in detail the ways in which cyborg discourses universalize the experience of disability, removing it from the realm of the political; and second, to explore the possibility of a cripped cyborg politics, one that draws on the practices of feminist and queer disability activists and theorists. To twist Haraway's iconic, ironic prose: "Crip the Cyborg for Earthly Survival!"[27]

"Rise of the Cyborgs"

The cyborgs of popular culture bear little resemblance to the cyborgs of Haraway's manifesto. Robocops and Terminators, they are more likely to engage in spectacular acts of violent hypermasculinity than in feminist theory and practice; their enhanced bodies seem to reify gender differences rather than critique them. Indeed, feminist critics from Anne Balsamo to Claudia Springer warn that such cyborgs will do little to transform existing gender relations, and their exaggerated able-bodiedness suggests that they offer few resources to disability theory or politics.[28] My focus, then, is not on these cyborgs, but on the cyborgs of critical theory; I leave the disability critique of science fiction to others.[29] Jennifer Gonzalez argues, however, that cyborgs "function as evidence" of "differences, histories, stories, bodies, [and] places,"[30] making it important to mark the multiple articulations of the cyborg/disability relation. Before turning to Haraway and other cyborg theorists, then, I want to briefly engage the disabled

cyborg as it figures in the mainstream news media. Articles in the popular press frequently draw on the image of the cyborg in their coverage of disability and technology, suggesting a seamless link between "cyborg" and "disabled person" thanks to adaptive technology. This assumption of identification is one that runs throughout academic approaches to the cyborg.

"The immediate future is filled with hope for the disabled," exclaims Sherry Baker in her article "Rise of the Cyborgs" in *Discover*. Thanks to new developments in medical technology, we are "soon" going to be living in an era when "brainpower will let the paralyzed walk, [and] allow the mute to speak." Enabling "the paralyzed" to walk is one of the most common expectations for these technologies. A similar article in *Forbes*—also, and not coincidentally, called "Rise of the Cyborg"—showcases a hybrid assisted limb that "one day . . . may even let recovering stroke victims and paraplegics walk again." That story was followed a year later by "Cyborg Waiting List," which described disabled consumers' enthusiasm for the still-under-development device.[31]

The term "cyborg" in these stories, associated with the forward-looking "rise," operates as evocative shorthand for adaptive technology, associating such technology with a promising future for "the disabled." It quickly becomes clear, even after only a cursory reading of these kinds of cyborg stories, that "cyborg" and "physically disabled person" are seen as synonymous. Or, rather, that "person with physical disabilities" is a self-evident, commonsense category of cyborgism. The reporters do not explain what they mean by "cyborg" or what leads them to describe disabled people in cyborgian terms. They assume that their readers will easily and uncritically understand disabled people as cyborgs and link their future to one of medical technology; no explanation or definition is apparently required.

Representing the cyborg/disabled person relationship as both seamless and self-evident obscures the facts of these very technologies. In a context in which most disabled people in the United States are un- or underemployed, and in which almost a third of disabled people live below the poverty line, many of these cyborg technologies remain out of reach of the people for whom they are imagined.[32] The "cyborg-style iLimb Hand" heralded in the UK *Register*, for example, costs eighteen thousand dollars, and the price tag leaps higher if we include not only the device itself but the training and maintenance it likely requires.[33] The ability to become cyborg is too often economically determined.[34]

Presenting the cyborg/disability connection in a purely positive light also ignores the fact that, for many people, adaptive technologies can be painful; the same brace that makes it easier to walk may cause skin breakdown or other difficulties. Yet these news stories tend to focus only on the advantages brought by these technologies, describing the latest inventions in the language of healing and restoration. Tobin Siebers explains that such accounts presume that "[p]rostheses always increase the cyborg's abilities; they are a source only of new powers, never of problems."[35] As a result, these celebratory news stories present high-tech technology as solving the "problem" of disability;

pity and discrimination are rendered irrelevant here. So, too, are issues of adaptation and negotiation: as Siebers suggests, these cyborgian tales assume an easy melding of body and machine. The relationship between disability and technology is discussed only in terms of the devices' ability to normalize the body and/or to restore its previous function; there is nothing else to discuss, apparently, and the devices' value is assumed.

Many of these articles position cyborg technology as affecting only disabled people; nondisabled people may eventually use these devices, but they are not currently cyborgs in the same way as disabled folks. Baker predicts that, "[w]hile the immediate future is filled with hope for the disabled, cyborg technology may soon spread, giving ordinary people extraordinary skills."[36] On the one hand, Baker's claim can be seen as erasing the disabled/nondisabled divide in assuming that everyone can benefit from these technologies. On the other hand, however, her "soon" reminds us that disabled people are the only immediate cyborgs; "ordinary" people will have to wait.[37] For the time being, then, "cyborg" is linked more directly to disabled bodies than to able-bodied ones.

This distinction between disabled people and "ordinary" people surfaces in the raft of news stories covering Oscar Pistorius's attempt to compete alongside nondisabled runners in the 2008 summer Olympics (rather than in the Paralympics). With his gleaming high-tech prosthetics, Pistorius perfectly embodied the cultural understanding of a cyborg; he was one with his machine. The fact that his prosthetics, coupled with his training and athleticism, enabled him to run at breathtaking speeds only strengthened this description. Leslie Swartz and Brian Watermeyer discuss the ways in which the responses of the International Association of Athletics Federations reveal a profound anxiety about disabled athletes;[38] what I want to highlight here is the way in which news writers presented Pistorius as a definitive cyborg and, therefore, almost of a different species than his fellow runners. Anna Salleh, writing for an Australian news outlet, described the Pistorius case as one involving "the competing rights of cyborgs and non-cyborgs."[39] Bloggers from both sports and technology sites described the case in terms of the arrival of the "cyborg athlete," an arrival that would change everything about how we understand athletics. Not only was Pistorius's cyborgization taken for granted in these stories, but so, too—and relatedly—was his difference. As Swartz and Watermeyer note, doping can also be seen as cyborg technology, but athletes accused of doping are not described in those terms; physical disability and its attendant technologies render one cyborgian in a way nothing else can.[40]

The cyborg/noncyborg distinction points to a problematic assumption underlying popular conceptions of the cyborg. Although Haraway intended the figure to critique dualistic understandings of nature and culture or of human and machine, too often it serves only to reify such binary logic. In these news stories, "cyborg" represents the melding of pure body and pure machine; there is an original purity that, thanks to assistive technology, has only now been mixed, hybridized, blurred. To return to the Pistorius case, the athlete is simply a body; when it gets mixed with the prosthetic

machine, it becomes impure, mixed, cyborg. A nondisabled runner, in other words, is natural, unmixed, unadulterated; it is only the presence of the prosthetic that makes one impure, or no longer purely natural.[41] The "cyborg" concept thus serves to perpetuate binaries of pure/impure, natural/unnatural, and natural/technological; rather than breaking down boundaries, it buttresses them.

Heroic "Cyborg Citizens"

Science studies scholar Chris Hables Gray adheres to this binary logic—cyborg/not-cyborg, disabled/not-disabled—when casting quadriplegics as definitive cyborgs; their dependence on high-tech equipment obviously, in Gray's view, renders them true cyborgs. While he argues that "[a]lmost all of us are cyborged in some way," he repeatedly lifts up disabled people as particularly cyborgian.[42] Indeed, he opens his book *Cyborg Citizen* not with cyborgs from science fiction or computer wizards who describe themselves in cyborgian terms but with Christopher Reeve.[43] Under the title "The Crippling of Superman," Gray writes, "In 1995, Christopher Reeve, the actor famous for portraying Superman in the movies, fell from his horse Buck and became a quadriplegic. A sad story? Yes, certainly, but also a heroic cyborg tale."[44] Although I can find no instance of Reeve referring to himself as a cyborg, he apparently struck Gray as the most effective way to introduce the cyborg figure to his readers. As Gray explains in an earlier article (coauthored with Steven Mentor), "[T]he quadriplegic patient totally dependent on a vast array of high-tech equipment" is one of the best examples of a true cyborg.[45]

Gray frequently uses words like "invalid" and "patient" to refer to quadriplegics, terms that assume spinal cord injury to encompass the whole of one's identity. Right after introducing Reeve as the hero of a cyborg tale, Gray describes him as "a barely mobile creature, dependent on and intertwined with machines, a cybernetic organism trapped in power beds and wheelchairs."[46] This kind of language is directly related to Gray's depiction of quadriplegics as definitive cyborgs: if disability is all that is needed to render one cyborg, and disability is the sum of one's identity, then cyborg becomes one's identity. Quadriplegics, like Reeve, simply are cyborgs.[47]

This reduction of disabled people to their impairments, and their subsequent classification as cyborg, leads Gray to present disability politics in terms very different from those he uses in describing other political movements. Drawing on Haraway, Gray articulates the "cyborg citizen" as someone who recognizes the importance of crafting contingent alliances and engaging in dissent. Yet he praises Reeve for mobilizing a "united front of invalid cyborgs," describing how the late actor "catalyzed the unification" of disabled people in his quest for a cure.[48] This description is troubling for many reasons, perhaps most obviously for its implication that prior to Reeve's accident, people with mobility impairments were aimless, unconnected, and politically inactive, unable to participate in society. Gray's rhetoric suggests that not only is Reeve's quest for the cure the only appropriate response to disability, it is

also a quest that is shared by all disabled people.[49] What I want to highlight, though, is that Gray discusses politics as a process of unification and universal agreement *only* in terms of disability; elsewhere in his book he describes cyborg politics as contentious, diverse, and complicated, where one achieves or participates in "cyborg citizenship" through one's political acts. He primarily describes Reeve and his fellow "invalid cyborgs," however, in terms of their bodies, not their contentious acts, and repeatedly highlights their "unification." Thus, disability activists in general and Reeve in particular disappear when Gray moves on to articulate his politics of shifting and contingent alliances. This disappearance suggests that Gray is concerned with disability only insofar as he can use the disabled body as an illustration of human-machine interactions; disability as a complicated lived experience, and disabled people as a diverse group encompassing a range of opinions, are apparently not political, not in the realm of cyborg politics.

I focus on Gray because he offers such a clear example of the deployment of the disabled body in cyborg theory, but he is not alone in drawing this cyborg–disabled person connection, or in using Reeve as the exemplary cyborg. Cultural studies scholar Annie Potts, for example, begins her "taxonomy of cyborgs" by including Christopher Reeve alongside a list of science-fiction characters. Even though she goes on to list a range of cyborg criteria—most of them, I should note, medical or diagnostic—Reeve is the only human cyborg she mentions by name in her taxonomy.[50] By grouping him with fictional characters, she implies that his disability has rendered him less than human, or at least more cyborg than human. Journalists have followed suit, also using Reeve to describe cyborg technologies or to illustrate cyborgism.[51] This pattern is likely due in part to Reeve's celebrity; most readers are familiar with Reeve, making him an ideal case for explaining specific medical developments. But it is also due to the fact that the imagined figure of the quadriplegic—someone who uses a power wheelchair and ventilator—seems the perfect embodiment of popular understandings of the cyborg.[52] "Obviously," here is someone who transgresses boundaries between machine and organism, someone whose body doesn't end at the skin, someone who is, indisputably, a cyborg.

Thus the term "cyborg," rather than entailing a critique of existing categories and ideologies, is used to perpetuate distinctions between "normal" and "abnormal" bodies, distinctions that have material consequences involving discrimination, economic inequalities, and restricted access. If nondisabled people are persuaded by the assertion that disabled people are real-life cyborgs, then cyborg status signals a distinction between nondisabled people and disabled people. Cyborg qualities become markers of difference, suggesting an essential difference between disabled people and nondisabled people. Any potential transgressive tendencies in the term are lost when these labels become locked to certain bodies. "Cyborg" itself becomes reified, reduced to a particular kind of body.

"Paraplegics and Other Severely Handicapped" Cyborgs

It doesn't take long to realize that Haraway is someone who loves words.[53] Puns, alliterations, and unexpected pairings appear throughout her writing, and she frequently invents and combines words to illustrate her arguments. She plays extensively with language, and she does so consciously, explicitly; she is always quick to remind us of the multiple meanings of the words at hand. This play is integral to her politics: "If we are imprisoned by language, then escape from that prison-house requires language poets," she asserts, and "cyborg heteroglossia is one form of radical cultural politics."[54] Given the importance Haraway attributes to words, language, and stories, I want to pay close attention to the exact way in which she names disabled people in the cyborg manifesto. In the essay's final section, she writes, "Perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization."[55] With that parenthetical "sometimes," Haraway leaves open the possibility that some disabled people might not achieve cyborgian hybridization, but states that those who do reach it experience "the most intense" versions of it. In noting that intensity, Haraway positions disability as one of the best means of achieving cyborgian boundary-blurring, suggesting that people with disabilities are exemplary cyborgs. Indeed, disabled people are one of the few types of "real-life cyborgs" hailed in the text.

When Haraway names "paraplegics and other severely handicapped people," she draws on the outdated (at least in the United States) language of "handicap."[56] At first glance, this terminology might be seen as a symptom of its time. First published in 1985, five years before the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the manifesto could simply bear the traces of a time before the disability rights movement became more mainstream. Although many disability rights activists began calling for "people-first" language in the 1970s ("people with disabilities" as opposed to "disabled people") and referring to "disability" rather than "handicap," we might assume that Haraway, like many Americans, was unaware of such shifts in 1983, when she began the piece.[57] Legislation passed in the 1970s, for example, employed the language of "handicap," while later laws used "disability."[58] Yet, in the footnote attached to that sentence, Haraway uses the language of "the disabled/differently abled" and makes a quick reference to "the always context-relative social definitions of 'ableness.'"[59]

Why the difference? If Haraway were aware of the usage of "disabled," why did she deploy "severely handicapped" in the text, and not once but twice? My suspicion is that she needed to evoke in her readers an image of a person completely dependent on technology, an image of a body that could not possibly exist without a technological intervention. "Severe" plays in to exactly this notion, suggesting the most disabled bodies, the bodies most in need of rehabilitation and intervention.[60] "Handicapped" serves a similar purpose. Unlike "disabled," which potentially has more political overtones, or even "differently abled," which can be seen as a (naïve and unsuccessful) attempt to break down able-bodied/disabled binaries, "handicapped" is thoroughly immersed in

individual, medical, and charity models of disability. It is a label that makes it easier to see all disabled people as monolithically bound to their adaptive equipment and, relatedly, makes it harder to notice the lack of attention to the experiences or perspectives of disabled people.

It is useful here to note that the one example Haraway gives of such "severely handicapped people" is not a real person but a fictional character from Anne McCaffrey's *The Ship Who Sang*: a "severely handicapped child" who was so physically disabled that her only hope of survival was to have her brain removed from her body and placed inside a machine (the spaceship of the title). While Haraway celebrates the story for its challenge to assumptions about "[g]ender, sexuality, and embodiment," it certainly echoes longstanding ableist assumptions about the uselessness of physically disabled bodies and the necessity of the technological fix, even—or especially—one that destroys the disabled body altogether. But Haraway needed just such a figure to make her argument about the cyborg; she was relying on her readers having an idea of what "severe handicap" looks like, an idea as fictional as the one in the story. In other words, she needed the stereotyped assumption that "severe handicap" means "total dependence" in order to convince her readers of the existence of bodies that don't "end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by skin," the passage that immediately follows the reference to disability.[61]

Haraway's reference to disabled bodies serves as the bridge between her discussion of two groups of texts, the work of US women of color and feminist science fiction.[62] Although the disability passage makes reference to McCaffrey's fiction, it occurs before Haraway explicitly moves into her "very partial reading of the logic of the cyborg monsters" in feminist science fiction.[63] The "severely handicapped" girl in McCaffrey's story thus serves as the segue into that reading, but structurally, she remains apart from it. It is hard, then, to read disability or disabled bodies as active participants in the cyborg politics Haraway articulates. Disabled people serve neither as the creators of cyborg writing (they are not included in "women of color" or the authors of science fiction) nor as the subjects of feminist literary criticism. Nor, for that matter, as the active subjects in their own narratives: while Haraway uses the passive tense to describe the cyborg political work of *The Ship Who Sang* ("Gender, sexuality, embodiment, skill: all were reconstituted in the story"), she employs the active tense to describe the work of the characters in stories that do not hinge on the character's disabilities.[64] In other words, although Haraway recognizes the potential insights to be derived from the experience of living with disability technology, casting disability as a challenge to "organic holism," she presents disability in remarkably monolithic terms, as a single, universal experience. Moreover, it is one that can best be described by referencing a text of science fiction, one that presents disability as the site of spectacular technological fixing. Several paragraphs later, she mentions "[u]nseparated twins and hermaphrodites," other sites of disability, but only as the monsters of early modern France.[65] The disabled body, then, is figured within the manifesto as the creature of

futuristic fiction or the monstrous past; disabled bodies are, once again, cast as out of time. Disability may be a site of "complex hybridization," and disabled bodies may exemplify the cyborg, but their cyborgization appears as a type apart from the rest of the cyborg politics discussed here.

Haraway's naming practices are one of the most troubling aspects of the manifesto, and not only in terms of disability. Looking carefully at which kinds of bodies, or which identities, get positioned as cyborg makes clear the universalizing assumptions that operate within the text. Early in the essay, Haraway pairs two groups of women as cyborgs: "Ironically, it might be the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing in Santa Rita jail whose constructed unities will guide effective oppositional strategies."[66] (Spiral dancing, she explains in a note at the bottom of the page, is "a practice at once both spiritual and political that linked guards and arrested anti-nuclear demonstrators at the Alameda County jail in the early 1980s.") While Haraway does not explicitly explain her reasons for this naming, she does hint at the processes making these women cyborgs. The Asian factory workers can be called cyborg because of their place in globalized capitalism. It is through their work in the assembly line, and their location in a region where multinational corporations can cut labor and safety costs, that they participate in the global economy. Their "nimble fingers," a description indebted to colonialist and racist stereotypes, link their bodies to the machines they are building. Based on Haraway's stated preference for affinity politics, it can be inferred that the Santa Rita protestors are cyborg because their anti-nuclear activism is based on coalition politics and affinity groups. Haraway may also position the protestors as cyborgs to stress that there is no position outside of technology; even as they protest certain manifestations of the technological age, they are simultaneously implicated in those same technologies.

Haraway gestures toward the reasons behind this naming, but she does not provide them, and it is that lack I want to highlight. Why is the act of Asian women making chips seen as self-explanatory, while the spiral dance requires definition? Spiral dancing may not be common knowledge, but neither are the reasons why assembling computer chips makes one "cyborg." Moreover, are there not differences between the kinds of activities and subjectivities Haraway links here—protestor and worker, jail and factory, Asia and the United States—that need exploring? Or what about the layers of history and assumption that lead to the differences in scale in Haraway's parallel, a single jail in a town in California versus the much more general, and generalizable, "Asia"?[67] In the next paragraph, Haraway goes on to praise "transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities," and it is exciting to imagine what progressive work might be made possible by drawing links between such seemingly disparate groups and situations. At the same time, I'm left to wonder about the different effects of naming such groups "cyborg," questioning the consequences of making a global generalization based on a concept that developed in a particular historical moment.

I am not alone in these questions. Malini Johar Schueller, for example, argues that simply pairing these groups of women, linking them with an undertheorized "and," fails to attend to the differences in their location. While an alliance between these two groups of women could be "energizing and powerful," Schueller argues that "it cannot be articulated without an acknowledgment of the spatio-political difference of the demonstrators that positions them, in however weak a fashion, as beneficiaries of globalization and with different interests than Asian women laborers who, in the interests of feeding their families, might not always join the protestors against multinationals."[68] Joan Walloch Scott worries that Haraway's naming of women of color as cyborg adheres to an all-too-familiar pattern of white women idealizing, and thus otherizing, women of color as repositories of wisdom; "What," she asks, "is the difference between Haraway's looking to these groups for the politics of the future and . . . the romantic attribution by white liberal or socialist women to minority or working-class women of the appropriate (if not authentic) socialist or feminist politics?"[69]

Haraway herself acknowledges this problem during an interview with Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, who also question her choice to illustrate cyborgism in these terms. Haraway agrees that her "narrative partly ends up further imperializing, say, the Malaysian factory worker," noting that if she were to rewrite the manifesto, she would be much more cautious about attributing cyborgism to others. She goes on to speak of the need for a whole range of boundary creatures, in the hopes that expanding the kind of figures in her imaginary would reduce the imperialist effects of the cyborg; "Could there be," she hopes, "a family of figures who would populate our imagination of these postcolonial, postmodern worlds that would not be quite as imperializing in terms of a single figuration of identity?"[70]

Many other theorists join Penley and Ross in challenging Haraway's assertion that "we" are all cyborgs, echoing Haraway's later remarks about the ways in which the manifesto romanticizes and imperializes Asian factory workers. From Scott (who still finds the manifesto compelling) to Schueller (who does not), a range of feminist theorists have challenged Haraway's use of these women to illustrate her theory. None of them, however, question Haraway's connection between disabled people and cyborgs, none see parallels between the use of "third world women" as illustrations in first-world theory and the use of disabled people.[71] This lack of recognition, in my view, is the result of the depoliticization of disability and disabled bodies. Many feminist theorists have the tools and the training to recognize the imperializing move behind Haraway's description of the cyborged factory workers (or at least have the tools to recognize it once it has been pointed out to them) but lack the familiarity with disability studies to recognize these characterizations of disability as equally problematic, equally contentious. And this positioning, this generalization about (and, indeed, construction of) a particular group of people is seen as unremarkable, as benign and disinterested statement of fact rather than partial and contested interpretation.

Thus, in stark contrast to the controversy generated by Haraway's assertion that Asian women factory workers are real-life cyborgs, identifying disabled people with cyborgs is widely accepted without question. Labeling disabled people "cyborgs" is apparently without troubling implications or effects; such a move, even by nondisabled theorists, is not seen to require any self-examination or critical analysis. In making this contrast, I do not mean to suggest that race has already been adequately addressed in cyborg theory, or that we have solved the "problem" of race. As the editors of *Race in Cyberspace* note, references to the gendered cyborg abound, but texts exploring the race of the cyborg are fewer and farther between.[72] Rather, I am simply drawing attention to the fact that even as the cyborg continues to be bandied about in feminist, queer, and disability theory, we as cultural critics have still to reckon with its unspoken assumptions about bodies and physical difference.

What stands out in Haraway's analysis, then, is its reliance on narrow understandings of disability. She offers disabled people as exemplary hybrids, but without any examination of what such hybridization might feel like or entail. Disability may be an excellent site for witnessing the blurring of human and technology, but not, apparently, for exploring actual experiences of such blurring. Indeed, such experiences are collapsed under the category of "paraplegics and other severely handicapped people," a category which is itself presented as coherent and monolithic. Moreover, moving beyond the human/machine interface seems to require leaving disability behind: once Haraway moves into discussions about political identification, or shifting affinities, or future formations, disability and the disabled figure drop away altogether. Disability and disabled people are decontextualized, removed from the realm of the political, and presumed to play no active role in the category breakdowns that animate both the cyborg and the manifesto.

Cyborg Attachments

Given all these problems with the cyborg figure, perhaps it is time to move on. Not only do some scholars find the figure "somewhat tired and tiresome from academic overuse," but even Haraway herself has turned her attention elsewhere.[73] The concept of "companion species" has become her focus of late, particularly the co-constitutiveness of dogs and humans. Although the cyborg continues to surface in her work, it serves more often as a contrast to the dog or dogs; as she puts it, cyborgs "no longer do the work of a proper herding dog to gather up the threads needed for critical inquiry."[74]

Although I share Haraway's enthusiasm for the possibilities of companion species, and think that disability studies has much to offer those conversations, "A Cyborg Manifesto" and the cyborg figure continue to entice. Calls for replacement or successor figures and tropes (e.g., Ingrid Bartsch, Carolyn DiPalma, and Laura Sells discuss the vampire, and Sara Cohen Shabot recommends the grotesque) seem to bring their own problems for disability studies; the work of Margrit Shildrick demonstrates that, at the very least, the monstrous and the grotesque require their own careful readings and

cannot be simple substitutes.[75] Moreover, Haraway's recent focus on dog agility practices, a competition that insists on the able-bodiedness of its dogs if not its humans, leaves me looking back longingly at the cyborg.[76]

And this longing is not despite its gaps and oversights, but because of them. In other words, one of the things that most appeals to me about the cyborg figure is its multiple, and often contradictory, deployments. Its very unpredictability is precisely what makes it such an important and potentially useful concept; its fluidity and permeability make it difficult to lock it permanently in to any one set of meanings. As Christina Crosby argues, it is "dynamic, mobile, [and] programmable, which makes the cyborg incalculably dangerous in the form of a cruise missile, but also offers opportunities that haven't yet been calculated for forming new alliances, new affinity groups, new coalitions."[77]

What I find most promising about Haraway's cyborg figure is its history—and present—in feminist activism and scholarship. As Zoë Sofoulis maps, the manifesto has played an integral role not only in the development of feminist science and technology studies but also in theories of architecture, anthropology, and literary criticism.[78] The pervasiveness of the manifesto makes clear its continued influence on critical theory; for example, Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle chose to include the piece in their *Transgender Studies Reader,* even though the manifesto never explicitly takes up trans identities, because of its examination of how "marginalized embodied positions" are "politically charged sites of struggle."[79] In its ubiquity, the manifesto, and the cyborg as figured in it, can serve as a resource for vital cross-movement work. It is easy to imagine the potent fusions and fruitful couplings that can result from a meeting of disability studies and transgender studies, for example, including examinations of how scholars in both fields have used and challenged the cyborg. It is exactly this kind of cross-pollination that I want disability studies to nurture and extend, and the manifesto facilitates such work because cross-pollination was key to its inception. Haraway derived the figure, at least in part, from her readings of women of color, and from their attempts to forge multi-issue coalitions and communities. Fiction writer Octavia Butler, essayist Cherríe Moraga, theorist Chela Sandoval: each influenced Haraway's articulation of the cyborg, offering insights into a feminist politics based on fluid identities, border crossings, and partialities.

As disability studies continues to wrestle with the figure, we have over two decades' worth of queer, feminist, and women of color criticism to draw on and learn from. Not only can we return to the manifesto itself, mining it for nuggets of antiracist feminism or coalition politics, but we can, and should, examine the wealth of feminist theory that has similarly pushed and extended the cyborg and its manifesto. For the remainder of this section, I want to offer a brief overview of some of these critiques, partly to acknowledge the ways in which my own thinking is indebted to them, partly to insist on their centrality to cyborg theory, and partly to recognize them as relevant and integral to disability studies.

Chela Sandoval traces this heritage in her own work, reminding Haraway's audience that the cyborg figure is a direct descendant of what Sandoval refers to as "US third world feminism." Cyborg conceptions of the fluidity between self and other, of the importance of transgressing boundaries and borders, are "analogous to that called for in contemporary indigenous writings where tribes or lineages are identified out of those who share, not blood lines, but rather lines of affinity. Such lines of affinity occur through attraction, combination, and relation carved out of and in spite of difference, and they are what comprise the notion of mestizaje in the writings of people of color." Too many cyborg theorists, Sandoval laments, ignore this aspect of the manifesto's genealogy, attributing the notion of "affinity-through-difference" to Haraway alone.[80]

While Sandoval addresses the ways in which the cyborg has been taken up by others, Malini Johar Schueller and Mariana Ortega focus their critiques directly on Haraway and her manifesto. For both authors, Haraway's treatment of the writings of women of color is troubling; although Haraway repeatedly lifts up "women of color" as a political position achieved through struggle not natural identity, they argue that she simultaneously homogenizes the writings of women of color. In their readings, Haraway is far too quick to assume that all chicanas feel the same way about *La Malinche* or engage in the same struggles over language and identity.[81]

By including these critiques alongside my disability reading, I am aware that I run the risk of presenting the critiques as analogical: disability functions "like race" in cyborg theory, or "just as" women of color have been marginalized within the manifesto, "so too" have disabled people. These kinds of analogical moves are all too common in disability studies (and beyond), and they unfortunately have the result of obfuscating the relationships between disability and race rather than illuminating them. But it is my hope that exploring these critiques together—the disability critique and the race critique (labels that are themselves part of the problem)—will enrich and extend existing readings of both disability studies and "A Cyborg Manifesto." As Abby Wilkerson explains, the manifesto raises questions about what it means to be an ally, questions that arise partly out of the manifesto's explicit framing, and partly out of the manifesto's unacknowledged gaps and erasures.[82] One of my goals in this chapter, then, is to use both the manifesto and its critics to think through how to do cross-movement work within disability studies and, relatedly, how to draw on the critiques of women-of-color theorists without merely analogizing race and disability or universalizing the experiences and categories of race and disability.

Continuing a crip engagement with the cyborg—a *critical* crip engagement—is a way for disability studies to participate in these discussions. Decades after its original publication, the manifesto remains a site of provocative, rich, creative feminist scholarship, work that can enrich disability studies in unexpected ways. Using the cyborg in disability studies, then, means not only reading Haraway and the manifesto but delving into the many critiques and retellings of the manifesto, not all of which are faithful to their origins.

Pushing the Cyborg: Cripping Cyborg Politics

Donna Haraway insists that the cyborg is about both pleasure and responsibility; she positions her manifesto as "an argument for *pleasure* in the confusion of boundaries and for *responsibility* in their construction."[83] Thinking through what it means to approach the cyborg from a disability studies or crip theory perspective requires this kind of dual move, this simultaneous holding of pleasure and responsibility. In her book-length interview with Donna Haraway, *How Like a Leaf*, Thyrza Nichols Goodeve asks Haraway if the pervasiveness of the cyborg figure disturbs her, if she feels it has been distorted by its many appropriations, gaps, and uses. Haraway responds,

> I think the cyborg still has so much potential. Part of how I work is not to walk away when a term gets dirty and is used in all these appropriate and inappropriate ways because of its celebrity. Instead such uses just make me want to push the reality of the cyborg harder. . . . So instead of giving it up because it has become too famous let's keep pushing it and filling it.[84]

Following Haraway, then, this section "pushes and fills" the cyborg in order to imagine feminist queer crip futures.

"Pushing" the figure from a disability perspective entails bringing a disability consciousness to the cyborg, attending to the specific benefits and dangers it harbors for disabled people. This shift requires an acknowledgment that human/machine interfaces are not always beneficial or pleasurable; an awareness that many disabled people lack access to the cybertechnologies so highly praised in cyborg writing; an accounting for the ways in which cybertechnologies rely on disabling labor practices across the globe; and a realization that not all disabled people are interested in technological cures or fixes. Each of these elements takes cyborgology away from its traditional use of disability as metaphor, and toward an understanding of disability in political and social context. In so doing, they also—and ironically—bring cyborg theory closer to the promise of Haraway's manifesto, a promise of a fully situated cyborg that refuses easy celebrations of human/technology connections.

A non-ableist cyborg politics refuses to isolate those of us cyborged through illness or disability from other cyborgs. Disabled people, in other words, can no longer be cast as modeling a cyborged existence that nondisabled people have yet to achieve. Such a move only strengthens the abled/disabled binary, suggesting that disabled people are fundamentally and essentially different from nondisabled people. If, as Haraway and others argue, technoculture is pervasive, then disabled people are not alone in the cyborgian realm. Cyborg theory could then turn itself to interrogations, for example, of why the very same technology is alternately described as "assistive" or "time-saving" depending on whether a disabled or nondisabled person is using it.[85] In this framework, "cyborg" becomes an opportunity for exploring or interrogating the abled/disabled binary.

We can still discuss medical cyborgs, but why not do so in a way that actually engages with the insights and experiences of such cyborgs? We could explore what such identifications or characterizations might mean to them, or how they might themselves frame cyborg discourse. These kinds of discussions can enrich our understandings of cyborg technology and, in turn, extend our theoretical framings of the cyborg. Tobin Siebers's reflections on the ways in which a leg brace increases both function and pain, for example, might serve to deepen our understanding of the cyborg's ambivalent relation to technology. A cripped cyborg theory would then warn against easy celebrations of the technological fix; it would require a more complex and ambivalent relationship with technology.

Or Nirmala Erevelles's insistence on attending to the material realities of those seen as cyborg can be a way of revisiting the figure's effectiveness for class analysis.[86] Gill Kirkup, one of the editors of *The Gendered Cyborg*, argues that few scholars have used the cyborg to address socialist feminism or engage in materialist analyses, even though the manifesto was explicitly written in the interest of both.[87] How might disability prompt a reexamination of the cyborg's ability to imagine a socialist-feminism in the early twenty-first century or to convince feminists (and disability studies scholars) of the need to attend more to issues of class in our work? Rather than simply repeat the "people with disabilities = cyborgs" equation, we might revisit Haraway's interrogation of the homework economy and the integrated circuit, using her critical frameworks to examine the ways in which disabled people are positioned in terms of efficiency, productivity, and ability to work, or lack thereof.

Or, to take yet another example, a disability studies approach can facilitate renewed attention to the cyborg as human-animal or human-human hybrid. To date, cyborg theorists have focused their energies almost entirely on technology, ignoring the possibilities of boundary transgression between human and organism, even though the latter was an integral part of Haraway's manifesto.[88] (It is this focus on the human-machine hybrid that prompted the fixation on disabled bodies.) A cyborged disability politics can provide astute theoretical insights into the boundary blurring that occurs between disabled people and our attendants, or between disabled people and our service animals, or among disabled people in community with each other and our allies: all experiences that point to a cyborgian understanding of interdependence, mutuality, and relationship.

Sociologist Rod Michalko writes about understanding the nature of blindness more fully through his relationship with his guide dog Smokie; he details how the boundaries of his body, of his awareness, shifted when working with Smokie, experiences that certainly could be productively mined by cyborg scholars.[89] Michalko describes a relationship not of straightforward instrumentalism or utility, but of integration and co-constitutiveness. Smokie is not mere tool but an opening into a new way or new understanding of "being in the world." As Cary Wolfe explains, the human–service dog relation is "neither *homo sapiens* nor *canis familiaris*, neither 'disabled'

nor 'normal,' but something else altogether, a shared trans-species being-in-the-world constituted by complex relations of trust, respect, dependence, and communication."[90] Examining the nature of such relations can not only extend theoretical framings of the cyborg but enrich emerging analyses of animality and the human.

Laura Hershey and Loree Erickson openly discuss their negotiations with personal attendants—an openness Erickson describes as being "out as a body"—and their work could similarly enrich existing understandings of the cyborg.[91] Erickson draws on phenomenology, for example, to articulate her relationship with attendants: "[M]y personal attendant and I, and our bodies," she writes, "are functioning as a self and as a unit," thereby breaking down the "dualism of singular self/combined unit."[92] Erickson is both singular and plural, neither fully "she" nor "they." The cyborg figure can offer a "theoretical prototype" for recognizing the ways in which such relationships push our notions of self and other, of body and boundary, of agency and interdependency.[93]

In other words, it is high time to explore how best to discuss the relationship between disability and cyborgism without facile references to disabled bodies as self-evident cyborgs simply by virtue of their use of "assistive" or "adaptive" technologies. Doing so will benefit not only disability studies but also cyborg theory and feminist critical theory more broadly. What I want to do for the remainder of this chapter, then, is sketch out alternative approaches to the cyborg, ones that crip the cyborg while still recognizing its frequently ableist deployments, ones that push disability studies in more feminist and queer directions.

Cripping the cyborg, developing a non-ableist cyborg politics, requires understanding disabled people as cyborgs not because of our *bodies* (e.g., our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of our *political practices*. In this framing, Erickson can be understood in terms of cyborgism not because she has a disability that requires her to utilize attendant care, but because she critically thinks through what such uses might mean. In her short film *Want*, for example, Erickson explains that she has collaborated with her friends, lovers, and community members to craft a network of attendants that operates outside of the larger health care system. In so doing, she offers a radical reinterpretation of what community can mean, of what living with a disability can mean. In both her film and her writings, Erickson seamlessly weaves together images of sex acts with other "activities of daily life," such as her attendants lifting her on and off the toilet; we move from scenes of Erickson sitting on the toilet to scenes of her having sex with her lover to scenes of her confronting inaccessible buildings. Again, her cyborgism is not so much about the fact that she needs attendants or uses a power wheelchair but rather that she uses her experiences with both technologies to force people—disabled and nondisabled—to confront our ableist assumptions about disability and sexuality.

Cripping the cyborg, in other words, means recognizing that our bodies are not separate from our political practices; neither assistive technologies nor our uses of them are ahistorical or apolitical. As anthropologist Steven Kurzman explains,

> I see cyborg more as a subject position than an identity, and believe it is more descriptive of my position vis-à-vis the relationships of production, delivery, and use surrounding my prosthesis than my actual physical interface with it. In other words, if I am to be interpellated as a cyborg, it is because my leg cost $11,000 and my HMO paid for it; because I had to get a job to get the health insurance; because I stand and walk with the irony that the materials and design of my leg are based in the same military technology which has blown the limbs off so many other young men; because the shock absorber in my foot was manufactured by a company which makes shock absorbers for bicycles and motorcycles, and can be read as a product of the post–Cold War explosion of increasingly engineered sports equipment and prostheses; and because the man who built my leg struggles to hold onto his small business in a field rapidly becoming vertically integrated and corporatized. I am not a cyborg simply because I wear an artificial limb.[94]

In tracing this prosthetic history, Kurzman recognizes his leg and the cyborg figure as political; his relationship to both, the prosthetic and the cyborg, is a political relationship, one embedded in larger histories, rhetorics, and economies.

Take, for example, the exoskeletons developed by Berkeley Bionics for both military and medical purposes; their products and promotional videos make clear the link between disability and the militarized cyborg. eLEGS is an exoskeleton that enables some paralyzed people to walk under certain conditions; according to Eythor Bender, the company's CEO, eLEGS are "built on the platform, or the legacy, of HULC (Human Universal Load Carrier)," a military application they licensed to Lockheed Martin.[95] The video touting HULC features multiple scenes of a man in fatigues wearing a HULC while he carries heavy loads over mountainous terrain. Jim Ni, the HULC program manager, explains that HULC was designed to facilitate soldiers carrying heavy weapons (one frame shows the soldier attaching a bomb to the front of the exoskeleton), thereby preventing back injuries and other repetitive-stress injuries associated with contemporary warfare. The same technology that enables a paraplegic to walk allows a soldier to kill more efficiently and ergonomically; cyborg ironies, indeed.[96]

Extending Kurzman's analysis, and reading it alongside the work of Erevelles, Siebers, and other crip theorists grappling critically with the cyborg, I want to provide a reading of the cyborg that places it within the realm of the political, moving it away from more essentialist readings that reduce it to particular kinds of (medicalized) bodies. Disability activists, communities, and movements often embody the kind of ironic, even blasphemous, politics that Haraway cast as necessary characteristics of the feminist cyborg. As Judy Rohrer argues, "Irony can help build the future-oriented, multiple-identity politics" we need, and disability politics offers a rich archive of ironic approaches to illness, disability, and the body.[97]

Haraway peppers her manifesto with ironic political slogans from her feminist no-nukes work, sharing the slogans of others as well as inventing her own: "Cyborgs for Earthly Survival!" and perhaps the most (in)famous, "I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess."[98] Her use of these phrases grounds her high theory in grassroots activism,

making clear that she is invested in the practical implications of her theoretical travels, and highlights her adherence to an ironic politics of blasphemy. In that spirit, I want to add another grassroots saying, one that does this same kind of ironic, blasphemous work: "Trached dykes eat pussy without coming up for air." Connie Panzarino, a long-time disability activist and out lesbian, would attach this sign to her wheelchair during Pride marches in Boston in the early 1990s. Shockingly explicit, her sign refuses to cast technology as cold, distancing, or disembodied/disembodying, presenting it instead as a source and site of embodied pleasure.

"Trach" is an abbreviation of tracheotomy, a medical procedure in which a breathing tube is inserted directly into the trachea, bypassing the mouth and nose. Someone with a trach, then, can, in effect, breathe through her throat, freeing her mouth for other activities (another version of this sign is "Trached dykes french kiss without coming up for air"). From a cyborgian perspective, this sign is brilliantly provocative and productive. It draws on the pervasive idea that adaptive technologies grant superior abilities, not merely replacing a lost capacity but enhancing it, yet it does so in a highly subversive way. The message here isn't about blending in, about passing as normal or hypernormal, but about publicly announcing the viability of a queer disabled location. It's disnormalizing, adamantly refusing compulsory heterosexuality, compulsory able-bodiedness, and homonormativity. As Corbett O'Toole argues, it challenges the perceived passivity of disabled women, presenting them as actively pleasuring their partners, thereby graphically refuting stereotypes linking physical disability with nonsexuality.[99]

The context of the sign is as important as its content. In sharp contrast to the disabled people in cyborg texts, who are presented as isolated individuals communing only with their technology, the woman with the sign is in public, participating in a political and social community. She is actively involved in shaping that community, extending the notion of "pride" to apply not only to her sexuality but also to her disability; indeed, she presents the two as erotically and productively inseparable. Appearing in such a public context, the sign can be read as an aggressive rebuke of the discourses of charity, pity, and tragedy that circulate around disabled bodies; in a direct challenge to the infantilization of "Jerry's kids," this woman proclaims herself a sexually active and actively consenting adult.

And she does so with a blasphemous humor born of community. For those unfamiliar with queer crip culture, Panzarino's sign might fly under the radar; those unaware of the workings of a tracheotomy might not understand the sexual promise of such a procedure. For queer crips, however, the sign is a revelation, a locating of pleasure not only in the body-technology interface but in the disabled body itself. In a culture in which technological and medical advances are constantly being touted for their ability to eliminate disability, to reduce the numbers of disabled bodies in the future, Panzarino asserts the value of those bodies, of her body.

Similarly, Laura Hershey becomes a cyborg not simply because of her use of a power chair or a ventilator, but because of her commitment to coalition politics and

transformative social practices. A poet, essayist, and longtime activist, Hershey served as a "poster child" for the Muscular Dystrophy Association (MDA) in 1973–74, appearing on posters and other promotional material encouraging (nondisabled) donors to contribute to the organization. The MDA's stated goal is to "conquer neuromuscular disease," and its primary means of meeting this goal is through the selection of poster children and an annual Labor Day telethon, long associated with Jerry Lewis. Hershey's body, and the bodies of other children like her, was used to advocate for a "cure," although "cure" is code here for a combination of prenatal testing, selective abortion, and/or prenatal therapy. Hershey, in other words, was expected to raise money for research into how to prevent children like her from ever being born. In a blasphemous irony befitting cyborg politics, Hershey has since become one of the leaders in the anti-telethon movement, condemning the poster-child rhetoric to which she was subjected as a child. Working with a network of ex–poster children, disability rights activists, and nondisabled allies, Hershey is a fierce and vocal opponent of Jerry Lewis's annual MDA telethon, lambasting Lewis and the organization for their ableist attitudes toward disabled people; when Lewis remarked in a 2001 interview that "cripple[s] in wheelchairs" should "stay in [their] house" if they want to avoid pity, Hershey and her comrades took to the streets, highlighting Lewis's remarks as indicative of the tragic model of disability that permeates charity organizations.[100] In 2009, when Jerry Lewis won the Jean Hersholt Humanitarian Award from the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences, a group of activists, including Hershey, organized a protest of the Oscar ceremonies.[101]

From a cyborg perspective, I am enticed by Hershey's provocative relationship to medical technologies. On the one hand, her very survival relies on this technology, a technology made possible by the medical industrial complex that supports and is supported by organizations like the MDA. On the other hand, she uses this technology to make her activism possible, activism that is often committed to interrogating the very system that she relies on. Hershey, in other words, is well-positioned to recognize the complexities of technology and biomedicine. As Haraway made clear in the manifesto, simple technophilia or technophobia is untenable; what we need to do is to take responsibility for the social relations of science and technology.[102] By tracing the effects of cure ideologies and pity narratives, by highlighting the economic assumptions and mechanisms of the telethon, Hershey and her comrades push for exactly this kind of responsibility without naively abandoning such technology altogether. Yet if Hershey were to be described in cyborg terms, most theorists would ignore these savvy negotiations, focusing only on her position in a wheelchair. Reducing Hershey to a cyborg because of her wheelchair or breathing tube ignores her cyborg political practices, thereby perpetuating the depoliticization of disability and disabled people.

In common parlance, Hershey and Panzarino could be considered "severely disabled" (Haraway's "severely handicapped"). They rely on power wheelchairs; they employ personal attendants to assist them in their daily activities; and their chronic

impairments occasionally lead to medical crises, particularly respiratory ones. For most cyborg theorists, the story would stop there, serving as a perfect illustration of the ways in which (certain) bodies don't end at the skin. Indeed, in this framework, the more severely disabled one is, the more cyborgian, because the more likely to be using high-tech medical equipment and adaptive technologies. A cripped cyborg politics, however, refuses to stop with this kind of recitation of diagnosis or condition. Following Robert McRuer, "severe" can be read as defiance, fierceness, critique; the "severity" of these women's impairments is due not to their perceived failures to adhere to normative expectations of movement, flexibility, or appearance, but to their public "call[ing] out [of] the inadequacies of compulsory able-bodiedness."[103] Rather than reduce these activists' experiences to the details of their impairment, let us focus instead on their complex and contradictory negotiations with technology, or on the ways in which such negotiations lead to questions about community, responsibility, pleasure, and complicity.[104]

Bradley Lewis draws on Haraway's cyborg theory for precisely these reasons, arguing that the cyborg can help us better understand Prozac and the domination of psychopharmacology. Critical science studies and, in particular, cyborg theory make it possible for us to recognize the stories we tell about Prozac *as* stories, as narratives, and thereby deserving of an attentive read. Cyborg theory, argues Lewis, enables us to ask "local political questions of *consequences* and *inclusion*."[105] The cyborg, in demanding responsibility and critique, pushes progressives to engage with technoscience, to inquire into the effects and assumptions of emerging technologies. Lewis urges attention to Haraway's mode of critique, her ability to challenge the simplistic binaries and dualisms that prevent a taking of responsibility. Prozac, he argues, "is not clearly oppressive or liberatory. It is a contradictory mixture of both—sometimes one more than another, but always both. This makes the problem not Prozac itself but the politics of representation surrounding the production and circulation of Prozac discourse."[106]

Michelle O'Brien echoes this contradictory approach, arguing for greater attention to the politics of prescription drugs. Just as Kurzman sees his prosthetic leg as a nexus of overlapping biomedical, military, and economic discourses, O'Brien positions her use of prescription medications as a practice demanding contextualization within a wider political economy.[107] She traces the manufacturer of each medication, discusses where she obtains the syringes she needs for injections (leading to a brief rumination on HIV/AIDS, the war on drugs, and needle-exchange programs in Philadelphia), and describes the politics of health care that lead her to purchase these medications out of pocket, online, and away from a "proper" provider. As a trans woman, she is "invisible" to her health insurance company yet dependent on her medications, and it is this contradictory stance that leads her to the cyborg.[108] Inspired by Haraway's manifesto, she describes her position within biomedicine as contradictory, ironic, subversive. She may be interfacing with corporate medicine, but she does so "improperly."[109] The cyborg, O'Brien argues, offers a way to approach the medical industrial complex that

does not privilege "isolation, purity, or refusal" but recognizes the potential to interact unfaithfully with the medical system. As she puts it, "If your survival depends on substantially accessing global pharmaceutical industries, a politics of purity and non-participation just doesn't get you that far."[110]

Like O'Brien, Dean Spade recognizes that many trans people's reliance on medical institutions necessitates a contradictory politics. He explains that some transgender advocates have turned to state disability laws as a potential site of relief from gender discrimination; filing such claims, however, requires that transgendered people be diagnosed with and identify as having gender identity disorder, or GID.[111] GID is controversial within trans communities, with many activists wary of its identification of gender difference as pathology. As Spade writes, "I do not want to make trans rights dependent upon GID diagnoses, because such diagnoses are not accessible to many low-income people; because I believe that the diagnostic and treatment processes for GID are regulatory and promote a regime of coercive binary gender; and because I believe that GID is still being misused by some mental health practitioners as a basis for involuntary psychiatric treatment for gender transgressive people."[112] At the same time, because "many trans people's lives are entangled with medical establishments," their best hope is a medical diagnosis and the recognition and access to services it entails.[113] In describing the strategic use of medical models of difference, Spade carefully maps the implications of such uses, challenging ableism within trans communities while detailing the risks of disability identification. Reading Lewis, O'Brien, and Spade together reveals that neither medical technologies nor diagnoses can be characterized as purely oppressive or politically neutral. As Haraway's cyborg insists, cyborg bodies are "maps of power," requiring ironic, doubled, contradictory responses.

"Cyborg" is not the only way to describe activists such as Hershey or Panzarino, nor is it the only way to frame their political practices and activist alliances. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that they would use it to identify themselves, finding other ways to characterize coalition politics or permeable identities. I want to be clear that I am not arguing that these activists are "real" cyborgs, or that "cyborg" is the best mode for conceptualizing their activist strategies and theoretical standpoints. We can describe the fluid nature of disability or articulate a disability politics that embraces contradiction and ambiguity without referencing Haraway or deploying the figure of the cyborg. Moreover, the cyborg figure may be more useful in examining some disabilities than others; it might be less effective in explorations of blindness than deafness, for example, or Down syndrome than amputation. At the risk of undercutting my argument, I want to acknowledge that cyborg theory is not necessary.

It may not be necessary, but, at the same time, it can help us do necessary work. Cyborg theory remains one of the few places that disabled people, and particularly disabled bodies, are present in contemporary critical theory, and I think it is essential for disability studies scholars to attend to the specificities of those appearances. Moreover,

rather than simply allow these representations to talk about us, we can intervene directly in them, adhering to the tradition of critical intervention of Haraway's original manifesto. How can we, by intervening in cyborg theory, wage our own multiple, often contradictory, critical interventions in feminist theory, in queer politics, in radical reimaginings of the future?

As I have suggested here, for the cyborg to guide us elsewhere, to lead us toward a more livable space, we must look to the cyborg as a guide for political practice, not strictly as a description of our physical bodies. Pushing the cyborg into an anti-ableist politics means refusing its reduction to the disabled body, refusing to use the figure to shore up binaries of normate/other or abled/disabled. It means recognizing the transgressive political practices of activists such as Hershey, Panzarino, and Spade, recognizing their work in forging coalitions and actions.

Cyborg Histories, Cyborg Futures

Although many analyses of the cyborg begin with Haraway, she was not the first researcher to use the figure in imagining a desired future. In a 1960 issue of *Astronautics*, scientists Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline offered up the cyborg, or "cybernetic organism," as a way to imagine human flourishing in space.[114] The two had been invited by NASA to address potential medical problems related to human space travel, and they explored the possibilities of biochemically, electronically, and physiologically modifying the human body.[115] They described their solutions as a mixture of "presently available knowledge and techniques" and "projections into the future."[116] What they imagined, based on experiments with rats, was the ability to implant humans with osmotic pumps that would permit "continuous injections of chemicals at a controlled slow rate."[117] The pumps would be implanted subcutaneously and programmed so as to require no effort or attention from the astronaut. They could then be stocked with medications appropriate for space travel; pumps might carry drugs preventing radiation sickness or fatigue, for example. One of Clynes and Kline's "future projections" involved the "strong possibility" that astronauts would experience psychotic episodes but be incapable of recognizing that anything was awry; what was needed, they argued, was the ability to "[trigger] administration of the medication remotely from earth or by a companion," medication that could include "high-potency phenothiazines together with reserpine."[118]

As this last scenario might suggest, Clynes and Kline both worked in psychiatric research; their work with NASA supplemented their jobs as researchers at Rockland State Hospital, in Orangeburg, New York. Kline founded a psychiatric research center at the hospital in 1952, and he spent most of his career building the center into a major site for drug research, development, and clinical trials. He hired Clynes to work in the hospital's Dynamic Simulation Laboratory in 1955, where the latter worked on physiological instrumentation and data-processing systems. Although Clynes eventually left Rockland, Kline remained there until his death in 1982, and the research facility now

bears his name (the Nathan S. Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research). According to the institute's website, Kline is "best known for his pioneering work with psychopharmacologic drugs," particularly his success with tranquilizers and antidepressants.[119] Inspired by these successes, and eager to spread the word about the efficacy of psychopharmacology, Kline wrote a mass-market paperback titled *From Sad to Glad*; first published in 1974, the 1989 edition featured the tagline, "Depression: You can conquer it without analysis." Kline's faith in drugs is evident in the article he coauthored with Clynes, "Cyborgs and Space," in which their imagined osmotic pumps deliver medicine that cures everything from radiation sickness to fatigue to psychosis.

It is this last condition, psychosis, that brings me up short. In their article, Clynes and Kline suggest that astronauts are unlikely to recognize when they have had a psychotic break (explaining that delusion and denial are common symptoms of psychosis) and will need to be involuntarily medicated by remote control. I do not know enough about the mental or emotional effects of space travel to evaluate their concern, but I cannot read their recommendation without being reminded of the two scientists' location in a state mental institution, one where many, if not most, of the patients were placed indefinitely and heavily medicated. Moreover, some of them likely served as research subjects for Kline's drug trials, trials that appear to have been grueling for the patients. In his early research on reserpine as a treatment for schizophrenia, Kline noted that for the first two to three weeks of treatment,

> patients are frightened by the feeling that they have "no control" over their impulses. Some feel that they "do not know what they are going to do next," and in point of fact may begin screaming and throw themselves to the floor. . . . Delusions and hallucinations increase and behavior not infrequently becomes more disturbed than prior to the beginning of treatment.[120]

As the treatment continued, Kline apparently thought that the patients eventually showed improvement, but it is hard to read this description without questioning the ethics of drug trials on institutionalized patients.

Rockland was infamous for its poor and negligent behavior toward patients. Overcrowding was rampant in the 1940s and 1950s, and the institution was repeatedly charged with contributing to, if not causing, the deaths of numerous patients by giving them lethal amounts of tranquilizers—to keep patients "under control"—or prescribing drugs that, in combination, are fatal. Accusations of rape and malnourishment were also lodged against workers and group homes affiliated with Rockland.[121] Although state commissions and investigations consistently rejected these charges, the frequency of such claims gives me pause.

Indeed, this connection to the warehousing of people with mental illnesses and intellectual disabilities in state institutions—and all that entails, from medical negligence to medical experimentation to physical and sexual abuse—should be enough to give any cyborg theorist, especially one identified with disability studies, pause. Haraway makes clear from the start that the cyborg is dangerous, non-innocent, and

complicit; the only way to approach the figure is in the spirit of ironic blasphemy, turning the figure against its very origins. And Bradley Lewis's use of the figure to critique the same psychopharmaceutical industry that originally birthed the cyborg seems the perfect illustration of such blasphemy. We need more such disability studies perspectives. Yet part of that work must include a reckoning, an acknowledgement, of the cyborg's history in institutionalization and abuse. Otherwise the irony, the blasphemy, the critique, is lost.

I close with this story to insist, alongside both Haraway and her critics, that the cyborg is not innocent. Our metaphors, our tropes, our analogies: all have histories, all have consequences. As Hiram Perez argues, part of the work of the critic is to explore the effects texts and images have on people's lives.[122] The blurring of boundaries, the permeability of bodies, the porousness of skin—all take on different meanings depending on whether they are viewed through the prism of institutionalization or as part of a strategy of feminist analysis. Arguing for the breakdown between self and other, body and machine, takes on a different hue in the context of coercive medical experimentation and confinement. The cyborg, in other words, can be used to map many futures, not all of them feminist, crip, or queer.

Haraway herself acknowledges this fact, warning us from the beginning of the cyborg's complicity in militarization, colonization, and control. Yet it remains a figure of feminist possibility, pointing toward a feminist futurity or, in Haraway's framing, "an elsewhere, not as a utopian fantasy or relativist escape, but an elsewhere born out of the hard (and sometimes joyful) work of getting on together."[123] To return to the epigraph that begins this chapter, "who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival."[124] This question has political, ethical, and epistemic dimensions, and answering it will require grappling with the histories and futures described here. It is a question I urge us to ask. If, as Haraway claims, "cyborgs are the people who refuse to disappear on cue," then the cyborg may very well be a perfect figure for refusing the erasure of disability from our presents and futures.[125] But in the spirit, if not the practice, of Haraway's manifesto, I argue for responsibility in making such claims.

26. Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 227–34; Betty Sasaki, "Toward a Pedagogy of Coalition," *Twenty-First-Century Feminist Classrooms: Pedagogies of Identity and Difference*, ed. Amie A. MacDonald and Susan Sánchez-Casal (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 33.

27. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, 10th anniversary ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), viii. See also Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange,* ed. Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser (New York: Routledge, 1995), 50–51; and Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993), 8.

28. Susan Stewart, of the Kiss and Tell Collective, notes, "Some of us have been reading across the grain for so long that our eyes have splinters." Kiss and Tell, *Her Tongue on my Theory* (Vancouver: Press Gang, 1994), 51.

29. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "The Politics of Staring: Visual Rhetorics of Disability in Popular Photography," *Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities*, ed. Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (New York: Modern Language Association, 2002), 63.

30. Photographs of these altered billboards are available on the Portland Independent Media Center's website, accessed July 4, 2004, http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2002/02/7617.shtml

31. Edelman, *No Future*, 2.

32. I am influenced here by Heather Love and her insistence that we attend to negative affect. Heather Love, *Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

33. Nomy Lamm, "Private Dancer: Evolution of a Freak," *Restricted Access: Lesbians on Disability*, ed. Victoria A. Brownworth and Susan Raffo (Seattle: Seal Press, 1999), 152–61. For an incisive critique of the inspiring disabled person, see John B. Kelly, "Inspiration," *Ragged Edge Online* (January/February 2003), accessed February 7, 2010, http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0103/0103ft1.html.

34. The disability rights organization ADAPT was a key player in transportation struggles in the 1980s; ADAPT originally stood for American Disabled for Accessible Public Transit. For more information on ADAPT, see http://www.adapt.org. For a more extensive history of disability rights activism, including transit battles, see, for example, Sharon N. Barnartt and Richard K. Scotch, *Disability Protests: Contentious Politics, 1970–1999* (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University Press, 2001); Doris Zames Fleischer and Frieda Zames, *The Disability Rights Movement: From Charity to Confrontation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); and Joseph Shapiro, *No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1994).

35. See, for example, Jasbir Puar's analysis of homonationalism. Jasbir Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). See also McRuer, "Taking It to the Bank."

36. As Robert McRuer shows in his analysis of disability imagery, it is not enough to frame some images of disability as "positive" and others as "negative." McRuer, *Crip Theory*, 171–98.

Chapter 5

1. Donna Haraway, "Cyborgs, Coyotes, and Dogs: A Kinship of Feminist Figurations: An Interview with Nina Lykke, Randi Markussen, and Finn Olesen," in *The Haraway Reader*, ed. Donna Haraway (New York: Routledge, 2004), 323–24.

2. Donna J. Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," *Socialist Review*, no. 80 (1985): 65–108. Unless otherwise noted, all references to the manifesto are taken from the revised version, published as "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" in Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149–81.

3. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 151–53.

4. Donna Haraway, "Introduction: A Kinship of Feminist Figurations," in *The Haraway Reader*, ed. Donna Haraway (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1; Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 154.

5. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 181.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 154.

8. Ibid.

9. Haraway, "Introduction," 3; Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 149.

10. Haraway, "Cyborgs, Coyotes, and Dogs," 326; Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 181.

11. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 154.

12. Ibid., 1.

13. Ibid., 156.

14. Ibid., 156. For more on the manifesto's debt to the work of women of color, see Chela Sandoval, "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed," in *The Cyborg Handbook*, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor, and Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera (New York: Routledge, 1995), 407–21.

15. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 180.

16. Haraway, "Cyborgs, Coyotes, and Dogs," 324.

17. "[W]e are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs." Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 150.

18. For an excellent overview of the uses of the cyborg manifesto, see Zoë Sofoulis, "Cyberquake: Haraway's Manifesto," in *Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History*, ed. Darren Tofts, Annemarie Jonson, and Allesio Cavallaro (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 84–103.

19. Several essays in the anthology *The Prosthetic Impulse*, for example, suggest that the cyborg needs to be replaced with a newer theoretical framework, such as the prosthetic. Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra, eds., *The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

20. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 178.

21. See, for example, the introduction to and framing of *The Cyborg Handbook*, edited by Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor.

22. For an overview of the cyborg's appearance in disability studies, see Alison Kafer, "Cyborg," in *Encyclopedia of U.S. Disability History*, ed. Susan Burch (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 223–24. For examples of scholars in disability studies who take up the figure, see Sharon Betcher, "Putting my Foot (Prosthesis, Crutches, Phantom) Down: Considering Technology as Transcendence in the Writings of Donna Haraway," *Women's Studies Quarterly* 29, nos. 3–4 (2001): 35–53; Fiona Kumari Campbell, *Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Nirmala Erevelles, "In Search of the Disabled Subject," in *Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in Language and Culture*, ed. James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001), 92–111; David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder, "Introduction: Disability Studies and the Double Bind of Representation," in *The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability*, ed. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 1–31; Katherine Ott, "The Sum of Its Parts: An Introduction to Modern Histories of Prosthetics," in *Artificial Parts, Practical Lives: Modern Histories of Prosthetics*, ed. Katherine Ott, David Serlin, and Stephen Mihm (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 1–42; Donna Reeve, "Cyborgs and Cripples: What Can Haraway Offer Disability Studies?" in *Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions*, ed. Dan Goodley, Bill Hughes, and Lennard Davis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming); Alexa Schriempf, "Hearing Deafness: Subjectness, Articulateness, and Communicability," *Subjectivity* 28 (2009): 279–96; and Tobin Siebers, "Disability in Theory: From Social Constructionism to the New Social Realism of the Body," *American Literary History* (2001): 737–54.

23. James L. Cherney, "Deaf Culture and the Cochlear Implant Debate: Cyborg Politics and the Identity of People with Disabilities," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 36 (Summer 1999): 22–34; and Margaret Quinlan and Benjamin Bates, "*Bionic Woman* (2007): Gender, Disability, and Cyborgs," *Journal of Research in Special Educational Needs* 9, no. 1 (2009): 48–58. For scholars who take up the figure of the cyborg in terms of disability in film and performance more generally, see, for example, Petra Kuppers, "Addenda, Phenomenology, Embodiment: Cyborgs and Disability Performance," in *Performance and Technology: Practices of Virtual Embodiment and Interactivity*, ed. Susan Broadhurst and Josephine Machon (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 169–80; and Helen Meekosha, "Superchicks, Clones, Cyborgs, and Cripples: Cinema and Messages of Bodily Transformations," *Social Alternatives* 18, no. 1 (1999): 24–28.

24. A few notable exceptions would be the works of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Diane Price Herndl, Robert McRuer, and Margrit Shildrick, each of whom (briefly) examines the cyborg in the context of feminist theory and feminist disability studies. Although Garland-Thomson initially approaches the figure enthusiastically, in later work she expresses more misgivings about the figure; Herndl and Shildrick are more optimistic, linking the cyborg to their respective articulations of the posthuman and the monstrous. McRuer does not explicitly take up the cyborg figure itself, but he casts crip theory as "allied" with cyborg theory in its critical, and feminist, approach to identity. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, "Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory," in *Gendering Disability*, ed. Bonnie G. Smith and Beth Hutchison (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004): 73–103; Diane Price Herndl, "Reconstructing the Posthuman Body Twenty Years after Audre Lorde's *Cancer Journals*," in *Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities*, ed. Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (New York: Modern Language Association, 2002), 144–55; Margrit Shildrick, *Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self* (London: Sage, 2002); and Robert McRuer, *Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 226n37.

25. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 180.

26. Ibid., 150, 177.

27. Haraway uses the slogan "cyborgs for earthly survival!" several times in *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, explaining that it is the phrase on her "favorite political button" (244n1).

28. For feminist critiques of the hypermasculinity of contemporary cyborgs, see Anne Balsamo, *Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kath Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden, eds., *The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2000); Cristina Masters, "Bodies of Technology: Cyborg Soldiers and Militarized Masculinities," *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 7, no. 1 (2005): 112–32; and Claudia Springer, "The Pleasure of the Interface," in *Sex/Machine: Readings in Culture, Gender, and Technology*, ed. Patrick D. Hopkins (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 484–500.

29. See, for example, Cherney, "Deaf Culture and the Cochlear Implant Debate"; Johnson Cheu, "De-gene-erates, Replicants, and Other Aliens: (Re)Defining Disability in Futuristic Film," in *Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory*, ed. Mairian Corker and Tom Shakespeare (New York: Continuum, 2002), 199–212; and Meekosha, "Superchicks, Clones, Cyborgs, and Cripples."

30. Jennifer Gonzalez, "Envisioning Cyborg Bodies: Notes from Current Research," in *The Gendered Cyborg: A Reader*, ed. Gill Kirkup, Linda Janes, Kath Woodward, and Fiona Hovenden (London: Routledge, 2000), 64.

31. Sherry Baker, "The Rise of the Cyborgs," *Discover,* October 2008, http://discovermagazine.com/2008/oct/26–rise-of-the-cyborgs; Tim Kelly, "Rise of the Cyborg," *Forbes,* October 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0904/090.html; and Tim Kelly, "Cyborg Waiting List," *Forbes,* September 3, 2007,http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0903/038.html.

32. In 2009, only 16.8 percent of disabled people were employed. S. von Schrader, W. A. Erickson, and C. G. Lee, *Disability Statistics from the Current Population Survey* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Disability Demographics and Statistics, 2010), www.disabilitystatistics.org.

33. Lewis Page, "Cyborg-Style 'iLimb' Hand a Big Hit with Iraq Veterans," *Register* (UK), July 18, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/18/robo_hand_gets_big_hand.

34. For more on economic disparity and cyborgization, see Erevelles, "In Search of the Disabled Subject"; Gonzalez, "Envisioning Cyborg Bodies"; and Mitchell and Snyder, "Introduction."

35. Siebers, "Disability in Theory," 745.

36. Baker, "Rise of the Cyborgs."

37. Baker's language of immediacy is a bit of an overstatement when it comes to disability as well. Many of the advanced technologies heralded in her article remain in the experimental phase; other cybertechnology remains financially out of reach for most disabled people, as does more "mundane"—and less celebrated—technology like lightweight wheelchairs.

38. Leslie Swartz and Brian Watermeyer, "Cyborg Anxiety: Oscar Pistorius and the Boundaries of What It Means to be Human," *Disability and Society* 23, no. 2 (2008): 187–90.

39. Anna Salleh, "Cyborg Rights 'Need Debating Now,'" *ABC Science Online,* June 5, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/05/2918723.htm.

40. Swartz and Watermeyer, "Cyborg Anxiety," 188. Hari Kunzru takes the description still further, arguing that elite athletes' high-performance clothing and scientifically tested diet and exercise regimens qualify them for cyborg status. Hari Kunzru, "You Are Cyborg," *Wired* 5, no. 2 (1997), accessed September 22, 2004, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/5.02/ffharaway_pr.html.

41. Gonzalez offers a compelling critique of this conceptualization of the cyborg in terms of hybridity and racial purity. She cautions against using the language of miscegenation or unlawful coupling in describing the cyborg's boundary-crossing; such terms cannot be stripped of their violent past to function solely as metaphor. This presumption of the cyborg as the blending of two previously pure entities is similarly complicit in racist notions of purity and miscegenation. Gonzalez, "Envisioning the Cyborg."

42. Chris Hables Gray, *Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1.

43. This choice seems significant given that several pages later he introduces a group of students at MIT who explicitly and proudly identify themselves as cyborgs. Gray, *Cyborg Citizen*, 9.

44. Ibid., 1.

45. Chris Hables Gray and Steven Mentor, "The Cyborg Body Politic and the New World Order," in *Prosthetic Territories: Politics and Hypertechnologies*, ed. Gabriel Brahm, Jr., and Mark Driscoll (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 223.

46. Gray, *Cyborg Citizen*, 1.

47. For more on medicalized language and the construction of disability as a master identity, see Linton, *Claiming Disability*.

48. Gray, *Cyborg Citizen*, 1.

49. In a footnote to his text, Gray acknowledges that some disability activists find Reeve's cure work troubling, but only because they felt he "encouraged false hopes among the crippled." Gray makes no mention of those who oppose the whole cure narrative, suggesting everyone would have supported Reeve's work if only his timetable for success had been more reasonable. This acknowledgement, however, never appeared in the book itself, but only on the publisher's website; Routledge has since closed that site, but Gray has moved its content to his personal website. Chris Hables Gray, "Cyborg Citizen," first accessed July 16, 2002, http://www.routledge-ny.com/CyborgCitizen/chappgs/introduction.html (site discontinued); now available at http://www.chrishablesgray.org/CyborgCitizen.

50. Annie Potts, "Cyborg Masculinity in the Viagra Era," *Sexualities, Evolution, and Gender* 7, no. 1 (2005): 4.

51. See, for example, "Scientists Test First Human Cyborg," *CNN.com,* March 22, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/TECH/science/03/22/human.cyborg/.

52. I refer to the "imagined figure of the quadriplegic" to stress the cultural construction of this figure. Not all quadriplegics need ventilators, and some use manual rather than power wheelchairs. Spinal cord injuries vary widely, and although we tend to assume that paraplegics can move their arms and quadriplegics cannot, the reality is much more complicated.

53. Indeed, Haraway is quick to admit as much: "I have a perverse love of words, which have always seemed like tart physical beings to me." Haraway, "Introduction: A Kinship," 2.

54. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 245n4.

55. Ibid., 178.

56. Ibid., 178.

57. Linton, *Claiming Disability*, 13.

58. Corinne Kirchner and Liat Ben-Moshe, "Language and Terminology," in *Encyclopedia of U.S. Disability History*, ed. Susan Burch (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 546–50.

59. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 247–48n28.

60. For an exploration of how to reimagine these associations with "severe," see McRuer, *Crip Theory*, 30–31.

61. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 178.

62. Malini Johar Schueller argues that this split implies a hard boundary between the two groups, as if all science fiction writers were white. She finds the split all the more mystifying given Haraway's inclusion of Octavia Butler, a black science fiction writer (Butler appears in the science fiction section, not the women of color section). Haraway does describe the two groups of texts as "overlapping," but Schueller sees the framing as indicative of Haraway's treatment of all women of color as the same. Malini Johar Schueller, "Analogy and (White) Feminist Theory: Thinking Race and the Color of the Cyborg Body," *Signs* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2005): 79.

63. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 174.

64. Compare this description to those of *The Female Man* by Joanna Russ or *Wild Seed* and *Xenogenesis* by Octavia Butler. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 178–79.

65. Ibid., 180.

66. Ibid., 154.

67. Later in the essay, Haraway gets slightly more specific, but more in terms of the production line than the women working it. She offers as one example of "real-life cyborgs" "the Southeast Asian village women workers in Japanese and US electronics firms." Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 177.

68. Schueller, "Analogy and (White) Feminist Theory," 81.

69. Scott, "Cyborgian Socialists?" 216–17. For yet another critique of this passage, see, for example, Carol A. Stabile, *Feminism and the Technological Fix* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).

70. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross, Cyborgs at Large: An Interview with Donna Haraway," in *Technoculture*, ed. Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 12–13. Even in the manifesto, Haraway raises concerns about naming. "[W]ho counts as 'us' in my own rhetoric?" she queries. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 155.

71. See, for example, Carol Mason, "Terminating Bodies: Toward a Cyborg History of Abortion," in *Posthuman Bodies*, ed. Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 225–43; Penley and Ross, "Cyborgs at Large: An Interview with Donna Haraway"; Scott, "Cyborgian Socialists?"; and Stabile, *Feminism and the Technological Fix*.

72. Alexander G. Weheliye stresses that "the literal and virtual whiteness of cybertheory" is directly related to the kinds of texts and technologies recognized as "cyborg." He argues for greater attention to aural technologies in general and black popular music in particular. Alexander G. Weheliye, "'Feenin':

Posthuman Voices in Contemporary Black Popular Music," *Social Text 71* vol. 20, no. 2 (2002): 21–47; Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman, introduction to *Race in Cyberspace*, ed. Beth E. Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman (New York: Routledge, 2000), 8.

73. Vivian Sobchack, "A Leg to Stand On: Prosthetics, Metaphor, and Materiality," in *The Prosthetic Impulse: From a Posthuman Present to a Biocultural Future*, ed. Marquard Smith and Joanne Morra (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 19.

74. Haraway, *Companion Species Manifesto*, 4. See also Haraway, *When Species Meet*.

75. On vampires, see Ingrid Bartsch, Carolyn DiPalma, and Laura Sells, "Witnessing the Postmodern Jeremiad: (Mis)Understanding Donna Haraway's Method of Inquiry," *Configurations* 9, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 127–64; and Shannon Winnubst, "Vampires, Anxieties, and Dreams: Race and Sex in the Contemporary United States," *Hypatia* 18, no. 3 (2003): 1–20. On the cyborg and the grotesque, see Sara Cohen Shabot, "Grotesque Bodies: A Response to Disembodied Cyborgs," *Journal of Gender Studies* 15, no. 3 (2006): 223–35. On the grotesque, the monstrous, and disability, see Garland-Thomson, *Extraordinary Bodies*; Garland-Thomson, "Integrating Disability"; and Shildrick, *Embodying the Monster*.

76. According to the American Kennel Club (AKC), "Dogs disfigured as the result of accident or injury but otherwise qualified shall be eligible provided that the disfigurement does not interfere with functional movement. Dogs should be physically sound. Dogs that are blind or deaf shall not be eligible. Blind means without useful vision, and deaf means without useful hearing. No dog shall compete if it is taped or bandaged or in any way has anything attached to it for medical purposes." The North American Dog Agility Council similarly excludes lame, blind, or deformed dogs, but it specifies that such exclusions are to preserve the "health and welfare" of the dogs; unlike the AKC, they admit deaf (and mixed breed) dogs. I appreciate the desire to protect dog athletes from injury, and I want to be clear that I am not advocating for the elimination of such guidelines; I do not know enough about dogs or dog agility to make such demands. My concern is more with using *agility* as a way to think through feminist relationality. I am not sure disability politics is well-served by a figure so invested in "useful," "sound" bodies. American Kennel Club, *Regulations for Agility Trials,* 2010, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.akc.org/pdfs/rulebooks/REAGIL.pdf; North American Dog Agility Council, *Exhibitor's Handbook: Rules for NADAC Trials,* 2010, accessed July 30, 2010, http://www.nadac.com/Rules_for_NADAC_trials.htm#_Eligibility_For_Entry.

There is at least one organization for disabled people involved in agility, and it describes itself as open to anyone who identifies as disabled: the Disabled Handlers Annual Agility League. For more information, see their website http://agilitynet.co.uk/reference/disabledhandlersleague_rulesandregs2006.html.

77. Christina Crosby, "Allies and Enemies," in *Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics*, ed. Elizabeth Weed (New York: Routledge, 1989), 206. See also Mason, "Terminating Bodies," 226; and Penley and Ross, "Cyborgs at Large."

78. Sofoulis, "Cyberquake."

79. The quotation comes from the editors' blurb introducing Haraway's essay. Susan Stryker and Stephen Whittle, eds., *The Transgender Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 103.

80. Attending to such erasures—to what Gloria Wekker calls "the politics of citation" in her discussion of the work of Gloria Anzaldúa—should be an integral part of cyborg theory, given its attention to troubling single origins. See Chela Sandoval, "New Sciences: Cyborg Feminism and the Methodology of the Oppressed," in *The Cyborg Handbook*, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor, and Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera (New York: Routledge, 1995), 413; and Gloria Wekker, "The Arena of Disciplines: Gloria Anzaldúa and Interdisciplinarity," in *Doing Gender in Media, Art, and Culture*, ed. Rosemarie Buikema and Iris van der Tuin (New York: Routledge, 2007), 56.

81. Mariana Ortega, "Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color," *Hypatia* 21, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 56–74; and Schueller, "Analogy and (White) Feminist Theory," 81.

82. Wilkerson identifies this question at the heart of the manifesto: "How are those who experience some form of social privilege to address work articulating the experiences of corresponding forms of oppression?" Abby Wilkerson, "Ending at the Skin: Sexuality and Race in Feminist Theorizing," *Hypatia* 12, no. 3 (1997): 165.

83. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 150; emphasis in original.

84. Donna J. Haraway, *How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 136.

85. Brenda Brueggemann raises this question about pagers, Blackberries, and other instant communication devices in terms of deaf and hearing people, and Katherine Ott questions the very concept of assistive technology. Brueggemann, *Deaf Subjects*, 17; and Ott, "The Sum of Its Parts," 21.

86. Erevelles, "In Search of the Disabled Subject." See also Mitchell and Snyder, "Introduction: Disability Studies."

87. Kirkup, *Gendered Cyborg*, 5. Stabile shares Kirkup's assessment, but she links this gap to the cyborg's inability to address "the increasingly insurmountable walls that divide classes." Stabile, *Feminism and the Technological Fix*, 152–55.

88. Stacy Alaimo notes, "Even though Haraway underscores the fact that the cyborg transgresses the boundaries between human and nature as well as between human and machine, it is telling that the cyborg has become much more popular as a creature of technology, rather than as a creature of nature." Stacy Alaimo, *Undomesticated Ground: Recasting Nature as Feminist Space* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000),186; see also Alaimo, *Bodily Natures*, 6–7.

89. Rod Michalko, *The Two in One: Walking with Smokie, Walking with Blindness* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999).

90. Cary Wolfe, "Learning from Temple Grandin, or, Animal Studies, Disability Studies, and Who Comes after the Subject," *New Formations* 64 (2008): 110–23.

91. Loree Erickson, "Revealing Femmegimp: A Sex Positive Reflection on Sites of Shame as Sites of Resistance for People with Disabilities," *Atlantis* 31, no. 2 (2007): 42–52; Hershey, *Just Help*.

92. Erickson's description of their activities reads "helping me prepare food, helping me get dressed, take a shower, change the batteries in my vibrator, get into bed and out again, use the toilet, and the list goes on." Notice the shift in syntax, with the "helping me" dropping away. Erickson, "Revealing Femmegimp," 45. Barbara E. Gibson addresses attendants' experiences of this relation; see "Disability, Connectivity, and Transgressing the Autonomous Body," *Journal of Medical Humanities* 27 (2006): 187–96.

93. Garland-Thomson, *Extraordinary Bodies*, 114.

94. Steven L. Kurzman, "Presence and Prosthesis: A Response to Nelson and Wright," *Cultural Anthropology* 16, no. 3 (2001): 382.

95. Berkeley Bionics, "Introducing eLEGS," posted October 6, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WcM0ruq28dc; Berkeley Bionics, "Human Universal Load Carrier (HULC), TM," posted April 30, 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPB6uwc7aWs.

96. For an extended analysis of the militarized cyborg, see Masters, "Bodies of Technology."

97. Judy Rohrer, "Toward a Full-Inclusion Feminism: A Feminist Deployment of Disability Analysis," *Feminist Studies* 31, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 43–44.

98. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 181.

99. Corbett Joan O'Toole, "The View from Below: Developing a Knowledge Base about an Unknown Population," *Sexuality and Disability* 18, no. 3 (2000): 220. See also Siebers, *Disability Theory*, 151.

100. Laura Hershey, "Crip Commentary," accessed September 5, 2004, http://www.cripcommentary.com/LewisVsDisabilityRights.html. See also Laura Hershey, "From Poster Child to Protestor," *Spectacle* (Spring/Summer 1997), The Independent Living Institute, accessed September 5, 2004, http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/hershey93.html.

101. Mike Ervin, another former poster child turned telethon protestor, has long worked with Hershey to critique Lewis's rhetoric and assumptions about disability. For more on the Oscar protests, see his essay, "Jerry Lewis Doesn't Deserve a Humanitarian Award at the Oscars," *Progressive* (Madison, WI), February 19, 2009, http://tinyurl.com/awlyn5.

102. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 181.

103. McRuer, *Crip Theory*, 31.

104. Panzarino died in 2001 at the age of fifty-three; Hershey died in 2010 at the age of forty-eight. I write about them in the present tense partly out of academic convention (Panzarino's protest sign, for example, lives on in the present as a text), but more out of an awareness that their work continues to impact queer crip communities, particularly disabled lesbian communities. For more on Panzarino's advocacy, see the obituary from Justice For All, accessed May 24, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/2fcpby6; for more on Hershey, see http://www.laurahershey.com.

105. Bradley Lewis, *Moving Beyond Prozac, DSM, and the New Psychiatry: The Birth of Postpsychiatry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 133, emphasis in original.

106. Lewis, *Moving Beyond Prozac*, 142. Elizabeth A. Wilson's analysis of Prozac suggests another way the cyborg can facilitate an understanding of psychopharmacology. She explains that, as a manufactured psychopharmaceutical, Prozac illustrates the difficulty of definitively distinguishing between nature and culture, between one's body and one's culture. Where does the body stop and the drug begin? Although Wilson does not take up the figure of the cyborg, her framing of the drug makes possible a reading of the drug through the lens of cyborgian boundary blurring. Elizabeth A. Wilson, "Organic Empathy: Feminism, Psychopharmaceuticals, and the Embodiment of Depression," in *Material Feminisms*, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 373–99.

107. Michelle O'Brien, "Tracing This Body: Transsexuality, Pharmaceuticals, and Capitalism," *deadletters: scattered notes toward the remembering of a misplaced present* (Summer 2003): 1–14, accessed June 22, 2010, http://www.deadletters.biz/body.html (site discontinued).

108. Ibid., 3.

109. Ibid., 11–12.

110. Ibid., 13.

111. Dean Spade, "Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender," *Berkeley Women's Law Journal* 18 (2003): 15–37. See also Anna Kirkland, "When Transgendered People Sue and Win: Feminist Reflections on Strategy, Activism, and the Legal Process," in *The Fire This Time: Young Activists and the New Feminism*, ed. Vivien Labaton and Dawn Lundy Martin (New York: Anchor, 2004), 181–219; and Cayden Mak, "Cyborg Theory, Cyborg Practice," May 11, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/2wm7vag.

112. Spade, "Resisting Medicine," 35.

113. Ibid., 35.

114. The original essay is included in the anthology *The Cyborg Handbook*, and Haraway credits editor Chris Hables Gray with uncovering this lost history. Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, "Cyborgs and Space," in *The Cyborg Handbook*, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor, and Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera (New York: Routledge, 1995), 29–33.

115. According to Clynes, Kline was invited to write something about psychopharmacology, and he invited Clynes to coauthor. Chris Hables Gray, "An Interview with Manfred Clynes," in *The Cyborg Handbook*, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor (New York: Routledge, 1995), 47.

116. Clynes and Kline, "Cyborgs and Space," 30.

117. Ibid., 30.

118. Ibid., 33.

119. Some of this drug research is described in a biography of Kline on the Nathan Kline Institute's web page "The Man Behind the Institute," accessed May 26, 2010, http://www.rfmh.org/nki/welcome/kline.cfm.

120. Quoted in Jackie Orr, *Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 312n159. Orr briefly discusses Kline's research in her analysis of postwar psychiatry and the rise of psychopharmacology. Haraway also mentions this psychiatric research in passing, noting that she discovered descriptions of experiments with "neural-chemical implants and telemetric monitoring" at Rockland when reading through old grant proposals from the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Mental Health. Donna J. Haraway, "Cyborgs and Symbionts: Living Together in the New World Order," in *The Cyborg Handbook*, ed. Chris Hables Gray, Steven Mentor, and Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera (New York: Routledge, 1995), xvi.

121. For discussion of Rockland during the 1940s and 1950s, see "Herded Like Cattle," *Time*, December 20, 1948, http://tinyurl.com/8b6wmv7; and Donna Cornachio, "Changes in Mental Care," *New York Times*, January 3, 1999. For examples of such accusations, see Pranay Gupte, "Tranquilizing Held a Factor in Deaths of Mental Patients," *New York Times,* July 17, 1978; Ronald Sullivan, "Panel Rejects Charges that Tranquilizer Use Led to Patient Deaths," *New York Times,* March 27, 1979; "Psychiatric Aide Accused of Rape," *New York Times,* November 26, 1979; and Cecilia Cummings, "Rockland Psychiatric Center Faulted in a Death," *New York Times,* July 17, 1988. Decades later, state institutions continue to come under scrutiny for negligence and abuse. See, for example, Danny Hakim, "At State-Run Homes, Abuse and Impunity," *New York Times,* March 12, 2011.

122. Hiram Perez, "You Can Have My Brown Body and Eat It, Too!" *Social Text* 84–85, vol. 23, nos. 3–4 (2005): 190n17.

123. Haraway, "Introduction: A Kinship," 3.

124. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women*, 153.

125. Ibid., 177.

Chapter 6

1. Tom Shakespeare, *Disability Rights and Wrongs* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 45.

2. Shakespeare, *Disability Rights and Wrongs*, 46.

3. Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson discuss Joe Hermer's work on campgrounds in their thorough examination of queer ecologies. Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, "Introduction: A Genealogy of Queer Ecologies," in *Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire*, ed. Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 19.

4. William Cronon, "Introduction: In Search of Nature," in *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature*, ed. by William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 23–56; and William Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," in *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature,* ed. William Cronon (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 69–90. See also Chaia Heller, "For the Love of Nature: Ecology and the Cult of the Romantic," in *Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature*, ed. Greta Gaard (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 219–42; and Lauret Savoy, "The Future of Environmental Essay: A Discourse," *Terrain* (Summer/Fall 2008), terrain.org.

5. Evelyn C. White, "Black Women and the Wilderness," in *The Stories That Shape Us: Contemporary Women Write about the West*, ed. Teresa Jordan and James Hepworth (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995): 376–83; on Carolyn Finney's work, see Barry Bergman, "Black, White, and Shades of Green," *Berkeleyan,* November 28, 2007, http://berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2007/11/28_finney.shtml. Surveys of parkgoers support these claims, revealing that visitors to wilderness parks such as Yosemite or Yellowstone tend to be overwhelmingly white. A survey conducted at Yosemite in 2009 found white people constituted 77 percent of park visitors; 11 percent were Latino, 11 percent were Asian, and only 1 percent were black. Mireya Navarro, "National Parks Reach Out to Blacks Who Aren't Visiting," *New York Times,* November 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/science/earth/03parks.html?scp=2&sq=race+national+parks&st=nyt. See also Jason Byrne and Jennifer

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