

Without Parallel: The Local 7 Deportation Cases, 1949-1955

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Introduction

In 1935, local workers stopped by the roadside a few miles outside Salinas, a small farming community in central California. Their curiosity piqued by the presence of new buildings erected so far from the town proper, they asked a grower who belonged to the local agricultural organization the purpose of the structures. The buildings appeared to be constructed with security and surveillance in mind: the enclosure boasted its own stockade, water tower, outhouses, and floodlights, complete with a twelve-foot-high security wall. The grower's response to the workers' question was immediate and direct: the buildings were concentration camps, built to hold labor strikers, "...but of course, we won't put white men in it, just Filipinos." The year before, the Filipino Labor Union had led a bitter strike in the lettuce fields surrounding Salinas. That strike had taught local growers, who wished to avoid future labor disputes, to quell any signs of labor organizing early and hard.¹

This small attempt by one local industry to counter Filipino labor organizing via the construction of concentration camps would parallel the U.S. government's attempt to deport Filipino labor leaders during the Cold War some fifteen years later.² Between 1949 and 1953, the United States Immigration Service investigated Local 7 and accused its Filipino members of communist party membership or other subversive activities. The union's success in raising cannery workers' wages tenfold and in organizing California agricultural

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workers and its militant brand of left politics made Local 7 suspect during the McCarthy years.

At this time of increasing Cold War tensions towards the Soviet Union, the label of communist or communist sympathizer fell upon a broad array of groups who dissented from the government's growing conservatism: New Deal supporters, dedicated trade unionists, civil rights advocates, or members of the Progressive Party. Just how little the government would tolerate dissent was made abundantly clear by the union's international president, Harry Bridges:

Under [this] cold war hysteria. . . . American workers are being deprived of their rights to make a living; are being threatened with deportation; are being tossed into prison; and concentration camps (which were occupied by the Japanese-Americans in 1942) are now being reactivated at Tule Lake, California and elsewhere to accommodate other Americans who don't go along with the administration's foreign or domestic policies. . . .³

So concentrated was the Service's ensuing campaign of red-baiting and arrests against Local 7 that one national civil rights organization described it as "without parallel anywhere else in the country."⁴

This essay will focus on the immigration service's investigation of Local 7 leaders and members. First, it will briefly touch on Filipino migration and labor organizing during the union's establishment. The bulk of the essay will detail the three phases of the deportation campaign itself: the first series of arrests from 1949 to 1950; a second series of arrests under the stricter guidelines of the Internal Security Act of 1950; and the immigration service's stringent screening of Filipino cannery workers during the 1953 season. The essay will conclude with a brief examination of the union's response and the effects of the deportation campaign upon union solidarity.

Historical Background and Migration

The beginnings of the United States-Philippines colonial relationship date back to 1898, when Spain ceded the Islands to the United States after its defeat in the Spanish-American War. The discovery that the Americans had usurped their fight for independence led Filipinos to declare the Philippine-American War. The United States government put down the Philippine insurrection, but only after four more years of fighting, and at the loss of 250,000 Filipino men, women, and children. The Philippines thus became a United States territorial possession, and its people American "nationals"—an ambiguous legal status that meant neither citizen nor alien.⁵

Starting in the early 1910s, several thousand young Filipino men and women came to the United States to further their college educations. Privileged, educated, and English-speaking, these *pensionados*, as they were called, were eager to learn American ways, and they made a favorable impression on the American public. Most returned home to become the Philippines' professional elite.⁶

This first group inspired more Filipinos to try their luck on the mainland United States. Dazzled by the stories of their American teachers, and by letters of previous travelers, Filipinos arrived by the thousands in the port cities of San Francisco and Seattle beginning in the 1910s. From less wealthy and educated backgrounds than the *pensionados*, many styled themselves as student-laborers, who would attend school while working. Others hoped to earn their livelihood for a short time, then return with enough money to purchase land or pay for their siblings' education. By 1930, more than 30,000 Filipinos had settled in California alone.⁷

This generation quickly found employment in agriculture and service industries. Following the seasons of fruits and vegetables, Filipino work crews traveled up and down the West Coast looking for work. Others had more stable employment in hotels and restaurants, working as busboys, bellboys, or doormen. Still others found a temporary livelihood in the summer months canning salmon in Alaska. All these jobs entailed low wages and long hours, sometimes in poor working and living conditions.⁸

In contrast to the more positive images of the *pensionados*, unfavorable stereotypes emerged about this latter group. Perhaps the most favorable comment came from a newspaper editor who had this to say about the suitability of Filipinos for stoop agricultural labor:

White men can't do the work as well as these short men who can get down on their hands and knees, or work all day stooping over.

More common, however, were feelings of resentment and suspicion. While Filipinos were stereotyped as good agricultural workers, they also were accused of "taking jobs away" from European American men, and of monopolizing the affections of European American women. Echoing the sentiment of the time, San Francisco Municipal Court Judge Sylvain Lazarus blasted the presence of Filipinos:

It is a dreadful thing when these Filipinos, scarcely more than savages, come to San Francisco, work for practically nothing, and obtain the society of these [white] girls. Because they work for nothing, decent white boys cannot get jobs.⁹

Based on this “undesirability,” Filipinos were excluded from joining American labor unions, subjected to housing segregation, and relegated to second class status.

The tensions exploded in incidents of racial violence in the 1920s and 1930s. In the worst case of violence, an incident involving Filipinos dancing with European American women escalated into a five-day riot in Watsonville, California. Mobs of hundreds pursued Filipinos about town; one “hunting party” surrounded a bunkhouse and riddled it with gunfire, killing lettuce worker Fermin Tobera. Upon return to the Philippines, Tobera was described as a martyr for the nation, and a national day of mourning and humiliation was declared.¹⁰

The passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934 marked the legal high point of anti-Filipino sentiment. While providing for Philippine independence in ten years, the act also reclassified the legal status of Filipinos to aliens, and set the annual limit of Filipinos who could immigrate to the United States at fifty persons a year.¹¹ The solution to the “Filipino problem,” some had reasoned, was exclusion.

Filipino workers, frustrated at the double standard of their life in America, the promised land of democracy and equality, unleashed a torrent of labor activity.¹² One result was Local 7, established in 1933. Its organizers envisioned a militant, democratic trade union that would fight for the rights of non-resident cannery workers in Alaska. By the late 1940s, union membership was approximately 80 percent Filipinos, with other Asians, Mexicans, and African Americans who constituted the remainder.¹³ The union claimed approximately four thousand Filipino members, or perhaps as many as one out of every ten Filipinos employed in the West Coast labor force.¹⁴

The First Sweep: 1949-1950

In the years following World War II, a series of international and domestic events altered the American political terrain. Internationally, the coming to power of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party in China, the continued cold war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the conflict in Korea, painted a picture in American politicians’ minds of encroaching “world communism” and “totalitarian governments.” On the domestic scene, the prosecution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in the summer of 1950 for espionage allegedly performed for the Soviet Union cemented in the national psyche the dangers posed by so-called fifth columnists to “traditional” American values of democracy, equality and freedom. Under the

leadership of Republicans and conservative Democrats, legislation aimed at containing communism and the spread of "alien subversives" was written into law. The two most significant were the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. These acts broadened the original 1918 statutes on subversive activities and immigration.

The immigration service's campaign against Local 7 does raise the sticky question of communist influence over the union. Again, many of those accused of being Party members or sympathizers were people who simply dissented with the conservatism of the times. As a union, it is more fair to judge Local 7 by its record of dedication to its members' economic and political welfare, whatever the individual beliefs of its members.¹⁵

Against this backdrop, the spring of 1949 began ominously. Hundreds of Local 7 members in Seattle and Portland, mostly Filipino nationals, began to receive letters from the Immigration and Naturalization Service "requesting" their appearance at immigration offices for questioning. A report in the *Philippines Mail* accused the Service of having ulterior motives:

In Seattle alone more than one hundred rank and file members were called by the Immigration office either by letter, telephone or personal calls [on workers' homes] by immigration inspectors in an effort to coerce the men to swear or sign affidavits that certain officials are "communists." The same situation is taking place in Portland where scores of rank and filers were questioned by immigration inspectors.

In Seattle. . . immigration authorities have subpoenaed George Minato, a member of the Local's executive board, to 'testify and to bring all records and documents' to prove that 'Chris Mensalvas [Local 7 Publicity Director and candidate for union President] and Ernie Mangaoang [business agent for Local 7]' are members of the Communist Party.¹⁶

Those initial signs foreshadowed what was to come. On August 2, shortly after business agent Ernesto Mangaoang came into the Local 7 offices, two immigration service agents arrested and charged him with membership in the communist party, a "crime" punishable by deportation. Mangaoang, a union member since 1937, had served as business agent for two years, and had served briefly as an assistant regional director for the International.¹⁷

Union officials and international representatives were convinced that his arrest had been timed to disrupt the union's organizing

drive in Southeastern Alaska. International Representative Ken Howard wrote to the FTA International offices back in Philadelphia:

The date of the first issuance of the warrant [July 6] coincides with our drive in Bristol Bay. July 1st Bob [Kinney] left for the Bay to prepare for strike action; Ernie demanded a meeting with the industry on the 5th. The warrant was issued on the 6th, and the meeting took place on the 8th. But meantime, or by the 11th at the latest, the industry knew that we had called off the action.

Intensive negotiations with the industry over the [southeastern Alaska] situation took place on the 29th of July, [when] it became clear to them that we meant business in [southeastern] Alaska; the warrant was served on the 2nd of August.¹⁸

Local 7 rallied to Mangaoang's defense. The day after his arrest, one hundred and fifty Filipinos picketed and chanted outside the immigration offices at Airport Way. A special union bulletin railed against his jailing as a wholesale violation of civil rights:

This is a flagrant attack against the labor movement and our union—Local 7, FTA-CIO. . . . The arrest of Brother Mangaoang is a definite threat against the civil rights of non-citizens and citizens!¹⁹

In view of the need for its ace negotiator during contract discussions with the industry, the union posted the \$5,000 bail out of the treasury's general fund. Mangaoang was out by the night of August 3.²⁰

By the end of August, the INS had arrested three more officers on charges of Communist Party membership. Jailed were publicity director Chris Mensalvas, and executive board member Ponce Torres, both in Seattle; and election committee member Casimiro Bueno Absolor in Portland. Bail for the three was set high: for Mensalvas, \$5,000; Absolor, \$500; Torres, \$1,000.²¹

The International insisted, however, that the reasons for the arrests and intimidation were Local 7's record of fighting militancy and trade union reforms—not communism:

Before the salmon workers were organized in Local 7, FTA, wages averaged around \$25 a month. Today, the average is \$250 a month. Before the union, hiring was done under a vicious contract system that robbed and victimized the workers. Today, hiring is done by rotation through the union.²²

The Local 7 defense committee was even more blunt. The committee charged the Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc. with a part in the deportation drive:

Where the industry has failed to demoralize the membership and break the union with the Taft-Hartley club, it has now turned to the U.S. Immigration Service for service and assistance. The bosses know that a great majority of the members of Local 7 are non-citizens. This is the hidden card up the sleeve of the employers. The crimes of the arrested workers are simple—they fought for years to organize the workers. . . .²³

Fellow Local 7 member Carlos Bulosan added his voice in criticism. By then, a fifth member, Joe Prudencio, a militant rank and filer and World War II veteran, had been arrested in Seattle, also on charges of Communist Party membership:

. . . The deportation proceedings against the five members of Local 7, FTA, should be halted by all those who want to live in freedom and see an America where the individual is not in constant fear of his life and security. It should be stopped before our constitutional rights are destroyed by an ever expanding machinery of our government, now bent on spying [into] the deepest recesses of our private lives. . . .²⁴

The McCarran Act

This initial campaign of intimidation escalated as new legislation was enacted. On September 23, Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950. More commonly known as the McCarran Act after its sponsor, arch-conservative Senator Pat McCarran (D-Nevada), it was scheduled to go into effect exactly one month later. The second phase of the government's campaign against Local 7 was about to begin.

The act's main goal was to contain "alien subversion" and "espionage" in the United States. First, the statute of limitations set by the 1918 Immigration and Nationality Act was extended, such that any past violation of immigration law, even if committed thirty years ago, would still be punishable by imprisonment, fine or deportation. Second, it expanded the scope of what could be considered subversive activities. Attending a demonstration or calling for a strike could, under the loose guidelines of the Act, be grounds for deportation. Third, the act broadened the powers of the Department of Justice. Under it, the Attorney General could arrest and detain indefinitely any alien even considered potentially subversive. Furthermore, the Attorney General was granted the power to withhold incriminating evidence on informers, should such background information prove damaging to governmental cases. And finally, the act allowed for the establishment and preparation of concentration camps, should an internal security emergency be declared. Approximately

one month later, 1950, the Department of Justice announced plans to deport more than 3,400 non-citizens under the McCarran Act.²⁵

Just three hours after it became law, the McCarran Act claimed its first victim in the Pacific Northwest—Ernesto Mangaoang. Answering a knock on his door at 3:00 A.M., the sleepy “fighting business agent” was startled to find immigration inspectors on his doorstep, who forced their way in. Because the agents had acted so hastily to enforce the law, there was no warrant of arrest. Nevertheless, despite this oversight, Mangaoang was taken into custody.

The charges this time were slightly different: past membership in the Communist Party, a crime punishable under the new McCarran Act. His arrest came in the first sweep of nineteen arrests to take place across the country, as part of the Department of Justice’s list of “top 86 alien communists” in the nation.²⁶

The goal of this “midnight rap on the door” campaign was harassment and intimidation. Since Mangaoang was already out on bail for his 1949 arrest, immigration agents could have notified him by telephone to come in for questioning. Instead, as Mangaoang later commented acidly, “. . .they did not choose to do that. This method. . .is [a] gestapo method.”²⁷

Almost simultaneously, immigration agents re-arrested Local 7 members Casimiro Bueno Absolor in Portland, and President Chris Mensalvas in Stockton on the same charges of past membership. Rather humorously, Mensalvas wrote to Mangaoang after his own release from detention in San Francisco on October 29:

Now I have a little time to drop you. . .a few lines after five days sweet vacation like you did have. . .I think you had the worst of it, since I heard they granted you room and board at the county. Also that I was not lonely at all since there were four of us McCarran victims in one department together, as we knew they did not want us get [sic] propagandized by other deportees. . . . Of course, I had the pleasure of spending some three hours at [the] Stockton County jail, and had the pleasure also of having a free ride to [the] San Francisco barracks of the Immigration Department. . . .²⁸

Bail for the two was raised easily. The Committee for Defense of Four of Oregon’s Foreign Born, a progressive local organization affiliated with the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born and composed of church ministers, activists and private citizens, paid Absolor’s bail. Mensalvas’s bail was posted by the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union International offices in San Francisco.²⁹

Mangaoang, however, was less fortunate. At his October 25 hearing, United States District Court Judge John Bowen ruled Mangaoang's apprehension was illegal due to the lack of an arrest warrant, and ordered him freed. However, before his bail bond could be transferred, immigration district director John Boyd secured the needed warrant. Mangaoang remained in solitary confinement in King County Jail.³⁰

A second sweep of McCarran arrests took place several months later after the start of the new year. Ramon Tancioco, Constancio Cargado and Pete Cabornay were taken to the county jail. Adding insult to injury, Cargado and Cabornay were active members of Absolor's Local 7 defense committee; Tancioco was the committee chair. The three were released about a week later after active protests by Portland area ministers, longshoremen, and the Committee for the Defense of Four of Oregon's Foreign Born. Bail was a total of \$2,000.³¹

Between February and March, the number of Local 7 members arrested and charged for deportation under the McCarran act increased to ten: in Seattle, Ponce Torres was re-arrested, as was Joe Prudencio; in Portland, Joe Raymundo and Federico Domingo were picked up; and in California, Marcial Peralta was arrested while working on a Delano farm. All ten were committed union men who had served with Local 7 in one capacity or another.³²

The union secured bail for the rest by the end of March. In Peralta's case, his \$1,000 bail bond was loaned by the Los Angeles Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born; total bail for the ten came to \$20,000. In nine of the ten cases, the charges were the same: past membership in the Communist Party. The one exception was Peralta, who, as a convicted felon, also came under the McCarran Act's category of "undesirable" aliens. Although he had served his sentence, the law required that he receive a full pardon from either the state governor or from the president before he would be excluded from consideration.³³

Throughout the rest of spring and into summer, the Justice Department held deportation hearings for the Local 7 deportees from Seattle to Los Angeles. From 1946 to 1950, Congress had regulated all immigration administrative procedures under the power of the Administrative Procedures Act. Such regulatory power was rescinded, and hearings officers now could not only charge and detain aliens, they could also present evidence, and determine the guilt or innocence of the party involved. As one ILWU attorney stated, immigration authorities could act as "complainant, prosecutor, judge and jury. . . ."³⁴

The INS hearings on the deportation case of President Chris Mensalvas illustrate the ease with which one could be accused of communist sympathies and held for deportation. Government witnesses were from Local 7's rival unions, namely the American Federation of Labor Seafarers union and the Congress of Industrial Organization's Local 77 Packinghouse Workers. In presenting its case against Mensalvas, one government witness, Pete Bautista, swore that he himself was a member of the Communist Party, that he knew that Mensalvas was a communist, and that he had seen Mensalvas present at closed communist meetings. Yet upon cross-examination by Mensalvas's attorney, Bautista admitted he had never seen a Communist Party membership book or card, had never seen Mensalvas pay dues to the Party, and had never heard him say anything to indicate membership. Bautista also indicated his testimony was in part motivated by self-interest, as his own petition to the Department of Justice for naturalization was still pending. The testimony of a second government witness proved so faulty that Immigration Service attorney Robert DeMoulin had it struck from the record, stating, "I am unable to rely on anything he has said at this hearing," and recommended that the witness be investigated for perjury. Despite the unreliability of the testimony, deportation proceedings against Mensalvas continued.³⁵

Meanwhile, the union defense committee stepped up its lobbying campaign on behalf of its embattled members. At an ILWU convention representing some eighty thousand workers, members unanimously adopted a resolution calling for a Congressional investigation of the Immigration Service's "union-busting" campaign against Local 7:

The Immigration Service patently operates upon the theory that no foreign-born person has the right to engage in trade union activities or take any step in concert with fellow workers in order to achieve security and better conditions. To the service such activity is a crime, and since there is now law to support its theory the service resorts to framed, perjured testimony. . . .³⁶

The second phase of the union's strategy was to file legal challenges to the deportation orders. As legal expenses mounted, defense committee members wrote letters of appeal for loans and pledges, and collected donations for a defense fund (five hundred dollars alone was collected from one longshoreman's local).³⁷ Members also turned their attentions to *Mangaoang v. Boyd*, which was shaping up as a test case for the McCarran Act. Mangaoang's attorneys hoped to use the ambiguity of U.S. colonial law to the

Local 7 deportees' advantage, as at the time of their "subversive activities," Filipinos were not aliens but American nationals. If the United States District Court accepted such an interpretation, union lawyers hoped the court would rule the Immigration Service's deportation campaign invalid.³⁸

Despite the show of solidarity, not all the responses to the defense campaign were in the affirmative. Just as the deportation orders were being issued, the *Philippines Mail* announced a campaign of its own against Filipino communists and communist sympathizers. In a November 1951 editorial, the Salinas paper backed the deportations, stating,

If there are Filipinos among us here in the U.S.A. who are Communists or fellow-travelers, they should be deported quick. They have no business to belong here in the land of democracy, equality and opportunity. . . .³⁹

Though in the minority, some Local 7 members shared those views. At a Seattle general membership meeting, Local 7 Treasurer Casimiro Abella openly red-baited Mangaoang. "Every time we have a meeting," Abella said icily, "we discuss the McCarran law and other laws. If they suspect that you are a communist, I do not blame the people who enacted those laws, for they want to protect their country. If you do not like those laws, get out of here!"⁴⁰

Developments in the two complicated routes of court and immigration appeals, motions and legal maneuverings continued.⁴¹ There was one deportation case, however, that reached an early resolution. In the spring of 1952, Constancio Cargado died from a heart attack in Portland. Fellow deportees said that the stress and worry brought on by the deportation order of possible separation from his family, and of his return to the Philippines where a similar Red Scare was asserting itself, had contributed to his ill health. His case was officially closed by immigration officials that May.⁴²

By September, authorities added three more names to the deportation list: Pedro Gonzales, Pete Bonilla, and Henry Rabang, bringing the total to thirteen.⁴³ By this time, the total number of non-citizens arrested for subversive activities under the McCarran Act came to one hundred and twenty.⁴⁴

The McCarran-Walter Act

The third and final phase of government intimidation was ushered in with the passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act. Passed by Congress on

June 27, 1952, the act both benefited and persecuted Filipino nationals. For the first time, those born in the "Asia/Pacific Triangle" area—that is, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, South Asians and others—who were permanent residents of the United States could become U.S. citizens. At the same time, the Act added a strict exclusion provision. Once in effect, residents returning from U.S. territories were to be screened and all "undesirable aliens" prevented from re-entering the country. Given the ambiguous scope of what was considered subversion and the self-interest of government witnesses, Local 7 members feared for their livelihood.⁴⁵

Seattle Immigration director John Boyd confirmed these fears shortly thereafter. Boasting he would stringently enforce the exclusion provisions, Boyd promised that "immigration officers will meet every ship coming to Seattle from Alaska, and anyone on board who can't prove he's an American citizen—and a desirable one, at that—will be refused permission to walk ashore."⁴⁶

Union officials were incensed. Blasting Boyd's screening program as "a special kind of discrimination against the Filipino people," the union protested that INS intimidation would deprive their members of their right to work. During open hearings before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Policy, ILWU attorney Lloyd E. McMurray pointed out that their work in Alaska provided the bulk of their yearly income. The new section of exclusion provisions would cause Local 7 members undue hardship, which, if they were to seek public assistance, would ironically, in turn, subject them to deportation under another section of the Act.⁴⁷

In the time before the act was to take effect on Christmas Eve, 1952, the union called for the repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act, and adopted a two-prong approach legal suits and a letter-writing campaign and petition drive. Encouraged by reports that the AFL, CIO, and independent unions were opposed to the act, the general membership voted four days before Christmas to file an injunction in federal court to stop enforcement of the exclusion provisions.⁴⁸ The union, aided by scores of organizations, also collected hundreds of petitions asking for immediate repeal of the Act.⁴⁹

The courts quickly repelled this legal move. On April 10, a three judge court in Seattle ruled against the union. Although union attorneys John Caughlan and Siegfried Hesse immediately filed an appeal, the legal process would take months. In the immediate period, the courts would allow the screening program. The act would be enforced as Boyd had promised.

The tensions in this game of cat-and-mouse between industry, government and union reached its height in 1953. As the season approached, industry became more emboldened. During contract negotiations, the industry had gone so far as to propose that "subversive" aliens be banned from employment, which was rebuffed by the union. The industry made a second offer around the beginning of May, this time of a joint pre-screening program with the Immigration Service.⁵⁰

The offer was rejected soundly by the union's membership on May 13. As Mangaoang pointed out, pre-screening was no guarantee of return to the mainland:

We shall cooperate with the government in every way possible to bring about national security but we refuse to take part in any action that is designed to weaken and destroy our organization. We shall abide by the law but in so doing we shall see to it that every remedy available to us for the protection of our members in the exercise of our rights under the Constitution and the Bill of Rights will be utilized.⁵¹

Internally, the deportation cases became a major issue in the 1953 union elections. Former union president Trinidad Rojo campaigned against Mensalvas on a platform of reforming, not repealing, the McCarran-Walter Act, and advocated non-involvement in progressive causes:

If some of our officers do not stop irritating Uncle Sam with regards to subversive cases, if we identify the Union officially [with] any and all deportation cases relating to a handful of members, and if the international tension worsens, Local [7] runs the risk of being listed as a subversive organization.

That risk is fraught with disaster. . . . In the event of war between Russia and America, our members may be interned in concentration camps. Let us be valiant fighters but for the cause of the greater number, for a real union cause, not for the private ideas of a few, not for the outside affiliations of whatever nature. . . . Let us work for the revision of the Law and not defy it. . . .⁵²

Additionally, it came to light that treasurer Casimiro Abella was withholding funds earmarked for the legal expenses of Mangaoang, Mensalvas, and others, and furthermore, had held back monies approved for the legal challenge to the McCarran-Walter Act, although all funds had been approved by the membership. Although Rojo was defeated and Abella sanctioned, sharp differences had developed

within the leadership on the question of staunch support for the deportees.⁵³

While crews were being dispatched to Alaska, word came that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had made a decision in the *Mangaoang v. Boyd* case. On June 22, 1953, the San Francisco court accepted union attorney's arguments that Filipinos were American nationals and not subject to deportation for past activities. But rather than challenge the constitutionality of the act, the court instead noted Mangaoang's possible value to the Immigration Service and its deportation campaign, as "...a most vigorous, aggressive and useful anti-communist."⁵⁴ While concern over civil liberties was not the court's main motivation, whatever the reasoning, the ruling was a major victory. In effect, the decision lifted the worry of deportation from Mangaoang and the other deportees, and threw the validity of the Immigration Service's screening program into question. In an interview with the *Seattle Times*, Immigration Inspector Boyd said the service would consider appealing the case to the Supreme Court.⁵⁵

The first reports of McCarran-Walter arrests, however, quickly overshadowed the court's decision. On July 25, immigration agents intercepted five cannery workers returning from Bristol Bay, interrogated and then jailed them for two days. A Local 7 bulletin warning members what to expect listed the questions put to the five while in screening:

"Have you ever been arrested before?

"Have you ever been a pimp?

"Have you ever lived with a woman, not your wife?

"Have you ever been drunk?

"Have you ever murdered [anyone]?

"Why [didn't] you get a new Alien Registration Card?

"Have you ever been in a hospital?

"Have you ever been convicted of a traffic violation?

"Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?"

The bulletin urged the men to ask for an interpreter, and to answer "no" to most of the questions. A "yes" to any one question, the union warned, could mean grounds for deportation under the McCarran-Walter Act. The bulletin cautioned, "Remember that the Immigration does not know. . .[the] jail records of [everyone]. It is none of their business in the first place"⁵⁶

The screenings and arrests continued until the end of the season in November. All together, the Immigration Service screened some

two thousand Filipinos returning to Seattle. In those few months, more than a hundred were jailed, and eventually, over a dozen singled out for exclusion.⁵⁷

While the grounds for exclusion varied, it is clear that their basis had little to do with espionage or treason. One man's offense against national security was that he had stolen a chicken during the Depression some twenty years ago. Another deportee, Alejandro Alcantra, experienced first-hand the "quick justice" of the Immigration Service. After discovering a prior conviction for burglary, the Immigration Service handed down its decision and ordered him deported after just six days. Given these examples, the Washington Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born insisted the exclusion program in fact did little for national security.⁵⁸

Supreme Court Decisions, 1953-1955:

Mangaoang v. Boyd, Gonzales v. Barber, Alcantra v. Boyd

The first legal victory came later that fall. On November 9, 1953, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling for Mangaoang. The high court reasoned that for the McCarran Act to apply, Mangaoang had to be simultaneously an alien and a member of the Party. Since the years of his alleged membership occurred before the Philippines' independence from the United States in 1946, Mangaoang, and by extension, the others similarly accused, were not deportable.⁵⁹

With the Mangaoang decision, resolution of the remaining McCarran and McCarran-Walter cases came quickly. The next summer, on June 7, 1954, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales's favor in *Gonzales v. Barber*. Filipinos, the court decreed, who had committed crimes of "moral turpitude" before 1946 were not deportable under the Internal Security Act of 1950. The final case, *Alcantra v. Boyd*, reached the Supreme Court the next spring. On May 10, 1955, the court struck down the McCarran-Walter exclusion provisions as unconstitutional. In so doing, the court argued that the exclusion would unfairly burden Alaska's economy, and might adversely affect its fishing and canning industry:

Many thousands of workers residing in the continental United States are annually employed in that industry; and one may well assume that substantial numbers of them are aliens who would be put in peril of exclusion and deportation upon their return home.⁶⁰

With the Alcantra decision, the legal battles were over. The Immigration and Naturalization Service dropped the remaining deportation and exclusion cases, and ended its screening program.

Local 7 members could now travel freely back and forth from their homes to their work without fear of harassment. The union had won.⁶¹

Conclusion

The Immigration Service's deportation campaign had an impact greater than the union's legal victories alone would indicate. Its use of intimidating letters, phone calls, and visits to pressure members into naming union leaders as communists; arrests; immigration hearings in which officials could act with impunity; and the screening program took their toll. The union's base of support eroded under such pressures, and splits formed within the union's ranks over the future direction of the local, and specifically, whether to challenge the deportation orders and to continue with its "political" cause of repealing the Walter-McCarran Act.⁶² The legal costs incurred as a result of the deportation campaign also led to severe financial losses. Bail and attorney's fees for the deportees caused such a drain on resources that union officials postponed, then abandoned, a plan to recruit California agricultural workers and expand Local 7's base.⁶³ Ironically, after its legal victories, union leaders returned to the basics of survival: recruiting members and paying off debts.⁶⁴

There were other repercussions and losses. For reasons still somewhat unclear, Mangaoang was expelled from the leadership, supposedly for violation of the union constitution. Bulosan, who had long been in ill health, passed away shortly thereafter. And a few years later, Mensalvas resigned after ten years as president and moved to Hawai'i. While the union continued, it would not venture into so-called political causes again until a new generation of leaders emerged in the 1970s.⁶⁵

To understand the larger significance of labor organizing, the individual story of what happened to Local 7 and its leaders must be multiplied by the hundreds. Accusations and arrests for alleged Communist Party membership or subversion became an all too common feature during the McCarthy years. But in the end, what was put down was not a conspiracy of traitors, but the freedom to dissent, to disagree, and to organize. Ultimately, the concentration camps activated by the government to hold subversives remained empty, just as they had remained empty in Salinas in 1935. The surveillance, arrests, and jailings proved enough.

Notes

Deportation arrests occurred for other figures associated with the progressive movements of the 1950s. Within the labor movement itself, other progressive, foreign-born leaders were also targeted. The Australian-born ILWU president, Harry Bridges, Luisa Moreno, former FTA West Coast Regional director, and Simeon Bagasol, another Filipino trade unionist with the ILWU in Hawaii, were among countless other immigrant labor leaders who were similarly treated to the worst excesses of the Red Scare. Moreno was a leading figure in the West Coast labor movement and was nicknamed "the California Whirlwind." She was deported back to Guatemala in 1950, on accounts alleging that she had been a member of the Communist Party in the late 1930s. Harry Bridges was similarly accused of past membership, but weathered four separate deportation attempts. Bagasol won his appeal on a later court decision. Please see the Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial Convention of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Volume 9, April 2 to 6, 1951, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, 465. This campaign was also directed against suspected Communists and sympathizers in the movie industry, in the universities, and in the federal government itself. The campaign against Local 7 was but one piece of a larger picture.

1. Herbert Klein and Carey McWilliams, "Cold Terror in California," *The Nation*, July 24, 1935, 97-98; Carey McWilliams, *Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California* (Santa Barbara and Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, Inc., 1935, 1971), 236-237; Howard DeWitt, "The Filipino Labor Union: The Salinas Lettuce Strike of 1934," *Amerasia Journal* 5:2 (1978), 1-21.
2. The spelling of Filipino with an "F", rather than with a "P", as in Pilipino, is used here to avoid clashing with historical documents. The author's own preference is to use "Pilipino," in recognition of the 1960s emphasis on self-determination.
3. *The Dispatcher*, April 25, 1952, 2. See also *The Dispatcher*, May 9, 1952, 5.
4. *The Dispatcher*, May 1, 1953. These successes had also made the union bitter enemies with the Associated Farmers of California and the Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc.
5. The status of American "national" refers to one who holds allegiance to the United States. Luzviminda Francisco, "The First Vietnam: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902," from *Letters in Exile*, Jesse Quinsaat, editor, (Los Angeles: Resource Development and Publications, UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1976), 1-22; Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 17. For a different perspective on the Spanish-American War, see Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., *Smoked Yankees and the Struggle for Empire: Letters Home from Negro Soldiers, 1899-1902* (Urbana, Chicago, and London: University of Illinois Press, 1971).
6. Their tuition was paid by the United States government, or by the colleges and universities they attended. See Ronald Takaki, *Strangers*

- from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1989), 58; Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans*, 75; Dorothy Cordova, "Voices from the Past: Why They Came," in *Making Waves*, Asian Women United of California, editor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 42-49.
7. C.M. Goethe, "Filipino Immigration Viewed as Peril," *Current History*, June 1931, 353-356; Casiano Pagdilao Coloma, "A Study of the Filipino Repatriation Movement." Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1939, 6-7.
 8. Benicio Catapusan, "The Filipino Labor Cycle," *Sociology and Social Research* 19:1 (Sept./Oct. 1934), 61-63. Catapusan lists the months of the salmon season as being from August to November or December. These months do not bear out with other accounts in the Filipino press at the time, nor with the accounts provided in the Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, at the University of Washington. Please see *The Philippine Review*, December 1931, 7.
 9. *San Francisco Examiner*, January 1936, 6, as quoted by Lauren Wilde Casaday, "Labor Unrest and the Labor Movement in the Salmon Industry of the Pacific Coast." Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1937, 348; Takaki, *Strangers*, 320.
 10. Emory S. Bogardus, "Anti-Filipino Race Riots," in *Letters in Exile*, 57.
 11. Howard A. DeWitt, "The Filipino Labor Union: The Salinas Lettuce Strike of 1934," *Amerasia Journal* 5:2 (1978), 1.
 12. Ronald Takaki, *Strangers*, 331-332; Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans*, 55-56; Sonia Emily Wallovits, "Filipinos in California," Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1966, 6.
 13. For clarity's sake, the union will continue to be referred to as "Local 7," although with the ILWU, it was called Local 7-C, then finally, Local 37. In 1950, the local changed affiliation from the FTA to the ILWU.
 14. Exact figures are difficult to obtain, as the Census did not begin to categorize Filipinos separately until after the 1960s. Instead, Filipinos were lumped together with Koreans, "Asiatic Indians," and "etc." in the census category of "other races." For example, the 1950 Census estimated that the non-white, foreign born, male population in California, Washington and Oregon was 38,860; 3,660; and 1,225, respectively, for an age range of between 40 to 65. Given that the population of Filipinos stayed relatively constant throughout exclusion, with approximately four to five thousand members, the union membership would have perhaps accounted for about ten percent of all Filipinos in the West Coast labor force. Please see the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population, 1950, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, Age by Color, Nativity and Sex, for the State, Part 5, California, 5-57; Part 37, Oregon, 37-96; and Part 47, Washington, 47-117*, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952.
 15. *Filipino Echo*, January 31, 1948, 1. Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 24-80, University of Washington Libraries;

- F.S. O'Brien, "The Communist-Dominated Unions in the United States since 1950," *Labor History* 9:2, Spring 1968, 190.
16. *The Philippines Mail*, June 13, 1949.
17. Ken Howard to Donald Henderson, Administrative Director, FTA-CIO, August 16, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 25-3, University of Washington Libraries.
18. Ken Howard, International Representative, to Donald Henderson, Administrative Director, FTA-CIO, August 16, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 25-3, University of Washington Libraries.
19. Ken Howard to Donald Henderson, August 16, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 25-3, University of Washington Libraries; Leaflet, "Special Meeting To All Cannery Workers!" August 2, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 21-39, University of Washington Libraries.
20. Ken Howard to Donald Henderson, August 16, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 25-3, University of Washington Libraries.
21. *FTA News*, September 1949, 8.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *The Philippines Mail*, March 31, 1950, 1, "An Open Letter to the Filipino People." Please also see the 1952 Yearbook, ILWU Local 37, 22. Several of the men had families here to worry about and support. Prudencio was father to two, Torres had a young daughter, and Mensalvas was a widower with three young children.
25. 81st Congress, 2d session, Chs. 1010, 1024, Sept. 23, 1950, 1008—1009; *Labor Fact Book*, No. 11, 68, Labor Research Association (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1953).
26. *The Dispatcher*, October 27, 1950, 3. He was accused of being a Communist Party member from February 1938 to December 1939, more than eleven years ago. See also Matias Lagunilla to Chris Mensalvas, November 2, 1950, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, General Correspondence—Officers Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.
27. Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial Convention of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union at Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, April 2-6, 1951, 233.
28. Chris Mensalvas to Ernesto Mangaoang, October 29, 1950, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, General Correspondence to Officers Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.
29. Louis Goldblatt to Chris Mensalvas, January 9, 1951, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.

30. Matias J. Lagunilla to Larry Itliong, November 2, 1950, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 37 Records, Box 27, Communications to and from Our Members Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries. In the late 1950s, Itliong founded the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC). Under his and Philip Vera Cruz's leadership, AWOC called for the 1965 grape strike in Delano, California. The organization later merged with Cesar Chavez's National Farm Workers Association to form the United Farm Workers Union.
31. *The Dispatcher*, January 19, 1951, 7.
32. Like most of the deportees, Peralta was a family man, with a wife and two children. Please see *The Dispatcher*, February 16, 1951, 10, and Louis Goldblatt to William Glazier, October 17, 1951, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
33. John W. Porter to Matias J. Lagunilla, August 5, 1952, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, Letters from Lawyers on Deportations, etc. Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries; *The Dispatcher*, March 16, 1953, 8; *The Philippines Mail*, November 1953, 2; William Glazier to Louis Goldblatt, November 15, 1951, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
34. Testimony given by Lloyd E. McMurray, attorney for the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union and Local 37 ILWU, October 29, 1952, before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Policy in San Francisco, October 14, 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
35. Please see *The Dispatcher*, April 13, 1951, 8; "Resolution," n.d., from the Committee for the Defense of Four of Oregon's Foreign Born to Hon. J. Howard McGrath, United States Attorney General, *et. al.*, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
36. Proceedings of the Ninth Biennial Convention, 237 and 464-465.
37. *The Dispatcher*, May 11, 1951, 10; May 25, 4, 10; June 22, 12; D.T. Siddal, Secretary, ILWU Local 8, to Matias J. Lagunilla, May 9, 1951, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, Letters from Lawyers on Deportations Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.
38. *Seattle Times*, August 10, 1951, 16; William Glazier, ILWU Washington D.C. representative, to Louis Goldblatt, November 15, 1951, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU. However, despite these positive efforts, the INS continued its harassment of deportees. In July 1951, Ponce Torres was arrested for the third time while working at the Naknek cannery of the Alaska Packers Association, and jailed briefly on a charge of "falsely claiming United States citizenship." Another \$1,000 bail bond had to be posted on his behalf before authorities

- would release him. Please see the Local 7-C Newsletter, July 19, 1951, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 29, Newsletters and Mailings Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.
39. *The Philippines Mail*, November 30, 1952. All four editorials of that issue deal with the evils of communism, and of opposing it by all means.
 40. General Membership Meeting, Minutes, January 30, 1953, Local 37 General—1950 Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
 41. On February 19, 1952, the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld deportation orders for Tancioco, Cabornay, Absolor, Torres, and Domingo. On April 14, 1952, United States District Court Judge William Lindberg upheld the Board of Immigration's deportation order of Mangaoang. "Statement on Ernesto Mangaoang," n.d., Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
 42. *The Dispatcher*, June 6, 1952, 8.
 43. "An Open Letter to Local 37 ILWU Members, August 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup; Ponce M. Torres to Louis Goldblatt, September 22, 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases—Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, both from the Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
 44. Leaflet, Local 37 ILWU Defense Committee, September 29, 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
 45. Local 37 Bulletin, January 2, 1953, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 29, Local 37 Newsletter Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries. Some Filipinos who had served in the United States Armed Forces of the Far East also could become United States citizens after 1946. However, the promise of citizenship was not made good, and was contested in court. The cases were settled recently, in November 1990. Please see the *Rafu Shimpō*, November 7, 1990, 1.
 46. *Seattle Times*, September 21, 1952, as quoted by the Local 37 ILWU Defense Committee, September 29, 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
 47. "Local 37 ILWU Opposition to the Walter-McCarran Act," Local 37 Historical Material Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU; Statement of the ILWU and Local 37 Before the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Policy.
 48. Matias J. Lagunilla and Chris Mensalvas, to "Rank and File and All Those Concerned," Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, General Correspondence—Mailings to Members Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries; "What You Should Know Under the Walter-McCarran Act," n.d., Local 37 General—1950 Subgroup, and "Cannery Worker Union Seeks to Halt Use of McCarran Walter Act Against Members," February 24, 1953, Local Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.

49. Around the same time, in another incident of Immigration Service harassment, President Chris Mensalvas was arrested on February 19 on charges of "violating his parole." Mensalvas refused to agree to INS requirements to disassociate himself from "subversive organizations and persons." He was released after six days when union attorneys persuaded the INS to set him free pending a new bail bond. Please see "Keeping the Record Straight," by Chris Mensalvas, n.d., Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU; the *Local 37 News*, March 1953, 4-5.
50. "Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc.—International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 37, Re: McCarran Walter Immigration Act, Public Law 414," from J.R. Robertson to Louis Goldblatt, May 8, 1953, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
51. "Local 37 Bulletin," May 18, 1953, 2-3. Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 29, Local 37 Newsletter Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.
52. *The Philippines Mail*, Salinas, June 1953, 3.
53. "Why Is Our Union In Danger?" by Ponce Torres, Candidate for Treasurer, n.d., Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 27, Elections Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries. Torres himself was running against Abella for the office of treasurer.
54. Washington Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, "Decision of United States Court of Appeals, *Ernesto Arcebal Mangaoang v. John P. Boyd*, District Director, INS, June 17, 1953," Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
55. *Seattle Times*, June 22, 1953, 23.
56. Leaflet, "Walter-McCarran Act In Action! An All-Out Fight!" July 28, 1953, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU.
57. "How the Alcantra Case Was Won," Local 37 General—1950 Subgroup, *ibid.*; *Filipino Forum*, August 19, 1955, 1.
58. Press Release, Washington Committee For the Protection of the Foreign Born (hereafter referred to as WCPFB), n.d., Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU, *The Northern Light*, November 1953, 3, WCPFB Papers, University of Washington Libraries.
59. *The Dispatcher*, November 27, 1953, 1; *The Seattle Daily Times*, June 22, 1953.
60. Press Release, WCPFB, June 7, 1954, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Alcantra, Gonzales, Peralta, and Others Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU; *The Dispatcher*, June 25, 1954; *The Philippines Mail*, June 1955, 3; *The Dispatcher*, May 27, 1955, 1.
61. *The Northern Light*, March-April 1956, 3, WCPFB Papers, University of Washington Libraries. Even some of Local 7's supporters were

arrested or harassed, as some were members of the various defense committees, such as the Washington Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, the Los Angeles Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born, and the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born. Communist Party influence in these committees was present. Please see the Marion Kinney Papers, WCPFB and the Carlos Bulosan Papers, University of Washington Libraries. Rose Chernin was also a member of the party while heading up the Los Angeles committee. Please see Kim Chernin, *In My Mother's House*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).

62. The union also faced raiding from competitive unions. The union's expulsion from the Congress of Industrial Organizations weakened its jurisdiction over Alaskan non-resident cannery workers. For accounts of the FTA's expulsion, please see F.S. O'Brien, "The 'Communist-Dominated' Unions in the United States since 1950," *Labor History* 9:2, Spring 1968, 192-193. For the Communist Party's look back at this period, please see George Morris, "Left Expulsions from the CIO—30 Years After," *Political Affairs* 58 (October 1979), 23-30. Shortly after Local 7 departed from the FTA, other ethnic minority locals, such as the predominantly black Local 22 in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and the predominantly Mexican locals in California collapsed, often due to hostile raids from competing CIO and AFL unions. Anti-communism here also played a large factor in their demise. Please see Barbara Griffith, *The Crisis of American Labor: Operation Dixie and the Defeat of the CIO* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), and Vicki Ruiz, *Cannery Women, Cannery Lives: Mexican Women, Unionization, and the California Food Processing Industry, 1930-1950* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987).
63. See Arleen de Vera, "An Unfinished Agenda: Filipino Immigrant Workers in the Era of McCarthyism; A Case Study of the Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7, FTA-CIO, 1948-1955." Master's thesis, Asian American Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 1990, 8-39.
64. In August of 1949, union secretary Prudencio Mori summed up this bleak view of the union's financial situation: "The finances of this union are very low because of the costly court litigations we have been engaged in for the past two years and because of the tremendous expenses we have incurred in trying to organize the unorganized asparagus and field workers in California for the past two years." Prudencio Mori to "All Labor, Social, Church, Civic Organizations, Fellows and Friends," August 31, 1949, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 23-41, University of Washington Libraries. The legal costs for one year's work in the Mangaoang and Mensalvas cases alone amounted to \$3,900. Please see John Caughlan to J.R. Robertson, August 2, 1951, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU. Since Local 7's attempt to organize farm workers, there has been the formation of a major union of California agricultural laborers with the establishment of the United Farm Workers Union in 1965 from

the merger of the Filipino-led Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) and Cesar Chavez's group. Two of the leaders of AWOC were Larry Itliong and Philip Vera Cruz, both former Local 37 members. Itliong was a Local 37 Vice President under President Chris Mensalvas.

There were accounts reported in the Filipino community press of two other deportations: that of Perfecto Tano y Carojo, from Baltimore, Maryland, and Vicente Santiago, from New York City. Tano y Carojo reportedly admitted his party membership. Reports as to Santiago's affiliation with the Communist Party, however, contradict each other. The first account alleges that Santiago is a "Party courier"; the second account alleges instead that his crime was that he entered the country illegally after 1946. Immigration authorities continued to insist, however, that he was a Communist Party member. Please see *The Fil-American Advocate*, November 15, 1952, 1-2; November 1, 1953, 2; and November 15, 1953, 8. The only other account in the Filipino community press of another Filipino arrested on such charges was Simeon Bagasol, a member of the ILWU in Hawai'i. Please see *The Dispatcher*, April 13, 1951, 12. Bagasol's case, too, was dropped after the Mangaoang decision.

65. This was a period of turmoil for the union, as other major officers, including Mensalvas, were facing similar charges, and in certain cases, were accused of up to eight violations. However, Mangaoang was the only one found guilty. It appears that Mensalvas and Abella were the ones most responsible on the Executive Council for the accusations against Mangaoang. Please see Bill Gettings to Louis Goldblatt, April 10, 1952, Local 37 Deportation Cases, Mangaoang and Mensalvas Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU; Trinidad Rojo to Bill Gettings, March 30, 1954, Victorio A. Velasco Papers, Box 12b-4, University of Washington Libraries; Local 37, *ILWU Information Bulletin*, November 10, 1954, ILWU Library; *Local 37 Newsletter*, January 12, 1955, Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers Union, Local 7 Records, Box 29, Local 37 Newsletter Subgroup, and Ernesto Mangaoang to Matias J. Lagunilla, January 24, 1955, Chris D. Mensalvas Papers, Mangaoang Trial Subgroup; "Resolution in Memory of Ernesto Mangaoang," Chris D. Mensalvas Papers, MSE 1970 negotiations (Chris) Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries; *The Dispatcher*, September 26, 1956, 5. Please also see Chris Mensalvas, "Mabuhay and Aloha! Dear Friend and Brother," Local 37 General—1950 Subgroup, Anne Rand Memorial Library, ILWU; Dow E. Walker to Mr. Eddie D. Wasan, October 25, 1960, Box 27, General Correspondence—Officers Subgroup, University of Washington Libraries.

Behind this government campaign was a fear of immigrants. The alleged link between communism and "the Alien" was one that was assumed, and where the burden of proof of innocence fell on the victim. As David Caute says: "People were afraid, and also ashamed: a survey taken in 1954 found that 20 percent of white people would not say where their ancestors came from. McCarthyism was the umbrella held out to all Americans, a repudiation of the Other (the

alien), even when the Other was the Self," *The Great Fear* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 225. Caute briefly mentions the deportation drive against Local 7, 236-237.

In the scheme of things, however, Asian immigrants were a special case. American society had long rejected them as the Other: Asian immigrants were barred from naturalization until 1952, were excluded from immigrating to American shores by a variety of exclusion acts directed against every Asian nationality, and were prohibited by state law from owning land.

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