

Public-Private Joint Ventures: Leadership practices of Appointed Public and Private Managers

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Public-Private Joint Ventures are one of the pervasive forms of Public-Private Partnerships in sovereign industries of emerging economies. They entail a state-international business relationship to extract and develop mineral reserves. The complexities in governing the partnership transcend the contractual agreement due to the tightness of the organizational form, and the state biased hierarchal structure that favours Public Partners over Private Partners. One of the core exchanges is leading a shared staff that administratively and directly reports to public partners, while technically and indirectly reports to the private partners. Building on the concepts of, principal-agent theory, and network governance, this article addresses the leadership practices enacted by appointed public and private managers in leading the working staff of PPJVs. Qualitative empirical data was gathered by interviewing public and private senior executives in the field. The findings identified two practices within the management-staff exchange of the partnership.

Keywords: Principal-agent theory, network governance, interviews, new public governance, state-owned enterprises, emerging economies

INTRODUCTION

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become an increasingly chosen strategy by governments to cope with global competitiveness and utilise their resources efficiently (Hodge & Greve, 2007, 2017; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). Public-Private Joint Ventures (PPJVs) in emerging economies are established as one of these forms that are prominently used in strategic

and sovereign industries (Ruble, 2017). They are autonomous legal entities (Steijn, Klijn, & Edelenbos, 2011) in the form of joint ventures (JVs) between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and international firms (Pongsiri, 2004).

Governing PPPs has been an area of significant interest for researchers and practitioners (Edelenbos, Klijn, & Steijn, 2011; Hodge & Greve, 2017; Hodge, Greve, & Biygautane, 2018; Jamali, 2004; Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; Klijn et al., 2015; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Sabry, 2015; Warsen, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2019; Warsen, Nederhand, Klijn, Grotenbreg, & Koppenjan, 2018). As an organisational form, despite their significance in shaping the economy of many countries; PPJVs in emerging economies, particularly in the sovereign sector in the Middle East and East Mediterranean region (MEEM) are under-researched partnerships (Andrews, Esteve, & Ysa, 2015a; Higgins & Huque, 2015a; Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012; Solheim-Kile & Wald, 2020; Steijn et al., 2011), more specifically, NE-PPJVs are seemingly under-represented in the literature (Roehrich, Lewis, & George, 2014). Geographically, the vast majority of studies on PPPs focused on developed economies (Wang, Xiong, Wu, & Zhu, 2018). A sheer minority of such studies have addressed emerging economies, yet still centred around the general governance and performance of consortium PPPs (Jamali, 2004; Maurya & Srivastava, 2019; Sabry, 2015). The performance of all forms of PPPs is prudently linked with an urge to look beyond contractual governance to explore relational and managerial factors that govern partnerships and to consider different geographical regions (Hodge et al., 2018; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Kort, Verweij, & Klijn, 2016; Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012; Steijn et al., 2011; Weihe, 2008). Part of such factors are the leadership practices employed by appointed public and private managers inside PPJVs.

The purpose of this study is to address this knowledge gap by exploring the leadership practices that public and private managers enact to govern PPJVs between SOE and international firms in emerging economies. To address this gap, the main question is: *what are the leadership*

practices of appointed Public and Private Managers in PPJVs in emerging economies? In answering this question, the practices will be introduced in a conceptual model. This model will enable public management policymakers and international business practitioners to review their current leadership practices to inform the governance of PPJVs. Additionally, the model will add to the literature of PPPs by offering fresh perspectives from under-researched partnerships and neglected geographical regions. These perspectives will also add to the unpopular regime of new public governance (NPG), expanding the relational and managerial factors that influence the governance of the wider family of PPPs (Osborne, 2006). The governance of PPPs varies due to the differences between; organisational forms, regions and the nature of industries (Casady, Eriksson, Levitt, & Scott, 2020; Matos-Castaño, Mahalingam, & Dewulf, 2014; Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012). Although NPG is borne to explore the inter-organisational exchange of PPPs in developed economies, expanding studies to emerging economies and the inclusion of fresh perspectives from PPJVs would ignite a spark for further public-policy reviews, and globalise the significance of the paradigm.

This is an exploratory qualitative study that builds on interviews with senior executives in the field of PPJVs, accessing their insights on the leadership practices that influence the governance of such partnerships. The senior executives represent the public and private sector partners on the parent firms and partnership levels. They are selected based on their span of experience of not less than 10-years in managing PPJVs in the region of MEEM. Their experience in the field covered several locations within the region in strategic public sector industries with the aim of maximising a state's social and economic welfare, especially within the complex areas of extractive industries. This aim is driven by a state's need to achieve global competitiveness and to avoid the exhaustion of their limited financial and technical capabilities. This need has led to an increase in the use of public-private collaboration between SOE and international firms, which makes the MEEM region an experienced and suitable empirical setting for the study.

Through the use of exploratory qualitative data, this paper represents a twofold contribution to the public management and the inter-collaboration management literature. First, the theoretical contribution lies in specifying the leadership practices by public and private managers that should be present to help in governing PPJVs. This way the aim is to refine relevant theories. The leadership practices are presented in a conceptual model with the focus on the exchange between the appointed management team of the PPJV and their subordinate working staff. Second, it furthers the so far limited knowledge of different forms of PPPs through studying a unique form of partnerships in different industries and geographical regions.

The article is structured as follows. The first section is the theoretical standing points underlying the governance of PPPs, pertaining to the organisational form of PPJVs, and the leadership practices that influence their governance. The second section is the methodology, a description of the method, data collection and data analysis. The third section is the results and themes that emerged from the coding and analysis of interviews using a display of the data through participants' accounts. These themes represent the leadership practices enacted by public (PuMs) and private (PrMs) that influence their governance of the partnership. The fourth section is the discussion of the findings in relation to the literature. Finally, the conclusion section with implications for future research.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE JOINT VENTURES

PPPs are found across a spectrum that ranges from finance-based infrastructure projects to loose organisational relationships e.g., BOOT, issue networks, etc. (Hodge & Greve, 2007, 2017; Weihe, 2008). PPJVs are in the middle of the spectrum as tight organisational forms that generate autonomous legal entities (Higgins & Huque, 2015; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Steijn et al., 2011). PPJVs are founded on the direct participation and involvement of host states and their willingness to form JVs with international firms (Pongsiri, 2002, 2004). They are

structured to operate in highly geo-political, geo-strategic and sovereign sectors (Palazuelos & Fernández, 2012; Pongsiri, 2004; Ruble, 2017). PPJVs are rare in OECD economies, they became a pervasive fact of economic life in emerging economies (OECD, 2013), predominantly in recent years in light of the ongoing natural gas discoveries in the MEEM region and their significance in supplying the European market (Genc, Kabak, Ozceylan, & Cetinkaya, 2018; Grigoriadis, 2014; Peng, Lu, Cheng, & Yang, 2021; Ruble, 2017).

Emulating ‘process-oriented’ JVs (Weihe, 2008), PPJVs are formed between SOE and international firms, they operate under agreements governed through a board of directors equally appointed by the parent firms (Johnston, 1994; Pongsiri, 2002, 2004). International firms are invited for their ownership of high capital investment and technical expertise in extractive industries, and they aim for profit maximisation (Ruble, 2017). The state aims to augment its geo-economic competitiveness by supplying international markets and to maximise the social and economic welfare of its nation through sufficient production (Jamali, 2004; Lee, Olson, & Trimi, 2012; Martins, Marques, & Cruz, 2011; Peng et al., 2021; Pongsiri, 2004; Ruble, 2017). Unlike the conventional definition of PPPs that are formed between public and private sectors to jointly finance, own, develop, and operate a facility or infrastructure asset (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). PPJVs are not equity-based, they are not jointly financed and owned by partners. The SOE is the national holding firm representing the state in its ownership of the assets; the natural reserves (Johnston, 1994; Pongsiri, 2004). International firms provide technical expertise to extract reserves and is committed to spending capital inflows throughout the development phases of the project, in return, they receive profit share and cost recoup (Pongsiri, 2002, 2004).

Public-Private Joint Ventures: Organisation and Theory

The public sector is reliant on the interdependent relationship (Hodge & Greve, 2007) with

international firms. Governments, through SOEs, seek to scrutinise the business activities that operate public ownership (Al-Emadi, 2010; Johnston, 1994). Central to this fact, governing PPJVs often entails unforeseen challenges between partners. The challenges are stemmed from the production sharing agreements (PSAs) which pertain to the structure of PPJVs warranting strict control and unequal rights favouring the SOE (Al-Emadi, 2010; Bindemann, 1999; Johnston, 1994; Pongsiri, 2004).

According to United Nations acts, PSAs fulfil a state's aspiration for strict control over their sovereign assets, i.e. mineral resources (Al-Emadi, 2010). Such agreements are inspired by principal-agent theory (PAT). In this theory, governments want to curb any possible opportunistic behaviour by international firms. International firms want to efficiently monitor their investments to achieve the highest possible profits. International firms are more experienced and technologically advanced in extractive industries (Pongsiri, 2004). Accordingly, the rational behaviour of partners will lead them to use any situation to their advantage. Especially when the exchange between partners, principals (SOE) and agents (international firms), is characterized by incomplete information and/or information asymmetries, partners may use these asymmetries strategically (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975). To deal with this, the formation of PPJVs structure and their agreements (PSA) are used to organise the exchange between principals and agents (Johnston, 1994).

After a bidding process is concluded, a PPJV is formed by an authenticated law approved by the parliament and the head of state to carry out the daily operations of the project (Al-Emadi, 2010; Johnston, 2000; Pongsiri, 2004). The SOE and international firms equally appoint their managers to constitute the PPJV management team and board of directors. Within this formation, a network of social exchanges evolves (Hudson, 2004) constituting an inter-organisational exchange between partners on the PPJV level and the parent firms' level, in addition to an intra-organisational exchange between the parent firms and their appointed

managers. Furthermore, as the focus of this study, a management-staff exchange emerges as the SOE solely hires the entire working staff of the PPJV (Al-Emadi, 2010; Johnston, 1994, 2000). They administratively report to the appointed managers of the SOE, with no authority for the international firm(s) appointed managers over them.

Extractive industries are characterised by high risks (Palazuelos & Fernández, 2012; Pongsiri, 2004; Ruble, 2017; Walls & Dyer, 1996). Accordingly, the principal (SOE) transfers the risk to the agent (international firms) and includes sanctions to guarantee that the agent will perform and abide by the agreement (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Ng & Loosemore, 2007). International firms bear such risks and contractually must fulfil financial expenditure commitments within stipulated timeframes. Annual plans and their budgets are prepared by international firms appointed managers and executed after the consent of the SOE appointed managers (Johnston, 1994; Nichols, 2010; Pongsiri, 2004).

The complexities of governing NE-PPJVs, however, transcend the structure and agreements with their emphasis on the state's dominance and intervention. PPJVs are partnerships that operate on social relationships for economic purposes. In social relationships, characteristics such as trust, respect, image and reciprocity are crucial to instigate appropriate governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Poppo, Zhou, & Zenger, 2008; Zheng, Roehrich, & Lewis, 2008). These characteristics allow partners and staff in partnership to positively cooperate beyond formal contractual arrangements (Bertelli & Smith, 2009). They are not stagnant in their silos, they coincide and interact along with differences in managerial approaches between partners (Boyne, 2002; Edelenbos et al., 2011; Klijn et al., 2010). Literature on governance suggests that values like legitimacy, fairness and positive leadership which are driven from the sense of appropriateness are not precluded from the behaviour of partners and staff, as social actors (Hall & C.R.Taylor, 1996). The application of network governance would, therefore, play a role in mitigating the complexities of governing PPJVs, as it addresses non-contractual practices that

improve the governance of partnerships (Hudson, 2004).

In extractive industries, PPJVs are influenced by political and economic pressures and multiple national and international actors (Palazuelos & Fernández, 2012). States are seeking geopolitical influence and geo-economic competitiveness (Genc et al., 2018; Kesseba & Lagos, 2019; Lee et al., 2012; Ruble, 2017), in addition to subsidising supplies to their social communities (Johnston, 1994; Pongsiri, 2004). International firms are also involved and linked to sporadic global value chains and are subject to economic and political pressures from their home countries (Palazuelos & Fernández, 2012; Ruble, 2017). These pressures are transmitted to PPJVs through parent firms (SOE and international firms), who are the vehicles to strategically penetrate the industry. Such plurality of influences on PPJVs intertwines with NPG overarching assumptions.

NPG accounts for the contribution of state and non-state actors in delivering public outcomes through partnerships (Osborne, 2006). It is borne to enable governments to contractually engage with private sectors in sophisticated relationships while accounting for the increasing uncertainty in managing public ownerships (Haveri, 2006). It accepts the effect of New Public Management (NPM), the ‘intra-organisational exchange’ on the governance of PPPs (Osborne, 2006), asserting the co-existence of various public management regimes in one given industry (McMullin, 2021). This entails a simultaneous inter-play between NPM ‘intra-organisational exchange’ and NPG ‘inter-organisational exchange’ to address efficiency (Hood, 1991).

NPG is able to incorporate the exchanges of PPJVs to inform their governance. It merges unequal power relationships established in PAT (Zeckhauser and Pratt 1985) with interdependent stakeholder settings established in network theory (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997). Its main goal is the development of public management policies through enhancing the governance of inter-organisational relationships by exploring key managerial

practices of partnerships (Osborne, 2010). Studies on relational and managerial factors of consortium PPPs are prolific (Caldwell, Roehrich, & George, 2017; Edelenbos et al., 2011; Klijn et al., 2010; Kort et al., 2016; Rufin & Rivera-Santos, 2012; Warsen et al., 2019, 2018; Ysa, Sierra, & Esteve, 2014). Researchers introduced PPJVs and their potential significance in adding to the literature of PPPs (Andrews, Esteve, & Ysa, 2015b; Higgins & Huque, 2015b; Solheim-Kile & Wald, 2020; Steijn et al., 2011). However, more detailed theoretical notions and empirical studies on what are the leadership practices the influence the governance of PPJVs are hard to find.

Exploring the leadership practices of PuMs and PrMs in leading and managing the staff of PPJVs is thus dependant on considering: the structure of the partnership with its power asymmetry between partners (Hudson, 2004; Johnston, 1994; Pongsiri, 2004) and the differences in managerial approaches between public and private managers (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bertelli & Smith, 2009; Boyne, 2002; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Parker & Hartley, 2003). Based on these considerations, this study scrutinises the exchange of the *Management-staff* in PPJVs.

Studies on PPP (Caldwell et al., 2017; Warsen et al., 2018), including autonomous legal entities (Higgins & Huque, 2015b; Saz-Carranza & Longo, 2012; Steijn et al., 2011), focused on horizontal relational and managerial strategies between partners and appointed managers. There is, however, a neglected perspective of the effect of PPJVs appointed management team on their leadership of partnership staff. More specifically, it is established in the literature that talented managers can improve the governance and performance of their partnership through staff leadership (Adobor, 2004; Druskat & Wheeler, 2003; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004). The working staff is a vehicle to achieve the objectives of a partnership (Adobor, 2004). In PPJVs, the power asymmetry between partners, and their appointed managers, may impact the way staff is led. The centralisation of power by one of the partners narrows the span of management

and creates room for favoured treatment among employees (Hatem, 1994; Holtgrave & Onay, 2017; Palmer, El Sayeed Yassin, & Leila, 1985; Youssef, 1994). This leads to their ‘factional behaviour’ (Pearce, 1997) favouring individual considerations over the objectives of the partnership (Adobor, 2004; Al-Yahya, 2009; Barsoum, 2017; Whitford, 2010).

The managerial differences in public-private collaborations bring different managerial competencies (Entwistle & Martin, 2005). In PPJVs, the appointed managers by SOE and international firms have unequal powers over the working staff. They both need to access information and achieve goals via managing the working staff, which pertains to different leadership patterns and tactics. Such leadership patterns can range from formal tactics ex. transactional leadership to informal tactics ex. transformational leadership (Andersen, 2010; Bass, 1985, 1997; Chen, Sharma, Edinger, Shapiro, & Farh, 2011; Clarke, 2011a; De Hoogh, Greer, & Den Hartog, 2015a; Goodall, 2016; Hansen & Villadsen, 2010; Hayati, Charkhabi, & Naami, 2014; Malik, Javed, & Hassan, 2017; Martin, Liao, & Campbell, 2013). Unlocking the different managerial competencies and leadership practices exercised over the working staff in public-private collaborations is thought to enhance their governance (Getha-Taylor, 2008).

METHODOLOGY

This study seeks knowledge of the underpinning views from actors managing PPJVs (Ritchie, Lewis, Nicholls & Ormston, 2013). A qualitative inquiry was the most appropriate for this research. This is due to the scant empirical research on this particular type of PPPs and its context – Leadership practices of PuMs and PrMs in PPJVs in emerging economies; the complex structure of the partnership and the investigative exploratory essence of the research question (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Outhwaite, 1975): *what are the leadership practices of appointed Public and Private Managers in PPJVs in emerging economies?*

Method

An inductive approach was used (Creswell, 2013; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Thomas, 2006) to gather empirical data through semi-structured interviews with senior executives in the field (Van de Mortel, 2008). An outline of questions was designed to inspect the interviewees' experience in managing and leading staff in PPJVs, and how their leadership practices influence the governance of partnerships. Some of the questions were: *How long have you been working in the extractive industry? How many of them related to PPJVs in MEEM? Is it classified a relational or a transactional partnership? From your experience, what are the managerial practices that can enhance the governance of PPJVs?*

In selecting the senior executives, a non-probabilistic and a non-random purposive sampling strategy were employed (Bowen, 2008; Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006; Mason, 2010; Pratt, 2008; Saunders & Townsend, 2016; Wilmot, 2005). The objective of employing non-probability sampling is to construct a framework which offers fresh perspectives and understanding of the leadership practices that influence the governance of PPJVs (Bowen, 2008; Stern, 1995) rather than achieving 'statistical generalisability' (Bernard, 1995; Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Trotter, 2012). This is followed by non-random purposive sampling criteria, the set criteria were to approach public and private senior executives with a minimum of ten years of experience managing PPJVs in the extractive industry, on the parent firm and the partnership levels (Guest et al., 2006; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). The criteria were more important than the number of interviewees, as their experience and seniority reflect diversity and breadth of knowledge of the sample population (Bowen, 2008; Wilmot, 2005). This allows 'theoretical saturation' ensuring data quality and richness (Bowen, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Data Collection and analysis

In recruiting the senior executives, a directory of all PPJVs in Egypt (Quick Petroleum Directory, 2015) was chosen as an unbiased comprehensive list of a targeted homogeneous sample (Wilmot, 2005). The chosen directory was for the Egyptian PPJVs as the majority of this type of partnerships in the region are concentrated in Egypt (Johnston, 1994). The directory included contact details of the management teams (Board of Directors) of PPJVs and their respective parent firms' management.

The recruitment process started with 3 rounds/days of phone calls from the UK to the whole population of 31 PPJVs in Egypt. The first day, 10, second day 15, and third day 6 NE-PPJVs. 10 public and private executives have signed in to participate in the study, 3 public senior executives and 7 private senior executives. Throughout their career, they have been assigned to different JVs across the 31 PPJVs, the least of them have worked in 2 JVs of the total population, ensuring the depth of their knowledge. Additionally, their career covered several locations in the MEEM region: Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Angola, Libya, and Greece, in addition to; the US, UK and Canada. This range of experience allowed depth, diversity, and richness of data (Bowen, 2008; Guest et al., 2006; Morse, 2000; Wilmot, 2005).

A field trip to Cairo commenced and lasted for 15 days to conduct interviews with participants. The interviews were recorded in audio files, 7 interviews were conducted in the English language and 3 were in the Arabic language – mainly the public sector officials. 6 of the English language interviews were not conducted with native English speakers, five of them were Egyptians working in English speaking companies, and the sixth was Greek. The average length of interview time was approximately 1 hour; the shortest being 46 minutes and the longest lasted 2.5 hours. The Arabic language interviews were translated word-for-word, then manually transcribed into Microsoft Word Documents, similar to English language interviews, both produced 64,000 words of interview transcripts.

In analysing the data, a thematic analytical procedure was implemented using the template analysis style (Aguinaldo, 2012; Braun & Clarke, 2006; King, 2012; Thomas, 2006). The analysis of transcripts was 'data driven' (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis started by identifying codes as a quote from the interview transcript. Using the hierarchal coding process (King, 2012), 'Codes' were grouped into 'Sub-Categories' which in turn were grouped to 'Categories', then categories were grouped into 'Themes'. This process did not bear any analytical weight on the semantics of the text, but on the 'latent' meaning of it, going beyond the surface of the data to the underlying views of participants (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Gioia et al., 2013; King, 2012). A preliminary sub-categories, categories, and themes were identified and revisited on an interview-by-interview basis. They became integral and consistent after fully analysing the first 3 interviews. Consequently, they were successfully used on the fourth, then the fifth, until the tenth interview (King, 2012).

Saturation was reached after analysing the 7th interview, the remainder 3 interviews were analysed adding no new insights, ensuring replication, data comprehension and completeness (Bowen, 2008; Charmaz, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Morse, 2000; Saunders & Townsend, 2016; Wilmot, 2005). To ensure reliability and consistency, the trustworthiness of the data analysis was examined through consistency checks by two external advisors who are interested in the field of research (Thomas, 2006). They looked for possible inconsistencies and offered recommendations, ensuring the analysis and findings robustness (Bowen, 2008). Every member was separately given a considerable part of the raw text with a list of the subcategories, categories, and themes. They were asked to assign sections of the text to the subcategories, then group the subcategories to the given list of categories, and then to themes (Thomas, 2006). After considering their recommendations, the re-inspection produced similar conclusions (Bowen, 2008). Two themes emerged from the data: Soft leadership and Authoritative leadership, which correspond to the management-staff exchange in PPJVs.

RESULTS

The aim of the study was to explore leadership practices enacted by PuMs and PrMs that influence their governance of PPJVs in MEEM. Soft and Authoritative leadership themes emerged in the interviews of ways and practices that allow leading the working staff in PPJVs under the existence of the power asymmetries between PuMs and PrMs. Finance Manager: P5 (PrM, JV) expressed how difficult it is to govern the partnership if the working staff holds information from him *‘In theory for example, I have may be something like 20 to 24 accountants reporting to me – that’s in theory – but is that real? No, they are not giving me the information unless they like me, or they will tell me go and ask your counter-part and they will instruct [...] it is directly affecting the performance’*. This signified the private partner’s lack of authority over the PPJVs working staff due to the hierarchal structure of the partnership. This unbalanced power between public and private partners instigated private partners to use *soft leadership* skills to indirectly manage the PPJVs working staff. *‘I’m getting the team to believe that I have the skills, knowledge, and capability to guide them [...]. I call it [...]: the expert power [...]. If you get it and guarantee this buy-in on the team, then I have the authority’* Projects Manager: P4 (PrM, JV). Others use leadership by respect and trust *‘They are not giving me the information unless they like me, it is of course a little bit of this and a little bit of that [respect and trust], plus chemistry too, part of it has to be chemistry’* Finance Manager: P5 (PrM, JV).

The public partners also echoed the importance of improving staff output to enhance and drive the governance and performance of the partnership using further leadership skills *‘The ability to understand the personal circumstances of the individual [...] and accordingly in order to have a better or an optimum output from an employee you have to maintain a free pressure atmosphere, setting an example as a leader is also important, my focus should be purely business without any favouritism which would enhance a professional environment [...] you are dealing with human beings not machines’* Chairman: P8 (PuM, JV). General Manager: P2

(PrM, JV) illustrated that the working staff follows the strict *authoritative leadership* of the public partner due to the hierarchal structure of the partnership ‘*The problem or the biggest problem in terms of performance is that they [working staff] will do whatever their managers [public managers] say [...] to get the job done [...] they are driven by a management hierarchy*’. This authoritative leadership was exercised by Chairman: P9 (PuM, JV) ‘*Corruptive attitudes [from employees], that is totally unacceptable under my management it will never be approved or even discussed, and I face these kinds of things with determinism [...]. If an employee is doing nothing during the day, then he/she will be a clear source of distraction to the rest of the working staff and the organisation*’. Collectively, these indications signified that soft and authoritative leadership practices enacted on the working staff in a PPJV vary between PuM and PrMs, and influence their ability to enhance its governance through the application of different leadership skills by public and private partners.

DISCUSSION

In scrutinising the views of senior executives in the field, evidence revealed that soft and authoritative leadership practices are enacted by PuMs and PrMs to allow them to govern PPJVs. The variance of between leadership practices is to the power asymmetry between public and private partners and the organisational form of the partnership. The findings on the leadership practices used by public and private appointed managers in managing and leading the working staff of PPJVs highlights an important gap in the literature of PPP governance. The literature paid more attention to the management practices of the inter-organisational exchange between partners. Indeed, the inter-organisational exchange is crucial in governing all forms of PPPs including PPJVs. However, the influence of leading and managing the working staff of a partnership on its governance was given little to no attention.

Evidence revealed that through different leadership practices that are enacted by PuMs and

PrMs. The appointed public and private managers can achieve their objectives by leading the lower echelon of the working staff in PPJVs. Such concept is established in the wider management literature, yet for private sector organisations and alliances (Adobor, 2004; Judge et al., 2004; Malik et al., 2017; Tung & Chang, 2011). In the case of public-private collaborations, the power asymmetry in PPJVs has created a series of leadership patterns exercised by the appointed managers of either sector to govern the partnership and achieve the objectives of their parent firms. In such context, the workings staff has constituted an integral element to consider in enhancing the governance of PPJVs.

The appointed private sector managers emulated soft leadership skills compensating their lack of authority over the working staff. To access daily operational information in the partnership and indirectly manage the staff, they employed indirect leadership skills. As employees are likely to be influenced by highly experienced managers (Goodall, 2016; Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002), they demonstrated their expertise to enhance the relationship with the working staff, gaining their respect and trust. The occurrence of respect and trust initiates positive interaction between managers and subordinates (Clarke, 2011b; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) which in turn help them in governing the partnership and achieving their objectives by indirectly managing the working staff.

As for the appointed public sector managers, the authority over the working staff is centred in their hands. The patterns of staff leadership they used varied according to their individual preference. Some adopted authoritative and transactional leadership approaches (Bass, 1985, 1997) cushioned on hierarchal authority, to create an atmosphere of discipline and boost the team performance to govern the operations of the partnership (De Hoogh, Greer, & Den Hartog, 2015b). Some fostered transformational leadership approaches (Bass, 1985, 1997) built on considering personal circumstances of employees winning their emotional gratitude. This allows them to drive favourable performance outcomes from the working staff (Adobor, 2004;

Hayati et al., 2014; Malik et al., 2017). Others reached the same end by using leadership by empowerment that encompasses a manager's ability to build the capabilities of employees, through sharing, passing and delegating broader powers to subordinates (Chen et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2013; Zhang & Bartol, 2010).

Proposition 1a: The governance of PPJVs are positively associated with the leadership styles embraced by the appointed public and private managers over the JV working staff.

Proposition 1b: The use of transformational leadership styles by the appointed private managers is positively associated with their lack of authority over the JV working staff.

Proposition 1c: The use of transformational and/or transactional leadership styles by the appointed public managers over the JV working staff is positively associated with the manager's individual preference.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented, demonstrates that governing PPJVs in emerging economies is influenced by different leadership practices between the appointed public and private managers. Such practices are dictated by the power asymmetries that exist in the partnership that favours the public manager's authority on staff over the private manager who has no to limited authority. The findings confirm the expectations that the partnership's tight organisational form and biased hierarchal structure requires special leadership practices to govern the partnership and drive the performance of its staff. Although the rigorousness of the research design and analysis has been portrayed, as with any exploratory qualitative and inductive studies, there are limits to the generalisability of the results. The research focused on a limited number of executives in one country in the region. Further research is needed to examine the conceptual model with the identified leadership practices in public-private collaborations, in other contexts, to consider

the broader applicability of the model. Research would also be welcome in other state-centric countries or larger bureaucracies, particularly post-soviet regimes which have considerably similar contractual and organisational settings in the industry but with different governance cultures (Henry, Nysten-Haarala, Tulaeva, & Tysiachniouk, 2016; Stanica, Balica, Henderson, & Țiclău, 2020).

Despite its limitations, this study has important theoretical, empirical and practical contributions. Theoretically, this study contributes to the field of PPPs governance by providing specific leadership practices for tight organisational forms rooted in unbalanced power between public and private managers. Empirically, it expands the limited knowledge of different forms of PPPs through introducing this unique form of partnerships in extractive industries and underrepresented geographical regions. This provides a step further towards developing more inferences on public-private collaborations' conditions and structures. Practically, this study provides recommendations to public and private practitioners through the presented set of practices and how they are enacted to explain and understand the cooperative dynamics in these partnerships.

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