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**GUIDANCE FOR DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS REGARDING STUDENT LOAN
BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION**

I. Introduction

This memorandum provides guidance (Guidance) to Department of Justice (Department) attorneys regarding requests to discharge student loans in bankruptcy cases. Developed in coordination with the Department of Education (Education), this Guidance will enhance consistency and equity in the handling of these cases. In accordance with existing case law and Education policy, the Guidance advises Department attorneys to stipulate to the facts demonstrating that a debt would impose an undue hardship and recommend to the court that a debtor's student loan be discharged if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the debtor presently lacks an ability to repay the loan; (2) the debtor's inability to pay the loan is likely to persist in the future; and (3) the debtor has acted in good faith in the past in attempting to repay the loan.

To assist the Department attorney in evaluating each of these factors, a debtor will typically be asked to provide relevant information to the government by completing an attestation form (Attestation). The Attestation requests information about the debtor's income and expenses to enable the Department attorney to evaluate the debtor's present ability to pay. The Attestation also seeks information that will help the Department attorney evaluate the other two factors. In the following sections, this Guidance provides more detail about the Attestation that a debtor will be asked to complete, and how the information provided in the Attestation will be considered by the Department attorney. In Appendix A, this Guidance provides a sample attestation form. In addition, in Appendix B, this Guidance provides a concrete example of how a debtor's request for discharge of a student loan will be evaluated.

II. Objectives of the Guidance and Education's Role in Supporting Discharge Cases

In cases where a debtor seeks the discharge of a student loan in bankruptcy, the Department shares with Education the responsibility to represent the interests of the United States in accord with existing law and in the interests of justice. This responsibility includes recommending that a bankruptcy court grant full or partial discharge of student loan debts in appropriate cases. To fulfill that responsibility, Department attorneys should stipulate to facts necessary to demonstrate undue hardship and recommend discharge where the debtor provides information in the Attestation (or otherwise during the adversary proceeding) that satisfies the elements of the analysis below. Some debtors have been deterred from seeking discharge of student loans in bankruptcy due to the historically low probability of success and due to the mistaken belief that student loans are ineligible for discharge. Other student loan borrowers have been dissuaded from seeking relief due to the cost and intrusiveness entailed in pursuing an

adversary proceeding. This Guidance is intended to redress these concerns so that discharges are sought and received when warranted by the facts and law. In addition, Department attorneys are expected to consult proactively with Education to evaluate the specific circumstances of each case.

In collaborating in the preparation of this Guidance, the Department and Education have sought to promote three goals in particular:

1. To set clear, transparent, and consistent expectations for discharge that debtors understand regardless of representation;
2. To reduce debtors' burdens in pursuing an adversary proceeding by simplifying the fact-gathering process. This includes use of an Attestation, and where feasible, information provided through prior submissions to the bankruptcy court and available student loan servicing records;
3. Where the facts support it, to increase the number of cases where the government stipulates to the facts demonstrating a debt would impose an undue hardship and recommends to the court that a debtor's student loans be discharged.

Education is committed to supporting Department attorneys handling these cases. Department attorneys should expect that, for each adversary proceeding, Education will provide to the Department attorney a record of the debtor's account history, loan details, and—where available—educational history, which the Department attorney will share with the debtor. This information will be provided with the Education litigation report.

The Department attorney is expected to consult with Education in each case; consultation includes sharing the completed Attestation and conferring on an appropriate course of action. In its initial litigation report, Education will advise on matters including whether it has data relating to the presumptions in this Guidance regarding assessment of future circumstances and whether it considers the debtor made good faith efforts to repay their student loans. This process will ensure the final decision is informed by Education's experience administering student loans and its role as creditor. Once the Department attorney reaches a recommendation in accordance with this Guidance, the Department attorney shall submit their recommendation or approval, as appropriate, along with Education's recommendation, under the standard procedures applicable in that attorney's component.

III. Applicable Law

Under Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, certain student loans may not be discharged in bankruptcy unless the bankruptcy court determines that payment of the loan “would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); *United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa*, 559 U.S. 260, 278 (2010) (“the bankruptcy court must make an independent determination of undue hardship . . . even if the creditor fails to object or appear in the adversary proceeding.”).¹ This inquiry is undertaken through a formal adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. *United Student Aid Funds*, 559 U.S. at 263-64; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6). The parties in that proceeding may stipulate to the existence of certain facts and recommend that the bankruptcy court find, based on such facts, that repayment of the student loan would cause the debtor an undue hardship.

The most common framework for assessing undue hardship is the so-called *Brunner* test, emanating from *Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp.*, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987). To discharge a student loan under the *Brunner* test, a bankruptcy court must find that the debtor has established that (1) the debtor cannot presently maintain a minimal standard of living if required to repay the student loan, (2) circumstances exist that indicate the debtor’s financial situation is likely to persist into the future for a significant portion of the loan repayment period, and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts in the past to repay the student loan. *Id.* at 396.

Other courts have employed a “totality of circumstances” test (Totality Test) to determine whether repayment of student loan debt would cause an undue hardship. *See, e.g., In re Long*, 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003). The Totality Test looks to: (1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and their dependents’ reasonably necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case. *Id.*

This Guidance applies in both *Brunner* and Totality Test jurisdictions. Courts have recognized the *Brunner* and Totality Tests “consider similar information—the debtor’s current and prospective financial situation in relation to the educational debt and the debtor’s efforts at repayment.” *In re Polleys*, 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); *see also In re Jespersen*, 571

¹ Section 523(a)(8) requires the debtor to demonstrate an undue hardship to discharge nearly all federal student loans, excluding Health Education Assistance Loans, as well as private education loans that meet the definition of qualified education loans under the Internal Revenue Code. *See* 26 U.S.C. § 221(d)(1).

F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).² Both tests require assessment of the debtor's income and reasonable expenses to determine whether the debtor has the present and future ability to maintain a "minimal standard of living" while making student loan payments. *See, e.g., In re Hurst*, 553 B.R. 133, 137 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2017) ("[I]f the debtor's reasonable financial resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while still allowing for a minimal standard of living—then the debt should not be discharged.") (citing *In re Jespersen*, 571 F.3d at 779). Finally, both tests direct the court to review the debtor's past efforts at repayment. *In re Polleys*, 356 F.3d at 1309; *see also In re Bronsdon*, 435 B.R. 791, 797 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010).

IV. Discussion of the Applicable Factors

As explained above, consideration of student loan debt discharge requires an evaluation of a debtor's present, future, and past financial circumstances. This Guidance offers a framework for Department attorneys to apply each of these factors.

With respect to the first factor, the Guidance relies upon the Internal Revenue Service Collection Financial Standards (the IRS Standards) to assess whether a debtor can presently maintain a "minimal standard of living" if required to repay student loan debt. In particular, the Department attorney is advised to use the IRS Standards to evaluate a debtor's expenses, and then to compare those expenses to the debtor's income, to determine whether the debtor has a present ability to pay the loan.

With respect to the second factor, the Guidance uses presumptions for determining whether inability to repay is likely to persist in the future. The Guidance recognizes, however, that even in the absence of such presumptions a debtor may be able to establish that their inability to pay will continue in the future.

With respect to the third factor, the Guidance identifies certain objective criteria that evidence a borrower's good faith. In addition, the Guidance discusses how to evaluate a debtor's

² The Eighth Circuit has described the Totality Test as "less restrictive" than the *Brunner* framework, *In re Long*, 322 F.3d at 554, but it has also recognized that the distinction between the standards "may not be that significant." *Jespersen*, 571 F.3d at 779 n.1, 782. *See, e.g., In re Long*, 322 F.3d at 554-55 ("Simply put, if the debtor's reasonable future financial resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student loan debt—while still allowing for a minimal standard of living—then the debt should not be discharged. Certainly, this determination will require a special consideration of the debtor's present employment and financial situation—including assets, expenses, and earnings—along with the prospect of future changes—positive or adverse—in the debtor's financial position"); *see also Jespersen*, 571 F.3d at 782 (the totality approach also requires consideration of "evidence of a less than good faith effort to repay . . . student loan debts"). The Guidance does not supersede applicable case law in the circuits. Department attorneys should advance the principles and goals described in this Guidance consistent with that case law.

payment history and decision to participate in an income-driven repayment plan, and clarifies that neither of these factors are dispositive evidence where other evidence of good faith exists.

Finally, the Guidance also provides direction to Department attorneys regarding the treatment of a debtor's assets and the availability of partial discharge.

The Attestation provided with this Guidance will assist in the assembly of the information needed to assess these factors.³ Department attorneys are expected to review completed Attestations in consultation with Education.

A. Assessment of Present Circumstances

The first factor relevant to whether a student loan debtor can meet the statutory undue hardship standard requires the debtor to prove an inability to presently maintain “a minimal standard of living” while making student loan payments. To address this factor, the Department attorney should complete two steps. First, the Department attorney should use the IRS Standards to determine the debtor's “allowable” expenses. Second, the attorney should compare those allowable expenses to the debtor's income to determine whether the debtor has income after expenses with which to make student loan payments. If the debtor's allowable expenses exceed their gross income, this element of the analysis is satisfied. If the debtor's financial circumstances changed since filing the initial bankruptcy petition, the Department attorney can look to the debtor's actual financial circumstances when making an undue hardship determination. *Cf. In re Walker* 650 F.3d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 2011).

1. Assessment of the Debtor's Expenses

The Attestation solicits expense information from debtors in categories corresponding to the IRS Standards, particularly the portions of the IRS Standards described as “National and Local Standards” and “Other Necessary Expenses.”⁴ The IRS Standards are a useful guide to assess a debtor's expenses for purposes of the “minimal standard of living” inquiry. Use of these standards will ensure more consistent and equitable treatment of debtors seeking discharge. The IRS has established and updated the IRS Standards to determine appropriate collection actions where taxpayers have outstanding unpaid tax obligations. The IRS Standards evaluate what

³ As discussed in more detail below, the Attestation requires a debtor to present information relevant to the Department attorney's analysis in an efficient, organized manner. If the debtor's satisfaction of the requirements for discharge are clearly demonstrated by the complaint or other facts available outside the Attestation, then upon verification of those facts, a Department attorney may recommend discharge without requiring that the debtor complete the Attestation.

⁴ Links to the IRS Standards are found at <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/collection-financial-standards>.

expenses are “necessary to provide for a taxpayer’s health and welfare[.]”⁵ or, as described in the IRS Collection Manual, “the *minimum* a taxpayer and family needs to live.”⁶ Courts have recognized the IRS Standards as useful objective criteria in assessing “undue hardship” under Section 523(a)(8). *See, e.g., In re O’Hearn*, 339 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2003); *In re Cota*, 298 B.R. 408, 415 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003). The IRS Standards list certain expenses (the National and Local Standards) for which they provide a recommended maximum allowance, but also recognize other potential expenses (Other Necessary Expenses) that are potentially necessary for an individual’s health and welfare.

Allowance of Expenses in National Standard Categories: The IRS National Standards consist of tables of allowable expense amounts in the following categories: food; housekeeping supplies; apparel and services; personal care products and services; and miscellaneous. Where the debtor’s expenses are below the amount allowed under the IRS National Standards, no further inquiry into the debtor’s actual expense amount is needed and the debtor is allowed the full National Standards amount. If a debtor’s reported expenses exceed the IRS National Standard amount, a debtor’s reasonable explanation for why particular actual expenses exceed the standard should be considered carefully by the Department attorney, in consultation with Education, and may be accepted if allowing the additional expenses is warranted by the debtor’s circumstances and would comport with a “minimal standard of living.”⁷

Allowance of Expenses in Local Standards Categories: The Local Standards provide expense standards for the categories of housing, utilities, and transportation. Unlike the expenses in the National Standards category, for the Local Standards categories, the Department attorney should limit the debtor to their *actual* expenses. To the extent such expenses do not exceed the amount prescribed in the Local Standards for the debtor’s location and household size, Department attorneys should consider the debtor’s actual expenses in these categories to be consistent with a minimal standard of living and treat such amount as allowed. If the debtor’s actual expense exceeds the Local Standards amount, Department attorneys should generally limit the debtor’s allowable expense to the standard amount. However, as with those expenses categorized as National Standards expenses, the Department attorney should, in consultation

⁵ IRS, *Collection Financial Standards*, <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/collection-financial-standards>.

⁶ IRS, Internal Revenue Manual: Part 5.15.1.8 (July 24, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-015-001#idm139862108264304 (emphasis added).

⁷ The decision whether to allow expenses in excess of the National and Local Standards will necessarily be fact-intensive, but allowable excess expenses could, for example, include specific health-related costs, costs for special dietary needs, unique commuting requirements, or other needs of the debtor or dependents.

with Education, carefully consider and accept a debtor's reasonable explanation for the need for the additional expenses.

Allowance of Other Necessary Expenses: The IRS Standards recognize "Other Necessary Expenses" in addition to the National and Local Standards expenses. The Attestation requests that debtors list expenses in these "Other Necessary Expense" categories. For example, the IRS Standards allow expenses for alimony and child support payments if they are court-ordered and actually being paid, as well as for baby-sitting, day care, nursery and preschool costs where reasonable and necessary. These Other Necessary Expenses are consistent with a "minimal standard of living," so long as they are necessary and reasonable in amount.⁸

Allowance for Reasonable Expenses Not Incurred: In addition to the comparison of expenses and income described above, Department attorneys should also recognize there may be circumstances in which a debtor's actual expenditures fall below the expenses required to maintain a minimal standard of living and to meet basic needs. For example, a debtor may be living in housing that the debtor is not paying for (e.g., the debtor is staying with a family member) or living in substandard or overcrowded housing but should not be required to remain there indefinitely. Likewise, a debtor may be forgoing spending on childcare, dependent care, technology, or healthcare that would otherwise be expenses one would reasonably expect to maintain a minimal living standard. A simple comparison of present expenses and income could unduly assess the debtor's financial situation against a standard that is below a minimal standard of living. In such circumstances, it would be inappropriate to conclude a debtor possesses income with which to make student loan payments and ignore the debtor's actual living standard. To address these situations, the Attestation provides an opportunity for a debtor to identify and explain expenses the debtor would incur if able to address needs that are unmet or insufficiently provided for. The Department attorney should use those projected expenses in assessing the debtor's present and future financial circumstances. Unless the amount of the projected expenses exceeds the Local Standards, it is not necessary to probe the debtor's calculation.

Appendix B includes specific examples of the recommended analysis of expenses.⁹

⁸ The Department attorney may consult the IRS Standards themselves to assist in determining whether these expenses are necessary to a debtor's minimal standard of living.

⁹ The Attestation process is intended to be distinct from the bankruptcy "means test," which is used to determine a debtor's eligibility for Chapter 7 relief. Although the means test also uses the IRS Standards as part of its calculation of a debtor's household disposable income for the purpose of establishing bankruptcy eligibility, courts have recognized that the means test is not a test of a "minimal standard of living." See *In re Miller*, 409 B.R. 299, 319–320 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (means test not appropriate to determine whether the "undue hardship" standard is met) (citing *In re Savage*, 311 B.R. 835, 840 n.7 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2004)). Moreover, the means test calculation differs from the Attestation in specific ways, including that (1) the means test (unlike

2. *Comparison of Expenses with the Debtor's Gross Income*

After determining the debtor's allowable household expenses using the National and Local Standards and Other Necessary Expenses, the Department attorney should compare the debtor's expenses to the debtor's household gross income. Gross income includes income from employment of the debtor and other household members, as well as unemployment benefits, Social Security benefits and other income sources. Debtors normally provide this information in the Schedule I filing. Where debtors filed this form less than 18 months prior to the adversary proceeding, the debtor may use the information on Schedule I to complete the Attestation. Where Schedule I was filed more than 18 months prior to the adversary proceeding or the debtor's circumstances have changed, the Attestation directs the debtor to provide the new income information.

Using the expense and income information provided in the Attestation, the Department attorney should determine whether the debtor possesses income with which to make student loan payments. If the debtor's allowable expenses exceed the debtor's income, the minimal standard of living requirement is satisfied and the debtor may be eligible for a student loan discharge, subject to consideration of the additional factors below. If, however, after considering the analysis described above, the debtor has sufficient discretionary income to make full student loan payments as required under their loan agreement, the debtor has not satisfied the test for undue hardship.¹⁰ Where a debtor's income allows for payment toward the student loan debt but in an amount insufficient to cover the required monthly student loan payment, the Department attorney

the Attestation) is required only for "consumer" debtors whose income exceeds a state "median," and (2) in practice, the means test often allows expenses regardless of their necessity to the debtor's basic or minimal standard of living, such as payments on multiple vehicles or for real property other than the debtor's residence.

¹⁰ Department attorneys are expected to consult with Education to determine the monthly repayment amount. Generally, where permitted in a given jurisdiction, the Department attorney should use the monthly payment amount due under a "standard" repayment plan for the student loan in question when determining whether the debtor has the ability to make payments. The standard repayment amount is the payment amount required to pay the student loan within the remaining term of the loan, as determined by Education. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 685.208. Where the account includes unpaid interest, Department attorneys should take care to ensure that the monthly payment amount would be sufficient to pay the loan obligation in full. Except as required by controlling law, the Department attorney should not use the monthly payment amount available through income-driven repayment plan options as the comparator. Finally, where a student loan has been accelerated, whether based on a debtor's payment default or otherwise, the Department attorney should, following consultation with Education, determine the standard repayment amount either prior to default or as calculated if the loan were removed from default status.

should consider the potential for a partial discharge (discussed more fully in Section IV.E. below).

B. Assessment of Future Circumstances

The second factor for discharge is whether the debtor's current inability to repay the debt while maintaining a minimal standard of living will likely persist for a significant portion of the repayment period. This showing is required in both *Brunner* Test and Totality Test jurisdictions. See *In re Thomas*, 931 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 2019); *In re Long*, 322 F.3d at 554.

A presumption that a debtor's inability to repay debt will persist is to be applied in certain circumstances, including: (1) the debtor is age 65 or older; (2) the debtor has a disability or chronic injury impacting their income potential;¹¹ (3) the debtor has been unemployed for at least five of the last ten years; (4) the debtor has failed to obtain the degree for which the loan was procured; and (5) the loan has been in payment status other than 'in-school' for at least ten years.¹² The Attestation is designed to identify any such circumstances, and it advises the debtor to disclose all of the circumstances applicable to their situation and not rely exclusively on a single presumptive basis for claiming a continuing inability to repay.

The presumptions identified in this Guidance are rebuttable. Although circumstances supporting rebuttal of a presumption will likely be uncommon, the Department attorney need not apply a particular presumption if the debtor's attestation nonetheless indicates a likely future ability to pay. Such a rebuttal must be based on concrete factual circumstances. Mere conjecture about the borrower's future ability is not enough. For example, the presumption in favor of a

¹¹ The debtor may, but is not required to, submit information from a treating physician indicating that the debtor suffers from a disability or chronic injury impacting their income potential, and when provided, that information should be considered carefully. The presumption may be applied even in the absence of a formal medical opinion.

Education offers Total and Permanent Disability (TPD) discharge for qualifying borrowers with certain severe disabilities. Because TPD discharge has its own requirements, the existence of that potential administrative relief generally should not foreclose the debtor from showing a future inability to pay. If, in the view of the Department attorney, the debtor may qualify for TPD discharge, the attorney can provide information to the debtor about the program. Finally, Education's denial of a TPD discharge request is not dispositive of the future circumstances analysis: a prior denial for TPD discharge only implies that Education determined the borrower is likely to have some ability to earn income at the time of the application based on the information provided and evaluation criteria in place, but does not otherwise suggest that the debtor's income is sufficient to service student loan debt or that future circumstances are likely to change.

¹² In the case of consolidation loans, the length of time the debtor has been in repayment includes periods in repayment on the original underlying loans.

debtor who failed to obtain a degree may be rebutted by evidence that the debtor has received employment offers with salaries significantly higher than their current income. In sum, a presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a debtor's future financial circumstances render them able to pay their outstanding debt.

The presumptions identified above are not the sole bases upon which a future inability to pay may be found. A debtor may attest to any facts the debtor believes are relevant to future inability to pay, and the Department attorney should review the Attestation to determine whether the facts presented by the debtor satisfy the standards for proof of likely persistence of inability to pay. A Department attorney may find, for example, that a debtor's financial circumstances are unlikely to improve in the future where the debtor has a significant history of unemployment, even if the debtor's unemployment does not meet the criteria for a presumption. A stipulation may also be appropriate, even absent a particular presumption, where the institution that granted the debtor's degree has closed, and that closure has inhibited a debtor's future earning capacity.¹³ Education has indicated that closure of a school after completion of the debtor's degree may affect a debtor's future ability to pay where the debtor incurs reputational harm from such closure or where the debtor's lack of access to records hampers employment efforts.¹⁴

C. Assessment of Good Faith

Whether a debtor has demonstrated good faith with regard to repayment of student loan debt depends upon the debtor's actions relative to their loan obligation.¹⁵ Good faith may be demonstrated in numerous ways and the good faith inquiry "should not be used as a means for courts" or Department attorneys "to impose their own values on a debtor's life choices." *Polleys*, 356 F.3d at 1310. A debt should not be discharged if the debtor has "willfully contrive[d] a hardship in order to discharge student loans," *id.*, abused the student loan system, *In re Coco*, 335 Fed. App'x 224, 228-29 (3rd Cir. 2009), for example, by committing fraud in connection with obtaining the loans, or otherwise demonstrated a lack of interest in repaying the debt, *id.*

¹³ Education offers a loan discharge for students attending a school that closed while the borrower was in attendance or shortly after withdrawal. As with a TPD discharge, the availability of this administrative relief should have limited influence on the analysis discussed in this Guidance. Debtors may not receive the "closed-school" discharge for a range of reasons that do not implicate their financial status.

¹⁴ The presumptions discussed in this Guidance are intended to direct a Department attorney's assessment of the debtor's situation and do not shift any burden of proof in undue hardship litigation. Before the court in the adversary proceeding, the debtor retains the burden of proof on all elements of the undue hardship claim.

¹⁵ In discussing good faith, this Guidance intends to encompass satisfaction of both Prong Three of the *Brunner* test and good faith as considered under the Totality Test in evaluating the debtor's past efforts at repayment.

Where the debtor has taken at least one of the following steps and in the absence of countervailing circumstances as discussed below, the steps demonstrate good faith. We would normally expect the Department attorney to be able to determine the presence of any countervailing circumstances based on the information contained in the Attestation and provided by Education or that is publicly available.

Evidence of good faith: The following steps evidence good faith:

- making a payment;
- applying for a deferment or forbearance (other than in-school or grace period deferments);
- applying for an IDR plan;
- applying for a federal consolidation loan;
- responding to outreach from a servicer or collector;
- engaging meaningfully with Education or their loan servicer, regarding payment options, forbearance and deferment options, or loan consolidation; or
- engaging meaningfully with a third party they believed would assist them in managing their student loan debt.

The good faith standard also assesses criteria such as “the debtor’s efforts to obtain employment, maximize income and minimize expenses.” *In re Mosko*, 515 F.3d 319, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing *In re O’Hearn*, 339 F.3d at 564); see, e.g., *In re Jespersen*, 571 F.3d at 780. A debtor’s handling of finances in a manner that suggests responsible management of their debts, including student loan debts, also suggests good faith. A debtor has minimized expenses if their expenses fall within the IRS Standards as discussed in this Guidance.¹⁶ Good faith can be satisfied where debtors’ personal or family obligations significantly reduce their employment opportunities or increase their expenses.” Issues concerning employment, income, and expenses are case-specific and may be highly dependent on a debtor’s family, community, and individual circumstances. Debtors may provide an explanation of those circumstances, and the Department attorney should weigh the explanation in consultation with Education.

Actual payment history and IDR enrollment: Department attorneys should consider the following two issues that frequently arise and deserve additional attention: a debtor’s actual payment history and a debtor’s enrollment or non-enrollment in an IDR. Department of Education studies have shown that the servicing of student loan debt has been plagued at times

¹⁶ By contrast, a debtor whose expenses exceed the IRS Standards should not be foreclosed from showing they have minimized expenses, and the Department attorney and Education should carefully assess any explanations debtors may provide for exceeding the standard expenses.

by administrative errors and dissemination of confusing and inaccurate information, and that these issues may have affected debtors' responses to their loan obligations. In addition, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has found that debtors have been wrongfully denied IDRPs and that monthly payments have been inaccurately calculated. *See* Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, *Supervisory Highlights* Fall 2022, Summer 2021, and Fall. The Bureau has also found that servicers falsely but affirmatively represented to borrowers that loans were never dischargeable in bankruptcy. *See* Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, *Supervisory Highlights*, Fall 2014 & Fall 2015. These problems have also given rise to a lack of trust by debtors in the repayment process. As a result, the good faith inquiry should not disqualify debtors who may not have meaningfully engaged with the repayment process due to possible misinformation, wrongful IDRPs, or a lack of adequate information or guidance. When considering a debtor's attempts to engage with their student loan, attorneys should look at the entire life of the loan rather than merely considering the recent history.

Department attorneys should consider payment history within the broader context of the debtor's financial means and personal circumstances. Where other evidence of good faith exists, including evidence that the debtor lacked financial means to pay or that the debtor made meaningful contact with Education or the servicer to explore repayment options, the failure to repay (or inconsistent or limited repayment) does not indicate a lack of good faith. In some circumstances, the Department of Education may not have records or have incomplete records about a debtor. The absence of ED data should not reduce the weight of the borrower's evidence.¹⁷

Department attorneys should also exercise caution in assessing IDRPs. IDRPs are intended to provide a means through which debtors may respond to difficult financial circumstances, and the model Attestation asks a debtor to identify if they enrolled in an IDRPs and to offer an explanation if they did not. Where a debtor participated in an IDRPs, this factor is evidence of good faith.¹⁸

¹⁷ Between March 2020 and December 2022, borrowers were placed into an automatic COVID-related forbearance. The vast majority of borrowers remained in that forbearance for the duration of the period because it included a zero percent interest rate and eligibility toward IDRPs and PSLF forgiveness. Due to this extended period, many debtors may not have taken any action toward their loans. This period of inactivity is not evidence of bad faith and actions taken prior to March 2020 should not be discounted because they are not recent.

¹⁸ *See, e.g., In re Tingling*, 990 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 2021); *In re Krieger*, 713 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2013); *In re Coco*, 2009 WL 1426757, at *228–229; *In re Mosko*, 515 F.3d at 323; *In re Barrett*, 487 F.3d 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007); *In re Mosley*, 494 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2007); *In re Jespersen*, 571 F.3d at 782–83; *In re Nys*, 446 F.3d 938, 947 (9th Cir. 2007); *In re Alderete*, 412 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005); *In re Bronsdon*, 435 B.R. at 802.

However, where a debtor has not enrolled in an IDRPs, the Department attorney should give significant weight to the fact that, as noted, Education has found widespread problems with IDRPs servicing. In particular, Education has advised that IDRPs have not always been administered in ways that have been effective for, or accessible to, student loan debtors. In some cases, borrowers may not have been aware of their IDRPs options. At times, servicers failed to inform borrowers about these options in favor of other repayment plans or nonpayment options like forbearance. Likewise, many schools have failed to advise prospective borrowers about IDRPs, despite being legally obligated to do so. *See* 20 U.S.C. § 1092(d). Thus, non-enrollment alone does not show a lack of good faith.

Where a debtor did not enroll in an IDRPs, the Department attorney is expected to look first to the debtor's Attestation response and to accept any reasonable explanation or evidence supporting the debtor's non-enrollment in an IDRPs. Acceptable explanations or evidence could include, for example:

- that the debtor was denied access to, or diverted or discouraged from using, an IDRPs, and instead relied on an option like forbearance or deferment;
- that the debtor was provided inaccurate, incomprehensible, or incomplete information about the merits of an IDRPs;
- that the debtor had a plausible belief that an IDRPs would not have meaningfully improved their financial situation;
- that the debtor was unaware, after reasonable engagement, of the option of an IDRPs and its benefits; or
- where permitted under controlling case law, that the debtor was concerned with the potential tax consequences of loan forgiveness at the conclusion of an IDRPs.

Where these explanations are based in part on contact or attempted contact with Education, servicers, or trusted third parties, they evidence good faith.

If a debtor provides an explanation that lacks sufficient detail or is not otherwise acceptable (or fails to provide any explanation), the debtor may still demonstrate good faith through other actions such as making payments, responding to outreach from a servicer or collector, enrolling in deferment or forbearance, making contact with Education or their servicer about their loan, or otherwise taking professional or financial steps that indicate a good-faith attempt to meet their loan obligations. In sum, we would expect Department attorneys not to oppose discharge for lack of good faith where there is a basis to conclude that the debtor's IDRPs non-enrollment was not a willful attempt to avoid repayment.

D. Consideration of a Debtor's Assets

A debtor's assets must also be considered in the undue hardship analysis. Department attorneys, however, should not give dispositive weight to the existence of assets that are not easily converted to cash or are otherwise critical to the debtor's well-being, and should be cautious in concluding that the existence of real property or other financial assets demonstrates a lack of undue hardship.¹⁹

The Attestation facilitates this inquiry by seeking information regarding the debtor's assets. It may be appropriate to suggest that a debtor consider liquidating an asset where the asset is unnecessary to the debtor's and dependents' support and welfare. Residential real property and funds in retirement accounts are often exempt from collection under federal or state exemption laws. Although the exempt status of property may not be dispositive of whether that property is necessary for a minimal standard of living, the Department attorney should be careful in considering such property in the undue hardship analysis. *In re Marcotte*, 455 B.R. 460, 471 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2011).²⁰ The Department recognizes that liquidating a primary residence or retirement account is an extreme measure and therefore requests to liquidate those assets should be exceptionally rare.

E. Partial Discharge.

Where appropriate and permissible under governing case law, Department attorneys may recognize the availability of partial discharge. Partial discharge occurs where the bankruptcy

¹⁹ The debtors' assets may be liquidated by a bankruptcy trustee to fund payments to creditors of the estate. Such property, if liquidated by the trustee, would not be available for the payment of student loan debt and thus should not be considered.

²⁰ The question of how exempt property should be considered under the "undue hardship" analysis has generated disagreement among courts. Generally, courts find that "the exempt character of an asset does not necessarily preempt its relevance to a hardship evaluation." *In re Armesto*, 298 B.R. 45, 48 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003); *see also In re Nys*, 446 F.3d at 947 (recognizing courts must consider availability of assets "whether or not exempt, which could be used to pay the loan"); *In re Gleason*, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3455, at *14 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2017) (allowing consideration of IRA or 401K account, regardless of exemption status). Other courts, however, have noted the necessity to weigh the policies underlying certain exemptions, for example, the homestead exemption in the debtor's residence, before considering such assets in assessing undue hardship. *Schatz v. Access Grp., Inc. (In re Schatz)*, 602 B.R. 411, 427-28 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2019) (reversing bankruptcy court's treatment of exempt equity in homestead as dispositive of a lack of undue hardship). Notably, the *Schatz* opinion states that the bankruptcy court failed to make any finding whether the equity in the debtor's home could be liquidated without imposing an undue hardship on the debtor. *Id.* at 428.

court discharges a portion of the outstanding student loan debt while requiring payment of the remainder.²¹

Department attorneys may consider recommending partial discharge based upon a determination that the debtor has the ability to make some payments on the loan while maintaining a minimal standard of living, but an inability to make the full standard monthly repayment due. A partial discharge should not result in a remaining (undischarged) balance larger than what a debtor's discretionary income (as determined under the Prong One analysis) permits them to pay off in monthly payments over the remaining loan term. In practice, a full discharge is appropriate for debtors whose expenses are equal to or greater than their income where they meet the other elements of the analysis. Partial discharge may also be available to a debtor who is able to liquidate assets to pay a portion of the debt but remains unable to pay the remainder while maintaining a minimal standard of living. *See In re Stevenson*, 463 B.R. 586, 598-99 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); *In re Clavell*, 611 B.R. 504, 531-32 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020).

V. Procedures

Although the process for soliciting and reviewing the Attestation may vary from case to case, Department attorneys should generally observe the following procedures in soliciting Attestations.

A. **Submission of the Attestation**

Upon a debtor's commencement of an adversary proceeding seeking discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), the Department attorney should provide a debtor the opportunity to complete and submit the Attestation. The Department attorney is encouraged to contact the debtor or debtor's counsel as soon as practicable after service of process in an adversary

²¹ Section 523(a)(8) is silent with respect to whether bankruptcy courts may discharge part of a student loan based on undue hardship. The concept, however, has been recognized by several courts of appeals. *See generally In re Miller*, 377 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2004); *In re Saxman*, 325 F.3d 1168, 1173-1174 (9th Cir. 2003); *In re Alderete*, 412 F.3d at 1207; *In re Cox*, 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). In most jurisdictions where no circuit level authority exists, lower courts have permitted partial discharges. *See, e.g., In re Rumer*, 469 B.R. 553, 564 n.12 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012) (recognizing majority rule is to allow partial discharges); *In re Gill*, 326 B.R. 611, 644 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (recognizing lower courts have generally allowed partial discharges); *but see, e.g., In re Conway*, 495 B.R. 416, 423 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the general rule prevents discharging parts of individual loans). Prior to any partial discharge, a debtor must have established all elements necessary for an undue hardship determination. *See In re Saxman*, 325 F.3d at 1175; *Hemar Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cox (In re Cox)*, 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).

proceeding, advising the debtor of the opportunity to submit the Attestation for review by the United States. Any Attestation should be submitted by a debtor under oath by signing under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The Attestation requests that a debtor provide documents corroborating the debtor's stated income (tax returns, or where appropriate, paystubs or other documents proving income). The Department attorney may seek additional evidence where necessary to support representations in the Attestation.

Education will provide debtors' account history and loan details to the Department and that information will be provided to the debtor with the Attestation form.

B. Time for Attestation

Ideally, the Department attorney would solicit the Attestation from the debtor at the outset of the case to permit early consideration whether to stipulate to facts relevant to undue hardship. The Department attorney is not required to impose any strict time limit for the Attestation.

C. Bankruptcy Court Authority

The Department attorney should advise debtors that although the United States may stipulate to facts relevant to undue hardship and recommend to the bankruptcy court that a finding of undue hardship is appropriate, the United States' position is not binding on the bankruptcy court, which will render its own determination whether a debtor has met the standard for an undue hardship discharge. Department attorneys and debtors should cooperate to file appropriate documents to enable the court to consider whether to issue an order to discharge student loan debt based upon undue hardship.

VI. Conclusion

The goal of this Guidance is to provide Department attorneys with a consistent and practical approach for handling student loan discharge litigation. Because of the fact-specific nature of such litigation, questions may arise about how the Guidance should be applied in particular cases. For assistance in interpreting and implementing the Guidance, Department attorneys are invited to contact the Commercial Litigation Branch, Corporate/Financial Litigation Section of the Civil Division.²²

²² This memorandum applies only to future bankruptcy proceedings, as well as (wherever practical) matters pending as of the date of this Guidance. This Guidance is an internal Department of Justice policy directed at Department components and employees. Accordingly, it is not intended to and does not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter.



U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for United States Trustees

Office of the Director

Washington, DC 20530

June 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM

TO: United States Trustees

FROM: Ramona D. Elliott RAMONA
Acting Director ELLIOTT

Digitally signed by RAMONA
ELLIOTT
Date: 2022.06.08 11:13:03
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SUBJECT: Guidelines for United States Trustee Program (USTP) Enforcement Related to
Bifurcated Chapter 7 Fee Agreements

I. Introduction

In our role as the “watchdog” of the bankruptcy process, one of the USTP’s core responsibilities is to protect and preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system. In doing so we seek to promote fair access to the bankruptcy system while ensuring that no participant is treated improperly. Enhancing access to justice not only includes removing barriers to entry but also ensuring that all debtors who seek bankruptcy protection in good faith and comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s requirements receive the relief the law affords them. This includes ensuring that debtors are properly and adequately represented by their attorneys, who in turn are negotiating the terms of their fee arrangements and representation in good faith.

The Bankruptcy Code’s¹ statutory framework generally prohibits postpetition payment of attorney’s fees arising from prepetition retention agreements in chapter 7 cases. The Supreme Court held in *Lamie v. United States Trustee*² that chapter 7 debtors’ attorney’s fees may not be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, and almost all courts that have considered the issue have held that attorney’s fees owing under a prepetition retainer agreement are a dischargeable debt.³ As a

¹ 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 *et seq.*

² 540 U.S. 526, 537 (2004). The Court’s reasoning was that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) only authorizes compensation to professionals employed under § 327, which does not include the debtor’s attorney in a chapter 7 case unless employed by the trustee under § 327(e).

³ See, e.g., *Rittenhouse v. Eisen*, 404 F.3d 395, 397 (6th Cir. 2005).

result, the traditional model for representation in chapter 7 cases is payment of the entire attorney’s fee for the case⁴ in full before the case is filed.

“Bifurcated” fee agreements—which split an attorney’s fee between work performed prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition and work performed postpetition—have become increasingly prevalent in chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy cases.⁵ Bifurcated agreements are generally structured so that minimal services—limited to those essential to commencing the case—are performed under a prepetition agreement for a modest (or no) fee, while all other services are performed postpetition, under a separate postpetition retention agreement, arguably rendering those fees nondischargeable.

Courts and stakeholders in the bankruptcy community have expressed differing views on the propriety of bifurcated fee agreements.⁶ Some courts have held that bifurcation by its nature violates certain local rules governing the professional responsibilities of counsel owed to their debtor clients.⁷ Other courts have held that nothing is inherently improper about bifurcation, provided that certain guardrails are obeyed.⁸

Absent contrary local authority, it is the USTP’s position that bifurcated fee agreements are permissible so long as the fees charged under the agreements are fair and reasonable, the agreements are entered into with the debtor’s fully informed consent, and the agreements are adequately disclosed. Bifurcated agreements provide an alternative under the current statutory framework to the traditional attorney’s fee model, which some have noted present a barrier to accessing the bankruptcy system for debtors who may need relief but are unable to pay in full before filing. The benefits these type of agreements provide—increasing access and relief to those in need—must be balanced against the risk that these fee arrangements, if not properly structured, could harm debtors and deprive them of the fresh start afforded under the Bankruptcy Code.

⁴ Typically, a flat fee for all services essential to the successful completion of the case.

⁵ This Memorandum only addresses enforcement guidelines for bifurcated fee arrangements. The exclusion from these guidelines of other alternative fee arrangements—such as the practice of filing chapter 13 cases solely to pay attorney’s fees over time—should not be construed as acceptance of the propriety of such arrangements. When any fee arrangement violates the Bankruptcy Code or Rules, the USTP will take enforcement actions as appropriate.

⁶ See, e.g., Terrence L. Michael, *There’s A Storm A Brewin: The Ethics and Realities of Paying Debtors’ Counsel in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases and the Need for Reform*, 94 AM. BANKR. L.J. 387 (2020); Adam D. Herring, *Problematic Consumer Debtor Attorney’s Fee Arrangements and the Illusion of “Access to Justice”*, ABI JOURNAL, Vol. XXXVII, No. 10, Oct. 2018; Daniel E. Garrison, *Liberating Debtors from “Sweatbox” and Getting Attorneys Paid*, ABI JOURNAL, June 2018, at 16. See also Adam D. Herring, “Great Debates” at the ABI Consumer Practice Extravaganza (Nov. 5, 2021).

⁷ See, e.g., *In re Baldwin*, No. 20-10009, 2021 WL 4592265 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2021); *In re Prophet*, 628 B.R. 788 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2021), *rev’d and remanded* No. 9:21-cv-01082-JMC, 2022 WL 766352 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2022).

⁸ See, e.g., *In re Kolle*, No. 17-41701-CAN, 2021 WL 5872265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2021); *In re Brown*, 631 B.R. 77, 101 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021); *In re Carr*, 613 B.R. 427 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2020); *In re Hazlett*, No. 16-30360, 2019 WL 1567751 (Bankr. D. Utah Apr. 10, 2019).

The USTP’s enforcement approach to bifurcated agreements balances these concerns. The USTP will review bifurcated fee agreements to ensure that they harm neither the debtors who rely on the bankruptcy system to obtain relief nor the integrity of the system. When appropriate, we will bring enforcement actions to address these harms. This document sets forth general guidelines that United States Trustees and their staff should use to assist them in determining whether to take enforcement action with respect to bifurcated fee agreements.

II. Attorney’s Fees Under Bifurcated Agreements Must Be Fair and Reasonable

When reviewing attorney fee agreements in consumer cases, our first consideration is to ensure that the agreements serve the best interests of clients, not their professionals. This tension is most evident—and the potential for the greatest harm to debtors exists—in the structuring of fees under bifurcated agreements. The three most common fee-related issues we see in cases involving bifurcated fee agreements relate to the allocation of fees and services, the reasonableness of the fees, and third-party financing.

First, it is important to ensure that there is a proper allocation of prepetition and postpetition fees and services. This issue commonly arises in no- or low-money down cases. It is the USTP’s position that fees earned for prepetition services must be either paid prepetition or waived, because the debtor’s obligation to pay those fees is dischargeable. This is particularly important to ensure—and to clearly document—that debtors receive appropriate prepetition consultation and legal advice, including with respect to exemptions and chapter selection.⁹ Debtors who enter into bifurcated fee agreements should receive the same level of representation as debtors who enter into traditional fee agreements. Bifurcation must not foster cutting corners in properly preparing the case for filing by eliminating tasks that should be performed prepetition or postponing all or some of those services until after the petition is filed to ensure that the attorney can bill for those services postpetition. Additionally, fees for postpetition services must be rationally related to the services actually rendered postpetition,¹⁰ so that a flat postpetition fee is not a disguised method to collect fees for prepetition services. Attorneys also should not advance filing fees and seek their reimbursement postpetition. Advanced filing fees are generally held to be dischargeable prepetition obligations.¹¹

Second, attorney’s fees charged to debtors in bifurcated cases—as in all cases—must be reasonable.¹² Bifurcated fee agreements should not be viewed as an opportunity to collect higher fees than those collected from clients who pay in full, before filing. For example, it would be inappropriate for an attorney to offer a debtor a fee of \$1,500 if they pay upfront, and \$2,000 if they pay over time postpetition, particularly given that fees for prepetition work should have been paid or waived.

⁹ The Bankruptcy Code requires attorneys to certify, by signing the petition, that they have performed a reasonable investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case and that the attorney, after performing an adequate inquiry, has no knowledge that the information in the schedules is incorrect. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(4)(C–D).

¹⁰ See *Brown*, 631 B.R. at 93 (citing *Hazlett*, 2019 WL 1567751).

¹¹ See, e.g., *Matter of Riley*, 923 F.3d 433, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2019); *Brown*, 631 B.R. at 102–03.

¹² 11 U.S.C. § 329(b).

Third, arrangements that employ outside parties to finance bifurcated fee agreements, including (but not limited to) factoring, assignment of the attorney's accounts receivable, and direct lending to clients, warrant significant additional scrutiny. The particulars of arrangements under which a third party finances the debtor's postpetition attorney's fees must be fully disclosed under Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b), including the details of the attorney's relationship with the entity providing the financing. The nature of these arrangements may incentivize overcharging, because the attorney generally receives only a percentage of the total fee charged or otherwise incurs financing costs. It is improper for an attorney using third-party financing to pass along the cost of that financing to their clients. Third-party financing arrangements may also create unwaivable conflicts of interest between the attorney and their clients and may violate applicable state ethical rules.¹³

The USTP should bring enforcement actions where bifurcated fee agreements adversely affect the client's representation, seek recovery of unreasonable fees, improperly allocate fees or services, improperly burden debtors with financing costs, or otherwise result in conflicts of interest.

III. Ensuring Adequate Attorney Disclosure and Fully Informed Debtor Consent to Bifurcated Agreements

In addition to ensuring that bifurcated agreements are fair and reasonable, courts examining and permitting bifurcated agreements have emphasized the importance of adequate disclosure and the client's fully informed consent. One court permitting the use of bifurcated agreements noted that "the propriety of using bifurcated fee agreements in consumer chapter 7 cases is directly proportional to the level of disclosure and information the attorney provides to the client and the existence of documentary evidence that the client made an informed and voluntary election to enter into a postpetition fee agreement."¹⁴ Similarly, professional conduct standards governing fee sharing and limited scope representation¹⁵ reinforce the need for disclosure and informed consent. The requirement of informed consent to bifurcated agreements is derived directly from the Bankruptcy Code's requirements that attorneys representing consumer debtors deal forthrightly and honestly with their clients, that they not make misrepresentations about the services they will provide or the benefits and risks of filing bankruptcy, and that they make certain disclosures and promptly enter into a clear and conspicuous written contract explaining the services the attorney will render and the terms of any fee agreement.¹⁶

The following disclosure and consent factors can assist your review of bifurcated fee agreements and determination whether an enforcement action is appropriate:

- Whether the attorney has clearly disclosed the services that will be rendered prepetition and postpetition, and the corresponding fees for each

¹³ *Brown*, 631 B.R. at 99, n. 34.

¹⁴ *In re Hazlett*, No. 16-30360, 2019 WL 1567751 at *8 (Bankr. D. Utah Apr. 10, 2019).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof. Conduct R. 1.2(c), 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).

¹⁶ 11 U.S.C. §§ 526–528.

segment of the representation, including that certain listed services may not arise in a particular case.

- Whether the attorney has disclosed their obligation to continue representing the debtor regardless of whether the debtor executes a postpetition agreement, unless the bankruptcy court permits the attorney's withdrawal.
- Whether the attorney has clearly disclosed that the client is being provided the option to choose a bifurcated fee agreement, any difference in the total attorney's fee between the bifurcated fee agreement and a traditional fee agreement,¹⁷ and the client's options with respect to the postpetition fee agreement.¹⁸
- Whether the agreement includes clear and conspicuous provisions explaining the options, costs, and consequences of entering into a bifurcated fee agreement and providing the debtor with an option to rescind the agreement.

The disclosure and consent considerations described above are not exhaustive and should not be mechanically applied, but instead qualitatively assessed to determine whether adequate disclosures were made and whether those disclosures permit a consumer debtor considering a bifurcated fee agreement to give informed consent. Additionally, when applying these criteria we must consider local authority and act accordingly where local rules or jurisprudence have imposed other clear standards for adequate client disclosures and conditions of informed consent—whether more or less stringent.¹⁹

IV. Ensuring Adequate Public Disclosure

The Bankruptcy Code and Rules also require public transparency in professionals' dealings with their clients, and the USTP regularly enforces these requirements. All attorneys representing debtors must promptly file disclosures of the particulars of their fee agreements and the amounts they have been paid under section 329(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy

¹⁷ As discussed *supra*, it is the USTP's position that fees under bifurcated agreements should not be higher than those under traditional fee agreements for the same services.

¹⁸ Generally, these options are for the client to sign the postpetition agreement for the attorney's continued representation; to hire other counsel; or to proceed in the case *pro se*.

¹⁹ We are aware that some courts have found that bifurcation is impermissible under local rules governing representation of debtors. *See, e.g., Baldwin*, 2021 WL 4592265; *Prophet*, 628 B.R. 788. The existence and wording of such local rules varies, and bankruptcy courts within a district may interpret them differently. In determining whether to take an enforcement action with respect to a bifurcated fee arrangement, the USTP will consider and follow applicable local authority but also should be mindful to exercise discretion in accordance with these guidelines to focus on those cases where the debtor is harmed or the integrity of the bankruptcy process is jeopardized.

Rule 2016(b).²⁰ The nature of bifurcated agreements requires detailed disclosures in order to satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's standards. Failure to make adequate public disclosures required under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules may be a basis to bring an enforcement action.²¹

V. Conclusion and Important Notes

It is vital that the USTP acts consistently across jurisdictions in these and other legal matters. Please ensure that all staff who engage in civil enforcement in consumer cases are familiar with these guidelines. Each case will have unique facts that should be considered in a manner consistent with these guidelines.

Please consult the Office of the General Counsel if there are any questions regarding these guidelines or their application in specific cases. This memorandum is an internal directive to guide USTP personnel in carrying out their duties, but the final determination of whether a bifurcated fee agreement complies with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules resides solely with the court. Nothing in this memorandum has any force or effect of law or imposes on parties outside the USTP any obligations beyond those set forth in the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.²²

Thank you for your continued cooperation and diligence in this important area of responsibility.

²⁰ The default remedy for failure to make proper disclosures under section 329(a) is return of all fees. *See, e.g., SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Stewart*, 970 F.3d 1255, 1266 (10th Cir. 2020).

²¹ Postpetition attorney's fee installment payments should be disclosed as monthly expenses on the debtor's Schedule J. This allows courts and the USTP to quickly evaluate whether the debtor can actually afford the attorney's fees charged under the postpetition contract, which is a factor in determining whether the bifurcated agreement is in the debtor's best interest. However, note that we do not take the position that Rule 2016(b) requires that attorneys using bifurcated agreements file a supplemental compensation disclosure each time they receive a postpetition payment, provided that the terms of the postpetition agreement have been previously disclosed and there have been no material changes.

²² Additionally, nothing in this memorandum: (1) limits the USTP's discretion to request additional information, conduct examinations under Bankruptcy Rule 2004, or conduct discovery with respect to its review of a particular fee arrangement; (2) limits the USTP's discretion to take action with respect to any particular fee arrangement; or (3) creates any private right of action on the part of any person enforceable against the USTP, its personnel, or the United States.

Faculty

Prof. Ingrid M. Hillinger is a professor of law at Boston College Law School in Newton, Mass., where she teaches a variety of commercial law/bankruptcy courses, including Contracts, Secured Transactions, and Business Bankruptcy. She was named one of the 26 “best law teachers” in the country by the authors of *What the Best Law Teachers Do* (Harvard University Press 2013), and was the 2002 winner of the Boston College Distinguished Teaching Award. Prof. Hillinger is a co-editor of *Chapter 11 Theory & Practice: A Guide to Reorganization*, a multi-volume bankruptcy treatise, and a co-author of an Article 9 case book, *Commercial Transactions: Secured Financing: Cases, Materials & Problems*, which adopts a problem-solving approach to teaching transactional law. She has taught at a variety of schools during her nearly 40-year teaching career, including College of William & Mary, the University of Texas at Austin, Emory University, Northeastern University School of Law and the University of Connecticut School of Law. While at William & Mary, she received an Outstanding Teacher Award from the Virginia Council on Higher Education. Prof. Hillinger is the faculty advisor to the *Uniform Commercial Code Reporter Digest*, a LexisNexis publication that annotates important UCC cases. She received her A.B. from Barnard College and her J.D. from the College of William & Mary.

Tara Twomey is the director of the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees in Washington, D.C. She previously was executive director of the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center and Of Counsel to the National Consumer Law Center in Carmel, Calif. She previously focused on bankruptcy and consumer credit issues, with an emphasis on home mortgage origination and servicing and, more recently, student loans. She has taught numerous programs in these areas, served as an expert witness, and testified before Congress on mortgage-servicing problems. Ms. Twomey is a contributing author of several books published by the National Consumer Law Center, including *Mortgage Servicing and Loan Modifications* (2019) and *Home Foreclosures* (2019). She is a conferee of the National Bankruptcy Conference, a contributing author to the *Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide*, and served as a commissioner for the ABI’s Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy. Ms. Twomey has been a lecturer in law at Stanford Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston College Law School. In addition, she is a former clinical instructor at the Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center of Harvard Law School, where her practice focused, in part, on sustainable homeownership for low- and moderate-income homeowners. This practice area included foreclosure prevention and chapter 13 bankruptcy. Ms. Twomey received her undergraduate degree from the University of California, San Diego and her J.D. *summa cum laude* from Boston College Law School, after which she clerked for Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Subsequently, Ms. Twomey received a two-year Skadden Fellowship to work at the Legal Services Center.