

exercises, in exciting the emotions and passions of the audience and spectators.

3. *A similar exercise of the imagination is required in the training exercises of elocution.*

The teacher of this art will not have failed to observe that the difference between those who are quick, and those who are slow to learn, turns as much upon the degree in which this faculty is possessed or developed, as upon any other cause. For precisely as in the case of the actor, it is by the exercise of the imagination that the student is enabled to bring himself under all those influences which inspired the author of the passage which he attempts to reproduce. Thus he also becomes for the time, as it were, the orator or author whose sentiments he is delivering; and hence is enabled to feel as he felt, and to speak as he spoke, or as the words were intended to be spoken.

4. *The imagination is equally necessary to feeling, in the practice of oratory.*

For it is by this faculty that we form those distinct and vivid conceptions and images of the truth which we have to deliver, and of the scenes and incidents which we have to describe or narrate, by which our own hearts become affected with the very same feelings which we wish to excite in the audience. This it is also which teaches us to lay hold of those individual and special traits, and "touches of nature," which are most powerful to affect our own feelings, and those of the audience. It enables us also to enter into the sympathies of the audience

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and to identify ourselves with those whose sorrows we portray, so as to feel the same sorrow ourselves.

5. *This whole view of the influence of the imagination in exciting the speaker's feelings, is confirmed by the highest authorities.*

(1.) Cicero upon this point delivers himself as follows: "There is such force, let me assure you, in those thoughts and sentiments which you apply, handle and discuss in speaking, that there is no occasion for simulation or deceit; for the very nature of the language which is adapted to move the passions of others, moves the orator himself in a greater degree than any who listen to him . . . I never yet, I assure you, tried to excite sorrow, or compassion . . . when speaking before a court of judicature, but I myself was affected with the very same emotions that I wished to excite in the judges." Elsewhere he gives us this precept, that "we must represent to our imaginations, in the most lively manner possible, all the most striking circumstances of the transaction we describe, or of the passion we wish to excite in ourselves."

(2.) Quintilian also teaches us that in order to feel as we ought, and thus to exercise the power of moving the feelings of the audience, we must form such images and representations of absent objects, that they shall seem to be present, and we shall seem to see them with our eyes.

"A man of lively imagination," he says, "is one who can vividly represent to himself things, voices, actions, with the exactness of reality; and this faculty

we may readily acquire if we desire it. When, for example, the mind is unoccupied, and we are indulging in chimerical hopes, and waking dreams, these images beset us so closely that we seem to be not thinking but acting, on a journey or a voyage, in a battle, or haranguing an assembly, or disposing of wealth which we do not possess. Shall we not then turn this lawless power of our minds to advantage? When I make a complaint that a man has been murdered, shall I not bring before my eyes everything that is likely to have happened when the murder was committed? Shall not the assassin suddenly rush forth? Shall not the victim tremble, cry out, supplicate, or flee? Shall I not behold the murderer striking, the murdered falling? Shall not the blood and paleness and expiring gasp of the murdered man present themselves fully to my mental view? . . . For thus our feelings will be moved not less strongly than if we were actually present."

§ 41. The fourth and last means of exciting the requisite feeling is the formation of a right moral character.

It has been much disputed, especially by Cicero and Quintilian among the ancients, and by Thoreau in modern times, whether, after all, eloquence be not a virtue, rather than an art; that is, whether any but a really good man can speak with the greatest power. The true solution of this question seems to be, that virtue is not in all cases essential to eloquence, but that it is essential to the highest