

self, or from within. The objective inducement to choice is but the occasion; the soul's own view and feeling are the efficient cause of action. The activity of his nature, as guided by his own intelligence, projects itself toward its appropriate object, and this spontaneous appetency is the true *motive* of choice. The etymological relation between the words "emotion" and "motive" gives correct expression to a truth. It is the emotions which immediately move the will. To produce volition it is not enough that the understanding be convinced; affection must also be aroused. The object held before the soul must be shown to belong to the category of the true, and also to that of the good; for where the latter aspect is not present to receive the appetency of the soul, the truth of the object is as powerless to produce movement as though it were fiction. No man is induced to arise and go to the modern Ophir by the most convincing assurance that it contains abundance of waste earth or stones. This is no more to him, although admitted to be certain, than the idlest dream of Utopia. But when he has credible testimony that there is gold there, and that "the gold of that land is good," he may form the purpose of going. This is because gold is to his nature an object of desire. If you would induce your hearer to adopt a given course, you must not only prove to his wisdom that it is the proper means to its end, but you must show to his heart that the end is desirable. Hence all suasive discourse, whatever its particular topic, may be reduced to two elements—that which places the proposition in the category of the true, and that which shows it in the category of the good. Both elements are essential to the oration. The

latter may be present only by implication, but unless it is virtually present there is no rhetorical discourse.

Although this is so obvious, you will still find a general prejudice against what is popularly termed an "appeal to feeling." Men argue that truth should be the guide of the righteous man's actions, and not mere emotion. They imagine that because the understanding is the directive faculty, its decisions are always correct, and the impulses of feeling are blind. Hence they conclude that he who appeals to their understandings deals honourably and beneficially with them, while he who appeals to their feelings is seeking to abuse their natures. And especially do they judge the latter expedient unworthy of the preacher of the gospel, whose message is infallible truth, and whose professed motive is absolute disinterestedness. Let us examine this prejudice.

I think it may be accounted for by two facts. The soul is often abused by an appeal to irrelevant and improper feelings. The hearers are sinners, whose emotions are in a state of moral disease. The false orator who, to gain some end, aggravates that disease of heart in some direction, has indeed done their nature a cruel wrong. But there are also relevant and proper feelings. The strength and prevalence of these are not a fault, but a virtue of the soul; so that he who enables us to enhance them is as obviously our benefactor, as he who enlightens our understandings. If the prosecutor of a man accused of crime should urge his judges to convict him because he was their ancient enemy, appealing to hatred and the lust of revenge in their breasts, this would be most criminal; but if the advo-