

PSF

Safe: Adm. E. J. King

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UNITED STATES FLEET

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RHP, NARS Date

MAR 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

March 5, 1942

Memorandum for the President:

1. The delineation of general areas of responsibility for operations in the Pacific is now taking place, in which it appears that we - the U.S. - will take full charge of all operations conducted eastward of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.
2. You have expressed the view - concurred in by all of your chief military advisers - that we should determine on a very few lines of military endeavor and concentrate our efforts on those lines. It is to be recognized that the very few lines of U.S. military effort may require to be shifted in accordance with developments but the total number should be kept at a very few.
3. Consideration of what war activities we (U.S.) should undertake in the Pacific requires to be premised on some examination of our (U.S.) relationship with respect to world-wide war activities - the Pacific being one part of the larger whole.
4. Other than in the Pacific our principal allies - Great Britain and Russia - are already committed to certain lines of military effort, to which our (U.S.) chief contribution in the case of Russia will continue to be munitions in general.
5. As to Britain's lines of military effort:
  - (a) it is apparent that we (U.S.) must enable the British to hold the citadel and arsenal of Britain itself by means of the supply of munitions, raw materials and food - and to some extent by troops, when they will release British troops to other British military areas.
  - (b) the middle East is a line of British military effort which they - and we - cannot afford to let go. This effort should continue to receive our (U.S.) munitions.
  - (c) the India-Burma-China line of British military effort is now demanding immediate attention on their part - and will absorb its proportion of our (U.S.) munitions - in addition to the munitions which we are committed to furnish to China.

Memorandum for the President

March 5, 1942

6. The chief sources of munitions for the United Nations are Britain, the U.S. and, to some degree, Russia. The chief sources of man-power for the United Nations are China, Russia, the U.S., and to less degree, the British Commonwealth. The only mobile factors are those available to Britain and to the U.S., because of their use of sea power - navies and shipping.

7. Australia - and New Zealand - are "white men's countries" which it is essential that we shall not allow to be overrun by Japan - because of the repercussion among the non-white races of the world.

8. Reverting to the premise of paragraph 2 - a very few lines of military endeavor - the general area that needs immediate attention - and is in our (U.S.) sphere of responsibility - is Australasia, which term is intended to include the Australian continent, its approaches from the northwest - modified ABDA area - and its approaches from the northeast and east - ANZAC area. These approaches require to be actively used - continuously - to hamper the enemy advance and/or consolidation of his advance bases.

9. Our primary concern in the Pacific is to hold Hawaii and its approaches (via Midway) from the westward and to maintain its communications with the West Coast. Our next care in the Pacific is to preserve Australasia (par. 8 above) which requires that its communications be maintained - via eastward of Samoa, Fiji and southward of New Caledonia.

10. We have now - or will soon have - "strong points" at Samoa, Suva (Fiji) and New Caledonia (also a defended fueling base at Bora Bora, Society Islands). A naval operating base is shortly to be set up in Tongatabu (Tonga Islands) to service our naval forces operating in the South Pacific. Efate (New Hebrides) and Funafuti (Ellice Islands) are projected additional "strong points".

11. When the foregoing 6 "strong points" are made reasonably secure, we shall not only be able to cover the line of communications - to Australia (and New Zealand) but - given the naval forces, air units, and amphibious troops - we can drive northwest from the New Hebrides into the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago after the same fashion of step-by-step advances that the Japanese used in the South China Sea. Such a line of operations will be offensive rather than passive - and will draw Japanese forces there to oppose it, thus relieving pressure elsewhere, whether in Hawaii, ABDA area, Alaska, or even India.

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EO 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
MAR 28 1973  
By RHP, NARS Date \_\_\_\_\_

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-3-

Memorandum for the President

March 5, 1942

12. The foregoing outline (of U.S. participation in the war) points the way to useful lines of U.S. military endeavor in the Pacific, which may be summarized in an integrated, general plan of operations, namely:

Hold Hawaii

Support Australasia

Drive northwestward from New Hebrides

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING


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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By **BHP**, NARS Date **MAR 28 1973**

THIS OVERSIDE ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





# THEATER OF WAR IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN

Compiled and Drawn in the Cartographic Section of  
The National Geographic Society for  
**THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE**  
Gilbert Grosvenor, Editor

Scale 1:25,000,000 or 1:25,000,000 at 1 inch = 1,000 miles



Legend:  
Degree of latitude: 0° to 90° North, 0° to 90° South  
Other symbols: 0° to 90° North, 0° to 90° South  
Circle and square: 0° to 90° North, 0° to 90° South  
Circle and square: 0° to 90° North, 0° to 90° South

Compiled by John W. Barry, Photographs by Charles E. Johnson

1942

AIRLINE DISTANCES IN STATUTE MILES

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

March 12, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Subject: St. Paul's Rocks.

Enclosure: H. O. Chart No. 537.

1. From the chart - and the sailing directions, it appears that:

- (a) St. Paul's Rocks are merely rocks - and nothing more.
- (b) Trinidad and Martin Vaz Islands and Rocas are impracticable as aircraft bases.
- (c) Fernando de Noronha has a landing field and limited facilities - not now included in U.S. Army or Navy or Brazilian plans for military uses. It lies some 200 sea-miles from Natal - and may come into the picture later.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING.

P. S. - The Brazilian Army now has 1 defense battalion of infantry there. They plan to have 2 battalions there eventually, armed with a few 7 m/m machine guns, 1 battery of 105 m/m guns and 1 battery of 75 m/m guns.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-26-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

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UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 6, 1942

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Prevailing winds along Russo-German front;  
May - September.

1. This memorandum is a brief summary of prevailing wind conditions along the Russo-German front from May to September, as to be expected at KOLA, LENINGRAD, SMOLENSK, KIEV and SEVASTOPOL.

| 2.         | May           | June           | July          | August        | September     |
|------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| KOLA       | Var.<br>(8)   | N<br>(9)       | N<br>(9)      | N+S.W.<br>(8) | —             |
| LENINGRAD  | W - NW<br>(9) | W - NW<br>(9)  | W - NW<br>(9) | W<br>(9)      | W - NW<br>(9) |
| SMOLENSK   | NE<br>(7)     | through<br>(7) | south<br>(6)  | to<br>(6)     | NW<br>(6)     |
| KIEV       | N - NW<br>—   | N - NW<br>—    | NW<br>—       | NW<br>—       | NW<br>—       |
| SEVASTOPOL | Var.<br>(5)   | NW<br>(6)      | NW<br>(6)     | NW<br>(7)     | NW<br>(7)     |

Figures in ( ) are average wind velocities.

3. The foregoing data has been extracted from data of record in the Bureau of Aeronautics, supplemented by the records of the Weather Bureau.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING

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R. J. KING

*PSE Safe: King*

July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL  
ADMIRAL KING  
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

1. O.K.

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

- (5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.
- (6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.
- (7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
- (8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:
- (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.
  - (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.
- (9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa beginning in 1942. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.
- (10) Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone.
- (11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

August 24, 1942

~~SECRET~~  
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

I am receiving almost daily a variety of military requirements for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and our Allies. While the most important of these requirements is the proposed increase of the Army, there are others which affect our production quite as much, if not more.

Furthermore, I believe that our production schedules in certain respects, particularly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels, are probably too low and, therefore, need to be revised. I am enclosing a separate memorandum to you on aircraft, which indicates my anxiety in regard to this.

What I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look at 1943 over-all requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that certain assumptions must be made on which estimated requirements for United States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of war, by number and general composition, are determined. It naturally follows that these assumptions must include judgments as to the strength of our Allies in 1943 and the probable strength of our enemies. The ability to transport and supply these forces overseas, of course, is an essential factor in determining our requirements.

This review - and I do not imply a detailed analysis - should be made by you and General Marshall jointly and your respective staffs.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

The British are our partners, hence we must have the fullest and frankest collaboration with them. Lend-Lease and merchant shipping must naturally be integrated in an overall requirement picture.

I feel that we may have our major impact with the enemy in the fall of 1943. Therefore it seems to me that a supreme effort from a production point of view should be given to producing the weapons and military units that we can bring to bear on the enemy by that time.

I think our general policy should be to put our munitions to work directly against the enemy as promptly as possible. We must always remember that the enemy is not going to wait for us to become fully prepared.

Copy to General Marshall.

HLH?lmb

August 24, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

I wish you would ask Admiral Towers to submit to you his judgment of the number of naval combat aircraft by types which should be produced for the Navy and the navies of our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy.

This report should be prepared without consideration for existing schedules or production possibilities or any other competing military requirements. I am asking for this because I would like to know what the theoretical requirements are to get complete control and domination of the air.

I realize fully, however, that there are limiting factors to the creation of air power, such as the availability of pilots, high octane gas, transportation and the competition of other essential critical munitions of war. Hence, I would like you and General Marshall to submit a second schedule based on these realities and the proper relationship of air power to the Navy and our ground forces.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

Copy to General Marshall

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 4 1972

HLH/lmb