

●PSF

Safe: Joseph Kennedy

file private

PAP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

PSF
Safe: Kennedy

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1254, August 25, 7 p.m.

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Turkish Charge d'Affaires Mr. Kadri Rizan has informed the Embassy in confidence that he has received following circumstantial information regarding secret annexes of the German-Soviet pact which came from trustworthy sources but which naturally he states with "complete reserve":

(one) Russia is given a free hand against Japan in the Far East.

(two) Probable partition of Poland and recognition of the special interests of Soviet Russia in the Baltic states: in effect a return to the Russian-German border of 1914.

(three) Territorial advantages to Turkey at the expense of Bulgaria and a kind of subprotectorate for Turkey over whatever is left of Bulgaria.

(four) Division of the Balkans into spheres of influence between Germany and Russia, the German sphere to include Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece, the Russian sphere Rumania and Bulgaria.

Any

PAP -2- 1254, August 25, 7 p.m. from London

Any so-called information regarding secret annexes to the German-Russian agreement is purely speculative.

Neither the Foreign Office nor diplomatic circles however, believe for one minute that Germany did not give Russia something much more substantial than anything that appears in the terms of the public agreement. The supposition above outlined by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires gives a fairly representative consensus of this speculative opinion. A Foreign Office official stated this morning that they had received similar circumstantial information to that set out in points (one) and (two) above.

KENNEDY

CSB

NC

*file
private*

GRAY

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 2 p.m.

*PSF
Safe: Kennedy*

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1259, August 25, 8 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

My 1243 August 25, 1 p.m. I have just seen Cadogan who told me he would let me know at home within the next couple of hours what he could of Henderson's report.

He did tell me, however, that they have received a message from Beck by which Beck gives the assurance that even if Danzig should attempt to become part of the Reich, Poland would not attempt military measures until they had discussed the situation with the British Government.

KENNEDY

CSB

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

NC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated August 25, 1939

Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1262, August 25, midnight.

I have just been at 10 Downing Street with Prime Minister Halifax, Cadogan, and Horace Wilson. They have discussed with me the Henderson interview.

Hitler seemed calm and earnest. He pointed out that he always wanted a deal with Great Britain but he was not deterred by Great Britain's actions of yesterday. He was indignant with the Poles for their persecutions of his people, firing on airplanes, et cetera, and if they said they did not, it showed they had no control over their subordinates. He was going to have his rights in Poland even if it meant a great war, from which England would suffer much more than Germany. He now had Russia to back him up with supplies and therefore he could go on.

If, however, he could get straightened out in this Polish business he would make a deal with England that would guarantee the British Empire forever. He would limit armaments and then Germany and England could proceed to economic satisfaction. Henderson kept pointing out that
England

PSF
Life: Kennedy
Joe Kennedy

NC -2- #1262 from London, August 25, 1939

England could not make any deal that the Poles did not want, and Hitler said he did not want England to break her word and in the next breath said that Poland had no future anyway because Russia and Germany would settle Poland. This last remark was said to Henderson but was left out of report of meeting which Hitler sent to Henderson after the meeting which purported to be the gist of the conversation. Hitler urged Henderson to fly home to persuade Britain to accept his proposition which was:

One. That Poland adjust her differences with Germany at once. Two. England agree and urge this and in return Germany would agree to respect and even fight to preserve the British Empire.

Three. Hitler would limit armaments, go back to peaceful pursuits, and become an artist, which is what he wanted to be. (Aside by Kennedy, he is now but I would not care to say what kind).

Four. If this was not agreed it was going to be a war worse than fourteen-eighteen.

Writing this out it looks like a ridiculous proposition to make Great Britain quit or cut away from the Poles but to hear the text as read it seems much more reasonable.

Chamberlain and others do not know just whether the proposition is (one) throw sand in their eye while he marches
in

NC -3- #1262 from London, August 25, 1939

in or (two) whether he really does not want a fight with England or (three) whether it is a proposition on which something can be done. They are going to listen to Henderson in the morning and then probably say.

We certainly will not agree to permit Poland to be carved up by you and Russia.

Nor are we willing to force Poland to make concessions based on these probably ridiculous charges of cruelty but we are willing to help negotiate a fair deal and perhaps with all other powers work out some economic future for the world.

Incidentally Hitler asked for a settlement from Britain on the colonies but on a time basis and as he said by fair negotiation.

They are not going to give this message to either (?) or French until they have thought it out very carefully and have heard Henderson.

During the conversation Wilson asked whether the President had received any answer from Hitler. I said I had not heard of any.

Chamberlain held up Henderson's wire and said "This is the answer".

KENNEDY

NPL

*file
private*

Safe: Kennedy^{BF}

CA

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (D)

LONDON

Dated August 26, 1939

Rec'd 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1263, August 26, noon.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY

Omitted from my number 1262, August 25, midnight, was
the important item that Henderson's message stated Hitler
said the only one to benefit from a war between Germany and
England would be Japan who might very well become the domin-
ating factor in the world.

KENNEDY

CFW CA

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

71

5 despatches

Aug-28, 1939

1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

Aug-28, 1939

RECORDED
INDEXED

S } only
u }

Safe: Kennedy ^{PSF}

NC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

LONDON

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1293, August 28, 6 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

My 1292, August 28, 5 p.m.

I have just learned from the Foreign Office that an
affirmative reply has been received from Poland, stating that
they are ready to enter at once into direct negotiations.
This will be incorporated into the British reply to Hitler.

KENNEDY

HPD

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

AC

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

London

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 11:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1292, August 28, 5 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

My 1288, August 28, 2 p.m.

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

The Foreign Office informs me confidentially that the draft reply to Hitler was finally approved by the Cabinet at noon today with only one change which was described as "not one of substance" to the effect that they are asking the Poles to express their willingness to enter immediately on direct negotiations with Germany on the premises laid down in the British note. They have no reason to suppose that the Poles will decline to give this assurance. Ambassador Henderson is flying back to Berlin this afternoon about 5 o'clock and they hope that he will be able to deliver the reply to Hitler tonight. The timing of course depends on Hitler. A slight feeling of optimism prevails in spite of the Daladier-Hitler bout.

KENNEDY

WWC:HTM

NC

This telegram must
be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (A)

LONDON

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1288, August 28, 2 p.m.

My ¹²⁷⁸ /, August 27, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

A responsible official of the Foreign Office this morning in comment on Hitler's reply to the French Prime Minister, the text of which was given out at Berlin during the course of the night, said that in opinion here the text of Hitler's statement itself particularly with reference to his demand that Danzig and the corridor must return to Germany, did not necessarily make the situation any worse but that they do view with great concern the fact that he has made it public. The official also said that in his opinion this publicity would not however effect any material change in the reply that the British are to send to Hitler. The Cabinet is to go over this reply again today and there may of course be changes in drafting. (END SECTION ONE).

KENNEDY

HPD

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

CJ

PLAIN

LONDON

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1288, August 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

According to press messages from Berlin, Hitler decided to release the reply he had made to Daladier through pique at a "unfair" statement made by the French Premier at his press conference yesterday to the effect that Hitler had not given him a satisfactory reply, the inference being that Hitler took M. Daladier's statement without the publication of the text of his letter as an almost personal and unfriendly act.

(END SECTION TWO).

KENNEDY

KLP

AC

GRAY

London

Dated August 28, 1939

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1288, August 28, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

I have also been informed by the Foreign Office that in view of the urgency of keeping all of Great Britain's allies in line, quantities of war materials are being sent to Turkey without reference to the still pending credit agreement. Negotiations on the political agreement (my No. 1192 August 18, 9 p.m. and despatch No. 3238 August 21, 1939) are being pushed as fast as possible, and they are considering sending a mission to Istanbul.

A telegram from the British Ambassador at Warsaw just received by the Foreign Office reports that the "full mobilization" in Poland does not mean "general mobilization". (END MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

CSB

1

*full
private*

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Safe: Kennedy *BSF*

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 6:44 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1314, August 29, midnight.

PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 1299, August 29, noon.

Hitler's reply was handed in person to the British Ambassador at 7:15 this evening. Henderson is forwarding translation of full text as soon as possible. Following is a summary:

In reply to the British proposals, namely direct German-Polish negotiations and an international guarantee of any settlement the German Government declares:

(One) That in spite of skepticism as to prospects of success, it accepts direct negotiations with Poland solely out of a desire to insure lasting friendship with Great Britain and (two) in case of any modification of territories the German Government cannot undertake to guarantee them nor to participate in guarantees without consulting the Government of Soviet Russia.

(END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

NPL

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 7:08 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1314, August 29, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

The note observes that German proposals have never had as their object any diminution of the vital interests of Poland and declares that the German Government accepts the mediation of Great Britain with the view to securing the visit to Berlin of a Polish plenipotentiary. The note adds that the German Government counts on the arrival at Berlin of this plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, August 30th.

Ambassador Henderson remarked that this last stipulation sounded like a ultimatum. After a heated exchange of remarks Hitler and Ribbentrop assured him it was intended only to stress the urgency of the matter, at a moment when two fully mobilized armies were facing each other.

The Ambassador said that he would like to transmit to his Government the assurance, in the event that such a Polish plenipotentiary did go to Berlin, that he would be received and the discussions

(END SECTION TWO)

KENNEDY

NPL

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

LONDON

Dated August 29, 1939

Rec'd 7:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1314, August 29, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

with him would be conducted on a basis of full equality. To this Hitler replied "of course".

The German demands are declared to be revision of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany and the security of the German national minorities in the rest of Poland.

The note concludes by stating that the German Government is ready immediately to elaborate proposals for an acceptable solution and to inform the British Government if possible before the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

A responsible official of the Foreign Office stated that it is unlikely any action will be taken on this note before tomorrow, when the full text will be here. They will, however, probably inform the Poles at once of the substance of the German reply.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

NPL

Safe: Kennedy ^{PSF} ^{Pres}

CJ

GRAY

LONGON

Dated September 1, 1939

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

**REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED**

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1358, September 1, 5 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

My 1349, September 1, 1 p.m.

Draft note to Germany has received final approval of Prime Minister and of the French and is now being despatched to Berlin.

The Foreign Office states it should be in the hands of the German Government by 7:30 at the latest. The note, in addition to requesting assurances from the German Government that hostile action against Poland has ceased, demands that German military forces be withdrawn from Polish territory and that failing to receive a favorable reply His Majesty's Government will fully and immediately implement their obligations to Poland.

A second note containing a time ultimatum is now in preparation and it was stated at the Foreign Office will be despatched later today. The actual terms of this second note have not been finally settled.

KENNEDY

PEG

XX

PSF
JFK Kennedy

September 11, 1939

H.F.M.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON.

905.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Your 1578, September 11, 2 p.m.

The President desires me to inform you, for your strictly confidential information and so that you may be guided thereby without divulging this message to any one, that this Government, so long as present European conditions continue, sees no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this Government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and of aggression.

Hull.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

U:SW:IJ

PSF
Safe Kennedy

NC

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 10:45

Secretary of State

Washington

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

1578, September 11, 2 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND MOST PERSONAL FOR THE
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

I spent an hour with the King and Queen alone yesterday and three quarters of an hour with Sir Samuel Hoare this morning in my office. From my conversation with the King it became very apparent to me that the one problem he is worried desperately about is that within a comparatively short time, possibly three or four weeks, Hitler will have cleaned up Poland and will then definitely make a proposition to Great Britain and France to call this war off and come to some agreement. I will discuss this problem later in this (*) as a result of my conversation with Sir Samuel Hoare.

As to the Queen, the problem that affects her seems to be the return of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, because it was very apparent to me that the King is worried about his arrival in England. The Queen told me that he

is

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939

is returning at once but only for a short time. She said it was, of course, frightfully embarrassing to have an "ex-King" around nearby. I should judge also that the situation will not smooth out, at least for the time being, because she will not receive the Duchess. I am citing this not as of great historic importance but rather because subconsciously it is going to have some effect on both the King and Queen in making up their minds as to what answer should be given Hitler.

Sir Samuel Hoare, as I said, called this morning and we had a long talk. He definitely believes that the most serious thing facing the world today will be the proposition he feels will unquestionably come. (END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

1
NC

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.(D)

PSF Safe: Kennedy
LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 11:48 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1578, September 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

within a month or six weeks from Germany to England to
give up the struggle. He sizes the situation up in this
way: Neither the French nor the Germans can make any
appreciable headway against each other. He said that the
French advance now is almost like the Lancers -- three
steps forward and three steps back; that it is extremely
unlikely, except at the cost of an incredible massacre,
that either side could break through either line. The
navy, of course, can patrol the seas but the results of
this will not be felt acutely for some time to come. In
the meantime then, there is nothing left but air war. He
said that at the minute Germany outnumbered in bombers
the British two to one, although he feels the British
outnumber the Germans in fighters; that it will be a
struggle in the air to see whose morale will break first.
The British have despatched practically all their bombers
to France but are still keeping them under English command.
The problem Hoare feels, will arise from a condition
something like this: After the French have had a number

of

Safe Kennedy

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (Section Two)

of casualties they will demand that the British bombers bomb the Ruhr and other places. The minute that starts, women and children are bound to be killed even though British airmen would be under the strictest orders not to do anything of the kind; immediately that would call for reprisals and in spite of all England's defenses, Germany is in a position to make these reprisals most serious. (END SECTION TWO)

KENNEDY

HPD

1
NC

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 12:06 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

PSF Safe Kennedy

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1578, September 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The General Staff feel definitely that the only method of countering German attacks is to keep sending their bombers in to attack the Germans and since their number is very limited it is a question whether they will last very long. In the meantime, the Germans will attack the various factories here and even though direct hits are not made, they will so interfere with production by constant air raid attacks that it is extremely unlikely that a number of bombers can be turned out to fill in the terrific losses. This will be the case if they obey France's suggestion of sending the bombers in. If, believing as they do that the bombers must be saved until they arrive at greater capacity and until they get a greater number, the French become restless and say "why fight any longer to save Great Britain?"

Now, Hoare knows that for any party here to consider any kind of an appointment with Germany would, of necessity

at

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (SECTION
THREE)

at the minute result in having the party thrown out of power and I rather got the impression from Hoare this morning that it is not at all inconceivable that this party may make that an issue. It was not what he said; it was the inference I drew. Lord Trenchard, whom they all regard here very highly, feels that if they send English bombers into German territory, the German morale would break quickly and go to pieces much faster than the British. Of course that is a gamble that may have to be taken, but I am of the opinion that the War Cabinet at the moment do not feel justified in taking that risk.

Hoare was responsible for the statement given out on Saturday night that the British regard this as a three year war, in order to keep their morale stiffened up and not let any disquieting criticism of the Government's policy get started too strongly. I could judge from talking with the King on Saturday that this matter is one that is giving the Government an unholy worry. They realize that a continuation of ^a war or the maintenance of a Government on a war basis means complete economic, financial and social collapse and nothing will be saved after

NC -3- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (SECTION
THREE)

after the war is over. On the other hand, calling the war off would give Hitler such increased prestige that it is a question of how far that would carry him. The King and Hoare recognize the very grave danger that the French may feel the British are not making contribution comparable to theirs and may start to get sick of the war even though their courage and determination at the moment is very strong. He told me in passing that he understood Bonnet was going to be thrown out in France.

I thought this information would be very valuable to you in making up your minds as to your course of action. It seems to me that this situation may crystalize to a point where the President can be the savior

KENNEDY

HPD

BF Gale
Kennedy

NC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated September 11, 1939

Rec'd 12:32 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1578, September 11, 2 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

of the world. The British Government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the President himself may work out the plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but, as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world and I have not thought so up to this minute.

If the war continues and air raids between the two countries continue, it is, of course, conceivable that at that time Italy or Russia or other countries may see fit to get in and then the situation might become hopeless.

I am passing this on because I think that beyond all other questions of importance in the world, this is one that the President should be thinking about to work

out

NC -2- #1578 from London, September 11, 1939 (SECTION
FOUR)

out in his own mind what might be done at the psychological moment not to increase Hitler's prestige but possibly to bring the whole world on a peace basis.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

HPD

PSF Safe: Kennedy

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


September 13, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made on the telephone just now, I am sending you herewith a copy of Joe Kennedy's telegram of September 11 as well as a copy of the reply made by the Department in accordance with your directions.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

No. 1578, September 11,
2 p.m. from London;
No. 905, September 11,
4 p.m., to London.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Safe: Kennedy

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

LONDON

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 10:12 p.m., 14th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1211, May 15, 2 a.m. (?)

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

I just left Churchill at one o'clock. He is sending you a message tomorrow morning saying he considers with the entrance of Italy, the chances of the Allies winning is slight. He said the German push is showing great power and although the French are holding tonight they are definitely worried. They are asking for more British troops at once, but Churchill is unwilling to send more from England at this time because he is convinced within a month England will be vigorously attacked. The reason for the message to you is that he needs help badly. I asked him what the United States could do to help that would not leave the United States holding the bag for a war in which the Allies expected to be beaten. It seems to me that if we had to fight to protect our lives we would do better fighting in our own backyard. I said you know our strength what could we do if we wanted to help you all we can.

You

-2- #1211, May 15, 2 a.m. from London

You do not need money or credit now. The bulk of our navy is in the Pacific and we have not enough airplanes for our own use and our army is not up to requirements. So if this is going to be a quick war all over in a few months what could we do. He said it was his intention to ask for the loan of 30 or 40 of our old destroyers and also whatever airplanes we could spare right now.

(END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

NPL

JT
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone (D)

LONDON

Dated May 15, 1940

Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RUSH

1211, May 15, 2 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

He said regardless of what Germany does to England
and France, England will never give up as long as he re-
mains a power in public life even if England is burnt to
the ground. Why, said he, the government will move to
Canada and take the fleet and fight on. I think this
is something I should follow up. If the Germans carry on
there will be some conversation on what England will even-
tually do. Churchill called in the First Lord of the
Admiralty Sinclair and Eden and although they are tough
and mean to fight they are very low tonight.

(END OF MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

NPL

Kennedy

PSF Safe: Kennedy

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated June 12, 1940

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

UNCLASSIFIED
REGRADED

RUSH.

1603, June 12, 2 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

My view of the situation this morning. The condition of Britain's preparedness equals her ability to fight the kind of war Hitler wages still appears to be appallingly weak. I am of the opinion that outside of some air defence the real defence of England will be with courage and not with arms. No matter what action the United States takes towards this war it is only fair to say that short of a miracle this country after, and if and when, France stops fighting will hold on in the hope that the United States will come in. Churchill said quite definitely to me he expects the United States will be in right after the election; that when the people in the United States see the towns and cities of England, after which so many American cities and towns have been named, bombed and destroyed they will line up and want war. The people here are kept buoyed up by the inference in the papers and the publication

-2- #1603, June 12, 2 p.m., from London.

publication of clippings from the NEW YORK TIMES, HERALD
TRIBUNE and political speeches. This morning an American
correspondent of an English paper mentions that all it needs
is an "incident" to bring the United States in. If that were
all that were needed desperate people will do desperate
things. The point of all this is the fact that the
preparedness for (END SECTION ONE)

KENNEDY

RR

HSM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated June 12, 1940

Rec'd 11:07 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1603, June 12, 2 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

carrying on a war here is pitiful, this in spite of the fact that production and war effort are now for the first time going ahead in urgently fashion. We should know this in the light of any action we in America might see fit to take. A course of action that involves us in any respect that presupposes the Allies have much to fight with except courage is, as far as England goes, I think fallacious. The United States would have nothing to work with with these two countries in their present condition. Unless France and England are dealing or will deal Germany really crippling blows at her industrial production and seriously affect her strength in the air and in tanks as a result of these battles, the United States will have plenty to worry about in their own country. The cry should be prepare for anything right there, right now. (END MESSAGE)

KENNEDY

RR

Kennedy

PSF Safe: Kennedy

HSM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

London

Dated June 14, 1940

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1349, June 14, noon.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I talked with Churchill at 9:20 this morning and made perfectly clear to him your attitude regarding publication of your message to Reynaud. On my arrival at the office this morning I received your personal and confidential message transmitted in the State Department's 1643, June 14, 1 p. m. I immediately called Churchill on the telephone about 11:30 and, Johnson being present while I was talking, repeated to him the sense of your statement and explained again clearly that there was no authority in the United States Government except in Congress to make any commitment regarding war. Churchill was obviously terribly disappointed as he had counted on publication of this message to put a little stiffening into the French backbone. I told him of your desire that any misapprehension which might

exist

hsm -2- No. 1649; June 14, noon, from London

exist in the minds of French officials regarding the meaning of the message be cleared up and that they should understand that the matter primarily in mind in sending it was the French fleet and its disposition for future use. He expressed his disappointment and said he was afraid conveying such a message now to the French would merely dampen what fires remained. I replied that I was passing your message on to him as instructed and that the action he would take on it of course was up to him.

He inquired if there had been any reply from you to his last message very early this morning. I told him not yet but that I would get in touch with him immediately if and when anything came.

KENNEDY

HPD

Kennedy

PSF *Safe: Kennedy*

GRAY

LONDON

Dated June 16, 1940.

Rec'd. 4:28 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

1680, June 16, 9 p.m.

**REGRADING
UNCLASSIFIED**

PERSONAL AND ~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY.

I saw Halifax at 7 p.m. He said early this morning they had message here from Reynaud saying that French proposed asking President of the United States to ask Germany for an armistice and Reynaud wanted to know if the British would agree to let the French make a separate peace provided the French agreed not to include the French Fleet as one of the terms of agreement.

British announced then agreement was not with a man or an administrator (this in answer to the statement that Reynaud said that if the British did not agree to the separate peace Reynaud would resign and then a Government might come in that would agree to everything that Hitler wanted). However, the British would agree to let the French make a separate peace provided the French Fleet sailed at once for British ports and then the British would fight on. They also told Campbell in separate agreement to have the Polish, Czechs and Belgium Governments come here. Also have the French air force come here or go

-2- No. 1680, June 16, 9 p.m. from London

to North America and all other troops outside of France do the same thing.

Later on the French gold arrived here with some Frenchmen who said Herriot, Mandel and others wanted to fight on and if Reynaud got some stiffening from England he would stick.

So the British drew up a declaration of union between France and England. All partners now, what you have is mine and what I have is yours. All damage done to France England pays her share. A noble sentiment but just does not mean much so the armistice preparation has been held up pending finding out Reynaud's reaction to the declaration of union.

These are high spots so you can get it in a hurry. Lothian will fill in all the details.

KENNEDY