

MR 310 - INVASION AND OFFENSIVES, PLANS, LANDING OF TROOPS - ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 1944

Southern France

✓ *Southern France*
MR 310 -- Sec. ~~A~~ -- ~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ 1944

*Map Room
Box 105
Folder 2*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF
"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.
To: War Department
CG, U.S. Army Forces in European Theater of Operations
CG, Supreme Hqs, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, Eng.

Nr: FX 81590 11 August 1944

FX 81590 AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated
USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, SHAEF for information
signed Wilson cite FHGBI. TOPSECRET BIGOT DRAGOON.

This is NAF 760. Principal planning security measures have included classification of officers involved. Number of French Officers informed reduced to barest minimum essential and system of cards to identify instituted. We thus controlled numbers. BIGOT procedure for handling documents, use of place code names, Q day for dates, restrictions on flying of personnel "in the know" and general office security measures including safeguarding maps. All above contained in memorandum B-389. Five zero four/nine dated 4th January of which AGWAR received copies. Further measures taken have included restrictions on posting to combat outfits of personnel "in the know", security warning to rotated and long service personnel, whose numbers restricted where possible, avoidance until recent date connecting planning staff with 7th Army, and courts martial of personnel violating security. Mounting instructions have embraced measures regarding issue of operational maps, wearing of shoulder patches, and isolating embarking troops. Other measures have included tightening of permission to travel to and from Corsica and high percentage of examination and delay of Corsican mail. All precautions taken regarding radio silence and security of radio links. Owing to with-

CM-IN-10227 (11 Aug 44)

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JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 6 1971

Signature- RHP
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

Nr: FX 81590

11 August 1944

drawal of French troops from line in Italy and speech of General DeGaulle stating invasion of France by French armies will take place shortly and fact that operation VENDETTA indicated attack on Southeast France and was maintained till 6th July it is inevitable that enemy must fear landing on southern coast of France but there are indications that he has no precise details. Also as far as known he has not increased forces in southern sector and his reserve remaining in Toulouse area. This in reply to your FAN 386. Consequently there is good reason to hope for tactical surprise.

End

FAN 386 is CM-OUT-77242 (8 Aug 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTER
"TOP" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department
Nr: FX 81292 10 August 1944

Ref nr FX 81292 TOP SECRET signed Wilson cite FHPR
for AGWAR for Surles pass to OWI Washington, TROOPERS for
DPR, FILPOT Main for DDPR and Chief Field Press Censor,
NADIST for FWB for Tyler, DEFENSOR Ottawa for Public Rela-
tions.

Text of special communique and of proclamation by
SACMED submitted herewith.

To be held for simultaneous release in London,
Washington, Ottawa and this Theater, GMT release time to be
signalled from this Headquarters approximately one hour in
advance. Text of communique begins:

"Today American, British and French troops strongly
supported by Allied Air Forces are being landed by American,
British and French fleets on the southern coast of France."
End communique.

Text of proclamation begins:

"Announcement from General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater to the people
of France. The Armies of the United Nations have landed in
the south of France. Their objective is to drive out the
Germans and join up with the Allied Armies advancing from
Normandy. French troops are participating in these operations

CM-IN-9615 (11 Aug 44)

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Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Casserta, Italy

Nr: FX 81292

10 August 1944

side by side with their Allied comrades in arms, by sea, land and air. The Army of France is in being again, fighting on its own soil for the liberation of its country with all its traditions of victory behind it-remember 1918. All Frenchmen, civilians as well as military, have their part to play in the campaign in the south. Your duty will be made clear to you. Listen to the Allied radio, read notices and leaflets, pass on all instructions from one man and woman to another. Let us end the struggle as quickly as possible so that all France may resume again her free life under conditions of peace and security. Victory is certain. Long live the Spirit of France and all that it stands for." End proclamation.

Approved French translation begins:

"Aux peuple de France le General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Commandant Supreme Alliee, zone de la Mediterranee. Annonce: les armees des nations unies ont débarque dans le Midi. Leur but est de chasser les Allemands et d'effectuer une jonction avec les Armees Alliees qui avancent de Normandie. Les forces Francaises participent a cette operation, aux cotes de leurs freres d'Armies Alliees. sur mer, sur terre, et dan les airs. L'armee Francaise est a nouveau une realite, elle combat sur son propre sol pour la liberation de la patrie, avec toutes les traditions de victoire. Rappelez-vous une neuf dix huit. Tous les Francais, civils aussie bien que militaires, ont leur role a jouer dans la campagne du Midi. Votre tache vous sera expliquee: ecoutez la radio Alliee, lisez les avis et les

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Date- DEC 8 1971

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Page 3

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy

Nr: FX 81292

10 August 1944.

tracts, transmettez les consignes de l'un a l'autre. Mettons fin aussi rapidement que possible a la lutte, afin que toute la France puisse reprendre sa vie libre dans des conditions de paix et de securite. La victoire est certaine. Vive l'ame de la France, et toute ce qu'elle represente." End translation.

If any substitution or alteration is made, will be signalled with release message. Any additional proclamations for announcements will be signalled in advance. Utmost care should be exercised to safeguard security and prevent premature release.

End.

ACTION: Gen Surles

INFO : Gen McFarland
Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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DDO BNL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

10 August 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WANX 78678

TOPSEC to Wilson for action, SHAEF for Eisenhower and ETOUSA
pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAW 387 from
the Combined Chiefs of Staff. NAF 720 is the reference.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve equipping not to
exceed 3 Italian divisions as a matter of urgent operational
necessity provided that combat equipment is to be furnished
from Italian sources, from equipment available without pre-
judice to other requirements of higher priority, or captured
equipment, and is not at the expense of the operational and
reserve requirements of OVERLORD and DRAGOON.

2. Any equipment which is of United States origin sup-
plied to Italian combat units under this authorization will
remain under the control of the United States theater commander,
to be returned to United States possession at the conclusion
of the war with Germany.

3. There are critical items in short supply which may
prevent fully equipping these divisions.

4. There are certain points on which Combined Chiefs
of Staff require information to enable them to estimate

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(10 Aug 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: WARX 78678

Page 2

commitments which this decision entails. These are:

- a. Your requirement for auxiliary units, e.g. artillery and service units to support these divisions;
- b. Your estimate of the time required to make these divisions operational after they receive their equipment;
- c. Your appreciation of availability of Italian labor, service and supporting troops for these divisions in the light of other requirements in Mediterranean for Italian manpower.

5. With respect to the other questions presented in NAF 720, separate action of which you will be informed is now being taken with respect to Italian service units serving under United States and British forces. This will result in limiting strength of Italian Army and Air Forces to those combat and internal security units serving under Italian command. FAN 338 authorizes the supply of food, clothing, medical supplies and fuel to Italian troops. This is interpreted to authorize necessities such as boots, soap, etc.

End

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JCS 29-71

ORIGINATOR: CG/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RAO

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(10 Aug 44) 2103Z amb

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[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE [REDACTED]

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

10 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAR 78677

TopSec to SHAEF London for Eisenhower, FACS 54 from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff

FACS 52 and SCAF 61 are the references.

Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that operation
DRAGOON should proceed as originally planned.

End

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JCS 34-71

Date- DEC 1 1971

Signature- RHP

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CH-OUT-78677

(10 Aug 44)

2102Z

bem

3:10 AM
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[REDACTED]
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URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, London, England.

To : War Department.
CG, Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta, Italy.

No : FWD 12704 8 August 1944

FWD 12704 to AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff
and to AFHQ and British Chiefs of Staff for information from
Eisenhower. Reference FACB 52. TOP SECRET. This is SCAP 61.

I am strongly opposed to a cancellation for major
modification of DRAGOON. While I have always believed that
if sufficient port capacity and communication facilities
were available to enable additional divisions to be deployed
in the northern battle area, all possible forces should be
sent there through northern ports, I must emphasize that
such facilities do not at present exist. Moreover, we can
not foresee the dates of opening of the existing or manu-
factured ports in Brittany and any prediction as to the time
when we can use these facilities or the communications
loading from them is largely guess work. Much time will
probably elapse before we can accept the ten divisions
earmarked for DRAGOON, and I agree entirely with Wilson that
it would be wrong to initiate the DRAGOON operation with
less than the divisions now allocated.

A long delay in employing the DRAGOON forces is quite
unacceptable, and it is my firm opinion that the best inter-
ests of OVERLORD will be served by carrying out the DRAGOON
operation as planned without reduction of allocated forces.
If the facilities become available for accepting additional
divisions over and above those we now estimate our port
capacity and communications will sustain, I will ask the US
authorities to phase forward divisions now allocated to
OVERLORD. It may even prove advisable later, provided our

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URGENT

- 2 -

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
Forward, London, England.

No : FWD 12704

8 August 1944

establishment of ports and communications is very rapid, to phase into the northern area some of the formations now intended for later build up of DRAGOON, but these things depend upon future developments, and it is my considered opinion that at this time there is nothing which justifies the recasting of plans in the Mediterranean, but rather that DRAGOON should be pushed energetically and speedily.

End.

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WCS34-71

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RAH*

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

CM-IN-7350

(8 Aug 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

7 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 77089

TOPSEC to SHAEP London for Eisenhower, FACS 52 from the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Combined Chiefs of Staff desire immediate expression
of your views and recommendations reference the proposal
of the British Chiefs of Staff in COS (W) 229 dated 5 Au-
gust, the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in WARX 76552
dated 5 August and General Wilson's views in MEDCOS 169
dated 6 August.

End

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JCS 34-71

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

Date- DEC 7 1971

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
CofS

Signature- *RAH*

CM-OUT-77089

(7 Aug 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

7 August 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
U. S. Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 77242

POFSEC to Wilson for action, SHAEF for Eisenhower and ETOUSA
pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information, FAN 386
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are anxious that all possible
security measures should be taken in your theater to ensure
that operation "DRAGOON" is launched with the maximum degree
of surprise. You should signal a summary of the security
measures you have taken to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for
their information.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Arnold
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
CofS
Adm. Leahy
OPD

OM-OUT-77242

(8 Aug 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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6 August 1944

To: British Chiefs of Staff

Repeated: Britman Washington for
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

From: FREEDOM

IMPORTANT.

Signed Wilson, cite MEDCOS 6th August. For U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff FX 79511.

This is MEDCOS 168.

Date referred in Paragraph 1 MEDCOS 167 is 15th August.

End

T.O.O. 060128B

ACTION: Gen. McFarland

INFO : Gen. Arnold
Gen. Handy
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

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Signature- RHP

CM-IN-6321

(7 Aug 44)

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From: AFHQ
To : Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: J.S.M., Washington
Info: HQ MAAF., CINC MED, Naples, SHAEP
Number: FX 79945 6 August 1944
MEDCOS 169
BIGOT - DRAGOON

Personal for British Chiefs of Staff repeated U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from General Wilson, cite FHCIC.

In reply to your COSMED 165 and further to MEDCOS 166.

Preliminary examination by Joint Planning Staff has been concluded and my views are as follows:

2. Present German strength in South and Southwest France totals 10 divisions of all types. Although some might be diverted to OVERLORD area before DRAGOON D-Day I do not feel we can count on this. It would therefore be most unsound to attempt to launch DRAGOON with the mission at present assigned to it unless the full build-up of 10 divisions as now planned is available. Furthermore, unless additional escorts could be found from United Kingdom the movement of DRAGOON forces and their follow-up to Brittany would require use of a substantial proportion of the destroyers at present earmarked for DRAGOON gun support and escort of carriers. This would leave inadequate Naval support to cover an opposed landing.

3. For reasons given in para. 2 above I consider that if it is decided to switch DRAGOON to Brittany all DRAGOON resources, (less Air Forces and Airborne Forces as see paras. 6 and 10 below) should be switched and no opposed landing in South France be undertaken.

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(8 Aug 44)

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MEDCOS 169

Page 2

4. Regarding method of carrying out switch the majority of cargo ships for DRAGOON assault and immediate follow-up are already loaded or in process of loading. Alterations of loading plans at this stage would result in complete disorganization and such delay as would evidently defeat object of switch. Only practicable method therefore is to adhere to present plans for loading and sequence of convoys cutting out the major landing craft which cannot carry out longer troop lift to Brittany.
5. On basis paragraph 4 above and subject to time factor in paragraph 11 (A) below, following forces comprising DRAGOON assault and pre-loaded follow-up could be switched to Brittany.
- (A) Sixth Corps comprising Corps Headquarters, 3, 36, and 45 United States Divisions, (Less some 40,000 personnel and 830 vehicles at present planned to be carried in LCT's and LCI's and by over-berthing LST for the short journey into Southern France, but see paragraph 7 below).
- (B) French Second Corps comprising Corps Headquarters, 1 DMI and 3 DIA of which the pre-loading in Italy as follow-up divisions is almost completed. No personnel or vehicles from these formations would be displaced but if the divisions are diverted to Brittany they will be for a period short of certain supporting units which it is planned to bring in during DRAGOON build-up.
- (C) Two French Armoured Combat Commands now pre-loading in Africa (less displaced personnel amounting to some 1,200).
6. Remaining DRAGOON formations, (less Air Forces, see para. 10, and Airborne Forces, which it is presumed would not be required) supporting arms and services forming the full build-up of DRAGOON can proceed to Brittany under arrangements to be planned later taking into account longer shipping turn round and requirements of SHAEF and 7th Army Commander.

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(8 Aug 44)

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MEDCOS 169

Page 3

7. Additional personnel shipping will be required to convey personnel displaced (See para. 5 (A) and (C) above). Part of this requirement might be provided in sufficient time from:

- (A) GUF 13 which has a capacity of 17,000.
- (B) Personnel shipping allocated to the Mediterranean but not earmarked for DRAGOON. Use of this shipping of capacity 12,000 would be at expense of DIADEN.

Above shipping could be ready to sail about August 16th. Only other immediate source of personnel lift would be warships which I would be most reluctant to use for such a long journey.

8. (A) All the above is on the assumption that reception facilities in Brittany would be provided by SHAEF. As far as unloading facilities are concerned approximately three-fourths of merchant ships carry port battalion personnel to effect their own discharge. Two hundred LCM would arrive with the ships. If ports are badly demolished LST after unloading could remain for unloading merchant ships.

(B) DRAGOON plan provides for discharge of convoys on three beaches. Least dislocation will be secured by adhering to same principle in allocating ships to ports in Brittany.

9. Maintenance during voyage and after disembarkation.

(A) Arrangements can be made for provisioning ships to cover longer voyage to Brittany and allowance is made for this in time factor in para. 11 (B).

(B) Formations disembark with 30 days supplies. Subsequent maintenance DRAGOON forces was to have been by direct shipment from U.S. and U.K. ports to DRAGOON area. Arrangements would therefore be required for diversion of scheduled convoys to Brittany ports under arrangements of SHAEF.

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MEDCOS 169

Page 4

(C) It is also pointed out that DRAGOON assault and immediate follow-up forces referred to in para. 5 are accompanied by light scale vehicles and equipment and set up to operate only over a short L. of C. for a month to 6 weeks.

10. Air Forces at present allocated to DRAGOON.

It would not, be practicable to switch 12 TAC in early stages even if this is desired. Complete replanning would be necessary to divert this Air Force to Brittany area. Air protection for disembarkation and tactical air support for Seventh Army thereafter would therefore have to be provided by SHAEF.

11. Timing.

A. DRAGOON will be committed by P.M. 12 August. Therefore if switch is to be implemented a decision must be received at AFHQ by A.M. 12 August either to carry out diversion or anyhow to postpone DRAGOON.

B. It is estimated that leading convoys could be off coast of Brittany approximately 15 - 18 days after decision to switch has been received at AFHQ actual time being dependent on routes adopted in Atlantic. Subsequent convoys to complete forces referred to in para. 5 could reach Brittany as soon afterwards as they could be accepted.

T.O.O. 062200B

End

ACTION: General McFarland

INFO : Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RAD*

CM-IN-7102

(8 Aug 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff
77500

5 August 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Number: WARX 76552

[REDACTED] to Eisenhower for information and Devers pass to Wilson for information from the United States Chiefs of Staff.

With respect to recent views British Chiefs of Staff as to DRAGOON, the United States Chiefs of Staff have this date replied as follows:

"1. The United States Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the conclusions and the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. We do not consider that the general situation has changed sufficiently to warrant such a radical change in our plans. The progress of OVERLORD towards freeing ports in Brittany has been less rapid than the estimate current when we decided on DRAGOON. The time when we can make use of ports in Brittany and the communications leading therefrom cannot now be predicted with any degree of accuracy. General Eisenhower has always given us to understand that the forces he required and wanted for OVERLORD build-up are determined by logistical factors in the Lodgment area, such as port capacities. Our information is that General Eisenhower still has divisions in the United Kingdom which are available for use in France as soon as they can be moved and received. We are sending him 4 more this month and are preparing to send him the 5 in September, which are all he has asked for.

CM-IN-76552

(5 Aug 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

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SECRET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Number: MARK 76552

5 August 1944

3. We are convinced that DRAGCON will be successful in landing phase, and we anticipate a rapid advance up the Rhone valley, aided to the fullest extent by the French resistance groups. This operation may well contribute the knock-out punch to the German Army in France. We consider that it would be extremely unwise to change our plans at this late date when all indications point to the complete success of the DRAGCON operations."

End.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

ORIGINATOR : Gen McFarland (JC/S)

INFORMATION: Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
Gen. Handy
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-OUT-76552

(5 Aug 44)

2358Z vn

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

5 August 1944

From: AFHQ
Reputed: JSM Washington for US Chiefs of Staff
To: British Chiefs of Staff

MEDCOS 167

BIGOT - DRAGOON

Signed Wilson cite FMCS No. FX 79396

The following is a brief review of the present situation in the Mediterranean theater.

Part I. Operation DRAGOON. All preparations for this operation are proceeding satisfactorily and it will be launched, subject to last minute postponements due to weather on the target date which is given in my immediately following telegram.

1. Task of the 7th Army is:

- (A) Able to establish a bridgehead east of Toulon as a base for the assault and capture of that port, and
- (B) Thereafter, to capture Marseilles and to exploit towards Lyon and Vichy. These objectives and the timing of the operation have been fully coordinated with General Eisenhower.

2. As a result of the operations in Normandy, considerable alterations have occurred in enemy strength on the Southern coast of France and in his ability to build up forces to oppose our advance. In general terms, since OVERLORD was

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MEDCOS 167

5 August 1944

Page Two

launched the enemy's available divisions south of the line Lyon-Bordeaux have been reduced by three to a total of 11. The quality of these divisions has however been materially reduced as three of the divisions now in the area are inferior replacements. I therefore anticipated that the initial landing will be successfully effected and the enemy's ability to build up forces to contain the initial landing will be insufficient to prevent our further advance. I do not anticipate, however, that the enemy will withdraw from the whole of southern France except under pressure. I consider that he will fight delaying actions to prevent us securing the ports of Toulon and Marseilles. Thereafter it should be possible to develop the maximum exploitation up the Rhone Valley and towards the Toulouse gap. For this, further divisions may be required to maintain the momentum of the advance if the maximum pressure is to be applied to the enemy in the coming weeks.

Part II. Italy.

3. In Italy, Ancona, Leghorn and part of Florence have been captured and the armies are now on the general line of the river Arno and are preparing to force the crossing of that river astride of Florence with the object of gaining contact with the main Gothic line defense system.

4. In spite of heavy casualties and a steady deterioration of his administrative situation, the enemy has been fighting stubbornly, and aided by demolitions and the difficult nature of the country has kept his front intact and shows no signs of yielding ground without a fight. There is every indication that he will throw in everything he has to prevent us crossing the Apennines and reaching the Valley of the Po. I estimate that for this purpose the enemy will be able to muster the equivalent of 13 plus divisions, and the equivalent of four Italian divisions which the enemy has recently equipped to hold his line and to protect his flanks.

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MEDCOS 167

5 August 1944

Page Three

5. On 5th Army Front, by using ancillary units to hold the front all four American Infantry divisions, less one regimental combat team, are now being given a much needed period for rest and reorganization in preparation for the next phase of the offensive in which their first task will be to secure a jumping-off position in the neighborhood of Pistoia. This operation will involve serious fighting. Subsequent to this, further operations will be necessary to capture the Monte Pisano feature and Lucca, which will free Leghorn from shell fire. This will involve a further drain on Fifth Army resources, the extent of which cannot be accurately foreseen at present. It may well reduce the Fifth Army forces available for the break into the Gothic line at the time required to two divisions or even less.

6. As regards 8th Army, the obligation to extend their left flank due to the withdrawal of French and American divisions and the necessity of husbanding resources for the assault on the enemy's main defense system, has slowed up the advance. Regrouping for future operations is now in progress and it is hoped that after the preliminary stages have been concluded it will be possible to launch the main blow with two corps each with three infantry and one armored divisions with the left on the axis Florence-Bologna. After providing divisions for defensive tasks on the flanks this will leave two infantry divisions and one armored division at the most for nourishing the battle or exploiting success.

7. It will therefore be seen that the scale and weight of the offensive is considerably less than that envisaged prior to the decision to launch DRAGOON. If the policy of applying the maximum pressure to the enemy on all fronts in the coming weeks is to be followed, it is therefore apparent that the resources available to General Alexander must be strengthened by every possible means subject to the overriding priority of DRAGOON which has been laid down by CCS. I would therefore ask that approval for the issue of combat

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MEDCOS 167

5 August 1944

Page Four

equipment for three Italian divisions asked for in NAF 720 should be sanctioned immediately.

8. Forecasts as regards timing are difficult, but it may well be that the main offensive against the Gothic line cannot be launched before the end of August or the beginning of September. The ability to strengthen the defensive fronts by additional Italian formations, and the introduction of fresh United States divisions might well make all the difference in reaping the fruits of a penetration of the Appennines. A disorganized enemy will then be faced with a difficult withdrawal with the River Po behind him, a situation which might lead to his destruction before he can stabilize his line further North. Alternately, the introduction of extra divisions might be necessary to ensure the passage of the mountains before the weather breaks.

9. I am taking every step to provide General Alexander with additional administrative resources, and all the ammunition I can, without regard to the position of reserves in three months time, as I feel that now is the time to throw everything in.

10. From this review, however, it is apparent to me that the provision of a Mediterranean theater reserve is essential if I am to take advantage of the situations which may arise either in Southern France or in Italy. In MEDCOS 159 I asked for two additional United States divisions as a theater reserve. In view of the developments in the situation, I would now ask that six United States divisions should be sent to the Mediterranean theater to arrive from the beginning of September onwards. This reserve would enable me either to reinforce DRAGOON or to ensure the destruction of the enemy's armies in Italy in accordance with whichever may seem the most desirable at the time. I have in mind also, with such a reserve it would be possible for me to withdraw experienced divisions from Italy to Southern France, replacing them with fresh divisions from the United

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MEDCOS 167

5 August 1944

Page Five

States which would thus gain combat experience in preparation for eventual transfer to France should this prove the right course. This would appear to me to afford the best chance of applying the maximum pressure to the enemy on all fronts before the winter sets in. I should also require one additional corps headquarters and would ask that the divisions should be sent with their due proportion of corps and administrative troops. Should the proposal be acceptable, I would ask that certain engineer and administrative units should be shipped first as these are likely to be required both in the DRAGOON operation and in Italy before the divisions can be usefully employed. Both the 7th and 5th Armies in particular are short of combat engineers, heavy artillery and truck companies.

Part III. Balkan Air Force.

11. Operations in the Adriatic, air land and sea, have been intensified since the formation of this force. The co-ordination of air, land and sea operations in working satisfactorily, and as a result of the better information and co-ordination made possible by the formation of this H. Q., air operations have been increasingly successful. Widespread raiding operations are also being carried out with increasing success by land forces, Adriatic, with the full support of the Air Force and the Navy, and the enemy is being kept in a constant state of uncertainty.

12. Very greatly increased amount of supplies have been introduced into Yugoslavia by air and by sea, but inland the Germans still hold the initiative and are able to move formations about the country wherever they are determined to do so. Therefore, I am not satisfied that we are getting full value from the arms and equipment being supplied to Marshal Tito. I am of the opinion that the best results can be secured by a further co-ordinated attack on the enemy communications on the lines of that carried out just prior to OVERLORD under the code name BEARSKIN. I am therefore

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(7 Aug 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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MEDCOS 167

5 August 1944 Page Six

going to press Marshal Tito at a conference with him which I am holding in the next few days, to co-operate wholeheartedly in such a scheme, which will then be prepared by AOC Balkan Air Force in conjunction with Brigadier MacLean's mission to ensure proper co-ordination between air action and the operations of the partisans.

Part IV. Greece.

13. Owing to the Greek breakdown of the negotiations which it was believed had been successfully concluded at the Lebanon conference little military value is being accomplished against the Germans in that country. I am therefore limiting airborne supplies to Greece to those necessary to maintain the military missions there.

Part V. Air.

14. In order to afford the necessary air cover and support for DRAGOON it will be inevitable that the present participation of the air forces in the campaign in Italy is substantially reduced. Up to the present, operations of the Tactical Air Force in support of the battle in Italy have continued, though on a diminishing scale, and have resulted in inflicting very severe damage and dislocation upon the enemy's rail and road communications in the Po Valley. When DRAGOON is launched the whole effort of the XII Tactical Air Command, including three British Spitfire Wings now concentrated in Corsica, as well as that of the medium bombers will have to be switched to the support of DRAGOON, though there should from time to time be occasions when the medium bombers can be made available for action in Northern Italy.

15. Nevertheless, by accepting certain additional risks and diverting squadrons from the Coastal Air Force and the Eastern Mediterranean it has been possible to build up the

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MEPCOS 167

5 August 1944 . . . Page Seven

strength of Desert Air Force, supporting AAI to a respectable total of 12 light and medium bomber squadrons, 18 fighter and fighter bomber squadrons and 4 TAC/R squadrons by the second half of August, a strength which, in view of the negligible effort of the GAF in this theater, should afford most valuable support to AAI. Similarly, by diverting from defensive tasks squadrons of a class not suitable for support of AAI, it has been possible to offset in Belken Air Force the reductions necessitated by the withdrawal of light and fighter bomber squadrons for Desert Air Force. The Strategic Air Force, while continuing operations whenever opportunity offers against enemy oil and other industrial targets in the Balkans and Southern Germany, is being used when it is essential to do so to supplement the Tactical Air Forces in connection with OVERLORD and DRAGOON. As for the Coastal Air Force, it is anticipated that substantial reductions will be possible once DRAGOON has been established and the ports of Toulon and Marseilles captured or neutralized.

16. To sum up, in spite of the diversion of certain squadrons and specialist personnel for the support of Turkey, I am satisfied that we have at our disposal adequate forces to afford a most formidable degree of support to the land operations in Italy and Southern France.

End

T.O.O. 061440B

ACTION: Gen MacFarland

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Hendy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of 3

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CM-IN-6320 (7 Aug 44) 1720Z

Date- DEC 7 1971

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Signature- RAB

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

IMMEDIATE

5 August 1944

From: AFHQ
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Info: Joint Staff Mission for United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

MEDCOS 166

DRAGOON
BIGOT

Signed Wilson cite PHC03. No. PX 79468.

1. Preliminary consideration of proposal to switch
DRAGOON resources to Brittany contained in COSMED 165
indicate following:

(A) French follow-up divisions could be diverted with-
out undue difficulty but would arrive less their full
complement of service troops. Since the DRAGOON build-
up is based on a quick shipping turn-around diversion
of DRAGOON forces would interrupt and delay their later
build-up in Brittany.

(B) About one-third of the leading personnel of the
three United States assault divisions is carried in
LST (L) and by over-berthing LST. DRAGOON forces
have already started loading and first convoys are due to
sail on August 10. Therefore, unless delay involved in
complete reloading is acceptable, additional personnel
shipping for some 42,000 men displaced from landing
ships and craft must be provided and further the rate
of complete assembly of these three divisions as fight-
ing formations after disembarkation must be slow.
Similarly small number of landing vehicles at present
planned to move in LCT would have to be conveyed by
other means.

CM-IN-5300 (6 Aug 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971

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MEDCOS 166

5 August 1944

Page Two

2. Above are preliminary views only. JPS are examining whole question urgently and I hope to report my views fully within 48 hours.

End

T.O.O. 051800Z

FOOTNOTE: COSMED 165 is not in WDCMC

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
J of S

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Date DEC 7 1971

Signature RHP

CM-IN-5300

(6 Aug 44)

1750Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
77500

27 July 1944

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Caserta, Italy

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Commanding General
USAF in European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number WARX 71481

[REDACTED] to Wilson for action, SHAEF for Eisenhower and
ETOUSA pass to British Chiefs of Staff for information,
FAN 383 in reply to NAF 733 and NAF 735, from the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff.

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff approve paragraph 4
your NAF 733.

2. Proceed with examination in accordance para-
graph 5 your NAF 733.

3. Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved on a
high priority, provision of additional suitable craft,
your NAF 735 refers, in replacement of 8 "D" type MTB's
which have been temporarily made available by the Admir-
alty.

End

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy CPD Adm King
Gen Arnold Gen Bissell Log

CM-OUT-71481 (27 Jul 44) 1947Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74 MAY 22 1974
By RHP, NLR, Date

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

To : AFHQ
From : Chiefs of Staff
Info : J.S.M. Washington.
Number : COSMED 156 25 July 1944

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.
Reference MEDCOS 152.

Provision of extra forces over and above those required by your 221944 June has been investigated by Admiralty and Cominch and the following will be allocated- One United States battleship, one British monitor, four United States cruisers, two British cruisers.

2. The final allocation of battleships, monitors and cruisers will therefore be as follows:

A. Battleships and monitors, British RAMILLIES, ABERCROMBIE, American NEVADA, ARKANSAS, TEXAS, French LORRAINE.

B. Cruisers British AURORA, ORION, AJAX, DIDO, BLACK PRINCE, ACHILLES, ARJONAUT, SIRIUS, American BROOKLYN, PHILADELPHIA, AUGUSTA, TUSCALOOSA, QUINCY, OMAHA, MARBLEHEAD, CINCINNATI, French MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES, EMILE BERTIN GLOIRE, and either DOUGAY TROUIN, or JEAN D'ARC.

3. In addition the British battleship MALAYA may become available for the later stages of ANVIL if then required depending upon the future requirements and casualties of NEPTUNE.

T.O.O. 251640
End

CM-IN-21766 (26 Jul 44)

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Signature- RHP

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Number: COSMED 156

25 July 1944

Page TWO

221944 is Enclosure A to CCS 621

MEDCOS 152 is CM-IN-1612 (3 July 44) CCS

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

ACTION: CC/S
INFO : Admiral Leahy
General Arnold
General Handy
General Bissell
Admiral King
Mr. Stimson
C of S

CM-IN-21766 (26 Jul 44)

1721Z

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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20 July 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff
To : Joint Staff Mission
Info: SHAEF and AFHQ
No : CCS (W) 184

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 162.

In view of General Wilson's anxiety that best possible threat be mounted against Biscay Coast we consider that despite difficulties enumerated in COSMED 150 and SHAEF's No. S 55814, Combined Chiefs of Staff should instruct SHAEF to do best he can to meet General Wilson's requirements without detriment to his own plans.

T.O.O. 201722Z

End

COSMED 150 is CM-IN-13971 (17 Jul 44) CCS
55814 is CM-IN-16557 (20 Jul 44) CCS
MEDCOS 162 is CM-IN-15733 (19 Jul 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS
INFO : Adm. Leahy
General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
C of S

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RAH*

CM-IN-17050 (21 Jul 44) 0145Z vdb

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: A.F.H.Q. ALGIERS

To : WAR OFFICE London for DP MOV

Rptd: BAS WASHINGTON for DD MOV (OP3)
AFHQ ADV CP

No : FX 69161

BIGOT. ANVIL.

Signed Wilson cite FBQDM

Ref War Office 57217 QM 2 of 4 July not to A.F.H.Q.
Adv CP.

ONE Our total requirements for personnel shipping in
Mediterranean for ANVIL and internal housekeeping are as
detailed in PSTO (MED) agreed signal to D of ST 021147.

TWO They are special assault shipping expected as follows.

- (A) 6 APA's times unknown EX U.K.
- (B) 6 XAP STANTON LYON NIGHTINGALE plus three unknown
EX U.K.
- (C) 7 LSI(L) WINCHESTER CASTLE CIRCASSIA DERBYSHIRE
DUNERA SOBIESKI KEREN DILWARA
Cosmed 137 refers.
- (D) 1 LSP ASCANIA
- (E) 7 AKA ANDROMEDA ARCTURUS BETELGEUSE CEPHEUS
OBERON PROCYON plus one EX U.K. name unknown.
- (F) 2 LSI(M) PRINCESS BEATRIX ROYAL SCOTSMAN.

THREE Personnel shipping for immediate follow up is required
as follows. Read (A) Port (B) Number of ships (C) Lift
(D) Date embarkation.

(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
ORAN	2	4000	D-7
NAPLES	4	8000	D-6
HEEL	7	14000	D-7

CM-IN-16669

(20 July 44)

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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Number: FX 69161

Page 2

Consider vessels should be available at port of loading minimum 4 days before embarkation. Total requirement 26000 of which we have been allocated 10000 EX UFG 12. These U.S. vessels are expected to leave MED in GUF 13.

FOUR Subsequent to assault and immediate follow ups a lift of 16000 is required every ten days commencing D plus 12. Loading Area NAPLES and ORAN.

FIVE. In the above figures for ANVIL personnel shipping and assault shipping allowance has been made for fact that 6 LSI(L) will not now be provided EX OVERLORD.

SIX Apart from ANVIL build up and subject final approval C in C MED hope to meet our August internal MED requirements with VILLE D'ORAN and slow ships in WEST MED XIF 20 (12000) Max ex EASTERNMED only. As far as we can foresee a total lift of 15000 in east and west MED plus our local ships will suffice in September.

SEVEN Agreed.

T.O.O. Nil

^{End}
FOOTNOTE: See CM-IN-6265 (8 July 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
C of S

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-16669

(20 July 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From : A.F.H.Q. (Signed Wilson)

To : British C.O.S.

Rptd : U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff
H.Q M.A.A.F.
C-in-C Med. Naples
A.F.H.Q. Adv. C.P.

18 July 1944

Nbr : MEDCOS 162 FX 73520

Realise that there will be great difficulties involved in mounting a convincing threat against Biscay and that only limited results can be expected from such a threat. Nevertheless it is felt that the assistance this threat might give will more than justify the effort involved. Request therefore that you strongly recommend to the C.C.S. that a threat be made against the Biscay area in support of ANVIL.

T.O.O. 182025Q

End

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SM 522-71

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-IN-15733

(19 Jul 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FROM: British Chiefs of Staff

TO : S.H.A.E.F.

INFO: J.S.M., Washington
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
A.F.H.Q.,
A.F.H.Q. ADV. CP.

NR : OZ 3789

17 July 1944

For SHARP from British Chiefs of Staff
Reference MEDCOS 137.

It is considered that 2 A.R.L. or L.S.E. should be
made available for operations ANVIL if they can be spared
from OVERLORD.

2. Request you will reply to MEDCOS direct to
SACMED in accordance with COSMED 139, para. 3.

T.O.O. 171800Z

MEDCOS 137 is CM-IN-12809 (16 July 44) CCS.
COSMED 139 is CM-IN-1613 (3 July 44) CCS.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm. Leahy
Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-IN-14846 (18 Jul 44) 1825Z hy

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTERS
"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
To: War Department.
CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.
CG, US Forces in European Theater of Operations,
London, England.
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy,

Nr: FX 73182.

17 July 1944.

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff, UNITY, AFHQ Adv CP. FX 73182
signed Wilson cite FHCOS and PHGCT. TOP SECRET. BIGOT ANVIL.

This is NAF 752.

Because of changes in availability of French man-
power and requirements for additional types of French units
in ANVIL troop list, the following revisions in French rearma-
ment program, COS 414/4, are recommended.

French have agreed to these recommendations: (read
in two columns. A units to be used added for maintenance
only. Column B T/O and E.)

3 GM Remount Troops, 10-97;

2 Vet Cos (SEP), 8-99;

3 Mobile Surgical Formations (50 bed surg hosp)

T/O spec; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

CM-IN-14337

(18 Jul 44)

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JCS 29-71

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RHA*

310 amvil

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[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

[REDACTED]
Page II.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: FX 73182.

17 July 1944.

1 Medical Collecting Co 8-137 S;
(MTN Div),

1 QM Pack Troop, 10-118.

(Column A, Units to be added for initial equipment
and maintenance. Column B, T/O and E).

1 Photo Interpretations Sec Spec T/O;
(10 units),

2 HQ/HQ Btry AAA Brig, 44-10-1;

1 HQ/HQ Btry AAA Gp, 44-12;

2 AAA Operations deta, 44-7;

1 Tank Destroyer Bn 18-25;
(SP)

1 Ordnance Armament Maintenance Bn,
9-315;

3 HQ/HQ Co Replacement Depot,
20-42;

20 HQ/HQ Det Replacement Bn,
20-46;

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(18 Jul 44)
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PRIORITY

[REDACTED]
Page III.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: FX 73182.

17 July 1944.

60 Replacement COS, 20-47;

(Column A, Units to be deleted. Column B, T/O
and E.)

2 Engr WS Co, 5-67;

2 Engr FF Plat, 5-500;

1 Engr Camouflage Co, 5-297;

3 Tank Transporter Co, spec T/O;

1 Ord Motor Vehicle Assembly Co,
9-348;

80 Fruehauf Tractor Trailers, nil.

In view of limited time available in which units
can be prepared for combat, request this matter be expedited.

End.

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Adm Leahy, Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell, Gen Bissell,
Adm King, Log, OPD

CM-IN-14337 (18 Jul 44) 0232Z

ekk

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URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post
Caserta, Italy

To : War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England
CG, U.S. Army Forces in the European Theater of
Operations, London, England
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. BX 13969 NAF 720, 16 July 1944

BX 13969 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and
to USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff repeated to AFHQ, AAI
and SHAEP for information signed Wilson cite FHQS. This
is NAF 720. BIGOT ANVIL.

In view of the withdrawal of troops for ANVIL, it is
essential to strengthen the forces in Italy under the command
of General Alexander in every possible way.

From recent experience it is clear that the Italian
Corps of Liberation is fighting well and that Italian troops
can be relied upon to provide a considerable contribution
towards the forces of the United Nations actively engaged
against the enemy.

I would therefore request that the previous decision
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to issue combat equip-
ment to units of the Italian Army should be reconsidered.

I understand that the British Chiefs of Staff are
prepared to make available gradually British combat equipment
sufficient for three Italian divisions, of which sufficient

CM-IN-13260 (16 Jul 44)

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3/0 Anvil
300 Italy

WAR DEPARTMENT
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(Page 2)

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post
Caserta, Italy
No. BX 13969 NAF 720, 16 June 1944

for one division could arrive in this Theatre towards the end of August. I would propose that this equipment should be used to reequip the Italian Corps of Liberation as the Italian equipment they are now using is rapidly becoming unserviceable. Later echelons of equipment should be used to convert two Italian divisions previously earmarked for internal security into active divisions.

On further consideration of the requirements in Italy, bearing in mind the need to rearm three Italian divisions and the fact that it is hoped shortly to advance into the populated area of the Po Valley, I consider that the total figure for the Italian Armed Forces, Army, Navy, and Air, should be raised from 444300 as recommended in my NAF 694 of 14 June to 470000 with the provision that this figure should not be considered immutable. I should like to be in a position to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff revisions up or down in keeping with the changes in the general situation.

Further, I am of the opinion that if Italian troops are to be kept in a proper state of discipline and esprit de corps, a reasonable scale of necessities such as boots, mending material, soap, razor blades etc should be authorized.

End

NOTE: NAF 694 is CM-IN-12066 (15 Jun 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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CM-IN-13260

(16 Jul 44)

1902Z bem

Date- DEC 7 1971

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From: AFHQ Adv CP
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Info: Britman Washington for
US Joint Chiefs of Staff
and AFHQ and Unity London.
Nr: MEDCOS 137

BIGOT ANVIL

Signed Wilson cite FHGOS this is MEDCOS 137. BIGOT
ANVIL.

I am anxious about the repair facilities available for the many small craft and IST taking part in ANVIL which will of necessity operate for some time out of touch with any of my established repair bases. The only available repair ship which could at present be used to supplement the repair facilities in the forward area is one US ARL.

In view of the fact that small craft in the Channel are within comparatively easy steaming distance of British bases, I request that you will consider whether it would be possible to release two ARL or LSE to me for ANVIL.

It would not be essential for these ships to arrive before the assault. They would be of great value at any time, though from our point of view of course the sooner they could be spared the better.

End
T.O.O. 15152'B

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold Adm King
OPD CofS
CM-IN-12809 (16 Jul 44) 0416Z bjm

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FROM: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

TO: War Department
CG US Forces in European Theater of Operations
London, England
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
CG, Supreme Hqs Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

NO: BX 13803

15 July 1944

There follows NAF 718X to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, UNITY,
HQ MAAF Rear, CINC MED Naples, AFHQ. Cite FRGCT. BIGOT
ANVIL BX 13803 signed Wilson.

This is monthly progress report of operations in
the Mediterranean Theatre from 16th June to 15th July 1944.

1. The offensive in Italy is continuing satisfactorily
in spite of the withdrawal of certain units that are to
participate in operation ANVIL.

2. British Colonial, Brazilian and US combat troops
are arriving or are shortly to arrive in Italy. These
troops will be used to replace French and American formations
withdrawn for ANVIL. Fifth Army, however, will be lacking
in certain combat and service troops badly needed for the
continuance of its offensive. One tired British Division
in Italy is being replaced by a refitted British Division
from the Mideast. The French Division which took part in
the recent operation on Elba has been withdrawn to Corsica
in preparation for ANVIL.

CM-IN-12733

(16 July 44)

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Page 2

FROM: CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
NO: BX 13803 15 July 1944

Training and mounting arrangements for operation ANVIL are being carried forward rapidly to meet the target date. Most of the ANVIL assault and immediate follow up formations have arrived in the mounting areas and are now being refitted and undergoing the final phases of their training for ANVIL.

4. A satisfactory solution for the nomination and training of ancillary troops for ANVIL has been reached. Administrative planning for the operation is almost complete. There are a few items still outstanding but most of these items, such as bridging material, will be required for the advance inland rather than the initial assault and operations to capture major ports. Therefore little difficulty is anticipated in securing the outstanding items now in short supply before their use becomes essential to the operation.

5. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces flew over 41,000 sorties during the period, attacking vital targets in France, Italy, Germany, Hungary and the Balkans. The main effort was directed against Germany's oil resources and installations with excellent results reported. The other strategic targets bombed were communication centers, steel works, airdromes, viaducts, harbors, Naval bases and industrial areas. Tactical and Coastal Air Forces struck at shipping off the southern coast of France, the Ligurian Sea, and in the Adriatic, and supported the Italian battle front by bombing communications, gun positions, motor convoys, etc.

End

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, C of S.
CM-IN-12733 (16 July 44) 0224Z smd

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PRIORITY

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

To: War Department
CG, Allied Force Hqs, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: FWD 12401 15 July 1944

To AFHQ for action for information to AGWAR for
Combined Chiefs of Staff, ANCXF, EXFOR Rear, FUSAG from
SHAEP forward FWD 12401 signed Eisenhower, cite SHOCT,
TOP SECRET.

FX69883, paragraph four, of 8th July. Reply is
as follows. Inclusion of Nievre is an error. For Nievre
substitute Saone Et Loire. Your comment A. Identical
limitations apply this theatre. Best use will have to
be made of available resources by mutual agreement as
operations develop. Your comment B. Agreed.

End

69883 is CM-IN-6466 (8 July 44) Gen MacFarland

ACTION: Gen MacFarland

INFORMATION: Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Adm King
CofS

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY ~~SR~~ , DATE JAN 30 1974

CM-IN-12892 (16 Jul 44) 0802Z pa

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"I" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post
Caserta, Italy

To: War Department

Re: BX 13803 15 July 1944

Here follows MAF 718X to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff, UNITY,
HQ MAAF Rear, CINC MED Naples, AFHQ. Cite FHQCT. TOPSEC
BIGOT ANVIL. BX 13803 signed Wilson.

This is monthly progress report of operations in the
Mediterranean Theater from 16th June to 15th July 1944.

Para 1. The offensive in Italy is continuing satisfactory
in spite of withdrawal of certain units that are to participate
in operation ANVIL.

Para 2. British Colonial, Brazilian and US combat
troops are arriving or are shortly to arrive in Italy. These
troops will be used to replace French and American formations
withdrawn for ANVIL. Fifth Army, however, will be lacking in
certain combat and service troops badly needed for the
continuance of its offensive. One tired British Division in Italy
is being replaced by a refitted British Division from the Mid-
east. The French Division which took part in the recent operation
on Elba has been withdrawn to Corsica in preparation for ANVIL.

Para 3. Training and mounting arrangements for operation
ANVIL are being carried forward rapidly to meet the target date.
Most of the ANVIL assault and immediate follow up formation
have arrived in the mounting areas and are now being refitted
and undergoing the final phases of their training for ANVIL.

CM-IN-15893 (19 Jul 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971 33

Signature: *RAP*

310 Annul

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Page 2

From: CG Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post
Caserta, Italy

Nr: BX 13803 15 July 1944

Para 4. A satisfactory solution for the nomination and training of ancillary troops for ANVIL has been reached. Administrative planning for the operation is almost complete. There are a few items still outstanding but most of these items, such as bridging material, will be required for the advance inland rather than the initial assault and operations to capture major ports. Therefore little difficulty is anticipated in securing the outstanding items now in short supply before their use becomes essential to the operation.

Para 5. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces flew over 41,000 sorties during the period, attacking vital targets in France, Italy, Germany, Hungary and the Balkans. The main effort was directed against Germany's oil resources and installations with excellent results reported. Other strategic targets bombed were communication centers, steel works, airdromes, viaducts, harbors, naval bases and industrial areas. Tactical and Coastal Air Forces struck at shipping off the southern coast of France, the Ligurian Sea, and in the Adriatic, and supported the Italian battle front by bombing communications, gun positions, motor convoys, etc.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Adm Leahy
Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

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Date- DEC 7 1971

CM-IN-15893 (19 Jul 44) 2307Z

ejm Signature: RHP

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URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command
Post, Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in the European Theater of
Operations, London, England
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No. BX 13842 NAF 719 15 July 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and USFOR
for British Chiefs of Staff repeated SHAEF and AFHQ for
information BX 13842 signed Wilson cite FHCOS, TOPSEC
BIGOT ANVIL. This is NAF 719.

1. Policy regarding supplies to French Ports and
French Warships under immediate control of US and UK is
laid down in CCS 358 (revised) of 4 October 43. Direction
is now urgently required with particular reference to ANVIL
regarding responsibility for supplying ports in France,
including French Warships and Naval personnel four therein
which will not be under immediate control of US or UK.

2. ANVIL plans include supply by RH of limited
quantities of repair equipment and materials and general
stores sufficient for immediate use of restricted personnel
embodied in a port party for repair of minor war vessels.
Although it may not be intended to develop Toulon and
Marseilles as major repair bases experience has shown that
considerably larger quantities of repair equipment and mat-
erials will be required in these ports as soon as possible
after they are opened, for repair of ships damaged in oper-

CM-IN-12501 (15 Jul 44)

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Page #2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command
Post, Caserta, Italy.

No. BX 13842 NAF 719 15 July 1944

ations and which cannot be taken elsewhere without temporary
repair. Such materials and equipment should be loaded in
first supply convoy entering captured ports.

3. A directive is therefore requested defining:

A. Extent to which it is intended to supply
repair equipment and materials, ships stores and
medical stores to French Navy in its home ports.

B. Policy retarding supply of machinery, loco-
motives, structurals etc for rehabilitation of such
ports and the source of such supplies, observing
that ports will be used by French and American Armies.

4. Since it will be necessary now to prepare
demands for anticipated requirements arising immediately
after capture of ports an early decision is requested.

End.

ACTION: CG/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

CM-IN-12501 (5 Jul 44) 20032 jb

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PRIORITY

FROM: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Forward Echelon, London, England

TO: War Department
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces Caserta, Italy

NO: FWD 12378 12 July 1944

SHAEP FWD signed Eisenhower cite SHGCT July 111425
Freedom rptd AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff British
Chiefs of Staff FUSAG 21 AG Rear ANCXF ANXF FWD 12378. TOP SECRET

We hope reply paragraph 4 your FX 6883 of 8th July
1944 in approximately 2 days.

Reference paragraph 9 your proposals correspond exactly
current practice and are agreed.

Reference paragraph 10 certain resources for release
from OVERLORD had already been notified in our S 53999 of
16th June, 1944, and our S 54597 of 26th June, 1944. Only
remaining major item referred airborne resources which were
covered by our FWD 12349 of 6th July 1944.

FOOTNOTE: See CM-IN-6466 (8 Jul 44) End
Gen McFarland

ACTION: CC/S

INFO: Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Adm Leahy, Adm King, C of S

CM-IN-9636 (12 Jul 44) 1648z ekk

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BY SR DATE JAN 30 1974

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~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1944

FROM: SHAEF FORWARD

TO: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
Rptd: British Chiefs of Staff
B.A.S. Washington (For United States Chiefs of Staff)

NO: FWD 12374

Signed Eisenhower cite SHQCT.

landing ship dock

PARA 1. Have carefully reconsidered your request in MEDCOS 158 for release of second LSD for ANVIL.

PARA 2. OVERLORD build up already reduced due to damaged ferry craft. Release of two LSD would gravely reduce build up and making no allowance for casualties would leave only one LSD in NEPTUNE area.

PARA 3. Appreciate the importance of your task but suggest motor boats could be carried by other means and do not feel able to release more than one LSD already promised.

End.

T.O.O. 102127B

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 158 is CM-IN-5468 (7 Jul 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen. Arnold
Adm. Leahy
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
CofS

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SK, DATE

JAN 30 1974

CM-IN-9094 (12 Jul 44) 0248Z mk

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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8 July 1944

FROM: AFHQ (Signed Wilson)
TO: British Chiefs of Staff
RPTD: JSM Washington for US Joint Chiefs of Staff
INFO: AFHQ Adv CP Hq MAAF and SHAEF

MEDCOS 159

FX 69815

BIGOT ANVIL

Reference COSMED 139. *aug 15*

1. Anticipate date in my immediately following message will be firm target date for ANVIL.
2. Arrangements are in hand to confirm with SHAEF agreements reached between that headquarters and my representatives in London.
3. Draft Directive to Major General Patch commanding ANVIL ground forces is being prepared for transmittal to SHAEF for concurrence, it being understood that command of operation ANVIL will remain my responsibility until channel of supply can be taken over by SHAEF.
4. In the absence of further direction I am assuming that my mission in Italy is to continue an all out offensive with my remaining resources in accordance with instructions contained in COSMED 90. To this end I am issuing instructions to General Alexander to the effect that his task will continue to be the destruction of the German forces in Italy and that to accomplish this he will:

CM-IN-7104

(9 Jul 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *R.H.P.* COY' NO.

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310 Annie

Adm. Leahy

WAR DEPARTMENT
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MEDCOS 159

8 July 1944

Page Two

(A) Advance through the Appennines and seize the line of the River Po to secure the area Ravenna-Bologna-Modena to the coast covering Leghorn, bearing in mind the importance of denying to the enemy the important road center of Piacenze, should the situation permit; and thereafter

(B) Advance north of Po and secure the line Venice-Padua-Verona-Brescia.

5. Thereafter, operations will depend upon the development of the strategical situation and further instructions will be issued to General Alexander to cover any advance beyond the line mentioned in Para 4(B).

6. To take advantage of the strategical situation and to obtain the fullest value from ANVIL and/or the advance into the Po Valley, I request that the undermentioned extra resources be placed at my disposal: -

(A) Such additional British formations and units as can be made available.

(B) Two American divisions to arrive in the theater by early September to provide a theater pool for relief of tired divisions.

(C) Bridging resources already notified to permit development of operations to the line Lyon to Bordesux and also to the Ljubljana Gap.

(D) Not less than six medium bomber squadrons and six fighter bomber squadrons.

End
T.O.O. 081129B

ACTION: CC/S Gen McFarland

INFO : Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Gen Bissell, Adm King
Adm Leahy, C of S.

CM-IN-7104 (9 Jul 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
CG Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy
No: FX 69883 8 July 1944

FX 69883 signed Wilson cite FHGCT. Action SHAEF
for Eisenhower rptd AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
rptd AFHQ Adv CP [REDACTED] BIGOT ANVIL

Reference your S-55130 of 6 July in Paragraphs
1 to 10 respectively:

Para 1. Agree.

Para 2. Agree.

Para 3. Agree. Please see my FX 69283 of 6 July
and your FWD 11358 of 7 July.

Para 4. This includes Department of Nievres not
heretofore in area of SAC MED administrative responsibility
(reference your M-118 of 25 February; our 67255 of 20
March; our F 24636 of 29 March; SHAEF/G 5/ 1001 of 14 May.
If that and further extensions are intended as you indicate
in your last sentence my comments are:

A. The present scale of services to support ANVIL
is based on exploitation of up to 225 miles. Operations
beyond this point will require Engineers, truck companies,

CM-IN-6466

(8 Jul 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

URGENT

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

No: FX 69883 8 July 1944

railroad personnel, and other units, which are not available in this Theatre. This based on the present plan that further US troops other than the three American Divisions for ANVIL assault will not be removed from operations in Italy.

B. By necessity we will need from you supplemental Civil Affairs personnel, organic equipment and civil supplies.

Para 5. Agree. Copies of my directives to ANVIL Ground Task Force Commander are being forwarded to you separately.

Para 6. Agree.

Para 7. Agree.

Para 8. Agree.

Para 9. It is proposed that deception continue to be coordinated by British Chiefs of Staff through London controlling section until you assume operational control of ANVIL forces. These forces will include a small US team to plan and execute tactical deception in southern France.

Para 10. Not received as of 1200B hours 8 July is referred to cable.

FOOTNOTE: See CM-IN-4927 (7 Jul 44) Gen McFarland

ACTION: Gen McFarland

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Adm King, Adm Leahy, C of S

CM-IN-6466

(8 Jul 44)

1842Z

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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION
OF LETTERS "AMUG", TO CLASSIFICATION OF
REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces,
Caserte, Italy
British Army Staff, Washington, DC

No. FX 69816 8 July 1944

To Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff repeated
Britman Washington for United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
and to AFHQ Adv CP, Hq MAAF and SHAEP for information
FX69816 signed Wilson cite FHCIC. BIGOT ANVIL. This
MEDCOS 160.

Date to be inserted in Paragraph 1 of my immediately
preceding message is 15 August.

End.

Reference not in WDCMC files. Urgent service requesting
duplication has been sent by WDCC.

ACTION: General McFarland (CCS)
INFO: General Arnold
General Handy
General Bissell
Admiral King
Admiral Leahy
C of S

CM-IN-6289 (3 Jul 44) 1332Z vdb

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTER
"AMUG" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department

Nr: FX 69694

7 July 1944

FX 69694 from AFHQ action TROOPERS London for DP MOV
info Washington for DDMOV (OP) AFHQ ADVCP cite PHGDM.
BIGOT ANVIL [REDACTED]

Add to para 2 (F) of my FX 69161 - 6th July the
following:

1. 4 US APD already in Med.
2. Also add any small ships allotted in response
to MEDCOS 156 (FX 69001 dated 6th July) not to you but
addressed SHAEF repeated US and British COS others. Agreed
CINC MED.

End.

FOOTNOTE: FX 69001 is CM-IN-4952(7 Jul 44) CC/S
Request made for repeat of FX 69161.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, OPD, Adm King, Adm Leahy, C of S

CM-IN-6265 (8 Jul 44) 1233Z Jb
[REDACTED]

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From : Chiefs of Staff

To : A.F.H.Q.

Info : Joint Staff Mission and S.C.A.E.F.

Number: COSMED 142 7th July, 1944

Following from Chiefs of Staff. Reference MEDCOS
148.

COSMED 137 appears to restore your requirements
for immediate follow-up to 32,000 which will be met as
follows:

British	21,000
---------	--------

U. S.	11,000
-------	--------

Subsequent follow-up will be:

British	10,000
---------	--------

U.S.	6,000
------	-------

T.O.O. 071530Z

End.

COSMED 137 is CM-IN-24123 (29 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS
INFO : OPD
GEN ARNOLD
GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
ADM LEAHY
C OF S

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CM-IN-5656 (7 Jul 44) 2103Z mcs

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

RECORDING AND RECLASSIFICATION
OF LETTERS "AMUC" TO CLASSIFICATION OF
REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
To: War Department.
CG, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy.
British Army Staff, Washington, D. C.
Supreme HQ, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, Eng.
Re: FX 69389 7 July 1944

AFHQ to SHAHF for General Eisenhower from General
Wilson repeated AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, Britman
Washington for US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Headquarters MAAP,
AFHQ Advanced Command Post and CINCPAC Med Naples for informa-
tion signed Wilson cite PHCIC. This is MEDCOS number 158.
TOP SECRET BIGOT ANVIL. FX 69389.

I request that you will again consider whether it
would be possible for you to release to me for ANVIL 2 LSD
instead of 1 as at present arranged, thus giving me a total
of 3 in the Mediterranean.

2. The under water obstacles on the south coast of
France have greatly increased in recent months and as there
is no rise and fall of tide in the Mediterranean we cannot
avoid them by assaulting at low water as was done in OVER-
LORD. It is therefore intended to blast a way through them
by sending explosive motor boats ahead of the assault craft.

3. By far the most efficient way of conveying these
boats to the assault area is by LSD. A 3rd LSD will not only
contribute to the number of these boats that can be used but
will greatly simplify the organization of this difficult
operation, since it will permit each of the 3 assault forces

CM-IN-5468 (7 Jul 44)

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43

Date- DEC 7 1971

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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URGENT

Page 2

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: FX 69389

7 July 1944

to be self-contained.

4. If in the light of these considerations you can see your way to releasing another LSD it would be appreciated if it could be sent at a very early date to assist with the movements not only of the explosive boats, but also of LCM which must be effected before the assault and which are at present partially held up owing to the temporary breakdown of the only LSD at present in the Mediterranean.

5. I could release one of the LSD to you again by D plus 3 at latest.

End

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm Leahy
Log

CM-IN-5468 (7 Jul 44) 1617Z ss

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Signature- RAO

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION OF LETTER
"IVI" TO CLASSIFICATION OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Number S 55130

6 July 1944

To AFHQ for action for information Combined Chiefs
of Staff from SHAEP, S 55130, signed Eisenhower cite SHGOT.
Top Secret. BIGOT.

COSMED 90 and COSMED 139 are references.

1. Mission. As I see it the objectives of ANVIL
are:

To contain and destroy enemy forces which
might otherwise directly oppose OVERLORD.

To secure a major port in South France for
the entry of additional Allied forces.

By advancing to the north to threaten the
south flank and rear communications of enemy forces
opposing OVERLORD.

To develop lines of communication for the
support of the advancing ANVIL forces and of the
additional forces which will be introduced through
the port to reinforce the Allied Expeditionary
Forces.

CM-IN-4927

(7 Jul 44)

[REDACTED]

[Printed in Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, the War Years, III, 1976-1978.]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Number 8 55130

6 July 1944

2. Method. I feel that these objectives could be best achieved if the ANVIL forces were to secure the Marseilles area without delay and then exploit up the Rhone Valley to Lyons. Subsequent action would depend upon the progress of OVERLORD but would probably take the form of further exploitation to Dijon.

3. Command and Control. In accordance with instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is understood that you will continue to exercise operational control over the ANVIL forces after they have landed until I can assume this responsibility. This will be subject to future conferences between you and me. Arrangements for coordination of intelligence will be notified separately.

4. Administrative Responsibility. It is understood that you are prepared to accept administrative responsibility for the ANVIL forces, including Civil Affairs Administration, within the area south and east of the outer boundaries of the following departments: Doubs, Cote D'Or, Nièvre, Allier, Puy de Dome, Yantal, Avreynon, Tarn, Haute Geronne. List of administrative policies to be coordinated by SHAEF will be forwarded separately.

You should be prepared to maintain ANVIL forces operating beyond this area if SHAEF cannot do so.

5. Civil Affairs. In order to insure a uniform policy throughout France, Civil affairs operations should be carried out in accordance with the directive already

CM-IN-4927

(7 Jul 44)

13

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Number 8 55130

6 July 1944

issued by SHAEF. (SHAEF G-5/1001/14 May 1944). Subject to this directive, Civil affairs should be your responsibility until such time as administrative responsibility is transferred to SHAEF.

Responsibility for ordering and accumulating stores and personnel and for the introduction of essential supplies for the civil population within the ANVIL area of operations will remain with you. The final area of your responsibility for the introduction of civil supplies should coincide with the area of administrative responsibility delineated in paragraph 4 above.

6. Signal Communications. Details relative to signal communications between this headquarters and your headquarters, and between this headquarters and the ANVIL forces are contained in parts 1 and 2 of SHAEF Signal Instructions for NEPTUNE dated 1 February and 1 March 1944, respectively, copies of which have previously been furnished you.

7. SOE/SO. Control of resistance in the agreed area of South France will pass to SACMED at time suitable to you. SHAEF will retain responsibility for general coordination of resistance policy in France.

SHAEF intends to furnish all practicable supplies to develop resistance in Southern France in order that it may afford maximum assistance to ANVIL in conformity with

CN-IN-4927

(7 Jul 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Number S 55130

6 July 1944

your plans. As the bulk of resources for supplies are located in the United Kingdom, SHAEP will act as your agent in making the necessary supply arrangements augmented by such supply contributions as are within your power. Detailed proposals are being transmitted by separate cable.

These arrangements supersede the directive to SACMED on resistance in the South of France (S-784).

8. P.W.E. Policy of publicity and psychological warfare in the ANVIL area should be coordinated by SHAEP before promulgation.

9. Cover and Deception. Coordination of cover and deception will continue to be effected as at present by interchange of appropriate information and instructions.

10. Additional Resources. Arrangements for the despatch of additional resources from OVERLORD to assist ANVIL will be transmitted by separate cable.

End

*Being serviced.

ACTION: Gen McFarland

INFO: Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Adm. King, Adm Leahy,
C of S

OM-IN-4927

(7 Jul 44)

0155Z

smd

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

BIGOT

ANVIL

6 July 1944

From: AFHQ

To : SHAEP for action

Rptd: British Chiefs of Staff

Rptd J.S.M. Washington for
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,
AFHQ Adv CP, CG 7th Army for information.

MEDCOG 156

FX 69001

Signed Wilson cite PHDSC

Detailed planning shows that additional Ranger landings will be necessary to take out the batteries on the islands and headlands which overlook the western beaches.

There are insufficient ships of the right type at present available for such operations and I therefore request that two L.S.I. (S) and two L.S.I. (M) may be made available and sailed to reach the central Mediterranean not later than first August. Consequent upon the decision to increase the size of the ANVIL assault to three divisions the assault area is now extended to the westward.

End
T.O.O. 061335B

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
Adm Leahy
C of S

CM-IN-4952 (7 Jul 44) 0218Z jb

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: AFHQ signed Wilson, cite PHCOS
To: SHAEP
Rptd: British Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Staff Mission, Washington,
for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
A.F.H.Q. Adv. CP.
Nr: FX 68506 5 July 1944

Reference your S 54970 dated 3 July 1944.

1. I fully appreciate the point stressed in your para. 1 and consider that a strong threat to the Biscay Coast will be the one effective way of containing German divisions in south France away from OVERLORD area without strengthening opposition to ANVIL.

2. I am asking British Chiefs of Staff to give you full details of our new FERDINAND plan which includes threat to Genoa as cover for ANVIL and continuance of general threat to Balkan area to assist OVERLORD.

End

T.O.O. 051309B

Reference is CM-IN-2364 (3 Jul 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold Adm King
Gen Handy Adm Leahy
Gen Bissell Cors

CM-IN-4624 (6 Jul 44) 1529Z bjm

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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To: Chiefs of Staff
Info: J.S.M. Washington for
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
for Action.
SHAEP and AFHQ ADV CP.
From: A.F.H.Q.
Nr: MEDCOS 155 5 July 1944

Signed Wilson cite FX 68557 5th July.

1. In view of SHAEP'S S 54970 of 3rd July. I should welcome early guidance as to overall deception policy now that BODYGUARD has run its course.
2. In this an urgent need will be to contain German forces away from the ANVIL assault area and for this purpose I recommend the inclusion of a strong threat to the Biscay coast to exact its maximum effect immediately before D day.
3. Pending a successor to BODYGUARD I have approved a new internal Mediterranean Plan FERDINAND to start on July 7th since urgent cover is required both for ANVIL preparations and for AAIS assault on the Appennine position. Plan provides for immediate threat to Genoa while keeping alive general threat to Balkan area.
4. Details of Plan FERDINAND are in hands of London Controlling Section and I should be glad if General Eisenhower could be kept fully informed. It would also be useful to us to know details of current SHAEP deception plans.

S 54970 is CM-IN-2364 (3 Jul 44) CC/S T.O.O. 051307B

ACTION: CC/S

End

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell

Adm King
Adm Leahy
Cofs

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CM-IN-4623 (6 July 44)

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Date-DEC 7 1971

Signature- RAP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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To: SHARP for General Eisenhower for action.
Rptd: British Chiefs of Staff J.S.M. Washington for
U.S. Chiefs of Staff AFHQ ADV CMD Post Commanding
General Seventh Army.
From: AFHQ
Nr: MEDCOS 154 5 July 1944

Signed Wilson cite FHCIO.

1. I am delighted that a firm decision has now been made as to the operation we are to carry out in this theater.
2. Request confirmation that the 48 DD equipped Sherman tanks were shipped on the APAS on 3 July with destination Naples, arriving there about 14 July, as indicated in your S-54763 of 29 June. Also request earliest information regarding decision to divert 12 motor carriage M 12-155 millimeter gun from the U.S. to MTO for ANVIL as set out by you in your above mentioned cable.
3. I am concerned, of course, about the amount of airborne lift which you are prepared to make available to me. I consider it essential that I am given an adequate lift to carry out the airborne operations now planned. Such operations are essential to secure the high ground behind the beaches and to block the movement of enemy reserves in the assault area. I am convinced that the successful accomplishment of this task will ensure the quick advance of the assault force forward from the beaches thus accelerating the ultimate encirclement of Toulon. I require two wings totalling not less than 384 operational aircraft in addition to those at present in the Mediterranean, to be able to carry out these airborne operations which involve the employment of all airborne troops in this theater. I would stress the strong desirability that as many as possible should arrive by 25 July since the maintenance aspect and training requirements demand that at least a proportion of the number being made available by you should be here by this date. The whole force must be collected here by not later than the first of August.

OM-IN-4622 (6 July 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

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Number MFDGOS 154

Page 2

4. The last echelon to arrive should include the personnel only of two Air Evacuation Squadrons. It is also essential that the reinforcing groups should be accompanied by the maximum scale of technical maintenance personnel that they can bring with them. Inasmuch as re-supply by air for several days is envisaged it is hoped that you will be able to send with the Troop Carrier Groups that scale of parachutes and containers that your experience in OVERLORD leads you to believe is required.

5. It is also essential that I have 225 glider pilots, preferably U.S., if I am to make full use of glider resources in this theater. This figure allows for only one pilot per glider for American WACO gliders. They must arrive in this theater at the same time as the transport aircraft.

6. Troop carrier resources made available to this theater by you can be released for return to U.K. approximately D plus 10 if necessary although retention beyond this date would greatly facilitate dropping of French parachute troops to support Resistance Movement in Massif Centrale area.

7. I am not including any naval resources in this telegram since it appears that detailed arrangements for these are now in hand through naval channels.

8. When the full support necessary for ANVIL has been allotted, the Tactical Air Forces now in this theater are inadequate to provide proper air support on two fronts. This is particularly the case in regard to medium bombers and fighter bombers. Recommendations for meeting this deficiency will be forwarded separately.

S 54763 not identified by WD CMJ. T.O.O. 051528B

End

ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell

Aim King
Aim Leahy
CofS

CM-IN-4622 (6 July 44)

1526Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.

To: War Department
CG US Army Forces, Caserta, Italy.
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: S 54970 3 July 1944

From SHAEF, S 54970, to AFHQ for info AMSSO for
British Chiefs of Staff Britman Washington for US Chiefs
of Staff, FREEDOM ADV CP signed Eisenhower cite SHGCT
TOP SECRET BIGOT.

Medcos 146 paragraphs 3 and 4 dated 28 June, 1944.

Appreciate object ANVIL is to assist OVERLORD and
desirability avoiding action resulting strengthening enemy
opposition ANVIL assault. Nevertheless consider essential
German Divisions in South France outside immediate ANVIL
area should be contained away from OVERLORD area. Also hope
you do not propose that all threats to Balkan Area should
lapse.

Request further details of your proposed plan for
containing enemy away from OVERLORD after ZEPPELIN has been
terminated.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : GEN ARNOLD, GEN HANDY, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING,
ADM LEAHY C of S

CM-IN-2364 (3 Jul 44) 2320Z rng

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SR, DATE JAN 30 1974 42

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~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.

To: War Department
CG US Army Forces, Caserta, Italy.
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: S 54970 3 July 1944

From SHAEF, S 54970, to AFHQ for info AMSSO for
British Chiefs of Staff Britman Washington for US Chiefs
of Staff, FREEDOM ADV CP signed Eisenhower cite SHGCT
TOP SECRET BIGOT.

Medcos 146 paragraphs 3 and 4 dated 28 June, 1944.

Appreciate object ANVIL is to assist OVERLORD and
desirability avoiding action resulting strengthening enemy
opposition ANVIL assault. Nevertheless consider essential
German Divisions in South France outside immediate ANVIL
area should be contained away from OVERLORD area. Also hope
you do not propose that all threats to Balkan Area should
lapse.

Request further details of your proposed plan for
containing enemy away from OVERLORD after ZEPPELIN has been
terminated.

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : GEN ARNOLD, GEN HANDY, GEN BISSELL, ADM KING,
ADM LEAHY C of S

CM-IN-2364 (3 Jul 44) 2320Z rng

TOP SECRET
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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY *SL*, DATE

JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

3 July 1944

FROM: Chiefs of Staff
TO: AFHQ SCAEF
RPTD: JSM Washington

COSMED 140

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff. Reference MEDCOS 151 and COSMED 139.

We consider that the size of your air borne lift can best be decided by direct consultation between yourself and SCAEF. We have invited him to communicate direct with you on the subject and to keep us informed of the outcome of your discussions.

End

T.O.O. 031645Z

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SM 522-71

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
C of S

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-2996

(4 Jul 44)

1728Z

ejm

310 Annie

41

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EMERGENCY

From: AFHQ
To: British Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: J.S.M. Washington for
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff;
HQ MAAF advance Main AAI,
SHAEP, AFHQ ADV CP
Dated: 30th June, 1944
Number: MEDCOS 151

Signed Wilson cite PHCOS FK 66414. In reply to COSMED 135.

1. I plan to use airborne forces as follows:

(A) If ANVIL is launched I propose to form a provisional airborne division from British and American airborne forces available to MTO. These forces will be dropped as far as possible simultaneously to afford immediate assistance to the assault (by?) the seizure of key communication centers and high ground in rear of the assault area. Forces dropped will not be sufficiently strong to maintain positions without relief for any appreciable period. Outline plans exist and dropping zones have been selected, but unless lift is available for equivalent of at least 2 RCTs, these plans will have to be severely curtailed and airborne forces will only play a minor part in the assault. In addition I propose to use French airborne forces available in support of the Maquis at a later date.

(B) If ANVIL is not launched I propose to use British and American airborne forces available in direct support of the battle in Italy and in this connection I have in mind their possible use to seize and hold the PO crossings in conjunction with the advance of AAI. I have not yet decided

CM-II -514

(1 July 44) Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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E M E R G E N C Y

Page 2

From: AFHQ
Date: 30th June, 1944
Number: MEDCOS 151

how best to employ French airborne forces.

2. Reference para. 5 of SCAF 54 not to AAI in which General Eisenhower stressed his need to retain an essential reserve of airborne troops for OVERLORD. Bearing in mind the manner in which ANVIL can be assisted and speeded up by the use of airborne forces it appears to me that the 2 requirements are not incompatible presumably his essential requirement is to have airborne forces with the appropriate air lift available for use at short notice until such time as the lodgement in northern France is securely established. In regard to ANVIL, adequate support by airborne forces would not only enhance the chances of success but should advance by a week or 10 days the date on which a port is secured.

3. I suggest therefore that without detriment to OVERLORD requirements, 2 additional wings of 6 groups could be sent to this theater to enable me to drop in one lift 2 RCTS. on light scale, the remainder of the provisional division being formed in this theater following in a second lift. In the event that SCAEF has an urgent need for these aircraft they could be returned to their bases in the U.K. within 72 hours. These aircraft to be fully effective should arrive by D minus 25.

4. The reason for desiring to retain one additional group after ANVIL is launched as mentioned in para. 5 of MEDCOS 133, is that I expect requirements for support to the Maquis to increase, and the extension of operations in this theater will inevitably call for increased requirements in emergency

CM-IN-514

(1 July 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971 49

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E M E R G E N C Y

Page 3

From: AFHQ
Date: 30th June, 1944
Number: MEDCOS 151

supply and air evacuation of wounded.

5. I also expect to have occasion for (the rotator) use of gliders for emergency supply and for increasing supplies to the Maquis after ANVIL is launched particularly in view of shortage of parachutes. There will be over 400 gliders in this theater when those enroute have arrived, and to make full use of them I require an additional 225 glider pilots (assuming one pilot per glider), preferably American.

T.O.O. 301530Z

End

SCAF 54 is CM-IN-21741 (27 June 44) CC/S
COSMED 135 is CM-IN-22372 (27 June 44) CC/S
MEDCOS 133 is CM-IN-21965 (27 June 44) CC/S

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
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SM 522-71

ACTION: CC/S


INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
CPD
Gen Missell
Adm King
Adm Lechy
CofS

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- 

CM-IN-514 (1 July 44) 1515Z

pa



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WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
Hq, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, Caserta, Italy

Nr: S 54746 29 June 1944

BIGOT TOPSEC from SHAEF for Wilson for information
of British Chiefs of Staff, AGWAR for US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Hq MAAF, Hq USSTAF signed Eisenhower S 54746.

With reference to MEDCOS 133. Action on this cable
is being held in abeyance pending:

A. Decision by Combined Chiefs of Staff as to
operations to be conducted in Mediterranean.

B. Decision regarding necessity for reinforcement
of Mediterranean troop carrier resources for ANVIL para 5
of SCAF 54.

End
NOTE: MEDCOS 133 is CM-IN-21965 (27 Jun 44) CC/S
SCAF 54 is CM-IN-21741 (27 Jun 44) CC/S

ACTION: JC/3
INFO: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
~~Col Park~~
Mr Stimson
Adm Leahy
C of S

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY **SK** , DATE JAN 30 1974

CM-IN-24124 (29 Jun 44) 2121Z bom

42

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

29 June 1944

From : Chiefs of Staff
To : AFHQ Algiers
Info : Joint Staff Mission
SHAEP, AFHQ
Advanced C.M.D. Post

BIGOT

COSMED 137

Following from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 134.

Since the 6 L.S.I. (L) are not essential to the assault they will not be sent. Your requirements of personnel lift for immediate and subsequent follow up will be met from Combined Resources.

Note: MEDCOS 134 is CM-IN-22573 (27 June 44) CC/S

End

T.O.O. 291100Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
~~Col Park~~
Adm Leahy
Mr Stimson
C of S

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SM522-71

Date- DEC 7 1971

CM-IN-24123

(29 June 44) Signature- *RAP*

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM		ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY	COM GR 2 11TH PHIB		PRIORITY
DATE	29 JUNE 1944	COMNAVNAV	ROUTINE
TOR CODEROM	1744	USS BAYFIELD	DEFERRED
DECODED BY	KRANING	COMTRANSDIV 5	
PARAPHRASED BY	HALE	COM 8TH PHIB	PRIORITY
ROUTED BY		CNO COMINCH ANCF	ROUTINE
		NCWTF COM 11TH PHIB	DEFERRED
		CTF 127 CTF 125	
		COMTRANSDIV 11TH PHIB	
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
290910B NCR 141			☐
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:	DATE	TIME	GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

COM GROUP 2 11TH PHIB SPEAKS. RDO ALGIERS PASS
ACTION COMNAVNAV INFO COM 8TH PHIB. CNO COMNAVEU
COMINCH ANCF NCWTF COM 11TH PHIB CTF 127
CTF 125 COMTRANSDIV 11TH PHIB COMTRANSDIV 5
USS BAYFIELD ARE ALSO INFO

REAR ADMIRAL MOON AND STAFF PLUS BAYFIELD

REPORTING THIS DATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMNAVEU

SECRET SERIAL 001308 OF 27 JUNE. RELINQUISHED

COMMAND GROUP 2 11TH PHIB AND ASSUMED COMMAND

GROUP 3 8TH PHIB

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/81)

Date- DEC 7 1971

COMINCH...COG

19...19C...200P...BUPERS...23...20P

NAVAIDE...

ACTION	
F-0	22
F-01	23
F-02	24
F-05	25
F-07	26
F-1	27
F-2	28
F-20	29
F-3	30
F-30	31
F-31	32
F-32	33
F-33	34
F-34	35
F-4	36
FX01	37
FX30	38
FX37	39
FX40	40
IG-00	41
VCNO	42

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See APL 76 (C) NAVREGS.)

OPNAV-NCR-13

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

29 June 1944

To : Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: Combined Chiefs of Staff
HQ MAAF

From: AFHQ signed Wilson

Rr : FX 66273 MEDCOS 148.

SEXTANT allocation provided initial lift in personnel ships of 32,000 for immediate follow up convoy and lift of 16,000 in subsequent follow-up convoys on a ten day cycle. Initial lift for immediate follow-up convoy will be reduced to about 26,000 if anticipated additional assault shipping is made available from OVERLORD as per cable SCAP 54, paragraph 3 dated 26th June reference S 54597. The responsibility for provision this reduced lift has been indicated by United States War Department to be 10,000 from United States sources and remainder by British in Milstaf from DDMOV and EMSF cable Quartermaster 495, dated 14th June 1944. Confirmation of this distribution is requested. It is further requested that the responsibility for provision of the 16,000 lift in subsequent follow-up convoys be determined as soon as possible.

Footnote: SCAP 54(554-97) is
CM-IN-21741 (27 Jun 44) CC/S T.O.O. 2920222 End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell
OPD, Col Park
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Adm. Leany
C of S

CM-IN-24893

(30 June 44)

1750Z

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974 COPY NO.

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: FREEDOM

To : SHAEF

Rptd: Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Staff Mission
Washington for United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,
AFHQ Adv CP and HQ MAAF for info signed Wilson cite
FHSQS.

No : FX 65863

29 June 1944

MEDCOS No. 147 BIGOT ANVIL

One addressee of MEDCOS 133 reports that in para.
5 it states the first instrument of reinforcing aircraft
should arrive not later than D plus 35. This date should
be corrected to read D minus 35.

T.O.O. 291045Z

Note: MEDCOS 133 is CM-IN-21965 (27 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
Admiral Leahy
Mr. Stimson
C of S

CM-IN-24153

(29 Jun 44)

2213Z

ejv

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974 41

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: S 54597 SCAF 54, 26 June 1944

S 54597 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and
to AFHQ for information to Wilson from Eisenhower. TOPSEC
BIGOT. This is SCAF 54.

Para 1. Reference MEDCOS 131, my comments are as
follows.

Para 2. It is noted that General Wilson is prepared
to carry out ANVIL provided he receives in time the assault
ships and craft mentioned in his paragraph 7. I attach
such importance to the early launching of ANVIL that I am
prepared to do my utmost to insure its success. Admiral
Ramsay and General Montgomery share my conviction with re-
gard to the importance of ANVIL.

Para 3. I have reexamined the situation since the
subsidence of the recent storm, and consulted my Commanders
in Chief, and I am now prepared to release from OVERLORD the
ships and craft mentioned in General Wilson's paragraph 7.
In addition, we are in a position to release a further 12
LCT (R), making 24 LCT (R) in all.

Para 4. Storm conditions have materially delayed
our buildup on the continent, and, in particular, have
affected the arrival of tactical vehicles. Consequently,
I am most anxious to retain the 24 LST's until the latest

CM-IN-21741 (27 Jun 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1954-1955]

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INCOMING MESSAGE
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
Nr: S 54597 SCAP 54, 26 June 1944

possible moment in order to make up for this delay, as the withdrawal of these LST's is equivalent to the loss of about 440 vehicles a day. General Wilson's representatives are firm in their estimate that August 15 is the earliest possible time on which operation ANVIL can be mounted. In view of this fact, I recommend that the 24 LST's from here for ANVIL sail from UK on July 15 as this will allow them to arrive in Mediterranean ports in time to meet AFHQ requirements for an ANVIL on August 15.

Para 5. As regards troop carrier resources, I note that General Wilson is prepared to carry out ANVIL with the troop carrier resources now available to him. He believes that the additional lift of 2 wings would materially enhance his chances of success and would speed up operations, but does not consider it essential. I am convinced, as stated in my S 54425, that airborne troops are an essential reserve for OVERLORD, and that it would be unwise at this stage of the OVERLORD battle to commit a large proportion of our airborne lift to the Mediterranean until we are securely established in our lodgement area as our plans contemplate repeated employment of large airborne forces. Consequently, I would be extremely reluctant to release the 416 aircraft included in the 2 wings which General Wilson desires unless this were essential for the success of ANVIL. If it should later appear that these aircraft are essential, they must go of course, and we will adjust our plans accordingly. It is understood in this case that they would reach the Mediterranean area by August 1st and would be released therefrom by August 20th.

Para 6. As regards warships, we are prepared to release the following from OVERLORD:

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
Nr: 3 54597 SCAF 54, 26 June 1944

Battleships, 3;
cruisers, 12;
fleet destroyers, 21.

No escorts or mine sweepers can be released at present.

Para 7. In addition to the above, by direct arrangement with the representatives of AFHQ, efforts are being made to release a number of DD tanks, 12, 155 self propelled guns M 12 for reducing seawalls and certain other facilities which will contribute to increasing the power of the assault.

Para 8. All of the above, I repeat, will entail certain sacrifices to OVERLORD, but these will be made gladly because we are convinced of the transcendent importance of ANVIL.

End

Note: MEDCOS 131 is CM-IN-20637 (25 Jun 44) CC/S
S-54425 is CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S
INFO : General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
Mr. Stimson
C of S

CM-IN-21741 (27 Jun 44) 0155Z ejv

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1954-1955]

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

To: Joint Staff Mission.

From: Chiefs of Staff

No: C.O.S. (W) 130.

25 June 1944.

Following from Chiefs of Staff C.O.S.(W) 130.

Reference J.S.M. 111 and 112.

1. At the present stage of the war in Europe our view of the overall strategic concept is to engage the enemy on the largest scale with the greatest violence and continuity. Only in this way can we expect to bring about his earliest collapse.

2. We agree with the views expressed in paragraph 3 of J.S.M. 111, namely:-

- (a) That the essential requirement is the support of OVERLORD and the earliest possible exploitation of the successes which it has already obtained, and
- (b) That this demands a rapid concentration of the maximum forces against the enemy in France. We would add that "enemy in France" means to us those enemy forces in France which are or may be opposed to the OVERLORD operations.

3. We are not, however, convinced that this can only be achieved by the seizing of another major port in France.

4. We are convinced that the Allied forces in the Mediterranean can best assist OVERLORD by completing the destruction of the German forces with which they are now in contact and by continuing to engage, in maximum strength, all German reinforcements deployed to oppose their advance.

CM-IN-22281

(27 Jun 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

Any compromising of the prospects of the destruction of the enemy armies in Italy at this critical phase in the war, without a compensation in the early destruction of equal forces elsewhere, would, in our opinion, be wrong. We think that this view accords with the spirit of paragraph 3 of the Combined Chiefs of Staff telegram to Generals Wilson and Eisenhower (3116 of 14th June).

5. General Wilson stated in paragraph 5 of MEDCOS 131 of 24th June that "In order to attain a target date (for ANVIL) of 15th August, it will be necessary to begin withdrawing additional resources from General Alexander on 28th June. This will affect his capacity to continue the battle in Italy". The immediate withdrawal of forces from Italy to achieve an ANVIL date of even 15th August is unacceptable to us. A target date of 1st August is clearly unattainable.

6. Even if ANVIL is postponed until the end of August, the withdrawal of additional resources from General Alexander would almost certainly prejudice operations for the destruction of the German forces in Italy. Moreover General Wilson states in MEDCOS 131, that "If ANVIL is to be carried out it should be launched on the 15th August, and certainly not later than 20th August" on account of the weather.

7. Apart altogether from whether it would be right or wrong strategy, we have considered whether an ANVIL could be launched on the 20th August with a good prospect of success while leaving General Alexander sufficient forces to maintain pressure on the enemy in Italy. We think that the mounting of ANVIL on a scale likely to achieve a success would hamstring General Alexander's remaining forces to such an extent that any further activity would be limited to something very modest. Moreover, we gravely doubt the suggestion in J.S.M. 112 that

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3

there are sufficient air resources in the Mediterranean to give simultaneously to an ANVIL and to operations in Italy that degree of support which has proved to be necessary, if rapid progress on land is to be made.

8. General Eisenhower has stressed the paramount importance of the campaign in France, but in view of paragraph 5 (d) of SCAF 53, regarding the setbacks occasioned by the recently adverse weather at the beach-heads and the losses which we are now suffering from the new German mine, we seriously doubt whether it would be wise for General Eisenhower to release the landing craft which he has earmarked for ANVIL.

9. We therefore strongly recommend the adoption of Alternative (B) at the end of General Eisenhower's telegram SCAF 53, namely, that some or all of the French and American divisions earmarked for ANVIL should be made available for OVERLORD as soon as shipping and port capacity permit their transportation and maintenance in the battle area.

10. In making this recommendation, we agree that the governing factor may prove to be the port capacity in the OVERLORD area; but by the end of September, General Eisenhower ought to be in possession of a number of ports, areas of sheltered water, and small harbours on the coasts of Brittany, many of which should be capable of rapid development. We cannot help being impressed by the use now being made of Port-en-Bassin, Courseulles and Ouistreham, aggregating with the use of landing craft a potential discharge of say 4,000 tons a day, none of which was allowed for in our original calculations.

11. Provided General Eisenhower can retain the full use of all available landing craft and assault shipping now at his disposal, we see no reason why the port capacity

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in that part of France should not permit a concentration against the enemy of all forces that can be made available and shipped to the OVERLORD area, including such American and French forces as the Mediterranean may yield.

12. We are anxious to reap the maximum benefit from the activities of the Maquis in the Rhone Valley, and recommend an increase in the scale of delivery of airborne supplies. When he reaches Northern Italy, General Alexander may be able to extend a hand in this direction, along the coastal road, using any French divisions that are left to him. General Wilson should also emphasize the threat of an amphibious assault on the South coast of France, so as to contain German divisions in this area.

13. To sum up, the best way, in our view of helping OVERLORD with our Mediterranean forces, is to pin down, and where possible, destroy the maximum number of German divisions. We are strongly of the opinion that, in this way, we shall achieve far better results by following up our successes in Italy than by the slow development of yet another bridgehead, for which we shall have to draw well in advance, and to their detriment, on our victorious armies in Italy. It seems to us that the Germans must divert more divisions to defend Northern Italy than to stem an advance up the Rhone Valley, which will be too late to threaten anything this summer.

14. We recommend that:-

- (a) We should continue to give absolute priority to the support of OVERLORD and to the exploitation of the successes which it has already attained.

CM-IN-22281

(27 Jun 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 5

- (b) General Eisenhower should retain all the landing craft he needs to undertake further amphibious assaults, and to develop the intake capacity of the coastline as he captures it, and should have the first call on all divisions which can be received from all quarters from which they can be found.
- (c) General Wilson should direct General Alexander to continue to develop the full power of his offensive in Italy with the object of engaging and destroying all German forces opposed to him.
- (d) General Wilson should do everything possible to emphasize the threat of an assault on the South coast of France, and to prepare to send General Eisenhower one or more American divisions and/or all the French divisions which General Eisenhower is capable of receiving and which our shipping resources will permit us to transport.

T.O.O. 262110Z

End.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm. Leahy, Adm. King,
Col Park, Mr. Stimson, C of S.

CM-IN-22281

(27 Jun 44)

1932Z

mlm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: AFHQ

TO : British Chiefs of Staff

INFO: J.S.M. Washington for U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff,
UNITY; Troopers for General Gammell; A.F.H.Q. ADVOP
cite FHCOS, signed Wilson

NR : MEDCOS 132

26 June 1944

Reference first sentence of para. 2 of MEDCOS 131.

In case there should be any misunderstanding I should point out that this sentence refers only to assault shipping and craft. Additional requirements of Naval combattant ships remain as stated in CINC MEDS 221944* to Admiralty. ✓

End.

T.O.O. 261257B

* COS (W) 128.

MEDCOS 131 is CM-IN-20637 (20 Jun 44) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park
Mr. Stimson
C of S

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RAP*

CM-IN-21518 (26 Jun 44) 1910Z vhm

41

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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MOST IMMEDIATE
INCOMING MESSAGE

26 June 1944

FROM: Wilson cite PHCOS
TO: SHAEF for action
INFO: Air Ministry for British Chiefs of Staff,
J.S.M., Washington, for United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Hq MAAF for information.
Date: 26 June 1944

BIGOT

ANVIL

MEDCOS 133.

1. Refer para 4 of MEDCOS 131. The requirements for airborne lift in this theater in connection either with ANVIL or with the operations envisaged in paragraphs 8 - 11 of my B 12995 have been examined, on the assumption that some additional resources can be made available from the United Kingdom.

2. In general terms these requirements are as follows. As far as timing is concerned they have been considered in relation to ANVIL with a D-Day of Q plus 14. If it were decided instead to continue the offensive in Italy, these additional resources will be required considerably earlier and, in that eventuality, an immediate decision followed by the most vigorous action is essential.

- A. Airborne operations now being planned in this theatre involve the employment of the equivalent of 2 RCT's on light scales in the assault with the remainder of the division following up in a second lift. This calls for a total of 39⁴ troop carrier aircraft and 30 gliders.

CM-IN-21965

(27 Jun 44)

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Date- DEC 7 1971

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Number: MEDCOS 133

26 June 1944

Page 2

- B. There are now assigned to MAAF 3 groups in number 51 troop carrier wing, out of which the requirements of supply to the partisans absorb the best part of the effort of 1 group. Air Commander in Chief considers that to provide the lift mentioned above, together with the necessary minimum reserves, he should have at his disposal a total of not less than 8 groups. The assistance we require from outside the theatre therefore amounts to 6 groups, which are understood to be organized in the United Kingdom on Q basis of 64 aircraft each.
3. If these operations are to be undertaken by the dates contemplated we have no time to lose, and I agree with General Eaker that it is most important that you should make available at once an experienced air divisional commander and operational staff to supervise, under the direction of Commanding General, Tactical Air Force, the planning, training and mounting of the air side of the operation.
4. There are enough gliders now in or en route to this theatre to meet our requirements.
5. All reinforcing aircraft should arrive in this theatre by D-25 at the latest. The first installment, however, of which I suggest detailed composition should be settled direct by Air Commander in Chief with General Spaatz, must arrive as soon as possible, and in any event not later than D plus 35 to supplement the resources now available in this theatre for airborne training. I anticipate that it should be possible to release all reinforcing aircraft at approximately D plus 10 if necessary with the exception of at least 1 group which I consider must be retained in this theatre to meet the inevitable increased demand for air lift of all sorts once ANVIL is established.
6. The last echelon to arrive should include the personnel only of 2 air evacuation squadrons.

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Signature [Signature]

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Number: MEDCOS 133

26 June 1944

Page

7. The maintenance resources now available to Air Commander in Chief are not unlimited and it is therefore essential that the reinforcing groups should be accompanied by the maximum scale of technical maintenance personnel and equipment that they can bring with them.

8. It is only prudent to envisage re-supply by air for several days. I hope therefore you will be able to send with the troop-carrier groups that scale of parachutes and containers that your experience in OVERLORD leads you to believe is required. These items are in very short supply in this theatre and indeed are already causing me anxiety in connection with the requirements of the supply to the partisans.

9. The foregoing scales in general outline my requirements in airborne lift and accessories for operations in this theatre. They are the minimum necessary to enable me to make full use of the airborne units which are available in this theatre. And as soon as the decision on major strategic policy has been made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff I hope that it will be possible for you to meet these requirements. I am sure you will agree that all details should be arranged direct between Generals Eaker and Spatz.

End

T.O.O. 261516B

FOOTNOTE: 131 is CM-IN-20637 (25 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO: Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, SGS, Adm King, Col Park, C of S

CM-IN-21965

(27 Jun 44)

1023Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

24 June 1944

From: AFHQ (Signed Wilson)

To : British C.O.S.

Info: J.S.M. for U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff BIGOT
Unity
Troopers for General Gammell
AFHQ Adv. C.P. ANVIL

MEDCOS 131.

1. With reference to SHAEP's telegram number 54425 of 23rd June. I will not comment on the strategic considerations involved since my views were given fully in my telegram number B12995 of 19th June. There are however certain misunderstandings on which my comments are as follows.

2. I am prepared to carry out ANVIL, provided assault shipping shown in para 3 of Admiralty's message 201351 arrives in time (see para 7 below) even though this would not give me the full 3 division shore to shore vehicle lift that I have asked for in Commander in Chief Mediterranean 221944 to Admiralty. On the critical question of L.S.T.s this means that I can carry out the assault with only 24 L.S.T.s from OVERLORD, and not 50 as stated in para 4 of General Eisenhower's telegram. In my judgment operation ANVIL should not be launched with less assault shipping than that indicated above unless in the meantime there is a substantial weakening of enemy forces in Southern France. In this connection the numbers of L.S.T. with which I am now prepared to carry out the operation, and the numbers in my full demand, approximate very closely to the numbers in General Eisenhower's plans A and B respectively of P/122 which were prepared under his direction at A.F.H.Q. last December.

3. With reference to General Eisenhower's 5 B, I have never contemplated carrying out ANVIL with as assault

CM-IN-20637

(25 Jun 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

MEDCOS 131.

Page 2

24 June 1944

force such as he mentions, except under conditions approaching RANKIN. It must be borne in mind that the enemy has substantially strengthened his beach defences since the operation was first conceived. It is therefore particularly important that the operation be carried out on a wide enough front. It should also be noted that recent experience has shown the great value of L.C.T. (R) in destruction of beach defences. I feel therefore that since ANVIL is a major operation the maximum allocation of these craft up to the total requirement shown in Commander in Chief Mediterranean 221944 is most desirable.

4. With regard to General Eisenhower's para 4, on the subject of airborne lift, I am prepared to carry out ANVIL with the troop carrier resources now available to me in the theatre, but the allocation of additional lift of 2 wings would enable me to make full use of the airborne forces now at my disposal and would materially enhance my chances of success and speed up operations.

5. With regard to General Eisenhower's para 7 A, if ANVIL is to be carried out, it should be launched on 15th August and certainly not later than 20th August, since further delay will mean shorter period of summer weather and this will affect the operations of all 3 Services. I must emphasize that a decision is necessary by 27th June since in order to attain a target date of 15th August, it will be necessary to begin withdrawing additional resources from General Alexander on 28th June. This will affect his capacity to continue the battle in Italy.

6. Finally if ANVIL is not to be launched it appears that the date by which the forces referred to in General Eisenhower's para 7 B be transferred to Northern France is so far distant as to militate against the attainment of the object set out in his para 3. This transfer would pre-

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INCOMING MESSAGE

MEDCOS 131.

Page 3

24 June 1944

judice the attainment of decisive results in this theatre. It should also be noted that the 4 French divisions have proved their great value in mountain warfare.

7. The assault shipping referred to in para 3 of Admiralty message 201351 (see para 2 above) was as follows:-

6 A.P.A. 3 X.A.P. 6 L.S.I. (L)
24 L.S.T. 24 L.C.I. (L) 12 L.C.T. (R)
1 A.K.A. 1 H.Q.Ship 1 L.S.D.
1 Fighter Direction Tender (L.S.T.)

T.O.O. 242005B

End

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.
To: War Department.
CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.
Nr: S 54425 23 June 1944

S 54425 to AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff
rptd AFHQ for General Wilson from Eisenhower. This is
SCAF 53 TOPSEC BIGOT.

Reference telegram number OZ3116 of 14 June from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, conversations with representatives from AFHQ have just been completed here. For reasons which General Wilson explains in his number BL2995 of 19 June, amphibious operations against western France can not be launched in time to be of use to OVERLORD, and, therefore, can be eliminated. Likewise, General Wilson says that there is no possibility of launching any major amphibious operation in the Adriatic before September. As an alternative to ANVIL and to either of the above operations, he recommends an advance to the Ljubljana Gap and Trieste, combined with amphibious operations against Trieste at a later date.

2. The following are the factors which emerge from our conversations:

- A. OVERLORD is the decisive campaign of 1944. A stalemate in the OVERLORD area would be recognized by the world as a defeat, and the result on Russia might be far reaching.

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, III, 1943-1945]

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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

It is imperative that we concentrate our forces in direct support of the decisive area of northern France.

- B. ANVIL, with an invasion in the Bay of Biscay precluded, then provides the most direct route to northern France where the battles for the Ruhr will be fought. Moreover, ANVIL initially will contain an appreciable number of German divisions, will give us a port through which reinforcements from the US can be deployed, and will open a route for an advance to the north where these reinforcements can fight on the main battlefield of France.
- C. Assistance from the French Forces of the interior in the ANVIL area is likely to be more effective than at any other place in France.
- D. Although the port of Marseilles is less desirable than Bordeaux from the standpoint of distance from the US and proximity to the OVERLORD area, yet the time factor is so important that the Bordeaux operation can be rejected in favor of ANVIL.

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

Page 3

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

E. Our forces in Italy do not directly threaten any area vital to the enemy who, therefore, has the initiative in deciding whether or not to withdraw out of Italy.

F. An advance on Ljubljana and Trieste would probably contain a considerable amount of German strength, but there would be no guarantee that it would divert any appreciable number of German divisions from France. Neither would it give us an additional port which could be used to assist in the deployment of divisions from the US, and this we believe to be one of the most important considerations. It is believed that it would have little positive effect until 1945.

3. I, therefore, recommend ANVIL. General Wilson is fully prepared to carry out ANVIL if the decision is made to do so. This opens up another gateway into France, which, if not the best in geographical location, is the best we can hope to obtain at an early date. The possession of such a gateway I consider vital.

4. As regards the means of mounting ANVIL against the present scale of resistance, General Wilson considers that for the operation to have a reasonable chance of success,

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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

Page 4

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

he must have a lift for 3 assault divisions, shore to shore, together with 3 preloaded followup divisions, one of which will be ship to shore. This will require 50 LST's over and above the 55 now allocated. In addition, he feels he should have the lift for 1 airborne division. He now has the lift for 4 battalions in sight. Furthermore, the representatives of AFHQ state that ANVIL can not be mounted earlier than 15 August without prejudice to the destruction of German forces in Italy south of the Pisa Rimini line. Also, that in no case can ANVIL be mounted until 15 days after the arrival of the necessary additional landing craft in the Mediterranean ports.

5. With regard to the above, my comments and recommendations are as follows:

- A. France is the decisive theater. This decision was taken long ago by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In my view, the resources of Great Britain and the US will not permit us to maintain 2 major theaters in the European war, each with decisive missions.

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

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PRIORITY

Page 5

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

- B. In connection with the estimate of the additional strength required for ANVIL, while appreciating the fact that the plan and operation are the responsibility of AFHQ, I must, in view of the effect on OVERLORD, point out that up until very recently, planning for ANVIL was on the basis of a 2 to 3 division assault, 1 division of which was to be ship to shore. The present revised estimate of strength now considered necessary for a successful assault has very serious implications in that it will require additional landing ships and aircraft from OVERLORD. I recognize the fact that the static defenses in the south of France have been increased, but there is now 1 less enemy division in the ANVIL area, and I believe it can be assumed that German defensive strength in the ANVIL area is approximately equal to that which existed through the initial stages of ANVIL planning.
- C. As airborne troops are an essential reserve for OVERLORD, I am convinced that it would be most unwise to commit a large proportion of our airborne lift to the Mediterranean until we are securely established in our

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

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PRIORITY

Page 6

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

lodgement area and then only for a temporary period as our plans of operation contemplate repeated employment of large airborne forces.

- D. A very severe northerly gale lasting 3 days has caused damage to landing craft and Mulberries. Although the extent is not yet definitely known, initial estimates are that Mulberry A is more than 60% out and Mulberry B about 30% out. This has been accompanied by additional losses in all types of small landing craft. Until the weather subsides and detailed reports have been received, it is impossible to estimate what numbers of LST's could be released from OVERLORD by July 10th which is the latest date if they are to be in time for an August 15 ANVIL. As soon as the weather subsides, and the possibilities of quick recovery become apparent, we will be able to estimate with some accuracy what can be our contribution to ANVIL, and this will be covered in a subsequent message. In any event, however, it is safe to say now that it would be completely impossible for me to release the 50 LST's or equivalent which General Wilson considers necessary for his additional shore to shore lift,

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

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[REDACTED]

PRIORITY

Page 7

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S 54425

23 June 1944

and that a large proportion of these additional ships would have to be provided from other sources.

6. Estimates regarding release of resources are further complicated by the fact that subsidiary operations are now being planned which will depend upon the course of the battle. These would necessitate the use of a considerable number of landing ships and craft and their main purpose is to provide additional port capacity.

7. Since time and an early decision are the overriding factors, I recommend:

- A. That ANVIL be launched not later than 30 August and preferably by August 15th, either on the scale desired by General Wilson, assuming that the resources can be made available, or with lesser acceptable resources.
- B. That if ANVIL can not be launched by August 30th with sufficient strength to give reasonable chances of success, all French divisions, plus 1 or 2 American divisions previously allocated for ANVIL be made available for OVERLORD as soon as shipping and port capacity permit their

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44)

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PRIORITY

Page 8

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Re: S 54425

23 June 1944

transportation and maintenance in the
battle area.

End

OZ 3116 is CM-IN-11530 (14 Jun 44) CCS
B 12995 is CM-IN-16273 (20 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
CofS

CM-IN-19511 (24 Jun 44) 0703Z ss

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From : Chiefs of Staff
To : A.F.H.Q.
Rptd : J.S.M. Washington
Number: COSMED 133 23rd June, 1944

Following for General Wilson from Combined Chiefs of Staff. Reference MEDCOS 125.

The quantity of shipping indicated in your MEDCOS 125 for an amphibious operation and for August internal maintenance will be allocated from combined resources.

2. Shipping authorities have been instructed to accelerate the collection of vessels required for follow-up convoys. It is understood that sufficient shipping to meet requirements for pre-loading for an earlier target date already is available in the Mediterranean.

3. Arrangements are being made to ship the most critical items of supply from the United States as indicated by your G-4 (General Agcock), and confirmed by Commanding General Services of Supply NATOUSA with an arrival date in the theatre of approximately mid July. Other required items will be shipped as rapidly as availability permits.

T.O.O. 231410Z

End.

MEDCOS 125 is CM-IN-5657 (7 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : GEN ARNOLD, GEN SOMERVELL, OPD, GEN BISSELL,

ADM KING, COL FARR, LOG

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Date- DEC 7 1971

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

21 June 1944

From: Joint Staff Mission

To : Chiefs of Staff

J.S.M. 109

Reference OZ 3116 and SCAF 52.

United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed following text for message for despatch to SACMED by you on behalf of British Chiefs of Staff:

Begins:

1. The quantity of shipping indicated in your MEDCOS 125 for an amphibious operation and for August internal maintenance will be allocated from combined resources.
2. Shipping authorities have been instructed to accelerate the collection of vessels required for follow-up convoys. It is understood that sufficient shipping to meet requirements for pre-loading for an earlier target date already is available in the Mediterranean.
3. Arrangements are being made to ship the most critical items of supply from the U.S. as indicated by your G-4 (General Adcock), and confirmed by Commanding General, Services of Supply, NATOUSA, with an arrival date in the theater of approximately mid-July. Other required items will be shipped as rapidly as availability permits.

Ends.

End

T.O.O. 212045Z

FOOTNOTE: 3116 is CM-IN-11530 (14 Jun 44) CC/3
MEDCOS 125 is CM-IN-5657 (7 Jun 44) CC/3
SCAF 52 is CM-IN-13769 (17 Jun 44) CC/3

ACTION: CC/3

INFO : Gen Arnold, OPD, Gen Bissell, Adm King, Col Park,
C of S

CM-IN-17534 (22 Jun 44) 0251Z jb

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SM-522-71

By SR

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: ~~SECRET~~
URGENT

From: CG, Allied Force Hqs, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

To: War Department
Special Signal Officer Air Ministry, London, England.

To: CG, Allied Force Hqs, Algiers, Algeria.
CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: B-12995 19 June 1944

Following personal for General Eisenhower repeated
British Chiefs of Staff and JSM Washington for U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff from General Wilson. From AFHQ Adv Cr
FHCIC to SHAEF rptd AMSSO; Britman Washington AFHQ (B-12995)
TOPSEC BIGOT ANVIL.

1. I have now studied CCS telegram no 3116 of June
14 in conjunction with Commanders-In-Chief here and in the
light of your S.57967. I have also had an opportunity of
discussing the problems involved with General Marshall and
General Arnold.

2. General Marshall brought out clearly for the first
time a point which seems to be of paramount importance to the
whole consideration of the strategic problem, but which was
not clear to me from previous telegrams, namely that there are 50
divisions in the United States which cannot be introduced
into France as rapidly as desired or maintained there through
the ports of North West France or by staging through the
United Kingdom; and therefore if the weight of these divisions

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-6-78
BY SC . DATE JAN 30 1974

TO: ~~SECRET~~

at w/h.
Carl Park

310 arrive

~~SECRET~~

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: [REDACTED]
URGENT

~~SECRET~~

2nd Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

is to be brought to bear upon the enemy in France we must
seize another major port at an early date.

3. This seems to me to face The Combined Chiefs of Staff with a decision as to whether our strategy in the coming months is to be aimed at the defeat of Germany this year, or, while making every endeavour to defeat him this year, at ensuring his defeat in the first half of 1945. I assume from your telegram that the danger of your bridgehead being forced back into the sea is now past; and therefore that the strategy best calculated to assist in the success of OVERLORD is to produce such an effect on enemy resistance thereto that your advance eastwards through France is fast and continuous. To strike a blow which may cause the enemy to divert or withdraw divisions from France and at the same time face him with the prospect of defeat this year appears to me to be the best means of achieving this.

4. If this is a correct interpretation of the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the course of action that I would advocate from the Mediterranean angle would be a major effort on the lines of para 4 (c) of CCS telegram no-3116 aimed at presenting a threat to the enemy in a spot that he must regard as vital.

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JCS LETTER, 7-8-72
BY SE, DATE

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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URGENT

3rd Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

I deal with this fully in paragraphs 8 to 11 below.

5. I am, however, obviously in no position to judge whether from the viewpoint of European strategy as a whole this is the right answer. If it is considered essential from this viewpoint, to seize another major port, then I am convinced that our only course is to carry out operation ANVIL on the lines already planned, on which, with the additional resource which I am now led to expect, I should be confident of success.

6. I agree with you that Bordeaux operation too difficult for quick success. Moreover a shore-to-shore assault could not be launched from the Mediterranean, though I could provide the follow up forces. ANVIL carried out in the Toulon area has far greater advantages than in the Sete area where the beaches are the worst encountered in the Mediterranean and, owing to the success of our deception plans, are heavily defended compared with the Toulon area and where no deep water port is readily available. With a 3 division assault and 3 division pre-loaded follow up it should be possible to take Toulon by D plus 14, Marseilles by D plus 40 and complete the build up of 10 divisions by approximately D plus 60.

OW-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SC / RKE

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4th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters. Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

Since the resistance movement is particularly active in this area the advance up the Rhone valley, which would normally be a slow and difficult affair, should not present insuperable obstacles. If the object is to increase the rate of build up by bringing in divisions direct from the United States, there is the added advantage that Marseilles is more likely to be captured at an early stage by ANVIL than by an attempt of Sete and once cleared it has an enormous capacity. There is the further point that a successful ANVIL would virtually remove the submarine threat in the Mediterranean. A possible alternative to an advance up the Rhone would be to exploit from Marseilles in the direction of the Toulouse Gap, possibly in conjunction with an amphibious operation to seize Sete after the Marseilles area is in our hands. Such an operation would, however, involve a flank march of about 250 miles to reach Bordeaux. This would be unsound unless the course of your operations and/or the activities of the resistance movement had rendered my right flank reasonably secure.

7. There are, however, certain disadvantages in launching ANVIL.

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BY SR . DATE JAN 30 1974

CM-IN-16273 (20 June 44)

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5th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

A. It is impracticable to launch it until 15th August at the earliest without prejudicing the operations already in progress for the destruction of the enemy forces in Italy south of the Pisa-Rimini line, and although planes and preparations for ANVIL are more advanced than for any other operation it is not the earliest means in my view by which we could divert German forces if that is what you require.

B. It would involve stopping AAI in front of the Pisa Rimini line and breaking up a force which has proved itself to be a first class fighting machine and in which cooperation between ground and air has reached a exceptional and increasing degree of efficiency after months of hard work.

C. To switch the effort from Italy to ANVIL would involve Mediterranean resources in approximately 6 weeks pause in offensive operations in which the Germans would be given a breathing space and an opportunity to rest and regroup their forces.

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BY SK DATE JAN 30 1974

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(20 June 44)

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6th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

8. If, however, our proper strategic policy is that outlined in para 3 above, in my opinion the course that holds out the best chance of really decisive results in this theater is to exploit the present success in Italy through the Pisa-Rimini line across the Po and then to advance towards Southern Hungary through the Ljubljana Gap. On the assumption that the enemy does not succeed in materially reinforcing his forces in Italy, we estimate that the timing of this sequence of events might be as follows:

A. End June -Florence area reached and contact obtained with the Pisa-Rimini line.

B. Mid July -Attack from Florence area against the Pisa-Rimini line with 14 divisions towards Bologna.

C. Early August -Establish bridgehead across the Po.

D. End August -strike across the Adige and reach the line Venice-Verona.

E. During September -an advance on Trieste and the Ljubljana Gap should be undertaken, preferably in conjunction with amphibious and airborne resources might be available.

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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7th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

The stronger these are the more effective the thrust can be.

9. The timing in the later stages may be somewhat optimistic, especially since maintenance of these forces will involve the use of major ports in Northern Italy * to be re-open to full capacity. On the other hand, there is a good chance that General Alexander may succeed in jumping the Pisa-Rimini line without the necessity of staging a major operation, for which the above timetable 14 days is allowed. If this were to happen the subsequent timing would be proportionately advanced. Moreover, the success of our operations in Italy has been largely due to the efficient application of our overwhelming air power, which has been a major factor in crippling the enemy's ability to regroup and make fresh dispositions with which to check our advance. Operations northwards from the Pisa-Rimini line provide by far the best opportunities for continuing to use the full weight of our air effort to keep the enemy on the run and prevent the effective employment of the re-inforcements which our further advance will force him to bring up. The routes by which the enemy must concentrate to oppose our advance are few and difficult and should give us the same chance to disrupt his communications and isolate the battlefield which has been offered and taken with such success in our present battle.

* being svcd.

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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8th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Nr: B-12995

19 June 1944

10. As regards timing LKH in comparison with ANVIL, the essential point is that our intention will probably be clear to the enemy * "C". By early August therefore, he must either allow our offensive in Italy to develop to a point at which it constitutes a serious threat to the Danube Basin - one of his most vital areas - or bring in substantial forces to reinforce his position in Italy. I estimate that, bearing in mind the losses which the enemy will suffer in the breaking of the Pisa-Rimini line, to forestall any advance beyond the Po he would require to introduce not less than 10 new divisions into Northern Italy and even then there is no reason to suppose that he could stop the advance. On the assumption that these could not be moved from the Russian Front, they must either be brought in from the Balkans in which case collapse of Balkans and exposure of German southeast flank would follow, or they must be withdrawn from France. He might withdraw 4 divisions from the Balkans and maintain his position very precariously but the balance would probably have to come from France. Hence he would have to maintain a certain scale of defence in Southern France there should be a net diversion from the rest of France of not less than 5 divisions.

* being svcd.

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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BY SR . DATE

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9th Page.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Advance Command Post,
Caserta, Italy.

Wt: B-12995

19 June 1944

I am convinced that the strategy outlined in para 8 offers me a better prospect than any other both of withdrawing enemy forces away from OVERLORD and also of hitting the German where it is most likely to hurt. Moreover by threatening one of his most vital areas it might even prove a major factor in bringing the war in the west to an early close.

11. The plan proposed in paras 8 and 9 is well * administrative capacity of this theater and once we have secured Trieste and Venice in addition to the other ports in Northern Italy we should be well able to accept a considerable number of fresh divisions direct from the United States, should it be decided to make them available for this purpose.

12. I hope that as a result of this appreciation you will be able to make recommendations to the CCS forthwith, since a decision is most urgently required if action on either of the *

* being svcd.

End

Footnote: 3116 is CM-IN-11530 (14 June 44) CCS
5-53967 not in WDCMC files.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION:

Gen Arnold

Gen Handy

Gen Bissell

Adm King

Col Park

CorS

CM-IN-16273

(20 June 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff

To : AFHQ

Rptd: SHAKF, JSM. WASHINGTON

Nbr: OC 3116

14 June 1944

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson and General Eisenhower.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the relationship of operation OVERLORD to operations in the Mediterranean in the light of the success of DIADEM and the progress of OVERLORD. Their views are as follows:

2. The overriding necessity is to apply to the enemy, at the earliest possible moment, all our forces in the manner best calculated to assist in the success of OVERLORD.

3. The destruction of the German armed forces in Italy south of the Pisa/Rimini line must be completed. There should be no withdrawal from the battle of any Allied forces that are necessary for this purpose.

4. When the Pisa/Rimini Line has been reached, there will be three possible courses of action open to us:

- (A) An amphibious operation against south of France;
- (B) An amphibious operation against western France;
- (C) An amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic.

5. The final choice from among the three courses in the preceding paragraph cannot be made at this moment.

CM-IN-11530

(14 Jun 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Page #2

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nbr : 02 3116

14 June 1944

Which will pay us best depends on several factors, at present unknown -E.G.-

(A) The progress of OVERLORD with the forces now assigned.

(B) The direction and degree of success of the forthcoming Russian offensive,

(C) The German reactions to (A) and (B) above. The one factor common to all three courses of action is an amphibious operation, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that preparations should go forward forthwith on the greatest scale for which resources can be made available and at the earliest date.

6. As to the scale of preparations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that greater resources than at present contemplated should be allocated to these operations. They have in mind a three divisional assault to be made up from landing craft already in or detailed for the Mediterranean, such craft as General Eisenhower can release without prejudice to OVERLORD and such additional assistance as could be provided from the United States. The C.C.O.S. also propose that a total lift for at least a full airborne division should be provided.

7. As to the date of the amphibious operation, the C.C.O.S. consider that the 15th August is too late and that we should aim at being ready to launch the operation by the 25th July always provided that this does not limit the completion of the operation south of the Pisa/Rimini line.

CN-IN-11530 (14 Jun 44)

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Page #3

From: Chiefs of Staff

Nbr : 02 3116

14 June 1944

8. As to the choice of an actual plan, the C.C.O.S. would observe that they are not inclined to favour a landing in the Marseilles area because of the strength of the coast defenses and the unpredictable lines of advance up the Rhone Valley. It seems to them that the operation in France most likely to help OVERLORD would be either an initial landing at Cote designed to lead to the early capture of Bordeaux and the support of the Guerillas in the south of France, or a direct descent on the west coast of France, the object of the latter being either to open some port through which a direct build-up from the USA could be achieved or if necessary to afford direct support to the OVERLORD forces if they are not making sufficient progress.

9. It is evident that the planning and preparation of the above operations must begin forthwith, as they will require the closest co-ordination between AFHQ and SHAEF who are requested to submit their comments as a matter of urgency after mutual consultation.

T.O.O. 141050Z

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,
Col. Park, C of S

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OM-IN-11530

(14 Jun 44) 2125Z

Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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PRIORITY

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
To : War Department
CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
CG, US Forces in European Theater of Operations,
London, England

No : F 59106

14 June 1944

TOP SECRET BIGOT ANVIL. AGWAR for Operations Plans
Division, TROOPERS for Inter Services Security Board, Mideast
for G (Operations) 3, Allied Armies in Italy for GSI (B), 5th
Army for G2, Services of Supply North African Theater of
Operations United States Army for G2, Fairbanks, MAAF Caserta,
USFOR for G2. USFOR pass to TROOPERS. Balkan Air Force,
Balkan Land Force, FLAMBO, UNITY, Force 163 from G2 Freedom
signed Wilson cite FBGHI BIGOT ANVIL. F 59106.

For additional security, dates referring to operation
ANVIL will be related to Q day. Date of Q day as in immediately
following. Cancel Freedom 41050 and 41051 of 21 January 1944.

End

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO : CC/S, Gen Arnold, Gen Bissell, Adm King
Col Park, C of S

CM-IN-11403 (14 Jun 44) 1920Z jb

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BY 32, DATE

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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TO: ~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY

SECRET
TOP SECRET

From: Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To: War Department
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England
CG US Army Forces in the European Theater of Operations
London, England

Nr: F 59107

14 June 1944

F 59107. TOP SECRET BIGOT ANVIL. AGWAR for Operations Plans Division, Troopers for Inter Services Security Board, Mideast for G (Operations) 3, Allied Armies in Italy for OSI (B), 5th Army for G2, Services of Supply North African Theater of Operations United States Army for G2, FAIRBANKS, MAAF Caserta, USFOR G2. USFOR pass to TROOPERS, Balkan Air Force, Balkan Land Force, FLAMBO, UNITY, Force 163 from G2 Freedom signed Wilson cite FHGBI BIGOT ANVIL.

|| Date as in immediately preceding cable is 1 August.

End.

NOTE: Ref is CM-IN-11403 (14 Jun 44) Gen Handy

ACTION: Gen Handy

INFO: CC/S
Gen Arnold
Gen Bissell
Adm King
~~Adm Park~~
C.O.F.S.

CM-IN-11542 (14 Jun 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFERENCE BETWEEN ADMIRAL COOK AND ADMIRAL DUNCAN

13 June 1944

1304Z to 1330Z

WASHINGTON PARTIES:

ADMIRAL DUNCAN (USN)
GENERAL J. E. HULL
CAPTAIN CAMPBELL (USN)
CAPTAIN D.R. GARDNER (USN)
CAPTAIN A.H. OSWALD (USN)
GENERAL F.N. ROBERTS
COLONEL V.H. CONNOR
COLONEL C.K. GAILLEY
COLONEL C.B. MAGRUDER
COLONEL A.D. REID
COLONEL C.P. SMITH
COLONEL M.B. STOKES
LT. COL. E.B. GALLANT
MAJOR C.L. OGDEN

LONDON PARTIES:

ADMIRAL COOK
COMM. J.A. MORRISON
CAPTAIN R.P. GOOD

GEN. HULL AND ADM. COOK

W: THIS IS GENERAL HULL.

L: THIS IS ADM. COOK.

W: I HAVE HERE WITH ME, ADM. DUNCAN, CAMPBELL, GARDNER, OSWALD FROM THE NAVY, ROBERTS, STOKES, REID, MAGRUDER, CONNOR, MYSELF FOR THE ARMY AND 1 OR 2 OTHERS HERE.

L: THIS MESSAGE WAS SET UP MORE PARTICULARLY FOR THE NAVY, HANDY IS NOT HERE. LINCOLN IS HERE, ALSO GOOD AND OSBORN. NOW, SUPPOSE I TALK TO DUNCAN FIRST.

~~SECRET~~

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

E.O. 11652, Sec. (NE) and (ND) or (2)

OSD Letter, May. 4, 1975

~~SECRET~~ By SLR

Date JAN 31 1974

Col Park

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

W: THIS IS DUNCAN .

L: THE FIRST THING I WANT TO TALK ABOUT IS THE AMMUNITION FOR THESE SHIPS FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN OPERATION. WE HAVE YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SHIPMENT OF AMMUNITION ON THE MT. BAKER WHICH SEEMS TO BE OKAY EXCEPT THAT WE THINK THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME AMMUNITION SENT OVER FOR THE NEVADA WHICH WILL STILL HAVE 30 ROUNDS PER GUN, LEFT AFTER THEY FIRE, IF THEY SHOULD FIRE, AND REFILL. THEREFORE, WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO INCLUDE IN THE "MT. BAKER'S" LOAD, 500 ROUNDS OF HIGH CAPACITY AMMUNITION FOR "THE NEVADA," 14 INCH. THAT MAY TAKE SOME AWAY FROM THE PACIFIC BUT WE WILL ACCEPT THAT. ADM. KING BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION AS TO THE CONDITION AND AVAILABILITY OF THE "NEW YORK". I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU HAVE THE ANSWER ON THAT OR NOT.

W: SHE WILL BE READY IN 60 DAYS.

L: THAT WOULDN'T BE IN TIME. YOU COULDN'T GET HER READY?

W: THAT IS THE ESTIMATE THAT I HAVE. SHE IS ON A MIDSHIPMAN CRUISE RIGHT NOW, WE WOULD HAVE TO GET HER BACK.

L: YOU WOULD HAVE TO GET HER OVER HERE NOT LATER THAN 25 JULY. YOU COULDN'T DO THAT, COULD YOU?

W: THAT COULD NOT BE DONE.

L: THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME 8-INCH AMMUNITION STILL HERE, NOT LOADED ON THE CRUISERS BUT IT CAN BE MOVED DOWN IF NECESSARY ON THE NATURAL.

W: WE CAN SEND 1,000 ROUND OF 8-INCH HIGH CAPACITY AND THE REMAINDER OF 1 FILL FOR THE 3CA'S WITHOUT DISTURBING THE PACIFIC.

L: HERE IS WHAT WE HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR MOVING DOWN FROM THIS AREA TO THE MEDITERRANEAN ABOUT 1 JULY. 24 LST'S; 6 APA'S; 3 XAP'S; 1 HAA, THE HAXENOR, AND POSSIBLY 6 BRITISH

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

ELUS

A O 11652 Sec. A(E) and A(D) as (L)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 31 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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Page 3

~~SECRET~~

LST'S; 24 LCRL'S; NO LCT'S; 9 LCTR'S (THAT IS THE LCT
FITTED UP AS ROCKET SHIPS); 1 LSD, THAT IS THE BRITISH LSD;
AND 1 FIGHTER DIRECTION SHIP WHICH IS A BRITISH MANNED
CONVERTED INVERTED LST. THE QUESTION NOW THAT I WANTED TO
TAKE UP WITH YOU IS--HOW MANY LCT'S CAN BE SHIPPED TO THE
MEDITERRANEAN TO ARRIVE BY JULY 20? WE DON'T KNOW JUST HOW
MANY THEY WANT BUT WE KNOW THERE WILL WANT SOME ADDITIONAL,
AND WE WOULD LIKE FOR YOU TO EXPLORE WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT
SENDING THEM OVER THERE BECAUSE THE LST'S YOU ARE SENDING
OVER WILL CARRY THEM.

W: THAT IS RIGHT.

L: THERE IS A NEED, PROBABLY, OF SHIPPING TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
GLIDERS AND AIRCRAFT, AND YOU MAY FIND THAT THOSE THINGS WILL
COME IN CONFLICT, AS THERE IS LARGE DECK SPACE ON SHIPS. IF
THAT IS THE CASE, THEN IT WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN UP WITH
CINC MED AS TO WHICH HE WISHES TO GIVE PRIORITY. BUT IN ANY
CASE, EXPLORE THE SUBJECT AND LET US KNOW HOW MANY LCT'S
YOU CAN SEND OVER.

W: TO ARRIVE BY WHAT DATE?

L: OSBORNE SAYS THAT HE THINKS THE NUMBER OF LCT'S THAT
WOULD BE NEEDED OVER THERE WOULD BE 24. I DON'T KNOW ABOUT
THAT.

W: TO ARRIVE BY THE 20TH OF JULY, IS THAT CORRECT?

L: YES. NEW SUBJECT. INGERSOLL WANTS HIS DE'S BACK AND
THEY HAVE ALREADY GOT THE 3 REMAINING DE'S, ONE OF THEM THE
RICH HAVING BEEN SUNK, ON THE WAY. NEW SUBJECT. HAVE YOU
ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE REPAIRS TO THE "PHILADEL-
PHIA?"

W: THE LAST WE HAD WAS AN ESTIMATED 8 WEEKS AT MALTA.

L: WHAT IS THE DOPE ON THE "SAVANNAH"?

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

~~SECRET~~

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4, and (E)

OSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

By STR

Date JAN 31 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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TO: ~~SECRET~~ Page 4

W: THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER.

L: SHE CAN'T BE PUSHED UP, SHE IS PROBABLY OUT OF THE PICTURE?

W: I DON'T SEE HOW SHE COULD BE IN IT.

L: THE MOVEMENT OF THE COMBATANT SHIPS IN THIS AREA DOWN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN IS, OF COURSE, STILL UNCERTAIN BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW JUST HOW LONG WILL BE REQUIRED FOR SUPPORTING ACTION HERE. WE WILL LET YOU KNOW MORE ABOUT THAT LATER. WE HAVE APPROVED THEIR KEEPING HERE 21 YMS'S BUT WE TOLD THEM THAT 11 AM'S WOULD GO WITH THE COMBATANT SHIPS WHEN THEY WERE MOVED. THEY HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION HERE TO ASK IF WE COULD GIVE THEM ANY MORE TC'S. IN THAT CONNECTION, OSBORNE ASKS AS TO WHETHER 12 TC'S COULD BE MOVED FROM THE STATES FOR ANVIL? CAN YOU GIVE ME AN ANSWER ON THAT NOW OR WOULD YOU RATHER GIVE IT TO ME LATER?

W: I WILL HAVE TO GIVE IT TO YOU LATER.

L: FLANNAGAN PLANS TO GO AHEAD AND REPAIR THE "ENDICOTT" HERE. THE "ENDICOTT" HAS 3 GUNS IN COMMISSION, AND WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND IS FOR THEM TO CANNIBALIZE THE "NELSON" USING GUNS AND OTHER MATERIAL AS NECESSARY, TO PUT HER IN COMMISSION. THAT SEEMS ALL RIGHT TO US, BUT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE YOUR REACTION.

ANOTHER THING THAT GOOD BRINGS UP HERE IS THE BULK PACIFIC DESTROYERS IN DESDIV OF 119, HE THINKS OUGHT TO GO BACK FOR OMAHA. HOWEVER, MY VIEW IS THAT WE NEED ALL THE DESTROYERS HERE IN THE 2 AREAS THAT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. HOW IS INGERSOLL ON DESTROYERS?

W: HE'S STRAPPED FOR THEM. HE'S DOWN AT THE BOTTOM.

L: GOOD MAKES THE POINT THAT THEY ARE PARTICULARLY NEEDED FOR ESCORTING TROOP CONVOYS INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. MY FEELING ABOUT THAT IS THAT IT'S MORE PROFITABLE TO USE THEM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AVOID HAVING THEM MAKE THE TRIP

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

~~SECRET~~

B. G. 11402, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (C)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1944

By SLR

Date

JUN 31 1974

~~SECRET~~

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 5

~~TOP SECRET~~

BACK AND FORTH ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, WHEN THERE IS QUITE A NEED, AND THERE'S GOING TO BE A CONTINUING NEED HERE FOR THEM FOR SOME TIME TO COME. OF COURSE, YOU KNOW THEY'VE LOST 4, AND THE "ENDICOTT" IS OUT OF COMMISSION FOR THE MOMENT. IN THIS AREA, AND ALL WE'VE GOT DOWN THERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, I THINK ARE NEEDED THERE.

W: YOUR ESTIMATE ON THAT'S AS GOOD AS ANYTHING WE CAN GIVE YOU OVER HERE, I WOULD THINK.

L: YES. HOW DO YOU THINK CINCPAC IS FOR DESTROYERS? HE DOESN'T NEED THEM AS BADLY AS THEY DO OVER HERE, DO YOU THINK?

W: NOT NOW. HE MAY IN A FEW DAYS.

L: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER FROM THEM?

W: YES, I GOT A MESSAGE THAT CAME IN THIS MORNING, WHICH I CAN GIVE YOU ANY TIME WHEN YOU'RE READY TO HEAR IT.

L: GIVE IT TO ME NOW.

W: THIS IS THE FIRST SUMMARY. THE INITIAL CARRIER STRIKES WENT OFF ON SCHEDULE. WE EXPECTED SURPRISE, AND DESTROYED 124 AIRCRAFT, ABOUT 75% IN THE AIR. WE LOST ABOUT 18, FROM VARIOUS CAUSES. ONE OF OUR TASK GROUPS INTERCEPTED A CONVOY ESCAPING FROM SAIPAN, SANK 10 SHIPS AND DAMAGED 10 MORE. THEY HAVE APPARENTLY RECOVERED SOME MAIL WHICH THEY THINK IS IMPORTANT, AND THEY'RE RUSHING IT BACK TO GET IT TRANSLATED, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THAT'S ABOUT. THE BOMBARDMENT HAS COMPLETED ON SCHEDULE, WITH NO AIR OPPOSITION. THAT'S ALL OF THAT.

L: HAVE WE HAD ANY HEAVY SHIP DAMAGE?

W: NO SHIP DAMAGE REPORTED.

L: THAT'S FINE.

W: IT LOOKS VERY GOOD AT THE START.

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

~~SECRET~~

EX-11552 Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (2)

Declassify, May 3, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 31 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Page 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

L: WHEN WE MOVE THESE APA'S AND LST'S, ETC., DOWN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, WE PLAN TO SEND COMMODORE EDGAR DOWN WITH THEM. OF COURSE, MOON IS STILL RIDING HERD ON "U" BEACH, AND HALL IS RIDING HERD ON "O" BEACH, AND JUST HOW LONG THAT'LL CONTINUE, WE DO NOT, AS YET, KNOW.

OUR CHIEFS HAVE BEEN OVER ON THE OTHER SIDE, THEY WENT OVER YESTERDAY, AND INSPECTED "O" AND "U" BEACHES. HANDY AND I WERE OVER THERE THE DAY OF THE ASSAULT, SO WE HAD A PRETTY GOOD PICTURE, AND THE OMAHA BEACH ASSAULT WAS VERY TOUGH, ABOUT THE TOUGHEST OF ANY OF THEM. OUR LOSSES YOU'VE GOT, PROBABLY AS WELL AS I HAVE, WERE FAIRLY HEAVY IN THE WAY OF LCT'S, AND SOME OF THE SMALLER CRAFT. THEY HAVE NOT BEEN TO HEAVY ON THE LST'S YET.

DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING THERE YOU WANT TO GIVE US?

W: WE HAVE A REQUEST FROM HEWITT FOR SOME FIRE FIGHTING SHIPS TO BE SENT TO HIM. CAN ANY OF THOSE BE SENT FROM THE U.K.? HE WANTS SOME TUGS ALSO. ARE YOU GOING TO SEND ANY OF THOSE DOWN, OR CAN THEY BE SENT?

L: THEY FIGURE THAT THEY CAN SEND SOME TUGS DOWN, BUT NOT ANY REGULAR FIRE FIGHTING SHIPS AS YET. THE TUG BUSINESS OF ESTABLISHING THEIR ARTIFICIAL HARBORS IS GOING ALONG EXTREMELY WELL. THE DOCK SHIPS WENT DOWN IN VERY FINE SHAPE, AND THE DERRICKS ARE GOING DOWN WELL. THEY'RE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE ON THAT WORK, SO WE CAN RELEASE TUGS DOWN THERE IN TIME FOR HEWITT'S NEEDS. THE GENERAL PICTURE HERE IS, SOME OF THE PLANNERS ARE STILL STRONG FOR ANVIL, SOME OF THE HIGHER LEVEL INTENDING TO MOVE A LITTLE FARTHER OVER TO THE WESTWARD IN THAT AREA. I GIVE THAT TO YOU SO YOU CAN PASS THAT ON TO HULL. ANYTHING MORE FOR ME?

W: YES. WE LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN OPERATION, I THINK WITH SOME PREFERENCE FOR THE RHONE VALLEY.

L: SO DO WE, ON OUR LEVEL.

W: WE DEFINITELY DO NOT LIKE THE BAY OF BISCAY, AND WE DON'T THINK IT CAN BE DONE. HERE'S ANOTHER ON. HEWITT WOULD LIKE SOME

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

~~SECRET~~

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1943

ONE letter, May, 4, 1943

By GLE

Date

JAN 31 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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~~TOP SECRET~~

EXPERIENCED NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON OFFICERS FROM THE U.K.,
IF THEY CAN BE SENT.

L: I'LL MAKE A NOTE OF THAT. HOW MANY TUGS DOES HEWITT
WANT?

W: HE DIDN'T ASK FOR ANY PARTICULAR NUMBER, HE JUST ASKED
FOR TUGS AND FIRE FIGHTING SHIPS.

L: WE MAY GO DOWN AND SEE HIM BEFORE WE GET AWAY FROM HERE.

W: I THINK THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL.

L: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU DO KNOW IT, THE INSTRUCTIONS
DOWN THERE WILL CALL FOR A 3 DIVISION ASSAULT, AND APPROXI-
MATELY AN AIRBORNE LIFT OF 1 DIVISION. THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE
GOING TO GIVE THEM FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

W: DOES THAT DATE FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE CVE'S LOOK ALL
RIGHT TO YOU?

L: YES, IT DOES. IT LOOKS VERY GOOD.

W: WE'LL GET DURGEN BUSY RIGHT AWAY, AND TELL CINCLANT TO
GET THEM READY TO GO.

L: IF THEY MAKE THE LANDING FARTHER TO WESTWARD THERE,
THEY'RE SPEAKING OF MORE AIR CARRIER LIFT OF FIGHTERS.
THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS, THE BRITISH WOULD PROVIDE 7 CVE'S
AND WE WOULD PROVIDE 2. WHAT IS YOUR REACTION THERE, IF THEY
WANT TO INCREASE THE LIFT, TO OUR INCREASING IT?

W: I THINK THAT WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME DOING IT.

L: YOU DON'T THINK WE OUGHT TO PROVIDE MORE THAN 2.

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

RECEIVED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.2 and 1.4 (D) or (S)

OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972

By ~~SECRET~~

Date JAN 31 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

~~INCOMING MESSAGE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ Page 8

W: I WOULD THINK NOT. I THINK THEY'RE GOING TO HAVE MORE THAN THEY NEED BY THAT TIME ANYWAY.

L: I THINK THAT 9 IS ENOUGH, MYSELF. THE QUESTION MAY COME UP, AND I JUST WANTED TO GET YOUR REACTION THERE, AND PUT IT IN THE PICTURE.

I SUGGEST THAT GENERAL HULL MAY WANT TO TALK TO LINCOLN.

W: I'LL PUT HIM ON NOW.

W: THIS IS GENERAL HULL.

L: I HAVE NOTHING EXCEPT 2 ITEMS OF INFORMATION FOR YOU. THE COMBINED CHIEFS WILL MEET AGAIN AT 2:30 TOMORROW AFTERNOON, AND THEN ABOUT OPERATIONS, WE HAVE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, BEYOND THAT GIVEN YOU LAST NIGHT, EXCEPT THAT THE 7TH BRITISH ARMORED DIVISION, WHICH WAS ON THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH 30TH CORPS, WAS HELD UP, AND SO TURNED SOUTH INTO THE AMERICAN AREA, MADE A FLANKING MOVEMENT, AND WHEN LAST HEARD OF, WAS ATTACKING STRONGLY STRAIGHT NORTH, AND ADVANCING.

I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. ADMIRAL COOK HAS GIVEN YOU THE PLANNING BASIS OF 3 DIVISION ASSAULT, AND APPROXIMATELY 1 DIVISION AIRBORNE LIFT.

HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR GENERAL HANDY?

W: I PRESUME THE CHIEFS HAVE ALREADY HAD THEIR MEETING TODAY?

L: THEY MET AT 11:30, AND CLOSED ABOUT 12:45, AND ALL WENT TO LUNCH TOGETHER.

W: NO INFORMATION ON ANY DECISIONS MADE AT THIS MEETING?

L: THEY DRAFTED A PROPOSED MESSAGE TO GEN. WILSON AND GEN. EISENHOWER, WHICH WE ARE NOT TOO SURE OF THE STATUS. THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE, HOWEVER, INCLUDED THIS PLANNING BASIS WHICH I HAVE GIVEN YOU, AND IF THE MESSAGE IS FIRM, YOU SHOULD GET IT VERY QUICKLY OVER THE WIRE.

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

~~SECRET~~

U. S. & 11932 (Sec. 3.3 and 3.4) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By ~~SECRET~~

Date JAN 31 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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W: YES.

L: ADMIRAL COOK SUGGESTS THAT I TELL YOU THAT IN THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE, THEY PROPOSE TO TELL GENERAL WILSON THAT HE WOULD DRIVE THE GERMANS TO THE PISA-RIMINI LINE, AND ALSO, AS INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE WAS THE FIRM DECISION THAT THERE WOULD BE AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, AND THE TARGET DATE 25 JULY. THE PROPOSED MESSAGE WAS SOMEWHAT LONG, AND WAS DRAFTED PRINCIPALLY BY GEN. ISHAY. THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

W: IS IT CONTEMPLATED THAT THEY STOP ON THE PISA-RIMINI LINE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE GERMANS DO? IS THAT GOING TO BE HIS MISSION, OR WHAT? DO YOU KNOW?

L: NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT THAT IN THE MESSAGE, AND I'VE HEARD NO REPORTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE CHIEF'S LEVEL. OF COURSE YOU WILL KNOW WHAT GENERAL HANDY AND ADMIRAL COOK THINK ABOUT THAT. WE SHOULD FIGHT LIKE HELL WITH WHATEVER WE HAVE.

W: THAT'S ALL WE HAVE HERE, IF YOU NEED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION, LET US KNOW.

End

ORIGINATOR: Adm Duncan

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
OPD
SGS
C of S

WDTC 554 (13 June 1944)

R & 11502 Sec. 3.3

OSD Letter, May, 1944

By RTN

Date JAN 31 1974

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDC
Executive Office
2904 TTH

12 June 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAR 49692

McNarney to Marshall.

We perceive no insurmountable difficulties in meeting
requirements amphibious operation in Mediterranean on
target date given your 8-53652. Navy concurs.

End

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: Gen Somervell
CC/S
Gen Arnold
Adm King (Adm Duncan)
Col Park
CofS

CN-OUT-49692 (12 Jun 44) 2130Z lee

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

CONFERENCE BETWEEN MAJOR GEN. HANDY AND MAJOR GEN. HULL

12 June 1944

1932Z to 2031Z

LONDON PARTIES

Major Gen. T. T. Handy
Colonel R. C. Lindsey
Colonel E. K. Lincoln

WASHINGTON PARTIES

Major Gen. J. E. Hull
Colonel J. L. Loutzenheiser
Colonel C. V. Whitney
Gen. M. E. Gross
Col. C. B. Magruder
Lt. Col. H. S. Patterson
Colonel C. P. Smith
Colonel J. D. Barter
Admiral D. B. Duncan
Cap. C. Campbell
Capt. A. H. Oswald
Capt. E. R. Gardner
General F. N. Roberts
General C. A. Russell
Colonel A. D. Reid
Colonel C. K. Gailey
Colonel V. A. Conner
Lt. Colonel W. B. Bunker
Colonel M. B. Stokes

W: This is Hull.
L: This is Handy.

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

REUSE

R. O. 11651 Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of 20

OSD letter, May, 3, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-FC-553

Page 2

W: All right. I have with me about half of the Army and a good portion of the Navy. I will tell you when I start out so you will know any questions that you want to raise, we will try and get the answer. Admiral Duncan is with me and a couple of his people, Russell, Connor, Reid, and Stokes and Magruder are here, Bonker, and people from the Air Force, Loutsenheiser is here. Now, did you get the message I dispatched this morning our no. 49502, reference the 17th Airborne Division. Have you received that?

L: No, we haven't received it yet.

W: I think maybe I had better read it to you and then read you what I think is the answer to the questions you raised in the later message.

L: All right. Abe Lincoln is here and Dick Lindsay. Abe is going to talk to Stokes and those people on shipping after I get through and also give you a little dope on the situation. Then Dick Lindsay wants to talk to Loutsenheiser and Whitney of the Army air men.

W: No's here. They're both here.

L: All right.

W: I sent you a message this morning which stated as follows:

"From a training standpoint the 17th Airborne Division can be made available now, granting waivers on minor deficiencies and hitches, and things of that nature. All T/E equipment for the 17th Airborne Division can be delivered to the port for shipment by July 5. Army Air Force equipment for troop carriers required in North African Theater of Operations, is now being studied." I have that information incidentally, and I'll give it to you later.

WD-FC-553 (13 Jun 44)

HOUSE

R. O. 11452, Sec. 3(2) and (3) of 20
OWD letter, May 1, 1973

By HLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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HLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/96

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WD-TC-553

Page 3

"For the UK a Division can be loaded so as to arrive about July 5th. This loading will displace the 80th Division, delaying the arrival of the latter, until about July 13. Now for North African Theater of Operation troops".

L: Can you get the shipping to move both of those divisions?

W: Yes, but it will mean stepping back the 80th Division if the 17th goes to England.

L: All right.

W: For the North African Theater of Operation if it is going there troops and a small part of the equipment can be loaded on UGS-12, sailing July 1, for arrival Naples, July 17. Further increments of equipment, following on unescorted 35, July 3, unescorted 36, July 10, for arrival Genoa 14th and 21st July respectively. Balance of equipment can be dispatched on UGS-48 sailing July 12 for arrival Ovan August 1 and Naples August 5. Shipment of the division to the Mediterranean will not delay movement of troops now set up for that theater based on presently planned British assistance."

Now, that is the message I dispatched to you this morning. You will get that presumably right away. Now, going ahead on the airborne units. There is now in Italy the 517th Parachute Regimental Combat Team, the 550th Battalion, Airborne, the 509th Parachute Infantry, the 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry, Parachute Battalion, and a special service force. That 509th Parachute Infantry is a battalion. The one I gave before. You will recall that we took the Regimental Combat Team from the 17th Division and shipped it to the Mediterranean in order to provide them with a replacement for the Regimental Combat Team of the 82nd Division.

L: That's right. The 504th.

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WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

R. O. 11612, Sec. XE and ND, or 62
ORD Letter, May. 1, 1972

By RTN

Date JAN 30 1974

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E.O. 12366, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

PLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST
AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TC-553

Page 4

W: Yes. That is there now. Now, the 13th Airborne Division is now tentatively set up for the Southwest Pacific, to be moved in February 1945. It consists of 1 Parachute and 2 Glider Regiments. The Glider Regiments are in good shape and can be shipped to the Mediterranean. The readiness date for this part of the division, that is the division less the Parachute Regimental Combat Team, as given to us by the Ground Forces is approximately 15 September. I believe we can move that forward somewhat, but the Parachute Regiment of this division has 500 new men in it and has completed only individual and basic training. It will not be fully trained until October or November. It is short equipment. Although the glider units are well trained as units, divisional training has not been completed. Now, by utilizing the Parachute Regiment now in Italy with the Glider Regiments of the 13th Airborne Division, which are in good shape, a complete division can be made available for Italy, but this will mean that we will not be able to furnish a second airborne division to the Southwest Pacific. It appears that the division, less the gliders, can be shipped to Italy in time to meet the target date you asked for, providing, of course, we can push forward the readiness date ahead of what the Ground Forces gave us. The question of the shipment of the gliders themselves presents a serious problem. The high priority equipment required for ANVIL will probably conflict with the shipment of the gliders which are quite bulky. There appear to be sufficient gliders on hand if we can find a way of shipping them. I will give you a statement on this a little bit later. The only other airborne units in this country that could meet the target date are 1 Paratroop Field Artillery Battalion and an Engineer Battalion, Airborne, less 1 company and a Negro Paratroop Infantry Company. Now, another factor, is the question of replacements. The shipping of additional airborne units to the Mediterranean will reduce the availability of replacements for units now overseas, probably to zero. The status of the equipment of all these units I have been talking about, is rather bad now due to their low priority, but it appears possible to furnish the

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 116-1, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (C)

OSD Letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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WD-TC-553

Page

equipment for them, but I am unable to give you a final answer on that. With respect to the gliders and the air lift in the North African Theater of Operation there are now 2 troop carrier groups in the Mediterranean, and a third one on loan to CBI which is due back in the Mediterranean by the 1st of July. They have 250 gliders and 150 pilots. We can ship glider pilots, fully trained, as follows:

Readiness date 22nd June ----- 466, but this requires the cancellation of the monthly attrition shipments of 133 each month to the UK for June, July, and August. We can ship 141 in July and 229 in August, but these last 2 shipments would require the cancellation of Kenny's commitment of 370 by 1 September, the Southwest Pacific. The following is our ability to ship crated gliders, and is based on the assumption that these gliders have first priority on deck space after assembled aircraft. I can give you the figures on this. I have them right in front of me, and I think I had better read them right off to you. I will read a table in 3 columns.

<u>Convoy number</u>	<u>Sailing Date</u>	<u>Glider Capacity</u>
UGS-46	24 June	142
UGF-12 which incidentally requires a diversion of a freighter in addition to those required to meet the airborne division in the ANVIL requirements		
	1 July	77
UGS-47	6 July	145
UGS-48	14 July	145
UGS-49	24 July	145
UGS-13	28 July	42
UGS-50	3 August	145

Now, the ability of the Air Force in the Mediterranean to receive and assemble these gliders is a point we don't know. It might be advisable to check from there if you feel that it's necessary. The proposed shipping schedule that I

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ORD Letter, May, 1, 1971

Date JAN 30 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WD-TC-553

Page 6

have given you contemplates unloading all gliders at Bari and Naples. That's so far for that. Now, I've got some more information here which I think will be of interest to you in connection with the decision just made and which we have received. We are shipping supplies and equipment to the Mediterranean that are urgently required to accompany the assault on a troop convoy to arrive in the theater in mid July, about the 15th. That's UGF-12.

The first cargo convoy to go direct to the beachhead will probably reach the theater about August 15, but this date is not firm. We will have to give you more detailed information on this later. The U.S. portion of the shipping required as stated by Wilson in his MEDOCS 125 can be made available for a target date of July 25. Now, for your consideration, an operation mounted from the Mediterranean for the Bay of Bizony area, could not be supported and built up as rapidly as a Mediterranean operation due to the much longer turn around involved and also due to the limitations of landing craft.

L: We figured that.

W: Is there anything about that which isn't clear?

L: No, Lindsay and Abe Lincoln may have some questions to ask, but it sounded to me very full information. Have you anything else?

W: Is Cook there with you?

L: No, he is not.

W: Admiral Duncan is here and he has a statement as follows: He has received no insurmountable difficulties from the Naval viewpoint other than bombardment ammunition and gun light situations with which Admiral Cook is familiar.

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

REMARKS

U. S. 11451, Sec. 5(2) and (3)

CWO Letter, May, 4, 1971

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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WD-TC-553

Page 1

- L: They have discussed that over here fully.
- W: We have discussed that with Adcock back here, the Mediterranean operations, and he feels that the assault can be made in late July as well as any time as far as supplies are concerned.
- L: I see. That's good.
- W: That's all I have.
- L: All right. I have got a few things here for you. The information you gave seems to be very complete and full. That's just fine.

The CCS is meeting again tomorrow morning at which time they will consider a fast message to Wilson. You see the stuff I sent you yesterday has not gone to Wilson as yet. It hasn't gone to Eisenhower formally, but we gave it to Gen. Smith and his people are working on it. The Chiefs are away today on the other side. We talked quite awhile with Eisenhower's plan as to date and got Eisenhower's views pretty well. I would say that indications all point to ANVIL. Rather than the Bay of Biscay.

- W: I think that is sound.
- L: Of course, no decision has been made on that as yet. I might give you there a little list of what Eisenhower's planners, the way they feel about it.
- W: All right.
- L: The logistic people say they need all of Bordeaux or Marseilles in order to deploy the forces which will become available, either will do. The available supporting troops are not sufficient for both. Considering the support of troops in the area around Paris, the railway consideration

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(b) and (D) or (S)
OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

By BLM

Date JAN 30 1974

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54-75784

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

BLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TC-553

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are about the same. Those are the logistic considerations.

The assault considerations are about as follows. At Bordeaux it is possible to assault with 1 HCT on each side of the estuary. There will be 50 to 60 miles to go before they join hands with Bordeaux. No suitable beaches on the Atlantic coast itself from which an assault could be pushed in against Bordeaux. Air support for Bordeaux operation would be entirely from carriers initially. Our conclusions are about as follows: Bordeaux is not as sound an operation as the Mediterranean was, particularly since the Mediterranean will have an unusual scale of tactical Air Forces unless an operation is lost in that area. If the Mediterranean should be selected.

- A. It gives more economical use of resources.
- B. It would allow a larger scale of attack.

The place for attacking the Mediterranean is for Wilson to say. This is Eisenhower's plan as you understand. Gen. Eisenhower's opinion is about as follows:

It is no use maintaining divisions inactive in Europe. Rather than do so, we should ship them out of the Mediterranean and if necessary ship direct from United States, that is if they could not be deployed in France. If ANVIL can be done in only a feeble way and Eisenhower's idea of a feeble way is 6 to 8 divisions, it is better to shift the divisions around.

W: I think he is right.

L: General Eisenhower advised that all Allied Forces in the Mediterranean and all in Europe fight hard to kill Germans. Advantageous operations would be a strong ANVIL in July. If this is not possible, then a strong ANVIL August 10 to 15. If the last is not possible, then start taking divisions from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. Those

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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G. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and (D) of GDS
OCS letter, May, 1, 1971

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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WD-TC-553

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are views of his planners. Don't quote Eisenhower on them directly because they haven't been submitted as yet. Another thing: I might explain to you. The reason for the interest in the airborne troops. It has been suggested and there is an idea of attempting to provide in the of 2 divisions, airborne, assault as a part of the Mediterranean amphibious operation.

- W: Going to send down some troop carriers from UK?
- L: We will probably have to. That's one of the phases of it that's being investigated. That's the reason for all of this information we wanted on Air Force troops. You know this, I believe, that our information is over here, that none of the special equipment for the 17th Airborne Division has yet been shipped from the port of New York.
- They were due to be shipped around 1 July.
- W: I see. I don't have any dope on that right here.
- L: That's all right. This is for Duncan's information particularly the proposal here which is under consideration is to send 15 APA's and 24 LST's from here to the Mediterranean. We figure that that will give him in the neighborhood of 3 division lift of what he has.
- W: That's the way it looks to us.
- L: I think I have brought you fairly well up-to-date. I have a question that Lindsey just asked me. Air people will have to answer. Could any additional troop carrier aircraft, with crews, be made available to augment units now in the Mediterranean? If so, how many, and by what date?
- W: This is Col. Loutzenheiser.
- L: I'll put Lindsey on, let him do the talking to you

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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EX-11652, Sec. (WD and KD) or (D)
On O letter, May, 4, 1975

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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HLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WD-TC-553

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about that.

W: We have now the following number of crews scheduled for theaters. I will first read the theaters, and then the months, June, July, and August, and then give you the numbers of aircraft and crew.

U.S. Mediterranean CBI Southwest Pac. Central Pac. CBI ATC

June	69	5	37	15	2	56
			(which includes the replacement aircraft for combat cargo group)			
July	50	10	21	27	2	50
August	50	10	14	45	1	75

In addition to that, we will have, on the 15th of August, the first combat cargo group, with 100 aircraft crews, but the crews are combat cargo trained crews and not troop carrier.

L: I understand. Those figures you gave me were replacements, is that right?

W: That is right. That is the works.

L: Those are replacement aircraft with crews.

W: That's right. We can divert these to any theater.

L: Are there any additional gliders available, other than those that were given by General Hull a while ago, and set up on the UGP convey.

W: There are additional gliders available. I can give you the figures on gliders that will be available to be shipped, without relation to shipping.

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 11651, Sec. 57D and 57E as 58

Oct 1944, May, 1, 1971

By SLR

Date

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E. O. 12386, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WD-TC-553

Page 11

There were scheduled to be shipped to U.K. in May 370 gliders. There will be shipped in June 130 gliders, in July 500 gliders, there are 567 gliders in storage, which do not have the latest modifications on them but can be modified in the theater.

- L: Do you have any estimate as to what the timing would be on making those modifications?
- W: It's just a matter of a few days work. There is scheduled to be shipped to U.K. for the British, 500 gliders in the 4th quarter. We could get those gliders back from the British, I believe. In addition to that, there are set up for shipment to CBI, 815 gliders, which could be diverted. There are set up and committed to the Southwest Pacific, 395 gliders, which could be diverted. Does that give you your answer?
- L: What is the timing of those last for CBI and Southwest Pacific?
- W: They are committed now, they are on the west coast waiting to be shipped.
- L: They are awaiting shipping space?
- W: That is correct. The Southwest Pacific asked for 1,100 gliders, of which only these 395 are presently committed.
- L: Is it contemplated that some of the gliders that you told me a while ago are now in storage could make up the difference between the 395 and the 1,100.
- W: That is correct, that figure, the remaining balance of 611, which we can get our hands on too.
- L: 567 of those would be those that you gave me that were in storage?

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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U.S. 11653, Sec. 5(D) and 5(F) or (G)
OWD letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 20 1974

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

HLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TC-553

Page 12

- W: That's right.
- L: That's all I have. I'll turn you back to General Handy.
- W: Is Osborne there?
- L: No.
- W: Nobody from the Navy contingent?
- L: No, nobody from the Navy here. We can ask them any questions, or give them any message. Abe Lincoln's been working with them right along.
- W: In a minute Admiral Duncan would like to raise a few questions. I'll turn it over to him.

This is Duncan. Tell Admiral Cook, that we propose to sail the 2 CVE's and their escorts in time to arrive in the Mediterranean by the 10th of July. We are proposed to load 8 inch, 6 inch, and 5 inch bombardment ammunition in the "Mount Baker" and sail her in time to reach the Mediterranean about the 20th of July. We will not send any additional LST's other than those which are now scheduled. We will not send any 14 inch bombardment ammunition, because we figure if they shoot up what they have now, they will also wear out the guns. That's all I have.

- L: He may want to know about the availability of LST's for the Mediterranean. If more could be supplied, could they or not?
- W: Not unless we sail additional LST's.
- L: You could send them on other ships, couldn't you. Those next to the last ones?
- W: We would like them to tell us their requirements.

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 11651 Sec. 3(D) and 3(D) or (S)

Classified, May, 1961

By SLR

JAN 30 1961

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

BLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TO-553

Page 1

- L: All right.
- W: This is General Hall.
- L: If you haven't get anything else, I'll let Abe give you a little information on the situation, and then he may want to talk to Marcus Stokes on this shipping.
- W: Before you get off, do you want me to confirm any of the information I've given to you in a message, or has it been recorded there to your satisfaction?
- L: They have it very definitely and clearly, so I don't think you need to send a long message.
- W: Admiral Dunsen tells me he'll confirm his statements to Admiral Cook in a dispatch.
- L: How's everything going?
- W: Going fine. We're getting a lot more information in now on the situation over there. The first few days we were sort of stumbling in the dark, not knowing what was going on, but it's coming in now very nicely.
- L: What does it look like now?
- W: It looks pretty good.
- L: It looks that way from what we can see.
- L: Abe will give you a little more information. I don't know, it may be a good deal better than we think.
- W: I hope it is.
- L: I do too.

WD-TO-553 (13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 11652, Sec. 5(K) and 5(D) or (E)

OWD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WD-TC-553

- W: The carrier strikes on the Mariannas have started and are initially very successful.
- L: Do you have any details on it?
- W: No details as yet. I think everything has been flashed to Admiral King that we have received.
- L: Your speech was a little different from ours. What time is the President going to make his broadcast?
- W: He's going to broadcast it some time tonight, I think it's between 10 and 11 our time. I'll check it and let you know.
- L: What did you think of that splurge that came over there?
- W: All right. We could recognize a little bit of what we sent to you in it. One thing that Surles was very anxious about, he was in hopes that they would send back a part of that message which General Marshall sent to MacArthur. You remember that one? You weren't here when it was dispatched, but it was a very fine congratulatory message.
- L: We didn't mention anybody's name in that except Eisenhower. If we started in on theater we'd have to mention every theater commander.
- W: That's true, but what Surles was worried about, he wanted to give the President some choice bits a la Churchill to be put out, of course we don't have much that Churchill hasn't already put out.
- L: I know it. I'll put Abe on now and let him give you a little information. And then he wants to talk to Marcus.

Here's the situation. General Bradly will assault Saint Lo tomorrow. The first British Airborne Division should

WD-TC-553

(13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 11631 Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) (C)
GPO: 1944, May. 1, 1944

By SLR

Date

JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TC-553

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go down tonight. We don't know where, probably south of Caen. The remainder of this is from a memorandum furnished by SHARP G-3, and closes as of 1800 tonight. The fighting has been very heavy along the entire coast, from the British 2nd Army where enemy armor has been largely committed. From the 7th Corps up has been outflanked from the northeast and southwest by armored of the 12th U.S. Divisions. Combat teams of the 90th Division and 86th Airborne Division have pushed westward and have reached the lines approximately 4 miles west of St Mere-Eglise. On the south flank, 101st Airborne Divisions have captured Carentan. Supposed to make contact with the 29th Division. That division is complete planning today. On the 5th Corps front there's a strong offensive to the south. They've captured Isigny as you know, St. Clair Sur L'Elle and Belleroy maintaining contact with the British 30th Corps in the vicinity of Lebut. The southernmost point of the offense is approximately 16 miles inland. The British 30th Corps have reached a point 7.5 miles south of the coast. The British 1st Corps have made very little progress to date. The enemy are maintaining a strong aggressive defense of Caen. On the extreme east point, the 5th Airborne Division has pushed down to the vicinity of

Here are the casualties reported as of 10 June, and you will note they may not exactly add up, but there's a note on here that the Omaha casualties are not yet broken down.

Killed	British	617
	Americans	386
Wounded	British	2572
	American	2184
Missing	British	2111
	American	3466

WD-TC-559 (13 Jun 44)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or 6(D)

OSD Lettlat, May. 1, 1972

NLR

Date

JAN 30 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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WD-TC-553

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Making a total British 5,300, American 6036, a total of 11,314, with a note that the Omaha casualties are not broken down. I do not know whether they are all included in the missing or not, but that's my assumption.

W: Are they included in the totals?

L: They are included in the totals.

W: That's up to June 10th.

L: Casualties up to June 10th, no time or day given, that's cumulative. Here's certain general information. The build-up is very much improved. We are a little behind schedule, but it is, we believe, not enough to worry about. All beaches appear to be progressing satisfactorily, except perhaps Omaha. The GOOSEBERRIES are in place, and working 100 per cent perfect. The LST's dried out and unbeached without damage. Casualties for Naval vessels was lower than expected. Landing craft, we have no accurate figures, but it appears that they're very much lower than expected, at the moment. The damage to LCT's has been rather heavy, owing to these teller mines on the beach obstacles. They, however, can be put back in operation in a reasonably short time. The Naval activity last night was small. They had one corvet hit by a torpedo, and one of those 6 story concrete structures was sunk. And the air report, which you will get in detail, of course with 1446 heavy bombers in attacks on airfields and railway bridges in the Paris area. 5 bombers are missing. The Tactical Airforce attacked transports and lines of communication. There are 2 advance landing grounds, and one re-fueling and re-arming strip in operation. General Arnold returned from the American sector today in a B-17. General Arnold and General Rutar took off from the American sector of the beachhead today in a B-17 to return to the United Kingdom. So the landing ground is operating very effectively.

I think that's all I had. Do you have a question?

WD-TC-553 (13 Jan 44)

~~SECRET~~

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1(b) and (d) of (S)

Oct 1972, May 1, 1973

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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WD-TC-553

Page 1

W: Yes, on the Airborne landings which preceded the assault on the part of the 82nd and the 101st Airborne Divisions, we don't have information on all units that landed. Are they all accounted for, are any of them still out in front of the present front line or what do you know about it?

L: This is Tom. The 101st on D plus 1, when we were over there, had gotten quite a few of our people together. They were well dropped, but the 82nd was scattered out more. At that time they had a regiment and 2 battalions. They have probably gotten a good many more together since then, but their idea was then that the 82nd had taken pretty heavy losses. The drop, as far as the Air Force is concerned, was very successful, the losses were very small. The British say the drop of the 6th Airborne was very good. They say it was almost like a picture, the gliders parked almost when they landed.

Here's one thing I wanted to tell you. I don't think you need say anything about it to Red's wife, but it's apt to be coming through. General Arnold said Red Seider got a 20 millimeter shell in his leg.

W: How serious is it do you know?

L: He's pretty badly wounded to evacuate.

W: I see. That's too bad.

L: He had the 12th Infantry.

I will put Abe on let him talk to Marcus about some shipping, and I'll tell him to make it short.

W: All right. Hello, Abe.

L: Hello Marcus. The British met today, on the subject of shipping for these Mediterranean operations. There is, I think, some chance that they may say they will be unable to

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

GROUP

R. O. 11623, Sec. 2(E) and -644) or (E)

OrdD letter, May, 1, 1972

By ~~SECRET~~

Date JAN 30 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

WD-TC-553

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provide all of their shipping by a target date of 25 July. I do not know what they are discussing. The question I want to ask you is this: If the British say that they are unable to provide all their share of the shipping, is there any chance of the U.S. providing more than their 50-50 basis plus our contribution to the assault?

W: We are already providing more than the 50-50 basis because they want to use the flatbed ships that are now in the Mediterranean and we are actually working on a 60-40 basis, the way it comes out. Because of the flatbed ships which are especially desirable for that operation so we have agreed to leave the flatbed ships, there are about 63 of them, in the theater for that operation so 63 out of 100 for the initial loading gives us, as you see, more than the 50-50 basis. The British already have about 73 ships in the area so there are more ships available in the Mediterranean now than the requirements call for. We do not see how they can fail to meet the initial requirements at least. The British here assured us that they saw no difficulty in that regard.

L: I think that's a very adequate answer. Have you anything to ask me?

W: No, we feel that the requirements as stated in that MEDCOS 125 can be met on the same basis that we calculated them by the earlier date.

L: All right. That is all I have.

W: This is Hull again. There is only one other point. I checked on this time for that broadcast. No definite time has been set, but it will probably be sometime between 10:00 PM and 11:00 PM tonight. That's Steve Early's information. That's our time.

L: That won't do us much good. That will be about four o'clock in the morning here.

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44)

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R. O. 11651, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 of (S)
OCSJ letter, May, 1, 1944

By SLR

Date JAN 30 1974

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WD-TC-553

Page 19

- W: You had better read about it in the papers. One other point: We have given the green light here and are going ahead on the movement of those supplies to the Mediterranean for ANVIL.
- L: I think that's all right.
- W: It's on its way. Do you have anything further?
- L: No, the dope you gave us was fine, very complete.
- W: Okay. I hope it helps you out.
- L: It will. I think maybe we won't do so bad here.
- W: I don't think we will. If you happen to see or any of you happen to run into Red Raider, please remember us to him.
- L: Yes, I am going to try to see him. They evacuated some people from Oran. They will probably get Raider down there fairly soon, but I got the information I had from General Arnold. He just came back from over there today.
- W: Good luck to you. Anything else you want, let us have word on it and we'll try and turn it out.
- L: Good-bye.

End.

ORIGINATOR : Gen. Hull (OPD)
INFORMATION: Gen. Somervell
Gen. Arnold
Adm. King - Adm. Duncan
C of S

WD-TC-553 (13 Jun 44) 0054Z ss/vhm ~~SECRET~~

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and (d) or (e)

OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLL

Date JAN 30 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
URGENT

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.

To: War Department.

Fr: S-53652

11 June 1944.

From SHAEF, S 53652, to AGWAR to McNarney from
Marshall pass to Navy Department. TOP SECRET.

I. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have made the
following decisions:

1. There will be an amphibious operation mounted
from the Mediterranean. The troops will come from those in
the Mediterranean.

2. It will have approximately a 3 division lift.

3. Target date-July 25 or as early thereafter as
practicable.

4. The location will be decided later on the basis
of further study.

End of decisions.

II. In the discussion the following propositions were
considered and agreed on for study:

Stand on the Pisa-Rimini line then execute
one of the following amphibious operations:

1. Istria, if the Russians get into the
Carpathians.

CM-IN-9167 (11 Jun 44)

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY SP-1 DATE

Col Park
JAN 31 1974 29

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page-2-

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England.

Nr: S-53652

11 June 1944.

2. The Rhone valley.
3. Sette, pushing northwest toward Bordeaux.
4. Bay of Biscay operation to:
 - A. The mouth of the Loire, or
 - B. Bordeaux. The order in which the operations are listed has no significance.

There is a question of availability of up to 2 airborne divisions for operations conducted by Wilson but this matter is as yet indeterminate.

It was agreed that responsibility for planning for operations in the Mediterranean would be charged to Wilson and for those in the Bay of Biscay would be charged to Eisenhower.

III. This is sent to give you information as early as practicable. The decisions given in paragraph I above can be accepted as firm and action initiated thereon.

IV. CCS meet again Tuesday 1130. If difficulties are foreseen radio flash estimate in time for meeting.

End

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: CC/S, Gen Arnold, Adm King, Col Park, CofS.

CM-IN-9167 (11 Jun 44)

2132Z bjm

~~TOP SECRET~~ DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-3-72
BY ~~SC~~ , DATE

JAN 31 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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CORRECTION

7th June 1944

TO: British Chiefs of Staff

Rptd: Joint Staff Mission, Washington for United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff HQ MAAF

From: A.F.H.Q. (Signed Wilson)

BIGOT ANVIL

MEDCOS 125

Supplementary Correction to CM-IN-5657. ^{WH} First sentence
in paragraph 3 should read:

"Figures for internal Mediterranean sailings will
depend on the precise nature of the amphibious operation
undertaken and also on the further progress of the battle
in Italy."

End

Supplementary correction to CM-IN-5657 (7 Jun 44) CC/S
^{WH}

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Somervell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of _____

SM 522-71

SR

JAN 30 1974

CM-IN-6254 (8 Jun 44) 13152 bjm

310 Anvil

37 Col
Park
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

7th June, 1944

To: British Chiefs of Staff

Rptd: Joint Staff Mission, Washington for United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff HQ MAAF

From: A.F.H.Q. (Sigael Wilson)

BIGOT ANVIL

MEDCOS 125

In reply to COSMED 120.

1. Owing to success of DIADUM I can now say definitely that I can be ready to carry out an amphibious operation on the scale permitted by full use of the assault resources available to me.

2. The target date at which I am aiming is August 15. Planning is being carried out on the assumption that the launching of Operation ANVIL at this date will fit into the general European strategic picture. For this I shall require shipping as given in Part C. of MEDCOS 107. With reference to the above target date shipping will be required as follows -

- (a) 100 ships for preloading. Preloading will begin on 7th July and ships will load at a rate of approximately 25 ships every seven days.
- (b) Sufficient ships to enable 150 sailings to be made for each of the first and second 30 day periods and 50 sailings for the first two convoys in the third 30 day

CM-IN- 3657

7 June 1944

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MEDCOS 125

7th June 1944

Page 2

period. Sailings will be at the rate of 25 ships every 5 days beginning approximately 15 August.

3. Figures for interval Mediterranean sailings will depend on the precise nature of the amphibious operation undertaken and also on the further progress of the battle in Italy. I estimate, however, that I shall need the 90 sailings for July requested in MEDCOS 107 and also 90 sailings for August.

4. With reference to your para 6, details of my needs for tactical requirements of supplies and troops have been furnished separately.

5. If a target date of 15th August is to be met, the allocation of the necessary shipping and also the supplies and troops which are deficient in this theatre must be authorized immediately. Administrative preparations are now proceeding in this theatre and the fitting out of cargo shipping at the present in the Mediterranean and earmarked for my amphibious operation has already begun.

End

COMMED 120 is CM-IN-5656 (7 Jun 44) CC/3 MEDCOS 107
is CM-IN-10691 (14 May 44) CC/3

ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, Gen Somervell, Gen Bissell,
Adm. King, Col. Park, Log, OPD

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2 June 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: AFHQ Algiers

Info: JSM Washington

COSMED 120

O.T.P.

Reference MFDCOS 110.

A. Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff. Begins -

1. The cargo sailings requested by you for internal maintenance and for the maintenance of DIADEM in June and July will be furnished from combined resources as follows: June (? 100) sailings, July 90 sailings.
2. You should estimate and report your requirement for cargo sailings for July and succeeding months for Italian operations on the assumption that an ANVIL-type operation is mounted at earliest practicable date.
3. You may plan on basis that 100 cargo ships can be made available in time to permit pre-loading in mid July for an ANVIL-type amphibious operation and that shipping can be made available to support the operation.
4. Actual allocation of shipping is dependent on firm decision to undertake the operation with specific target date.
5. You should bear in mind that your firm demands for shipping must be made 60 days before assault to allow time for collection of vessels.

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CM-IN-5656

(7 Jun 44)

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COSMED 120

2 June 1944

Page

6. In view of priority (? afforded) DIADEM and its supply requirements, supplies originally furnished (? to) ANVIL have been released for DIADEM and only such part of them as are not used in DIADEM can be considered as being available for an ANVIL-type operation. Some service units originally earmarked for ANVIL have been shipped from U. S. to other theaters. Therefore any major or specially critical requirements for supplies and troops for an ANVIL-type operation which must come from the U. S. can be met only if proposed operations is restored to priority originally given ANVIL. Approximately 90 days will be required after firm decision is taken in order to insure the provision of such supplies and troops. - Ends.

B. Reference - Para 6 above. We have instructed JSM to take up with U. S. C. O. S. the question of reducing from 90 days to 60 days the period of notice required for provision of supplies and troops in question.

End

T.O.O. 021525Z

NOTE: MEDCOS 110 is CM-IN-13590 (18 May 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Gen Somervell
Col Park
Log

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Date- DEC 7 1971

Signature- *RFP*

CM-IN-5656 (7 Jun 44) 2031Z

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