PSF Interior Dept.: Harold Ickes 1941

Box 73

PSF Ickes

January 4, 1941.

Dear Harold:

It is good to get yours of December thirty-first. I am going to talk with Halifax in regard to a more general meeting when he gets here, and I am sending over to London Harry Hopkins for two of three weeks so that he can talk to Churchill like an Iowa farmer.

We have two recruits who played with us Thursday night and we drank your health. Knudsen is good at the ancient game but Knox is worse than you are!

I do hope you caught a fish. Pa won't let you in if you don't. Said fish must weigh more than seven and a half pounds in order to beat Pa's latest. A word is enough!

As ever yours,

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Brooksville,
Florida.

PSF Ickes

THE WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED
JAN 3 8 57 AM '41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

Brooksville, Flordia.

December 31, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

Jane and I brought a portable radio set with us so that we could hear your speech last Sunday night. We were glad that we did. The country was ready for this particular speech and only you could have given it. I was particularly pleased with what you said about "business as usual" and our own appeasers without mentioning names. Now that you have laid the foundation, more specific statements can follow and others can share that burden with you.

Now that the call to arms has been sounded it seems to me more than ever necessary to set up quickly an organization that can follow through in engaging the fifth columnists and the appeasers. I have also been much taken with the suggestion of a convention or congress or parliament of democracies to be held in Washington. In this instance might it not be a good plan to give it the name "parliament" because England is fighting for its parliamentary system and the British parliament has been the mother of similar groups whatever their names might be. If you decide to do this there is one precaution that has perhaps occurred to you. It would not be well to have as representatives of either Spain or France or Belgium or any other country that has been overrun by Hitler, persons who might make a plea for sending food into the territories that have been occupies by the Nazis or Fascists.

May I thank you again for the most attractive despatch case that

came from you for Christmas. I liked it particularly that this year you went to England to buy this gift. That Jane shares my pleasure is evidenced by the fact that when I opened my brief case upon arrival at Bimini's Isle I found within it the despatch case loaded with her personal stationery. However, she has not yet dared to substitute her initials for mine.

The weather is lovely here now, but the fish are as illusive as they generally are when I am in a boat with a rod in my hand. Poker is my real metier; no one runs from me in that great indoor sport.

Jane and I send affectionate greetings and best wishes to Mrs. Roosevelt and yourself for the New York.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

PSF dclbo

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file
corr. dealer
School

Mr. President:

You are a great psychologist. I will print you a $10,000 story
at your earliest convenience.

H. L. P.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President

File personal PSF

Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED
JAN 11 8 49 AM '41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON
Brooksville, Florida.

January 8, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Yours of January 4 inspires the hope that Knox may participate in some game in which I sit. Until then I can hardly believe that he is any worse than I am. But with two of us to pluck, the rest of you ought to have a pleasant and profitable evening.

You are right about waiting to talk to Lord Halifax about the more general meeting. I hope he will agree that it is a good idea. It would give a wonderful setting for reaffirming the principles and ideals of democracy. And it would have a tonic effect in all parts of the world where the dictators are feared or hated.

I refuse to commit myself on the question of what we may or may not have caught in the way of fish. Even to raise such a matter is an unwarranted intrusion into one's privacy. I might be willing to discuss it with you in strict privacy, but I am in no mood to say anything that would give "Pa" a chance to shake the building with his gargantiun laughter. Without making any piscatorial admission and with a full reservation of all legal rights, I do venture to express the hope that I am going to be luckier in the matter of Forestry than I have been at the "ancient game." After all, one is entitled to a break in luck somewhere along the line and I am looking forward to January 21 as I imagine that a man sentenced to the guillotine must have looked forward to the time when the tumbrel backed up for its victims. You will, of course, be aware that, under this bandinage with respect to

Forestry, there is real seriousness and deep feeling.

We have decided to shorten our stay here so that we will be back in Washington next Monday, January the 13th.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

P.S. The more I think of it the more impressed I am with your fireside chat on December 29 and your subsequent message to Congress. They were impressive in their statesmanship and eloquent in their expression. This is a pair that only you could hope to draw to.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

PSF Interior

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED
JAN 21 11 45 AM '41

January 18, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

You may be interested in the enclosed copy of a letter from Cyrus S. Eaton in re Wendell Willkie, with attachment.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Encs.

CYRUS S. EATON
300 CUYAHOGA BUILDING
CLEVELAND, OHIO

January 14, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Wendell Willkie wasn't long in going back to his old pals. Landon K. Thorne, whom the barefoot boy from Wall Street has chosen as one of his companions for his trip to England, is another one of his "boyhood heroes", although not one of those he mentioned during the recent political campaign.

Thorne, who is a director of J. P. Morgan's First National Bank, was the organizer of the American Superpower Corp., the utility holding company which is the grandfather of most of the Morgan holding companies, including United Corp. and Commonwealth & Southern. The chief contents of American Superpower's portfolio are 3,500,000 shares of C. & S. common, 2,721,447 C. & S. warrants and 1,000,000 shares of United Corp. common. These carefully selected holdings undoubtedly help account for the fact that the decline in the market value of American Superpower stock is right in line with that of its grandchildren.* From the market high the value of American Superpower common has shrunk 99.8%, from $590,000,000 to $1,036,625.

Thorne shared with the Morgans in the organization of United Corp. and with the Morgans and Willkie in the formation of Commonwealth & Southern. He very wisely passed on a great deal of his personal utility holdings to the public at the top of their market value.

Birds of a feather!

Sincerely yours,

Cyrus S. Eaton

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C.

*See attached tabulation for shrink in United Corp. and other associated companies in the Morgan group.

Market valuations placed on equity of United Corporation, and the 10 Utility Companies associated with United Corporation in the Morgan group.

Computations based on stocks and warrants outstanding December 31, 1939, using all time high and 1940 closing prices.

| Name of Company | All time high | 1940 close |
|---|---|---|
| Columbia Gas & Electric | $ 1,332,515,226 | $ 57,633,581 |
| Niagara Hudson Power Com. & Wts. | 1,158,308,322 | 28,925,444 |
| Public Service Co. of N. J. | 758,064,835 | 161,656,294 |
| United Gas Imp. | 1,386,401,096 | 229,613,599 |
| American Water Works | 466,277,895 | 15,815,958 |
| Commonwealth & Southern Com. & Wts. | 1,290,802,887 | 27,909,209 |
| Consolidated Edison of N. Y. | 2,103,073,573 | 258,221,857 |
| Consolidated Gas Balto. | 186,783,520 | 80,112,619 |
| Electric Bond & Share | 2,986,472,349 | 21,068,588 |
| Lehigh Coal & Nav. | 111,808,986 | 4,581,676 |
| United Corporation Com. & Wts | 1,212,203,892 | 20,444,557 |
| Total - - - - - | $ 12,992,712,581 | $ 905,983,382 |

Total shrinkage $12,086,729,199 - - 93¼%

PSF Interior Ickes

January 21, 1941

Dear Harold:

You are a grand soldier and this second sacrifice hit of yours is deeply appreciated. There is one good thing about these sacrifice hits -- they do advance another member of the team from first to second or second to third or third to home plate. They build up runs and runs are what count. We will get something done about National Forests yet.

As ever,

The Honorable,
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

fdr/tmb

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am dictating this additional note which I will not have an opportunity to sign but which will be enclosed with the accompanying letter sent to you.

Burlew has just called me at the farm to say that McCarran on behalf of a subcommittee that was appointed at the last session to investigate matters in connection with the public lands, was demanding all intra-departmental letters and memoranda in connection with the proposed transfer of Forestry to Interior. We do not believe that he has a right to these files under the resolution setting up his committee and we are going to refuse to produce on this ground. I understand that the same demand has been or will be made on the Department of Agriculture, and Burlew is advising Appleby by telephone of our position in the hope that Agriculture will do the same. If we make this objection, the matter will be thrown back to the full Committee on Public Lands in the Senate, of which Senator Adams is chairman, and we think that the full committee will uphold our stand.

I need not tell you that it might be very embarrassing if we had to produce these files. Probably Agriculture would be more embarrassed than we.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

(Dictated but not read)

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your suggestion, I went down late this morning to Jimmy Byrnes' office and we thoroughly considered from all possible angles the question of sending an order to Congress not later than January 21, next, transferring Forestry to Interior. He told me of the commitments that had been made both by you and by him on your behalf in order to hold together the votes necessary to defeat the Wheeler amendment. If you should send up the order, he would feel that he would have to oppose it, and I do not see how he could do otherwise.

I am persuaded, and I believe that Byrnes likewise is convinced, that if you should send up the order the House would defeat any motion to disapprove it. Even so, however, the stage would be set for your enemies to make the charge that you had broken faith, not only with your letter to Senator Pittman, in which, at the time that the act was passed, you said that you had no intention of transferring Forestry, but with other senators as well to whom verbal statements had been made by you and by Senator Byrnes. So far as Jimmy is concerned, he has no feeling one way or the other about the locus in quo of Forestry. But he does feel strongly that you should not be put in such a position as I have described.

Senator Byrnes was persuasive with me. Much as I want Forestry and bitterly disappointed as I am that once again I am to be denied the objective toward which I have persistently worked for almost eight years, I am un-

willing to be a party to your being placed in a position where you can be attacked. At the last session I made one sacrifice hit when I urged you not to send up the order on which your mind was set because at that time I was doubtful whether you would be sustained in the House, and for the further reason that it might have unfortunate repercussions during the campaign. Now, although I believe that the House would sustain the order, I am making another sacrifice hit in asking you not to send it up in view of the commitments that were made at the time the reorganization act passed the Senate.

Senator Byrnes also convinced me that your message, with the accompanying joint resolution giving you further time within which to send up reorganization orders, should not be introduced until the important "Lend-Lease Bill," which is now pending, shall have been disposed of. If you are given this further grant of power, I hope that you will be disposed at once to send up an order transferring Forestry. Jimmy is of the opinion that an extension of your powers will absolve you from the commitments that were made at the time the reorganization act passed the Senate. In other words, there could be no just criticism of the order on the ground of any commitment made. Jimmy would then feel free personally to consider the order strictly on its merits.

If you cannot get this further grant of power, the easiest way of transferring Forestry will, of course, be lost. In that event, I hope that you will give me permission to introduce a bill transferring Forestry and that you will support that bill. The sentiment not only

in Congress but among conservationists and stockmen who formerly bitterly fought any suggestion of transfer has so changed that I believe that we could put such a bill through both branches of the Congress.

I know that I am giving up a certainty for an uncertainty, but I would not be happy if you should send up the order now and thus draw down criticism upon yourself.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

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Ickes

February 6, 1941.

Dear Claude:-

There has come to my attention a copy of a letter signed by Earl H. Clapp as Acting Chief of the Forest Service. This letter was dated Washington, March 30, 1940, and was addressed to "Regional Foresters and Directors".

The second sentence of this letter refers to "the threat of reorganization". Under the law -- a special law current at that time but now expired by limitation -- the President of the United States was authorized to make certain departmental or agency reorganizations, subject to disapproval of both Houses of the Congress within a given time. I am, of course, aware that there was much talk in regard to a dozen different plans affecting different agencies or bureaus of the Government at that time. These were plans, many of them imaginary, none of which were acted on by the President under the Reorganization Act.

The Forest Service, like any other bureau of any other department, acts under the law as a part of the executive authority which, under the Constitution, is vested in the President.

The words "threat of reorganization" on the part of the Acting Chief Forester obviously imply:

(a) That his executive superior, the President of the United States, proposes under the law some reorganization of the Forest Service.

(b) That the Forest Service is opposed to any reorganization under the authority granted by the President. Furthermore, the whole letter assumes the right of a subordinate branch of one of many departments to organize the Government employees to oppose an Executive Order issued by the President, in accordance with law.

I think that this requires explanation on the part of the Acting Chief Forester, Mr. Clapp; in fact, the whole letter does.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Honorable
The Secretary of Agriculture

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1941.

THE WHITE HOUSE
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My dear Mr. President:

The document I enclose is a long one but I think that you will find it interesting as a frank disclosure of the way the Forest lobby works. You will note that it is over the signature of Acting Chief Forester Clapp. I call your particular attention to the expression "the threat of reorganization" in the second paragraph. The document that I am sending with Mr. Clapp's form letter is a copy of editorial comments upon that letter in the magazine maintained by the lumber interests.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

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Pertinent Comments on Letter of March 30, 1940, directed to Regional Foresters and Directors of the United States Forest Service by Earl H. Clapp, Acting Chief

The Forest Service has issued the attached instructions to all of its field offices to conduct an intensive "educational campaign" relating to a National Forest Policy. As part of an orderly balanced program, there would seem to be no objection to a discussion of facts when the object is to develop thought which will make its own determinations.

When such campaign goes beyond limits somewhat of that character, and when its theme is a system of new federal and state laws of rather definite character involving large appropriations, it cannot properly be called an "educational" program, but it is in fact a drive for specific types of legislation and for large appropriations of public money.

In the current instance, the program of regulation, as recommended by the U. S. Forest Service representatives at the Joint Congressional Committee's hearing, including proposals for federal policing and state policing of private lands, and including proposal for large expenditures for the purchase of forest lands, is the definite objective of the campaign.

To bring about this legislation, the executive officers of the Forest Service are instructed to forget their provincialism, to give up their own views regarding the meaning of basic facts and conditions to them, and to accept the legislative program of the Forest Service as their law and gospel. It is made clear that the Forest Service is laying down the law, and that all members of that organization are now to adjust their thinking to that pattern.

To put the legislative program into effect, the executive officers of the Forest Service are definitely instructed to conduct an intensive campaign for this legislation using as much of their personnel as possible. The U. S. Forest Service has thousands of employees and annual appropriations running into the millions. That instruction can be implemented by directing many people to do less of their regular work, and more of this special campaigning all to be paid for out of Bureau funds, primarily appropriated for other definite purposes.

As a feature, regional officers are instructed to compile lists showing those who are not sympathetic to this legislative plan, and to see that such lists are filed with headquarters in Washington. Similar action is to be taken with those who are favorable to the plan, and it is directed that this "educational" work shall be intensified at those spots where it will do the most good.

It is ordered that this intensive drive shall be so made that those who thus become interested shall direct their attention on this matter, not so much to the committees which are studying these problems in Congress, but to the Members of Congress themselves, so that it will be easier to put this legislative program through that body.

Finally, it is pointed out to the Regional executive officers that representatives of the Washington office will visit them from time to time to find out to what extent these instructions are being followed up. They are instructed to make reports of progress and the Washington headquarters states that there will be a special set up in Washington to give intensive consideration to the entire campaign.

Here is an intensive specially organized campaign directing that all of the resources of a very large Government Bureau be without argument or protest directed into a campaign to influence Members of Congress to the end, that specific forms of legislation be promptly enacted, such legislation involving new relationships to the police powers of the states, and involving tremendous appropriations. Assuming that all of the objectives are good, that the program for attaining the objectives is not controversial in the states or in Congress, nevertheless, it is highly improper, if not illegal, for a Government Bureau having at its command millions of dollars, and thousands of employees to organize an intensive propaganda campaign directed at the Federal Congress aiming to force the passage of the legislation, which the Bureau recommends, and to make the appropriations to cover it. The procedure is dangerous, costly, tends to put Congress under the influence of administrative departments, and if it is not illegal, should be made so promptly.

The forest problems of the United States are necessarily provincial in many aspects. There are proper differences of opinion regarding their solution and the measures which may best be taken in each state. The attached letter outlines what appears to be an improper activity by a Federal Bureau. The merits of the legislation are not here discussed. Attention is called to a method of dealing with Congress which ought not to be followed by any Bureau of the Administrative Departments.

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It is believed that an investigation will show that the Executive Departments are expected to deal with Congress on matters relating to appropriations or specific legislation only through certain channels, such as the Secretary's office, or as called upon in the course of Congressional

Committee hearings. It is not believed that members of the Executive Departments are permitted to lobby with Members of Congress, or to ask people to write to Members of Congress in behalf of such legislation, or to conduct a drive with the intent of influencing Congress on such legislation.

Presumably Departments or Bureaus can conduct educational campaigns where they present facts. Probably they can handle such efforts so that they are in behalf of a broad, generalized program, and it is difficult to draw an exact dividing line between the elements of a proper educational campaign and propaganda for appropriations and rather specific types of legislation. But, in this instance, it is clearly shown that the intent is to bring pressure to bear upon Members of Congress through friendly organizations and individuals, to see that efforts are directed towards such members rather than committee members, to see that lists are kept of persons and organizations not favoring the program, and to use all possible personnel to accomplish results. Probably, these lists of opponents are to be compiled and sent to Washington so that their arguments can be nullified by classifying them under "self interest". Compiling complete lists in Washington of citizens who do not agree with the Bureau program is a startling, new feature of life under our democracy.

Despite all these considerations, it is not believed that the lumber industry should take the lead in discussing this particular case of Departmental immorality. It will simply be claimed that the selfish interests are trying to undermine a worthy project. In due course, if the Bureau campaign is conducted as intensively as indicated, Members of Congress will sense that an improper Bureau effort is being made to influence them, and may investigate that situation from that viewpoint, which is something which concerns them as considered separately from the merits of the legislation itself.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FOREST SERVICE

Address Reply to
Chief, Forest Service
and Refer to
C
Supervision

Washington, D. C.
March 30th, 1940

Regional Foresters and Directors

Dear Sir:

While in the West last summer and fall I discussed with a number of Regional Foresters and Directors two groups of problems, and a plan which might help in their solution.

One group of problems included the existing morale in the Forest Service, and baffled feeling of many men because they do not know what Forest Service objectives are, the feeling of uneasiness or even hopelessness because of inadequate legislation and funds for badly needed work, the belief that the Service is continually on the defensive, the damper on enthusiasm and creative effort caused by the threat of reorganization, the tendency throughout the Service toward provincialism and a narrow conception of individual jobs and of Service responsibilities, etc.

The second group of problems includes the broad forest problem of the United States and the inadequacy of what is being done about it. It includes the numerous and frequently opposing forces, which have widely different conceptions of the forest problem, and which by advocating different programs, and opposing all programs but their own, tend to nullify each other and prevent real progress. The immediate focal point of this group of problems includes the work of the Joint Congressional Committee on Forestry, the recommendation it may make, the hurdles which its legislative program will have to overcome, the opportunity which the creation of the Committee affords to obtain the federal action needed to put American forestry on a satisfactory foundation.

I asked whether a decidedly worth-while contribution to the solution of both groups of problems could not be made by a nation-wide educational campaign in which the entire Forest Service would participate, designed to obtain a real public understanding of the forest problem of the United States, and to stimulate aggressive public action to safeguard its own interest.

Whether, so far as the first group of problems is concerned, such a campaign would not help to unify the Forest Service, restore its morale and fighting spirit, broaden its conception of its job and help to redeem its responsibility.

And whether, as far as the second group of problems is concerned, such a campaign, under unified, sustained and nationwide Forest Service leadership could not offset the nullifying effect of the opposing forces which now prevent progress. And finally, whether such a campaign would not help to supply the impetus needed to insure enlightened public support to the Joint Committee and assistance in obtaining satisfactory federal action.

In practically every instance the answer was yes. But it was pointed out that the Forest Service would first have to have a clear-cut statement of the forest problem, and of the program which we advocate.

The purpose of this letter is, first, to outline a plan for a Service-wide educational campaign, and second, to issue instructions for getting it under way. In preparation for it I have already had sent to you copies of:

(1) A report entitled "A National Forest Economy" drafted for possible submission to the Joint Congressional Committee. This report, which contains considerable background material, was sent to all Regions, Stations, and National Forests last summer.

(2) The statement of the Secretary of Agriculture before the J. C. C. which among other things includes a positive recommendation for public regulation.

(3) The full statement on public regulation made by the Forest Service to the Joint Committee.

(4) And finally, a summary of the entire program presented by the Forest Service to the Committee, and of the justification for it.

Statements 2, 3 and 4 may be distributed wherever desirable to further the campaign. This material will be supplemented from time to time as required.

Copies of the volume of the general Washington hearings, containing the full Forest Service analysis of the forest problem of the United States as well as the full statement on the program recommended, will be sent to all Regions, Stations and National Forests as soon as it is received from the printer. The limited number available will not permit general distribution.

On August 18, 1939, a short-term program was sent to you which was designed primarily to have something which could be given to people and organizations who wanted to take an active part in furthering forest conservation. This short-term program is now superseded by the program recommended to the J. C. C.

One viewpoint in our presentation to the Committee and two recommendations call for special mention.

The viewpoint is the social importance of forestry and the social objectives of the forest program recommended. This was given major emphasis by the Forest Service in our analysis of the nationwide forest problem at the general Washington hearings. This emphasis constituted a sharp contrast to the evidence of some other witnesses who said that social problems, such as unemployment and low income and rural problem areas in forest regions, were not a part of the forest problem and necessarily had to be approached and handled by themselves. This point is stressed so that the social aspects and objectives of forestry will be kept fully in the picture in the educational campaign called for in this letter.

Public regulation is one of the recommendations referred to. It is certain to meet a large amount of opposition from the forest industries at least. We have tried to take the edge off such opposition by making regulation a part of a two-way cooperation--enlarged public aid on the one hand and assurance of satisfactory private practice through public controls on the other. Legislative authorization for public regulation is a major step in the consummation of a real forest program in the United States. As you already know, regulation was recommended to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Forest Service and approved personally by him. The Secretary went so far as personally to recommend regulation to the Joint Committee. This part of the program, accordingly, has Departmental as well as Forest Service status. This is the status which requires the full and whole-hearted support of the entire Forest Service organization.

I know, of course, that some Forest Service men have never given the question of regulation very much consideration. I know that some have been opposed to it. I know that others have held back because of the fear that active support would threaten cooperative relations with various groups of forest land owners. I am convinced, however, that in the long run the Forest Service has little to fear and much to gain from a strong position on this question. We are employed by the general public and we should work in its interests. We should not allow ourselves to be deterred by fear of criticism by timberland owners or reactionaries whose point of view is frequently selfish and contrary to the public interest.

I want to put especial emphasis on the importance of retention in any regulatory legislation of one part of the plan recommended. This is the part under which the Federal Government would be authorized to take over the regulation job in cases where the States are unwilling to do it or unable to do a satisfactory job. It is my judgment--and the Washington staff joins me in this--that the success of the regulation effort is going to depend to a

very large extent upon this provision. The reasons for this belief are outlined in some detail in the supplemental statement forwarded to you with my letter of March 1.

I shall appreciate it if on the regulation phase of the program in particular you keep me currently informed of the support which is developed, as well as of the opposition. I mean this in the sense of individuals, organizations, newspapers, etc. I am particularly anxious to learn of people and organizations who will support the plan recommended by the Department and the Forest Service. Without any doubt there are many public-spirited people and organizations in the United States who will be glad of the opportunity to support public regulation if it is brought to their attention.

The second recommendation to which I would like to call attention is the extension of public ownership; community, State and Federal. We all know that there are millions of acres of forest land in the U. S. which for one reason or another should be in public ownership. The sooner this can be brought about the better. It is another major step towards a real forest program in the United States. We should not be deterred from seeking support on this important and fundamentally sound part of our program because of unsound or selfish opposition. Such opposition merely emphasizes the need for an educational campaign. Furthermore, a part of the program recommended is designed to make more equitable contributions in lieu of taxation to local units of government. The present system is one of the main points of criticism of public acquisition.

In the printed record of the general Washington hearings you will find a supplemental statement on public acquisition which may be helpful in your educational effort.

These two parts of the program, public regulation and public acquisition, are mentioned because of their outstanding importance; not to detract in any way from the importance of other recommendations such as public cooperation, national forest administration, and research. It is worthwhile remembering that both regulation and acquisition, along with various forms of public cooperation, are merely different forms of attack on the private forest land problem.

You have already been notified that a concurrent resolution has been introduced in both the Senate and the House which will extend to April 1, 1941, the time before which the Committee must submit its recommendations. The Forest Service has not been consulted in regard to this proposed extension of time. Apparently, however, one reason is the realization by the Committee that it has a much larger problem on its hands than it anticipated, and that more time will be required to do a satisfactory job.

Regardless of the reasons, and despite obviously unfortunate aspects of the decision, it does have the advantage of affording more time for public education and consideration.

In closing minutes of the New England hearing in Washington, Chairman Bankhead commended the Forest Service for the help given to the Committee and for our general attitude. He said among other things that we had tried in every way possible to help the Committee, but not to dominate it. This commendation emphasizes the need for directing our educational efforts toward the development of widespread public understanding and interest in what the public itself needs, and for avoiding the appearance of a concerted drive by a bureau merely to aggrandize itself or to force the hand of the Committee.

The specific purpose of this letter is to ask you to begin--or to continue--efforts toward a nationwide educational effort. It must, of course, be carefully planned and carried out systematically and ably with all of the resources at your disposal. The detailed ways and means must be worked out locally. And they must be worked out in cooperation by the Regional Offices and the Forest Experiment Stations.

The general direction and coordination of the campaign will have to come from Washington.

The objectives of the campaign should be:

1. To acquaint the general public with the forest situation, the remedial program called for and the reasons for it, so that the public can and will act understandingly and aggressively in its own interest.

2. To make sure the J. C. C. is aided as fully as possible by a full public appreciation of the problem, and of the need for a sound program and by widespread public support for it.

3. To aid the rank and file of the membership of both Houses of Congress in keeping abreast of an informal public opinion.

Obviously, our efforts with the general public, whether with individuals or with organizations, must to a reasonable extent be selective. We would defeat our objectives if we tried to acquaint every person and every organization with every part of the entire program. It is equally obvious that different people and different organizations will be particularly interested and anxious to do something worthwhile on different parts of the program. This should not be construed to mean that we should not face the music on controversial questions like regulation with a good many groups which are not indifferent or opposed, such as the forest industries. We

shall have to do this to get any support on controversial questions. Altogether this does mean the use of good judgment and good strategy in accomplishing a major purpose.

It would be most helpful to the J. C. C. if the opinion of interested people is reflected in the legislature consideration which undoubtedly will be given the Committee's recommendations, rather than to have such interest conveyed to the Committee direct.

Local members of Congress will be the first to appreciate an enlightened public sentiment and will no doubt express the opinion of their constituency to others from other districts or States including the members of the Committee itself.

Controversial questions like regulation, and particularly the Federal part in regulation, is probably an exception to the general rule outlined in the two preceding paragraphs. Here the Committee will probably need all the direct encouragement and help and support it can get.

Some such procedure as the following should be helpful in attaining objectives 1, 2, 3:

A. Determine what phase of the forest problem and of the program your key people and organizations, or any others, might be interested in or <u>should be active in</u>. This should include wide representation of the general public, conservationists, agriculture, owners of forest land, consumers of forest products and other beneficiaries of the forest, the distributors of forest products, labor, etc., etc.

B. For each of these make a liason forest officer responsible for:

1. Acquainting the key people, organizations, etc., with information on the forest situation, and with all or appropriate parts of the program to the point of active interest and the desire to take effective action.

2. Helping him--or them--effectively to present the questions involved in the manner heretofore indicated so as to render the maximum service to the J. C. C.

3. Seeing that the most effective educational devices and forms of action are employed.

4. Keeping you informed.

The educational service called for in this letter should be <u>one of the major public relation efforts</u> of the Forest Service in months to come.

It should be an effort in which, as already indicated, just as large a part as possible of our entire personnel should be asked to participate. So far as the Washington office is concerned this means the active participation not only of the Divisions of I. and E. but also of all other branches and divisions. It means a special set-up in Washington, if one can be arranged, to insure action and correlation. As long as I have direct responsibility I want to devote as much personal time and attention to this effort as the pressure of other work permits.

I think that there is a growing tendency among men in charge of important units of the Forest Service to decide for themselves whether or not they and their assistants will take an active part in carrying out instructions from the Chief's office such as these. This is one example of what I had in mind in the first paragraph of this letter as a tendency towards provincialism. If the Forest Service is to occupy the place that it should in the conservation field, and if it is to exercise outstanding leadership in forest conservation, there are occasions such as this campaign when the entire organization will have to act together as a unit to accomplish a single purpose.

Men from this office on field trips will confer with you to learn what progress is being made, to keep you posted, and to help coordinate efforts. Conferences in Washington and in the field will be arranged as necessary.

Various questions in regard to the program recommended will be taken up in separate letters in the near future.

In closing I want to restate for emphasis my strong conviction that this educational program is justified, primarily because both the Department and the Forest Service are falling far short of doing a satisfactory job. This is true in spite of all the good work which has been done on national forests and on privately owned lands. We ought to bring about the practice of forestry on privately owned lands much more rapidly. We ought to raise the standards of national forest administration. We ought to make forestry contribute much more largely to the solution of our critical social problems.

As a means to these ends we must clarify Forest Service objectives. We must broaden the outlook of our own personnel. We must unify the organization. By unified nationwide sustained action, we must overcome the conflicting forces which are now nullifying each other and preventing necessary action. In brief, the Forest Service must exercise the public leadership necessary for fully meeting its responsibilities.

The deliberations of the J. C. C., its recommendations, and the action taken on these recommendations by Congress afford one opportunity that we and the American Public may not have again for many years.

Drop me a line about your plans and as developments warrant.

Very sincerely yours,

Signed: Earl H. Clapp

Acting Chief, Forest Service

PSF
Ickes

Interior
Folder

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

February 7, 1941.

Dear Rex:-

Harold and I have talked over the matter of Forestry again. If anything is to be done, it is necessary to get some new blood into the picture, and I have asked him to try to find for me two people who will not only represent "new blood" but be, if possible, popular with the Congress. One of these should be a new name of the Louis Brownlow, Charles Merriman type -- an expert in Government management set-up. The other should be a man who can make and give a quick field survey and show where and how national forests, public lands, national monuments and national parks all overlap and need consolidated management for practical reasons.

It all goes back to my general reading of American history -- that the Interior Department was originally set up to look after all kinds of Government owned land, and that ten years later the Department of Agriculture (first as a Bureau) was set up as an aid to farmers who owned or rented their own land.

In the last analysis, that old distinction is the simplest one that we can make now.

Always sincerely,

Honorable Rexford G. Tugwell,
Municipal Building,
New York City,
New York.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1941

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ICKES:

To read and speak to me about.

F.D.R.

Municipal Building
New York City

January 27, 1941

My dear Mr. President

While I have been waiting to hear from you further about the Forest Service, I have had time to give it a good deal of thought. It seems to me you have only three effective alternatives: one, determine to let the situation rest as it is with some attempt to compose differences between the two Departments involved; two, determine to come out in the open in favor of moving it to the Department of the Interior; and, three, set up a commission with a year or two in which to study, have hearings, try to conciliate differences, and report to you.

I have come to feel that this is a situation in which the commission technique can very properly be used and might result in something useful. Before you make up your mind finally I should like you to consider it. In the first place, it would put off deciding and I believe the current of opinion will run in the direction in which you want it to run; whereas if you decide now to leave Forest Service in Agriculture and merely try to compose differences between the Departments I think you will make it more difficult to do anything of another sort in the future. In the second place, I think that by having hearings such a commission could bring all the irritations and antagonisms out into the open and expose their real pettiness.

Such a commission might be composed of three members of the Senate, three of the House, three from the colleges of forestry, and six members of the public from all sections of the country, making fifteen in all. You would have to ask Congress, I suppose, for a joint resolution and for expense money, although everyone might be expected to serve without compensation. Such a commission ought to have at least a year and perhaps two years in which to report. I should be glad to undertake its organization and management, if you should desire it. Of course, I should have to have LaGuardia's approval.

In case you decide on the first alternative, you need only have a meeting of those concerned. In case you decide on the second, I enclose a memorandum which might serve as the basis for a message to Congress. If you decide on the third, I enclose another draft which could be used as a message to Congress.

You realize, I hope, that I am only doing this to save you time and, if possible, to help clarify your mind; not in any attempt to influence your decision in the matter.

Respectfully

Rex Tugwell

In 1905, for reasons which have now lost all reality and are of interest only to antiquarians, the Forest Service was moved from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture. The suspicions and antagonisms from that past time have survived in the minds of conservationists to a certain extent but, among members of the two Departments involved, in a bitter form which appears on every possible occasion. More than a generation has passed; yet fears and recriminations still seem to be passed on in virulent form to new members of all the agencies involved. This is a sad matter for the cause of conservation in this country and I have had an ambition to bring it to an end.

In disucssions leading to the various agency changes I have recommended during the past few years in the interest of greater efficiency in the executive departments, the Forest Service, the Park Service, the Grazing Service, and the Fish and Wild Life Service have been much in controversy. Much of this controversy comes from old jealousies and very little of it has had to do with genuine interest in improvement. The old Fisheries Bureau was moved to the Department of the Interior and there combined with the Biological Survey, which had been transferred from the Department of Agriculture, under the name of Fish and Wild Life Service. But there is evidently more that needs to be done. In both Forests and Parks there is provision for recreation. On the Forests there is extensive grazing under other management than that of the Grazing Service. Other illustrations could be used to show why there has been so much discussion during all this time of the best organization for these various services - of ways to eliminate duplications, to

mark out spheres of interest and get on with the business of conservation.

Alternative principles have been suggested to guide reorganization, none of them acceptable to everyone because they were so obviously invented to support a previously held position. Without lingering longer over the history of dissention which has been so unfortunately characteristic of the uses of our public lands, I have come to the conclusion that clarification may best be approached by the appointment of a Commission to study the whole matter, to reconcile conflicting opinions, and finally to report its findings. I believe we may in this way find a basis for settlement of old controversies and for a new approach to conservation.

Such a Commission should be given broad terms of reference to study and to recommend the best methods of managing the lands owned by the government of the United States. No reservation should be imposed in the interest of any government agency, and none should be considered with the intention of protecting one private interest more than another. This is a matter in which the whole people are concerned and it should be the general interest primarily which should be sought.

I therefore ask that by joint resolution the Congress may empower me to name a commission to consist of three members of the Senate, three of the House of Representatives, three from the Colleges of Forestry, and six from the general public, all to serve without compensation; and that $_____ be provided to meet travel and office expenses for such time as may be necessary.

For reasons which by now have lost all reality, and are of interest only to historians, the Forest Service in 1905 was transferred from the Department of Interior to the Department of Agriculture. However necessary it may have been to protect forest lands in the past by their conspicuous isolation, there was another result which has become more apparent as the years have passed. There was administrative confusion. For the government's other land holdings -- the Public Domain and the Parks -- remained in the Department of Interior. What began as an interdepartmental quarrel over policy became a persistent mutual antagonism which at best was merely annoying but which at worst was dangerous to the morale of all the affected services.

For forest lands are not notably different in character from other public holdings; there is much grazing on them, they are largely devoted to recreation, they are a habitat for wildlife. The timber, it is true, is cultivated as a crop. But growing trees are also the most distinctive feature of our Parks. And most of the Parks are surrounded by Forests. What is obviously called for is common management of these great national assets and adjournment of departmental jealousies over their control.

There will be lobbyists who will tell you that conservation will be jeopardized by any change. I do not believe it. Whether sinister influences may have operated in the Department of the Interior in the past I do not know. It is of no interest to this generation. For I do know that they are not there now. I know also that grazing is under several confusing jurisdictions now, that the Forest and Parks Services dispute over boundaries, over functions, and over fancied grievances, and that all this ought to come to an end.

In seeking a solution I have waited literally for years hoping for clear guidance and have sought the advice of countless conservationists. I believe the solution now accepted by most of those who have put aside prejudice, unseemly emotion, and vested interest is to be found in creating a Public Lands Administration to be set up in the Department of the Interior. The other land services could not be moved to Agriculture. There is not needed an independent Department. There remains only the alternative I suggest.

I propose that the Public Lands Administration should include in one unit the Park, Forest, Grazing and Wildlife, and Fisheries Services. In this way economies of administration may be gained by the elimination of duplication. It is also necessary, however, that certain measures should be at

once considered for extending and strengthening the consolidated services. These would include the purchase of certain valuable stands of timber which might otherwise be lost through clear cutting, the extension of cooperative fire protections and the further development of recreational areas of the sort most appreciated by average folk who love their national monuments and value their contact with nature and the wide outdoors.

It will be a relief to all involved, I am sure, if this perplexing problem can be settled now and a new future entered upon by the custodians of these vast national resources.

Ickes Folder

BF

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I agree that you should take no personal part in the campaign in Spokane, Washington, for municipal power. I have discussed this with Senators Bone and Wallgren and they both agree. They think, however, that a statement by someone that the National Administration would be interested in continuing a transmission line to Spokane to supply power in the event of a favorable vote, would be desirable. Accordingly, a planted question will be asked of me at my next press conference.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

293

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1941

PRIVATE AND [redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ICKES:

What do you think? I hesitate to go as far as John Boettiger suggests in mixing up in a municipal power election.

F.D.R.

Memorandum from JB (John Boettiger), to Miss LeHand, with enclosed drafts of letter to C.C. Dill and Homer Bone, in reply to letter from Mr. Dill to the President, 1/20/41, in re President's support to win fight in connection with municipal ownership of Spokane's power distribution system, which will be voted on March 11. Miss LeHand, by memorandum of 1/24/41 had asked Mr. Boettiger for preparation of answer for the President's signature.

PSF Interior

Ickes

file personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I don't like to write this letter to you because I love Ben Cohen.

But word has come from Lyndon Johnson that full and most unfair use will be made on the Hill of the fact that Ben is a Jew. Already they are talking it up there, especially republicans, and of course it is succulent stew to the isolationists, whether republican or democratic. I had learned from an outside newspaper source yesterday that similar murmurs were being heard in various quarters. The reasoning of these morons is that the Jews want to get us into war and that dear, Christ-like Ben Cohen is going to London for the devilish purpose of bringing this about.

The whole thing smells to high heaven, but there you are. I had applauded your decision that Ben should go to London but I don't want to see him hurt nor your fine policy with respect to England injured.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

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Jokes folder

BSF

Bill Hassett

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am more than a little disturbed as the result of a recent telephone conversation during which Frank Knox informed me that he had gone direct to you and secured your permission for the parking of 5,000 cars on the Polo Field for an indefinite period. I am disturbed for two reasons. The first is that Frank should not have given me an opportunity to go to you with him. The second is that an important decision should have been made within my jurisdiction without my being given an opportunity to present my views.

It is always easy, particularly for the military mind, to pick a public park or playground for a use which is in direct contravention of the purposes for which the area has been set aside by the people. As you, yourself, remarked the other day, everything now is justified or pleaded in the name of "national defense". We have too few parks now in Washington for the present population and this disparity will increase as more people come here. This being so, they should not be encroached upon unless it is absolutely necessary.

I realize as well as anyone the great need for additional office space in Washington, especially for the Army and the Navy. I recognized this several years ago when I pleaded for an Army building and urged an enlarged building program for the City of Washington. I have never been able to see the economy in paying from two and a half to

three million dollars a year for rent for private properties when the building of additional facilities would give employment and serve as a stimulus to business.

But that is neither here nor there now. What I am concerned about is the lack of foresight in sacrificing our public parks instead of pulling together and saving our parks while providing whatever space may be necessary for additional buildings and for parking areas in connection with them. I refuse to believe that the Navy's requirements are insoluble except on the basis of ruining an attractive section of our parks and taking it out of public use. A little patience and a willingness to cooperate would have solved a problem even more serious than this. This demand of the Navy will doubtless be followed by others.

Frank's first proposal was that I permit him to use the triangle south of the Interior Building for parking purposes. Perhaps that will be his next grab. It is fortunate that the parks are nearer to the Navy building than the White House or he might choose to use the grounds there.

Since the decision in this matter has been taken out of my hands after I thought that Frank and I had reached an agreement only an hour earlier, there is nothing left for me except to protest. And that I do.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

CC to Secretary Knox.

PSF
Interior

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

file personal

THE WHITE HOUSE
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February 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I think I have already left in your hands a memorandum along the same general lines as the enclosed, which comes from Bergman, but this is more complete and certainly very interesting.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

3 c's.

Feb. 5, 1941.

WHERE DOES THE AMERICAN TYPEWRITER INDUSTRY STAND IN THE PRESENT DEFENSE PROGRAM?

It is of interest to note that the important American typewriter companies: The Remington, the Underwood, and the Royal, all own factories in Germany, and their respective heads, or subheads, are Americans of German parentage who have long taken an interest in their great German developments and the Nazi methods. Their German factories, even long before the War, were manufacturing munitions for the German Army. The Remington Company owns and controls the large Torpedo Works of Frankfurt which is producing not only typewriters and bicycles but machine guns and fuses, etc. for the German Army. The chief stockholder of the Remington is Mr. James Rand, Jr., well-known anti-Labor Industrialist in this country and for years one of the strongest opponents of The President in his policy to help the workers in America, and now opposed to helping England. Why?

He is known to employ thugs in keeping the workers down, and his reputation as an opponent of all free institutions is well-known and a record in the courts of this country. It was this gentleman who threatened to move his factories out of America to Europe, if necessary, some time before the War. He, no doubt, meant to Germany. The German business of this Company, like the German business of the other Companies, now controls all of their former very valuable export trade to all parts of Europe, and long before the War began these Industrialists neglected their American business and sold as much as possible from Germany, sending to Germany their best mechanics,

all their American patents, and thereby built up their German business so far with cheap Labor that the American Labor man could not compete, robbing work from American Labor.

At the same time, they insisted on maintaining open shops in the American factories to keep the Laborers down in this Country.

There has been a recent sit-down strike at the Royal Factory which has necessitated the Royal's paying the workmen about .04¢ per hour more. This Company is paying dividends of about $7.50 on its Common Stock, while their workmen have been working at a wage which necessitated the whole Factory's going on a sit-down strike.

The Underwood Company, whose President is Phillip D. Wagoner, who has made many trips to Europe and Germany and who recently appeared in print as a friend of Westrich, the famous German Agent in this country, owns and controls by 90% majority the Mercedes, largest office-machine equipment Company in the World and its Factory in Germany. This Company has about 6000 workers, and even many years ago an extra Factory was built in Germany by the Mercedes Company, which is owned and controlled by the New York firm for the purpose of building munitions only for the German Army. A control of their books will tell the story. This certainly was done with their knowledge and consent. Since the recent exposure, Mr. Wagoner has stepped very much into the background, turning his management over to Mr. Treske, another gentleman very friendly with Mr. Westrich and a visitor at his home.

The Underwood Typewriter Company, which had a business of six to eight million dollars in Europe before the War under John Underwood, has in recent years, through their Pro-German Management and their German subsidiaries where they build practically all the models of the Underwood Typewriter business, given that business, as well as a great part of their South American business to their subsidiary, the Mercedes Company.

The Royal Typewriter Company, which owns and controls the Royal Orga Typewriter Company in Nuremberg, is headed by Mr. Edward C. Faustmann and Mr. Max Miller, which German Company has developed its business and given its models to the Royal Orga Company in Nuremberg, Germany, for production. The Royal subsidiary, like Remington's and Underwood's, produces munitions for the German Army.

All these Factories in Germany of these American Companies, with investments amounting to at least four or five million dollars, have been building in Germany munitions, fuses, machine-guns, etc. to destroy England, even before the War began, -- while their factories in this country are still untouched for the same purpose by our Government. All of their machine-tool mechanics could immediately go into manufacturing our machine-tools which are necessary for airplanes, and most of the machines could be changed over without delay to manufacture fuses, machine-guns, etc. Their Government orders are big but their love for Roosevelt is hate.

It is quite evident that these men in charge, who even at the present time are doing all possible to develop and aid the German manufacturers and helping to defeat England, are defeat-

ing the very purpose of the aid that we are trying to render to that Country to save our own. Is there a dangerous Fifth Column in our Industry, and what is our Government going to do about it? Is German blood thicker than America's life, or are we asleep to their methods at home?

The Government should take over these Factories without further delay in our own interest. Certainly there are enough typewriters in the country, used and otherwise, to supply the immediate demands, while these Factories can be used for armament purposes under loyal Americans.

It is quite evident that the men in charge -- with their very anti-Labor psychosis and very pro-German affiliations, now owning munition works in Germany -- are not fit to handle these jobs.

Remington Rand

Mr. John Zellers, who was born in Germany, has recently been referred to by the Dies Investigation to aid the German-American Bank in this country and was listed as a strong supporter. He openly commended the Nazis on his trips to Germany.

No doubt, there are other Industries which are under similar management and which should be considered seriously from a loyal point of view.

Hitler acts fast! Why don't we? And then talk afterwards. Who runs our Automobile Industry?

* * * * *

Jokes Folder

PSF
Interior

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

File
Personal
Confidential

February 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

You may not have time to go throughthis document, but I am sending it to you nevertheless. I understand that the report of the Morale Committee will be ready to submit to you after the middle of the week.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MORALE FACTORS IN COLLAPSE OF FRANCE - 1940

COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL MORALE

February 11, 1941

# MORALE FACTORS IN COLLAPSE OF FRANCE - 1940

## A. Introduction.

The spectacular military collapse of France and the widely-reported state of low morale noted by competent observers in France, both during the war-time period and for many years before, raises the question of the role played by morale in the whole French disaster. There is abundant evidence that the role was a decisive one but it is impossible to fully substantiate this interpretation. The following study merely lists notorious manifestations of bad morale definitely observed in France side by side with known factors in French life which are notoriously harmful to morale. The comparison shows that many of the factors which unquestionably contributed in some way to the unsatisfactory state of morale, could easily have been eliminated by a sound morale-policy, based on a scientific understanding of morale.

## B. French Morale From a General Point of View.

I. Manifestations of Bad Morale.

1. Abnormal gravity and frequency of social and political conflicts.

a. From 1934 to 1939 political tension rose to the point where large organized bodies — Fascist leagues, Leftist militia-groups -- armed for civil war or insurrection.

b. During the same period violence in the form of disorderly street demonstrations, riots, physical clashes between bands of partisans, sit-down strikes, etc. was frequent and sometimes tragic in consequences as during the Stavisky riots of February 1934.

c. During the same period and back as far as 1919 — or even before the World War -- extreme political views — Royalist, Fascist and Communist -- flatly repudiating the existing regime and form of society, were openly expressed by substantial bodies of citizens.

d. A large proportion of the country's intellectual, economic and even political leadership openly manifested lack of confidence in the existing regime and made themselves apologists for its avowed enemies, even if they did not actively support them. Such institutions as the private financial structure, revolving around the Banque de France and the Comite des Forges, and fashionable 'society' were dominated by these partly-disaffected classes and they were strongly represented in the conservative political parties, the military hierarchy and a section of the press. Their defeatist attitude toward democratic society was expressed by:

i. Direct criticism of democratic institutions.

ii. More frequently, indirect criticism of the democratic principle by exaggerated stress on democratic abuses.

iii. By expressed admiration for, and sympathy with, authoritarian regimes in other countries.

e. There was an analogous disaffected but non-subversive fringe on the Left, strongly represented in the school and university system and

in politics.

f. As a consequence of these subversive or disaffected attitudes toward the state there was a chronic division of opinion over foreign policy which in its milder manifestations resembled the present split between isolationist and interventionist opinion in the United States, while in moments of acute crisis -- e.g. just before Munich -- it reached such a pitch of violence than one or both groups seemed to identify themselves unreservedly with the policies of a foreign government, considered by the other group as an enemy of France.

g. Even graver was a duality of policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a lesser degree in the armed services, with one group constantly trying to sabotage the policies of the other.

h. Social antipathies and prejudices -- e.g. bourgeois attitudes toward workers -- were strongly marked.

2. Apathy and political defeatism of majority opinion over reversals or sabotage of majority policies.

3. Lack of confidence in political leadership, both national and partisan.

4. Exaggerated individualism, egoism, and cynicism in regard to social and even moral values.

a. Evasion of taxation.

b. Relative lack of professional conscience on the part of workers, many artisans and merchants, petty dishonesty in business dealings.

c. Absence of philanthopic spirit among the rich; absence of concern for social welfare -- in any terms other than higher salaries or shorter working hours -- on the part of the poor.

d. Prevalence of real or affected cynicism and contempt for moral values in bourgeois youth as evidenced by published alarm of French moralists like Bernanos, Maritain, Julien Benda.

e. Toleration of business and political venality and <u>arrivisme</u> as reflected in humorous anecdotes about prominent personalities and popularity of satirical novels, plays and revues handling this theme without indignation e. g. Marcel Pagnol's play <u>Topaze</u>.

f. Wide-spread belief, that politicians, regardless of party, were in fact corrupt.

g. Readiness of intellectuals with heavy social responsibilities to accept economic favors from government, private interests or even governments of potentially enemy countries e.g. the success achieved by the German propaganda agent Otto Abetz in subsidizing prominent French writers by arranging for sale of translation-rights of their works in German at fantastic prices (Henry Bordeaux of the Academie Francaise accepted 700,000 francs for the German rights to his books).

h. Popularity, and prestige in intellectual circles, of plays, books, (to a lesser degree of paintings), of violently inconoclastic, revolutionary or anti-social tendencies, like the works of L. F. Celine and Henri de Montherland, and the vogue of 'morbid' literature, dealing with sexual perversions, criminality and prostitution, e.g. Andre Gide, Francis Carco, Jean Cocteau, the surrealist poets, Paul Morand, etc. Popularity of revolutionary moralists like Aragon, Malraux, etc., in bourgeois circles probably reflects the same 'decadent' taste in literature. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the authors named above rank among the most talented and distinguished in post-war literature. It would be unfair, however, to conclude that French literature as a whole was decadent.

5. Chronic anxiety and pathological quest for security.

a. Hypersensitivity of capital to financial stimuli as reflected in flight of capital at times when the franc was not seriously menaced, and in monetary hoarding.

b. Emphasis on defensive armaments -- the Maginot line -- and development in military circles of a fortress mentality.

c. Obsessive insistance of French diplomacy on French, as distinguished from European, security.

d. Resistance to change:

i. Intransigence of French economic management to demands of labor resulting in near-revolutionary wave of sit-down strikes in 1936.

ii. Reluctance to adopt new techniques in industry, armed services, administration, education, medicine and business.

iii. Reluctance to modify political and parliamentary machinery although need for renovation was admitted by nearly all parties.

iv. Reluctance to admit revision of Treaty of Versailles, particularly in territorial clauses.

6. General passivity, inertia, lack of iniative.

a. Emphasis in labor agitation on shorter hours rather than higher pay or social welfare.

b. Unwillingness to change routine habits or put forth greater efforts even for increased profits on the part of both workers and management.

c. Criminal neglect in public services e.g. frequent fires on French passenger liners, police inefficiency in the assassination of King Alexander of Jugoslavia and other cases, the Nouvelles Galleries fire in Marseilles, and other disasters avoidable by proper vigilance. Public and official apathy in the face of these national humiliations and analogous indifference to public health problems such as typhoid, tuberculosis, syphilis (despite brilliant achievements with

limited means of individual physicians and services), abortion, and alcoholism. (Some progress in all these fields was apparent in the last few years, largely thanks to the Popular Front government). Also all the above and several previous symptoms noted probably reflect an American bias but their objective nature cannot be wholely dismissed).

7. Direct expressions of a subjective impression of French decadence were frequently made by Frenchmen of all classes. The need for a general renovation of French political institutions and society was generally admitted -- but not realized in action.

II. General Factors Harmful to Morale.

1. Political.

a. Governmental instability and parliamentary "Byzantinism" due to defects in the political machinery.

b. Venality of a large part of the press resulting in discordant and colored pictures of reality among wide numbers of readers and lack of confidence in information among others.

c. Failure or inability of political leaders to express the majority will in action, thus falsifying the democratic machinery by allowing minorities to exert an exaggerated influence on the formulation of policy, leading to repeated sense of betrayal or frustration and finally apathy on the part of the majority -- i.e. the partisans of democracy. This was perhaps the most decisive single factor in the breakdown of democratic morale in France and played an important role in the ultimate downfall of the Third Republic. It manifested itself as follows:

i. By formulating policies, which, instead of expressing majority will limited or braked by minority opposition, simply gave the majority a guaranty against adoption of minority policies, and vice versa, e.g. The policy of non-intervention in the Spanish civil war.

ii. By allowing minority opposition to block or sabotage policies demanded by the majority e.g. abandonment of Popular Front program of social reforms under pressure from Rightist opposition.

iii. Allowing mob violence or back-stage political maneuvers to alter radically the governmental formula fixed by popular suffrage e.g. resignation of the Daladier cabinet in February, 1934, following the Place de la Concorde riots and its replacement by the conservative Doumergue cabinet; Resignation of the Blum government in 1937 and its replacement by a less radical combination.

d. Falsification of the democratic machinery through survival of authoritarian attitudes in certain branches of the state, notably the political police and the army, and in the characteristically Second Empire approach to problems of censorship and public information, similar to that of the totalitarian regimes. (Suppression of disagreeable facts even in peacetime, unnecessary secrecy surrounding administration, lack of criticism of subordinate officials, servile and

unjustified press flattery of public servants and politicians, paid for out of government slush funds).

e. Chronic conflict, never completely appeased, between Catholic Church and the democratic parties with whom the Third Republic was largely identified. This was particularly grave since the education of the young of an influential section of the bourgeoisie was in the hands of the Church.

2. Demoralizing political propaganda.

a. Rightist attacks on democratic principles undermined the faith of conservative democrats.

b. Revolutionary attacks on bourgeois society as a whole undermined the faith of liberal democrats.

3. Socio-Economic conditions.

Dissolvent character of political propaganda noted above reflected social tensions due to:

a. Low living standards of workers compared with levels in other countries on the same cultural plane.

b. Insecurity of bourgeoisie and diminished economic influence of upper classes due to post-war inflation.

c. Economic and social ideology of both workers and bourgeoisie and their economic behavior corresponded to a relatively primitive phase of capitalism which made adjustments to the industrial and financial evolution of France after the war difficulty.

i. Archaic monetary attitudes e.g. private hoarding instead of investment, gold-fetichism, prejudice against use of checks, etc.

ii. Small-scale, hand-labor, low-salary concepts of management during a period of rationalization and transition to mass-production in industry with steadily rising living costs.

4. Demographic factors.

Losses during World War were so heavy that there was nearly a gap in male generations. In addition to increased gravity of the youth-age conflict due to this fact, a still graver result was that many of the key positions in France were held by men who were already middle-aged in 1914 and intellectually unable to adjust themselves to post-war necessities. This is probably the greatest single reason for the general 'backwardness' and defensive attitude toward life which were striking symptoms of inferior morale. Loss of a large part of the war-generation of males in France had particularly grave results as compared with other European countries because of the low French birth-rate and because — at least until 1936 — it had not been offset by revolutionary processes bringing younger men into positions of leadership.

5. Historical factors.

a. Sufferings of the French people in the World War through casualties, invasion and destruction of property might be reasonably argued to constitute a traumatic experience in national life, corresponding to traumatic experiences which frequently determine grave neuroses in the individual. This cannot be directly demonstrated but it is possible to trace certain collective attitudes born of the war which persisted into the 1930's:

   i. Pathological fear of invasion, apart from, or even to detriment of, higher strategic considerations, as reflected in the Maginot mystique, can be directly traced to war-time sufferings.

   ii. Widespread toleration or legitimation of hedonism, planlessness, irresponsibility and corruption in the immediate post-war period as natural reaction from war-time privations rendered these vicious attitudes chronic in the absence of a "Back to work" movement of comparable intensity.

   iii. Political propaganda of rightist parties continually reminded population of past sufferings deducing from them a national right to privileged treatment in world society, at first in the sense of preferential security, later in the sense of license to disregard contractual or moral obligations likely to involve the country in war.

   iv. Leftist and pacifist propaganda, instead of appealing to social and international idealism, followed the more immediately effective line of 'debunking' patriotic idealism, using constant reminders of war-time horrors to sustain an avowed or implicit right of the individual citizen to repudiate the authority of such social 'Molochs' as the state, the army, bourgeois society, capitalism, 'La Patrie', national honor, etc. (The destructive effects of both Rightist and Leftist anti-war propaganda were so obvious and spectacular that they rank as prime factors in the break-down of national morale but their efficacy appears rather as indications of psychic havoc wrought by the World War than as demonstrations of the power of propaganda).

b. The tradition of nearly 150 years of intermittent civil war in France.

   i. In the post-war period there were still living survivors of the Commune, and the savage repression of the Versaillesais forces was still vividly remembered and bitterly resented by the Parisian workers. Certainly memory of the Commune played a bigger role in shaping the attitudes of the French proletariat than does the American Civil War in shaping present-day political attitudes in the South.

   ii. The political consciousness of most French leaders was shaped at a time when monarchism was still a central issue in French public life. The fathers of the present generation of aristocrats and wealthy bourgeois were impenitent monarchists. Their sons received in youth an anti-republican orientation which

persisted after the monarchist issue had ceased to be a 'live' one. Furthermore the avowed or active Royalists in post-war France exercised an influence out of proportion to their numbers or economic power owing to the prestige of aristocracy, to which the nouveau-riche sections of the bourgeoisie, despised by the established bourgeois, were particularly susceptible. This historical factor goes far toward explaining the anti-democratic bias of French upper-class society and the bitterness of social conflicts.

SUMMARY:

THOUGH MOST OF THE PATHOLOGICAL SYMPTOMS NOTED ABOVE COULD BE MATCHED BY EVIDENCES OF HEALTHY MORALE IN SOME FIELD THE IMPRESSION OF COMPETENT OBSERVERS IN FRANCE DURING THE 1930'S WAS THAT OF A DANGEROUSLY SICK SOCIETY. THE CAUSES OF DECAY WERE DEEP ROOTED AND DIFFICULT TO ERADICATE. YET POWERFUL FORCES OF RESISTANCE AND RECOVERY EXISTED, AND A SOUND MORALE POLICY BASED UPON KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTORS WHICH AFFECT MORALE COULD HAVE EXPOLITED THEM SPECIFICALLY, IF THE POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENTS HAD POSSESSED A SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR OWN MORALE DEFICIENCIES AS WELL AS OF THE REAL NATURE OF THE SOCIAL RESISTANCES THEY HAD TO COPE WITH, THE YEAR 1936 MIGHT WELL HAVE MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A GREAT NATIONAL RENASCENCE IN FRANCE.

C. Morale in Relation to the War-Effort.

I. Signs of Low Morale.

The outbreak of war produced an apparent improvement in French morale but not a revolution. All the symptoms of low morale noted in the previous section persisted but were less pronounced. New symptoms appeared, particularly in the final phase of the war. The new symptoms and the war-time manifestations of the old ones include the following:

1. Apathy, lack of enthusiasm, fatalism even among the majority who professed to believe the war necessary.

2. Pessimism and anxiety concerning consequences of the war.

a. Though few Frenchmen believed that the war would be lost, the feeling that victory would not improve matters or might even have disastrous consequences was widespread.

i. Lack of confidence in the chances of creating a durable peace by victory — the basic pre-occupation of the people — was directly expressed and indirectly reflected by soldiers in the popular parody of a World-War slogan "La Premiere des Suivantes", which might be rendered as "The war to begin wars."

ii. Fear that victory would imply a new holocaust of human lives and wide-spread destruction of French cities by enemy bombing.

iii. Fear on the part of conservative elements that victory would lead to social revolution in Germany, and prolonged war to revolution in France.

iv. Fear on the part of workers that war would lead to dictatorship and social reaction.

3. Negative, critical, occasionally hostile attitude toward British allies in many quarters.

4. Existence of a fairly strong defeatist minority both among revolutionary workers and in upper classes (defeatist in the sense of consciously opposed to the war).

5. Widespread unconscious defeatist attitudes determined by ideological sympathy toward internal or external enemies.

a. Right or conservative elements in politics, business and the army -- including, probably, a majority of the professional officers -- accepted official thesis that Germany was the national enemy but continued to feel attracted toward the Nazi ideology. This state of mind was evidenced in the following ways:

i. Anti-semitism.

ii. Belief in the military superiority of the totalitarian form of organization.

iii. Conviction that the political menace of Bolshevism was no less great than the military menace of Germanism.

iv. Reluctance to consider Germany's allies -- Italy and Spain -- as France's enemies.

v. Opposition to employment of revolutionary propaganda to undermine Germany or exploitation of democratic war-aims to uphold French morale, or enlist American support.

b. Workers admitted necessity of making war on German nation to overthrow the Nazi regime but suspected and resented official efforts to suppress Communist sabotage of the war.

6. Defensive orientation of French strategy and persistance of routine methods and inertia, in defense preparations. Belief that the war would win itself.

7. Sense of injustice and suspicion of favoritism in apportioning of war-time risks and hardships felt by large numbers of soldiers.

i. Resentment of World-War veterans at being re-mobilized.

ii. Resentment of front-line soldiers at demobilization of farmers, fathers of numerous families, and skilled workers, and complaints over the apparent absence of rotation in dangerous outpost-duty.

iii. Resentment of soldiers over failure of government to adopt a more energetic policy for safeguarding the economic welfare of their families.

8. Mutual suspicion and friction based on class conflicts between soldiers and officers.

9. In the blitzkrieg phase susceptibility of soldiers to German and Communist defeatist propaganda, absence of combativity or even courage in many units as reported by British and other foreign witnesses of the retreat and some French observers like Rene de Chambrun.

10. Susceptibility to panic and despair.

a. Wholesale flight of civilian populations from war-zone, largely provoked by German terrorist propaganda.

b. Rout of certain units at first appearance of enemy.

i. Not only the civilian population but sometimes the entire local administration frequently failed too show courage and responsibility in maintaining their posts in the face of danger. When Georges Mandel took over the Ministry of the Interior he was obliged to order wholesale dismissals of officials who had deserted their posts at the approach of the enemy. This tends to corroborate much other evidence that the whole administrative system in France had been lax, demoralized and corrupt for years past.

c. Collapse of morale in French general staff and upper brackets of army hierarchy consequent to break-through at Sedan; a determining factor in the military collapse of France. It manifested itself by:

i. Excessively pessimistic impression of the military situation, including over-evaluation of the enemy and under-estimation of the morale of the bulk of the French army due to defection of certain inferior units.

ii. Evidences of panic in premature orders to retreat from defendable positions and failure to provide for destruction of supplies or re-organization along new defense-lines.

d. Belief among both political and military leaders after the break-through on the Somme front and the evacuation of Paris in an early German victory over England.

e. Fifth-column phobia, hysterical fear of spies and saboteurs in both civilian population and army, (this factor played a particularly big role in the collapse of military morale).

II. Consequences of Low Morale.

1. In the inactive phase of the war the prevalent low morale in France acted as a diffuse virus reducing the total efficiency of the national war effort in every phase from planning to execution, through the chief of government down to the individual soldier and worker.

2. In the Battle of France morale deficiencies of individual commanders

and particular units e.g. Gen Corap's Ninth Army, were the determinant cause or at least one of the determinant causes of some of the tactical collapses on which the success of the German offensive largely depended.

3. More controversially, the low morale of the French High Command appears to have had a distorting influence on military judgement and an inhibiting influence on command at critical moments of the early phase of the German offensive, and in the latter phases it can at least be argued that the Command showed an unhealthy readiness to accept defeat.

4. The political collapse of France after the armistice — willingness to accept total defeat when means of resistance on another theater of war remained and complete passivity of both leaders and masses in face of the Petain coup d'etat disestablishing the democratic regime — can be attributed at least as much to morale deficiencies as to the grim realities of the situation. From the point of view of scientific morale-work the soundness or unsoundness in terms of objective reality of the decisions taken in Bordeaux and Vichy are irrelevant; history shows that when morale is high in a belligerent people it continues to resist for some time after resistance is shown to be hopeless. Particularly the acquiescence of French democrats in the overthrow of democracy must definitely be considered a sign of broken political morale, due partly to the military defeat but chiefly to the deficiencies of democratic leadership noted in Section B II.

III. Deficiencies in French Morale-Policy.

The low morale-tonus of France in relation to the war effort can be traced in large part to the failure of the government to adopt a sound morale-policy taking into account both the special stresses of war and the previous deficiencies of national morale. Errors of omission or commission from the point of view of morale can be listed in general policy, military organization and policy, and in the functioning of the specific organizations created to deal with both civilian and military morale problems.

1. General policy.

a. Political leadership did not emphasize sufficiently the necessity of war.

i. It was assumed that the country realized the necessity for war as well as did the government.

ii. The government did not wish to antagonize the defeatist elements who wanted to leave the door open for a Munich negotiated under arms.

b. No attempt was made to arouse enthusiasm or provide a deep emotional basis for conviction.

i. The leaders lacked enthusiasm and conviction themselves.

ii. The theory was officially held that owing to the repeated

debunking of World War propaganda any attempt to utilize an emotional appeal would defeat its own purposes. There was a pathological dread of 'propaganda'.

c. The leaders--ie. the Daladier cabinet -- did not succeed in conveying an impression of energy and determination in their public acts and speeches.

i. They actually were not resolute men.

ii. The Daladier cabinet was not composed of men associated with a policy of resistance and energy. At the beginning of the war it was still the Munich cabinet. The Reynaud cabinet attempt to apply the principle utilized by Clemenceau in the World War, Negrin in the Spanish Civil War and Churchill in England, but in the end allowed purely political criteria to determine its composition to a considerable degree.

d. No effort was made to associate the whole population with the prosecution of the war by differentiated appeals to various categories of citizens dramatizing their individual roles, and little or no attempt was made to organize or utilize volunteer energies. Particularly the role of women in maintaining morale was overlooked.

e. No symbolic sanctions against defeatists were taken and if the police had any success in tracking down spies and outright traitors it was concealed from the public.

f. No general plan for prosecution of the war was presented to the public and no definite war-policy was clearly outlined until Paul Reynaud took power. This left the public confused, irresolute, unaware of the urgency or extremity of the danger that threatened the nation's existence.

2. Deficiencies of the government propaganda service.

a. As the name — Commissariat, later Ministry, of Information — denoted the morale service was almost exclusively oriented toward the problem of controlling the press and other channels of communication rather than toward the problem of morale as a whole.

b. It was staffed on a faulty principle.

i. Average age of officials was too high.

ii. Journalists and writers selected without regard to their understanding of scientific morale problems were numerous.

iii. College professors (constituting 65% of the main office personnel) out of touch with political reality, unfamiliar with practical aspects of morale work and having no common approach to the problems of morale neutralized rather than complemented the journalists.

iv. No effort was made to train the personnel for scientific morale

work.

c. The divisions of propaganda outgoing information and censorship worked in the dark because no systematic survey of public opinion and morale was ever undertaken.

d. Censorship was in the hands of army officers and representatives of other government services who lacked even a lay journalist's or academic professor's understanding of morale.

i. Resultant drastic curtailment of information, military, political and diplomatic, deprived the public of normal morale-stimulants, rendered adjustment to reality different and thereby fed the prevailing state of apathy which prevented mobilization of the nation's energies. At the same time it increased the underlying anxiety by giving the impression of concealment.

ii. The policy of forbidding discussion of war-aims or controversial political issues in the press did not eliminate previous ideological conflicts but simply transposed them to the plane of morale, replacing conscious disagreement by unconscious suspicion and resentment. The experience of France and other countries strongly suggests that censorship of all polemical activities within a social group has a harmful effect on group-morale somewhat analogous to that of suppression (in the Freudian sense) in the formation of individual neuroses. Whether or not this view is correct it is definitely advisable from the point of view of morale to consider social and political conflicts — that is their public expression — as symptoms rather than causes of bad morale, and the French failure to take this view seems to have had serious consequences.

e. The propaganda -policy followed by the Ministry of Information was unimaginative, uninspiring and ineffective — except when it was definitely destructive.

i. Too-rigid control of the press on the one hand and a certain cynical, unscientific belief in the influence of rhetoric, created an impression of insincerity and lifeless formalism.

ii. Note of forced optimism destroyed confidence.

iii. Absence of criticims and emphasis on governmental clairvoyance destroyed iniative.

iv. Failure to prepare opinion for reverses and sacrifices paved way for collapse of morale.

v. Occasional attempts to overcome apathy and stimulate effort by stressing imminence of unspecified dangers merely created anxiety.

vi. Both entertainment and news on radio programs were so badly

presented that listeners were bored and sometimes tuned in on foreign stations. This was particularly unfortunate since great efforts had been made to supply soldiers at the front with radio sets in the hope entertainment and relaxation off duty would improve their morale.

f. Morale-services were crippled by division of authority which made correction of errors and gradual development of an empirical understanding of morale-problems impossible.

i. Censorship, radio, movies, press were all under separate control, hence conflicts and lack of coordination.

3. Deficiencies in Military Morale-Policy.

(See also memorandum on Military Morale.)

a. Army lacked a properly organized central morale service cooperating with national morale service and morale-officers attached to army units had no training, special qualifications or prescribed point-of-view for their work.

b. The following factors in morale were overlooked, misunderstood or insufficiently stressed:

i. The necessity of special measures to counteract the depressing consequences of strategical defensive and tactical inactivity.

ii. Combating influence of German propaganda.

iii. The survival of civilian conflicts in the army, notably the general class-conflict between officers and soldiers who were predominantly of the peasant or worker class.

iv. Avoiding the appearance of favoritism or injustice.

v. Existence of a 'maginot mystique' in both officers and men which was bound to produce a collapse of morale if the enemy every penetrated the border defenses.

vi. Failure when the break-through occurred to realize the necessity of orienting the army towards a last stand at some specified point e.g. Paris.

vii. Failure to realize that the morale of higher officers is also variable and subject to dissolvent influences.

viii. Failure to realize necessity of special psychological preparation for withstanding blitzkrieg methods of attack.

ix. Repeated warnings to be on guard against fifth-columnists spread panic.

SUMMARY:

WAR NOT ONLY MADE A DRASTIC AMELIORATION OF FRENCH MORALE NECESSARY BUT ALSO OFFERED POSSIBILITIES FOR ACHIEVING IT WHICH WERE LACKING IN PEACE-TIME. IN FINAL ANALYSIS FAILURE TO REALIZE THESE POSSIBILITIES BOILS DOWN TO ONE THING: IGNORANCE AS TO THE REAL STATE OF MORALE IN THE ARMY AND COUNTRY AND THE REASONS FOR IT. HAD ANY ORGANIZATION EXISTED WHICH COULD HAVE PROVIDED FRENCH LEADERS WITH AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT MANY OF THE NECESSARY REMEDIAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE BEEN APPARENT AND WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

February 11, 1941.

Edmond Taylor
Arthur Upham Pope

PSF Interior

Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1941.

File Personal Confidential

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I enclose herewith a copy of a letter from Julio Alvarez del Vayo, former Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic, and the original of a statement on the present situation in Spain that came with it.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Encs.

188 Sullivan Street
New York, February 12th, 1941

Personal

INTERIOR DEPT
1941
OFFICE
THE SECRETARY

My Dear Mr. Secretary :

I am sending you herewith the promissed report on Spain . It is based on reliable, first-hand information which has recently come to us from Madrid.

In spite of the favors which have been extended to Spain in the form of food relief from the U.S. and credits from England and wheat - financed by American loans- from the Argentine, the Franco regime is quite obviously following the course we all knew it must take. Franco 's first act after making sure of the wheat , was to consult with Mussolini and I am ver much afraid that we are on the eve of Spanish military cooperation with the Axis powers.

I remain as always ,My dear Mr. Secretary,

Very cordially yours

Julio Alvarez del Vayo

Hon.
Harold L.Ickes
Department of the Interior
Washington, D.C.

It is difficult to give an exact figure on the number of political prisoners in Spain today if one includes among them, as seems logical, not only those in prison but also those in the concentration camps and the labor battalions. For some time the number of prisoners has been given as 1,000,000. Nevertheless, the better informed people here think that the total figure is nearer 2,000,000. There is no city without a minimum of 2,000 prisoners and even the little towns count their political prisoners by the dozens. In the three cities, Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia there are half a million prisoners; 200,000 of them in Madrid and more than 15,000 of these latter are women. Old convents have been made over into jails. In the Salesian Convent on the Calle del Cisne there are more than 4,000 prisoners.

The executions are continuing with the same ferocity as in the months immediately after the end of the war. Women receive the same sentences as the men. Girls of 20 who were only 16 when the war broke out are being shot for having engaged in anti-fascist propaganda. The morgue of San Carlos, in the medical school, is always full of bodies and morgues have had to be constructed in the prisons themselves for those who die from the barbarous penal treatment. Hygenic facilities are primitive or non-existent. Since in each prison there are many more prisoners than were originally intended by the builders, they lie piled on each other without sufficient space to stretch out at night. In one of the Madrid prisons 300 men sleep in a room originally intended for 50. When anyone wishes to turn over at night he must of necessity waken the four or five people sleeping next to him. For the 300 men there are five toilets and the prisoners must rise early and form a queque in order to wash. The food is insufficient and unclean. In the morning the prisoners are given a pot of water flavored with cooked chestnut shells. At noon they are given another dish with beans and vermicelli. The evening meal is the same. The bread ration is 80 grams every 48 hours.

The following punishments are used in order to make a prisoner talk, or to chastise him for failure to sing the falangist hymns properly, or for any slight disrespect alleged to have been shown to the Franco government: electric shocks, hanging the prisoner up by his feet or severe beatings. Women, besides suffering these same punishments, have their hair shaved off and are frequently raped. If they have small children, they are taken away and sent to special centers to be educated in the Catholic faith.

In Madrid there are three large concentration camps: one in the Campo de Comillas, another in Vallecas and the third in Chamartin. The concentration camps are considered by the Franco government as "a school of regeneration." If a former loyalist is absolved by the tribunal, or his case is dismissed for lack of proof, he is sent to a concentration camp where for terms varying from six months to one or two years, or "for an indefinite time", he is purged of his sympathies for the Republic. Prisoners in the camps are forced to work without pay in the construction of roads or the building of fortifications. The food is thoroughly inadequate for that type of work for such long hours. From the concentration camps in Madrid men are distributed for work throughout Spain, many of them going to Morocco, probably in connection with the military plans of the German high command.

The trials are a bloody mockery of, and a true challenge to, any normal system of justice. The tribunal is composed of a colonel, who presides, and two lesser officers. An accuser and a defender are part of the formula. The juridicial base of the whole proceedings is that the Republicans "revolted." With this theory it is easy to build up charges of "military rebellion", or of "aid to the rebellion", both of which carry the highest penalties. The trials are public and this fact has permitted us to learn how the accused behave them-

selves. In general their conduct is magnificient. When the women are sentenced, they react with indescribable bravery. They shout defiance at the judges or break out in cries of "Long Live the Republic", although they know that this may increase the sentence or even call for immediate execution. The very officers sitting on the tribunal cannot at times hide the impression produced by the integrity and strength of the women of Madrid. Almost two years of peace have convined the Franco leaders that terror is not enough. To conquer the Spanish people they would have to shoot twelve millions and this they dare not do. Therefore they increase their efforts to win the support of the masses. It is a desperate and useless effort, but one that persists as can be seen in the constant attempts to combine the executions with demagogic propaganda around "the new syndical state." The instrument for all that sort of propaganda is naturally the Spanish Phalanx. But the Phalanx itself is anything but a monolithic and homogeneous party. In the first days of the occupation of Madrid by Franco's army, thousands and thousands of workers and people of all social classes who had sympathized with the Republic and defended it, were able to hide their past and enter the Phalanx. They were simply seeking a refuge against the Franco repression, a breathing spell in expectation of the day when they could again work against fascism. The same thing occurred in the rest of Spain. In spite of all the precautions taken by the Phalanx leaders, it was not possible to prevent numerous infiltrations. Later some of these newly converted falangists, having lost their fear of the terror, abandoned the Phalanx. Others entered the Juventudes Catolicas, which have been developed as an opposition group to the Phalanx in the camp of reaction.

It is well known that the Monarchists and the Traditionalists are against the Phalanx. But in the very ranks of the Phalanx there is a desperate struggle between the newer Falangists grouped around Serrano Suner, and the

earlier, pre-war falangists. The Serrano Suner faction, dominated entirely by Nazi influence and more enthusiastic for Berlin than Rome are today the true masters of Spain. Nevertheless despite their holding the principal posts in the government, they have not succeeded in giving to the projected totalitarian state either consistency or uniformity. There exists no centralized power. It is rather a constant chaotic situation in which the "gang" around Serrano Suner practices its leadership. Unbridled corruption is the order of the day. There have been frequent scandals in the administration of Auxilio Social and some of its leaders have had to be imprisoned. Three times since the end of the war the leadership of the Madrid Phalanx has had to be ousted. Finally Miguel Primo de Rivera, brother of Jose Antonio, founder of the Phalanx, has been made leader in Madrid in the hope that his name can contribute to ending the ever-increasing dissension.

The Phalanx has failed utterly in its efforts to attract workers through the creation of the "vertical unions." Imitating Hitler in his "anti-capitalist" demagogy, Serrano Suner constantly attacks industrialists and business men who do not show themselves ready to share the personal sacrifices which the "national syndicalist revolution" and "the reconstruction of the country" demand. But since within the "vertical union", formed by workers and owners, the workers do not feel themselves really protected, while the owners are subject to the whims of the Phalanx, the result is that both dislike the present regime. The workers have been robbed of all the social legislation introduced by the Republic. Minimum wages and hours exist now only on paper. The worker is forced to labor ten to twelve hours and his day's pay is out of line with the general high cost of living, increased by the tremendous speculation in foodstuffs and the total lack of staple and basic foods. Not only is there a great shortage of foodstuffs, but the distribution is incredibly inefficient. Rationing of food

exists in name only. For example the Madrid ration was officially established a year ago at 400 grams. In reality people receive only 150 grams and this only two or three times a week. Some weeks the total is only 150 grams. Olive oil is officially limited to 50 grams a week but the fact is that it is difficult to secure a fourth of a litre once a month. Meat is reserved for the officials of the Phalanx.

In spite of the hundreds of thousands of workers in jail, unemployment in Madrid is higher than at any other time in the last twenty-five years. Hardly any of the war damage has been repaired. There is a shortage of raw materials, and large quantities have been sent to Germany. Private capital is in hiding because it lacks confidence in the permanence of the government. The number of unemployed together with the failure of Auxilio Social to care for homeless youth, explains the great number of beggars in Madrid today. In former times children had a monopoly on begging in Madrid. Today a characteristic Madrid street scene shows workers begging on the corners and young girls of poor families forced to prostitute themselves for a slice of bread.

The problem of the beggars has reached such proportions that on October 17th the Cabinet had to hold a special meeting to study methods of ridding Madrid of beggars. The official communique issued to the press at the end of the meeting said: "The Council of Ministers has today examined a plan of the Minister for Internal Affairs for removing all the beggars from the streets of Madrid with the cooperation of Auxilio Social." But three months have passed and in Madrid, as in the rest of Spain, in every alleyway there are bands of children picking through the garbage to find left-over food.

The government seeks to place responsibility for the disastrous food situation on the little merchant. While the big speculators in foodstuff grow rich, the small merchant is subjected to constant fines. Hundreds of them have

been ruined and a decree of October 3, 1940 threatens them not only with economic sanctions but also "physical sanctions." Such measures naturally increase the enemies of the Phalanx.

The space around the prison doors is no longer reserved for the families of the "Reds." As fas as the Franco government tries to cover up its own incapacity by extending repression to other social groups, the visiting days at the jails find an increasingly heterogeneous multitude that stands as a symbol of the growing unpopularity of the men who today govern Spain. The incidents with the police around the jails and in the visiting rooms are frequent and have more than once led to a fatal suspension of visiting privileges. The most current expression among the people formerly with Franco is: "Things can't keep on this way, there must be a change." Franco is achieving Spanish unity, but it is unity against him and his government. If a plebescite were held in Spain today Franco would not get 10% of the votes. "Franco is drowning himself in blood", the people are saying.

Almost every day the police have to tear down from the walls posters stuck up at great risk during the night. The wording on these is usually short: "Amnesty", "When is all this killing going to stop?", "Down with terror", "Long Live the Republic." The people's spirit is magnificient. A ferment of revolt is growing everywhere, with sufficient sureness that it will not let itself be trapped into a useless provocation, but will await the day of sure liberation.

PSF
Interior
Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I think that you will be interested in the enclosed photostatic copy of a letter to Congressman Compton White from Mr. J. P. Wilson of Troy, Montana. The last sentence of the first page contains a reference to a very dear friend of yours.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

TROY MONTANA

FEB: I4th, I94I

HONORABLE COMPTON WHITE

WASHINGTON D.C.

DEAR MR WHITE:-

I neglected to acknowledge the good work y YOU done awhile back. in heading off the deal by the J NEILS LUMBER CO: Of LIBBY.where they were trying to tie up a hundred million or more of FORST TIMBER, adjacent to LIBBY & TROY. spread out over five areas;

Now we here in TROY must have been asleep, for they have pulled a fast one lately on us here in TROY. by securing 50 million of WHITE PINE near TROY, to-gether with several million mixed timber; after" it had been awarded to one E.C.OLESON of PRIEST RIVER IDAHO: who had all plans made to bring his MILL to TROY, and operate for ten to twenty years. how this was accomplished we do not know.

This is only "ONE" of several such happenings, and it appears to us that the J. NELIS LUMBER COMPANY has a monopoly on the lumber & logging buisness in LINCOLN COUNTY. which is contrary to the new deal planning. or a GERMAN DYNASTY".

It has got so the J NELIS LUMBER CO: are the "ONLY" ones that can get SAW TIMBER advertised. from the forest service:

Opinions of outside lumbermen whom I had contacted, were of the opinion that this CHOICE timberc would be sold for around $8.oo a thousand. it was bid in for $3.8I by OLESON. the NEILS thought they could get it cheap so only bid 5¢ a thousand above the minimum which was $3.30 After OLESON had the timber. NEILS bought up all around his nill s site, and tried to buy him out, which took some weeks, and WALTER NEILS made a trip to WASHINGTON, talked with SENATOR WHEELER, and very soon after NEILS return, the DEAL was closed with OLESON.

The logging cost will be around $3.81 STUMPAGE, $2.00 frills, logging $10.00 making $15.81 the over run is 25% making about $12.00 expence up to the milling cost which is about $10.00 which is $22.00 lumber;

They get from $35.00 to $36.00 for this lumber F.O.B. CARS.

So we feel here that NEILS must have paid OLESON at least $5.00 per thousand to turn it over to them. so the COUNTY is loser by the amount they paid OLESON, which the county should have from the tax money. figuring the countys part of this sale should have been 25% of the price paid,

BUT" in this case OLESON got it, instead of the county.

A possible remedy for such situations, would be for a law passed to give the COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, the authority to pass on all apraisals;

JIM HILL would never let his SUPERINTANDENTS stay in one place longer than two years, so they would not get too well acquainted, it might be a good system to adopt in the supervisers of forests;

We can get 75% of the voters of LINCOLN COUNTY to sign a petition to protest against this PARTICULAR DEAL:

We have five or six billion feet of timber adjacent to TROY, and LIBBY; we hope to see some" competition in the future. we have "NO payroll, except the few LOGGERS living here in TROY. so the loss of this payroll to TROY. is a very serious matter.

I am sorry to bother you at this critical time, and hope you can pardon my intrusion. But I know you are on the FORESTRY COMMITTEE, and so I have confidence in you doing what you can for us out here.

Thanking you far past favors.

I remain Yours SINCERELY

J. P. Wilson

J.P.WILSON.

File personal confidential Ickes 1-41

PSF

Box 73

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sure that the enclosed estimate of your position and standing will be of interest. This translation was sent to me by Mr. Arthur Upham Pope, Chairman of the Committee for National Morale. I understand that it is circulated among the higher agents in the German propaganda service. It indicates an entirely different opinion of the sources of your political strength and the reasons for your policy than appear in the day-by-day attacks on you by agents of the Reich.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

COPY

# AN OFFICIAL GERMAN APPRAISAL OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

(Chapter VI of "Die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, by Professor Dr. Friedrich Schoenemann, used as a text-book at the Hochschule for Politk, a higher educational institution maintained by the German Ministry of Propaganda for the training of its political agents.)

## VI. THE PUBLIC OPINION

All phases of American diplomatic activities, all the successes of American policy should be viewed in the light of the President's absolute leadership. However, one restriction should be made: the President's leadership must be strictly in line with the public opinion of his country. Ultimately, the President's success or failure depends on his ability to synchronize his acts with existing public opinion. In conjunction with the dominant public opinion, his initiative is practically irresistible. In peace or war, he can forcefully express the will of his people, and materialize public demands even over the head of Congress. Public opinion is much more effective than Congress, since American sovereignity actually rests with the people.

Only when and if public opinion is not firmly behind the President and his administration, may Congress consider itself an instrument of the people's will, obstructing, and even defeating the presidential policy.

Aside from the radio, the President's press-conferences are instrumental in moulding public opinion. President Roosevelt is extremely skillful in playing on this instrument and usually secures for his ideas a wide echo in the woods of the American press.

The immense importance of American public opinion is rooted in the American people's frame of mind and is organically connected with their predilection for indirect government. Thomas Jefferson's famous "government by influence" does not necessarily mean a genuine government of and by the people, but permits all, even evil and destructive "influences" to gain control of the government. For example, the Lobby is an integral part of present-day American Democracy; it shows how popular influence may degenerate. Similarly, the people's recognized influence on Congress has been practically superseded by professional politicians and their organizations and "machines" which are abused by the "Boss" to exploit popular elections and the ballot for his own benefit. The confidence in the people's ultimate sovereignity is of not much value if it is incapable of expressing itself in action, especially since the path to its free expression is blocked by an irresponsible, sensationalistic and misleading press.

No matter how imperfectly public opinion may correspond to the actual interests of the nation, it provides the President with ideology and slogans. If today President Roosevelt showers his democratic epistles on the world, then this is not the result of his personal or his Party's ideology, but that of the American public's general ideology.

American faith in democracy has a domestic and a foreign political aspect. Insofar as domestic politics are concerned, it is overcrowded with the pet ideas of the American public which are the spiritual and emotional motivations of its appraisal of Democracy. The development of this American Democracy was rather peculiar: Jefferson's ideas were all preserved to these days to provide its ideological content; in practice, however, American

domestic politics followed the road marked out by Hamilton, Jefferson's foremost opponent. In the United States of today they preach Jefferson but practice Hamilton: the former stands for the Bill of Rights, equality and liberty, for confidence in the simple man; the latter stands for perpetuated inequality and systematic government which curbs the people in the interest of State and capital. Is good old democracy only a hoary legend in this greatest land of plutocracy on earth? Is the Bill of Rights a pious, half-true, half-forgotten belief? Whatever it may be, it is the ideology of the American people, just as important as it is dangerous for us.

We are more interested in the effect of this democratic ideology on America's foreign policy. It is capable of assuming the character and driving force of a political faith which may yet pounce upon all contrary faith with an unbelievable fanaticism. The cult of freedom alone satisfies the American people. Cheek by jowl with the people's inborn pacifism, it assumes the attitude of messianism which keeps on penetrating into world politics ever since the days of President Wilson. Americans worship peace as an idea and theory, since no progress is imaginable without it; this is the basic current of America's public life.

In practice, this faith developed into the pacifism that is now cultivated under Jewish-Communistic influences. But even the slightest impulse is capable of making this peculiar pacifism extremely belligerent, especially with an emotionally highly excitable people like the American.

War is identical with militarism which Americans abhor, but a war for peace, a war to end war is not only permissible but even necessary. President Wilson plunged his people into the last war with such a delusion.

Under President Roosevelt, this ideology of democracy is again an integral part of America's foreign policy. Again it is Democracy which is being menaced, which must be defended in the interest of world-peace. Thus Roosevelt assumes the role of a second Wilson, revamping and streamlining Wilson's slogans. He pursues the idea of Panamericanism more energetically than his predecessor. He wants to organize the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere under the slogan of "Democratic Peace." His policy is extremely successful; in the Lima Conference, he actually obtained South America's sanction to his North-American democratic ideology.

This democratic ideology is the core of the crusading mood which wound up in American intervention under President Wilson. Under President Roosevelt it again represents a danger of the first magnitude. It threatens our security and our future. It darkens the horizon of peace and our New Order of Europe.

## VII. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The centre of American foreign policy is the President, but not as leader of his Party, but as Chief Executive and administrator of the whole nation. By way of his Party, he is in direct touch with the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee; by way of his Cabinet, he works in closest cooperation with the Department of State. Beyond that the American system of government enabled an ambitious and energetic president to seize initiative and power in foreign politics, provided that he is backed by the American public, since the people is the real sovereign of America.

According to the Constitution, decision over peace and war rests with Congress and not with the Executive. Nevertheless this same Constitution leaves enough power in the President's hands to send diplomatic notes and take measures which may force Congress to support his war-policy even against its better judgment.

This actually happened under President Wilson; the example of President Roosevelt shows that it may happen again, since he came closer to war within two months than Wilson did in two years.

President Roosevelt's official policy is a distinct menace to peace. He is a Wilsonian, coming from the atmosphere of the Versailles Treaty whose senselessness he is incapable of understanding and thus can speak of the European status quo and the "sanctity of treaties" in one and the same breath. He possesses an only naive idea of the forces which are at work in the totalitarian countries, especially in Greater Germany. His moralism is in striking contrast to his prejudices, and this induces him to view all the political needs and tasks of these times in a light of wrong simplification. Personally a Germanophobe, he is prepared for anything against Germany, Italy and Japan.

His Secretary of State, Cordell Hull is, by origin, ancestry and upbringing, a country-gentleman, an excellent speaker, but a bad pyschologist. A member of Wilson's school, he is a narrow-minded moralist even more prejudiced than President Roosevelt. He combines moral sermons with economic imperialism and is chiefly responsible for America's pro-British course. His Department of State is more or less convinced of Britain's greatness and benevolence and sold on the idea of a free alliance of the Democracies, above

all, on the idea of an Anglo-Saxon Brotherhood of nations.

It is an open secret that there exist certain political, military and financial alliances between President Roosevelt's government and those of France and Britain, even though Secretary Hull denied their existence... The East Coast is all for joining the front of the democracies, for a discriminating neutrality and practical alliance by way of material supplies. At this point, Jewish influence is most effective.

In the way of such activities is the Senate where south and west are strongly represented. Basically it is the bulwark of foreign political tradition, for isolation that is deeply rooted in the national conscience, for neutrality in America's own interest, against participation in any European wars, but practically, it is strongly influenced by the Democratic Party and the aggressive war policy of President Roosevelt. Here in the Senate are some of the sworn enemies of President Roosevelt's policies, men like Hiram Johnson, Robert M. La Follette (Wisconsin), Gerald P. Nye (North Dakota), Arthur H. Vandenberg (Michigan), and Robert R. Reynolds (North Carolina). Of the leading Republican Senators, only Senator Norris of Nebraska has fallen for the Roosevelt policy, the same Norris who was one of the six Senators voting against the "delusion of war" during the World War.

The Republican Party speaks its oppositional mind through ex-President Hoover whose authority is again on the upgrade. On the other hand, Henry L. Stimson, his Secretary of State, works for Roosevelt's and Hull's foreign policy. A really equal opponent of Roosevelt, especially as a propagandist and politician, is still wanting.

Whatever President Roosevelt is doing today, and no matter how dangerous it may be, is not motivated by either Wall Street or the armament industries, BUT MERELY BY THE DYNAMIC IDEOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. This is the motive power behind his foreign policy as it is the decisive inducement of American public opinion. It is the sense and meaning of all American policies, of all American propaganda in peace or war. Nothing can limit or coerce the American ideology, and, therefore, the American people now bear a tremendous responsibility.

(The book was published in 1939, but a few months after the outbreak of the war.)

Ickes folder

PSF Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

What should I do about this?

F. D. R.

James

Memorandum for the President ~~for~~ from General Watson, 3/6/41 as follows: "Governor Cox of Florida phoned to say that, through his Atlanta contacts, he has learned that a word from the President to the Governor would pass the pipe line bill, if that is the President's wish. He said he heard that Secretary Knox was very anxious to have this from a national defense standpoint, and he stands ready to serve in any way he can."

former Gov. of Ohio
owns newspaper in Fla.

PSF Ickes folder 1-41

File personal

OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT

SOCIAL SECURITY BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 11, 1941

[redacted]

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning your confidential memorandum of March 3 which I have read with a great deal of interest.

Respectfully yours,

Donald M. Nelson
Director of Purchases

The President

The White House

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1941

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. DONALD NELSON

I think this will interest you. Please return. This is, of course, confidential.

F. D. R./tmb

Enclosures

LET TO THE President 2/21/41 from Sec. Ickes enclosing photostatic copy of let. to Congr. Compton White from J. P. Wilson of Troy, Montana dated 2/14/41 re the J. Neils Lumber Company monopoly on lumber and logging business in Lincoln County.

file personal

PSF Ickes folder 1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I want to thank you again for your courtesy in asking me to be one of your guests on the POTOMAC during recent days. I badly needed the rest that I was able to absorb and I know that those days at sea, even when we were tossed about more than some of us land-lovers relished, were good for all of us. But, most of all, I delighted in the fine fellowship of a congenial group of men.

But I presume to express the hope that you will not go into such waters again on the POTOMAC. You are too preeminently valuable at this time of crisis to submit yourself to the least possible risk. I hope that you will not regard this volunteered advice as an impertinence, but will take it for what it is intended, namely, a sincere observation by one who is devoted to you and who realizes what an irreparable tragedy the civilized world would suffer if anything should happen to you.

You no longer belong to yourself but to the cause of humanity, which no one can serve so well as you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Taken folder 1941 Lilienthal

April 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL WATSON

Will you give the attached to me when Generosso Pope comes in to see me?

F. D. R.

The Benjamin Franklin
Chestnut at Ninth Street
Philadelphia

COPY

April 4, 1941.
Morn.

Private

Dear Secretary Ickes:

I was sorry yesterday in Washington not to be able to get in touch with you. I wanted to submit you

a) The enclosed memo on a very dangerous fellow ( the species of the Communist agent in practical service of Nazi-Fascism is becoming more frequent); you'll decide about it.

b) an authentic account of Pope's state of mind -- and a reminder of the political necessity to decide about an Italian liberal daily.

I have at last succeeded (as you'll read) in having first rate men, respected by everybody; but money and means -- it is not for me to find.

Why did I say "respected by everybody?" Because the Italian masses through the U. S. are very good; what has been rotten for years is Italian bosses in New York. A new leadership might provoke miracles.

Since I had something to submit to the President (I'll tell you) I added the memo on IL PROGRESSO and said that I was getting in touch with you.

Here I am for the proceedings of the Academy of Political Sciences and leaving next Sunday morning for my University of Virginia -- always ready and pleased to come and see you.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) Sforza.

1

April 11

Interior

PSF: Ickes

[4/11/41]

I. Neither Lyndon nor his advisers want the President to make any public statement or do anything in the way of expressing a personal choice of one candidate over another.

A. The President should realize that he can depend on the discretion of Lyndon and Wirtz because he had an example of it in connection with the Presidential pre-nomination campaign in Texas in 1940.

B. The Johnson supporters have more discretion than to invite the charge of "dictator."

II. The leading candidates are certain to be

A. Anti-administration, anti-New Deal, and particularly anti-Roosevelt, viz:

(1) Martin Dies

(2) Governor O'Daniel (who is worse than Dies as an opponent to every liberal measure)

B. Administration's friends

(1) Maury Maverick - who couldn't possibly get to first base

(2) Wright Patman - who was smeared with the McKesson-Robbins tar

(3) Lyndon Johnson - whose batting average is 1000

C. Unbranded and unknown - a possibility but hardly a threat - Mann, the Attorney General, is the most likely.

III. Johnson is the best bet

A. Neither Dies nor O'Daniel are invincible, as some Texas politicians represent. These same political wiseacres were saying Garner was invincible in Texas in 1940.

B. Johnson has record as a liberal because of

(1) His election to Congress on New Deal - New Court issue

(2) His voting record

(3) His fight on Garner and support of Third Term

(4) His prominence in Congressional Campaign of 1940.

C. Johnson is

(1) A good campaigner

(2) A good organizer

(3) Colorful

(4) Personally popular

(5) A political "natural"

D. Johnson has offers of support, viz:

(1) Charles Marsh, publisher of newspapers in Austin, Waco, Beaumont, Port Arthur, Texarkana, Wichita Falls

(2) Houston Hart, publisher of newspapers in San Angelo, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, Lubbock, Mineral Wells, Marshall

(NOTE: Both of the above publishers have urged Johnson to make the race and are running editorials. Their papers cover practically all second and third rate cities in Texas.)

Ickes folder
1-41

file
Confidential
Secy Ickes
April 11. 1941

(3) Johnson has personal friends on staffs of papers in Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth and El Paso, but is not yet counting on support there.

(4) Johnson has had telegrams from practically all sections, among those offering active, energetic support being

(a) Bill McCraw, former Attorney General and a political power

(b) Tom Miller, Mayor of Austin

(c) A mass meeting in Corpus Christi

(d) Sid Richardson, of Fort Worth, a good New Dealer

(5) Johnson has assurances of substantial financing.

IV. The President should see Johnson because

A. Johnson's loyalty entitles him to this courtesy, even though the President should say that he is in nowise interested

B. Johnson can make suggestions, which the President may or may not agree to, that would be helpful without directly involving the President in the campaign

C. Johnson's present inclination is not to run. He needs encouragement from his friends. Without involving himself in any way, the President can inspire Lyndon as no one else can. By inspiring and encouraging, the President may save a bad situation, without risk to himself, and help the Liberal cause

D. The President should not be deterred by Texas politicians who gave him erroneous advice on the Texas political situation in 1940

E. Having heard from the other side, it would make the Liberals feel better if the President would hear from "our side."

PSF - Ickes Folder 1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1941

PRIVATE [redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR H. L. I.

What do you think of this?

I feel very sympathetic.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Memo for FDR 4/16/41 from Jim Rowe re getting job for Gardner Jackson. Rowe suggest Consumers' Counsel of Bit. Coal Com.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

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file personal

PSF Ickes Folder 1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

April 24, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Here are some quotations from prominent French contemporaries of Petain's at the time of the last World War, which may be interesting.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

4-22-41

COPY

Memoirs of Marshal Joffre. The Battle of Verdun (9 and 10th, June 1916) page 222.

"The firm countenance of Foch, who had come to headquarters, had calmed the excessive fears: in fact, Petain had again alarmed everybody."

The Battle of Verdun (June 26, 1916) page 227.

"This conversation made me fear that Petain let himself still be impressed by the enemy, and I had to specify again that he must continue a strong resistance on the right bank of the Meuse without being influenced by the risk of possibly losing material."

Poincare: In the Service of France. The Troubled Year. Page 367, November 4th, 1917.

"The Tiger arrives - - - Very cordial conversation. He speaks of Petain whom he judges with a sympathetic understanding. The best of our chiefs, although with resolutions of complacency and comradeship his ideas are sometimes a little wrong; sometimes he has annoying words of pessimism and discouragement."

In the Service of France - Victory and Armistice, 1918 by R. Poincare.

Monday, March 25th, (page 96)

"Clemenceau, whom I met when going to the points where the last bombs fell, went to see Petain yesterday at Compiegne. He reproaches him with an exaggerated pessimism. Imagine, the President of the Council told me that if we were beaten, it would be due to the English.

Tuesday, March 26 (page 88)

"Clemenceau takes me to the side and says: Petain is annoyed due to his pessimism. Imagine that he told me something

which I would not confide to anyone but you. It's this sentence: The Germans will beat the English in flat country; after which they will beat us too. Should a General talk or even think like this?"

...(page 89)

"Milner talks to me about Petain without any enthusiasm. He is not in the least disposed to subordinate Douglas Haig to him. He is much more favorable towards Foch, and thinks that it might be interesting to entrust at least him to coordinate the action of the allied armies.

Wednesday, March 27th (page 91)

"At 11 o'clock Council, to which Clemenceau has called all the Under-secretaries of State. Before the meeting, Clementel reports to me that Joffre has said to him: Although I am restrained, I see and I know enough to understand that Petain has sinned by the same faults as when he wanted to abandon Verdun. One can save the situation if one wants it seriously"...

(Page 93). Loucheur is very dissatisfied with Petain whom he finds entirely defeatist and who told him a few days ago:

"They should call a peace conference". About this, Loucheur consulted with Foch, whom he has known a long time and who answered him: "This is madness. We have known madnesses."

Thursday, March 28, (page 94)

The Marshal Joffre.... He declares that he had foreseen all that happened with Petain. He says that Petain and Anthoine both lack character."

Monday, April 15.

Foch is confident and he hopes that afterwards we can take

some part in the offensive. He declares that his connections with Petain are good, that on the second plane, as executor Petain is perfect, but that he withdraws from responsibilities and he cannot command as chief.

Friday, June 7th (page 222)

Foch came to Paris.... I have been closer to Petain in order to make him understand my thoughts better. I am sending him Weygand to work with him if necessary. Petain needs to be supported and encouraged. I take all responsibilities and I am telling him so. He would be of the opinion to shorten the front.

"The Tiger" by Martet.

Clemenceau: "In Doullens, I found myself between two men: One who told me that we were lost and the other who went and came like a madman and who wanted to fight. I said to myself: "Let's try Foch; at least we will die with the gun in our hands." I let that man go who was sensible and full of reasons who was Petain. I adopted this madman who was Foch. It was the madman who pulled us out of there."

- - -

(Translation)

COPY 4-21-41

FROM "BATTLE FOR THE WORLD" BY MAX WERNER

(PAGE 185-186)

"...On December 22, 1939, in the fourth month of the war, de Kerillis warned in L'Epoque:

'It was a matter of convincing Marshal Petain that he must resign himself to accept leadership of a cabinet of national union into which the most notorious defeatists and Seyss-Inquarts (the Austrian Quisling) would be introduced. According to the plotters, the aged marshal would have unwittingly played a role analogous to that of Hindenburg, opening the door to a Hitler in a moment of despondency. It will be admitted that this idea could not have been forn in French minds.'

These revelations were ignored, and half a year later they became a reality. Yet it would be wrong to represent the defeat of France as the result of an intrigue, a conspiracy. It was the result of the nation's total crisis. But the surrender itself was the result of a conspiracy, deliberately sought, calculated, and prepared by the defeatists. During the war the leading circles among the French defeatists chose and accepted defeat in advance as a means in the domestic struggle. Hitler's victory was to bring them to power. To them Hitler's victory was a solution for France, the necessary condition and guarantee for their rise to power. As early as October 8, 1938, just after Munich, de Kerillis prophetically asked this question about Flandin:

'What does he want? What does he hope for? Does he envision the moment when Germany, dominating the world, will impose upon our country whatever regime and men it wishes?"

* * * * *

PSF Ickes Folder 1-41

File personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1941.

Box 23

My dear Mr. President:

There came to Jane a few days ago, from Professor Hans Kohn of Smith College, a letter containing the following suggestions:

"It may be wise to precede any definite action not so much with the declaration of war or peace aims, but with a summons to make peace, a peace which would be in concordance with the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the American people. For political reasons this peace proposal could use to a certain extent the words used in the Five Points peace program of the Pope in his Christman 1939 message. The summons should be addressed not to Chancellor Hitler but to all the warring nations (and the Dutch, Norwegian and similar peoples to be considered as warring nations). The terms offered should be general, also to Germany, not terms of victor and vanquished, but terms of a democratic world order. The British could answer that they accept these terms. Hitler would never accept them. But the feeling in America would be to a greater extent unified around the war effort, if such an attempt should precede, which would at the same time serve to clarify the war issues and the peace aims.

"Such a delegation or summons should not contain an emphasis on negative aims (destroy Hitlerism, etc.), but on positive goals which also would direct and inspire the war effort."

I have talked with Dr. Kohn myself on one or two occasions and I have found him very able and very suggestive. It was he who first predicted to Jane and me that Hitler would proceed to take Holland and Denmark before attempting a final blow at England. His reasoning impressed me at the time and it has since been borne out by events. He is a Sudeten German by descent. He fought in the German Army some years ago and after the Armistice, taught in various parts of Europe. He is now a naturalized citizen and professor of history at Smith College.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF, Ickes Folder
File personal 1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1941.

My dear "Missy":

Shortly after I returned to my office after seeing you this morning, Mr. Clark Eichelberger, the Executive Director, I believe, of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, came in to see me. He proceeded to weep on the corner of my desk, as I had shed briny tears on yours. If anything, he was more lugubrious than I had been. It is his opinion that if Wheeler and Nye are allowed to circulate throughout the West in opposition to the policies of the Administration, without the slightest attempt being made to answer them, the Administration will lose by default the debate on the pending defense bill.

He has appealed to Senator Barkley for assistance in getting Administration Senators to go out and make speeches, but to no avail. He has appealed to the White House without result. He finds that no one feels like taking the initiative in the absence of knowledge, first, of the President's policy and second, of the President's willingness that speeches should be made. He felt, as I have already expressed it to you, that Lindbergh is gaining and that people are becoming confused and anxious in increasing numbers.

He has talked with Willkie, who believes that it would not be proper for him to make additional speeches because his doing so might be misunderstood as trying to snatch leadership from the Commander-in-Chief,

to whom he has sworn fealty.

I could write you much more to the same general effect, but I have said enough. This is the sort of thing that I get day by day.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.

BF Jokes Folder

file personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

It is not customary, I know, to make a present to the father when a child has been born, but it might be a good thing at that. And you are a breaker of precedents! You have had a coveted present lying on your topmost shelf for so long a time that it is covered with dust and cobwebs. How about dusting it off and sending it over to the Interior Building?

I believe that it was Longfellow who wrote:

"This is the forest primeval,
The towering pines and the hemlocks
Stand like druids of old."

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Ickes Folder

BF
Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND

RETURN.

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, 5/16/41 to the President, with enclosed letter and telegram he received from Alfred Bergman, Savoy Plaza, 5/15/41 and 5/16/41, in re surrender of France, suggesting that U.S. take over Martinique and French Guiana, and that the official representatives of General De Gaulle are M. Gerald DeSaint Andre and M. Jazques Desieyes, and that he would be glad to accompany either or both of them to Washington.

PSF Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY ICKES:

To read and return for my files.

F.D.R.

Letter from Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., "Enroute", 4/29/41 to Miss LeHand, with enclosed letter he received from Pat O'Brien, 4/19/41, suggesting a heavy patrol along the shores of Lake Mead at Boulder Dam.

Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

I agree with the recommendation of June 16th in regard to the guarding of power and reclamation dams, etc. Please send up an immediate appropriation estimate.

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. John B. Blandford, Jr., 6/16/41, returning letter to the President from Secy. Ickes, dated 6/?/41, with attached letter from Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 4/??/41 in re heavypatrol at shores of Lake Mead at Boulder Dam. Copy of memo from Budget in our files.

JUN 1 6 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Guarding storage and power dams, Bureau of Reclamation.

You have referred to me the letter of June 2, 1941, from Secretary Ickes regarding protection of dams, powerhouses and other vulnerable structures under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. You request my recommendation on the subject.

This question has been under consideration in this office for several months. The Department of the Interior recently submitted, at the request of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, supplemental estimates involving increases for Bureau of Reclamation irrigation and power projects, including funds for protecting dams and power plants. I submitted a memorandum to you regarding these estimates and recommended that in view of the fact that adequate provision had already been made for financing the construction program for reclamation projects on an economical basis for 1942, the supplemental estimates be not approved. You approved this recommendation. Since that time, however, conditions led to your declaration of an unlimited national emergency. In the light of this declaration and further representations from the Commissioner of Reclamation and others, I have caused this matter to receive further consideration.

Storage dams serving Federal reclamation projects are generally constructed only after repayment contracts have been executed by the water users to be served by the dams. The repayment contracts usually call for liquidation of the obligation by the water users within forty years, without interest, after which title continues to remain in the United States. These dams and control works are costly and if one of them were destroyed, it undoubtedly would be replaced through a direct nonreimbursable appropriation, because the water users would not be in a position to pay for the original installation and, subsequently, the replacement.

I have had in mind that the protection of a facility so important to the lives of settlers on a reclamation project might be expected to be an obligation of the water users, and particularly so when it is realized that almost their full income is dependent upon water for growing crops. Standing alone, this theory would be sound. But when it is considered that the Government will retain title to the structure, even after it is completely paid for, and that the Government undoubtedly would be called

upon to replace the facility if it were destroyed, I think the Government has as much or more interest in these storage dams as the water users themselves, and that it would be reasonable for the Federal Treasury to bear the cost of protecting these works during a national emergency.

In those structures where power facilities have been installed, it has been the expectation of the Congress that power revenues would be used to reimburse the cost of construction and in some cases to reimburse in part the cost of reclamation features of a project. There are a number of power developments in connection with dams constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation, and the power generated is of considerable importance both to project operation and to farmers on the project, as well as to the project towns. In many instances the Bureau of Reclamation uses a portion of generated power for the operation of pumping plants and other reclamation features. The surplus power is sold principally to public-service corporations or municipalities. Even in these cases, when the plant investment has been recovered, title to the property remains in the United States, where again we have the question of the Federal Government investing its own funds for the protection of its own property.

Projects such as Boulder and Grand Coulee occupy an outstanding position in defense operations. Boulder power is being used in California for defense-production purposes, and the impairment of the power plant at this dam would have a serious effect, particularly in the Los Angeles area. Grand Coulee power is being used at present for the production of aluminum and for other defense activities. Damage to the generators or any of the other facilities would have a serious effect upon defense production. While the Grand Coulee Dam eventually will provide water for irrigation farming, no land is now served by the water stored back of the dam and no provision has been made for bringing any new land under cultivation. There are no repayment contracts covering the construction of this dam. The Government has the sole interest in this structure at the present time.

In addition to the dams and power plants constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation, there are several facilities in the Indian Service that would require some protection. I refer in particular to the Coolidge Dam in Arizona, which provides for both irrigation and power; the Fort Hall Dam in Idaho, purely for irrigation purposes; the Flathead project pumping plant in Montana, valued at more than $500,000 and providing a water supply for a large area of irrigated land; and the Wapato pumping plants in Washington.

This question was considered by the Appropriations Committee of the Senate in connection with the 1942 Interior Department Appropriation

Bill. Representatives of the War Department and of the Federal Power Commission, as well as representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation, urged that protective measures be taken for these projects. The Federal Power Commission has made an extensive survey in this connection and fully endorses the request of the Department of the Interior for funds to provide adequate guard service and to provide protective devices such as fencing and floodlighting where necessary. There was inserted in the appropriation bill an item of $50,000 for fencing, floodlighting and other protective devices, and the conference committee, I am informed, will accept this amendment.

Where power dams have been constructed by the Corps of Engineers the War Department has taken steps to protect those structures.

The Tennessee Valley Authority is providing 24-hour guard service for its dams, powerhouses, and other facilities. In May, 264 persons were employed in this work. This number will be increased to 300 by July 1. This service is being financed in part at least by funds appropriated to the Authority.

The question of detailing Army personnel to guard the Bureau of Reclamation projects has been considered. The remoteness of location of Army posts in relation to reclamation projects makes such details inadvisable.

After reviewing this subject, I am now of the opinion that special provision should be made for protecting these important works, and I recommend that an estimate be transmitted to the Congress in an amount sufficient to provide satisfactory protection for the major Bureau of Reclamation and Indian projects. It is not intended to employ guards at all dams. If you agree, an appropriate estimate will be submitted to you for consideration and for transmission to the Congress.

(Signed) John B. Blandford, Jr.

Acting Director.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

For recommendation.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, 6/2/41 to the President, returning letter from Neil Vanderbilt, 4/29/41, to Miss LeHand, with attached letter he received from Patrick O'Brien, suggesting a heavy patrol along the banks of Lake Mead at Boulder Dam.

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

JUN - 2 1941

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your note of May 19, with which you enclosed two letters asking that I read and return them for your files.

The subject of the protection of Boulder Dam has been one which has received much attention during this year and 1940. The Bureau of Reclamation has devised protective measures, most of which are now effective. It was assisted by the Army and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The protective measures include fences, bullet proof enclosures, guards, gates, the closing off of sections of the interior of the dam, the patrolling by boat of Lake Mead, and a net in the lake above the dam to catch submerged objects. Of these, all but the net and some bulwarks around banks of transformers at present are installed or in the process of installation.

To protect this and other powerhouses, dams, and other vulnerable structures under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior will cost more than $450,000 per annum. As yet the Bureau of the Budget has not approved an estimate for this purpose, although it now has this subject again under consideration. That work which has been done at Boulder Dam has been done with funds from other sources. The big net in the lake above the dam has not been installed because of the cost, and because of some doubt as to the requirement for it and its effectiveness.

The Army is establishing at Boulder City a cantonment for the training of a military police battalion and from 40 to 50 troops will be available temporarily, I understand for patrolling outlying areas of the project, the waterworks of Boulder City, and certain other features. I have been advised that this battalion may be transferred elsewhere at any time. The primary responsibility for the protection of Boulder Dam and the other structures rests on the Department of the Interior.

Boulder Dam has not been closed to visitors, of whom there are about 600,000 a year, but measures have been taken amply to protect the project from these visitors. An organised party of saboteurs would be required to do any damage. The dam itself is not particularly vulnerable, but certain elements of the water diversion system and of the powerhouse are considered vulnerable. These are most carefully protected.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HAROLD L. ICKES
Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosure 2713328.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Many thanks for letting me see the attached.

CH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File
Personal
confidential

May 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND

RETURN.

F. D. R.

Ickes Folder

BF

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I am enclosing a telegram just received from Alfred Bergman.

I also enclose a letter from Bergman which has just come in.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Encs.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

# WESTERN UNION

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R. B. WHITE, PRESIDENT

NEWCOMB CARLTON, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NT = Overnight Telegram

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

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1941 MAY 16 PM 1 14

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THE HON HAROLD L ICKES=

SECY OF THE INTERIOR DEPT OF THE INTERIOR=

REFERENCE TO PRESENT VICHY BREAK SUGGEST THAT IN CASE THE ADMINISTRATION WISHES TO TALK TO ANY OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL DEGAULLE THE OFFICIALS ARE M. GERALD DESAINTANDRE ENVOY OF DEGAULLE AND M. JACQUES DESIEYES PERMANENT DEGAULLE REPRESENTATIVE IN AMERICAN EITHER OR BOTH OF WHOM I WILL BE GLAD TO ACCOMPANY TO WASHINGTON STOP REGARDS AND MANY THANKS=

ALFRED BERGMAN SAVOY PLAZA.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

THE SAVOY-PLAZA

FIFTH AVENUE 58TH TO 59TH STREETS
AT CENTRAL PARK

NEW YORK

INTERIOR DEPT.
RECEIVED
MAY 16 1941
OFFICE
THE SECRETARY

May 15, 1941

The Hon. Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am afraid I am right again. The mistake of the Democracies has been to believe in men who have proven rotten to others. Men don't change. And he who plays with the Devil, whoever the victim may be, will always pay.

I hope now we will not delay recognizing General de Gaulle. A great deal can still be saved if we do. Martinique and French Guiana could then be taken over too. Why do we wait until we lose every chance? The History of our time will show that the mistake in believing in the wrong men has caused most of the misery of our time. We must change fast where we see our mistake and not wait until all is lost.

Sincerely,

Alfred Bergman

ANB:d

Our position is getting worse by the hour and our State Dept is still in the clouds

PSF Ickes Folder

file personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

My own belief is that the Germans will not create an incident for us until Hitler is ready to strike and then he will strike, incident or no incident. I know that we cannot cold-bloodedly go to war with Germany, but isn't there something that we could do to clarify the issue, such as declaring a general emergency or announcing that all of our Pacific fleet has been ordered to go into the Atlantic, excepting only those ships which represent the minimum requirement in the event that Japan goes berserk? I have always understood that Japan cannot strike at our Pacific coast any more than we can strike Japan. Personally I would like to see both of these steps taken.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Ickes Folder

PSF Interior

COPY

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

May 29, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I wonder if you have remembered to give a tip to Henry Morgenthau that you are interested in the election of Lyndon Johnson in Texas.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HAROLD L. ICKES

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

"H.M. Jr.

Do what you can!

FDR"

Original of this letter sent to the Secretary of the Treasury as per President's notation, 6/4/41.

hm

PSF Dies Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Thank you ever so much for letting me see the enclosed.

F. D. R.

Letter to the Secretary of the Interior from Mr. Esteban Santiago-Marquez, re protecting the island of Martinique.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you the enclosed letter from Mr. Esteban Santiago-Marques for your information.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

BSF Interior

BF Ickes Folder
Interior

June 16, 1941.

Dear Harold:-

I did not have the slightest thought of your planting that story. It and the other story by Alsop and Kintner had very thoroughly got my goat, not at all because of where they came from but because of the fact that no decent columnist ought to print stories which would hurt the prosecution of our defense program.

You are right that Pierson and Allen could have got their story from a dozen or hundreds of sources -- but they ought to have realized that it would have been more patriotic for them not to have broken the wing of the baby chick before it was out of the nest.

In the same way, Alsop and Kintner's story about an American destroyer dropping depth charges near a German submarine ought not to have been printed whether it was true or not.

That, incidentally, is why it is a mighty good thing that both you and I are continuing our ridicule of the calumnist columnists!

Ever yours,

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

When I lunched with you on Wednesday, you expressed a vigorous opinion with respect to the Merry-go-Round column that had appeared that morning, in which uncomplimentary things were said about Lowell Mellett and the failure to establish a Morale Division. As I told you, I had not read this column but I did so that evening. I would say that it clearly was the work of Bob Allen.

I wonder if I was wrong in my impression that you thought that I had "planted" this story.

The reason for my writing this letter is to tell you that I did not. I have not even seen Bob Allen since I ran across him at the time that John and Anna Boettiger were in Washington last winter. I went up to their room in the White House and Bob was there. I have had no communication with him since that occasion.

I did have Drew Pearson in recently, just after you sent up the nomination of Jack Dempsey for Under Secretary here. When I was in Florida last January, he had written a story saying that I had been trying to ease Wirtz out as Under Secretary in order that Dempsey might have the job. You know that situation and so I need not repeat it to you. I did not want Pearson to print a twisted story after Dempsey's nomination had gone up and this was the subject matter of our talk.

To the best of my recollection, neither Lowell Mellett nor morale was mentioned.

As a matter of fact, Bob Allen could have picked this story up in a hundred places. There have been numerous conferences between various individuals and groups on the question of a morale setup, many of which I have attended, and some of which I have not. A lot of people have been genuinely concerned about the lack of such an organization and doubtless there has been much speculation and gossip about the subject matter at cocktail parties and elsewhere.

In conclusion, may I say that the internal evidence in this column is conclusive that I could not possibly have "planted" the story. My name appears four times in the story and if I had "planted" it, my name either would not have appeared at all or it would have appeared with different connotations. One does not beat himself over his own shoulder and, as you know, it is the invariable policy of columnists who write on tips to protect the tipsters. Certainly I was not protected in this instance. Moreover, I could have given a more accurate statement of facts than the article contains.

What really bothers me about the whole thing is that you did not give me a chance to defend myself. While I am persuaded that you suspected me of doing something surreptitious to embarrass you — a thing that I have not done during all of the years that I have had the privilege of serving under you -- it was not until I reviewed our talk in perspective

that I really felt that in your kindly way you were accusing me on Wednesday. You should not forget, Mr. President, that I have enemies in Washington, some of whom have ready access to you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HAROLD ICKES

I do wish that you would take off the occasional hair shirt which you put on in regard to a plan of the State Department to create a Caribbean Division. I have carefully checked and I think that somebody must have been trying to plant an April Fools' Day joke on you. There never has been such a plan. You sure are 'objecting to something that isn't contemplated'. Forget it. All quiet in the Caribbean!

F. D. R.

PSF Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For several months now reports have come to me from various sources about the plan of the Department of State to create a Caribbean Division which will probably include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. I have had no communication from the Department of State with reference to this matter. The evidence is clear, not only that the State Department has been considering some plan, but that it very definitely has done all that it could to prevent any information of its doings from reaching me. Now the newspapers are beginning to print stories, yet I have no official information of whatever designs may be in the process of formulation with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of this Department.

In objecting, as I do to the possibility of this jurisdiction of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands being transferred to the Department of State, I may be objecting to something that is not contemplated, since I have been studiously kept in the dark. However, the mere fact that the State Department has not frankly approached me is some warrant to believe that it is planning a surprise raid.

In the first place, the State Department is not an administrative agency. Its function is to look out for our foreign relations and in doing this it represents Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands no less than it does the rest of the Nation.

Territorial administration and foreign relations are two entirely separate and unrelated functions. The State Department has no experience or qualifications, as far as I know, in territorial administration. The foreign office of Great Britain does not administer any colonies or dominions. There is a separate office for that and I do not deny that there would be a good argument for a separate Department for the same work here if our territorial possessions were sufficient in size and represented enough work to warrant it.

Logically, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands belong in the same administrative agency that is charged with responsibility for Hawaii, the Philippines, Alaska, etc. On your own motion, early in 1933, you transferred jurisdiction of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to the Department of the Interior, which already had jurisdiction over Hawaii and Alaska. You did this because you saw the absurdity of dividing our Territories and Islands among different agencies. At that same time you told me that you would transfer the Philippines if the independence of those Islands were not in the offing. Later you made this transfer anyhow and in doing that you were following your own consistent policy.

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands belong with their sister Territories and Islands administratively. I do not see how any successful administration could be set up that would include American, British and possibly Dutch and French units. I am sure that there would be violent opposition by the citizens of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to what would amount to a negation of their American citizenship and of the status of their Islands as integral parts of the American Nation. More than this,

there are racial and linguistic questions involved which would make such a setup a veritable Tower of Babel.

If it be alleged that under Interior the people of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have not made the economic and social progress that they should have made, my counter would be that we have done as well as a bunch of career men, each of whom seems to have not only the facility, but the liking for pulling against every other one, would have done. Necessarily, the success of any Department with respect to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands depends upon legislation and financial ability to do anything. These two Islands have been consistently discriminated against in acts of Congress, just as they were discriminated against, particularly Puerto Rico, in the distribution of relief funds.

I confess that we have not been able to furnish either Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands with a market for its sugar, but that has been no fault of ours. I admit also that we could not do anything to prevent the hurricane some five or six years ago that laid the coffee bushes low. The recovery from that severe blow has been a long, hard pull. However, I am ready to maintain the proposition that, considering all of the circumstances, including particularly lack of funds to ameliorate economic conditions, we have done as good a job as was possible. Of course, you and I know that, fundamentally, the trouble in Puerto Rico is the birth rate. The cold and austere gentlemen in the State Department might be able to do something about that.

My own belief is that the Department of State would be the last Department in the Government with which to entrust this or any other administrative function. It has had no experience and it is not equipped

for such duties as would devolve upon it. It could not do the job as economically as Interior has been doing it, and if our Islands and Territories are to be divided between two Departments, that would mean still more costly administration, as well as overlapping and jealousies. Moreover, this scheme smacks somewhat of the setting up of a colonial empire and I doubt very much whether that notion would set well with the American people, especially at a time when we are trying so hard to persuade our South American neighbors and democracies everywhere that our main interest in world affairs at this time is not based upon greed for more territory.

You remarked at a Cabinet meeting recently, in explaining why you wanted leaseholds to various possessions rather than complete jurisdiction over the people, that the question of jurisdiction over the peoples would raise difficult and trying questions.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Interior Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

File personal

June 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

I wish you would take this up with Edgar Hoover. I think it has reached his province by now. Frankly, I do not know just what to do about Pope. I saw him and he was all milk and honey, but we all have serious doubts about his connection with the Fascists.

F. D. R.

Photostats of memoranda from Count Sforza to Secretary Ickes in re Generosso Pope and his tie-up with the Fascists.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith copies of memoranda that came attached to a letter from Count Sforza.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

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file personal

BF: Ickes Folder

Interior

June 23, 1941.

Dear Harold:-

I have yours of June 23rd recommending the immediate stopping of shipments of oil to Japan. Please let me know if this would continue to be your judgment if this were to tip the delicate scales and cause Japan to decide either to attack Russia or to attack the Dutch East Indies.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

PSF Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

There will never be so good a time to stop the shipment of oil to Japan as we now have. Japan is so preoccupied with what is happening in Russia and what may happen in Siberia that she won't venture a hostile move against the Dutch East Indies.

To embargo oil to Japan would be as popular a move in all parts of the country as you could make. Recent expressions of sentiment have demonstrated how the people feel on this subject. There might develop from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as would make it, not only possible but easy, to get into this war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in as an ally of communistic Russia.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

BF: Ickes Folder

Personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Russia, England and then the United States of America! Hitler continues to fall upon his victims at his own time. He has taken on one nation after another while the others have held back, believing that somehow they would escape the fate that he has told them he has in store for them. It may be difficult to get into this war the right way, but if we do not do it now, we will be, when our turn comes, without an ally anywhere in the world.

Psychologically, the war situation is now a difficult one. I hope that we won't permit the isolationists to get the jump on us and undertake to prove that aid to England is aid to Stalin and communism. Lindbergh and Wheeler will lose no time in renewing their campaign for isolation. And they will have a new and formidable weapon. As a matter of fact, Wheeler started in last night.

It seems to me that we have been caught unprepared in the domestic field while the international situation is far from clear. Public sentiment is terribly confused. Our enemies at home will busy themselves in an intensive effort to resolve this confusion in favor of inevitably destructive isolation.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

BF
Interior

Ickes Folder

Personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

At our last interview you challenged me to suggest a better man than Knudsen to head up the defense program, with increased powers. I nominate Bill Douglas, even although he would be a tremendous loss to the Supreme Court. He has youth, energy, imagination and decisiveness. Moreover, you would never have any doubt as to whom he was working for. He is used to giving orders and not receiving them, a quality that is now both needed and lacking. He is a liberal who knows why he is a liberal, and he has been a loyal and intelligent supporter of your administration.

Within his limitations, Mr. Knudsen has done a good job but his limitations are obvious to everyone. I do not believe that he can overcome them at his age, with his background. Of his loyalty, no one can doubt. But loyalty alone will not defeat Hitler. I believe that Bill Douglas has all of Knudsen's qualities, and more.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Jokes-Folder

file personal

Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
JUN 25 1 31 PM '41
RECEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am replying to the question you asked me in yours of June 23 whether it would still be my judgment that we ought to stop the shipment of oil to Japan "if this were to tip the delicate scales and cause Japan to decide either to attack Russia or to attack the Dutch East Indies".

As I see the situation, Japan will make no decision to attack either Russia or the Dutch East Indies until it is pretty clear what the outcome in Russia will be. If Hitler, as I anticipate, smashes Russia, as he has other countries, it is my guess that Japan will invade Siberia, just as Mussolini went over the French border when he saw that France was thoroughly licked. Japan will want to be in a position of exacting from a victorious Hitler at least part of the loot. If Japan goes into Siberia, I would not expect her to attempt anything at the Dutch East Indies, at least until she had consolidated her gains in Siberia and found herself more comfortable in China.

In other words, I do not believe that Japan will attack the Dutch East Indies in any event until the die is cast with respect to Russia. Then she will attempt the Dutch East Indies if she chooses, whether or not we are supplying her with oil. But it appears that the Dutch are all ready to render these oil fields of no value to Japan for approximately

a year and a half.

It is presumptuous of me to offer you advice in an international matter and I may be wrong. However, I have followed the diplomatic game with intense interest from the time that Italy invaded Abyssinia, and I think that our State Department has made mistake after mistake. I believe that it has done so particularly with respect to Japan, and I don't think that continuing a mistake will get us anywhere except into trouble.

My dear Mr. President, we are not going to call the tune by which Hitler will dance. And Japan is more tightly drawn into Hitler's web by the German invasion of Russia. Foreign wars cannot be fought without oil and gasoline, and we are furnishing Japan with this sine qua non in order to fight against what we are fighting for.

And so, with diffidence, I continue to believe that this is the best time that we will ever have to stop sending oil to Japan.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

File Personal

PSF Interior

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

The other day I suggested Bill Douglas to head up your defense organization. I did that because I believed that Barney Baruch could not be persuaded to take over. I still think that Bill Douglas would be an excellent man, much better than Knudsen, but I do not believe that he would do as well as Baruch. I understand why Baruch, on account of his age, might hesitate to take on such an onerous job, but since I wrote you about Douglas I have been wondering whether he could not be persuaded to do so. His experience and disposition are such that he could carry this tremendous load better than anyone else and the people would have confidence in him because he did the same kind of a job, and did it so admirably, twenty years ago.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder
Interior

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
July 1, 1941.

Dear Harold:-

There you go again! There ain't nothing unfriendly about me, and I guess it was the hot weather that made you think there was a lack of a friendly tone!

As a matter of fact, I think the whole business of exports to Japan was made difficult by the press and the press only -- including perhaps just a pinch of State Department snootiness thrown in. Both of these are elements that we have to live with whether we like it or not.

You are doing a grand job as Petroleum Coordinator -- so much so that it looks to me as if you will have to take unto your manly bosom the coordination of the whole power situation if things get any worse. That would include, of course, coal -- hard and soft -- water power, and domestic consumption of all of them.

I think it will interest you to know that the Japs are having a real drag-down and knock-out fight among themselves and have been for the past week -- trying to decide which way they are going to jump -- attack Russia, attack the South Seas (thus throwing in their lot definitely with Germany) or whether they will sit on the fence and be more friendly with us. No one knows what the decision will be but, as you know, it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep

peace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round -- and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic.

I am still running a bit of a temperature and wish this flu would clear up.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

PSF Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I utterly fail to understand your letter to me of June 25. You say:

"The difference of opinion arose not over limitation of exports from the Eastern Coast but over your communications to General Maxwell on the general subject of petroleum exports to Japan."

So far as my files disclose, I have communicated only once, except in a routine way, with General Maxwell, and that was under date of June 11. That letter led up to the following request:

"As Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, I would like to receive from your office complete information as to all export licenses which have been approved covering petroleum shipments to Japan, the quantities and grades of petroleum and petroleum products which have been shipped thereunder; the quantities and grades remaining unshipped under each such license; and the remaining effective time under which shipments may be made under approved license."

A copy of this letter was sent to the Secretary of State.

It will be noted that I was merely asking for information in this letter. I was not undertaking to formulate or direct international policies. I felt justified in asking General Maxwell for any information in his possession with respect to oil, because there had been sent to him a

copy of your order making me Oil Coordinator. I believe that I had the right to assume that you sent him this copy because you expected him to cooperate with me, and at least one way to cooperate, perhaps the only way, would be to furnish me with such information as I requested in my letter. I do not see how a man can function effectively as Petroleum Coordinator unless he is in full possession of all the facts relating to the production and distribution of oil. And to ask for information does not even presuppose action based upon that information.

You say further:

"For this reason I insisted to you in my letter of June 18 that your writ did not run in the field of export control policy."

I did not suppose that it did, and I suggest that I have done no act indicating a disposition to take over any of the functions of the Secretary of State. The most that can be charged against me is that I asked the Treasury to suggest to those who proposed to ship a consignment of oil from South Philadelphia to Japan not to load the boat until I had had an opportunity to <u>suggest</u> that <u>you</u> do what you did later, namely, bring such shipments as these within your policy of export control. That you did this within a few days is some indication that my suggestion was not an inappropriate one. Certainly what I did calmed the storm of public opinion that was beginning to rage along the Atlantic Coast. As a matter of fact, your modified policy, as later announced, went further than my original suggestion.

Ever since I began to serve as Petroleum Coordinator, I have made

it clear that shipments of oil to Japan was a matter for the Department of State. Hundreds of letters of protest have been coming in to me against that policy and I have referred them to the Secretary of State, advising the writers of the reference, without comment by me. I have refused to make any public comment on this policy further than to say that it was a matter within the sole jurisdiction of the State Department.

It should further be added that, after my request to the Treasury to suggest that the loading of the oil intended for Japan be held up temporarily, I did direct Assistant Coordinator Davies to get in touch with General Maxwell by telephone to convey to him our hope that he would prepare and send to the State Department for presentation to you, if approved by that Department, an order along the line that you subsequently signed. Mr. Davies assures me that his conversation with General Maxwell related only to shipments from the Atlantic Coast. Subsequently he wrote General Maxwell a letter, a copy of which I did not see until the other day. Mr. Davies made it clear in this letter that he was interested only in shipments from the Atlantic Coast, not confined to shipments to Japan.

Perhaps I may reiterate again that our concern related merely to shipments from the Atlantic Coast; it was not directed toward shipments to Japan alone. In the criticisms that have been directed toward me for suggesting a policy, which within a few days came to be accepted as sound, the fact that we also held up temporarily a shipment to Australia seems to have been overlooked.

I have not attempted to interfere with the policy of the State Department but I did not know that I am not supposed to have an opinion with respect to it and some of its policies. I do not recall that I have ever taken upon my shoulders duties or responsibilities with respect to the conduct of our foreign affairs, although there have been times when I have expressed my opinion, particularly to you. As a matter of fact, since the helium incident, I have been reluctant to communicate in any way with the Department of State on account of the hostility that is all too apparent in that Department toward me, because in all good conscience, I could not abdicate the statutory responsibility that was mine, in spite of the pressure, both proper and improper, that was brought to bear upon me by the Department of State. Frequently I have sent to you communications that, in ordinary course, I would have sent directly to the Department of State. These communications have generally related to some refugee matter in which my interest was sought and some have consisted in making accessible to you communications from Count Sforza and others.

It is not my fault that the State Department is so regarded by many people that they will not even attempt to communicate with it directly. For my part, I have kept aloof because I feel that there would be an initial prejudice against any suggestion that I might make to it, either on my own behalf or on the behalf of someone else.

I have not been able to overlook the lack of a friendly tone in letters that have come from you recently. Most of these have related to

something in connection with my duties as Petroleum Coordinator. Perhaps you are no longer satisfied with me in general, but certainly it is clear that my services as Petroleum Coordinator do not meet with your approval.

Accordingly, I am offering my resignation as Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, and I urge that it be given effect at the close of business today.

A change can be made now without too much disturbance, since the organization is in its early stages. You can appreciate that it is impossible for me to continue if a mere request for information is to be regarded as a violation of the proprieties that calls for such a letter to me as I would not have supposed that you would ever sign. And as to the State Department, you may be assured that in the future, as in the past, I will not attempt to exercise its functions, however much I may disapprove of the manner in which they are being exercised.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder
FL
Personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 3, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of July 1, with reference to the proposal to call together here in Washington a congress or parliament of democratic countries, is before me. Obviously, now that Russia is with us, even if not of us, this could not be done without great embarrassment and, therefore, it should not be done at all.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF
Interior

Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Will you be good enough to prepare a very nice personal letter for me to send to Sayre?

F. D. R.

BF Ickes Folder
1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Under date of July 1 you said in a letter to me: "You are doing a grand job as Petroleum Coordinator -- so much so that it occurs to me as if you will have to take under your manly bosom the coordination of the whole power situation if things should get any worse. That would include, of course, coal -- hard and soft -- waterpower and domestic consumption of all of them."

There has just been brought in to me a release issued as of this date by OPM which announces the appointment of J. A. Krug as OPM Coordinator for Defense Power. The release says: "He will have full responsibility in this field * * * OPM is now equipped to handle all defense power problems through a single clearing office. The program has been worked out in close collaboration with Chairman Leland Olds and the staff of the Federal Power Commission and with leading representatives of public power agencies and the private power systems." The underscoring in the foregoing I have supplied.

This Department is by far the biggest power agency in the government. In addition to this, I am Chairman of the National Power Policy Committee. I not only was not consulted, I had no intimation that such a move as this was in prospect.

Last week Mr. Olds announced a new power program. He gave a release to the newspapers carrying this program. Although this program had been

worked out, at least in large part, by people on the staff of the Power Policy Committee, of which I am Chairman, Mr. Olds never consulted me or any other member of my immediate staff. We had no advance knowledge that he was prepared to give to the public such a program. In effect, he worked up this program as Vice Chairman of the Power Policy Committee without consulting the Chairman. Nor is this the sole instance that I could give of Mr. Olds, in effect, attempting to usurp the power of the Chairman of the National Power Committee.

I have not expressed to you a dissent to this power program of Mr. Olds but I do dissent as to essential particulars. In addition, I take strong exception to him misusing his power as Vice Chairman of the Power Policy Committee, just as I take exception to the statement of OPM that the new setup in that organization "has been worked out in close collaboration with Chairman Leland Olds and the staff of the Federal Power Commission and with leading representatives of public power agencies and the private power systems."

I wonder if you had been told that birth was about to be given to a new coordinator? Or are Olds and Lilienthal, and now Krug, shortcutting you, as they have been shortcutting this Department for many months?

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder

C O P Y

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ANGELES: DEPARTMENT OF FRENCH

July 21, 1941.

The Honorable Harold Ickes
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Ickes:

Since I mailed my last letter to you I have heard from reliable sources of the plans and activities of the Nazis in connection with the Azore Islands. It is quite clear that the Germans were terribly disappointed by our occupation of Iceland. They hope now to get even with us by controlling, as early as possible, the Azores and the Canary Islands. If they are not taking immediate steps, it is because they are so busy in Russia, but if successful, they will have no scruples about occupying the islands, no matter what means they may have to employ.

I presume that the Administration is fully informed, but my feeling is that we have very little time to lose. If it is not possible for us, diplomatically or militarily, to secure a foot-hold on this most important strategic outpost, perhaps Great Britain might take the initiative, and then we might assume the guardianship as we are doing in Iceland.

Pardon me for suggesting things that may be very evident to you, but it is well sometimes to have our convictions or impressions confirmed by other sources.

Looking forward to the pleasure of seeing you very soon, I am

Cordially yours,

PAUL PERIGORD.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I think that you will want to see the enclosed copy of a letter from my friend Professor Perigord, of whom I have already spoken to you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
CHIEF OF STAFF:

For your information.

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS:

For your information.

F.D.R.

File Personal PSF Ickes Folder.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Senator McNary called me on the telephone last Friday to say that he was leaving for Oregon Sunday evening and would probably return within about ten days, depending upon the legislative situation on the Hill.

When he comes back he is going to ask for an appointment with you. He believes that if you will see Bone and him alone and repeat firmly to Bone what you have already told him both verbally and in writing, namely, that you will not be satisfied with anything except a one-man administrator for Bonneville to work under Interior, Bone will yield. According to McNary, Bone persists in the idea that you really do not care whether it should be a one-man administrator or a three-men independent board, but if you drive the point home, McNary believes that Bone will go along.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

BF Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

August 5, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

Again I am writing to you when I would much prefer to tell you what I have in mind. I do hope that this communication will be held within the confines of your own office. It is as nearly as possible for your own eyes alone.

I have heretofore expressed my concern about the manner in which some contracts for war industries are being handled. I was greatly cheered by the copy of the memorandum that you sent me recently, the originals of which had gone to Jesse Jones and to Knudsen and Hillman, advising them that the policy of the government was against clauses in management contracts giving an option to purchase.

As I understand the situation, your policy is very properly the sound one that when plants are built with Federal funds to be managed under contract, the contract shall safeguard the government's investment so that, at the end of the emergency, the government may sell, or lease, or itself operate, or scrap, as its own best judgment may dictate. This seems to me, as evidently it does to you, to be the only sound and rational policy if we are to avoid a social and economic situation at the end of the emergency that may well be as disastrous for our country as would be a defeat at the hands of Hitler.

To come to concrete cases: For some time Jesse Jones had been negotiating a contract for a magnesium plant near Las Vegas, Nevada. This plant would be dependent upon power from Boulder Dam and it would have to have public land upon which to be built. More recently Jesse has been negotiating with Alcoa for at least one plant to be built in the Bonneville area, which plant would be operated under a management contract.

I have repeatedly said to Jesse that I want to be in on these contracts. He keeps telling me that the contracts have not yet been agreed to and that "in a few days" he will be ready to talk to me. Every time that I take the matter up he tells me that he will talk with me "in a few days." I insist to him that I want to be in on the negotiations from the beginning, but, so far, all of my protestations have come to naught. I keep telling him that I don't want to have

presented to me a contract that has been agreed to. But, in his immoveable way, he refuses to let me know what these contracts contain or to discuss any of their terms with me. All that I have gotten so far is a remark from him over the telephone that Davis, the president of Alcoa, is a "tough customer".

For some time I have suspected that I am to be made the victim of a squeeze-play by OPM and Jesse. They are likely to come into my office with a completed contract containing one or more terms that I may regard as being against the public interest. Then they will try to give me the "bum's rush". They will say, as they said when Knudsen and others came to my office to insist that I give to Alcoa the power at Bonneville that subsequently went to the Reynolds Metals Company, that there is no consideration except that of defense; that we haven't an hour to lose and that it would be futile to start to negotiate all over again a contract that is agreeable, say, to Alcoa and Jesse Jones and OPM. They will deliberately put me in the position of delaying defense by haggling over terms that "are of no consequence because the only thing that matters is speed to prepare our defense."

Two or three days ago I learned that the contract for the magnesium plant at Las Vegas, Nevada, was in final form at OPM. I asked Jesse Jones at Cabinet meeting on Friday whether he knew this fact. He cheerfully admitted it, but apparently, it isn't ready to be submitted to my profane eye. I asked Jesse when I was to have a look at it and he seemed delightfully vague about it all. I told him again quite definitely that I did not relish the idea of having contracts negotiated and then submitted to me with a gun at my head. I told him that I had the right to be in on these contracts from the beginning. I got exactly nowhere with him.

Frankly, I do not like the looks of some things just now, anymore than I like the smell of some others. And I don't want to see a scandal at the end of this Administration. I wish that you had or could find a man whom you could turn loose with the power to come to any of us and make us disclose anything and everything that he wanted to know about. You can't do this job yourself any more than you can expect people on your staff who may be interested in putting something over, to give you advance notice of their intentions. Jesse complained to me recently because I had appealed to you from a decision of his not to let Bonneville have money to buy out the Puget Sound Light & Power Company. He is still going through the form of "studying" that proposition, but I am not hopeful of the result.

So the burden is thrown upon some of us of bringing to you matters which arouse our suspicions. I don't like to do this because the only result, so far as I have been concerned is to get myself in wrong. Jesse Jones and I have always gotten along quite well. I respect his

undoubted ability, but I know that we don't have the same political and social outlook. I don't want to get into a jam with Jesse. I have troubles enough now without wanting to lock horns with the most powerful man in the Administration barring only yourself. Jesse is a tough man to go up against, especially at a time like this, when the big business interests are trying to shoulder all the rest of us out of the way.

I suspect that it would be much better for me personally if I had the ability to shrug my shoulders and say: "Well, it is no concern of mine." But I am a member of your Administration and everything that concerns that Administration matters to me. Even if it didn't, my concern for you and what is going to be said about your Administration when you are no longer here, is of very real consequence to me.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Interior

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON
August 28, 1941.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

I have been thinking that labor, particularly, and people in general would like to have from you personally an explanation of the labor policies of the Administration, in connection with the defense effort. While of course a labor strike cannot be permitted to tie up an essential plant indefinitely, it must come as a shock to labor to find either the Army or the Navy taking over such plants as was done, first, in California and more recently in New Jersey. I believe that labor would be more understanding if you told it publicly and sympathetically that your fundamental views on and sympathy with labor have not changed, but that it is simply out of the question for labor to walk out and stay out when airplanes and ships have to be built.

The general public does not seem to realize it, but, of course, labor knows full well that business hasn't any too clean a slate itself. But neither the Army nor the Navy takes over a plant when labor is working willingly, while management is recalcitrant.

At the beginning of the emergency, manufacturers throughout the country refused even to sign contracts until they got what they wanted in the way of an excess profits law and a satisfactory amortization plan. As I remember it, Ford refused a big contract for airplane motors because a specified part of the product was to go to England. Alcoa has spent more than four full months dickering and haggling over terms for building and managing much needed aluminum plants.

Examples such as these could be cited many times. But these sit-down strikes, although they result in much greater damage to our defense program than all of the walk-out strikes put together, do not interest the newspapers. The result is that millions of people who want to be fair are ignorant of the facts and unjustly criticise labor alone when management should come in for its share.

It seems to me that this whole issue could be clarified for the benefit of the country. I believe that the people would welcome a statement from you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House
Washington, D.C.

BF: John Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I had "highly resolved" that I would never again mention to you the question of national morale. However, one cannot read or listen to people who come to one's office, let alone make any trips into the hinterland, without becoming frightened. I am thoroughly frightened. We are being drawn nearer and nearer to actual warfare, but the people of the United States, generally speaking, have no conception of the issues involved that are vital, not only to their security but to the future well-being and happiness of themselves and their children. Lacking this, they have no wish to fight, and lacking a wish to fight, they have no will to victory, without which no people, however strong and resourceful, can hope to win.

I have said before, and I believe more strongly than ever, that airplanes and tanks and muskets are of no use unless they are manned by those who know what their cause is and who believe in its justice with sufficient passion to make them willing to lay down their lives if necessary. This is not true of America today. As a matter of fact, I believe that, at best, public opinion is confused to that extent that Wheeler and Lindbergh, who are positive and assertive as to what the individual should think and do, have been making steady inroads into public sentiment.

I still believe that no people is more willing to sacrifice and suffer for a just and noble cause than the American people, but they have to know that their cause is just and noble.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes File Interior Folder personnel 2-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am getting ready to introduce a bill transferring Forestry to Interior, following up your consent that I do so. However, this bill ought not to be introduced until you have made it clear to Claude Wickard that the bill represents the policy of the Administration and that you desire that it become the law.

I have a feeling that you will not have much trouble with Secretary Wickard, but that, on the contrary, he will loyally abide by your decision. I have no such feeling of confidence, however, so far as Under Secretary Appleby is concerned, and, as you doubtless know, he is very influential in the Department of Agriculture. He knows how to give lip service while sabotaging effectively. Neither do I have any confidence in the Forest Service. The men at the top may pretend to obey the orders of the Chief Executive, but they will follow the customary policy of silence while the men in the field do the dirty work. You will know how to handle this situation better than I because you have had experience with insubordination in this quarter in the past.

I think that it will also be necessary to advise the Vice President of your wishes. He is more likely to get off the reservation than is Secretary Wickard. And, unfortunately, he is in the position, as presiding officer of the Senate, to do damage which, however, can be counteracted if the Administration leaders of that body make it clear that the Administration is back of the bill.

There will not be the opposition to this bill from the outside that there has been to similar bills in the past. Practically all of the bona fide conservation organizations will either support the bill or will keep hands off. In the past, the Izaak Walton League has been one of the chief, as it has been one of the most effective, opponents of legislation transferring Forestry to Interior. At the very worst, the Izaak Walton League now will take no position one way or the other. In effect, a position of indifference, in view of past history, will be a position on the side of Interior.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

—

10 Oct

PSF Interior

Ickes Folder

1941

Copy

Longhand note to Secy. Ickes
from the President.

Dear Harold:

I am awfully sorry to hear you are still laid up. Hurry up and get well! Don't worry. Don't shoot the doctor, he is doing the best he can!

Affectionately,

F.D.R.

Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your note and the lovely roses that came with it. I am really out of the woods, even if I can't see the oil fields for the derricks. This afternoon the doctor could find no trace of trouble in my chest and he has told me that I may be up and on my way again on Monday. So, if you hear any stray shooting, you may resign yourself to the thought that "there goes Harold at it again," -- but I won't be in pursuit of the doctor, who really did a fine job on me.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

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File Personal

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Ickes Folder 1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
OCT 20 11 30 AM '41
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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information I am sending you a copy of a letter from Mr. Alfred Bergman.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

THE SAVOY-PLAZA

NEW YORK

October 3, 1941

Strictly Personal

The Hon. Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I read with a great deal of interest the investigation of the moving picture industry by Senator Wheeler and the Nye Committee.

Nothing could be more outrageous, but this is the way that all of these Fascists operate. They operate by taking the aggressive in every situation, and although they have been a minority in every country, they have been successful because the others have failed, for one reason or another, usually because they wanted to be too considerate or because they thought it wasn't Liberal to fight back.

I have just returned from the country with Henri de Kerillis, and from his experience in France and mine in America, I think the situation today is very similar to the French problem.

The reason for my writing you at this time is to suggest that the Administration, which is under fire by the Wheeler-Nye investigation and by the attacks of Lindbergh, has a very good counter-attack if it would use it, and that is in the following:

During the time that I was with the Royal Typewriter Company, that company, as well as other companies having German subsidiaries, expected an investigation by the American Government of all American companies having German interests. As you know, these interests have amounted to some hundreds of millions of dollars, and believe me, they are genuine. If all these companies, including General Motors, were gone through and an investigation made, things could be found that would make your hair stand on ends. The Government should do this in its own interest, as well as in the interest of the people.

When I was with the Royal, Mr. Faustmann, the President, said he expected such an investigation but that it would be handled by his good friend, Wheeler, and that he had nothing to fear. Apparently, he knew where he stood, and no doubt all of these higher-ups are the real bosses and are in with Wheeler and Nye.

THE SAVOY-PLAZA

NEW YORK

The Hon. Harold L. Ickes - October 3, 1941 -

In many cases, the heads of these companies are German-Americans, as in the case of E. C. Faustmann, President of the Royal, and in the case of the Remington Typewriter Company, where Mr. John Zellers, Vice-President, was strongly identified in German matters, and cited by the Dies Committee. President Wagoner of the Underwood was in the Westrich affair. All companies having German contacts should be investigated by a strong pro-Administration group of Senators.

Real Nazis 100%-

If you will look into this matter, you will find the rattlesnakes in this country, but to talk and not act only makes them more aggressive.

I believe this is one of the best leads that I have given he Government so far.

Time is so important.

I should not like to have it known that this idea is coming from me. We must act at once.

Awaiting your early reply, I am

Most sincerely,

Alfred Bergman

AHB:d

PSF: Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
OCT 24 10 21 AM '41
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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you these letters from Rex Tugwell dated October 15 and 20 respectively, with attachment, for your confidential information. Will you please return them to me for my files?

I may say that I know no more about the plans of the State Department with reference to the Caribbean than Rex seems to know, although, as you are aware, I have tried at various times to get information.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
November 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Of course, if Rex Tugwell bases his thinking on what columnists and such gentry do, or even on stories circulated by Senor Pagan himself, I will not be responsible for the consequences. I think Rex ought not to start a fire where no fire exists at the present time.

F. D. R.

Enclosures addressed to the Secretary of the Interior by Hon. Rexford G. Tugwell returned to the Secretary with this memorandum.

PSF Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
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1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 30, 1941.

San Francisco, California.

My dear Mr. President

It is sad about Saul Haas, but it would not do to withdraw his nomination now. When I sent you the telegram I really didn't credit the rumor that had come to me that Haas' name had gone in. So I used the first word that came off the top of my mind.

I don't know how we got mixed up on this matter. I wrote you some time ago suggesting that Haas be not renominated until he had lined up Bone on the Bonneville Bill. When I talked it over with John Boettiger, in Seattle, he agreed with me. When you mentioned Haas after cabinet meeting last Friday, October 24, I thought that it was understood that his name would not go in until this other matter was settled. I told you that Fortas was having rough sledding with him.

Now, as you suggest,we ought to go after the other members of the Washington delegation. I saw Knute Hill before I left Washington and he is all right. I believe that Wallgren is all right too. As soon as I get back to Washington it is my intention to get very busy with all of the members of the Washington delegation. I believe that we can hold them against both Bone and Haas who are in a none too comfortable position just now.

After I get back I hope, at an early date, to be able to discuss strategy with you. Unfortunately McNary has told Bone that he will make no move on this bill until Bone is out of the hospital and no one knows when that will be. My own feeling is that we ought to line up on this bill and go to bat. Ten months of this session has already gone by and Bone is still in the process of trying to make up [redacted] what passes for his mind.

I had a fine meeting last night on the Hetch Hetchy matter at the Civic Auditorium. Governor Olson and Mayor Rossi also spoke. The fight is closer than any so far and there is an outside chance that in spite of the newspapers, all excepting the San Francisco News, and private utility money, we may win, but it is only an outside chance.

Tonight we are pulling out to take a look at the two big dams that constitute the Central Valley project. I haven't seen these dams since they were started three years ago and great progress has been made.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

The President
The White House,

1

PSF Interior Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRIVATE AND [redacted]

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE FEDERAL LOAN ADMINISTRATOR

What about the final determination of the legal questions raised by RFC in respect to financing the acquisition of Puget Sound Power and Light Company properties? I think we ought to get action.

F. D. R.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

NOV 18 1941

My dear Mr. President:

After my discussion with you, I urged Secretary Jones six weeks ago to follow your suggestion that he join me in submitting to the Attorney General the legal questions that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation lawyers have raised with respect to financing the acquisition of the Puget Sound Power and Light Company properties by the public agencies in the Northwest. Jesse has not replied to this request and the matter is still bogged down in the RFC.

I would appreciate it if you would urge Jesse to give favorable consideration to this financing. If he again suggests that there are legal objections, you may want to put this problem up to the Attorney General yourself; or you may want to ask Jesse to join with me in presenting it to him.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder
Interior

File Personal

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Upon my return from lunch a short time ago I found the following message which had been telephoned from your office: "The President has heard a report that something was being said in the Interior Department about oil for Japan, but that he cannot believe it. The Interior Department cannot in any way interfere with this international picture. The President hopes that you will give directions that nothing is to be said."

I have talked with everyone who by any stretch of the imagination might have anything to say about oil for Japan or about oil in any of its aspects and I think that I may say with certainty that no one here has talked about oil for Japan. Certainly, I have not and I would be the one to whom any inquiry would naturally be addressed. Moreover, if "oil for Japan" means what I think it means, you undoubtedly know that my consistent attitude from the day that Japan invaded China was that we should not ship a barrel of oil to Japan. I have the same feeling now.

It seems to me in a case like this that it would be only fair that I should have the name of your informant or the sources of your information. I am getting pretty fed up with incorrect rumors that are being circulated to the disadvantage of this Department. Of course here, as in every other Department, there are leaks over which I have no control and which I would stop with a strong hand if I could. But I do not believe that there is anyone in this Department who would take it upon himself officially to discuss such a subject matter with anyone.

I may say, too, that the sentence "The Interior Department cannot in any way interfere with this international picture", in that it seems to assume that this Department is interfering, is one that does not make particularly pleasant reading.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House.

PSF Ickes Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 25, 1941.

B 04 23

My dear Mr. President:

If you have time for it I think you will find the enclosed report of downstate conditions in Illinois written by Professor Paul H. Douglas of the University of Chicago very interesting.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House.

REPORT ON SPEAKING TOUR BY PAUL H. DOUGLAS IN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S FOREIGN POLICY

I have just completed a speaking tour of over a month in downstate Illinois in support of the President's foreign policy. In all I made 36 speeches and radio addresses in 22 of the principal cities and towns, covering nearly all of the downstate congressional districts. The audiences were in general fairly large, and enthusiastic and there were few or no hecklers in the question period which followed. News releases were prepared each day and sent to Illinois newspapers, and the Chicago Times and Chicago News each sent a reporter with me for about a week each. In general the newspapers of the state gave the trip excellent publicity. I have sent on some of the clippings although it has not been possible to assemble all of the downstate clippings.

In each city, I talked with the newspaper editors and many leading citizens as well as the Democratic leaders in the counties. I also talked with a considerable number of leading Republicans.

The following are the main impressions I received from the trip.

1. Public opinion in the state is on the whole not isolationist. In the 22 cities I visited, there were approximately 27 different daily newspapers. Normally speaking, nearly four-fifths of these would be Republican. And yet only three of this total were isolationist in their policy, namely the papers in Rockford, Moline, and Danville.

Of the remainder, perhaps a third are going along with the administration's foreign policy in a luke-warm way with out any real enthusiasm and probably could not be counted upon in a pinch. Among these are the historic Republican Illinois State Journal at Springfield and the papers at Champaign, Kewanee, Galesburg, and

On the other hand, at least half of the papers are vigorously supporting the President's foreign policy and give every evidence of being completly sincere. This naturally includes the Democratic papers such as the Illinois State Register but also such papers as (1) the Lindsay-Decatur chain with newspapers in Decatur, Urbana, East St. Louis, and Quincy with a total circulation of between 90,000 and 100,000 and which are probably the best downstate newspapers. (2) The Peoria Star and the rival Peoria Journal-Transcript. (3) The Rock Island Argus and the Davenport Times. (4) The Pekin Times, a strong Republican paper yet also vigorously interventionist.

The editors of these papers believe that public opinion in general supports them. They say people are swinging towards the President's policy. This was confirmed by independent observers with whom I talked.

2. I found no evidence however that public opinion is ahead of the President or that any large section demands more violent action. Herbert Agar and the Fight For Freedom groups who at times imply that the President is following the procession seem to me to be completly wrong so far as downstate Illinois is concerned.

There is a tremendous fear of another A.E.F. with its heavy losses. I think the people are in favor of (a) economic aid (b) material aid and probably even (c) use of an airforce but they are opposed at present to an A.E.F. The American Legion resolution at Milwaukee has, however, made a great many willing to accept it if competent military authorities believe it to be necessary to defeat Hitler.

3. I found surprisingly little objection to our aiding Russia and people seem to take a very realistic attitude on this subject. There was also opposition to a negotiated peace as proposed by Mr. Gudahy, and I always drew applause when I urged the final and complete defeat of Hitler and Nazism as the only basis for a true peace.

4. On the other hand, there was a great deal of distrust of Britain for not opening up an offensive in the West. I tried to meet this by pointing out that Britain did not have enough tanks to invade the continent but that it had sent troops and tanks to North Africa. The offensive in Libyia which has taken place since I closed my tour should help in this direction.

5. Despite all these favorable signs, there are however certain sources of danger. Among these I would list

(1) Many of those of German stock who are not necessarily pro-Hitler but who don't want the U.S. to be hostile to Germany. These are silent but strong along the Mississippi and especially in such places as Belleville and Quincy

(2) The mothers of boys in the army. A definite move to bolster morale in the army would help here.

(3) The Swedish-American group. About two thirds of these seem to be quietly opposed. The reasons are probably (a) their traditional Republicanism. (b) their Lutheranism which connects them religiously with the Germans. (c) Their dislike of the Norwegians which gives many a bit of sadistic pleasure at what has happened to Norway.

(4) The Roosevelt-haters, led by the Tribune and many wealthy industrialists. In my judgement, action should be quickly started to win over the first three groups. If we can find able Swedish-Americans who believe in the President's program, they should be sent to the Swedish centers not only in Illinois and Wisconsin, but Minnesota, North and South Dakota as well.

We should try to do similarly with German-Americans. Possibly Frank Bohn's group could be useful here.

6. Turning to the Senatorial situation, I found that Senator Brooks was not personally stronger than his cause. In my judgement, if we nominate a man who believes in the President's program and goes out and campaigns vigorously for it, then he can win in the election. But a "stuffed shirt" or one who merely gives

lip-service to the President's program and who does not campaign vigorously will be beaten. Whether the Democrats will nominate such a person, is of course another question.

In conclusion, I would emphasize the need for an educational campaign to acquaint the Swedish Americans of the danger of Hitlerism both to this country and to Sweden. This is very important in my judgement.

Paul H Douglas

PSF Ickes Folder
1-41

December 3, 1941.

Dear Harold:-

Thank you for your private note of December first about ultimate oil reserves not only in this country but in other near-by Republics. I am deeply conscious of the situation regarding the future and have talked about it on many occasions with the State Department, the Army and Navy and even private producers. As you say, there is no assurance that our own oil will be sufficient twenty years from now.

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

PSF Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

December 1, 1941.

PRIVATE

My dear Mr. President:

It appears that we are about to negotiate with Mexico for compensation to be paid to the American Oil Companies whose properties in that country were expropriated. This is all to the good, but, in my opinion, there is more involved than merely an agreement upon price, irrespective of whether or not Mexico shall or shall not be willing to pay a sum of money satisfactory to the oil companies.

As I indicated to you in a memorandum some time ago, some thought ought to be taken concerning the future of the United States with respect to oil. Few new reserves of any moment have been discovered within the past few years. The result is that, whereas four or five years ago we had in sight an oil supply of twenty years, we can only count upon fifteen years now. This is all the more serious because demand is increasing as our reserves dwindle and if we are to maintain anything in the way of an army and navy during the coming years, as now seems probable, we will be drawing constantly ever more heavily upon our reserves. Even aside from this, however, shouldn't we expect an increase in demand as aviation develops as it seems to me bound to do, as well as from agriculture as it is more greatly mechanized?

What I am driving at is that there is a national interest in this Mexican situation quite aside from any desire that our nationals, who now own Mexican oil, be satisfied. The time may come when our Government will wish that it owned these properties itself in order to exploit them in the national interest. It seemed to me that, at the very least, it would do no harm if those who represent us at the council table have this possibility in mind, although it is something that ought not to be mentioned above a whisper just now and then only to a few.

So far as petroleum is concerned I can see even further south than Mexico. There are rich oil fields in Columbia, Venezuela, Peru and the Argentine and elsewhere. All of these oil reserves, added together, would not equal the total that Germany would possess if Germany should defeat Russia and then proceeded to add to the oil captured from Russia, the reserves of Arabia, Iran, Iraq and the Persian Gulf area. It seems to me that it is of the utmost importance that we look ahead in this matter of oil from a nationalistic point of view as we have not done to date. So far as I can see the future depends upon oil more than upon any other factor.

England, lacking any oil of her own, long ago set out to stake out claims in other parts of the world. We have relied upon private companies, whose interests do not always run parallel to those of the Nation. It seems to me that we ought at least begin to formulate a National policy, our known reserves being what they are, and the importance of oil to civilization being what it is.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF Interior Folder 2-41

/

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

What about the permission to erect booths in the park opposite the Willard Hotel for the Civilian Defense?

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1941

Memo for the President:

I have just heard that nothing has been done by Secretary Ickes about letting the people have permission to erect booths in the park opposite the Willard. I gave you a memo on this, and I also spoke to Mrs. Ickes.

Is there anyway of hurrying the Secretary to make a decision?

E.R.

BF
Interior

Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. I.

It is almost impossible to deal with anonymous letters. Could you tell me who wrote this?

F. D. R.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

DEC 12 9 34 AM '41
RECEIVED
THE WHITE HOUSE

December 11, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I don't pretend to know anything about the subject matter of the letter of which I enclose a photostatic copy, and I don't vouch for any of the facts. I am merely sending it to you for your information.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

File Personal

Ickes Folder 1-41

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
DEC 18 11 07 AM '41
RECEIVED

December 16, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to the attached, I didn't send a photostatic copy of the letterhead on which it came for the following reasons:

The letter was left with me by Alfred Bergman of New York. I didn't read it until he had left my office. The letter was a personal one to him on the letterhead of Sol A. Rosenblatt and William B. Jaffe of 630 Fifth Ave., New York City, and apparently it was written by Jaffe.

When I read the letter it seemed to me to contain important information, if the information was accurate. However, I did not feel at liberty, without Bergman's consent, to use the letter with the name of the writer. It might have been embarrassing if the photostatic copy with the name of the writer had gotten into other hands than yours, but this is only a surmise.

If I had not known the name of the writer, I would not have sent it to you in any circumstances. I simply sought to protect him -- not from you, who are always entitled to the fullest information, but from anyone else into whose hands the letter might come, and that is the reason that it went to you in the form that it did.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

One of the most disturbing factors in the O.P.M. set-up is the existence of bootleg markets.

They must be blasted out of existence promptly.

It is difficult to explain transactions in a bootleg market with respect to strategic materials, particularly when producers claim that they haven't enough to fill defense needs. (It is hardly likely that the materials sold in the bootleg market are hold-overs from so-called "pre-scarcity" or "pre-strategic" days.)

Since the small business man feels he is being buffeted about, as it is, it is most injurious to the morale of the small manufacturer to find that he cannot secure materials for the existence of his business except in a bootleg market where prices are well beyond the accepted ceiling (if a ceiling exists) or beyond the accepted quoted market price.

The bootleg market can be eliminated if prompt and effective action is taken through the means of open hearings at which producers and users of strategic materials will be asked to add their views and give whatever information they have.

These open hearings should be conducted impartially and should not be used as a political football.

These hearings should be conducted by impartial persons that have no interest in the particular industry but whose duty will be to get at the bottom of the facts and find out what actually is the truth. How much is being produced, by whom, and how is the production being consumed.

I am certain that a more satisfactory form of questionnaire could be worked out in each industry than the type now used.

Some of the values of such impartial hearings will be as follows:

1. Because of more accurate information, it will be possible for more reasonable and fairer allocations with respect to strategic materials to be made.

2. Clean-cut, accurate information will be secured promptly.

3. Many problems that have not as yet presented themselves in certain industries will be anticipated.

4. Our general defense effort will necessarily be strengthened and speeded.

5. As a result of suggestions and solutions worked out in open hearings, committees on which the small business man would be represented, could be formed to work with the deputy acting for the O.P.M. and O.P.A. in the given industry. (This would give the smaller man a feeling of greater security. It would be a morale builder to the extent that the small man would know that in all important problems concerning his industry, he would have some voice and to that extent his interests would be protected and not simply brushed aside by the big operators.)

6. The danger of concentrating too much economic power leading to a strangle hold monopoly of an industry by a few would be considerably lessened.

7. The anticipation of problems in an industry is most important. (To illustrate: At the present moment intermediate manufacturers of dye stuffs are not having enough trouble for too much squawk on their part. However, more and more basic materials are being eliminated from the available list, and soon the intermediate manufacturer except to the extent that he will be involved in the making of dye stuffs for cloth which will go into army and navy uniforms, that manufacturer will be out of business. The problem is not yet critical, but will be soon.)

It is the writer's opinion that knowing the problem and sitting down and talking about it within the industry may find ways and means of easing the hardship and eliminating a good deal of the economic waste that would otherwise result.

The foregoing represents a sketchy outline of a proposed form of procedure, which, if set up now could, in the opinion of the writer,

Eliminate many headaches.

Anticipate problems in advance of their occurrence.

Help build morale.

Help eliminate much economic waste and hardship.

Help keep smaller business in business, and its employees employed.

More cooperation within the industry could be secured.

The threat of increased monopoly could be lessened.

## SUMMARY

The defense program could be materially speeded up.

The government would likewise have a better chance to study and understand the problems of individual industries to a much greater extent that it now understands it. This might be a great assistance in the period of reconstruction after the war.

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BSF Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR:

This relates to Army morale in Alaska. This is just for your private information. Please return for my files.

F.D.R.

I have read this with great concern.
H.L.S

Pers. Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
DEC 22 2 58 PM '41
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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Several months ago I sent Dr. Ruth Gruber to Alaska to take her own time in studying the social and economic situations there. She is the youngest person ever to have won a Ph.D. degree and I felt that she was particularly equipped to do a valuable piece of work in Alaska because of the two years she had previously spent in studying conditions in the Russian Arctic. The book that she wrote as a result of that trip, "I Went to the Soviet Arctic", aroused a great deal of interest.

I have just had a letter from her, a copy of which I enclose. I think that it will interest you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

ADDRESS ONLY
THE ALASKA RAILROAD

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
THE ALASKA RAILROAD

HLS

Anchorage, Alaska
December 2, 1941

My dear Mr. Ickes:

Since my return to Anchorage, a number of civilian and army organizations have asked me to talk for them. I have accepted their invitation in the hope that through these talks I may be able to create a better understanding of your objectives in Alaska, and also to do something toward raising army and civilian morale.

The question of morale, serious enough in the States, is really acute here. There have been a distressing number of suicides and insanities among the soldiers. Civilian morale, especially among the newcomers, is little higher. Evenings hang heavy; new saloons open almost over night; the red light districts spread and flourish while men and women search desperately for time-killers.

You hardly know there's a war going on. On the one hand, there's a listless apathy toward world events; on the other, a violent hatred for Alaska. The boys look upon the territory as a prison, a place of exile. The general attitude is: "If the Germans get Alaska, they deserve it."

It seems to me that these soldiers and civilians need to know what they're defending and what they're fighting for. They need not only military education but political education. They ought to know the importance of Alaska, and of the whole Arctic, in times of peace and war; that Alaska is the springboard to Asia and Europe and that the Arctic is both the crossroads and the weather-kitchen of the world.

I'm enclosing some clippings telling about the talks I've given. Col. Ohlson, with whom I've discussed the whole question, seems to feel the talks are doing some good. I don't want to continue them, however, if there is any possibility that they might in any way embarass you. I hope you will let me know.

With best wishes for a happy holiday season,

Cordially,
Ruth Gruber
Ruth Gruber

The Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior

PSF: Ickes Folder

December 30, 1941.

Dear Harold:-

What you say about Lindbergh and the potential danger of the man, I agree with wholeheartedly.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
DEC 30 1 05 PM '41
RECEIVED

December 30, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I notice that Lindbergh has just offered his services to the Army Air Corps. I believe that, taking the long view, it is of the utmost importance that his offer should not be accepted.

An analysis of Lindbergh's speeches and articles -- and I have a complete, indexed collection of them -- has convinced me that he is a ruthless and conscious fascist, motivated by a hatred for you personally and a contempt for democracy in general. His speeches show an astonishing identity with those of Berlin, and the similarity is not accidental. His actions have been coldly calculated with a view to attaining ultimate power for himself -- what he calls "new leadership." Hence it is important for him to have a military service record.

It is a striking historic fact that every single dictator and half-dictator of post-war Europe had a military service record. Mussolini was a war veteran, Mustapha Kemal Pasha was a war veteran, Pilsudski was a war veteran, Horthy was a war veteran, Hitler was a war veteran. The same is true of fascist leaders who never achieved power, but came close to doing so: Colonel de la Rocque in France and Starhemberg in Austria, for example.

To accept Lindbergh's offer would be to grant this loyal friend of Hitler's a precious opportunity on a golden platter. It would be, in my

opinion, a tragic disservice to American democracy to give one of its bitterest and most ruthless enemies a chance to gain a military record. I ardently hope that this convinced fascist will not be given the opportunity to wear the uniform of the United States. He should be buried in merciful oblivion.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

PSF Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

DEC 31 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In connection with your recent broadcast to the people of the Philippine Islands, a radiogram has been received in this Department from the United States High Commissioner reading as follows:

"President Quezon requests following extract from inaugural speech be forwarded to President United States as his answer to President Roosevelt's message to Filipino people:

'Mr. High Commissioner, may I ask you to convey to the President of the United States our profound gratitude for the noble sentiments expressed in his proclamation. The Filipino people are particularly grateful for his abiding interest in our welfare and for his pledge to assure and protect our freedom and independence.

'My answer, our answer, to his is that every man, woman and child in the Philippines will do his duty. No matter what sufferings and sacrifices this war may impose upon us we shall stand by America with undaunted spirit, for we know that upon the outcome of this war depend the happiness, liberty and security not only of this generation but of the generations yet unborn.

'In taking my oath of office, I make the pledge for myself, my government, and my people, to stand by America and fight with her until victory is won. I am resolved, whatever the consequences to myself, faithfully to fulfill this pledge.'

Sayre."

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.