

●PSF

Safe: Army Air Force

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Army all times

file 7

BSF


WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Subject: Airplane Production.

Yesterday the President asked me for some figures on airplane production in 1941. They are attached hereto.



H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

Incl: Fig. on airplane
prod. for 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

Type

Combat

S. Com

Traini

TC

~~SECRET~~

1941 AIRPLANE PRODUCTION
AS INDICATED BY CUSTOMERS ACCEPTANCES FROM MANUFACTURERS OF MILITARY TYPES
ADJUSTED TO SHOW ULTIMATE RECEIVER

<u>Type</u>	<u>Total Acceptances 1941</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Other Foreign</u>					<u>Total Other Foreign</u>	<u>Commercial</u>
					<u>Russia</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>N.E.I.</u>	<u>S.Amer. Countries</u>	<u>Other</u>		
Combat	8540	2919	942	4211	266	1	108	22	71	468	0
S. Combat(Misc.)	1530	557	682	51	39	0	27	15	9	90	150
Training	<u>10407</u>	<u>5783</u>	<u>1863</u>	<u>1470</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>1048</u>
TOTAL	20477	9259	3487	5732	305	71	211	100	114	801	1198

(4-H)
Materiel Division, OCAC
January 5, 1942

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

U. S. ARMY AIR CORPS
AIRPLANES ON HAND AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1940,
RECEIPTS AND LOSSES DURING 1941, AND BALANCES AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1941

<u>AIRPLANES</u>	<u>ON HAND</u> <u>Dec. 31, 1940</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u> <u>DURING 1941</u>	<u>BALANCE ON HAND</u> <u>Dec. 31, 1941</u>
Combat	1357	2919	4368
Miscellaneous	535	557	984
Training	<u>2021</u>	<u>5783</u>	<u>7515</u>
TOTAL	3913	9259	12867

(4-H)
Materiel Division, OCAC
January 5, 1942

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 12, 1942

Rec'd 3:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

167, January 12, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE).

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE PRESIDENT.

Nothing heartened England so much as your address to Congress of January 7. I want to single out your statement on 60,000 airplanes for 1942. You know that I continuously hammer on the need of getting British war experience built into our airplane production and yet in spite of General Arnold's complete cooperation, there is a continuing lag in actual accomplishment and only today the British received an unofficial report from their representatives in the United States that multiple production would require a simplification of design and necessitate an abandonment of the accoutrements provided by combat to be necessary. It is my opinion that the Battle of Britain was won over the Germans in spite of their superiority in numbers in September and October 1940 because of superiority in gunfire, protection and maneuverability and organization of ground control

-2- #167, January 12, 7 p.m., (SECTION ONE),
from London.

of ground control due to utilization of the products 3
of radio research laboratories. You will remember
that I sent you a report months before you ordered
me on my present assignment pointing out that in the
last war when we came into mass production, the war
experience of the Allies was ignored and in spite of (4)
the efficiency of the Liberty engine, the plane that
housed it was a fire trap that in design failed to
take into account Allied war experience.

WINANT

WTD

PD
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 12, 1942

Rec'd 6:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date _____

FEB 3 1972

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

167, January 12, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Since I have been here I have done everything
in my power to see that present British war experience
was reported back to Washington through military
channels in order to make certain that in the in-
evitable conflict that we faced that the American
pilot would be provided with every aircraft im-
provement and instrument that the British through
experience have found essential for the RAF pilots
in conjunction with the ground supports that had been
developed here. I explained to you in a message that
I wrote some months ago that the efficiency of ground
control made a hundred airplanes more effective than
a thousand planes would have been without such ground
control. Sixty thousand airplanes for 1942 demands,
I realize, the application of American ingenuity for
mass production but the application of mass production
principles must not sacrifice the small margins of

technical

-2- #167, January 12, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO) from London

technical superiority that the RAF pilots experience has forced the British manufacturers into incorporating into British aircraft used here. I still believe that the latest designs of the Spitfire, and there have been developed six successive types, is more effective than any combat plane we have so far produced, the light bomber and the medium bomber of United States design is equal if not superior to similar British models, the United States heavy bomber, although perhaps a better airplane is not as efficient as a bomber because of the lack of equipment, flexibility and general utility as the British bombers. In fact the latest models of the Liberator twos now delivered cannot be used until 5000 hours of labor is expended here on each airplane in order to incorporate the necessary improvements resulting from combat experience.

WINANT

GW

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 3 1972

TRB
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 12, 1942

Rec'd 6:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

167, January 12, 7 p.m., (SECTION THREE).

As a result of a message to you and my interceding
with the Prime Minister the present British setup in
the United States permitting effective collaboration
of both the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aircraft /o
Production has resulted in British experience being
more effectively presented to the United States
authorities but the fact still remains that there is
still an unnecessary time lag incorporating the
latest British design changes in our production lines.

The two men best informed on these problems are
Lt. General Brett and Brigadier General Royce. The
latter is scheduled to leave here by plane for
Washington via Lisbon tomorrow. I believe it would
be in the interest of the service to have Brett report
to you on the practical needs necessary in ground
organization, airfields and equipment and design as
well as on the particular needs in Britain the Near

5 East and the Far East

-2- #167, January 12, 7 p.m., (SECTION THREE),
from London.

East and the Far East in spite of his assignment to his present post which I felt was one of the best appointments that could possibly have been made. Royce was in the Near East 6 months ago. He has complete knowledge of the British situation. These two men because of Brett's two trips to the Near East and his presence there during this last campaign and Royce's complete knowledge of the United Kingdom theater would give you an up-to-date picture on which present plans should be based with the supporting supply and airfield requirements which are a necessary corollary to a production program. 12

I know that because of the presence of the Prime Minister and his military commission that you have clearly in mind the British estimate of what is needed. but I believe it should be supplemented by the views of these two American experts who have a very realistic understanding of our own shortcomings as well as confidence in our own service.

(END OF MESSAGE).

WINANT

CSD

*Pst Safe:
Army Air Forces*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL ARNOLD

Please let me have your slant on this so that I can answer the Ambassador. This is, of course, a purely personal telegram to me. Please return the dispatch with your reply.

F. D. R.

*P.S.F. Staff: Army
Air Forces*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Utilization of British War Experience.

It would appear that there should be no cause for alarm in connection with the Ambassador Winant's cables. We have taken advantage of British war experience, as soon as it became known to incorporate improved or additional gadgets in our airplanes for production. Furthermore, we have standardized on certain items, such as armament, oxygen and bombs. The British representatives in the United States have passed and are passing on all items of equipment that go into British aircraft. They also are passing on the changes which they consider must be made after the planes roll out the door before they are sent to England.


As a result of British experience, we have incorporated Radex or Radar, the device for identification of aircraft, the device for detecting a hostile plane from one of ours at night, and the device for picking up objects at sea. These are all now in production. In so far as ground control for operation of planes is concerned, as a result of our observers being sent to England and British technicians being present in the United States, we have taken over bodily from the British their organization and we have adopted their equipment so as to insure our being able to operate co-jointly with them when required. As a matter of fact, the British were highly pleased with our latest air maneuvers in which we demonstrated our ability to utilize this equipment.

In so far as the quality of our airplanes is concerned, we accept the high performance qualities of the Spitfire, but it must be borne in mind that the P-47, which is about to come in to production, has been judged by all British pilots who have flown it as the best they have ever flown or seen.

With reference to the four-engine bombers, the first aircraft were shy on equipment, such as turrets and radio, but the new four-engine bombers which the British are receiving will be in accord with British specifications and we are and have been collaborating with the British to insure that the latest British equipment is included. However, there is a time lag between the decision to install new equipment and the rolling off the production line of the plane in which it has been installed. We are taking care of this by creating depots which will have no other purpose than to insure that everything possible is done to bring these planes up to British

standards prior to their shipment across the Atlantic.

In connection with the recommendations of Royce and Brett, all Brett's recommendations have been studied and adopted when British and American technicians approve. The same might be said for Royce's recommendations. Incidentally, Royce will be here prior to any American units leaving for Great Britain.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. H. Arnold', with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

Incl: Tele. to Sec. of State
1/12/42 frn Winant.
(3)

MISS TULLY:

THIS CAN BE PUT IN THE PRESIDENT'S
FILES AFTER HE HAS SEEN IT. I HAVE A
COPY.

L. BERNEY

per

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Army Air Force

PSF

Box

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

Subject: Airplanes for South American Countries.

1. In accordance with your instructions, fifty AT-6B airplanes have been allocated to South American coastal countries as follows:

13 to Brazil
15 to Chile
5 to Peru
4 to Uruguay
4 to Ecuador
4 to Columbia

2. Arrangements are being made to ship these by boat to the countries concerned. They will be accompanied by one pilot and one crew chief for each airplane. The airplanes will be completely equipped with guns, bomb racks, and a ninety-day supply of bombs and ammunition.

3. It is contemplated that as soon as the American crews have completed training the crews of the countries to which these airplanes are assigned, our crews will be returned to the United States.

4. The fifty AT-6B airplanes are scheduled to be ready for delivery at the factory by February 20, 1942. Shipping arrangements are being made for shipment at the earliest possible date thereafter.

5. Letters are being prepared to each of the countries concerned telling them of the detailed plans.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Army Air Force

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF

February 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Status of Aerial Torpedoes.


Estimated number in Australia	- 20
Arrived on PRESIDENT POLK	- 60
Enroute aboard ship	- 24
Scheduled to be shipped in February	- 30

Information indicates that accelerated production of aerial torpedoes will get underway in April, and we should be able to get greater deliveries.

Adapters have been made for our B-26's so that all B-26's can carry torpedoes. There will be a total of 115 operating B-26's in the ABDA area capable of carrying torpedoes.

Our total torpedo requirements as furnished to the Navy is for 150 torpedoes immediately and 5,000 additional for delivery as soon as possible. The type of torpedo desired is the Navy aerial torpedo MK XIII Mod-1.

In this connection, your attention is invited to letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 5, to which I have been unable to find a reply, and also letter from the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air dated February 4th. Copies of these two letters are attached.


H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

Incl: Cpy of Ltr to The Sec.
of Navy, 1/5/42 frm. Sec.
of War.
Cpy of Memo for Asst. Sec.
of Navy for Air, 2/4/42 frm. Mr.
Lovett.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

January 5, 1942

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The relative effectiveness of the torpedo launched from aircraft, coupled with the fact that low cloud ceilings frequently restrict other types of attack against naval vessels from the air, strongly indicates the desirability of having that weapon available for use in some of our present theatres of war. Some of the airplanes which we will send to the Far East can be readily equipped to carry and launch the aerial torpedo which has been developed by and is being produced for the Navy.

It is requested that you advise, at your earliest convenience, how many aerial torpedoes can be furnished from your supplies for the use of the Army Air Forces and the approximate date they can be supplied to our forces in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

February 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR

Subject: Aircraft Torpedoes

1. A number of B-26's have been adapted for torpedo carrying and are shortly to be sent to the Far East. Can you have the appropriate division in the Navy Department advise us of the quantity of torpedoes available in the Abda district and the number which you feel can be delivered to that area monthly.

2. A suggestion has been made by the Production Engineering group at Wright Field that new facilities for the production of aerial torpedoes be undertaken by the Air Corps. They have selected two manufacturers whom they feel might be competent to undertake this work. The reasons for their suggestion are stated to be: a. that the present supply is wholly inadequate, and b. that the Air Corps is unable to obtain any reliable assurances of a steady, adequate supply. In addition, there seems to be a feeling that the torpedo might be strengthened in certain respects to stand increased launching speeds.

Before approving such a project, it seems desirable to get your views on this problem which appears to me to be one of common concern. My offhand judgment is that it ought to be quicker, easier and cheaper to expand existing facilities than to create wholly new ones. However, the need is so great and the shortage seems to be so considerable that perhaps we ought to introduce new manufacturers in order to develop additional sources of supply.

3. Will you please let me have your views as soon as you conveniently can?

R. A. L.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4 - 2 - 59

~~SECRET~~

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

*Safe: Army Air Force
PSF*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS: (The White House)

Subject: ASV and AI Equipment.

1. Last Sunday the President asked me certain questions about our ASV and AI equipment. I told him that I had forgotten the letter designations and accordingly could not give him a complete picture. Here, however, is the complete picture.

- a. ASV Equipment (To determine the location of surface vessels at sea. Distance of pickup about 60 miles.)

We are now equipping 22 B-24's.

8 of these B-24's have been shipped to Panama.

2 will leave within the next few days.

A total of 38 B-24's so equipped will be sent to Panama.
10 B-18's are being equipped for training purposes.

- b. AI Equipment - British (To intercept aircraft).

This equipment is being installed on a modified A-20. Equipment is coming out at the rate of about 10 this month and building up to 75 in August. We have some equipment installed on A-20's for instructional purposes.

- c. AI-10 - American.

We have some of these already delivered and installed in training equipment for our schools. Production on this equipment starts in April and builds up to 200 a month by next November.

- d. Planes will be available for installation of the AI equipment where needed.

2. Our present plans contemplate a total of about 38 ASV's on airplanes being used in Panama.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-10-31-66

Signature-

Carl L. Spicer

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Safe: Army Air Force
PSF
File
Box

MILITARY AIRPLANE ACCEPTANCES
March, 1942

	Mar.	Feb.
Total Military Airplanes	3457	3082
Total Combat	1667	1498
4-Engine Heavy Bombers	156	134
4-Engine Flying Boats	0	0
2-Engine Flying Boats	50	63
2 Engine Medium Bombers	266	108
2 Engine Light Bombers	251	310
1 Engine Light Bombers	52	14
2 Engine Pursuits	100	127
1 Engine Pursuits	585	561
1 Engine Navy Fighters	91	80
1 Engine Naval Reconnaissance	116	101
Total Service Combat	433	394
4 Engine Heavy Transports	1	0
2 Engine Heavy Transports	0	0
2 Engine Medium Transports	74	46
2 Engine Light Transports	15	13
1 Engine Communications	343	335
Total Trainers	1357	1190
2 Engine Advanced Trainers	297	269
1 Engine Advanced Trainers	212	175
Basic Trainers	325	351
Primary Trainers	523	395

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-2-59

Signature- *Carl J. Spicer*

Safe: Army Air Force

PSF

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

file
Secret

April 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON: - (The White House)

Subject: Compilation of Airplane Strength
of all Nations at War.

Herewith is copy of the chart I referred to
over the telephone. I will be available at any
time the President desires to have me further
explain it.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Secret Charts Nos.
1, 2, and 3 re
United Nations
Aircraft Strength
Photo. Sheet on
Consolidated Totals
Operational Aircraft.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
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DDO DWM 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-1-71

Signature- *RAH*

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 3

~~SECRET~~

CONSOLIDATED TOTALS *
Operational Aircraft

Present Strength

ALLIES					
	Bomb H	Bomb M	Bomb L	Pursuit	Totals
United States	567	282	953	1668	3470
Great Britain	—	2913	—	4340	7253
Russia	—	4450	—	2300	6750
Australia	0	21	89	42	152
New Zealand	0	0	38	18	56
Canada	0	7	74	28	109
N. E. I.	0	11	10	25	46
GRAND TOTALS	—	9415	—	8421	17836

AXIS					
	Bomb H	Bomb M	Bomb L	Pursuit	Totals
Germany	1832	853	987	1960	5632
Japan	—	2184	—	1234	3418
Italy	—	605	—	655	1260
GRAND TOTALS	—	6461	—	3849	10310(2)

(2) British state this figure is optimistic

Estimated Strength
Dec. 31, 1942

ALLIES					
	Bomb H	Bomb M	Bomb L	Pursuit	Totals
United States	2679	1790	3602	6680	14,751
Great Britain	1116	1693	850	3362	7021
Russia	—	4450*	—	2300*	6750
Australia	0	0	149	252	401
New Zealand	0	0	70	52	122
Canada	0	18	215	108	179
N. E. I.	—	—	—	—	—
GRAND TOTALS	—	16,632	—	12,754	29,386

AXIS					
	Bomb H	Bomb M	Bomb L	Pursuit	Totals
Germany	3911	1798	1094	4165	10968
Japan	—	1504	—	846	2350
Italy	—	500	—	500	1000
GRAND TOTALS	—	22972	—	5511	18483

* Russia's production and attrition rates are not known. This figure assumes that these rates balance and that a/e strength remains the same.

(i) Reached only if reallocation of Defense Aid commitments is made.
* To accompany Charts 1, 2 and 3 (AAF - Adv. C. - 4-9-42)

AAF - Adv. C. - 4-9-42

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Chart No. 1

UNITED NATIONS AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

Pacific Theater

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
2	AUSTRALIA (including New Zealand and New Caledonia)	Present Strength			Enroute	Current Total (4 + 5)	Planned Strength Dec. 31, 1942.			Remarks
3		Oper.	Non- Oper.	Total			Oper.	Reserve	Total	
3	U. S. Army Air Forces									
4	Bomb (H)	27	14	41	39	80	80	40	120	
5	Bomb (M)	28	0	28	94*	122	159	57	216	* Does not incl
6	Bomb (L)	47	0	47	39	86	57	30	87	* allocated to
7	Pursuit	240	177	417	61	478**	320	160	480	** Incl. 120 to
8	Total	342	191	533	233	766	616	287	903	
9	R. A. Air Force									
10	Bomb (H)	0		0		0	0	0	0	
11	Bomb (M)	21	--	21	--	21	0	0	0	
12	Bomb (L)	89		89		89	149	--	149	
13	Pursuit	42	--	42	--	42	252	--	252	
14	Total	152	--	152	--	152	401	--	401	
15	Netherlands E. I. Air Force									
16	Bomb (H)	0	--	0	--	0				
17	Bomb (M)	11	--	11	18	29				
18	Bomb (L)	10	--	10	--	10				
19	Pursuit	25	--	25	--	25				
20	Total	46	--	46	18	64				
21	U. S. Navy Air Forces									
22	Bomb (H)	6	--	6	--	6				
23	Bomb (M)	10	--	10	--	10				
24	Bomb (L)	35	--	35	--	35				
25	Pursuit	16	--	16	--	16				
26	Total	67	--	67	--	67				
27	British Navy									
28	Bomb (H)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
29	Bomb (M)	--	--	--	--	--	246	--	246	
30	Bomb (L)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
31	Pursuit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
32	Total	--	--	--	--	--	246	--	246	
33	R. N. Z. Air Force									
34	Bomb (H)	0	--	--	--	--	0	--	0	
35	Bomb (M)	0	--	--	--	--	0	--	0	
36	Bomb (L)	38	--	38	--	38	70	--	70	
37	Pursuit	18	--	18	--	18	52	--	52	
38	Total	56	--	56	--	56	122	--	122	
39	Totals									
40	Bomb (H)	)	14	)	39	)	)			
41	Bomb (M)	) 322	--	) 336	112	) 526	) 761	127	818	
42	Bomb (L)	)	--	)	39	)	)			
43	Pursuit	325	177	502	61	563	624	160	784	
44	Grand Total All Types	647				1089	1385			
45	PACIFIC ISLANDS (Exclusive of Hawaii, New Zealand, New Caledonia)									
46	U. S. Army Air Forces									
47	Bomb (H)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	
48	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	
49	Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	
50	Pursuit	88	0	88	0	88	155	39	194	
51	Total	88	0	88	0	88	155	39	194	

45 PACIFIC ISLANDS
(Exclusive of Hawaii, New Zealand, New Caledonia)

46 U. S. Army Air Forces

47 Bomb (H)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--
48 Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--
49 Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--
50 Pursuit	88	0	88	0	88	155	39	194
51 Total	88	0	88	0	88	155	39	194

52 U. S. Navy

53 Bomb (H)	16	0	16	0	16	--	--	--	Navy pl
54 Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--	not det
55 Bomb (L)	19	0	19	0	19	--	--	--	theater
56 Pursuit	12	0	12	0	12	--	--	--	
57 Total	47	0	47	0	47	--	--	--	

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70 Totals

71 Bomb (H)	16	0	16	0	16	--	--	--
72 Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	--	--	--
73 Bomb (L)	19	0	19	0	19	--	--	--
74 Pursuit	100	0	100	0	100	155	--	155

75 Grand Total All Types

	135	0	135	0	135	155	--	--
--	-----	---	-----	---	-----	-----	----	----

76 INDIA - BURMA - CHINA
(Exclusive of Hawaii, New Zealand, New Caledonia)

77 U. S. Army Air Forces (AVG)

78 Bomb (H)	9	0	9	28	37	51	0	51
79 Bomb (M)	5	0	5	0	5	0	0	0
80 Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
81 Pursuit	0	0	0	189	189	160	80	240
82 Total	14	0	14	217	231	211	80	291

83 Royal Air Force

84 Bomb (H)	0	--	0	--	0	--	--	--
85 Bomb (M)	4	--	4	--	4	36	--	36
86 Bomb (L)	32	--	32	--	32	144	--	144
87 Pursuit	77	--	77	--	77	630	--	630
88 Total	113	--	113	--	113	810	--	810

89 Chinese

90 Bomb (H)	)							
91 Bomb (M)	)							
92 Bomb (L)	)							
93 Pursuit	)							
94 Total	)							

95 British Navy

96 Bomb (H)	)	--	--	--	)	0	--	0	* Fleet B
97 Bomb (M)	)	147	--	--	)	147*	56	--	56
98 Bomb (L)	)	--	--	--	)	13	--	13	
99 Pursuit	)	--	--	--	)	0	--	0	
100 Total	)	147	--	--	)	147*	69	--	69

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS
MICROFILMED IN SECTION

96	Bomb (H)	)	--	--	--	)	0	--	0	
97	Bomb (M)	)	147	--	--	)	147*	56	--	56
98	Bomb (L)	)	--	--	--	)	13	--	13	
99	Pursuit	)	--	--	--	)	0	--	0	
100	Total		147	--	--		147*	69	--	69
101	Totals									
102	Bomb (H)	)			28	)		--	--	
103	Bomb (M)	)	123	--	123	)	151	300	--	--
104	Bomb (L)	)				)		--	--	
105	Pursuit		151	--	151		340	790	--	--
106	Grand Total of All Types		274				491	1090		
107	HAWAII									
108	U. S. Army Air Forces									
109	Bomb (H)		31	0	31		36	70	18	88
110	Bomb (M)		0	0	0		0	0	0	0
111	Bomb (L)		9	0	9		9	14	4	18
112	Pursuit		80	68	148		148	240	60	300
113	U.S. Army Totals		120	68	188		193	324	82	406
114	U. S. Navy									
115	Bomb (H)		86	4	90		90			Navy Planned
116	Bomb (M)		44	4	48		49			Not determined
117	Bomb (L)		98	35	133		185			Theater
118	Pursuit		46	13	59		109			
119	U. S. Navy Totals		274	56	330		433			
120	Hawaii Totals									
121	Bomb (H)		117	4	121		126	70	18	88
122	Bomb (M)		44	4	48		49	0	0	0
123	Bomb (L)		107	35	142		194	14	4	18
124	Pursuit		126	81	207		257	240	60	300
125	Grand Total of All Types		394				626	324*		* Plus U.S. Navy
126	TOTAL UNITED NATIONS IN PACIFIC THEATER									
127	Bomb (H)	)				)				
128	Bomb (M)	)	748			)	1081	1145		
129	Bomb (L)	)				)				
130	Pursuit		702				1260	1809		
131	Grand Total All Types		1450				2341	2954		

NOTE: United Nations' planned strengths based on J. C. S. #23, amended to 4-9-42.

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Chart No. 2

United Nations Aircraft Strength

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
2	Mediterranean Theater (including Africa, Malta, Asia Minor)	Present Strength			Enroute	Current Total (4 + 5)	Planned Strength Dec. 31, 1942			Remarks
		Oper.	Non- Oper.	Total			Oper.	Reserve	Total	
3	Royal Air Force									
4	Bomb (H)	5	7	12	--	12	54	--	--	* Approximately 400
5	Bomb (M)	69	161	230	--	230	144	--	--	non-oper. a/c may
6	Bomb (L)	172	403	575	--	575	252	--	--	not become operational
7	Pursuit	375	1231	1606	--	1606	941	--	--	
8	Total	621	1802	2423	--	2423	1391	--	--	
9	British Navy									
10	Bomb (H)	)		)			--	--	--	
11	Bomb (M)	) 45	--	) 45	--	45	139	--	--	
12	Bomb (L)	)		)			72	--	--	
13	Pursuit	28	--	28	--	28	--	--	--	
14	Total	73	--	73	--	73	211	--	--	
15	Total United Nations Mediterranean Theater									
16	Bomb (H)	)		)			)			
17	Bomb (M)	) 291	571	862	--	862	) 661	--	--	
18	Bomb (L)	)		)			)			
19	Pursuit	403	1231	1634	--	1634	941	--	--	
20	GRAND TOTAL	694				2496	1602			

21	United Kingdom Theater (incl. Gibraltar less Iceland)									
22	U. S. Army Air Forces									
23	Bomb (H)	0	0	0	0	0	525	131	656	
24	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	399	100	499	
25	Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	396	100	496	
26	Pursuit	0	0	0	0	0	720	180	900	
27	Total						2043	511	2554	
28	Royal Air Force	*								* Includes combat a/c in O.T.U's
29	Bomb (H)	351	49	400	--	400	1062	--	--	
30	Bomb (M)	1323	1337	2660	--	2660	774	--	--	
31	Bomb (L)	711	1020	1731	--	1731	423	--	--	
32	Pursuit	2714	2715	5429	--	5429	2421	--	--	
33	Total	5099	5121	10220	--	10220	4680	--	--	
34	British Navy									
35	Bomb (H)	)		)			0	--	--	
36	Bomb (M)	) 99	--	) 99	--	99	334	--	--	
37	Bomb (L)	)		)			90	--	--	
38	Pursuit	72	--	72	--	72	--	--	--	
39	Total	171	--	171	--	171	424	--	--	
40	U. S. Navy									
41	Bomb (H)	0	--	0	--	0	--	--	--	
42	Bomb (M)	9	--	9	--	9	--	--	--	
43	Bomb (L)	29	--	29	--	29	--	--	--	
44	Pursuit	27	--	27	--	27	--	--	--	

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UNITED NATIONS AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 Continental U. S. and Canada	Present Strength			Enroute	Current Total (4 + 5)	Planned Strength Dec. 31, 1942			Remarks
	Oper.	Non Oper.	Total			Oper.	Reserve	Total	
2 U. S. Army Air Forces									
3 Bomb (H)	190	163	353	0	353	700	175	875	
4 Bomb (M)	156	149	305	0	305	641	160	801	
5 Bomb (L)	455	106	561	0	561	846	212	1058	
6 Pursuit	826	347	1173	0	1173	3015	769	3784	
7 Total	1627	765	2392	0	2392	5202	1416	6518	
8 U. S. Navy									
9 Bomb (H)	97	0	97	--	97				Navy Planned Strength Not Determined By Theater
10 Bomb (M)	16	2	18	--	18				
11 Bomb (L)	222	50	272	--	272				
12 Pursuit	114	40	174	--	174				
13 Total	469	92	561	--	561				
14 R. C. Air Force									
15 Bomb (H)	0	0	0	--	0	--	--	--	
16 Bomb (M)	7	21	28	--	28	18	--	18	
17 Bomb (L)	74	188	262	--	262	36	--	36	
18 Pursuit	28	24	52	--	52	108	--	108	
19 Total	109	233	342	--	342	162	--	162	
20 British Navy									
21 Bomb (H)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
22 Bomb (M)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
23 Bomb (L)	--	--	--	--	--	179	--	179	
24 Pursuit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	
25 Total	--	--	--	--	--	179	--	179	
26 Totals U. S. and Canada									
27 Bomb (H)	287	163	450	--	450				
28 Bomb (M)	179	172	351	--	351				
29 Bomb (L)	751	344	1095	--	1095				
30 Pursuit	988	391	1399	--	1399				
31 Grand Total All Types	2205				3295				
32 ATLANTIC BASES (Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland & Bermuda) (See Line 96)									
33 U. S. Army Air Forces									
34 Bomb (H)	4	0	4	0	4	8	2	10	
35 Bomb (M)	2	0	2	0	2	13	4	17	
36 Bomb (L)	3	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	
37 Pursuit	25	14	39	0	39	130	34	164	
38 Total	34	14	48	0	48	151	40	191	
39 U. S. Navy									
40 Bomb (H)	28	--	28	--	28				
41 Bomb (M)	--	--	--	--	--				
42 Bomb (L)	--	--	--	--	--				
43 Pursuit	--	--	--	--	--				
44 Total	28	--	28	--	28				
45 Totals Atlantic Bases (Except for Iceland RAF - see line 96)									
46 Bomb (H)	32	--	32	--	32				
47 Bomb (M)	2	--	2	--	2				
48 Bomb (L)	3	--	3	--	3				
49 Pursuit	25	14	39	--	39				
50 Grand Total All Types	62				76				

45	Totals Atlantic Bases (Except for Iceland RAF - see line 96)								
46	Bomb (H)	32	--	32	--	32			
47	Bomb (M)	2	--	2	--	2			
48	Bomb (L)	3	--	3	--	3			
49	Pursuit	25	14	39	--	39			
50	Grand Total All Types	62				76			

51 ASCENSION and LIBERIA

52	U. S. Army Air Forces								
53	Bomb (H)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
54	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	10	3	13
55	Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
56	Pursuit	0	0	0	0	0	38	10	48
57	Grand Total All Types	0	0	0	0	0	48	13	61

58 ALASKA

59	U. S. Army Air Forces								
60	Bomb (H)	1	0	1	0	1	35	9	44
61	Bomb (M)	12	0	12	18	30	18	5	23
62	Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
63	Pursuit	14	0	14	24	38	80	20	100
64	Total	27	0	27	42	69	133	34	167
65	U. S. Navy								
66	Bomb (H)	12	0	12	0	12			
67	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0			
68	Bomb (L)	0	0	0	0	0			
69	Pursuit	0	0	0	0	0			
70	Total	17	0	17	0	17			
71	Totals Alaska								
72	Bomb (H)	13	0	13	0	13			
73	Bomb (M)	12	0	12	18	30			
74	Bomb (L)	5	0	5	0	5			
75	Pursuit	14	0	14	24	38			
76	Grand Total All Types	44				86			

77 CARIBBEAN (Panama)

78	U. S. Army Air Forces								
79	Bomb (H)	35	5	40	3	43	70	18	88
80	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0	57	15	72
81	Bomb (L)	10	0	10	0	10	57	17	74
82	Pursuit	160	51	211	29	240	337	85	422
83	Total	205	56	261	32	293	521	135	656
84	U. S. Navy								
85	Bomb (H)	25	--	25	--	25			
86	Bomb (M)	--	--	--	--	--			
87	Bomb (L)	21	--	21	--	21			
88	Pursuit	--	--	--	--	--			
89	Total	46	--	46	--	46			
90	Totals Caribbean								
91	Bomb (H)	60	5	65	3	68			
92	Bomb (M)	0	0	0	0	0			
93	Bomb (L)	31	0	31	0	31			
94	Pursuit	160	51	211	29	240			
95	Grand Total All Types	251				339			

96 ICELAND (R.A.F. aircraft only)

97	R. A. F.								
98	Bomb (H)	1	0	1	--	1			
99	Bomb (M)	4	4	8	--	8			
100	Bomb (L)	24	12	36	--	36			
101	Pursuit	0	0	0	0	0			
102	Total	29	16	45	--	45			

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

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MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.

April 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Army Air Force Requirements for Transports.

1. A careful survey of the minimum requirements for transport planes for the remainder of 1942 shows the following:

a. To accomplish the mission of the Air Forces with airborne infantry, parachute troops and gliderborne infantry for combat not later than November 15, 1942

389 transports

b. Ferrying Command: Burma Road; U.S. to Alaska; San Francisco to Australia; U.S. to Natal; Takoradi to Cairo, Karachi; U.S. to U.K. Requirement

284 transports

c. To train replacement pilots and to organize new units and train airborne infantry in the U. S.

111 transports

d. To supply and maintain cargo and transport service in the Army Air Forces, in the Caribbean area, Hawaii, Australia and Alaska

196 transports

2. Total requirements
On hand
Balance required (no attrition)
Attrition
Net requirements
Present allocation
Deficit December 31, 1942

980
111
869
170
1039
660
379

H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Copy for Mr. Hopkins. ✓

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD LHM, May 2, 1972

By RHP, 11/1/72 DEC 4 1973

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April 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Airline requirements for Transport Planes.

The number of airplanes required to maintain scheduled air transportation for strictly war purposes depends directly upon the definition of war purposes. There is another and probably far more important mission under war purposes than that of carrying passengers and mail, and that is as a reserve for future military needs of the United States Army.

If a policy were adopted that 'neither passenger nor mail will be carried between any two points which can be reached in less than 18 hours by rail', a material number of transport planes could be taken off of the airlines and made available for strictly military use.

Total number of airplanes on hand (not including Pan American, Panagra, and Hawaiian) as of April 15th	327
To be utilized by the Air Service for military purposes.	77
Balance available for airline operations	250

It is estimated that if the 18 hour elapsed time policy is put into effect, a total of approximately 200 airplanes will be all that will be required to operate the airlines. In this 200 airplanes will be included the necessary reserves to take care of airplanes out for engine changes and overhauls. To insure that the 200 airplanes available will provide for this service, it will require some re-routing, some reorganization of the airmail system, and possibly "washing out" of some of the smaller lines. Great care must be exercised in selecting the 50 planes taken away from the airlines, otherwise the airlines will become inoperative due to shortage of certain types of planes.

If it is desired to secure more than 50 airplanes for strictly military purposes, it is my opinion that the Government had better take over and operate the airlines. Paying for planes does not compensate the airlines for the ground service and overhead necessary to keep planes in the air. As the number of planes is reduced, the cost of operation per plane of the airlines rises. If the airlines are limited in their operations to 200 planes, unless the overhead is correspondingly reduced the cost per passenger and per lb. of cargo will rise and the airline rates will have to be revised upwards.

The airlines within the United States are probably the most efficient

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

COPY FOR MR. HOPKINS By RHP, NARS Date DEC 4 1973

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anywhere in the world. They have attained this efficiency as the result of years of hard work, careful management and organization. It is my opinion that we cannot reduce the planes they are using beyond the 200 limit without causing this entire system to collapse and the results of many years' work being lost.

I desire to again call to your attention the value of the airplanes as an Army reserve which can be called upon in case of emergency, or when a critical situation exists which necessitates this number of airplanes in any one of many theatres in which we must be operating.

The above estimate of the airline situation is my own opinion after conferring with General Connolly. A more thorough study of this subject is being made which should be available within a week.

H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date DEC 4 1973

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS:

1. In answer to your request of last evening for a memorandum showing production of air transports in 1942, by month, together with number of transports that now exist, the number which are now in the hands of the Army or the Navy, and the number of these latter which are used on the African-Asiatic ferry route, the attached memorandum prepared for my signature by Col. Jamison is forwarded.

2. In answer to your request for the shipping loss picture, there are forwarded herewith the following documents containing the data:

Memorandum of April 20, 1942 by Mr. Lubin
Tables I to IV showing gains and losses
of ocean going merchant vessels for
certain periods.

Two charts - weekly and monthly gains and
losses of ocean going merchant vessels.

3. I suspect that ship losses may not tell the whole story. Ship "turn arounds" on the various routes and voyages may be increasing. I am asking Mr. Lubin to analyze this question.

/s/ J.H.B.

8 Inclosures
(as listed above)

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JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 1 1973

*Filed under
Shipping
Losses
original
memo.*

Air Transports

~~SECRET~~

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

Subject: Air Transport Data

1. Air Transport Production 1942.

	Delivered			-----To Be Delivered-----									
	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
VS-44 (8-I)								1		1		1	3
Constellation													
C-54				2	3	3	4	4	4	4	1	2	27
C-46						1	2	5	8	10	20	25	71
C-47		23	29	44	60	75	93	100	105	110	114	120	873
C-53	23	16	15	25	24	26	25	25	25	25	25	25	279
Total C-47 & C-53	23	39	44	69	84	101	118	125	130	135	139	145	1152
C-60 (L-18)			8	4	8	16	15	14	21	23	20	21	150
C-45								10	25	25	25	25	110
GB-2				2	18	20	8						48
GH-1			2	8	8	6							24
C-61	4	24	28	25	24	9							114
Totals													
All Types	27	63	82	110	145	156	147	169	188	198	205	219	1699

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JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date

DEC

1 1973

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2. Transports Operating


a. U.S. Air Forces -----	403
b. U.S. Navy -----	42
c. Domestic Airlines -----	326
d. Pan American Airlines ----	67
e. U.K. -----	226

3. Transports on African - Asiatic Ferry Routes.

a. 10th. Air Force (India ---	17
b. Lagos - Calcutta route ---	20*

* 10 in China
4 in India
2 on the route
4 scheduled to leave U.S.

20


J. E. BURNS
Major General, U. S. Army
Executive
Munitions Assignments Board

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JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

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file
Boat
PSF (Safe) Army Air Forces

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Arnold arrives at his figures somewhat differently than Lubin but they do not fundamentally conflict.

The difference is due to the fact that Arnold's "requirements" are not quite as high as your objectives.

H.L.H.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.H.

Do these figures fit in with
the ones we went over yesterday afternoon?

F.D.R.

~~SECRET~~

PSF (safe) Army Air Forces
HHA

WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Air Forces
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS~~
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of War

1. Tab a indicates the present and December 31, 1942, objective strengths of the Air Force units outside continental United States.

Tab b shows the present and December 31, 1942, objective strength under the control of continental United States.

Tab c shows the strength which it is contemplated will participate in the main effort overseas.

Tab d shows the total requirements with shortages for the December 31, 1942, objective.

2. Production resources of aircraft are short of these requirements by the following amounts, if we meet present foreign commitments.

	Aug. 1	Sept. 1	Dec. 31
Heavy	418	644	938
Medium	809	934	1095
Light	1268	1476	1742
Pursuit	2176	2907	5367
			<u>9142</u> Total Shortage Dec 31

These figures include allowances for a reasonable attrition rate and a reserve of twenty-five percent as well as essential commitments for technical and training purposes.

3. It is proposed to meet the requirements of the main effort by:

1. The reduction of Defense Aid commitments.
2. The establishment of priorities between theaters and commands.

4. Our December 31, 1942, objective of 9,568 tactical aircraft assigned to units is not excessive when compared with the

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED
STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

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Date- 4-1-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

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corresponding strength of our enemies. The aircraft assigned to Axis tactical units are:

Germany	<u>11,000</u>	=
Japan	<u>3,400</u>	=
TOTAL	14,400.	

H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
Commanding General,
Army Air Forces.

4 Incls.-
Tabs a, b,
c & d.

*The British normally allow 100% reserves
We at present have no reserves.*

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COMBAT UNITS ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED OUTSIDE THE U. S.
(Less Main Effort)

THEATER	TYPE	<i>actual</i> PRESENT STRENGTH		<i>Normal</i> AUTHORIZED STRENGTH		
		Grps.	A/C	Grps.	A/C	
1. Caribbean (Panama)	H	1	44	2	70	<i>Operational</i> No Reserve 25%
	M	1	0	1	57	
	L	1 sq	10	1	57	
	P	2	240	4	320	
2. Hawaii	H	2	37	2	70	No Reserve 25%
	M	0	0	0	0	
	L	1 sq.	9	2 sq	13	
	P	1	149	3	240	
3. Pacific Islands Bases	H	0	0	1 sq	8	No reserve 50%
	M	0	0	0	0	
	L	0	0	0	0	
	P	3 sq	88	9 sq	225	
4. Australia (and SW Pacific)	H	2	50	2	170	Reserve included
	M	2	105	2	114	
	L	1	61	1	57	
	P	3	476	5	400	
5. India and China	H	0	16	1 plus	51	no reserve 50%
	M	0	0	2 sq	0	
	L	0	0	0	0	
	P	2	10	2	240	

NOTE: Authorized strengths of A/C are operational requirements only and do not include attrition or reserves Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

* H - Heavy
M - Medium
L - Light
P - Pursuit

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4 - 2 - 59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

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COMBAT UNITS ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED IN THE U. S.

THEATER	* TYPE	<i>Actual</i> PRESENT STRENGTH		<i>Normal</i> AUTHORIZED STRENGTH		
		Grps.	A/C	Grps.	A/C	
1. East Theater (Including Newfoundland)	H	1	13	1	35	<i>No Reserves</i>
	M	1	39	1	57	
	L	0	77	0	0	
	P	3	158	2	160	
2. West Def. Command	H	1	14	1	35	<i>"</i>
	M	0	6	0	0	
	L	0	98	0	0	
	P	3	293	3	240	
3. Alaska	H	1 Sq	4	1	35	<i>"</i>
	M	1 Sq	30	1 Sq	8	
	L	0	0	0	0	
	P	2 Sq	38	1	105	
4. Atlantic Bases (Iceland, Greenland, Bermuda, Ascension and Liberia)	H	0	5	0	0	<i>"</i>
	M	0	0	2 Sq	26	
	L	0	3	0	0	
	P	1 Sq	54	1 Sq	25	
5. Army Air Forces <i>Temporary Picture</i> <i>Out of this must come the planes for the major offensive</i>	H	6	160	8	280	<i>"</i>
	M	1	110	6	342	
	L	2	275	5		
	P	2	356	plus 2 Sq. 7	351 560	

NOTE: Authorized strengths of A/C are operational requirements only and do not include attrition or reserves.

* H - Heavy
M - Medium
L - Light
P - Pursuit

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COMBAT UNITS AUTHORIZED FOR MAIN EFFORT

TYPE	STRENGTH		TIME READY FOR COMBAT
	Groups	Aircraft	
Heavy	3	105	<u>By August 15, 1942</u>
Medium	1	57	
Light	3	171	
Pursuit	5	400	
Heavy	11	385	<u>By November 1, 1942</u>
Medium	3	171	
Light	5	285	
Pursuit	7 ? 17 <i>from 17</i>	560 <i>1500 should be</i>	

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TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEC. 31 OBJECTIVE

Including all theatres - both defensive and offensive.

TYPE	NO. OF GPS.	NO. OF A/C REQUIRED	RESERVE	Probable ATTRITION up to Dec 31	TOTAL RE- QUIREMENTS	SHORTAGE AS OF DEC. 31, 1942
Bombardment H	33 plus 3 sq.	1441	360	819	2620	938
Bombardment M	12 plus 3 sq.	1267	288	748	2303	1095
Bombardment L	10 plus 76 sq.	1360	340	747	2447	1742
Pursuit	35 plus 82 sq.	5500	1260	3098	9858	5367
Aggregates		<u>9568</u>			<u>17,228</u>	<u>9142</u>

NOTE: No changes in commitments of aircraft to foreign governments are included in the shortages indicated above.

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Boyd

*Safe: Army Air Force
PSF*

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: (The White House)

Subject: Development of road from LAGOS to KHARTOUM

Reference the attached message from the Grady Mission, the Cullen-Roosevelt report, as well as information from other sources, tends to corroborate the statements made therein concerning the road from LAGOS to KHARTOUM via KANO.

A study has been started to ascertain the all-weather character of the road, the weight and type of vehicle it will bear and the tonnage which it may be expected to accommodate. This information should give a sound basis upon which to determine the practicability of developing and using this road for the transportation of military supplies to the Middle East area.

General Maxwell is being asked to expedite forwarding information in this connection to Washington.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl: Copy telegram #360, 5/16/42
frm the Grady Mission.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10 - 31 - 66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Bombay

Dated May 16, 1942

Rec'd 9:09 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

360, May 16, 11 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GRADY.

"T-21. Beyster, a member of our mission and an engineer, believes it practicable to develop and improve the present all-weather road from Lagos to Khartoum via Kano. Such a project would operate to safeguard supply lines to the Middle East against enemy action in the Indian Ocean and to conserve shipping. Deliveries of equipment in Africa and the Middle East could be made more promptly and in increased volume. Airfield in Central Africa could be supplied more easily since the improved road would follow air route. Moreover, the railroad from Lagos to Kano could for that distance supplement the road, although some additional equipment would be required. Beyster states that this project would not be costly and with adequate equipment could be completed in less than six months. The mission believes the plan merits a serious consideration of officials in Washington."

EDA

DONOVAN

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PSF
Safe

Army Air Forces

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Possibility of flying pursuit airplanes
from Hawaii to Midway.

With regard to your inquiry of the possibility of flying pursuit airplanes from Hawaii to Midway, there are in Hawaii approximately 22 P-39D airplanes, with 5 belly tanks each. The all-out range of this airplane with belly tank, in still air, is 1000 miles. There are also approximately 87 P-40 type airplanes, with 5 belly tanks each, whose all-out range, in still air, is about 800 miles.

The distance from the closest point in the Hawaiian Islands, which would be on the Island of Kauai, to Midway is 1225 statute miles.

None of these fighters have sufficient range to make the passage.



H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

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Date- 4 - 2 - 59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

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WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

Safe: Army Air Force
col *PSF*

July 5, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes moving across North Atlantic.

The following is status of airplanes of groups moving across the North Atlantic:

B-17's

United States	5
Labrador & Newfoundland	15
Greenland	16
Iceland	5
England	1

P-38's (Fighters)

United States	17
Labrador	39
Greenland	24

Transports

United States	27
Labrador	12
Greenland	12
Iceland	1

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Date- 4 - 3 - 59

Signature- *Carl T. Spier*

H. H. Arnold
H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 5, 1942

Receipt is acknowledged this day of a ~~SECRET~~ memorandum from
Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, Room 2018, Munitions Building,
to The President, The White House, Washington, D. C., dated
7/5/42.

NAME

RANK

Please accomplish and return to:

Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold
Room 2018
Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

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*Safe: Army Air Force
PSF*

**WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON**

port

August 19, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reply to Peter Masefield's criticism of Flying Fortresses and Liberators.

The following message has been received from General Spaatz in reply to my request for data relative statement made by Peter Masefield covering unsuitability of Flying Fortresses and Liberators:

"Bombing attack on Rouen far exceeded in accuracy any previous high altitude bombing in this theater either by German or Allied aircraft. Strong fighter protection accompanied this bombing mission. American bombers will not be sent indiscriminately into Germany and daylight attacks on enemy will be progressive. Experience will dictate the depth of penetration. The above mentioned raid justifies our belief in the feasibility of daylight bombing. Enemy attacks were not pressed home, apparently due to crossfire of bombers in formation and heavy fighter protection. Definite conclusions cannot be reached as to feasibility of bomber attacks unsupported by fighters until determined enemy attacks are made. Four tons of bombs have been carried in practice flights which is the same as British Maximum normal bomb load. Combat crews are enthusiastic about flying fortresses as the gunners are confident and the turrets are working perfectly. It is my opinion and conviction that the B-17 is suitable as to speed, armament, armor, and bomb load. I would not exchange it for any British bomber in production. It is believed the reference tonight bombardment was a reference to glow caused by the turbo superchargers. These must be dampened for night operations."

Insofar as the glow from the engines is concerned, dampeners for these supercharger exhausts are now in production and it is only a matter of time until all planes are equipped.

The above more than vindicates our faith in the Flying Fortresses and precision bombing. Similar message was received this date covering our Medium Bombardment airplanes operating out of England.

H. H. Arnold
H. H. Arnold
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 10-21-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~SECRET~~

PSF(Safe): Army Air Force

March 15, 1944.

My dear Chennault:-

I wish to goodness that communications were a little bit quicker. I did not get yours of January twenty-sixth until March fourth, and many things have happened since then.

As you know, I had a hard time in pushing the British to improve the transportation of oil, etc., from Calcutta up to the Assam bases, and I hope that their new promises will materialize. Meanwhile, I understand that the total tonnage over the hump is going fairly well.

In regard to the B 29's, people here are very certain that this outfit should be under Washington command and not solely in China. By command I mean overall location determination but not operational work. When they are assigned to the Chinese area operational command would be yours. The reason for this is that they want the right to move them to any part of the Pacific theatre if and when the situation changes. I am inclined to think that once in China they will stay and be kept up to strength because the production of B 29's is coming on well. Good luck to you and them!

I take it you are kept informed of plans for the whole Southwest Pacific area.

I agree with you about the importance of the plan against shipping as a part of an effective flank attack on Japan from China. Your figures of successful operations against Japanese shipping are excellent.

You are the Doctor and I approve your treatment. Nevertheless, as a matter perhaps of sentimentality, I have had a hope that we could get at least one bombing expedition against Tokio before the second anniversary of Doolittle's flight. I really believe that the morale effect would help!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Major General C. L. Chennault,
HEADQUARTERS, 14th U. S. AIR FORCE.

*Page
file: Army Air
Force*

HEADQUARTERS, 14TH U. S. AIR FORCE
Office of the Commanding General

26 January, 1944.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Hitherto, in my occasional reports to you, I have avoided raising basic issues of military policy. After most serious thought, however, I have concluded it is now my duty to do so. I can see no other course open; since I am convinced the war will be needlessly prolonged by neglect of our opportunity to attack Japan in the flank from China; and since I am certain the opportunity will, in fact, be neglected unless you intervene.

The matter is pressing. It is now urgent to prepare for the day when Germany will be beaten, and you can turn the whole strength of the United Nations against Japan. As matters stand, your strength will then be far greater than the enemy's, but you will be unable to bring more than a little of your strength to bear. Limitations of naval bases, air bases, ports and supply facilities will prevent you from deploying your full forces, at least until the Japanese have been driven from their positions in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific. These positions are now strongly fortified and stubbornly held. They can be rapidly weakened, however, by an intelligently conceived attack on the Japanese flank from the China base. By expediting the fall of Japan's outer defenses, such an attack will directly advance the time when the United Nations' full forces may be deployed for the final assault. But preparation for such an attack must begin almost immediately; if it is to bear fruit when it should, in the next twelve months.

What ought to be done is not difficult.

1. Our air forces should be augmented to establish air supremacy throughout East China.

2. From the base thus secured, Japanese shipping on the Chinese inland waterways, in the Chinese and Formosan ports, and in the sea lane along the China coast, should be intensively attacked by medium bombers. At the same time, the attack on shipping should be carried out over the China Sea to the coast of the Philippines, by heavy bombers with Radar and other special equipment for sea search. The sea search should cover both the vital sea routes, between Japan and Shanghai, and between Japan and her new Empire in the South.

3. Meanwhile, in close coordination with the attacks on Japanese air power and shipping, heavy bombers of the B-29 type should

drive the attack home to the Japanese Islands, and to Japan's industrial installations in Manchuria, North China and Korea.

4. Nor should closer ground targets be neglected. Use of the great Japanese staging areas on Formosa and Hainan Island may be virtually denied by a strong, well-balanced air force in China. In China proper, when the weather opens next summer, the attacks on shipping will cut the Yangtze River supply lines, on which the Japanese positions from Hankow up to Ichang are entirely dependent. If these positions are also pulverized by heavy bombardment, and if the Chinese Armies are given strong air support in attacking them, the Japanese hold should be broken by relatively slight Chinese pressure. Both the Generalissimo and the able General Chen Cheng, who actually led two sieges of Ichang, have always maintained that the upper Yangtze positions could be retaken with 500 allied aircraft in China. I am confident they are right.

The four kinds of operations are listed in what I regard as their true order of military priority. It may seem surprising that I put the most spectacular - long range bombing of Japan - in third place. Yet the reason is simple.

Long range bombing of industrial installations, as European experience has shown, takes a long time to produce decisive results. I believe that immediately decisive results can be produced by the attack on Japanese shipping and air power. Since in China we can count on knocking down approximately nine Japanese aircraft for each one of our own lost, the fight for air supremacy here should subject Japanese air power to an extremely heavy strain. More important still, I will risk my reputation that when the air units and supplies are available for the job, we can sink a minimum of 150,000 tons of Japanese shipping each month. I consider that the strain on Japan's air power, added to existing strains in other areas, ought to prove crippling. Japan's shipping resources are plainly unable to withstand additional losses at the rate of 150,000 tons a month. To one with your war experience and special mastery of naval strategy, I need hardly point out that the Japanese positions in South-east Asia and the South-west Pacific must soon fall, if Japan has not the shipping and air power to support them. Finally, destruction of the Formosan and Hainanese staging areas will further increase the effect of the attacks on shipping and air power, throwing out of kilter the whole Japanese system of military movement. For these reasons, while both types of operation are exceedingly important, I think the attack on shipping and air power should have present priority, while long range bombing of Japan must be looked to for the eventual knock-out blow.

The attack on the Japanese flank which I have outlined is quite feasible. If energetic preparations are made during the next months, all necessary units should be in place, and all supply and other facilities should be ready, by the end of June. The weather in China opens, and the best fighting season starts during July. By scheduling the most intensive operations to begin in July, they should coincide.

exactly with the major frontal assaults in the South-west Pacific and South-east Asia which I assume we shall make next summer. I may add that the proposed operations from China are a way of doing much with little. They will require no premature diversion of essential forces from the western front.

Unfortunately, since the abandonment of the plan for a major campaign in Burma, the China program appears to consist exclusively of the Matterhorn Project, for long range bombing of Japan. No additions to the program seem likely. The Chinese leaders, while I am sure they will approve and cooperate in the operations which I suggest, are too preoccupied with domestic and financial problems to take the initiative. I am glad to say that I was recently able to explain the potentialities of an attack on Japanese shipping and air power to Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Wedemeyer. They immediately grasped its importance, and have promised to support the plan in the appropriate quarters. But they are in no position to do over-all planning for China, and an over-all plan is required.

I am not only convinced long range bombing of Japan is less immediately important than the attack on shipping and air power; I also believe that as now planned, the Matterhorn Project is tactically dangerous, and that the proposed division of command of the Matterhorn Project and the Fourteenth Air Force is militarily unsound. The whole weight of my experience in China is on the side of these conclusions. As you know, I have always maintained that properly conducted air defense by an adequate force could enable the Chinese Armies to beat back any Japanese counter-offensive. But if the present plan for the Matterhorn Project and its command is adhered to, I cannot feel the same confidence on this point. I append a copy of a letter to General Arnold, listing the defects in the Matterhorn Project, and a Plan of Air Operations for the attack on shipping and air power.

Summarizing, the conditions of an effective flank attack on Japan from China are:

a. Recognition of such an attack as part of the broad strategy of the war;

b. Augmentation of the Fourteenth Air Force;

c. Integration of the Matterhorn Project into the Fourteenth Air Force;

d. An energetic effort to improve supply facilities, and especially transport facilities, within China;

e. Agreement with the Generalissimo respecting the proposed ground-air assault on the upper Yangtze positions.


All but e. are essential. Clearing the upper Yangtze will be effective

and relatively cheap, but is not a vital operation. To complete the whole program, so that most intensive operations can begin in July, will take some months. Prompt action is therefore, necessary if the proposed flank attack is to be made on Japan at the right time and with full effect. On the other hand, I am not so self-assured as to suppose that you will even consider acting on my recommendations alone, since a radical change in strategic planning in this area is necessary. I most earnestly suggest, therefore, that you choose as your representatives some such able, impartial men as Gen. Wedemeyer, and that you send them to China to re-survey the situation in the light of the failure of the Burma campaign.

While the Burma campaign was the first item on the agenda, it seemed useless to trouble you with my opinions. I write you now with a full sense of the gravity of the step I am taking, and with the hope you will understand the motives which impel me to do so. So long as I believe the actual length of the war to be at issue, I do not feel justified in withholding from you the facts as I see them. If you accept my recommendations, but feel my job may be better done by another man, I shall come home with some relief and with great gratitude to you for your faith in my judgment.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Most respectfully yours,



C. L. CHENNAULT
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

Encls: Copy letter to Gen. Arnold
Copy Plan of Air Operations in China.