

Document B Vol. I Paris

**ESTIMATE**  
*of*  
**Potential Military Strength**  
**Documents B**  
**Naval Attaché**  
**PARIS**

**Volume 1**  
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(27 Jan. 1937 - 3 June 1941)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

FRANCE

OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

No. 69

By SLR

Date

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27 January, 1937

900 NAVY

902 POLICY

902-100 BASIC NAVAL  
POLICIES

**FRENCH POLITICAL AND NAVAL POLICIES:** Naval Policy up to year 1938; maritime consequences of events since 1938; naval expansion of world powers; study of basic principles influencing French policies; summary analysis of the situation; important decisions which must form part of policies.

The Finance Commission of the French Chamber, under the Presidency of Monsieur Gratien GANDAGE, examined and reported on the French Navy Budget for the year 1937, prior to its discussion by the Naval Committee and final presentation to Parliament for approval.

A free translation of the report submitted by the Finance Commission, on the expenditures comprising the French Naval Budget for 1937 (and running building program appropriations), forms part of and is the object of this report.

At a time when other continental powers are hiding their military weaknesses, and glorifying their military prowess, it is surprising that the French would make public the "report" in question which is nothing short of a "confession" of present naval weakness and an apology for not being able to do any better in the future.

The French treat the airing of their naval difficulties before the Dictators with the same "laissez-faire" manner with which they treat the actual causes of such naval difficulties when called to their official notice.

Notwithstanding the lessons of the late war which proved to France that the strength of her Army (see paragraph 6 of report), in the field, depended on the protection which the navy could give to her lines of communication with North Africa, she neglected this arm of defense, under the influence of the League and collective security pacts (see paragraph 17 of report), and now wakes up to find the Dictators of Germany and Italy classing "collective security" on a par with "worn-out" Democracies.

France, in all her post-war military calculations, thought of Italy in terms of a second rate power, as well as counted on her unflinching friendship. The first years of Italy, under Mussolini, were considered in France as a passing phase in the life of this country and the French press expressed laughter at his patriotic "black shirt" mass meetings. Further, a wave of anti-Fascism swept over France and the political exiles from Italy were welcomed and sheltered. The first incline that the French had that Mussolini was to be reckoned with, in maritime matters, was his various statements about the status of Italian subjects in French Tunisia. This discussion was followed by an increase in navy building programs, and eventually in the laying down of the two Italian 35,000 ton battleships in answer to France's projected DUNKERQUE and STRASBOURG. The above naval expansion, together with Mussolini's various utterances to the effect "that a country's peace time importance was measured by its Navy", started the French to seriously consider Italian naval expansion. It needed nothing more than the Ethiopian affair, and the defiance of Britain's Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, to spread the alarm in French political circles that France had to contend with an important naval power in the Mediterranean.

Whatever may have been the reasons for England entering into the Anglo-German naval treaty, such a treaty compromised (see paragraph 22 of report) the peace foundations nourished in France as they viewed it.

The rising influence of Italy in the Mediterranean, due to her position in Ethiopia and consequent mortgage on the British Empire (see paragraph 71 of report), and lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, is greeted by the French in a political sense as it forces England to establish permanent friendships with a Mediterranean power (France), and

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change her traditional policy of "balance of power" which was so irritant to post-war France who desired nothing more than rest on her laurels as a satisfied member of the "haves" European organization.

Referring to the London Treaty of 1936 (see paragraphs 25 and 47), it would appear that England is not having much success in having Russia and Germany affix their signatures to the treaty. The admission (see paragraph 47) that the reason that England was not anxious to have Russia a party at the London Naval Treaty was because she feared that the projected Russian building program (7 cruisers and 2 battleships) would have served as a pretext for Germany to denounce the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, is of interest.

The reference to Japan accepting budgetary deficits, and charging them to future dividends (see paragraph 36 of report), thereby carrying on naval expansion and consequent inroads into Manchuko, is interesting as coming from a Left Government whose watchword has been "no profits in armaments", and also against all wars of aggression.

The dilemma of the United States before Japan (see paragraph 59 of report) in her "open door" policy in the Far East, and possible "reply" of Japan to the United States fortifying the Pacific islands, is mentioned as coming within the category of "influences" on French Policy.

The reference to England (see paragraph 61 of report) getting "no little pleasure" watching Japan strike in a direction that does not directly touch England shows that the French are politically aware that England's interest is only aroused when the danger reaches "home".

The diplomatic sarcasm mentioned in paragraph 65 of report: Washington Conference and President Hughes sending a telegram to France, is also worthy of mention.

Making allowances that "Dictators" are necessarily two years ahead of "Democracies" in armament programs, it is the opinion of a good many people (French Naval Officers and Foreign Naval Attachés), that France is inexcusably behind in her building programs.

Naval Attaché, Paris, reports Nos. 727 (901-200), 1936; 741 (902-100), 1936, and 20 (902-100), 1937, reported the delay in French building programs, and it must be again reiterated that with the Democratic policy of the Blum Government being "welfare - short hours and more pay for the masses", it is not seen how a speeding up of shipbuilding can take place unless "La Patrie" is in danger at which time it will be too late.

Letters have been circulated (round robins) to all members of the Chamber calling attention to this state of affairs, but unless two shifts are put to work in yards (financially impracticable), it is feared little can be accomplished in this respect.

The recent Anglo-Franco "mutual aid agreement", which neutralizes Italy's preponderance of naval power in the Mediterranean, relieves the embarrassing position of the French due to division of French fleet in Mediterranean and Atlantic waters. Were it not for this "agreement" the position of the French, in keeping their building program ahead of that of Italy and of Germany, would be precarious to say the least.

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OSD Policy Rep. 4, 1972

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TRANSLATION OF REPORT SUBMITTED BY FINANCE COMMISSION  
OF FRENCH CHAMBER IN SUBMITTING NAVAL BUDGET  
FOR YEAR 1937.

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FRENCH NAVAL POLICY UP TO YEAR 1932

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May, 3, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

Gentlemen:

1. During the 18th Century the French Navy remained second in rank. In 1914 the French Navy sank to fourth place: if the U.S. Navy had just barely passed it, the German Navy largely outclassed it.

2. In the year 1900 the French Navy was superior to the German. In 1906 still a margin of superiority remained but our ships were getting old. Germany was then on the verge of a large naval expansion. France failed to follow the German lead and consequently fell behind. The Act of 1912 fixed a naval program the realization of which took us up to 1920. However, the principal merit of this program was to lay the foundation of our modern navy.

3. On the heels of the laying down of the 3 battleships of the BRETAGNE class the world war broke out, and these were hurriedly finished during 1916. The 6 battleships of the FLANDRE class remained unfinished and had to be finally broken up with the exception of the BEARN, which was converted into a carrier.

4. In August, 1914, Germany, sure of her maritime superiority, counting on the neutrality of England, declared war. The Austrian menace in the Adriatic, and the raid of the two German cruisers in the Mediterranean, caused us to maintain in these waters our principal naval forces in order to assure communication with North Africa. We all remember the pathetic sailing of the Second Squadron: 6 old cruisers with a gun range of 12,000 meters (13,125 yds), and a small number of submarines. This squadron was to oppose a fleet of 21 German battleships with a gun range of from 15000 to 18000 meters (16-19,000 yds), and well escorted with destroyers and submarines. No one in the French Squadron had any illusions - all hands made the sacrifice that was expected of them.

5. If for any reason, diplomatic, or interior policy, England had delayed her entry into the World War, the German Fleet, after having quickly swept the French Squadron off the seas, would have become mistress of our maritime communications.

6. At the specific demand of Mr. Lloyd George, Monsieur Clemenceau had to admit, as a good sport, that had England delayed in dominating the seas with the least possible delay, the French Army could not have won the battle of the Marne.

7. Even after England had taken over command of the seas, the French Navy, with its small fleet, held the seas all during the period of the war and put forth a superhuman effort in doing its part. It was during the 4 years of the war, when France had to cease building and devote all her efforts to manufacturing shells for the Army, that the United States, Japan and England speeded up their building programs and attained fleets heretofore without precedent.

8. Then came the 1922 Washington Treaty which relegated us, at least in spirit if not in text, to the lower ranks of naval powers. However, to be frank, this had to be accepted due to our precarious financial situation and the situation of our building yards.

9. In 1914, on the eve of profiting from the 1912 program, the French Navy was only inferior to the navies of England and Germany. It was equal to the U.S. Navy, superior to Japan's and double that of Italy.

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10. Then came the 1922 Washington Treaty, and the famous coefficients, which placed us on a par with Italy:

United States.....5  
England.....5  
Japan.....5  
France.....1.75  
Italy.....1.75

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EL O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)  
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11. France, however, by careful and tenacious planning, rebuilt her light forces and took her place in the navies of the peaceful post-war world.

12. During the 1930 London Conference, the French Delegates finding themselves again confronted with the aggravated 1922 Washington conditions, were on the point of saying "we can go no further".

13. In 1932 the French delegate to the Geneva Conference, without violating the naval obligations already contracted, proposed a limitation of armaments based on the then existing tonnages and claiming for France a tonnage superior to that of both Italy and Germany.

14. If for a good many years France no longer entertained the thought of disputing with the Anglo-Saxons the hegemony of the oceans, now with Japan her interests in the Far East, she assumed that in European waters she was entitled to the Two-Power Standard", by reason of her Atlantic and Mediterranean coastline - not to mention her colonial empire spread over the seven seas.

15. The above is, therefore, the maritime situation of France in the year 1932.

#### EVENTS ARISING SINCE 1932 AND THEIR MARITIME CONSEQUENCES

16. Suddenly we find the peace platform, on which rested world peace since 1918, torn asunder and our naval policy dislocated. Here we find the International Political situation again brought to the front and, to quote Admiral Jurien de Granville whose words are once again verified: The Navy is above all a part of a country's policy.

17. Peace rested since 1918 on German disarmament as set forth in the Versailles Treaty; on the League of Nations; and on the principle of collective security apropos of which principle we have recently heard:

"You can think what you want of the principle of collective security, that it be a crazy utopia or a model of wisdom, but there is one thing beyond discussion and that is that for 16 years this idea of collective security has served as the guide for all France's policies."

18. Now this collective security principle has undergone some violent shocks, without any effective remedies intervening.

19. Italy has been able to annex the territory of Ethiopia.

20. Germany has been able to occupy and fortify the Rhineland provinces in direct violation of Locarno.

21. The Treaty of Versailles, which was also a pedestal of peace, was torn up by Germany. From the naval standpoint, with which we are at present dealing, this violation of the Treaty was the most pronounced: this violation was not alone tolerated but was given official sanction and approval by a diplomatic act - the Anglo-German Treaty of 1935.

22. We do not intend to enter into late and sterile criticism of this Treaty: sufficient for us to state that the political basis which reposed for 17 years the world peace organization (which peace defined France's naval position) has been compromised.

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23. Amongst the nations who remained members of the League, which already lost its universal character, were the small powers who perhaps remained by reason of their weakness, but who now are giving proof of doubts in its ability as a mediator of peace and security.

24. If we examine the purely naval aspect of the limitation of armaments, the perspectives are none too reassuring, we find that the naval treaties which the Anglo-Saxons always desired to negotiate (contrary to the French thesis), outside of Geneva, ~~was~~ not at present any more efficacious than the treaties of the League of Nations.

25. The Washington and London Treaties ceased to exist 31 December, 1936. The new Treaty signed in London during 1936 has only, to date, three signatures - France, England and United States (and the latter only with certain reservations). Japan and Italy have bolted notwithstanding the many concessions (qualitative limitations) made in their favor. Finally, the attempts made by England to have Russia and Germany put their signatures at the bottom of this "modest treaty" have to date met with little success.

26. The naval limitations which were realized in a period of political stability are now, in a world in full revolution, as compromised as the Geneva projects of general world disarmament.

27. It is in comparing the naval effort of the big powers that we can better discover the future pacific policies of the world.

28. In this comparison, naval and political questions will once again find themselves entangled. It is essential then to approach the question in an objective spirit in giving to the word "politic" its highest meaning: the art of watching over the destinies of people by holding ourselves aloof from emotional impulses, very often of a generous nature - though summary, which enables us to always foresee and be prepared for the worst or arrive at definite conclusions upon confrontation of each deviation in a policy which has long been followed by the people and the various representatives of Governments.

#### NAVAL EXPANSION OF BIG NAVAL POWERS

##### ENGLAND

29. From recent political events England has arrived at the following conclusion: without abandoning her connections with the League of Nations, she will rearm with all her might at the expiration of the naval treaty. The building program 1935-1936 which comprised 45,000 tons has been increased, during discussion of the budget, to include a torpedo flotilla of approximately 12,000 tons.

30. The 1936-1937 program, the first program free from the strings of the Washington and London Treaties, has just been announced. It approaches 200,000 tons. The building program has been quadrupled. These ships are not on paper but comprise actual construction, and the builders have been instructed to speed up the construction of the units. A torpedo boat will be constructed in less than 18 months - a heavy cruiser in 2½ years.

31. Beginning in 1937, 15,000 men will be recruited to man the new units when completed.

32. The British navy budget has passed from 60 million pounds in 1935 to 81 million pounds in 1936 (aviation not included).

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

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UNITED STATES

33. The United States began to rearm in 1933. For the present it is sufficient for the U.S. to carry out the Vinson bill to bring the U.S. fleet, with the least possible delay, to the maximum allowed by the Treaty - 5/5 by relation with Japan. This level is now almost obtained, thanks to the huge effort put forth in the past three years. Nearly 300,000 tons of ships are actually under construction - only a few destroyers and submarines are needed to bring the navy up to the limit allowed by the Washington and London treaties. If Japan does not take some initiative to break away from the quantitative or qualitative limits observed up to now, the U.S. Navy, with all light forces composed of new units, can devote all its time to replacing battleships. The huge effort made by the United States in recent years is due in a great measure to the National Recovery Act. In the entire U.S. budget the President is endeavoring to reduce expenses, but for the Navy expenditures are increasing: 528 million dollars for 1936-1937, against 483 millions in 1935-1936.

34. In the United States it is not only a question of ships, but all men and auxiliary armaments. Naval aviation follows the same cadence as the ship building and very soon the limit of 1910 planes as set forth in the Vinson Bill will be accomplished.

JAPAN

35. One would be partly correct in thinking that Japan received a good deal in the provisions of the Washington and London treaties; in exchange for her "pride" which consisted in accepting the ratio 3/5 to the Anglo-Saxon fleets, she received permission to play the role of mistress in Asiatic waters which she considers as her property. However, this did not stop her, during the years that the United States and England let their fleets become old and worn out, from attaining the maximum limit allowed by the treaties, and took steps not to be taken by surprise by a new race in armaments. It was Japan who took the initiative to denounce the Washington Treaty, as well as quit the London 1936 Conference trying to bargain for advantages. An eventual revision of the article of the treaty of Washington which prohibited fortifying the islands in the Pacific will not take Japan unaware.

36. For a long time all naval observers have predicted annual bankruptcy for nations spending over one-half of their budgets for armaments. The truth is that Japan was capable of traversing a long period of budgetary deficits to capitalize on a big navy (good future dividends) which procedure is already giving excellent results: exploiting a large section of the Asiatic continent (Manchuko), which not only makes Japan more respected, but gives her important economic and political advantages.

ITALY

37. From 1922 to 1934 Italy laid down an average of 23,000 tons - about two-thirds of tonnage laid down by the French. This relationship represented "grosso modo" the naval forces of both France and Italy.

38. During the three years 1934-1936, inclusive, the building program of the Italians almost attained the French figure: 103,000 tons against 117,000.

39. One would have been justified in thinking that after the conquest of Ethiopia, with the prospective financial outlay in connection therewith, that Italy would have allowed up her building program. Nothing of the sort occurred - Italy has just announced the laying down of several destroyers and submarines. In Italy, as is the case in the United States, England and Japan, steps are being taken at the same time to man these new ships. Further, all the Italian fleet was mobilized at the time of the Ethiopian trouble and the training of the men was intensified for future occasions. With a 60 hour week in Italy, against a 40 hour week in France,

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Italy will have reached par with France in 1939 unless additional steps are taken to make up the difference in working hours and conditions.

40. In brief, Italy will attain in 2 years a parity which no Frenchman ever thought she would attain. Italy with her two 35,000-ton battleships, her fleet modernized, her developments in light craft, submarines, etc., has increased her strategical position in the Eastern Mediterranean as was seen during the Italo-Ethiopian affair.

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11.

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(B) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May. 4, 1972

By SLR

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GERMANY

41. Germany is utilizing to full capacity the permission granted her to build ships, without time limit, as set forth in the Anglo-German Treaty, 420,000 to 450,000 tons in the next few years.

42. The construction of a submarine in Germany takes from 8 to 18 months; that of a cruiser 2½ years; that of a battleship 3½ years. With this speed, it should be about the middle of 1938 that Germany will begin thinking about denouncing the Anglo-German treaty - the pretext for which she is now looking for by complaining of the Russian naval program.

43. Germany, who is forcing herself to live in a closed economy and who does not possess any colonies, is speeding up her naval program which is essentially an offensive weapon or, eventually, a means of bringing pressure in bargaining. This naval force once completed will comprise:

- (a) A homogeneous naval force to be reckoned with in the Baltic, the North Sea, the English Channel and the North Atlantic.
- (b) Raiders with a long steaming radius.

44. Thus composed, the German fleet has no need to attain a tonnage equal to ours to constitute a grave danger against our lines of communications. Of all the elements which have torn away the foundations of peace, the rebuilding of the German fleet is the most damaging.

45. Then, though we do not want to indulge in vain criticism, a reflexion is necessary:

If the rearmament of the German Navy has been sanctioned by the bilateral act of the Anglo-German treaty of June 1935, the first serious mistake made in the Treaty of Versailles, was it not the weakness of the Ambassadors to the Conference who tolerated, for the new German battleships, certain characteristics which were even prohibited for the allies and associated powers in later treaties?

RUSSIA

46. The fleet of Soviet Russia which has been paying for the past 20 years (like the French navy from the revolution of the first Empire), the price of the upheaval caused by the Russian revolution, is again awakening to its maritime destiny. Russia profited, at the Mortsreux conference, due to the absence of Italy, and the lack of bad humor on the part of England over the Ethiopian affair, to have her rights and advantages recognized in the convention of the Straits of the Dardanelles.

47. At the same time as she is investigating the newly opened door to the Mediterranean, she is studying her liaisons in the Baltic, White Sea, and even the Pacific and Arctic Oceans. England did not strive very hard to have Russia become a party to the tripartite treaty of London: if the talks were not pushed (from actual information at hand) further in this direction, it was because England feared that the Russian projects (construction of

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7 cruisers and 2 battleships) would have served as a pretext for Germany to denounce the recent Anglo-German accord.

#### FRENCH NAVAL EXPANSION

48. The French Navy is proceeding with the reconstruction and modernization of its fleet without modifying the cadence adopted since 1922. At this cadence it will not attain, in 1940, neither the 691,000 tons accorded by the 1924 naval program, nor the 628,000 tons announced at Geneva in 1932 as a basis for stabilization or proportional reduction of the various existing fleets in the "cadre" of the international situation of 1932.

49. In brief, the French Navy cannot be accused of an excess of "politic" when it ignores:

- Violations of the Treaty of Versailles;
- Creation of a German fleet;
- Violation of naval treaties and the speeding up of building programs, regardless of financial situations, by all naval powers whose expansion was heretofore limited.

50. The French 1937 naval program, as outlined in the 1937 budget, should have been superior to the average of former years; after consultation with the Budget Officer the Navy dropped one cruiser from the program, and renounced its intention to ask for an increase of complement of 3,751 to man the new light cruisers going in commission.

51. In brief, France, after having furnished during 14 years a continuous serious effort, hesitates at the cross-roads at a time when all naval powers are running on deficit budgets due to military and naval expansion plans.

(Note by Naval Attaché: The above paragraphs, developing France's apparent concessions to the world wide armament race, must not be taken too seriously. The truth is that the 1937 program was classed as an "entre act" program while the General Staff is preparing the plans for the regular program consisting of at least 3 35,000-ton battleships; 10 10,000-ton cruisers; 12 destroyers, submarines, etc., if items appearing in the press are any indication of plans. It is expected that the bill authorizing this program will be approved before the adjournment of the Chamber in May. As for the 3,751 men needed for the new light cruisers: with the French system of obligatory military service and the Army transferring annually to the Navy some 8-10,000 army recruits, it would be an easy matter to transfer the extra 3,751 men to naval shore bases and relieve regular navy men for sea duty. All men so transferred, being obligatory recruits and receiving \$1.50 per month (roughly \$6,000 per month), could easily be taken up on the Navy rolls with the elastic accounting system existing in France between the dual military services. In items of "National Defense" France has ONE budget - transfers between appropriations being freely made).

52. But, the speed which reverses the heretofore naval strengths of world powers has increased over the period 1906-1914; the French fleet held up to recent months a 50% superiority over Italy, but the Italian fleet is on its way to outclass the French fleet and will do so in the next two years.

53. As regards Germany the information is rather uncertain; but the new German fleet not having need of approaching the French fleet, in point of tonnage (having no colonies and lines of communication) to constitute an element of pressure, can be counted upon as being tactically equal to ours in 1940.

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Ex. O. 11864, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (C)

ODD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 2 1973

54. Let us remember, apropos of our building program, that it is not a question of time varying from 1 to 3 years as in other countries but a period of 5 years.

55. Without going into too many technical details the above expose is sufficient to show us what is going on before our eyes and enables us:

- (a) To try and interpret the meaning of these events which are passing before our eyes;
- (b) avoid finding ourselves, at a near date when we might have to consider in haste the possibility of an imminent war, unprepared with inevitable disaster to France and her colonies;
- (c) avoid anything and everything, while it is in our power, so that we may not find ourselves eventually in the position of composing long explanations to the problems which now exist: how is it that such a state of affairs exists - how did it come about?

#### STUDY OF BASIC PRINCIPLES INFLUENCING FRENCH POLICIES

56. We have just exposed the case of all the world powers caught in the wild armament race. Everything points to the fact that each nation is trying to obtain a military position, in two or three years, that will find them ready for a possible war, or a peaceful arrangement of political difficulties - but all at "present arms".

57. Certainly, we do not belong to the class of people who want to live the days prior to 1914, and throw away, with distrust, all that has been accomplished in the past 18 years. It is for this reason, therefore, that we leave to the technicians the task of comparing gun calibers, strength of fighting units, tactics, etc., while we remain free to examine and seek to find out exactly what each power wants in the political domain.

58. For Japan: the control of the seas in the Extreme Orient has become a national vision. Add to this the search for raw materials, especially oil. Briefly, her hard pressed economy is seeking to extend itself not only in Asia but in the direction of Africa and the Mediterranean.

59. For the United States: this country remains in the presence of this dilemma, and must either permit Japan to seize progressively all international markets, exploited up to the present under the regime of the "open door", or undertake a foreign expedition of her troops which might well end in disaster. The organization of a naval base in the Philippines, for example, would soon bring a reply from Japan in the nature of reinforcing and extending her belt of bases which now control the China sea. The only real solid naval base actually in the Far East, at present, is the British base at Singapore.

60. But as for an Anglo-American cooperation, of a close nature, incorporating, for instance, the freedom of the Dutch East Indies - is it not precisely an unwise move and is it not sufficient to cause a Japanese explosion?

61. England: this country, in full swing of rearming, and engaged in European complications, is sparring for time and gently holding Japan in line. England sees, with no little pleasure, Japan exerting her excess military energy in a direction which does not directly strike Great Britain.

62. United States in regard to Europe: The attitude of this country remains extremely reserved. The neutrality act of 1936, which corresponds to the majority opinion of all Americans, is as formal and complete as present legislation will permit. However, a few indices permit us to hope in an evolution of the United States in favor of international collaboration and world-wide economic cooperation. We do not know of anybody as qualified as

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President Roosevelt to bring about this evolution, especially as the world is soliciting his aid and experience. He has just been reelected with an incontestable majority for another period of four years.

63. The United States can do a good deal, even if it only cut off food supplies to belligerents, but it could do much more by collaborating in the economic and political peace problems and stave off the threatening conflict.

64. Friendly liaisons certainly are not lacking between the two great Democracies. But the majority of opinion in the United States is terribly aloof and summary as regards European affairs. For Americans, an arrangement for our Old Continent consists above all of tying all European countries in the same sack to prevent them from stirring up trouble. All European disputes are referred to in the United States as "nervous ancestors - Europe".

65. As for us, Frenchmen, for many years at the various naval conferences where all political problems have been turned over and over again, we were made to understand that all our arguments about thousands of miles of coastline, historical and geographical position of our colonies, etc., etc., were a great honor to us, but a source of great annoyance. And the Franco-American sympathies above all served, during the Washington Conference, President Hughes to break down the last resistance of M. Briand by the sending of a telegram as sympathetic as it was pressing.

66. England and the Treaty: If the naval parity arrived at at the Washington Conference did nothing but leave agreeable memories to our proud friends - the English, it is certain that a collaboration between the two Anglo-Saxon nations, big naval powers and distributors of raw materials, can again serve as the basis of worldwide peace.

67. Collaboration, Franco-English: These words are not mere vain words, as was recently seen when the French and British Ministers of Foreign Affairs stated that relations between the two countries were never better. But it is at this junction that we must keep our eyes open and have a correct understanding of our proper duty. On several occasions several English authorities declared that England could not take under its charge all European countries who had a grievance or a complaint to make. To her best friends, England actually is discretely saying: "aid thyself, and England will aid thee". And we must admit that our friends, the English, are giving us a courageous example: after having delayed arming as long as it was possible for her to do so, she is now proceeding to arm with all haste; a rearmament which is a solid guarantee of maintenance of order in Europe. The rapidity with which the recent loan was oversubscribed is a rupture, on the part of England, with her budgetary traditions and an example worth meditating over.

68. But the English have more need of collaborators than of nations needing help. Among the powers who will be ready to flatter England on her newly found strength France has priority. Between the two nations we have the memories of the sacrifices made in common in the late war, as well as a communion of interests between two big peaceful nations.

69. Quite recently assurances were given, on the part of one and the other, of aid in case of an unprovoked attack.

70. Finally, at a moment when the British Admiralty is struggling with construction problems, rearmament, etc., the presence of the French Fleet in the Atlantic, capable of holding in check the German Fleet for still some time to come, facilitates the transportation of British forces where needed.

71. Good contacts of this kind help to form new friends, even though they have reasons for friendship elsewhere. Precisely, this is what Mussolini thinks when he seeks to capitalize Italy's naval power and blot out the unhappy memories of the Ethiopian affair in Anglo-Italian relations.

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Not only has Italy just conquered a large colony, and multiplied her points of contact between her North African colonies and those of Great Britain, but she has taken a heavy mortgage on the British Empire and on its lines of communications in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

72. To take a mortgage on the property of your neighbor is certainly a strong arm method of forcing him into a collaboration of interests. But in politics fortune attends the audacious, when their audaciousness has reason and has been well thought out. If two nations align their fleets of equal strength, which will be shortly the case with France and Italy, one is compelled to disperse its forces while the other concentrates its forces at its very door, which happens to be a point vital to British communications. With which of these two nations does collaboration on the part of Great Britain seem essential?

73. German diplomacy, when it makes its periodical tour of the continent, successively plays and profits by existing situations, sometimes by raising the mailed fist and sometimes by violating treaties, but also periodically returns towards London.

74. If we desire to conserve Franco-British collaboration, so essential, with all its force, it is about time to capitalize our role in the international situation, not as the France of 1918, but of 1936.

#### SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

75. France, second largest colonial power, alone with England in having interests in all seas, started at the beginning of the century to lose naval position. Her good relations with the Anglo-Saxons permitted her to obtain supplies and defend her interests during the World War.

76. Relegated to 4th place amongst the naval powers, by her own allies, she was still able to progressively play her political and naval role in supporting the various peace treaties. Present aligned naval parities of nations are about to explode and we are headed with great speed towards a new assignment of naval ranks amongst nations which will be established by a new war, or by a peaceful arrangement (which is our wish) based on present relative forces.

77. It is under such conditions, if we do not keep close watch on events, that the French Navy will pass in 1939 to FIFTH naval rank and in 1940 towards the SIXTH naval rank amongst the powers.

78. According to the inexorable rule her political and diplomatic position, even in relation to her now closest and most faithful friends, must submit to the same reverses.

79. Such is the current which the French people are following, without distinguishing it, perhaps due to the constant nervous state of the nation constantly kept on the alert by interior and exterior propaganda.

80. As in 1906, when France failed to follow the building program adopted by other nations, we are running the risk of being victims of another Washington agreement. The agreement to which we have just made allusion may certainly not be identical with any of the preceding ones. Perhaps it will again be called a "Disarmament Conference" or "Conference of Redistribution of Raw Materials", unless it is bluntly titled "Revision of Colonial Mandates", or "Reconsideration of Economic Interests in Europe".

81. It would be vain to trace in advance the line of oratory of the nations whose representatives reach their highest degree of oratory when totally free of any of the political worries which are ours. But what we might try to do is to tighten the lines and prepare for all and any events.

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82. In addition, the most favorable time for a peaceful move on the part of the United States, in the international domain, will come to an end with the end of the second term of President Roosevelt - about 1940. It is, therefore, between the period 1936-1940 that an attempt to organize peace, or to impose it, will have the best chance of meeting with success. And it will not be by a simple hazard that the naval and military measures taken by all nations will produce full effect at this period when the question of "peace or war" will be posed with its acute consequences.

83. It is, therefore, upon the present government that rests the choice, as well as the responsibility, vis-a-vis the French people of the sort that awaits them in the near future. If we want to avoid finding ourselves in a disastrous situation there is not a minute to waste and not another mistake to be made.

IMPORTANT DECISIONS WHICH FORM PART OF POLICY

84. First - Avoid delay in executing projects once the decision has been made. That is to say, reduce the time now needed to build ships and bring it into line with other nations.

85. Second - Recruit and train the crews necessary to properly man all ships of the navy - including new units.

86. It is inadmissible that France, alone, of all naval powers should be behind in her building program the very units of which no longer suit our policy, and which is only leading us to be rapidly outclassed both from a naval and military standpoint.

87. The present building program, as well as the aeronautical maritime program, should be urgently revised and our shipbuilding activities immediately brought to maximum capacity. We must also immediately solve the problems now under study, problems to which I (Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Chamber) recently invited the attention of the Ministry of Marine after my tour of inspection: I mean the putting into a war state of defense all naval ports and commercial ports - especially coast and aerial defense forces. If funds are now available, or will be made available, under the title of "National Defense" certainly the construction of our fleet must be considered as coming under this caption.

88. All that may be accomplished for our national economy, or to develop our colonies, will be an edifice without foundation (an inverted pyramid) extended to our enemies or our competitors, unless we have a fleet sufficient to assure our maritime communications. Building of our fleet, alone, would suffice to take up unemployment and open up vast fields of production. There is no industry so complex and which diversifies employment and use of materials so much as that of shipbuilding - all branches of industry are keyed up by a shipbuilding boom.

89. There is no branch of society where comradeship is so well formed as in the Navy. No greater outlook could be had for youngsters looking for a career. There is no school better than the sea to form character, something which France has great need of at present.

90. France has never had need, more than to-day, of a strong navy commensurate with the high international role which she is called upon to play.

91. It is thanks to her Navy that France is an international power, as well as an outpost of democratic civilization. Thanks also to her Navy that France is a colonial power and able to assume all responsibilities incident thereto. It is in building up her Navy to a level demanded by present political conditions that she can continue to play her role and assume responsibilities. Complying with such a condition our country can realize its full development, not only material, but human, of our splendid

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

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colonial empire, - an empire which is forever incorporated in its history and destiny, the first stone of which was laid by the French Navy in what is now called our "Old Colonies" - the Antilles, which last year celebrated its tricennial as a living symbol of our colonization.

92. The adaption of our naval power to present circumstances is as necessary as it is urgent: in order to assure to the nation the security of its maritime communications, which is the first condition to assure the efficiency of our Army, to hold the respect which France inspires, the solidity of friendships so essential for herself, as for the world peace.

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N.A. PARIS

**FRANCE**  
Report No. 96  
11 February, 1937.

900 - Navy  
902 - Policy.  
902-100- Basic Navy Policies

**DEBATE IN FRENCH CHAMBER ON "PREPAREDNESS  
OF NATION FOR WAR" - COVERING THE  
THREE MILITARY SERVICES AND ENTIRE  
"NATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE".**

1. The debate on France's "NATIONAL DEFENSE PROBLEM" took place in the Chamber of Deputies 29 January - 4 February, 1937.

2. Speakers from the different political parties took part in the debate and exposed their views. With one exception concerning the accusation by Deputy de Kerillis, that the French Government had sent certain Dewoitine planes to the Spanish Reds, the entire debate was conducted in a patriotic spirit - all parties favoring immediate military preparedness of the nation up to the hilt.

3. The Government received a vote of 405 against 186, on its measure of preparedness of the nation for national defense.

4. Naturally, as would be the case in France where the Army is the important military branch, the debate centered principally around the Army and Air Army.

5. The interesting question of a "Unified Command" for the three military services was touched upon in the general discussion by M. Piétri (former Minister of Marine), and this matter is made the subject of a separate report (See Y.No.82 (901-100) of 4 February, 1937).

6. The principal features, concerning the Navy, brought out in the debate form part of this report.

7. The interesting features developed in debate concerning the "Army" and "Air Army" will be covered later (by this office if time permits), or by the Military Attaché, in which case copies will be forwarded to O.N.I. The "political aspects" of the debate are being covered by the Embassy for transmission to the State Department.

8. The naval features, covered in the debate, took in the following points :

- (a) unusual delay in building programs ;
- (b) increase in naval personnel ;
- (c) reducing time of placing ships with the fleet, and eliminating long periods of "trials".
- (d) submission to the chamber, for approval, of the tranche of the 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 naval programs.
- (e) increase in number of workers in shipyards to offset 40-hour week.

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9. However, the principal feature of the naval debate was the concerted attack on the Ministry of Marine on the delay in completing the battleship DUNKERQUE. All speakers (as the result of round robins sent them by the French Ligue Maritime), were charged full of statistics on the reasons for delay in completing the DUNKERQUE and light cruisers, and put the Minister of Marine on the defensive on several occasions. The fact that the Minister of Marine has only been in office since July 1936, and the DUNKERQUE has been underway since 1932, saved his face on several occasions when he endeavored to avert off the attack by stating that some of the remarks were "exaggerated", and that the DUNKERQUE "could take her place with the fleet if necessary". The Minister of Marine was informed that the DUNKERQUE could not join the fleet, fully completed and ready for action, until the end of this year; this according to officers who were to man the DUNKERQUE. The Minister of Marine gave several evasive answers and tried his best to squirm out of the embarrassing questions put to him. He stated on one occasion that the "DUNKERQUE" having a totally new type of gun, with mountings, etc., that adjustments by the experts took a long time."

10. As Monsieur Gasnier-Duparc is the Minister of Marine of the Blum "Fronte Populaire" government, which is responsible for the increase in wages and shorter hours, he was questioned on what he intended to do to make up for this tribute to "labor" at the expense of the naval program.

11. Whatever the reasons are for the delay in the French building program (various reports from this office fully cover this subject), the airing of this affair in the Chamber has given the average Frenchman "food for thought". Of course France suffers, further, from comparison with the Dictator nations who are going full blast on their programs.

12. While all hands (Ministry of Marine, Naval Committee, and Finance Committee), tried to save their faces, the following delays in the French building program were thoroughly aired:

| Name            | Date authorized. | Date laid | Present Status |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------|----------------|
| Dunkerque (BB)  | 1931             | Dec. 1932 | 96% completed  |
| Marseilles (CL) | 1932             | Oct. 1933 | Just completed |
| Mogador (DL)    | 1932             | Dec. 1934 | 50% completed  |
| Bayonnaise (DD) | 1931             | Oct. 1934 | 90% completed  |
| Quessant (SS)   | 1930             | Jan. 1932 | 90% completed  |

13. Attention is invited to paragraph 71 signalling out the naval officer, from the tribune, as being the "elite officer of the three military services". While this is the prevailing opinion in France, it is not known how the Army will view this partial statement coming from a member of the Chamber in a public statement.

14. The meeting of Deputy de Kerillis with the Spanish Military Attaché (see paragraphs 57-58) is shown in this report by reason of its particular interest in the general discussion.

15. Statements of the various speakers of the Chamber follow:

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OSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

By SEA

Date MAY 1 1973



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Statement of Monsieur Gratien CANDACE (Head of Com-  
-mission charged with Navy Budget).

16. I ask the Government to inform the Chamber if the actual potential strength of France is adapted to the present tense international situation? The present time is opportune to demand urgent adjustments, in our building program, demanded by the present critical situation.

17. My report on the Navy Budget-1937 (see Y.No.69(902-100) February, 1937 for gist of said report), confirms the gravity of present naval problems - especially our line's of communication in the Mediterranean.

18. There was a time when a war broke out over a frontier post, or over slapping a diplomat in the face with a mere fan. To-day a war may break out over a stretch of water suitable for an aeroplane base, if the owner cannot defend it.

19. No nation, in this respect, has the responsibility of France. Just look at the chart of the world, with all the post-war changes, which obliges us to revise our post-war naval policy.

20. Europe: The Baltic Sea, if not already a German sea, risks to become a closed field of Russian-German rivalry; the North Sea, and English Channell, with anchorages and havens converging on the main atlantic trade routes - likewise the theatre of a maritime air war - coupled with the menace of a powerful German fleet operating close to its naval bases.

21. With England busy transferring bases to the West Coast of England, Brest, Cherbourg, Boulogne, Dunkirk (the latter two ports in the zone of active operations), take on a military character of the first importance.

22. Germany, in addition to her bases in the channel coast and North sea, has her squadrons for raiding the atlantic lanes when informed of ship movements by her air forces.

23. With Dakar, Pointe-Noire and French West Indies, in the theatre of operations, France must, at all costs, assure her atlantic lanes.

Mediterranean :

24. In a previous report my predecessor, M. Jacques Stern, stated that it was the Mediterranean "Hornet's nest" that we should keep our eye on; French lines in Occidental Mediterranean; Italian lines in Oriental Mediterranean; and finally the British line from Gibraltar to Port-Said.

25. The Ethiopian affair clearly showed us, as well as our English friends, that the Italian lines could be transformed into a regular barrage.

26. New factors have recently arrived upon this scene: Russia will not neglect to utilize the Mediterranean door which the Montreux conference opened to her.

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27. Our bases at Bizerta and Mers-El-Kebir are no longer bases for probable theatre of operations, but are important lines of communications for transport of troops for national defense.

28. Coming through Suez we find ourselves at Djibouti. This port, whether we wish it or not, participates in the economic life of Ethiopia, and is of strategic value to our bases: Massauah (recently developed), Perim, and Aden, which commands the entrance to the Indian Ocean and Extreme Orient.

#### Indian Ocean and Pacific:

29. In the Indian Ocean we find the French territory of Madagascar, and we should like to feel in perfect security at Diego-Suarez; proceeding further we arrive at Indo-China. I cannot say from this tribune what I could say before the Naval Commission. However, you will understand when I affirm that our maritime defenses in Indo-China are not sufficient to defend the territory; further on we arrive at our Oceania possessions, Tahiti, Les Marquises islands, etc.. We find no naval bases in these outposts, while the English and the Americans have organized naval bases in the smallest of these islands.

30. The large powers have, on several occasions, tried to extenuate the risks coming from possible rivalry in the Extreme-Orient; the Russians coming from the North; the English from the South; the Americans from across the Pacific; the Dutch East Indies, and Australia; all these nations are anxious over Japanese expansion, directed not only against China, but towards the South Pacific Islands.

31. France's anxiety has grown, not only since the Japanese-German-Italian agreement, but from yesterday (2nd February) with the Japanese revolution bringing the Military into political control of the country.

32. The Pacific problem will once again come to the fore now that the Washington Treaty has terminated. While on this question permit me, M. Piétri, to call your attention to the fact that two years ago, when you were Minister of Marine and we were discussing the Washington Treaty, I said to you: "The Treaty has been torn up by Japan, the others are getting ready to tear it up. What then are we waiting for to turn our attention towards another horizon? Why remain within the framework of a treaty that is about to disappear?"

#### Panama Canal and West Indies:

33. Proceeding further on we pass the Panama Canal, and French West Indies, and finally arrive in the Atlantic where we will probably meet the S/S WESTFALEN - floating German air base.

34. The tour of the world completed, having witnessed all the grave problems confronting us, we readily understand while thinking of Batavia and Saigon the reasons the British are so prudent in Europe (Oriental reasons), and the reasons the British are so prudent in the Orient (European reasons).

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Building Programs of principal naval powers:

35. Since the expiration of the Washington Treaty naval construction has increased to a new pace; England, the principal European naval power, has laid down 200,000 tons - the quadruple of her usual annual tonnage.

36. Italy, whose 1934 tonnage was only two-thirds of France, has laid down sufficient ships to permit her tonnage to equal ours in 1940.

37. Germany will place in commission in 1941 a fleet of 450,000 tons, certainly inferior to ours, but representing a formidable force when we take into account the distribution of our naval forces.

38. France's building program is proceeding with the speed of 1922. Under these conditions, it will not attain in 1940 the 691,000 tons outlined by the 1924 program, nor even the 620,000 tons declared at Geneva in 1932.

39. With reference to time required for construction: In England, where the building program is in full swing, a destroyer will be completed in 18 months; a heavy cruiser in 2 and one-half years;

40. In Germany, a submarine is being constructed in 12 months; a cruiser 2 1/2 years; a battleship 3 1/2 years;

41. In all European totalitarian countries, not excepting Soviet Russia, workmen are willingly working overtime to hasten the manufacture of war materials.

42. In Italy, with a 60 hour working week, all ship building industries are working at full speed.

43. It is a very dangerous procedure to adopt the policy of saying "everything is going alright".

When I witness the effort put forth by England to build a battleship in 3 and a half years, it seems to me that we should try and do likewise.

Delay in French building programs:

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44. I must maintain my assertion on the long delay, from the time a ship is authorized by the Government, to the completion and entry into service. I am also willing to admit that sometimes exaggerated criticism is hurled at the Ministry of Marine, but a good part of it was not without good reason.

45. At the beginning of 1927 only 4 of the 10 submarines, authorized in 1930, were in service; for the remaining 6 submarines 8 years delay will have taken place since date of authorization and date of entry into service.

46. The 4 cruisers (Marseillaise type) authorized in December, 1931, are just about ready for preliminary trials.

47. The DUNKERQUE, our only modern battleship, is not yet in service - 5 1/2 years from date of authorization.

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48. The time for talk has passed, and the hour for action has arrived.

Naval Bases :

49. Our naval bases must also draw our close attention. Up to recent times we have concentrated on our Mediterranean bases - reasons for which we all know; now we are concentrating our efforts on Brest, Cherbourg, and other channel ports - all this in keeping with the Franco-Anglo exterior relations.

50. A word to those who criticize the "Capital Ship": the freedom of the seas was not won in the late war by submarines alone; England had to despatch two battle cruisers from her home fleet to the Falklands to destroy the German cruiser fleet and open up the Atlantic sea routes for transportation of troops and supplies.

Statement by M. Coquillaud :

51. Interdependence of armaments essential for next war: We must choose our weapons of combat; Germany has chosen hers. Rightfully enough we are practically decided on the character and rapidity of the next war. The result is the absolute necessity of the interdependence of armaments. Germany has seen the necessity of this move; she has a concise plan of attack and it is sufficient to glance at the character of her new ships to learn that she expects the next war to end in about 3 months at the maximum.

52. Her naval policy is joined to her land policy; she has constructed types of ships corresponding to this policy. Germany knows that to fight against England it is not necessary to have a high sea fleet (this was her mistake in 1914), - it is sufficient to have fast cruisers, powerfully armed, with long steaming radius so as to raid commercial routes. With this in view Germany built the Deutschland.

Statement of M. Pinelli:

53. I regret that the Minister of Marine has not tabled prior to this discussion his bill for increase in naval personnel.

54. I hope this bill will not only take into account the line officers, but also the warrant officers. In the warrant officer corps we have a splendid group of devoted men.

55. In the Italian Navy, where the officer effectives are about 50% of the total line effectives in the French Navy, warrant officers (men from the enlisted ranks) are much more numerous than in our Navy.

56. The same applies to staff corps; the Italians have a greater number than we have.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) at GPO

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
Report No. 96  
11 February, 1937.

900 - Navy  
902 - Policy  
902-100- Basic Naval Policies

Statement of M. de Kerillis, Member of the Chamber, and  
Editor for ECHO DE PARIS.

57. I received a visit from the Spanish Military Attaché, who, together with the majority of the personnel of the Spanish Embassy, went heart and soul over to the Insurgent cause at the commencement of the revolution.

58. The Spanish Military Attaché said to me: "Your Government affirmed that it was not delivering planes to the Spanish Reds. I have good proof that the French Government is delivering planes to the Reds". Immediately, the Spanish Military Attaché placed on my desk official telegrams exchanged between the Government at Madrid, and the Spanish Embassy at Paris. He, the Spanish Military Attaché, added: "Monsieur de Kerillis, this is a serious matter, and I do not wish to hide from you the fact that immediately upon leaving your office I will bring these telegrams to the German Military Attaché in Paris."

(Note by Naval Attaché: This statement from de Kerillis came in reply to questioning relative to his accusation in the ECHO DE PARIS that the French Government were sending fighting planes to Spanish Reds).

Statement of M. le Bail :

59. The question of the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir (at Oran - 250 miles from Gibraltar) must receive our urgent attention.

60. Our interests in the Mediterranean are ever increasing, and require our constant attention.

61. In the next war, if we control the triangle, Toulon, Bizerte, Mers-El-Kebir, we will hold an impregnable position in the Western Mediterranean, - providing, of course, that the Balearic islands do not fall into the hands of a possible enemy.

62. The question of the Balearic Islands is one of life and death for France .

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OSD letter, May. 3, 1972

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Date MAY 21 1972

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Report No. 96  
11 February, 1937.

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902 - Policy  
902-100-Basic Nav. Policies.

Statement of M. Jean-Michel Renaitour:

63. The results of our investigation discloses that if France is to avoid 6th place in naval strength, appropriations for naval building programs must be increased; this applies also to maritime aviation.

64. You will excuse me for not forgetting that I, myself, am an aviator when I speak of maritime aviation. Planes are the eyes of the fleet - location and movements of the enemy must come from the air.

65. In a recent flight at Cherbourg in one of the big navy seaplanes, I witnessed the spotting of submarines which were clearly distinguishable under water by long black streaks.

66. However, to have planes, we must have Aircraft Carriers.

67. At the present time we have only one: the BEARN which is an old craft and of little use. Carriers must be fast and able to maintain place with the fleet.

68. On my recent trip to San Francisco, I saw the SARATOGA and LEXINGTON, and I was immediately convinced that the United States understood the value and position of carriers.

69. As soon as a plane sights the periscope of a submarine, it must immediately find its base on the deck of a carrier steaming with a fleet at 30 knots per hour, hence, the speed of a carrier is vital.

70. I understand that the projected 1937 program includes 2 airplane carriers. Two is not too many if we must avoid putting all our planes on the same ship.

71. Referring to our naval personnel, let me state here, from this tribune, that our naval officers are the aristocrats of the officer corps of the military services; after their training at the Ecole Navale, they are the elite of the intelligentsia. This proves, notwithstanding the turmoil and social upheavals of this epoch, that there still remains something of "Old France".

72. Our confidence must also go out to the enlisted man; we know his sentiments of the sacred patriotic duty, as well as his loyalty to republicanism.

73. We have heard various orators state that France is well defended by the Army, and Air Army. Let me state, in the name of the Naval Committee of the Chamber, that in case of war our merchant fleet can freely navigate, and our coasts are assured against a surprise attack, thanks to the readiness of the French fleet which is, today as it was yesterday, ready to fulfil its highest mission - the safeguard of the country.

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Statement by M. Gasnier-Duparc, Minister of Marine:

74. The criticism levelled at the navy, on the delay in the building program, is not altogether the fault of the navy. The 40-hour week had to be invoked in shipyards as in other industries.

75. We are now taking steps to remedy the shortage in labor by hiring extra men. We have increased the number of workmen by 11% in 1936, and intend to do likewise in 1937. We are having trouble hiring specialists due to shortage. ...

76. The navy has increased the number of apprentice mechanics to offset the shortage in specialities. We have at present 950 apprentices instead of 540, and a further increase is in prospect for 1937.

77. New equipment, machinery, tools, etc., will be installed to bring the building yards up-to-date.

78. The time allowed for trials of new ships, prior to acceptance, will be reduced.

79. The projected naval program for 1938, 1939, 1940, will be submitted for approval of the Chamber very shortly; plans and design are in order and work will proceed as expeditiously as possible. I believe that further expansion of building programs cannot be undertaken, for the present, due to limits of industry I will not go further into details as it is preferable not to enlighten foreign nations on our industrial capacity.

80. Critics may state that the proposed naval program is not sufficient to build up our navy, but we must take into account our industrial possibilities.

81. If France is to be attacked by several allied nations, without any nation coming to her assistance, then the "Patrie" is certainly in danger.

82. When speaking of the delay to the DUNKERQUE, we forget to mention that this ship is a prototype, and will have a main gun battery different from any other type of ship - I mean the new 330 mm. (13 inch).

83. The adjustment of the guns, the minute adjusting of which did not work out just exactly as the engineers had figured on plans, will require an additional couple of months.

84. The DUNKERQUE is a prototype model and nothing like her exists in any navy of the world. Her sister-ship the STRASBOURG will only take 2 1/2 years.

85. I have issued orders to reduce the time allowed new ships for speed trials, etc.

86. The projected building program is now in the hands of the permanent committee, and I expect to submit it to the Chamber for approval without delay.

87. Our coast defense batteries are not all armed in time of peace, as they will be in time of war; a certain number of them would be ready to enter into action with a short delay.

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ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

# ATTACHE'S REPORT

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From Y. Date 12 Feb., 19 37 Serial No. 104 File No. 409  
(Continuation new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Reliable.  
Subject France Industries Nationalization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

## Reference

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

NATIONALIZATION OF WAR INDUSTRIES—  
OBJECTIONS TO

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Y. No. 104 (409), February, 1937, is transmitted  
herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Enc. 3(E) and 5(D) at 03

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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No. 104  
France  
February, 1937

400 - Industries  
409 - Manufacturers

NATIONALIZATION OF WAR INDUSTRIES-  
OBJECTIONS TO

Since the passing of the law authorizing the Government to take over all war industries, control of many war industries, principally aviation, has passed to the Government.

Prior to coming into power of the Socialist Government, and especially during the "peace spasms" that passed over Europe 1923-1930, the Socialists (especially Premier Blum's paper) were constantly clamoring for Government control of the "cannon merchants" as a sure and only means to stopping wars.

Now that the Blum Government is in office it is forced to carry out the abolition of the "cannon merchants" regardless of the financial or military results attained.

Criticism of the nationalization of war industries is coming from all quarters on the ground that the requirement in such materials are essentially variable, and that works employed exclusively on them are likely to remain idle for long periods when the international outlook is free of disturbing influences. A private manufacturer, so it is pointed out, does not depend entirely on orders for war material, and can always turn to other productions when work on armaments fails.

He is, moreover, obliged to adhere strictly to specifications and to dates of delivery when, as is nearly always the case, penalties are imposed for delays. It is therefore argued that, in the absence of competition and without the pressure of sanctions, Government works cannot be expected to turn out material as quickly as private firms.

One objection to private manufacture of arms has been the supposed exaggerated profits realized by manufacturers, but the profit is now limited by Government control and supervision, and it is argued that there is no reason why the Government should monopolize the manufacture of arms when it is done efficiently by private firms under conditions that are likely to be less costly to the nation than would be the case if the manufacture were concentrated in Government factories.

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EL O. 11652, Sec. 4(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date SEP 21 1973

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NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

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From Y Date 16 Mar., 1937 Serial No. 172 File No. 103  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Press  
Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES - International Rel.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
Reference \_\_\_\_\_

Remark.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

BRITISH REARMAMENT: What does it represent to France,  
now her ally?

Report N° 172 (103), March, 1937, is transmitted  
herewith.

|                          |                                                                   |                   |                   |                  |                |                |                |            |      |      |        |           |       |        |         |       |               |                       |
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| <p>Stamp: <i>dup</i></p> |                                                                   |                   |                   |                  |                |                |                |            |      |      |        |           |       |        |         |       |               |                       |
| Director                 | A-1, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16 | Maneu-<br>graph   | Arch-<br>ives     | Budget           | C.N.O.         | Gen'l<br>Staff | War<br>College | M.I.D.     | Navy | Ord. | T.S.D. | C.A.R.    | Eng.  | S.A.A. | M.A.S.  | Aero. | U.S.<br>M.C.  | H.O.                  |
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FRANCE  
Report No. 172  
March, 1937...

100 - Political Forces.  
103 - International  
Relations.

BRITISH REARMAMENT : WHAT DOES IT REPRESENT TO FRANCE,  
NOW HER ALLY.

The apparent announcement of England and France, of "mutual assistance" in case of attack, is evidently only the foundation of permanent military alliances of these two countries.

Events in Europe, especially the Berlin-Rome axis, are forcing England closer and closer to France (and eventually with Russia - France's ally - if Russia will only drop this Komintern propaganda). The initiative displayed by England in the Montreux conference, in demanding an outlet for Russia through the Dardanelles, is frequently mentioned in the French press as the forerunner of the pre-war "Entente". The apparent irreconcilable problems between England and Germany, as well as Italy's Empire expansion plans at the expense of Great Britain's prestige, are clearing the way (according to the French press) for the establishing of the pre-war "Entente".

The following resume, taken from EXCELSIOR of 16 March, giving the future probable operations of the combined English and French Fleets, shows which way the wind is blowing as the EXCELSIOR is very often the "spokesman" on French Colonial matters:

" WHAT DOES BRITISH REARMAMENT REPRESENT  
FOR FRANCE;

Eventual Organization and cooperation of the  
two navies.

(1) Before the completion of the British armament plans; union of the two battle fleets in Northern waters; union of light forces in the Mediterranean;

(2) After completion of rearmament; British battle fleet in Northern waters; French battle fleet in Mediterranean waters.

In the event that France finds herself in a European conflict, what help can she obtain from England on the sea ?

Not one of the British ships announced in the recent rearmament program will be ready before 1940, while France will have the DUNKERQUE and STRASBOURG ready in 1938, and the RICHELIEU in 1939.

In case of immediate critical situation these battle units, aided by the RODNEY and NELSON, could form a powerful modern combat division.

Regardless of who was the enemy, the French and English Fleets would have to operate in the North Sea and the Mediterranean.

It

**FRANCE**  
Report No.172  
March,1937...

100 - Political Forces.  
103 - International  
Relations.



It is Germany who has the most powerful battleship after France and England - or at least will have when her program is completed; hence, the French and English battle divisions would likely have to remain in Northern waters. Our light forces, supported by a few battleships, would have to control the Mediterranean.

Once England is armed, after 1942, the situation would entirely change, and then it would appear logical for England to guard the North Sea and France to look out for the Mediterranean.

It must be remarked, however, that at present date as will be the case in 1942, the battleforce fleets of England and France are, individually, superior to any other European power. It is only in case that France and England have to deal with an enemy coalition that the uniting of the two fleets will be necessary.

The distribution of naval forces of both countries, comes under the respective naval ministries who are better informed than anyone to properly organize and distribute the fleets.

PLAN OF PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN FLEETS, 1937 and 1942:

|      | ALLEMAGNE                                                                                         | ITALIE                                                                                            | FRANCE                                                                                            | ANGLETERRE                                                                                            |
|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1937 | <br>156.000 t. | <br>180.354 t. | <br>233.945 t. | <br>455.500 tonnes |
| 1942 | <br>230.000 t  | <br>230.000 t. | <br>335.000 t. | <br>670.000 tonnes |



Naval Attache,  
FRANCE  
No. 271  
3 May 1937

900 NAVY  
912 SHIPS  
912-2200 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

#### PLANNING OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN FUTURE FRENCH BUILDING PROGRAM

The intention of the Ministry of Marine to include three carriers in the 1937 building program was held in abeyance due to the General Staff not having the plans ready. However, the matter has not been dropped and the 3 carriers may be included in the "three year program" about to be presented to parliament for approval.

In recent maneuvers of the French Fleet, off North Africa, the role which aviation will be called upon to play in warding off attacks from raiders on French troop ships crossing the Mediterranean was the principal theme of the maneuvers.

The following article: "Naval Aviation, An Integral Part of the Fleet," was taken from a maritime publication and throws some light on the probable conclusions arrived at by the French General Staff due to lessons of the maneuvers.

French "maritime specialists" are advocating light fast airplane carriers of approximately 16,000 tons (speed 33 knots) as the most suitable to the French Navy whose probable theatre of operations will be in the Mediterranean or around the French coast (England is supposed to handle the North Sea and Atlantic waters).

-----  
ARTICLE FROM JOURNAL DE LA MARINE MARCHANDE

#### NAVAL AVIATION, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE FLEET.

Representatives of LE PETIT PARISIEN were given an interview by M. Gasnier-Duparc, Minister of Marine, upon his recent return from a tour of inspection of naval activities in North Africa. The press representatives questioned the Minister on the recent maneuvers carried out off the Coast of Morocco by the French Atlantic Fleet. The Minister is quoted as stating that important lessons in the role of aviation, with the fleet, were learned:

#### The Plane is part of the Ship -

M. Gasnier-Duparc stated that the planes of the carrier BEARN, of the battleships and of the cruiser EMILE-BERTIN took part in all exercises of the Fleet. The Minister then concluded:

"Naval aviation, provided it forms an integral part of the fleet, strengthens the offensive, as well as the defensive power of the fleet."

This is an opinion which we have always defended. It would be illogical to consider naval aviation as being an offensive or defensive weapon distinct from the weapons of fighting ships.

Ship-based aviation constitutes an arm to be looked upon like all other arms, be it the torpedo or gun, when it is a question of its offensive power in bombing or torpedoing. Ship aviation is a sort of "detached part", temporarily detached from the fighting ships, when planes are catapulted to carry out a reconnaissance mission or other exercise. Aviation is, therefore, an integral part of the fighting ship, or, as the Minister expressed it:

FRANCE  
No. 271  
3 May 1937

"Recent maneuvers have convinced the Navy High Command that naval aviation can no longer be considered as a mere auxiliary of our naval forces - it has become an indispensable part of those forces."

SHIP-BASED AVIATION - Number of planes insufficient.

The foregoing clearly shows the importance of ship-based aviation, an indispensable element of our naval forces. From this we infer that when planning a new war ship, location must be provided for housing planes, just as a location is reserved for main batteries, and torpedo tubes.

Now, our ship-based aviation is obviously insufficient. The armament plan which is part of the 1937 budget, provided for the Mediterranean fleet a total of 3 air squadrons: two based on the aircraft tender Cdt. Teste and the third distributed amongst the eight cruisers. In the Atlantic Fleet, we had three air squadrons based on the Carrier BEARN, plus two planes on the Cruiser EMILE BERTIN. Our squadrons are not composed of a sufficient number of planes.

What is worse, is that our carriers or airplane tenders are in no way suitable to meet modern requirements.

Not much is to be expected of our aircraft tender the "Commandant Teste", in assisting the Fleet in its maneuvers. The Cdt. Teste has a slow speed and her armament consists of 12 A.A. 3.9" guns, which does not permit her to accompany the fleet. As for the Carrier BEARN, - a beautiful 22,000 ton target - it is doubtful if she can speed over 20 knots, and besides, her 6.1" guns are not sufficient for her defense.

Hence the necessity of building without delay two modern carriers that will be the latest thing in construction, and, above all, have a speed of over 30 knots, i.e., a speed superior to that of the new battleships. These carriers, aside from being able to defend themselves against light craft, should have an armament sufficient to engage combat with a cruiser type. It is precisely the intention of the Ministry of Marine to include, in the "three year plan" to be presented to Parliament, two aircraft carriers having those characteristics; even should this type be unable to carry as great a number of planes as the present carriers.

The Navy has abandoned the idea of building very large carriers, so as not to put "all its eggs in one basket" - or rather, all its "planes in one hull". It is likewise certain that the tonnage of our aircraft carriers will be inferior to the 19,500 ton carriers of the German Navy, since they are expected to have a tonnage between 16,000 and 16,500 tons.

We conclude from the foregoing that in future programs it will be necessary to take into account the important roll of ship-based aviation and that in planning a vessel allotted space for planes will be of prime importance. The role of a carrier has changed from a "transport" to an offensive unit. Therefore, in the future, we will have, in addition to the light attacking forces, an "aviation cruiser" forming part of these forces.

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From Y Date 10 May, 1937 Serial No. 278 File No. 902-100  
 Source of information Reliable (Comments new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject FRANCE NAVY BUILDING PROGRAMS  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference

**BRIEF.**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

**FRENCH BUILDING PROGRAMS**

Report No. 278 (902-100), May 1937, is transmitted herewith.

|                                                                                                      |  |                             |  |                         |  |                      |  |                               |  |                        |  |                    |  |                        |                            |                           |                      |  |                                |  |                    |  |                    |  |                    |  |                      |  |                       |  |      |  |
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FRANCE  
NO. 278  
May 1937

900, NAVY  
902 POLICY  
902-100 BUILDING PROGRAMS

#### FRENCH BUILDING PROGRAMS

Information appearing in the press about the proposed "three year" French navy building program (1938-1941) would indicate that the project presented by the Minister of Marine to the Finance Committee for study contains the following units:

- 2 - 35,000 ton battleships
- 2 - 19,000 ton carriers
- 2 - 8,000 ton cruisers
- 15-20 - 1,000 ton destroyers
- 20-25 - 1,000 ton submarines

This program should soon appear before the Chamber for discussion and official verification of above figures will be possible.

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From N.A. Paris Date 24 June, 1937 Serial No. 351 File No. 401-100

Source of information Reliable (Common new series each January first) (Select proper from O. N. I.)

Subject FRANCE INDUSTRY - General Mobilization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION.

Report N° 351 (401-100), June, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 205 and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 2 1973

*J. M. Manteau*

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Naval Attache

FRANCE

Report No. 351

June, 1937.

400 - Industry

401 - General

401-100-Mobilization.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION.

Reference:- OMI Letr. Op-16-B12/ Serial No.1761 of  
15 December, 1936. .

Upon receipt of above reference the matter was again taken up with the Ministry of Marine with a view to furnishing answers to questions 1, 3 and 4 of above reference.

The following letter was received from the Ministry of Marine in reply to specific questions (questions 1, 3 and 4) on the basic subject :

" In your letter of 14 January 1937, in which you enclosed a copy of a pamphlet entitled "INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION", you informed me of the U.S. Navy's desire to receive general data concerning methods of the same order adopted in France.

I have the honor to inform you that the problem of economic mobilization with which France is confronted is not the same as that which presents itself in the United States, due to the difference which exists between our two countries not only as regards their location in the world but from the point of view of the interior organization.

On the other hand, there does not exist in France any publication for sale, similar to the pamphlet which you have been so kind as to communicate to me and which I am returning, herewith, with my thanks.

As regards the bill on the "Organization of the Nation in war time", you will find below a few explanations; please note, however, that those explanations are relative to a proposed law : -

a)- What is meant by "a reasonable profit" .

In accordance with the terms of the Bill for the Organization Law (Article 14), all profit on supplies furnished the Government is prohibited.

If the enterprises that supply the Government are placed under the system of amicable agreement (Art.15), all excess profits are turned over to the French Treasury .

Capital invested in a company is awarded dividends, by the Government, commensurate with the official dividend rate paid on Government bonds issued during that period .

Salaries and allowances are fixed by the Government (Art.9). Special indemnities for inventions and overtime work may be granted to the personnel.

RECEIVED  
SEC. 11612, Sec. 11613 and 11614 of 1912  
GSD letter, May, 1, 1912  
BY SLR  
Date MAY 9 1912



FRANCE  
Report No. 351  
June, 1937...

400 - Industry  
401 - General  
401-100-Mobilization.

If the enterprises furnishing supplies to the Government are placed under the Requisition System (Art. 17 and 18), such enterprises receive an indemnity for the occupancy of their establishments. Pay and allowances, as well as salaries, are fixed by the authorities that have taken over the establishments (Art. 9). They may be increased by payment of special premiums for overtime work.

b) - The rate of the premiums paid for overtime work is not fixed in peace time .

c) - Mobilization exercises, to mobilize workers for war, have been carried out. No practical exercises to mobilize material have been carried out .

d) - Article 8 provides for mobilization of women in industry, especially industries equipped in peace time to employ solely women in time of war. Women can serve in government administrative offices for the duration of the war. "

The problem of "mobilization of all forces" (men and material) in France in the event of war is being studied by both the Army and Navy General Staffs. Rough drafts of the proposed "bill" have been placed in the hands of the respective committees in the Chamber, for perusal, prior to presentation by the Government for debate.

The various laws passed by the Blum Government, taking over aircraft and munition factories, give indication that the Government intends to stop all excess profits from war materials in the event of another war.

The subject will be kept in mind and any interesting developments followed up.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

ORD letter, May, 4, 1978

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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From Y Date 29 June, 19 37 Serial No. 361 File No. 103  
(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)  
Source of information Reliable  
Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INT. RELATIONS  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
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POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 29 June, 1937.

Report No. 361, 29 June, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(f) and 5(D) on (20)

OSD letter, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
No. 361  
June 29 1937

100 POLITICAL FORCES  
103 INT. RELATIONS

POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 29 JUNE 1937

**CABINET CRISIS IN CATALONIA:** As mentioned in previous report a serious cabinet crisis in the Spanish Republican Government is underway. The Provisional Government is being reconstructed in which the parties will be represented in accordance with their electoral strength. Present indications are that the more moderate Catalan parties, as well as most of the Anarchist groups, will be excluded, which will give the Socialists stronger representation. The new Government will consequently show little change from the old one.

The present crisis is in reality a continuation of that of last March, which was never quite settled. The various parties failing to come to an agreement at that time, President Companys took matters into his own hands by forming a temporary government, in which each of the parties had only one representative.

Latest information reports that the Catalan Cabinet had been formed: 3 Republicans (left); 3 Socialists, and 3 Labor.

**SUCCESSSES OF THE NATIONALIST INSURGENT TROOPS:** From all accounts appearing in the press, the Insurgent troops under General Franco are having a sweeping success in the Basque country. Santander is reported as being in a perilous condition and capture of the town is imminent. While French opinion leans towards the view that General Franco is now in a much better position to advance on the Madrid front, a move essential to him if he is to avoid another winter in the trenches, it is also stated that the Republican Forces will put up a stiff fight and the war may well be brought into late winter.

**THEFT OF AIRPLANES:** On June 27th, an attempt was made to steal two aeroplanes from Villeneuve-sur-Lot. Both pilots concerned took off safely, but one of them, a Spaniard named Gil Antonio Quesvesanta, who was born at Valencia, was found dead in the wreckage of the machine he was piloting at Freche, near Bordeaux; the other pilot, whose name was not known, made a forced landing at Biarritz and has been arrested.

**CHAMBERLAIN'S SPEECH AND PRESS SPEECHES:** European press, especially Germany and Italy, has dropped all former diplomacy and vent is freely given to polemics and vile threats, accusations, etc. The request of Chamberlain, in his speech, that this should cease brought a violent attack from the Italian press ridiculing the Democracies for their double-dealing tactics.

As a sample of what is appearing in the European press, the following extract from INTRANSIGENT (Paris conservative paper), supposed to have been taken from the Italian press, is quoted:

**"TRANSALPINE POLITENESS:** M. Farinacci, director of the Regime Fascista, writes: 'we will not incline before the decisions of the two slimy creatures, BLUM and EDEN - sheep dressed in a lion's skin.'

"In the present situation what line must Italy follow? It is clear that while the philobolchevique policy of Eden is being carried out in England, and while in France the Jew BLUM is in power, Italy should break all relations with these countries whose imposture has been proven.

"This being done, firm action should be taken on the first provocation by the Spanish Communists. Such action should not only be a punishment for the Reds but a defy and open challenge to London and Paris.

"Before the firm stand of Rome and Berlin these two slimy

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Date MAY 21 1937

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creatures, EDEN and BLUM, will not fail to act the part of the sheep in the lion's skin. However, if they feel in condition to act, taking into account the disarmament of England and the interior troubles of France, it is better to come to the mat to-day sooner than wait for a future date when our enemies will be armed."

**MUSSOLINI ACCUSES EUROPEAN PRESS OF LYING:** An anonymous article in the POPOLO D'ITALIA, by Mussolini, denies certain recent newspaper articles. According to the French press Mussolini stated:

"There exists in the world a press which lives and gets rich on lies - lying is their daily commerce. This press is the anti-Fascist press of all nations and colors; there is a race between them to invent lies.

"We hear of a blockade of the Spanish Coast - this is false; it was said that 15,000 Italian soldiers have debarked at Malaga or Cadix - this is false.

"Certain American newspaper men who have need of the more spiced European news to feed to an American public totally ignorant of Europe, and who care less about its destiny, invented the lie that 50,000 men are concentrated at Civita-Vecchia, all ready to sail for Spain - this is false.

"Side by side with these lying newspapers, there exists a more subtle press, but none the less treacherous, and that is the French press. This press keeps guard over the Rome-Berlin axis and picks flaws with every little word upon which to build a case for possible weakness of the axis."

The reaction in the French press to the propaganda in the Italian press was practically "nil". The Frenchman, who talks a good deal himself about politics, seems to understand his Latin brother better than strangers and pays little attention to polemics coming from beyond the Alps. Items in the press indicate that the British, with the Anglo-Saxon mentality not understanding the Italian, are vexed and humiliated at the outbursts in the Italian press and that protests are constantly being made to Rome. The French, not even having an Ambassador at Rome, seem to pay little attention to the outbursts of the Italian press.

**MEETING OF THE CHAUTEMPS CABINET:** The presentation of the Chautemps Cabinet before Parliament will take place late in the afternoon of June 29th. This presentation of the Cabinet was held up pending the arrival of Monsieur Bonnet, Minister of Finance.

It is yet too early to form an opinion on the policies to be followed by Premier Chautemps. The majority opinion is that the Chautemps Cabinet is just a mere shuffling of the Blum Cabinet and that there cannot be any drastic changes. Premier Blum tried in vain to bring about a "pause" in his program; Premier Chautemps will bring about the "pause".

The Socialist Party (party of former Premier Blum), holds an important conference on 10 July, at Marseilles, and Blum has prepared a Resolution to be submitted to the party conclave. This Resolution contains many important and irritable points and may well cause a break in the Socialist ranks which could very easily determine the life of the Chautemps Cabinet.

The most important sections of the Resolution read:

"The resignation of the Socialist-directed Fronte Populaire Government was determined not by a vote of the Senate, which was not faced by a question of confidence, but by the repeated refusal of the Senate to furnish it with weapons which it judged to be indispensable for the fight against tax evasion and the flight of capital. The Congress deplores that for the third time the will of universal suffrage should thus have been balked by the resistance, the rebellion, or the desertion of a fraction of the capitalist forces.

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"It is obliged to note that the withdrawal of the Government has provoked in the country a bitter and dangerous disappointment. But, it understands that, in the face of the internal situation of the country and, above all, of the international situation, the comrade delegates in the Government did not feel justified in embarking on a struggle which, once begun, must have been followed up, without respite, to final victory, and which would necessarily have implied the putting into action of the popular masses in an increasingly energetic manifestation of their will.

"The unanimous wish of the party is that the new Cabinet should represent the principal political formations of the Fronte Populaire, and that its control should return, in logic and fairness, to the most numerous of its parliamentary groups: that is, the Socialist Party."

LEFT WING SOCIALISTS AND EXTENDED PROGRAM: The Left Wing Socialists have issued a long statement calling for the application of a number of highly controversial and, in some cases, expensive measures, among them old age pensions, a national unemployment fund, public works, increased taxation of big incomes, and exchange control. In addition, they suggest the nationalization of insurance, banks, key industries, and transport, and a system of price fixing.

How far the Radical-Socialists are prepared to support the Socialists in extending the program remains to be seen. Political opinion is that the Chautemps cabinet will be more conservative than the Blum Cabinet, and will, if anything, be inclined to tone down the demands of the Socialists. The probability of another Senatorial defeat for a Government, especially on measures which savor of protecting the Capitalists, must be avoided at all costs if the entire program of the Fronte Populaire must not be made the subject of a general election. It is doubted if the Senate would again attempt to defy the Chamber on a similar issue as the one which overthrew Blum. On the decision taken at the Marseilles Socialist Congress may well depend the life of the Chautemps Government.

DEMANDS OF MINISTER OF FINANCE, M. BONNET: Latest information reveals that M. Bonnet intends to ask Parliament for "extensive power" in dealing with the financial crisis.

The Paris Bourse and all commercial exchanges in France have been ordered closed until further orders, and a moratorium granted on all foreign and gold payments.

The Government intends to close the Parliamentary Session and send the Chamber and Senate on summer vacation as soon as the "extensive powers" bill is voted by both Houses. The "extensive power" is asked until 31 August, 1937.

It is recalled that the Senate refused to give its support to the Blum Cabinet, because it refused to divulge the manner in which it would use its plenary powers. To satisfy the Senate, the bill which will be presented to Parliament by the Chautemps Cabinet will mention specifically that the Government will use its "extensive powers" to: 1, defend the franc; 2, regulate advances by the Bank of France to the State; 3, enact certain fiscal measures.

It appears probable, at present writing, that the Chautemps Cabinet will get a vote of confidence. However, the hornet's nest, "enact certain fiscal measures", will certainly call for explanation as the Socialists will not let this elastic item go unchallenged, especially in view of the fact that the Senate overthrew their leader (Blum) on a similar item even though couched in different language.

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

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What measures are envisaged by Premier Chautemps under "enact certain fiscal measures" it is difficult to foresee. Certainly increased taxation (objectionable to the Socialists) is an absolute necessity and must form part of the measures; deflation, in some disguised form (which will be fought by the extreme Left as bringing progress to a standstill), will be mentioned as a sop to the political parties objecting to extravagance on the part of the Government. In brief, no matter what Premier Chautemps does in the financial sphere, it must be money from the pockets of the people into the coffers of the Government: any distribution of taxes on the masses will be objected to by the Socialists whose policy is "soak the rich" and get money where money exists.

It would appear that nothing short of the immediate adjournment of both Houses can possibly save the Chautemps government from embarrassment and perhaps an adverse vote of confidence in the Chamber.

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E. O. 11652, Sec 2(E) and 5(D) et (B)

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From Y Date 13 July, 1937 Serial No. 387 File No. 103  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Reliable  
Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INT. RELATIONS  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

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POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 13 July, 1937

Report No. 387, 13 July, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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FRANCE  
No. 337  
July 15 1937

100 POLITICAL FORCES  
105 INT. RELATIONS

POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING JULY 15 1937

**SPANISH SITUATION:** The political arena for the past week witnessed the struggle between the opposing International blocs for settlement of the gap left in the Spanish Control by the withdrawal of Germany and Italy. France has informed the Non-Intervention Committee that at noon Tuesday, 13 July, the neutral observers on the Pyrenees frontier would be requested to withdraw unless Portugal agreed to have the neutral observers restored on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier. Latest reports indicate that Portugal has refused to restore the neutral observers; hence, the Pyrenees frontier will be considered open insofar as foreign observers are concerned. The frontier will be guarded by the French Federal Police. The action by the Government, in removing the neutral Observers, has the unanimous approval of the French people. It is the intention of the French Government at present to stand by the agreement of 1936 prohibiting all contraband of war crossing the frontier.

The French press is of the opinion that General Franco's position due to lack of materials and money is somewhat more precarious than the radio propaganda from Burgos indicates. It is thought by the press that General Franco sent a Secret request to Mussolini and Hitler to send troops and materials in order to bring the war to a close before the winter sets in. It is claimed that Franco stressed the fact that the North African Moors, comprising the bulk of his troops, cannot stand another winter in the sold trenches and that "digging in" operations will be the result thus exposing his troops to the demoralizing effect of another hard winter. It is also rumored that General Franco's heavy losses, as well as requirements, explain the Leipzig affair and the Dictators' desire for belligerency for both sides to give Franco the advantage of a blockade of the Republican coast. Mention is also made that General Franco, not being any too sure of further help from Hitler or Mussolini due to the non-intervention committee, is throwing out feelers for England's friendship and bartering the iron mines ore from the Bilbao mines in exchange for a loan and the granting of belligerent rights.

Note: This opinion of the French press is at variance with the reports from Valencia by Commander Chandler, who states that the morale is much lower on the government side than it was during his last visit.

While too much notice can<sup>not</sup> be paid to the extreme Left French press, as they are pro-Republican, gleanings from the Right press woven into the comments in the Left press, indicate that General Franco is not any too sure of a sweeping victory over the Spanish Republicans, and that he would willingly negotiate with the Spanish Republicans for a truce if he could only eliminate the Anarchist or Communist elements within Catalonia. Franco realizes, on the other hand, that only a complete victory can enable him to settle the many political autonomous factions in Catalonia; hence, his wavering between partial victory with the probability of future internal political trouble, or holding out for complete victory with the probable chance of being compelled to seek a truce in the end.

Confirmation is made from London financial centers that General Franco has sought a loan of approximately \$2,000,000 to enable him to obtain supplies and pay his troops. Agents for loans are also reported to be negotiating in Geneva and Paris with Franco bartering raw materials for cash.

Reports also indicate that the civilian population on both sides of the Spanish war have had their fill of the entire business and are bringing pressure to bear on both sides to seek a truce. Republican propaganda is strongly at work in the Franco sector blaming the "FOREIGNERS" (German and Italian troops) for the continuation of the war, and that the real aim of Germany and Italy is to conquer Spain, taking advantage of internal strife. This propaganda, coupled with Eden's statement that "both sides wish they could get rid of the foreigners," brought a statement from Mussolini that Italy had no designs on Spain and that Italian troops could leave with permission of General Franco.

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HELLYGOCK ITALY: Whatever may be the real peace policy of Mussolini as uttered in his many speeches - notably his interview with the English laborite LAMBERT, the French Left view, as expressed in the LE POPULAIRE, accuses Italy of bellicose intentions. The Socialist organ places no faith in Italy's profession of a desire for peace, in view of the fact that everything in her plans appear to point toward preparation for a war in the Mediterranean:

- "(1) Naval maneuvers in August in Sicily;
- (2) increased financing to develop iron ore fields;
- (3) Council of ministers ordering yield of ore mines of Elba to be increased to 1 million tons;
- (4) Italy had made large purchases of coal and wheat, and had put a ban on the export of rice, one of the Army's chief food supplies.

"Fascist Italy is feverishly preparing for war and is subordinating all her economic activities to that preparation. There is no use in sounding an alarm, or of closing the eyes to that reality. But no one can believe in Italy's 'pacific will' or in her non-intervention unless she gives material, decisive, indisputable pledges, and these pledges must be given particularly with respect to Spain."

INTERIOR POLITICAL SITUATION: As mentioned in previous report the "Socialist Congress", under the Presidency of former Premier Blum, is now in session at Marseilles. After much talking and criticism of the pros and cons of the Socialist Party, under Blum, while in office, it looks as if Monsieur Blum can hold the extremists in leash and that the final vote of the Congress will be for ardent support of the CHAUTEMPS cabinet and continuation of cooperation with the government in interior problems. The Socialists are confronted with the lesser of two evils, and there remains no course open to them but to aling to the CHAUTEMPS government.

Mention has been made that the announcement of the removal of the foreign Observers from the Pyrenees frontier was a sop on the part of the Chautemps Cabinet to calm the ire of the Socialist extremists at the Congress who were clamoring for more active intervention in Spain to offset the work of the Dictators.

The agenda of the Socialist Congress is as follows:

- (1) Statutory reports.
- (2) Defense of the lay schools.
- (3) North Africa.
- (4) General policy.

Defense of the "lay schools" is one of their pet policies and is more or less used as "cement" to keep the "Republican" spirit welded together in Socialist strongholds in the Provinces where the "Young Turks" still believe that anything "anti-Church" is pro-Republican. This "lay-school" business has very little glamour for the people in large cities, who generally send their children to the "nearest" school for reasons other than Republican, (save lunch and car fares). It is common knowledge in France that the majority of the Left brainy Radicals are all graduates of the "JESUIT" schools (notably CHAUTEMPS and HERRIOT) and that they advise their rich friends to send their children to the "JESUITS", if they can afford it, where they get a good education.

The debate on North Africa was a repetition of the socialist clamor that the Arab must have complete political freedom and be a "Frenchman" in everything except his "tax". Conservative French opinion is that the Arab (Moslem) prefers to be under the domination of a "Leader": the entire Moslem religion is one of hierarchy, and the necessity of an "upper crust" is innate to the Arab.

The question of "general policy" means the "taking stock" of political tactics and strategy in coming political campaigns. The defeat of the leader, Blum, before the Senate, necessitated more correct soundings throughout the Provinces in the coming by-elections; the new taxes passed by decrees has made the average Frenchman feel that the many promises of the Blum government must in the end be met with extra taxes.

COLONEL DE LA ROCQUE PURCHASES THE PAPER "PETIT JOURNAL": It is reported that Raymond PATENOTRE has sold the PETIT JOURNAL to Colonel de la Roque, leader of the French Social Party, which succeeded the dissolved Croix de Feu. The figure involved in the deal is stated to have been 9,000,000 francs. This gives de la Roque a powerful weapon in his bid for political power, and there are rumors of his staging a comeback with a view of gaining support from the center and not the extreme Right.

NEW TAX DECREES: The CHAUTEMPS government has issued the first batch of decrees, to obtain some 10,000,000 francs needed in additional taxes. Increases are:

- (1) in postal rates, telephones, telegraph, etc;
- (2) in railway fares;
- (3) in electricity and gas;
- (4) in surtax on incomes;
- (5) stock transactions;
- (6) tobacco, matches, etc.

The Socialist Congress has just announced that the government will take over and nationalize the railroads by the end of the year. French railroads are running at a deficit of some 6,000,000,000 francs annually, counting interest on outstanding obligations, and it is claimed that State control will eliminate a good part of this debt.

LABOR DEMANDS ON THE SOCIALISTS: The "PEUPLE" publishes a long series of measures signed by JOUHAUX, Labor Leader, which Labor intends to have incorporated in the future Socialist program. Briefly, they are as follows:

- (1) Control of foreign operations in banks;
- (2) organization of money control on English system;
- (3) control over insurance companies;
- (4) fusion of all railroads;
- (5) nationalization of public utilities;
- (6) institution of fiscal identity card;
- (7) corporate tax on profits;
- (8) increase in inheritance taxes;
- (9) aged workers' pensions;
- (10) reorganization of private banking system.

It goes without saying that the CHAUTEMPS government would never risk its life by presenting to the Senate all the items on the program mentioned above. French capital is at present suffering from "freight", and this program is not a measure to bring confidence to the conservative French capitalist.

JAPANESE-CHINESE TROUBLE: While the British and Continental English newspapers have featured the trouble between the Japanese and Chinese, the French press has not, as yet, made any comment (other than news) on the trouble in the Far East.

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From Y Date 27 July, 1937 Serial No. 406 File No. 103  
(Common use serial number from January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INT. RELATIONS  
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POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING JULY 27TH 1937

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Report No. 405, 27 July, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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EX A 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) of (S)  
OSD letter, dated 1, 1972

By SLR Date 22 MAY 21 1973

1937

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FRANCE  
No. 2006 404  
July 27 1937

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OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1972

100 POLITICAL FORCES  
103 INT. RELATIONS

**POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING JULY 27TH, 1937.**

**SPANISH SITUATION:** Reaction of the French press to the "Questionnaire" submitted to the Non-Intervention Committee by Mr. Eden is to the effect that both Germany and Italy will spar for time, by submitting a counter "Questionnaire" hoping that General Franco's forces will deal a knock-out blow to the Government forces in the interval. Germany and Italy are openly accused of fomenting trouble for Great Britain in the Mediterranean to strengthen their bargaining hand in the many pending problems to be settled. Certain press opinion generally favorable to Spanish Republican Forces infer that General Franco is secretly negotiating with the British to liquidate the Spanish trouble, under certain guarantees, favorable to the British point of view. Reason given are: that General Franco will need Great Britain's "money market" when the reconstruction period sets in more than Italy or Germany's mentions; that the centuries old friendship of Spain and England (England being satisfied with Spain's "status quo" in the Mediterranean) will eventually count for more than the doubtful (profit seeking) friendship of two strangers.

Strong criticism has been in the French press over the apparent "lies" in the German press about a detachment from the French Foreign Legion (which was embarking at Marseilles for duty in Syria) proceeding to Spain to help the Spanish Republicans. French Ambassador to Berlin made a personal protest to the German Foreign Office on this "lie" being circulated in the German press. This "lie" has been denied by the French Foreign Office which stated that France had lived strictly up to the non-intervention agreement and that no troops or volunteers have left French soil for Spain since the agreement was signed.

Press opinion on this "lie" in the German press is that the aim was to support Grandi's offensive in London against the British plan; that Berlin and Rome were seeking pretexts on the one hand to hide their real and massive intervention in Spain, and on the other hand to upset the order of execution of the plan.

Pertinax, in *ECHO DE PARIS*, reports that the French Foreign Office is not very optimistic over the outcome and that both look for an end of the system of non-intervention, but that London wants to put the end off as long as possible.

Discussing Franco's action after this eventuality, Pertinax says that, to open the Pyrenees to give Valencia the same sort of help in the way of volunteers and war materials that Italy and Germany were furnishing Franco would be the height of imprudence and might embarrass the cause of Valencia which did not appear to be very solid. Franco's aim should not be to serve Valencia against Salamanca, but to liberate her Mediterranean communications and to make international treaties respected in the Spanish Moroccan zone.

The question of Franco's Mediterranean routes is seriously occupying the French and British Governments. Inferences in the press indicate that the French would like to take action if possible (jointly with Britain, or singly if necessary) to clear the Mediterranean of the presence of German and Italian troops in Spain and the Balearics.

**SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT:** French reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict seems to be neutral with a slight preference for orderly rule by the Japanese in the Orient, in deference to the continual misrule of the Chinese. Were it not for England's interests, in preventing Japan from expanding in China, it is felt that the French would favor Japanese penetration in China as the best means to securing their own Far Eastern possessions. The French feel that the Japanese would be satisfied if they had a good slice of China (of course excepting the oil fields in the East Indies), and would have no need of expansion at the expense of France. Japan has the monopoly of the cotton goods trade with French possessions, including North Africa, an



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items which Japan would like to retain by remaining friendly with France.

The new Japanese Ambassador, Yotaro Sugimaro, on his arrival in Paris Saturday morning, made a statement in which he said that the Franco-Japanese entente, following the Russo-Japanese war, had survived many tests, notably the World War, the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Washington Naval Treaty, and Japan's withdrawal from the League. The Ambassador stated that his mission here was to strengthen still more the cordial relations which united the two countries. His experience in Italy had given him reasons to have confidence in the possibility of realizing that mission.

In a special interview given Bauerwein, PARIS SOIR quotes the Ambassador as having stated, in answer to questions concerning Japan's attitude toward China in the present Sino-Japanese conflict, the following:

"Many events have taken place. In the first place, Chiang Kai Shek has lost prestige since he was prisoner of young Marshal Chiang Housh Liang. Then he became reconciled with the Communists in the South. As a result, very strongly anti-Japanese elements become extremely influential. It is to these changes in spirit that I attribute the exaggerated repercussions of small, local frictions in China. But I do not believe that this repercussion will be important. In my estimation, the Sino-Japanese incidents are practically settled. I do not look for anything grave. To people who ask us whether we want to go to war with China, I simply reply: 'he are really not so stupid.' But naturally one must guard himself against certain very important factors. In the first place, our military considers the safeguarding of their prestige as essential. It is all very well to speak of equality, but with restricted effectives in the midst of a dense population, it is essential to have it respected. We know that strong and courageous elements exist in the Chinese Army alongside valueless divisions.

"Furthermore, consideration must be given to the particular situation of the North. No real frontier separates these regions from the Jehol and from Manchuria. Armies are constantly in close touch with each other, creating an unstable situation which must be settled. From an economic standpoint, the Provinces of the North form a complete whole, with interests which are entirely common, and, finally, the population of these regions in no way consider themselves as dependancies on the Central Power influenced by the Communists. We, therefore, have numerous reasons for wanting to see North China relatively autonomous and friendly towards us, and this is one very legitimate ambition of our policy.

"In my opinion, the Chinese would not have been so excited had they not hoped for the support of foreign Powers. America replied by a polite refusal. England, who possesses powerful interests in China, renounced her policy of support, to which she wanted to win over the other powers.

"The Chinese Government today knows that if it attempts to prevent us from settling our affairs in the North, it will hardly have any allies. Perhaps the Soviet Union has encouraged resistance against us. But we do not think that she will go very far."

FRANCE INTERNAL AFFAIRS: In an address last Sunday at Maveil (Leire-et-Cher), Premier Chautemps rebuked the Socialists and Communists for their tactics. The political reunions and manifestations of extremists of the Socialists and Communists and their impatience for immediate application of the strict Front Populaire Social program.

Following a resumé of the Government's action to reestablish budgetary equilibrium and ease the Treasury situation, to check unjustified rise in prices, appease social conflicts and maintain public order, Premier Chautemps declared that it was his belief that this severe program had received the approbation of the nation which recognized its necessity. In fact, every citizen, no matter what party he belonged to, knew that there could be no

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FRANCE  
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durable social progress without order in finances, without tranquility in the streets, without activity in production. But his task was not facilitated by political manifestations of the parties, ably exploited by partisan polemics.

Chautemps felt he should clearly explain the aims of the Government once more, so as to silence absolutely unjustifiable rumors which threatened to weaken investors' confidence in the future of the financial situation.

While it was perfectly legitimate for political parties to justify their action, to develop their propaganda, to offer to the people seductive programs with a view to electoral competition, nevertheless, apart and above parties, there was the nation to think about, to which the Government was accountable.

When he had taken over power, said Chautemps, he clearly defined his program in the Ministerial Declaration, which still held and which would guide the solid action of all Ministers who pledged their responsibility in common. It was clearly stated in that document that the "pause" announced by the preceding Government was more necessary than ever, that the Government's first duty was to establish budgetary equilibrium and compress the expenses of the Treasury, that it would not renounce social reform in any manner, but that those which were too onerous for the Budget to bear must be deferred and the others realized and applied in an atmosphere of peace and labor.

This was the Government's program to which it intended to stick, and which it would fulfill with no other desire than to well serve the nation.

The Chautemps Cabinet is having trouble with the strikes due to the application of the 40-hour week, as well as the consequent increase in the cost of living. The average workman, not caring for the specific task or industry which he is serving (public utilities, barges, tugs, hotels, etc) is demanding the application of the 40-hour week to his specific industry if for no other reason than that his fellow workman has this privilege; convincing him that his specific job does not permit this privilege is, naturally enough, only waste of time and words. Employers are resigned to the forty-hours' week because circumstances are opposed to any appeal of the law, and the only way out of an impossible situation is to spread the hours over a period in a manner to meet the fluctuating needs of industry. There are indications of the Government being driven to the necessity of relaxing the rigidity of the short week. Even with concessions that may be granted to employers, the situation will still be serious, for with the higher wages and social charges the total charges on production have been increased in the year by 75 to 100 percent, and a further drawback, which is the subject of general complaint, is a decline in the individual production of workers, which may be partly explained by the collective contracts that tend to level the wages of different grades of workers and remove incentive effort.

PRICE MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE AS RESULT OF SOCIAL LAWS: The tendency of wholesale prices continues upwards. During the week ending June 12, 1937, the general index stood at 530, compared with the average of 515 in January last, and 566 in 1934. Foodstuffs stood at 581 on June 12, 1937, compared with 544 in 1935.

The general index of retail prices in Paris also reveals a substantial rise. The average for last May stood at 564 compared with 461 in 1934.

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**Note:** The frank opinion of hard headed Frenchmen who actually understand finance and economics is: that the 40-hour week is incompatible with present state of French finances where more production and less expenses are essential to meeting budgetary expenses. The only alternative to a proper working of finances, under the 40-hour law, is a obligatory conversion of "government bonds" at reduced rates, if not complete suspension of interest payments until the 40-hour week proves a success. Such a drastic step would bring about the fall of any Government. Of France's \$6 billion annual budget, over \$2 billion is for interest on outstanding state obligations.

The opinion of the RIGHT press, due to the fact that the Hotel strike was settled more less in favor of the Employers, is that the "cooling" process has set in and that the general public is getting somewhat tired of the extreme measures in the Fronte Populaire Program. Inference is made that a certain loss of prestige has taken place due to the favorable settlement of the Hotel strike.

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From Y Date 10 Aug., 1937. Serial No. 413 File No. 100-103  
(Continuous new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)  
 Source of information Reliable.  
 Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES- International Rel.  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

## Reference

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POLITICAL EVENTS - PERIOD ENDING AUGUST 10th.

Report N° 413 (100-103), August, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (X)

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FRANCE  
Report No. 413  
August, 1937.

100 - Political Forces.  
103 - International  
Relations.

POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING AUGUST 10th.

SPANISH SITUATION : Comment in the French press, on the failure of the Non-Intervention Committee to agree on the withdrawal of volunteers, and according belligerent rights to General Franco, was to the effect that the improved Anglo-Italian relations (Mussolini-Chamberlin private letters) was of much more importance in the final liquidation of the Spanish situation. It is stated that the importance which Mussolini attaches to official recognition of Ethiopia is of much more importance than what eventually will take place in Spain, and that the withdrawal of Italian volunteers will be hastened by Mussolini should France and England promise recognition of Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Several conservative writers state that Mussolini's tactics, in occupying the Balearics and sending active troops into Spain, were specifically drawn up to bring pressure on England and France in the final count of recognition of Ethiopia. The Right press admires Mussolini for his well thought out plan and attributes his action to the fact that a "Dictator" can act, while the Democracies discuss.

Opinion in the press is also swerving around to the point where it is expressed that a victory for General Franco will bring peace to Europe, and that Franco will have the support of all conservative thinkers, whereas, victory for the Spanish Republicans will mean a prolongation of strained relations between the Facist countries. It is also stated that a Spain, under General Franco, can more readily obtain much needed loans in the London markets than a Spain under the Reds.

Due to the recent bombing by "unknown" Spanish planes (presumably from the Franco forces), the French have decided to escort all French merchant ships leaving northern African ports, for French ports, via the Mediterranean.

Reports state that General Franco has published a decree setting up the new form of the Spanish Government when victory is declared. The decree is approved by all the factions forming the Right political forces. The new government will be Facist in formation, and character. According to the press there is to be a National Council to consist of 25 to 50 members, appointed by the Leader, to meet when convoked by the Leader. The organization is described in the decree as having a Catholic and Imperial mission. It will also establish an economic regime transcending individual group and class interests with a view to the multiplication of riches in the service of the people, State, social justice, and the Christian liberty of the individual.

ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS : Pertinax in ECHO DE PARIS, observes that British policy will now insist upon two things in connection with the Anglo-Italian negotiations: (1) the territorial domain of Spain must be respected, and (2) no State shall set foot on the eastern shore of the Red Sea. On these two points England intends to stand firm, even though she might yield in recognizing belligerent rights to Franco, particularly if he further consolidates his position :

"Thus

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" Thus, after 2 years of hesitation, London the seat of the Empire, has set down a defined policy; a formal alliance with France for the defense of their respective frontiers, at least as long as no European settlement has been made with Germany; economic sanctions only against an aggressor, with the reservation that she may resort to military sanctions of her own free choice and whenever she sees fit as the occasion should arise; alliance with Egypt and Iraq, the protection of Palestine and the Trans-Jordan which, before long, would doubtless become an alliance with the Arab and Jewish States proposed in the Report of the Royal Commission."

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION : The penetration of the Japanese into China is featured in the French press, and great interest is attached to the entire affair. Naturally, Russia (France's ally), in whose French interest lies. The recent upheaval in the Russian army is causing the French much concern, and press comment indicates that there exists a great doubt about Russia's ability to take the field, either in the East or in the West.

Kerillis, in EPOQUE, points out that the United States and England cannot consider without uneasiness the Japanese attempt at hegemony on a continent of 400-million souls, and in which these two powers had invested considerable capital. The conquest of China meant the domination of the Pacific, and therefore Australia and New Zealand also would be directly threatened ;

" In any case, if Japan dares attack China entire, who is more or less supported by the Anglo-Saxon Powers and Russia, it is almost certain that she has taken precautions to assure herself of serious support in Europe. The German and Italian fleets, holding the British fleet in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean, would render valueless the bases at Singapore and Hongkong. As for Russia, fearful of Germany at her back, she should be powerless to conduct a large-scale campaign in the Far East.

" At first sight, France does not appear to be directly interested. But her Policy is close to Anglo-Saxon policy in Europe as well as in Asia where the fate of Indo-China is dependent upon the present balance of forces in the Far East. Moreover, it is evident that, if the war brings Russia and Japan face to face, Germany will profit by it to pursue her avowed ambitions in Eastern Europe, and thus encounter France's historic interest and military alliances.

"Therefore, a Sino-Japanese war would affect the whole world. The imagination recoils before such a nightmare."

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OSD letter, May, 1973

By SLR

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FRANCE  
Report No. 413  
August, 1937.

100 - Political Forces  
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Relations.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS : Minister of Finance BONNET is making good headway in straightening out French finances, and endeavoring to balance the budget. Prices are rising steadily and the time does not seem far off when the workers will again demand increases in salary to compensate for increased costs in living. The deflation policy of BONNET is displeasing the Socialists who claim that such a policy spreads unemployment and injures the workers. In a speech last Sunday BONNET stated that just prior to leaving Washington President Roosevelt told him: "Whatever you do balance your budget". The present problem confronting the Government, now that the financial and economic program has been given the "pause", is the political problem of keeping the Front Populaire forces united, and having them accept the deflation program until such time as the country gets on its feet. As long as the political situation is not cleared up, there can be little hope of confidence returning to French finances. The next three months should give a good indication of the actions of the Left forces towards the new measures. Things seem alright for the present as the Paris Exposition is in full swing and prosperity has once again returned to Paris. The taxi-cab drivers even objected to an increase in taxi rates stating that such an increase might interfere with present prosperity for the taxis. However, the winter is approaching, when the exposition will be closed, and then the test will come as to whether or not the Left forces will have patience for gradual prosperity to return or will openly demand the enforcement of the socialist program of "spending up to the hilt". Such a program would undoubtedly bring about the fall of the present CHAUTEMPS government and throw the country into another political crisis.

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(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)  
 Source of information Press  
 Subject FRANCE (International) POLITICAL FORCES INT. RELATIONS  
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**POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 7 SEPTEMBER, 1937.**

Report No. 442, 7 September, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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FRANCE (International)  
No. 446  
September 1997

100 POLITICAL FORCES  
100 INT. RELATIONS

WEEKLY POLITICAL REPORT - Week ending 7 Sept., 1997.

THE JOURN OF SIX MEMORANDUM TO BRASSI.

The PARIS KIMI published a long article from the New York correspondent, Jacques Frensch, to show that Latin America is gradually getting away from the democratic United States and is looking toward Mussolini and Hitler, as evidenced by the "Common Front" of the dictatorship in Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador), and a very advanced penetration of dictatorship in Brazil and Argentina.

In second, the article points out that the affairs of the 6 countries has brought to light in a very evident, if not alarming fashion, the following facts:

- (1) The penetration of dictatorship in South America and in Central America was progressing with giant steps!
- (2) This constituted fear the United States a commercial and military menace!
- (3) The American Republican League, founded on the extension of the Monroe Doctrine and the spiritual union of democracies was probably a half, and was tending to become exhausted!
- (4) There existed in South America and in Central America an increasingly active "anti-democratic" tendency!
- (5) A French victory interrupted the United States directly and, in spite of her official neutrality, she would do everything to counteract the inevitable repercussions on her neighbors!
- (6) Secretary Hall's commercial policy and the world policy of President Roosevelt's directly collided with that of Germany, Italy and Japan, and the battle-field would be the South American markets as a whole.

THE FRENCH POSITION IN THE MONROVIA DOCTRINE.

The French press frankly states that there could be no doubt that Italy was at her setting on her own account or had ceded enthusiasm to France, - and that this enthusiasm means and the situation in the Far East required absolute cooperation between France and England.

The Japanese Navy Attack told us frankly about the submarine strategy (but he would not talk about the Far East). He intimated that the submarines were, of course, Italian and kept repeating that it was very funny that they had made a mistake and had attacked one Italian ship.

French and British officials met as if the subject is too delicate to mention.

The French papers of today (Tuesday, 7 September) attack most importantly to the refusal of Italy to enter a conference in regard to the submarine strategy, and feature the Russian co-action to Italy as creating a very dangerous situation.

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No. 442  
September, 1937

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OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 31 1973

FRENCH OPINION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS:

The Sino-Soviet non-aggression treaty is characterized by LE JOUR as one which serves to camouflage a mutual assistance treaty. This paper gives additional information to the effect that it was learned from a good source that the furnishing of arms already begun would be intensified, and that Marshal Blucher, now in Mongolia, was in direct connection with Nankin by wire. On August 23rd, 12 large bombers of the 1932 type, manufactured at Grandstedt by Dornier, left for Kouang-Noua-Men, with 3 asian crews of 9 men each, who had signed contracts for 6 months in the Chinese Army.

"The policy of the Soviet Government now tends very clearly to extending the conflict and to assuring its duration for a long period, because the prolongation of the war alone would save China by exhausting the adversary who was incapable of financing it longer than six months.

"The Soviets are taking such an interest in China's victory that it is reported that, in case the Chinese Generals mark a tendency toward indiscipline with regard to the Nankin Government, measures have already been taken to confide the supreme command in General Blucher.

"In the eyes of Litvinoff and Marshal Tchang-Kai-Chek, this situation is one of mutual assistance, which will permit the U.S.S.R. to intervene in Far Eastern affairs at such hour as they may choose. At the present hour, there is no doubt but what Russian intervention has taken the form of furnishing arms. Tomorrow, it may assume a more apparent political aspect, and imperialist Russia's true countenance will have been clearly revealed under her pacific mask."

MUSCOLINI-HITLER MEETING:

Dominique, writing in REPUBLIQUE, advances the theory that Mussolini's trip to Germany is not so much a demonstration of the solidity of the Rome-Berlin axis as of the firm will of the Triple Alliance (Italo-Germano-Nippon) henceforth to direct the affairs of the world.

This writer, in this connection, refers to Frensch's article in PARIS MIDI a few days ago, which drew attention to the incursion into South America by Germany, Italy and Japan, and to the tendency toward dictatorship in which the United States which showed that the Panama Canal was at the present moment practically encircled by dictatorships, particularly in Central America, who were clearly favorable to the interests and ideas of Germany and Italy.

"In other terms," says Dominique, "we are faced with a veritable Triple Alliance concluded between Germany, Italy and Japan, the three States thus forming the nucleus for a virtual coalition in which the Spain of Franco, Austria and Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, perhaps Finland, and surely a half-dozen South American States would take part.

"The aim of Mussolini's trip at the precise moment when Japan is going to war will thus not be so much to emphasize the importance and the solidity of the Rome-Berlin axis as the firm will of the Triple Alliance in question to direct henceforth the affairs of the world."

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No. 448  
September 1957

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#### SPAIN:

The French press keeps inquiring if there is any truth in the reports that Catalonia is seeking peace with Franco.

Lieutenant Colonel Melburg, U.S. Army, who was on two months' temporary duty as Assistant Military Attaché for Colonel Fuqua in Spain, told me that one of the most popular jokes in Valencia of the Spanish Government is that Catalonia is the only European country that has fully obeyed "non-intervention". He also stated that Franco's chances of winning now looked about 90 out of 100.

#### GENERAL GAMELIN'S LONDON VISIT:

Certain papers attach considerable importance to this almost unobserved visit of the French Chief of Staff, who arrived in London on 1 September to witness the British Army maneuvers which will take place between the 9th and 11th in Norwich on the east coast.

It is emphasized in the press that this trip has nothing to do with working out any combined action of the two Powers any more than there was question of that at the conference of the General Staff a year ago.

In fact, says the press, its only object was to maintain the military organisms and relations established between them at that time.

EXCELSIOR observes that one fact remains certain, namely, that if France and England were now drawn into an armed conflict, France would have to carry the load on land practically alone, since England would not be able to support an effort on land for two years hence at the minimum.

On the contrary, in spite of the state of her fleet, the British action on the sea would be effective for the protection of maritime routes and overseas territories. However, the distribution of the British forces raised a certain number of problems of which France constituted one of the elements. This was the question, not of adopting a common action, but a common attitude towards belligerents who were facing each other in China on one hand, and in Spain on the other.

"It would appear that the best means of obtaining such a result resides in a strict entente between the French and British General Staffs. It is for the purpose of envisaging the details of such an entente that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and General Gamelin are meeting with respect to the particular cases of China and Spain."

#### FRANCE POLITICAL SITUATION:

The first "sit down" strikes for some time occurred in an automobile factory near Paris and a few small ones have been reported in the building industry.

In general, all classes have the impression that M. Bonnet is doing the best possible with French finances; but there is a large amount of unrest over the cost of living which has gone up in the last 9 months from an index of 504 to 606.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (B)  
OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date 22 May 1973  
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 Subject FRANCE AVIATION G.E.R.M.A.N.  
 (Station reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
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OUTPUT OF MILITARY AIRPLANES, AS COMPARED TO GERMANY.

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Report No. 556(1000), 4 Nov., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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No. 556  
NOVEMBER 1937

1000 Aviation (General)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OUTPUT OF MILITARY AIRPLANES, AS COMPARED TO GERMANY

The average monthly production of French military airplanes for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936 was 65 - an average annual output of 780 planes. The writer has just been informed, by the director of one of the Nationalized airplane companies, that nationalization has resulted in a slight decrease in airplane production. The output of military airplanes in France will be, therefore, approximately 750 for the year 1937.

From a reliable Italian source it is reported that German airplane factories are turning out planes at the rate of 15 to 20 a day; an annual output of 5400 to 7200 military airplanes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(1) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

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From Y Date 9 Nov., 1937 Serial No. 563 File No. 103  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

## Reference

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 8 November, 1937

17 1937

Report No. 563 (103), 9 Nov., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

File 129.

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No. 563  
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103 International Relations

**POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING 8 NOVEMBER, 1937**

**SPANISH SITUATION:** The announcement in the press that England intended to send a representative to Salamanca was greeted with pleasure. From the press it would seem that this announcement came as a surprise to nobody but the Communist paper HUMANITE. The majority opinion was that it was a step in advance and would enable the peaceful forces now at work to clear up the Spanish situation. The French are sick and tired of the Spanish civil war as it is only sharpening the appetites of the dictators for further demands taking advantage of the precarious positions of France and England in the Mediterranean. Pressure is now being brought on the government to follow the lead of England and have France send a representative to General Franco. Naturally, this will be a much debated move when one considers that the extreme Left is still talking of shutting off supplies from France to General Franco's sector. Rumors keep arriving in Paris that a large Franco offensive is about to start ever since the fall of Oujda, but it seems very slow in starting.

**NORTH-AFRICAN AGITATION:** General Nogues, Resident General of North Africa, has returned to Paris to take part in the North African weekly conference. Reports indicate that matters have quieted down since the ringleaders were imprisoned and a firm hand used by the French troops.

Allal el Fassi, who has been regarded as the real leader of the anti-French nationalist movement in Morocco, has been banished.

This order was pronounced toward the latter part of October by the Sultan, and, on the recommendation of General Nogues, after agreement with the Foreign Minister and Minister of Colonies, el Fassi was sent to Libreville (Gabon), to which place of exile he was transported by plane.

**SINO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE AT BRUSSELS:** The entire French press, while somewhat disappointed at President Roosevelt not following up his Chicago speech with an alignment of the "Liberty Loving Democracies" versus the Berlin-Rome-Tokio pact, take a very lenient view of the probable fruitless results of the Brussels conference. Not one paper expects anything to come out of it - with the possible exception of a few peaceful imploring messages to Japan asking her to mediate when she has her wants fulfilled - unless it be another opening for Japan to show her contempt for outside intervention in the Far East.

However, a general hope is expressed that the Brussels conference will give Ambassador Davis, Mr. Eden and M. Delbos a chance to get together and discuss the entire international situation. The Left press states that this discussion, between the big chiefs of three democratic nations, is really of more importance than the Sino-Japanese affair.

**BERLIN-ROME-TOKIO ANTI-COMMUNIST PACT:** The reaction of the French press to this pact is that it is aimed at England more than at the Soviets. It is Germany's method of bringing pressure on England to meet her colonial demands. Opinion is also expressed that the commercial privileges in China will be divided between Italy and Germany to the detriment of the United States, France, and England.

The Pact is supposed to bring German pressure in Central Europe and Russia, Italian pressure in Egypt, and Japanese in the Far East, on England. It is also freely admitted that the pact is a military pact, in the full sense of the word, should conditions warrant military force. The conservative press states that this Pact is the boldest step yet taken by the dictators in their hunt for power and expansion: it is only another challenge to democracy, with many more to come, and finally the sword will decide whether democracy must give place to the new political institution of the dictators.

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Opinion is also expressed that the Pact was the jumping off board for Germany to propose a peaceful solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict (everything supposed to have been arranged) and that it is Germany's intention, in agreement with Japan, to show up the useless conferences in comparison to direct action on the part of the dictators who know what they want and how to go and get it. This, it is claimed, will increase the prestige of the Dictator countries and may be the means of bringing the small European countries closer to the idea that their interests are better served with the firm action of the Dictators.

Unanimous opinion expressed leaves no doubt that Czechoslovakia is the first target of the pact, with Germany moving slowly down to Central European countries. This move has, so it is stated, the consent of Italy who will be well repaid by German support in the Eastern Mediterranean.

INTERIOR SITUATION: Following the Radical-Socialist Congress, at Lille, the Alliance-Democratic, and Socialists held their meetings, this week, to plan and determine their attitude in the political field.

As was to be expected, the Socialist Council voted support of the Front Populaire Government, hoping that a more radical application of the Front Populaire program would be forthcoming in the future.

The important meeting was that of the Alliance Democratique at Nice. This party has about 100 members in the Chamber and 83 in the Senate, and its policy is conservative and away from any Front Populaire innovations.

The principal speaker was Etienne Flandin, a former Premier, who dealt with the delicate interior problems brought on by the Socialists' labor policies and which was disuniting the many different factors in French life. The appeal of Flandin was for union and that "all Frenchmen" should agree on problems which were purely "French". Flandin's appeal, however, was more of a request for semi-left parties to move to the Right and endeavor to obtain strength (which he promised would be extended) by collaboration with the Center-Right parties. The suggestion of Flandin is well nigh impossible as the different outlook on how the interior situation should be handled (labor settling accounts with Capital after years of oppression) prohibits any collaboration with a party which demands the canceling of the benefits accorded workers under the Front Populaire program.

The following quotation about sums up what Etienne Flandin had to say in his appeal to the other factions:

"If the Chautemps Government, notwithstanding its many praiseworthy efforts for labor, permits the Labor Syndicates to impose its proposed social legislation on employers and employees it will be signing in advance the mobilization for future revolutionary disorders.

"Is it not a sufficient warning when we see the rapid rise in prices of essential materials and commodities? What will be the natural reactions of people whose revenues cannot follow the upward scale of prices? Do you think that parents who listen to their children crying for bread will remain faithful to the regime?

"Do you think that in a country where youth finds its parents' savings (which they counted upon for a start in life) dwindling away will fight for a regime which gave them unemployment in return? Blind, indeed, are those who do not see the grave events piling up in the interior of our country.

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"Referring to the international situation, the friendship and alliance of France with England is of prime importance and is the essential guarantee of peace. For this reason must we refrain, at all cost, from any isolated action. France, like England, cannot accept any menace to her lines of communication in the Mediterranean. Mussolini has often mentioned the vital importance of Italy's routes in the Mediterranean; therefore, Italy cannot be surprised by any action taken by France and England to defend their own routes.

"Our empire is threatened; the troubles recently in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were the fruits of a well conceived plan to weaken France. An attempt is constantly being made in Central Europe to break up our alliances.

"Unite or die, will soon be the question put to all Frenchmen. Let the French people meditate on this question and let rich and poor, employers and employees, fascists or communists, democrats or totalitaires, measure the 'meaninglessness' of their quarrels before the possible destruction of their country.

"All that pertains to national defense: military forces, finance, production and morale, must be brought to its highest pitch of efficiency if we are to safeguard peace. Certain nations believe us weak! Our weakness will be a terrible temptation for those who believe that the strength of people develops with the audace of the noise of boots in the aisles of the temples of exaltation and submission.

"No, the historic mission of France is not completed. The future is not so far away where these generations intoxicated with the fumes of collectivism, which is not so different in Moscow, Rome, or Berlin, will be succeeded by generations hungry for individual liberty and freedom. Once again, then, France will shine out as having saved for mankind the greatest gift of God, freedom and liberty.

"Let us be strong to remain free. Let us remain free to be strong. I hope this appeal will unite all Frenchmen."

The constant bickering of the various French political factions, since the coming into power of the Front Populaire, has certainly weakened France's influence with her Little Entente friends, and increased the audacity of the dictators. The closing in of the iron belt (Rome-Berlin-Tokio-Batman) is bringing Frenchmen to realize that if France is attacked all bickering must cease, - so why not cease immediately? There is a possible chance that at least on international questions, if they can be separated from internal ones, a political truce may be called when the Chamber meets. The firm attitude of the Chautemps government towards the excessive demands of Labor would indicate that the application of the Socialist social policy must be moderated if anything approaching a political truce is to take place.

The Socialist Council, by a vote taken November 8, decided to continue to form part of the Front Populaire Government. The vote was 3,498 against 909.

**TRADE UNIONS AND DEMONSTRATION:** The C.G.T. (Federation of Labor) has given instructions to its adherents to participate in a national manifestation on November 14 in Paris and 80 other principal cities throughout France.

The official notification states that the purpose of the manifestation is to give support to the laboring masses the following principles:

- (a) the fight against the high cost of living and the maintenance of the purchasing power of the salaries;
- (b) an increase in the public works program;

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- (c) the settlement of the problem of hiring and discharging workers;
- (d) union liberty, and respect of collective conventions;
- (e) aged workers' pensions;
- (f) the maintenance of peace by granting to the people themselves the right and liberty to see their own destiny.

This order to manifest is criticized by the Right papers as a deliberate campaign of agitation for the program of the masses, which Leon Jouhaux commands, as opposed to the program of the government which calls for a "pause".

NOTE The Naval Attaché has just been informed that General Franco has given orders to mine all the Mediterranean Spanish coast, and that the Ministry of Marine has issued orders to all French ships to keep to the eastward of the Balearics.

It is noted that there is 400 fathoms or more between the Balearics and the Spanish Coast. It is doubtful if this area could be effectively blocked by mines, but there is always the danger from mines breaking loose and drifting.



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BERLIN-ROME-TOKIO "TRIANGLE" replacing the  
BERLIN-ROME AXIS.

Report N° 570 (103) November, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

NOV 23 1937

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BERLIN-ROME-TOKYO "TRIANGLE" REPLACING THE  
BERLIN-ROME AXIS.

The following comment from EXCELSIOR, best informed paper on Colonial problems, throwing some light on the web being weaved by the BERLIN-ROME-TOKYO axis around the former world "colonial powers" to strangle them into agreement for a complete realignment of the world's good is of interest.

Extreme "Right" opinion in France has long been leaning to the decision that the Dictators being fully convinced that the much heralded Democracies (whatever their past glories may have been) are temporarily weak-kneed "softies" more interested in playing the role of "shopkeepers" than in joining the pioneer movement of replacing the old worn out doctrines by virile reorganization of political, social and economic life, for the betterment of the entire human race.

" THE TRIANGULAR AXIS: Nazism has consolidated its diplomatic situation by bringing Italy into the three power anti-communist plot. Viewed from Berlin this alliance is one of principle with scope for development of active intervention depending on the circumstances. Germany and Italy both have treaties of friendship with Moscow and nothing will deter these two powers, should the wind turn, to warm up to Moscow under the guise that the Berlin-Rome-Tokio pact is nothing more than an 'anti-communist' pact, and NOT an anti-RUSSIAN pact. If STALIN eventually becomes disgusted with the weak attitude of the Democracies, sufficiently to acquiesce in the plans of expansion of the Dictators in Europe and the Orient, the Dictator 'anti-communist' pact will be forgotten and the "triangle" will immediately make friends with Russia .

" The principal task of the German press, who shouted the joys of Italy's adhesion to the pact, was to convince England that Germany entertained no anti-British feelings in drawing Italy into the pact, nor any designs against British interests. However, Germany's position is certainly compromised by the pact with Italy. The original pact between Berlin-Tokio was not necessarily anti-British. However, the bringing in of Italy to this pact, at the present moment of strained relations, is decidedly an anti-British move. The agreement of the three Fascist countries is born of the conviction that the moment has arrived to bring pressure and obtain results from the 'haves' .

" It is not at present clear to see how this triple accord can menace Russia's military organization , especially as Japan is deeply engaged in China, but it

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but it does reinforce the means of intimidation sought by the Berlin-Rome-Tokio axis to threaten Franco-British possessions in the far east. Germany supports the Mediterranean aspirations of Italy while the latter supports the Colonial aspirations of Germany. The triple accord openly supports the aggression of Japan in China. The triple accord is now in position to measure and weigh its pressure in the vital sectors: Extreme-Orient; Mediterranean; African colonies, where France and England are requested to cede the former German colonies. This game of chess has been going on for some time - no one has been taken unaware. "

The declaration of a Dictator state in Brazil, coming immediately after the Berlin-Rome-Tokio pact, and Mussolini's statement that all Europe would be Fascist by the logic of events has cast gloom over the section of the French press that put hope in the Pan-American agreement, not to mention the Chicago speech and Mr. Hull's role as an eulogist on the inevitable coming out on top of democracy and the crumbling of the empires of the despots.

The Right press, as well as conservative opinion, is leaning more and more to the long advocated road of coming to an agreement with Germany and drop the complicated alliances in Central Europe. The Left politicians in France see clearly that there can be no clean cut issue with Germany by means of the "musket" (odds seem all the other way) and several recent moves on the part of the Chautemps government indicate that France (no doubt with the approval of England) is getting tired of having Germany a perpetual enemy, for reasons more historical than actual, and peaceful overtures (exchange of visits of veterans, leading military officials, etc.) have recently been numerous.

The military weakness of France, has practically convinced all the middle European powers that she cannot come to their assistance; hence, we have the influence of the Dictators growing in these small countries.

Various articles in the French press, originating in French minds as well as expressing the hopes and aspirations of the Dictators, would not be surprised at the following line up when the Continent is convinced that Dictators alone are capable of handling the turmoil due to economic collapse:

Poland : Dictatorship, and pro-German;

Yugo-Slavia: Leave the French orbit and approach Italy and Germany;

Turkey : Neutral, as at present, depending Russia's faith - would follow Russia into the Dictator's camp;

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- Rumania: Due to internal disorder, makes little difference which way she turns, but a military dictatorship would eventually reign - naturally pro-German;
- Greece : Rumored that the military clique is pro-German;
- Austria-Hungary - Incorporated in German expansion;
- Czecho-Slovakia - Taken over by Germany -unless it is brought on war with Russia which would entirely change the European line up;
- Russia : Regardless of which way Russia turns, an internal revolution is to be envisaged;
- Spain : Under German and Italian influences - maintaining economic friendship with England

Should the above line-up develop it is self evident that France and England would be compelled to cede to Germany's demands for colonies. Whether or not France's democratic form of Government (which is a sad picture with present bickerings) would survive this change is a matter of conjecture. At present, it is almost impossible to see where a Dictator could fit into the present mentality of the French without a repetition of Spain's civil war. //

N. A. Paris

FRANCE

No. 571

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902 Policy

902-100 Programs

A Word Survey of Naval Building Programs, from the French Viewpoint.

The following is a translation, from "Le Temps" of 11 November, 1937, of an article on Naval Building Programs. It is interesting as presenting an accurate picture of the present and future French Building Programs in comparison with those of the other Great Powers:

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"A WORLD SURVEY OF NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAMS FROM THE  
FRENCH VIEWPOINT."

"France, possessing as it does colonies in all parts of the world, must have a strong Navy. The rebuilding of the French Fleet has been one of the dominating preoccupations of our successive governments, since 1918. It constitutes, with the reconstruction of the devastated regions and the efforts made to provide France with adequate military material and personnel, and necessary industrial equipment, one of the most meritorious tasks of victorious France. Today, however, are we certain that France will be in a position to carry on the work undertaken?

"At the present time, there is a predominant fact in the international situation: the general tendency to increase to the extreme limit armaments on land, on sea, and in the air. The big foreign naval powers are concentrating energy, all their energy, in speedily carrying out their programs of new ship construction, and are busily engaged in drawing up new programs.

"The Spithead Naval Review, this summer, during which the young King of England passed in review the Imperial squadrons and the foreign men of war present, was assuredly a grand spectacle. However, the British Fleet appeared very mediocre in comparison to what the predecessors of the new monarch had in their time been able to review. There was a fact, though, that brought consolation to the British sailor: behind the existing fleet, so mediocre, they could see another one, - the fleet of the future, for which necessary credits have been voted, under the pressure of the peril menacing Great Britain and its dominions; these are really gigantic programs that have thus been drawn up and voted. The program for this year included huge increases of allotments that will permit building very speedily a new fighting fleet: 3-35,000-ton battleships of the GEORGE-V type; 2 big aircraft carriers; 5-8,000-ton cruisers, 2-5,300-ton cruisers; 16-destroyers; 7 submarines for patrol duty, plus an important number of smaller units and auxiliary craft. It is particularly the battleship force which the British Admiralty is endeavoring to increase, and they hope by 1940 to possess the most powerful squadron in the world, which will consist of the KING-GEORGE-V, the PRINCE OF WALES, the ANSON, the JELLICOE and the BEATTY, all of which are equipped with 356 mm (15") guns. And this year, the strength of the British Fleet has been increased by the addition of 3 big 9,000-ton cruisers, 11 large destroyers, and a number of submarines. Units at present under construction represent a total tonnage of 500,000, 21 cruisers included therein.

"As for the United States, their programs indicate even a greater ambition, considering that the U.S. Navy contemplates laying down, each year - for a period of seven consecutive years - a 35,000-ton battleship equipped with 406 mm. (16") guns. They have put - or will put in the service before the end of this year - 2 carriers whose building has been somewhat delayed due to defects of a technical nature, 2 cruisers, 10 torpedo-boats. However, it seems there is always some delay in carrying out naval building programs in the United States, so it is very doubtful that these magnificent projects will be quickly followed by realizations.

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"Japan's method is a different one. The Japanese having proceeded, as speedily as possible, with the modernization of four battleships, are now very actively pushing the construction of light craft, submarines and carriers. A "replacement program", on which the Japanese Admiralty is extremely secretive, includes (2) first-line battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines, the construction of which is in full activity at present, in all probability.

"As for the German and Italian navies, their strength is rapidly increasing. In accordance with the agreements made with Great Britain, Germany shall not build a fleet superior to 35% of the strength of the British Fleet, and 45% of the strength of Britain's submarine fleet. Will Germany live up to this agreement? Being applied as it is at present, and now that Great Britain has decided to increase its naval strength to such a considerable extent, it will permit Germany to possess, a few years hence, a fleet about comparable in strength to the French Fleet. It is calculated that, since certain of its units will reach their normal age limit, and even though the building of new units may be conducted at an appropriate pace, the French Navy, by 1942, shall possess no more than 456,000 tons. At that time Germany will have built 420,000 tons. Her fleet, if we do not react, will be more efficient than ours considering the battleship force she will then have available: two 26,000-ton units, two 35,000-ton units, three "pocket-battleships" of 10,000-tons. She will possess, besides, two big aircraft carriers of 19,250-tons each, eleven new cruisers of between 10,000 and 6,000 tons, 40 destroyers and torpedo boats and 45% of the British submarine force consisting of units of from 250 to 750 tons. The carrying out of this program requires a gigantic effort: work is going on day and night, in the government arsenals and private ship-yards. Up to this year, 260,000 tons have already been laid down or built.

"Italy's activities in this line are very great also, and a few years hence she will possess, in the Mediterranean, a very powerful battleship squadron composed of two 35,000-ton units (launched recently) and of four old battleships that have been most ingeniously and thoroughly remodelled. Dating from this year, the Italian submarine fleet practically equals our own. Italy possesses 74 submarines against our 83. Italy's tonnage in modern units (of which there are 216) amounts to 435,000 tons. She has, in addition, 22 other units under construction, which represent a total of 100,000 tons.

"What is the situation in the French Fleet? Years of effort have led to the construction of a modern fleet of over 500,000 tons; approximately 150,000 tons were still under construction last year and this year.

"Between 1 January and 1 October of this year, we have put into service quite a number of fine ships of all types, equal, if not superior, to corresponding types built by foreign nations. We have added to our fleet: 4 - 1500-ton submarines (TIGRANT, CONQUERANT, AGOSTA, BEVEZIER); 2 - 600-ton submarines, (PARLE, JUNON); 5 new light torpedo boats of 600 tons each (ASIPERONE, FLORE, POMONE, IPHIGENE, BOMBARDE); 1 - 7500-ton cruiser (MARSEILLAISE); one large hydrographic vessel (ALBATROS-ROUGE). Before the end of the year, the series of the 7500-ton cruisers will be completed, by putting into service at that time three new units: the MONTCAILL, the GEORGES-LENGUES and the GLOIRE. Notwithstanding certain delays, the DUNKERQUE may be considered as definitely in commission.

"This is evidently a satisfactory accomplishment. New building programs, however, are less satisfactory, not so much on account of the number and types of units which they comprise, but because of the pace at which it seems building work will not be carried on. It is a fact that progress on ships under construction is far from being what would be desirable. Last year's naval program comprises only one light cruiser and a small fleet of light craft, orders for which have been distributed among a great number of shipyards. This consists of 2 - 1772-ton destroyers; 4 - 1000-ton destroyers; 2 submarines, first class, 4 second class and one minelayer; 2 despatch vessels; 4 aviation tenders; 10 mine sweepers; 18 sub-chasers; 2 vedettes.



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"All these units are no doubt indispensable auxiliaries of the high seas forces; they will not, however, materially increase the offensive power of our Navy. For this, we must count on the guns of our battleship force. The STRASBOURG, sister-ship of the DUNKERQUE, is progressing satisfactorily and is expected to make its first trials in the spring of 1938. Progress on the construction of the two 35,000-ton units is far from being what it should be. It is not to be expected that the RICHELIEU will be launched before the middle of 1938; the JEAN-BART follows, but much behind. The big problem remains that of armament. Whereas, in the British and German navies, the practice is to have the guns built and tested before the construction of the hull is completed, the practice in France is the opposite one. The foreign method is infinitely more logical.

"The program of new construction in the 1938 budget appears more substantial than that of 1937. It includes two aircraft carriers, one cruiser, three destroyer leaders, three light destroyers, five submarines, two vedettes. How long will it take to build these different units? This will depend on the credits available for this purpose.

"If France appropriates in 1938 the sum of 23 billions for national defense (an enormous sum in appearance); and if, through depreciation of material and augmentation of war stocks the Army receives an increase of 28% and the Air Army 33%, the Navy on its part, finds itself reduced 7%. Whereas, due to the decreasing purchasing power of the franc and the general increase in cost of construction (an increase of from 75 to 100%), the credits set aside for new work for the Navy should amount to approximately 4 billions, they hardly reach the figure of 2½ billions. This latter sum will only permit financing work already under way; which, moreover, is proceeding much too slowly. It will be impossible for the Navy, under these conditions, to carry out its program of indispensable work: repair work and new installations in naval bases; new equipment for naval aviation, building of oil tanks.

"We thus see one of the most dangerous repercussions of our financial situation, that is, the weakening of vital necessities for the Navy - and this is rather alarming."

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

# ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

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From Y Date 19 Nov. 1937 Serial No. 559 File No. 1000-100  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject FRANCE AVIATION ORGANIZATION  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

Notes:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

Report No. 559 (1000-100), November, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1978

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
No. 889  
November 1937

1000 Aviation  
1000-100 Organization

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 1962  
By SLR Date 4/19/3

# THE FRENCH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

References: Y Report 779 of 28 Dec., 1936.  
Y Report 885 of 28 June, 1937.  
Y Report 886 of 28 June, 1937.  
Y Report 887 of 2 Nov., 1937. = 20456-B

- Enclosures: (A) Article on Nationalization, by Mr. Raoul Dauterive.  
(B) Copies of contracts between the Air Ministry and the Bloch Co.  
(C) An analysis of the present and future production possibilities of the Bouleau Group of Nationalized Societies (SNGAM).

The nationalization of the aircraft industry has been reported and discussed in the referenced reports. The factories have been nationalized now for various periods, averaging about nine months. There have been public statements to the effect that the effect of nationalization has been to increase production; there have been counter-statements that nationalization has greatly curtailed production. The truth seems to be that nationalization has, up to the present time, had little or no effect on the rate of production of military airplanes, which is still near the average output of the previous three years, a production of 65 military airplanes per month.

**Financial Status.** The law and decrees nationalizing the French aircraft industry called for the Government to acquire and hold two-thirds of the capital of the nationalized groups of firms (National Aircraft Construction Companies), the remaining one-third of the capital to be owned by private stockholders. What the Air Ministry actually did was to take over the factories, stocks, tools, land, etc., of the nationalized factories at the Air Ministry's appraised value, capitalize the new Companies at a figure approximately 2/3 these appraisals, and issue 2/3 the capital stock of the new Companies to themselves in return for putting the expropriated property into the National Companies. The minority block (1/3) of the capital stock is to be bought by private subscription, for cash.

The Air Ministry's arrangement for capitalizing the new Companies thus depends, for working capital, on cash purchase of stock by private individuals or firms. The difficulty is that stock in a nationalized Company is not worth much, because its value is entirely controlled by the Air Ministry, and the payment of dividends is doubtful. The one Company that has been favored by the Air Ministry is the SNG-30 (South-East Group). This Company valued its combined resources at Frs. 30,000,000. It was appraised and expropriated at Frs. 35,000,000, and the 5,000,000 difference was put back into the Company for a block of minority stock. The writer is reliably informed that this is the only subscription for minority stock in any of the Companies, and this is only a partial subscription of minority stock, since the majority (2/3) share is valued (by the Air Ministry) at Frs. 35,000,000, and the minority share must be Frs. 17,500,000. The SNG-30 (South Group) resources were appraised at Frs. 10,000,000, and Dauterive (Director of SNG-30) was told to raise Frs. 5,000,000 cash for the minority stock.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the financial status of the new Companies is most indefinite. Working capital has been borrowed from private banks, against government contracts. The Finance Ministry has, since Benet became Finance Minister, determined to bring order out of chaos, and has designated Mr. de Mailly, an Inspector of Finances of the Ministry of Finance, as the financial controller of all the aviation Societies. The writer has lunched with Mr. de Mailly, who is young, most intelligent, and determined to learn the truth about the French

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aviation industry. It is probable that new decrees will be promulgated this winter which will clear up the situation.

A Study of Nationalization. Enclosure (A) is a study of the general subject of the nationalization of war industries, written by Mr. Raoul Dewoitine. This article is considered most interesting. It starts with the statement that the underlying reasons for nationalization are the peacetime organization of wartime industrial mobilization, and the suppression of private profit in war industries. The point is well taken that while the peacetime organization must be ready for instant and efficient expansion, the rapid obsolescence of aviation material precludes the piling up of large stocks of airplanes in readiness for war.

The section on "New Means of Production," pages 6 and 7, is an argument for efficient preparation for wartime requirements. Chapter II, "Methods of Organization of Aircraft Production," pages 8-11, discuss the necessity for modernization of airplane factories, in order to increase production at lower unit cost. The whole study (Enclosure (A)) is an argument in favor of complete modernization of equipment of airplane factories, preferably by the construction of new factories. Mr. Dewoitine has been unable, to date, to convince the Air Ministry of the necessity for a new factory group for the SNCAM, but his arguments have been taken very seriously by Mr. de Mailly of the Finance Ministry, and the plans for the new factory are already drawn up.

Patent and License Contracts. (Enclosures (B)). The only contracts which have been signed between the Air Ministry and the private concerns taken over are those of Enclosures (B). None of the other firms or designers have been so favored. Mr. Marcel Bloch is evidently the "white-haired boy" with the Air Ministry. The copies of the Bloch Co. and Marcel Bloch contracts, of which Enclosures (B) are translations, are confidential documents, the writer having the only copies that have been seen by anyone not in the Air Ministry, or in one of the Nationalized Societies.

There are two contracts: an Agreement between the Marcel Bloch Airplane Company and the Air Ministry; a Supplementary one between the Air Ministry, the Marcel Bloch Airplane Company, Mr. Marcel Bloch, and the SNCASO.

An Analysis of the Possibilities of the SNCAM. Enclosure (C) is an analysis by its Director, Mr. Raoul Dewoitine, of the Tealouse (South) Group of nationalized airplane factories. This analysis is an argument and plan for a new factory employing 2000 men. The highlights of Enclosure (C):

Page 1, The Average French Production of Military Airplanes.

Page 2, an analysis of what 2,000 workmen produce now, and could produce in new factories.

Page 3, Enumeration of personnel. In connection with the last paragraph under this heading, Mr. Dewoitine told the writer that the State would never receive any profits; the State's share of profits will be used in the experimental division, or for the buying of new machine tools, etc.

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Pages 6 and 4, possible output of the Toulouse Group  
in pursuit planes.

Pages 4-7, Financial analysis of the proposed new factory  
employing 2,000 men for direct labor. This  
analysis gives present average rates of pay;  
percentage of direct labor charges assigned  
to various overhead charges; estimated costs of  
manufacture based on past performances; the old  
cost of manufacture of a pursuit plane  
(186,800 francs), and the present cost of  
manufacturing a pursuit plane (257,800 francs).  
This whole analysis is considered most complete,  
and very interesting.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (2)

OPD letter, May, 4, 1972

Date MAY 31 1973





ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
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From Y Date 22 Nov., 1937 Serial No. 581 File No. 103  
Source of information French paper "CHOC" (Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Subject FRANCE Political Forces International Relations  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
Reference

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France - Mediterranean Routes Threatened.

NOV 1937

Report No. 581 (103), 22 Nov., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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**FRANCE: Mediterranean Routes Threatened.**

The following article from "CHOC", a satirical weekly, is transmitted as being of interest.

While CHOC sees nothing good in any actions of the Left government, the article is of interest if for nothing else than it shows that France is paying a little more attention to her "Naval Line", which was always accorded a second place in "Army France" who only thought in terms of the Maginot Line.

The coming into power of Italy's fleet, and Mussolini's colonial plans, has succeeded in bringing to the attention of the French Government that the "Navy" must now rank on equality with the "Army" in that Italy has given good cause for a "Naval Line" in the Mediterranean.

Interrogations registered for discussion in the Chamber show that the Navy will come in for an overhauling and the advocates of a large fleet (unfortunately majority of Navy advocates belong to the Right, and if the Left is Navy minded it is more or less from fear of dockyard politics) will get a chance to air their grievances:

**"IS OUR SOUTHWEST MARITIME ROUTE SAFE?"**

"There are no longer any Pyrenees! What has become of the beautiful dream of Louis XIV? The accession to the throne of Spain of one of our Kings' grandsons put an end to the incessant fighting provoked by the multiple-crowned Charles V.

"Henceforth, peace would reign over the Pyrenees, an uninterrupted peace except during the few years when Napoleon tried to substitute his dynasty in Madrid for the Bourbons. Even during the Revolution, the Spanish fleets joined ours.

"France can neglect the Pyrenees guard and concentrate her forces on the Eastern frontier.

"Two centuries have passed. With Alphonse XIII the Bourbons have passed away. Have we made any effort to preserve the friendship of future leaders in Spain? Here is a painful test for our present leaders. The large interests of France have given way to partisan passions. The security of our maritime routes is menaced, speed of mobilization compromised. For Spain enjoys, perhaps after France, the most privileged maritime position.

"Situated between the Mediterranean and the Ocean she commands both the Suez and Far East route and the landing fields of the large Atlantic routes. She stands against our Algerian coast and our Moroccan empire whose foreign lanes she can easily threaten. What a heavy handicap for our Navy a Spanish enmity would be! That is what we have risked, what are still risking by causing no trouble for our extremists.

"The regicides of 1794 had a most clear understanding of the interest of the country and in addition of their own interests when they sought an alliance with this race no matter how much disliked, which held the Spanish throne. It was that a defeat of our armies would have been followed immediately by a bloody repression even as now a Hitler victory would very quickly put an end to the joyful exploits of the communists in France.

"But don't let us complain too much; there is still the Portuguese friendship to lose!

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"Let's look at the map; our southwest route passes the coast of Portugal. Shall we let her slip from a France delayed by the cast-off ideologies which she, like all other European countries, has condemned?

"Our extremists still have this last blow to give France, but let them be sure that this one is fatal!

"The naval problem, on our National Defense checker-board, is dominated, more than any other, by the political orientation; at sea, there is no Maginot Line; the sea lanes are always vulnerable; they find security only along a friendly coast.

"But if the political problem cannot be solved by the naval General Staff, it must at least look for the solution to the military problem.

"The railroad between Tunisia and Morocco is finished and now troops can be transported from east to west by rail. But from Casablanca to France the route is long and made longer by the detours necessary to avoid submarines.

"Fast ships as used for passenger service in peace time between the African Coast and France are no longer sufficient. One must have ships with a large radius of action capable of remaining at sea a long time. We must have bases in roadsteads large enough to permit rapid concentration of convoys. We must have docks and fueling and supply stations.

"One thinks immediately of Casablanca and Dakar. But what a delusion for an observer forewarned! If they have been developed considerably in the last few years, it was not because of military considerations.

"Scarcely two years ago, the Navy abandoned at Casablanca large fields which formerly they had wisely kept. All the Navy can hold for the Empire of Morocco is a small base without hope of development and an artificial harbor not at all adapted to quick concentrations.

"There are, however, other ports and sailors will all think of Agadir. Isn't it time to give thought to this? Dakar has a large and well protected anchorage, but the harbor requires dredging before it could accommodate a convoy.

"The 1937 Navy budget carried an allotment of 4 millions, a mere drop in the bucket, for the development of a base at Dakar. But even before the first spade was used, the allotment was cut down and the 1938 budget doesn't even allow anything.

"A vice-admiral is now studying the situation at Dakar. Doubtless his mission is to gage the job to be done to assure some security to our southwest traffic lanes. But will our heavy and slow machine in the Rue Royale act in time? Will Parliament understand?

"If it is possible to find 500 millions for extending the Exposition, couldn't a few of these millions be directed towards the defense of our soil and keep our children from being butchered?

"This question is put most seriously to all Frenchmen of France, no matter what political faction, and especially to those who, tomorrow perhaps, will fill the trenches to pay for twenty years of indulgence."



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POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING NOVEMBER 1937

**SPANISH SITUATION:** The majority of French papers seem resigned to the eventual defeat of the Spanish Republican forces and an unconditional victory for General Franco. The extreme Left press, copying articles from Left Spanish papers, still hopes for a victory for the Red forces (if help comes immediately) and calls on the French Government to help the Spanish Reds.

The speech of Foreign Minister Delbos, in the Chamber, dispels any hope that any Left parties may have of French help for the Spanish Reds. Monsieur Delbos guided himself on the fact that non-intervention in the Spanish affair saved world peace, and that France intended to proceed, in cooperation with Great Britain, in a similar manner in the future.

The Spanish question was discussed at a meeting of the Socialist Group in the Chamber last week during the course of which Blum intervened in defense of the Government's policy.

Asked by certain members of the Socialist Group why England had so suddenly turned in favor of France, Blum stated that the British Government appeared to be desirous of gaining time until rearmament was achieved. He also pointed out that the idea of pacifism deeply rooted in the British people had forced their leaders to preserve and persevere in an effort of her own responsibility in case of aggravation in the international situation.

Blum finally stated that Britain's leanings towards France had undoubtedly been influenced by the realization that his successes had been due, not so much to the capricious and passing fortunes of military combat, but to an irremediable division of republicans. In fact, Blum gave this same reason for the Soviet's decision to rally to the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers.

Information from Spain from various sources, reaching the Naval Attaché, indicates that General Franco should deal the knock-out blow to the Republican forces in his next big drive, which is rumored to take place between now and the end of the year. Comment from U.S. military observers, heretofore containing an element of doubt, now seem to confirm the fact that the Republicans are defeated and it is only a question of time when an armistice (which Franco says he will never accord - demanding unconditional surrender), or complete victory will ensue to the Insurgent Forces.

**SINO-JAPANESE AFFAIR - BRUSSELS CONFERENCE:** While the failure of the Brussels Conference to arrive at any definite action in the Sino-Japanese affair disappointed the French press, no severe criticism was made against any one power as being the cause. The entire question was dealt with as being an "impossible" one unless military action was to follow a decision to make Japan respect the treaty.

The statement by Senator Berenger, that the Japanese had warned the French that if munitions passed through Indo-China and certain Indo-China ports they would be compelled to take measures to occupy the Island of Hainan and certain Indo-China ports, caused quite a controversy in the press. The French feel that a difficult situation would arise should Japan, with the urging of Berlin and Rome, caused friction in the Far East by threatening the French, British and Dutch possessions. From articles appearing in the press there is no doubt but that the Japanese gave the French very formal warning about munitions passing through Indo-China.

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The press also publishes the formal denial of the Japanese Embassy, in Paris, that the Japanese Ambassador ever made the statements accredited to him by Senator Berenger, and that any ultimatum had been addressed to the French government.

Senator Berenger himself is reported to have declared that this denial did not concern him at all, since he had never pronounced the word "ultimatum" nor had he made any allusion to whatever the word might suggest, as would be discerned by reference to the text of his lecture as released to the press.

The LEBOU DE PARIS (Partisan) remarks that the French Government, preoccupied with the security of Indo-China, had decided not to permit after October 13th the passage of war material purchased by China. He further remarks that Japan reserved the right to stop delivery of arms, by every means in her power, on either side of the two frontiers, should she deem such action necessary:

"To cut off shipments of munitions, Japan was seeking air bases close at hand. Hence, the project of occupation of Hainan and Pratael Islands, which could play an important role in the maritime liaisons between Indo-China, Hongkong and Singapore.

"France and England have tried to obtain the promise that Japan's Navy would not seize these strategic points, their steps being made independently of any other consideration. Up to now the Japanese Government has not taken any engagement."

L'OEUVRE complains that the German and Italian munition factories can ship arms to China, only being confiscated enroute by the Japanese who will make the usual excuses to Italy and Germany, including payment, while France cannot use the Hunan Railway for fear of a rupture of neutrality:

"When Japan occupied Manchuria and the United States declared herself ready for energetic action, England felt that Manchuria was too far away to get mixed up in the affair.

"When Italy attacked Ethiopia, the United States seemed disposed to call sanctions which were eventually set aside because the United States was not sure that it could apply them.

"Italy and Germany installed themselves in Spain. The first reaction of French opinion was to go to the aid of Republican Spain, but England preferred to wait and see.

"Japan is now flying at China's throat. But this time England, interested in the Pacific as much as in the Mediterranean will perhaps be disposed to act. This time it is the White House which hesitates."

REPUBLICAIN observes that the Brussels Conference is a complete flop. The first lesson to be observed was that its refusal to put in motion the most modest "quarantine" signified the impossibility henceforth of applying any sanctions whatever.

This paper states that observers who followed the debates revealed that dissection arose between Britain and the United States over the question of taking the initiative in some exchange or other reprisal. The British delegates wanted Washington to take the initiative, but Washington side-stopped the suggestion:



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"President Roosevelt's Chicago speech made too much noise here, in our opinion, and we wanted our readers not to have any illusions about it at the time.

"This Brussels affair should teach us that a nation can only count on itself, and live for itself."

LE MOULIN's principal criticism is against the three Scandinavian abstainers, whose argument that they were not directly interested in the Far East was contested, since the matter concerned democratic countries who pretend to be attached to collective security:

"Never before 1935 have such abstentions been recorded. From this one can measure once more the ravages accomplished by the policy of Pierre Laval. At every turning of the road one finds the consequences of his crimes."

INTERNAL AFFAIRS: The Chamber had its first week of the winter session and interrogations, covering all phases of interioand international affairs, were put on the carpet. As predicted, in the previous report, the Chautemps government obtained a vote of confidence of 399 against 160 after many fiery debates on damages caused by the Front Populaire Government both in the internal and international sphere.

THE "CAGOUARDS" (Hooded Clan): The most exciting event of the week was the discovery, by the State police, of large arsenals stowed in private houses, trucks, etc. Every form of weapon: machine guns, mortars, rifles, bombs, powder, cartridges, etc., etc., were discovered in many parts of France. Weapons discovered were mostly of German and Italian manufacture.

While the matter was mentioned in a debate in the Chamber, it is yet too early to form any definite opinion as to the extent of operations of the Cagouards. Premier Chautemps, when the debate in the Chamber took place, stated that the matter would be pushed by the government and the culprits dealt with under the law. So far 450 arrest warrants have been issued, and 700 investigations ordered throughout the country.

Suspicion and rumors, to date, point to the extreme Right elements as being at the bottom of the Cagouard affair. While no actual proof exists, at present writing, as to the leaders of the organization, it has been, however, clearly established that the several of the arrested men (though only small fry) are former members of the organizations: "Party Social Populaire" (former Gauche de l'Est); "Royalist Action Francaise", and Doriot's "Party Populaire Francaise". With a Left Government in power carrying out the many distasteful social policies favoring labor and taxing the upper crust it is only natural that the suspicions and inferences indicate that the former members of this extreme organization are still active members and that their resignation is only nominal.

Preliminary investigation tends to show that the "finance" behind the Cagouards comes from wealthy industrialists. The arrest of a Monsieur de la Meuse, whose connection with the Cagouards (though remote) has been established, is a wealthy textile mill owner. When questioned by the police he stated that he was a "Lorrainer" before being a Frenchman, and that he knew the Communists were arming to attack the country, so he took precautions and armed his friends.

On November 21st the French Royalists held a meeting in Geneva, under the leadership of the Count de Paris (pretender to the French Throne). Hundreds of French Royalists crossed over to Geneva to attend the meeting. However, the Swiss Government expelled the Royalists and ordered the Count de Paris and his followers to leave Swiss territory immediately.

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No doubt the Royalists were expelled with the knowledge of the French Government, and this fact may be a lead that the extreme Right elements are suspected by the Left Government of being at the bottom of the plot.

Conferation with the conservative Frenchmen in the street (not tainted with Left or Right doctrines) indicates that the whole affair is greatly exaggerated by the Left Press just to magnify the underhanded work of the semi-military organizations in preparation of the Coup d'etat when the time is ripe. Had the Right government been in power, it is felt that it would be a very easy matter to find similar conditions in many of the extreme Left camps of the Communists and Socialists. Naturally, the Communist paper HUMANITE sees the work of Hitler and Mussolini in arming the French Fascists for the eventual overthrow of Front Populaire political parties in France.

The following short excerpts from two papers, one LEFT and one RIGHT, about sums up the extreme views of the parties on the Cagoulard question:

"LE POPULAIRE (LEFT): After the bombings at Rue Prestbourg, now comes the discoveries of munitions and bombs in the 4th and 7th districts of Paris.

"The plot is much vaster than was at first thought. Who is furnishing the enormous capital for this enterprise of civil war? Who is its leader? Let us hope that the Police will be in position to inform us, and that very soon.

"The L'EPOQUE (de Kerillis) knows very well that the Communists are not armed, and are not organized for civil war. But he also knows that de la Rocque was, and he pretends to the contrary."

"L'EPOQUE (RIGHT): The press that shut its eyes to Communist arms, and on the enormous traffic of war material in favor of Red Spain, will probably cut loose against the Cagoulards.

"The Cagoulards are certainly in large majority men of good faith and patriots and the armaments in their possession are certainly for defensive purposes. They fear Communist coup de force.

"Only if the Cagoulards are disarmed, then the Communists (who are much more dangerous) must also be disarmed.

"The Cagoulards do not, properly speaking, belong to any organized national party. They appear to be extremists of all the Right movements: leguere of the Action Francaise, former Jeunesses Patriotes, partisans of energetic action; former Croix de Feu dissidents who, even prior to their dissolution, did not believe their association sufficiently aggressive."

Note: Were it permissible for the Attaché to render an opinion on the Cagoulards, from what has passed up to the present, he would state that while arm depots may be scattered throughout the country by extreme Right organizations, the entire question has been exaggerated by the press. The event, however, will serve as good propaganda for the Front Populaire government to squeeze tighter the ties between the Left and Center parties in front of a "common danger."

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No. 557

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VISIT OF "JOUHAUX" (Leader of French Labor) TO MOSCOW: It was confirmed at the meeting of the Union Leaders that JOUHAUX will go to Moscow next week. It is reported that this visit is for the purpose of making a first contact between the Federation Syndical Internationale, of which he is Vice-President, and the Internationals Rouges, with a view to the realization of a fusion of the two organizations.

While the relations between Jouhaux and Moscow may be considered, outside of France, as political, the French Labor Unions consider them as purely workers' agreements and not coming within the political sphere.

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103-7-2  
N. A. Paris

FRANCE 76  
Report No. 410  
7 December, 1937.

100 - Political Forces.  
103 - International  
Relations.

POLITICAL EVENTS. PERIOD ENDING 6 DECEMBER.

SPANISH SITUATION:-

The only explanation that can be deduced from the very small amount of information received in Paris about the inactivity on both sides in Spain, is that Franco has delayed his drive because Italy is about to withdraw her support. Italy believes that she has been let down by Germany, because Germany only wished to act with Italy as long as there was a possibility of a revolution in France. When the Radical-Blum government was turned over by Monsieur Blum to the more conservative Monsieur Chautemps, and Blum was retained in the Chautemps Cabinet, with part of Blum's followers dropping their radical ideas there was no chance for any grave internal disorders in France.

This action on the part of the French, in a peaceful turnover of Government, altered circumstances and the only chance for German expansion was in the South East. Therefore, Germany withdrew her Spanish support leaving Italy holding the bag in Spain. It is thought that General Franco has refused to give any important concessions to Italy, and feels he has a chance of winning with his own strength should Italy withdraw her support. This is the only reasonable explanation of the present Franco inactivity. The inactivity on the Red side is due to their usual lack of leadership and the fact that they were forced to move the government headquarters to Barcelona, principally to try and reorganize, and to prevent complete anarchy in Catalonia.

It is still believed in some quarters that General Franco's "big drive" will commence about 14th December. This drive, so it is stated, may bring operations to a close prior to the end of the year. While the Communist press is still clamoring for help for the Spanish Reds, and holding meetings where Spanish political leaders speak on the urgent need of help if the Republican Forces of "Liberty" are to win, the entire French press considers the Spanish affair as liquidated in favor of General Franco.

Information coming in from Spain indicates that General Franco is now fairly well equipped with a Navy, and that a complete blockade of Red Spain will shortly set in, thereby depriving the Republicans of Russian help from the Black Sea.

VISIT of FOREIGN MINISTER DELBOS to POLAND:-

While secrecy is still maintained on the Halifax-Hitler discussions, items appearing in the press on the occasion of Delbos' visit to Poland indicate that Hitler, upon the economic recommendation of Dr. Schaecht, suggested to Halifax that the Belgian and Portuguese West African Colonies, as well as the Cameroons, be grouped under a Charter Company with Germany holding the majority shares. This suggestion, so it is claimed, is to justify Germany's claim on England's positive refusal, for strategic reasons, to hand over German West Africa and East Africa.

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7 December, 1937.

100 - Political Forces.  
103 - International  
Relations.

As an offset to Germany's claim that she "must" have colonies to take care of her populations, the French press is stressing the needs of Poland for Colonies. One can read between the lines that France is encouraging Poland to make her "application" for a slice of the African Colonies. France would prefer Poland as an African neighbor, to Germany, and such a "bait" held out to Poland would keep the latter in the French circle until the European mass is straightened out.

The entire French press, while conceding that Germany should have her share of "raw materials", is opposed to giving back the African Colonies to Germany. It is mentioned Italy and Germany (Lybia-Camerouns) could easily cut the British and French colonial line and give these countries outlets in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

The paper PETIT BLEU cautions France's leaders against yielding on any German point:

" To give in today on any point is to delay perhaps a final settlement which will be tragic, but which will render it more certain and more perilous. Any partial concession will weaken us. It is commonly believed that a catastrophe would follow a rejection of the German impudent claims. On the contrary, we are on the brink of that catastrophe precisely because we have never repulsed them."

#### SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT :-

The Sino-Japanese affair received a good deal of attention this week, - especially the peace offers supposed to be initiated by Berlin-Rome axis.

It is claimed that Germany is acting as mediator between Tokyo and Nankin. It is understood that this German mediation proposes (1) that Japan give assurances that she has no territorial ambitions in North China, (2) that she evacuate her troops from China, and that (3) China participate in the German-Italo-Nippon anti-communist pact.

The negotiations for mediation are supposed to be taking place in Nankin between General Chiang Kai Shek and Dr. Trautmann, German Ambassador.

FIGARO points out that the gravity of the situation in the Far East resides in the fact that Germany and Italy were taking advantage of it for bargaining purposes in the western European sphere. Peace with Japan must pass through the Berlin-Rome axis;

" Events in the Far East weigh heavily in the balance of international influences. This balance was destroyed the moment the United States withdrew its weight. For six months, England had been trying to build up that balance by negotiation

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with Washington. Her greatest success was Roosevelt's Chicago speech, followed by sending Norman Davis to Brussels. This, however, was a precarious success, which the internal reactions of American demagogues almost immediately denied.

"The world in 1919 was conceived in relationship to the arbitration of the American power. Faith in that arbitration failed Europe and led the nations to an impasse. To-day, for the same reason, the labor of the Whites in the Far East is ruined."

"Will American weakness endure until the world of 1919 is turned into a slaughter house?"

The French are certainly worried over Japan's threats to French and British possession in the Far East in the event that "necessity" may drive Japan to military action to prevent China from receiving supplies from the Franco-British possessions.

The helplessness of France and England, to defend their possessions against Japan, is seen in the many comments appearing in the press. Italy is taking advantage of this helplessness and an article from the Italian press quoting Mussolini as stating:

"That the United States, England and Japan, are helpless onlookers and that they can do nothing to stop Japan from a crowning victory and ultimate domination of China. The three democracies are frightened (having chosen bread instead of cannons) and that Japan has a clear field and need not fear the bluff of the three worn out democracies."

The departure of the French light cruisers for the Far East (Y.No. 537, 26th. October) is featured in the press as a sign of France's strength and determination to defend her Far Eastern possessions. Whatever hopes the French had of Russia helping China are shattered and disappointment with the Franco-Soviet Treaty is being echoed in a good many papers heretofore neutral in the matter.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS:-

Jouhaux back from Moscow: On his return from Moscow, Léon Jouhaux, Secretary-General of the Labor Unions, stated that he had been received enthusiastically in Russia and had been allowed perfect freedom of movement while in Russia.

Speaking of the adhesion of the Russian syndicated labor organizations to the Fédération Syndicale Internationale, this was now a practically assured fact. The Federation would take the matter up at its next meeting in January. The independence of the national organizations would be safeguarded. This particular fusion of the Russian Organizations with the Federation meant the addition of some 22-million union workers which about doubled the present membership.

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#### Employers and Employees - 40-hour week:

The pressure of the Chautemps Government on the trade unions, to meet the employers half-way, is bringing excellent results. The large department stores in Paris are now to remain open on Mondays, and employees will alternate in having their day off. This arrangement was made by an all around agreement and it is expected to be the forerunner of similar agreements in other industries.

The closing of the Paris Exposition gave the Labor Unions a chance to agitate for public works to take up the unemployed. However, nothing has been done and it appears that the Chautemps Government, with a stiffening of the attitude of the Employers, is finally convincing Labor that employment cannot become permanent while labor is striking to force its wishes on industry.

#### Repudiation of ACTION FRANCAISE (Royalist Paper) by Count de Paris:

Referring to report 596 Nov. 27th., dealing with manifesto of Count de Paris, another manifesto has been issued by the Count de Paris, published in the COURRIER ROYAL, stating that the House of France had been forced to a definite and irrevocable break with the ACTION FRANCAISE which, instead of serving it, had used it for their own ends.

While little attention is paid in France to Royalist Squabbles, this action definitely settles the relations between the House of France and the Royalist paper ACTION FRANCAISE. Such action will, without doubt, cause the paper to loose many readers and financial backers, and might make it difficult for the paper to continue.

#### Closing of Congress of French Social Party:

The annual Congress of the French Social Party (de la Reequ) closed at Lyons last week. Colonel de la Rocque read the final declaration of the Party, which had been unanimously approved.

The essential points of the Declaration include the followings:

##### Foreign Policy

- (1) a rapprochement between Paris and Berlin to ensure durable peace in Europe;
- (2) the establishment of solid alliances with Britain, Italy, Poland and the Little Entente;
- (3) strict non-intervention in Spain, and the establishment of official relations with France;
- (4) a return to a realist policy by ending all dangerous ties with Soviet Russia.

##### Internal Policy

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**Internal Policy.**

- (1) the creation of statutes forbidding civil servants the right to strike; but insuring them professional guarantees;
- (2) reforms aiming to restore the authority of the State and improvement in the functioning of the parliamentary regime, such as, women's suffrage, compulsory voting and proportional representation.

Referring to (4), "Foreign Policy", Colonel de la Roquette pointed to Spain as an example of what might be expected in France if Moscow gained the upper hand. De la Roquette declared that France would have no dictatorship of persons or classes, since Dictatorship was an offense against nature; what she demanded was freedom. In conclusion, the Declaration emphasized the Party's firm intention to support Republican institutions, and condemned the ridiculous and odious attempts to arm Frenchmen against Frenchmen. Furthermore, it expressed the Party's hostility towards totalitarian doctrines.

The platform of the French Social Party is of interest for the reason that this party is the largest Right Party in France, and certainly the most powerful. Whether or not de la Roquette is besmirched with "graft" from secret funds, the party organization remains and would be the "General Franco" party of France if events followed the Spanish course.

The declaration shows clearly that de la Roquette has swung back to the "Republican Institutions", and denounced the "Dictators". This is essential if the party is to hold the middle class Frenchman who is hostile to any extreme Right party as savoring of a Dictatorship. The accusations that de la Roquette's party harbored aspirations for a Dictator for France lost the support of the middle class Frenchman.

**French 1938 Budgets**

The budget is now under discussion in the Chamber, and the press features the rapidity with which the various appropriations are being almost unanimously passed. Statements by the Minister for National Defense, "that France must keep armed to the hilt" in presence of constant dangers, are also featured and commented on with approval. The Chautemps government, to dispel the impression abroad that France is divided by internal squabbles, is certainly rallying all parties in the Chamber to cast unanimous votes on appropriations for military expenditures.

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From Y Date 14 Dec., 1937 Serial No. 627 File No. 806-100  
 Source of information French Reserve Officer  
 Subject FINANCE ARMY TRAINING  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_

REMARK.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

FRANCE - Efficiency of the non-commissioned officers. A detail of the mobilization plan.

Report No. 627 (806-100) 14 Dec., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

DEC 22

## DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) of (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                      |                |          |                |          |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
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| A. B. C. D. E.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |                                      |                |          |                |          |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
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| Tech. Dir.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | C. in C.                             | Com. Sec. For. | C. in C. | Com. Sec. For. | C. in C. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. |
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FRANCE  
No. 687  
14 December 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SOS Army  
SOS Training  
SOS-100 Results, Methods

FRANCE - Efficiency of the non-commissioned officers. A detail of the mobilization plan.

Source: French Reserve Officer.

In the course of a recent conversation in which the relative efficiencies of armies were compared on acquaintance, a Lieutenant in the Reserve, stated that the strength of the French Army lay in the excellence of its non-commissioned officers. He said that in an emergency and with all the officers killed some one never failed to take charge and handle the unit efficiently.

He went on to say that in his own particular case he was assigned to command one of the "compartments" of the Maginet Line with a platoon of about thirty men of the Chasseurs a Pied. He had been given training at this point, knew the layout thoroughly, and stated that the compartment was about the size of the good-sized room in which we were sitting when the conversation took place. It was to this point that he and all his men were ordered to proceed in the event of mobilization. He said that his organization was composed entirely of reservists except for two regular Army non-commissioned officers and added that with them to depend upon he had no worries at all.

He seemed to feel confident that the Maginet Line was absolutely unassailable and made some remarks to the effect that if there was a Franco-German war it would have to be decided by some means other than an invasion at this point.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 2(D) or (G)

OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLH

Date MAY 21 1973

Copy to M.A. Paris

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From Y Date 14 Dec., 1937 Serial No. 629 File No. 1000.  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Reliable.  
Subject FRANCE (ENGLAND - GERMANY) - AVIATION - General.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
Reference

Note.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, and GERMANY.

Report N° 629 (1000) of 14 December, 1937, is transmitted herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 304

ODD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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Report No. 629  
FRANCE (ENGLAND - GERMANY).  
14 December, 1937.

1000 - Aviation  
( General )

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, and GERMANY.

The following information relative to production capacity of airplanes in France, Great Britain and Germany, furnished the U.S. Military Attaché, Paris, by a high ranking officer of the French General Staff, is transmitted as of interest.

" 1. ENGLAND had manufactured approximately three hundred and fifty planes during October. It is doubtful that she can maintain that rate in the future.

2. FRANCE produced fifty planes during the month of October. The rate has been stepped up and there is an anticipated output of one hundred planes for November. One reason advanced for the smallness of the output during October and previous months was that no real effort had been made to increase the number beyond fifty as money that might have been used for the purchase or manufacture of planes was used for more urgent matters.

3. GERMANY was producing from three hundred and twenty five to four hundred planes per month. The former figure was the French estimate and the latter figure that of the English.

COMMENTS:-

There are other reasons for the low rate of production of airplanes for the French Air Force. Nationalization and its demoralizing effect, the forty-hour week and the loss of morale in airplane designers, engineers and workers have all had their influence. There is no doubt now but that the General Staff of the Army and Air are much concerned over the airplane situation and intend to push production and new prototypes to the maximum. "

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)  
OSD-Istar, May. 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1972



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From Y Date 16 Dec., 1937 Serial No. 635 File No. 302-200  
Source of information Reliable  
Subject FRANCE ECONOMIC FORCES NAVY  
(Indicate reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Substitute)

Reference

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Extracts from discussion of naval budget before the Naval Committee

Report No. 635 (302-200), 16 Dec., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

|             |                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |            |          |          |          |          |             |          |            |          |          |          |          |          |             |          |
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FRANCE  
No. 635  
16 December 1937

300 Economic Forces  
302 Budgets  
302-200 Navy

**EXTRACTS FROM DISCUSSION OF NAVAL BUDGET BEFORE  
THE NAVAL COMMITTEE**

Reference: (a) Y No. 628 (105) 14 December, 1937. *In this folder.*

Extracts from the discussion of the naval budget before the Naval Committee, as outlined below, are given as a matter of interest.

Extracts covering events in the Far East, as well as Japanese Navy, were given in reference (a):

- (a) Negotiations re: limitation of armaments.
- (b) Political and military events during 1937.
- (c) German naval construction.
- (d) Italian naval construction.
- (e) Naval aviation.

(a) Negotiations regarding the Limitation of Armaments.

The international naval situation, in so far as concerns the limitation of armaments, is much the same as described in our report on the 1937 Budget. The Year 1937 is characterized mostly by Great Britain's efforts to obtain the adhesion to the London Treaty of 25 March, 1936, of the big powers which so far have refused.

On 9 December, 1935, a conference was held in London, grouping representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, with a view to drawing up a treaty that was to be substituted, on 1 January, 1937, for the Washington Treaty, the latter expiring on 31 December, 1936.

At the very beginning of the conference, the Japanese delegation insisted on the adoption of a principle in absolute opposition with the thesis of the United States and Great Britain: Japan proposed that the same tonnage limit (to be as low as possible) be assigned to all the fleets. In presence of the irreducible opposition of the U.S. and Great Britain to this proposal, the Japanese delegation withdrew from the conference.

The result was that all propositions tending to a quantitative limitation were then abandoned. On the other hand Italy, after having taken an active part in the discussions, finally decided not to sign the treaty, as a matter of protest against the economical sanctions to which she was subjected because of the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia.

Great Britain has attempted to bring the principal naval powers to adhere to the London Treaty or, at least, to sign with Great Britain bilateral agreement analogous to that treaty. She has been unsuccessful with Japan and Italy.

Great Britain's greatest triumph is no doubt the signing by Germany on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand, on the date of 17 July, 1937, of agreements which, although they follow closely enough in their general lines the text of the London Treaty, present some differences on certain particular points.

In the recent accords, the main points are as follows:

The Anglo-German Accord confirms the principal stipulation of the former Accord of 18 June, 1936, namely: that Germany is allowed a tonnage up to 35% of the British fleet.

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16 December 1937

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The Anglo-Russian Accord contains a clause (Art. 2) according to which no limitation is placed on the Soviets - as regards their naval forces in the Far East - as long as an agreement has not been reached on this subject between Russia and Japan. The Soviet Government, however, consents not to build nor purchase any ship that would exceed the limits agreed upon in London, so long as Japan (or any other power having naval forces stationed in the Far East) does not take the initiative of building or purchasing such ships. In this occurrence, Great Britain shall be notified prior to the laying down of such vessels, or their purchase from foreign governments. It is expressly stipulated that vessels exceeding the limits set forth in the London Treaty can be assigned only to the naval forces operating in the Far East.

(b) The Political and Military Events during the Year 1937.

Just as the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was coming to an end, two new conflicts broke out, which came very near setting Europe afire in 1937. One of them, the Spanish Civil War, started in July 1936, and has been raging all through 1937. The other broke out in 1937, the theater of operations being the Far East.

In both of these wars the Navy was naturally called upon to play an essential role.

(c) German Naval Construction.

One of the most important consequences of British naval rearmament is the fact that it leads Germany to rearm at the same time, and that, so to speak, it "legalizes" German naval rearmament. Since the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on 18 June, 1935, the Reich, in fact, has a right to possess a fleet equal to 35% of the British Fleet.

The German Government at present is far from having attained that level; its first line ships comprise only 91,000 tons of modern units. The press, however, has already reported the construction of surface ships totalling 215,000 tons, to be placed in service within four years time. These ships consist of:

|                     |                       |
|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 4 capital ships     | 122,000 tons (global) |
| 2 aircraft carriers | 38,500 "              |
| 3 cruisers Type "A" | 30,000 "              |
| 14 destroyers       | 25,750 " ,            |

to which must be added 12 submarines representing 21,000 tons.

From 1934, which is the time when Germany started to re-arm on the sea, the programs for new construction, officially reported, passed successively from 55,000 to 72,000 tons per year and, finally, reached 100,000 tons per year (against 35,000 tons which is the figure for France).

To carry out this program requires considerable effort - work is pushed on day and night. This formidable effort will result in the tonnage of the German fleet in underage ships passing from a minimum of 91,000 tons on 1 January 1938 to 323,000 tons on 1 January, 1941. This figure is still inferior by 200,000 tons to the 35% of the British tonnage in underage ships on 1 January, 1941. Under these conditions, it is not impossible that Germany may decide to build new units to reach the percentage allowed by the London Accord within the least possible delay.

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(d) Italian Naval Construction.

The Italian Navy, on the date of 1 January, 1938, will possess 379,000 tons of new or modernized units. Assuming that the pace of construction is not further increased, this figure will pass to 478,000 tons on the date of 1 January, 1941.

Italian effort will bear more particularly on the construction of capital ships. Three years hence, the Italians will have available two 35,000-ton battleships, the "Vittorio Veneto" and the "Littorio" which have been launched - last summer - plus four battleships which have been completely modernized - a total of 6 large units forming a very powerful battleship squadron.

(e) Naval Aviation.

We have to felicitate ourselves on the functioning of naval aviation under the new organization as set forth in the decree of 22 August, 1936. This new organization outlined the different liaisons between the Air and Navy organizations. However, these different liaisons must not interfere with the efficiency and rapid functioning so essential to aviation. It must be mentioned that the delivery of planes and engines is far too slow at present, and deliveries which have been overdue for several months have not as yet been delivered. This may be due to the slowing up due to nationalization of the industry, technical difficulties, etc.

The aviation personnel forms a splendid corps and they are full of confidence in their mission.

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 Source of information Reliable (Continuation new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)  
 Subject FRANCE AVIATION PRODUCTION  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
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A SERVICE OF PRODUCTION FOR THE AVIATION INDUSTRY IS ESTABLISHED

Report No. 639, 20 Dec., 1937, is transmitted herewith.

REMARKS

R. O. 11657, Sec. 3(2) and 3(1) of (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1932

By GLR

Date MAY 2, 1933

Flet. Int.

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FRANCE  
No. 139  
30 December 1937

1000 Aviation  
1004 Material  
1004-200 Production

**A SERVICE OF PRODUCTION FOR THE AVIATION INDUSTRY  
IS ESTABLISHED.**

DECLASSIFIED

G. 11642, Sec. 5(C) and 5(D) of U.S.  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

By a decree signed by the Air Minister on 13 December, 1937, a Service of Production is established for the French aviation industry. This Service of Production, if efficient, should serve a most useful purpose in tying together the scattered units of the French aviation industry, nationalized and privately-owned.

Before the war the French Government did not control the carrying out of the orders placed with the manufacturing concerns working for national defense. Its role was limited to the inspection and acceptance of war materials. In case of a delay in the delivery, penalty was applied as provided for in the contract. This was the reign of liberty; such a procedure was then satisfactory because the contracts between the Government and the bidders were never very important ones.

During the course of hostilities, though, the requirements of the armies, involving all types of materials, became so great that the principle of free manufacture had to be abandoned and a new system adopted, a prelude to the control of production. This period saw the creation of Commissariats charged with the distribution of labor and of materials.

After the war, France reverted to the old system. She then possessed enormous quantities of planes, engines, etc., and it was more than ten years before the wartime stocks became exhausted. During that time, considerable progress had been made in aviation, and even before the old material had completely been used up, at a period when new conflicts menaced, the Government was compelled to find the means of rapidly producing new material.

The first step was an attempt (rather timid, in fact) to remove the aviation factories from the Paris region in order to decrease the risks of aerial bombardments on the Paris industrial center. Then, new aviation factories being created all the time, an attempt was made towards "concentration". Finally, a year ago, a radical measure was applied: Nationalization. Each of these moves was characterized by increased interference of the Government in private affairs, necessitated as much by the international political situation and by economic necessities, as by the principles of such and such internal policy.

What is going to be the role of the "Service of Production"? How is it going to operate, destined as it is to exercise its control and authority over so many services of the nationalized aviation industry, on the one hand, and the privately-owned industries, on the other hand?

In fact, it has a dual role: For the present, its efforts must tend to have the material under construction delivered as quickly as is possible. Its role, in the future, will consist in exercising a control over the factories and obtaining, wherever it is practicable, a lowering of the cost price. There is a great similarity between a service of that kind and those operating in all the large industrial establishments and known as "Planning Departments."

The following definition can be given of any type of fabrication: Transform the raw material by means of adequate machinery after the appropriate labor force has been provided. This proposition is more complex, insofar as aviation industry is concerned, because of the diversity of the elements necessary for the building of a plane. The Service of Production, therefore, must have authority to penetrate into the different domains in connection with the carrying out of orders of material destined for the Air Army. For



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E. O. 11652, Sec. 205 and 207 of (U)

ON 12 Jan. May, 1973

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SLR

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example: the manufacturer of variable pitch propellers can not produce more than 1 propellers per month. In order to increase this production and to harmonize it with the plane and engine production, it will be decided to purchase the right to manufacture the propeller in question in factories located away from the Paris Region.

Before such action can be exercised over the industries, it will of course be necessary to establish an information bureau on a solid and sound basis. This bureau, charged with gathering statistical data and recording results, will not be content with recording immediate results, but will draw up, from their study, forecasts for future requirements.

At present, when the General Staff of the Air Army places an order, the date of delivery promised by the manufacturer may be optimistic, due to an inaccurate evaluation on his part. For example: A plane manufacturer counts on receiving, within sixty days, the duralumin necessary for the execution of a contract; actually, it may take four months before the material is delivered. The Service of Production will have for its mission, among others, that of overcoming difficulties of this kind.

That is not all that is expected of the Service of Production. It will establish contact between the diverse categories of industries, all of which concur in the production of that entity - the airplane - but which more or less ignore one another. Mishaps will no longer occur - at least let us hope so - like those which were too frequent up to now. It must not happen any more, for instance, that the delivery of a plane is delayed for several weeks, on account of one missing "accessory" - the landing gear - which had not been delivered on schedule.

The Service of Production will ask each of the establishments concerned to furnish their production schedules, after which it will be in a position to state, positively, what will be the real delay in delivery. This Service will know what conditions may cause some delay in the delivery of material, and knowing where the difficulty lies, may be able to eliminate it.

To ensure a speedy production, and one of satisfactory quality, it is necessary that it be carried on at an even pace, by qualified personnel, composed for the greater part of specialists whose training requires a long time. This continuity of output requires the heads of factories to be in a position to draw up, for a sufficiently long period, manufacturing schedules covering each of the orders received by them, with no break between orders. This will avoid discharging any of the specialized personnel, which it is so difficult to find when again required.

One question remains to be analyzed, that of available labor. The Service of Production must handle that question also: technical training, geographical distribution, etc. This problem demands not only a peacetime solution, but it requires that wartime industrial mobilization be planned in advance.

The Service of Production, at the head of which is M. Vernillet, an engineer who has already furnished proofs of his competency, includes the following sections:

1. A section for the general organization of production, with engineers charged with the required investigations on the production: 1) of raw materials and semi-finished products; 2) of aviation material consisting of airplanes, seaplanes, engines, moto-balloons, accessories, armament, aviation equipment.

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2. A section for the drawing up of statistics and determination of cost prices.

3. A section charged with labor questions.

To increase the production (or the potential production) of the French aviation industry; to lower the cost price of aviation materials; such is the aim to be attained. France is a nation whose financial possibilities are limited. These possibilities determine the volume of orders for National Defense in general, and for the Air Army in particular. In reducing costs the newly created Service of Production will assure, to the general benefit of tax payers a real economy.

The decree is appended hereto.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(C) and 5(D) et (G)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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Appendix to No. 689 (France) of 20 December, 1937.

A DECREE TO ESTABLISH A SERVICE OF PRODUCTION

THE MINISTER OF AIR, in accordance with -

- 1) The Decree of 8 March, 1934 relative to the creation, in the Air Ministry, Central Administrative Section, of a Bureau of Aviation Construction, modified by the Decree of 28 November, 1934;
- 2) The Decree of 28 March, 1934, on the organization of the services and establishments dealing with aviation construction, located outside the Air Ministry;
- 3) Ministerial Orders of 30 March, 1934, setting forth the conditions of application of the Decrees of 8 March, 1934 and 28 March, 1934;
- 4) The Decree of 16 October, 1937, determining the functions of the General Staff of the Air Army and the Bureau of Aviation Construction in connection with the materials required by the Air Army;
- 5) The Decree of 19 October, 1937, reorganizing the exterior establishments previously placed under the control of the Bureau of Aviation Construction.

DECREES:-

Article 1

In accordance with Article 6 of the Decree of 19 October, 1937, and from the date fixed by this decree, the following services, previously under control of the Section of Aviation Construction, will come under the General Administrative and Civil Personnel Section:

1. The Service dealing with Aviation Contracts.
2. All of the administrative Services previously grouped under the designation: Administrative Sub-Section of technical services.

These two services, the duties of which are set forth in the articles given below, will operate for the benefit of the various bureaus of the Air Ministry.

Article 2

In accordance with Article 4 of the Decree of 28 March, 1934, a service is created, which has for its object the establishment of all contracts relative to aviation material. To this end:-

1. The Section of General Administration and of Civil Personnel furnishes the newly created service with:
  - a) The instructions drawn up by the Control Section as regards general regulations applying to contracts.
  - b) The particular administrative clauses which are to appear in the contracts.
2. The newly created service receives from the other bureaus concerned orders for the awarding of contracts.

Appendix to No. 629 (France) of 20 December, 1957 (CONTINUED).

5. It receives from the Technical Service charged with the inspection of manufacture the technical clauses which are to appear in all the contracts, together with an estimate of the prices figured out by the Technical Service if the contract involves technical studies or an experimental airplane.
6. It receives from the Service dealing with the organization of production all statistics and information relative to the fixing of delays of delivery for the material ordered, and to the determination of prices for material manufactured in quantity production.

The Service charged with the placing of orders submits the contracts to the Contract Commission whenever the opinion of the latter commission is required. Otherwise, contracts are submitted either to the Minister's approval, through the intermediary of the Bureau which has requested the placing of the order or, as the case may be, they are presented for approval to the authorities invested with the proper authority to this effect. Finally, the new Service is charged with notifying the manufacturers that the contract has been approved.

#### Article 2

The Administrative sub-Section is charged:

- a) With the liquidation and the passing of orders for payment in the case of all contracts for aviation material, and likewise in the case of contracts awarded by the Research Service.
- b) It is provisionally charged with the administration of the following field services:

Technical Service charged with the inspection of aviation materials.

Service charged with the organization of production.

Research and Signal Service.

Service charged with the establishment of contracts and with that of general technical inspection.

- c) It is charged with the settlement of expenses incurred by the aviation centers and establishments indicated below:

Technical Experimental and Research Center of Issy-les-Moulineaux.

Technical Experimental and Research Center of Chalais-Meudon.

Villacoublay Test Center.

A new decree will set the date from which the Administrative Sub-Section will cease to handle the payment of the expenses incurred by the above establishments, the operating expenses, and the advance of funds.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 2 1973

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Article 4

Technical experimental centers will now be, in addition, Research Centers. They will perform all researches ordered by the Minister (Section of Aviation Construction), furnishing all facilities for the performance of the tests and experiments which they are required to conduct either by order of the Minister (Section of Aviation Construction) or by a delegate of the Minister, either by the Director of the Technical Service charged with the Inspection of Aviation Material, or the Director of the Aviation Armament Service, after agreement with the Director of Aviation Construction.

These establishments, as well as the Villacoublay Test Center, will operate on the economy plan dating from such date as will be later fixed by official decree. They will then liquidate all operating expenses as well as advance payments; the approval for payments of these expenses will remain with the Administrative Sub-Section.

Article 5

All previous dispositions contrary to the present decree are hereby cancelled.

Article 6

The directors of the Central Administration are charged, each as far as they are concerned, with the application of the present decree.

Paris, 15 December, 1957

(Signed) Pierre Cot.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

Naval Attache, Paris  
FRANCE  
No. 1  
5 January, 1938

100 Political  
108 International Relations

THE DAYS OF THE WHITE RACE IN CHINA ARE OVER

The following article by General de GUENAC, French Army, published in "CHOC", is transmitted as of interest.

The article deals with the present and future aspects of the situation in the Far East. General Guenac, like all French officers, is naturally an "Imperialist" and does not favor the passing of French influence in the Far East into the hands of the Japanese. This article, as well as many others written on the subject, does not foresee for the present French Indo-China going to the Japanese. French writers do see, however, where France would have a difficult time defending Indo-China should the Japanese include this colony in the expansion program.

While the entire French press has done its best to maintain the prestige of the "White" ~~people~~ the Far East, it is easy to see that the "thinking" people are fully convinced that Japanese successful expansion in China (with the powers doing nothing but sending notes) brings to an end the secondary role heretofore played by Japan in Chinese affairs. The military writers claim that the "anti-communist" bloc (Berlin-Rome-Tokio) have won all around, and that their task has only commenced.

Paragraphs 9-11 are of particular interest as dealing with the recent bombing of American and British ships by the Japanese.

THE REIGN OF THE WHITE RACE IS ON ITS KNEE

The Conquest of China by the Japanese

1. There is no use trying to dissimulate the importance of the events which are taking place in the Far East. This is the end of a period in the world's history. A new epoch is commencing. For centuries the White race has ruled over Eastern Asia, but this is the end of their influence there. A new leaf is being turned. A chapter in the school books of our great grandchildren will have for its title "1937-Conquest of China by the Japanese"; another chapter, "Asia to the Asiatics".

2. In the course of last summer, the invasion of Northern China by the Japanese, the occupation of Peking, were sure signs of the big Japanese enterprise. CHOC has signalled, from the beginning, the importance of this offensive maneuver of the armies of the Mikado. It could then be foreseen that the Japanese were marching towards their aim, their ideal, what they believe to be their destiny, - rule over the Yellow race.

3. They have advanced very rapidly into China. Not only are the provinces of Northern China occupied by the Japanese troops; they are occupying also Central China with its two big commercial centers, Shanghai and Hankow, and the rich basin of the lower Yang-Tze. Then, after the fall of Canton, they will make their way into Southern China. Finally, the whole of Eastern China, all the eastern coast of China, from Tientsin to Yang-Tze; Shanghai, Amoy and Canton will be under the domination of Japan, absolute master of the sea. And when Japan controls all the Chinese coasts; when it has in its possession all the ports, the richest provinces and commercial centers, then China will be forced to accept its conditions. And no power will be invited to express its opinion.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 5 1973



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E.O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (S)  
OSD letter, May. 4, 1972

FRANCE

No. 1

3 January 1908

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

100 Political

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4. Japan has no doubt chosen the proper time for realizing its project of domination over Eastern Asia. China was in the process of reorganizing its army, with instructors of Russian, German and Italian nationality. The Japanese general staff decided to start action before China could become strong and well armed troops. On the other hand, Soviet Russia is not at present in a position to send military forces to the Far East. Japan took the initiative of operations on the Asiatic Continent, feeling certain she could advance without encountering any resistance.

5. On the sea, Japan's task is more easy still. China has no war fleet. Russia has none at Vladivostok. As for the European powers, Great Britain included, they have but a limited number of light craft in the Far East. The naval vanguard of the United States is at the Hawaiian Islands, half a month's distance. The Japanese fleet therefore has absolute control over the entire Western Pacific.

6. All that has happened in China in the course of the last six months, all that is expected to occur there, is based on the absolute indisputable superiority of the Japanese forces in that part of the world. It is not a matter of ascertaining who is in the right, or what treaties are in force. The fact is that the Japanese are strong, that they are making use of their strength and are determined in continuing to do so. The rest is nothing but a vain fancy.

7. The Japanese fleet is playing a capital role in the present drama. It is a most precious auxiliary for the army, blocking the Chinese ports and securing the supply of food and munitions for the Japanese troops. To accomplish this, Japan has at its disposition modern units: nine battleships equipped with 35 and 40 cm. guns; twelve cruisers with 20 cm. guns and fourteen cruisers of a smaller tonnage. Japan, with its fleet controlling the Eastern Pacific, sees its long cherished hope - the conquest of China - about to be fulfilled.

8. Much has been said about the conflict in the Pacific; it has been attempted to predict what would be the result of the Japanese offensive. Naval conferences have determined fleet percentages, placing Japan in a marked state of inferiority with regard to the British and American fleets. We now discover that all this was miscalculation, that all provisions were wrong. Japan has chosen, for entering into play, the moment when there is considerable tension in the Occidental Continent, when it is indispensable that the British Fleet remain in the European seas. Although British and American commerce in China is seriously menaced, the guns of the war fleets will remain silent - The Japanese Fleet has absolute control over the Chinese seas. Rival squadrons are absent. The warships of the "White" Powers will not take up the gauntlet. The Pacific conflict will end, this time, without any naval battle having been fought.

9. The recent attacks of British and American ships on the Yang-Tze by Japanese planes and land troops are probably the result of errors. However, it would seem that the Japanese General Staff is but slightly grieved at what has happened. This was more or less a demonstration of their strength. It was an opportunity for them to disparage the White Race in Chinese opinion. No doubt they have succeeded in so doing. Diplomatic protests - such as is the only response which the distant London and Washington Governments have been able to make after their ships had been bombed and shelled by the Japanese.

10. The British and Americans will bear this injury just like they have supported to see China invaded by the Japanese, and they will accept in the same manner the commercial conditions imposed upon them by the new masters of Eastern Asia. The policy of the "Open Door" will no doubt be transformed considerably. The door will close, or maybe will open only very slightly at the will of the Japanese. The result will be an immense loss for American and European commerce - for British commerce in particular.

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5 January 1938

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11. The British, Europeans, Americans, will assume a passive attitude, because there is nothing else they can do, the reason being that they lack strength. The White Race is at present powerless to intervene in the Far East. Mr. Eden has publicly recognized this fact, at the House of Commons. He declared that no nation could decide to apply a sanction, could take an initiative carrying a possibility of war "unless such a nation was certain it could dispose of crushing forces in its enterprise." And Mr. Eden added: "Such is not the case at the present time."

12. What will be the limits to Japan's appetite? At what point will they judge their expansion sufficient? Will they be wise enough to set a limit to their ambitions? Is any fear to be had as regards the French, British and Dutch colonies? Is there any peril for Hong-Kong, Hanoi, Haïphong, Singapore, Batavia, Borneo and its petroleum? Only a few days ago, the Chief of the Foreign Office, replying to a question on this burning subject in the House of Commons, made the following statement: "For the British possessions in the Far East there is no imminent danger." This goes without comment.

13. We are at present witnessing the crash of one of the frameworks in the political organization of our planet. And while Eastern Asia is undergoing a complete transformation, Europe, divided as it is by intestine struggles, is losing its prestige and influence. States - and not only Statesmen, but men in general, - should not be so boastful, for it is very often that they prove to be unable to make plans for the many unseen events of the future.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

### ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

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From Y Date 11 Jan., 1938 Serial No. 16 File No. 103

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Subject FRANCE POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
(Station reported on) (Order No.)

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**NOTE.**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Political Events period ending January 11, 1938

Report No. 16, 11 Jan., 1938, is transmitted herewith.

NOTES

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 5, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21[illegible]

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 1.2(e) and 1.4(f)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

FRANCE

No. 15

11 January, 1936

By SLR

Date

100 Political

103 International

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**POLITICAL EVENTS PERIOD ENDING JANUARY 11TH**

**SPANISH SITUATION:** Items appearing in the press indicate that the City of Teruel has fallen into the hands of the Republican forces. The fall of this City came as a surprise as it was generally expected that General Franco's superior forces would be able to defend the city and dislodge the Republicans. The extreme Left papers hail the fall of Teruel as a Republican victory, and only one of the many more to come due to the excellent reorganization of the Republican forces. The conservative and Right press, taking a more conservative view of the fall, claim that the Republican forces threw their main strength into the attack and that there was nothing surprising in the fact that they won an initial victory in a key position. While a cross section review of the press still indicates that time is in favor of General Franco's forces, due to the desperate internal situation of the Republicans for food supplies, munitions, etc., one can easily glean that the apparent reorganization of the Republican forces (along disciplined lines) will make General Franco "fight" for any further victories, and that the struggle could very easily be prolonged into the summer season.

Reports in the French press, coming from the press correspondents in Germany and Italy, indicate that the ardor which existed in these two countries during the early part of 1937 to "make Facism triumph over Communism in Spain" has somewhat calmed down for many reasons:

- (a) Franco's absolute need of England in the refinancing of the New Spain; hence the necessity of England's friendship in the final count;
- (b) Doubtful political advantages to be obtained from Spain;
- (c) General Staffs advising the respective Fascist governments that large-scale intervention in Spain was not in keeping with plans for any prospective military campaigns.

It is yet too early to evaluate the effects of the Republican victory at Teruel on the general military situation of the opposing forces in Spain. A counter attack by General Franco, using the Italian and Moroccan troops, is expected and depending on the success or failure of such an attack a clarification of the situation may be possible.

**ITALY'S NAVAL PROGRAM:** The announcement that Italy will construct two 35,000 ton battleships, 12 cruisers and a large number of submarines, has not caused any great surprise in France.

Since Italy is not bound by any treaty on limitation of naval armaments, and especially since the Berlin-Rome-Tokio accord, the French expected a continuation of Italy's naval program.

According to the French (whose battleship *RICHHELIEU* is costing roughly \$90,000,000 francs) Italian battleships will cost approximately 30% less, armor and guns being manufactured in Germany on the barter system in commodities and exchange goods. Such an advantage, on the part of Italy, has caused serious comment in the press in the event that France should decide to increase her naval program.

**EXCLUSIOR** reports that, in any case, London interprets the increase of the Italian naval forces as a threat necessitating a parallel naval effort on the part of Britain, France and America:

"The Duce's decision is somewhat analogous to the measure announced this week in Washington. The open competition against the democratic nations appears evident. If the report is confirmed that Japan's new first-line ships are to be 46,000-tons,

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armed with 16-inch guns, then England will probably take advantage of the safeguard clause to exceed the 35,000-tons.

"In any event, the problem of the naval equilibrium of the Mediterranean will be raised anew by the Duce's gesture. It goes without saying that it will weigh heavily in the decisions the Admiralty may take during the ensuing months."

LE JOUR states that the new Italian program will cost 3 billion liras, whereas the gold reserves of the Bank of Italy only amount to 4 billion liras. Such a program will necessitate a new levy on an impoverished people:

"Italy, in a rearmament race, will inevitably be beaten by England, who announces for this year a new 46,000-ton (16-inch guns) battleship.

"The Duce has merely desired to move a pawn forward in the forthcoming diplomatic game which will be begun shortly with Sir Vansittart."

LE PETIT JOURNAL states:

"Today the Suez Canal is no longer only the imperial route of France and England. It is also that of Italy. In case of war, the Italian Admiralty must defend her rights in the Suez Canal since, were it blocked, her colonial Empire would be shut off from the metropole.

"No one can object to the measures of precaution the Italian Government has taken. The only question that can be raised is whether this formidable rearmament has any other object than that of the defense of the Empire. In any case the balance of power is in the Mediterranean, and England will not leave the Italian gesture unanswered."

THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT: The Sino-Japanese conflict is being carefully watched in the French press. It is not felt that Indo-China is as yet in danger, but the probable outcome, on British-Japanese relations, as well as influences on the Berlin-Rome-Tokio bloc, is of major importance to France. Some military writers claim that Europe's fate has been transferred from the Mediterranean to the Orient and Pacific, as Germany's claim in England will increase with Japanese pressure in the Far East.

Referring to the attributed report of Admiral Sutsugu, on chasing the white race from China, EPOQUE observes that the Admiral's declarations give the lie to the anti-communist Sacred Alliance:

"Japan is not making war on communism. If she is massacring Chinese, she is in reality making war on the Whites. The ideological pretext of anti-communism only hides the imperialistic motive of a nation who wants to roll Russia back to the steppes of North Siberia and eject England and France from South Asia.

"In the same manner, Germany is camouflaging her secret ambitions. She pretends to want to annihilate communism, which she has already done at home and which in no way threatens her, while in reality she dreams of putting her hands on Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Austria, in order to create a Central European Empire."

BRASSIER

E.O. 11052, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD Memo, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EPOQUE recalls how the Duce, in concluding the Treaty with the Soviets on September 2, 1933, lauded the two great revolutions, the Fascist and Bolshevik, and declared that "the two renovating systems of government, placed between the past and the future, would mark in all probability the new aims of humanity."

"After writing such things, one can hardly be sincere in pretending to launch a crusade against communism. If the Duce's tone has changed brutally, it is because suddenly the thirst for conquest and glory have obsessed the Duce: he dreams of Corsica, Syria, Tunis, Algeria, Egypt, Africa!

"However, let us not wait for Hitler and Mussolini to throw off their masks and avow their true aims to us, as Admiral Suetsugu has just done." Instead, let us avoid the storm. Let us remain calm. Let us avoid all provocation. Let us arm and arm well. If we are known to be strong and resolute, everything may still be saved. Our destiny depends upon ourselves."

The journal L'OEUVRE, in a leading editorial takes exception to Berlin's press comment which attempts to show that the Admiral's declarations are not aimed at Germany, since Germany has no interests in China.

"Since the Admiral stated that the 'mercantile interests of the Whites must be obliterated in the sun of the Yellow mission', that means that one of the outlets still offered European production will be closed to it. If Europe does not realize what Briand had in mind, namely that Sino-Japanese economy would have at its disposal an inexhaustible amount of cheap labor, there will be a veritable threat of that economy invading Europe and flooding the markets with cheap products.

"Is Germany boasting that she would escape, thanks to the existence of the anti-communist Pact? Perhaps she will now begin to realize what 'scraps of paper' mean."

INTERIOR SITUATION: As mentioned in previous report, France is passing through a period of economic unrest: strikes, public protestations, etc., due to the many conflicting interpretations of the Blum social laws. The general economic depression is not helping either the Employers nor the Employees to fulfill their part of the contract. One strike is settled, only to give place to another - not to mention the many pending threats of important strikes in the textile industries.

It is common knowledge that Premier Chautemps, who is more less a mouthpiece for the Radical-Socialists under the leadership of Caillaux in the Senate, objects to many of the impracticable laws incorporated by the former premier Blum in his Social Program. However, Chautemps cannot openly disapprove of the laws without weakening the Front Populaire Government, as it is his duty as Premier to enforce them. Such being the case, he is favoring a repeal of the Blum Social Laws and the drawing up of a new labor charter. A new Labor Charter has the backing of the Senate, and Premier Chautemps has now announced that he is willing to meet a delegation representative of employers, unions, labor, etc., to formulate further labor agreements acceptable to all parties. Premier Chautemps has invited all these parties to a conference to be held immediately and has promised to present to the Chamber, to become Law, any Labor Charter which can be drawn up with the approval of all parties concerned. Premier Chautemps states that once the new Labor Charter becomes law, the Government will enforce it regardless of lock-outs or strikes, and for this reason he is anxious to have the Trade Unions (representative of Labor) approach the task in a spirit of general goodwill for the benefit of the entire country.

DECLASSIFIED

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973



FRANCE NO. 16

Premier Chautemps' invitation to the conference was in the form of a letter to the various representatives in which he repeated his statement that the Government is determined to put an end to the present dangerous tension. After recalling that each side blames the other, the letter continues:

"I feel certain that a courteous and straightforward discussion, held under government arbitration and the control of the nation, will permit a clear definition of the causes of existing antagonisms and the setting up, by general consent, of a new regime of work, which is essential to social peace and general prosperity."

Opinion expressed in the press on Premier Chautemps' invitation, leads one to believe that "Labor" will not agree to any decisions detrimental to their cause, and that the government (elected by Labor) will have a hard time enforcing (by force) any violations of future labor contracts entered into even if by law. It is pointed out that should the economic depression continue Employers will be compelled to lay off and reduce hours and salaries, as in the United States and other countries, and that it is doubtful if Labor will willingly accept such lay-offs and may seek to hide their grievances under the many interpretations which can be placed on any law pending decision by higher tribunals. If such were the case, the Government would be powerless to appease labor and could not very well compel industry to take on workers when there were no backlog orders on the books, and when deficits were accumulating to a height where the Bankers refused further financing. It would be a very easy matter for Labor to accuse Employers of "bad faith" (this is the present cry of labor even where evidence is to the contrary) in taking on labor and stretching their industrial programs so as to employ as many of the unemployed as possible.

Conservative opinion in France is becoming more and more alarmed at the social conflicts at a time where "unity" was of such importance in face of the threatening dangers from outside. The delay in the National Defense Programs is causing wide comment in the press. Also, the conservative element is becoming more and more convinced that French Trade Unions are more or less under Communist influences, at least in their labor and social aspirations, if not politically.

If Employers and Labor cannot agree, after the Chautemps Government provides them with a new Labor Charter, it would appear that nothing short of a general election to define the lines which separate Labor from the Conservative element would result. This, of course, could not take place prior to Parliament passing the new Labor Charter. How quickly Chautemps would present the new bill, and how long it would take Parliament to pass upon it, are matters of conjecture at present writing.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973



CONFIDENTIAL

N. A. Paris

FRANCE (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)  
Report No. 130  
March 24, 1938.

100 - Political Forces  
103 - International  
Relations.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(C) and 8(D) or (3)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

MAY 21 1973

FRANCE - CZECHOSLOVAKIA - Doubt of French aid if  
attacked.

Since the seizure of Austria, by Germany, the question of French aid to Czechoslovakia is taking a "realist" turn in French discussions.

The refusal of Chamberlain to commit England to aid Czechoslovakia, in event of attack from Germany, has made the Frenchman realize what a task he has on his hands.

The exposure of the Czechs frontier, with Austria now in Germany's hands, has made French military leaders admit that the problem has another aspect.

It is now freely admitted that the French Government in making the statement that "France will fulfil her agreement with the Czechs" was only voicing the politicians' and endeavoring to bolster up the treaty rights until a more subtle way out was found.

It is pointed out that, whatever may be the strength of the Czech army, the whole strategic position has now changed. Czechoslovakia now stands isolated, with the German army surrounding the northern, western and southern frontiers of the German speaking section of the country.

The Czechs are now negotiating with the German Sudists (no doubt with the approval of Paris-Berlin) in an effort to straighten matters out before it is too late. Naturally, with Berlin behind them, the Sudists are asking rather strong demands on the Czechs. It is admitted here that the Czechs will be forced to accede to the demands of the German Sudists if they do not want the Germans to step in and "protect their fellowmen beyond the frontiers".

The concert of public opinion rising against the risk of plunging France into war may be gauged from the following representative press quotations:

LE JOUR:

If M. Corbin told Lord Halifax "France will fight for Czechoslovakia," he could only have done so on the instructions of M. Leon Blum and M. Paul Baudouin, and such a thing would be simply monstrous."

Le JOUR goes on to point out that in the last war France lost 1,500,000 men, and that it is madness to think that the French nation should be mobilized again to protect Czechoslovakia.

"NO AGGRESSION."

"Doubtless France has always the duty to intervene in favor of Czechoslovakia, but if the events took a tragic turn, it is not the duty of France any more than that of Great Britain to declare a war of aggression against Germany."

FRANCE(CZECHOSLOVAKIA)  
Report No. 150  
March 24, 1938.

100- Political Forces  
103 -International  
Relations.

The writer in the JOUR. M. Léon Garibaldi, studying the possibilities of such a war, points out that France would be held up by Germany's fortifications, that Russian air aid would be held in check by the Poles and that the issue of the whole war would have been settled long before the French army could have pierced the German fortifications.

"It is only by diplomacy, by an agreement with England, by an accord with Italy and by agreeing to negotiate with Germany on all the questions which separate us," he goes on, "that we can help Czecho-Slovakia."

"It is certainly not by blustering, by nonsense, or by pronouncing that terrible phrase 'France will go to war.'"

"The bones of one French soldier are worth more to the French than all the Czecho-Slovaks and all the peoples of the world."

"No, M. Blum, France will only fight for her own independence and you cannot use our army to defend peoples in Eastern Europe who are too far away for our assistance to be of any real use."

#### DEPESCHE DE TOULOUSE :

The "Depesche de Toulouse, which town is the stronghold of French Radicalism, in an article on the present situation printed in black type, lays down solemnly that France's supreme concern is "to think of her duty to herself."

"She must look after her own security, the security of her frontiers, her territory and her inhabitants. She must avoid any work or any act which would risk leaving her isolated in the midst of a feverish Europe."

"What do the war-makers want? Do they want France to adopt a policy of adventure when the Soviets, who are urging her on this path, did not raise a little finger in aid of their immediate neighbors the Chinese? No, France is not prepared to be the instrument of any policy of false idealism."

#### L'ERE NOUVELLE :

M. Marcel Déat, Moderate Socialist, writing in L'ERE Nouvelle, says: -

"Very calmly I invite our rulers not to talk lightly, not to engage in an adventure light-heartedly on the faith of 'being prepared down to the last garter-button.'"

"I ask them

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"I ask them to remember the last war, never to take their desires for realities and never to yield to the terrible temptation of launching our country into war in the hope that Great Britain would be obliged to follow us. Such mistaken audacity would be, in reality, a crime."

#### ACTION FRANCAISE :

M. Charles Maurras, in L'ACTION FRANCAISE, points out that the whole Czech scheme of defense of the mountains of Bohemia relies on French intervention, and asks: "How can such an intervention be promised in the present state of Europe? The policy of the barrier defenses was already stupid in 1919 and now it no longer exists."

#### "PE OR BETTER."

M. René Babin, the Socialist Deputy, general-secretary of the French Confederation of Trade Unions, writing in LE PEUPLE and also in the INDÉPENDANT of Perpignan, warns the workers of France against engaging in hostilities urged on by the Soviets, and says: "Even unsatisfactory negotiations resulting in peace are better than a war, though it may be victorious."

Mr. Raoul Roche, Radical, in LA REPUBLIQUE, reminds his readers that Radicalism has always stood for the rights of people to dispose freely of themselves.

The ECLAIRER DE NICE points out that Britain's reinforcement consists of more cruisers and more airplanes, and goes on to say that, against Germany's 52 divisions, France can only put 23 or 26 in the field.

"In the air, M. Guillaumet has told us, "the ECLAIRER continues, "that we are behindhand, very much behindhand."

#### SHORT OF TANKS.

"As a result of strikes and the 40-hour week, France has not yet the number of tanks which the War Minister thought indispensable at the end of 1936, nor an air force which is sufficiently strong."

"Marshal Joffre said that, to envisage war, it was necessary to have 75 chances out of a hundred of winning it. Now could anyone dream of declaring an offensive war against Germany when, far from having 75 per cent of chances, we would be obliged at the outset to remain on the defensive?"

"PEOPLE ARE"

FRANCE (CZECHOSLOVAKIA)

150-38

100 - Political Forces  
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Relations.

" There are many people in France and in England who do not like to look facts in the face. Left-wing politicians live in the lying atmosphere of Moscow and are content to hate the totalitarian states, such as Germany, Italy, Japan, France's Spain, and would like to wage war on them.

" When it is a question of the very existence of our country, we must think of keeping France intact, not expose her to an unequal war, and must bring about union among Frenchmen. "

CAMMINE publishes a leading article on this subject:

" Czecho-Slovakia constitutes a grave and urgent problem. We admit that it cannot be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulder. But M. Bergery (a Deputy) goes too far when he maintains that to divide up Czecho-Slovakia would be as shameful as was the partition of Poland.

" Poland was a real country, many centuries old and possessing absolute unity. Czecho-Slovakia, which is 30 years old, is the worst, from the point of construction, and the most heterogeneous of the Wilsonian States.

" While bearing in mind that the Czechs are entitled to independence and respect, it must be realized that this cocktail of three races constitutes a serious pretext for the final World War in which law and our civilisation will be at stake.

" And there are people who ask: 'What about France's alliances?' We deplore the fact that France under Briand, wanting to imitate the policy of the Kings of France, chose her allies to the east from the weakest nations, from those who could never give us useful aid in return.

" We have antagonized the strongest among these nations - Jugo-Slavia and Poland - by engaging in an alliance with Russia. Thus, there only remain the others, which ask for everything and give nothing.

" The worst fault is to persevere in the errors already made. To plunge our country into the war demanded by Thorez and Peri (leading French Communists) to defend the honor of Stalin, of Magrim (the Spanish Red leader) and of Benes would be diabolical.

" France has already been led by a man who pursued sentimental wars in the four corners of the World. This unfortunate man ended at Sedan. "

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

FRANCE  
No. 272  
19 May 1938

900 Navy  
902 Policy  
902-100

Naval Policy - Statement of the Minister of Marine.

When I presented the 1938 budget to the Chamber, I did so with one great reservation -- if external conditions changed greatly, the government would have to make corresponding changes in the budget.

Recent events have caused the government to make this change. We cannot defer any longer the replacement of our older units, unless we wish within a few years to see ourselves surprised by the navies of other continental powers.

The financial effort that is to be made in 1938 will bring the naval budget to 3,500,000,000 francs for new construction, and will raise the entire naval budget to more than 5,700,000,000 francs.

Our constructing yards are well equipped and ask nothing more than to start building. The contract for a new capital ship of 35,000 tons has just been signed and that for an aircraft carrier will be signed shortly. The new ships that are just going into service are wholly successful, and their construction marks a signal advance in the shipbuilding art. The "STRASBOURG" is beginning her trials; she is a sister ship of the "DUNKERQUE", the most modern capital ship in the world. This summer we shall have seven capital ships in commission. The "MOGADOR" and the "VOLTA", heavily armed and speedy, outclass anything foreign in this type, where we already have the world's record for speed (The "TERRIBLE", 45 knots).

Our forty first-class submarines are vessels of adequate tonnage, excellent sea-keeping qualities, and, by cruises to the Americas, the Far East, and Africa, have demonstrated that they are real ocean-going ships.

The ships that we shall construct under the new program will not be inferior to those actually in service. They will enable the French Navy to maintain its present rank, indispensable to the security of France and its prestige in the world.

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FRANCE  
Report N° 270  
20 May, 1938.

1000 - Aviation  
1004 - Materials  
1004-100-Planes.

AIRPLANES: Placing of Orders for about  
1400 Planes.

Source: Air Ministry Publication.

Since the date of March 17, 1938 the Air Minister has placed orders for material totalling 1,600,000 000 Francs, which represents approximately 1400 war planes with their spare parts and accessories.

This of course has required considerable effort on the part of the technical bureaus and the services charged with the drawing up of contracts and the placing of orders.

In all contracts, a new clause now appears: from now on the Air Minister can, on short notice to the manufacturers, stop the manufacture of the series under construction, provided it is replaced by the fabrication of planes of an improved type.

This will enable the Air Minister to place important orders without there being a risk of the planes ordered becoming obsolete during the course of their construction.

Plane constructors on their side will thus be able to prepare their equipment with the assurance that the volume of their production will suffer no decrease.

A double result is achieved: Produce the most modern materiel, which is essential in aviation, while at the same time assuring continuity in the orders, which alone will permit the speed-up of aviation production.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) of GDS

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973



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NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT - 2

## ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

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| From                  | Y                    | Date | 23 May                           | 19 | 38 | Serial No.                                        | 277 | File No.                 | 105 |
| Source of information | Reliable             |      |                                  |    |    | (Communications new series<br>start January 1948) |     | (Select from Y, N, I, C) |     |
| Subject               | FRANCE               |      | POLITICAL                        |    |    | COLONIES                                          |     |                          |     |
|                       | (Nation reported on) |      | (Index title as per index sheet) |    |    | (Number)                                          |     |                          |     |

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EDOUARD HERRIOT'S RETURN FROM TRIP TO EGYPT

Report No. 277 (105), 23 May, 1938, is transmitted herewith.

UNCLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(C) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 8, 1972

By **RLH**

Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
No. 277  
23 May 1938

100 Political  
105 Colonies

EDOUARD HERRIOT'S RETURN FROM TRIP TO EGYPT.

Edouard Herriot, President of the Chamber (and probably next President of France as relief of President Lebrun) has just returned from a trip to Egypt.

Upon his arrival at Marseille he was interrogated by the press and gave out a few of his impressions.

He stated that, as evidence of the progress French influence had made in Egypt, there were 140 French schools there, with 2,500 professors and 42,000 pupils, of which only 2,000 were French. He paid special tribute to the liberalism under King Farouk, which had permitted of the most fraternal collaboration in Egypt. To develop that collaboration still further, the French Parliament must adapt itself frankly to the new situation of a country which intended to remain independent.

As for his impressions of Palestine, Herriot acknowledged that disorder continued there still (in his auto excursions he was preceded always by a military car equipped with a machine-gun supplied by the British). In the Lebanon and Syria, he recognized that France must give proof of the most intelligent liberalism.

With regard to France's position in the Eastern Mediterranean, Herriot is reported to have stated that the Suez Canal, which he had traversed and flown over, appeared to him to be a critical point. The rivalry of the nations, their preparations, imposed extreme vigilance on the part of France. As for the execution of new defensive works in that region of the Mediterranean, he reserved that information for the Government.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

N.A. Paris  
FRANCE  
No. 522  
24 June 1938

1000 Aviation

THREE STATEMENTS OF THE FRENCH AIR MINISTER WITH  
REGARD TO FRENCH AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

Mr. Guy La Chambre, Minister of Air, made the following statements when he received press representatives accredited to the Air Ministry, on the afternoon of June the 16th:

Referring to the pace at which French planes are delivered each month, Mr. Guy La Chambre declared that, due to unavoidable questions of technique, a delay of from ten to twelve months was to be expected from the moment the decision was made to manufacture a prototype in quantity production, to the moment when the first planes of the series were delivered.

Last February, when the plan for increasing our Air Army was adopted, it was decided that only those planes capable of performances at least equal to those of foreign planes would be ordered. It was deemed a bad policy to spend appropriations - necessarily limited - on the manufacture of planes that would no longer constitute up-to-date material on the date they would be placed in service. Such being the case, the monthly pace of our production could not increase all of a sudden.

Of the planes proposed by the General Staff as being satisfactory, only two were retained in the plan referred to above. These planes are the MORANE-406, a pursuit plane, and the three-seater POTEZ-63 (pursuit), speed 480 km/hr. Built along the same lines as the latter there already exists a two-seater day bomber. Mr. Guy La Chambre decided that three factories instead of one would engage in the manufacture of the MORANE-406, and he increased to a considerable extent the order for the POTEZ-63. These two types are at present in mass production. The Air Minister has just visited the Nantes factory, where he witnessed the first tests of the first production MORANE built there.

A squadron of POTEZ-63's will take part in the air review on the occasion of the visit of the King and Queen of England.

The situation is different in the case of the other planes. For instance, as regards the AMIOT 350 Bomber (a military version of the plane with which ROSSI recently won a number of records) and the LIERE-45 bomber. No factory equipment had been prepared for the mass production of these planes, so the first deliveries cannot be expected before the end of the year.

Nevertheless, the Minister affirmed, the MORANE and the POTEZ are examples that delays of delivery had been just as expected. There is reason to hope, therefore, that if all goes well in regard to the supplies of raw material and fabrication of the required manufacturing equipment, our plane production will increase materially in the course of a few months and will be fully satisfactory by next spring.

It is because a delay in starting production was unavoidable that M. Guy La Chambre decided to order 100 pursuit planes from the United States.

M. Guy La Chambre ended by stressing the necessity of an increase of personnel in the Air Army, stating that pilots should be trained to handle planes with continually increasing speeds. A decree published in the Journal Officiel of June the 15th increases the effectives of the Air Army.

UNCLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OWD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

FRANCE  
No. 323  
24 June 1939

1000 Aviation

STATEMENT OF M. GUY LA CHAMBRE, Air Minister, before the  
Aeronautical Commission of the Chamber of Deputies:

M. Guy La Chambre made a very complete and precise exposé of the situation. Members of the Commission had requested explanations regarding the order for 100 Curtiss planes in the United States. The Minister stressed that the transaction had been decided after mature deliberation, that all steps had been taken to make a success of it. Thus, the contract contains provisions regarding possible fluctuations of the exchange, and the French Government has not hesitated to demand the application of penalties, going so far as to provide for the cancellation of the contract in the case of delays of more than a month in the delivery of the material ordered.

Questioned as to the rumors having circulated that Great Britain and France had decided in common to specialize their aviation production - the former assuming the fabrication of bombers for Great Britain and France, the latter the fabrication of pursuit planes for both countries, the Minister replied that this news was entirely without foundation.

The Minister stated he was glad to announce that with the modern aviation equipment now available in France, our factories were not in a position to deliver the first of the modern type planes ordered in quantities and that those planes, on their first trial tests, proved to be a success. The Minister frankly declared that last April, due to the strikes, the pace of our production, insufficient as it was then, materially slowed down.

Fortunately, the situation has improved during the following months, and it is now possible to affirm, practically with mathematical certainty, that save unforeseen circumstances, by next October the average output will be quite satisfactory and that it will reach during the first months of 1939 a remarkable limit inasmuch as it is expected that we shall then be capable of producing nearly 250 planes monthly.

Two hundred and fifty planes per month - the news is very comforting indeed. M. Guy La Chambre added that in our aviation factories, work was going on day and night. When the meeting was over the President of the Aviation Committee (Comdt. Bouscoute), obviously satisfied with what he had learned, remarked: "Even those who are most pessimistic must admit there is nothing to complain about now."

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ADDRESS delivered by M. Guy La Chambre before the Foreign  
Military Attachés:

M. Guy La Chambre made the following statements on the occasion of a luncheon recently given in honor of the foreign Military Attachés accredited to the Air Ministry:

The problems with which French Aviation is now confronted need not be presented to you in detail; you are indeed familiar with the technical, industrial, military and commercial elements which are at the bottom, for these are problems which are sure to confront the other nations also, if this has not already occurred.

Perhaps.....

FRANCE  
No. 322  
24 June 1936

1000 Aviation

Perhaps, too, it is within this most interesting domain - aviation - which is in a constant state of evolution, that you foreign attachés, with well-informed and keen minds, judge our country in the correct way, aware as you are of its possibilities for mastering difficult situations and of its sincere and deep love for peace - peace which aviation could well imperil but to which it, fortunately, can also contribute, permitting as it does a close rapprochement between the peoples.

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From Y. Date 12 Sept. 1938 Serial No. 438 File No. 800  
(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Source of information Personal information  
 Subject FRANCE ARMY  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

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FRANCE, ARMY - PREPARATION

Report No. 438 is transmitted herewith.

33

RECEIVED

E. C. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (D)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

|                                                                                                |          |               |                   |                   |                  |                |             |             |            |                 |               |        |              |             |                |                       |    |      |        |        |      |        |        |       |              |      |
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FRANCE  
No. 458  
12 Sept., 1938

800

FRANCE - ARMY - Preparation.

At an Attaché dinner on the evening of the 9th of Sept., the Italian naval attaché had calmed down and apologized for his excitement of a few days ago, in stating that he considered war very possible.

The Germans were very annoyed at the attitude of the U.S. in sympathizing with England and France, but made the statement that there could never be another war between Germany and the U.S., as the only way it could occur was by the U.S. sending an army to Europe, and they were sure we would never do that again, implying that they could act as they wished in Europe regardless of the opinion of the U.S.

Captain Harris, U.S.M.C., a student officer, has just returned from a curtailed "stage" of instruction in artillery in Clermont-Ferrand. All of the French students, reserves and actives, were sent back to their regiments and the foreign officers were told to go back to Paris as there would be no more schools. The French officers were very pleasant to Harris throughout all of his stay, and when the school was discontinued, the colonel of the regiment said that they were all ready to go and that this time the German bluff would be called.

On Sunday, 11 September, while enroute to accompany the Ambassador to a dedication of a monument, the Naval Attaché observed military detachments in several cities to the north of Paris. In Senlis, bridges and railroad culverts were guarded by several batteries of .50 caliber A.A. machine guns. At Compiègne were seen eight light armored cars, each carrying a .57 mm. cannon, and machine guns; also eight .50 caliber A.A. machine guns were seen. These armored cars and A.A. machine guns were all ready for action, and were placed in various parts of the town, all ready to go.

As a further example of the readiness of the French Army for action, the lieutenant colonel commanding the parade battalion at the dedication ceremonies informed the N.A. that he had received word, only at 1030, Sunday morning, that his battalion would have to leave at 1130. At 1130, the entire battalion in heavy marching equipment, full packs and all, were ready to leave for the parade.

Reservists are still being called up to take their places in the French army, but the process is being done so quietly that there is no alarm or excitement. The result, however, is that what corresponds to a partial mobilization of the Army is being carried out, but all very quietly and with no stir or fuss. On Monday morning, 12 September, three full trains of reserves going to active duty left the Gare St. Lazare in Paris, for various Army posts in the north of France.

*Direct*  
*B*  
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 3(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

May 31, 1972

**ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF  
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**ATTACHE'S REPORT**

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A-1-v

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From Y Date 27 Sept, 1938 Serial No. 469 File No. 1000  
(Commence new series each January first) (Submit proper name from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject FRANCE AVIATION MOBILIZATION  
(Citation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

AIR ARMY PRE-MOBILIZATION

Report No. 469 is transmitted herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (3D)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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| Tech.<br>Dev.                                                                                                                                                                                                     | C. in C.<br>U. S.                                                            | Com.<br>Int. Sec. | Com.<br>Sec. Sec. | C. in C.<br>Asst. | Com.<br>S.S.S.  | Com.<br>Air   | Attached at | Operational |                |                |        | Com. Dir. | W.P. | Com.   | M. T.  | State | Com-<br>munic. | Return to<br>Source No. |       |              |      |

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FRANCE  
No. 469  
27 Sept 1938

1000 Aviation (Mobilization)  
1005 - Operations

AIR ARMY MOBILIZATION

1005-400. Mobilization

French Air Army activity to date has consisted of equipping all planes with full armament, bore-sighting, issue of ammunition reserves to military airdromes, camouflage of all combat airplanes, maximum effort in depots to complete overhauls and put all planes in commission.

Passive defense measures on military airdromes have consisted only of digging temporary machine gun emplacements, which are now manned and on alert. No movement of units has been effected but truck trains pertaining to units, consisting of rations, spare parts, etc., are loaded and ready to move to alternate locations.

No reserve pilots have been called except a small number who are also specialists, and were called due to their specialist qualifications.

With partial mobilization the ground-observer aircraft warning system was alerted. Details of operation of this system, number and kind of personnel, locations, etc., have been withheld.

Estimate 1500 first line airplanes including observation types as maximum number available for immediate action; of this figure roughly 450 fighters, 320 light bombers, 600 heavy bombers.

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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N. N. L. 96

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ATTACHE'S REPORT

21555-L  
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From Y Date 27 Sept., 1938 Serial No. 470 File No. 103  
(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)  
Source of information Personal observation and press  
Subject FRANCE POLITICAL FORCES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
(Relation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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FRANCE - POLITICAL SITUATION - WEEK ENDING 27 SEPT., 1938



Report No. 470, 27 Sept., 1938, is transmitted herewith.

35

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ONR letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

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FRANCE  
No. 470  
27 Sept., 1938

100 Political Forces  
103 International Relations

FRANCE - POLITICAL SITUATION - WEEK ENDING 27 SEPT., 1938.

This week started, as so many others recently, with a great let-down in tension and much brighter prospects of peace on Wednesday, September 21st. On that day, after sitting in council session for twenty hours continuously, the Czech government accepted the proposals brought back by Mr. Chamberlain after his first visit to Berchtesgaden. This acceptance was obtained only after great pressure had been brought by the representatives of England and France, including one last call and warning to Benes at four a.m.

At the same time, Polish and Hungarian leaders had conferences with Hitler, and began to assert more vigorously their claims for a discussion and settlement of their respective minorities in Czechoslovakia.

As the feeling that the outbreak of war was a matter of a few hours or so, decreased, the French became increasingly indignant over the "voyage to Canossa" of Chamberlain, and more and more articles appeared regarding the "humiliation" France had suffered in being dragged along on England's coat-tails in the results of Chamberlain's trip to Berchtesgaden. This feeling of indignation increased until Friday when the government of Mr. Hodza in Czechoslovakia fell, and the new government of General Syrový ordered a complete mobilization of the Czech army. The Czech mobilization was followed on Saturday morning by the calling of two echelons of French reserves, about three hundred thousand men, to the French army. Then there was no more talk of "humiliation" or "indignation" but only an extreme worry about the once-more imminent possibilities of war.

The first reports of Chamberlain's second visit to Hitler at Godesberg was that the British and French were in complete accord as to what was to be ceded to Germany and the only difference to be regulated was the time when the cession was to take place. When the accord was published, the Czechs immediately claimed that Hitler's demands were far more than had been agreed to in the first agreement after Berchtesgaden. The French, egged on by the Left press, also had a stiffening of feeling, although, in reality, the two proposals were almost identical in what places were to be ceded. The difference between them is that in one case, the German forces start moving in to the Sudeten parts of Czechoslovakia on 1 October, with a corresponding withdrawal of Czech troops, and a plebiscite for the regions where the Sudetens are under fifty percent of the population, to be held not later than 24 November. The details of this proposal are to be regulated by a German-Czech commission.

The opposing British suggestion to which the Czechs stated their acceptance is that an international commission meet, fix the definite boundaries of the territory to be ceded to Germany (this territory is almost the same as that named in the German proposal) then proceed to hold the plebiscite in the other disputed regions. The German objection to this is that with the appointment of an international commission, and the time it has always required for such a commission to function, entirely too long a period would elapse before the Sudetens were finally turned over to Germany.

On Saturday morning, Sept., 24, the French partial mobilization of 300,000 men was announced, and at the same time the Army requisitioned trucks, some motor cars, and some horses. Fifty large garages were taken over in Paris to provide issuing depots to the reservists called to active duty, to receive their uniforms and equipment. At the same time, all gasoline stations were notified of a certain minimum amount of gasoline and lubricating oil that must be carried at all times. The gas stations can sell freely down to the minimum limit but when that limit is reached there can be no more sales until a new supply is delivered to the station.

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FRANCE  
No. 470  
27 Sept., 1938

100 Political Forces  
103 International Relations

Saturday and Sunday were most tense, passive defense measures were being taken, such as placing blue lamps in the street lights, orders for automobilists about dimming lights, what to do in case of air raids, etc. On Monday, before Hitler's speech, the tenseness and excitement increased to a great extent. Many French civilians left Paris for points in the country, and the trans-Atlantic steamship companies were besieged with Americans trying to get back. The cross-Channel boats were crowded to capacity with English tourists returning to England, and the English, French and American steamship companies, on advice of the Embassy, waived lifeboat requirements in order to accommodate more passengers. The American Embassy issued a circular advising all Americans who had no compelling reasons to for remaining in France to leave as soon as possible. Extra volunteer help, obtained from among the wives of American officers, were put to work assisting in handling the crowds of American tourists who frequented the Embassy, seeking advice, aid and information. On Monday, the 26th, war seemed a matter of hours.

Monday night, Hitler's speech from Berlin was listened to almost unanimously with great interest. The speech was placatory toward England and France, but particularly violent toward Czechoslovakia and Mr. Benesh who was accused of dilatoriness and intrigue in trying to delay and hold up the applications of the agreement regarding the cession of the Sudeten territories. On Monday, also, M. Deladier permitted a statement to be issued under his name saying that if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, France would go to war. This has been the most definite and most direct statement issued yet by the French.

At the time of writing this report (Tuesday afternoon, 27 Sept.), the French are continuing quietly their mobilization, more measures for passive defence are being taken, and both French and foreign civilians are leaving Paris in increasing numbers. However, the general feeling seems to be much easier, and among various diplomats and members of diplomatic missions in Paris, the general feeling is that a compromise of some sort will be reached before Saturday, 1 October. It is on that day that Hitler threatened to march into Czechoslovakia, provided his demands are not met before. But the general feeling is that somehow (no one is as yet certain of the means) an agreement will be reached before that limiting date whereby war will be avoided.

Poland and Hungary who, at first, demanded equal treatment of their nationals in Czechoslovakia with that accorded the Sudeten Germans have backed down considerably and after receiving assurances from the Czech government that the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities would be treated in negotiations between the respective states, seemed to have withdrawn their demands. However, in spite of Poland's direct statement that she would not move into the Teschen district, if a localized conflict occurs in Czechoslovakia, it is believed that Poland will attempt to take this district, by negotiations if possible, otherwise by force of arms.

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H. N. I. 98

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From Y. Date 14 Oct., 1938 Serial No. 508 File No. 903  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable.

Subject France Navy Mobilization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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## MOBILIZATION OF FRENCH NAVY PERSONNEL DURING CRISIS

Y. No.508 (903), 14 October, 1938, is transmitted herewith.

Prepared and forwarded by:

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and (F) of 2

OSD letter, May, 1, 1932

By SLR

Date May 22 1943

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No. 508  
France  
14 October, 1938.

702-309 Strategic  
900 - Navy  
905 - Personnel  
(Mobilization)

**MOBILIZATION OF FRENCH NAVY PERSONNEL DURING CRISIS**

Information from a member of the "Inscription Maritime" (Bureau handling mobilization for Navy) on recent naval mobilization during European crisis is transmitted herewith.

It clearly stands out that the French system of (1) liaison with army; (2) annual reserve training; (3) segregating men into specialities on the reserve list with option of calling for special technical training, enables the Navy to mobilize without any unnecessary publicity or propaganda.

First: Prior to official mobilization call for reservists the French Fleet was completely manned during June-September. All specialists whose term of obligatory military service expired were retained on active service to serve their annual reserve period for the ensuing year. In addition many specialists were recalled in June to serve their annual period, or to undergo special training. It is estimated that this procedure gave the Navy approximately 8,000 reservists on active service.

Second: That about 20,000 men, mostly from the seaboard sections, were drafted when the call for partial mobilization went out. That the majority of these men were sent to naval arsenals to man district craft and handle supplies. The trained crews for the coast defense batteries were already in active service, and all batteries manned, when the crisis broke.

Third: With the trained permanent personnel at Navy Yards "Corps du direction du Port", all navy yards were immediately commissioned for war: submarine nets placed in position, ammunition magazines, torpedo and supply depots, etc., immediately manned.

Fourth: Liaison between Army and Navy came into play in the handling of transportation, ammunition, supplies, etc., by the Army for the coast defense batteries.

Fifth: Mobilization did not extend to merchant marine, nor fishing fleet, except in case of certain tankers, cargo ships, etc., earmarked by the Navy for immediate service.

Sixth: That the Navy could never use the large number of naval reservists available, and that the majority (like in world war) would have to be transferred to army services.

Seventh: The communication service, in all naval districts, has been on war footing since March, 1938.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) on (S)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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From Y Date 17 Oct., 58 Serial No. 507 File No. 800  
(Commence new series each January first) (Revised number number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Press  
Subject FRANCE ARMY  
(Index title as per index above) (Index title as per index above) (Subtitle)  
(Index reported on) (Index title as per index above)

Reference .....

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FRANCE - Military Situation

Report No. 507 is transmitted herewith. (Filed in Monograph)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
No. 297  
17 October, 1938

300 Army

FRANCE - Military Situation.

That the French, in spite of an earnest desire for peace, are becoming more and more aware of the consequences of the Munich Accord is made evident in the following article of General de Gaulle:

The great General Staff of Germany, charged with the handling of their military forces, knows that a war on two fronts is a risky and delicate enterprise, as was demonstrated in the last war. And in 1914, the Russian Army was poorly equipped and its offensive in East Prussia did not menace any vital parts of Germany. Several army corps could be opposed to the Russians, and the larger part of the German army concentrated in the west.

DE  
In 1938, conditions were entirely different. The Czechoslovakian Army was solid, well organized, and had been instructed for twenty years by a French military mission. Moreover, it was concentrated almost in the center of Germany, at a distance of less than two hundred kilometers from Berlin. It would have been necessary for a good part of the German Army to hold the Czech Army, and the entire German Army to conquer it quickly. A German offensive against France could not have been made at the same time, and such a war on two fronts would have been very susceptible of leading Germany into a disaster.

nd  
The leaders of the German Army, in order to force this combination, developed the plan of meeting on the defensive forcing France, with a smaller number of troops, supported by a system of fortifications several kilometers in depth, and attacking Czechoslovakia with the larger, by far, part of their forces. The German General Staff then divided up their plan into two phases, one to be completed before the other was begun. This was a sound and prudent plan, but still difficult in that a war on two fronts had to be envisaged.

nd  
The German diplomacy then came to the assistance of the military, with the end of keeping France neutral while Czechoslovakia was conquered. By propaganda, and by saying loudly to the world that Germany, already half-mobilized, would fight over the wrong done to the Sudetens, the German diplomacy succeeded far better than they imagined. Not only did France, and England, not support Czechoslovakia, but the two allied countries practically proposed, themselves, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

By this unprecedented diplomatic victory, the German General Staff won the first of their two battles, without even firing a shot. There are no longer any German enemies on the South and on the East, Poland, after a few concessions, will be found on the German side. The nightmare of a war on two fronts has been obliterated. The whole weight of the German Army can now be directed to the West.

This German Army is now further reinforced by contingents from the Sudetens. The three and a half million additional inhabitants of the Reich will be able to furnish at least four active divisions, the 10th and 20th Army Corps, and at least six divisions of reserves. The fusion of these new elements will only be a matter of a few months. The example of the two Army Corps already incorporated from among the Austrian contingents is proof enough of that statement.

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2

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FRANCE

No. 807

17 October, 1938

800

At the beginning of 1938, the German Army will have forty-five active divisions, as compared to forty active divisions in the French Army. The numerical inferiority of the French Army was compensated, in the beginning of 1938, by the aid of the Czechoslovakian forces, and by the two fronts. Now, that compensation has completely disappeared and the French are left with a very disturbing inferiority.

The above are facts, and it is no use discussing whether or not French diplomacy was skillful or not. Perhaps, it was necessary, to avoid war, to end everything, to give what did not belong to us, to lose our ally and to reinforce our enemy of tomorrow. We thought we were averting war when we were only postponing it. We can very well ask whether we should cheer the 30th of September and whether it is logical now to cheat any to Deans of victory.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

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**REPORT**  
**Report No. 687**  
**10 December, 1938.**

200 - Navy  
681-1- Building  
Programs.

**44-HOUR WEEK IMAPORATED IN ALL NAVAL**  
**ACTIVITIES.**

In order to speed up naval construction, the Minister of Marine has ordered that a 44-hour week ( at present 40-hour week ) shall become effective in all naval activities commencing 8 December.

A 10% increase for overtime shall be accorded for the 4 extra hours in accordance with the recent social laws.

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Report No. 639  
FRANCE  
10 December, 1938.

900 - Navy  
902-100- Programs.

NO ADDITIONAL UNITS PROJECTED IN  
FRENCH 1939 NAVY BUDGET .

Reference: (a) Y . Serial No.232 (902-100), 6 May, 1938.

The French Navy budget for 1939 does not provide for construction of any additional ships to the present authorized program.

Ships now authorized, as shown on quarterly progress sheet of ship construction, will occupy French shipyards to capacity until 1942 .

Note: While the 1939 Navy budget does not provide for any additional units, the 24,000 tons of small craft and auxiliaries authorized to be laid down (see reference (a) ) is still available for ship construction .

From this 24,000 tons the Minister of Marine has authorized the construction of 4-1,000 ton destroyers (see Y. No.644 (902-100), 12 December, 1938. While several tugs and barges have been built under the 24,000 ton provision, there would appear to be roughly about 10,000 tons still available for small craft.

B

B-1

Morgan

Archives

R. D. S.

Mr. C. H. C.

H. P.

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A. I. 96

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From Y Date 18 Jan., 1939 Serial No. 41 File No. 1004-1  
 Source of information Reliable  
 Subject FRANCE AVIATION AIRPLANE PRODUCTION  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subsidiary)

## Reference

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FRANCE AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, 1938; OUTSTANDING PRODUCTION ORDERS

Report No. 41 is transmitted herewith.

Prepared by:

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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H.A. Paris  
Rome  
No. 41  
15 January, 1972.

RECEIVED  
R. O. 11603, Sec. 301 and 600-4425  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
By ECE Date MAY 21 1973

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**FRENCH AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, 1969; OVERVIEWING  
PRODUCTION CHANGES.**

The following official statement of the French Air Minister is  
a record of French military airplane production during the year 1969:

The present Air Minister came into office on 15 January, 1969.  
From 15 January to 15 March, the September Air Council elaborated on  
airplane replacement plan called Plan 5, which is now in progress. This  
calls for 2000 first-line airplanes - that is, a total of 4000 airplane  
structures and 12,000 engines. From 15 March to 15 June, 1969, airplanes  
were ordered, 477 only of the preceding program having been retained for  
Plan 5.

From 15 June to 15 September, orders were placed for the machine  
tools, jigs and fixtures for mass production of airplanes. The State  
contributed one billion francs and private capital 470 millions. An  
additional amount of 570 million francs will be spent in 1969 for Plan 5  
equipment, making a total of over 1,000,000,000 francs (when the airplane  
factories were nationalized in 1964, the total value of plant equipment in  
the French aeronautical industry was estimated at 40,000,000 francs).

Commencing 20 September, 1969, mass production of airplanes really  
got underway.

**Average Monthly Military Airplane Production.** From 1 January to  
1 September, 1969, 41 airplanes per month. The monthly average for the  
same period in 1967 was 28. From 1 September to 1 December, 1969, the  
monthly average was raised to 54, against 28 in 1967. In December, 1969,  
75 military airplanes were produced, and the number will pass 80 this  
month (January, 1970). We are now building modern military airplanes, not  
a single one of which had been produced prior to January, 1969. The above  
figures cover only military airplanes. If one adds training planes, the  
1969 production was 1,000 planes against a total of 200 in 1967. The total  
airplane tonnage constructed in 1969 was 2070, against 1945 in 1967.

These results have been obtained in spite of the two weeks' paid  
holiday in August, the labor unrest caused in September by the introduction  
of the 40-hour week, and the effects of the general strike of 20 November  
which affected 90% of the personnel of the nationalized airplane factories.

The Minister of Air then explained how the French airplane industry  
will deliver 200 military airplanes per month, commencing in May. Actually,  
only three of the nationalized companies (North-South and Southwest) are  
delivering military airplanes. The other groups (Center, Southeast and  
South), which have up to the present time delivered only training planes,  
will begin next month to deliver military airplanes. Three private companies  
- Bugnot, Aulot and Cancon-Bussat - are also commencing deliveries.  
The number of sub-contracts, for construction of sub-assemblies, is growing  
rapidly. The total 40 number is being made by 25 sub-contractors.

This "shadow industry" must overcome certain difficulties, such  
as the difference in wages that must be paid in the same factories to workmen  
who are engaged in aircraft production and to those who continue their  
normal work. It must be kept in mind that a large number of airplanes are  
practically completed except for their motors, propellers and retractable  
landing-gears. In 1969, the French constructors took delivery of 5,000 tons  
of aluminum alloy, of which up to the present time only 1,000 tons has been  
used.

DRAFT

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By ELR

Date MAY 21 1973

FRANCE

No. 41

18 January, 1980

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The Air Minister then discussed the question of personnel. Up to the present time our personnel has been sufficient for a fleet of 1200 airplanes. In setting in motion Plan 8 it has been necessary to augment the personnel accordingly. The effort which has been made along these lines will not show results until next year. The Mechanics' School at Rochefort, which furnished only 800 graduates in 1968, will by the end of 1980, with the assistance of the two private schools of Gaudron and Marriot, graduate 2000 qualified mechanics. The increase in aircraft mechanics, which was only 40 in 1968, will be 800 this year. There will be 900 pilots trained at the Aircraft Gunners School at Oussun this year, against 184 last year. The number of college students admitted to service in the Army of the Air has been augmented, and 800 reserve officers will be chosen after a competitive examination.

The Air Minister then adds the following of particular interest to the American aviation industry:

Only 100 Curtiss fighters were ordered last year, because it was not possible to furnish more of this model before the month of April, 1980, and because there were no other really modern American military airplanes available. The American aeronautical industry is not (though it will be tomorrow) a greatly developed industry, which is the first step necessary before large orders can be thought of. A foreign military airplane was not interesting for our Air Army unless it possesses performances equal to the French airplanes now under construction and unless it could be delivered within the coming three months.

The following reliable story is illustrative of the confusion that has existed in the French aviation industry up to the present:

One factory received orders to tool up for production of 80 sets of airplane parts. This having been done, they were then told to tool up for 200 sets. When this was completed the jigs and fixtures were ordered sent to another factory which would carry out this work. The factory manager of the latter factory rejected the jigs and fixtures and insisted on designing and manufacturing his own.

#### MILITARY AIRCRAFT ON ORDER TO BE DELIVERED BY 1 APRIL, 1980.

| Number | Type           | Place manufactured           |
|--------|----------------|------------------------------|
| 200    | F4U Corsair    | ENCA - North                 |
| 1000   | Bombardier 400 | ENCA - Center, West, South   |
| 400    | Bombardier 181 | ENCA - Southwest             |
| 100    | LoC 40         | ENCA - Southeast             |
| 100    | Amiot 300      | Amiot factories              |
| 200    | Bombardier 400 | Bombardier                   |
| 100    | Bombardier 181 | ENCA - Southwest             |
| 1000   | Gaudron 8-71A  | Gaudron-Bombardier factories |
| 100    | Curtiss P-40   | Buffalo, N.Y.                |
| 50     | Boeing E-28    | Holland                      |

Orders will undoubtedly be placed shortly for Dassault D-500 fighters, Bombardier 181 4-engine bombers, when the experimental models have completed flight-tests now underway.

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O. N. I. 98

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From **Y** Date **21 Jan.,** 19**59** Serial No. **54** File No. **90S-100**  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information **Reliable**Subject **FRANCE**

(Nation reported on)

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INCREASE IN ENLISTED COMPLEMENT OF FRENCH NAVY

Report No. 54 is transmitted herewith.

Prepared and forwarded by:

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date **MAY 21 1973**

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N.A. Paris  
FRANCE  
No. 94  
21 January, 1969

~~RESTRICTED~~  
900 Navy  
900-100 Personnel

**INCREASE IN ENLISTED COMPLEMENT OF FRENCH NAVY**

The complement of the enlisted forces in the French Navy is to be increased from 72,000 to 74,000.

Increases will take place gradually during 1969.

Manning of A.A. coast defense, coast batteries, and commissioning of new ships, is cited as the reason for increase.

SPARE  
Director.  
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Photograph  
Cecil Bond  
Bu Nav  
W.P.  
M.I.D.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) of (2).  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

FRANCE (ITALY)  
No. 75  
21 January, 1939

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CONVERSATION WITH HIGH-RANKING OFFICER OF FRENCH  
MINISTRY OF MARINE

The Naval Attaché and the Assistant Naval Attaché had a conversation of a little more than an hour with Captain de Vilaine, the Chief of the 2nd Bureau of the Ministry of Marine. On asking about the comparative strengths of the French and Italian Navies in case of a war between these two countries alone, Captain de Vilaine stated that the tonnages were about equal, but that he firmly believed the French Navy was the better of the two and would be the victor. The lines of communication between France and Algeria would be temporarily cut, but the French Fleet would soon reestablish them. Also, if the Italians used bases in Mallorca or on the mainland of Spain, they would be pushed out of such bases very promptly.

De Vilaine then went on to say that he could not envisage a war between France and Italy alone, but that if such a thing occurred when one took in all factors, - Army, Navy, Aviation, and the spirit and capabilities of the peoples, - then the French would win decisively. However, even if victorious in such a war, the French would be the losers because they would end up somewhat weakened, that they would then be an easy prey for Germany.

It was further stated that the French Navy did not believe that France would allow the use of bases in the Balearics or Spain to the Italians, as he knew that many France officers hated the Italians. If that was done, the problem would be more serious, but in that case the first thing necessary would be to kick the Italians out of the Spanish bases and the French could do that. Of course, with Italian occupation of such bases, communications with Algeria would be practically at an end, and even the outside route from Casablanca to France would be menaced. It was absolutely necessary for France to have a neutral Spain; if that neutrality did not exist, then Spain would have to be captured first. Of course, that meant much more effort would be required by the French but even so, he believed the French could do it.

Without using bases in Spain, Italy, with her submarines and aviation could at times interrupt the flow of communications between Africa and France, but he believed the French Fleet was capable in a short period of securing communications as against the Italian Fleet. He repeated again that in tonnage the two Fleets were about equal, but that he believed the French Fleet to be the better of the two.

In case Germany aided Italy surreptitiously, as in the Spanish Civil War, they would have to send much more help, to be effective, both in material and men, than was furnished to France. In that case, undoubtedly a general war would develop.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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From Y Date 27 February, 19 39 Serial No. 135 File No. 900  
 Source of information Magazine "Le Yacht" (Commence new series each January 2nd) (Select proper code from O. N. I. Ind)  
 Subject FRANCE NAVY GENERAL  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

**Reference**

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**THE FRENCH NAVAL EFFORT**

Report No. 135 is transmitted herewith.

Prepared by:

Forwarded by:

|                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                             |               |               |               |                   |               |               |             |                |                |          |      |           |          |          |       |          |               |                       |                |       |
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FRANCE  
No. 135  
27 February, 1939

900 Navy

#### THE FRENCH NAVAL EFFORT

With the French opinion on other countries' naval expansion being expressed repeatedly, this article in "Le Yacht" appears opportunely.

The launching of the *RICHIELIEU* and laying of the *CLEMENCEAU*'s keel which recently took place on the same day, have attracted the public's attention to the effort now being made by France for its Navy. This is considerable. During 1939, the shipyards and Navy Yards will work on a program amounting to not less than 130 ships. Of these, four are battleships of 35,000 tons, two plane carriers of 18,000, 3 cruisers of 10,000, destroyers, submarines and various auxiliaries. The total tonnage under construction will be 340,000, more than half of the present tonnage of the Navy. It is the most important program the French Navy has ever undertaken.

The size of our authorizations is gaged by that of other navies, particularly Italy and Germany. At the end of 1942 Italy will have about 700,000 tons. The specialized and excellently organized Italian shipyards allow a rapid construction especially in smaller units. Six hundred ton submarines can be built in 12 to 15 months. Considering that the Secretary of the Navy can order the construction of ships without authorization from Parliament, it is easy to see that the above number may even be exceeded.

As to Germany, who had only 80,000 tons in 1934, she will have in 1942 more than 400,000 including 4 or 5 large battleships, 3 *DEUTSCHLAND* type, 16 cruisers, 2 carriers, 60 destroyers and more than a hundred submarines. But the important item is that this whole fleet will be completely new.

In the face of this enormous rebuilding of navies, it was the obvious duty of the French government to develop our naval power as much as possible. It was for this that the two 1938 allotments were made. But we were also forced to construct other items: fortifications, trucks, cannon, tanks, planes, such that one wondered if France could do everything at once. Even a former Premier (Blum) scarcely four months ago, advocated the sacrifice of the navy in favor of aviation, even to the point of turning over the navy yards with their technicians and workers.

This solution has not had the success its author wished. The French realized that in time of war, with the land frontiers closed, only maritime routes would permit the country to live and fight. And these routes would remain open only with a strong and efficient navy to protect them.

The law of 11 July, 1938, on the organization of the country in time of war, empowered the Minister of National Defense to coordinate the three military ministries in peace time and to apportion the total allotments in a manner that best suited for the common task. In this way, of the 25 billion appropriation for 1939, the navy received 5 1/2 billion, an increase of 57% over the 1938 appropriation; the air service received about the same increase and the army even more. The navy cannot - as one recently inspired article demanded - carry out a program equal to the sum of Germany and Italy together. It cannot do it either from the industrial or from the financial viewpoint. The task undertaken, which has for object to be not inferior to any continental navy, requires heavy sacrifices; but it is necessary, it is sensible and it must be accomplished.

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From Y Date 18 April, 1939 Serial No. 241 File No. 165

Source of information ..... Personal observation, press, contacts

Subject **FRANCE** **POLITICAL** **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

| Reference | (Number of pages) | (Date) | (Author)    | (Title)                                             | (Subject)          | (Keywords)                          | (Abstract)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | (Notes) | (Comments) |
|-----------|-------------------|--------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------------|
| 1         | 10                | 1980   | Smith, J.   | The Role of the Teacher                             | Education          | Teacher, Role, Education            | The role of the teacher in the classroom is a complex one, involving a variety of factors such as the curriculum, the students, and the school environment.                                                                                           |         |            |
| 2         | 15                | 1981   | Johnson, M. | The Impact of Technology on the Classroom           | Technology         | Technology, Classroom, Impact       | The impact of technology on the classroom has been a topic of discussion for many years. While some believe that technology has revolutionized education, others believe that it has simply changed the way we teach.                                 |         |            |
| 3         | 20                | 1982   | Brown, K.   | The Importance of Assessment in the Classroom       | Assessment         | Assessment, Classroom, Importance   | The importance of assessment in the classroom cannot be overstated. It is a key component of the teaching and learning process, providing valuable feedback to both the teacher and the student.                                                      |         |            |
| 4         | 25                | 1983   | White, L.   | The Role of the Parent in the Classroom             | Parent             | Parent, Classroom, Role             | The role of the parent in the classroom is a topic that has been discussed for many years. While some believe that parents should be heavily involved in their child's education, others believe that the school should be the primary focus.         |         |            |
| 5         | 30                | 1984   | Green, P.   | The Impact of the School Environment on the Student | School Environment | School Environment, Student, Impact | The impact of the school environment on the student is a topic that has been discussed for many years. While some believe that the school environment is a major factor in a student's success, others believe that it is simply one of many factors. |         |            |

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POLITICAL EVENTS - WEEK ENDING 18 APRIL, 1939

Report No. 241 is transmitted herewith.

B-10 ①  
B-13 ② }  
B-13. Please return to  
B-2715

RED AUSTIN

E. Q. 110:2, 5 (1971) and MD) at 1971

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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FRANCE  
No. 841  
18 April, 1939

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 2 1972

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# POLITICAL SITUATION - WEEK ENDING 18 APRIL, 1939.

This week has witnessed a most intense diplomatic activity, which great as it was however only slightly overshadowed the military and naval activities. The international situation after the seizure of Albania looked most disturbing; in spite of Italian promises not to commit any aggression toward Greece, the British, fearful of the occupation of Corfu by the Italians, concentrated the British Mediterranean Fleet at Malta, and then later in the week, withdrew most of the ships eastward in the direction of Alexandria. The French Toulon Squadron hastily left that port to cruise in the vicinity of Bizerta, while the French Brest Squadron left Brest under orders for Toulon, which were changed enroute to Tangier, where the Brest Squadron was on 17 April.

A concealed, although serious, disagreement arose at this time between the British and French governments, the French accusing the British of paying more attention in their dispositions to safeguarding the British Empire as a whole rather than supporting France in obtaining security in Europe. Another source of difference between the two countries was, and remains, the British reluctance to institute some form of military service. As one French Army officer expressed it, "The British are going wild guaranteeing the frontiers of Poland, Greece, Rumania, but they don't say with whose soldiers. They have none of their own to send, and certainly France can't spare any - not with three frontiers to defend."

By the end of the week, the differences had been somewhat smoothed over and Daladier and Chamberlain issued simultaneous statements offering bilateral security pacts to Greece and Rumania, similar to the agreement concluded between England and Poland. Negotiations were also being carried on to include Turkey in the "encorement", as well as to find some method whereby the objections of Poland and Rumania to Russian assistance could be overcome. This last hurdle was got over by the end of the week, by Russia agreeing to furnish supplies to the neighboring countries and by the conclusion of an air pact, in which Russian aviation, but no other Russian forces, would come to the aid of Poland and Rumania in case of an aggression toward those countries.

The French are continuing military preparations and have called to active duty about two hundred thousand reservists, consisting principally of fortification troops, radio, armored-car and other specialists. There has been no public mobilization order, but the reservists are informed directly and individually by gendarmes or military messenger. In addition, anti-aircraft machine guns have been placed on many of the public buildings in Paris, and other anti-aircraft detachments have been placed in various towns toward the frontier.

The Germans, meanwhile, caused considerable concern when they announced the despatch of a squadron to Spanish waters ostensibly "for maneuvers". Besides demonstrating the closeness of Spain to the axis powers, it is felt that in case of hostilities, the German Fleet would not remain bottled up in the North Sea, but being already in Spanish bases could immediately set out on commerce raiding. In this connection, it has been definitely confirmed that new and additional defenses are being constructed in the Canary Islands and are well on the way to completion. Consequently, more bases will be available to the fleets of the axis powers.

FRANCE  
No. 841  
18 April, 1939

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Maréchal Pétain, the French Ambassador to Spain, returned to Paris for a consultation, and confirmed the reports of additional Italian troops landing in Spain, and estimated that seven thousand had arrived within the past week. He has no doubts as to the solidarity of Spain with the totalitarian powers, and confided that although he, personally, had been treated with the utmost courtesy and politeness, as far as attempting any conversations or negotiations went, he had been given the "run-around". Along this same line, the ex-Government fleet of three cruisers and eight destroyers which had been interned in Bizerta by the French on the fall of the Loyalist government, were delivered back to Franco by the French. Franco immediately despatched the force to Italian yards for repairs and overhaul, to all intent and purposes increasing the Italian navy by just so many units.

President Roosevelt's telegram to Hitler and Mussolini published here Saturday evening, 15 April, caused much favorable comment in all French circles. The majority of the declarations are that this message has put the dictators' backs to the wall and obliges them to answer "yes" or "no", and, dependent on the answer, war or peace will ensue. Mixed with French praise of the message, however, are some regrets that an announcement of the abrogation of the Neutrality Act did not accompany the message. The feeling is unanimous, though, that while awaiting the Italian and German replies to the message, the production of armaments must continue to be pushed.

The German and Italian answers, according to all reports, will not be immediately forthcoming. The date given for the answer is, now, April 28th, and the general impression is that the response will be negative; a negative, qualified perhaps, to make it better-sounding but none the less a negative.

Numerous reports, which cannot be verified, are current to the effect that a "démarche" for the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich will occur shortly. At the other end of Europe, there is unquestioned activity around Gibraltar. The British have placed booms and net-defenses before the entrances through the breakwater and have doubled the garrison there. On the Spanish side, a heavy concentration of troops and artillery is quartered very close to the British territory, and the German guns placed on the African Coast opposite Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War, are reported fully manned. In addition, many Moorish troops who made the Spanish campaign with Franco have been returned to Spanish Morocco.

In general, during the present crisis, in marked contrast to the feeling last September, the feeling among French army and naval officers at this time is one hundred percent to the effect that war in the very near future is inevitable. This is developed to such an extent that most feel that having a war now and getting it over with would be preferable to living under these continual crises. On these lines, French military schools, the Ecole de Guerre, the Ecole du Genie Maritime, are graduating their senior students now, in April, instead of waiting for the usual graduation dates in July.

DECLASSIFIED

N.A. PARIS  
FRANCE  
No. 259-39  
25 April 1939

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**POLITICAL SITUATION, WEEK ENDING 25 APRIL, 1939**

This week has been one of outward calm, but meanwhile, without undue publicity many measures looking to the increase of preparations for a possible war. The French have quietly continued mobilization until now they have more troops under arms than during last September. All of the calling of the conscripts has been by individual notification and has been carried out with the minimum of noise and publicity.

In the international situation, a peace has occurred while the world awaits Hitler's answer on 25 April to President Roosevelt's telegram. Unquestionably the tenor of the response will be entirely negative with possibly an announcement of the proposals which Hitler would have made to establish a just peace, and which, he will say, would have been rejected. In an effort to discredit Roosevelt, and possibly to label him as an "agent provocateur," Hitler has sent questionnaires to all the surrounding smaller countries asking if they feel themselves menaced by German threats or aggression against them. Of course, the answer is perforce "No," and in his reply Hitler can ask "Where is this aggression of which the President speaks?"

The Ambassador's efforts to secure an "encirclement" of Germany failed decidedly when Yugoslavia and Italy signed an accord on the 22nd, whereby, in exchange for guarantees of frontiers and perhaps the promise of some territorial adjustments in the neighborhood of Salonica, Yugoslavia to all intents and purposes became another member of the axis. The accession of Yugoslavia to the side of the Rome-Berlin powers will undoubtedly exert a great influence on Bulgaria and Rumania to keep these countries not only neutral but actively friendly toward the totalitarian states.

The situation in Spain is also continuing to arrest sightings among the French. No Italian troops have left Spain, and there are considerable concentrations around Gibraltar and in Spanish Morocco. The Italian troops, which, it was announced, would be withdrawn after the victory parade on 15 May, for a time seemed destined to remain longer, when it was reported that the parade would not be held until 20 May. This rumor was later denied by Rumania, but in such a half-hearted fashion that one was left undecided whether or not it is true. France's accession to the anti-Comintern pact, the opening of Spanish ports to the German navy, and the retention of Italian troops in Spain does not portend any special friendliness and good-neighborliness toward France.

In internal politics the French were given an unusual surprise on 25 April when a new series of decrees laws were issued. These consisted of various economic and financial decrees all more or less concerned with the national defense, and in general increasing taxes, the number of working hours (without additional pay) and a reduction in various expenditures. The Minister of Finance stated that fifteen billion francs additional were needed to meet the increased costs of rearmament, and the country must be willing to make the sacrifices called for, since it was for the defense of France. As a whole, the decrees were fairly well received although there was much dissatisfaction in the Communist and Socialist press, who felt that too much of the burden was being placed on the poor man and not enough on the rich.

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FMDCB  
No. 222  
25 April 1973

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The trans-Atlantic liner "PARIS" mysteriously caught fire alongside the dock in Havre and finally sank. The official investigation has not yet been completed but the belief is unanimous that the disaster was caused by foreign sabotage. Several Senators demanded a reinforcement of the surveillance of foreigners of every description to avoid any further acts of sabotage.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 9 1973

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ATTACHÉ'S REPORT 17252-2 (6-5-2)  
903-140

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From Y Date 19 May, 1939 Serial No. 297 File No. 903-963  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Press

Subject FRANCE NAVY PERSONNEL  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

REMARKS:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

FRANCE - NAVY - Increase in Officer Personnel .

The decree-law of 12 April, 1939 published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of 22 April, 1939, provides for an increase in the different officer corps of the Navy. Article 1 of this decree states that :

" In the course of the years 1939 and 1940 the Minister of Marine is authorized to increase the recruiting of officers for the various corps of the Navy, and to proceed with promotions as necessary, provided that, for each year and in each corps, the distribution by grade will be arranged in such a manner as to maintain between the different grades the proportions set by the Law of 2 March, 1938 applying to naval officers. "

The distribution by grade of the officer complement fixed by the Law of 2 March, 1938 appears in the Budget voted for the Year 1939 . Using this as a basis, it has been possible to determine the strength to be reached by the end of 1940 :

- former officer strength : 2,295 .
- new officer strength : 2,590 .

According to this calculation, at the end of 1940 there should be :

18 Vice-Admirals,  
36 Rear Admirals,  
133 Captains ,  
275 Commanders,  
452 Lieut.-Commanders,  
971 Lieutenants,  
705 Lieutenants j.g. and Ensigns .

Strength provided for by the Law of 2 March, 1938 :

The number of officer personnel fixed by the Law of 2 March, 1938 was to be reached within a period of five years, commencing January 1st., 1938, it being stipulated that the first yearly increase should correspond to one third of the total increase contemplated for each corps, the other two thirds to be reached by equal yearly increases .

\*\*\*\*\*

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Report Y-297 , File No. 900-903, of 19 May, 1939.

The result is that the percentages prescribed in the budget of 1939 are far from being those fixed by the law of 2 March, 1938 and that, consequently, to determine the increases to be realized through application of the decree-law of 12 April, 1939, it is necessary to base oneself on the existing officer complements. We will consider that the percentages given in the 1939 budget have been reached. They are the following :

|                                 |      |
|---------------------------------|------|
| Vice-Admirals .....             | 16   |
| Rear Admirals.....              | 30   |
| Captains .....                  | 110  |
| Commanders .....                | 225  |
| Lieut.-Commanders.....          | 373  |
| Lieutenants .....               | 820  |
| Lieutenants (j.g.) and Ensigns. | 621. |

Contemplated increases :

A comparison of the two tables given above shows that, for each grade, increases to be effected within the years 1939 and 1940 are as follows:

|                                |      |
|--------------------------------|------|
| Vice-Admiral.....              | 2    |
| Rear-Admiral.....              | 6    |
| Captain .....                  | 23   |
| Commander.....                 | 50   |
| Lieut.-Commander.....          | 79   |
| Lieutenant .....               | 151  |
| Lieutenant(j.g.) and Ensigns.. | 84 . |

Promotions which it will be necessary to make :

The foregoing shows that, to reach the contemplated officer strength, additional promotions as outlined below must be effected. (In this calculation account has been taken of the fact that promotion to any grade calls for promotion in all the grades below that particular grade. Account has not been taken of the promotions which it will be necessary to make in order to fill the customary vacancies which occur on account of certain officers passing from the active status to the reserve status). Those additional promotions are as follows:

|                              |       |
|------------------------------|-------|
| Vice-Admiral .....           | 2     |
| Rear-Admiral .....           | 8     |
| Captain .....                | 31    |
| Commander.....               | 81    |
| Lieut.-Commander.....        | 160   |
| Lieutenant .....             | 311   |
| Lieut.(j.g.) and Ensign..... | 395 . |



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From Y Date 24 May, 1939 Serial No. 311 File No. 905-100  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable.

Subject **FRANCE** **NAVY** - **PERSONNEL**  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference (a) N.A. Paris Report Y-202 (903-100) of 28 March, 1939.

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INCREASE IN ENLISTED STRENGTH OF FRENCH NAVY.

An official decree dated 20 May, 1939 increases the enlisted strength of the French Navy from 77,500 to 82,500 (1939) and to 85,000 in 1940 .

Recent increases in complement of enlisted strength of French Navy have been :

|                                        |         |
|----------------------------------------|---------|
| Complement, 1 July 1938 .....          | 71,000  |
| Authorized complement Sept. 1938 ..... | 72,500  |
| Authorized complement Jan. 1939 .....  | 74,900  |
| Authorized complement March 1939 ..... | 77,500  |
| Authorized complement May 1939 .....   | 82,500  |
| Authorized complement for 1940 .....   | 85,000. |

Petty Officer strength is authorized as follows :

|                 |          |
|-----------------|----------|
| Year 1939 ..... | 16,500   |
| Year 1940 ..... | 17,850 . |

The Minister of Marine gave the following reasons for increase in enlisted strength of Navy :

**"Increase in Navy Strength :** The necessity for the Navy to be always in a state of alert, depending on degree of political tension, and the absolute necessity of avoiding national alarm by the frequent mobilization and discharging of reservists, demands a permanent increase in long term personnel to meet service requirements.

"The recall of reservists is at present the normal procedure to man the Navy; however, the fleet cannot efficiently operate unless manned by permanent crews composed of men on long term enlistments .

These

|                                                                              |                   |               |               |               |                   |                   |             |           |           |       |      |       |       |              |                       |               |        |          |                |                |          |      |      |          |          |      |          |          |      |                |       |
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| Tech.<br>Div.                                                                | C. in C.<br>Asst. | Com.<br>Sect. | Com.<br>Sect. | Com.<br>Sect. | C. in C.<br>Asst. | C. in C.<br>Asst. | Attached to | Operative | Com. Sec. | W. P. | Com. | P. T. | State | Com-<br>mune | Return to<br>Room No. |               |        |          |                |                |          |      |      |          |          |      |          |          |      |                |       |

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From "Y" Serial No. 311, File No. 903-100 of 24 May, 1939.

" These results cannot be obtained without increasing the present strength to 82,500 men (1939) and 85,000 in 1940 " .

Since Premier Daladier has received full powers to prepare the nation to meet a national emergency, mobilization of reservists has been going on in a quiet manner. However, the constant calling up and discharging of reservists, for many reasons (political and social) keeps the families and factories where the reservists work in a state of excitement as to just what is taking place. To change the system to suit the Army in present tension (expansion from 500,000 men to 1,200,000) is practicably impossible. The Navy, with such a small complement (85,000 out of present mobilization strength of 1,200,000) was easily adaptable to the change reported herein.

From items appearing in the maritime press it appears that the strength of the French Navy, should political tension continue and all ships be retained in commission in a state of alert, will have to be increased to 90,000 - 110,000 by 1942 . There are roughly 90 ships now authorized and under construction and completion is projected by 1942.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 24 1973

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From T Date 9 June, 1939 Serial No. 207 File No. 103-100  
(Commentary new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Source of information Press  
Subject POWERS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)  
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REMARKS.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the subject is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

## MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST FROM THE ITALIAN PRESS.

JUN 20 1939

48

- CATRO-SUEZ PIPE LINE.** Autotrasporti e Carburanti, 25 April: An oil pipe line will be constructed across the desert from Suez to Cairo following the lines of communication existing between these two points. Having to satisfy requirements of a military nature, the line will be underground. It will be of great strategic and commercial importance as it will place Egypt, which depends largely on Roumania for oil supplies, in a position to supply herself and also other markets.
- REPATRIATION OF ITALIANS.** Messaggero, 3 June: 800 repatriated Italians arrived at Ventimiglia yesterday from France. They were entertained at lunch by the local authorities, given presents of money from the Duce, and orders for immediate employment. They left in the afternoon for various destinations. Messaggero, 7 June: 250 Italians repatriated from Algeria arrived at Naples yesterday.
- FRENCH NAVAL FORCES INCREASED.** Messaggero, 3 June: It is announced from Paris that two new decrees have been published by which the French naval forces have been increased from 75,000 to 85,000 men. This is said to be necessary due to the amount of new construction, it being planned to build 240,000 tons of ships between 1940 and 1943. Naval bases are also to be increased especially in view of the fact that Toulon and Biserta are too vulnerable to air attack. 1,267,000,000 francs are to be spent this year on new ships and bases; two 22,000 ton aircraft carriers are to be launched early next year. During the last two weeks three 1,000 ton torpedo boats have been laid down and one 8,000 ton cruiser which will be ready next year. Two other units of the same type are to be laid down shortly.
- BULGARIAN VINDICATIONS.** Osservatore Romano, 6 June: The "Belgian" Agency publishes the following information received by its Sofia correspondent from the President of the Bulgarian Chamber in regard to the Bulgarian vindications: Referring to his previous statements published in the foreign press, the President affirmed that his words had been wrongly interpreted. He stated: 1) in regard to Macedonia: "We will not speak of it"; 2) in regard to Tracia and a Bulgarian outlet into the Aegean: "I hope that this matter may be arranged by friendly means"; 3) in regard to South Dobruja: "Bulgaria cannot live without this province upon which depends all the activity of Varna and Rustchuk".
- ITALIAN NAVY DAY.** The Minister of Marine has issued the following instructions to the Naval Squadrons and dependent authorities in regard to the celebration of Navy Day on 10 June:

All ships in national or colonial waters will full-dress ship during the day and will illuminate ship during the evening; Navy buildings and establishments will be illuminated until midnight. At mid-day, ships and gunning batteries of the Navy will fire a 21 gun salvo. Solemn ceremonies will be held in all Navy bases for the presenta-

Routing slip to be filled out by the attaché and forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., with the report. These slips should be filled out for the purpose of distribution to the various offices of the Navy Department.

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page 2.

tion of medals for military and naval valor. All laborers and employees of the Navy will receive one full day's pay. On all ships, in C.R.E.M. barracks, Navy Schools and Naval Artillery Militia schools, the Commandants will assemble all hands and give a lecture on the importance and significance of Navy Day. A similar talk will be given by all Directors of auxiliary yards and Commanders of Italian ships in port and at sea.

Altogether the naval forces and personnel working directly for the Navy that will celebrate Navy Day in all the main naval centers of Italy, Albania and the Empire and on all the seas of the world, will amount to the imposing figure of 250,000 men.

6. ITALIAN LEGIONARIES RETURN FROM SPAIN. Mussolini issued the following Order of the Day to the Italian Legionaries who returned to Italy from Spain on 6 June:

Comrades, Legionaries! The country salutes you upon your return to its sacred shores after 30 months of victorious war against the democracies and Bolshevism. You are preceded by thousands of your Comrades who fell heroically - you are accompanied by the legendary "Frecce", flower of the Spanish Army. Legionaries! On the battlefield you have sealed the union between Spain and Italy with your blood. Thanks to your sacrifices, the Spain of Franco has arisen - one, free and great. For 30 months you have been a nightmare - literally a nightmare - to the pluto-democracies, and of this you must be proud. The irresistible "Littorio" Division, well-known and feared, will remain in force. You have fully merited this great reward.

7. "ALONGSIDE THE ROCKS". The following editorial by Virginio Gayda is translated from the "Giornale d'Italia" of 6 June, 1939:

The ship of the encirclement policy is steering a difficult course and her unskillful mariners are constantly running her aground on rocks and sandbanks.

The Anglo-French-Soviet alliance, in which Daladier seems to have given place to Blum and Chamberlain seems to be following Churchill, is still under discussion. Molotov's written reply is not being examined by the Chancelleries of London and Paris. But Marshal Voroshilov who was to visit London for the Grand Maneuvers, has advised that he cannot leave Moscow and has deprived the British government of the pleasure of presenting him as an acquisition to the great bloc of encirclement.

Everyone in Europe has by now realized that this triple alliance between super-capitalism and anti-capitalism, even if it were concluded, could not represent an element of strength for the use of the two imperial democracies. It has required weeks of discussion even to get the pact down on paper. Much more discussion would be required to carry it on to the battlefield.

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page 3.

The interests in the dispute are divergent ones. Everyone talks of general and collective facts; of Europe, peace, liberty of nations, defense against the aggressor. But in reality each is thinking above all of his own interests. And it is right that this should be so since this is the reality of politics. Therefore the only authentic alliances are those in which the individual interests of the parties meet in common aims and are naturally united. This is the case in regard to the political and military alliance between Italy and Germany. It is not so in the case of the encirclement bloc organized by the two imperial democracies.

It is evident that in her bargaining Russia is thinking of three of her own interests. Above all she wants to acquire the prestige of political power both at home and abroad. She also wants to guarantee her frontiers towards the territory of the Baltic States. These territories, Esthonia, Latvia and Finland, were once under the domination of the Tsars. It is evident that the relations between a great guarantor State and small guaranteed States is one of dominion; that it works thus in time of peace and becomes a dubious association of forces of defense in time of war. It is for this reason that the Baltic States reject the guarantee. Esthonia has already spoken clearly. Latvia is raising her voice. Finland merely asks to be left out of this mix-up which does not regard her.

But it is clear that these are not the interests of France and Great Britain. Forgetful of the precedents that they themselves have created in regard to Roumania and Greece, the two imperial democracies now take cover behind the Baltic refusal of guarantees to evade the Soviet requests which would engage them in zones which do not affect their present needs.

The dispute between Paris, London and Moscow is therefore typical of the spirit which inspires the two contractors of encirclement and the material of which their great wall is to be built. France and Great Britain do not want to move outside their pre-established European center, the system and functions of the great machine which is intended to appear as/disinterested instrument of defense against the aggressor. As we have said before, the encirclement is merely a reprint, smaller and more manageable, of the League of Nations which was created and administered by the Franco-British company. The League of Nations died unscathed. It is remembered without regret - rather, with repressed anger at the time it wasted and the peace it imperilled. Its new edition meets, among the nations which merely want to be left alone, the resistance which is aroused by all useless enterprises of unwelcome memory.

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S. N. I. 88

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## ATTACHE'S REPORT 21555-9 (2-7-2)

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From **Y** Date **30 June 1939** Serial No. **402** File No. **200**  
(Commence new series each January first) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information **Personal observation**

Subject **FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, GERMANY, SWITZERLAND** **INTELLIGENCE**  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

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By SLR Date **MAY 2 1973**

OBSERVATIONS ALONG THE FRONTIER REGIONS OF BELGIUM, HOLLAND, FRANCE  
AND SWITZERLAND

The following observations made by a military officer are forwarded as of possible interest to the Department:

BELGIUM:

The valley of the Meuse river is quite strongly held as a great many troops were in evidence. All the bridges were guarded over the river and I was assured by various civilians with whom I talked that all of the bridges were mined and ready to be blown up in case of a German movement through Luxembourg. The main highway from Givet (France) to Namur was mined for a distance of about thirty kilometers.

Many detachments of recruits were seen drilling. Their equipment seemed serviceable but quite old. The anti-tank guns seen with the recruit units were old and did not look as though they would be practical in the field due to the ease with which they would upset. The distance between the wheels was very small. The guns, on the other hand, had an excellent prime mover in the form of a small tractor.

On June 15th I was informed by the Belgian and Dutch customs agents that ten German divisions had moved away from the frontier with Danzig and Moravia as their destination, and that several new divisions had been concentrated along the frontiers of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.

The new Albert Canal just completed seems to form a part of the defensive plans for Belgium. This canal runs from Antwerp to Liege and the portions of it viewed showed it to be a very serious obstacle to military operations if defended by an adequate force.

The wooded regions to the East of the Meuse river, between the river and the frontier seem to offer excellent defensive possibilities and the excellent condition of the roads through this relatively sparsely inhabited region and the numerous small detachments of soldiers seen seem to indicate that a defense is visualized initially in this area.

The inhabitants of the frontier region as well as those in the interior say that war will come shortly. They fix the date as the completion of the harvest in Germany.

HOLLAND:

Tremendous military activity was evident in Holland, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Company and battalion training was being carried out all through the region around Eindhoven and the troops and their equipment looked very good. The canals and the rivers in Holland seem to furnish excellent obstacles if defended, although no strong defensive works were seen and no artillery or aviation was in evidence for the support of a defense. The

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Sheet 2

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(d) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

Dutch seem to generally accept the fact that the Germans will make war within two months and that they will invade Holland.

## FRANCE:

The frontier regions of France from Metz to Strasbourg and from the latter city to Belfort seem thoroughly defended. The segments of the Maginot Line seem look solid and are well placed. The German fortifications along the Rhine at Strasbourg are very evident. The first line being right along the water's edge. The Rhine forms a tremendous obstacle and its crossing would be tremendously difficult in the face of any opposition.

From news leaking across the frontier it seems that Germans in all walks of life and regardless of sex and age have been conscripted to aid in the harvest.

The Swiss frontier is being fortified to block invasion from that direction. New works are being constructed by the military along the Doubs River on the Swiss frontier due east of Besancon. The infantry regiment at Besancon that was not moved out during the crisis of last September now has two of its three battalions in line. Reserve elements of this regiment are construction fortifications noted above.

Troops from reserve units are also installed along the frontier east of Pontarlier and the defensive works there look exceedingly solid. The natural defensive strength alone of this region is great.

French aviation activity seems to have a new lease on life. Landing fields are equipped with personnel and planes in regions where there was nothing last September.

The airfield at Romilly-sur-Seine is at least five times as large as it was in September from the point of view of personnel and buildings. The pursuit ships visible seemed to be the new Curtiss planes in contrast to the old French planes of September.

## SWITZERLAND:

The Swiss seem fully aware of the danger of a German drive coming down through western Switzerland to turn the Maginot line in France. The region from Neuchatel to Geneva presents little in the way of natural obstacles to progression of large forces and the possibility of water transportation for troops and supplies cannot be neglected. Swiss business men complain of the billions of francs (Swiss) that have had to be spent for military purposes. The tourist trade this year seems to be at an all time low. Practically no Swiss troops were seen as they are all concentrated on the German and Italian frontiers. It seems to be the general impression in Switzerland

| A-B-C-D-E            |                                                                                 |                |                |                    |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |                |
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### Sheet 3

that Italy and Germany will start a war in a very short time and that both of these powers will make an attack on Switzerland.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From Y Date 27 Sept, 1938 Serial No. 581  
(Continuation from serial 580 January 1938)

Source of information As noted

Subject FRANCE  
(Nation reported on)

WAR MOBILIZATION

(Index title as per Index sheet)

OFFICE OF  
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Notes: Navy mobilization; Channel Patrol Boats; Shortage of Clothing; Food Supplies; Ammunition supplies; Spies; British help; Gas masks; Anti-aircraft guns; Unemployment; French hopes of America joining war; The Daladier cabinet.

First Paragraph Page 2 + 3

The following notes, compiled by a member of the staff of this office, are forwarded as submitted:

Navy Mobilization (Fairly Reliable). In addition to the 85,000 men on active duty (which includes about 9,000 already mobilized since 1938 crisis) it is estimated that the Navy has mobilized about 75,000 men, including all specialist ratings.

Ages of navy men mobilized are mostly in the younger brackets - 25-35.

Word from Brest indicates that Brest is being evacuated, due to fear of bombing raids on military objectives, but that the town is full of navy personnel loafing around. In the coastal semaphore stations, where the war complement is about 6 men, there are 20 men on duty. A large number of the young navy men are transferred to aviation bases for training. Very few of the members of the merchant marine, or fishing industry, have been called to active service. Crews for ships building have been ordered to the yards, though ships not near completion, to help out with materials.

Channel Patrol Boats. Trawlers which can be replaced by sail yaws, as well as other propulsion craft available, are being taken over by the navy for patrol work in the channel. It is expected to utilize the older men (35-50) on this job.

Shortage of Clothing. (Reliable). There is an acute shortage of blankets and bedding - one-half of hotel bedding and blankets have been requisitioned and advertisements are in the press offering to purchase blankets at prices of 60 to 160 francs, depending on size and quality. Word received from a soldier mobilized stated that his company was sleeping on straw, using army overcoats for blankets, and that a good many of the troops caught cold.

Shoes and clothing factories are working day and night to catch up with shortage of supplies.

Food Supplies (Reliable). Word received from soldiers at the front states that the food is excellent and 100% better than that served to troops in the World War.

Ammunition Supplies (Fairly Reliable). A postal card received from a sergeant in the Maginot Line stated that as far as the eye can reach one can see ammunition piles and, contrary to the last war, the byword was "not to spare ammunition on the enemy."

Spies (Rumors). A member of the American Legion informed a member of this office that his son witnessed the arrest of a German spy dressed in a French uniform (posing as an Alsatian), who is accused of spreading rumors of thousands of French dead and wounded coming in from the front. Note: The French

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Sheet 2

O. 11682, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) in (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By S.I.R.

Date MAY 2, 1972

are not publishing any figures on dead and wounded.

British Help (Fairly reliable). One hears quite frequently in cafes Frenchmen making remarks, more or less jokingly, that the British will do the talking while the Frenchmen do the fighting. Note: An official notice was published to-day ordering the arrest of anyone criticising the British or Poles in connection with their conduct of the war. The anti-Britishers, especially the fairly well-to-do, blame the "City" for England's help to the Poles in order to stave off German financial and economic penetration in the Balkans.

Gas Masks (Fairly Reliable). Rumors have it that only the large congested cities have gas masks. One man stated that in his village only the Mayor has a gas mask and that, on the steps of the village church last Sunday, he gave an exhibition on the use of the mask to the delight of the small village population.

Anti-Aircraft Guns (Rumors). It is stated that only towns and cities in the war region circles coming within the scope of anti-aircraft protection have A.A. guns. A man stated that he personally verified that the large city of Clermont-Ferrand did not have one anti-aircraft gun, and further remarked that the Germans could easily verify this and fly over the city of Clermont-Ferrand and bomb it at their leisure.

Unemployment (Fairly Reliable). Since the date of mobilization the shock to industry was so great that unemployment has increased, notwithstanding the fact that 3,500,000 men were taken away from industry. Conversing with a manager of a small construction company on the reason for unemployment, it was stated:

(a) Since the last war, French industry is more or less "chain" and "machinery"; hence, the closing down of the entire plant when only a few key men leave. At the beginning of the last war, the French workman was still of the "hammer and chisel" type and no breakdown in heavy machinery took place.

(b) Large French plants, especially automobile plants, were not prepared for conversion to war work; hence, complete shut down for a short period prior to opening up for government work - trucks, tractors, ammunition, etc.

(c) Through fear of inflated rise in prices, many large stores willingly shut down to open up later with war prices marked up.

(d) Evacuation due to fear of possible air raids (something unknown in last war) has cleaned the big cities out of women and children; hence, the stagnation of business in districts which were once flourishing centers. All this brought unemployment in many industries catering to congested districts.

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| Director    | A-E-C-D-E |          |                |                | Micro-graph    | Ar-chives      | Budget         | C.M.O.         | Gen'l Board    | War College                     | M.I.R. Nav.    | Ond.           | T.S.R.         | C.A.R.         | Esp.           | S.A.A.         | M.A.A.            | Ann.           | U.S. M.C.      | H.Q.           |
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Sheet 3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

French hopes of Americans joining war (Reliable). It is surprising to hear from many French people, some through ignorance and other through press propaganda, the question, "What is America going to do; when is she going to decide?"

A good many people mistook the President's address to Congress on the neutrality law for a clear out demand for American participation in the war. This was partly due to the headlines in the French press: "America Pronounces To-morrow!" A member of this office, who went to a nearby store the day prior to the President's message, was immediately accosted by the proprietor, who said, "When is America going to decide - now is the time before it is too late I see Roosevelt has postponed his message until to-morrow." This man actually believed that the President's address was to be a demand for American participation in the war. When I explained that it was merely to remove an embargo so that we could sell war supplies, he nearly keeled over and remarked, "You're out for business."

Premier Daladier's Cabinet (Rumors). A member of this office listened to a conversation (a newspaper reporter, who just came from the Chamber of Deputies, did the talking) on discussion within the Daladier Cabinet. He stated that Daladier himself was known, by his close friends, as a "weakling" and that he never did anything without asking the advice of people weaker than himself - Bonnet, Sarraut, etc. It was stated that Daladier was criticised for not taking stringent war measures immediately upon mobilization, viz: issue of ration cards, gasoline cards, suppression of communist party, etc.

It was stated that the present war called for a "military" man in the form of a Dictator at the head of the government, and that such weaklings as Bonnet, Sarraut, etc., should be put aside. Daladier, being a Major in the Reserve, was even suggested for promotion to a high rank and, conjointly with General Gamelin, take over the government for the duration of the war.

The newspaper man stated that this plan was pending and that this was the real reason why the War Cabinet was not formed. It was also remarked that no one can agree on former Premier Flandin being in any cabinet.

It was stated that General Gamelin stated that France must find a Clemenceau as well as a General Foch and that pressure was being brought to bear on Daladier, by military men, to act before the fighting commences. It was remarked that the only candidate for Clemenceau's job was Andre Tardieu, who is at present near death in a hospital, but that Tardieu so despised the group of "weaklings" in the Chamber that he would not accept the job under any conditions.

Criticism was also made to Premier Daladier about men receiving wages of 100-150 francs per day in war industries when they could very easily be mobilized and receive army pay, thus saving the nation millions in high salaries,

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Sheet 4

not to mention the affect on morale of the troops.

It was stated that the French General Staff complained of the "sitting on the fence" of Italy as interfering with military operations and that a decision must be reached. It was remarked that the opinion of the Chamber was that Italy will remain strictly neutral and that General Franco has impressed upon Mussolini the importance to Spain of keeping the war out of the Mediterranean unless he was ready to see Spain return to a state of chaos.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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(Continued from previous page)  
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Subject **France** **Navy** **Increase in Corps**  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)  
Reference **(a) Y. No.297 (900-903)/ 19 May 1939.**

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INCREASE IN OFFICER PERSONNEL- FRENCH NAVY

**NCE**

| CORPS       |      |      |     |      |                    |        |      |                  |   |
|-------------|------|------|-----|------|--------------------|--------|------|------------------|---|
| Rank        | Line | Eng. | C&R | Ord. | Hydro :<br>graphic | Supply | Med. | Pharm:<br>acists |   |
| Admiral     | -    | -    | -   | -    | -                  | -      | -    | -                | - |
| Vice-Adm    | 18   | 2    | 3   | 2    | -                  | 2      | 2    | -                |   |
| Rear-Adm    | 36   | 6    | 12  | 8    | 2                  | 5      | 6    | 1                |   |
| Captain     | 142  | 15   | 38  | 27   | 4                  | 19     | 29   | 6                |   |
| Com. tender | 315  | 29   | 40  | 28   | 5                  | 31     | 47   | 8                |   |
| Lt. Comdr.  | 450  | 114  | 51  | 34   | 7                  | 50     | 95   | 16               |   |
| Lieut.      | 971  | 265  | 80  | 59   | 9                  | 104    | 157  | 28               |   |
| Lieut. (JG) | 703  | 130  | 44  | 25   | 4                  | 38     | 87   | 15               |   |
| Ensign      | 7    | 7    | 7   | 7    | 7                  | 7      | 7    | 7                |   |
| Warrants    | 446  | -    | -   | -    | -                  | -      | -    | -                |   |
|             | 3061 | 561  | 268 | 183  | 31                 | 249    | 421  | 74               |   |

Prepared and forwarded by:

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From Y Date 20 October 19 39 Serial No. 548 File No. 103  
 Source of information Press, personal observation, contacts  
 Subject FRANCE POLITICAL AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
 Reference (Notes reported on) (Notes file in the index sheet) (Subj's)

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France - General situation, period 13-20 Oct., 1939: Germans commence offensive action - no large-scale offensive envisaged in immediate future - German air raids on Firth of Forth and units of British Fleet - only minor material damage - mystery as to how German sub got in to sink ROYAL OAK - German submarine losses positively stated to be 12 destroyed and 4 possibly destroyed

For the first time since the war began, the German forces in the West moved to offensive action. Sometime ago, a General in the French Air Army declared, in conversation with the Attaché, that if the Germans really desired they could, in two days, throw back the French forces out of that part of Germany occupied by the French; i.e., the space between the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. This was principally because the French had no idea of entrenching themselves there, but if vigorously attacked would move back to the shelter of the Maginot Line, in order to avoid casualties. The truth of this statement was demonstrated by the German attacks on 16 and 17 October. When the attacks developed, the French forces slowly withdrew toward the Maginot Line. The French Army Staff characterizes the German attacks as only strong "coups de main" with no forces larger than a battalion participating at any one time and then only after considerable artillery preparation. The purpose of the attacks seemed merely for morale effect to cause the French to withdraw from German territory. There has as yet, been no direct attack against any of the main defenses of the Maginot Line. The French Army believes that any such offensive may occur only if there is a period of good weather, that is, weather suitable for large-scale air attacks, with the ground well dried out for tank operations. As long as the weather remains bad (continued rains on the 16th, 17th and 18th) it is considered that no large offensive action will be undertaken.

The air attacks against the British Fleet and the Fifth of Forth were made by only a small number of German planes, and are regarded more as "feeling out" attacks to determine the location of land anti-aircraft batteries, time to get interception planes in the air, etc., than as any serious effort against the British Fleet. Outside of actual damages caused, such attacks, of course, have an annoyance and nuisance value. Only minor material damage was caused to British warships, and almost the entire loss of personnel (2 officers and 13 men killed and some 25 wounded) were caused, not by bombs but by low-flying planes diving on ships and machine-gunning anti-aircraft crews and other exposed personnel. Of the German bombers taking part in the two raids, 12 on 16 October and 6 on the 17th) four were put out of action on the first day and two on the second. Fire from anti-aircraft guns accounted for one plane each day.

The loss of the "ROYAL OAK", by torpedoes, while at anchor in Soap Flow was a most disagreeable surprise to the British. Just how the submarine managed to enter and escape from the anchorage, protected by nets and mine-fields, is not yet definitely known, but one report states that the submarine lay off Soap Flow for two days and discovered the mine and net-free channels from watching British ships go in and out.

The French Ministry of Marine stated positively that up to 17 October, the total of German submarine losses from all sources, French and British, air and surface, were 18 destroyed, certainly, and 4 additional possibly destroyed. However, the campaign against submarines has been effective in that the submarines are now operating from two to four hundred miles at sea, and not close

[illegible]

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## RESULTS

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and E.O. 11652

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(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

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Official number casualties 1st month of war - period only a fairly successful one for Allies, diplomatically - attitude of Italy continues neutral - French uneasy because continued building of fortifications along French frontier on Italian side - another annoyance is large shipment petroleum into Germany - France to demobilize approximately 500,000 soldiers.

## Sheet 2

aboard French or British coasts.

The Ministry also reported that the official number of casualties in the French Army in the first month's fighting (September 3rd to October 3rd) was 952, killed and wounded. The French Staff was endeavoring to keep losses as small as possible.

This period has been only a fairly successful one for the Allies in international diplomatic dealings. German and Russian influence is particularly strong and active in Roumania. The French and British have been trying to get out of Roumania interned Polish pilots, specialists, and hoping eventually to acquire plain soldiers with a view to using them in France. All such efforts have been thwarted by German and Russian pressure requiring Roumania to refuse the delivery of a single ex-Polish soldier.

The signing of the Franco-British-Turkish Pact, however, is a considerable diplomatic victory for the Allies. It is reliably stated that the Russo-Turkish negotiations were called off, because the Turks, after agreeing to keep belligerent warships out of the Black Sea, would not accept a German-Russian agreement concerning zones of influence in the Balkans. Then since the talks had stopped, the Turks signed up in a mutual assistance pact, with no limitation on warships in the Black Sea. Even though the mutual help agreement does not apply if the U.S.S.R. engages in hostilities against the Allies, nevertheless, German advance and influence in the Balkans is now materially curtailed. Of even greater importance, oil shipments by tanker may be hindered, although how this can be done without bringing Russia into the war is difficult to foresee.

The attitude of Italy continues to be one of neutrality. Five thousand Italian troops have been withdrawn from the Dodecanese to the Metropolis as well as one thousand from Libya. Italian troops have also been withdrawn from the French border, but some uneasiness exists among the French because of the continued building of defence fortifications near the French border and by the accumulation of military supplies in depots in northern Italy. A further annoyance is the continuance of steady, large shipments of petroleum and gasoline to Germany from the port of Trieste.

With the present limited extent of the battle front, France has now more soldiers than is required, and "to aid the economic life of the country," the classes of 1910 and 1911 are to be demobilized, together with certain other special categories of older men. In all, the number of men thus sent out of the army amounts to about 500,000.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1974

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- Page 2 -

**Article 2.** The Consultative Committee is presided over by the Minister of Armament, or his representative .

A representative of the following ministries :  
Finance, Blockade, War, Navy, Air, Commerce, Agriculture, Colonies, Public Works, Merchant Marine, and Labor .

And 120 representatives of diverse industries of interest to National Defense, as well as secretaries, etc. .

**Article 3.** The Consultative Committee may hold session : in general assembly of all members ; reduced assembly consisting of members of Parliament, delegates of the various Ministries and sections providing for 2 members for each section ; groups of sections, or part of sections .

**Article 4.** The representative of the Minister acting as president of the Committee, the president of sections, and members of the committee are named by the Minister of Armament. However, any person may be summoned to appear before the Committee on questions of National Defense .

**Article 5.** Rules governing the functioning of the Consultative Committee shall be determined by the Minister of Armament in an official decree .

**Article 6.** The chief of the technical services of the Ministry of Armament will assume the duties of Secretary of the committee and will assign and distribute the work of the committee .

**Article 7.** The Minister of Armament is charged with the execution of the present decree .

Dis

| Tech. Div. | C. in C. U. S. | Com. Sec. For. | Com. Sec. For. | C. in C. Asst. | Com. S. S. S. | Com. Air | Attended at | Operations |       |      |       | Status | Comments | Return to Room No. |
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From Y Date 2 Jan., 1940 Serial No. 5  
Source of information Reliable  
Subject FRANCE NAVY  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet)  
Reference (a) N.A. Paris Report Y.No. 528 (901-100) of 4 October, 1939.

REMARKS.—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

FRANCE - NAVY - BUILDING PROGRAM : Changes due to exigencies of war.

The Second Bureau informed this office, informally, that the following changes in the French building program were considered necessary due to exigencies of present war :

- Battleships : Battleship RICHELIEU now approximately 85% completed is to be pushed with a view to commissioning in the Spring of 1940.
- Battleships JEAN-BART, CLEMENCEAU, and LA GASCOGNE, construction held in abeyance .
- Cruisers : Construction of DE GRASSE, CHATEAU-RENAULT, and GUICHEN held in abeyance .
- Barriers : Construction of JOFFRE and PAINDRE held in abeyance .
- Flotilla Leaders : Construction on HOOHE, MARCAU, KLEBER and DESAT, will commence as soon as construction of small tonnage destroyers is completed .
- Destroyers, Minesweepers, and other vessels of building program : Work is speeded up on all small craft, especially destroyers and mine-sweepers, in view of suitability for convoy and minesweeping .

Reasons given for curtailment of building program are :

- Probable changes in design of heavy craft due to lessons of present war;
- Urgent need of small craft for convoy and minesweeping operations.

RE. 2. MINER, Sec. 2(15) and 2(16) are (15)

OSD:letter, May, 4, 1940

By SLR

Date 21 1940



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From Y Date 15 April, 1940 Serial No. 148  
Source of information Personal observations.  
Subject FRANCE AVIATION Planes & Engines.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
Reference

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General Report containing observations made by Asst. Naval Attaché for Air during recent inspections of aircraft and engine factories.

1. Types of guns, and bombs, carried by fighter planes Lioré and Bréguet. Trend is definitely toward power driven multiple gun turrets for heavy bombardment aircraft to replace the 20 m.m. free gun, but the 20 m.m. shell cannon has proved its worth as an offensive weapon for fighting aircraft as a fixed gun installation.
2. Necessity of providing armor protection for pilot and gunner.
3. Fire resistant fuel tanks necessary.
4. New Pursuit type aircraft (VO-33) all wood, speed 660 Km/hr., expected to go into production during coming summer.
5. Dewoitine 520 Fighter: redesign of oil and water radiators - These modifications increased speed to 560 Km/hr.
6. Morane 450 Fighter Prototype - all metal construction - will probably be equipped with 1300 h.p. Hispano-Suiza Engine.
7. Hispano-Suiza C\* at present producing approx. 300 engines of the 12-Y type, monthly. Is making experiments with new type mechanical supercharger. War experience shows high performance at altitude requires turbo supercharger. Hispano-Suiza Co. has already developed exhaust turbine supercharger that will carry rated power to 33000 ft. and even higher.
8. Hispano-Suiza has designed new engine of 1300 h.p. that will weigh approx. 1100 lbs.
9. Fuel injection considered superior to all other fuel systems.

During the past week visits have been made to several French aircraft and engine plants, on which full reports will be submitted later. The following notes, considered of particular interest, are forwarded in advance of the routine reports.

Lioré-45 Heavy Bomber -

Armament : 1 - 20 m.m. free gun aft, 1 - 7.5 m.m. forward.

Bomb Capacity: 2 - 1000 lbs. bombs carried in wing bomb compartments. Provision for carrying numerous small bombs, incendiary type, in fuselage compartments (exact number not known).

Note:— It is understood that although the 20 m.m. free gun is an ingenious and excellent installation, the French have decided that one large, slow firing gun does not provide adequate protection aft and that this installation will be replaced in later types by the English-built 4 - 7.5 mm. power driven turret).

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| Director                                                                                                                                          | A-B-C-D-E                                                    | Major          | Arch           | Index          | C.N.O.      | Gen'l      | War         | N.I.D.      | Nav.      | Ord. | T.S.R.      | C.A.R. | Eng.        | S.A.A.    | M.A.S.    | Asst. | U.S. | H.O. |
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Date

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— Sheet 2 —

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

BRUGNOT Attack Aircraft :

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

Type 693 equipped with Gnôme-Rhône M-series engine, 675 h.p. at 3600 meters altitude,

and Type 695 equipped with Pratt & Whitney 1535 SB4G type engine of 750 h.p.

Armament :

Forward ( 1 - 30 m.m. cannon,  
( 2 - 7.5 m.m. Châtelleraut fixed guns .

Aft : ( 1 - 7.5 m.m. free sky gun  
( and  
( 1 - 7.5 m.m. fixed tunnel gun firing directly aft,  
( operated by remote control by rear gunner.

Bomb Capacity : 8 - 100 lbs. bombs housed in center fuselage compartment, on vertical bomb-rack - dropped by rear gunner who also actuates access doors to bombing compartment .

Armor Protection for Pilot : 7 m.m. armor plating provided to rear and underneath the pilot and to rear of rear gunner.

Bréguet 700 twin-engined Fighter :

This is an experimental model having installed 2 - 1000 h.p. Gnôme-Rhône engines and the following armament :

Forward : 2 - 30 m.m. and  
4 - 7.5 m.m. fixed guns.

Aft : 2 - 7.5 m.m. Châtelleraut free sky guns, and  
2 - 7.5 m.m. fixed (cone firing) tunnel guns .

VO-33 Pursuit Prototype .

This plane is expected to have high speed of around 650 km/hr. It will probably go into production this summer. It is wooden construction throughout and is considerably smaller than present pursuit types. It is to be equipped with the new Hispano-Suiza 18 cylinder engine rated at 1300 H.P. at 6300 meters, and 1500 H.P. for take-off .

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| Director   | B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16 | Man-graph      | Arch-ive       | Budget        | C.N.O.      | Gen'l Board | War College | M.I.D.     | Nat.  | Ord.           | I.S.B. | C.S.R. | Eng.      | S.A.A.             |
| Yach. Div. | C. in C. U. S.                                               | Com. Bat. For. | Com. Sea. For. | C. in C. Asia | Com. S.S.S. | Com. Air    | Attache at  | Operations |       |                |        | State  | Com-merce | Return to Room No. |
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(2) and 2(3) OF (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

Detroit 580 Fighter -

Recent wind tunnel tests have proven advisability for redesign of oil and water radiators. These changes have increased the speed of this plane to 560 Km. an hour, equipped with a standard Hispano-Guiza 13-Y engine rated at 860 h.p. at 3600 meters.

Merano 450 Fighter Prototype -

Only the fuselage of this plane was seen. It is all-metal construction and appears to be even larger than the Curtiss P-36. It is believed to have been designed to take the 1300 h.p. Hispano-Guiza engine.

Hispano-Guiza Engines -

The Hispano-Guiza Company is now producing only the 13-Y type and it is estimated that the rate of production is approximately 300 per month. This engine is fitted with a standard type single speed, single-stage compressor with a critical altitude of 3600 meters. Several engines have been fitted with an experimental mechanical supercharger of novel design, having installed 3 concentric rotors which are said to boost the critical altitude to 6800 meters. Considerable work is being conducted with superchargers for fighters since experience to date indicates that practically all action by these aircraft takes place above 8000 m. High altitude performance is therefore a pressing necessity and work on superchargers is being rushed to the utmost.

Superchargers: The Hispano-Guiza Company has developed exhaust turbine superchargers, weighing approximately 67 lbs. One supercharger is fitted to each bank and is mounted to the rear of the engine - Complete installation of two units weighs 135 lbs. High heat is avoided by cooling the exhaust through ducts which take the air from directly behind the propeller. This supercharger will carry rated power to 33000 feet and probably higher.

New 1300 H.P. Hispano-Guiza Engine -

This engine has a rather long nose, a small frontal area, and is equipped with exhaust driven superchargers for each bank. Only a glancing view was permitted and the designer declined to answer questions but stated that the engine would weigh considerably less than a pound per h.p., - approximately 1100 lbs.

Fuel Injection -

The Hispano-Guiza Company have in their laboratory one Junker-Bell and one Daimler-Benz 601 A. engines which have been placed at their

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From Y Date 15 April 1940 Serial No. 148 File No. 1000  
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- Sheet 4 -

disposal by the French Government for inspection and study. The Jumo engine weighs 750 Kilos, complete, including engine mount, and the Daimler-Benz slightly less. The fuel injection system of the Jumo is considered superior to the Daimler-Benz. The greatest interest is professed in fuel injection and a great deal of experimental work is now in progress.

**RESUME** - As a general review, and for purposes of emphasis, it is desired to invite attention to the following trends of development influenced by general war experience :

- 1) The trend is definitely toward power driven multiple gun turrets for heavy bombardment aircraft to replace the 30 m.m. free gun, but the 30 m.m. shell cannon has proved its worth as an offensive weapon for fighting aircraft as a fixed gun installation.
- 2) High performance at altitude requires turbo super-charger.
- 3) Fuel injection is considered superior to all other fuel systems.
- 4) Armor protection for pilot and gunner necessary.
- 5) Fire resistant fuel tanks necessary.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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| Director      | B-1         | B-2               | B-3               | B-4               | B-11           | Memor-<br>graph | Archiv-<br>es | Budget | C.N.O.     | Com'l<br>Board | War<br>College | H.L.D. | Nav. | Ord. | T.S.D. | C.S.R. | Eng. | S.A.A. | M.S.S. | Aers. | U.S.<br>M.C. | H.O. |
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From Y Date 18 April, 1940 Serial No. 150 File No. 902-100  
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Source of information Reliable.  
Subject FRANCE NAVY PROGRAMS.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Submit)  
Reference NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

REMARKS—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

## PROJECTED FRENCH NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM OF 200,000 TONS.

The Minister of Marine, appearing before the Naval Committee of the Chamber on 3 April, 1940, stated that it has been decided to project a 200,000-ton building program composed of various types of ships.

In view of the fact that the present authorized building program (supposed to be completed by 1942) will not be completed until perhaps 1943, it is very probable that the projected 200,000 additional tons is only on paper.

On inquiry from reliable officers in the Navy Second Bureau, this office was advised that, actually, the 200,000 tons referred to by Minister Campinchi are, in effect, only a program, and that because of lack of building facilities, it would not be commenced before the spring or summer of 1941.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(F) on 080

OSD Letter, May, 3, 1978

By SLR

DATE: MAY 3 - 1979

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| Directed                                                                                                                                                                                      | A-B-C-D-E                                                    | Major graph | In-charge      | Budget         | C.H.O.        | Gen'l Board  | War College | N.I.D.      | Nav. | Ord. | T.S.R.      | C.A.R. | Eng. | S.S.A.    | M.S.S. | Arm.          | U.S. M.C. | N.O.      |                       |
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## 116-12

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From \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_ 19\_\_\_\_  
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| Subject              | Topic                           | Production                                        |
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| (Nation reported on) | (Main title as per index guide) | (subtitles) (Make separate report for each title) |

**Summary** (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

### Estimate of French average production in 1942.

Estimate by French of present German aircraft production.

**Possible Common pilot shortage.**

An officer in the Economic Bureau d'Air stated that he considered Canada a complete protection, exclusive of all training planes, to be at present 2,000 a month.

When questioned about present and prospective French plane production for German military needs, he stated this work was now getting under way, but that after a very careful and painstaking survey of man, material and plant facilities at the disposal of the French, a report had recently been made to General Hapgood that the maximum French production by the end of 1942 would be about 200 planes a month. New factories will have to be built, or the old ones completely re-equipped, machine tools were practically non-existent, and most of the material would have to come from Germany. How efficient the comparative the French labor would be was a question which still had to be answered.

He also stated that the Germans to date had practically refused all information to the French. When asked about German pilots and planes, he said that German plane production might easily be running ahead of good pilot material, and that as far as the pilots of the dive-bombing Stukas were concerned they were only good for 20 to 30 flights, and then had to be rested and transferred to another branch of the service.

REF ID: A55175

E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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