

*Documentation of Moscow
Conference.*

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JUN 2 1972

Secret

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Most Secret Protocol

*Copy not
For the President*

of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through the 30th of October, 1943.

*BSF.
Trip File*

The following took part in the discussions:

For the United States: Mr. Harriman,
Major General Deane,
Brigadier General Vandenburg,
Captain Ware.
For the United Kingdom: Sir A. Clark-Kerr,
Lieutenant General Ismay.
For the U.S.S.R.: Marshal K. E. Voroshilov,
A. Ya Vyshinski,
Major General Gryzlov.

"THE CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO SHORTEN THE DURATION OF THE WAR AGAINST HITLERITE GERMANY AND HER ALLIES IN EUROPE"

(Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the 19th October, 1943)

On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the 19th October, 1943, made the following proposals which were handed in writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull:

"For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is proposed:

- (1) To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in 1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to determine whether

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the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American forces will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force.

- (2) To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.
- (3) To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle against Germany."

(a) With regard to point (1) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 19th October 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hull, on the 20th October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the British Lt-General Ismay and the American Major-General Deane (see appendices: statement of Lt-General Ismay and statement of Major-General Deane) as being an accurate presentation of the most recent decisions of their Governments, taken at the Quebec Conference in August 1943.

With regard to the question put by the Soviet Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull gave an affirmative reply declaring that the decision to undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the recent conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull added that this decision has not been changed and that preparations to carry out the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as rapidly as possible.

The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V.M. Molotov, stated that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden's and Mr. Hull's statements, as well as of the statements of Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements, will be carried out on time.

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- (b) With regard to points (2) and (3) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation (regarding Turkey and Sweden)-

Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V.M. Molotov recognize the desirability of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Soviet Union continuing to study the question of Turkey and Sweden.

- (c) The United States delegates placed the following proposals before the conference.

(1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

(2) That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it is essential that means of communication between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. be strengthened.

(3) That air communication between these two countries be improved.

V. M. Molotov said that the U.S.S.R. agrees to the United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out these proposals.

Cordell Hull

W. Averell Harriman

Anthony Eden

13 Nov 43

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STATEMENT MADE BY LT. GEN. ISMAEL BEGORE TRI-
PARTIAL CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 20TH, 1943.

I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put forward by the Soviet Delegation:-

"In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being proposed:

That the Governments of Great Britain and the U.S.A. take in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American armies and, coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main German forces on the Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a decisive shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943, by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt to the effect that Anglo-American forces will undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains valid."

The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will, I hope, interrupt if I say anything with which he does not agree, and will in any case amplify and explain those matters which are predominantly American interests.

Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together, the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two months ago at Quebec:-

The overall objective is -

"In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe."

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I should not, however, like it to be inferred that we can concentrate the whole of our combined resources against the Axis in Europe. It is essential for us to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by General Deane.

I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the operations to be undertaken in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order, but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever increasing scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to have the highest strategic priority.

As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night. The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The graph which I now pass round shows the steadily mounting weight of bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German Air Force was concentrated on us.

It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same intensity that we have been attacking Northern Germany during the past year. These industries have hitherto been out of reach or at extreme range.

I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary U.S./British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944. This invasion is to be launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in the English Channel become favourable.

The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being

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made to increase the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the anti-submarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches until such time as deep water ports have been captured and put into order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is essential.

I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.

The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, G.A. F. and training divisions. The beach and coast defences of France and the low Countries have been built up over the long period of German occupation. Our experience at Dieppe showed without any doubt that, even to gain a footing in North West Europe, is a most formidable operation. Moreover, the enemy disposes of excellent lateral communications across Europe which enable him to move reinforcements to the West by road and rail far quicker than we could reinforce our initial lodgments by sea. The enemy rate of reinforcement is thus limited by the availability of his forces and not by his communications.

In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be fulfilled.

First, there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the date of the assault. It is expected that the ever increasing Anglo-American bomber offensive will produce this result.

The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions during the first two months of the operations.

It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the following:-

- (I) The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber forces.
- (II) The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American land and air forces in Italy.

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- (III) Allied landings in Southern France - threatened or actual, synchronising with the invasion of Northern France.
- (IV) Operations in the Balkans by guerilla forces which will be sustained by sea and by air.
- (V) And lastly, but of course by far the most important of all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the Soviet forces.

The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.

I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were conceived in three phases.

(I) First phase:

The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north;

(II) Second phase:

Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;

(III) Third phase:

The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force, into Southern France.

It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre. Seven U.S. and British battle-tried divisions are to be brought back in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel. These are divisions which have had experience in amphibious warfare. It has been laid down that, wherever there is a shortage of resources of any kind, the governing principle will be that they will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of the invasion of Northern France.

The operations described above will stretch our resources to the limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken to give effect to these plans. In the first place,

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U.S. divisions are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate this point. Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom are being reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane will also speak on this point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is being turned into one vast airfield. Fourthly, a cross-Channel invasion on the scale contemplated against long prepared defences, manned by German troops, is an operation of a character which has never before been attempted in the history of war. It requires most extensive and elaborate administrative preparations at the ports of embarkation and on the lines of communication leading to the ports. All these measures are being pressed forward with the greatest vigour.

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Appendix-1.

STATEMENTS MADE BY MAJOR GENERAL J. R. DEANE,
U. S. A., BEFORE CONFERENCE 23 OCTOBER 1943.

In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would insure an invasion of Northern France. I should like to outline some of the measures that are now under way.

In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this presentation I have asked General Vandenberg to present pictures of our most recent bombing operation against Marienburg. Target in this instance was the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory. It was moved to Marienburg by the Germans for security reasons. Its destruction was almost complete. This particular picture was selected as an illustration because the objective was the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been attacked thus far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front. (at this point General Vandenberg displayed several pictures of bombing operations and explained their significance.)

As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel operation is the bomber offensive of the British-- American air forces from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by 1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a cross-channel operation. The build-up of the force necessary for the bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the addition of United States formations. At the present time the United States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4-engined heavy bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately

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2,300 fighter aircraft by that date. The R. A. F. strength will be about the same and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full operation strength.

The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed in Southern England. This construction is underway and will be completed prior to the time the operation is launched.

The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a build-up of 30 mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial bridgehead.

The build-up of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate transporting more than one million men from the United States to Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require the unloading of 400 personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in the United Kingdom during that period. To do so will tax the port capacity of Britain to the utmost and require that it be diverted exclusively to this purpose.

Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in the over-all production program.

It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.

I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are a great many others. The military mission of the United States in Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our respective staffs.

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With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the translation of them for your information. The proposals are as follows:

That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, that U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. communications be strengthened.

That improved air transport be effected between the two countries.

Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the validity of the decision for a cross-channel operation I made the following statement:

The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as is the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production effects the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.

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Moscow, November 1, 1943

PERSONAL AND ~~MOST SECRET~~

Dear Mr. Hull:

I received today your letter concerning the desirability of completing the most secret Protocol by the inclusion of the proposal of the delegation of the United States under point 1 of the agenda. Desiring to meet your desire, I expressed my agreement with your proposal to include it as the last point of the most secret Protocol with certain changes of a drafting nature in the text of my statement presented by you. This, I hope, will assure the completeness of the protocol which you desired. I attach to this letter the text of the supplementary portion of the Protocol with the drafting corrections, etc.

With sincere esteem,

(Signed) V. Molotov

Enclosure.

Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the
United States of America,
Moscow.

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Translation from English

(c) The United States delegates placed the following proposals before the conference.

(1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the U.S.S.R. on which U. S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

(2) That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it is essential that means of communication between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. be strengthened.

(3) That air communication between these two countries be improved.

V. M. Molotov said that the U.S.S.R. agrees to the United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out these proposals.

Copy for the President
DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY.

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization/

organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

H. Roosevelt

Winston Churchill

Cordell Hull

Zou Taifeng

MOSCOW,

30th October, 1943.

ANNEX 2.

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

1. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to establish a European Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the three Powers. The Commission will have its seat in London and will meet as soon as possible. The presidency will be held in rotation by the representatives of the three Powers. A joint secretariat will be established. The representatives may be assisted where necessary by technical advisers, civilian and military.
2. The Commission will study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it. For this purpose the members of the Commission will be supplied by their Governments with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work.
3. As one of the Commission's first tasks the three Governments desire that it shall as soon as possible make detailed recommendations to them upon the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European states with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms. The Commission will take into account, as part of the material for its study of these matters, the memorandum of July 1st, circulated by the United Kingdom Government to the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, regarding the principles which should govern the conclusion of hostilities with European enemy States. The Commission will also take account of the experience already gained in the imposition and enforcement of unconditional surrender upon Italy.
4. Representatives of the Governments of other United Nations will, at the discretion of the Commission, be invited to take part in meetings of the Commission when matters especially affecting their interests are under discussion.
5. The foregoing terms of reference will be subject to review by the three Governments if circumstances should arise which call for an extension of the membership and competence of the Commission.
6. The establishment of the Commission will not preclude other methods of consultation on current or other issues which the three Governments think it desirable to discuss. There may for example be questions calling for special consideration. These questions may be handled by tripartite discussions in one or other of the three capitals (Washington, London or Moscow, as may be found most convenient) between the head of the Foreign Ministry and the permanent diplomatic representatives of the other two Governments.
7. There may also be questions calling for international or special tripartite conferences.

ANNEX 3.

ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY.

1. An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith, composed in the first instance of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable, in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.
2. Each Representative will be assisted, where necessary, by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational questions. The members of the Council will be supplied by the respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several recommendations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, concern themselves with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing the terms of surrender.
5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters affecting the Council's work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.
6. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and the United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of the Italian administration to an end, the Commander-in-Chief will relinquish the presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume the direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission.

ANNEX 4.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:-

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organisations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

ANNEX 5.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR FRANCE.

The primary purpose of the Allied landing in France will be the defeat of Germany. Subject only to this, it will be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority may be able to assume the civil administration. The ultimate aim of the Allies is the free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live. Meanwhile and until this stage is reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security shall be restored to the French people. As far as the over-riding interests of military operations allow, there shall be freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press and of correspondence. The French flag shall be used on French public buildings.

With these considerations in mind, the following principles may be laid down as governing the civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities.

1. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity requires, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war against Germany may continue unhampered.
2. The civil administration under the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in France.
3. The two Governments will inform the French Committee of National Liberation that the Supreme Allied Commander will invite the French military authorities to appoint a military mission on civil affairs to his headquarters. The Supreme Allied Commander shall in the planning of civil affairs consult the French military authorities appointed to assist in this work and give consideration to the policies recommended by them. When operations start, the French Military Liaison Mission shall be associated in the direction of civil affairs.
4. Military control of civil affairs will be of as short duration as is practicable. The time of termination of military control will be decided by C.C.S. on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.
5. If circumstances permit, the transfer of civil responsibility to French hands may be progressive.

6. . . .

6. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of government under which they wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander shall do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.

7. One of the first tasks of civil affairs staff of the Supreme Allied Commander on entering French territory will be to establish relations with resistance groups within France and to secure their cooperation in civil matters.

8. The Supreme Allied Commander shall have no dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of liquidating it. He will not retain or employ in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause.

ANNEX 6.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15th, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

ANNEX 7.

THE FUTURE OF POLAND AND DANUBIAN AND BALKAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF FEDERATIONS.

The Soviet Government consider the liberation of small countries and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks in the post-war arrangement of Europe and in the creation of lasting peace. For this purpose the defeat of aggressive force, as a result of the victory of the allies and the removal of the threat of new aggression, at any rate in the first years after the war, will create favorable conditions. The Soviet Government consider that the small countries will require some time, which cannot yet be definitely calculated and which will not be the same for all of them, to enable them fully to orientate themselves in the new situation created as a result of the war and in the re-created relationships with neighboring and other States, without being subjected to any outside pressure to join this or that new grouping of states. The premature and possibly artificial attachment of these countries to theoretically planned groupings would be full of danger both for the small countries themselves, as well as for the future peaceful developments of Europe. Such an important step as federation with other states and the possible renunciation of part of their sovereignty is admissible only as a result of a free, peaceful and well-considered expression of the will of the people. It is to be feared that neither the existing emigré governments nor even the governments which will be set up immediately after the conclusion of peace under conditions still not sufficiently normal, will be able fully to ensure the expression of the real will and permanent aspirations of their people. The creation of such federations by the decisions of emigré governments, which, in virtue of their special situation, cannot be closely bound with their people, might be interpreted as imposing on the people decisions not in conformity with their wishes. It would be particularly unjust if countries which had become satellites of Hitlerite Germany should at once be placed, as equal members of any such federation, in conditions as favorable as those of other small states which had been the victims of attack and occupation at the hands, among others, of those same satellites, and thus freed from the consequences of their part in the Hitler-Mussolini crimes.

Moreover, some of the plans for federations remind the Soviet people of the policy of the "cordon sanitaire", directed as is known, against the Soviet Union and therefore viewed unfavorably by the Soviet people.

For these reasons the Soviet Government consider it premature from the point of view of the interests both of the small countries themselves, and of the general post-war settlement of Europe, now to plan and thus artificially to encourage combinations of any states in the form of federations and so forth. They will in due course be ready to re-examine this question in the light of the experience of post-war cooperation with other United Nations and of the circumstances which may arise after the war.

ANNEX 8.

JOINT ACTION FOR ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

1. In the immediate post-war period, the most urgent matters of relief and rehabilitation in third countries presumably will be taken care of on a cooperative basis, mainly through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

2. We believe that it would be desirable to have the longer-range work of reconstruction dealt with on a cooperative, joint-action basis. In this connection, economic and financial experts of the United States have given preliminary study to the possibility of setting up an international lending agency which would supplement the facilities which may be offered by private investors, private financial institutions, and governmental lending agencies.

3. The important question of the amount of aid for rehabilitation from the long-range viewpoint will of course have to be determined, from time to time in the future, by each Government in the light of developments relating to the ability of a given nation to render material aid, while at the same time receiving the necessary support of public opinion.

ANNEX 9.

BASES OF OUR PROGRAM FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The basic objective of our economic policy is to help create conditions which would enable each country after the war to restore its economic activity as rapidly and as effectively as possible, and thereafter to improve progressively its production, distribution, employment and living standards. All this requires a large measure of international cooperation in many directions.

The first obvious steps, some of which will need to be undertaken even before the attainment of complete victory, relate to international cooperation in providing relief and to cooperative arrangements for the handling of economic problems involved in the occupation of enemy territories and operations in liberated countries. Arrangements required for these purposes are now under way through the negotiations looking to the convocation of a United Nations Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation and through such measures as the creation of the Mediterranean Commission.

Beyond these steps, international cooperation in the economic field will be indispensable for the following purposes:

1. Bringing about an expansion of international trade on a non-discriminatory basis. To this end we believe that consideration needs to be given to the following:

The conclusion of a general convention to which all of the important countries of the world would be parties, which would lay down the rules and principles that should govern trade relations between nations. Such a convention would contain provisions whereby each country would abstain from practices such as nations in the past have adopted in a futile attempt to benefit themselves at the expense of world trade and the welfare of other nations. It would make provision for concrete steps whereby the participating countries would abandon preferences and discriminations, reduce their trade barriers and refrain from export dumping practices. The agreement or agreements would be so drawn as to enable a state-trading country to adhere on an equitable basis.

2. The orderly regulation and ultimately the elimination of arrangements, public or private, to restrict production and trade in individual commodities. To this end we believe that consideration should be given the following:

a. The conclusion of special international agreements relating primarily to the marketing of commodities in chronic over-supply or subject to extreme variation in prices.

b. International

b. International arrangements for the regulation of cartel activities.

On the establishment of stable foreign exchange rates and of the International Monetary Fund. We believe that discussions are now in progress among the United Nations looking to the creation of an International Stabilization Fund.

4. Promotion of the development of commerce and industry wherever international collaboration is required for this purpose. To this end consideration is being given to the possibility of creating appropriate international investment agencies and other improved facilities for international investment and for exchange of technical information and personnel.

5. Improvement of facilities for shipping, air transport and other means of transportation. This will involve:

a. International consideration of the reestablishment of the merchant fleets of the world, the adjustment of ship-building activity, and related topics.

b. International agreement on all aspects of commercial aviation, including passenger and freight traffic arrangements, landing rights, rights of transit, exchange of technical information, questions of subsidization.

c. Similar international discussions regarding problems involved in the improvement of other transportation facilities.

6. Improvement of means of telecommunication. This will require the extension of international collaboration already existing in this sphere.

7. Improvement of nutrition and consumption in general. The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to June 3, 1943, laid the foundation for international collaboration in this field with regard to the consumption of agricultural products. This work is being carried forward by the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. It looks forward to the promotion of appropriate domestic policies for each country and to the establishment of a permanent international organization in this field.

8. Improvement of labor standards and conditions. This involves primarily development of the work which has been well carried on by the International Labor Organisation.

It is clear that in connection with most of these subjects there will be need for organized discussions among the United Nations, both informal and in formal conferences. We believe that the time has come for the establishment of a Commission comprising representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning of the best procedures to be followed in these matters. Such a Commission might consist of technical economic experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, and possibly certain other countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil.

Even

The British Government has been invited to send a group of experts to Washington, and as a result a most desirable interchange of views has taken place between us on many topics of basic importance in the fields of monetary stabilization, international investment, commercial policy, commodity arrangements and related questions.* These conversations provided an opportunity to discover the extent to which there is common ground and the extent to which there are differences of importance in the points of view of those whose expert advice may frequently be utilized in the formulation of policy.

In response to this invitation, the British Government has sent such a group of experts to Washington, and as a result a most desirable interchange of views has taken place between us on many topics of basic importance in the fields of monetary stabilization, international investment, commercial policy, commodity arrangements and related questions.* These conversations provided an opportunity to discover the extent to which there is common ground and the extent to which there are differences of importance in the points of view of those whose expert advice may frequently be utilized in the formulation of policy.

It is particularly important that similar conversations be arranged soon between Soviet and American experts. It is our earnest hope, therefore, that the Soviet Government, which participated in the Hot Springs Conference and is now participating in the work of the Interim Commission and in the discussions relating to relief, will find it possible to arrange for such an interchange of views in the near future.

*See attached Memorandum Concerning the Washington Meeting Between British and American Economic Experts with Reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement.

The second discussion which ended on October 18
between United States and United Kingdom
discussed the following general topics were explored:

1. Commercial Policy.

a. International Commodity Arrangements.

The discussion of measures to promote employment.

These discussions further exchanges of
views on the way with regard to monetary sta-
bility and also a preliminary exchange of views
on the promotion of international investment.

At the end of the first session of the topics dis-
cussed in the four headings listed above. It will
be seen that an attempt was made to reach defi-
nitive conclusions further to prepare an orderly agenda for
the work of each of the respective governments and for
possible future informal joint conversations.

1. Commercial Policy.

Attention was given to the relative effectiveness
of the multilateral as compared with the bi-
lateral system for bringing about a reduction of tariffs.
A number of formulas were examined and
discussed. However, at this stage attempting a selec-
tion of formulas was also given to the substantial aboli-
tion of preferences and discriminations and the question of
the question of action in this field to the reduction of
tariffs.

The need for and feasibility of the abolition on a multi-
lateral basis of quantitative restrictions on trade were ex-
amined. The question of abolishing export taxes and restric-
tions was similarly considered as was the general question
of export duties.

The subject of state trading of various types and the
need for harmonizing the interests of countries employing
such a system with those of other countries was examined.
Although an attempt was made to reach definitive conclusions
it was apparent from the discussions that this problem should
present a great difficulty.

Finally, provisional consideration was given to the need
for creating some international body to facilitate the appli-
cation of such basic principles of commercial policy as may
be developed.

2. International Commodity Arrangements.

The problems discussed were:

(a) Short-term price fluctuations in primary products.

(b) . . .

(b) Periodic slumps in demand and in prices as related to the business cycle.

(c) Excess capacity in relation to past stimulation of high-cost production and to special war-time measures affecting production.

Methods of dealing with these problems were considered, having regard to securing efficient production and, at the same time, to mitigating the hardship on producers in making adjustments to conform to demand.

The methods included:

(a) Buffer stocks.

(b) Quantitative regulation schemes.

The discussion included the possibility of stating principles which might govern arrangements for dealing with commodity problems and the possible relation of such arrangements to existing inter-governmental and private international commodity schemes and to other parts of the international economic system, including commercial policy agreements.

3. Cartels.

Consideration was given to problems likely to arise in the post-war world from the activities of international cartels. The interchange of views was not so extensive as in the case of the other topics discussed. It was agreed that much further discussion was needed. The officials recommended that each group separately should examine the problems arising from international cartels and appropriate measures, national and international, to solve them with a view to joint discussion at some future date.

Preliminary views were presented by the United States officials on the possible consequences of international cartels in obstructing production and trade and in endangering national and international security.

The United States officials proposed that further consideration should be given to the possibility of intergovernmental undertakings:

(a) To register all non-governmental international agreements for the establishment of enduring relationships between private business enterprises;

(b) To introduce measures to make information about registered agreements available to governments or to international institutions;

(c) To prohibit practices by international cartels inimical to the expansion of production, trade and consumption including, inter alia, price fixing and restrictions on the exploitation of inventions.

4. Employment policies.

The

The problems discussed under the foregoing three heads relate to a wide complex of policies which influence the level of employment in individual countries and in the world as a whole. Some of these policies are of a domestic nature, but facilities should be provided for consultation and for the exchange of information between governments on these matters as well as on matters of a more directly international nature with a view to the harmonization of policies.

The experts therefore discussed:

(a) The desirability of establishing an international advisory economic staff charged with the study of international economic questions with particular reference to the harmonization of measures, national and international, for the maintenance of high levels of productive employment.

(b) The functions and organization of such a staff.

(c) The character of the governing body to which it should be responsible.

ANNEX 10.

DECLARATION OF GERMAN ATROCITIES.

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:-

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not inbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

(Signed): ROOSEVELT STALIN CHURCHILL

SECRET PROTOCOL

*Copy No. 1
For the President*

of the Conference attended by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, V. M. Molotov, which was held in Moscow from the 19th to the 30th October, 1943.

The following took part in the Conference:

U.S.A.	Mr. Harriman Major General Deane Mr. Hackworth Mr. Dunn Mr. Bohlen and experts
U.K.	Sir A. Clark Kerr Mr. Strang Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay Mr. Wilson and experts
Soviet Union	Marshal Voroshilov Mr. Vyshinski Mr. Litvinov Mr. Sergeyev Major General Gryzlov Mr. Saksin and experts

AGENDA

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her Allies in Europe.
(Proposed by U.S.S.R.) | See the Most Secret Protocol of the Conference. |
| 2. (a) Four-Nations Declaration concerning general security.
(Proposed by U.S.A.) | (a) The text of a declaration was agreed. The Declaration was signed on October 30th. (see annex 1). |
| (b) The establishment of a Commission of the three Powers.
(Proposed by U.S.S.R.) | (b) It was recognised as desirable that representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should conduct, in a preliminary fashion, an exchange of views on questions connected with the establishment of an international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security, the intention being that this work should be carried out in the first instance in Washington, and also in London and Moscow. |

3. The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration, with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers.
(Proposed by U.K.)
4. Exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans.
(Proposed by U.K.)
- (a) Information about the position in Italy and the Balkans.
- (b) Proposal of the U.S.S.R. about policy in regard to Italy.
- (c) Proposal of the Soviet Government as regards the transfer to the Soviet Union of part of the Italian Navy (one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines) and of the Merchant Fleet (to a total of 40,000 tons) which was at the disposal of the Anglo-American forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy.
5. Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses.
(Proposed by U.S.A.)
6. Attitude towards the French Committee with special reference to its position in Metropolitan France and the establishment of eventual French government.
(Proposed by U.K.)
7. A. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.
- (a) International military, political, and economic control over Germany during the armistice period.
- (a) It was decided to set up a European Advisory Commission in London (see annex 2).
- (b) It was decided to set up an Advisory Council for Italy (see annex 3).
- (a) A written and oral exchange of information took place.
- (b) The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 4).
- (c) Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull did not raise any objection to the proposal of the Soviet Government but reserved their final answer.
- See the decision under point 3(a).
- An exchange of views took place upon the document presented to the Conference by the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.K.: "Basic scheme for Administration of liberated France" (see annex 5).
- In connection with questions put by the Soviet Delegation and observations made by them, the document in question was referred for examination to the European Advisory Commission.
- An exchange of views took place, which showed identity of view on the main questions.
- The question was referred for detailed study to the European Advisory Commission.

*The American title of this document is "Civil Affairs for France".

(b) Steps

(b) Steps toward ultimate settlement of future status of German Government, frontiers and other questions, length of armistice period.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

B. Agreement in principle in regard to treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.

(a) During the armistice period, e.g. control commission, etc.

(b) At peace settlement, e.g. frontiers, military occupation, disarmament, reparations, decentralization of the German Government etc. (Austria)

(Proposed by U.K.)

(b) The text of a declaration about Austria was adopted (see annex 6).

8. Question of agreements between the major and minor Allies on post-war questions.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of Mr. Eden's statement that he had no objection to the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, the draft of which had been communicated to him.

9. Common policy towards Turkey.

(Proposed by U.K.)

The question was considered in the discussion on point 1.

10. Common policy in Persia.

(Proposed by U.K.)

The following proposal, which was worked out by a committee appointed by the Conference, was accepted: "(a) After an exchange of views, the Committee detects no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments; (b) the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran; and (c) the issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran, with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran."

11. Relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and policy in relation to Poland generally.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place.

12. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including the question of confederations.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of the statement of the Soviet Delegation (see annex 7).

13. Peace feelers from enemy states.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place. The following resolution was adopted on the line to be taken in the event of peace-feelers being received from enemy countries:

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the Government of, or from any groups or individuals in, a country with which any one of the three countries is at war. The three Governments further agree to consult together with a view to concerting their action in regard to such approaches."

14. Policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of the Allied forces.

(Proposed by U.K.)

An exchange of views took place. The question was referred to the European Advisory Commission.

15. A. Post-war economic cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

(Proposed by U.K.)

It was considered necessary to continue the examination of the questions raised.

B. Economic matters for reconstruction.

(Proposed by U.S.A.)

(a) Cooperation in the rehabilitation of war damage in the U.S.S.R.

(a) It was considered desirable to start conversations between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy in Moscow.

(b) Joint action for assistance to other countries.

(b) The statement of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (b) "Joint action for assistance to other countries" is attached to this Protocol (see annex 8).

(c) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office.

(c) The memorandum of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (c) "Bases of our program for international economic collaboration" is attached to this Protocol (see annex 9).

(d) Question

- (d) Questions of reparations.
- (d) An exchange of views took place in the course of which there was some difference of opinion on some points in the memorandum which had been put forward.
16. Common policy towards resistance movements in Yugoslavia.
(Proposed by U.K.)
- This question was removed from the Agenda of the Conference at the suggestion of Mr. Eden.
17. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate areas of responsibility.
(Proposed by U.K.)
- This was dealt with under point 12 of the Agenda.
18. Declaration about the responsibility of the Hitlerites for atrocities.
(Proposed by U.K.)
- The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 10).
19. Mutual exchange of military information.
(Proposed by U.K.)
- The following resolution was adopted: "It is agreed that in order to ensure that all information regarding the common enemy is available to all the Allies engaged in his destruction, the Allies should keep each other mutually and constantly informed of all technical military information reaching them regarding the German Army, Navy and Air Force, the fighting value of enemy formations and the tactics used."
20. Publication of Conference documents.
- It was decided to publish the documents reproduced in annexes 1, 4, 6, and 10 to the present Protocol.

Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943.

Conrad H. H. H.

ANNEX 1.

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY.

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China;

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
5. That for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.
6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.
7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

10
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached, a letter giving the exact status of the war criminals' trials, and of Pell and his group.

Summarized:

(1) Donovan's draft convention is considered by the State Department lawyers, who thought it would require action by Congress and raise questions of constitutional difficulty.

(2) The suggestion that delivery of war criminals be made an armistice condition is chiefly met by the statement signed by you, Churchill, and Stalin on November 1, 1943.

(3) Pell's group met, without Pell, this October. The U.S.S.R. was not represented but asked to have representation from each of the several component states of the U.S.S.R. Pell had not arrived there. He would not travel without his wife. He is about getting off now -- with his wife. -- "we hope."

E. A. Tamm
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:
To the President, with
enclosures.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your memorandum of October 29, I am returning General William J. Donovan's memorandum to you of October 25, 1943 with its accompanying documents concerning a draft Convention for the Extradition of Axis War Criminals prepared in the Office of Strategic Services.

As stated by General Donovan, a copy of the draft Convention with the accompanying documents was submitted to the Department last year and received the consideration of the Legal Adviser. Subsequently, in a letter dated February 11, 1943 to Mr. Hugh R. Wilson of the Office of Strategic Services, Mr. Berle stated that the "legal people of the Department are pretty plain that an Extradition Convention relating to War Criminals would require special action by Congress and that considerable questions of Constitutional difficulty would be raised". The letter also stated for Mr. Wilson's confidential information that "quite a bit of work had been done on the problem of after-war criminals, based pretty much on violation of the Geneva Convention and of the laws of war".

The suggestion in General Donovan's memorandum that you might think it advisable to consider the possibility of having as a term of your unconditional surrender a refusal to conclude an armistice unless and until there should be turned over to the United Nations war criminals in areas held by the German armies is in the main met by the statement signed by you, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin regarding atrocities published on November 1, 1943.

With reference to your inquiry concerning the present status of war criminals' trials, and as to what Mr. Pell and his group are doing, I respectfully submit the following:

The President,

The White House.

-2-

The American Ambassador at London in a telegram dated October 21, 1943 reported that at a meeting held on October 20th of the representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia and the French Committee of National Liberation, it was agreed to establish forthwith in London the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The USSR was not represented. This was explained by Viscount Simon, who presided, as due to two or three technical points which had not yet been cleared up, but it was hoped that they would be settled shortly. It appears from a separate telegram from Mr. Winant that the Soviet Government, in view of the representation of British Dominions on the Committee, desired to have the several states of the USSR also represented.

As you know, the Commission is a fact-finding body and will be engaged in the collection and recording of all available evidence with respect to war crimes, with a view to identifying those responsible for such crimes and assembling the proof of their guilt.

Mr. Pell, who does not wish to fly or to travel without his wife, is now awaiting the first available steamship transportation for himself, Mrs. Pell and his secretary in order to proceed to London. In the absence of the American member of the Commission and pending a decision of the Soviet Government as to representation thereon, it has not been possible to hold official meetings. However, Ambassador Winant reports in a telegram dated October 26 that at an informal meeting of members in London of the Commission at which, at his request, Mr. Allison of the Embassy sat as an observer, it was the consensus of those present that much useful preliminary work could be accomplished in an informal manner, and it was decided that another meeting should be held in the near future, the exact date of which would be determined by Sir Cecil Hurst, the British member. At this informal meeting a small subcommittee was appointed to draw up a paper outlining the broad lines on which the Commission


should

-3-

should get to work. This paper will be considered at the next informal meeting. It was also agreed that each of the Governments represented should be requested to inform the Commission of what it may already be doing or have done in the matter of collecting information with regard to war crimes.

Mr. Winant in his telegram of October 21 stated that at the meeting on October 20 the representatives of the United Nations concerned, it was the predominance of opinion of those present that a technical committee was essential, and that this Committee should be set up on a parallel basis rather than as a subcommittee of the Commission, with an advisory relationship to it, as well as to the governments concerned. The governments present agreed that the setting up of such a committee would be postponed until after the establishment of the Investigation Commission. A note of the British Foreign Office of August 30 last, suggests that the technical committee should consider matters of a technical kind, "for example, the Governments concerned will require to be advised as to the sort of Tribunals to be employed and as to the procedure to be adopted and the rules of evidence to be followed".

Faithfully yours,


Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

From Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
October 25, 1943, with enclosures.

25 October 1943

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

You will recall that you asked me certain questions about the possibility for the trial of war criminals. I enclose a proposal, prepared by our Planning Group, which I sent to the State Department some months ago, which would have the United Nations conclude a convention for the extradition of Axis war criminals.

You might think it advisable to consider the possibility of having as a term of your unconditional surrender a refusal to conclude an Armistice unless and until there should be turned over to the United Nations war criminals in areas held by the German armies.

I have prepared a partial list of present German officials in that class of criminals, and will see whether other names might be included.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA ltr 11/27/74
By *ABJ* Date DEC 4 1974

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

P. O. 5

COPY NO. 24

January 16, 1943.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PLANNING GROUP

PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION
OF AXIS WAR CRIMINALS

The attached proposal was submitted by the Office of Strategic Services to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee in October, 1942. It was considered by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee and by it recommended for approval. In December, 1943 the Senior Committee referred the plan to the Joint Psychological Warfare Advisory Committee as a means of obtaining informal comment by representatives of the State Department.

As unfinished business of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee this proposal is referred to the OSS Planning Group for appropriate action.

Lt. Col. A. H. Onthank
Secretary

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

OBJECTIVE

1. To implement measures already taken by the United Nations toward the establishment of machinery for punishment of Axis forces guilty of war crimes and atrocities, by having the United Nations conclude a Convention for extradition of Axis war criminals guilty of such crimes.

SUMMARY OF SITUATION CONFRONTED

2. Axis forces have committed wholesale atrocities, including the murder of innocent civilians, as part of a campaign of terror designed to maintain control of occupied areas. The only action taken by the United Nations has been:

(a) Public protests warning the Axis that information regarding these barbarities is being filed and upon capture the perpetrators will be tried and convicted for their crimes. (See Resolution of 9 Governments in Exile, January 14, 1942, attached as Ex. A; and President Roosevelt's statements of August 21, October 7 and October 12, 1942, attached as Exs. B-1, B-2, and B-3).

(b) The use of Nazi war crimes for propaganda purposes by the British, who have compiled a list of Nazi war criminals, including hostage murderers, which are published in occupied areas by radio and leaflets, with warnings of what treatment they will receive.

EFFECTS DESIRED

3. The proposed Convention is designed to:

(a) Break down the will of enemy peoples to resist;
(b) Lessen the fear on the part of enemy peoples that they will be subject to indiscriminate mass murder by way of retribution;

(c) Build up the confidence of the oppressed in ultimate victory over the oppressor;

~~SECRET~~

(d) Maintain the war spirit of the United Nations and promote the sympathy of neutral countries for their cause by publicizing the enemy's atrocities.

4. The Convention would accomplish these purposes by:

(a) Making it clear that, upon capture, Axis war criminals cannot excuse their crimes as being part of permissible warfare, but that they will be punished as common criminals;

(b) Showing that the United Nations are no longer stopping at general resolutions on the subject, but are putting teeth in their plan to avenge these crimes;

(c) Showing that the United Nations are confident of eventual re-conquest of occupied areas.

(d) Keeping before the eyes of the world the fact that the Axis has committed brutal atrocities in occupied areas.

FACTORS INVOLVED

5. Factors Available

(a) An Extradition Convention would constitute an effective means of counter-propaganda appealing to the legalistic German mind because it would establish a legal machinery designed to avoid mass retribution and still punish the guilty.

(b) Some of the Axis forces committing atrocities probably suffer a "guilt complex."

(c) Others can be frightened by the prospect of being subjected to eventual retribution.

(d) The morale of the populace in some occupied areas can be strengthened by communications evidencing the solidarity of the United Nations, their confidence that they will retake the occupied areas, and the existence of a definite plan to avenge them.

~~SECRET~~

6. Factors Opposed

(a) German peoples still remain solidified through fear of collective punishment upon defeat, which has been intensified by internal propaganda.

(b) Known perpetrators of atrocities will not change their course (since they are doomed anyway).

(c) The Axis can use counter-propaganda

(1) Charging that the United Nations have themselves committed war crimes. Since this has been and will be done anyway, however, the objective is not destroyed.

(2) Pointing out that after World War I sporadic war criminal trials accomplished nothing.

7. The proposed plan is not rendered a useless act by the probability that the oppressed peoples will upon invasion exact swifter retribution by taking the law into their own hands. The fugitives against which it is directed are not likely to be among those summarily disposed of in such fashion.

POSSIBLE COURSE OF ACTION

8. There appears to be only one possible course of action: A conference between the United Nations and such neutrals as wish to participate, for the purpose of adopting a Convention for extradition of war criminals.

9. Such course of action appears to be suitable feasible acceptable.

10. It is recognized that J.P.W.C. is concerned only with the psychological warfare aspect of the proposed Convention and that all matters relating to its execution and adoption are for the State Department. With this in mind there has been attached for the consideration of the State Department an illustrative draft of a suggested form of Convention.

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION

11. That J.P.W.C. suggest to the J.P.W. Advisory Committee that the State Department be approached:

(a) To initiate conversations with the United Nations and such neutrals as wish to participate for the purpose of determining whether such Nations would be willing and able to enter into a Convention for extradition of Axis war criminals; and if so,

(b) To draft a proposed Convention, and in conference with the parties thereto, arrive at terms agreeable to all.

12. That, upon execution of the said Extradition Convention, arrangements be made with proper authorities for the publication of the same by press and radio throughout the world.

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT A

RESOLUTION of nine European Governments in Exile, pledging retribution for oppression of Occupied Countries by Germany, signed in St. James' Palace, London, on January 14, 1942.

WHEREAS, Germany has instituted in Occupied Territories a regime of terror characterized by imprisonment, mass expulsions, execution of hostages and massacres,

WHEREAS, acts of violence being similarly perpetrated by allies and associates of the Reich in certain countries by accomplices of the occupying Power,

Recalling that international law, established in particular, and the Convention signed at the Hague in 1907, regarding laws and customs of land warfare did not permit a belligerent in occupied territories to perpetrate acts of violence against civilians, to bring into disrepute laws in force, and to overthrow national institutions,

The undersigned representatives of the Government of Belgium, the Government of Czechoslovakia, the Free French National Committee, the Government of Greece, the Government of Luxembourg, the Government of Netherlands, the Government of Norway, the Government of Poland, and the Government of Yugoslavia

1. Affirm that acts of violence thus perpetrated against civilian populations are at variance with the accepted ideas concerning acts of war and political offences as those are understood by civilian nations;

2. Take note of the declaration made in this respect on October 25, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the British Prime Minister;

3. Place amongst them the principle of war mass punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty and responsible for their crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them, or in any way participated in them;

~~SECRET~~

4. Determined in the spirit of national solidarity to see to it that

(a) Those guilty and responsible, whatever their nationality, are handed over to justice and judged;

(b) That sentences are carried out.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, the signatories duly authorized, have signed the present Declaration.

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT B - 1

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 21.

"The Secretary of State recently forwarded to me a communication signed by the Ambassador of the Netherlands and the Ministers of Yugoslavia and Luxembourg on behalf of the governments of Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the French National Committee in London, calling attention to the barbaric crimes against civilian populations which are being committed in occupied countries, particularly on the continent of Europe.

In this communication attention was invited to the declaration signed in London on Jan. 13, 1942, by the representatives of nine governments whose countries are under German occupation. This declaration affirmed that acts of violence thus perpetrated against the civilian populations are at variance with accepted ideas concerning acts of war and political offenses as these are understood by civilized nations; stated that the punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty and responsible for these crimes is one of the principal war aims of the contracting governments; and recorded the determination of the contracting governments, in a spirit of international solidarity, to see to it that those guilty and responsible, whatever their nationality, are handed over to justice and tried and that the sentences pronounced are carried out.

The communication which I have just received from the chiefs of mission of the Netherlands, Yugoslavia and Luxembourg states that these acts of oppression and terror have taken proportions and forms giving rise to the fear that as the defeat of the enemy countries approaches the barbaric and unrelenting character of the occupational regime will become more marked, and may even lead to the extermination of certain populations.

~~SECRET~~

As I stated on Oct. 25, 1941:

'The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already injured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks, the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would 'collaborate' with Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning.

'The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of breaking men's spirit by terrorism. Instead they develop their 'Lebensraum' and 'New Order' by depths of frightfulness which even they have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of hatred which will one day bring fearful retribution.'

The Government of the United States has been aware for some time of these crimes. Our government is constantly receiving additional information from dependable sources and it welcomes reports from any trustworthy source which would assist in keeping our growing fund of information and evidence up to date and reliable.

The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of the United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to these barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they should have this warning that the time will come when they shall have to stand in courts of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts."

SECRET

EXHIBIT B - 2

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 7

On Aug. 22 I said that this government was constantly receiving information concerning the barbaric crimes being committed by the enemy against civilian populations in occupied countries, particularly on the Continent of Europe. I said it was the purpose of this government, as I know it to be the purpose of the other United Nations, to see that that when victory is won the perpetrators of these crimes shall answer for them before courts of law.

The commission of these crimes continues.

I now declare it to be the intention of this government that the successful close of the war shall include provision for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals.

With a view to establishing responsibility of the guilty individuals through the collection and assessment of all available evidence, this government is prepared to cooperate with the British and other governments in establishing a United Nations commission for the investigation of war crimes.

The number of persons eventually found guilty will undoubtedly be extremely small compared to the total enemy populations. It is not the intention of this government or of the governments associated with us to resort to mass reprisals. It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith.

SECRET

EXHIBIT B - 3

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 12

Meanwhile, they (Axis Powers) are driven to increase the fury of their atrocities.

The United Nations have decided to establish the identity of these Nazi leaders who are responsible for the innumerable acts of savagery. As each of these criminal deeds is committed it is being carefully investigated; and the evidence is being relentlessly piled up for the future purposes of justice.

We have made it entirely clear that the United Nations seek no mass reprisals against the populations of Germany or Italy or Japan. But the ringleaders and their brutal henchmen must be named, and apprehended, and tried in accordance with the judicial processes of criminal law.

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT C

SUGGESTED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION OF WAR CRIMINALS

The High Contracting Parties, (names to be inserted), desiring to implement their avowed plan of avenging the brutal hostage murders, atrocities, and other inhuman acts in violation of international laws and customs of war, which are now being perpetrated in those countries and in occupied areas as part of a reign of terror by the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Italy and their allies, have resolved to conclude a Convention for the extradition of such persons and have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries (names to be inserted) who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

Article 1. Recognition of Powers. The High Contracting Parties mutually recognize (a) the right of each other to try before its domestic tribunals and to punish persons accused of having committed within its jurisdiction or against its nationals any of the crimes hereinafter set forth, and (b) the right of such international war crime tribunal as may be set up by the Signatory Powers for such purpose to try and punish persons accused of the crimes hereinafter set forth.

Article 2. Hostage Executions Prohibited. The High Contracting Parties recognize that under the law of nations and under the international laws and customs of warfare the killing of hostages, whether or not in reprisal, constitutes the crime of murder.

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Article 3. Extraditable Acts. The High Contracting Parties agree reciprocally to surrender any person, regardless of military or political rank or status, who is accused or has been convicted by the High Contracting Party requesting extradition or by an international war crime tribunal established by the Signatory Powers, of having committed within its jurisdiction or against any of its nationals a crime violating the international laws and customs of warfare while such person was acting in the service of or on behalf of the governments of Germany, Japan, Italy, or any of their allies.

For the purpose of this Convention, a violation of the international laws and customs of warfare shall include the following:

- (1) Murder.
- (2) The torture of civilians.
- (3) Rape.
- (4) Mistreatment of prisoners of war in violation of Convention of Geneva of 1929.
- (5) Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
- (6) Forced labor of civilians in connection with military operations.
- (7) Pillage.
- (8) Imposition of collective penalties.
- (9) Wanton destruction of religious, educational, and historical buildings and monuments.
- (10) Deliberate attack upon, or bombardment or destruction of hospitals, or hospital ships.
- (11) Use of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or explosives or expanding bullets.
- (12) All other acts prohibited by the Convention signed at Hague in 1907 regarding the laws and customs of land warfare.
- (13) Ordering the commission of any of the above crimes.

SECRET

It shall not constitute a defense to extradition that the person claimed was acting under superior orders in committing the crime charged.

Article 4. Lapse of Time. Extradition shall be granted for any of the above crimes committed during the course of existing hostilities, provided, however, that extradition shall not be granted where exemption from prosecution or punishment has been acquired by lapse of time under the laws of the High Contracting Party applying for extradition.

Article 5. Double or Pending Prosecution. Extradition shall not take place if the person claimed has already been tried and discharged or punished or is still under trial, in the territory of the High Contracting Party applied to, for the crime for which his extradition is demanded, except that a discharge shall not prevent extradition if based solely upon the ground that the offense was committed in a foreign jurisdiction.

If the person claimed should be under examination or under punishment in the territory of the High Contracting Party applied to for any other crime or offense, his extradition shall be deferred until the conclusion of the trial or the full execution of any punishment imposed upon him.

Article 6. Prosecution for Other Crimes. The High Contracting Party to which a person has been extradited shall not, without the consent of the High Contracting Party which extradited such person, prosecute or punish such person for any act committed prior to his extradition other than that for which he was extradited or surrender such person to another state for prosecution or punishment, unless the person extradited voluntarily remains within the territory of the High Contracting Party to which he was extradited for a period of thirty days, or voluntarily returns thereto.

~~SECRET~~

Article 7. Manner of Extradition. Extradition, including the form and content of the requisition and the procedure of surrender, shall conform to the normal practice relating to extradition now in force in the territory of the High Contracting Party applied to for extradition. All communications relating to extradition shall be carried on through the regular diplomatic channels.

Article 8. Request for Provisional Arrests. A High Contracting Party may ask for the provisional apprehension and detention of a person if it indicates at the same time its intention promptly to request the extradition of that person. The form and contents of the request and the procedure for provisional arrest shall conform to the normal practice in force in the territory of the High Contracting Party applied to for surrender. The request for provisional arrest may be made through the regular diplomatic channels or by an authorized agent of the High Contracting Party making the application, directly to an official of the High Contracting Party applied to who is competent to order such arrest.

Article 9. Expenses of Extradition. All expenses connected with an extradition shall be borne by the High Contracting Party making the application.

Article 10. Ratification. The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties.

Article 11. Other Extradition Agreements. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the provisions of any agreement in force between any of the High Contracting Parties concerning extradition for acts for which extradition is not required by this Convention; nor shall this Convention preclude any of the High Contracting Parties from entering into such an agreement.

SECRET

Article 12. Text of Convention. The present Convention is drawn up in two texts, one being in the English language and the other in the French language, both texts being equally authentic.

Article 13. Adherence by Neutral Powers and Successor Governments of Enemy Countries. Neutral powers and successor governments of enemy countries which are recognized by the High Contracting Parties may adhere to this Convention.

Article 14. Duration of Convention. The ratifications shall be deposited in Washington, D.C. and upon exchange of ratifications by four or more of the High Contracting Parties this Convention shall take effect between them. As to each of the other signatories or adherents, this Convention shall take effect upon deposit by it of its ratifications.

This Convention shall remain in force until a period of five years after termination of all hostilities between the High Contracting Parties and Germany, Italy, Japan and their Allies.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention and have herunto affixed their seals.

October 19, 1942.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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November 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Oil concessions in the Middle East.

As I promised at our meeting Friday, I am pleased to enclose herewith a two-page memorandum summarizing the problem of oil concessions in the Middle East. This is the memorandum you said you wanted to have with you.

E. Butting

Enc.

20

The situation with respect to oil concessions in the Middle East is as follows:

Iraq Petroleum Company (whose shares are owned 23.75% each by the following four companies:

1. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (owned 56% by British Government)
2. Shell Oil Company (believed controlled to some extent by British Government)
3. Société Française des Pétroles (owned in large part by French Government. Now controlled by Alien Property Custodian, London)
4. Near East Development Corporation (owned in equal part by Socony-Vacuum Oil Company and Standard Oil of New Jersey)

The remaining 5% of the shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company are held by Mr. G. S. Gulbenkian.

In its own name, or through subsidiaries, the Iraq Petroleum Company holds concessions in all of Iraq, in all of the Peninsula of Qatar, as well as in certain areas of Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan and possibly in other territories along the eastern and southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. Production, which is active only in Iraq, is pumped to Haifa, Palestine, where there is a refinery, and to Tripoli, Syria.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company In addition to its holdings in the Iraq Petroleum Company, the Anglo-Iranian holds an important concession in Iran and has a large refinery at Abadan.

Bahrein Petroleum Company is owned in equal shares by Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Company. It has production and a refinery on Bahrein Island in the Persian Gulf.

California-Arabian Oil Company also owned by the Standard of California and Texas Company. It has immense holdings in Saudi Arabia, with reserves of possibly fifty billion barrels. Present production, which is small, is refined at Bahrein.

Kuwait Oil Company, owned in equal shares by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Gulf Oil Company of Pennsylvania. This company's concession in

Kuwait

Kuwait (or Koweit) at head of Persian Gulf has been proved to the extent of nine or ten billion barrels. Drilling was stopped over a year ago by order of British military authorities.

All of the companies mentioned above have small concessions in Egypt.


In view of military needs, it has been proposed to erect refineries at one of the following places:

1. At Dhahran in Saudi Arabia, opposite northern end of Bahrein Island, under arrangements with California Arabian Standard Oil Company.
2. At Kuwait, under arrangements with the Gulf Oil Company (presumably in agreement with its partner, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.)
3. At Bombay or some other port in India, under arrangements with the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company. Presumably production would come from the Iraq Petroleum Company field in the Qatar Peninsula. The two wells drilled there were blown up over a year ago under orders of the British military authorities.

Whatever course is adopted, the question arises whether it is better for the United States Government to purchase shares in the producing companies or to make some other arrangement, such as purchasing options on a given quantity of oil in the ground. This question is under review by the Petroleum Reserves Corporation.

In general American companies holding interests in the Middle Eastern area desire to produce. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, on the other hand, with its large field in Iran, is inclined to restrict production in other areas. This and other questions make it desirable that some general understanding be reached between the British and American Governments regarding Middle Eastern petroleum questions. A draft of such an agreement is being considered in the Department and has been furnished informally to other interested departments for their consideration and suggestions.

(See map attached)



Boundaries
Syria-Transjordan, and Transjordan-Iraq boundaries from Karte der Türkischen Republik, Petermanns Mitteilungen, 81 Jahrgang 1935, Tafel 82, scale 1:2,500,000.
Northern boundaries of Saudi Arabia from 1/11 sheets North E-37 and E-38, on which boundaries are plotted from the Hadda agreement (Nov. 2, 1925), protocol of December 2, 1925 to Mohammurah convention (of May 5, 1922), etc.
Nov. 4, 1925.

ANGLO-IRANIAN
— IRAQ PETROLEUM CO.
— CALIFORNIA-TEXAS
■ KUWAIT OIL CO. CRITREA

Department of State
Revised F.R. Nov 7, 1935

NOTE For further details about turning points, agreements, etc. see Int. Map 1:1,000,000 plates 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

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
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 9. 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with your request I attach a memorandum on the question of trusteeship for the disputed islands in the Central Pacific and certain other groups of islands, a memorandum on the geographic factors involved and a chart.

These memoranda have been very hastily compiled. As you know, comprehensive studies of the problems of international trusteeship are well under way in the Department but not completed. Before discussing this question with the Prime Minister you may wish to obtain the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly with respect to the inclusion in the trusteeship of nearby American islands such as Howland, Baker, Palmyra and others which the British would no doubt suggest be included.



Enclosures:

1. Memorandum on trusteeship.
2. Memorandum on geographic factors.
3. Chart.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

1. United States legal claims to the contested islands are less strong than those of the British Government. If pressed to a settlement, we could expect little except on political grounds. Nevertheless Australia and New Zealand wish the United States to remain permanently interested in the Southeast Pacific for security reasons and Great Britain's attitude is not unfavorable.

2. It is believed that the best disposition is international trusteeship since the United States, assumably, is less interested in the question of sovereignty over these contested islands than in their adequate administration within a security system, and their usefulness on the basis of equal access in the development of common pacific interests, particularly transportation and communication. Responsibility for trusteeship should be assumed by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and China. Administration of the individual islands should be allocated through friendly negotiation. The administrator should be accountable for the progressive attainment of the well-understood objectives of trusteeship.

3. Responsibility

3. Responsibility for administration of defense should be vested singly in the United States, or jointly in the United States and Great Britain (and/or Australia and New Zealand) on terms to be proposed to the heads of the two Governments by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The inclusion of China as a trustee should not be of a kind devolving far-flung naval commitments upon her.

4. This arrangement while assuring immediate advantages to this country should not in any way prejudice United States claims or future freedom of action with respect to them.

5. Inclusion of the French possessions in the area of trusteeship would involve including France among the trustees. French sovereignty need not be disturbed, but France would be obligated to give to the United States and other participating states rights not heretofore granted. She would receive in return protection and equal access to the other islands under trusteeship.

6. This zone of trusteeship might well be extended to include neighboring islands, such as the French Austral and Society Islands, and the British Henderson, Ducie, Pitcairn, and Oeno Islands.

7. It might be desirable that this trusteeship should be integrated with a broader trusteeship encompassing similar islands in the entire South Pacific and possibly
including

including the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Chile among the trustees. It should in any event be integrated with whatever general international trusteeship system may be established.

8. In any considerations of Pacific islands the vital importance to the United States of Clipperton Island (French) should never be overlooked. The same might be said of the Galapagos Islands (Ecuador).

Inf file

November 9, 1943

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~~Edward H. Stettinius, Jr.~~

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MEMORANDUM

1. United States legal claims to the contested islands are less strong than those of the British Government. If pressed to a settlement, we could expect little except on political grounds. Nevertheless Australia and New Zealand wish the United States to remain permanently interested in the Southeast Pacific for security reasons and Great Britain's attitude is not unfavorable.

2. It is believed that the best disposition is international trusteeship since the United States, assumably, is less interested in the question of sovereignty over these contested islands than in their adequate administration within a security system, and their usefulness on the basis of equal access in the development of common pacific interests, particularly transportation and communication. Responsibility for trusteeship should be assumed by the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and China. Administration of the individual islands should be allocated through friendly negotiation. The administrator should be accountable for the progressive attainment of the well-understood objectives of trusteeship.

3. Responsibility

3. Responsibility for administration of defense should be vested singly in the United States, or jointly in the United States and Great Britain (and/or Australia and New Zealand) on terms to be proposed to the heads of the two Governments by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The inclusion of China as a trustee should not be of a kind devolving far-flung naval commitments upon her.

4. This arrangement while assuring immediate advantages to this country should not in any way prejudice United States claims or future freedom of action with respect to them.

5. Inclusion of the French possessions in the area of trusteeship would involve including France among the trustees. French sovereignty need not be disturbed, but France would be obligated to give to the United States and other participating states rights not heretofore granted. She would receive in return protection and equal access to the other islands under trusteeship.

6. This zone of trusteeship might well be extended to include neighboring islands, such as the French Austral and Society Islands, and the British Henderson, Ducie, Pitcairn, and Oeno Islands.

7. It might be desirable that this trusteeship should be integrated with a broader trusteeship encompassing similar islands in the entire South Pacific and possibly including

including the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Chile among the trustees. It should in any event be integrated with whatever general international trusteeship system may be established.

8. In any considerations of Pacific islands the vital importance to the United States of Clipperton Island (French) should never be overlooked. The same might be said of the Galapagos Islands (Ecuador).

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER

November 9, 1943.

CERTAIN PACIFIC ISLANDS

Information has been requested concerning the following Pacific islands, especially in connection with possible trusteeship over them:

- a) Islands claimed by the United States, in a note to Great Britain dated August 16, 1939: (The population is added, as given in H.O. Pub. 166, 1940 edition.)

1) Claimed also by Great Britain:

Vostok	0 (no date given)
Malden	0 (1936)
Starbuck	0 (1940)
Caroline Island	2 laborers and families (1936)
Flint	0 (no date given)
Christmas	23 native, 3 French (1936)

Ellice Islands (the southern 4 of them)--administered as part of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.

Nukufetau (DePeyster). . .	361 (1929)
Funafuti	392 (1929) including 5 Europeans
Nurakita (Sophia).	39 (1929)
Nukulailei (Mitchell). . .	202 (1929)

2) Claimed also by New Zealand:

Penhryn (Tongareva). . .	462 (1936)
Manahiki (Humphreys) . . .	486 (1937)
Rakahanga (Rierson). . .	290 (1936)
Danger Islands	651 (1936)

Union Group (all 3 islands)

Atafu	380 (1932)
Nukunono	250 (1936)
Fakaofu	431 (1925)

- b) Two of the French groups in the South Pacific:
The Marquesas
The Tuamotu Archipelago

The

The relative geographic positions of these and other islands have been marked and studied on a globe (a globe-mounted "printers' proof" of a special air route globe which has been prepared in this office, 1,000 copies of which have been ordered by the War Department). From the globe, the more important lines have been transferred, approximately, to the accompanying H.O. chart No. 1500.

The problems relating to the islands listed above can not be adequately assessed, it is submitted, without taking the following steps:

- (1) Evaluating all islands in the Pacific which are pertinent, in view of their geographic position, at least approximately, regarding their use for:
 - (a) Land planes
 - (b) Sea planes
 - (c) Surface ships;
- (2) Studying the geographic relationships of all islands which are important for the possible use of one or more of the above -- initially without any reference to sovereignty, but only with reference to the range of airplanes and to desirable routes of both airplanes and surface ships;
- (3) Studying the limitations imposed by political sovereignty and claims, with reference only to significant islands and their geographic relationships with each other and with the continental mainland.

The present memorandum is restricted in scope by a 24-hour deadline. Further data and maps will be submitted later, if desired.

The assumed range of commercial airplanes is 2,500 statute miles, as represented on accompanying chart by circles and arcs of 1,250 mile radius. The portions of the Pacific are ruled which are, on that hypothesis, outside those limits; commercial operation across those zones seems improbable, at least in the near future.

Separated

Separated by vast spaces of free air and high sea, there are in the Pacific several thousand islands, many of them mere pinpoints. Very few of them are adapted, by virtue of size, surface structure, and geographic position, to transportation uses, either for landplanes, seaplanes, or surface ships, and then only at great expense. To be useful for airplanes they must also accommodate surface ships to bring supplies. Except for the airway corridor to the Pacific coast of the United States by way of the Hawaiian Islands there is an extensive zone near the American continents which can scarcely be traversed by airplanes with pay loads.

The Pacific is preeminently the area which seems to call for master-planning of air routes. On the basis of natural geographic factors (adaptability to use, and geographic position) excellent trans-Pacific routes are feasible, including alternate routes for varying weather conditions, emergency landings, and adequate aids to navigation.

The imposition of the limitations of political geography greatly reduces the utility of many of the islands, and renders some desirable routes almost impossible. No nation possesses the stepping-stones for a trans-Pacific route under its own flag.

The political problems, however, are relatively simple, involving only colonial possessions of a very few countries, with small populations, and historical background which is brief in comparison with problems in Europe and Asia.


At the request of the Department of State, initiated by Judge R. Walton Moore, the Navy Department in 1938 made a careful, detailed evaluation of 27 islands possessed or claimed by Great Britain (including the more valuable of those claimed by the United States, listed on page 1 of this memorandum) and more than 25 French islands, including the best in the Marquesas and Society groups. The islands were rated on a score of 1,000. A map showing the ratings of these individual islands, with sovereignty of all Pacific islands, is on file in the Office of the Geographer. Much better information regarding adaptability to both landplane and seaplane use is now available. No attempt is made,

therefore,

-4-

therefore, on such brief notice, to discuss the islands individually.

International action on some principle of "trusteeship" seems essential in planning trans-Pacific air services. The details require much study.




S. W. Boggs

6,476
 Auckland - Panama

AIR ROUTES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PACIFIC

SOVEREIGNTY

-  United States
-  British
-  United States and Great Britain (joint control):
Canton and Enderbury islands
-  Claimed by the United States and Great Britain
-  French
-  Japanese mandate

DISTANCES -- in nautical miles

(1 naut. mi. = 1' latitude, or 1.15 statute miles)

AIRPLANE RANGES

..... Line 1250 statute miles from the American mainland

(Circles) Circles of 1250 statute-mile radius are drawn in colors corresponding to sovereignty indications

 More than 1250 statute miles from land

Ge:SWB:WWR:PSS
 November 9, 1943

New Publication: 46th Ed., Apr., 1939

Retired for preservation -
 also archived on duty if you want to see the entire map.

(20)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF
Trip

November 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President.

In a message to you dated November
2nd Ambassador Winant said in part:

"I would like to have a chance
to serve on the European Advisory
Commission in London."

You directed me to give you this
quotation in order that you might discuss
it with the Secretary of State.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Brown
WILSON BROWN.

15
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Secretary Hull phoned that the President desired this document this afternoon. We apologize for its appearance but it is the only one we have to send you on this short notice.

CW Gray
C. W. Gray

U.S. Proposal

The Treatment of Germany

PSF
Trip File

It is proposed that, in accordance with the declarations of the principal United Nations regarding the unconditional surrender of Germany, the terms of surrender to be accepted unconditionally by Germany shall be previously agreed upon jointly by the Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States; and that in coming to this agreement the three Governments be guided by the following principles:

1. That an instrument be signed which contains an admission of the total defeat of Germany.
2. That the instrument be signed both by an authorized agent of whatever German Government may exercise power in fact or in name and by an authorized agent of the military authorities.
3. That the instrument empower the United Nations to exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout Germany.
4. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, without reciprocity, all prisoners of war and such other nationals of United Nations states as may be held in detention.
5. That the instrument empower the United Nations to regulate the demobilization of the German armed forces.
6. That the instrument stipulate the release of the political prisoners held by the German Government, the abandonment of the concentration camps and the delivery to agents designated by the United Nations of persons who may subsequently be accused of actions within the United Nations' definition of war crimes.
7. That the instrument bind the German Government to the continued maintenance of all agencies of economic control, together with their staffs, complete records and other equipment, for subsequent disposition by the United Nations authorities.
8. That the instrument empower the United Nations to supervise the economic activities of Germany.
9. That the instrument bind the German Government to deliver, according to the stipulations of the United Nations High Command, all arms and armaments, other military and naval stores, and stocks of raw materials wherever located.

A. - TREATMENT OF GERMANY DURING THE ARMISTICE PERIOD

International Control. It is proposed that during the armistice period a strict international control--military, political and economic--be maintained; and that this control

be exercised through an inter-Allied Control Commission charged with the carrying out of the terms of surrender and the policies agreed upon by Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States.

The Occupation of Germany. For the purpose of securing the cessation of all future wars and assuring the creation of conditions for a permanent system of security it is recommended that the occupation of Germany be effected by contingents of British, Soviet and American forces.

Local Government. It is recommended that policy with respect to local governments (functions, agencies, personnel) be based upon the principle of minimum interference with established mechanisms and procedures. All Nazi government officials, in whatever capacity, should be promptly eliminated and every vestige of the Nazi regime should be uprooted.

It is recommended that effective supervision of local government be maintained by the occupation authorities and the Control Commission through the media of:

1. Mandatory and veto power over acts of key administrators.
2. Control of personnel administration.
3. Control over the administrative functions of the governmental authorities.

Treatment of National Socialist Party. The National Socialist Party should be dissolved forthwith. The functions of certain existing structures, such as those dealing with employment and social insurance, might be continued temporarily, subject to a thoroughgoing elimination of Nazi and other objectionable elements and to effective supervision by the occupation authorities.

Reparations. It is recommended that the principle be recognized that it is the duty of Germany to provide reparations for the physical damages inflicted by its armed forces upon the U. S. S. R., and other Allied and occupied countries; and that the form, extent, and distribution of such reparations be determined through a Commission on German Reparations, consisting initially of representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, the U. S. S. R., and the United States, with provision for the representation of other directly interested governments.

Disarmament. For the purpose of providing a basis for a general security system, it is proposed that, on the cessation of hostilities:

1. All German armed forces should be disbanded and demobilized;
2. All arms, ammunition and military equipment and facilities wherever located should be surrendered to the United Nations;

3. Captured

3. Captured and surrendered arms should be scrapped;
4. Manufacture of war material should cease immediately;
5. For the transition period at least the control of arms manufacturing facilities, as well as all economic facilities, in Germany should be transferred to the United Nations.

Among measures of permanent control of German military potential, the following are suggested for consideration:

1. Germany should be denied a standing army and military training should be prohibited;
2. The German General Staff should be disbanded and should not be reconstituted in any form;
3. The military caste system in all its phases should be eliminated;
4. Arms manufacturing facilities in Germany should be dismantled;
5. The importation and manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and materials essential to their manufacture, including all types of aircraft, should be prohibited;
6. A permanent audit and inspection system should be established and maintained under supervision of the United Nations.

B. - PERMANENT STATUS OF GERMANY

Problem of German Political Unity. At the present time there is no indication whether the effect of defeat will be to strengthen the trend towards political unity within Germany, or whether the reaction against the defeated Hitler regime will lead to emergence of a spontaneous movement for the creation of several separate states out of the territory of the present Reich. Certain vital phases of this question continue under study.

Democratic Government. It is the view of the American Government that, in the long run, the most desirable form of government for Germany would be a broadly based democracy operating under a bill of rights to safeguard the civil and political liberties of the individual. Among the conditions required for the success of a new democratic experiment in Germany would be: a tolerable standard of living; restriction of measures of control to the requirements of general security; harmony of policy and purpose among the British, Soviet and American Governments. Since the administration of Germany will be controlled by the inter-allied mechanism during the transition period, it is during that period that the bases of a democratic regime should be laid. Early steps should be taken to restore freedom of speech, religion, and of the press, freedom to organize political parties other than of Nazi-Fascist doctrine, cultural associations and trade unions. When conditions permit, preparations should be made for the holding of free elections for the creation of a Central German Government to which the occupation authorities would gradually transfer their responsibility for the internal administration of the country.

Rehabilitation

Decentralization. It is the view of the American Government that the potential threat of Germany to general security might be lessened through decentralization of the German political structure, through assigning to the federal units control over a wide range of administrative functions, and through encouraging any movement which may emerge within Germany in favor of the diminution of Prussian domination over the Reich.

Prussia. This is a matter which should come within the purview of the general settlement.

- supple
behind
5. Bavaria, Baden, Westphalia
 3. Saxony & Leipzig area.
 4. Old Prussia
 2. Hanover & The Northwest
 6. Hesse and The South of the Rhine
 6. Free State of Prussia
 7. The Ruhr & The Saar (under United Nations)

(My notes at Tübingen Dec 1 '43 from
which I spoke on the subject of Germany
FHP)

Place card signed by Marshal Stalin and
Prime Minister Churchill at my dinner -
Teheran - December 1st, 1943.

Teheran -

Dec 1 1943



1 Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President
W. S. Grant
Winston Churchill -

Signature of Ismet Inonu, President of Turkey.
At my villa in Cairo, December 4th, 1943.



Dec 4
1943

President Roosevelt

Ismet Inonu



THE PRESIDENT.



DINNER

Oyster Patties

+++

Consomme

+++

Boiled Salmon

+++

Roast Turkey

+++

Persian Lantern

+++

Cheese Souffles

Place card and menu - dinner - December
5th, 1943, given by the Prime Minister for
the President of Turkey and me in Casey's
villa, Cairo.

100

