

● PSF

Saudi Arabia

PSF: Saudi Arabia

Received from Fred W. Shipman, Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library the following documents:

Subject: Financial aid to Arabia. (King Saud)

- Encl: ✓(1) Carbon copy of Memo for the Secretary of the Navy from FDR, April 30, 1941
✓(2) Letter from John H. Dillon, Major, U.S.M.C., Department of the Navy to Miss Dorothy Brady, The White House, May 17, 1944
(3) Carbon copy of letter from John F. Q'Keefe, Special Asst. to Secretary to Miss Marguerite LeHand, The White House, May 23, 1941
✓(4) Carbon copy of Memo for the President from Frank Knox, May 20, 1941
✓(5) Memo signed by H. A. Stuart, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves, for the Secretary of the Navy, May 17, 1941
✓(6) Carbon copy of (5)
✓(7) Original Memo from FDR for the Secretary of the Navy, April 30, 1941
✓(8) Original Memo, April 16, 1941 (4 pages) not signed

*Returned to
files 5-14-47
FWS*

Dated March 2/ 1947

C. R. K.
Attorney for the executors
of the Estate of Franklin D.
Roosevelt.

(Z. W. P.)

Re: to file: 2/11/48 : S.W.R.

M E M O R A N D U M

The attached correspondence was handed personally to Mr. Marshall Jacobs at Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, 120 Broadway, NYC on January 27, 1949 as evidence in court action between James A. Moffatt vs. Aramco.

On April 27th, Mr. Jacobs returned the material to the Hopkins files.

Following is a list of the correspondence:

Hull Memo	4/25/41
State Dept. Memo	4/21/41
Moffett letter to LeHand	4/16/41
Moffett letter to FDR	4/16/41
Moffett Memo (attached)	4/16/41
Hull memo to President	5/29/41
Knox memo to President	5/20/41
FDR memo to Hull	5/21/41
O'Keefe letter to LeHand	5/23/41
Hopkins letter to Jones	6/14/41
Jones to Hopkins	7/22/41
Jones Memo to Hopkins	8/27/41

*Found in Hopkins Papers,
Jan. 1954.
SWR*

Grace Murphy
Secretary to Robert E. Sherwood

PSF: Saudi Arabia

MEMORANDUM

April 16, 1941

King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia formerly depended largely on the revenue from the pilgrimage and customs duties to finance his government. Due to the war, this revenue has been reduced to a negligible amount.

The only economic resources of any substantial value of Saudi Arabia are its oil resources, the development of which has been seriously interfered with on account of the war.

The King has privately expressed himself, and we believe sincerely, as strongly pro-Ally. No other man in the Arab countries, nor among Moslems the world over, commands prestige equal to his. In order to feed and maintain control of his people, which is essential to maintain his prestige in the Arab world elsewhere and to prepare, even in a moderate way, for equipping his own soldiers for service, he estimates that he will require \$10,000,000 per annum until the emergency has passed and he recently demanded that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company supply him with \$6,000,000 during the year 1941. In addition to this, the British have promised him 400,000 pounds sterling during 1941, which he hopes to increase to 900,000 pounds.

Based on the best information which we have been able to obtain, it is our opinion that the King's estimate of \$10,000,000 for this year is moderate and close to a minimum figure for essential expenditures.

The California Arabian Standard Oil Company owns an oil concession in Arabia consisting of approximately 162,000,000 acres and embracing all the probable oil territory of the country. This area is approximately equal in size to the states of California and Oregon. The original concession was acquired in 1933 and runs to 1993; the remaining area was acquired in 1939 and runs until 1999. The company is of American nationality and 50% is owned by the Standard Oil Company of California and 50% by The Texas Corporation. These two companies between them have approximately 160,000 American stockholders.

The development work commenced in 1933 and to date the company has discovered on three structures an estimated 750,000,000 barrels of crude oil reserves and there are many other structures of considerable promise on this concession. The Calarabian Standard Oil Company has so far spent approximately \$27,500,000 on this development. In addition, the company has advanced to the King against future royalties \$6,800,000. It has now come to a point where it is impossible for the company to continue the growing burden and responsibility of financing an independent country, particularly under present abnormal conditions. However, the King is desperate. He has told us that unless necessary financial assistance is immediately forthcoming, he has grave fears for the stability of his country.

PROPOSAL

1. We propose that the United States Government purchase from the Saudi Arabia Government finished petroleum products to the value of six million dollars annually for a period of five years.
2. The Company will contract with the King to produce, manufacture and load such products for his account at a Persian Gulf port.
3. The King will waive royalty on an amount of crude oil corresponding at current royalty rate to \$6,000,000.
4. The products taken under this arrangement, except that taken for use by the U. S. Navy or other U. S. Government purposes within the area, would have to be moved outside an area approximately defined as follows: Egypt, the east coast of Africa, South Africa, Australasia, India, the Straits Settlements, China, Japan and possibly the Philippines.
5. We suggest that for the purpose of determining the quantity of products due under this arrangement an agreement be reached as to the prices of certain products to be supplied over an agreed period.
6. We suggest that our State Department approach the British not only to increase the amount of money which the British have been advancing to the King, amounting to 400,000 pounds sterling per year, but also to request the British to continue to make such advances in sufficient amount, which, added to those made by the United States Government, plus any other revenue received by the King, will total approximately \$10,000,000 per year.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Any British advances should be on a political and military basis and should not involve their getting any oil from this concession, the British at the present time being well supplied from Iran, Iraq, and Bahrein, etc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

L 4-2 (25) (410430)

April 30, 1941.

Cross: EF4/887-11 (410430)

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Pres.

State D.

This has not^w reached the
stage when you enter the picture.
Please read Moffett's letter,
then the Secretary of State's
memorandum; then send for Moffett
and see if you can work out some-
thing to submit to me.

F. D. R.

Ask Jesse Jones.

Ask about sulphur in this oil for
navy use.

671-00786
Hull Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

This has ^{Now?} not reached the
stage when you enter the picture.
Please read Moffett's letter,
then the Secretary of State's
memorandum; then send for Moffett
and see if you can work out some-
thing to submit to me.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from the Secretary of State,
4/25/41 for the President, with accompanying
memorandum prepared by the Dept., 4/21/41
in re financial assistance for King Ibn Saud
in order for independent Arab Kingdom to
survive present emergency, which was prepared
in connection with letter from J.A. Moffett,
NYC, 4/16/41, to the President in re above.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON


17 MAY 1944

My dear Miss Brady:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this morning, I am attaching hereto the correspondence which we discussed.

I have had a search made of the department's files and this seems to be all that remains in our files on this subject.

Sincerely yours,


JOHN H. DILLON,
Major, U. S. M. C.

Miss Dorothy Brady
The White House
Washington, D. C.

✓
L4-2(25)(410430)

May 23, 1941

Dear Miss LeHand:

The attached correspondence, I believe, should have been returned with the Secretary's memorandum to the President under date of May 20, 1941. I regret this oversight.

Very truly yours,

John F. O'Keefe
Special Asst. to Secretary

Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.

Encs.

May 30, 1941

24-2(25) (410430)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Recently you sent me a memorandum concerning the matter of giving some financial assistance to King Ibn Saud through the medium of purchasing \$6,000,000 annually of petroleum products for the next five years.

I have had an investigation made of the oil produced in Saudi Arabia and find that its quality is not suitable for Navy use. The gasoline has a very low octane number, about 70, which corresponds to a second grade gasoline. It could not be used in airplanes and normally could not be used for ordinary purposes.

The Diesel fuel oil has an octane number of 55, but on account of its high sulphur content Navy men say it is inadvisable to use it and do not recommend it. The sulphur content runs between 1.5 and 1.9%. Navy specifications have a maximum limit of sulphur of 1%. I am told the sulphur would have a very deleterious corrosive effect on the exhaust system.

This high sulphur content also operates against the use of the fuel oil for Navy purposes. In the case of fuel oil, the sulphur content is 3.9% and the Navy specifications have a limit of 1%.

I appreciate the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and if needful, would be glad to see the small sum of money under question devoted to securing the military support of King Ibn Saud. I do not believe, however, there is any sound business reason for mixing that help up with the purchase of the type of oil produced in that field.

FRANK KNOX

Green

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

L.4-2(25)(410430)

17 May, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

1. I have investigated the possibilities of the Navy using oil from Saudi Arabia and I find conditions to be approximately as follows:

2. The gasoline has a very low octane number, about 70, which corresponds to a second grade gasoline in commercial use in this country. It could not, therefore, be used in airplane service but could under necessity be used for ordinary purposes, although not advisable.


3. The Diesel fuel has cetane number of 55 and could be used from a purely operating standpoint, but on account of its high sulphur content its use is inadvisable and is not recommended. The sulphur content is 1.5 to 1.9% while Navy specifications have a maximum limit of 1%. The sulphur would have a very deleterious corrosive effect on the exhaust system.

4. The fuel oil is of 14 A.P.I. gravity and viscosity under 65 at 122° F. Purely from an operating standpoint this fuel also could be used, but again its use is highly inadvisable for naval vessels on account of its high sulphur content, 3.9%. Navy specification sulphur limit is under 1%.

5. The exhaust gases would have a very serious corrosive effect on the uptake spaces of naval ships and would also probably cause serious discomfort - if not more harmful effects - to the anti-aircraft personnel of the ship if exposed to the exhaust fumes.

6. The gravity of the situation is appreciated, but Naval use of these fuels could only be recommended as a last resort.

7. It is possible that use for a large part of these fuels might be found in the merchant service where the fuel specifications are not so strict for obvious reasons.



H. A. STUART,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 25, 1941.

Memorandum for the President

The accompanying memorandum
which I had prepared after a
study of Mr. Moffett's letter
is self-explanatory.

CH



April 21, 1941.

Memorandum by the State Department

In the attached papers Mr. Moffett states that unless King Ibn Saud receives financial assistance at once there is grave danger that this independent Arab Kingdom cannot survive the present emergency. Mr. Moffett therefore proposes:

1. That we urge the British Government to increase from £400,000 to £900,000 the payment which they are making to the King in 1941.

2. That the United States Government agree to purchase from King Ibn Saud petroleum products to the value of \$6,000,000 annually for the next five years.

(a) Mr. Moffett believes that some of this petroleum could be consumed by the United States Navy or other Government agencies.

(b) However, that part of the oil not used by the Government would have to be marketed outside the Pacific area, presumably through private channels. In practice this would mean that, as conditions are at present, the only marketing area would be the Western Hemisphere.

COMMENT:

Although our own information regarding the financial situation in Saudi Arabia is not precise (we have no representative permanently resident in Saudi Arabia), we do know that the King's finances have been severely strained. Ordinarily the chief revenues of the Kingdom come from the Moslem pilgrim traffic, from customs revenues and from oil royalties. The first two sources have been effectively dried up by the existing situation. The oil royalties paid by Mr. Moffett's company, plus advances on those royalties in the amount of \$6,800,000, have apparently been insufficient to meet the financial needs. The annual budget of \$10,000,000, estimated by Mr. Moffett, appears to be reasonable in the existing situation.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

King Ibn Saud is unquestionably the outstanding figure in the Arab world today. He has long had intimate relations with the British and has been friendly with them despite the fact that during the last war the British supported his rival, King Hussein, as their candidate for the proposed Arab Empire. All of our recent reports from our own officers and from the British indicate that the King favors the Allied cause. He has some complaints against the British, particularly their policy

policy of supporting the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The only political dealings we have had with him were on the same subject when, about two years ago, he addressed a letter to the President objecting to this Government's alleged activities in favor of the Jewish National Home and against Arab interests. There seems little reason to doubt, however, that fundamentally Ibn Saud is anti-Axis. (It is pertinent to remark that about three years ago he refused to grant oil concessions to German and Japanese interests and instead accepted a less favorable concession agreement with Mr. Moffett's company.) Since Ibn Saud's influence is great in the Arab world a good case can be made out in favor of granting him financial support. The question arises how this support can best be given. The following comments are submitted on Mr. Moffett's proposals, as outlines at the beginning of this memorandum:

1. No objection is perceived to discussing with the British the question of their increasing by £500,000 their 1941 payment to the King. This would be a small price for them to pay for Ibn Saud's support and influence in this vital Near Eastern Area.

- 2a. It would presumably be possible for the Navy to use in the Pacific area some, or possibly all, of the extra oil which Mr. Moffett proposes to produce.

This

This question would have to be discussed with the Navy Department, and would involve consideration of such points as whether the Navy is obligated by law to obtain its oil by competitive bid, the extent to which the Navy is restricted by current contracts, et cetera.

2b. Whether it would be possible for the Government to sell, through commercial channels, that part of the proposed Arabian new production which it could not consume raises various considerations. Mr. Moffett makes the condition that the proposed production in excess of United States Government requirements "would have to be moved outside" of the Pacific area. This probably means that in practice it would have to be sold in the Western Hemisphere since there is no available market in Europe or West Africa. Why this excess oil could not be sold in the Pacific area through commercial channels Mr. Moffett does not make clear. One is perhaps justified in the speculation that such sale would be contrary to marketing agreements among the large oil companies or merely that there actually is no ready market in that area except Japan. The further question arises whether this excess oil could find a market in the Western Hemisphere unless the Government was prepared to sell it at a loss to marketing companies. Consideration might also have to be given whether the charge might not

not be made that the commercial part of Mr. Moffett's proposal was of direct benefit to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and that the proposal was designed to relieve that company from the difficult situation in which it has been placed. All in all the commercial part of the proposal seems open to come objections, although these might be overcome upon more intensive investigation.

AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

If it is decided that action should be taken to give financial support to Ibn Saud, and there appear to be sound reasons in favor of such a proposal, possibly an arrangement might be worked out combining a part of Mr. Moffett's proposal with action under the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Moffett feels that Ibn Saud needs approximately \$6,000,000 from our side. It might be feasible for the Navy to purchase \$3,000,000 to \$4,000,000 worth of oil for use at bases in the Pacific. Even more might be used, but it is not clear from Mr. Moffett's statement whether it would be possible to produce more refined products than he has suggested. (Nearly
one-half

one-half of the proposed production of \$6,000,000 consists of gasoline which might not be required by the Navy. In this connection it is understood that the gasoline produced in the Saudi Arabian field is of low octane content which, even when leaded to the maximum, does not exceed 85-87 octanes.) Assuming, however, that the Navy could use all of the heavy products amounting to something over \$3,000,000 in value, the balance of the \$6,000,000 might be made up by furnishing supplies to Saudi Arabia under the Lend-Lease Act. Such help might be extended in return for satisfactory political assurances and commitments by Ibn Saud.

Negotiations covering these matters might appropriately be undertaken by Mr. Kirk, our Minister in Egypt, who in any case should be proceeding shortly to Jedda to present his credentials to Ibn Saud, to whom he is also accredited.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1941

*File
Personal
Confidential*

Dear Miss LeHand:

The attached correspondence, I believe, should have been returned with the Secretary's memorandum to the President under date of May 20, 1941. I regret this oversight.

Very truly yours,

J. O'Keefe
John F. O'Keefe
Special Asst. to Secretary

Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.

Encs.

EXHIBIT
U. S. Dist. Court
S. D. of N. Y.
FEB 2 1949

April 16, 1941

My dear Missy:

When I saw the President last week, he asked that I prepare a memorandum covering the situation in Saudi Arabia and what the King might be able to do in furnishing finished petroleum products.

I enclose herewith a letter to the President and also the memoranda in question and would greatly appreciate your delivering same to him.

I am sorry to trouble you in this matter but it is so urgent and I hope you will forgive me.

With my kindest regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

J. A. Moffat

Miss Marguerite LeHand
The White House
Washington, D. C.

J. A. MOFFETT
130 EAST 43RD STREET
NEW YORK

April 16, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to the interview which you so kindly gave me on Wednesday, April 9th, and in line with your request, I am attaching hereto a memorandum covering the existing situation in Saudi Arabia. Also a proposal which we hope will be acceptable as a means of providing funds for the Saudi Arabian Government.

Our representatives have had numerous conferences with the King. His financial situation is desperate. The British Government has advanced him four hundred thousand pounds and he is endeavoring to have this increased to nine hundred thousand pounds. His budget requirement is conservatively estimated at \$10,000,000.

You referred to the four Danish tank steamers which might be utilized to transport finished petroleum products. If the United States Government will advance to the King of Saudi Arabia \$6,000,000 annually for the next five years, we feel confident that we can work out with the King an arrangement whereby he will deliver through us the following quantities of petroleum products, and at the prices mentioned:

\$2,606,000 (C)	1,800,000 bbls. of Gasoline	F.O.B. SHIP
\$1,999,500	2,660,000 bbls. of Diesel Oil	<u>PERSIAN GULF</u>
\$1,360,000	3,400,000 bbls. of Fuel Oil	@ 3 1/2¢ per gallon?
		@ 75¢
		@ 40¢
\$5,965,500	totalling approximately \$6,000,000 worth of petroleum products annually.	

The King's normal revenue (from pilgrimage and customs) has practically disappeared. His expenses have very materially increased, not only on account of the war, but due to the drought this past year, so that he has been forced to feed two thousand of his subjects.


ONE THIRTY EAST FORTY-THIRD STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.

Page 2.

4/16/41

I sincerely trust that some way may be found under existing legislation to provide King Ibn Saud financial assistance, which he so urgently needs in order to maintain his government in a stable condition. We believe that unless this is done, and soon, this independent kingdom, and perhaps with it the entire Arab world, will be thrown into chaos.

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. A. Maffett". The signature is stylized, with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long, horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

April 16, 1941

King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia formerly depended largely on the revenue from the pilgrimage and customs duties to finance his government. Due to the war, this revenue has been reduced to a negligible amount.

The only economic resources of any substantial value of Saudi Arabia are its oil resources, the development of which has been seriously interfered with on account of the war.

The King has privately expressed himself, and we believe sincerely, as strongly pro-Ally. No other man in the Arab countries, nor among Moslems the world over, commands prestige equal to his. In order to feed and maintain control of his people, which is essential to maintain his prestige in the Arab world elsewhere and to prepare, even in a moderate way, for equipping his own soldiers for service, he estimates that he will require \$10,000,000 per annum until the emergency has passed and he recently demanded that the California Arabian Standard Oil Company supply him with \$6,000,000 during the year 1941. In addition to this, the British have promised him 400,000 pounds sterling during 1941, which he hopes to increase to 900,000 pounds.

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United Arab Kingdom, plus any other revenue received by the King, will total approximately \$10,000,000 per year.

PROPOSAL

1. We propose that the United States Government purchase from the Saudi Arabia Government finished petroleum products to the value of six million dollars annually for a period of five years.
2. The Company will contract with the King to produce, manufacture and load such products for his account at a Persian Gulf port.
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5. We suggest that for the purpose of determining the quantity of products due under this arrangement an agreement be reached as to the prices of certain products to be supplied over an agreed period.
6. We suggest that our State Department approach the British not only to increase the amount of money which the British have been advancing to the King, amounting to 400,000 pounds sterling per year, but also to request the British to continue to make such advances in sufficient amount, which, added to those made by the United States Government, plus any other revenue received by the King, will total approximately \$10,000,000 per year.

Any British advances should be on a political and military basis and should not involve their getting any oil from this concession, the British at the present time being well supplied from Iran, Iraq, and Bahrein, etc.

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EXHIBIT

15

U. S. Dist. Court
S. D. of N. Y.

FEB 2 1949

Hill Folder

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

May 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thank you for letting me
read the attached memorandum.

CH

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Recently you sent me a memorandum concerning the matter of giving some financial assistance to King Ibn Saud through the medium of purchasing \$6,000,000 annually of petroleum products for the next five years.

I have had an investigation made of the oil produced in Saudi Arabia and find that its quality is not suitable for Navy use. The gasoline has a very low octane number, about 70, which corresponds to a second grade gasoline. It could not be used in airplanes and normally could not be used for ordinary purposes.

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This high sulphur content also operates against the use of the fuel oil for Navy purposes. In the case of fuel oil, the sulphur content is 3.9% and the Navy specifications have a limit of 1%.

I appreciate the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and if needful, would be glad to see the small sum of money under question devoted to securing the military support of King Ibn Saud. I do not believe, however, there is any sound business reason for mixing that help up with the purchase of the type of oil produced in that field.

Frank Knox

14
Hull Folder
EXHIBIT
U. S. Dist. Court
S. D. of N. Y.
FEB 2 1949
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND RETURN.

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of the Navy, 5/20/41, referring to President's recent memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy concerning the matter of giving some financial assistance to King Iben Saud through the medium of purchasing \$6,000,000 annually of petroleum products for the next five years. States he appreciates the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and if needful, would be glad to see the small sum of money under question devoted to securing the military support of King Iben Saud. He does not believe, however, there is any sound business reason for mixing that help up with the purchase of the type of oil produced in that field.

11
EXHIBIT

U. S. Dist. Court

S. D. of N. Y.

FEB 2 1949

June 14, 1941

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Jesse:

The President is anxious to find a way to do something about this matter. I am enclosing confidential correspondence from the White House so you can see what goes on. Will you return it as soon as you have read it.

I am not sure what techniques there are to use. It occurred to me that some of it might be done in the shipment of food direct under the Lend-Lease Bill, although just how we could call that outfit a "democracy" I don't know. Perhaps instead of using his royalties on oil as collateral we could use his royalties on the tips he will get in the future on the pilgrims to Mecca.

The RFC has done some funny things since that man from Houston took charge of it.

Cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

The Honorable
Jesse Jones,
Administrator,
Federal Loan Agency.

RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
THE RFC MORTGAGE COMPANY
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
METALS RESERVE COMPANY
RUBBER RESERVE COMPANY
DEFENSE PLANT CORPORATION
DEFENSE SUPPLIES CORPORATION
DEFENSE HOMES CORPORATION

FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
HOME OWNERS LOAN CORPORATION
FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION
ELECTRIC HOME AND FARM AUTHORITY
DISASTER LOAN CORPORATION
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON

FEDERAL LOAN AGENCY WASHINGTON

JESSE H. JONES
FEDERAL LOAN ADMINISTRATOR


July 22, 1941

Dear Harry:

You wrote me June 14th, hoping that I could find some way to assist King Ibn Saud.

There appears no legal way that we can help the King so, with the approval of the President, I suggested to Lord Halifax and Sir Frederick Phillips, also Mr. Neville Butler, that they arrange to continue taking care of the King.

Sincerely,


Administrator

Honorable Harry Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT

U. S. Dist. Court
S. D. of N. Y.

FEB 2 1949

FEDERAL LOAN AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

DATE August 27, 1941

Memorandum to HON. HARRY HOPKINS

I want to talk with you about this
situation.

Gene

file
personal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


November 3, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In response to your memorandum of October 29, 1941, there is enclosed for your signature a suggested reply to Mr. Julian P. Boyd's letter of October 24 to Miss LeHand, concerning relations with Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Boyd's letter and the enclosure thereto are returned herewith.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. To Mr. Julian P. Boyd.
2. From Mr. Boyd, October 24, 1941, with enclosures.

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. Boyd:

Your letter of October 24, 1941 to Miss LeHand and the memorandum by Mr. Nabih Amin Faris bearing the same date, which you enclosed, have been brought to my attention.

I desire to assure you and Mr. Faris that we are alive to the importance of King Ibn Saud in the present situation. We are also fully and currently informed regarding the King's basic attitude toward the war, which has been and remains most helpful and satisfactory.

The question of accrediting a Minister individually to Saudi Arabia has already received careful consideration on several occasions, and if the desirability of such a step becomes clear, appropriate action will of course be taken. The Honorable Alexander Kirk, American Minister at Cairo, plans to proceed to Saudi Arabia in the near future, and with world conditions what they are it is unlikely that his visit will be limited to an exchange of courtesies. Please inform Mr. Faris that his offer to serve as a special emissary is, however, greatly appreciated.

Very sincerely yours,

Mr. Julian P. Boyd,

Princeton University Library,

Princeton, New Jersey.

PSF Saudi Arabia

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

October 24, 1941

Miss Marguerite LeHand
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss LeHand:

I should not intrude upon your time, so much levied upon by so many people, were it not for the fact that I believe the enclosed memorandum is one of vital importance. The motive back of it, together with its significance, will I think justify this intrusion.

The author of this memorandum is a member of the Faculty of Princeton University. In various conversations with me he has set forth his own opinions about establishing a better relationship between this country and the Moslem world, the chief figure in which is Ibn Su'ud, Keeper of the Sacred Cities of Medina and Mecca. I have been so impressed by Mr. Faris' arguments that I have asked him to reduce them to a brief memorandum which I could lay before you. Mr. Faris is a scholar who comes from a well-known Arabian family. I have the highest respect for his abilities as well as for his patriotic motives.

I hope you will agree with me that his suggestion is important enough to be brought to the attention of the President.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Boyd

Librarian

Ever since the Russian campaign it has become more and more clear that the next and most crucial phase of the war will take place in the Near East, beginning with Turkey and spreading across into Iran, Iraq, Syria and Palestine, and on to Egypt, into which the Axis Powers hope to sweep from Lybia as well. Next to the battle of the Atlantic, the battle of the Near East is the most important. The democracies must win both or lose all. We cannot afford another Crete.

With the exception of Turkey and Persia (Iran), the inhabitants of all these lands are Arabs or Arabic-speaking, certainly upward of ninety per cent are; and including Turkey and Persia more than ninety-five per cent of all the inhabitants are followers of Muhammad. What concerns one section is of primary importance to all sections; what happens in Angora has its repercussions in Teheran, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus, Cairo, Tunis, Fes, and even throughout India, with its 80,000,000 Moslems. Islam is the key to the entire Moslem world from Gibraltar to the confines of China, including the Dutch East Indies, with their 40,000,000 Moslems, and our own Philippine Islands. Islam is the most cohesive and homogeneous community in the world today.

So far the Moslem world has leaned towards the democracies, not for love of them, but for love of democracy and hatred and fear of the Axis Powers. The Iraq and Iran incidents could have been far more serious had it not been for that leaning and that fear. Certainly the Moslem world is not enamoured of Britain, for its experience with British diplomacy has not been very helpful. Nevertheless, its passive good will has been very advantageous to the cause of the Allies.

This passive good will or benevolent neutrality can be transformed into active good will. Only America can do it. Hitherto the United States has enjoyed a peculiar position in the hearts and imaginations of all Moslems, particularly in the Near East and Arabia. Freedom of American diplomacy from imperialism and territorial ambitions has always appealed to these peoples. It was for this very reason that Ibn-Su'ud, the most powerful potentate of Arabia and the most respected person throughout the Moslem world, granted the oil concessions of the Bahrain region to American companies, turning down very attractive offers from Japan, Germany and Italy.

With this decided advantage favoring the United States, she alone can effect that transformation. The key man in the whole situation is this same Ibn-Su'ud. By virtue of being the keeper of the two sacred cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina, the exponent of orthodox Islam (the Wahhabis, of whom he is the leader, are the "Puritans" of Islam), and his accomplishments in welding together the warring tribes of the peninsula, he is now the central figure in a resurgent Pan-Islamism. What he says or does will be obeyed and followed throughout the Moslem world. To insure his good will is to insure the good will of all the Moslems.

At present the United States representative in Egypt is the accredited representative of this country to the court of Ibn-Su'ud. This does not go beyond the customary exchange of courtesies, an obsolete procedure in this time of active and aggressive diplomacy. We need a representation which will supplement the present type, one which will actively put forth the position of this democracy before Ibn-Su'ud as well as gauge his own deep intentions. Formal diplomacy cannot do this.

It lacks the necessary equipment, knowledge, perfect acquaintance with the language, religion, and institutions of the people, their habits of thinking, their methods of approach. The position of the United States must be presented to Ibn-Su'ud in his own tongue, with its own subtleties, shades of meaning, and niceties. It must be done in a concrete manner, because the Arab believes his eye more than he does his ear. It must be done boldly, because the Arab respects courage. It must be done by an Arab, because the Arabs are suspicious of all foreigners. It must be done by one whose family is known throughout Arabia for its learning and honesty. It must be done by an Arab of the Arabs, wholly Americanized, yet still aware of the feelings, hopes, aspirations, and fears of the Arabs.

My father has known personally the leading Arab potentates, their aides and advisers. Up to the time of his death in 1938, he had been a teacher for forty-nine years, instructing three generations of Arabs, many of whom now hold key positions in those lands. I personally know many of the leaders and rulers and, by virtue of my father's reputation, have access to many places otherwise closed. My life work has been the cultural, social and political institutions of Islam and the Arabs, and their language is mine. At the same time I have become thoroughly Americanized, partly because of my ten years' stay in the land of my adoption, where I identified myself with its people, sharing their ideas and ideals, partly because I have married one of them, and finally because I have come to believe that this land is the last best hope of the world. I did not happen to be born an heir to this great heritage, but by arduous work and thinking I have qualified to be an heir by adoption. Consequently I am convinced that I can render a service to these two peoples who represent the land of my birth and the land of my adoption.

I therefore suggest the following:

1. That the present representation of the United States to Ibn-Su'ud be separated from Egypt and a minister be accredited who would reside at Juddah and give his full time to the service.
2. That the program be further supplemented by sending a special emissary from the President to Ibn-Su'ud.
3. That the special emissary should carry, besides the greetings of the President, some token of good will, perhaps in the form of a gift -- a sword, a gold watch, a horse, or the like.
4. That the United States government extend an invitation to Ibn-Su'ud to send one of his sons on a visit to this country.

These would serve as the beginning of a long-range program of cultural and economic relations between the two lands. Their effect would be felt throughout the Moslem world, and I daresay they might be a deciding factor in weaning away the already shaky loyalties of the Moslems of North Africa from Italy and Vichy France.

It is because I am convinced of the rightness of the cause that I have the courage, the temerity, to suggest such a program and to place myself at the disposal of the Government to serve as the special emissary. Time is of the essence.

October 24, 1941

Nabih Amin Faris
Nabih Amin Faris

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الرقم ٤٥/١/٤/٢٦

التاريخ ٢٦ ربيع الاول ١٣٦٤

الموافق ١٠ مارس ١٩٤٤

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود
ملك المملكة العربية السعودية
الى حفرة صاحب الفخامة المستر روبرت
رئيس الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية - الانجم

يا صاحب الفخامة

انها لثروة سعيدة انتزعوها لاشراككم السوء في استثمار المبادى
التي املتت العرب من اجل نعرتها ولا ذكر النفعيات المظيمة التي
بيدها بعد الله تعريف مقاليد نظام العالم بحق مريح قائم منذ
عز التواريخ وفراد الان الققاء على هذا الحق يظلم لم يسجل لسه
التاريخ مثيلا ولا نظيرا .

ذلك هو حق العرب في فلسطين الذي يريد دماء اليهودية
المستورنية فسطه وازالته يفتي وساطلهم التي اخترعوها
وبيتوها وملوا ليهانى انحاء العالم من الدعايات الكاذبة
ومملوا في فلسطين من المظالم وامت واللعن وان على العرب
ما امت واما علم بمفهم الناصر وبقي الكثير منه تحت طي الغطاء
وهم يمدقن المدة لخلق شكل نازي فاشستي بون مستح
الد يموقرا طيبة وعمرها في وسط بلاد العرب بل في قلب
بلاد العرب وفي قلب الشرق الذي اخلصا لمسل القضيعة
المعلقاء في هذه الظروف الحرجة .

ان حق الحياة لكل شعب في موطنه الذي يميز نفسه
حق طبيعى فمنته الحق الطبيعى وانرتها مبادى
الانسانية واملنها الحلفاء في ميثاق الاطلنطيق ونسى
مناسبات متعمدة والحق الطبيعى للعرب في فلسطين

لا يحتاج ليهنا فقد ذكرت غيرة لخماسة الرئيس روزفلت وللمعركة البرمالية في عدة مناسبات ان العرب هم سكان فلسطين منذ اقدم عصور التاريخ وكانوا سادتها والاكثرية الساحقة فيها في كل العصور وانما نشور اشارة موجزة الى هذا التاريخ القديم والقديم للفلسطين حتى اليوم ليتبين بان ديموري الصهيونية في فلسطين لا تنفهم على اساس تاريخي صحيح .

يعتقد ان تاريخ فلسطين المعروف من سنة ٢٥٠٠ قبل الميلاد واول من تروطن فيها الكنعانيون وهي قبيلة مصرية نزحمت من جزيرة العرب وكان من مساكنهم الاولى في منخفضات الارض ولذا لك سموا كنعانيين ، وفي سنة ٢٠٠٠ - قبل الميلاد هاجروا من المرات (اورالكندانيين) بقيادة النبي ابراهيم فترك من اليهود اقساموا في فلسطين ثم هاجروا الى مصر بسبب الجوع مما حيث استعبد هم الفراعنة . وقد ظل اليهود مشردين فيها الى ان انقذهم النبي موسى من غرقهم وماد بهم الى ارض كنعان من طريق الجنوب الغربي في زمن رسيس الثاني الموافق سنة ١٢٥٠ اوابنه منتاح سنة ١٢٢٥ قبل الميلاد .

وانا اسلمنا بنس التوراة نجد ان قائد اليهود الذي فتح فلسطين كان يشوع بن نون وهو الذي عبر جيبه واحتل مدينة اريحا من الكنعانيين بقوة شديدة ووحشية يدل عليها قوله لجيشه ((حرقوا كل ما نرى المدينة واقتلوا كل رجل وامرأة وكل طفل وشيخ حتى البقرة والغنم بحد السيف واحرقوا المدينة بالنار حتى كل ما فيها)) يشوع ٦ - ٢١ - وقد انقسم اليهود بعد ذلك الى مملكتين ، مملكة اسرائيل ومقيمتها - السامرة - نابلس وقد دامت ٢٥٠ سنة ثم سقطت في يد شلناهر ملك آشور سنة ٧٢٢ قبل الميلاد وسبى شعبها الى مملكتهم .

ثم مملكة يهوذا وقصبتها اورشليم - القدس - وقد دامت ١٢٠ سنة بحد انقراض مملكة اسرائيل ثم اعيدت بيد نبوخذ ناهر ملك بابل الذي احرق المدينة والهيكل بالنار وسبب الشعب الى بابل سنة ٥٨٠ قبل الميلاد .
ودام السبي البابلي مدة ٧٠ سنة ثم رجع اليهود الى فلسطين بامر

تروث ملك الفرس، ثم تلا ذلك الفتح البيزناني بقيادة الاسكندر المقدوني سنة ٣٢٢ - قبل الميلاد ودام حكمه في فلسطين مدة ١٧٢ سنة وجاء بعده الفتح الروماني سنة ١٣ قبل الميلاد بقيادة بومبي ودام حكم الرومان في فلسطين مدة ٧٠٠ سنة وفي سنة ٦٣٧ ميلادية احتل العرب فلسطين ودام حكمهم فيها مدة ٨٨٠ سنة متواصلة وكانت وية الخليفة للفتح كسائتي ((لاخوزيولا تندر و لاوتنلوا لا تمشلوا لا تقتلوا طغلا ولا شيخا كبيرا ولا تمقرقا نخلا وتمرقوه ولا تقطعوا شجرة مثمرة ولا تذبحوا شاة ولا بقرة ولا بعمرا و سوف تعرف باناس قد فرغوا انفسهم في الموامع فدعهم و سافرغوا انفسهم له)) وقد ذكر هذا ابن الاثير المنيخ المشهور.

ثم انتقل الحكم في فلسطين الى الاتراك سنة ١٥١٧ ميلادية في زمن السلطان سليم الاول وظلت فلسطين في حوزتهم مدة ٤٠٠ سنة وكان العرب سكانها وكانوا شركاء مع الاتراك في حكمها وادارتها وفي سنة ١٩١٨ احتلها البريطانيون ولا يزالون فيها الى الان .

ذلك تاريخ فلسطين المريبة يدل على أن العرب اول سكانها سكنوها منذ ثلاثة آلاف سنة وخمسماية قبل الميلاد واستقر سكانهم فيها بعد الميلاد الى اليوم وحكموها وحدثهم وبيع الاتراك الف ولاثمماية سنة تقريبا، أما اليهود فلم تتجأ وزبدة حكمهم المتقطع فيها ٢٨٠ سنة وكلها اقامات متفرقة مشوشة . ومن منذ سنة ٣٢٢ قبل الميلاد لم يكن لليهود في فلسطين أي وجود او حكم الى أن دخلت القوات البيزنانية فلسطين سنة ١٩١٨ ومعنى ذلك أن اليهود منذ الفين وسائتي سنة لم يكن لهم في فلسطين عدد ولا نفوذ ولما دخل البريطانيون في فلسطين لم يكن عدد اليهود يزيد على ثمانون ألف كانوا يعيشون في رفد وهناء ورخاء مع سكان البلاد الاصليون من العرب ولذا لك فاليهود لم يكونوا الا دخلاء على فلسطين في حقبة متفرقة من الزمن ثم أخرجوا منها منذ أكثر من ألفي سنة .

أما المحقق الثابتة للعرب في فلسطين فمستند -

- ١- على حق الاستيطان الذي استمرت مدته منذ سنة ٢٥٠٠ قبل الميلاد ولم يخرجوا عنها في يوم من الايام .
- ٢- وعلى الحق الطبيعي في الحياة

٣- ولوجود بلاد هم المقدسة فيها

٤- ليس العرب دخلاء على فلسطين ولا يرد جلب أحد منهم من أطراف المعمورة لاستكانهم فيها .

أما اليهود فإن دعوهم التاريخية هي مخالطة ثم ان حكمهم القمطر في نترات متقطعة كذا ذكرنا لا يطمئئهم اى حق في ادعائهم انهم اصحاب البلاد لان احتلال بلد سائر المخرج منه لا يخلو لاي شئ مما ادعاه ملكية تلك البلاد والمطالبة بذلك وتاريخ الممالك مسلمة يمثل هذا الامثال .

ان حل قضية اليهود المضطهدين في الممالك تختلف من قضية الصهيونية الجاثرة فان ايجاد اساكين لليهود المشتتون يمكن ان يتم ان عليهم جميع المالم وفلسطين قد تحملت قسما نفوق طائفتها ، وامانقل هؤلاء المشتتون ووضعمهم في بلاد آهلة بسكانها والغناء على أهلها الاصليين فامر لا يمثل له في التاريخ البشرى وانا نوضح بمراحة ووضوح ان مساعدة الصهيونية في فلسطين لا يعني خطرهم على فلسطين وحدها فاحسب بل انه خطر يهدد سائر البلاد العربية بوقد اتهم الصهيونيون الحجة الناصحة على ما ينوونه في فلسطين وفي سائر البلاد الجاثرة ، نفاقا ويبتكيلات عسكرية سرية خطيرة وسن خطا القول ان يقال ان هذا عمل شرذمة متطرفة منهم وان ذلك قول سهل باستنكار سن جميعياتهم وحيثاتهم وانا نقول ان اعمال الصهيونيين في فلسطين وفي خارجها صادرة عن برنامج متفق عليه وشرطي عنه من سائر اليهودية الصهيونية وقد بدأ هؤلاء اعمالهم المنكرة في الاساءة للحكومة التي احسنت اليهم وارتهم وهي الحكومة البريطانية فاعطت جميعياتهم الحرب على بريطانيا واست لذلك تشكيلات عسكرية خطيرة تملك في فلسطين في الوقت الحاضر كل ماتحتاجه من الاسلحة والمعدات الحربية ثم قام افرادها بقتي الا اعتدأت وكان من انظمامها الا اعتداء على الرجيل القذال الذي كان مستلقيا بالحب والخير لصالح المجتمع وكان من اشد مسنهم على اليهودية المضطهدة وهو اللورد سميث ، وسأيدل على ان نعتهم المنكرة كانت مستهدفة من مجموع اليهود هي المظالم والمسا في التي قام بها رجال الصهيونية في كل مكان في طلب تخفيف المسؤولية من الجور من

ليجبروا غيرهم على أمثالها .

فهذه أعمالهم مع الحكومة التي أحست اليهم كل الاحسان فكيف يكون الحال لو كنوا من أغراضهم وأصبحت فلسطين بلدا خالصة لهم يفعلون فيها ونسب جوارها ما يريدون .

لشرك الامر بين العرب وبين هؤلاء المعتدين ربما كان الامر ولكنهم محبون من قبل الحكومة البريطانية صديقة العرب . فاليهودية الصهيونية لم ترع حرمة هذه الحماية بل قامت بتدبير حبال من الشرور بداتها ببريطانيا وأنذرت العرب بعد بريطانيا بمثلها وأشد منها . فاذا كانت الحكومات المتحالفة التي تشعر العرب بصدقتها تريد ان تشمل نار الحرب والدماء بين العرب واليهودية فان تأييد الصهيونية سيوصل الى هذه النتائج .
وان أخشى ماتخشاها البلاد العربية من الصهيونية هو .

- ١- أنهم سيقومون بسلسلة من المذابح بينهم وبين العرب
 - ٢- ستكون اليهودية الصهيونية من أكبر العوامل في افساد ما بين العرب والحلفاء وأقرب دليل على ذلك قضية اليهوديين في مقتل اللورد موير في مصر فقد قدر اليهود أن يخفي ما علوا الجريمة فيقع الخلاف بين الحكومة البريطانية ومصر .
 - ٣- ان مطامع اليهود ليست في فلسطين وحدها فان ما أعدوه من العدة يدل على أنهم ينوون العدوان على ما جاورها من البلدان العربية .
 - ٤- لو تصورنا استقلال اليهود في مكان ما في فلسطين فما الذي يمنعهم عن الاتفاق مع أي جهة قد تكون معادية للحلفاء ومعادية للعرب وهم قد بدؤوا بعد وانهم على بريطانيا بينهم تحت حمايتها ورحمتها ، لاشك ان هذه الأمور ينبغي أخذها بعين الاعتبار في اقرار السلم في العالم عندما ينظر في قضية فلسطين ، ففضلا على ان حشد اليهود في فلسطين لا يستند الى حجة تاريخية ولا الى حق طبيعي وانه ظلم مطلق فهو في نفس الوقت يشكل خطرا على السلم وعلى العرب وعلى الشرق الاوسط .
- وصفة القول أن تكوين دولة يهودية بفلسطين سيكون ضربة قاضية لكيان العرب

وهو د للمسلم باستمرار لانه لابد وان يسود الاضطراب بين اليهود والمسيح فاذا انقضى صبر المسيح يوسا من الايام ويقبضوا من مستقبلهم فانهم يخطرون للدفاع من انفسهم ومن اجيالهم المقبلة ازاء هذا المد وان وهذا ابلا شك لم يخطر على بال الحلفاء الماملين على سيادة السلم واحترام الحقوق ولا يشك بانهم لا يرضون هذه الحالة المقلقة المهددة لسلم الشرق الاوسط.

ما كنت اريد في هذا المشترك العظيم ان ائتمل نضائكم ورجال حكومتكم الماملين في هذه الحرب المظلمى في هذا الموضوع وكنت افضل - وانا واثق من انصاف العرب من قبل دول الحلفاء - ان يستمر سكوت العرب الى نهاية الحرب لولا مسانراء من قيام هذه الفئة الصهيونية اليهودية بكل عمل شديدي مزعج غير معتد به من الظروف الحربية ويشافل الحلفاء حتى قد مرها عاظمون للتاثير على الحلفاء بكل انواع الضغط ليعملوهم على اتخاذ خطة ضد العرب تختلف عما اعلمه الحلفاء من ببادى الحق والمدل لذلك اردت بيان حق العرب فى فلسطين على حقيقته لدحض المحجج الواهية التى تدعيها هذه الفرز منة من اليهودية الصهيونية د فعلا لمد وانهم ويبننا للحقائق حتى يكون الحلفاء على علم كامل بحق العرب فى بلادهم وبلا د - ايمانهم واجدادهم فلا يسمع لليهود ان ينتهزوا فرصة سكوت العرب وغيبتهم فى عدم التمشيش على الحلفاء فى الظروف الحاضرة فياخذوا من الحلفاء مالا حق لهم فيه .

وكل ما نرجوه هو ان يكون الحلفاء على علم بحق العرب لينتج ذلك تقديم اليهود فى أى امر جيد يستعير خطرا على العرب وعلى مستقبلهم فى مسانراء اوطانهم ويكون العرب مطمئنون من المدل والانصاف فى اوطانهم .

وتغلبوا بقول فائق احتراماتى . صه على
عبد الرحمن
السعيد

URGENT AND MOST SECRET

Saudi Arabia folder
1-48

BSF

June 9, 1943.

The President of The United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed several days of conferences with
Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud is the wisest and strongest of all the leaders
I have met in the Arab states. He is a man of vision and execu-
tive ability ready to lead his people in keeping pace with the
progress of the world. He is, however, sensitive to the primi-
tive outlook of his countrymen and their reluctance to accept
foreign influences too readily.

Ibn Saud acknowledges frankly that his country for its
own safety and welfare needs the friendship and the assistance of
a strong foreign power, but he distrusts and fears foreign imper-
ialism. He is determined that his country will not become a pawn
or a mere instrument for profit of some foreign government.

The King has, however, great faith and confidence in the
United States. He looks to America and to you for the benevolent
friendship which his nation needs and for the integrity of lead-
ership which must be demonstrated by the United States if the
Atlantic Charter and the four freedoms are to become realities.
He expressed complete confidence in your leadership and sincerely

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

pleaded for your friendship.

I found many manifestations in Saudi Arabia of Ibn Saud's confidence in America and of his eagerness that American interests rather than those of any other foreign power, so often instrumentalities for political penetration, should assist the Saudi Arabian government in the development of the natural resources of the country. The King pointedly referred to British and French economic penetration in other sectors of the Middle East. He made it clear that he will deny entry to Saudi Arabia to any business interest which is dominated by an imperialistic government and whose policies would be subject to such a government rather than fully subject to Saudi Arabian authority.

For Saudi Arabia Ibn Saud has favored American interests by granting all oil concessions, his most valuable natural asset, to an American company, the California Arabian Standard Oil Company.

The King acknowledges that Britain has befriended his country in recent months. He emphasized that he wishes to continue friendly relations with the British government but he was positive in asserting that insofar as it is within his power he will not permit British or any other imperialism to rule or to influence the internal life of Saudi Arabia.

At one time during the conferences the King dismissed all of his advisers who were present and asked me if I would permit my interpreter to leave as he wanted to have a secret conference with me. Then the only persons present were the King, myself, and the

King's confidential interpreter. The King said that he was making this conference secret for the reason that he wished to discuss with me frankly his relations with Britain. He advised me that what he was saying was for your information alone.

As soon as I had left the King I dictated the outlines of his confidential communication to you. I will transmit it to you as soon as I see you. I have thought best, however, not to commit to writing in this report the King's secret communication.

While the King did not display bitter hostility toward Britain, he expressed the opinion that the British government still intends to force imperialistic rule on the Arab states. I pointed out to him that Britain had renounced imperialism as a policy in the Atlantic Charter and that in addition to the Atlantic Charter you had declared your unqualified commitment to the principles embodied in the four freedoms. He expressed confidence in your commitment but he believes that the Atlantic Charter has been repudiated on at least two occasions by Britain. Consequently, he said, nations that are opposed to imperialism must place their trust in you. He trusts you implicitly and his acceptance of the principles promulgated by you is complete.

I was in conference with Ibn Saud when we received the announcement from Moscow of the dissolution of the Third International. The King stated that he knew that Stalin, unlike Trotsky, did not favor a world communist revolution but relied on the creation within Russia of a successful example of applied communism.

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1953
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

Relying on this estimate of Mr. Stalin's motives the King expressed his own conviction, which he believed Moslems generally would come to share, that Russia has sincerely renounced the policy of forcing the world to accept communism. He concluded by stating his conviction that Mr. Stalin's action at this time was the result of your intervention.

In addition to the issue of imperialism, the King discussed with me three specific matters bearing upon his country and the Arab peoples of the world. They were (1) the creation of a union of Arab states, (2) the Palestine question, and (3) the needs of Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud favors the eventual establishment of an Arab union on principles similar to those embodied in the Constitution of the United States. If such a union is established, he continued, it should participate in a world federation which he thinks should also be patterned generally after the union of American states.

Such a federation, he said, must depend heavily upon American leadership and on application of the American principles of equality and democracy to the structure of the postwar world.

I will omit in this report the King's discussion and objections to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. I am aware of the fact that he has sent you a letter on this subject and that he also has given an interview to the magazine "Life" on the same subject. I, therefore, assume that his attitude is

well known to you.

As to the immediate needs of Saudi Arabia the King and his advisers discussed with me four specific categories, namely: food, transportation, communications and money.

I am aware that the Middle East Supply Center has received schedules of the immediate needs of Saudi Arabia and has approved at least parts of these schedules. It is the delay in meeting the approved schedules that prompted the King to mention their urgency to me. The King was also perplexed by the fact that it had been indicated to him that American Lend-Lease to his nation would be controlled by British authority. I was informed that subsequent to my seeing the King he had been advised that Lend-Lease will be handled directly between the United States and Saudi Arabian Governments. This decision will eliminate the bases of many misunderstandings.

The King and his Finance Minister, Abdullah Suleiman, discussed with me at length the fiscal difficulties of Saudi Arabia. I understand that the Saudi Arabian monetary problem is also at present being studied in Washington in the State Department. The Saudi Arabian monetary problem is complicated by lack of realistic application of religious principles and a primitive attitude toward the requirements of modern commerce. The unit of Government currency is the silver rial. Because the Saudi Arabian rial has greater silver content than comparable units of currency in neighboring nations the rial has disappeared through extensive hoarding

within Saudi Arabia and in nearby countries.

The suggestion was made that the silver content of the Saudi Arabian rial be reduced and that silver coin or bullion be deposited in the Saudi Arabian treasury or in a bank of issue and paper money be issued against such deposit. This proposal was met by the objection that such a course would be considered dishonest and prohibited under Moslem law and religious principles. I have studied the Saudi Arabian fiscal situation and, if it is deemed desirable by you, I will transmit my information on this subject to the State Department. I recommend that immediate attention be given to extending a loan to Saudi Arabia and to the establishment for that country of a proper fiscal system.

There are two American-owned companies now operating in Saudi Arabia. The first is the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, Ltd., a Canadian corporation American-owned. The operations of this Company are not yet extensive. But the fact that the concessions are made to an American-owned company is important. In this report I wish to deal principally with petroleum.

Saudi Arabia stands today as the only state in the Middle East not subjected to foreign imperialism. Once considered worthless desert land, the country has assumed its present importance by reason of its strategic location and the discovery by an American oil company of its great petroleum resources. The King has stated definitely that he wishes the petroleum resources of Saudi Arabia to be developed by American interests only.

Foremost of the factors which have stimulated the good feeling expressed by the King and his people toward America has been the work of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company and its relations with the local government. Through agreements dating from 1933 through 1939, this American oil company now holds a definite lease on 290,000 square miles of Saudi Arabia and a preferential right to lease an additional 177,000 square miles. An additional 212,000 square miles covered by the concessions are involved in boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and neighboring governments.

The California Arabian Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Oil Company. These two American concerns likewise are sole owners of the Bahrein Petroleum Company, operators of a concession on Bahrein Island, an independent sheikhdom in the Persian Gulf. Through these two subsidiaries, the American interests have opened four producing structures, three in Saudi Arabia and one in Bahrein. In my opinion three hundred thousand barrels of oil per day could be produced from these four structures alone. I believe a much greater yield would follow from additional structures.

Saudi Arabia is potentially one of the greatest oil areas in the world.

The concessions held by the California Arabian Company in Saudi Arabia have a term of sixty years and provide for a royalty to the government of twenty-three cents per barrel. The

terms of the concessions appear to be equitable and fair. The government of Saudi Arabia is well pleased with its contract and the King is high in his praise of the cooperation and assistance he has received from the company.

Notable in the latter category has been the drilling of water wells and construction of irrigation works. Lack of soil fertility and lack of water by reason of an average rain-fall of only three inches limit the development of agricultural irrigation projects.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the King and his advisers said that with the revenue derived from the development of their oil resources and with the help of the American petroleum engineers he believed that sufficient agricultural irrigation projects could be developed to enable Saudi Arabia to produce sufficient food for its population.

The King mentioned that the United States through Lend-Lease and through sales and priorities has furnished British-controlled oil companies operating in the Persian Gulf area with steel, iron, tin, rubber, machinery for drilling purposes, pipelines, refining machinery, and other commodities to enable those companies to conduct great expansion and development programs. But up to this time, he said, no priorities had been given to the American company developing Saudi Arabian oil resources. Inasmuch as he has favored American interests by giving them the sole petroleum concession in Saudi Arabia, he feels that the oil resources

of his country should be developed as rapidly as those of nearby British-controlled areas. In this connection he indicated that possibly his feeling on this subject is accentuated by the dire need for the revenue that the development of the oil resources would bring.

The one factor in all of the foregoing that I think will strike you as it does me is the statement of the King that he desires the development of Saudi Arabian oil resources to be conducted by an American company or companies that would be completely subjected to the authority of Saudi Arabia rather than any other Government. I can understand the King's desire in this matter. Operating companies should always be primarily subject to the government of the country in which they are operating. I am, however, rather inclined to the opinion that eventually American oil companies developing foreign resources must be subjected to a degree of supervision by the American government. Such companies also must have a degree of protection in foreign countries by their own government. Finally, the American government will have to acquire a degree of ownership of American companies operating in foreign territory sufficient to assure governmental supervision without destroying private ownership or private initiative. In the meantime, I recommend the Saudi Arabian situation be handled through the instrumentalities now existing and in your hands.

American control of the Saudi Arabian oil resources places you in a trading position that will enable you to obtain

for all concerned an equitable allotment of the oil resources of Africa, the Middle East, and continuing through Afghanistan to the Far East.

The development of the situation in Saudi Arabia gives you, Mr. President, the possibility for a complete answer to the critics who tell us we are exhausting our oil resources at home without any hope of replacement. The development of the great oil resources of Saudi Arabia will give you a supply of this essential commodity in a strategic location. The development of this great resource will enable you to see that an equitable share of this wealth is used for the benefit of the people of Saudi Arabia who own it. And Finally, after having served all these purposes, this resource will be of great importance to our own country in the reconstruction period after the war.

Your leadership and American prestige stand high. Great confidence in American ability and honesty of purpose has been established in Saudi Arabia. With American assistance, King Ibn Saud hopes to give his people the opportunity to help themselves in creating (1) irrigation projects to enable the country to provide food without having to rely on imports, (2) a system of roads, (3) acquisition of transportation facilities, (4) a communications system, (5) an educational system, (6) a public health system, and other essentials for the welfare of the people and the support of

an independent nation.

I am, Sir,

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S.A.

(1378)

*Signified original of this letter sent to Mr. Stone,
State Dept, for delivery.
hm*

*S. Arabia folder
1-43*

July 7, 1943

Great and Good Friend:

I have instructed Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, Army of the United States, in whom I repose full faith and confidence, to seek an audience with Your Majesty in order to discuss confidentially on my behalf certain matters of mutual interest.

I take this opportunity again to express my best wishes for Your Majesty's good health and for the well-being of your people.

Your Good Friend.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

His Majesty

Abdul Aziz ibn Saud,

King of Saudi Arabia.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your recent conversation with Dr. Weizmann there is enclosed for your signature, if you approve, a communication addressed to King Ibn Saud informing him that you have directed Colonel Hoskins to proceed to Saudi Arabia to discuss with the King certain matters of mutual interest.

C H

Enclosure:

To King Ibn Saud.



Department of State

BUREAU }
DIVISION }

NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 7/5/43

ADDRESSED TO

The President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What date do you think we
should arrange for Ibn Saud? I
would suggest the early part of
October.

F.D.R.

Telegram, 8-3-43, from Abdul Asizal Saud,
thanking for the invitation to visit the
U.S.

من عبدالعزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل ملك المملكة العربية السعودية
الى صاحب الفخامة المستر فرانكلن روزفلت رئيس جمهورية الولايات المتحدة الاميركية
يا صاحب الفخامة

تلقيت ببالح السرور كتاب فخامتكم الصادر عن البيت الابيض بتاريخ ٧ يوليو ١٩٤٣
والذي حملته اليّ مندوب فخامتكم اللفتننت كولونيل هارولد هوسكنز وقد كان من دواعي
اغتنابي انني اجتمعت بالمندوب المشار اليه وأطلعني على آراء فخامتكم الخاصة
ببعض الشؤون والمسائل ذات الصالح المشترك وبحثت معه في هذه المواضيع
على ضوء الصالح المذكورة وهو سينقل بدوره ولا شك لفخامتكم آرائي وانكاري
هذا وقد تلقيت بالحبور تحيات فخامتكم التي حملها اليّ المندوب المشار اليه آنفا
والذي قام بماعه اليه من المهمة بما تقتضيه فطنته ولباقته اللامعة واني اغتنم
فرصة عودته الى الولايات المتحدة فابحث لفخامتكم بشكري الخالص على نبل غايتكم
بانتداب سمادته التي دلت على متانة الصداقة التي تربط بلادينا كما أبعث
بتحياتي الخاصة وتحيات حكومتي وشعبي وتغياتنا الطيبة لفخامتكم
واللشعب الامريكي الكرام

صدر بقصرنا في الرياض في اليوم التاسع عشر من شهر شعبان سنة ١٣٦٢ هجرية
الموافق لليوم العشرين من شهر اغسطس سنة ١٩٤٣ ميلادية .

صدقني المخلص
عبد الله
الفيصل

الى صاحب الفخامة المستر فرنكلن روزفلت رئيس جمهورية الولايات المتحدة
الاميركية

Translation

In the Name of God the Most Merciful

From Abdel-Aziz Ibn Abdel-Rahman El-Faisal,
King of Saudi Arabia.

To His Excellency Mr. Franklin Roosevelt,
President of the Republic of the
United States of America.

Excellency,

It was with exceeding pleasure that I received Your Excellency's letter written at the White House on July 7, 1943, which was delivered to me by Your Excellency's delegate, Lt. Colonel Harold Hoskins. I was greatly pleased to meet the above delegate who conveyed to me Your Excellency's views regarding certain matters and questions of common interest. I have discussed these topics with him in the light of the above interests and he will no doubt, in his turn, convey to Your Excellency my views and opinions.

It was also with pleasure that I have received Your Excellency's greetings conveyed by the above delegate who acquitted himself well in the discharge of his task in conformity with his brilliant tact and wisdom. I seize the opportunity of his return to the United States to send to Your Excellency my sincerest thanks for your noble object in delegating His Excellency--a thing which proves the strength of the friendship which binds our two countries. I also send to Your Excellency and to the noble American nation my sincere greetings and the greetings of my government and my people.

Written at our palace at Riad on this the nineteenth day of Shaaban, in the year 1362 of the Hegira, corresponding to the twentieth day of August of the year 1943 of the Christian Era.

Your sincere friend,

Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

Again, somebody is talking in the State Department and you ought to be able to find out why someone there gave the information to Colonel Hoskins in regard to the visit of the son of Ibn Saud.

Of course, I have no sympathy with those Jews who object to my seeing the son of Ibn Saud any more than I have any sympathy with those Arabs who are starting anti-semitic prejudices in this country.

Please return enclosure for my files.

F.D.R.

*file
personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The document accompanying your attached memorandum contains several inaccuracies or misstatements. It states that the son of Ibn Saud has been invited to come to the United States; that the invitation came from some one in the State Department and was transmitted through Colonel Hoskins.

As you know, such an invitation was issued at your direction but the message was not transmitted through Colonel Hoskins who, as a matter of fact, had been gone from the United States at least ten days before the invitation was extended. The invitation itself was sent through the usual diplomatic channels, that is through our Minister Resident at Jidda. So far as we are aware, the fact that the invitation has been issued is not known to Colonel Hoskins unless he has learned of it during his present visit to Saudi Arabia.

I do not believe that any leak occurred in the State Department regarding the issuance of this invitation. As a matter of fact, a member of the British Embassy called

an

an Officer of this Department about the time the invitation was issued and said that he had learned through Zionist contacts in New York that an invitation was to be extended. How the Zionist contacts in New York learned of the proposed invitation I do not know.

So far as Arab propaganda activities in the United States are concerned, our Minister Resident at Jidda has reported that the British Legation at that city has advised the Saudi Arabian Government to undertake such propaganda to counteract Zionist propaganda in the United States.

The enclosure is returned herewith for your files.

CH

Information has come from two reliable sources, one American and one British, that the son of Ibn Saud has been invited to come to the United States. It is said that the invitation came from someone in the State Department, and was transmitted through Col. Hoskins now attached to the Office of Strategic Services.

We understand that Ibn Saud has heretofore been advised by certain Americans that something ought to be done by the Arabians to counteract Jewish influence in the United States on the subject of Palestine. While in theory that point of view is arguable, the practical effect of such a visit may well concern not merely Palestine but the anti-Semitic situation in the United States. It is feared that the proposed visit which is apparently for propaganda purposes would result in the establishment of an Arabian anti-Semitic bureau here which would serve as a focal point for various anti-Semitic movements and would attract anti-Semitic money.

There has been an Arabian National League functioning here (address - 303 Fifth Avenue, New York City) which has been involved in definitively anti-Semitic work in this country. Names of persons connected with that organization can be readily made available.

2

AIDE MEMOIRE

Riyadh,
19 Shaaban 1362,
20 August 1943.

Your Excellency has informed me of the kind request of President Roosevelt regarding our opinion and the opinion of the Arabs on the problem of Palestine, the importance of which has increased during recent months. While we thank the President for his kind attention and his sending a tactful representative in the person of Your Excellency in order to ascertain our opinion on the Palestine problem we may observe that our opinion in this case has not changed and we have explained it to the President quite clearly in our two letters sent to His Excellency on November 19, 1938 and April 30, 1943. All that we desire in the question is that the obvious rights of the Arabs, which are clear as the sun, may not be dimmed by historic fallacies or social and economic theories of the Zionists, which theories God has not ordained. Also we wish to confirm all that has been stated in the letters referred to above and we hope that the deeds of those working for justice and the welfare of mankind, which we doubt not that America has entered this hard war to support, may not be correlated with an inhuman deed that will suppress the rights of the Arabs in Palestine owing to ignorance of the truth. Such a case would be a tragedy and a crushing blow to the Arabs unprecedented in history.

While we are pleased at the kind promises to consider this problem of Palestine justly after the defeat
of

of the Axis, still we may ask the President to use his influence to see that the White Paper is continued in force at least during this war for, by not doing so and by not stopping the immigration which has exceeded the limited quota, there is a great breach in the promises of the Covenant (White Paper) and that would be wholly in the interest of the Jews and against the Arabs beyond all doubt or explanation.

As for my entering into discussions for the solution of the Palestine problem in a practical way apart from giving advice or opinion, this is not possible for I have no direct responsibility for that country or for all the other Arabs who are concerned with this problem and so I cannot do anything definite except after probing the opinion of all those concerned and in whose hands lies the solution of this problem. In this case, however, it would be possible to collect the various ideas to serve as a basis for the solution and, if the President wishes to obtain the opinion of the Arabs through us, we are ready to do so, God willing.

As regards the President's proposal that I meet with Dr. Chaim Weizmann, I wish the President to know that we meet anyone who comes to us, whatever be his religion, and we welcome him and do everything which his position requires in the matter of hospitality. But the Jews are a peculiar case and the President must know about the enmity which is between us in earlier and in recent times. This enmity is well known and mentioned in our holy books and it is rooted from earliest times and forever. From this it is clear that

that we cannot guard against the treachery of the Jews and we cannot discuss anything with them nor trust in their promises. The reasons are:

(1) Because we know their feelings towards Arabs and Moslems.

(2) Because we have not yet communicated with the other Arabs and we do not know their opinions. However, if as mentioned above, the President wishes me to obtain their ideas, we are ready to do so.

As for Dr. Weizmann there is a personal enmity between him and me owing to the criminal affront which this person has committed against me by choosing me from among all Arabs and Moslems to charge me with a dastardly thing--that is that I should become a traitor against my religion and my country. This affair increases my hatred against him and all connected with him. This insult took place during the first year of this war when he sent me a well-known European person who asked me to abandon the question of Palestine and the support of Arab and Moslem rights in connection therewith against a payment to me of £ 20 million, which amount would be guaranteed by His Excellency President Roosevelt himself. Is there any affront or baseness greater than this? And is there a crime greater than that which this person was bold enough to suggest in making the President a guarantor of such a vile proposal? I have no doubt that His Excellency the President would not accept that this should be attributed to me or to him. This is one of the motives which I wish you to express to the President so that he may understand to what limit the Jews go in order

to

-4-

to reach their unjust objectives and that the President
may judge in his wisdom such deeds which need only
to be mentioned in order to be understood.

الرياض في ١٩ شعبان ١٣٦٢

الموافق ٢٠ أغسطس ١٩٤٣

ان سعادتكم قد ابغتموني تفضل فخامة الرئيس روزفلت عن سؤاله
رأينا ورأى العرب في مشكلة فلسطين التي زادت اهميتها في الايام الاخيرة
ونحن ان نشكر لفخامته هذا الاعتناء المهم وابغاده مندوبا لبقا مثل
سعادتكم لأجل الاستفسار عن رأينا في قضية فلسطين نذكر لفخامته
ان رأينا في هذه القضية لم يتغير وقد ذكرناه لفخامته بكل وضوح
في كتابنا اللذين ارسلناهما الى فخامته بتاريخ ١٩ نوفمبر ١٩٣٨ وتاريخ
٣٠ ابريل ١٩٤٣ وان كل ما نريد في الامر هو ان لا يهضم حق العرب المريح
الذي هو مثل الشمس بمغالطات تاريخية ونظريات اجتماعية واقتصادية
من قبل اليهود الصهيونيين ما انزل الله بها من سلطان ثم اننا نؤيد
كل ما اتينا به في كتابنا المشار اليهما آنفا ونرجو كذلك ان لا تقتصر
اعمال من يريد العدل ونصرة الانسانية التي لانك بأنه ما دخلت اميركا
هذه الحرب الضروس الا لتأييدها - لعمل غير انساني ان يقضى على حقوق
العرب في فلسطين لعدم الوقوف على الحقيقة فتكون بذلك مأساة وضربة
قاسية على العرب لم يأت التاريخ بمثلهما . ونحن ان يسرنا الوعود الكريمة
للنظر في هذه القضية بوجه الحق والانصاف الى ما بعد اندحار المحرور
فيمكننا ان نرجو لفخامته بتطبيق احكام الكتاب الابيض على الاقل مدة هذه
الحرب لأن في عدم تطبيق احكامه وعدم ايقاف الهجرة التي تجاوزت الحد
المعين خرقا كبيرا لحرمة العهد والوفاق وان ذلك في صالح اليهود
على طول الخط وضد العرب بصورة لا تقبل الشك والتأويل . اما دخولي
في مذكرات لأجل حل قضية فلسطين بصورة عملية غير ابداء الرأي والنصائح
فذلك غير ممكن لأن ليس لي علاقة مباشرة في البلاد ومع كافة العرب الذين

لهم علاقة بهذه القضية ولذلك فلا يمكنني ان اعمل اى عمل الا بعد استطلاع افكار ذوى العلاقة الذين بيدهم الحل والعقد في هذه القضية وبذلك يمكن توجيه الآراء لحل المشكلات على ضوء هذه الافكار فإذا يرى فخامته مراجعة العرب من طرفنا للاستفسار عن آرائهم فنحن نقوم بذلك ان شاء الله .

اما ما ذكر فخامته من جهة مقابلتي الى الدكتور حليم وايزمن فأحب ان يعلم فخامة الرئيس باننا نقابل كل من يأتي إلينا من جميع الأديان بكل تحارب مع القيام بالواجب معهم حسبما يقتضيه مقامهم من الأكرام اما اليهود بصورة خاصة فلا يخفى على الرئيس الجليل العداوة التي بيننا وبينهم سابقا ولاحقا وهي معلومة ومذكورة في كتبنا التي بين ايدينا ومشأصلة من اول الزمان وآخره فمن هذا يظهر جليا باننا لانأمن غدر اليهود ولا يمكننا البحث معهم او الوثوق بوعودهم اولا - لاننا نعرف نواياهم نحو العرب والمسلمين ، ثانيا - لاننا لم نتصل بالعرب ولم نعرف نواياهم وكما ذكرنا اعلاه اذا يريد فخامته ان نقوم باستزاجهم والاستفسار عن آرائهم فنحن نقوم بذلك الرغبة حينئذ .

اما الشخص المذكور الذى هو الدكتور وايزمن فهذا الشخص بيني وبينه عداوة خاصة وذلك لما قام به نحو شخصي من جرأة مجرمة بتوجيهه نحوى دون جميع العرب والاسلام تكليفا دينيا لا كون خائفا لديني وبلادى الأمر الذى يزيد البغض اليه ولعن ينتسب اليه وهذا التكليف قد حدث في اول سنة من هذه الحرب ان ارسل الي شخص اوروبيا معروفا بكلفني بأن اترك مسألة فلسطين وتأبيد حقوق العرب والمسلمين فيها وسلم اليّ عشرين مليون جنيه مقابل ذلك وان يكون هذا المبلغ مكفولا من طرف فخامة الرئيس روزنلت نفسه فهل من جرأة اودانة اكبر من هذه

وهل من جريمة اكبر من هذه الجريمة يتجرا عليها هذا الشخص بتكليفه
هذا التكليف ويجعل فخامة الرئيس الجليل كهيلا لعمل مثل هذا العمل
الوضيح . انى لاشك بأن فخامة الرئيس روزفلت لا يقبل هذا لافسي
حقى ولا فسي حقه فهذه من جملة الاسباب التي اريد ان تعرضوها
على فخامته حتى يرى الى اى حد تتوسل بها اليهود في الوصول
الى غاياتهم الباطلة وينظر برأيه السديد في هذه الاشغال التي بيانها
يكفي عن وصفها .

MEMORANDUM

Cairo, August 31, 1943.

(1) In accordance with Secretary Hull's directive of July 7, 1943, I have visited Riyadh and put to His Majesty King Ibn Saud the question requested as to whether he would enter into discussions with Dr. Chaim Weizmann or some representative selected by the Jewish Agency for the purpose of seeking a solution of the basic problems affecting Palestine acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.

(2) During the week in which the King considered the matter I saw him daily. In long conversations he voluntarily outlined fully and frankly his ideas on various subjects. The fact that he could talk to me directly in Arabic, often without any one else present, allowed him, he said, to be more frank than would otherwise have been the case since his best interpreters are not Saudi Arabians by birth. He said he was most anxious to have the President and the State Department know as nearly first hand as possible his ideas and he welcomed a chance to tell them to some one specially sent from Washington who was going back there directly. I therefore had only to be a good listener and make very few comments since he carried on ninety-five percent of the conversation.

(3) His conversations, of which I made full notes, covered the following general subjects:

(a) His domestic problems including his pressing need for silver coins and for an additional two hundred motor cars, both items to be available before the next pilgrimage which begins about the latter part of November.

(b) His relations past and present with various foreign powers.

(c) His relations with each of his neighboring states and his frank estimates of the various political figures in power there.

(d) His ideas on Arab federation. On this subject I wrote a memorandum of our conversation, with a summary of his ideas as I understood them, that I submitted to His Majesty and to which I received his specific approval.

(4) As from my daily conversations with the King I became increasingly impressed with the certainty of his refusal to meet Dr. Weizmann personally, I thought it advisable to develop more specifically an alternative question to which there might be a favorable response. This second question was as follows: If the King will not meet Dr. Weizmann himself, will he appoint a representative who might meet elsewhere than in Riyadh, perhaps even outside the country, in Cairo, for instance, with Dr. Weizmann or his representative?

(5) At the end of a week the King gave me verbally his answers to the two questions I had put to him and in both instances they were clear and categorical refusals. He expressed again great appreciation at my having been sent to see him and outlined in a most friendly way his reasons in detail for his refusals. These reasons he confirmed in a memorandum which he handed me at the end of our conversation.

(6) His refusals and his reasons seemed to me entirely consistent with his character and with his policies as he had explained them to me during the previous week. They are based on his own religious and patriotic principles and reflect his sound political sense in recognizing clearly his limitations, both

spiritual

spiritual and physical, in this matter. He realizes that, despite his position of leadership in the Arab world, he cannot, without prior consultation, speak for Palestine much less "deliver" Palestine to the Jews, even if he were willing for even an instant to consider such a proposal.

(7) His Majesty went on to explain, he said for the first time to anyone, the reason for his personal hatred of Dr. Weizmann. He said that during the first year of the present world war Dr. Weizmann had impugned his (the King's) character and motives by an attempted bribe of £ 20 million sterling. Furthermore, the promise of payment, the King was advised, would be guaranteed by President Roosevelt. His Majesty said he had been so incensed at the offer and equally at the inclusion of the President in such a shameful matter that he had never mentioned it again. He now explained it in detail and gave me the name of the intermediary, St. John Philby, so that I could understand more clearly his reasons for having nothing whatsoever to do with Dr. Weizmann or any of his associates.

(8) As a result of my visit I had a chance to become convinced that there has been no change in the attitude of His Majesty toward the Jewish question in Palestine as expressed in his two confidential letters to President Roosevelt under dates of November 19, 1938 and April 30, 1943. His recent statement to an editor of LIFE magazine merely gave public utterance to what he had already written privately and reflects his sincere opinion from which there will, I believe, be no deviation. Furthermore, he cannot but have realized,

by

by the flood of telegrams and letters of congratulations which he received from Moslems in all parts of the world, that, by his frank and unequivocal statement regarding Palestine, he has gained still greater moral and even political prestige not only throughout the Arab world but among Moslems in Turkey, Russia, India and even China.

(9) The King did not say so, but he clearly has the political acumen to realize that, even if he had no religious convictions on the subject, he still could not afford to support any Jewish claims to Palestine. For in the light of what he has said and written he would by so doing lose the moral and spiritual leadership of Moslems everywhere that he now enjoys.

(10) The conclusion, it seems quite clear from my visit to Riyadh, is that His Majesty's silence in regard to Dr. Weizmann's proposal put to him by Philby has been completely misinterpreted by certain British officials as implying a possible willingness on the part of the King to consider the proposal. Actually I am convinced that there never was any possibility of acceptance and there is none today. The King may not feel he can prevent by force the establishment of either Palestine as a Jewish State or even a Jewish State in Palestine. He is, however, firmly opposed to both solutions and I see no possibility of his being of any assistance to the Zionists in their efforts to come to terms with the Arabs in Palestine.

(11) In addition to the two written memoranda which I am bringing with me, the King has given me a personal letter to the President and has asked me

to transmit certain personal messages. Also His Majesty has agreed to our communicating to the British Government the contents of these two memoranda if the President, after he has seen them, desires to do so.

Harold B. Hoskins
Dr. Colonel, A.U.S.
H.B.H.

HBH/rq

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

(Translation of Arab Text Approved by the King)

Date and Place: 16 August 1943 at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Subject: Arab Federation.

Participants: His Majesty King Ibn Saud,
Lt. Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S.

A summary of the confidential views of His Majesty expressed for the benefit of President Roosevelt and the United States Government follows:

(1) It is questionable how far any plans for Arab Federation can go, whether during the war or later, until certain political decisions relating to this area are taken after the Allied victory. These decisions would include, for instance, whether Syria is to be independent and as to what will be the future status of Palestine and Trans-Jordan.

(2) It is important, in the King's opinion, from the beginning, to realize the fundamental unity of culture, language and religion that already exists naturally now throughout the Arab world.

(3) At the same time the King realizes the necessity of closer economic and also political cooperation between the various Arab states. As a full and equal member His Majesty's country would be glad to help to form such a union. In his opinion, the best solution would be a group of independent Arab states joined in a loose federation initially perhaps along the lines of the Pan-American Union (of North and South America) and later developed as the need and necessities of the Arab countries require. His Majesty has only two reservations to full cooperation in the formation of such a federation:

(a) Since His Majesty has no ambitions to extend his own kingdom to Syria and Palestine, he would not on the other hand be agreeable to the extension of the Hashimite family's hand in the ruling of these territories.

(b) Also,

(b) Also, nothing regarding federation shall be done that will hinder or handicap the Allies in their winning the war or in establishing a just peace thereafter.

(4) As to the activities of Nuri Pasha of Iraq or of Nahas Pasha of Egypt regarding Arab federation, the King has not been informed by them directly about their plans and program since, to date, they have proceeded without consultation with him. (Sentence here added in Arabic text as follows: "Nahas Pasha wrote to us inviting us to join in the conversations. But because we did not know anything about the program we asked our representative in Cairo to tell us about what happened so that we might assess any possible advantages for the Arabs.") Therefore, naturally and wisely His Majesty feels he cannot express any opinion about these activities so long as he knows nothing in detail about their plans and program.

H.B.H.

HBH/rq

خلاصة حديث

الزمان ١٦ أغسطس ١٩٤٣
المكان مدينة الرياض
الموضوع - الاتحاد العربي

- وهذه خلاصة حديث دار بين حضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك ابن سعود وبين الكولونيل (هرولد . ب . هسكنز) مندوب الرئيس روزفلت ليطلع الرئيس روزفلت وحكومة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بحفة سرية على وجهة نظر جلالة كما يلي -
- ١ - اننا لا نستطيع البتة في القول انه يمكن لنا وضع خطة سياسية واضحة للاتحاد العربي سواء كان ذلك خلال الحرب الحاضرة ام بعد انتهائها مالم نعرف الوضع العقلي الذي ستكون عليه الاقطار العربية بعد نصر الحلفاء .
- وهذه الخطة الاساسية تتناول مثلاً فيما اذا كان سوريا ستعطى استقلالها ومن ما عسى ان تكون عليه فلسطين وشرق الاردن .
- ٢ - وانه لمن الضروري جداً في نظر جلالة مبدئياً ان يؤخذ بعين الاعتبار الوحدة الاساسية في الثقافة واللغة والدين والتي هي موجودة الان بالطبع بين جميع الاقطار العربية .
- ٣ - وفي نفس الوقت فان جلالة الملك يرى ضرورة ايجاد تعاون اقتصادي وايضاً سياسي اوسع واشمل بين الاقطار العربية المختلفة وان جلالة ليسره جداً ان يساعد نفسي انشاءً مثل هذا الاتحاد العربي فيما اذا اتخذت بلاد جلالة المكانة اللائقة بها بين الاعمالين لذلك . وفي رأي جلالة ان احسن حل للاتحاد العربي هو ان يكون مجموعة من بلدان العرب المستقلة تجمع كلها في اتحاد يكون مبدئياً مثلاً على صورة اتحاد دول الأمريكتين الشمالية والجنوبية على ان ينمو بعد ذلك ويزيد وفقاً لما تقتضيه وتطلبه الحاجة والضرورة للاتحاد العربي .
- ٤ - يرى جلالة الملك انه اذا استثنينا مسألتان فقط يمكن حينئذ لجلالة ان - يتعاون تعاوناً تاماً وشاملاً في مساعدة الاتحاد وهاتان المسألتان هما :
(١) لما كان جلالة الملك ليست لديه مطامع في توسيع مملكته على حساب سوريا

وفلسطين فان جلالته كذلك لا يوافق على ان يكون للاشراف يد في حكمها .

ب) وايضا فانه لا يمكن ان يقوم اى اتحاد عربي من شأنه ان يؤثر او يضع عراقيل ومشاكل من شأنها ان تؤثر او تبطل .

بتعجيل احراز الحلفاء النصر وانشا سلام عادل في العالم بعد الحرب .

٥ - اما عن المساعي التي يبذلها كل من نوري السعيد رئيس الوزارة العراقية اورفعه النحاس باشا رئيس الوزارة المصرية للاتحاد العربي فان جلالته لم يخاطب من قبلهما مباشرة عن خططهما وبرامجهما لهذا الموضوع حتى هذا التاريخ بل اتفهما يواصلان تلك المساعي بدون الاتصال بجلالته . ومن الواضح والحال هذه ان يرى جلالته انه لا يستطيع اعطاء اى رأى عما اذا كانت خططهما وبرامجهما لذلك سالحه لان تكون اساسا جيدا للاتحاد ام لا . وقد كتب لنا رفعة النحاس باشا يدعونا الى ذلك . وماننا لم نفهم برنامج الامر لاوله ولا آخره فرجونا ان يرسل الينا مندوبا يعرفنا بما وقع حتى نتفق نحن راياه في المصالح العائدة للحرب . واذا فانه لمن الطبيعي والد محقول ان لا يعطي جلالته رأيا في مساعيهم وهولا يحرف شيئا عن خططهما وبرامجهما لذلك .

Saudi Arabia folder

*file
personal*

BJR

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Jidda

Dated September 25, 1943

Rec'd 6:54 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

141, September 25, 4 p.m.

My 104, September 3, 8 p.m.

Unreliable local rumors put cost of sword to be presented
to President at \$100,000. Probably this figure is an
exaggeration but the sword is undoubtedly expensive.

MOOSE

WNP

*(This sword was presented to the President
by His Majesty Abdul Aziz ibn Saud through
his two sons who are visiting here)*

Next trip
fileDEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I. Introduction

To begin with, I wish to express my appreciation for the opportunity to go as your special representative to Saudi Arabia, and to assure you of the satisfaction which I got in feeling that the background and knowledge of languages, including Arabic, that I acquired from my parents who were missionaries in Syria could thus prove of special use to the American Government.

II. Results of Mission

I hope you will feel that my mission was properly carried out and that the results and the information which I collected were worthwhile. Furthermore, if, as a result of my mission, the false impression that has for some time existed in certain high British quarters that there was even the slightest possibility that Ibn Saud could be bribed to be of assistance to the Zionists can be completely dissipated, my trip will certainly have been useful.

III. Procedure

III. Procedure

If agreeable to you, I suggest first of all your reading:

- (1) the letter that I have brought to you from His Majesty Ibn Saud;
- (2) the aide-mémoire given me by Ibn Saud in regard to my directive; and
- (3) my memorandum dated August 31, 1943 summarizing the results of my mission.

IV. Amplification of the King's Attitude

I wish to emphasize again the impression that I received from Ibn Saud of his very sincere resentment at even the implication, which of course he did not believe, that you had any part in the attempted bribe. From my visit I am firmly convinced that the King was entirely sincere in his reason for remaining silent regarding the effort of the Zionists to bribe him for his support and that this silence in no way whatsoever implied any willingness on his part to consider acceptance of the offer. The fact that the King's silence in this regard was misinterpreted by Dr. Weizmann as well as by various important British officials is one of the strangest developments in the whole case.

In addition to the King's outstanding qualities of honesty, patriotism, and religious sincerity, I was impressed
by

by his wisdom in the clear recognition of the limitations of his power in regard to matters extending beyond Saudi Arabia. While admitting his ability to influence the thinking of millions of Moslems in various parts of the world, he fully realized that he had no mandate to speak for them on Palestine or any other subject outside of his own Kingdom.

He demonstrated an ability to express a clear and succinct opinion in answer to any question put to him; he never stumbled, never hesitated. This was particularly impressive since his poor eyesight as well as his limited reading capacity have made his very wide accumulation of knowledge possible only through his ear.

As regards the King's moral leadership of Moslems everywhere, there is no question but that his forthright statement recently given to the editor of Life, in regard to the Jews and to Palestine, has further raised his standing everywhere throughout the Arab as well as the Moslem world.

His very high regard for you personally and his growing admiration for the American people as a whole was clearly demonstrated in his very cordial hospitality to me and in fact to every American visiting him in your name. I hope you will be good enough to have the necessary word passed
on

on to the Protocol Division of the State Department that, as a result, more than a routine job should be done during the approaching visit of Prince Feisal and his brother. This is particularly important since from the United States these Princes will be going direct to Great Britain where, as you know, much will be made of them.

V. Importance of Mr. Churchill and British Foreign Office Understanding the Facts

I trust if I have convinced you of the correctness of the facts given in my memorandum attached, you may decide that it is advisable for me to complete the assignment that you gave me by my visiting London where I may have an opportunity of informing Mr. Churchill and various members of the Foreign Office of the facts and information that I collected. In this connection, I obtained the prior consent of the King to the contents of the two aide-mémoire, relating to the proposed meeting of Dr. Weizmann and the memorandum regarding Arab federation, being shown to the British Government if you so desire.

In addition, I am preparing a full and complete report of all the information that I collected from the King during my visit. This will be available for the use of the State Department, the Treasury, and of any other government agency that may have need of this material.

VI. United

VI. United States Policy Toward the Middle East Problem

As to a sound policy for the United States in regard to Middle East, I suggest that in the light of the information collected during my two recent trips to the Middle East we should neither try to take over major responsibility, which is British, for action in this area, nor try to evade all American responsibility for what occurs which, I submit, would be equally inadvisable.

In the Middle East our policy should be planned with the United States taking the position of an important junior partner in a joint undertaking just as in South America, for instance, the roles of partnership would be reversed--there the United States would be the senior partner and Britain the junior partner. However, in both areas the junior partners can perform useful functions and should plan to perform them.

VII. Basis of American Interests in the Middle East

Besides the long-term cultural, missionary, and educational interests of thousands of American citizens in the Middle East, there is also the natural interest of many American Jews in the problem of Palestine. I have no easy solution of the Palestine problem, but a peaceful solution must and, I firmly believe, can be worked out. It is clear, however, that to gain American support for
a sound

a sound and peaceful solution the American people as a whole must be properly informed and much better informed on the Arab and Moslem viewpoint as well as on the Zionist viewpoint. At present this is not the case.

Furthermore, on the material side we are for the first time developing some fundamental postwar economic interests of a long-term character in the Middle East and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Primarily, these consist of our interest in the enormous oil reserves of the Arabian Peninsula, the concession for which is in the hands of an American company, and also in American rights for postwar air routes crossing various parts of Arabia. In addition, there is in this area a substantial postwar import market for tobacco and dates, and an export market for American automobiles, moving pictures, and certain specialized products such as typewriters, adding machines, and other types of mechanical equipment.

VIII. British and French Organizations in the Middle East

Our British friends have found it advisable to build in the Middle East an organization to deal with political and economic problems of the area or region as a whole, with a Minister of State (Mr. R. G. Casey) in charge. It is his duty on the one hand to coordinate the political policy of various British ambassadors and ministers

throughout

throughout the Middle East area and, on the other hand, to coordinate work on the economic problems of the area working primarily through the Middle East Supply Center (MESOC). In both fields, Mr. Casey has experts studying specific problems such, for instance, as the relations of the Arabs and of the Moslems generally with the Jews both in Palestine and in other areas of the Middle East.

The French Committee of National Liberation has also found it advisable to centralize responsibility in one individual--General Catroux--for developing a sound French policy toward Moslem problems both inside and outside the French Colonial Empire.

IX. Existing American Situation in the Middle East

As yet the United States does not have a similar coordinated political set-up in the Middle East and, as a result, American political interests tend at times to suffer. Each American ambassador or minister quite naturally thinks primarily in terms of American relations to the particular country to which he is accredited. The result is that there is a lack of what might be termed a regional or area point of view in regard to such problems as extend beyond any one country. For example, an intelligent American policy in regard to the Moslems should be framed not simply

simply in the light of conditions in any one State in the Middle East but should include consideration of Moslem attitudes in neighboring Middle Eastern States as well as in North Africa, in India and even in Russia and China.

The recent appointment of Mr. Landis with the personal rank of minister to deal with the economic problems of the Middle East area is an excellent first step. It should definitely help in the development of an area economic policy on the part of the United States both for the war and for the postwar period.

X. Suggested Procedure for the United States Government

If politically feasible, I suggest the appointment without further delay of an American ambassador-at-large to the Middle East to act as the American counterpart to the British Minister of State. This would be an effective step and in line with experiments already made in other parts of the globe. Such an ambassador-at-large, whose headquarters would no doubt be in Cairo, should have clear authority for visiting and coordinating American political and economic policy in regard to the broader problems of the Middle East area as a whole. Since such an official can count on assistance from the various diplomatic and consular posts already established in the Middle East area, his own staff need not be large and would probably be

composed

composed of a few experts specializing in the major broad political problems of the region as a whole.

If for any reason such an appointment is not at once possible, I suggest that at least an officer with the personal rank of minister and corresponding on the political side to Mr. Landis on the economic side be appointed to Cairo to act as a liaison officer on the Minister of State's staff. It would be his duty to keep the State Department and the American Government fully informed

- (1) on British regional policies in this Middle East area;
- (2) on the broader American political interests in the Middle East;
- (3) on various minority problems, and most particularly on the interests and attitudes of the 50 million Arabs in the Middle East as well as on the viewpoint of the 200 million additional Moslems elsewhere in the world.

Certainly it is not too soon to set up such an American Middle East political organization since the men having first-hand knowledge in this area would be useful during the war, but should also be even more useful as advisers at the peace conference that must eventually be held. We can be sure that the French and the British will have their "experts", and the United States should not be without its expert advisers. These experts should not merely be professors with a historical knowledge of past events

in

in this area but should also be men with a first-hand knowledge of its present-day problems and, for most effective work, with a personal acquaintance with the key political personalities as well.

XI. Conclusion

I come back from my second tour of the Middle East within a period of eight months with the strengthened feeling that the inhabitants of this area, and particularly the Arab Moslems, need and would welcome some assurance from the United States in regard to the future of Palestine. Basically, the Arabs are not pro-Axis but are pro-Arab, and their lack of enthusiasm for our United Nations' cause should be so understood. Based on past experience they are suspicious of Anglo-American policies and more than anything else fear being faced with a fait accompli by some new Balfour declaration that would deprive them of Palestine and give it to the Jews as a Jewish State. This the one million Arabs of Palestine will not willingly accept and in this refusal the Arabs of Palestine have the support of the remaining 49 million Arabs of the Middle East. It was to meet this situation that I had recommended the recent statement freezing for the duration that existing status of Palestine. You will recall that this statement after being approved by you and by the British Government was
shelved

shelved on the flimsiest basis and has not as yet been issued.

The situation in Palestine itself--far from having improved in the past few months--has deteriorated further and the recent trials of Zionist Jews for organized thefts of arms from British arsenals has again brought home to many Palestinian Arabs the feeling that they in their turn may be forced to open hostilities against the Jews in Palestine in order to make clear to the United Nations the settled determination of the Palestinian Arabs not to accept willingly the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

In conclusion, therefore, I have one final point, more important than perhaps any one other, to re-emphasize. Not only you as President but the American people as a whole should realize that, if the American Government decides to support the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, they are committing the American people to the use of force in that area, since only by force can a Jewish State in Palestine be established or be maintained.

Harold B. Hoskins
Harold B. Hoskins
Lt. Colonel, A.U.S.

IN SPECIAL TRIP FOLDER

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- ✓ 1. Secret memo from Stettinius, Nov. 9, enclosing copy of telegram from Harold MacMillan to Mr. Churchill concerning the Italian constitutional crisis, also coded message from Murphy. - *Safe - Secret*
2. Memo to S.T.E. from Breck. Long, Oct. 10, with letter from Judge Cockrell, re post-war studies. - *Safe - Secret*
3. Secret draft of a declaration by the United Nations on National Independence, dated March 9th. - *Secret*
4. Copy of the Congressional Record, Jan. 21, 1943 containing speech by Cong. Angell from Oregon.
5. Secret letter from Campbell, British Embassy, Sept. 18th re text of agenda for the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Also, revised copy sent to the President on Sept. 19th. *Secret*
6. Secret from the British Embassy, Sept. 28th, enclosing text of an amendment which the British Govt. desires to offer to the draft 4-Power declaration. *Secret*
7. Secret draft, Sept. 14th, re agenda for tripartite conference.
8. Letter to the Pres. from Lt. Col. Harold B. Hoskins, A.U.S. Sept. 27 re his mission to Saudi Arabia and the results thereof.
9. Copy of letter to the Acting Secy. of State from Ambassador Gromyko of Russia, dated Oct. 2, re Soviet views on agenda.
10. Letter from Stettinius, Nov. 4, attaching letter giving exact status of war criminals' trials and of Pell and his group. *Secret*

Memo from Berle to the Pres. Oct. 2, attaching memorandum on International Civil Aviation.
12. Memo for the Pres. from Stettinius, Nov. 8, re oil concessions in the Middle East.
13. Memo for the Pres. from Stettinius, Nov. 9, attaching memo on the question of trusteeship for the disputed islands in the Central Pacific and certain other groups of islands, together with a memo on geographic factors involved and a chart.

17 Congressional Record of Nov. 5th
Story of the origin of C.C.C. and its full background from
Lowell Mellett.

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14. Sealed envelope "Documentation of Moscow Conference for the President" *Secret*
 15. Memo from Secy. Hull, Nov. 11, enclosing copy of proposed "Treatment of Germany" - legal sized paper - 4 pages.
 16. Memo to the President from Secy. Ickes, enclosing opinion from Fowler Harper, Nov. 9 re title of property at Hyde Park.
 - ✓ 17. Memo from Jimmy Byrnes, to the Pres., Nov. 11 re acquisition by the U.S. Govt. of a third interest in the Iranian oil fields.
 18. Letter to the President from Secy. Ickes, Nov. 11, together with maps and tabulations in connection with the oil situation particularly the reserves in the Middle East. Re Iraq.
 - ✓ 19. Memo for the President from Under Secy. Stettinius, Nov. 11, re The Galapagos Islands.
 20. Memo for the President from Admiral Brown, Nov. 10, re message from Ambassador Winant saying he would like to have a chance to serve on European Advisory Commission in London.
 21. Memo from Miss Thompson, re Mrs. Roosevelt's conversation with the Pres. about making a list of things he has read in his life which have had an influence on his development.
 22. Letter from Asst. Attorney General Norman Littell, Nov. 6, re: matter of conveyance of Hyde Park property.
Also letter from Henry Hackett to the President, Nov. 2, re proposed transfer of property at Hyde Park to the U.S. Govt.
 23. World Map from Natl. Geographic Magazine
 24. Letter from Bruce D. Smith, Special Asst. to Paul McNutt, Nov. 10 re Warmanpower Commission and labor pool.

Memo fro the Pres. from Director of the Budget re: Troop bases
x for all services for 1944 with his O.K. F.D.R. at top, together with Admiral Leahy's memo, Nov. 9th, on same subject, O.K. F.D.R.
 25. Letter and enclosure to the Pres. from Emil Ludwig, Nov. 8, "How to treat the Germans".

x Memo for the Pres. from the Director of the Budget, Nov. 8, with attached memo from Admiral Land recommending that the Pres. sign a directive to him re events of the past 22 months in connection with shipbuilding program
Letter from Arthur Murray, London, Oct. 1 to the President
- * all returned herewith except two marked with red X, which were never received by me,
Rigdon