

● PSF Great Britain: John G. Winant

P. F. Winant J. L. L.
LB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL ARNOLD

Please let me have your slant on this so that I can answer the Ambassador. This is, of course, a purely personal telegram to me. Please return the dispatch with your reply.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Ambassador Winant, dated January 12, 1942, No. 167, re need of getting British war experience built into our airplane production, etc.

Winant Folder
(Diplomatic)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

AMBASSADOR WINANT:

I am enclosing copy of letter
which I have just received from General
Arnold. I think the British staff
conferences here helped a lot.

F.D.R.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Utilization of British War Experience.

It would appear that there should be no cause for alarm in connection with the Ambassador Winant's cables. We have taken advantage of British war experience, as soon as it became known to incorporate improved or additional gadgets in our airplanes for production. Furthermore, we have standardized on certain items, such as armament, oxygen and bombs. The British representatives in the United States have passed and are passing on all items of equipment that go into British aircraft. They also are passing on the changes which they consider must be made after the planes roll out the door before they are sent to England.

As a result of British experience, we have incorporated Radex or Radar, the device for identification of aircraft, the device for detecting a hostile plane from one of ours at night, and the device for picking up objects at sea. These are all now in production. In so far as ground control for operation of planes is concerned, as a result of our observers being sent to England and British technicians being present in the United States, we have taken over bodily from the British their organization and we have adopted their equipment so as to insure our being able to operate co-jointly with them when required. As a matter of fact, the British were highly pleased with our latest air maneuvers in which we demonstrated our ability to utilize this equipment.

In so far as the quality of our airplanes is concerned, we accept the high performance qualities of the Spitfire, but it must be borne in mind that the P-47, which is about to come in to production, has been judged by all British pilots who have flown it as the best they have ever flown or seen.

With reference to the four-engine bombers, the first aircraft were shy on equipment, such as turrets and radio, but the new four-engine bombers which the British are receiving will be in accord with British specifications and we are and have been collaborating with the British to insure that the latest British equipment is included. However, there is a time lag between the decision to install new equipment and the rolling off the production line of the plane in which it has been installed. We are taking care of this by creating depots which will have no other purpose than to insure that everything possible is done to bring these planes up to British standards prior to their shipment across the Atlantic.

In connection with the recommendations of Royce and Brett, all Brett's recommendations have been studied and adopted when British and American technicians approve. The same might be said for Royce's recommendations. Incidentally, Royce will be here prior to any American units leaving for Great Britain.

s/ H. H. ARNOLD
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

*file
Confidential*

*PSF: Winant Folder
1-42*

London, January 22, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

The other day I was talking to General Sikorski. He has recently returned from Russia and has written out an estimate of the German military situation for you and Mr. Churchill. He gave Mr. Churchill his copy yesterday and planned to send yours on by special envoy shortly. I told him, if he would give me a copy in English, I thought I could get it to you sooner. I had planned to cable it but, as there is a special air-mail pouch leaving via Canada, I am sending it this way.

Sincerely,

John G. Winant

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

~~Most secret~~

AN ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

At the time of their attack on Russia the Germans were more efficiently organized and better equipped than the Russians; their discipline and training were superior. A spirit of success and confidence in their leaders prevailed throughout the German Armies. These advantages in addition to the blunders committed at the outset by the Soviet High Command, accounted for their initial superiority over the Russian Army during the first months.

Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war, repeated information tended to indicate that the purpose of German offensive operations was to attain in 1941 a line between Archangel and Astrachan. The success of such an achievement was expected not only to signify the doom of Soviet Russia. It would moreover bring about Russia's downfall upon which Hitler grounded political schemes on a tremendous scale which he intended to disclose in conquered Moscow. Had the Germans been successful, they would have acquired the most vital

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED /agricultural

agricultural and industrial areas of the Russian Empire including the Donetz and Krivorog Basins, the capital towns of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev and particularly the oil-fields of the Caucasus. In accordance with their plan the Germans originally deployed their action in three directions; Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The progress of the German offensive extenuated their armed forces and obliged them to limit their main thrusts at first to two and finally to one direction. Moreover their main effort was more than once transferred from one strategic direction to the other.

During the latest phase of the campaign the Germans conducted offensive operations on the Southern sector in the direction of Rostov on the Don with the purpose to sever communications between Russia and the Caucasus, and north-eastwards in the direction of Moscow.

The offensive in the South led to a partial control of Rostov. It was met however by a Soviet counter-action which was launched from the north-east against the flank and the rear of the German forces fighting for Rostov. It was directed against Taganrog and even as far in depth as Mariupol. The Russian counter-offensive succeeded in driving the Soviet Army forward as far as Taganrog and compelled the Germans to withdraw from the Rostov area where they suffered heavy losses. The next main Soviet effort was transferred further westward in the direction of Mariupol, with the object of intercepting

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the withdrawal of German forces operating in the region of Taganrog.

The German manoeuvre against Moscow was executed according to the old "Schliefen" formula by means of a bilateral encircling movement with simultaneous engagement of the enemy in a frontal attack. The Southern German wing struck in the direction of Tula-Ryazan, while at the same time carrying out an operation in depth towards Orel and Jelec. This thrust resulted in the occupation of the region North-East of Tula and Jelec. The Northern German wing attacking along the line Kalinin-Jaroslav, occupied the region of Kalinin-Maly Jaroslaviec. It is difficult to ascertain along which of their wings the Germans directed the main effort. It seems probable that the main brunt was transferred from one direction to the other in accordance with the gravitation of Russian resistance. The encircling operations in the Moscow area did not bear signs of a general large scale success along a broad front. They merely resulted from the system adopted by the Germans in this campaign, of piercing through enemy concentrations by driving wedges of panzer units followed up by mechanised forces. These operations produced the formation of deep pockets whose flanks were threatened in permanence by the Russian forces occupying territory which had not been directly overrun by the thrusts of the panzer-divisions. The Russians took advantage of this situation, counter-attacked the exposed

/German

German wedges and wiped out in turn the pockets in the regions of Jelec, Kalinin and Tula.

Except for the counter-offensive in the Rostov area the Soviet counter-attacks have so far been successes rather of a tactical nature. There has not as yet been a grand style counter-offensive of serious strategic importance. Fresh Siberian divisions, transported by rail from the Far East, as well as large quantities of Cavalry were brought to the Moscow area and thrown into action near Kalinin and Tula. As a result of these operations the German forces embarked on their retreating manouvre along the whole front. The Soviet Supreme Command and the Soviet army are resolved to take every advantage presented to them by the conditions of winter in order to continue offensive operations westwards.

Unless the Germans prepared adequate defensive positions in their rear during the offensive on Moscow and Rostov, it will be extremely difficult for them to fortify a defense line sufficient to withstand Russian offensive action.

The terrain west of the line attained by the Germans during their offensive is not favourable to defensive operations. There are no natural obstacles which might facilitate a stand.

The first advantageous line from the point of view of defence runs along the river Luga, the river Lowat, the

/"gate"

"gate" of Smoleńsk, the eastern borders of the Polesie marshes and the river Dniepr. The Germans are said to have prepared some extent of defence along that line.

Their withdrawal however to those positions would equal the surrender of vast areas which had previously been conquered against a particularly heavy toll of blood. Hitler's last speech delivered on the occasion of his taking over the supreme command seems to indicate that the Germans after rectifying their front would at all costs endeavour to hold as large as possible a part of the conquered areas. It remains to be seen whether and how far they may be successful. There is no doubt however that the further the Germans retire westward the more distant will become the purpose of their campaign and the less time will be afforded them for the reorganisation of their extenuated land and air force units.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SOVIET ARMY.

During the present campaign the Soviet Army has suffered enormous losses in men and equipment. Owing to the fact that Russia has almost boundless human resources, loss of life is less important than loss of war material which is expected to be replaced by Britain and the U.S.A. Russia is incapable of absorbing all men of military age in the ranks and reserve centres of the fighting forces on account of the technical impossibility of providing sufficient food, equipment and maintenance for such tremendous masses of soldiers.

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The losses in armoured and mechanised equipment are particularly grave and should be completed during the winter months. The Russian soldier is a good fighter. So far the morale of the Red Army has not been shaken. This circumstance is a proof of the exceptional power of resistance of the Russian soldier, who not only managed to withstand the long retreat in passive resistance but furthermore proved his ability to fight on the offensive.

The Soviet Supreme Command, or more precisely Stalin, has been throwing and will go on throwing huge masses of troops into battle with complete disregard for human life. So far the heavy losses have not, nor are they likely for a long time to shake the discipline of the soldiers. The Bolshevik regime has stood the trial of war and would have stood even the fall of Moscow. The officers of middle and lower ranks are efficient. This is not always the case with the senior O.C.'s and staffs, who seem to be inadequately prepared for conducting large scale offensive operations.

With the progress of war however, the Soviet High Command is acquiring experience and Field-Marshal Timoshenko has come to the fore as a leader. I have had the opportunity to see for myself that the Russian army is well prepared for a winter campaign in the heaviest possible climatic conditions.

One of the weakest points of the Soviet Army is the communication problem. The railway net over the whole of Russian
/territory

territory is extremely scarce and its transport capacity is very limited. Owing to insufficient organisation of transport and lack of rolling stock it cannot be put to its full advantage. Motor-transport is also deficient owing to shortage of vehicles and especially of spare parts, which limits the possibilities of repair. At the present moment climatic conditions also greatly reduce the efficiency of rail and motor transport.

After the ultimate recapture of areas held by the Germans who before retreating would have destroyed all means of communication the Russians will be obliged to put themselves to a tremendous effort in order to prevent a deterioration in their transport service which would directly endanger the supply and the maintenance of the fighting forces at the front. Notwithstanding serious losses suffered during the first days of the war, especially from the bombing of air-fields, the Soviet air force is still powerful. It has proved itself capable of dealing with the Luftwaffe and lately has even acquired a certain degree of superiority in the air. The supply system has so far been working satisfactorily and the Soviet soldier is well clothed and sufficiently fed to keep going. On the other hand the civilian population of Russia this year will be threatened with famine. The army and the Government as well as the war industry will not be affected since Stalin has sufficient reserves at his disposal for these purposes.

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

It is the opinion of neutral observers who visited the eastern German front, that the Germans have so far suffered very heavy losses both in men and war material. These losses are estimated at 1,500,000 killed and missing and over 2,000,000 wounded. Numerous cases of frost-bite among the soldiers have lately been confirmed in hospitals behind the lines and throughout the country. The problem of replacing their losses in human material is becoming to the Germans a cause for growing anxiety. The material losses of the panzer units are estimated to equal the establishment of 12 panzer divisions. In spite of the fact that almost the whole of the European continent is toiling for the production of armaments for the German forces, their losses are so heavy that they will be extremely difficult to replace. The German army has not been sufficiently equipped for a Russian winter campaign. During our conversation Stalin, compared the German armies to those of Napoleon in 1812 when they were retreating from Moscow. He stated that the Germans who were taken prisoner in the Moscow area wore civilian and even women's clothing. The German soldier, unaccustomed to the severe Russian winter, is more seriously affected by the cold than the Soviet soldier. So far the operational achievements of the Germans resulted chiefly from the great superiority of their panzer and motorised units over the Russians. The conditions established by the Russian winter, have greatly diminished the power of their armoured forces, reducing

/their

their efficacy and thereby transferring the advantage to the Russians.

My visit to Moscow occurred at a crucial moment of the eastern campaign of 1941. At that time the battles for Moscow and Rostov which strategically governs the entrance to the Caucasus, were reaching their decisive stage.

The history of warfare will no doubt recognise those battles as examples of determination and of skilful resistance during a grave crisis. The will-power of Stalin, the Supreme-Commander, and his unshaken obstinacy to persevere, together with the bearing of the Russian soldier prevented Moscow from being surrendered and accounted for the recapture of Rostov.

It was not only the Russian winter however, that checked the German offensive, as Hitler and Goebbels endeavoured to explain. Hitler recognised his defeat before the gates of Moscow and ordered a retreat. The Soviet- counter-attack on Rostov, which was carried out with much talent, took General von Kleist's army completely by surprise and forced it to a disordered retreat.

The battle for Moscow and Rostov will bear decisively upon the eastern campaign and considerably influence the progress of the war against Germany.

It would be difficult to anticipate the consequences of these events. There is no doubt however that they brought about the defeat of the Germans during the campaign of 1941. For the time being it can be assumed that the interruption of the German

/offensive

offensive in the East and the resulting breach in the faith of the nation in ultimate victory, have given cause to serious ferment within the Reich. With the British successes in Africa these disorders will become more serious. If the North African campaign is brought by the British to a successful ending which is not an easy task their "second front" in the country would be shaken and defeatism would spread. Anticipation of defeat may already be observed especially among the German troops.

According to information which I received upon my return to London, there are signs of growing dissatisfaction, slackening of discipline and morale among the German army and people. There also appears to be a breach between the leaders of the army and the National-Socialist Party.

It is doubtful whether the German General Staff still lay much confidence in Hitler or his strategic genius. It is more likely that the bulk of the German troops are beginning for the first time to question the merit of the decisions of their Supreme Commander. The German Command is at present faced with the problem as to where and how they will succeed in halting their armies in the East in order to withstand the winter and reestablish their decimated, weakened, inadequately supplied and ill-equipped forces and prepare for a fresh offensive in the spring or even for defensive action. It is possible that the future months will give a clearer picture of the consequences of Hitler's defeat during the first year of his campaign against Soviet Russia.

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The Russians will no doubt employ the winter months to solidify their gains and prevent the enemy from establishing winter billets behind an organised front. At the present moment the initiative along the entire front line is passing to the Soviet Supreme Command. This fact has been proved by the daring operations in Crimea.

It is as yet difficult to establish the extent and the consequences of this initiative owing to the scarcity of accurate information.

The Soviet Army disposes of highly trained ski-units and of masses of well equipped cavalry which may play a significant part in winter operations when mechanised equipment and to a certain extent the air-force are severely handicapped.

The eastern front will continue to engage the main German forces hindering their movements in other directions and probably preventing the German army from undertaking any major operation during this winter. The Germans are purposely spreading various rumours on this subject in order to conceal the present weakness and embarrassment of Hitler. Nevertheless efforts of minor counter-action and organised diversion may be expected (for instance in the direction of Tripoli, with the object of restoring Hitler's prestige).

In spite of heavy losses the German Army has not yet been broken and still represents a great operational force which has not so far suffered a single decisive defeat. It

/failed

failed however to deal a final blow to the Red Army in 1941 according to Hitler's plan. It is the first frustration and may become a turning point. If on the other hand, the Russians were to commit a similar blunder by underestimating the enemy's forces, they would expose themselves to all the consequences.

In connection with the developments on the Eastern front it is most expedient to lay stress upon the great importance of organising a second front on the European continent. The Allied Forces, in the first place British and American should enter in the spring of this year, when Hitler is likely to commence a new offensive against Russia.

London, January 8th, 1942.

PSF: Winant *fold*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Confidential*

2-20-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Winant phoned me from London and said:

"Our friend here is sending a message by the direct method. It went through about half an hour ago. He would like to get as immediate a reply as possible and asked if I would call and request it."

E.M.W.
E.M.W.

COPY

PSF: Minant Folder

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file

PLAIN

LONDON

DATED MAY 26, 1942

REC'D 7:10 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

2934, TWENTY-SIXTH

MAIN EDITORIAL IN TIMES TODAY IS ENTITLED "AN AMERICAN LEAD" AND IS DEVOTED TO SECRETARY'S MAY 18 STATEMENT REGARDING NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE WEEK, VICE PRESIDENT WALLACE'S ADDRESS OF MAY 8, AND SPEECH DELIVERED YESTERDAY BY MR. MILO PERKINS AT SWARTHMORE. EDITORIAL CALLS THEM "A SERIES OF REMARKABLE UTTERANCES BY AMERICAN SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZING AND CLARIFYING THE AIMS OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER", AND ASSERTS THAT "THEY ARE THE THREE MEN IN THE UNITED STATES WHO HAVE THE GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY OF PREPARING PLANS TO MEET POST-WAR NEEDS".

TIMES DECLARES THAT WHILE EACH APPROACHES PROBLEMS OF PEACE FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE, "ALL AGREE IN PROCLAIMING THAT THESE PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SOLVED BY ANY NATION, EVEN THE UNITED STATES, ACTING BY ITSELF AND SEEKING ITS OWN ADVANTAGE". IT CITES SECRETARY'S CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTS OF COLLABORATION TO SHOW AMERICAN READINESS TO SHOULDER FULL SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUILDING A BETTER WORLD; MR. WALLACE'S PROCLAMATION THAT PEACE OBJECTIVE MUST BE FREEDOM FROM WANT FOR ALL PEOPLES; AND MR. PERKINS' WARNING THAT IF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HELP TO PROMOTE ALL-OUT WORLDWIDE PRODUCTION, IT WILL FACE ISOLATION IN A WORLD WHERE

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date _____

FEB 9 1972

MEN ARE

COLT
- 2 - #2934, TWENTY-SIXTH, FROM LONDON.

MEN ARE GROWING CLOSER TOGETHER. EDITORIAL POINTS OUT THAT MR. PERKINS' IDEA OF INCREASED WORLD CONSUMPTION AND MR. WALLACE'S AIM OF WORLD FREEDOM FROM WANT "ARE LINKED WITH MR. CORDELL HULL'S IDEAL OF REVIVAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE--FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE HAS NO MEANING EXCEPT INSOFAR AS IT MINISTERS TO HUMAN NEEDS BY MAKING THE RESOURCES OF THE WHOLE WORLD AVAILABLE TO ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD".

EDITORIAL CONTINUES BY STATING THAT ALL THREE AMERICAN SPOKESMEN RECOGNIZE THAT VICTORY WILL BRING DANGERS AS WELL AS OPPORTUNITIES, AND CALL FOR USE OF UNPRECEDENTED METHODS.

IT ASSERTS: "THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT OF THE DECISIVE SHARE WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS CALLED UPON TO TAKE IN THIS GREAT TASK. BUT OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NATIONS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, MUST ALSO PLAY THEIR PART. VICTORY IN THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY THROUGHOUT THE WORLD CAN ONLY BE WON BY COOPERATION BETWEEN ALL NATIONS AS CLOSE AS THAT NOW BEING BUILT UP BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST TYRANNY AND AGGRESSION. THIS COOPERATION WILL INVOLVE EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES MANY OF WHICH WILL BE HARD TO MAKE. IT WILL CALL FOR SOMETHING LIKE A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMIC THINKING AND ECONOMIC PRACTICE. TO RESUME AFTER THE WAR THE OLD SCRAMBLE FOR MARKETS, IN WHICH EVERY NATION SOUGHT TO EXPORT AS MUCH AND TO IMPORT AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE, CAN ONLY LEAD TO ANOTHER BREAKDOWN WITH CONSEQUENCES, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, WHICH WOULD BE EVEN MORE DISASTROUS THAN BEFORE.

THAN BEFORE. THE PRODUCTIVE FORCES OF THE WORLD MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO PRODUCE ALL THEY CAN, AND THEIR PRODUCTION MUST BE DISTRIBUTED WHEREVER IT IS NEEDED IN EVERY PART OF THE WORLD. THE OLD TRADE WAR MUST GIVE WAY TO COOPERATIVE TRADING AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE MUST BE MADE TO FULFILL ITS TRUE FUNCTION AS THE INTERCHANGE OF GOODS FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT. COUNTRIES MUST BE ENABLED TO IMPORT THE GOODS WHICH THEY NEED AND WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ANXIOUS TO SUPPLY WITHOUT THE HAUNTING FEAR OF AN ADVERSE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, FOLLOWED BY UNPLEASANT CHOICE BETWEEN A DISASTROUS INFLATION AND A STILL MORE DISASTROUS DEFLATION."

TIMES DECLARES THAT NECESSARY READJUSTMENTS WILL "REQUIRE A GREAT EFFORT OF WILL WHICH CANNOT BE EVOKED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMIC THEORY OR MATERIAL SELF-INTEREST". IT CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT SUCH AN EFFORT CAN ONLY BE EVOKED BY A MOTIVE WHICH WILL CARRY THE ALTRUISTIC IDEALS OPERATIVE IN TIME OF WAR OVER INTO THE PEACE, AND THAT IT IS TO BE FOUND IN THE VISION CREATED "OF A WORLD IN WHICH THE COMMON MAN EVERYWHERE WILL HAVE BOTH THE DUTY AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK AND PRODUCE SO THAT HE AND HIS CHILDREN CAN ENJOY THE RICHES OF THE EARTH AND REPAY TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY ALL THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM IT".

I SHOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THIS TELEGRAM MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF EACH OF THOSE MENTIONED IN THE TIMES EDITORIAL. ITS FULL TEXT IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY AIR MAIL

WINANT

CSB

PSF: Winant Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. PAUL V. McNUTT

Please read and return. This
has not been paraphrased so please do
not make a copy of it.

F.D.R.

Secret telegram from London May 25, 2898
to the President from Winant re allocation
of manpower to the forces.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date ~~FEB~~ 9 1972

C.H.

OK

JDK

7/17/42

Winant-1942

7

July 17, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a telegram dated July 11, 1942 from Ambassador Winant concerning the desire of United States forces in Great Britain to be relieved of any property accountability to the British Government in respect of facilities made available to us in the United Kingdom.

Good progress is being made toward consummating the exchanges of notes with the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments on reciprocal lend-lease but it will probably not be possible to effect the actual exchanges for at least another week.

In view of the desire of United States military authorities in England that the exchange relating to property accountability be concluded immediately, I am also enclosing a revised draft note on that subject which,

if

The President,

The White House.

x25-

x4193

x B. F. Lend Lease

x4675-

x48

x48-10
x487

if you approve, can be given the British Embassy immediately and appropriately acknowledged.

It is anticipated that the exchanges of notes concerning reciprocal lend-lease will receive wide publicity but I see no reason why the exchange concerning property accountability should be publicized at all. It goes without saying that this proposed exchange has the support of the War Department and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

x 20

*x4559
x C. F. State*

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from London,
July 11, 1942;
2. Draft note to
British Embassy.

NNN
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

London

Dated July 11, 1942

Rec'd. 10:54 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3845, July 11, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

The United States forces in the United Kingdom are now receiving and will increasingly receive large amounts of British stores of all kinds and the use of a large number of British military installations including barracks, depots, airdromes, port facilities, headquarters and the like which will be equipped and partly serviced by the British. Many of these are being presently constructed by the British for the United States forces. Under United States Army regulations 35--65 twenty officers receiving similar United States property are held personally and financially to strict accountability. These United States Army regulations have been relaxed for the European theatre of operations. It is at present unclear what the position is with respect to articles and facilities given and loaned United States forces by the British. Unless property accountability
to the

-2- #3845, July 11, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from London.

to the British is entirely dispensed with in respect of British articles and facilities handed over to the United States forces and the degree of accountability if any is made a matter solely between United States headquarters and United States forces it is deemed necessary by United States forces to apply AR 35-620 to British articles and facilities delivered to United States forces. This would result in detailed inventories and very substantial paper work as a condition precedent to signing receipts presented by the British.

The British look exclusively to Lend Lease for all credits they may be entitled to and have no interest in holding United States forces or officers to any property accountability. With full knowledge they say they are willing to take the risk that they may not in future receive full Lend Lease credit because the receipts presented by them to substantiate a claim under reverse Lend Lease are inadequate. They frankly state they have not sufficient personnel to make necessary inventories and prepare necessary papers to satisfy United States Army regulations regarding property accountability without enormous waste of

-3- #3845, July 11, 11 p.m., (SECTION ONE), from London.

waste of time and manpower. The greater accounting and inventory difficulty exists in connection with these facilities which are loaned United States forces by the British to be returned after they have served their purpose. The British further state with respect to these facilities that they are not interested in making claim against United States forces for damage of any nature which is sure to occur.

The British War Office, Air Ministry, Foreign Office and Treasury and United States forces have agreed to the following suggested note to be exchanged between the respective governments in Washington.

WINANT

EMB

RCC

PLAIN

London

Dated July 11, 1942

Rec'd 8:44 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

3845, July 11, (SECTION TWO)

"With reference to the notes exchanged between us today on the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom to the armed forces of the United States. I have the honour to inform you that since the conditions affecting the provision of reciprocal aid by the Government of the United Kingdom are sufficiently defined in the aforesaid notes. It is the intention of the President of the United States not to require any property accountability to the Government of the United Kingdom by United States forces or their officers in any theater of operations with respect to articles and facilities which have been or will be furnished to or put at the disposal of the United States by the Government of the United Kingdom as reciprocal aid. In particular, it is intended with respect to such articles and facilities that United States forces and their officers will only be responsible to the

Government

-2- # 3845, July 11, (SECTION TWO) from London.

Government of the United States under such regulations as may be issued from time to time by the United States for the purpose. If the Government of the United Kingdom is agreeable to the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two governments in this matter."

WINANT

CSB

RF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

London

Dated July 11, 1942

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

3845, July 11, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

The British Foreign Office at the instance of the British Treasury has sent a note identical with the one herein above quoted to Phillips at Washington with a similar explanation and a request that action on the proposed note be accelerated. I am advised by United States forces here that the matter is sufficiently urgent to justify passing the note above quoted without waiting the execution of the principal agreement if it be delayed beyond July 16. If this is not feasible, I request that I be informed at the note has been agreed upon and will be exchanged.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

EMB

Draft note

Sir:

With reference to discussions which are taking place between our two Governments concerning reciprocal aid, I wish to advise you that it is the intention of the President of the United States not to require any property accountability to the Government of the United Kingdom by United States forces or their officers in any theater of operations with respect to articles and facilities which have been or will be furnished to or put at the disposal of the United States by the Government of the United Kingdom as reciprocal aid. In particular, it is intended with respect to such articles and facilities that United States forces and their officers will only be responsible to the Government of the United States under such regulations as may be issued from time to time by

The Honorable

the

Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B.,

British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

the United States for the purpose. If the Government of the United Kingdom is agreeable to the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

Dorothy,

This can be filed.

his



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Assistant Secretary
of State

SEP 22 1942

MR. ACHESON 1

PSF: Winant Folder
1-42

PERSONAL

AMERICAN EMBASSY

file →
Dear Mr. President:

London, August 5, 1942.

Just before Harry left, the Lord Chancellor told me of a memorandum which you had given to the Prime Minister on his last visit to Washington, relating to atrocities. He told me that he understood that Harry had prepared this memorandum for you, and that as a result of it, and on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet had formed a "War Cabinet Committee on the Treatment of War Criminals" to study the problem presented in the memorandum. He asked me if I would sit in with the committee. On Harry's suggestion, I did so. The recommendations made are not in line with the memorandum but Harry thought that it might be well to consider the problem without necessarily being bound by the memorandum.

The committee is composed of the following, and I found that they had given considerable study to the subject:

Lord Simon (In the Chair),
Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Eden,
Sir Donald Somervell, Major Sir David P. Maxwell Fyfe,
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir William Malkin,
Sir Claud Schuster.

The President,

The White House.

After talking over their conclusions they unanimously decided to ask that I forward them to you for such suggestions as you might want to make. There was a kind of preamble attached relating the present program back to the Bryce Committee of the last war, with the thought that it might give standing to action taken at the present time. I felt that the Bryce Committee had been somewhat discredited as a propaganda agency and therefore suggested eliminating reference to it, which was agreed. There is great pressure on the part of Allied Governments here to force some action that might act as a deterrent against further atrocities by the enemy. The suggested plan might be a deterrent and would at least prevent less wise measures being taken.

I am forwarding a copy of the proposal for a "United Nations Commission on Atrocities", and likewise a copy of the "Suggested Functions for a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes".

Sincerely,

John Gilbert Wmont.

Enclosures:

as stated.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt telegram 1-12-72

By JL Date FEB 9 1972

PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON ATROCITIES

1. The Committee on the Treatment of War Criminals (the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Information, the Attorney General, and the Solicitor General) has considered, on reference by the War Cabinet, a proposal for a United Nations Commission on Atrocities. After preliminary consideration by the Committee, the Chairman invited the American Ambassador to attend the Second Meeting on 27th July, and Mr. Winant was good enough to do so. The following is a summary of the suggestions discussed.

2. NATURE OF COMMISSION

The Commission should investigate atrocities committed against nationals of the United Nations and should report from time to time to the Governments of those Nations any case where they are satisfied that an atrocity has been committed and should name, where possible, the persons responsible; they should direct their attention in particular to organised atrocities. For this purpose, atrocities perpetrated by Germany in occupied France should be included.

If it is thought desirable to set out the functions of the Commission in some detail, the attached paper (Annex I) gives a summary of suggested functions.

The suggestion of some sort of international court for the trial of war criminals should be deprecated. Nor is it necessary or desirable to create a new body of law, for war crimes are already sufficiently well-defined.

The Commission should be a fact-finding body, making reports to the Governments of the United Nations and to the Fighting French which would be available for publication; these reports might also contain material upon which decisions would ultimately be taken on the treatment of war criminals. Some of the European Allies have suggested that war criminals who come into their hands might be dealt with by their own tribunals. It is not suggested that we can intervene to prevent this. But if the United Nations Commission acquires authority and reputation by its composition and work, it may be that the reports of the Commission would influence or control the selection of persons to be prosecuted in Allied countries.

3. REPRESENTATION

Membership should be confined to nationals of the United Nations; the following might be invited to send representatives -

United Kingdom

United States

U.S.S.R.

China

Belgium
Czecho-Slovakia
Greece
Holland
Luxembourg
Norway
Poland
Yugo-Slavia

Special provision for the representation of the Fighting French would seem desirable. The Dominions Secretary should be asked to consult the Dominions as to whether they wish separate representation.

4. METHOD

It would seem decidedly preferable to constitute a single Commission, which might sit from time to time in two or more panels in different countries. The whole Commission should examine the conclusions of the panels before reporting to the United Nations.

5. SCOPE OF ENQUIRY

The atrocities of all offenders, irrespective of rank, should be investigated. The aim should be to collect material about the main atrocities, especially those which are being systematically committed.

Every effort should be made to fix the names of those who have been responsible for the perpetration of the atrocity, in addition to verifying the occurrence.

29th July, 1942

51

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED FUNCTIONS FOR A UNITED NATIONS
COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF
WAR CRIMES

1. With a view to establishing responsibility for atrocities in the nature of war crimes perpetrated by the enemy in the present war, to investigate all cases referred to the Commission by any of the Governments of the United Nations of atrocities committed by, or by order of, the nationals of any of the countries at war with any of the United Nations against nationals of the United Nations.
2. To collect, record and assess all available evidence, oral and written, upon such atrocities.
3. To direct their attention in particular, in the first instance, to those cases which appear to be atrocities organised and committed in pursuance of a deliberate policy.
4. To report from time to time, and as early as possible, to the Governments of the United Nations, cases in which the Commission is satisfied that an atrocity has been committed, naming, where possible, the person or persons whom they consider responsible.
5. To investigate, consider and report upon any other instances or classes of war crimes referred to them by the general consent of the Governments of the United Nations.
6. To constitute such panels for the taking and recording of evidence, and to sit whether in panels or as a whole, in such places as the Commission may from time to time decide.
7. To co-opt such expert technical advisers for the purpose of particular investigations as the Commission may consider necessary.
8. Perhaps, to make recommendations upon the procedure by which war criminals should be dealt with after the war.

29th July, 1942.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Int. telegram, 1-12-72

By JL Date FEB 9 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

Assistant Secretary
of State

SEP 22 1942

MR. ACHESON

September 20, 1942

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

Telegram no. 5253

Dated: September 20, 2 p.m.

From: London

Rec'd: September 20, 10 a.m.

URGENT FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR MR. HOPKINS

An early reply to the questions taken up in this telegram would be greatly appreciated.

I have had no word about the atrocity commission plan which was the subject of a letter from me to the President except a statement made by Averell on his return. Averell said to me that you had spoken to him about the plan, but I could not make a reply to the Government here as his statement was not definite enough. I understand from the Foreign Office that the subject has been taken up by Lord Halifax.

Eden asked me this morning if I would not be able to obtain an immediate reply, adding that a question on this matter would have to be answered by the Government in Parliament. Definite action on the matter is being urged by the Allied Governments which are pressing the British. I personally have received, since wiring you, over 200 petitions requesting action. These were from British organizations.

The British request answers to certain questions

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

and these can be divided into three parts. My letter to the President and the papers which were attached cover these questions in part.

(1) The British wish to know if you consider satisfactory their proposed arrangement regarding the setting up of a commission for examining evidence on atrocities.

(2) What are the President's opinions with regard to our joint statements to the other Allied Governments on this matter?

(3) With regard to an agreement which would require the turning over of war criminals to the Allies by the enemy, would we agree to have this included in the armistice terms?

WINANT

S:ASB

To Mr. Hopkins (2)

TELEGRAM

Assistant Secretary
of State

SEP 22 1942

MR. ACHESON

SEPTEMBER 21, 1942

TO: AMEMBASSY

LONDON

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM HARRY HOPKINS

YOUR 5253. YOUR LETTER OF AUGUST FIFTH WAS MISLAID
AND HAS JUST COME TO LIGHT. THE WHOLE MATTER HAS BEEN
REFERRED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND I HOPE YOU WILL GET
ADVICES VERY SOON. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT NO REFERENCE
DIRECT OR INDIRECT SHOULD BE MADE TO THE BRYCE COMMITTEE.

HARRY HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 1972



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1942

Dear Harry:

I am returning your file on the War Crimes Commission with paraphrases of telegrams from Ambassador Winant of October 4 and 6 and the one to him of October 5 to bring it up to date.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

As stated.

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins,

The White House.



PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Washington
From: London
Dated: October 6, midnight.
Rec'd: October 6, 10:28 p.m.
No.: 5572

For the Acting Secretary from the Ambassador.

Your 4850, October 5, 10 p.m., was greatly appreciated here. Both the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Eden were pleased by the alternative title for the Commission which you suggested and it will be adopted. Mr. Eden has just given me a memorandum from which the following is an extract:

"The Lord Chancellor asked me to tell you that he welcomes the President's suggestion for an additional statement and will speak along the lines indicated although not in identical terms. As our proposals are not restricted to Germany he will refer throughout to enemy nationals rather than to Germans. As we must consider Jews, Moslems and others, he will speak of the violation of every tenet of humanity rather than of the Christian faith. You may remember the difficulties caused in Turkey by recent references of Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Halifax to Christian ideals.

"I cannot give you the exact time of the announcement as it will be made during the course of the debate but believe it will be approximately 3:30 p.m. London time.

"All the Governments in Exile in London and the French National Committee have warmly welcomed the proposal and authorized us to associate them with it. We have not yet had time to obtain the views of the Russian and Chinese Governments."

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: London
From: Washington
Dated: October 5, 10 p.m.
No.: 4850

Your telegram 5532 of October 4 and previous.

After consulting with the President on his return to Washington I hasten to give you the following:

The texts enclosed with your letter of October 5 to the President are satisfactory and the project may be announced as one having the joint support of this and the British Governments. We had already told the British Ambassador that we were agreeable to a concurrent announcement of our intention that the armistice terms should provide for the capture or surrender of war criminals. We suggest that the Commission be called the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.

The President wishes that a statement along the following lines be made in connection with the proposed announcement:

Neither this Government nor the British Government intends to indulge in mass reprisals and they believe the German people will understand that the two Governments seek only to punish the ringleaders responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith. The number of such ringleaders would obviously be very small in relation to the total population of Germany.

The President considers such a statement essential to forestall any idea that the Allied Governments intended to resort to mass executions. We will issue such a statement here on October 7 simultaneously with that to be made in the House of Lords. Our text will be sent as soon as possible. Please advise exact time.

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

To: Washington
From: London
Dated: October 4, 3 p.m.
Rec'd: October 4, 3:50 p.m.
No.: 5532

Personal from the Ambassador to the Secretary and Under Secretary.

With reference to my previous telegrams concerning the War Crimes Commission I greatly hope you can give me your and the President's views soon. The Lord Chancellor telephoned me again yesterday and I have just received the following letter from Eden:

"You will recall that I asked a few days ago whether you could expedite your Government's reply to our proposals for dealing with war criminals.

"No doubt as a result of your efforts, which I greatly appreciate, Lord Halifax was advised last week that your Government was agreeable to the proposal the United Nations Governments include in eventual armistice terms a provision for the surrender of war criminals. He was further advised that a statement to this effect might be made at the same time as 'the contemplated statement concerning the proposed United Nations Commission.' We hope that this meant that your Government was also in agreement with our proposal for a War Crimes Commission. However our Embassy in Washington stated in response to a further inquiry that your Government had not yet completed its study of our proposal. The State Department asked the British Embassy if our approach to the other Allied Governments could be delayed until its study was completed.

"As you know, we are subject to heavy parliamentary pressure for a statement on this subject. Some weeks ago we secured postponements of a debate in the House of Lords on the definite understanding that a statement would be made when Parliament reconvened. A motion for this debate has been scheduled for October 7 and we must make some statement then. We must say at least that we favor the idea of a Fact Finding Commission and the provision in the armistice

terms

terms for surrender of war criminals. We would not give any details of the proposals now under consideration by your Government but we would be most grateful if we could have its views before October 7 and if we could indicate your agreement on these two points. This would add greatly to the value of the statement.

"In these circumstances we cannot much longer delay consulting the other Allied Governments. We shall have to tell them in general terms what is contemplated, naturally without mentioning our consultation with your Government. We will also ask them to associate themselves with the proposals, preferably in time to enable us to state their agreement on October 7. This will naturally be but the first step and there must be further consultations between the Governments concerned on the detailed application of the proposals as well as on other aspects of the war crimes problem.

"I have telegraphed Halifax in the sense of the foregoing but would be grateful if you would also again tell your Government how much we would like to have its views before October 7."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Assistant Secretary
of State

SEP 24 1942

MR. ACHESON

6

September 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM:

Mr. Hopkins will telephone
Mr. Acheson about this.

Lis M. Gurney

Secretary to Mr. Hopkins

156

Assistant Secretary
of State

SEP 24 1942

MR. ACHESON 6

COPY

A UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON ATROCITIES

1. An authoritative presentation of the atrocities committed by the Germans and Japanese in Liddice, Poland, Nanking, Hong Kong, and other places should: a) Help to keep the people of the United States informed of the nature of our enemies, spurring us to renewed efforts to defeat them; and b) Serve to deter those committing the atrocities by naming their names and letting them know that they are being watched by the civilized world, which will mete out swift and just punishment on the reckoning day.

2. Such an authoritative presentation could be made by a United Nations Commission on Atrocities, headed by someone like former Chief Justice Hughes, and including outstanding representatives of the other United Nations, such as Tolstoy of Russia, Del Vayo of Spain, Sforza of Italy, Holdsworth of England, and Dr. Wu of China. To avoid any implications of propaganda, the personnel of the Commission should not officially represent their Governments, though they should be satisfactory to them. They should be persons of a world-wide reputation for integrity and an ability to appraise the evidence.

3. The Commission should: a) Investigate the atrocities by taking depositions, interrogating eye-witnesses and assessing all other available or obtainable evidence; and b) Report to the United Nations from time to time on the shooting and maiming of hostages and prisoners, the beating and torturing of women and children, and the other violations of the fundamental rights of human beings. The report to the United Nations should, wherever possible, name the persons who are responsible for the atrocities.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. EBEN: *DH*

The letter from Ambassador Winant to the President of August 5, 1942 on atrocities and treatment of War Criminals, which you sent over this afternoon, has been sent to Dean Acheson at the State Department. Mr. Acheson is going to have it photostatted and then return the original. The State Department will handle this business.

Lois

*Signed original of this letter sent to
Hon. Sumner Welles for delivery*

Winant Folder

1-42

9/10/42

HW

September 10, 1942

The Honorable John W. Winant,
American Ambassador,
London, England.

Dear ~~Winant~~:

Gil

I was glad to have your recent telegram relative to the relations between the British public and our troops in England. The action of the British Parliament in giving us exclusive jurisdiction over members of our forces who commit criminal offenses should be helpful, and indicates a very sincere desire to extend to us every possible cooperation.

The Red Cross situation will, I am sure, be solved to the satisfaction of everyone. The Red Cross activities in England are, I believe, tremendously important.

There are, of course, many complications with regard to the use of negro troops. We will, of necessity, have to send a reasonable proportion of negro soldiers overseas, and present plans contemplate that the ratio of negro troops to white troops will correspond to that obtaining in the Army as a whole. This is approximately ten per cent. The dispatch of negro WAAC units to England is deferred for the present. General Eisenhower has withdrawn his recommendation that this action be taken, because the specific need that he had in mind for them has been met by the Red Cross. The question of other uses for negro WAAC units with troops in England is still under study in the War Department.

The relative affluence of our soldiers under the new pay rates has already been brought up by General Eisenhower. This is a troublesome question and one for which there appears to be no simple and wholly satisfactory solution. The War Department has for some time been encouraging soldiers to purchase War Bonds, and there has always been a constant effort to promote the sale of Government Life Insurance. There is no legal authority now for compulsory allotments of pay, except in a relatively limited number

of dependency cases. It is possible that some results can be obtained through encouraging soldiers to utilize the soldiers' deposit system in order to accumulate personal savings. Under present statutes such savings would be entirely voluntary on the part of troops. The War Department is corresponding with General Eisenhower on this subject, and you may be sure that we shall continue to strive for a suitable solution.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


September 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reply to a letter from
Ambassador Winant relative
to the public relations be-
tween our troops in England
and the British civilian
population.

The questions raised by Ambassador Winant
affecting the public relations between our troops,
negro and white, in England, on the one hand, and the
British civilian and military population on the other
are under constant study by the War Department and
General Eisenhower.

It is recommended that the attached draft
of a letter to Ambassador Winant be signed and dis-
patched.


Chief of Staff.

Enc.


Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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BOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 5-3-66

Signature-



SECRET

Pres.
Harry Hopkins
to speak to me
about *file*
PSF: Winant folder
1-42

des
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated October 5, 1942

Rec'd 10:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

5537, October 5, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM

HARRIMAN:

Without any specific information, it is my guess
that Stalin's statement last night to the Associated
Press is part of a scheme developed by the Soviet
Foreign Propaganda Bureau with which I understand Oumansky
is now associated.

Stalin has evidently been told that the way to get
action on the part of the United States and the British
Governments is to have those in authority, to use
Willkie's word "prodded" by popular demand. Stalin's
statement ties in with what Maisky said here to the
American press a fortnight ago.

The Slavic mind does not understand us any more
perhaps than we understand them and they do not realize
that their relations with us, both now and in the future,

cannot

-2- 5537, October 5, 1 p.m. from London

cannot be built on a sound basis with this type of devious method. The statement does not sound at all **like** the direct manner in which Stalin personally dealt with the Prime Minister and myself when we were in Moscow. It sounds more like a scheme of a mind like Oumansky's.

From my personal talk with Stalin I am convinced that he wants above all to be on a basis of intimacy and frank interchange with you. On the other hand it should be borne in mind that Stalin does not pretend to understand the ways of our democracies.

I feel Stalin has been misinformed of the psychological and political situation in both the United States and Britain and the effect that this type of heavy-handed propaganda will have on our relations. I believe it is correct to say that since Dieppe there has been far less public clamor here and more sober thinking regarding a second front.

ALC

WINANT

SW-
OK - see
corrections
ZDR

Winant folder
1-42

October 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request I have telegraphed Ambassador Winant your wish that the proposed Declaration concerning the establishment of a United Nations Commission to Investigate War Crimes should be accompanied by a statement that it is our intention to punish only the guilty and not to resort to wholesale executions.

I attach for your consideration a draft statement which, if you approve, might be issued on October 7 at the time the British statement is made in the House of Lords. I will let Mr. Early know the exact time. Would you kindly let me know whether the draft statement has your approval in order that it may be telegraphed to Ambassador Winant?

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft statement.

The President,

The White House.

Statement by the President

On August 21 I said that this Government was constantly receiving information concerning the barbaric crimes being committed by the enemy against civilian populations in occupied countries, particularly on the continent of Europe. I announced the purpose of this Government, and of the other United Nations, to see that when victory is won the perpetrators of these crimes shall answer for them before courts of law.

The commission of these crimes continues.

I now declare it to be the intention of this Government that the ^{successful close of the war} ~~armistice to be made eventually with the~~ ~~enemy governments~~ shall include provisions for the ~~capture~~ ~~and~~ surrender to the United Nations of war criminals.

With a view to establishing responsibility of the guilty individuals through the collection and assessment of all available evidence, this Government is prepared to cooperate with the British and other Governments in establishing a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes.

The number of persons eventually found guilty will undoubtedly be ^{extremely} small compared to the total enemy populations. It is not the intention of this Government or of the Governments associated with us to resort to mass reprisals.

It is

It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent persons and the commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith.

file
personal

Win ant folder
1-42

October 31, 1942.

Dear Gil:-

Ever so many thanks for yours of October seventeenth, and also for your messages about my Missus -- and for all you are doing for her.

I think she is having a thoroughly successful visit and from this end her publicity has been extraordinarily good, especially considering the fact that we are in the last week of a campaign which I wish to heavens was over. When that time comes next Tuesday, I hope the country will forget politics for two years. That, however, is an almost impossible miracle.

You are doing a magnificent job -- and I say that not only for myself but as an expression of what everybody over here is unanimous on. In fact, hardly a new job turns up in Washington that somebody does not suggest that I bring you back to handle it.

In that connection I tell them that there is literally no one over here that I or anybody else can think of who could fill your place in London.

But I do think that it would do you a lot of good to come back soon for at least a month -- new scenes, dry climate, good food and warm houses. I love England in the Spring, Summer and early Autumn, but I do dread chilblains!

Why don't you come back the end of November
or beginning of December and stay over New Year's
before returning? That may be a period of reason-
able quiet.

As ever yours,

Honorable John G. Winant,
American Embassy,
London,
England.

1, Grosvenor Square,
London, W. 1.

October 17, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your very nice letter of October 6th which was very much appreciated. I know you will enjoy Camrose. Seeing Herschel Johnson will give him a lift. He has been on the job away from home for four years without leave and is a conscientious and fine public servant.

After you wrote I sent you a second message on the Chicago Tribune situation saying it was in hand here. I do not think that matter will trouble us again. We have already made some progress in setting up a daily newspaper for our troops and I appreciate very much your speaking to Elmer Davis about it. He can give us considerable support from Washington.

I believe public opinion here in relation to chaining prisoners is against attempting to retaliate in kind, in spite of the Prime Minister's early statement. The common sense view recognizes that the Germans have three times as many British prisoners as the British have German prisoners and there is a general unwillingness to attempt to compete with the enemy in the maltreatment of defenseless men. Better informed people here believe the order for chaining was given by Hitler in a rage, and I was told that when it was explained to one of the German officer prisoners that it might be necessary to chain him the

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

following day as retaliatory action he said, "This is Hitler's doing". In spite of anger the answer given the most general support by the British is to "get on with the war".

I am enclosing a letter that Harold Laski asked me to forward to you.. I see him intermittently. He is devoted to you and all you stand for.

We make some progress here at the Embassy. I believe our relations with the British are good. I have great faith in the common people of England.

Always sincerely,

John Gilbert Winant

*Confidential for Ambassador Winant
from EF Renshaw*

Feb. 4. 1943.

ARTICLE VII CONVERSATIONS

PSF:

*file
Amb Winant
pers mail*

Recently I have had some long personal talks with Ronald and Jebb in the Foreign Office, Keynes in the Treasury, Maud and Drummond in the Ministry of Food, and Fraser of the Foreign Trade Section of the Board of Trade, and others.

The following are some points arising out of these talks.

1. A memorandum was received by the British Embassy people in Washington, apparently from Berle which appears to have been based on White's plan for a Stabilisation Fund. *I understand that,* an inquiry in Washington ~~understand~~ the British found that the views in it were to be taken only as those of the writers of the memorandum and not as official.

This again raises a point which I stressed in the memorandum on Article VII matters which I gave to you at the time you left. The point is that the British papers on the implementations of Article VII - the document on the international clearing union, and others to come - are to be considered as documents which have received Cabinet blessing, while such documents as we have put forward up to now have been purely individual documents without Government backing.

Cabinet sanction of the British documents means (a) that the British Government approves the documents as a basis for international discussion; (b) that the documents give the general principles of plans which it is hoped can be worked out in detailed practical administrative forms after international discussion; (c) that if as a result of international

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date **FEB** 9 1972

discussion detailed plans are worked out to give practical effect to the principles and general outlines given in the documents, the British Government can be relied on to back these plans.

To give a practical illustration: the Keynes document on the international clearing union does not represent simply the bright ideas of an individual, but it is a government document indicating in general outline the principles of international monetary measures which, when worked out in detail, will be accepted by the British Government.

2. The clearing union document has the above status already. This afternoon a Cabinet Committee meets to consider a document for International Commodity Councils, and is expected to give it official blessing. I will write ^{by next air pouch} ~~on Friday~~ to let you know the result. I think there is no doubt it will be adopted and from confidential indications from reliable friends of mine I believe it will be a document on lines that in general we can fully support. Of course it will not satisfy our agricultural extremists but in my opinion anything that would satisfy our agricultural extremists would be inconsistent with and would gravely endanger our trade policy. It is essential that both we and the British handle our agricultural vested interests firmly. I believe the Canadians and probably the Australians will be firm with their agricultural groups and if we can handle ours I don't think we need fear the British.

I hope to learn more today about the status of the document on commercial policy which the Board of

Trade are preparing. I believe it will be on very sound lines.

3. The monetary, the commodity and the trade plans will be closely related to one another. I think it is most important that our discussions with the British should be on comprehensive lines. The adoption of freer trade and non-discrimination will be considered here as dependent in part on the adoption of satisfactory machinery for dealing with international monetary problems. On the other hand the success of international monetary organization will be largely dependent on the freeing of trade channels and access to export markets. Again, commodity controls have to be harmonised with trade policies. It would be a great mistake for us to confront the British with piecemeal proposals on small points taken in isolation - for example, points relating to the tariff on some single commodity, or the control of some single commodity. The negotiations on the wheat agreement are an example of how not to approach post-war reconstruction. The wisest plan is to discuss international commodity questions as a whole, with a view to the setting up of an international commodity council which will supervise, in accordance with agreed principles, controls or councils dealing with single commodities. Any attempt to revive discussions on wheat before these general questions are settled would be likely to have unfortunate results.

4. How many countries should hold Article VII conversations at the same time? This is very important and I have ascertained the precise British position on it.

The British do not wish to have an Anglo-American

agreement and then attempt to impose it on the rest of the world. The British public would certainly not stand for such an approach to post-war problems. Pro-Russian sentiment is very strong and is increasing in Britain. Because of its great distance China is less known to the masses in Britain but sentiment in favor of the Chinese is strong and has been growing since the very successful visit of the British Parliamentary delegation to China.

However, in regard to the elaboration of detailed economic plans for the implementation of Article VII, for example the monetary plan, the British position is that confusion would result from starting out with multilateral ^{technical} discussions. They think that such technical discussions should start with two countries, and then extend to others. But these two countries need not necessarily, in their view, be Great Britain and the United States. They might be any two countries - for instance, Britain and Russia or the United States and Russia.* But there is strong feeling here against having a number of different technical plans thrown into the arena at the same time to be discussed by a number of countries.

From one British spokesman I got the impression that the monetary document embodying much of the first part of the White plan, which I referred to above as having been given to someone in the British Embassy, has also been given to the embassies of some other countries at the same time. The person who mentioned this to me expressed annoyance about the matter, but it was not mentioned to me by the Foreign Office people, so it may not be accurate.

* *I have ascertained by direct question that this is an official viewpoint, and not merely the feeling of a particular civil servant or Government economist.

If such a procedure should be adopted without previous consultation with the British, in regard to the monetary document, it would cause annoyance both in ministerial and in civil service circles here. The position in regard to international monetary reconstruction is that the British took the initiative, worked out the principles of a plan, had it adopted by the Cabinet, and handed it to us as a basis for discussion. The British had hoped that we would discuss it with them before they discussed it with the Dominions. However, they could not go back on their arrangements made last spring to discuss these questions with the Dominions. Now the Dominions appear to have given the monetary document their backing.

If in the above circumstances we were to ignore the British document, refuse to discuss it with the British and without consulting them circulate to a number of countries another document on the same subject, we ~~shall~~ ^{should} certainly cause offense here.

Since the British are now ready to cooperate on liberal and progressive lines with us on post-war international economic matters, it seems important for us to maintain the best relations possible with them. Since they made the first move and put out a document with Cabinet backing it would be a blunder on our part to ignore their document and put out an independent one to a number of countries before even discussing theirs. The least we could do is to consult them before giving anything to other countries that covers the same subject as the British monetary document covers.

This may appear merely a matter of procedure but I am convinced that it is important. In twelve days' time one year will have passed since the signing of the Mutual Aid Agreement. During the whole period the

British have pressed for conversations with a view to the implementation of Article VII and we have stalled them.

The British Government is now under increasing pressure from Parliament, from the press and from the people to state its position on post-war international economic reconstruction. It is accused of stalling at the time when it really is anxious to go ahead, but is held back by us.

Similarly the Allied Governments are pressing the British very hard on the same subject, and for the same reason the British cannot say anything to them. The result is that some of the Allies are turning to Bogomoroff rather than to Maisky, and looking to Russia as more likely to take the lead in Europe than ~~the~~ America and Britain. Cooperation of the European allies with Russia is all to the good when it is linked with cooperation between Russia, U.S.A., Britain and China, but not, I think, when it is the result of despair regarding the willingness and ability of U.S. and Britain to take an active, progressive part in post-war reconstruction. I believe the Soviet will cooperate in the best sense if we and the British play our cards right but it is unlikely that the Soviet has dropped its prewar basic underlying idea of power politics designed above all to safeguard the Soviet Union - having two alternatives, one to use if Britain and America can be relied on to prevent reactionary aggression that will menace the Soviet, and the other to fall back on if Stalin feels that America and Britain cannot be relied on. From this point of view it is important that we do not

dally too long and leave our continental European Allies feeling doubtful whether we will cooperate as we did or draw out/after the last war. In this connection international economic reconstruction is as important as political reconstruction.

I cannot impress too strongly the embarrassment in which British Government circles are placed by their inability to reply to critics who demand that they state their intentions regarding post-war economic matters. The pressure is so strong that one spokesman told me he doubted whether the Government could refrain much longer from making some statement. The Foreign Office is very reluctant to make any statement before talking with us but as they see no definite prospect of such talks they may have to do something about it before very long.

Free Trade and Elimination of Discriminations

The British would prefer some multilateral arrangement on tariffs and discriminations rather than merely proceeding by bilateral treaties through the Trade Agreements Act. They would like however to begin technical discussions on a multilateral plan perhaps with two countries only just for convenience in working out a plan. But they think that as regards the ultimate adoption of post-war commercial measures a comprehensive plan adhered to in a multilateral treaty would be most effective. There is every indication *that* ~~they~~ they will come thru on this and eliminate preferences. They think that they will have to stage a showdown with Amery and the "Empire" group at the right time but they believe - and I think from recent study of the House of Commons debates that they are right - that they can

decisively vote down the Amery group when the showdown comes.

I gather that in Washington there is a tendency to think that Congress will be difficult if it comes to going beyond the Trade Agreements Act. That may be but I wish to emphasise we have an excellent opportunity here, if we can carry Congress, to make a substantial move on a wide basis towards freer trade.

In concluding this rapidly written note which I will recast and expand for the next air pouch, I would like to urge the importance of stepping carefully in the matter of procedure for the technical talks and not rushing into procedures without careful consultation here. Otherwise we run the risk of alienating our best friends in Government circles here - the people who backed us behind the scenes over Article VII a year ago. I am doing my best to reassure them but I hope sudden moves will not be made which give the appearance of brushing the British documents aside and throwing out own documents to a number of countries without consulting the British. If we want to put out our own document on monetary matters we should work it out as an amendment of the British document, and try to get their agreement to it. <

I will expand this in the next air pouch and make more definite suggestions on procedure.

< If we insist on putting our document out to a number of countries simultaneously we should discuss this with the British first and ask them to agree to it.

For the next pouch I will ~~exp~~ describe an idea which was put out in the Foreign Office of having a series of ^{short} statements in elaboration of Article VII. - giving only very general indications of principles of monetary, commodity & trade post war economic organization to which the signatories of Article VII adhere. This would help to meet critics and would begin to prepare the public.

Pen.

PSF: Winant folder
1-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you ask Winant
to get his 3879 directly to the Prime
Minister?

F.D.R.

Mr. President:

no file

Morris Ernst is calling to ask for the letters. I can tell him that you wrote one to Ambassador Winant but do you want to write a special letter to the Prime Minister for Mr. Ernst.

GGT

41)

Signed original of this letter sent to State Dept. for delivery by pouch.
hms

Winant folder
1-43

October 15, 1943.

Dear Gil:

Morris Ernst is going over to
London. I do hope you will have a chance
to see him.

With kindest regards,

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable John G. Winant,
American Embassy,
London, England.

(Copy filed - Ernst folder, 3-43)

~~SECRET~~

PSF: Winant folder
1-44

*file
personal*

1 January 1944

From: London

To: The President of the United States

No Number

Filed: 01/1532Z

To the President.

Happy New Year. I hope you are having a quick recovery from the flu. Last Sunday, I took Mary down to Chequers where we had a Christmas party for the grandchildren and children of the neighborhood around your Christmas tree. It was a happy time for them. I wish you might have been there.

Winant

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

PSF: Winant folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Gray in the State Dept. called to say that on May 8th Mr. Winant sent word to the Secretary asking his approval for returning to the United States for a few days. He believes a verbal report would be helpful to the Secretary. They are going to give him the approval but would like your O.K.

G.G.T.

OK
JHR

hms

PSF: Winant folder 1-44

CH: JH
 Carbon initialed
 and returned to JH
 5/17/44

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 WASHINGTON

May 17, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

on map room files
 due to military nature

I refer to your memorandum of May 3, 1944 in regard to the possibility of sending someone to London, in accordance with Ambassador Winant's suggestion in his telegram to you of April 23, to advise on political implications of bombing in Europe.

Since receiving your memorandum we have learned informally from the United States Chiefs of Staff that the situation as regards bombing directives in Europe is as follows. Until General Eisenhower assumed the position of Supreme Allied Commander all bombing directives for Europe were approved in the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington and not in London, as suggested in Ambassador Winant's telegram. This is still the situation with respect to bombing in the Mediterranean Theater. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that the channel for communicating views on political considerations in connection with bombing to General Eisenhower or to General Wilson should be the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

In these circumstances it would appear to be desirable to take up the Ambassador's telegram with the United States Chiefs of Staff here, rather than to send anyone to London as suggested by Mr. Winant. I shall be glad to have this done if this procedure meets with your approval. After discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff I should also draft a telegram to Winant telling him what has been done.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

FEB

J 1972

CH

C
O
P
Y

PSF: Winant folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1944

FILE MEMO:

The following messages received by the President were referred to Admiral Leahy by the President:

No. 758 P.M. to the President, dated
Aug. 18, with Pres. message to
P.M. 600

759 PM to the President

760 PM to the President with draft
of proposed reply

Map Room message from Winant to
the President, file number 1815502, dated
Aug. 18.

Message to the President from
Harriman, Aug. 18 in regard to Poles.

(copy of this memo filed - Churchill folder, 1-44
and Russia folder, 1-44
and Poland folder, 1-44)

Pres
ARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PSF: Whelan folder 1-44
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

EOC-348

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SECRET)

London

Dated August 19, 1944

Rec'd 1 a.m. 20th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

6750, August 19, Midnight

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE SECRETARY AND FOR THE
PRESIDENT.

We are in agreement with the Department's view that
an interim arrangement for securing prompt and substan-
tial contribution from the German economy in the early
post war period is essential in order to accelerate
European rehabilitation and to avert an unduly heavy
imposition of European requirements on the American
economy while the war against Japan is still in progress.
It is also clear from discussions in the EAC that the
Russians, the British and ourselves agree that there
shall be central controls during this same early post
surrender period.

No discussions have as yet taken place on partition.
We recognize that this problem presents three distinct
lines of action (one) division of Germany into three or
more completely

-2-#6750, August 19, Midnight, from London.

more completely separate states; (two) A cutting off of certain areas east and west; (three) decentralization of the political structure within a territorially united Germany.

In considering the immediate decisions before the EAC which are necessary to military planning and recognizing the thinking of the Department and the chiefs of staff as outlined in messages and preliminary papers which have reached us in London I would recommend that for the time being the EAC give priority (one) to acceptance of unconditional surrender terms and (two) the implementation of these terms which includes (A) completion of the protocols in regard to the assignment of zones in Germany and the areas of Berlin and the stationing of troops in Austria; (B) control machinery in Germany and Austria; (C) basic proclamations and orders to accompany the surrender instruments; (D) directives to be agreed upon as instructions to the three commanders-in-chief for their guidance in administering Germany and Austria.

It is understood that such actions and assignments as may be made in these fields in respect to the satellite states fall within the sphere of the deliberations of EAC except

-3-#6750, August 19, Midnight, from London.

of EAC except in cases where emergency requirements lead to their being handled directly by the three governments.

Any confusions which have arisen between EAC planning SHAEF planning have been due to the slowness of the EAC in reaching tripartite agreement and the military necessity of the US-UK Allied forces to be prepared to act in case of partial occupation of Germany or immediate surrender. These latter contingencies have prompted SHAEF to plan on a bipartite basis rather than to wait for the formulation of tripartite agreement. There is also the recognition by SHAEF of the transition period during which the combined US-UK command divides into separate US and UK commands the European Advisory Commission in its initial conception was organized as a deliberative body. In fact because of the action of the three governments it has been used as an instrument for negotiation. Under the Moscow resolution its powers were advisory in character. Under its present practice its findings are purely preliminary until confirmed by the three governments.

I believe that when the work outlined above by the EAC is completed it will be found necessary to merge
the EAC into

-4-#6750, August 19, Midnight, from London.

the EAC into a high commission for Europe with authority to deliberate to advise and to execute within the framework of general policies laid down by the governments. (Two-four two C preliminary August 3, 1944).

The Russian and the US Delegations have had neither the equipment nor the personnel nor the authority to function under the mandate laid down in the Moscow resolution. If the EAC went out of existence on completing the military phases of its assignments the need for secrecy which was agreed to under the mandate and is justified because of the military character of the information before us and its value to the enemy would be understood and at the same time the new commission would be able to operate under more flexible conditions from the point of view of public relations (I have also felt in studying the economy of Germany and Austria which was part of our assignment that it is difficult to formulate an economic policy towards Germany and Austria without considering its effects on the economy of the rest of Europe. I therefore, believe that it would be wise to have these matters considered by a subcommittee of the European high commission

-5-#6750, August 19, Midnight, from London.

high commission whose assignment would cover all of Europe rather than by a group whose mandate was limited to the treatment of enemy countries. This change would not delay consideration of these subjects as the work of preparation has been and will continue to be carried on by coordinated groups of the respective governments

In a message to the Department I suggested that the preliminary formulation of a policy on reparation be undertaken in Moscow. The Soviet has a committee that has been working for a long time on this subject and I believe that better progress would be made if we and the British were close to those forming Soviet policy. It has been made plain to me that the Russian Government has difficulty in delegating to its agents sufficient latitude and discretion to enter into informal discussions away from their home base without delay and constant reference back for instructions.

When conclusions of such an advisory group were reached they could be reported back to the three governments and after review forwarded to the European High Commission.

WINANT

NPL

T

PSF: Winant folder
1-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I do not think it is necessary
to press this matter in view of the
feeling of Gousev. Will you let
Winant know?

F.D.R.

Telegram (Personal and Top Secret) to the
Secretary of State and the President, 8-16-44
from Winant, London, re his talk with Gousev,
with reference to the President's desire of in-
forming the Chinese of the German surrender
terms.

file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In reply to your memorandum of August 21 on the subject of informing the Chinese of the surrender terms for Germany, I must tell you that the Chinese were informed orally of the substance of the surrender terms on August 14. This was done in accordance with your original instructions and in the manner explained in our telegram to you of August 10, 1944.

We impressed upon the Chinese the top secrecy of the document and received their assurance that the terms would not be communicated to Chungking by telegram or by mail. No document was handed to Dr. H. H. Kung or General Shang Chen.

Ambassador Winant was informed of this action by a telegram of August 16, in reply to his telegram of the same date attached to your memorandum.

CH

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972



Pall Mall
London E.C. 1.

Nov 22 '44

My dear Mr. President.

Would you accept
my warmest congratulations upon your
reelection! It meant so much not
only to America but to us all.
With you at the White House there
is every prospect that all ~~our~~ the
difficulties will be safely overcome.

Last night in the
Evening Standard I read the enclosed.
I thought you might ^{also} wish to read it.

The Honble
Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States

With every good wish Mr. President
Very sincerely yours
Joyce Parish.

July 9. 1901

Personal.

Winant folder 2-44

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt

President of the United States

The White House

Washington
D. C.

What Makes Germans Fight?

OUTSTANDING in the present Allied offensives has been the character of German resistance.

Neither at Metz nor behind Belfort did the Germans leave strong pockets on the Allied flanks. At Metz the forts in the outer defences were virtually unattended; the defence of the city was left to small groups of determined men whose job was to delay the advance of the much larger American force. But this time the High Command did not risk the isolation of a large German force, though the advantage to them—had they been able to afford it—would have been great indeed.

The same is true of the German positions behind Belfort; along the Rhine between Basle and Mulhouse.

Throughout October the Germans were building trenches and munition dumps right up to the Swiss frontier. It was possible to watch these preparations from the Swiss side. It was believed the Germans had

THE MILITARY CORRESPONDENT

deliberately placed these dumps so as to embarrass the Allies by their proximity to neutral territory.

In other words, the positions in the triangle between Belfort, Basle and the Rhine offered not only opportunity to menace the flank of the advancing French army but also to make political trouble between the Swiss and the Allies.

Yet here, as at Metz, the Germans abandoned their positions. They crossed by the repaired pontoon bridge at Huningen before the French arrived.

What conclusion is one to draw from these two incidents? German defence where it is most stubborn depends on the determination of comparatively small forces holding out even under unfavourable conditions. Evidence from every single front underlines that this kind of German resistance has been

stiffened during the past two months, since Goebbels began his propaganda of "Sieg oder Sibirien"—victory or Siberia

These small groups of Germans fight on as much from the fear of what will happen to them if captured as from loyalty to their cause. It seems odd, therefore, that the Allies should now drop their propaganda to the enemy just when his moral is making him receptive. Propaganda against victorious armies is never effective, but against retreating and defeated armies it is often more potent than bullets.

Most Allied propaganda now tends to underline the fears promoted by Dr. Goebbels. In this way it reinforces the resistance of the German nests that cause our troops so much trouble.

The greatest and most decisive victories in the past (and also on the Eastern Front) have been won with the aid of political warfare. Those who scorn it think they are tough. They are—towards the Allied troops who have to pay in the field for it

(World Copyright)



A photographic illusion—the men are going downstairs—taken from above the second staircase, adjoining Somerset House, to Waterloo Bridge.

U.S. FLYERS'
HELP FOR

matter-of-factness to history—to the building of a bridge costing many millions, and constructed all the while the Germans were trying to demolish the capital.

Mr. Hallett had unofficially opened Waterloo Bridge to its use by a full six lines of traffic.

Unlike Mr. Hallett, Miss F. M. Burrows, of Kensington, knew of to-day's "opening" and had waited several minutes to be the "first motorist" to cross.

Block Removed

The opening consisted of an L.C.C. workman placing a "Keep Left" sign in position and removing a temporary traffic block.

In the words of Mr. F. N. Nolans resident engineer for the L.C.C., who was among the handful of people there, "the traffic looks lost."

"In the rare moments when I did see six lines of vehicles," writes a reporter, "all were able to proceed smoothly, and there was ample room. The bridge should be able to carry even the highest peak traffic well in normal times."

Right of Way

At the same time, the right of way of the north-east stairway connecting with the Embankment was given.

Two young King's College students and Miss Jean Mount were the first to use the right of way.

in Whitehall

Three thousand workers, representing some 10,000 employees in factories around London, to-day sent deputations to No. 10, Downing-street, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade, on the question of redundancy.

At Downing-street a request was made that the Prime Minister should give his personal attention to providing a plan for the transition period.

One of the deputation told a reporter that they were promised a written acknowledgment of their request and that it might be possible for an appointment to be made to see some of their representatives later.

The procession marched from St. James's Park down Whitehall carrying banners.

Sir J. G. Broodbank's Will

Sir Joseph Guinness Broodbank, of Writtle Wick, Chelmsford, Essex, left £51,695 gross (net personality £45,881).

FOOD

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR-OUT-561

NOVEMBER 28, 1944

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WINANT.

NUMBER 1081.

THE OTHER DAY STETTINIUS ASKED ME TO FORWARD TO YOU MY RES-
IGNATION AS AMBASSADOR TO GREAT BRITAIN. THIS I NOW DO. I WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR ACCEPTING IT WITHIN YOUR PRESENT TERM OF OFFICE AT
YOUR CONVENIENCE.

NO SIG.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

Signature-

RECEIVED



NOV 28 1944 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR-OUT-565:

29 NOVEMBER 1944.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WINANT:

TOMORROW IS THE PRIME MINISTER'S BIRTHDAY. YOU WILL REMEMBER
THAT WE WERE WITH HIM AT TEHERAN A YEAR AGO.

NO SIG.

RECEIVED



NOV 29 1944 PM

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

Signature-

~~TOP SECRET~~

PSF; Winant *freder*
file 1-44

23wh mc THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dec. 2, 1944.

Miss Tully:

I think important that President answer Winant's
cablegram of resignation as soon as possible. He needs
reassuring answer.

Harry Hopkins.

*Sent via
map room*



PSF: Winant folder, and 11
file
SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Winant

I understand that Ambassador Winant has cabled you stating that I had asked for his resignation and that he was therefore submitting it to you. I am afraid he has misunderstood the pro forma request for resignation which you will recall was sent to all our Chiefs of Mission with your approval, just as was done four years ago.

I am wiring Winant at once and explaining to him the pro forma nature of this request and the fact that it had no personal significance whatsoever.

E. A. Tamm

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

winant folder 1-45-
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

MLB-452

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

London

Dated January 6, 1945

Rec'd 8:55 p.m.

*file
personal*

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

US URGENT

NIACT 232, January 6, 11 p.m.

A fine summary of the President's message was
given on the BBC 9 o'clock broadcast. A complete
copy of the text has been sent to the Prime Minister
and I am taking a duplicate copy to Eden. All of
the British newspapers have been supplied with the
text for their Sunday editions. This has been pos-
sible because of the efficient service of the OWI.

It was a great message. I wish you would tell
the President so for me.

WINANT

LMS

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PSF: Whant Jorden 1-45-
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

PEM-1830

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. ~~(SECRET)~~

London

Dated January 11, 1945

Rec'd 6:02 p.m.

file

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT

NIACT 396, January 11, 8 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ TO THE SECRETARY AND FOR THE
PRESIDENT.

On December 8, I sent a top secret message to the
President and to you in relation to the occupation of
Austria (my 10864, December 8, 6 p.m.). I find that
this message was multigraphed and more than sixty
copies distributed as annex to Appendix B of JCS
1169/1 of December 15, pages 10 to 15...

Anyone reading the document and knowing that I
was continuing to negotiate with the British and the
Russians should, I feel, have prevented this action if
only to protect the negotiation. The message contained
highly secret information given me by the Foreign Office
on the Eden--Molotov negotiations in Moscow. There
were other forecasts and references which involve the
inter-relationships of the three major powers and which
should

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 9 1972

-2- NIACT #396, January 11, 8 p.m., from London.

should have been most closely guarded. Were copies sent to SHAEF? This would involve British distribution.

I would like to know who authorized the wide distribution of this message and I request its immediate recall from circulation.

WINANT

IMS

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

winant folder 1-45-
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

GEK-1837

PLAIN

London

Dated January 11, 1945

Rec'd 6:28 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

384, Eleventh

DAILY TELEGRAPH this morning plays up an article
by Mrs. Roosevelt in her newspaper column yesterday quoting
extensive extracts under the headline "Mrs. Roosevelt
champions Britain".

WINANT

RB

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PSF: *Wimant folder* 1-45

DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

EK-16

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (S-1000)

London *file*

Dated January 12, 1945

Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT.

404, January 12, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

The Germans make a practice of using small mobile transmitters behind the western front in order to confuse listeners to BBC and other Allied programs by sending stories on the same wave lengths as those used for these programs.

These transmitters alternately relay actual BBC broadcasts and broadcasts originating in Germany, so skillfully interwoven as to deceive the unpracticed listener.

On Monday, January 8, such a pseudo-BBC Broadcast was picked up by listeners on the Third Army front. It is thought that this broadcast was at 9:00 a.m., but since it was not heard in England this time is not certain. Presumably, some American reporters believing that this was an authentic BBC broadcast, cabled home that the BBC was slighting American troops and giving to General

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date **FEB** 9 1972

~~2~~-#404, January 12, 1 p.m., from London.

to General Montgomery entire credit for stopping the German advance.

January 9, the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS ran a story under the headline "Applause for Monty: Applesauce to Yanks". The NEW YORK DAILY MIRROR ran the story under the heading "Monty Gets Glory; Yanks Get Brush-off". On January 10 the CHICAGO TRIBUNE ran an indignant editorial.

On Wednesday, January 10, C.V.R. Thompson in the LONDON DAILY EXPRESS, under a New York dateline, reported the DAILY NEWS and DAILY MIRROR stories. Apparently, Thompson still believed that the alleged broadcast was authentic because he states that the uproar in the New York papers "was the BBC's fault. On seeing Thompson's story in the EXPRESS Agar sent the following cable to Kuhn: "Thompson in January 10 EXPRESS seems to believe the fake BBC broadcast about Montgomery and the Americans was genuine. Has BBC taken steps to inform Thompson and DAILY NEWS that this was a German fake?"

On the morning of January 10 the LONDON DAILY MAIL carried a front page box under the heading "It Was Germany Calling: BBC Fake Upsets United States". On the evening of January 10, the BBC carried a denial of the broadcast

-3-#404, January 12, 1 p.m., from London.

the broadcast in its nine o'clock news. This denial was printed in full in the LONDON TIMES of January 11.

On January 11 the German radio in English to Allied forces in the west mentioned the BBC disavowal of the night before and went on to disclaim that this was a Nazi station; actually, said the announcer, this station presents both the German and the Allied side and, therefore, merits the soldiers continued attention as a neutral source of information.

The London morning papers of Friday, January 12, carry an explanation of the whole incident by Brendan Bracken in the form of a message to General Eisenhower. Mr. Bracken's message ends: "With one trivial exception, the whole of the British press supports him (Eisenhower) in his great task." Confidentially, the reference here is to the DAILY MAIL, which carried an ugly editorial about General Bradley on January 11, and which had previously run some mildly derogatory stories.

I am told that Mr. Bracken does not intend publicly to identify the paper.

I would appreciate copies of this message going to the President and General Marshall.

WINANT

JT

~~DEPARTMENT~~
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Warrant folder 1-45
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

GEM-664

PLAIN

London

Dated January 14, 1945

Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

483, Fourteenth

U.S. URGENT

SUNDAY DISPATCH this morning carries following story from its New York correspondent, Don Iddon:

"Plans for the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill meeting are now virtually completed. Final details will be arranged with Mr. Churchill by Mr. Roosevelt's chief confidant and liaison man - Harry Hopkins - who is expected to make a quick trip to London shortly to confer with the British Premier as a prelude to the "Big Three" meeting.

The Hopkins-Churchill parley will take the place of a Roosevelt-Churchill conference, which Mr. Churchill was anxious to have before the meeting with Marshal Stalin. Mr. Roosevelt is said to have turned this idea down on the ground that it might create the impression in the Kremlin that an Anglo-American bloc was being formed.

-2-#483, Fourteenth, from London.

formed.

When Mr. Churchill and Mr. Hopkins have completed their talks it is probable they will proceed together to the appointed meeting place. The Chiefs of Staff of Britain and the United States, and Russia's military leaders, will be there too.

Roosevelt offer:

There have been reports that President Roosevelt will offer Churchill and Stalin an ironclad treaty extending the life of the grand alliance until the Dumbarton Oaks plan is formally ratified by the United States Senate.

William Philip Simms, foreign editor of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, writing in the NEW YORK WORLD TELEGRAM, said that a number of United Nations envoys in the United States are convinced that the President will make an offer in line with Senator Arthur Vandenberg's proposal for a treaty between Britain, United States, and Russia to keep Germany and Japan permanently demilitarised.

Simms wrote: "In return for this specific commitment, of course, it is expected that the President would obtain from London and Moscow an equally definite pledge regarding the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. Stephen Early,

-3-#483, Fourteenth, from London.

Mr. Stephen Early, President Roosevelt's secretary, announced yesterday in Washington that the President will visit Paris."

No other paper has this report.

PLEASE SEND COPY TO WHITE HOUSE.

WINANT

NPL

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

Minut folder 1-45
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

MOK-1087

file PLAIN

London

Dated March 1, 1945

Rec'd 7:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2125, first.

Majority of London newspapers today carry brief items of local origin stating that President Roosevelt is expected to visit London later this spring as guest of the King. Several papers add that Marshal Stalin had also been invited to London, but that it is improbable that he will be able to do so until later in year, after end of European war. Fullest item is that appearing in DAILY TELEGRAPH under by line of its political correspondent: "President Roosevelt is expected to visit London this year as the guest of the King. Provided the situation in America permits, he will travel shortly after the end of the San Francisco Conference. The Conference is to open on April 25. The occasion will not be invested with the full panoply of a state visit. But there will be a number of public and ceremonial functions in which the President will participate. There will be numerous opportunities for the public to

accord

-2- #2125, first, from London

accord to him the warm welcome of which he is assured. It is possible that he will address both Houses of Parliament, as General Smuts and Mr. MacKenzie King, the South African and Canadian Prime Ministers, did earlier in the war. The Government hopes that Marshal Stalin will also visit London this year. In his case there is no prospect of his coming until after the war in Europe. There is very little chance of both leaders being in this country at the same time. The invitation to Marshal Stalin was conveyed by Mr. Churchill during the Crimea Conference. Both President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin are likely to be offered the freedom of the City of London." Most papers also state that President will be accompanied by Mrs. Roosevelt.

Despatches from Washington on President's press conference on return from Crimea all give prominent place to his statement that he expects to meet Mr. Churchill again sometime after end of San Francisco Conference.

Please make copy of this message available to White House.

WIN/NT

RB

DEPARTMENT
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Warrant folder 1-43-
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

LFG-1525

PLAIN

London

Dated March 2, 1945

Rec'd 8:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2185, second

President's address to Congress on Crimea Conference is given greatest prominence in British newspapers and on radio news broadcasts. Full text is carried in leading papers. Typical headlines are those from TIMES--"Mr. Roosevelt in Congress: pleas for Crimea plans: a rousing welcome"; DAILY TELEGRAPH--"third world war if United States stays aloof: President's warning in reviewing Crimea Conference"; DAILY HERALD--"United States decision soon to 'settle worlds safety for generations': must back Yalta"; and NEWS CHRONICLE--"Franklin D. Roosevelt puts Yalta talks results to Congress: failure may lose the peace".

NEWS CHRONICLE says editorially: "everyone will rejoice that President Roosevelt is safely back in the States. He has made a long and strenuous journey in the interest of Allied unity; he has returned in good heart

and full

-2-#2185, second, from London

and full of hope for the future". It welcomes his emphasis that Crimea decisions mark a big advance on those of Tehran, and his assurances that Allied unity will be maintained by more frequent conferences.

DAILY TELEGRAPH asserts that military alliances in past have tended to be less cohesive in prosperity than in adversity but that in case of United Nations success has produced opposite effect. Quoting President's declaration that major Allies are now closer together than ever before, (TELEGRAPH editorial says: "that was exactly the language used by Mr. Churchill on Tuesday and there is a unanimity of thought, even of emphasis, in the two speeches which is the best proof that these were no empty words. Mr. Roosevelt has made it clearer than ever that the Yalta agreements were not of the sort in which carefully phrased formulas are but a flimsy cloak to cover up latent differences and conflicting aims. Divergencies, and important ones, there were at the outset, otherwise what need for a conference? Yet not only was a settlement reached on every point, but on every point a settlement which two of the participants vigorously and wholeheartedly endorse. The third had not yet spoken,

-3-#2185, second, from London

yet spoken, but his two colleagues could not have used the words they did if they had had the smallest reason to doubt that his mind was one with their own. A good test of this consensus is the subject of Poland, which was the most controversial both within the conference and in opinion outside. Here not so much as a assurance of difference can be detected between the attitudes of Mr. Roosevelt and of Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Roosevelt expressly selected it as an outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allies. A similar unison emerges in the references to the treatment of Germany, to the share of France in the counsel and responsibilities of the other great Allies, to collaboration in solving the problem of liberated Europe, to the rejection of anything in the nature of 'spheres of influence'. The matters dealt with at Yalta were far wider and more complex than at any of the previous conferences between the leaders of the principal Allies, yet it has been undeniably the most successful of them all". TELEGRAPH says that section of President's speech dealing with America's part in organizing world security, and with responsibility resting on Congress, will be read abroad with particular interest.

-4-#2185, second, from London

interest.

Quoting President's remarks on American responsibility for world collaboration or another world conflict, editorial in DAILY EXPRESS said this uncompromising and blunt challenge shows "the full magnificence" of President Roosevelt's statesmanship. It asserts: "these are historic words to a proud and independent people whose traditions so far have inclined them to hold aloof from the problems of the outside hemisphere. Mr. Roosevelt's words need no embellishment or emphasis from these islands. The people here recognize the quality of this man and are happy that America should have such splendid representation in the counsels of the world".

Editorial in TIMES declares that President spoke "as one confident that his country was ready to undertake under his leadership--what it declined to undertake under that of Woodrow Wilson--a share commensurate with its great power in the responsibility for keeping the peace". It goes on to state: "If his confidence proves well founded, the new league will start upon its task with two immeasurable advantages over the old. Instead of reposing in effect on the support of the powers of western Europe--and

-5-#2185, second, from London

Europe--and those ambiguously pledged--it will be sustained on either hand by the greatest power of the new world, which stood aloof in 1920, and by something that in those days did not exist, a federation of states stretching away from the Curzon Line to the Bering Strait. Both moreover will have undertaken not only to consult but to act in defense of world peace".

Noting that American discussion of Crimea agreements opens on day the British debate closes, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN editorial says this American discussion must pursue its own course but is likely to end in much the same result. Editorial declares: "the Crimea Conference will be recognised by the overwhelming majority for what it is, a highly successful preparation for military victory and for a decent peace system. Just as Mr. Churchill had made his report in the form of a convincing appeal for national unity, so also did President Roosevelt. Congress will exercise all the prerogatives of debate, but we may think that the example of Parliament will not be wholly lost and that, on the Polish issue at least, the clarifications which Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden have given will be of help to American legislators".

Stating that

-6-#2185, second, from London

Stating that President's testimony to spirit of Crimea was same as that given by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, GUARDIAN says: he drew the same moral as Mr. Churchill from the long and unfortunate delay in fixing the meeting. He had a curious sentence about there having begun to grow up in some of the liberated countries 'vaguely defined ideas of spheres of influence which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration'. We need not press too hard to inquire what the Americans were doing to allow this to happen, any more than we need comment on the apparent incomparability between the assurances Mr. Churchill received at Yalta about American approval of our doings in Italy and the earlier admonitions of the Secretary of State and even of the President himself. These things can be passed over as belonging to an uncomfortable period of misunderstanding and disharmony that must not recur. It rests mainly with the Americans whether it does recur. They have to decide formally whether to take their share of responsibility for keeping the world's peace and of continuing the influence they have so notably exercised in the war and in the Yalta discussions. They have a great part to play in the San

Francisco Conference,

-7-1/2185, second, from London

Francisco Conference, and they can do it the more effectively because their delegation there will be bipartisan." Quoting President's assertion that world peace is not a party question, GUARDIAN says it will be devout hope of all countries that American statesmanship will prevent its once more becoming one.

Despatch to TIMES from its Washington correspondent on President's speech declares: "Today he was the very picture of quiet confidence. He must know that his part in the Yalta Conference has increased his stature. The former Justice Byrnes hurried back from the conference to say publicly that if the American people had been able to see him there they would have 'been proud of him,' and that is the feeling undoubtedly of all those who have not been so long committed to backbiting. He had a rousing reception from the House, whose galleries were crowded almost to suffocation, and a hearing as eager as the occasion deserved".

WINANT

WTD

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Amount for 1-45
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1945 MAR 12 PM 2 03

JP-522

PLAIN

London

Dated March 12, 1945

Rec'd 8:08 a.m.

White House
(Via Mr. Keen)
Rm. 282

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2537, Twelfth.

DAILY MAIL under heading "United States to cut Europe's supplies--shortages loom", carries following despatch from its special correspondent in New York:

"The White House moved swiftly tonight to meet a threatened food crisis resulting from the demands of SHAEF UNRRA and the home front, which exceed prospective supplies for the three months beginning April 1. Mr. James F. Byrnes, United States War Mobilizer, announced the setting-up of a foreign shipments committee with overall powers governing the exports of rationed produce. The new committee takes over the job of the war food administration in deciding how the reduced supplies shall be allocated. Announcing the new board, Mr. Byrnes warned the military authorities that indents for food for liberated nations 'will thus be evaluated against our own minimum civilian needs'. America's reconversion needs

must

-2- #2537, Twelfth, from London.

must also be considered before long-term commitments to feed liberated Europe are entered into, he said. This decision brings into the open a behind-the-scene tussle which threatened to hold up the whole Allied program for restoring order to Europe. It was officially announced today that supplies of meat, sugar, butter, fats and canned goods in the United States are at the lowest point in the war. Officials admit that they are tired of trying to estimate from conflicting reports just what are Europe's needs. It is contended that Britain has too great a reserve of supplies now that Germany is toppling and there is little danger of an effective enemy blockade. Semi-official opinion is that Britain should use a large part of these stores to feed hungry Europeans".

Please furnish copy of this message to White House.

WINANT

WFS

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PSF: Winant
DIVISION OF
CENTRAL SERVICES
TELEGRAPH SECTION

file

MJK-672

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (~~SECRET~~)

London

Dated April 6, 1945

Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT.

NIACT.

3502, April 6, 1 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY DUNN AND MR. MATTHEWS.

Thank you for forwarding to me the President's
message. (Department's 2662, April 5, 7 p.m.). I
have already made it completely clear to Gousev that
we stand uncompromisingly on unconditional surrender
terms. I would appreciate your letting the President
know that this has been my position.

EDA

WINANT

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schmale Date **FEB** 9 1972