

● American-British Joint Chiefs of Staff

Box

SECRET

JOINT BOARD ESTIMATE OF
UNITED STATES OVER-ALL PRODUCTION
REQUIREMENTS.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1941.

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THE JOINT BOARD.
WASHINGTON.

September 11, 1941.

JOINT BOARD ESTIMATE OF
UNITED STATES OVER-ALL PRODUCTION
REQUIREMENTS.

I. DIRECTIVE.

1. The directive requesting the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to undertake an exploration of over-all production requirements of the United States is contained in a letter from the President. This letter, which was referred to the Joint Board for recommendation, is quoted as follows:

"July 9, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish that you or appropriate representatives designated by you would join with the Secretary of War and his representatives in exploring at once the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.

I realize that this report involves the making of appropriate assumptions as to our probable friends and enemies and to the conceivable theatres of operation which will be required.

I wish you would explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require.

I am not suggesting a detailed report but one that, while general in scope, would cover the most critical items in our defense and which could then be related by the OPM into practical realities of production facilities. It seems to me we need to know our program in its entirety, even though at a later date it may be amended.

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I. DIRECTIVE (Cont'd)

I believe that the confidential report which I am asking you to make to me would be of great assistance, not only in the efficient utilization of our productive facilities but would afford an adequate opportunity for planning for the greatly increased speed of delivery which our defense program requires.

I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences. I would appreciate it if the Secretary of War could take the initiative in these conferences.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt."

2. In solving this problem, it is first necessary to conceive how our potential enemies may be defeated. Having arrived at this conception, it is possible to estimate the military forces required to carry out the operations planned. Once a statement of the major forces is completed, the critical items of equipment may readily be computed.

3. The production requirements mentioned in The President's letter refer to the materials which the United States will be called upon to provide for supporting successful military action against our potential enemies. Any military action by the United States ought to be undertaken only in accordance with sound military policy, necessarily based upon sound strategy. This paper, therefore, will present views as to how the national policy of the United States can best be supported by a military policy which shall guide all military operations, undertaken either by the armed forces of the United States, or by the armed forces of other Powers which may be associated with the United States. Categories of forces and approximate strengths which the United States should raise, or which it should support in whole or in part, will then be listed. In the interest of brevity, lines of reasoning and supporting arguments are omitted.

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II. MAJOR MILITARY POLICY.

4. Germany, and all German-occupied countries whose military forces cooperate with Germany; Japan and Manchukuo; Italy; Vichy France; and possibly Spain and Portugal, are assumed potential enemies. Countries considered as friends or potential associates in war are the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, China, Russia, Free France, peoples in German-occupied territory who may oppose Germany, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

5. Those major national objectives of the United States which are related to military policy may broadly be stated as: preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

6. Since the paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere, it is fundamental that the United States must provide armed forces appropriately disposed, which in all eventualities, and operating in cooperation with the forces of other American Powers, can successfully prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or military power, even though the British Commonwealth had collapsed.

7. Attainment of this objective alone will not lead to the success of all of the national policies mentioned in paragraph 6. These national policies can be effectuated in their entirety only through military victories outside this hemisphere, either by the armed forces of the United States, by the armed forces of friendly Powers, or by both.

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II. MAJOR MILITARY POLICY. (Cont'd)

8. Should Germany be successful in conquering all of Europe, she might then wish to establish peace with the United States for several years, for the purpose of organizing her gains, restoring her economic situation, and increasing her military establishment, with a view to the eventual conquest of South America and the military defeat of the United States. During such a period of "peace", it seems likely that Germany would seek to undermine the economic and political stability of the countries of South America, and to set up puppet regimes favorable to the establishment on that continent of German military power. In such circumstances, Germany would have better chances to defeat the United States. This concept can not be accepted as certain, because it is conceivable that Germany might at once seek to gain footholds in the Western Hemisphere.

9. Were Japan to defeat China and Russia, and obtain control of Siam, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, it is probable that she likewise would endeavor to establish peace for the purpose of organizing the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Almost inevitably the Philippine Islands would ultimately pass under Japanese hegemony.

10. It is believed that the overthrow of the Nazi regime by action of the people of Germany is unlikely in the near future, and will not occur until Germany is upon the point of military defeat. Even were a new regime to be established, it is not at all certain that such a regime would agree to peace terms acceptable to the United States.

11. Assuming the truth of the views expressed in the preceding paragraph, it is the opinion of the Joint Board that Germany and her European satellites can not be defeated by the European Powers now fighting against her. Therefore, if our European enemies are to be defeated, it will be necessary for the United States to enter the war, and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in the Eastern Atlantic and in Europe or Africa.

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II. MAJOR MILITARY POLICY. (Cont'd)

12. The Joint Board also holds the view that, if, under present circumstances, Japan should advance against the British in Malaya and against the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, British and Dutch forces probably could not successfully withstand such an advance in the absence of active military assistance by the United States. The result of an attack by Japan on the Eastern Siberian Soviet Republic cannot now be predicted.

13. In view of the preceding considerations, the Joint Board recommends that the over-all production and material objective of the United States be designed to meet United States needs while engaged simultaneously in war against Germany and Japan, under either of the following sets of circumstances:

- a. While associated as a belligerent with the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, Russia, and China.
- b. While associated as a belligerent with Canada and some of the Latin American countries, other belligerent Powers having been defeated by Germany and Japan.

14. Due to inadequate industrial capacity and material resources, friendly Powers must look to the United States for a large part of the munitions and other materials which they will require for success. The munitions and other materials which may be produced or controlled by the United States should be divided between itself and friendly Powers in such a manner as to effectuate the success of the military strategy adopted by the United States as best calculated to defeat our common enemies.

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III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:

(A) GERMAN STRATEGY:

15. For Germany, the objective of the current phase of the war is the complete military and political domination of Europe, and probably of North and West Africa. If Germany is successful she may then seek a period of peaceful refreshment, during which she can reorganize Europe and prepare for further adventures. However, the possibility can not be dismissed that Germany might seek at once to continue into India, South Africa, or South America.

16. Germany's present major strategic objectives, and the means by which she seeks to attain them, seem to be some or all of the following:

- a. The conquest of European Russia, the destruction of the Russian Armies, and the overthrow of the Soviet regime. This is a task for the German army and air forces, and will doubtless absorb most of the energy available to these contingents for some months to come. Final success in this aim is still in the balance.
- b. The destruction of the power of resistance of the United Kingdom, through accelerated attrition of shipping, and continued bombing of British facilities. The forces employed will be surface raiders, submarines, and aircraft in the northwestern approaches and down through the Middle Atlantic, operating from bases in Norway, France, Portugal, and French West Africa; and merchant-type raiders distributed throughout all oceans. Invasion of England may possibly not be attempted unless these other measures fail.
- c. The conquest of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. This may be the region in which the next major German offensive will be undertaken. Large land and air forces must be employed, both German and Italian, aided by Italian naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and

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III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:
(A) GERMAN STRATEGY: 16. c. (Cont'd)

the Black Sea. Success may depend upon whether or not a large concentration of British and Russian defensive forces are available, and upon the continued military capacity of Italy, now an uncertain quantity.

- d. The occupation of Spain, Portugal, Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Atlantic Islands, for the purpose of strengthening the German offensive against British shipping, and for denying these positions to Germany's enemies. Considerable land, air, and naval forces will be required for this offensive, though not so great as would be required for conquest of the lands to the eastward of the Mediterranean.

17. In and near her own home territory, Germany can exert her full effort. As her forces move away from the home base, the effort that can be exerted at the point of military contact becomes reduced in proportion to the length and security of the lines of communication, and to the difficulties of transportation. Germany is experiencing these difficulties in Russia; she would experience them in an even greater degree in an offensive in the regions to the east of the Mediterranean; while the problem of the support of strong forces in Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Azores would be very great indeed. In the eastern part of European Russia, in Egypt, Irak, Iran, and North and West Africa, the effort that German military forces can exert is only a fraction of what they have been able to put forth in France, the Balkans, and Poland. Severe German defeats in these regions might readily affect the stability of the Nazi regime. This significant possibility should be taken into account in the development of the strategy of the Associated Powers.

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III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:
(Cont'd)

(B) JAPANESE STRATEGY:

18. The Japanese objective is the establishment of the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". It is Japan's ambition ultimately to include within this Sphere Eastern Siberia, Eastern China, Indo-China, Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and possibly Burma. The accomplishment of this objective is a heavy task for Japan's strength, a fact well realized by the Japanese.

19. Dependent upon results in Europe, Japan's strategic moves might be as follows:

- a. Building up and maintaining an effective screen in the Japanese Mandate Islands by the employment of minor naval forces and considerable air forces, supported by the COMBINED FLEET. This activity would include submarine and raider action against United States naval forces and United States and British lines of communication in the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean.
- b. The conquest of Eastern Siberia by means of land and air operations covered by the COMBINED FLEET operating to the eastward of Japan.
- c. The conquest of Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. Success will require strong air forces, a considerable strength of light naval forces, and rather large land forces. It is unlikely that Japan will simultaneously attempt a major effort to the Northward and to the Southward, because of her lack of equipment and raw materials.

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III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:
(B) JAPANESE STRATEGY: (19 - Cont'd)

- d. An offensive from Northern Indo-China against Yunnan for the purpose of cutting the Burma Road and eliminating further resistance of the Chinese Nationalist army. This move might be supplemented by an attack on Burma. Considerable land and air forces would be required, as well as a large amount of shipping to provide the necessary support.

20. All of these prospective Japanese moves would be made at great distances from Japan. If Japan encounters stubborn and protracted resistance, her ability to continue offensives at these distances is problematical, owing to a lack of adequate resources and industrial facilities. Marked weakness or lack of cohesion on the part of her opponents might permit Japan to accomplish any one of these objectives within the next few months.

IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ASSOCIATES.

21. The Joint Board is convinced that the first major objective of the United States and its Associates ought to be the complete military defeat of Germany. If Germany were defeated, her entire European system would collapse, and it is probable that Japan could be forced to give up much of her territorial gains, unless she had already firmly established herself in such strength that the United States and its Associates could not afford the energy to continue the war against her.

22. An inconclusive peace between Germany and her present active military enemies would be likely to give Germany an opportunity to reorganize continental Europe and to replenish her strength. Even though the British Commonwealth and Russia were completely defeated, there would be important reasons for the United States to continue the war against Germany, in spite of the greatly increased difficulty of attaining final victory. From this it follows that

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ASSOCIATES.
22. (Cont'd)

the principal strategic method employed by the United States in the immediate future should be the material support of present military operations against Germany, and their reenforcement by active participation in the war by the United States, while holding Japan in check pending future developments. Necessarily, only small Army contingents are now sufficiently equipped and trained for immediate participation in offensive operations.

23. Except in the case of Russia, the principal strength of the Associated Powers is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may greatly contribute to victory. By themselves, however, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land armies can finally win wars.

24. It is out of the question to expect the United States and its Associates to undertake in the near future a sustained and successful land offensive against the center of the German power. It being obvious that the Associated Powers can not defeat Germany by defensive operations, effective strategic offensive methods other than an early land offensive in Europe must be employed. These methods may be found in a continuation of the economic blockade; the prosecution of land offensives in distant regions where German troops can exert only a fraction of their total strength; air and sea offensives against German military, economic and industrial resources; and the support of subversive activities in the conquered territories. Strategic methods to be employed against Japan (assuming her in the war) should be a strong defense of Siberia and Malaysia; an economic offensive through blockade; a reduction of Japanese military power by raids; and Chinese offensives against the Japanese forces of occupation.

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ASSOCIATES.
(Cont'd).

25. The major strategic objectives which it is believed the United States and the Associated Powers should adopt are indicated below, as well as the means for attaining them. The material assistance to be supplied friendly Powers (where mentioned in the succeeding subparagraphs), should be consistent with the needs of the United States.

- a. The security of the Western Hemisphere against the extension into it of European or Asiatic political or military power is an essential of United States strategy. To provide this security under all eventualities, the United States must have naval, land, and air forces in such positions that they can be made promptly available in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans in strengths adequate for preventing invasion should the British Isles and Russia collapse. In this connection, an important question is whether or not Northwestern Africa and the Atlantic Islands are in German or friendly hands. Similarly, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Islands of the South Pacific Ocean have an important relation to the security of the Eastern Pacific. United States naval strength, built up in accordance with the approved program, should be adequate for defensive needs until 1944. However, if Germany is successful in Europe, and Japan is successful in the Far East, naval strength for defensive purposes must be increased, even in excess of the present approved naval program. United States land and air forces may be required for the defense of the Western Hemisphere within the next few years, and it is necessary for Latin American countries to be provided with munitions and manufactured articles.

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ASSOCIATES.
(Cont'd) 25.

- b. The security of the United Kingdom is essential to the prosecution in the Eastern Hemisphere of military operations against Germany and Japan. Its safety is also highly important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The security of the United Kingdom depends on an effective defense by sea, land, and air forces. In turn, this defense depends upon the safety of sea communications. The sea communications can continue to support the United Kingdom only if the damage now being inflicted upon them is greatly reduced through increases in the strength of the protective sea and air forces based in the British Islands, Iceland, and positions in the central and eastern Atlantic. Unless the losses of British merchant ships are greatly reduced, or unless there is an internal collapse of Germany, it is the opinion of the Joint Board that the resistance of the United Kingdom can not continue indefinitely, no matter what industrial effort is put forth by the United States. Therefore, the immediate and strong reinforcement of British forces in the Atlantic by United States naval and air contingents, supplemented by a large additional shipping tonnage, will be required if the United Kingdom is to remain in the war. These contingents must be manned by Americans, since the reserves of British manpower for employment in Europe are practically exhausted. To maintain present British strength, the United States must also continue to supplement the British blockade, and the naval building and repair potential; and to provide considerable numbers of aircraft.
- c. Safety of the sea communications of the Associated Powers throughout the world is essential to the continuance of their war effort. Naval and air

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ASSOCIATES. 25. c. (Cont'd)

forces employed in and near Europe should, so far as practicable, be strong enough to prevent the escape of surface raiders to the open sea, and to defeat submarine and air raiders. In addition, a widespread distribution of naval and air forces for direct protection of shipping foci and shipping routes will be required.

- d. The enforcement of economic blockade is, for the time being, likely to be the most effective offensive method for use against Germany and Japan. Naval and air forces must be maintained to close all avenues of sea approach to Germany. The continued existence of hostile land fronts in Russia and in the Middle East is necessary if this blockade is to be maintained. In addition, diplomatic, economic, and financial measures should be employed for increasing the effectiveness of the military blockade.
- e. The retention by the British of the control of the Red Sea, Irak, and Iran is necessary for preserving opportunities for decisive land action against Germany. Of great importance are effective land and air forces of all categories; large numbers of merchant vessels for their support; and adequate naval forces for the protection of communications leading to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. These forces can not be fully supported by the material means available to Britain. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and raw materials required by these troops, and should supply much of the merchant shipping for their transport.

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ASSOCIATES. 25. (Cont'd)

- f. The maintenance of an active front in Russia offers by far the best opportunity for a successful land offensive against Germany, because only Russia possesses adequate manpower, situated in favorable proximity to the center of German military power. For Russia, ground and aviation forces are most important. Predictions as to the result of the present conflict in Russia are premature. However, were the Soviet forces to be driven even beyond the Ural Mountains, and were they there to continue an organized resistance, there would always remain the hope of a final and complete defeat of Germany by land operations. The effective arming of Russian forces, both by the supply of munitions from the outside and by providing industrial capacity in the Volga Basin, or to the east of the Ural Mountains, would be one of the most important moves that could be made by the Associated Powers.
- g. Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, but also as security to British sea communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States. Because the British Commonwealth has but few troops available and because of the unfriendly relations between the British and the Veygand regime, it seems clear that a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this region necessarily must be United States troops.

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ASSOCIATES. 25. (Cont'd)

- h. Retention by the United States and its Associates of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australasia, Burma, and China would have far-reaching effects. The armed forces of the United States can not be greatly increased in the Far East if they are to discharge their heavy tasks in other regions, but the operations of the Pacific Fleet will have an important influence on events. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and aircraft to China and the Netherlands East Indies. A large part of this material must be transported in United States bottoms.
1. Retention of Eastern Siberia by Russia is necessary if Japan is to be checked. Only material assistance can be provided by the United States to Siberia. No materials can be sent to Siberia by water when Japan is at war with Russia, but deliveries of aircraft could continue by air.
26. The following principles have been taken into consideration in arriving at recommendations concerning the strengths of the armed forces which the United States should undertake to raise or support, in whole or in part:
- a. The Navy considers that, since the principal strength of the Associated Powers is at present in naval and air categories, the strategy which they should adopt should be based on the effective employment of these forces, and the employment of land forces in regions where Germany can not exert the full power of her land armies. The Army believes that the foregoing strategy may not accomplish the defeat of Germany and that it may be necessary to come to grips with the German armies on the continent of Europe. Consequently, the Army feels that the equipment for the land armies necessary to meet this contingency should be provided as a part of the over-all production requirements.

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IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ASSOCIATES. 26. (Cont'd)

- b. Past experience of the United States and other Powers should condition estimates of the capability of the United States to support a war effort, with due regard to differences in over-all industrial capacity; differences in availability of materials; and an appropriate balance between the man-power to be employed in the armed forces, and the man-power to be employed in industry and essential civilian services. Because of the present high degree of mechanization, a greater proportion of man-power must be allocated to industry for the manufacture of equipment and munitions than was the case in former wars.
- c. The sound use of diplomatic, economic, financial, and propaganda weapons, will serve to reduce the magnitude of the direct military effort.
- d. The burdens of the war effort, even though continued by the United States over a long period of time, should be so adjusted as to maintain the morale and the will to fight of the civilian population.

27. In Appendix I the Chief of Naval Operations presents his estimates of the over-all production required from the United States, by the dates indicated. Those estimates pertain to the United States and foreign navies, and to the United States and foreign merchant marine fleets. The proposed size of the U.S. Navy is the so-called "Two-Ocean" Navy as approved by the President and Congress, plus a total tonnage increase of 21 per cent, plus the aircraft required for the indicated increase in aircraft-carrying naval vessels. The additional naval vessels recommended for the United States can be constructed without any increase in existing or approved ship-building and manufacturing facilities.

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
IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
ASSOCIATES. (Cont'd)

28. In Appendix II the Chief of Staff presents estimated requirements for the United States and foreign armies, including aviation for forces other than United States naval aviation. The Chief of Staff believes that the equipment set up in the Army program should be assembled, if practicable from the viewpoint of industry, against the possible necessity of an all-out effort against Germany and her allies. The position of the Chief of Staff is that the maximum requirements of the Navy and Army, as related to tonnage and the probable conflicts in material, priority and production facilities, should be surveyed by OPM and then if necessary readjusted by the Joint Board within the limits determined by OPM.

George C. Marshall,
General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

H. R. Stark,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Naval
Operations.

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APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF
MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY

(A) NAVY PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1946.

1. U.S. Navy, including aviation. Provide naval forces and facilities for the United States capable of executing strong naval offensives in the Eastern Atlantic and the Central and Western Pacific Oceans. Major items of this program are:

a. Naval Personnel, including that required for manning merchant auxiliary tonnage 1,100,000

b. Marine Corps Personnel 150,000

c. Naval vessels -

<u>Type</u>	<u>Built</u>	<u>Building</u>	<u>Additional Required</u>	<u>Total</u>
BB	15	17	0	32
CV	6	12	6	24
CB	0	6	4	10
CA	18	8	0	26
CL	19	40	16	75
DD	170	194	80	444
SS	112	72	54	238
Auxiliaries, large	183	95	100	378
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces	236	493	600	1329
Naval District Utility Craft	491	102	500	1093

Note: Additional auxiliary tonnage is included for estimate purposes in subparagraph (D) "Merchant Shipping Program".

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APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY.

(A) 1. (Cont'd)

- d. Schedule of Naval Ship Deliveries.
Deliveries of large combatant naval vessels now under construction, authorized and proposed should be planned in accordance with this table:

	Jul-Dec					
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
BB - Battleships	2	3	3	2	3	4
CV - Carriers	1	-	-	6	5	6
CB - Large Cruisers	-	-	-	-	6	4
CA - Heavy Cruisers	-	-	3	1	4	-
CL - Light Cruisers	1	7	14	17	8	9
DD - Destroyers	9	55	100	99	13	-
SS - Submarines	2	26	31	36	31	2

e. Naval Aircraft.

	<u>Four Engined</u>	<u>Twin Engined</u>	<u>Single Engined</u>	<u>Total</u>
Combatant aircraft assigned to tactical units	294	862	7,558	8,714
Combatant aircraft assigned as reserves and spares	147	431	7,558	8,136
Total Combatant Aircraft	441	1,293	15,116	16,850
Training, Administrative and Miscellaneous	24	382	3,812	4,218
Total	465	1,675	18,928	21,068
Annual Replacement	600	1,400	16,500	18,000

Note: Overall replacement requirements, during war operations, and including active and inactive theaters, are estimated at approximately 100 per cent per year for combatant aircraft, and 40 per cent per year for all others.

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APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY.

(A) 1. (Cont'd)

f. Naval Shore Establishment.

See Appendix I and Appendix II for the permanent naval shore establishment program. To these total requirements should be added temporary overseas naval base constructions equivalent to 25% of the authorized permanent overseas construction. Emergency shipbuilding and manufacturing equivalents are to be computed under subparagraphs d, e, and g.

g. Naval Munitions Requirements for naval ships, aircraft and bases.

h. Marine Corps Munitions Requirements.

2. Foreign Navies. Provide Naval forces and facilities for Associated Powers as follows:

- a. 300,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for the British Commonwealth.
- b. 200,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for Latin-American countries.
- c. Temporary facilities in the United States for the repair of 25% of British naval combatant vessels.

(B) ARMY PROGRAM, excluding aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

(C) AVIATION PROGRAM, excluding U.S. Naval Aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

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APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY.

(D) MERCHANT SHIPPING PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1944.

1. Increase United States merchant shipping to a continuing total of 18,000,000 gross tons, including 600,000 gross tons for the U.S. Navy, additional to the present program. This merchant fleet is to be manned by the United States.
2. Supply the British Commonwealth with merchant shipping of a total of 6,000,000 gross tons.

Note: An analysis of shipping requirements is as follows:

a.	For United States Industry and Latin-America, including sea-going and coastwise ships of over 1,000 gross tons	--	6,000,000 gross tons
b.	For support of U.S. Army forces in Europe, Africa, and South America, estimated at 1,500,000 troops	--	2,400,000 " "
c.	For transporting annually 12,000,000 tons of munitions for the support of Associated armed forces in Middle East, Russia and Asia, (estimated as the munitions requirements of 2,000,000 troops)	--	5,000,000 " "
d.	For support of population, industry and armed forces in United Kingdom, (annual delivery of 15,000,000 tons)--	--	4,000,000 " "
e.	For transports for U.S. Navy for support of overseas naval forces and U.S. Army overseas garrisons	--	600,000 " "
	Total required by 1944	--	18,000,000 " "
	Loss of U.S. Flag vessels expected by 1944	--	3,000,000 " "

APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY.

(D) 2. (Cont'd)

- f. Ships to be supplied to the British Commonwealth by 1944 -- 6,000,000 gross tons

Thus the total tonnage that must be made available from United States sources by the end of 1944 is

--27,000,000 " "

Of this there is now available --

- g. U.S. Shipping -- 6,700,000 " "
- h. Present merchant ship program due for completion in 1943 --10,700,000 " "
- i. Total estimated as available by 1943 --17,400,000 " "
- j. The additional program to meet requirements, and which should be built by the end of 1944 is -- 9,600,000 " "

Note: The Chairman of the Maritime Commission estimates this figure is the maximum that should be fixed for the United States shipbuilding industry.

(E) PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required by the population of the United States for civil purposes. (Requirements for this need should be established by other than military agencies.)

(F) PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF FRIENDLY POWERS.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required from the United States for the industrial and civil establishments of friendly Powers. Attention should be given to the importance of establishing

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX I.

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF
MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY.

(F) (Cont'd)

raw material and industrial production facilities outside of the United States, in regions where the following conditions exist:

1. Raw materials are available, or their production is readily possible.
2. Man-power is available for industrial employment.
3. Proximity to a hostile front, with ample man-power available for military employment. (Requirements for this need should be established by civil agencies, in consultation with military authorities).

DECLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON


December 20, 1941.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. President:

I have dictated the enclosed brief memorandum of my views as to the basic questions which will come before the approaching conference. I hope they may be of some assistance to you in guiding the discussions. The strategic views therein expressed have the approval of Marshall, Arnold and Gerow.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

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Date- FEB 2 1972

Signature- RHP

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A suggested analysis of the basic topics and
their attendant problems

I.

The North Atlantic

Our joint war plans have recognized the North Atlantic as our principal theatre of operations should America become involved in the war. Therefore it should now be given primary consideration and carefully reviewed in order to see whether our position there is safe. Its safety must underlie all our other efforts in the war.

I suggest the following topics:

A.

The safety of the British Isles

1. Have the beach defenses been improved?
2. What is the condition of the mobile forces defending the Isles?
3. Should America land any major forces other than air forces in the British Isles?

Should not American forces take over the defense of Ireland, releasing the present British forces in North Ireland?

It is assumed that air forces are to go into the Isles.

B.

The situation of Iceland and Greenland

1. The possibility of the reenforcement of the American garrison in the light of further calls upon American shipping by any of the possible expeditions mentioned below.

They may be called for in others. They are being made or suggested in the following areas:

a. In the northwestern Pacific theatre.

b. In the western African theatre including the Cape Verde and Azores, or ...

C.

American Navy in the North Atlantic

1. Is it sufficient in size in view of the following possibilities:

a. A violent renewal of submarine activity which is quite possible during the long winter nights.

b. The demand for naval support for an American expeditionary force either to the Cape Verdes and Dakar, the Azores and Natal, or to French North Africa

c. Possible losses to the British naval forces in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic.

1. The Northwestern Pacific

a. This is of first importance because it has been forced upon us by a new and most serious situation which is challenging our ability to carry out our legal and moral obligation to protect the Philippines.

2. Should the Atlantic fleet be depleted under any circumstances in order to strengthen the Pacific fleet?

b. It is also of vital importance

c. To assist the British in defending Singapore, the fall of which would be an almost vital blow to the British Empire as well as to our own future commercial interests in the Pacific.

II.

American efforts in other theatres of the war -- their importance and their order of priority

This seems to me the most difficult and important problem of the conference. American efforts are now being either made or suggested in at least four different possible theatres of operation. They may be called for in others. They are being made or suggested in the following areas:

- a. In the southwestern Pacific theatre.
- b. In the western African theatre including the Cape Verdes and Azores, *or French N Africa*
- c. In the Syria and Iran theatre.
- d. In the Egypt and Libya theatre.

They might be forced on us in Natal where the situation at the present moment is perilous, threatening our air communication with the Far East.

I have arranged them in what I consider their present apparent order of priority although I am supporting it suggestively rather than dogmatically:

1. The Southwestern Pacific

- a. This is of first importance because it has been forced upon us by a new combatant power which is challenging our entire position in the Pacific and our troops are already fighting desperately to carry out our legal and moral obligation to protect the Philippines.
- b. It is also of vital importance:
 - (1) To assist the British in defending Singapore, the fall of which would be an almost vital blow to the British Empire as well as to our own future commercial interests in the Pacific.

- (2) To protect the Netherland East Indies and their sources of oil from falling into the hands of the Japanese and thus aiding Japan in her contest for the control of the Pacific against us.
- (3) For protecting the great dominions of Australia and New Zealand from domination by Japan.
- (4) To encourage and keep China fighting — who has and is still carrying the main effort of holding Japan in check.
- (5) To encourage Russia in staying in the war against the Axis powers.

2. The West African theatre

This theatre is vital to us in two respects:

- a. To protect our line of communications and supplies, both air and sea, with the British activities in Egypt; with the supply of Russia through the Persian Gulf; with the activities in the Far Eastern theatre through Australia and Singapore on the south and through China on the north.
- b. It is vital as a means of preventing Germany from reaching Dakar from which she would both block the trade route around Cape Horn and also threaten the South American continent.

These two reasons seem to me more vital to the interests of this country than anything we can do in the areas of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The method of our operations in this West African area, in which I include operations against the Cape Verdes and the Azores, are directly a question for our military advisers. Personally I regard any expedition to the Azores as strategically less important than a strong effort against the Cape Verdes and Dakar.

3. The area of Syria and Iran

I think this area is strategically, and in view of the ultimate winning of the war, more important than the Egyptian area because it furnishes our safest route for help to Russia. Thus far our activities consist solely in the improvement of the base and the furnishing of supplies. There is no prospect apparent to me of combat efforts.

4. The Egyptian area

While this area is of immense importance psychologically to the British Empire and perhaps strategically as a possible though unfavorable front for an attack on Hitler in Europe, it seems to me of the least importance to us as a combat area. We should of course continue our supplies to the British. In my opinion we should not divert armed forces to that area which could by any possibility be ^{necessary for use in} ~~used in~~ the Far Eastern area, in Ireland, or in the West African area.

H.A.S.

III.

The essential problems of America in the areas which I have described in the foregoing portions of this memorandum can be in summary described as follows:

First: The preservation of our communications across the North Atlantic with our fortress in the British Isles covering the British fleet.

Second: The protection of our communications with the Near and Far East by air via Brazil and Africa and by water around the Cape of Good Hope.

Third: The building up as rapidly as possible of air and sea communications in the Pacific with Australia.

* * * * *

Underlying all of these objectives is the immediate necessity of protecting the vital ^{naval} ~~sea~~ and air industrial establishments on the west and east coasts of the United States.

H. A. S.

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

W.W.-1.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

Washington War Conference

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.
2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and Japan must speedily follow.
3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.
 - (a) The realisation of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.
 - (b) The Maintenance of essential communications.
 - (c) Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.
 - (d) Wearing down and undermining German resistance

Note:-

* For brevity the abbreviation A-B is used to denote American-British

by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.

- (e) The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.
- (f) Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The security of areas of War Production.

5. In so far as these are liable to attack, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-

- (a) The United Kingdom.
- (b) The West coast of North America.
- (c) Russia.

6. The United Kingdom. To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion. We are prepared to answer any questions which the United States Chiefs of Staff wish to put to us about the defence of the United Kingdom.

7. The United States. The main centres of production on or near the West Coast of North America must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Dutch Harbour. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale can be ruled out of account, whether Hawaii or Dutch Harbour are held or not.

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defence of the West coast of America are, of course, matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess. We are prepared to give our views if required.

9. Russia. It will be essential to afford the Russians such assistance as will enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus.

Maintenance of Communications.

10. The main routes which must be secured are:-

- (a) From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.
- (b) From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.
- (c) The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.
- (d) The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.
- (e) The route through the Panama Canal, and U.S. coastal traffic.
- (f) The route through the Panama Canal to Hawaii and Australasia.

In addition to the above routes we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The security of these routes involves:-

- (i) Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions.

We are ready to discuss joint dispositions with the American Chiefs of Staff.

- (ii) Holding and capturing essential bases. The main bases which are, or may be, required.

apart from the terminal points to the various routes, are:-

Iceland
Gibraltar or the Canaries.
The Azores.
Freetown
Dakar
Madagascar
Ceylon
Hawaii.

Closing and Tightening the Ring around Germany.

12. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows:-

ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN
SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF
EUROPE.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

13. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the Long haul round the Cape.

The Undermining and wearing down of the German Resistance

14. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be :-

- (a) Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces based in the U.K.
- (b) Assistance to Russia's offensive by all means in our power.
- (c) The blockade.
- (d) The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organisation of subversive movements.

Development of land offensives on the Continent

15. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 14 to conduct limited land offensives in North-Western Europe or across the Mediterranean.

16. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, either across the Mediterranean or from Turkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of North-Western Europe. Such operations will

be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory programme should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The safeguarding of vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

17. First of all, the security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and Chinese resistance supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold :-

- (a) Hawaii and Dutch Harbour.
- (b) Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.
- (c) Rangoon and the route to China.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter for mutual discussion.

Signed DUDLEY POUND

Washington, D.C.

J.G.DILL

22nd December 1941.

C. PORTAL

U. S. ~~SECRET~~
BRITISH ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. 9

December 30, 1941

U.S. ABC-4/5
British WW 3

*Return this
copy to the President*

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES -- BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME

COMMANDER IN THE ABDA AREA

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

December 30, 1941.

U.S. Serial ABC-4/5
British Serial WW 3

BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS OF
AUSTRALIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, HEREINAFTER
REFERRED TO AS THE ABDA GOVERNMENTS:

1. Area. -

A strategic area has been constituted, to comprise initially all land and sea areas included in general region Burma - Malaya - Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines; more precisely defined in Annex 1. This area will be known as the ABDA Area.

2. Forces. -

You have been designated as the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area and of all armed forces, afloat, ashore and in the air, of the ABDA Governments which are:

- a. Stationed in the Area;
- b. Located in Australian territory when such forces have been allotted by the respective governments for services in or in support of the ABDA Area.

You are not authorized to transfer from the territory of any of the ABDA Governments land forces of that government without the consent of the local commander or his government.

3. The Deputy Supreme Commander and/or, if required, a commander of the combined naval forces and a commander of the combined air forces will be jointly designated by the ABDA Governments.

4. No government will materially reduce its armed forces assigned to your Area nor any commitments made by it for reinforcing its forces in your Area except after giving to the other governments, and to you, timely information pertaining thereto.

5. Strategic Concept and Policy. -

The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct of the war in your Area is to maintain initially the strategic defensive. The ABDA Governments intend to provide immediate reinforcements for defense. As additional forces become available, it will become possible to take the offensive and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized. Although your operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further preparations for that offensive.

*not only in the immediate future to maintain
as many key positions as possible, but to
take the offensive at the earliest opportunity
and ultimately etc*

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6. The general strategic policy will therefore be:-

a. To hold the Malay Barrier as the basic defensive position of the ABDA Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

b. To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.

c. To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

d. To maintain essential communications within the Area.

7. Duties, Responsibilities and Authority of the Supreme Commander. -

You will coordinate in the ABDA Area the strategic operations of all armed forces of the ABDA Governments; assign them strategic missions and objectives; where desirable, arrange for the formation of task forces, whether national or international, for the execution of specific operations; and appoint any officer, irrespective of seniority or nationality, to command such task forces.

8. While you will have no responsibilities in respect of the internal administration of the respective forces under your command, you are authorized to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials.

9. You will dispose reinforcements which from time to time may be dispatched to the Area by the ABDA Governments.

10. You are authorized to require from the Commanders of the armed forces under your command such reports as you deem necessary in the discharge of your responsibilities as Supreme Commander.

11. You are authorized to control the issue of all communiques concerning the forces under your command.

12. Through the channels specified in paragraph 18, you may submit recommendations to the ABDA Governments on any matters pertaining to the furtherance of your mission.

13. Limitations. -

Your authority and control with respect to the various portions of the ABDA Area and to the forces assigned thereto will normally be exercised through the commanders duly designated by their respective governments. Interference is to be avoided in the administrative processes of the armed forces of any of the ABDA Governments, including free communication between them and their respective governments. No alteration or revision is to be made in the basic tactical organization of such forces, and each national component of a task force will normally operate under its own commander and will not be subdivided into small units for attachment to the other national components of the task force. In general, your

except in the case of urgent necessity

instructions and orders will be limited to those necessary for effective coordination of forces in the execution of your mission.

14. Relations with ABDA Governments. -

The ABDA Governments will jointly and severally support you in the execution of the duties and responsibilities as herein defined, and in the exercise of the authority herein delegated and limited. Commanders of all sea, land and air forces within your Area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with the provisions of this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

15. If any of your immediate subordinates, after making due representations to you, still considers that obedience to your orders would jeopardize the national interests of his country to an extent unjustified by the general situation in the ABDA Area, he has the right, subject to your being immediately notified of such intention, to appeal direct to his own government before carrying out the orders. Such appeals will be made by the most expeditious method and a copy of the appeal will be communicated simultaneously to you.

16. Staff and Assumption of Command. -

Your staff will include officers of each of the ABDA powers. You are empowered to communicate immediately with the national commanders in the Area with a view to obtaining staff officers essential to your earliest possible assumption of command. Your additional staff requirements will be communicated as soon as possible to the ABDA Governments through channels of communication described in paragraph 18.

17. You will report when you are in a position effectively to carry out the essential functions of Supreme Command, so that your assumption of command may be promulgated to all concerned.

18. Superior Authority. -

As Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area you will be directly responsible to the ABDA Governments through the agency defined in Annex 2.

Signed

(By Power furnishing
Supreme Commander)

Countersigned:

Other ABDA Representatives.

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ANNEX 1

U. S. [REDACTED]
BRITISH [REDACTED]

BOUNDARIES OF ABDA AREA

1. The ABDA Area is bounded as follows:

On the North: By the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the meridian of 140° East.

Note: Indo-China and Thailand are not included in this area.

On the East: By the meridian of 140° East from 30° North, to the equator, thence east to longitude 141° East, thence South to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South Coast, thence east along the Southern New Guinea Coast to the meridian of 143° East, then south down this meridian to the coast of Australia.

On the South: By the northern coast of Australia from the meridian of 143° East, westward to the meridian of 114° East, thence north-westward to latitude 15° South, longitude 92° East.

On the West: By the meridian of 92° East.

2. Forces assigned to the ABDA and adjacent areas are authorized to extend their operations into other areas as may be required.

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ANNEX 2

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH

December 30, 1941.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States and by the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

- a. The provision of reinforcements.
- b. A major change in policy.
- c. Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

a. Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

b. The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

c. On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Combined Chiefs of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 31, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY HOPKINS:

Will you speak to me about
this today?

F.D.R.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA


The Chiefs of Staff have somewhat revised their original memorandum on the above subject, so as to incorporate certain of the President's suggestions. With respect to those points where the revised memorandum, hereto attached, differs from the President's re-draft, the following explanation is submitted:


(a) The U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff through their representatives in Washington, are in an especially favorable position to weigh the needs of the ABDA area in relation to those of other theaters of war. Recommendations to the President and to the Prime Minister emanating from the joint Chiefs of Staff would reflect this balanced perspective.


(b) Consultations with the Dutch, Australian, and New Zealand governments can not well be carried out in several places without serious loss of time, and creation of confusion. For the reasons set out in paragraph 4 of the attached revised memorandum, London would appear to be the logical place for carrying on such consultations. The Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington can of course, keep the representatives of the Dutch and Dominion governments informed, should this be considered desirable.


(c) The suggested duplication of messages from the Supreme Commander to London and Washington is for the purpose of saving time. The copy sent to Washington would be the action copy, but the one to London would furnish the basis for immediate comment to Washington.

(d) Admiral Pound feels that, in view of his conversation with the Prime Minister this morning the attached procedure will be entirely acceptable to the Prime Minister.


Chief of Staff


Commander in Chief
U. S. Fleet


Chief of Naval Operations


Chief of Air Forces

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

December 30, 1941

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR IN THE ABDA AREA

REVISED MEMORANDUM

1. On all important military matters, not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will constitute the agency for developing and submitting recommendations for decision by the President of the United States, and the British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Among the chief matters on which decisions will be required are:

- + minutes*
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 - (b) A major change in policy.
 - (c) Departure from the Supreme Commander's directive.

2. This agency will function as follows:

(a) Any proposal coming either from the Supreme Commander or from any of the ABDA governments will be transmitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee both in Washington and in London.

(b) The Chiefs of Staff Committee in London will immediately telegraph to their representatives in Washington to say whether or not they will be telegraphing any opinions.

(c) On receipt of these opinions, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the representatives in Washington of the British Chiefs of Staff will develop and submit their recommendations to the President, and by telegraph to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Prime Minister will then inform the President whether he is in agreement with these recommendations.

3. Since London has the machinery for consulting the Dominion Governments, and since the Dutch Government is in London, the British Government will be responsible for obtaining their views and agreement, and for including these in the final telegram to Washington.

4. Agreement having been reached between the President and Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, the orders to the Supreme Commander will be dispatched from Washington in the name of both of them.

~~SECRET~~ REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

January 12, 1942

Memorandum for The President

There are submitted herewith for your formal approval Joint Agreements reached by the United States - British Chief of Staffs on the subjects indicated:


(a) "American-British Strategy" (U. S. Serial ABC-4/CS-1; British Serial W.W.1 - Final). Agreement reached 24 December 1941.


(b) "Supporting Measures for the South West Pacific (The Far East and Adjacent Regions) Until Establishment of Unified Command" (U. S. ABC-4/3; British W.W. 4). Agreement reached 31 December 1941.

(c) "Establishment of United States Forces in North Ireland" (U. S. Serial ABC-4/7; British Serial W. W. 12). Agreement reached 11 January 1942.


G. C. MARSHALL
General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff


H. R. STARK
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations


H. H. ARNOLD
Lt. General, U. S. Army
Chief of Army Air Forces


E. J. KING
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

U. S. [REDACTED]
BRITISH [REDACTED]

U.S. Serial ABC-4/CS-1
British Serial W.W.-1 (Final)

Washington War Conference.

American-British Strategy.

Memorandum by the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff.

Note: The circulation of this paper should be restricted to the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates.

I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At the A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers, and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion, therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grand strategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

- a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note:-

*For brevity the abbreviated A-B
is used to denote American-British.

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- b. The maintenance of essential communications.
- c. Closing and tightening the ring round Germany.
- d. Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.
- e. The continuous development of offensive action against Germany.
- f. Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will safeguard vital interests (see paragraph 18) and deny to Japan access to raw materials vital to her continuous war effort while we are concentrating on the defeat of Germany.

III. STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN 1942 TO PUT INTO EFFECT

THE ABOVE GENERAL POLICY.

The Security of Areas of War Production.

5. In so far as these are likely to be attacked, the main areas of war industry are situated in:-
- a. The United Kingdom.
 - b. Continental United States, particularly the West Coast.
 - c. Russia.
6. The United Kingdom. - To safeguard the United Kingdom it will be necessary to maintain at all times the minimum forces required to defeat invasion.
7. The United States. - The main centers of production on or near the West Coast of United States must be protected from Japanese sea-borne attack. This will be facilitated by holding Hawaii and Alaska. We consider that a Japanese invasion of the United States on a large scale is highly improbable, whether Hawaii or Alaska is held or not.

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BRITISH [REDACTED]

8. The probable scale of attack and the general nature of the forces required for the defense of the United States are matters for the United States Chiefs of Staff to assess.

9. Russia. - It will be essential to afford the Russians assistance to enable them to maintain their hold on Leningrad, Moscow and the oilfields of the Caucasus, and to continue their war effort.

Maintenance of Communications.

10. The main sea routes which must be secured are:-

- a. From U.S.A. to the United Kingdom.
- b. From U.S.A. and the United Kingdom to North Russia.
- c. The various routes from the United Kingdom and U.S.A. to Freetown, South America and the Cape.
- d. The routes in the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to India and Burma, to the East Indies and to Australasia.
- e. The route through the Panama Canal, and U. S. coastal traffic.
- f. The Pacific routes from United States and the Panama Canal to Alaska, Hawaii, Australia and the Far East.

In addition to the above routes, we shall do everything possible to open up and secure the Mediterranean route.

11. The main air routes which must be secured are:-

- a. From the U. S. to South America, Ascension, Freetown, Takoradi, and Cairo.
- b. From the U. K. to Gibraltar, Malta and Cairo.
- c. From Cairo to Karachi, Calcutta, China, Malaya, Philippines, Australasia.
- d. From the U. S. to Australia via Hawaii, Christmas Island, Canton, Palmyra, Samoa, Fiji, New Caledonia.
- e. The routes from Australia to the Philippines and Malaya via the Netherlands East Indies.

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- f. From the U. S. to the U. K. via Newfoundland, Canada, Greenland and Iceland.
- g. From the U. S. to the U. K. via the Azores.
- h. From the U. S. to Vladivostok via Alaska.

12. The security of these routes involves:-

- a. Well-balanced A - B naval and air dispositions.
- b. Holding and capturing essential sea and air bases.

Closing and Tightening the Ring Around Germany

13. This ring may be defined as a line running roughly as follows: ARCHANGEL - BLACK SEA - ANATOLIA - THE NORTHERN SEABOARD OF THE MEDITERRANEAN - THE WESTERN SEABOARD OF EUROPE.

The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of the whole North African coast.

14. If this ring can be closed the blockade of Germany and Italy will be complete, and German eruptions, e.g. towards the Persian Gulf, or to the Atlantic seaboard of Africa will be prevented. Furthermore, the seizing of the North African coast may open the Mediterranean to convoys, thus enormously shortening the route to the Middle East and saving considerable tonnage now employed in the long haul around the Cape.

The Undermining and Wearing Down of the German Resistance.

15. In 1942, the main methods of wearing down Germany's resistance will be:-

- a. Ever-increasing air bombardment by British and American Forces.
- b. Assistance to Russia's offensive by all available means.
- c. The blockade.
- d. The maintenance of the spirit of revolt in the occupied countries, and the organization of subversive movements.

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Development of Land Offensives on the Continent

16. It does not seem likely that in 1942 any large scale land offensive against Germany except on the Russian front will be possible. We must, however, be ready to take advantage of any opening that may result from the wearing down process referred to in paragraph 15 to conduct limited land offensives.

17. In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the Continent, across the Mediterranean, from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe. Such operations will be the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself, and the scope of the victory program should be such as to provide means by which they can be carried out.

The Safeguarding of Vital Interests in the Eastern Theatre

18. The security of Australia, New Zealand and India must be maintained and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be secured. Our immediate object must therefore be to hold:-

- a. Hawaii and Alaska.
- b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier and the Philippines.
- c. Rangoon and the route to China.
- d. The Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The minimum forces required to hold the above will have to be a matter of mutual discussion.

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U.S. ABC-4/3
British W.W. 4

December 31, 1941

REPORT

By

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

UNTIL ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFIED COMMAND

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BRITISH [REDACTED]

U. S. ABC-4/3
British WW(JPC)3

Washington, D. C.
December 31, 1941

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Planning Committee report of December 29, 1941, on "Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific" as appropriate action to be taken in the interim prior to the establishment of the unified command of the forces in that region.

The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agreed to send immediately to the United States and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East Area the following telegram:

"The general strategic policy for operations in the Far Eastern theater which has been agreed upon by the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff is as follows:-

- (a) To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and North Australia, as the basic defensive position in that theater and to operate sea, land, and air forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.
- (b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the theater, and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to the defense of India.
- (c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.
- (d) To maintain essential communications within the theater.

In disposing of the re-inforcements arriving in that theater, you should be guided by the above policy and consider the needs of the theater as a whole. To this end, close co-operation among the British, Dutch and United States Commanders is essential, and you should continue to concert measures accordingly.

British Commander-in-Chief, Far East, will inform the Dutch and request their cooperation."

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U. S. Serial ABC-4/3
British Serial W.W.(J.P.C.) 3

Washington, D. C.
December 28, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT

TO

CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

(THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT REGIONS)

Directive.

1. Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Joint Planning Committee.

Until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved, the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements.

Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the South West Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements, particularly air forces, expected to be available in the South West Pacific Area on:-

- (a) 15th January, 1942.
- (b) 1st February, 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:-

- (1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.
- (2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.
- (3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold.

Concept of Operations.

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the South West Pacific Theater. The present

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strength of forces in that area is insufficient to maintain that defensive position.

After providing immediate reinforcements for defense, and as additional forces become available, it will become possible to undertake offensive operations and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive against Japan. Accordingly although our operations in the near future must be primarily for defense, they should be so conducted as to further our preparations for a future offensive.

3. The general strategic policy should therefore be:-

(a) To hold the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, North Australia, as the basic defensive position of the Far East Area, and to operate air and sea forces in as great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.

(b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions for the Far East Area, and Burma as essential to the support of China and to the defense of India.

(c) To re-establish communications with Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(d) To maintain communications to Burma and Australia, and to and within the Far East Area.

(e) To obtain in the Far East Area and Australasia all possible supplies to relieve shipping requirements.

Forces and Reinforcements.

4. The estimated strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements ordered or planned to be sent are shown in the attached tables (Annexes I, II, and III). Future reinforcements should be planned in accordance with approved strategic policy, having due regard to the essential requirements of other theatres.

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Recommendations.

5. It is recommended that, until such time as the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the South West Pacific Area is solved:-

(a) Under the assumption that the Philippines and Singapore both hold, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, as shown on the attached table, should go forward as now arranged, subject to the direction of the commander to whom they are assigned.

(b) Under the assumption that Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not, the total U. S. reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, should be employed in furtherance of the defences of key points on the Malay Barrier, and for protection of the vital lines of communication from the east. In the absence of unity of command, detailed dispositions of these reinforcements must be left to the senior U. S. Army commander, in collaboration with the senior British, Dutch, and Australian commanders. Under this assumption the planned disposition of British reinforcements remains unchanged.

(c) Under the assumption that neither Singapore nor the Philippines hold, the total reinforcements available up to 1st February, 1942, be used for the defence of the remainder of the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia, U. S. reinforcements being used to the eastward, and British reinforcements to the westward.

NOTE:- The subject of reinforcements for New Zealand and Fiji is being considered separately.

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BRITISH

U. S. Serial ABC-4/7
(Approved)
British Serial WW 12

Washington, D. C.

January 11, 1942.

UNITED STATES - BRITISH

CHIEFS OF STAFF

Approved

REPORT BY THE U.S.-BRITISH

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

U.S. ABC-4/7

British WW 12

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

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U.S. [REDACTED]
BRITISH [REDACTED]

U.S. Serial ABC-4/7
British Serial WW (JPC)7

Washington, D. C.
January 10, 1942

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN NORTH IRELAND

1. Mission.--United States Army troops will be dispatched to North Ireland for the accomplishment of the following mission:

a. To relieve the mobile elements of the British forces in North Ireland and, in cooperation with British local defense forces, to defend North Ireland against attack by Axis Powers.

b. To be prepared to move into South Ireland for the defense thereof.

2. Forces.--The forces which will be employed are the V Army Corps, consisting of the 32d, 24th, 37th Divisions, Corps Troops, Army and Corps Service Elements, with the 1st Armored Division attached. This force is under the command of Major General Edmund L. Daley, U. S. Army. The strength of the field forces, less aviation and auxiliary units and antiaircraft units, is approximately 105,000 officers and men, for which approximately 1,207,500 ship tons are required. The strength of the antiaircraft personnel (to be provided later) is approximately 31,000 officers and men. The strength of aviation and auxiliary personnel is approximately 22,000 officers and men. Movement of air units can commence on or about February 1, 1942, if shipping is available. When the air and antiaircraft support is assumed by the United States forces, an additional 583,000 ship tons will be required.

3. Command.--Command of all United States Army forces and personnel in the British Isles, including those in North Ireland, is vested in Major General James E. Chaney, who has been designated "Commander U. S. Army Forces in the British Isles." The term "command" is defined as that control of individuals, forces, functions,

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and establishments which is normally vested in, and exercised by, United States Army commanders by law, regulations, and competent orders. General Chaney is authorized to arrange with appropriate British authorities for the employment: (1) of organizations of his command under British control, and (2) of British organizations under United States control.

4. Strategic Direction.--a. The strategic direction of the United States Army Forces in the British Isles will be exercised by the British Government through the Commander United States Army Forces in the British Isles.

b. The term "strategic direction" is defined to mean the function of prescribing for a force as a whole the general mission which it is to carry out over a long period of time, and such modifications of that general mission as may from time to time become necessary or desirable, without any control of details of tactical operations or administrative matters.

c. It is agreed however that units assigned to the United States North Ireland Force will not be moved to areas outside Ireland without prior consent of the Commanding General Field Forces United States Army.

5. Arrangements for the Operation.--The following agreements in respect to arrangements for the operation have been arrived at:

a. Questions relative to dispatch of U. S. Army Forces and materials from the United States that may require British collaboration will be handled through the British Mission in the United States.

b. Matters connected with command, reception, distribution, accommodation and maintenance of the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland that may require collaboration between the two

U. S.
BRITISH

governments will be handled for the United States through the Commander, United States Forces in the British Isles.

c. Weapons and Equipment.

(1) Antiaircraft. Initially all antiaircraft protection for U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations will be the responsibility of the British. Eventually antiaircraft protection for U. S. forces in Northern Ireland will be provided from United States personnel equipped and maintained for armament and ammunition from British sources.

(2) Field Artillery. Initially 144 25-pounders, with 1500 rounds per gun, will be delivered by the British to U. S. Forces in Northern Ireland. The British will supply additional ammunition and maintenance equipment for these weapons as requested by the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles.

(3) Air. It will be the responsibility of the British to provide appropriate air protection and support for the U. S. Field Forces, establishments and installations in Northern Ireland, in their mission, until such time as the means are made available to the Commander, U. S. Forces in the British Isles to assume this responsibility.

d. Shelter.

It will be the responsibility of the British to provide shelter for the U. S. Army Forces in Northern Ireland.

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
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
JCS Declassification
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
January 14, 1942

Memorandum for The President

There is submitted herewith, with the recommendation that it be approved, a Joint Agreement reached by the United States - British Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 13 January 1942.



G. C. MARSHALL
General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff


H. R. STARK
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations


H. H. ARNOLD
Lt. General, U. S. Army
Chief of Army Air Forces


E. J. KING
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet

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"We, the combined U. S.-British Chiefs of Staff are agreed in principle that finished war equipment shall be allocated in accordance with strategical needs. We accordingly submit that an appropriate body should be set up, under the authority of the combined Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, and a corresponding body in London, for the purpose of giving effect to this principle."

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WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:-

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have considered the President's outline proposals for the representation of the Dutch and of the British Dominions. In their view these proposals would work out as follows:-

(a) A separation will be made between political and strategical questions, borderline cases being treated as strategical.

(b) All discussions on political questions will be conducted in London where the principal representation of the Dominion and Dutch Governments is centred.

(c) Strategical questions will be handled in Washington through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with procedure to be prescribed. This procedure will be laid down in the final agreed version of "War Collaboration between United Nations."

(d) The Dominions and Dutch Staffs will be represented by Staff Missions in Washington, each primarily responsible to their own Chiefs of Staff. While there will be the normal contacts between Dominion Staff Missions and U. S. Staffs, it will be the responsibility of the United Kingdom Joint Staff Mission to conduct preliminary discussions with Dominion Staff Missions and to evolve, if possible, a co-ordinated British Commonwealth point of view. The U. S. Chiefs of Staffs will be responsible in a similar way for preliminary discussions with the Dutch Staff Mission.

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WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
WASHINGTON

- 2 -

(e) Where questions affecting any Dominions or the Dutch are under discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Heads of the Staff Missions concerned will be invited to attend.

(f) The interests of the Dominions and Dutch are primarily confined to particular theatres of war. The British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff on the other hand have to consider the strategy of the war as a whole, the interests of their two Nations being world-wide. The responsibility for making final recommendations to Governments will, therefore, remain with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The whole question of Dominion and Dutch Representation is at present under active discussion between His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and the Dominions and the Dutch Government. The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff are not yet in a position to give the views of London on the matter.



H. R. STARK.



G. S. MARSHALL.

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DOROTHY:

I THINK THIS COPY IS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
FILES. I HAVE A COPY FOR MR. HOPKINS.

LOIS

CCS 381. Germany
(2-13-42)

Copy No. 34

February 14, 1942.

NOTE BY SECRETARY

The two attached papers, JPS 5 and JPS 5/1,
are transmitted to the Combined Intelligence Committee
with the request that a combined evaluation be prepared
of the two views set forth, for presentation to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

E. L. SIBERT

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JCS MEMO, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

J.P.S. 5

Copy No _____

February 3, 1942

U.S. JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

DIRECTIVE

SUMMARY OF RECENT JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S

APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S INTENTIONS

Note by Secretary

In accordance with directive quoted herewith, enclosure is forwarded to the Joint Strategical Committee for appropriate action.

"It is desired that the attached "Summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions", received from the British, be forwarded to the Joint Strategical Committee for study and comment.

A copy of this document has been furnished the Joint Intelligence Committee for analysis.

The two Committees should collaborate.

L.R. GEROW
Brigadier General
Assistant Chief of Staff.

R.K. TURNER,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy."

(Signed) L.R. McDOWELL
U.S. Member, Combined Secretariat

ENCLOSURE

NAVAL MESSAGE

IN

T.O.O. 0835A/30

Received 30/1/42

Time : 1531

Addressed: B.A.D., Washington 868

From: Admiralty.

MEDAL 65

Following is a summary of recent Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's appreciation of Germany's intentions.

1. Germany is becoming short of oil and her air force has been reduced to first line strength of approximately 4,000 opera-

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tional and 1,400 transport aircraft.

2. She has recently increased naval and air forces in the Mediterranean. Considerable number of submarines and small craft have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have been accumulated at Mediterranean ports.

3. We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for protection of Axis communication with North Africa to neutralize Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to the Tunis frontier.

4. On Russian front the initiative still in Russia's hands and German forces withdrawing under strong pressure. As yet, no sign of present Russian offensive exhausting itself. Until it does, it will be impossible for Germany to withdraw substantial forces from Russia to rest and refit so as to form a striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian front or for large scale operations in other theatres of war.

5. On the contrary, we know Flak defenses in Ukraine are being strengthened at the expense of Roumania and that other air units including air force troops, recently withdrawn from Russian front are being hurriedly returned there after minimum time spent in rest and refit.

6. Owing to reduction in strength of German Air Force unlikely that Germany will be able to make available sufficient air force to contain Russians and at the same time undertake large scale operations elsewhere. Further, this weakness will compel Germany to limit her offensive to one major operation only where she might hope to concentrate on air force sufficient to give her local superiority. To achieve this she would have to reduce her air force elsewhere to a minimum required for security.

7. No evidence (German) striking force being created now, nor do we consider a striking force sufficient for large scale operation can be created so long as the Russian offensive is maintained. Assuming for the sake of argument that stabilization is reached by 15th February, earliest date by which division (includ-

ing divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons for large scale operations could be withdrawn, rested and restored, would be the 1st May. So far as Russia is concerned large scale operations unlikely to take place owing to thaw during April, and the consequently difficulty of movement.

Possible courses of German action.

8. (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front. For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly impossible as yet.

(B) A thrust in the south towards Caucasia (while containing Russian army in north and centre).

Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity possible substantial supplies of oil. She can only obtain fabric oil in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caucasia is the most likely major operation.

9. A thrust through Turkey (towards) Syria and thence to Iraq and/or Egypt. Advance through Turkey into Iraq would put Germany in possession of oil fields potentially capable of meeting her needs. Would deprive us of oil on which our Eastern Mediterranean naval position partly depends. Would bring Germany within striking distance of Abadan and open way to a further advance into Egypt. On the other hand transport of oil from Iraq would be more difficult than from Caucasia at least until Germany had a secure sea route through Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, even if Turkey acquiesced in passage of German forces through her territory Germans would be undertaking new military commitments. Seems unlikely that Turkey would acquiesce unless Russian army defeated or we had suffered such reverses that she felt confident that Germany would win the war.

10. Operation in central and western Mediterranean areas (a) through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Advantage to be gained substantial but operation would involve Germany in another military commitment in theatre of war remote from main source of oil and other supplies. Occupation of

Peninsula would subsequently be a heavy economic liability. This operation therefore appears likely, only in order to counter or forestall action against ourselves or America. (b) Through North Africa ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Germans will attempt to maintain and exploit their position in North Africa, and for this purpose re-inforce Rommel with forces necessary. Presence of strong air force in central Mediterranean area would serve to neutralize Malta and protect communication with Tripoli. Germany may try to capture Malta.

11. Invasion of British Isles. It is unlikely that Germany could undertake so large and risky operation as long as Russia remains undefeated.

CONCLUSION

12. Most probable German major operation likely to be made through Ukraine (towards) Caucasus to obtain oil. Meanwhile every effort will be made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and (exploit) the position in North Africa.

13. Following is our estimate of force Germany would require for operation referred to in paragraph 5 to 11 above and of time that must elapse between beginning of withdrawal of divisions from Russia and concentration of force ready for attack in several theatres of operation. "Z" day is date on which withdrawal of divisions beginning:

(A) Renewed offensive against Russia.

(1) An offensive all along the Russian Front. We cannot as yet see possibility of this operation. Forces required more than Germans have got.

SECRET

(11) Thrust in south towards Caucasias (while containing Russian armies in north and centre). Force required against Caucasias some 30 Divisions (of which some 4 to 6 armoured and 4 to 6 motorized) and 1500 aircraft. Earliest date by which this operation could be developed. Concentration on the southern sector Z upward $2\frac{1}{2}$ months. Fall of ROSTOV Z plus 3 months. Occupation of MAIKOP - TUAPSE area Z plus 4 to Z plus $4\frac{1}{2}$ months. Occupation of SROZNI area Z plus 5 months. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasias.

?(B) Thrust through Turkey towards Syria and thence Iraq and/or Egypt. Land force required 20 Divisions (including 4 armoured and 6 motorized). Air force required - if Germans decided to attack Turkey they would expect Turks to receive air assistance from ourselves. Unlikely therefore that Germans would attack until they had assembled, in area from central Mediterranean to Black S (which must be treated as a whole) some 1500 aircraft in addition to all available Italian aircraft.

Earliest date on which forces could be concentrated on Turkish Frontier. Z plus $2\frac{1}{2}$ months. Earliest date on which force could reach Syrian Frontier. Turkey acquiescent Z plus $4\frac{3}{4}$ months. Turkey resistance incalculable.

(C) Invasion of British Isles.

Land force required: 30 divisions (including 9 armoured) exclusive of Divisions required for diversion.

Air force required: -Full first line strength, denuding all other theatres of war.

Naval forces required: Substantially the whole German Navy would be involved. Earliest date by which force could be concentrated in west. Z plus 3 to 4 months.

(D) Operations in Central and Western Mediterranean.

(1) Through Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa. Land Air Forces required - since these operations only likely to be contemplated by Germans to forestall

or counter Allied action, they would have to employ such forces as they could muster at the time. Timing would similarly depend on the state of affairs then existing.

(ii) Through North African ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Land force required - 7 divisions made up say as follows:- 2 German armoured divisions, 1 German motorized division, 1 Italian armoured division, 1 Italian motorized division, 2 Italian infantry divisions.

Assuming of Axis forces now in Libya, equivalent of 1 armoured, 1 motorized and 2 infantry division will still be in area. These are included in above. Air Force required - the force set out in sub paragraph (B) above would cover this operation. Earliest date by which force in TRIPOLITANA could be reinforced. Not using Tunisian ports - 3 months from date of embarkation. Using Tunisian ports - 1½ months from date of embarkation.

14. Above, putting into terms of CALENDAR, and assuming 15th February as earliest date on which substantial force can be withdrawn from Russia, gives earliest date for stage referred to above as follows:-

(a) 1. Earliest date of concentration on the south Russian sector 1st May.
2. Fall of Rostov 15th May.
3. Occupation of MAIKOP-TUAPSE area 15th June to 30th
4. Occupation of GROZNI area 15th July.
5. Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area, dependent on degree of resistance in Caucasasia.

(b) 1. Concentration on the Turkish frontier 1st May.
2. Earliest date on which forces could reach the Syrian frontier - Turkey acquiescent - early August, Turkey resisting - incalculable.

(c) Concentration of forces for invasion of U.K.
15th May to 15th June.

COPY NO. _____

J.P.S. 5/1FEBRUARY 11, 1942JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERSSUMMARY OF RECENT JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S
APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S INTENTIONSNote by Secretary

The enclosure, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee in collaboration with the Joint Strategical Committee, in accordance with directive of J.P.S. 5, is circulated for consideration by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners.

L. R. McDOWELL.

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE:

Subject: Comments on a British Appreciation of Germany's Intentions.

References: (a) Medal 65, a summary of a recent British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee appreciation of Germany's intentions.
(b) Memorandum, Joint Staff Planners, February 2, 1942.

1. Reference (b) forwarded reference (a) to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Strategical Committee for collaborative study and comment. The Joint Strategical Committee has collaborated in the preparation of this paper, and concurs therein.

2. This Committee believes that Germany cannot undertake a major offensive elsewhere before having destroyed Russia's military power. It, therefore, agrees in general with the conclusions stated in paragraph 12 of the British J.I.C. appreciation. The most probable German major offensive operation during 1942 will be an attack on Russia intended to complete the destruction of the Russian Army and to gain access to the oil of the Caucasus. Meanwhile, every effort will be

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

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made to control the central and eastern Mediterranean and to maintain and exploit the position in North Africa.

3. This Committee's views regarding other hypotheses may be stated briefly as follows:

a. An operation through North African ports against Egypt from the west: Likely as a subsidiary undertaking, but not as the major effort. See paragraph 2.

b. An operation through the Iberian Peninsula against Gibraltar and French North Africa: To be undertaken only if necessary to counter an Allied initiative in that region.

c. A thrust through Turkey to Syria and thence to Egypt or Iraq: Unlikely.

d. Invasion of the British Isles: Most unlikely.

4. The considerations from which these conclusions are reached may be indicated by comment, seriatim, on the paragraphs of the British appreciation.

(1) While it is known that the German oil supply is strictly limited, it is believed that it is sufficient to meet the needs of military operations through 1942 at least. The Military Intelligence Division's estimate of German air strength is as follows:

Total aircraft in tactical groups	5094
In operational training units	2097
In schools	1498
In reserve	4195
In civil repair	<u>2097</u>
Total except transport	14981
Transport	<u>1700</u>
Total aircraft strength of G.H.F.	16681

These figures seem reasonable. They are 20 to 24 percent higher than those given in the British appreciation.

(2) Agreed.

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

(3) Agreed, with recognition of an additional objective of ultimately gaining control of the Mediterranean.

(4) It is believed that Germany has already withdrawn the bulk of her forces from the Russian front and is now resting and re-equipping these troops in rear areas. The so-called Russian offensive has thus far met little except strong German rear guard action. Up to the present time the situation will not permit a conclusion that a major Russian offensive has been in operation.

(5) No comment.

(6) Wherever Germany has taken the initiative she has always assured herself of air superiority.

(7) No comments. See paragraph (4).

(8A) A renewed German offensive along the whole Russian front is certainly most unlikely, if not wholly impossible, at the present time, nor is it believed that it could be launched prior to 15 May.

(8B) Agreed, assuming that the word "containing" is used in an active sense. The thrust would be designed to split the Russian Army. The main effort would then be in the south toward the Caucasus. The containing action would depend on the capabilities of the Russian Army at that time.

(9) Turkey will be entirely realistic. If the situation is decidedly favorable to Germany at the given time, it is unlikely that Turkey would offer any resistance in the face of certain defeat.

(10A) Agreed.

(10B) Agreed.

(11) Agreed.

(13-14) See paragraph 5 immediately below:

5. a. "Z" and "D" days. (1) The British use a "Z" day, the date on which the Germans will begin to withdraw divisions from the Russian front to re-equip and reorganize them for later offensive action, as the starting point for their

estimated German time-tables. This Committee considers "Z" day to be meaningless, inasmuch as the Germans rotate their divisions in line throughout the year and constantly strive to maintain fresh divisions available for service anywhere. Moreover, it is our opinion that numerous divisions as well as the bulk of the German air force in Russia have already been withdrawn to rest and refit.

(2) A more practical starting point would be a "D" day, that on which the Germans will resume a major offensive against Russia. This "D" day will be determined primarily by climatic conditions. From the Sea of Azov to Finland there is naturally a wide variation in weather conditions. Along the Black Sea coast the thaw should begin about the middle of March, whereas north of Moscow winter conditions will continue well into May. The thaw, usually combined with heavy rains, makes quadmiros of the roads, which at best are none too good. On the front from Taganrog to Kursk, it is extremely doubtful that climatic conditions would permit the launching of a major offensive prior to 15 May. For that reason 15 May is taken as a probable "D" day.

b. Operations against the Caucasus. (1) The campaign which requires most thorough consideration is that envisaged by the British Committee in paragraphs 13 (A) 11 and 14 (a); that is, a drive on the Caucasus, while containing Russian forces in the center and north.

(2) A campaign in Russia is primarily a problem in logistics. The railroad-highway net will determine in large measure the number of troops that can be employed. From the line Kharkov-Taganrog three railways lead eastward to the line Kamensk-Rostov. From that line only one railway leads on to Stalingrad. In order to secure adequate rail facilities for a force advancing on the Caucasus, it becomes practically necessary to obtain use of the Kursk-Voronezh-Povorino-Stalingrad rail line. Thus there would be four railroads east from the line Kursk-Taganrog to the lateral Voronezh-Rostov railroad and two thence to Stalingrad.

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

(3) Although the Germans supplement railways with heavy motor columns, it is inconceivable that even they can supply more than 20 divisions to each penetrating rail line. Accordingly, a maximum of 80 divisions could be maintained on the initial Kursk-Taganrog front, which is 400 miles long. For general global planning purposes, it is reasonable to assume one division for every 5 or 6 miles of front in a normal campaign, or 70 to 80 divisions on a 400-mile front. This agrees with the estimated maximum capacity of the railroad net. Thus the German main effort may be estimated as a mass of about 80 divisions advancing from the line Kursk-Taganrog.

(4) For purposes of general estimation, it may be assumed that the normal average advance in an operation of this nature would be limited to 100 miles a month, in alternate equal stages of movement and consolidation. (In the Russian offensive of 1941 the Germans covered approximately 500 miles in five months.)

(5) The offensive from Kursk-Taganrog against the Caucasus would probably take the form of a right wheel pivoting on Rostov, so that eventually this group of armies would change from an easterly direction to a southeasterly one along line of Don River between Rostov and Stalingrad. Within two weeks Rostov would probably have fallen. The drive to Stalingrad, however, might well take three or four months. While the elements of the German Army that reached Rostov in two weeks could well debouch therefrom, say within "D" plus 30 days, without awaiting the fall of Stalingrad, they would be definitely limited in strength to no more than 20 divisions. The front Stalingrad-Rostov calls for a force of nearer 40 divisions. These can be supported when Stalingrad is taken, as the rail line Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk indicates. The remaining 35 divisions of the original attacking force would be utilized in containing or assisting in containing the Russian Army in the north.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

(6) The advance from Rostov to the line Armavir-Maikop-Tuapse (150 miles) could be made in about 1½ months; that is, about 2 months after "D" day, or by 15 July. This estimate is based on an assumption that the Kerch Peninsula is defended strongly and that the Germans are unable to force a landing at Novorossiisk and Tuapse. These assumptions are considered reasonably sound. The occupation of Grozni could well occur 2 months later, that is "D" plus 4 months, or 15 Sept.

(7) If the campaign reached this point in accordance with this highly theoretical time schedule, it would find the Germans solidly in control of Stalingrad and the Volga north thereof, while the Russian Army defending the Caucasus would have fallen back beyond Grozni. A major decision would then arise as to whether the remnants of this Russian Army would withdraw towards Astrakan or decide to continue the defense of the oil regions of Baku, falling back on the Trans-Caucasus and ultimately on Iran. It must be remembered that the Russian forces defending in this Caucasus area would then be hopelessly separated from the main Russian Armies, which would probably have withdrawn on the Kazan-Kuibyshev front.

c. Secondary operations in Russia. Containing action to prevent Russian forces in the north from disrupting the German advance toward the Caucasus is essential to the success of the main effort outlined in such detail above. It is believed that this would be accomplished by a secondary attack northeastward, generally along the Oka River, with a view to seizing Gorki and Kazan, driving the Russian forces north and east of the Volga River. By the same reasoning and consideration of time schedule it would seem that this maneuver would require about 4 months. The Russian forces, if all went well, would thus become hopelessly divided.

d. The Middle East. (1) Discussion of another likely secondary effort is pertinent. This effort would envisage heavy reinforcements to Rommel with a view to over-running Egypt,

seizing the Suez Canal, driving eastward and threatening Basra. This large-scale double envelopment is of the type normally envisaged by the Germans. The drive through Egypt, with the present weakened strength of the Allied forces, would probably require not more than 20 division.

(2) If this gigantic maneuver was succeeding, the attitude of Turkey would no longer be in doubt. Rather than accept certain defeat, it is probable that the Turks would grudgingly permit the use of their railroads and highways by Germany.

e. Summary. These time-tables are purely theoretical. They are meant to indicate the maximum rate of progress of which the Germans are apt to be capable. So much speculative data is involved, and so many imponderables, that rigid estimates as to forces and elapsed time required to reach various distant objectives may be misleading and dangerous. If the Germans can maintain such a schedule, they can gain a major decision against Russia in 1942 and perhaps a decision in the Middle East as well. They would then be in a position to move on India in 1943, if they so elect. The Russian Army might disrupt the schedule. The outcome therefore depends more upon the relative combat value of Russian and German divisions than upon any other factor.

LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE,
Major, Cavalry,
Secretary, J.I.C.

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COPY NO. 1

FEBRUARY 16, 1942

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Subject: Timing, rate of build up and scale of German air attack to be expected at Casablanca in the initial stages of Super Gymnast.

1. The Combined Planners directed that the Secretaries refer the attached papers to the Combined Intelligence Committee with the request that that Committee furnish an agreed appreciation of the views set forth therein.
2. It is further requested that the Combined Intelligence Committee set forth the various hypotheses upon which their appreciation is based.

E. L. SIBERT,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

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JCS memo. 1-4-74

By RHP, ELR, Date FEB 19 1974

AS/G2
JCH/amf

December 24, 1941

An Estimate of possible Axis move into North and North-west Africa.

Should the Axis move into West and Northwest Africa their aircraft will form the advance element. Due to the availability of numerous bases and lines of communication through Spain, Sicily and North Africa this move will not occasion any serious difficulty for the Axis. Air Force requirements would not be great and could be furnished by the 2nd Air Fleet, now reported to be based in Italy, augmented by whatever Focke-Wolfe bombers the Axis decided to spare from France. (The above Air Fleet is estimated to comprise 400 aircraft, mostly bombers, and according to reliable information its strength will be increased shortly, probably with fighters. Its strength then will probably be between 700-800 aircraft.) The movement through two zones, (1) Sicily and (2) Spain, would occur simultaneously.

The force from Sicily of approximately 350 aircraft would occupy and operate from bases in Tunisia and Algeria thereby denying the Western Mediterranean to Allied forces. Complete occupation could be effected in two days and within two weeks effective operations could be conducted. It has repeatedly been demonstrated that surface craft cannot operate within range of determined attack by land based aircraft without aerial superiority. This cannot be secured by the British at this time. Obviously Gibraltar would be untenable as a Naval Base. In consequence the Axis would have a direct surface supply route to all ports in this theatre, hampered only by sporadic air and submarine attacks.

The force from Spain, of approximately 100 long range bombers, 200 single engine fighters and 100 twin engine fighters, would occupy consecutively the bases from Tangier to Dakar. This would require about one week, the distance involved being almost 1700 miles by air. Within another week effective operations could be conducted. Heavy bombers will probably be based at Dakar, Villa Cisneros, Cap Juby and Tangier, with single engine fighters occupying the adjacent auxiliary fields. Twin engine fighters would occupy the Canary and Cape Verde islands and serve as photo reconnaissance, light bombers and fighter protection for those bases. They could also escort heavy bombers operating from African bases. There are sufficient facilities on these islands to protect the powers which occupy them first. It is believed that French, Portuguese and Spanish forces would augment the Axis forces in this theatre should the Allies attack them.

The requisite supply for all Axis forces in this theatre could easily be accomplished by air and sea transport.

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C.P.S. 2/2

10th February, 1942

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

SUPER GYMNAST

(previous reference C.P.S. 2/1)

Note by the Secretaries.

The enclosure, which sets out certain information and comments obtained by the British Joint Staff Planners from London, raises various further questions for discussion by the Combined Staff Planners.

C. T. SMITH

P.O.A. DAVISON

COMBINED SECRETARIAT.

Washington, D.C.

10TH FEBRUARY, 1942.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 31-71

By 85 Date APR 5 1973

SUPER GYINAST

POLICY.

1. London defines the circumstances which are sine qua non to the whole plan as "a guarantee of no opposition by the Vichy French Fleet together with full information regarding all minefields laid in the approaches to French African ports". They add that it is also most desirable that all French warships shall have moved from Casablanca before the arrival of the first convoy so that all berths in the harbour may be clear.

SCALE OF AIR ATTACK.

2. The British Joint Intelligence Committee's view is that there is no imminent threat of air attack on Casablanca in the postulated circumstances. That even operating through Spain it is improbable that the German scale of effort would exceed 30 long range bombers by the end of the first month, although thereafter it might be built up more rapidly.

3. German and Italian air forces could to-day attack Tunisia. Scales of effort are estimated as follows:

German - 350 aircraft (of which 180 bombers)
Italian - 180 aircraft (of which 50 bombers
based on Sicily)

A possibility of a further 130 Italian fighters
based on Tripoli (Libya).

4. The view in London is that the enemy's air attack from Spain would almost certainly be directed against the Algerian ports before reaching out as far as Casablanca. If this be so, there is little immediate threat to Casablanca when a British contingent is disembarked in Algeria.

EMPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES.

5. General Alexander has expressed the view that the British air forces in Tunisia are inadequate. It is appreciated that General Fredendall, the Supreme Commander, has not been able to see his way to accepting the suggestion that certain U.S. air forces be allocated to General Alexander. However, having regard to the arguments put forward above as to the probable scale of air attack on Casablanca, it is thought that General Fredendall may be willing to reconsider the practicability of making some U. S. pursuit air forces available to the British in Tunisia or Algeria, after setting up his squadrons in the Casablanca area.

PORT CAPACITY.

6. Casablanca cannot accommodate 55 ships. Detailed examination has been made which shows that we must reduce our previous estimates. A detailed appreciation by the British Joint Planners in London is as follows:-

(a) As it is felt that 1/3 of the accommodation of the port must be allowed for French requirements, even during the unloading of the first convoy, it is estimated that a maximum of 14 M.T. storeships, 2 petrol ships, 1 fleet of oilers and 1 group of escorts can be accommodated inside the boom defence. 4 of these M.T. storeships must be loaded with coal or other bulk cargo, so that they can be dealt with at the coaling quay, and the remainder must not contain more than 25,000 tons dead weight stores if they

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Date APR 5 1973

are to be unloaded in a 16 day cycle. It would be possible to unload 6 more ships artificially flattened and loaded only with M.T. provided the personnel were accommodated either at satellite ports such as Safi, or in the outer harbour in the area marked "prohibited anchorage" which is probably a controlled minefield area. This is still under investigation.

(b) Transit capacity is 4,000 tons a day. Allowing 1300 tons a day for French requirements this gives us 2700 tons per day. These figures (i.e. 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, chiefly for French Railways, and 4,000 tons petrol) give an average of 2500 tons per day over a 16 day cycle. The allowance for building up reserves will therefore be small.

(c) The capacity of Casablanca each 16 day period is thus estimated at 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, 4,000 tons petrol and 3,000 vehicles. The vehicle figures must be reduced to 2,100 if 6 extra M.T. ships cannot be accommodated. 3,000 vehicles are sufficient for about 8 personnel ships carrying up to 2,000 British troops in each 16 day cycle; and it is proposed to plan on this basis. Personnel convoys should arrive 4 days before M.T. stores convoys.

A/A DEFENCE.

7. It is pointed out that the number of heavy A/A guns in the A/A regiment detailed for the first convoy is 24. To add more will probably be difficult as it would involve another ship.

CONVOY PROGRAMME.

8. A revised convoy programme appears to be essential. General Alexander suggests that the British contingent should be maintained through Oran as long as possible so as to reduce the strain on Casablanca. This must however be subject to the proviso that all Allied Forces landed in Africa must be capable of being maintained through Casablanca should the Germans enter Spain. The British convoy programme to Oran is therefore dependent upon the British programme to Casablanca.

9. B-1 cannot now sail before D-24 owing to the release of shipping previously held in readiness. The fast portion of the British contingent, including at least two M.T. ships, cannot arrive before D-34, while the slow portion cannot arrive before D-38. London agrees that the first Casablanca convoy should be joint American-British, but they doubt the wisdom of planning to meet at sea.

10. The minimum British requirement for carrying A/A and the necessary administrative units is estimated at 4 personnel and 5 M.T. ships. Thereafter alternative British and American convoys are proposed - in that order and at 16 day intervals. British convoys to Oran will conform as long as the port can be used. Should the use of Oran be suddenly denied, any convoy which is en route will be diverted to safe anchorage until Casablanca can receive it.

11. Attached hereto (Annex 1) is a revised convoy programme based on the 16 day cycle referred to above.

DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVE.

12. It also seems desirable to confirm that there is identity of view as regards objective. The objective was agreed in Para. 2, ABC-4/2 WW(J.P.C.)2 by the Joint Planning Committee as follows:-

"We consider our primary object is to establish ourselves in Northern French Morocco as quickly as possible. This would provide a base from which Spanish Morocco could be occupied at short notice and thus block Germany's line of advance from Spain. The area would also form a base from which Allied control could be extended over all North Africa and into Europe".

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U.S.
BRITISH

FEBRUARY 16, 1942.

COPY NO. 1

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Subject: Possible Japanese action against
Australia and New Zealand.

The Combined Staff Planners directed the Secretaries to refer the attached papers (C.P.S. 10 and C.C.S. 18) to the Combined Intelligence Committee with the request that an agreed appreciation be furnished the Combined Planners based on the two views set forth in the papers attached. This request should be given higher priority than the request with reference to Super Gymnast.

E. L. SIBERT,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 31-71+33-71
By RT Date MAR 27 1973

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BRITISH [REDACTED]

CCS 385 (2-13-42)

C.P.S. 10

COPY NO. _____

FEBRUARY 13, 1942.

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, is circulated for consideration by the Combined Staff Planners.

(Signed) E. L. SIBERT,
" P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 31-71
ENCLOSURE By RT. Date MAR 27 1973

1. The reference directs that the Joint Intelligence Committee furnish the Combined Staff Planners with its comments on an appreciation of the subject enclosed in the reference.
2. The Committee agrees in substance with the conclusions of the Enclosure (paragraphs 2 and 11). Specifically, it believes that at this stage Japan would be content to deny the use of Torres Straits and to isolate Australia and New Zealand, without embarking on a major invasion of either country.
3. The Committee is in substantial agreement with the Enclosure's statement of conditions precedent to a major Japanese attack on Australia or New Zealand (paragraphs 3 and 4). In paragraph 4, however, the Enclosure hypothecates Japanese consolidation of a position including the Netherlands East Indies and islands eastward as far as New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa as prerequisite to further offensive operations. In J.I.C. Special Study No. 1, "Japanese Logistic Capabilities," this Committee

estimated that the Japanese would consolidate the Burma-Malaya-Netherlands East Indies-Mandates barrier before undertaking further offensive operations. Subsequent comment will be made with reference to hypothetical Japanese consolidation of the B-M-N-M barrier, as outlined in J.I.C. 1.

4. From the barrier, without undertaking a major offensive operation, Japan could deny the use of Torres Strait by neutralizing or occupying key points on the north coast of Australia. This coast is so inaccessible by land from the settled area of Australia and so accessible by sea from the Netherlands East Indies that it is, strategically, an integral part of the barrier rather than of Australia. From the barrier the Japanese could also raid the ports of Australia and New Zealand, as envisaged in paragraph 1 of the Enclosure. Operations to interrupt or harass supply routes from the United States should also be anticipated. It is not necessary to occupy Samoa, Fiji, or New Caledonia for that purpose.

5. Australia and New Zealand are sparsely inhabited white communities isolated from other whites by the 6,000 miles of ocean which separate them from the United States and from South Africa. Both are dependent on overseas communications for essential supplies. Their individual characteristics are as follows:

(a) Australia. In an area of 3,000,000 square miles there are only 7,000,000 Australians, nearly half of them in the five cities of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth. The vital area is the southeastern corner of the continent, bounded by the line Brisbane-Adelaide. There are found the bulk of the population, industry, agriculture, communications facilities, and other utilities. Perth is the center of an isolated community on the west coast. The rest of the country is largely uninhabited desert.

The 12,000 mile perimeter of Australia is too long for all-around defense by the limited forces available. The terrain offers few serious obstacles. Communications are poor by American standards and virtually nonexistent outside of the vital area. A significant war industry has been developed, but it is rendered vulnerable by dependence on outside sources for essential materials.

(b) New Zealand, with a population of 1,600,000 in 100,000 square miles, is divided into two main islands incapable of mutual support. The terrain is rugged, but the perimeter is disproportionate to the area and the vital points are the coastal cities of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.

6. By invasion and occupation of Australia and New Zealand Japan could gain the following advantages:

(a) The elimination of these countries from the Allied war effort.

(b) Their elimination as a bridgehead for counter operations against the barrier.

(c) Protection of the Japanese left flank in future operations for the control of the Indian Ocean.

(d) The satisfaction of territorial ambitions through the acquisition of territory attractive to emigrants.

(e) Acquisition of natural resources, especially iron and wool.

7. By invasion and occupation of Australia and New Zealand Japan would incur the following disadvantages:

(a) The extension of their flank and lines of communication across the front of their principal enemy, the United States, and the displacement of major forces away from their traditional enemy, Russia.

(b) The forces required for secure occupation would be disproportionate to the advantages gained.

(c) It would be a time-consuming operation, absorbing forces which might be employed more profitably elsewhere.

(d) The resistance of a white people in their homeland would be more determined than any yet encountered. They could expect no assistance from a fifth column.

(e) The operation would invite the United States and Russia to attack their flank and rear.

8. It is premature to estimate Japanese scales of attack on Australia and New Zealand (paragraph 6 of the enclosure). The Japanese have not yet fulfilled the agreed conditions prerequisite to such an attack. Until they have done so, neither the effect of their losses on forces available nor the effect of Allied counter measures on the forces required can be estimated with precision. An attempted landing in the populated sector of Australia or in New Zealand will assume the proportions of a major operation and will require control of the adjacent sea areas together with local air supremacy.

9. The Committee concludes that, although a major invasion of Australia or New Zealand is unlikely, enemy operations to deny the use of Torres Strait and to isolate the two countries are probable.

U.S. [REDACTED]
BRITISH [REDACTED]

C.C.S. 18

COPY NO. _____

31ST JANUARY, 1942.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND

Note by the Secretaries.

At the request of the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, the attached appreciation of possible Japanese action against Australia and New Zealand, which has been prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee in London, is circulated for consideration of the Committee.

(Signed) V. DYKES.

L. R. McDOWELL.

Combined Secretariat.

Washington, D. C.

31st January, 1942.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 33-71

By RT Date MAR 27 1973

ENCLOSURE

1. RAIDS

Raids by Cruiser and Armed Merchant Cruiser possible at any time against one or more principal ports on Coast of Australia and New Zealand, and might take following forms:-

- (a) Bombardment.
- (b) Attack by aircraft launched from these ships.
- (c) Interference with port approaches by minelaying.

(d) Attacks by midget submarines and Coastal Motor Boats launched from these ships.

Surprise attack by carrier-borne aircraft on concentration of shipping at Port Darwin, or ports further South, possible.

2. MAJOR OPERATIONS.

Japanese plans at this stage not thought to embrace major attack on Australia and New Zealand as distinct from raids as set out above. Only exception is attempt to occupy Darwin.

3. CONDITIONS

Before making major attack against Australia and New Zealand, Japanese Naval Staff would probably require following conditions fulfilled: (a) Singapore in Japanese hands or beleaguered and Java, Sumatra and Philippine Islands in Japanese hands.

(b) Japanese control extended in South China Sea by occupying key points in Islands of East Indian Archipelago as far as Timor inclusive, and Islands of New Guinea, New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa group.

(c) No hostilities with Russia or situation on that front not such as to require material for strengthening of Japanese force in that area.

(d) (?To) retain power to transport large bodies of troops over long line of sea communications, without risk of serious loss from Allied action.

4. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Japanese strategy at present seems to be aiming especially at (a) and (b) above as rapidly as possible. If successful Japan will be established in powerful advanced Naval and air positions with safe lines of communications to Home bases, will also threaten communications between America and New Zealand and thus be strongly placed to secure major gains and proceed with further aims as follows:- (a) Full scale operations against Burma (for which preliminary moves already in progress) and thence possibly towards India.

(b) Full scale operations against Australia and/or New Zealand.

(c) Attack against Russia - which we consider improbable. It is too conjectural to say, at this stage, which of the two remaining courses Japanese would adopt, but they would be unlikely to adopt more than one at the same time. Operations against Burma, with limited objective as far as say, Rangoon, need not await outcome of operations in Malayan Archipelago and would not preclude simultaneous operations against Australia and New Zealand.

5. GENERAL METHODS OF ATTACK.

(a) Before attempting any major operation against Australia and New Zealand, Japanese likely to attempt capture of Darwin, denying to us only possible bases in Northern Australia. Due to its isolated position Darwin is an attractive target for capture before it is strengthened and while our military strength in this area comparatively weak.

(b) If and when Japanese decide to develop major operations against Australia and New Zealand operations likely to take form of simultaneous landings at, or in vicinity of, important ports, with a view to gaining stranglehold on key points and communications. Any attempt at occupation of Australia or New Zealand would probably be mainly confined to Coastal area.

6. SCALES OF ATTACK.

(a) NAVAL. Close escort, to protect convoys and subsequently cover each landing, might consist of:- 6 Cruisers, 2 Aircraft Carriers and possibly 2 Seaplane Carriers, 20 Destroyers.

Main Japanese Fleet would be disposed so as to intercept any large scale interference by Allies.

(b) MILITARY. Some 12 Japanese Divisions could be made available and transport for operations against Australia and New Zealand, and following might be scales of attack in each phase:-

(i) Darwin. Attack on Darwin likely to be made by one to two divisions transported in landing craft and small craft. Initial landings carried out by Brigade groups.

(ii) Australia. 6 or 7 divisions likely to make attack on continent of Australia, landing up to 2 divisions at 2 or more key points simultaneously. Initial landings would be carried out by Brigade groups in landing craft transported to assembly positions in landing craft carriers.

(iii) New Zealand. From 4 to 5 divisions would make attack similar to (ii) above.

If attacks on Australia and New Zealand not simultaneous, scale of attack against either could be increased accordingly. Availability of special landingcraft would not be limiting factor for any of above operations. Large numbers of small craft such as Pearlina Luggers small Trading schooners available in Caroline Islands which could be used for this purpose.

(c) AIR. Following scales of attack based on assumption that no developments had occurred on Russian front which would justify Japanese reducing Air Force retained to meet potential threats in that theater of war.

(i) To cover landing and obtain aerodromes from which to develop operations on shore, Japanese might support landings with some 5 or 6 aircraft carriers, and similar number of seaplane carriers, capable of carrying some 250 aircraft, comprising say 100 fighters and 150 dive and torpedo bombers and up to 100 seaplanes.

(ii) As soon as port captured, Japanese could bring, by ships and possibly overland from Darwin area, if intermediate landing grounds had been established, additional land based aircraft. Assuming operations in Malaya and Philippines successfully concluded, they might make available some 400 of such aircraft and possibly in addition some 30 long range flying boats.

7. Above scales of attack represent maximum considered possible in conditions most favourable to Japanese. Conditions in paragraph 3 must first be fulfilled, and operations involved represent formidable task. In these operations, combat losses and waste of aircraft would be heavy.

8. OPERATIONS IN BURMA.

Necessity of retaining forces on northernmost front against possible Russian attack in spring and garrisoning of China and other territory captured, all representing heavy drain on Japanese resources, particularly in air.

9. In these circumstances Japanese might hesitate before attempting occupation of continents such as Australia or even the smaller territory of New Zealand, particularly in view of their experience in China.

10. Such further dissipation of their forces might seriously jeopardize Japanese power to hold territory gained, in view of increasing strength of Americans.

11. CONCLUSION.

It seems likely that Japan will at this stage be content with endeavouring to isolate Australia and New Zealand without embarking on major operations to southwards except for capture of Darwin. Attack on Darwin likely in any event.

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Boat

Am. Br. y. chiefs of staff

~~U. S. SECRET~~
~~DEFENSE INFORMATION~~

C.P.S. 23/1
MARCH 6, 1942

COPY NO. 6

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

UNITED STATES SHIPPING FOR TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH
TROOPS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

Note by the Secretaries

Pursuant to C.P.S. 23(D), March 5, 1942, the enclosure is presented by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to the Combined Staff Planners for comment or concurrence prior to presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

C. M. BERKELEY,
R. L. VITTRUP,
Combined Secretariat.

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ENCLOSURE

The Combined Military Transportation Committee:

1. Recommended that the following plan be transmitted to the Combined Staff Planners:

a. Two convoys to leave Atlantic Ports for U.K. Ports, including QUEEN MARY, QUEEN ELIZABETH and AQUITANIA.

b. Sailing dates:

1st Convoy from New York about April 26.

Troops carried 23,800.

2nd Convoy from New York and Boston about

May 6th. Troops carried 16,400.

c. Shipping to be allocated.

U. S. troop ships	10
British " "	3
Cargo Vessels	15*

*(4 available; 11 additional to be found).

d. Proposed Source of Additional Cargo Vessels.

Assuming that tonnage for Russia cannot be touched, it is proposed to find the 11 additional cargo vessels from Defense Aid shipments.

The U. S. War Munitions Allocation Board (Major General Burns) has suggested proportionate withdrawal of shipping from the following routes in this order:

1. Burma
2. Red Sea
3. Persian Gulf.

2. Took note:

a. That the use of the QUEEN MARY, QUEEN ELIZABETH and AQUITANIA on the proposed routes will be contrary to British Government policy.

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They considered, however, that the present situation had changed sufficiently to justify the above stated recommendations.

b. That the effect of this recommendation on the plans would be as follows:

(1) It will still be possible to accomplish this movement without interfering with the present scheduled movements to Caribbean bases, COPPER and X.

(2) It will be necessary to defer reinforcements to Indigo.

(3) This movement will not affect the movement of approximately 34,000 troops to COPPER by May 15 and will permit convoys of movements to Ascension Island, Stilwell Mission to Bombay, Wheeler and Maxwell Missions, 2600 Air Corps to Bombay, and the 41st Division to X.

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CCS 391 (3-6-42)

J.P.S. 2/6

COPY NO. 6

MARCH 6, 1942

JOINT U.S. STAFF PLANNERS

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAND,
SEA AND AIR FORCES OF THE U.S.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a study submitted by the Joint U.S. Strategic Committee in compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3a of J.P.S. 2/4(D), and should be considered in connection with J.P.S. 2/5.

R. L. VITTRUP

J. E. REID

Joint Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

March 5, 1942

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAND, SEA, AND AIR FORCES OF THE U.S.
REPORT BY JOINT U.S. STRATEGIC COMMITTEE

1. Assumptions:

- a. Territorial integrity of North and South America and safety of coastal communications are vital, and are the responsibility of the United States.
- b. Increased safety of Atlantic Sea communications is essential and is a joint charge of the United States and the United Kingdom.
- c. Continuing an active Russian front against Germany is the surest means of absorbing German military energy, thus contributing to the security of India and the Middle East. Maintaining this front is essential to the defeat of Germany within a reasonable time.

2. Under the foregoing assumptions estimates have been made to determine the United States forces, in terms of major combat units and shipping, required to carry out during 1942 the following:

- (1)(a) Secure the Southwest Pacific Area, including Australia, or
- (b) Secure the Eastern Pacific (Alaska, Hawaii, Panama).
- (2) Offensive action in the European theater which will result in material diversion of German forces from the Russian front.
- (3) Other overseas deployments necessary while (1) and (2) are being carried out.

3. The forces determined to be necessary to carry out the above have been compared with the means prospectively avail-

able to the United States in 1942. The detailed data used in these estimates and comparisons are attached hereto in:

Annex A - Forces required to secure the Southwest Pacific.

Annex B - Forces required to secure the Eastern Pacific.

Annex C - Forces required for offensive action in the European Theater.

Annex D - Additional overseas requirements if an offensive is undertaken in Europe.

Annex E - Availability and Deployment of naval forces to meet assumed requirements.

Annex F - Availability of ground and air forces.

Annex G - Availability of U.S. Shipping.

Annex H - Summary.

4. Overseas movements in 1942 are so limited by a general shortage of cargo shipping that it is necessary to analyze the courses of action under consideration in terms of the shipping problems involved, and thereby to determine their influence on the scale on which operations involving overseas troop movements can be carried on concurrently in various theaters. There are at present available a sufficient number of transports to move all the troops which can be maintained by the cargo shipping expected to be available. The analysis made is based on the assumption that the number of cargo ships available under Army control for maintenance of United States ground and air forces in overseas positions will be augmented by an average of 18 ships a month. If the number is not so augmented the scope of contemplated operations must be reduced correspondingly. The analysis is also based on the assumption that cargo vessels now under Navy control or scheduled for Navy use will be able to main-

tain U.S. Naval combatant ships and ship based aircraft overseas.

5. Although there are prospectively available more major ground units than can be moved, the same is not true of air forces. Accordingly, the availability of air forces both for defense of the United States and its coastal communications, and for offensive and defensive operations overseas similarly requires careful evaluation.

6. The general situation with respect to ground forces, shore based air forces, and the shipping required to transport and maintain them is briefly as follows:

(a) To secure the Southwest Pacific Area, including Australia, requires on shore in overseas positions during 1942 a total of 416,000 troops. Of this number 225,000 are now in or en route to the areas concerned, leaving 191,000 to be transported. (See Annex A)

(b) To secure the Eastern Pacific (Alaska, Hawaii, Panama) requires on shore in overseas positions during 1942 a total of 319,000 troops. Of this number 151,000 are now in or en route to the areas concerned, leaving 160,000 to be transported. (See Annex B)

(c) The forces required during 1942 for offensive action in the European Theater which will result in material diversion of German forces from the Russian front are estimated to amount to an army of about 600,000 ground troops, composed mostly of armored and mechanized divisions organized in such manner as to permit rapid and destructive blows at enemy objectives. These ground elements should be supported by an air force of about 6,500 planes. (See Annex C)

(d) Other deployments in overseas positions necessary if an offensive in Europe is undertaken, require during 1942 a total

of 91,000 troops. Of this number 63,000 are now in or en route to the areas concerned, leaving 28,000 to be transported. (See Annex D)

(e) The cargo shipping available after providing for needs in the Pacific, plus those in other areas in the Atlantic, and India-Burma-China, would be sufficient to transport and maintain in the European Theater only the following troops (See Annex G):

(e) (Cont):-

By	Southwest Pacific Secured	Eastern Pacific Secured
July 1, 1942	100,000	160,000
October 1, 1942	305,000	365,000
January 1, 1943	435,000	495,000

(f) The numbers listed in sub-paragraph (e) could be increased by postponing augmentations of strength in the Pacific, either because of delays in availability or by reason of decision to defer such augmentations in order to expedite movements to Europe.

7. The effect of providing the air forces necessary in the Pacific under the two alternative premises, and for other employment in the Atlantic and India-Burma-China would be to limit United States Army air forces available for the European Theater by July 1st, 1942, as follows (See Annex F):

	<u>Southwest Pacific Secured</u>		<u>Eastern Pacific Secured</u>	
	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Planes</u>	<u>Groups</u>	<u>Planes</u>
Heavy bombardment	Three	(105)	Three	(105)
Medium bombardment	One	(57)	One	(57)
Light bombardment	Three	(171)	Four	(228)
Pursuit	Five	<u>(400)</u> 733	Seven	<u>(560)</u> 930

8. These air forces may be increased to totals of 1401 and 1618 airplanes respectively by July 1, 1942, and to totals of 2363 and 2580 airplanes respectively by January 1943, provided that the allocations of Army and Navy aircraft to the defense of the United States and coastal communications, as listed in Annexes "E" and "F" prove adequate. In estimating their probable effectiveness in offensive operations, due consideration must be given to the relatively low level of experience and training in the newly created organizations which will form the greater part of their strength.

9. The ground forces prospectively available (Annex F), although not fully trained, are sufficient to perform the contemplated tasks in both the Pacific and European Theaters, provided that they are afforded adequate sea and air support. However, if all the air forces available for the European Theater are sent, the number of ground troops which can also be sent will be limited by availability of shipping to (See Annex H):

	<u>S.W. Pacific Secured</u>	<u>Eastern Pacific Secured</u>
July 1, 1942	51,000	111,000
October 1, 1942	191,000	240,000
January 1, 1943	252,000	301,000

10. The naval forces available, as shown in Annex E, are in the present strategic situation considered barely adequate to ensure the territorial integrity of North and South America and their coastal communications; to meet United States responsibilities for the trans-Atlantic sea communications; and also to secure the Southwest Pacific, including Australia, in cooperation with the necessary land and air forces.

11. The requirements of the action contemplated in the various theaters, and the means available for such action, have been

[REDACTED]

compared and summarized in Annex H. From the results of the comparison and the analysis made it is apparent that:

- (a) The two alternative promises in the Pacific have a relatively small difference in effect on the forces available for the European Theater.
 - (b) Under either promise the force available for the European Theater is not adequate immediately for a major offensive.
 - (c) Under either promise the forces available for the European Theater will be adequate to assist effectively in such an offensive in the fall of 1942 and can be progressively increased. Their prospective availability should enable the British to initiate an offensive even sooner.
12. The following general courses of action are recommended for the fighting forces of the United States:
- (a) Make secure the territory of North and South America and their coastal communications.
 - (b) In cooperation with the forces of the British Commonwealth make secure the trans-Atlantic sea and air routes.
 - (c) Secure Australia, the island positions between Australia and Hawaii, and their sea and air communications with the United States.
 - (d) Exert pressure against the Japanese by operations of naval and air forces based in the mid Pacific and in the Anzac area, including attack on vital Japanese sea communications and exposed positions, and attack on Japanese naval forces under conditions favorable to increasing our relative strength.
 - (e) Give limited air assistance to the defense of the India-Burma-China area.
 - (f) Having arranged for the accomplishment of the above

courses of action with minimum forces, exert a maximum effort in cooperation with the British, in offensive operations against Germany.

13. It is recommended that specific assignments of United States forces for 1942 be:

- (a) Those recommended in Annex "A" for the purpose of securing the Southwest Pacific including Australia, and which include recommendations for Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama.
- (b) Those recommended in Annex "D" for certain overseas positions in the Atlantic and for India-Burma-China.
- (c) Those recommended in Annex "E" for naval forces on the assumption that Australia is to be secured.
- (d) Movement of air forces to the European Theater to the extent permitted by the foregoing requirements. It is estimated that their strength can be approximately:

	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Troops</u>
By July 1, 1942 -	700	50,000
Oct. 1, 1942 -	1400	114,000
Jan. 1, 1943 -	2300	183,000

(e) Movement of ground forces to the European Theater to the extent permitted by shipping available. It is estimated that their numbers can be approximately:

By July 1, 1942 -	51,000
Oct. 1, 1942 -	191,000
Jan. 1, 1943 -	252,000

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Dear Harry:

What do you think of this
draft? Let me have any suggestions
by Tuesday morning, when I get back
to Washington.

F.D.R.

Enclosure.

DRAFT

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

On further consideration of the war situation I have come to the conclusion that it is advisable that the Congress can greatly help the successful prosecution and shortening of the war by authorizing an increase in the Army of the United States to a total of ten million men. The strength of the Army is now about seven million three hundred thousand men. This figure is somewhat deceptive because of these men four hundred fifty thousand are sick or wounded men in Army hospitals. The prosecution of the war calls for an adequately trained reserve, and such a trained reserve is not available at the present time.

Further, the requirements for the arming of these men should be taken care of and the arming of some additional French divisions must be provided for. Therefore, we need additional workers.

It is not sufficient to comb and recomb by executive action the men classified as 4-F.

The efficient method of utilizing the nation's manpower, and a just method, is the passage of a National Service Act which will solve our manpower problems and give our enemies final assurance of their defeat.

WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
PRESS BRANCH
Tel. - RE 6700
Brs. 3425 and 4860

January 11, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS:

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, made the following statement today at his press and radio conference:

"I would like to announce that the War Department has requested Selective Service to increase its quota for the March draft to 100,000. This is an increase of 20,000 over our requests for January and February. I think it should be obvious from what I have just told you in reviewing the war that the tempo of action in both hemispheres has increased radically in intensity. The Germans are very evidently not going to accept the inevitable without a fight to the finish, and the war against the Japanese has moved ahead of schedule. These draft calls are carefully calculated to provide the replacements that will be needed as soon as the men thus selected have received their training. The men called will necessarily have to be of the same physical and age standards required by the Army's replacement program."

END



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

[REDACTED]
11 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Eisenhower has sent a message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff asking for additional resources and acceleration in the movement of forces and supplies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have diverted to Eisenhower two fully trained infantry divisions which were on the west coast scheduled to be moved to the Pacific in May. They will be moved at once to the east coast and sail for Northern France on 19 February. Seven other divisions will leave the U.S. for Northern France between today and 3 February. This will give General Eisenhower, by the first of March, a total of 85 divisions on the western front, of which 61 will be American, 9 French (U.S. supplied), 11 U.K., and 4 Canadian and Polish. The arrival of the additional 9 U.S. divisions in France should give General Eisenhower an adequate reserve and permit him to rotate tired divisions.

The accelerated movement of the nine divisions will not interfere with the movement of supporting and service troops.

The most important consideration at this time is the supply of infantry replacements to meet the losses due to a winter campaign and bitter fighting. By various measures 23,000 additional infantry replacements are going to General Eisenhower in January, making a total of 60,000 of infantry alone.

Supplies being furnished by the U.S. for eight new French divisions and their corps and army troops will begin moving to France this month. Certain critical items (artillery and artillery ammunition, mortars and tanks) which the French divisions must have to operate effectively are not now available from the U.S. All sources including captured enemy equipment are being combed for those items.

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The equipment and support of the new French divisions added to the consumption of the battle in France will continue to place an increasing demand on our production. Every short-cut is being taken to achieve increases in manufacturing capacity for the supply of critical munitions of war. In order to get the supplies to the western front, an increasing number of fast vessels are being placed in service in the Atlantic to shorten the time from the manufacturing plants to the front line. There is now in operation a fast ship express service for critical items of ammunition and other supplies.

With the departure of the two divisions on 19 February, the last divisions will have left the United States for combat theaters.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
PRESS BRANCH
Tel. - RE 6700
Brs. 8425 and 4860

January 11, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS:

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War was asked the following question today at his press and radio conference:

Isn't the Army already over strength when you consider its ceiling of 7,700,000?

Mr. Stimson replied as follows:

"Yes, but we have 450,000 wounded and sick men in Army hospitals at the present time. These are entirely ineffective for the purpose of conducting a war but certainly no one would even suggest that we would not bear the full responsibility for these men, and that means keeping them on the Troop List until we have done everything that can be done for them. There are also moving in and out in the so-called pipeline for the maintenance of the rotation policy, some 85,000 men. These again are ineffective. Measured in terms of effectiveness the Army is under strength. What we need are 7,700,000 highly effective men. Some seem to have the idea that the war should be decreasing in intensity. Quite the opposite is the case. We are in the process of completing our deployment for the maximum intensity of effort which must be continued without abatement up to the moment of victory. I think the people will agree that in these crucial times the effective size of the Army must be kept up to its proposed ceiling.

"I might add here some general observations on the manpower problem facing the Army, not only within its ranks but in industry. An examination of war needs, directly and indirectly affecting the prosecution of the war, indicates that in our critical program in war production, the requirements up to June 30, 1945, will necessitate some 300,000 additional workers. These programs include production of essential war items such as heavy ammunition, heavy guns, trucks, heavy-duty tires, cotton duck, etc., which are now lagging behind the required rate of production. In addition we will need in war industries and war-supporting industries, which last include for example labor requirements for transportation, public utilities, construction, and other essential activities, some 200,000 additional men.

"Further, we will require for additions and changes in our original program which include, for instance, the requirements for the arming of some additional French Divisions to which the President has already referred, a further addition of 200,000 men. All of these additional workers must be secured before June 30, 1945.

"In the light of what I have just told you I believe that you will all agree that we must make a statesman-like approach to our manpower needs in the proper prosecution in this greatest of all wars in which we are such a major factor.

"In its requirements upon Selective Service, the Army has no alternative but to ask in these calls for youth--youth with its aggressiveness and its endurance. Our resources in youth are not exhausted--but those resources are now almost entirely engaged in industries which make some contribution direct or indirect to the war effort. If the needs of the Armies at the front are to be met there seems to be no escape from calling into the Armed Services during this year, substantially all physically qualified men below 30 years of age from factory, farm and government. But when we do this, in order to meet the necessities of the Armed Forces for equipment and supplies, and to meet civilian needs, the places of these young men will have to be taken by older men, women and younger men not acceptable for military service.

"It is only too apparent that the assignment of military manpower in industry must be placed on an orderly, democratic, and above all, a sure basis. This is no time to back away from real responsibilities. This is no time for piecemeal or makeshift legislation. The efficient method of utilizing this nation's manpower through a National Service Act will solve our manpower problems and give our enemies final assurance of their defeat."

END

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MAJOR UNITS INVOLVED

Recommended Strength.

Air

7 Heavy Bomber Groups.
3 Medium Bomber Groups.
2 Light Bomber Groups.
13 Pursuit Groups.
2 Pursuit Squadrons.
26 VPB Squadrons.
5 VBO Squadrons.
9 VSB Squadrons.
9 VF Squadrons.

JCS MEMO
BY: [redacted] NLR, Date: [redacted] 1974

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ADDITIONAL OVERSEAS REQUIREMENTS IF AN OFFENSIVE IS UNDERTAKEN IN EUROPE

RECAPITULATION

28,131 men to be transported from U.S. Overseas

Recommended Strength

2 Inf Divs., (Reserv)	1 Medium Bomber Group
1 All Regt.	3 Pursuit Groups
2 Composite Squadrons	9 VPS Squadrons
2 Heavy Bomber Groups	3 VSO Squadrons.

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ANNEX I **AVAILABILITY OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES** **ARMY AIR FORCES**

Expressed in Terms of Groups as per Aviation Branch

	JULY 1st				OCTOBER 1st				JAN 1st
	H	N	L	P	H	N	L	P	
(1) Total Available	16	6	5	27	24	8	7	29	28
(2) Overseas Forces Listed in Annex "P"	8	3	0	3	2	1	0	3	2
(3) Defense of U. S.	8	3	0	5	4	1	0	5	4
(4) Total (2 and 3)	6	3	0	8	6	2	0	8	6
(5) Case a - Secure Southwest Pacific	7	3	2	13	7	3	2	13	7
(6) Available for other employment if SW Pacific is secured	3	3	3	5	11	3	5	7	15
(7) Case b - Secure Eastern Pacific	6	1	0	8	6	1	0	8	6
(8) For Committed to Southwest Pacific	3	2	1	4	3	2	1	4	3
(9) Total in Pacific for case b	7	3	1	12	7	3	1	12	7
(10) Available for other employment if Eastern Pacific is secured	3	3	4	7	11	3	6	9	15

* NOTE: 1 Light Squadron in Hawaii not listed in figures listed.

Army Air Forces Available For European Theater

Under Assumption: Secure SW Pacific:

Under Assumption: Secure Eastern Pacific:

		PLANE	STRENGTH
July, 1942.	3 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 105	15000
	1 Medium Bomb Group	- 57	5000
	3 Light Bomb Groups	- 171	11400
	5 Pursuit Groups	- 400	18000
		733	49400
October, 1942.	11 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 385	55000
	3 Medium Bomb Groups	- 171	15000
	5 Light Bomb Groups	- 285	19000
	7 Pursuit Groups	- 560	25200
		1401	114200
January, 1943.	15 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 525	75000
	7 Medium Bomb Groups	- 399	35000
	7 Light Bomb Groups	- 399	26600
	13 Pursuit Groups	- 1080	46800
		2403	183400

		PLANE	STRENGTH
July, 1942	3 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 105	15000
	1 Medium Bomb Group	- 57	5000
	4 Light Bomb Groups	- 228	15200
	7 Pursuit Groups	- 560	25200
		950	60400
October, 1942.	11 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 385	55000
	3 Medium Bomb Groups	- 171	15000
	6 Light Bomb Groups	- 342	22800
	9 Pursuit Groups	- 720	32400
		1618	125200
January, 1943.	15 Heavy Bomb Groups	- 525	75000
	7 Medium Bomb Groups	- 399	35000
	8 Light Bomb Groups	- 456	30400
	15 Pursuit Groups	- 1200	54000
		2580	194400

GROUND FORCES

Availability of Army Units in Continental United States

UNIT	STRENGTH	JULY 1, 1942		OCTOBER 1, 1942		JANUARY 1, 1943
		EQUIPMENT	STRENGTH	EQUIPMENT	STRENGTH	
DIVISIONS (TRIANGULAR)(POW)	15,374	100 a/s	50 a/s	100 a/s	50 a/s	100 a/s
DIVISIONS (TRIANGULAR)(MTS)	15,225	11	19	16	25	23
DIVISIONS ARMORED	12,760	3	4	5	4	4
CA Bn. (AA)(Mobile)	1,584	11	4	17	6	6
T. Bn. Md.	521	4	4	4	7	43
T. Bn. Lt.	461	4	4	4	4	4
Inf. Bn. (Front.)	469	4	5	11	0	10
Inf. Bn. (Air-Borne)	917	1	0	1	0	1
Inf. Bn. (Light Troop)	765	12	15	16	12	20
Inf. Bn. (Night Self-Prop)	728	2	4	3	3	4
Inf. Bn. (Heavy Self-Prop)	744	20	20	30	16	40
Availability of Marine Corps Units in Continental United States						
Divisions (Triangular)(Front)	15,119	2		2		2
Infantry Bn.	860	7		7		7
Recon Bn.	909	2		2		2
Art. Bn.	521	2		2		2
Para. Parachute Bn.	524	1		1		1

AVAILABILITY OF UNITED STATES SHIPPING

Compiled as of March 1, 1942

A. TROOP CAPACITY.

1. The available transports are sufficient to move all the troops that can be maintained overseas with the cargo vessels expected to be available during 1942. Within this capacity:

- a. 23,760 troops can be transported combat loaded in one trip.
b. 12,000 additional troops can be carried combat loaded by July, 1942.

B. SEA-GOING CARGO VESSELS (5000 dead weight tons or over).

1. This is the critical item and it controls the magnitude of our overseas effort.

- a. Controlled by Maritime Commission. 515 ships - 5,665,000 ship tons (40 sq.ft. per ton)

Approximate distribution.

- (1) 100 under repair, arming, degaussing, and factor for sinkings.
(2) 170 Archangel and Persian Gulf Routes.
(3) 175 India - Burma - Red Sea routes.
(4) 70 transporting coal, bauxite, manganese and miscellaneous strategic materials.
515 Total.

- b. Controlled by U.S. Navy 63 ships - 694,000 ship tons.

- c. Controlled by U.S. ARMY 110 ships - 1,200,000 ship tons.

Note: Only the Army ships are available to maintain additional troops overseas. The present shipping can maintain a maximum of 375,000 troops.

C. FACTORS USED FOR DETERMINING CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

1. These data have been carefully checked and the factors such as actual capacity of cargo vessels, the ship locations and turn-arounds, factor for sinkings, and the line, have been reduced to a common denominator. This table shows therefore the number of troops that can be transported and maintained overseas with a given number of cargo ships during 1942. This is under the assumption that an average of 18 additional cargo vessels per month will become available, which has been proposed by the War Department as a basis for planning. This is also under the assumption that sufficient additional cargo vessels will become available to meet Navy requirements. The average capacity of these cargo vessels is assumed to be 11,000 ship tons. The average turn-around is taken as 2.7 months.
2. In estimating the number of troops that can be subsequently transported and maintained overseas during 1942, the following conservative data have been used. This is based on the experience gained from the actual loading of task forces.

Ship tons per man.

	Troops	Temperate	Arctic
a. Equipment, vehicles, guns	5	5	55
b. 30 day maintenance	1	1.5	2
c. 60 days maintenance	2	3	4
d. Ship tons required for the initial movement of personnel, their individual equipment and subsistence while enroute, has been determined, from past experience, to be about 3.75 ship tons per man. This tonnage is normally carried in troop transports. The figure of 5 tons in sub-paragraph a. above also provides for the shipment of air force equipment and crated airplanes (less the large airplanes that usually fly to destination). If a shipment should be primarily tank or tank destroyer units, the figure of 5 ship tons in sub-paragraph a. above should be increased.			

D. TROOP MOVEMENT LIMITATIONS.

1. Military overseas movement and maintenance plans are based on obtaining an average of 18 additional cargo ships per month, losses included. With this increase the following troops can be moved and maintained.

- a. Number of troops that can be maintained overseas with present shipping - 375,000
Number of troops overseas enroute (less P.I.) as of March 1, 1942 - 267,000
Additional troops that can be moved and maintained with present shipping - 108,000
- b. Troops that can be moved and maintained with additional 18 ships per month.
- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (1) Additional troops that can be moved and maintained to July 1, (monthly average 50,000) | - 501,000 |
| Cumulative total to July 1 | - 309,000 |
| (2) Additional troops that can be moved and maintained to October 1, (Monthly average 41,000) | - 350,000 |
| Cumulative total to October 1 | - 351,000 |
| (3) Additional troops that can be moved and maintained to January 1, (Monthly average 39,000) | - 390,000 |
| Cumulative total to January 1 | - 390,000 |
| (4) Total troops overseas or enroute (less P.I.) as of March 1 | - 267,000 |
- c. Total troops that can be maintained overseas during 1942 with average turn-around (2.7 months) - 475,000
- d. Total troops that can be maintained overseas during 1942 if bulk of troops go to Europe (2.4 months) Estimated. - 480,000
- e. Total troops that can be maintained overseas during 1942 if bulk of troops go to Australia (4.0 months) Estimated. - 390,000
- f. Total troops that can be maintained overseas during 1942 if bulk of troops go to India-Middle East (5.0 months) Estimated. - 472,000

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