

310, Sec. ~~1~~ - INVASION AND OFFENSIVES, PLANS, LANDING OF TROOPS ** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1944

Normandy

Map Room
Box 104
Folder 3

310, Sec. ~~1~~ -

1944

Normandy

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

To : War Department

Rr : F 58883

13th June 1944.

From AFHQ F action USFOR, AGWAR F 58883 PWB to PWE
and OWI signed Wilson cite FHPWO.

Summary of French political intelligence report no
30 for week ending June 11.

First rumors Allied landings in France spread thru
Algiers early Tuesday morning as result German radio announce-
ment. Confirmation by Allied communique received with great
excitement. Crowds gathered around shop windows where
announcements posted. Frenchmen felt this really beginning
of end. Immediate reaction was relief, enthusiasm, boundless
optimism. Political quarrels and agreements or lack of agree-
ments abroad forgotten in general jubilation. Local press
full of statements by such figures as Guin, D Astier, and Le
Troquer. Consultative assembly considered special session.
Meanwhile public anxious for news and no news except communi-
ques was forthcoming from Allied sources. Therefore local
papers were filled with news from German sources until CPLN
instructed Bonnet to put stop to it. Public enthusiasm
greatly diminished next day. Still intense thirst for news
but people soon realized struggle in France might be long
and added dampening factor was no news large scale French
participation. When over optimism dwindled interest turned
against to progress negotiations in London between De Gaulle
and Allied authorities.

CN-IN 11170 (14 Jun 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY SR DATE

JAN 21 1974

Col. Park

30

310 Overland

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 2.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
Nr : F 58883 13th June 1944.

News of De Gaulles arrival in London not released in Algiers until after first invasion communique. Seeming coincidence of arrival and D day plus fact he broadcast to Europe along with heads of European Governments in exile were received with pleasure by French official circles. French here gained impression discussions with Eisenhower Churchill and others were going smoothly though some were puzzled selected commissaires had not gone to London especially Le Troquer. Finally France Afrique announced no agreement concerning administration liberated territories. This bitter despatch implied British ready come to understanding but American Government refused treat with De Gaulle and intended Allied civil administration for France until people could elect own Government. Eisenhowers 2 statements this week have not dispelled this interpretation in French minds. French object these statements made no reference to De Gaulle and implied continued Allied control liberated territory until people could choose own government whereas ordinance of April 21st providing provisional government during interim period had been publicly approved by Churchill. Thus French increasingly resent US Government and wearily welcome De Gaulles projected visit to Roosevelt as only possible remaining means of arriving satisfactory solution. De Gaulle believed returning Algiers for June 18th celebrations and to report on London talks before going Washington.

In interview with France Afrique De Gaulle protested Eisenhower's 2 declarations to French people which he said "Appear to foreshadow a kind of seizure of power in France by the Allied military command." He also mentioned another subject causing bitter comment in Algiers namely special

CM IN-11170 (14 Jun 44)

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BY SR , DATE JAN 21 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 3.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
Nr : F 58883 13th June 1944.

currency for Allied troops in France. The Algiers government greatly resent printing billions of notes in US without any guarantee agreement or consultation with the French and French financial officials fear serious economic complications. French authorities also unsuccessful in efforts persuade US to restrict purchasing power of troops in France. Mendes France just returned from Washington seems to have achieved no material results.

French find Allied attitude regarding use of term "Provisional Government" inexplicable. Whereas PWB live broadcasts from Algiers or elsewhere must avoid new title even when quoting French text the Frenchman hears BBC London frequently speaking of the "Provisional Government" on its French service. Further complication is that PWB relays these BBC broadcasts. Ban on use of term in leaflets dropped over France from Algiers has caused French authorities to withdraw cooperation with PWB in their production.

All diplomatic missions in Algiers now officially informed of change of title. Communique says that "According to diplomatic usage this notification does not necessitate a reply." Radical socialist party held congress in Algiers Saturday and Sunday first since war began. M Marc Rucart presided assisted by Professor Cassin Senator Astier and M Paul Anzionnaz all 3 assembly members. Party representatives within the government MM Queuille, Giscard and Mendes France did not attend. Tone of motions adopted reflected conservatism of radical socialists. Rucart De Astier provided bitterest opposition in assembly to plan for post liberation provisional government. Rucart described role of party by quoting Gambetta:

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 4.

From: CG, Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria
Nr : F 58883 13th June 1944.

"Our mission is to prevent putting the clock back to the French Revolution." Congress unanimously resolved expulsion from party of MM Camille Chaumps, Lucien Lamoureux, Chichery, Georges Bonnet and Jean Mistler. Members agreed next congress be held Paris.

On Sunday June 11 it was announced frontier Spanish and French Morocco would be closed to all but diplomatic and consular agents of France great Britain US and Russia. Also that cipher or pouch correspondence between neutral diplomats and consular agents accredited to CFLN and their governments would cease until further notice.

Moroccan border closing has again raised affair of Lemaigre Dubreuil and Rigaud. Persistent rumors concerning help these men received in crossing into Spain have resulted in inquiry commission to investigate means and possible accomplices. Called to appear and also indicted for desertion is Colonel Malaise former Chief Girsauds French mission in Madrid who reportedly left Morocco about time of Girsauds resignation without instructions. General Bethouard also reportedly requested to testify. Rumors in French official circles say that Colonel Malaise organized Madrid meeting of Lemaigre Dubreuil, rigaud and various Frenchmen recently arrived there from France including M De Monzie. The Comte De Paris recently in residence at Pampeluna also reported present at conference.

End.

ACTION: G-2 (OWI)

INFO : OPD, Log, CAD, Mr McCloy, Col Park

CM-IN-11170 (14 Jun 44) 1246Z jb

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BY SR . DATE JAN 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRIVER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSES	PRIORITY
FROM	AMCON VLADIVOSTOK	ASTERISK (*) MAILGRAM ADDRESSEE	
RELEASED BY		CNO	PRIORITY
DATE	9 JUNE 1944		ROUTINE
YOUR CODE	1627		DEFERRED
RECEIVED BY	GIDEON		PRIORITY
FORWARDED BY	HERWITZ <i>Herwitz</i>		ROUTINE
ROUTED BY	GIBSON		DEFERRED
090243		NCR 2364	

ON DEFERRING CARRIAGES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE HOUR CLEAR SPACE BEFORE THE

(ACTION CNO MOSCOW FROM AMCON VLAD.)

SECOND FRONT NEWS RECEIVED QUIETLY IN VLADIVOSTOK
CARRIED ON FRONT PAGE LOCAL NEWSPAPER FOR ONLY
TWO DAYS AND ALWAYS SECONDARY TO SOVIET COMMUNIQUE
ON RADIO. LOCAL REACTION IS ONE OF RESERVATION.
MAN IN STREET WONDERING WHAT WILL TAKE PLACE
ON RUSSIAN FRONT AND IS ASKING IF AMERICA WILL
CONTINUE TO SEND CANNED MEAT TO USSR. PRACTICALLY
NO RUSSIAN SPECULATIVE TALK OF JAP REACTION.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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500 DIR. 5200.8 (8/27/58)

16.....ACTION

Date-12-1-71

COMINCH....CNO...20G...NAYAIDE...STATE DEPT....

13....

Make original only. Deliver to Code Room Watch Officer in person. (See AIC 78 (1) NAVREGS.)

310 Overland

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

*ELH
Please inform
me about this
one*

**WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE**

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

Nr: 660

8 June 1944

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane

Burrows and I saw General Slavin, General Staff representative, last night. He was quite effusive in his congratulations on the opening of the second front and indicated that the Soviet General Staff was very appreciative of the situation summaries which we receive from General Eisenhower's Headquarters that we are sending to them. He gave us the general plan of the Soviet offensive which was communicated to the combined chiefs of staff over British channels. I asked him if it would not be possible to give us a situation summary daily similar to the one that we are furnishing to them and Slavin indicated that he thought the letter that we received from Antonov covered that point and that such a situation summary would be given us in sufficient detail to keep us abreast of Soviet operations.

No indication was given of where the offensive was to open initially, but I believe that it will be some place between Pskov and Vitebsk. I base this on the Soviet reluctance to permit us to hit Riga on our first shuttle

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-7177 (9 Jun 44)

Col Park

32

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: US Military Mission in Moscow, Russia

Nr: 660

8 June 1944

bombing missions. This refusal, I think, was to prevent drawing German fighters in that area.

End

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OFD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
CofS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-7177 (9 Jun 44) 1529Z 1cc

32
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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To : War Department
Nr : 650 7 June 1944
For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane

My impression of Soviet reaction to second front is that there is a general atmosphere of pleasure and relief but not a particularly demonstrative one.

Yesterday announcements were made on the street radios and crowds gathered and listened to announcements with evident pleasure but no wild cheering. Several of my closest contacts have either telephoned or written letters of congratulations. The Press this morning devotes almost their entire edition to the subject of the second front and its possibilities.

In conversation with individuals, there is a note of over-optimism that the war is practically ended. Burrows and I had a conference with our correspondents and pointed out to them that they should not sound an over-optimistic strain while at the same time avoiding any evidence of pessimism. We know that from time to time there will be lulls in our operations while we are organizing our advantages and we wish to avoid a too violent reaction from over-optimism to extreme pessimism on the part of the Russians during such periods. I am attempting to get an interview with General Staff representative this afternoon and may be able to give you more of the official reaction after I have seen him.

ACTION: JC/S End
INFORMATION: CG AAF, OPD, G-2, Adm King, Col Park, Log
CM-IN-6224 (8 Jun 44) 1213Z bjm

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

OVERLORD HIGHLIGHTS

German radio reports starting at 0033 EWT (0633 British time) gave first news of the invasion stating that the invasion had begun with the landing of paratroops at the mouth of the Seine and that German warships were battling Allied landing craft at Le Havre. Various German reports regarding the invasion were climaxed by one at 0315 which stated that landings were being made along the entire coast between Le Havre and Cherbourg.

At 0332 the first Allied confirmation of the invasion was broadcast from SHAEF with the previously prepared statement: "Under the command of General Eisenhower Allied Naval Forces supported by strong air forces began landing Allied Armies this morning on the northern coast of France". Previous to this official statement the only broadcast by the Allies was one from London warning the peoples of Holland and France within 18 and 22 miles of the coast respectively to stay away from cities and not to crowd highways and if possible to leave the coastal area.

At 0338 General Eisenhower's Order of the Day to the Allied Expeditionary Force was broadcast. A copy is attached herewith.

General Eisenhower's statement to the French people was broadcast at 0347 and was followed immediately by statements to their peoples by King Haakon, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and the Prime Minister of Belgium. It was announced that General De Gaulle would broadcast to the French people and King George to the British people later in the day.

No official communiques have been released regarding the progress of the landing. London sources say that the first paratroops to land met light, scattered resistance and that landings have been made in force from the Seine River to Cherbourg. German sources state that fierce fighting (presumably paratroops) is going on ten miles inland from the Normandy coast; Hitler is

taking personal command of his troops; the Netherlands have been warned that invasion is imminent.

The Prime Minister in report to House of Commons stated: 4,000 ships with several thousand smaller craft were engaged in the invasion; massed airborne landings successfully completed behind the German lines; landings on beaches progressing; shore batteries have been largely silenced; underwater obstructions not nearly as bad as feared; 11,000 Allied planes took part in softening up.

Eisenhower Order of the Day

The following is the Order of the Day issued today by General Eisenhower to each individual of the Allied Expeditionary Force. This Order was distributed to assault elements after their embarkation and was read by appropriate commanders to all of the Allied troops in the Allied Expeditionary Force.

"Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

"You are about to embark upon a great crusade toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers in arms on other fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny of the oppressed people of Europe and security for ourselves in a free world. Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained and well equipped and battle hardened. He will fight savagely, but this is the year 1944. Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted a great defeat in open battle man to man. Our air forces have seriously reduced the strength in the air and the capacity to wage war on the ground. Our home front has given us an over-whelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned, the free men of the world are marching together to victory. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory. Good luck and let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking."

all times ① EWI

- 052115 - OSC out for a supply of coffee.
- 2130 - Capt Wood called to review set-up.
- 2135 - Major Greer called. All set at his end.
- 2225 - Col Park called to review set-up.
- 2245 - Capt Putnam called for any last minute instructions. None.
- 2245 - Col Park called for periodic check.
- 2300 - News Broadcast. Heavy Bombers in great strength departed over the channel to-night.
- 2340 - Col Park called for periodic check.
- 060010 - Capt Putnam relieved Major Greer *2400*.
- 0040 - Capt Putnam gave Berlin broadcast, announcing that invasion had begun with landing of paratroops. Heard over Radio few minutes later. *91033*
- 0045 - Berlin broadcast says German warships are battling enemy landing craft at Le Havre. Le Havre being bombed.
- 0050 - Lt *Admiral* of G2 with same reports as above which he wanted to get to Col Park.
- 0100 - Radio. War Dept said early today that it had no information on German report that invasion had begun on Calais coast.
- 0100 - Per Col Park. G2 agent reports *in English, French & Dutch* paratroops landings taking place. First Broadcast from England. All inhabitants all areas 35 kilometers from coast asked to cooperate in order to prevent many losses of lives. Germans say landings at mouth of Seine to northern part of Normandy. Many landings taking place. Light tanks involved. Going after airfields. Last two per Putnam. *Modeling*
- 0115 - Radio broadcast. Germans say airborne troops landing at mouth of Seine.
- 0142 - Germans report strong bombing attack by allied forces on Calais and Dunkerque. Landings not followed up.
- 0155 - News Broadcast. Nothing new except that Germans say shock troops have been hurled against landings.
- 0200 - German radio reports that Allied Commander has warned that a new phase of the air offensive has begun which will effect people within 22 miles of the coast.
- 0230 - BPC broadcast. Leaflets will be dropped one hour or less before bombing of cities and people are warned to keep off main roads, railroads and bridges.

310 Overland

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- 060235 - Radio. Allied Supreme Command has broadcast a warning to inhabitants to leave the entire coast of France.
- 0235 - US commentators say German report may be designed to draw French underground into the open to annihilate them. However if reports are true it may be either a diversion or a large scale raid.
- 0300 - Radio. Resume states that only broadcasts from British sources have been to warn civilians in Holland within 18 miles of coast and in France within 22 miles of coast to stay away from cities, avoid crowds and try to stay in the country or wooded areas. Leaflets will be dropped by Allied planes one hour before bombing of cities.
- 0315 - Radio. Germans say combined British and American forces are landing along the entire coast between Le Havre and Cherbourg. 6 heavy warships and 20 destroyers are off Le Havre.
- 0318 - Putnam reports "alert" issued at 0317. "Alert" stated broadcast would be at 0332. *Called Adam Brown, Capt Mack and Cde Parks.*
- 0332 - Communique #1 "Under the command of Gen Eisenhower Allied Naval Forces supported by strong air forces began landing Allied Armies this morning on the northern coast of France"
- 0
0338 - Eisenhower Order of the Day
About to embark on a great crusade
Eyes of the world are on you
Hopes and prayers of liberty loving people all over the world march with you
Task not easy; enemy will fight savagely
Urge devotion to the task
May God go with you
- 0345 - Radio. British broadcast Gen Montgomery in command of British, Canadian and American troops.
- 0347 - Eisenhower Statement to the French People (SCAF 33 with two minor changes). Followed by Statements by King Haakon, Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Prime Minister of Belgium to their peoples all of which urged the people not members of organized resistance groups to do all in their powers to aid the invasion without committing any overt acts which would bring retribution on them. DeGaulle will broadcast later in the day. *King George will broadcast later in the day.*
- 0410 - Radio. German reports say Allied troops reenforced at dawn. Fierce fighting ~~xxxx~~ 10 miles inland from the Normandy Coast.

(3)

- 06455 - Radio. London reports landings made in overwhelming force from the Seine to Cherbourg; paratroops fighting well behind enemy lines.
- 0540 - Radio. German broadcasts state that Hitler has taken personal command of his troops. Germans have warned The Netherlands that invasion is imminent. Germans report many key airfields wiped out. London reports that the first paratroops met only light, scattered resistance.
- 0635 - PM told House of Commons: 4000 ships with several thousands smaller craft were engaged in the invasion; massed airborne landings successfully completed behind the German lines; landings on beaches progressing.
- 0700 - Radio. Germans admit loss of a ship. London states 15 planes lost. More on PM to Commons: shore batteries have been largely silenced; underwater obstructions not nearly as bad as feared; 11000 allied planes took part in softening up.
- 0715 - Ringing of Liberty Bell from Independence Hall in Philadelphia.
- 0718 - Radio. London says German DD's and E-boats are rushing into the landing area.
- 0725 - Radio. London reports Swedish correspondents in Germany stating landings made at 12 points on French Coast; forces now 10 miles inland at the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula.

0745 - Log closed. Summary prepared & go up with tray.

OS Collins

Naval

according to plan
casualties small to shipping

2 DDs / LST

061259 B

no maj chg on enemy intell.

CHARACTERISTICS OF US NAVAL
FORCES IN OVERLORD.

	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Standard Displacement</u>	<u>Designed Speed</u>	<u>Principal Guns.</u>
ARKANSAS --	1911	26,000	20.5k	12-12" 6- 5"
TEXAS -----	1912	27,000	20k	10-14" 6- 5"
NEVADA -----	1916	29,000	21k	10-14" 16- 5"
^N QUICY(CA) --	1943	13,400	34k	9-8" 12-5"
AUGUSTA(CA) -	1931	9,000	32.5k	9-8" 8-5"
TUSCALOOSA(CA)-	1934	10,000	32.5k	9-8" 8-5"
MARBLEHEAD(CL)-	1924	7,000	33k	10-6" 7-3"

DESTROYER LEADERS(All Completed 1944---2200tons---34.5ks---6-5"Guns)

Barton	Meredith	Walke
Laffey	O'Brien	

DESTROYERS(Completed 1938-39---1850tons---35ks---6-5" Guns)

Davis
Somers
Jouett

DESTROYERS(Completed 1940-43---1700 tons---35.5ks---6-5" Guns)

Baldwin	Fitch	Jeffers
Butler	Frankford	McCook
Carmick	Gherardi	Murphy
Corry -- <i>SWW</i>	Glennon	Plunkett
Loyle	Harding	Rodman
Emmons	Hambleton	Shubrick
Ellyson	Herndon	Satterlee
Forrest	Hobson	Thompson

310 *enclosed*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

From: US Military Attache, Stockholm, Sweden
To: War Department
No: 390 7 June 1944
390 Washington London.

Although the invasion was expected D day itself was a surprise here. Number 266 Military Advisor to the Defense Minister and cabinet admits he thought the invasion would be preceded by a powerful Russian attack directed at an objective that would force the Germans to react by withdrawing units from the West. I believe his thoughts were shared by many others in the defense establishment. The first news of the invasion was broadcast by local station 6 June at 7 hours Greenwich time. Eisenhower, King Haakons and other speeches were well received. An appreciation of the importance, magnitude and seriousness of the undertaking was evident. There was general enthusiasm for our success. Also evident was sober realization that shaping events might involve Sweden in the conflict.

Rayens

ACTION: G-2
INFC : CG AAF

OPD
Col. Park
LOO

RECEIVED

R. O. 12356, Sec. 3(1) and (2) at (2)
Classified May 3, 1972

By [signature] Date JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-6146 (8 June 44) 1024Z hle

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

CORRECTED COPY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-53233 5th June 1944

To AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, from
Eisenhower, S-53233. TOP SEC. This is SCAF 47.

Yesterday General De Gaulle agreed to broadcast a message on military line to the people of France following the statement by the Supreme Commander transmitted to you in SCAF 33. He requested a copy of this statement on which to base his own broadcast. Today he submitted a redraft of the Supreme Commander's statement which he requested be substituted for the text given you in SCAF 33. This redraft rearranged the text previously approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and in particular modified paragraph 9 thereof generally to the effect that French authorities would re-establish civil government.

General De Gaulle's representative was informed that time did not permit these proposed changes to be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or to be recorded and reprinted if approved. This afternoon word was received from General De Gaulle that while he understood and appreciated the reason why we were unable to change the original statement, he felt that in these circumstances he was unable to make a statement following that of General Eisenhower.

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CM-IN-4045 (5 Jun 44)

Date-

Signature-

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Nr: S-53233 5th June 1944

We have accordingly given up the idea of including a statement by Degaulle in the broadcast program, and will proceed without it as originally planned. It is probable that Degaulle will broadcast later.

End

Corrected copy of CM-IN-3958 (5 Jun 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

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CM-IN-4045 (5 Jun 44) 2145Z mos

Date-

Signature-

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE
URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-53201, SCAF 46, 5 June 1944

S-53201 TOPSEC BIGOT AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of
Staff signed Eisenhower this is SCAF No 46.

Exercise HORNPIPE. HALCYON Y plus 5 finally and
definitely confirmed. Acknowledge receipt.

End

Footnote: Receipt of this message acknowledged by WDCMC at
0953Z

4
0553Z

ACTION: Colonel McFarland

INFO: General Arnold
General Handy
C of S
Admiral King

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Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-3669 (5 June 44) 0953Z

bes

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Col. Park
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chief
71469

June 5, 1944

Supreme Commander
Allied Expeditionary Force
London, England

Number War 46236

TOPSEC for Eisenhower London, FACS 37 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

This acknowledges receipt of your S 53201, SCAF 46,
dated June 5, 1944.

End

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ORIGINATOR: Col McFarland

Date-

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Adm King
Col Park
Cofs

Signature-

CM-OUT-46236

(5 June 44)

1309Z

fbb

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY REQUIRES ADDITION
OF LETTERS "CCBF", TO CLASSIFICATION
OF REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To: War Department
CO, US Navy Department, Washington, DC
CG, US Forces in the European Theater of
Operations, London, England

DTG: 041254B 4 June 1944

BIGOT TOPSEC 041254 June COSITINTREP Number 3 from
Ramsey signed Eisenhower.

Part 2. Naval.

A. Enemy Intelligence.

No change.

B. Operation postponed 24 hours. Ships and
craft already at sea proceeding to shelter. Bombarding ships
remaining at sea.

ACTION: General Handy

INFORMATION: CG/S (Col. McFarland)
General Arnold
CGS
Adm. King
Col Park

Encl.

CM-IN-2939 (4 Jun 44) 1502Z rb

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY 9R, DATE JAN 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To: War Department

Nr: CP 90012

4 June 1944

SHAEP CP 90012 TOPSEC. To the Combined Chiefs
of Staff from Eisenhower cite SHSAC. This is SCAF number
45. To AOWAR for info SHAEP.

Arrived General De Gaulle in London today, in response to the Prime Ministers invitation. Since the principal purpose of inviting him here was to secure from him a statement to galvanize and unify resistance groups in France to help us at the crucial moment, the Prime Minister with my concurrence, necessarily briefed him in the general outline of our plan. In spite of the fact that weather has compelled some delay in the initiation of the attack, I am convinced that this does not involve any slightest risk to security since it is obvious that General De Gaulle and his Chief of Staff, both of whom are pledged to absolute secrecy, are anxious to assist in every possible way and to have the lodgement effected as soon as possible. As a result of conferences on military subjects attended by the Prime Minister, General De Gaulle, my Chief of Staff and others, General De Gaulle has agreed to prepare a broadcast on the lines suggested by us his broadcast to the French people will immediately follow mine on D Day. Moreover,

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CM-IN-3218 (4 Jun 44)

Printed in Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years, III, 1906-1907

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

Nr: CP-90012 4 June 1944

he directed General Koenig as head of the resistance groups
in France to take his instructions from me.

No political subject of any kind arose at my
Headquarters at the conference.

End.

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SM522-71

Date-12-1-71

Signature- RHO

ACTION: CCS (Col McFarland)

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

CM-IN-3218 (4 Jun 44) 2039Z mos

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Hr: S-53141, SCAF 44.

4 June 1944

From SHAEP to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
and SHAEP Adv CP, S-53141, signed Eisenhower. This is
SCAF 44.

overload identification
Delay in 2 day
Exercise HORNPIPE RIPCORD *1 day* one day TOP SECRET BIGOT.

2 day
HALCYON now designated Y plus 5. *15, 16 June* Acknowledge receipt.
Decision taken at 0430 hours 4 June 44 to postpone HALCYON
24 hours because of approaching adverse weather conditions
which will make air and airborne operations impossible.
Prospects are that further postponement of an additional
24 hours will be necessary. This decision to be taken at
2130 today 4 June 44 and confirmed again at 0430 tomorrow
5 June 44.

End

Footnote: Receipt of this message acknowledged by WDCHC
at 0552Z

ACTION: Colonel McFarland

INFO: General Arnold
General Handy
Admiral King
C of S

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CM IN-2659 (4 June 44) 0552Z

bes

Date-

Signature-

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria

Nr: S-53173 4 June 1944

To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated to AFHQ
signed Eisenhower. S 53173 TOPSEC.

Follows directive for D day and post D day white radio
propaganda to non Germans serving in Wehrmacht and auxiliary
services in OVERLORD area. Request Washington OWI and AFHQ
radio propaganda conform.

1. Main effort to be concentrated on transmissions
in Polish in usual Polish programs, with much shorter trans-
missions in Czech, Hungarian and Rumanian in usual programs
of these languages. Effort to be sustained until further
notice.

2. General lines of broadcasts will be:

- A. "This is not your war", therefore desert.
- B. Our treatment of prisoners of war is good.

3. All broadcasts to be trailed very briefly on all
German programs from D day to D plus 3 if there will be no
other attempt in German broadcasts to exploit presence of
non Germans in Wehrmacht.

see attached

CM-IN-3304 (4 Jun 44)

[REDACTED] T

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SR, DATE JAN 21 1974

Col. Park
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INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr: 8-53173

4 June 1944

4. Broadcasts to nonGermans will contain no implication of any amnesty, nor that they carry authority or approval of governments of nationals addressed.

5. So as not to involve local civilian populations, this campaign will not be reported in French, Dutch, Belgian, Danish and Norwegian programs, and no advice will be given civilians as to how they should behave towards deserters.

End

ACTION: JCS (Col McFarland)

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell (for OWI)
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
Log

CH-IN-3304 (4 Jun 44) 2232Z WOB

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SR DATE JAN 21 1974

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PRIORITY
SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department
Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, Algeria.

Nr: S53173 4th June, 1944

To AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated to AFHQ
signed Eisenhower. S 53173 TOPSEC.

Note: Correction para 3.

All broadcasts to be trailed very briefly on all
German programs from D day to D plus 3. There will be no
other attempt in German broadcasts to exploit presence of
non Germans in Wehrmacht.

End.

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-3304 (4 Jun 44) JCS

ACTION: JCS (Col McFarland)
INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell (for OWI)
~~Adm King~~
~~Col Park~~
Gen Surles
Log

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY *SR* , DATE JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-3532 (5 Jun 44) 0223Z mcs

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

To : 30 Military Mission Moscow

Rptd: J.S.M. Washington

From: War Cabinet Offices

Hbr : 2920

3 June 1944

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff for General
Burrows and General Deane.

Reference 2712 of 23rd May paragraph 3.

Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that
special intelligence room should be run on a combined
British-US basis.

2. We are taking up with SHARP question of providing
you with earliest intelligence of the progress of the
battle, and will telegraph further.

3. Air Commodore Roberts left last night carrying
originals of documents containing background information
on OVERLORD for your personal information, summaries of
which were despatched to you in recent series of telegrams
commencing 2872.

T.O.O. 031702Z

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy, Col. Park, C of B

CM-IN-2696

(4 Jun 44)

0705Z

ejv

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

3 June 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia (M-376)

Commanding General
U S Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WARK 45590

[REDACTED] to Generals Deane and Burrows for action, ETOWA pass to British Chiefs of Staff and SHAEF for Eisenhower for information from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff have agreed with proposal of General Burrows to set up a special intelligence room in Moscow for keeping the Soviet General Staff informed of the progress of operation OVERLORD but are strongly of the opinion that the room should be set up on a combined bases with General Deane participating and that information on the progress of the battle should be sent to Generals Burrows and Deane concurrently.

SHAEF has been asked to provide copies of situation and intelligence reports which will be sent to the United States and United Kingdom Military Missions in Moscow.

Meanwhile the British Chiefs of Staff are preparing background information, summaries of which will be cabled

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CM-OUT-45590 (3 Jun 44)

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

*col.
Pank*

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

Number WARK 45590

Page 2 [REDACTED]

to General Burrows in order to put both him and General Deane in the OVERLORD picture and to enable them to explain to the Soviet General Staff the reasons for any holdup in the operations if this occurs. Originals of these documents and certain photographs will be sent to Moscow by first safe opportunity.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the foregoing arrangements.

End

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
CofS

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-45590 (3 Jun 44) 1441Z lee

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
URGENT

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ONLY

From: CG Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London England

To: War Department

DTG 031815 B 3 June 1944

From Eisenhower to General Marshall eyes only
TOPSEC BIGOT.

Weather prospects so far as sea conditions are
concerned are rather favorable. From air viewpoint the
forecasts are not yet firm but we have almost an even
chance of having pretty fair conditions. In any event
I should say that only marked deterioration beyond that
now expected would disarrange our plans.

End

ACTION: Gen. Handy

INFORMATION: CC/S (Col McFarland)
Gen Arnold
Adm King
CofS

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BY SA DATE JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-2223 (3 Jun 44) 1828Z ss

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PRIORITY

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
To: War Department
No. U 63028 1 June 1944
To Arnold and Spaatz U 63028.

At the request of Air Ministry, British Ministry of Information has issued following guidance to British Press: "It is evident that Doctor Goebbels and the enemy propaganda machine have launched propaganda campaign deliberately designed to undermine the morale of our airmen. Broadcasts and articles have recently appeared actually inciting the German people to lynch any of our airmen who bail out on enemy territory. It is of the highest importance that this campaign should receive no assistance by its reproduction in the British Press, which of course is widely read by our airmen. It would be very much appreciated if you would refrain from reproducing such broadcasts or articles as may appear on this subject from enemy or neutral sources.

Story has now come from Stockholm that 5 American


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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

CM-IN-1115 (2 Jun 44)

Date-

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

Page -2-

From: CG, Strategic Air Forces in Europe, London, England
No. U 63028 1 June 1944

airmen were lynched yesterday by angry mobs before police could interfere * of this story and it is felt it may well be part of new line of propaganda to which Goebbels has now resorted. It would be much appreciated if you would refrain from publishing it until we have confirmation it is true."

We have asked Stars and Stripes also to refrain from publishing these reports. US Army censors here have requested that correspondents not cable stories on the alleged lynching but will permit them to do so if correspondents insist.

Recommend that War Department ask Byron Price to issue requests to American Press along the same lines as Ministry of Information issued.

No Sig.

*Being serviced for possible omission.

ACTION: BPR

INFO : CGAAP, OPD, G-2, Col Park, Log

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CM-IN-1115 (2 Jun 44) 0906Z j b

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

[REDACTED]
Date-

Signature-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
GENERAL MARSHALL EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

To : War Department

Nr : S 52951

1 June 1944

From SHAEF, S52951, to AGWAR personal from
Eisenhower to General Marshall eyes only. BIGOT ~~SECRET~~

Weather forecasts while still indefinite are
generally favorable. I will keep you informed on this
point. Everyone is in good heart and barring unsuitable
meteorological conditions we will do the trick as scheduled.

No Sig

ACTION: Gen Handy

Info: CC/S
Gen Arnold
Adm Eng
C of S
Col Park

CM-IN-411

(1 June 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SR . DATE

JAN 21 1974

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EYES ONLY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

June 1, 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 44981

[REDACTED] for Eisenhower London, FACS 35 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorize employment
of T-98 and PD-74 influence fuses with 3.7 and 90 MM.
Anti-aircraft guns respectively for defense of artificial
harbours in OVERLORD Beachhead areas, provided that such
use is limited to engagement of targets over the sea or
over land areas under our control where duds cannot be
recovered by the enemy.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-44981

(2 Jun 44) 0206Z amb

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

31 May 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR-44476

With reference to SCAP 31- [REDACTED] to Eisenhower, London,
FACS 34, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff do not consider that there can be any question of omitting the Polish Government from the list of those governments to be approached about the issue of an amnesty statement. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also see no grounds for not allowing the Polish Prime Minister to broadcast on or after "D" day to Poland, the Polish troops, and to Polish resistance groups in France. Any such broadcast statement of the Polish Prime Minister would have to be carefully worded and the State Department and Foreign Office would wish to see the draft beforehand.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park
Log

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-44476 (1 June 44) 0140Z met

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

To : War Department 619
US Military Attache, London, England 183

31 May 1944

To Combined Chiefs of Staff for action
Repeated to SHAEF and British Chiefs of Staff for info
from Deane and Burrows.

Word has just been received from the Soviet Foreign Office (re: WARK 42280 dated 27 May) concerning amnesty of Russians forced into service with German forces in the west. The Soviet Foreign Office stated that according to information at the disposal of the Soviets the numbers of such persons is insignificant and that no political interest would be served in making a special appeal to them. They stated further that the Soviet Government does not consider it expedient to join in the proposed statement in the name of Stalin or the Soviet Government.

No Sig

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
Col Park ✓
Log

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-333 (1 Jun 44) 1106Z ejm

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST
AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England

To: War Department

NR: S 52910, 31st May 1944

S 52910 to AGWAR for action Combined Chiefs of Staff,
information Jurien to AFHQ for information to Wilson for
McCrystal signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD this SCAP number
42.

SCAP series. Subject of the following is "D day
guidance for the press". This background information not
to be published. London correspondents will be briefed
along these general lines.

1. "The stress of public feeling among the peoples
of the United Nations has been so great during the past
months of expectancy that the release of pent-up emotion on
D day will have the character of an explosion. It will not
be possible to stem the forces of the explosion but it is
essential that they be channelled in a direction where, at
worst, they will do least harm. Uncontrolled detonation
would be a disaster. At best, these forces should be di-
rected where they will do most good for the Allied war ef-
fort. Such direction will not be easy but it is incumbent
on all concerned with the press and radio to ensure that
these moulders of public opinion are given such guidance
as will cause the emotional forces liberated by the break-
ing of the news of the invasion to be kept within defined
channels.

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CM-12-445 (1 Jun 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England
NR: S 52910, 31st May 1944

2. The fortress of Europe is a nut with a kernel. The kernel is the German Reich-the military, political and personal objective of everyone engaged on the Allied side in this war. To get at the kernel in order to destroy it, it is necessary to crack the shell.

3. The shell is extremely tough, and the first hammer blow cannot be expected to cause more than an indentation. But the posing of the hammer for the first blow has been a task of the greatest magnitude, and the fact that it caused an indentation is something which is a great accomplishment in itself. In other words, the fact that we have landed on the continent can be recorded as a great feat, taken all by itself, and without any speculation as to what may be coming next. This is a point which can and should be written up.

4. Though it is unquestionably true that the actual landing on continental soil is a great feat, it is but a first step. The second step is the securing of a firm enough footing to stay there, that is, to stay there until the enemy has abandoned all hope of turning us out. During the period which ends with the completion of the 2nd step, our troops will be engaged in warding off counter-attacks which in the beginning may be expected to be local, swelling later to the fully prepared and co-ordinated counter-attack by mobile reserves. The press and radio would not be deluded into believing that the period of counter-attacks is likely to be of short duration; it may be extended. For this reason it is very important that early successes should not be magnified. We have far to go.

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GM-10-245 (1 Jun 44)

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Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England
NR: S 52910, 31st May 1944

5. The 3rd step is the spring forward from the secure lodgement and the move towards the goal.

6. Allied commanders and armies are conscious of the magnitude of the task before them, yet no one should be led to believe that the lodgement battles are a prelude to the immediate end of the war.

7. In describing the preparations which have gone before to make a landing possible at all, stress should be laid on the integration of effort between all the Allied forces engaged from the highest ranks to the lowest.

8. While we have taken time to lay our preparations well and surely, so have the Germans. The enemy has been in possession of the territory he now has to defend for four years. He is a past master in the art of war-defence, as well as offence. The defence we are up against may be expected to be the best that man can devise.

9. The beach defences are only the crust, and behind them we shall have to meet rear positions and mobile reserves. How strongly the enemy will hold his rear positions we do not know. It is possible to indicate topographically where they might be, and some speculation on this point may be permitted. The point is, however, that the attack on each successive position brings something fresh to our dispositions, and in this great adventure, as with everything else, success or failure is only made certain by the actual passing of events. Thus we should watch this operation as a succession of changing dispositions, without trying to guess what shape they may take in the

GM-IN-445 (1 Jun 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
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Page 4

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England

HR: S 52910, 31st May 1944 :

future.

10. If the changes bring forth success at each succeeding phase, then we should count them as one further stage in outwitting the enemy, and a tribute to the skill of our Army; not as a milestone to Berlin.

11. Any tendency to gloat over the failure of the German Navy to prevent the assault troops from reaching the shore should be restrained. His Naval forces may be biding their time, and waiting for the larger game.

12. All beach attacks must be frontal; it is impossible to sail up estuaries, and get round behind. In this respect, viewed very broadly, we have a reflection of the static warfare period of the last war. But with this difference, "no mans land" is much wider and is water. Everything from a bull-dozer to a set of instruments-makers tools has to be water-borne. Any indication that this assault bears relation to the trench attacks of 1916-17-18 must be skillfully done, and the only purpose of doing so might be to bring out the essential frontal nature of beach assault. (It would obviously be out of the question, and without relation to fact, if we were to hark back to the "land" assaults of Passchendaele).

13. The number of German Divisions located in the western seaboard of Europe has often been referred to on the press recently. We should try and avoid being definite on this point, and attempting to keep it up to date in the absence of official releases. What we can and should say

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Page 5

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England
NR: S 52910, 31st May 1944

is that the enemy array is very formidable. It is obviously impossible to say anything about Allied strength or Allied order of battle. As operations proceed, releases of Commanders, Formations, Regiments and Units will be made by SHAEP as soon as it is possible to do so.

14. We must keep the enemy guessing.

15. Therefore, anything that the press and radio can do to keep the enemy in a state of nervous tension as to whether or not the landings of which he has already expressed himself as aware, are but a foretaste of something which may be repeated anywhere anytime will be of the greatest possible help. A high state of nervousness and tension may be expected among the inactive flanking troops who at the beginning will be awaiting attack on themselves.

16. It is important that there should be no indication of the manner in which the supreme commander intends to conduct the campaign, or, beyond the bold statement that, topographically, a line of defence exists here or there, that he has this or that objective at the front of his mind at any particular time.

17. It is equally important to realize the danger of conjecture. A lucky guess published in a newspaper may afford the guesser some personal satisfaction, but it may result in giving the enemy satisfaction as well. A lucky guess by one person may not in itself be so dangerous, but the danger lies in many correspondents guessing in the same lucky way on the same day. We may indicate which way, in

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Page 6

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London England
Nr : 3 52910, 31st May 1944

our personal opinion, the dice appear to be loaded, but we must not take it upon ourselves to predict how the dice will fall out of the shaker.

18. It will be regarded as a service if the press and radio will emphasise the all importance of an exact measure of the logistics involved in staging an operation of this magnitude.

19. Finally, 2 points which may arise at press conferences namely:

A. The press and radio should not be misled by the presence of troops of other nationalities within the German ranks into believing that these troops are necessarily a source of weakness, nor that such dilution is likely to be a cause of early disintegration. There is a considerable risk from our point of view that they will fight well.

B. Too much must not be expected from the local inhabitants in the coastal belt. They are comparatively few in number mostly women, children and old men.

To sum up: Our urge upon the press and radio should be to present a correct and sober representation of events as they occur, and to leave the future to unfold itself.

ACTION: CCS
INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
Log

No Sig

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[REDACTED]

PRIORITY

[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

No: S 52827

30 May 1944

From SHAEF, S 52827, to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff signed Eisenhower TOPSEC BIGOT this is SCAF number
40 cite SHGBI.

As the date of assault approaches it is apparent
that 2 factors operate powerfully to mislead the enemy and
hence to further the success of our plans. The Germans
overestimate the strength of our seaborne assault and
therefore will hold out forces to deal with landings addi-
tional to those planned by us. The enemy is also in ignor-
ance of the dependence we place on MULBERRIES and therefore
tends to garrison lightly terrain which is critical to us.
I am convinced that we cannot overestimate the importance
of security concerning these 2 vital matters namely the
strength of our assault and the nature and purpose of MUL-
BERRIES. I therefore request that the United States Chiefs
of Staff be instructed to employ the resources of joint
security control to the utmost to ensure security on these
matters. Similar action is being initiated in these head-
quarters and with the British Security organization.

No sig.

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold, Gen. Handy, Gen. Bissell, Adm. King,
Col. Park, C of S.

CM-IN-23360

(30 May 44) 2311Z

e:jv

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[Printed in The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, The War Years, III, 1894]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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URGENT

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: S-52846

30 May 1944

S-52846 for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from
Eisenhower site SHCO3 TOP SECRET. This is SCAF 41.

Last sentence of paragraph 1 of SCAF 39 should read
as follows. "Furthermore, the necessity for building up
reserves in the NEPTUNE area, the unproven quality of our
various pipe line devices and the necessity for providing
insurance against their failure, and in particular, the
vital part to be played by the Air Force in our operational
plan convinces me that if ever there was a time to bring
the reserves of aviation gasoline in the United Kingdom up
to the 4 months estimated forward consumption previously
agreed upon, it is now"

No Sig.

Note: SCAF 39 is CM-IN-22200 (29 May 44) OCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park

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CM-IN-23310

(30 May 44) 2113Z

ejv

Date-

Signature-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: US Military Attache, Moscow, Russia

To: War Department

No: 608 29 May 1944

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane

Upon receipt of your number 42280, 27 May, yesterday morning, Burrows and I had our respective Ambassadors request Mr. Malotof to have Stalin issue a statement along the lines indicated in your message which General Eisenhower would be authorized to use. At the same time, Burrows and I informed General Staff of your wishes and to both the Diplomatic and Military authorities we expressed the necessity for prompt action in the matter. We shall keep after it and let you know as soon as we get a reaction.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
Col Park
Log

42280 is CM-OUT-42280

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-22877 (30 May 44) 1045Z ejm

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3/10 Quebed

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PRIORITY

SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

No: S 52713

28 May 1944

Reference your W 39395 of 20 May and our S 52384 of 23 May. To Joint Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower S 52713 TOPSEC. Repeated to FREEDOM for information OWI, PWE, London and AFHQ, Algiers are being furnished same suggested guidance.

This is propaganda guidance for first few days OVERLORD operation. Following this period we revert to the normal practice of a married OWI-PWE directive in which will be reflected SHAEF guidance. The civilian agencies being unaware of the cover and deception plans, we have slanted the background information to ensure that the output of these agencies conforms to such plans. Text of guidance is:

"Item 1. Background briefing for propaganda agencies. (not to be used in output.)

A. Military.

1. Initial composition of forces.

- a. Not only Anglo-US troops but also other allied troops will participate, including French troops.

CM-IN-22112 (29 May 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY SR, DATE

JAN 21 1974

Col Park

30

310 Overlord

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PRIORITY

Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713

28 May 1944

- b. Allied Naval and Air Forces will carry, maintain and protect the operation.
- 2. Synchronization with other offensives.
 - a. There will be synchronized, but not necessarily simultaneous, offensives on
 - (1) The Russian front,
 - (2) in the Balkans by Tito,
 - (3) in Italy,
 - (4) and in the air war over Germany—unless air needs over the beachheads interfere.
 - b. It will be the first of a series of West European operations aimed at targets ranging from North Cape to Biscay and throughout the Mediterranean.
- 3. Likely German strategy and resources.
 - a. The German resistance will be fanatical, and they will be employing all their available resources. Rommel's main assignment for the past 4 months has been to strengthen the Atlantic wall, and for some time German propaganda

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PRIORITY

Page 3

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713

28 May 1944

has taken the line that ultimate victory goes to the army which not only has the arms but also deserves victory because of its morale.

- b. Under Rundstedt, Rommel, along with Blaskovits, will be in charge of operations. We can expect that Rommel will throw forward all the men at his disposal so as to crush the landings on the beachheads themselves, or in the immediate vicinity, as soon as possible.
- c. The Germans will have initial superiority in supply facilities and with the use of these may well be able in 24 hours to concentrate numerical superiority. In the early stages these superiorities may be substantial. Against these we shall have
 - (1) marked air superiority,
 - (2) Naval supremacy,
 - (3) limited strategical initiative and tactical surprise; the Germans do not know how many more landings there will be and this will immobilize their distant reserves.

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BY *SK*, DATE JAN 21 1974

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From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: S 52713 28 May 1944

4. First phase--Capture and consolidation of the bridgehead. We should assume, in preparing propaganda, 2 possible critical moments during the first phase--

- (1) the first few hours on the bridgehead, and
(2) the first few days when we are seeking to enlarge and consolidate the bridgehead.

This first phase may well last several days.

5. Second phase. After the bridgehead is established the next critical periods will be those of the German counterattacks.

B. Wehrmacht.

- A. The morale of the German Battle troops should be assumed good. This will not apply to the Polish and Russian (largely Georgian) units, although there is considerable risk that the latter will fight well.
- B. Nervousness and tension will probably be high among the inactive flanking troops and flanking services, who at the beginning will be awaiting attack on themselves.
- C. Appreciable numbers of non-Germans in the German labor organization and TODT Organization will be in the vicinity.

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Page 5

SECRET

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 28 May 1944

C. Local population.

(A) The civilian population in the areas concerned is far below its normal strength--most of the residents will be women, children and old men. They will be instructed by radio and leaflets to stay put. We cannot assume, however, that these initial instructions will be obeyed or that they will be able to obey them.

(B) Organized resistance groups have received their instructions from the appropriate authorities to carry out their tasks from the moment of landing.

Item 2: Guidance.

A. General Consideration.

1. In handling the news bearing upon the operation it will be necessary to maintain a balance between:
 - (a) Our complete confidence in the outcome of the operation.
 - (b) Our recognition of the difficulties and hazards of the greatest amphibious

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PRIORITY

Page 6

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 26 May 1944

operation ever staged against massive
defenses.

B. Overall guidance.

Do's

- (a) Call our armies the "Allied Expeditionary Force", not "The Armies of Liberation".
- (b) Emphasize integrated action by all 3 services and Allied Nations Forces.
- (c) Maintain by related reporting, the balance between this front and all others, showing synchronized action by the United Nations on all fronts.
- (d) Stress the increased vulnerability to further landings on the west of Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean Coast.
- (e) Point out that progress of our forces must be judged not in terms of miles but of defense positions broken and enemy killed. It will be achieved against German troops whose defenses, numbers, material and, above all, morale, are good--as good as any available to the German high command.

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PRIORITY

Page 7

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 28 May 1944

- (f) Comment that progress achieved is the result of
- (1) our superior morale,
 - (2) our superior tactics--especially in terms of flanking and encircling movements,
 - (3) our preceding air attacks on German means of communication and supply throughout Occupied Europe,
 - (4) the assistance of organized resistance and of transport workers,
 - (5) our strategical and tactical superiority on the sea and in the air, the latter giving us freedom to use airborne troops.

Don'ts

- (a) Don't claim that the maximum German naval effort to defeat the operation has been made and overcome; their maximum effort may come at a later stage. Don't ask what has happened to the German surface fleet.
- (b) Do not call the operation the "Invasion" or "The second front".
- (c) No suggestion of the use of "secret weapons" by either side unless it is covered by official United Nations release.

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From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 28 May 1944

- (d) No suggestion or implication that this is the only landing taking place or contemplated in Northwestern Europe.
 - (e) No mention of the nationality and comparative strength of the troops engaged until an official release.
 - (f) No naming of, or speculation about the identity of, the commanders of naval, air and land forces, except those announced officially.
 - (g) No speculation as to the rate of progress or future objectives.
 - (h) Don't state or imply that victory on the beachheads means an early end of the war.
 - (i) Avoid building up German commanders by undue use of their names.
 - (j) No reports or discussions about food and relief supplies should be given unless based on official releases.
- C. Special guidance for propaganda to the enemy.
- (a) Do not waste radio time on the German troops

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PRIORITY

Page 9

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 28 May 1944

in the battle area. They will not be listening.

- (b) Concentrate on explaining to the German people as a whole, and in particular to the German troops on the flanks, the plight of the forward and flanking troops left behind like "human land mines" to be "winkled out". Draw parallel from Cassino and the Hitler Line.
- (c) A special directive will follow for propaganda to foreigners in the German Army.
- (d) Air attacks on Germany should, wherever possible, be linked with the shortage of German fighters--particularly night fighters.
- (e) Exploit the tension of German troops standing to along the whole length of the Atlantic Wall.
- (f) Generally in handling the news avoid melodrama. The treatment should be soldierly, sober, matter of fact.
- (g) Stress the tremendous firepower which will be needed to breach the Atlantic wall,

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PRIORITY

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From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S 52713 26 May 1944

emphasizing the effects of our naval gunfire,
the heaviest yet experienced by German troops.
Play up hardness of the effects of our fire-
power on sea, land and air.

- D. Special guidance for propaganda to Western
occupied countries.
- (a) Maintain constant appeal for restraint and
discipline. These should follow strictly
the lines of supreme commanders statement.
In particular, follow the supreme commanders
lead in doing all you can to discourage a
levee en masse in this phase. The supreme
commander will be supported in this line
by statements from King Haakon, The Dutch
Prime Minister and M. Pierlot. It is
still uncertain whether General De Gaulle
will speak, and if he speaks, what he will
say.
- (b) London radio will give the line for a
special campaign to encourage transport
workers to organize sabotage of communications
feeding the Atlantic Wall between Antwerp
and Nantes. This line will be given by
British and American speakers and also by
Guigui in a special appeal to members of

CM-IN-22112 (29 May 44)

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TO ~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: 3 52713 28 May 1944

the French Trades Union, CGT. This line must be strictly followed and no appeals made to transport workers outside the above area. Cross reporting in various language broadcasts is permitted.

- (c) News of successful action by transport workers should be fully reported and related where possible to our air campaign against German communications. Contrariwise, news suggesting levee en masse should be played down.
- (d) Achievements of organized resistance groups in France should be treated solely as part of military operations and not as prelude to levee en masse.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: 52384 is CM-IN-17618 (23 May 44) JC/B

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park, ✓
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BY 3K . DATE JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-22112 (29 May 44) 1018Z mlc

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Re: S-52647

27 May 1944

From UNITY, S-52647, to AOWAR for Combined Chiefs
of Staff signed Eisenhower TOP SEC cite SHPRD. This is
SCAF number 37.

For release of the first communique we are prepar-
ing procedure consisting of 3 steps.

1st step: To flash you a signal saying that we are
releasing the communique. This will be sent by the Public
Relations Officer immediately he is told by G 3 that the
communique may be released. The flash signal is for your
information and does not require action. This substitute
plan is considered an improvement over the plan suggested
in our SCAF 22.

2nd step: Immediately the flash message to you is
dispatched the communique will be broadcast by the Public
Relations Officer. This will be done on a network of
channels under Public Relations control reaching the
United States, Canada and AFHQ plus the BBC for the
British public. The Chief Signal Officer and Director of
Public Relations of the War Department are being asked to
make the necessary arrangements at that end. This broad-
cast should assure simultaneous release in all Allied
nations.

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CN-IN-21230 (28 May 44)

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Page 2

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

No: S-52647

27 May 1944

3rd step: Simultaneously with the broadcast the
communique will be sent by Public Relations officer by
cable and radio teletype to the office of War Information
in Washington for distribution to the United States and
Canadian press. The War Department also is being asked to
make this arrangement with OWI. We are arranging trans-
mission to the British Press AFHQ and a supplementary
channel to Canada.

No sig.

FOOTNOTE: SCAP 22 is CM-IN-5301 (7 May 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

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INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
C of S

Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-21230 (28 May 44) 0458Z jb

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 26, 1944

U.S. Military Mission,
Moscow, Russia M-333

Att: Major General John R. Deane

Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces;
London, England

Number: WAR 42280

[REDACTED] for Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action from
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, repeated to SCAEF and British
Chiefs of Staff for information.

There is a large Russian element which has been forced to serve
with the German Forces in the west. SCAEF would like to obtain
a statement promising amnesty or considerate treatment of
these Russians provided they surrender to the Allies at the
first opportunity. This promise would not include persons
known to have intentionally performed traitorous acts, or vol-
unteers, or members of SS formations, but would be confined to
those Russians serving as a result of German compulsion.
Such a statement would be used with the view of inducing
Russian desertions from the German armed forces and of
creating German mistrust of Russians serving with those
forces. No statement along these lines would be issued prior
to D Day for obvious security reasons.

It is requested that you approach the Russian authorities
regarding their willingness to make any concessions along
the lines indicated and report the Russian reaction to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ORIGINATOR : CG/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, OPD, Adm King, Col Park, LOG

CM-OUT-42280 (27 May 44) 0046Z mud

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

URGENT
[REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

No. S 52599 26 May 1944

From UNITY to AGWAR S 52599 [REDACTED] for the Combined
Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is SCAP 36.

Amend sentence 2 paragraph 6 of SCAP 33 please to
read as follows:

"Fighting beside their allies, they will play a
worthy part in the liberation of their homeland."

This change will avoid premature disclosure of com-
position of forces.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: SCAP 33 is CM-IN-18403 (24 May 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

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Date-

CM-IN-20190 (26 May 44) 23557 jbsignature-
[REDACTED]

310 Overlord [REDACTED]

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 23, 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 40513

TOPSEC for Eisenhower London, PACS 30 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

This acknowledges receipt of your S 52372 dated
May 23rd.

No Sig

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
LOG

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Date-

Signature-

WM-OUT-40513

(23 May 44)

2238Z

ekc

310 Overland
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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

To: War Department

NR: 3 52384

23 May 1944

From Unity to AGWAR, S 52384, [REDACTED] for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite SHPWD
reference your W 39395 of 20th May.

Detailed propaganda and publicity guidance
coordinated with PWE and OWI London and schedules
D Day broadcast and leaflets due for despatch Saturday
next 27th May. For security reasons we are planning not
to send you in advance any texts or translations other
than the communique already furnished and statement
by Supreme Commander as will be contained in SCAF number
33.

We are arranging special D Day broadcast to Europe
including communique and statements by Supreme Commander.
Also probable are statements by King of Norway, Queen of
Netherlands, Belgian Prime Minister, Grand Duchess of
Luxembourg and, if possible, DeGaulle. This broadcast
should be monitored by OWI New York and AFHQ Algiers and
thus provide them with authorized texts and official
translations of all D Day statements to Europe.

We do not expect D Day statement by President or

CM-IN-17618 (23 May 44)

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY *SL* . DATE JAN 21 1974

31

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By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

-page 2-

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

NR: S 52384

23 May 1944

Prime Minister addressed to European peoples. We assume that if they speak, their remarks will be addressed to the troops and to home public.

Distinct from D Day broadcast to Europe we plan simultaneous D Day broadcast in English to cover all British and American broadcasting stations. Detailed schedules for this will also be despatched by Saturday.

No Sig

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park ✓
Log

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JCS LETTER 7-5-72
BY *SR* , DATE JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-17618 (23 May 44) 2258z jb

~~SECRET~~

31

~~SECRET~~

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT *To be shown to*
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER *the President*
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE *WGS*


U R G E N T

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

To: War Department

Nr: S-52137 19 May 1944.

S-52137 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff,
signed Eisenhower, cite SHPWD. This is SCAP number 31.

In furtherance of SCAP number 28, some doubt arises
as to the political implications involved in approving the
Polish Government in exile for any amnesty statement. Such
statement is desirable and would be most acceptable. No ap-
proach in this matter has yet been made.

✓ A further concern is whether the Prime Minister of
the Polish Government in exile should be permitted to broad-
cast on or after D day any message to Poland, Polish troops
serving with the allies (some of which are a part of my Com-
mand), and Polish resistance groups in France.

It is desirable that heads of states do broadcast
to their peoples in occupied countries on D day and rein-
force my demands for obedience to my orders given to resis-
tance groups and my instructions about premature levee en
masse. Their statements can also be used to further plan
fortitude.

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CM-IN-14486 (19 May 44, 


310 Overlord

Col. Park
COPY NO.

41

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
U R G E N T

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Nr: S-52137 19 May 1944.

✓ In both these matters the Polish Government in exile
would have to be approached. The Russian attitude toward
this Government causes me to ask for guidance.

No Sig.

FOOTNOTE: SCAF 28 is CM-IN-12783 (17 May 44) CC/S

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ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
SGS
Adm. King
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-14486 (19 May 44) 1934Z jb
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

b2

[REDACTED]

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia
To: War Department
Nr: 577 19 May, 1944

For Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff from Deane
[REDACTED]

Following is a report of Russian activity regard-
ing progress of the BODYGUARD plan: ^{deception}

With respect to Scandinavian feature of the plan, Russians are implementing their share by simulating sea-borne attacks on unspecified targets in northern Scandinavia. Active measures to simulate this attack include concentration of ships, troops, and equipment in Kola Inlet; training with the Navy; air and sea reconnaissance of coast between Vardo and Berlevag; lectures, issue of maps to personnel; increased interservice wireless communications. As a notional measure, it has been indicated to enemy that Soviet Army and Naval officers have been flown to Scotland to coordinate Russian assaults with our own.

With regard to the part of the plan that OVERLORD is to be postponed, measures taken by Russians include information being passed to enemy that the Army's main offensive will not begin until end of June; that Soviet Command is forming a new army on central front out of high category troops; this Army has been ordered to be ready by June; reserve commands have received a directive to increase training of reserves for employment in July; military schools have been instructed to train cadets for graduation

CM-IN-14952 (20 May 44)

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JOS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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[REDACTED]
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2

From: U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, Russia

Nr: 577 19 May, 1944

as officers by 15th July; Partisan Commanders have been instructed to spread in enemy occupied territory the report that the summer offensive will start in June.

As far as I can learn, the Russians have done nothing with regard to the Balkan phase of the plan, perhaps feeling that they have accomplished their part by actual advance to the frontiers of Rumania.

No Sig

ACTION: JC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
C of S
Col. Park

CM-IN-14952 (20 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 18, 1944

Commanding General
US Military Mission
Moscow, Russia USSR (M 292)

Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London, England

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

Number WARX 38594

[REDACTED] for General Deane and General Brocas Burrows to be submitted by them as a Combined Report to USSR from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This message repeated to CGUSAFETO for information British Chiefs of Staff

Consisting of 2 parts this message contains firstly a periodic report on Mediterranean operations and secondly a report on OVERLORD. Report on pointblank when received will be forwarded separately.

PART 1.

This is the monthly progress report on operations in the Mediterranean Theatre covering the period from 16 April to 15 May 1944.

1. Current operations. The Allied Armies in Italy are now engaged in offensive operations. The extent and results of these operations cannot as yet be properly evaluated.

2. Build up of formations. The US Division mentioned in last month's report has closed in MTO. The refitting of the 2 British Divisions sent to Mleast from Italy is progressing.

CM-OUT-38594 (19 May 44)

310 Overlord

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

Book Message Number WARX 38594

Page 2

3. Preparations for future operations. Planning for alternative operations in the south of France continues. Plans for operations to take and hold the Island of Elba are now well advanced.

4. Service troops. The training of Service Units which are now in the theatre is proceeding.

5. Supplies. Essential supplies for the initial phases of operations subsequent to diadem are in the theatre or enroute.

6. Air Offensive. The heavy bombers of the Mediterranean Theatre have concentrated on bombing transportation centers in the Balkans in support of Russian operations: Ploesti, Bucharest, Brasov and Turnu-Severin have been major targets. During the period covered by this report approximately 34,000 tons of bombs have been dropped by MAAF on targets in Germany, Austria, Italy, France and The Balkans.

PART 2.

Fourth Progress report on preparations for operation OVERLORD as of May 15, 1944.

1. a. U.S. Divisions: 12 Infantry, 5 Armoured and 2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. All these divisions are operationally available.

b. British Divisions. 10 Infantry, 4 Armored and 2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of these 9 Infantry, 4 Armoured and 2 Airborne Divisions are operationally available. 1 Polish Armoured Division is also in the United Kingdom, but there are not sufficient rear administrative units available to maintain it in addition to the 4 British Armoured Divisions.

2. Status of U.S. and British Air Forces.

a. The general state of readiness of the Air Forces to be
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Book Message Number WARX 38594

Page 3

employed in support of operation OVERLORD, both operationally and administratively, is satisfactory.

b. Air Forces are now actively engaged in operations preparatory to the assault.

3. Naval preparations for mounting the assault and build-up of landing craft. Intensive training has been carried out during the past month by all forces with beneficial results. All forces are now very nearly up to full strength.

4. Administrative preparations in general.

a. Mounting. Concentration of formations and assembly and loading of merchant shipping proceeds according to plan

b. Build-up of Administrative Troops. Shortages of transport troops and of Medical Officers and Nurses still exist.

c. Material resources. Shortages of several major items, such as amphibious trucks, tank transporters, LVTS, mine exploding devices, certain heavy transportation equipment, and various types of ammunition still remain, but arrangements have been made to assure that shortages existing on D-Day will not be such as to seriously affect the operation.

d. Civil Affairs. Personnel. Mobilization of Civil Affairs personnel continues. Supplies. Basic items of civilian supplies allocated to army groups for first 90 days will be available as required, and study of requirements for second 90 days has begun.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold, OPD, Adm King, Col Park, LOG

CM-OUT-38594 (19 May 44) 0211Z 1pb

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974
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WS*

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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

P R I O R I T Y

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To : War Department

Nr. : S-52025 17 May, 1944

TOPSEC S-52025 for AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of
Staff signed Eisenhower.

*** 15th May, 1944. This is SCAF number 29, part 1-
operation OVERLORD.

Paragraph 1.

A. U.S. Divisions. 12^{1/2} Infantry, 5 Armoured and
2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. All
these divisions are operationally available.

B. British Divisions. Ten Infantry, 4 Armoured
and 2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of
these 9 Infantry, 4 Armoured and 2 Airborne Divisions are
operationally available. One Polish Armoured Division is
also in the United Kingdom, but there are not sufficient
rear administrative units available to maintain it in
addition to the 4 British Armoured Divisions.

Paragraph 2. Status of U.S. and British Air Forces.

A. The general state of readiness of the Air
Forces to be employed in support of operation OVERLORD,
both operationally and administratively, is satisfactory.

B. Air Forces are now actively engaged in operations
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CM-IN-13142 (18 May 44)

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Col Park

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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[REDACTED]

Page [REDACTED]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Nr. : S-52025 17 May, 1944

preparatory to the assault.

Paragraph 3. Naval preparations for mounting the assault and build-up of landing craft. Intensive training has been carried out during the past month by all forces with beneficial results. All forces are now very nearly up to full strength.

Paragraph 4. Administrative preparations in general.

A. Mounting. Concentration of formations and assembly and loading of merchant shipping proceeds according to plan.

B. Build-up of administrative troops. Shortages of transport troops and of medical officers and nurses still exist.

C. Material resources. Shortages of several major items, such as amphibious trucks, tank transporters, LVTs, mine exploding devices, certain heavy transportation equipment, and various types of ammunition still remain, but arrangements have been made to assure that shortages existing on D Day will not be such as to seriously affect the operation.

D. Civil Affairs. Personnel. Mobilization of Civil Affairs personnel continues. Supplies. Basic items of civilian supplies allocated to Army groups for first 90 days will be available as required, and study of requirements for second 90 days has begun.

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CM-IN-13142 (18 May 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Mr. : S-52025 17 May, 1944

RANKIN case B-NORWAY

Part 2 - Summary of plans ~~for~~ - Norway.

WZ Paragraph 1. SHAEP plans provide that in the event of a German withdrawal from Norway, British, Norwegian and U.S. Forces will occupy and establish control in key areas of Norway for the purpose of:

(KING AND A GOVERNMENT)

A. Assisting in the restoration of the ~~country~~.

B. Introducing the necessary food and supplies to facilitate a return to normal conditions.

SECURING BASES

C. ~~for~~ in Northern Norway for Naval forces to ensure protection of shipping around the North Cape Passage to Russia.

D. Securing bases in Southern Norway for Naval Forces to blockade the entrance to the Baltic and for minesweeping.

Paragraph 2. Occupation of key areas is contemplated in the following order, depending on method of German withdrawal:

A. Kirkenes-Hammerfest.

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B. Tromsø or Narvik.

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C. Trondheim.

D. Stavanger-Bergen.

Date-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

Fr. : S-52025 17 May, 1944

E. Christiansand (S).

F. Oslo.

Paragraph 3. Except where forces are necessary for protection of Naval bases, Allied Forces will be withdrawn as soon as the Norwegians have gained adequate control.

Paragraph 4. Only such forces will be employed in the occupation of Norway as will not detract from the main effort of OVERLORD.

No sig.

* Being serviced.

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ACTION: OCS

INFO : General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
C of S

Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-13142 (18 May 44) 0205Z

ejv

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PRIORITY

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England.

To: War Department.

No. S 52025 17 May 1944.

TOP SEC S 52025 for AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of
Staff signed Eisenhower.

Insert where omission occurs on previous message.

Page 1, line 3.

Fourth progress report on preparations for operation
OVERLORD as of 15th May 1944.

Page 3, line 1,

Part 2-summary of plans Rankin case B-Norway.

Paragraph 1 SHAEF plans provide that in the event
of a German withdrawal from Norway, British, Norwegian and
US Forces will occupy and establish control in key areas of
Norway for the purpose of:

A. Assisting in the restoration of the King and a
Government.

B. Introducing the necessary food and supplies to
facilitate a return to normal conditions.

CM-IN-13382 (18 May 44)

DECLASSIFIED
JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY DATE

T. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

A. C. 11511, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 of Sec. 3.4

OSD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Date JAN 21 1971

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Overlord

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England.
No. S 52025 17 May 1944 Page-2-

C. Securing bases in northern Norway for Naval
forces to ensure protection of shipping around the North
Cape Passage to Russia.

No Sig.

Supplementary copy of CM-IN-13142 (8 May 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park
C of S

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JCS LETTER, 7-5-72
BY _____ DATE _____

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~~RE-CLASSIFIED BY _____ DATE _____~~

By SLR

Date JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-13382 (18 May 1944) 0816Z mod
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

May 13, 1944

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WAR 36141

TOPSEC for Eisenhower London, FACS 25 from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved your additional shipping requirements, namely:

(a) M.T. Shipping:

D plus 30 to D plus 60-40 ships
D plus 90 onwards-70 ships

(b) Stores Shipping:

D plus 11 to D plus 42-48 ships
D plus 42 onwards-126 ships

(c) Coasters:

Retention of additional 150,000 DWT of
Coasters from D plus 42 onwards

2. Combined shipping authorities have been instructed to provide the above additional shipping from combined resources.

CM-OUT-36141

(13 May 44)

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Number WAR 36141

May 13, 1944

Page 2

3. Additional cargo shipping is being loaded in U.S. so that an average of at least 4,000 tons per day of U.S. supplies can be diverted for continental unloading at discretion of force commander.

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Date-

Signature-

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

CM-OUT-36141

(13 May 44) 1535Z amb
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[REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~
PRIORITY ~~SECRET~~

Date-

Signature-

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

To: War Department.

Nr: S-51795

13 May 1944.

To AGWAR S-51795 for Combined Chiefs of Staff,
signed Eisenhower. ~~TOP SECRET~~. This is SCAF number 27.
Reference FAGS 24.

The changes in the outline plan for political warfare
OVERLORD, suggested in paragraphs A B and D of your message
W-35300 have been incorporated in the plan.

In connection with paragraph C of your message the fol-
lowing reference to Austria is proposed:

"In propaganda to Austrians, our objectives are not
essentially different from those given above. The main dif-
ference of emphasis are;

Under objective C, it is part of our objective to
exploit the Moscow Declaration, thereby showing Austrians
that the consequences of Germany's unconditional surrender in-
clude the liberation of Austria and are far preferable to
the Austrians than the continuance of Hitler's War, particu-
larly if the Austrians contribute to their own liberation.

Under objective E, it is part of our objective to
exploit the difference in tradition and interest between
Austria and Nazi Germany, in order to increase to a maximum
Austrian dissatisfaction with Hitler's leadership which has
brought them nothing but sacrifices.

CM-IN-10088 (14 May 44)

*col
Park 33*

~~SECRET~~

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE
PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England.

Rr: S-51795

13 May 1944.

The changes and addition given above are concurred in by PWE and OWI London who were instrumental in the preparation of the original plan.

No Sig.

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Date-

Signature-

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: GEN Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log

CM-IN-10088 (14 May 44) 0251Z amb

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INCOMING MESSAGE

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces,
London, England

To: War Department

Hr: S 51708 SCAP 26 12 May 1944

From UNITY to AGWAR, S 51708, BIGOT, TOPSEC, for
combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite SHPRD.
This is SCAP number 26.

It is proposed to amend wording of the initial
communique for operation OVERLORD to read as follows:
begin "under the command of General Eisenhower Allied Naval
Forces supported by strong air forces began landing Allied
Armies this morning on the northern coast of France."
Reference is made to our SCAP number 22, 7 May 1944. Other
arrangements proposed therein remain unchanged.

No Sig

SCAP 22 is CM-IN-5301 (7 May 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Surles
CofS

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CM-IN-8946 (12 May 44) 1644Z bjm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Classification
71469

May 9, 1944

Major General John R. Deane
US Military Mission to USSR
Moscow, Russia

Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: WARX 34539

~~for General Deane and General Brocas Burrows, to be submitted by them as a combined report to USSR. This message repeated to CGUSAFETO for information of British Chiefs of Staff.~~

This message consists of three parts, the first a periodic report on Mediterranean operations, the second on OVERLORD, and the third on POINTBLANK.

Part One

This is the monthly progress report on operations in the Mediterranean Theater covering the period March 16 to April 15, 1944.

1. Current operations. At present AAI is regrouping in preparation for renewed offensive. The current aerial offensive against communications in Italy is progressing satisfactorily.

2. Build up of formations:

One US division is expected to arrive in the MTO in the near future.

Two tired British divisions have been moved from Italy to the Mideast and are being replaced by fresh divisions.

3. Preparation for future operations.

CM-OUT-34539

(10 May 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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WARX 34539

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

Planning has been undertaken for an operation to capture and hold the Island of Elba.

4. Service troops. 60 administrative units have been formed from a former cavalry division in this theater.
5. Supplies. Equipment and general supplies in the Theater are satisfactory.
6. Major air raids. Since March 15 a total of seven major bomber attacks have been made against Bucharest, Vienna, Steyr, Sofia and Budapest. A total of 10,500 tons of bombs have been dropped on Balkan targets. In addition large fighter bomber raids have been carried out against targets in the Balkans. End of Part One.

Part Two

Herewith third progress report on preparations for operation OVERLORD as of April 15.

1. (a). US Divisions. 10 infantry, 5 armored and 2 airborne divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of these, 9 infantry, 5 armored and 2 airborne divisions are operationally available.
- (b). British Divisions. 10 infantry, 4 armored and 2 airborne divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of these 9 infantry, 4 armored and 2 airborne divisions are operationally available. 1 Polish armored division is in the United Kingdom but is not yet operationally available.
2. Status of US and British Air Forces.
 - (a) Satisfactory progress continues to be made in all aspects, training, operational and administrative, for the Air Forces. Agreement has been reached for the transfer to the United Kingdom of certain additional fighter squadrons for the operation.
 - (b) Air Forces are now in process of taking up their tactical dispositions in the United Kingdom and

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(10 May 44)

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WARX 34539

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2

squadrons are engaged in active operations preparatory to OVERLORD; these operations confirm their satisfactory state of training.

3. Naval preparations for mounting the assault and build up of landing craft.

(a). The assault forces are now practically at full strength except for LST and the follow up forces are forming satisfactorily.

(b). Training has been carried out at high pressure since the last report.

4. Administrative preparations in general.

(a) Mounting. Movement preparations are continuing. The take up of shipping and the fitting of same have commenced.

(b) Build up of administrative troops. Shortages in transport troops and of medical officers and nurses exist.

(c) Material resources. Delivery of anticipated shortages in tank transporters, heavy bridging equipment, mine exploding devices and certain items of heavy transportation equipment is not yet assured.

(d) Civil affairs. Personnel. Although a shortage of trained US and British personnel exists minimum requirements can be met. Supplies. A programme for the phased allocation of civil supplies to army groups for the period D to D plus 90 has been completed. End of part two.

Part Three

Following is progress report for March on combined bomber offensive against Germany by RAF Bomber Command, U.S. Eighth Air Force and Strategic Bombers based in the Mediterranean for transmission by C.C.O.S. to U.S. and U.K. service missions for Moscow.

Summary of operations of combined bomber offensive against Germany during March.

CM-OUT-34539

(10 May 44)

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Page 4

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Total bombs on all targets---55, 249 tons

Total tons on Germany---33, 390 tons

This was the largest tonnage of bombs dropped on all targets and on Germany in any month during the war.

1. Following principal operations were carried out by RAF Bomber Command, U.S. Eighth Air Force and Strategic Bombers based in the Mediterranean Theater:

(a) Stuttgart. 4,524 tons in 2 major attacks. Neither of these attacks was successful in causing more than scattered damage in the central portions of the town of Stuttgart itself, but heavy industrial damage was caused in the northern industrial suburbs.

(b) Frankfurt. 6,446 tons in 2 major attacks. These attacks succeeded in devastating the center of this great German city. Final assessment has not yet been made but it will probably prove that Frankfurt is now amongst the worst devastated of the major German cities. Among additional important factories almost entirely destroyed are those of Aldred Jeyes, producing crankshafts and aircraft and M/T components, and Adler Werke, large makers of M/T.

(c) Essen. 2,840 tons in one attack. Further severe damage was done to this already semi-devastated town and three more important shops of Krupps were severely hit.

(d) Berlin. 2,538 tons in one attack. Cover of the city taken after this attack is incomplete but very considerable fresh damage can be seen in those portions of the city which have been covered.

(e) Nuremberg. 2,460 tons in one attack. This attack was not successful.

2. During the month of March weather conditions were generally very unfavorable for daylight precision bombing.

CM-OUT-34539

(10 May 44)

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WARX 34539 **OUTGOING MESSAGE**

Page 5
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However, in order to exploit the great damage inflicted on the German fighter factories in February, it was essential to impose the maximum amount of attrition on the enemy fighter force. Accordingly, the Eighth Air Force operated over Germany whenever weather conditions permitted in a deliberate effort to bring the German fighter force to battle with our long-range fighters and bombers. In order to achieve the maximum enemy reaction Berlin itself and targets in the Berlin area were selected on several occasions, and the routes chosen were such as deliberately to provoke battle. In addition, the long-range fighters flying home across Germany from their escort duties were instructed to carry out low-level attacks on German aircraft on the ground whenever possible. A definite desire by the German fighter force to conserve its fighter defenses was evidenced during the month, but in spite of this the Eighth Air Force long-range fighters claim to have destroyed 525 German aircraft in the air and on the ground in this period. The bombers claim to have destroyed 350.

3. The majority of operations necessitated bombing through cloud, but one very successful attack was carried out visually against the important Erkner Ball-Bearing Factory in the suburbs of Berlin, and another visual attack was directed against the city of Berlin itself. On all these missions, long-range fighters were able to cover the bombers all the way.
4. In the second half of the month weather conditions made visual bombing possible in southern Germany on only one day, and aircraft factories and G.A.F. installations were attacked at Oberpfaffenhofen, Lechfeld, Landsberg and Friedrichshafen. At Friedrichshafen bombing was hindered by a smoke-screen. On two other days there were clear conditions over France and very successful attacks were carried out against German air force training schools and other air force installations in central, southern and western France.
5. Weather conditions in southern Italy were the worst in

CM-OUT-34539

(10 May 44)

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WARX 34539 **OUTGOING MESSAGE** Page 6

In many years, and long-range operations against the Luftwaffe were virtually impossible throughout the month. In the course of short-range operations, the U.S. 15th Air Force was able materially to contribute to the attrition of the German fighter force-71 German fighters being claimed destroyed by the escort fighters and 115 by the heavy bombers. In addition, 4 daylight operations were carried out against Sofia which caused grave disorganization in the Bulgarian capital. End of Part Three End of Message.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
SGS
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

CM-OUT-34539 (10 May 44) 1525Z hrt

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JOS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To : War Department

No : S 51546 9th May 1944.

S 51546 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff for Combined Civil Affairs Committee information to H'lldring and British Chiefs of Staff from Holmes signed Eisenhower this is VOG 38 TOP SECRET

Comments on your GOV 38 concerning military responsibility of SCAEF for Civil Relief for Hiatus areas during operational phase follow. Present operational requirements preclude any possibility, except as outlined in the last 2 paragraphs below, of SCAEF being able to completely discharge such a responsibility, considering material resources available, during the operational phase. The only feasible course of action with regard to supply of Hiatus areas during the operational phase appears to be that of establishing a separate shipping program to operate under the general supervision of SCAEF, and to require that local indigenous authorities receive and unload supplies made available to SCAEF by the CCAC for delivery to Hiatus ports.

Until arrival on the ground it will not be possible to fully determine the suitability of available ports to receive supplies, nor to determine whether or not ships can be unloaded with available local civilian labor and facilities without using military resources and labor not presently available to SCAEF for such uses. If suitable ports are available a further problem to prevent undue port congestion is to determine the means by which indigenous authorities will effect area distribution after the unloading of ships. This likewise is largely dependent on a survey after arrival on the ground.

The CCAC should arrange direct shipments from source to Hiatus ports upon recommendation of SCAEF in ships specifically allocated by the combined shipping board for this purpose. If this can be done SCAEF can provide a minimum of CA personnel to survey conditions on the ground and to super-

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CM-IN-6802

(9 May 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England
No : S 51546 9th May 1944.

wise the unloading and clearance of supplies from the port
by indigenous civilian authorities.

Prior to arrival on the ground SCAEF can determine
the probable Hiatus areas and the dates they are likely to
occur, and can compute and advise you of minimum requirements
in advance of the need therefore.

No Sig.

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Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

GOV 38 is CM-OUT-30384 (1 May 44) CCAC.

ACTION: CCAC

INFO : CC/S
Gen Somervell
OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Maxwell
Adm. King
Mr McCloy
Log

CM-IN-6802 (9 May 44) 2336Z vh

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

F-30
JR.

[REDACTED]

"OVERLORD" TASK FORCES

Combat force allocation at present between Western and Eastern Task Forces for OVERLORD are as follows:

<u>WESTERN</u>	<u>EASTERN</u>
NEVADA (BB)	RODNEY (BB)
TEXAS (BB)	WARSPITE (BB)
ARKANSAS (BB)	RAMILLIES (BB)
EREBUS (Monitor)	ROBERTO (Monitor)
AUGUSTA (CA)	<u>13 Cruisers</u>
TUSCALOOSA (CA)	<u>39 Destroyers.</u>
GLASGOW (CL)	
BELLONA (CL)	
BLACK PRINCE (CL)	
ENTERPRISE (CL)	
LAWKINS (OCA)	
25 Destroyers.	

(NOTE: If the cruisers MONTCALM and GEORGUES LEYGUES are assigned to the Western Task Force, there will be a total of 9 cruisers in that force. However, if these are not available, 1 British cruiser will be transferred from the Eastern Task Force to the Western Task Force.)

Plans for ANVIL contemplate employing 5 French cruisers: MONTCALM (CL), GLOIRE (CL), GEORGUES LEYGUES (CL), EMILE BERTIN (CL), and DOUGAY TROUIN (CL).

(NOTE: The MONTCALM and GEORGUES LEYGUES are at the moment on the way to UK from the Mediterranean.)

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[REDACTED]
U R G E N T

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, the War Years, III, 1852-1853]

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, London, England

To: War Department

No. S 51479, 8 May 1944, SCAF 23.

TOPSEC from UNITY to AGWAR, S51479, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. Reference CX 17150. This is SCAF number 23.

In order that arrangements can be made for the coordinated action by French resistance groups, it has become imperative that General Koenig, head of the French Mission here, be given certain general information in connection with forthcoming operations. It is, therefore, my intention to give to him personally but to no other member of the French Mission, under pledge of secrecy, the name of the country in which the main attack will take place and the month for which it is scheduled. It may be necessary later to give certain additional information to General Koenig only. Recent restrictions on communications other than by British code are considered to be adequate safeguard against leakage to Algiers.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park
Log

CM-IN-5775

(8 May 44)

1455Z

cw

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PRIORITY

From: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
London England

To: War Department

Nr: S51446 7 May 1944

S51446 to AGWAR for the Combined Chiefs of Staff
signed Eisenhower. BIGOT TOPSEC this is SCAF number 22.

It is proposed that the wording of the initial
communique for operation OVERLORD be as follows:

"Allied Naval Forces supported by strong Air Forces
began landing Allied Armies this morning on the Northern
coast of France". The nationality of troops involved will
be withheld until there is an assurance that the Germans
have reasonably accurate information of their composition.
At that time the Nationality of all Allies taking part in
Naval Air Ground action will be mentioned. It is proposed
that the communique should be released at the direction of
SHAEF simultaneously to all interested news and broadcast-
ing agencies by Public Relations Division SHAEF. Release
time to be D day at approximately H plus 3, the exact hour
to be furnished to SHAEF by 21st Army Group following re-
ceipt of flash reports from landing parties. Washington
Ottawa and Algiers to release confirmation copy of the
previously prepared communique on flash signal from SHAEF
transmitted through Signal Corps channels. Monitoring of
BEC should be provided as additional check.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO : Gen. Arnold
OPD
Gen. Bissell
Adm. King
Col. Park
Gen. Surles
C of S

CM-IN-5301 (7 May 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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April 29, 1944

To: British Chiefs of Staff

From: A.F.H.Q. (Signed Wilson)

Rptd: J.S.M. Washington for U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
SHAEP, H.Q. M.A.A.F.

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BIGOT ANVIL

MEDCOS 101

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1. In para 6 of MEDCOS 100 I suggested various directions in which this theatre might use the small amphibious lift remaining to us to give the best possible support to OVERLORD during its critical period. I emphasize, however, that no major amphibious operation in this theatre would be possible without additional resources in assault craft and shipping. Thus any such operations in this theatre after the critical OVERLORD period depend essentially on the provision of further shipping and assault craft; either from the United Kingdom when released from OVERLORD; or from other theatres. I cannot make effective use of the surplus forces that will be freed by the joining of the Bridgehead and the capture of Rome without these additional resources.

2. It would be neither profitable nor wise to attempt at this stage in the war to decide on any one definite plan for adoption after the critical period of OVERLORD. No one can forecast what the situation will be in 3 months time. Whatever the position, however, this much is obvious - that immobilized forces will be useless, whereas a flexible strategic reserve would be of great advantage. This flexibility can only be provided by the allocation to this theatre of additional shipping and amphibious resources.

3. The following are some of the situations which I visualize may arise at that time:

(a) The enemy may succeed in stabilizing another
CM-IN-128 (1 May 44)

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MEDCOS 101

April 29, 1944

Page - 2

defensive position South of Rome. If he does, it is essential that I have sufficient amphibious resources available to strike in force behind him and penetrate quickly with the object of turning his flank.

- (b) The enemy may fight a slow delaying action back to the Pisa-Rimini line. I can only follow him up on land with at most 8 divisions, while the initial build-up by land in front of the Pisa-Rimini line cannot exceed 15 divisions, and even this will take many weeks. I must be in a position both to outflank him by sea (provided the movement is in sufficient strength to insure that I am not involved in a prolonged supply and air cover problem) and also to accelerate by sea the build-up in front of the Pisa-Rimini line, if this becomes necessary.
- (c) Circumstances may arise in which a modified form of ANVIL might become feasible and desirable. I must be in a position either to take advantage of Rahn's "B" conditions in the ANVIL area if they arise, or to exploit German weakness to precipitate these conditions, if an opportunity presents itself.
- (d) It may well be that German difficulties can best be exploited by an operation in Northern Yugoslavia. I can visualize conditions in which this might have most strategic possibilities, notably in precipitating the collapse of Hungary. It would be too late in the year to initiate major land campaign with British forces in the Balkans. By securing an advanced air base in the Split area, however, the range of fighter-bombers could be extended to cover the whole of Northern Yugoslavia and important stretches of the Danube Basin. Moreover, by supporting Tito with limited air forces, with certain specialized units such as airborne troops, commandoes, armoured cars or S.P. artillery, and with really large-scale supplies of arms and food, I could go far towards making the Partisan Army a really formidable offensive force.

CM-IN-128 (1 May 44)

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MEDCOS 101

April 29, 1944

Page - 3

4. Experience has shown that, except for minor operations in close tactical support of the main forces, anything less than a three-division assault, with immediate follow-up of three divisions, is likely to lack penetrating power and to be contained. Therefore, if I am to be in a position to take advantage of opportunities arising under any of the above headings, either singly or in combination, I must have an additional shore-to-shore lift of two and one third divisions, to make my present shore-to-shore lift (2up) to a three division basis. An additional allocation of mine-sweeping and naval support vessels would also be necessary. Though I realize the difficulty of making any definite allocations of assault shipping (?to this theatre) until you see how OVERLORD is going, you will, no doubt, have appreciated that assault vessels released after the launching of OVERLORD and sailing to the Far East could be used in the Mediterranean enroute without prejudice to Far Eastern operations.

5. Our requirements for cargo shipping have so far been considered (in accordance with COSMED 86) in relation to what is required for internal Mediterranean movement in order to support the forces in Italy. This will be quite inadequate to cope with any situation or combination of situations which may reasonably be expected to occur in this theatre after the critical period of OVERLORD. Details of what I shall require are the subject of separate examination, but it is provisionally estimated that cargo shipping of the order of 150 sailings will be necessary, for the assault and immediate follow-up convoys if an amphibious operation or series of operations is to be staged and to provide the necessary initial resources with which to deal promptly with Rankin conditions should they arise.

6. I am also very weak in air lift. Even when the Dakotas recently sent to India return, my lift will be less than one RCT. German weakening at any point in the Mediterranean might present favourable opportunities for airborne

CM-IN-128 (1 May 44)

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MEDCOS 101

April 29, 1944

Page - 4

and air-landed operations, while a lift of one division would be of great assistance if I have to stage an amphibious operation of any size. I therefore suggest that additional air lift of one division less 1 ROT should be provided for this theatre. This also might be effected by temporary diversion of resources enroute to India from the European theatre.

7. I should be grateful for your early agreement in principle to the allocation of the resources requested above, which represent my requirements. If it is impossible to satisfy them in full, it is important that I should know for planning purposes the minimum additional resources that might be made available and when these might arrive.

Time of Origin 291845B

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SM 522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 100 is CM-IN-17913 (24 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : General Arnold, OPD, General Bissell, Admiral King,
Colonel Park, Log

CM-IN-128 (1 May 44) 0426Z mem

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

1

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

April 26, 1944

Pauch
From: War Cabinet Offices

To: A.F.H. Q.

Rptd: Joint Staff Mission

COSMED 94

Reference MEDCOS 94

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SM522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

1. We appreciate your difficulties in maintaining threats with the forces at your disposal.

2. We have examined the possibilities of giving you actual reinforcements to assist your task, especially with regard to augmenting the threat to the South coast of France immediately before and after OVERLORD D Day and have reached the following conclusions:

- (a) No British Military reinforcements are available and your suggested move of Br Div from India to M.E. is impracticable.
- (b) There are 7 escort carriers in home waters which might be made available to the Mediterranean. 3 could possibly reach you early in May and 4 by the end of May.
- (c) "Victorious" may be passing through Mediterranean enroute for Eastern Fleet about the second week in May but for operational reasons delay in the Mediterranean is unacceptable.

CM-IN-21411 (29 Apr 44)

310 Overlord
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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Page - 2

- (d) By readjustment of existing convoy programme it might be possible to give impression that large convoy was passing through straits of Gibraltar. This is being studied.

3. Please reply urgently.

Time of origin 261440Z

MEDCOS 94 is CM-IN-12248 (17 Apr 44) CC/S

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SM 522-71

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Park ✓
C of S

Date-12-1-71

Signature-*RHP*

CM-IN-21411 (29 Apr 44) 0244Z mem

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OUTGOING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

April 26, 1944

United States Military Mission
Moscow, Russia M-158

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number: WARX 28471

[REDACTED] for General Deane and General Brocas Burrows for action, repeated
to SHAEP for information of British Chiefs of Staff

MIL 1155 is the reference. Combined Chiefs of Staff consider
that you should not press Russians for details of their plans.

→ in Map Room

ORIGINATOR : CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm. King
C of S

CM-OUT-28471

(26 Apr 44) 2211Z 1s

[REDACTED]
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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

col. Park
MAY 22 1974

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: Joint Staff Mission

Dated: 24th April 1944

MIL 1155

Following from 30 Military Mission Moscow to Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington (AMSSO pass) repeated British Chiefs of Staff London (WO pass).

Following for Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Deane and General Burrows. In continuance of our MIL 1146 23 April.

1. After General Slavin had handed to us Marshal Vasilevsky's reply we raised the question of a mutual exchange of details on plans for OVERLORD and the supporting Russian offensive.
2. Slavin attempted to sidetrack this by saying that he considered this to be a detail which would arise later.
3. We pointed out that the date announced was already within six weeks and that therefore if any such exchanges were to take place they should do so now.
4. Slavin replied that he hoped that we understood that when the Red Army undertook a supporting offensive it intended to carry through its task with all the means in its power.
5. We replied that this was fully understood by us and that OVERLORD would be embarked upon in a similar spirit.
6. We pointed out however that you had stated in your communication that any details regarding the Soviet plans would be welcome and we added that we would like to know at an early date whether or not it was the intention of the Soviet

CM-IN-18441 (25 Apr 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Overlord

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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

page 2

General Staff to take us into their confidence.

7. Slavin said he would make a report on this immediately and inform us as soon as possible.

8. We are of the opinion that the Soviet General Staff do not consider an exchange of details of the plans to be necessary at this stage and we feel that it would be inadvisable to press for one.

9. We consider that we should be satisfied with the guarantee of the Soviet General Staff to do everything in its power to support OVERLORD and we suggest that the arguments which can be put forward for the detailed exchange of plans are at the moment weak and might lead to suspicion that we were merely out to obtain information which was not vitally necessary to us.

T.O.O. 242000Z

MIL 1146 is CM-IN-17333 (23 Apr 44)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Colonel McFarland)

INFO: General Arnold
General Handy
Admiral King
C of S

CM-IN-18441 (25 Apr 44) 1243Z med

[REDACTED]

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

This message must be thoroughly paraphrased if its text is to be published or communicated outside British or American services or departments. If re-transmitted unparaphrased other than through holders of Chiefs of Staff cyphersettings, the originator must mark the message "to be sent on One Time Pad".

COPY NO. 22

From: War Cabinet Offices

To: Joint Staff Mission

Dated: 24th April, 1944.

MOST IMMEDIATE

02 2178

MIL 1185.

Following from 30 Military Mission Moscow to Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington (AMSSO pass) repeated British Chiefs of Staff London (WO pass).

Following for Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Deane and General Burrows. In continuance of our MIL 1146 23 April.

1. After General Slavin had handed to us Marshal Vasilevsky's reply we raised the question of a mutual exchange of details on plans for OVERLORD and the supporting Russian offensive.
2. Slavin attempted to sidetrack this by saying that he considered this to be a detail which would arise later.
3. We pointed out that the date announced was already within six weeks and that therefore if any such exchanges were to take place they should do so now.
4. Slavin replied that he hoped that we understood that when the Red Army undertook a supporting offensive it intended to carry through its task with all the means in its power.
5. We replied that this was fully understood by us and that OVERLORD would be embarked upon in a similar spirit.
6. We pointed out however that you had stated in your communication that any details regarding the Soviet plans would be welcome and we added that we would like to know at an early date whether or not it was the intention of the Soviet General Staff to take us into their confidence.
7. Slavin said he would make a report on this immediately and inform us as soon as possible.
8. We are of the opinion that the Soviet General Staff do not consider an exchange of details of the plans to be necessary at this stage and we feel that it would be inadvisable to press for one.
9. We consider that we should be satisfied with the guarantee of the Soviet General Staff to do everything in its power to support OVERLORD and we suggest that the arguments which can be put forward for the detailed exchange of plans are at the moment weak and might lead to suspicion that we were merely out to obtain information which was not vitally necessary to us.

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T.O.O. 242000Z

JOS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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MOST IMMEDIATE

April 23, 1944

To : Joint Staff Mission

From: War Cabinet Offices

OZ 2146

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

Following received from 30 Mission.

Combined Chiefs of Staff Washington (London please pass).
Repeated British Chiefs of Staff London.

MIL 1146 April 23, 1944

In continuation of our MIL 1133 April 20th.

Following for Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Deane and General Burrows.

General Slavin received us at 0100 hours this morning and handed us a letter of which the following is a paraphrase signed by General Antonov on behalf of Marshal Vasilievsky.

- ✓ 1. The General Staff of the Red Army is gratified to receive your communication concerning the date of OVERLORD in accordance with the agreement reached at Teheran.
- ✓ 2. The new advance of the Soviet forces to support the operation of the Anglo-American forces will start at the same date.
- ✓ 3. I ask you to convey this information from Marshal Vasilievsky to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Anglo-American forces."

No Sig T.O.C. 231510Z

FOOTNOTE: MIL 1133 is CM-IN-15405 (21 Apr 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold, Gen Handy, Col Park, C of S

CM-IN-17333 (23 Apr 44) 2116Z JB

310 Overlord

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

[REDACTED]
WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE
[REDACTED]
PRIORITY

From: US Military Mission, Moscow Russia

To : War Department

No : 468 23 April 1944

Joint Chiefs of Staff TOP SECRET

Early this morning Burrows and I were called to a meeting with representatives of Red Army Gen Staff and were each handed a written reply sent by Army General Antonoff acting for Marshal Vasilievski in response to the letter we had delivered concerning OVERLORD. The reply included three short paragraphs the first of which indicating the satisfaction of the General Staff of the Red Army on the date selected which they state is in accord with decision taken at Teheran Conference. Second paragraph indicates that a new offensive of the Soviet Army will open on the same date. Third paragraph asks that this information be sent to the Chiefs of Staff. Burrows and I are sending a more complete translation to combined Chiefs of Staff over British channels.

I expressed gratification that Red Army offensive would coincide with ours and said I felt that it would constitute a definite contribution to our success.

CM-IN-17462 (24 Apr 44)

[REDACTED]
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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

P R I O R I T Y

From: US Military Mission, Moscow Russia
No : 468 23 April 1944

New subject: At the conference it was also agreed that liaison for purpose of coordinating Balkans Air operations would be established in Moscow using British communications which are already set up and providing for a rapid exchange of information between Red Army General Staff and British and American military missions. We shall work out details of this with Allied Force Headquarters as indicated in our instructions. This will start just as soon as the communication channel is in operations and arrangements to this end have already been started.

No Sig

ACTION: Joint Chiefs of Staff

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
Col Park
C of S

OM-IN-17462 (24 Apr 44) 0109Z jb

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

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By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] WS

April 23, 1944

TO : Chiefs of Staff

INFO: Joint Staff Mission, Washington for US Chiefs of Staff,
Unity for Eisenhower, and Fairbanks

FROM: Freedom

NR : B 12516

BIGOT

MOST IMMEDIATE

MEDCOS 100

From Wilson

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SM 522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

The following is a general outline of intentions and ideas
on the implementation of the policy laid down in your COSMED
90.

1. Your Para 2 (a).

Operation DIADEM is due to be launched at a time which should
be most favorable to the achievement of the object in your
Para 1. It will absorb all army formations in this theatre
except those employed on the security role. Two French
Armoured Divisions in North Africa and (91) US Division
which is (? undergoing amphibious) training at Oran and
will not be ready till mid June. The preparatory air offensive
has already been in progress for some weeks and has achieved
a degree of success against the enemy's communications and
supply which should make it at least extremely difficult for
him to offer prolonged resistance to DIADEM.

2. Action to meet your Para 2 (b), is the basis of stage
4 of Plan ZEPPELIN. This includes a positive threat to
Southern France during the critical OVERLORD period, which
will be developed by concentration of 91 US Division for
assault training in May and early June at Oran. A French
Division, Class 1 RCT will also be located during May at

CM-IN-17913 (24 Apr 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

NR: B 12516

April 23, 1944

Page two

the assault training centre at Salerno. 9th DIC is concentrating in Corsica where landing craft will also be assembled with a view to launching an operation to capture Elba on any date after May 25th which will also provide a threat to the South of France. In support of these preparations State Department and Foreign Office should be asked to inquire of the Spanish Government whether they would be prepared to grant facilities for evacuation of casualties and entry of civilian food supplies through Barcelona.

3. Air action to support the threat to Southern France must conform to the general bombing plan for OVERLORD and will be coordinated with SHAEF. In addition to any action that may be called for against objectives in Southern France, the Strategic Air Force from this theatre should be able to make a valuable contribution to the object stated in your Para 1 by pinning down German fighters in Southern Germany and South East Europe, by interfering with rail communications from Italy, Hungary and the Balkans, Northern France, by accentuating German difficulties in the Balkans and supporting the Russian Offensive in the East. Air operations which are already successfully adding to the enemy's difficulties on the Dalmatian Coast and supporting our cover plans in the Adriatic and Aegean will be intensified, combined with action by light naval forces and raiding parties.

4. Steps have already been taken to intensify support of the Partisans in the Balkans during this period, especially in the form of increased assistance to Tito. Instructions have been issued to extend the scope of raiding in the Adriatic to Western Greece.

5. As regards your Para 2 (c), the extent to which the use of the amphibious lift remaining to me can be used in furtherance of the object in your Para 1 during the critical period of OVERLORD depends on a number of factors which cannot now be foreseen, notably the progress of DIADEN and the development of the situation in the Balkans. I shall be telegraphing shortly an appreciation of the possible assistance which might be rendered in this theatre after the initial critical period, together with an estimate of the amphibious and air

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

NR: B 12516

April 23, 1944

Page three

lift that I should require if and when resources can be released from OVERLORD or made available from other theatres.

6. During the period between the D day DIADEM and the end of June however,

(A). All craft in this theatre will remain available to assist in the offensive in Italy as long as they can usefully be employed for that purpose. For instance, should the enemy succeed in offering prolonged resistance south of Rome after we have joined up the bridgehead, it might be desirable to execute an amphibious assault close in rear of enemy's lines in connection with a second phase of DIADEM. Or at some stage in the advance it may be desirable to capture Elba, for which all preparations are now in hand, using elements of the Ninth French DIC.

(B). On the other hand, a combination of the near approach of OVERLORD, developments in the Balkans and effect of the preparatory air offensive might result in DIADEM progressing more rapidly than we now expect, leading to an early withdrawal by the enemy to Pisa-Rimini line. In that event not only would divisions become available but also the amphibious lift might be more profitably employed elsewhere. It seems not impossible that continued Russian progress in Roumania might lead to Bulgarian defection and even RANKIN B conditions in the Balkans before the end of June, and I am exploring the possibility of taking advantage of this situation to contain enemy forces away from OVERLORD. It is perhaps unlikely that this opportunity will arise before D plus 25 OVERLORD, but it is desired to be in a position to take advantage of it should it arise.

(C). Any entry into the south of France during the OVERLORD critical period could only be under RANKIN conditions and, provided adequate resources in shipping could be made available, these conditions can be tackled

CM-IN-17913

(24 Apr 44)

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NR: B 12516

April 23, 1944

Page four

on an ad hoc basis.

7. As far as amphibious operations are concerned, therefore, my intention is to concentrate everything on the success of DIADEM; and thereafter to make use of the flexibility and reserves which will be released by the junction with the bridgehead to mount such operations as may be desirable and practicable with the very limited assault lift available according to the situation as it develops, for which alternative plans are now being studied and it must be realized, however, that until additional resources in assault craft and shipping can be placed at my disposal, any major amphibious operation in this theatre is quite out of the question.

No Sig

T. O. O. 231700B

NOTE: COSMED 90 is ~~CM-IN-3958 (6 Dec 43) 6878~~ error - should

ACTION: CC/S

he Cm-m-13977 - 19 April

INFO : Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
Log

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SM522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature RHP

CM-IN-17913 (24 Apr 44) 1901Z mlc

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

April 20, 1944

WST
P-1

FROM: War Cabinet Offices

TO : JSM, Washington

NO : OZ 2079

Following received from 30 Mission,

From 30 Mission to Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, rptd
British Chiefs of Staff, London. MIL 1133 April 20, 1944

Reference WD messages 19546 and 19778.

Following for Chiefs of Staff from General Deane and General
Burrows.

- 1 We were received at 1700 hours this afternoon by Army General Antonov. Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff representing Marshal Vasilievsky who stated to be still at the front.
2. General Antonov opened the meeting by saying that he was authorized on behalf of Marshal Vasilievsky to receive from us a notification about the date of exercise OVERLORD.
3. We handed him a letter signed by us containing the full sense of your above--mentioned telegrams under the following headings:-
 - (A). The date of the operation.
 - (B). A request for confirmation of the Red Army operation to contain the maximum number of German Divisions.
 - (C). An indication that any details regarding the plans of Soviet General Staff for the operation indicated under 1 would be welcomed.
 - (D). A congratulatory message from the American and British Chiefs of Staff on the magnificent success of the Red Army.

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CM-IN-15405 (21 Apr 44)

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310 Overlord [REDACTED]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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INCOMING MESSAGE

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TOP
SECRET

NO: OZ 2079

April 20, 1944

Page two

4. General Antonov accepted the letter without comment,
promised to pass it immediately to Marshal Vasilievsky and
reply as early as possible. T. O. O. 201930

No Sig

T. O. O 202245Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : Gen Arnold
Gen Handy
C of S

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SM522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-15405 (21 Apr 44) 1315Z mlo

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

P-R-I-O-R-I-T-Y

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To: War Department

No. S 50400 16 April, 1944

S-50400 TOP SECRET from SHAEP to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is SCAP 13.

Herewith 3rd progress report on preparations for operation OVERLORD as of 15 April.

Para 1.

(A). US Divisions. 10 Infantry, 5 Armored and 2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of these, 9 Infantry, 5 Armored and 2 Airborne Divisions are operationally available.

(B). British Divisions. 10 Infantry, 4 Armored and 2 Airborne Divisions are now in the United Kingdom. Of these 9 Infantry, 4 Armored and 2 Airborne Divisions are operationally available. One Polish Armored Division is in the United Kingdom but is not yet operationally available.

Para 2. Status of US and British Air Forces.

(A). Satisfactory progress continues to be made in all aspects, training, operational and administrative, for the Air Forces. Agreement has been reached for the transfer to the United Kingdom of certain additional fighter squadrons for the operation.

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CM-IN-11840 (16 Apr 44)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

T-O-P 3-E-C-R-E-T

Page 2.

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To: War Department

No. S 50400

16 April, 1944

(B). Air Forces are now in process of taking up their tactical dispositions in the United Kingdom and squadrons are engaged in active operations preparatory to OVERLORD; these operations confirm their satisfactory state of training.

Para 3.

Naval preparations for mounting the assault and build up of landing craft.

(A). The assault forces are now practically at full strength except for LST and the follow up forces are forming satisfactorily.

(B). Training has been carried out at high pressure since the last report.

Para 4.

Administrative preparations in general.

(A). Mounting. Movement preparations are continuing. The take up of shipping and the fitting of same have commenced.

(B). Build up of administrative troops. Shortages in transport troops and of Medical officers and Nurses still exist.

(C). Material resources. Delivery of anticipated shortages in tank transporters, heavy bridging equipment, mine exploding devices and certain items of heavy transportation equipment is not yet assured.

CM-IN-11840 (16 Apr 44)

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Page 3.

From: Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Forces, London, England

To: War Department

No. S 50400 16 April, 1944

(D). Civil Affairs. Personnel. Although
a shortage of trained US and British personnel exists mini-
mum requirements can be met. Supplies. A programme for
the phased allocation of civil supplies to Army groups
for the period D to D plus 90 has been completed.

No Sig.

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ACTION: CC/S

Date-

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Adm King
Col Park
Gen Bissell
CofS

Signature-

CM-IN-11840 (16 Apr 44) 2216Z bjm

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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April 14, 1944
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DECLASSIFIED
SM 522-71

To: Chiefs of Staff
Rptd: AFHQ, Algiers

From: Joint Staff Mission

JSM 1644.

Date- 12-1-71

Reference MEDCOS 88.

Signature- RHO

At today's CCS meeting US Chiefs of Staff stated that they were unable without interfering with OVERLORD programs to find twenty additional sailings within the Mediterranean during April to complete US quota of one hundred. The matter was then referred to CMTC on the understanding that full MED requirements of 195 sailings must be found for April.

At CMTC meeting where Combined Shipping authorities were represented, US authorities were informed that the additional twenty sailings for April would be found from British sources at the expense of other commitments for which compensation should be made. It was agreed that the matter of compensation should be worked out by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. BMSM are informing Ministry of War Transport accordingly.

No sig

Time of Origin 150049Z

FOOTNOTE: MEDCOS 88 is CM-IN-8494 (12 Apr 44) CCS

ACTION: CCS

INFO : General Arnold, OED, General Bessell, Colonel Park
C of S

CM-IN-10957 (15 Apr 44)

1712Z

ltw

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: AFHQ Algiers
Info: J.S. M., Washington
Date: 10 April, 1944

BIGOT
COSMED 86.

1. Heavy demands for cargo shipping for future operations demand rigid economy in shipping during next 4 months. The narrow margins to which shipping authorities are working require fullest information on future needs. Urgently request, therefore, reconsideration of your requirements for April as quoted in F.22458 24th March, and most accurate possible forecast of cargo shipping sailings required for internal Mediterranean services during May, June, July, omitting ANVIL requirements and on the assumption that ANVIL will not take place before mid-July.

2. Re-examination of your shipping requirements should be based on the following assumptions:

(A) A co-ordinated all-out offensive to join the bridgehead with the mainline will be launched as early as practicable. Thereafter pressure will be maintained to contain the maximum number of German formations in Central Italy.

(B) A positive amphibious threat will be developed against the Mediterranean Coast of France in support of OVERLORD. This threat should be fully developed by OVERLORD, D minus 5 and maintained as long as possible after D day.

CM-IN-7637 (11 Apr 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974
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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Overlord

WAR DEPARTMENT
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COSMED 86.

- Page Two -

3. Your report should include the major units you propose to move and the dates you estimate they will be operational.

4. It is essential that there be the utmost possible reduction in lay-over time of ships in your theater and that every effort be made to unload those now in port expeditiously.

Time of Origin 10 (71)715Z

Footnote: 22458 is CM-IN-17681 (25 Mar 44) WSA

not logged as having been read

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Arnold
OPD
Gen Bissell
Adm King
Col Park
CofS

CM-IN-7637 (11 Apr 44) 1619Z bjm **DECLASSIFIED**

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date **MAY 22 1974**

31

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: FREEDOM ALGIERS
INFO: JOINT STAFF MISSION
FROM: BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
DATED: 5TH APRIL, 1944

COSMED 82

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

You will have seen from C.O.S. (W) 1261 and J.S.M. 1619 that Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that 2nd (Le Clerc) French Armored Division should be returned from the Mediterranean to United Kingdom.

2. Request you arrange that LST's leaving in MKS 45 bring as much of Division's equipment as possible without delaying their departure from Mediterranean and inform us in due course of equipment shipped in these vessels.

3. Programme for return of personnel and remainder of equipment being worked out here. We will keep you informed.

Time of Origin 051800Z

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: GEN. ARNOLD
OPD
GEN. BISSELL
ADM. KING
COL. PARK
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RL DATE

CM-IN-3638 (6 Apr 44) 0023Z cng

MAY 22 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Chiefs of Staff
To: J.S.M. Washington
Rptd: A.F.H.Q. Algiers
Dated: April 4, 1944
C.O.S. (W) 1261. B I G O T

1. H.M.G. think it essential for political reasons that the 2nd French Armored LeClerc Division should be moved from Mediterranean to U.K. in order to increase French participation in OVERLORD. Eisenhower will be glad to have this division and Wilson says he can spare it without affecting ANVIL.

2. As it is essential to make use of British L.S.T. due to sail in M.K.S. 45 on April 8th, please ask U.S. Chiefs of Staff immediately if they will agree to move. Also in order to economize M.T. stores shipping we would like to make full use of lift provided by such American L.S.T. referred to in J.S.M. 1605 para 2, as are due to return from Mediterranean to U.K.

No T.O.O.

ACTION: CC/S
INFO: General Arnold
OPD
General Bissell
Admiral King
Colonel Perk
Log

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SM522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

CM-IN-3639 (6 Apr 44) 0024Z med

310 Overlord

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG, U.S. Army Forces in North African Theater
of Operations Algiers, Algiers

To : War Department

No : F25964 1 April 1944

F25964 to AGWAR cites SPILA and HAJRO signed
Devers.

French are unable to organize at this time 3
General Hospitals table organization 8-550 which we
requested be added to the rearmament program in our
W1847/47163 of 4 February. They plan to obtain nec-
essary personnel later in North Africa or in Contin-
ental France. Request equipment for these units be
shipped on lowest priority in revised rearmament
program.

No Sig

1874 is CM-IN-2944 (4 Feb 44) CC/S.

ACTION: CC/S

INFO : CG AAF

ASF

OPD

G-2

Adm King

Col Park

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-526 (1 Apr 44) 1737Z mm

Date-

Signature-

310 Overload

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Combined Chiefs of Staff

March 31, 1944

Commanding General
US Army Forces
European Theater of Operations
London, England

Commanding General
Allied Force Headquarters
Algiers, Algeria

Supreme Headquarters
Allied Expeditionary Forces
London, England

Number WAX 17150

TOPSEC for Eisenhower, London and Wilson, FREEDOM Algiers, for action, ETOUSA pass to the British Chiefs of Staff. This message is FACS 15 to Eisenhower and FAN 353 to Wilson from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are concerned at the possible leakage of information concerning "OVERLORD" through French channels. It appears likely that any information which the French authorities in the United Kingdom may communicate to Algiers and in fact any information which the French in Algiers may obtain is liable to be passed from there into France. Therefore no information which might compromise "OVERLORD" should be passed to the French until such time as a possible leakage would have no effect upon the security of "OVERLORD".

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: GEN ARNOLD
OPD
GEN BISSELL
ADM KING
COL PARK
LOG

CM-OUT-17150 (1 Apr 44) 0309Z 10m

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DECLASSIFIED JCS 29-71
JCS 34-71

Date-12-1-71

Signature-RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

From: US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
London, England

To: War Department

Nr: None March 24, 1944

From Spaatz to Arnold

Employment of Strategic Air Forces in the support of
OVERLORD.

1. The discussion which follows refers to the plans
submitted by the USSTAF and the AEAf.

2. It is agreed unanimously that the first requirement
is the destruction of the German Air Force in being and the
industry upon which it depends. Without this, complete air
supremacy cannot be achieved at the time of OVERLORD, which
is the primary aim of the Strategic Air Forces. It is to
be noted that the USSTAF plan provided for this by the
maintenance of intensive effort against the German Air Force
and industry. It provided for the reduction of German air-
craft production to a level below 500 aircraft per month
and its maintenance at this minimum practicable level.

3. The AEAf plan calls for a prolonged attack on rail
transportation, commencing immediately, as the second object-
ive. The purpose of this attack is stated to be the dis-
location of enemy rail communications so as to impede the move-
ment of strategic reserves to France from other fronts, and
to interrupt the supply of the German armies in France after
D-Day.

In our opinion, the proposed plan will not accomplish
any worthwhile results in achieving these aims and we are
strongly supported in this view by the J.I.C. paper no. J.I.C.
(44) 106 (C) (Final) dated March 18th, 1944 and by inquiry

REUSE

CM-IN-17908 (25 Mar 44)

R. O. 11424, Sec. 3(7) and 3(8) et al

Classified, May 1, 1972

By SIA

Date JAN 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

page 2

from responsible agencies. The J.I.C. paper estimates that in the period D-Day to D plus 5 weeks, the German military rail requirement into the assault area will be about 80 trains per day, and in the period following D plus 5 weeks, about 50-55 trains per day. This is but a fraction of the available rail capacity.

The inescapable conclusion from this is that the transportation "cushion" is so large, and essential traffic so small, that the proposed attack on transportation will be a misdirection of effort. Study of the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, where the problem was relatively simple, confirms these views. Nor can we subscribe to the theory that transportation is an essential target on the grounds that all three forces, tactical and strategic, are capable of attacking it. Three wrongs do not make a right, and if the plan is wrong this theory would simply commit all our air power to the wrong course of action. We believe, rather, that any sound plan should make the most of the maximum capabilities of the forces to be employed, not the minimum.

This does not in any way imply that attacks on transportation of all kinds, properly directed, should not play a strong part in isolating the battle area in the tactical plan close to the period of D-Day, and the USSTAF plan provides for this.

4. In the destruction of the German Air Force in being, we must have targets for which the German Air Force will fight - this is a primary requirement. We believe he will not defend marshalling yards or rail installations of which he has a large surplus beyond his military requirements. Our recent experience shows that he will go to any lengths to conserve his fighter strength.

5. We must select a target system which:

A. The Germans will defend at all costs;

B. If destroyed, will rapidly reduce the capabilities of his ground armies to wage war successfully.

CM-IN-17908 (25 Mar 44)

R. O. 11512, Sec. 3(2) and (4) of (K)

Ord. Ltr. No. 1, 1972

~~SECRET~~ NLR

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3

6. Of all systems examined, oil best meets these requirements. All our evidence shows that attack on the transportation potential will fulfill neither.

7. In comparing the two systems, some interesting points emerge:

A. The weight of attack required to deal with a large marshalling yard is about the same as that required for a synthetic oil plant, and the target areas are roughly the same size;

B. Fourteen synthetic oil plants produce 80 per cent of all German synthetic petrol and oil, whereas any fourteen marshalling yards comprise only a fraction of the German rail potential, which can be readily dispensed with without seriously disrupting German military operations. In this connection, it is of value to note the complete disinterest of the Germans in our current attacks on marshalling yards in France, and his similar disinterest during the "STARKEY" operation last year.

Deception operation against
F&I DeCallais + Belgium

8. Synthetic oil plants and refineries can effectively be put out of operation for many months by air attack. Those in Germany are not specially protected by blast walls, and the Ploesti refineries, which were protected in this way, proved that this type of protection is inadequate. The refineries which were heavily hit were destroyed. The USSTAF plan provides for the attack of twenty seven (27) oil targets, accounting for approximately 80 percent of total synthetic production, and 60 percent of readily usable refining capacity. If these targets are successfully attacked, competent authorities agree that stocks are inadequate to cushion such a drastic reduction. An immediate curtailment of supplies, both to the military forces and to industrial users, will be mandatory.

An interesting commentary on the German motor fuel position is provided by an order from the QM General of the High Command of the Army, (German). *~~SECRET~~

R. O. 11402, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4, (E)

C&D Letter, March 1, 1944

CM-IN-17908 (25 Mar 44)

~~SECRET~~
By SLR

Date JAN 21 1974 12

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

Page 4

9. Our final conclusions on rail transportation and oil as strategic targets are as follows:

A. Strategic attacks on rail transportation with the forces and time available will not affect the course of the initial battle, and will not prevent the movement of German reserves from other fronts. On the other hand, our forces employed against oil will force policy decisions in anticipation of impending reduction in fuel supplies and consequent reduction in fighting power.

B. We believe attacks on transportation will not force the German fighters into action. We believe they will defend oil to their last fighter plane.

C. Attacks on the vast European rail transportation system cannot within any acceptable length of time weaken the resistance of his ground armies on all fronts simultaneously. Oil will do this very thing, and expedite the success of OVERLORD in the period subsequent to D-Day.

10. Recommendation: In view of the foregoing, I recommend that the Strategic Air Forces (RAF and U.S.):

A. Continue the destruction of the German Air Force in being, and the industry which supports it, particularly the ball bearing industry.

B. Attacks Axis oil production.

C. Join with SHAEF, AEF, and the Air Staff in producing a plan for the direct tactical support of OVERLORD. This plan to provide for attacks in great strength upon communications and military installations of all kinds in order to assist to the maximum the initial phases of OVERLORD.

*"Order from QM General of High Command of the Army, dated General Headquarters of High Command of Army, 13th

ENCLOSURE

CM-IN-17908 (25 Mar 44)

R. O. 11601, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 or (E)

OSD Letter, May, 1, 1944

SECRET

By SLR

Date

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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Page 5

December, 1943.

Basic Order No. 24

Measures to economize motor fuel:

Motor fuel is a means of movement. At a decisive hour, we will not be able to move either our tanks or our fast units if there is no motor fuel.

The motor fuel situation is serious. In 1944, it may become still more serious. Restrictions have to be imposed in January. It is impossible to give more than there is.

A crisis with motor fuel, such as we have experienced with the light field howitzer ammunition, must be avoided in time. The order of the hour for motor fuel, therefore, is:

Economize now whenever possible."

ACTION: General Arnold

INFO: General Handy
Colonel Mathewson
Log

CM-IN-17908 (25 Mar 44) 1436Z med

RECEIVED

R. O. 11652 (Sec. 3.3 and 3.4) or (2)

On 21 Jan 1974

By SLR

Date JAN 21 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: CG Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces London
England

To: War Department

Nr: B300 18 March 1944

For AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff from SHAEF
signed Eisenhower. This is SCAP 10.

Preparations for operation OVERLORD as of 15th
March 1944 herewith second progress report:

1. A. US Divisions.

9 Infantry, 5 Armoured and 2 Airborne Divisions
are now in the United Kingdom. Of these, 8 Infantry, 3 Ar-
moured and 1 Airborne Divisions are operationally available.

B. British Divisions.

10 Infantry, 4 Armoured and 2 Airborne are
now in the United Kingdom. Of these 8 Infantry, 3 Armoured
and 2 Airborne Divisions are operationally available.

1 Polish Armoured Division is in the United
Kingdom but not at present available operationally.

2. Status of US and British Air Forces.

A. The operational and administrative re-
quirements for the Air Forces continue to be met in accord-
ance with the planned build-up rate. Considerable progress
in the formation of the necessary administrative units has
been made during the past month.

3. Naval preparations for mounting the assault and
build-up of landing craft.

A. The expeditionary force has now been in-
creased to 5 assault forces and 2 follow-up forces. The 5
former are formed and nearly complete, except for LST and
LCI pa (L); the 2 latter are still only in embryo.

B. The state of training is showing a satis-
factory improvement.

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CM-IN-13084 (18 Mar 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: CG Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces London
England

To: War Department

Nr: B300 18 March 1944

4. Administrative preparations in general.

A. Mounting.

Preparation of embarkation facilities continues.

Planning for the assembly and loading of the assault and follow-up has reached an advanced state. Planning for stores movement continues.

B. Build-up of administrative troops.

Shortages exist in transport, medical and chemical warfare troops. Mobilization of some ME (TN) units still delayed due to short supply of mechanical equipment.

C. Material resources.

The deficiency of 6-ton lorries is no longer considered critical. Following items of heavy transportation equipment, plant and stores are temporarily in short supply CL certain items of cargo handling gear. Railway bridging.

D. Civil Affairs.

Arrangements have been made with the Ministry of Food for stocks in the United Kingdom to be made available to SCAEF, for civilian relief requirements for the first 90 days of operation OVERLORD. It is considered that these supplies are more than adequate. For this operation provision is being made for the stockpiling of medical and sanitary supplies, soap and clothing.

ACTION: CC/S
INFORMATION:

OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON
LOG

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Date-

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CM-IN-13084 (18 Mar 44) 2331Z cng

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: AFHQ
INFO: JOINT STAFF MISSION
FROM: WAR CABINET OFFICES
DATED 14th March 1944

BIGOT

COSMED 59

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

- sent to W7H*
1. OVERLORD/ANVIL. In accordance with paragraph (IV) of COSMED 43 we shall on 20th March be reviewing the position regarding plans and preparations for amphibious operations in the Mediterranean to be undertaken in conjunction with OVERLORD.
 2. Please telgraph to reach us by 18th March in amplification of NAF 645 your appreciation of the situation then existing in the Mediterranean with particular reference to the prospects and requirements of the battle in Italy and an outline of the plans which you propose.
- sent to W7H*

Time of Origin 141425Z

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ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
CofS
ADM. KING
COL. MATHEWSON

Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-10475 (15 Mar 44) 1409Z eng

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY CONTROL

SUPPLEMENTARY COPY

URGENT

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: SHAEF
To: WAR

NR: B 245, 9th March 1944

BIGOT. To General Marshall for the US Chiefs of Staff Personal from Eisenhower cite SHCOS.

Note: Correction of Page 2 Line 25.

On the other hand it is becoming increasingly apparent that in order to provide the maximum, requisite lift and flexibility for OVERLORD.

No Sig.

Supplement to CM-IN-6377 (9 Mar 44) JC/S

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Arnold
CofS
Adm King
Col Mathewson

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CM-IN-6502 (10 Mar 44) 0241Z bjm

adm. Sec'y

5/0 Overlord

17

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

for
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEP London
To: War

No: B247 9 March 1944

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisen-
hower. This is SCAF number 9.

Logistic operational requirements following US Naval
during OVERLORD are forwarded:

- A. 2 old cruisers *British*
- B. 6 merchant ships
- C. 2 ARL's *Caribbean*
- D. 6 SC or PC
- E. 2475 ton pontoon docks *British*
- F. 1 LSD *British*

Paragraph 2. Reference above A, E, and F being pro-
vided by British, C being arranged by COMNAVEU, D required
for control of traffic off assault beaches, 2 of which will
be MULBERRY A control vessels ETA in UKY minus 30, B the
6 merchant ships are required for the following purposes:

1. 1 ship to lift 500 drow personnel and equip-
ment and serve as headquarters and accommodation ships for
captured port organization. This ship required in UK by Y
minus 45.

2. 1 ship to lift 500 drow personnel and equip-
ment and serve as headquarters and accommodation ship for

CM-IN-6497 (10 Mar 44)

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

Col. Mathison
35
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

- Page 2 -

From: SHAEF London
To: War

No: B247

9 March 1944

MULBERRY organization. This ship is required in UK by Y minus 60.

3. 2 ships to accommodate 400 men each on near shore commencing Y minus 60. This personnel to be trained for manning MULBERRY elements and commencing D day will be dispatched overseas with elements. Upon completion of MULBERRY ships will not be longer required.

4. 2 ships for accommodation of 1,200 officers and men each are required in UK by Y minus 21. They will proceed to far shore with relief crews and maintenance staffs and provide facilities for rest and rehabilitation of personnel of ferry service. These merchant ships cannot be provided by British who are making parallel arrangements for British Sector.

no sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
CofS
Adm King
Col Mathewson

CM-IN-6497 (10 Mar 44) 0211Z bjm

DECLASSIFIED
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

MAY 22 1974

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Moscow
To: WAR

No. 278 5 March 1944

For Joint Chiefs of Staff from Dean.

(Cover Plan for Overlord)
Soviets this date approved plan BODYGUARD as it was originally presented to them without any changes. They withdrew all suggestions for changes that they had presented during the discussions. They agreed that the plan becomes effective and that implementation should start at once. Col Baumer has done an outstanding job here and he will return to London as soon as transportation can be made available.

Nosig

ACTION: JC/S

INFORMATION: General Handy
C of S
General Arnold

CM-IN-3468 (5 Mar 44)

2041Z med

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

To : Chiefs of Staff

From: Joint Staff Mission

Number J.S.M. 1538

February 25, 1944

At today's meeting we were informed that President had approved the conclusions agreed at the meeting between British Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower, representing U.S. Chiefs of Staff, set out in C.O.S. (W) 1168. Supreme Commander, A.E.F., has been notified in PACS 13. Request you transmit conclusions to Allied Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, on behalf C.C.S.

T.O.O. 252317Z

Note: 1168 is CM-IN-16428 (23 Feb 44) CC/3
PACS 13 is CM-OUT-11052 (26 Feb 44) CC/3

ACTION: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
C of S
Admiral King
(White House)

DECLASSIFIED

CM-IN-18350 (26 Feb 44) 1702Z

ejv

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14-53394AB 1800*

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Jm.
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

February 25, 1944

SHAFF, LONDON

Number 181

For Eisenhower London, FACS 13, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The following conclusions have been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and Prime Minister:

"(I) The campaign in Italy must, until further orders, have overriding priority over all existing and future operations in the Mediterranean, and will have first call on all resources land, sea and air, in that theater.

(II) Subject to (I) above, the Allied C in C Mediterranean Theatre, should prepare alternative plans and make such preparations as can be undertaken without prejudice to operations in Italy, for amphibious operations in the Mediterranean with the object of contributing to OVERLORD by containing and engaging the maximum number of enemy forces. The first of these alternatives should be ANVIL on approximately the scale and date originally contemplated, I.E. a 2 division assault building up to about 10 divisions to be launched shortly after OVERLORD. Full consideration will be given to the maximum use of French Forces.

(III) The Allied C in C Mediterranean Theatre should, for the present, base these plans on the assumption that the assault shipping and landing craft at present allocated to him will be at his disposal with the following exceptions:

A. 20 L.S.T.'s to consist of as many British L.S.T.'s as possible, the balance being U.S. and 21 British L.C.I. (L)s

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(26 Feb 44)

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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SECURITY
CONTROL

Page 2

are reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD and will sail for United Kingdom on or about April 1st after having been refitted.

B. 6 U.S.A.K.A.S. are reallocated from OVERLORD to ANVIL.

(IV) The arrangements set out in (II) and (III) above will be reviewed on the March 20th in the light of the situation then existing in Italy. Unless, as a result of this review, it is then decided that ANVIL on the scale and date quoted in (II) above is practicable, such landing craft (over and above a 1 division ship-to-shore lift) as can profitably be employed in OVERLORD will forthwith be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The Allied C in C Mediterranean, will then revise the plans prepared under (II) above on the basis of the assault lift remaining in the Mediterranean."

ORIGINATOR: CC/S (Captain Royal USN)

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INFORMATION: OPD

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C of S
Admiral King
General Arnold
General Bissell
White House

Date-

Signature-

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SECURITY CONTROL

To : Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff

Number COS (W) 1170

February 24, 1944

Reference COS (W) 1168 Para. (V)

Prime Minister has approved.

T.O.O. 241140Z

Note: 1168 is CM-IN-16428 (23 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
C of S
Admiral King
White House

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SM522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- *RHP*

CM-IN-17120 (24 Feb 44) 2208Z ejv

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SECURITY CONTROL

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: Chiefs of Staff

To : Joint Staff Mission

Number COS(W) 1168

February 23, 1944

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SM 522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

Quote Reference JSMM 1528 and 1529.

Following conclusions were agreed this morning at meeting held between British Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower representing U.S. Chiefs of Staff:

(I). The campaign in Italy must, until further orders, have overriding priority over all existing and future operations in the Mediterranean, and will have first call on all resources land, sea and air, in that theater.

(II). Subject to above, the Allied C. in C. Mediterranean theatre, should prepare alternative plans and make such preparations as can be undertaken without prejudice to operations in Italy, for amphibious operations in the Mediterranean with the object of contributing to OVERLORD by containing and engaging the maximum number of enemy forces. The first of these alternatives should be ANVIL on approximately the scale and date originally contemplated, i.e. a two division assault building up to about 10 divisions to be launched shortly after OVERLORD. Full consideration will be given to the maximum use of French forces.

(III). The Allied C. in C. Mediterranean Theatre should, for the present base these plans on the assumption that the assault shipping and landing craft at present allocated to him will be at his disposal with the following exceptions;

A. 20 LST's to consist of as many British LST's as possible, the balance being U.S. and 21 British LCI. (L)'s are reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD and will sail for UK on or about April 1st after having been refitted.

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2

B. 6 U.S. AKA's are reallocated from OVERLORD to ANVIL.

(IV). The arrangements set out in (II) and (III) above will be reviewed on the 20th March in the light of the situation then existing in Italy. Unless, as a result of this review, it is then decided that ANVIL on the scale and date quoted in (II) above is practicable, such landing craft (over and above a one division ship-to-shore lift) as can profitably be employed in OVERLORD will forthwith be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The Allied C. in C. Mediterranean, will then revise the plans prepared under (II) above on the basis of the assault lift remaining in the Mediterranean.

(V). If conclusions (I) to (IV) above are approved by the President and Prime Minister, they will be transmitted forthwith to Generals Eisenhower and Wilson.

T.O.O. 231740Z

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Bissell
General Arnold
C of S
Adm King
White House

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SM 522-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

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SECURITY CONTROL

February 23, 1944

From: Chiefs of Staff

To: Joint Staff Mission

Number 1169

Following from Chiefs of Staff COS(W) 1169

The meeting mentioned in COS(W) 1168

- (1) Took note with satisfaction that the United States would provide 7 additional LST for OVERLORD, and emphasised the importance of the arrival of these craft in the United Kingdom not later than mid May.
- (11) Agreed that the Minister of War Transport in consultation with WSA should be invited to provide 64 additional MT ships required for OVERLORD.
- (111) Took note that the British would make available the following additional resources for OVERLORD
1 LSH, 3 LSI, 1 LSI(H), 2 LSD.

1168 is CM-IN-16428 (23 Feb 44) CCS

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
C of S
Adm King
White House

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JCS MEMO. 1-17-75
BY RT, DATE MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-17302 (25 Feb 44) 0357Z es

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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DATE FEB. 23, 1944		# W 11674	ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM 1332			DEFERRED
DECODED BY			PRIORITY
PARAPHRASED BY BENNETT			ROUTINE
ROUTED BY			DEFERRED
UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE.			IF OPERATIONAL CHECK BELOW
PAGE 1 OF 5 NO. W 11674, 22 FEB. '44 NCR 10221			☐

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ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

(RECEIVED BY COURIER FROM ARMY)

SECURITY CONTROL. ~~EYES ONLY.~~

MARSHALL EYES ONLY SIGNED EISENHOWER.

I THINK YOUR 153 REPRESENTS THE BEST DECISION THAT CAN BE MADE UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE PROSPECTS FOR ANVIL IN THE HOPED FOR STRENGTH OF A 2 DIVISION ASSAULT AND A TOTAL STRENGTH OF AT LEAST 10 DIVISIONS SEEM TO ME TO HAVE DETERIORATED IN PAST 10 DAYS, I STILL BELIEVE WE SHOULD PRESERVE FOR SOME TIME SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY AS TO INSURE AS FAR AS WE CAN AGAINST A POSSIBLE STAGNATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION AT THE TIME OF OVERLORD WITH ONLY A PORTION OF OUR TROOPS THERE ENGAGED AGAINST THE ENEMY. I AM STRENGTHENED

[Printed Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, War Years, 1744-1745]

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 ON CHIEF

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED

ACTION: F-1

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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DATE

TIME

GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

IN THE BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD RETAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT IF REVIEW IN LATTER PART OF MARCH SHOULD INDICATE THAT ANVIL IS NOT FEASIBLE, WE COULD STILL REINFORCE OUR MEANS OF BUILDUP IN OVERLORD FROM EQUIPMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. WE MUST NOT LOSE THE INITIATIVE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THE VERY TIME WHEN WE WILL NEED IT MOST. HOWEVER, THE ORDERS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER SHOULD POSITIVELY STATE THAT ANVIL PLANNING IS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CURRENT BATTLE. THESE ORDERS SHOULD BE MOST EMPHATIC.

WE ARE HAVING A MEETING WITH THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF THIS MORNING SO AS TO SETTLE THIS MATTER. IN MY OPINION IT SHOULD BE REVIEWED AGAIN IN SUFFICIENT TIME SO THAT IF IT BECOMES APPARENT THERE IS NO HOPE FOR ANVIL AS NOW CONCEIVED

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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THE MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT ADDITIONAL TO THAT ALREADY AGREED
COULD START BY APRIL 1ST.

IN THIS CONNECTION AND REFERENCE MESSAGE FROM THE PRES-
IDENT CONTAINED IN YOUR NUMBER 154, I SUGGEST THAT THE THIRD
POWER SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT ANVIL IS OF COURSE CONTINGENT
UPON THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF EARLY SUCCESS IN THE PRESENT IT-
ALIAN CAMPAIGN BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT OUR OPERATIONS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER WILL BE CONDUCTED ON SUCH A BASIS AS TO
EMPLOY THE BULK OF OUR TROOPS OFFENSIVELY. IF THIS NOTIFICAT-
ION WERE GIVEN NOW WE WOULD HAVE IN ADVANCE THE NECESSARY
FLEXIBILITY IN DECISION WHEN THE TIME COMES.

WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBILITY OF DOING ANYTHING CONCRETE
TOWARD ANVIL IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WHILE THE PRESENT BATTLE IS

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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PAGE 4 OF 5 NO. W 11674, 22 FEB. 44 NCR 10221

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GCT

ON OUTGOING DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE BEFORE BEGINNING TEXT

GOING ON WE MUST FACE FACTS AS THEY ARE. THE PRESENT BATTLE DEMANDS EVERY AVAILABLE RESOURCE. WHILE 2 EXPERIENCED AMERICAN DIVISIONS ARE OUT OR COMING OUT OF THE LINE FOR A PERIOD OF REHABILITATION THE PROSPECTS GROW STRONGER THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO REENTER THE SAME BATTLE WITHIN A FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER IN THE MEANTIME THEY ARE GETTING READY TO FIGHT AGAIN AND IF THE SITUATION SHOULD SUDDENLY TURN IN OUR FAVOR AND THEY SHOULD NOT BE NEEDED AGAIN IN ITALY THEIR ADDITIONAL TRAINING FOR AN-VIL COULD BE QUICKLY ACCOMPLISHED. WHAT WE MUST HAVE DEFINITELY IN SIGHT EVENTUALLY IS A TOTAL STRENGTH OF SOME 10 TO 12 DIVISIONS TO PUSH INTO SOUTH FRANCE AFTER THE OPENING IS MADE. IF INCESSANT BATTLING IN ITALY SHOULD CONTINUE TO ABSORB THE GREAT BULK OF TOTAL UNITED NATIONS RESOURCES THERE, THEN, AS

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No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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TIME

GCT

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YOU MENTIONED IN A LETTER TO ME, THE SITUATION AUTOMATICALLY
RESOLVES ITSELF.

NO SIG

153 IS CM-OUT-4837 (21 FEB 44) JC/S
154 IS CM-OUT-8865 (21 FEB 44) JC/S

CM-IN-15721 (22 FEB 44)

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, the War Years, III, 1744-1745]

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**SECURITY
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EYES ONLY

SECURITY CONTROL

EYES ONLY

Admiral William D. Leahy, USN

February 21, 1944

CG
SHAEF, LONDON

Number 154

For Eisenhower London signed Admiral Leahy

For General Eisenhower's eyes only. At conference Joint Chiefs of Staff just had with the President this date the memorandum of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff furnished you for information in 153 was read to him and the President directed that the following be sent to you as being additional to the prime military considerations "Call attention that we are committed to a third power and I do not feel we have any right to abandon this commitment for ANVIL without taking the matter up with that third power".

ORIGINATOR : JCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
CofS
ADM KING
GEN ARNOLD
WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

February 21, 1944

SHAEP LONDON ENGLAND

Number 153

For Eisenhower London from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff furnish herewith for your information the text of a memorandum that they have this date submitted to the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff have considered the message of the British Chiefs of Staff, COS (W-1156) and General Eisenhower's proposal COS (W-1157). We agree that the present state of uncertainty regarding ANVIL should be terminated. We disagree that ANVIL should be cancelled. On the contrary, in view of that fact that resources can be made available for a 2-division lift in the ANVIL assault, it is our opinion that the decision should now be made to plan to mount ANVIL with a 2-division lift, but that all combat ground forces in the Mediterranean should be considered available to further the occupation and security of the Rome area. *we have in M/R*
2. U. S. and French units being rehabilitated should be reequipped and trained for ANVIL as required. It should be possible to do this without interfering with the war in Italy. Consideration should be given to the use of French Units in the ANVIL assault, some of which are now receiving amphibious training in North Africa.

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JCS letter, 6-10-73
& OSD letter, 6-3-72

JAN 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Number 153

Page 2

3. The foregoing views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, if agreed to, would be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the understanding that if the campaign in Italy has not developed favorably for the Allies by April 1, the situation will be reviewed with a view to a new decision as to the furtherance of the campaign in the Mediterranean, which may require a deferment of ANVIL.
4. We agree with General Eisenhower's recommendation in paragraph 6 of COS (W) 1157 that 6 U. S. AKA's be reallocated from OVERLORD to ANVIL and that 20 British LST's and 21 British LCI (L) S be reallocated from ANVIL to OVERLORD in order to meet OVERLORD requirements and still retain sufficient craft for a 2-division lift for ANVIL.
5. We note that in paragraph 7 of COS (W) 1157, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force reports that there will still be a shortage of 15 LST's for OVERLORD which must be provided from increased loading, increased serviceability, U. S. production, and increased serviceability of LCI's whose vehicle lift can be substituted for LST's. The U. S. will provide 7 LST's at the expense of LST training but these 7 LST's will not arrive in the U. K. until about the middle of May.
6. In accordance with General Eisenhower's request in paragraph 8 of COS (W) 1157 we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm the allocation of 64 MT ships from combined sources and 3 LSI (L) S and 2 LSD's from British sources.
7. The necessity for and provision of additional escort groups should be considered in conjunction with the over-all Naval support requirements by the Naval Staffs of the United Kingdom and United States.

CM-OUT-8837 (21 Feb 44)

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JCS letter, 8-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Number 153

Page 3

8. We recommend that the attached message be sent to General Eisenhower (enclosure) and a copy be sent to General Wilson for information.

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT OF MESSAGE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that planning and preparation for ANVIL shall proceed on a 2-division assault basis and that OVERLORD and ANVIL allocations will be adjusted to strengthen OVERLORD. Accordingly, 6 U.S. AKA's now assigned to OVERLORD are re-allocated to ANVIL and 20 British LST's and 21 British LCI (L)'s are re-allocated from ANVIL to sail for U.K. on or about April 1st after having been refitted.

The U.S. will provide 7 additional LST's for OVERLORD which however will not arrive in the U.K. until about the middle of May.

They confirm the allocation to OVERLORD of 64 additional MT ships from combined sources and 3 LSI (L)'s and 2 LSD's from British sources.

The need of additional escort groups for OVERLORD is being studied by the Naval staffs of the U.K. and the U.S.

With reference to operation ANVIL, all combat ground forces in the Mediterranean should be considered available to the Italian campaign but U.S. and French units being rehabilitated should be re-equipped and trained for ANVIL as required. This can be done without interfering with the war in Italy. Consideration should be given to the use of French units in the ANVIL assault.

ORIGINATOR: JC/S (Capt Royal USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, Gen Bissell, Gen Arnold, CofS,
Adm King, White House.

CM-OUT-8837 (21 Feb 44) 1954Z bjm

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JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-2-73

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

February 19, 1944

TO: Joint Staff Mission

FROM: Chiefs of Staff

BIGOT

Following from Chiefs of Staff COS (W) 1157

Following is text of General Eisenhower's proposals referred to in COS (W) 1156.

I have re-examined problem of mounting OVERLORD with landing ships and craft allocated as of this date. It now appears that in light of certain adjustments in loading and use of ships and craft and later advice as to increased serviceability of US LSTs, LCTs and LCI(L)s over previous planning figures, it is practicable to mount a satisfactory assault and to maintain the required buildup without allocation of all ships and craft requested in CCS 465/1.

It has also become clear that only additional landing ships and craft, beyond those now allocated to OVERLORD, which can be certain to arrive in adequate time for target date are those now allocated to ANVIL. I am convinced that ANVIL will be of great assistance to OVERLORD, both by diverting German divisions from buildup against the lodgement and by opening way into France for French and US divisions now in Mediterranean to join in decisive effort against Germany. Hence, we must make maximum effort to mount ANVIL.

Certain alternatives set forth below would give OVERLORD assault lift which is considered necessary and would also transfer to Mediterranean 6 AKA's which should serve to replace in part the withdrawals hereinafter considered. These ships are considered to be more suitable for use in an assault in Mediterranean than across Channel.

It is reconsidered that lift remaining in Mediterranean even if all changes considered below are made should be sufficient to mount at least a two-division assault against South of France. It is believed that planning for operation ANVIL should be continued on basis that

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CM-1N-14255 (20 Feb 44)

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310 Overlord

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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- (a) It is necessary to withdraw 20 LSTs and 21 LCI(L)s from present allocations to ANVIL. These craft should sail on or about April 1 having been refitted.
- (b) The vehicle lift in the 20 LSTs which are withdrawn be replaced in ANVIL by the 6 US AKAs now assigned to OVERLORD.

In interest of balancing national lift for both OVERLORD and ANVIL withdrawals from Mediterranean should be British vessels.

As representative of US Chiefs of Staff I recommend that

- (a) There be withdrawn for use in OVERLORD 20 British LSTs and 21 British LCI(L)s from those now allocated to ANVIL to sail for UK on or about April 1 having been refitted.
- (b) The 6 US AKAs now assigned to OVERLORD be reallocated to ANVIL in replacement of vehicle lift of 20 LSTs withdrawn.
- (c) Planning for an assault against the South of France to be launched in conjunction with OVERLORD be continued on above basis.

From point of view of Supreme Commander for OVERLORD we are still short the lift of 15 LST. This must be obtained from increased loading, increased serviceability US production and increased serviceability of LCTs whose vehicle lift can be substituted for LSTs. In order to give reasonable assurance that this essential lift will be provided it is urgently requested that not less than 7 additional LST be assigned to OVERLORD from US production.

The recommendations in this paper are made on the assumption that 64 additional MT Ships, the 3 LSI(L) which Chiefs of Staff have suggested may be available and the 2 LSD will be assigned to OVERLORD. Confirmation of these assignments is requested as a matter of urgency.

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BIGOT

February 19, 1944

Page 3

It is further pointed out that the decrease in number of LCI(L) will entail use of additional personnel ship convoys and this in turn will require three additional escort groups.

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ACTION: CC/3

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Arnold
C of S
Adm. King
White House ✓

Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-14255

(20 Feb 44)

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SECURITY CONTROL

February 19, 1944

TO: Joint Staff Mission

From: Chiefs of Staff

BIGOT

Following from Chief of Staff COS (W) 1156

We had a meeting with General Eisenhower this morning. He has put forward a proposed allocation of landing craft as between OVERLORD and ANVIL (for details see immediately following telegram) which provides an irreducible minimum for OVERLORD and a bare two-divisional assault lift for ANVIL. General Eisenhower said that he would like ANVIL if possible as an adjunct to OVERLORD but expressed the personal view that it might no longer be practicable owing to the developments of the situation in Italy. He stipulated that if ANVIL should be cancelled, he would expect OVERLORD to have an immediate call on all landing craft, over and above a 1-division lift, which would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean in time.

Our first impression of General Eisenhower's proposal is that both OVERLORD and ANVIL are skimped. We are examining it in detail and will telegraph again.

Meanwhile there is a much bigger aspect of the situation which requires immediate decision. The campaign in Italy has not developed according to expectation. Hitler has decided to fight it out south of Rome. On the long view, we are satisfied that the opportunity that has thus been given us of bleeding and burning German divisions is in our best strategic interests. This being so, the requirements of the campaign in Italy should be placed above all others in the Mediterranean. We must in any case make certain of one battle before preparing for another.

As it is, we feel that the shadow of ANVIL is already cramping General Wilson who requires all the resources on which he can lay hands particularly infantry formations in order to nourish the battle and replace tired troops. It would now be wholly unjustifiable to keep any formation

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

BIGOT

February 19, 1944

Page 2

SECURITY CONTROL

out of Italy on the grounds that it was going to be required for ANVIL. It would be still less justifiable to withdraw any formations out of the battle for that express purpose. In these circumstances we think that the fact should be frankly faced that, irrespective of the strength of the initial assault, the prospect of providing ANVIL on a ten-divisional scale or anything like it, has become exceedingly remote.

The present state of uncertainty ought to be terminated at the earliest possible moment, and we strongly recommend that this should be done by the immediate cancellation of ANVIL, and that Generals Eisenhower and Wilson should be so informed at once.

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ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen. Bissell
Gen. Arnold
C of S
Adm. King
White House

Date-

Signature-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

17 February 1944

OVERLORD PROGRESS REPORT AS OF 15 FEBRUARY
(Brief of SCAF6, 16 Feb)

1. Build-up and state of readiness of U.S. and British Divisions:

a. U.S. Divisions:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Operationally Available</u>
Airborne.....	2	1
Armored.....	3	2
Infantry.....	8	5

b. British Divisions:

Airborne.....	2	2
Armored.....	4	3
Infantry.....	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>
	29	21

(Plus one Polish armored division, not yet operationally available).

2. Buildup of U.S. and British Air Forces:

a. Requirements are being met and planned buildup rate being achieved satisfactorily.

b. Suitable airfield capacity has been planned for all the squadrons of the Continental target force. Majority of the fields already completed.

3. Airborne Forces:

a. Particular attention is being paid to training for large scale airborne operations.

4. Naval preparations for assault; buildup of landing craft:

a. Expeditionary force at present divided into three assault forces and two followup forces. Each has landing craft to carry one division. Combined training with assault divisions is proceeding. To allow this, civilian population from five areas has been evacuated.

b. The three assault forces are steadily approaching completion; training proceeding satisfactorily despite weather. Followup forces are only just forming.

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5. Material Resources:

a. Present position in regard to stores and equipment for British forces satisfactory except for shortage of 6-ton lorries and 40-ton tank transporters.

b. Buildup of general supplies for U.S. forces satisfactory. Organizational equipment now arrives in U.K. 30 days ahead of troops, permitting prompt equipping on arrival. Certain items are temporarily in short supply.

c. Common user items not available in desired quantities; crawlers, mobile cranes, earthworks machinery, heavy bridging. However minimum requirements will be met, spare parts and replacements in short supply.

6. Civil Affairs:

a. Tables of civilian supply requirements for initial 6 months have been forwarded to Combined Civil Affairs Committee for approval and procurement.

b. Preliminary arrangements for provision of food stockpile for initial 90 days will be made.

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Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

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PRIORITY

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEF.
To: WAR.

No. B-157 16 Feb. 1944.

To Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower this
is SCAF 6.

In reply to your cable FACS 5-68 dated 5th February
herewith progress report on operation OVERLORD as of 15
February 1944:

1. Build-up and state of readiness of US and British
Divisions:

A. US Divisions:

2 Airborne, 3 Armoured and 8 Infantry
Divisions are present in the United Kingdom. Of these 1
Airborne, 2 Armoured and 5 Infantry Divisions are operation-
ally available.

operationally available divisions

	airborne	armored	inf	total
US	1	2	5	8
BR	2	3	13	21

British Divisions:

2 Airborne, 4 Armoured and 10 Infantry
Divisions are present in the United Kingdom. Of these,
2 Airborne, 3 Armoured and 8 Infantry Divisions are operation-
ally available. In addition, 1 Polish Armoured Division is
present in the United Kingdom but is not yet operationally
available.

2. Build-up of US and British Air Forces.

A. The requirements for Air Forces are being met
and the planned build-up rate is being achieved satisfactorily.

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CM-IN-11245 (16 Feb 44)

310 Overlord

Date-12-1-71

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SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEP.
To: WAR
No. B-157 16 Feb. 1944.

Page-2-

Administrative preparations are also progressing in accordance with the schedule.

B.

Suitable airfield capacity in the United Kingdom has been planned for all the squadrons of the Continental Target Force. The majority of the airfields concerned are already completed.

3. Airborne Forces:

Particular attention is being paid to training for airborne operations which will be on a large scale. Readjustments in tactical dispositions are being made to suit the glider commitments for the airborne operations.

4. Naval preparations for mounting the assault and buildup of landing craft:

A.

The expeditionary force is at present divided into 3 assault forces and 2 follow-up forces, each composed of landing ships and craft to carry about 1 division. Combined training with the assault divisions is proceeding, the civilian population having been evacuated from 5 areas in Great Britain to allow this to be carried out.

B.

The 3 assault forces are steadily approaching completion, and training is proceeding satisfactorily despite

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEF.
To: WAR
No. B-157 16 Feb. 1944.

Page-3-

the weather. The follow-up forces are only just forming.

5. Administrative preparations in general:

A

Mounting:

yards
The necessary construction of Embarkation points, hards, concentration areas, assembly and transit areas etc., has been largely completed in the central area. The construction of the remaining hards, assembly areas etc. is now in progress. A draft berthing and sailing programme for stores, coasters and ships has been prepared.

B.

Build-up of administrative troops:

(1) ^{the General} State of readiness of the administrative part of the force is such that the US and British Divisions indicated as operationally available in paragraph 1 can be supported administratively.

(2) With regard to the British Forces, the present position shows shortages in supplies and transport, medical and transportation personnel.

(3) The mobilization of mechanical equipment (transportation) units is being delayed by shortage of mechanical equipment.

(4) The build-up of US Forces is arranged so as to have administratively balanced forces in the United

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CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEF.
To: WAR
No. B-157 16 Feb. 1944.

Page-4-

Kingdom at all times. Arrivals are generally on schedule. ✓

C. Material resources:

(1) Present position in regard to stores and equipment for British Forces is satisfactory except for 6-ton lorries and a temporary short supply of transportation equipment, particularly 40-ton tank transporters. ✓

(2) The build-up of general supplies for US forces in the United Kingdom is proceeding satisfactorily. Organizational equipment is arriving in United Kingdom 30 days ahead of troops, permitting prompt equipping of troops on arrival. Certain items of organizational equipment, particularly Signal, are temporarily in short supply. ✓

(3) Common user items—crawlers and mobile cranes, earth works machinery and heavy bridging for loads of 40 tons, are not available in quantities desired, but minimum requirements will be met. In the case of mechanical equipment, special efforts will be made to provide essential spare parts and replacements now in short supply. ✓

D. Civil Affairs: Tables of civilian supply requirements for the initial period of 6 months have been forwarded to the Combined Civil Affairs committee for approval and procurement action. Supplementary tables are being ✓

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SECURITY CONTROL

From: SHAEF
TO: WAR
No. B-157, 16 Feb. 1944.

Page -5-

prepared and will be submitted to the committee in the near future. Preliminary arrangements for the provision of a stock pile of food for the initial 90 days of the operation will be made.

No Sig

* Being Serviced.

FACS 5 is CM-OUT-1945 (4 Feb 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (CAPT. ROYAL, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE
LOG

CM-IN-11245 (16 Feb 44) 1905Z cng

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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Am
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

To: Chiefs of Staff
From: Joint Staff Mission
Dated 12th February, 1944

J.S.M. 1511

U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that General Wilson's request in last para. of MEDCOS 37 should be approved and that Supreme Commander, A.E.F., should also be so informed.

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Time of Origin 122225Z

attached

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SM522-71

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. BISSELL
GEN. ARNOLD
CofS
ADM. KING
WHITE HOUSE

Date-12-1-71

Signature- *RHO*

CM-IN-9213 (13 Feb 44) 1416Z ong

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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To: British Chiefs of Staff

Info: JSM Washington for
US Chiefs of Staff

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From: AFHQ signed Wilson cite PHOCT.

Dated: 11th February 1944

MOST SECRET

Date-

MEDCOOS NO. 37

Signature-

Authority was granted in FAN 292 of January 2nd to retain 504 RCT until completion of SHINGLE.

AGWAR cable 9046 dated February 5th indicates that the 504 Regimental Combat Team should now rejoin the 82nd Airborne Division in England by 16th March.

At present the 504 RCT is holding a front line sector of the Anzio Bridgehead. It has become necessary to ensure the security of the bridgehead by reinforcing VI Corps with an additional RCT or the equivalent and to furnish relief for brigades of the First British Division, which, as a result of heavy fighting recently, have become weakened. (Up to the end) of February such action will absorb all new formations that become available and will leave no troops available to relieve the 504 RCT prior to early March.

We will do all possible to relieve the 504 RCT from the bridgehead in early March and urge that the move of the combat team to England be deferred. The next convoy after forecast date of relief that could lift the unit is MEF 30 sailing approximately 9th April.

Request that the 504 RCT not be withdrawn from this theater until MEF 30 at the earliest. Urgent decision essential.

FAN 292 is CM-OUT-607 (2 Jan 44) 00/3. 9046 is CM-OUT-2240
(5 Feb 44) OPD 310 Shingle

ACTION: CO/S

INFORMATION: OPD, Gen. Bissell, Gen. Arnold, C of S,
Adm. King, White House

CM-IN-7933 (11 Feb 44) 2252Z med

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P R I O R I T Y

From: SHAFF London
To: WAR

Number: B-115 February 7, 1944

This is SCAP 5 CO Marshall for combined Chiefs of Staff from Betts signed Eisenhower.

Recommend early approval of CCS 271/1. Suggest that committee be formed in London by Foreign Office and State Department. Urgently need cable approval to cover pending problems and negotiations.

Nosig

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Bissell
Gen Arnold
Gen Hilldring
Adm. King
White House
LOG

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Date-12-1-71

Signature- RAB

CM-IN-5147 (8 Feb 44) 0407Z jb

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SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff
71469

February 4, 1944

SHAEP, LONDON

Number 68

For Eisenhower London, FACS 5, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Commencing February 15, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 1 month, render by despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with copies to the British Chiefs of Staff, periodical progress reports on preparations for OVERLORD for transmission to Moscow. Special reports will be submitted whenever you deem it desirable.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
Adm King
White House
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CM-OUT-1945

(4 Feb 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

U R G E N T

SECURITY CONTROL

From: SAC London
To: War

No. B36 24 January 1944

To AGWAR and Troopers for Combined Chiefs of Staff
rptd British COS from SC, AEF signed Eisenhower, BIGOT.

The target date referred to in paragraph 16 of our
B-33/M-37 dated 23rd January is 1st May.

No Sig

FOOTNOTE: 33 is CM-IN-15541 (24 Jan 44) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
White House
C of S
Adm King
Gen Arnold

CM-IN-15682 (24 Jan 44) 1247Z 1mj

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WFS.
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

[Printed in Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, the War Years, 1673-1675]

U R G E N T

From: SAC London
To: War

No. B 33, 24 January 1944

To AGWAR and Troopers for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated British C/S from SC, AEF signed Eisenhower.

I have now had an opportunity of discussing the OVERLORD plan with my Commanders in Chief. We are convinced that in all discussions full weight must be given to the fact that this operation marks the crisis of the European War. Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered and every risk run to ensure that our blow is decisive. We cannot afford to fail.

2. In this light we have reviewed the OVERLORD plan and we are fully convinced that it is, as the Chiefs of Staff have already asserted, on a narrow margin. The present plan is limited to a 3 divisional assault. To ensure success we consider it essential to increase the assault force to 5 divisions. Nothing less will give us an adequate margin to ensure success.

3. Our reasons for this view are that an operation of this type must be designed to obtain an adequate bridgehead quickly and to retain the initiative. 3 divisions are insufficient for this. The present frontage of assault is consequently too narrow. It will be essential to extend the front to give us a greater opportunity of finding a weak spot through which to exploit success. Moreover, the chances of success of the operation will be greatly increased and the capture of a port speeded up if we could extend our assault to the eastern beaches of the Cotentin Peninsula west of the barrier formed by the river Vire and its marshy estuary. Further, the securing of the eastern flank, and the

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From: SAC London
To: Wer

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No. B 33, 24 January 1944

early capture of the important focal point of Caen with the vital airfields in its vicinity will be facilitated by the extension of the assault to the beaches just west of Ouistreham.

4. With 5 Divisions we should carry out our assault as follows:

i.e. increase of 2 Divisions
We should land 1 US and 2 British assault Divisions on the Caen beaches each on a 2 Brigade front as already planned. We should land 1 additional British Division with 1 Brigade upon the beach just west of Ouistreham and a US Division with 1 Brigade up at the southern end of the east Cotentin beaches. The whole assault would thus be made by 5 Divisions with 8 Brigades up. These would be followed on the second tide of D day by the equivalent of 2 Divisions in landing ships and craft as in the original plan. To assist the assault on the Cotentin an airborne division would be landed on D day to seize the exits from the beaches; followed probably by a second airborne division in approximately 24 hours.

5. I understand that COSSAC has previously stated that additional craft becoming available for OVERLORD should be used to strengthen the follow up on D plus 1 by embarking in landing craft units at present carried in ships. While I agree as to the desirability of this, I am convinced that the first necessity, as stated above, is to widen the frontage of the assault in order to obtain a larger initial bridgehead.

6. I have had examined the additional resources required to fulfill these proposals. By cutting down the

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**SECURITY
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From: SAC London
To: War

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No. B 33, 24 January 1944

scales of vehicles carried in the assault and follow up I can find enough craft from within those already assigned to me to provide lift for one more assault brigade and 1 brigade in reserve. The balance required will have to come from resources outside my control.

7. To carry out the revised plan will require an addition of the following:

- 1 LSH
- 6 LSI (L) or APA
- 1 LSI (H) (all with full complement of LCA or LCVP)
- 72 LCI (L)
- 47 LST
- 144 LCT (see Paragraph 16 below).

8. The following additional Naval Forces will be required above those already requested:

- (A) Escorts:
 - 24 destroyers
 - 28 Motor Launches
- (B) Minesweepers:
 - 4 Flotillas
- (C) Bombardment Force:
 - 5 Cruisers
 - 12 Destroyers
 - 1 or 2 Monitors or Old Battleships.

CM-IN-15541 (24 Jan 44)

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: SAC London
To: War

Page #4

No. B 33, 24 January 1944

9. The majority of the Naval Forces, including the assault shipping and craft, must be formed in the United Kingdom by D minus 42, the last ships and craft joining their Naval Forces by D minus 28 at the latest.

10. The following additional British Land Forces will be required to start training in the United Kingdom by D minus 42:

- 2 Beach groups
- 1 Beach sub-area Headquarters
- 2 Dock operating companies.

11. An additional 8 Fighter Squadrons will be required to ensure the necessary cover over the extended assault area and wider shipping lanes, and 200 troop carrier aircraft to ensure reasonable provision for the dropping of 2 airborne divisions within approximately 24 hours. These air forces must be available in the United Kingdom by D minus 60.

12. To allow an increase in the rate of follow up and build up proportionate to the increase in the assault, an additional 64 MT/stores ships will be required for the first month.

13. The problem that must be faced at once is the provision of these additional forces.

14. I regard ANVIL as an important contribution to OVERLORD as I feel that an assault will contain more enemy forces in Southern France than a threat. The Forces both US and French are in any case available; and the actual landing of these forces will increase the cooperation from

CM-IN-15541 (24 Jan 44)

19
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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: SAC London
To: War

Page #5.

No. B 33, 24 January 1944

resistance elements in France.

15. OVERLORD and ANVIL must be viewed as one whole. If sufficient forces could be made available the ideal would be a 5 Divisional OVERLORD and a 3 Divisional ANVIL or, at worst, a 2 Divisional ANVIL. If insufficient forces are available for this, however, I am driven to the conclusion that we should adopt a 5 Divisional OVERLORD and a 1 Divisional ANVIL, the latter being maintained as a threat until enemy weakness justifies its active employment. This solution should be adopted only as a last resort and after all other means and alternatives have failed to provide the necessary strength by the end of May for a 5 Divisional OVERLORD and a 2 Divisional ANVIL.

16. As regards the target date, it is preferable from the Army point of view that the early-May date should be adhered to if possible in order to obtain the longest campaigning season. I should prefer, therefore, to adhere to the existing date if it were possible. Rather, however, than risk failure with reduced forces on the earlier date, I would accept a postponement of a month if I were assured of then obtaining the strength required. Such a postponement would give an additional month of good weather for preparatory air operations and for training the additional troop carrier aircraft crews. It would also make available an extra months production in the United Kingdom of about 96 LCT.

17. An immediate decision on the plan to be worked to and the date is vital necessity. I request this decision at the earliest possible moment in order to allow time for the transfer of the additional resources to this Theater and

CM-IN-15541 (24 Jan 44)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page #6

From: SAC London
To: War

No: B 33, 24 January 1944

to enable planning and training to be completed in the limited time still available. The recommendations contained in this message have been made after consultation with my Commanders and my own staff, but with no outside agencies.

No Sig.

ACTION: CCS Capt Royal USN

INFORMATION: Gen Handy
C of S
Gen Arnold
White House

[Printed in the Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, the War Years, III, 1673-1675]

CM-IN-15541 (24 Jan 44) 0415Z es

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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DECLASSIFIED SMS22-71

FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-10459 MEDCOS NO.2

FILED: 310 ANVIL

DATE: 16 January 1944

Index Number

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHO

INDEX SHEET

BIGOT
MOST SECRET

"I have been informally advised that the possibility of increasing the OVERLORD assault at the expense of ANVIL has been proposed. The reasons for this are clearly understood. In order that an early decision in this regard may be reached, it is believed expedient to inform you as to what is considered to be the minimum requirements of this theater in assault shipping and craft under the proposal.

If an actual assault against Southern France is to be undertaken, it must be undertaken by a force of no less than 2 divisions plus craft for this lift (which) were allotted to this theatre by SEXTANT. Hence if the operation is to be undertaken as indicated in outline plan ANVIL, a copy of which has been furnished you, the SEXTANT allocation cannot be reduced.

If operation ANVIL is to (?consist) of a threat which will be launched against the coast of France only in the event reduced German resistance warrants as indicated in NAF 492, a copy of which has been furnished you, a minimum lift of one division is required. In addition, if the Mediterranean Theatre is to undertake operations against Southern France under cases A or B RANKIN as previously discussed with COSSAC a minimum lift of one division is required. If assault shipping and craft are to be available to assist the land battle in Italy by coast hopping operations or by an attack against one flank reasonably close to the land battle an assault lift of one division is required.

Experience on this theatre has shown that the average amount of assault shipping and craft to be on station to insure sufficient serviceable craft to land one division shore to shore at assault scales with a high rate of discharge consists of 46 LST, 50 LCT and 75 LCI(L). The serviceability factor and an allowance for losses have been considered in the total figures quoted. Hence these numbers are considered to be the (?minimum) that should be left in the Mediterranean Theatre under all circumstances. However weather conditions will probably not permit the excess LCT now in this theatre to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD. If this excess number of LCT remains in this theatre, viz 62, they can be used for vehicle lift, in which case the total number of LST required can possibly be reduced proportionately to 37.

It is requested that this information be transmitted to the Combined

Chiefs of Staff.

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0022
May 10-23

310 Overlord

3-404

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SM
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

Joint Chiefs of Staff 71469

January 4, 1944

CG
USAWW LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: A-5246

CG ETOUSA
USAFOR LONDON ENGLAND

NUMBER: R-7687

CG NATO
FREEDOM ALGIERS

NUMBER: 6385

Book message for Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz care of 8th Air Force London, Commanding General ETOUSA, and Commanding General NATO from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. Effective January 1, 1944 there will be established an air command designated "The US Strategic Air Forces in Europe," consisting initially of the 8th and 15th US Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the US Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

2. The US Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the SAC, and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all point-blank operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of pointblank targets to be attacked by the 8th and 15th Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the 8th and 15th Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available for his forces.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-1273

(5 Jan 44)

White House
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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY
CONTROL

BOOK MESSAGE

January 4, 1944

PAGE TWO

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

4. The Commanding General, US Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of Operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the US Army air units in their respective areas, including the provision of base services. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the 15th Air Force in performance of operation pointblank as the air operation of first priority.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the Strategic Air Forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.

6. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ 6 heavy bombardment groups and 2 long range fighter groups of the 15th Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for pointblank, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on October 22 (FAN 254).

ORIGINATOR: JCS (Capt Royal USN)

No Sig

INFORMATION: OPD
C of S
Gen Arnold
White House

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

ON-OUT-1273 (5 Jan 44)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-246
1 JANUARY 1944
FILED: 310 SHINGLE

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

"Instant is my NAF 572. General Alexander has informed me that he considers it essential to retain 504th Parachute RCT of 82nd Airborne Division until completion of operation SHINGLE. I have pointed out to Alexander the ill effects of such action on OVERLORD and my reluctance again to approach you for another delay in the movement of resources allotted to that operation but he still insists that the use of this unit is of such importance to the success of SHINGLE that we should press for its retention. He points out that the British Airborne Brigade is now engaged in the line and will be difficult to replace. Further they have never yet taken part in any active operations as paratroops and are badly in need of training before they would be suitable.

"Incontestibly the retention of 504th Parachute RCT will improve the chances of success of SHINGLE. Moreover a successful SHINGLE should yield us the Rome line and might result in the destruction of important enemy forces. On the other hand you may consider that Rome has lost some of its importance since it appears that we can provide reasonable security for our Italian bases without it.

"Nevertheless in consideration of the circumstances detailed above I feel compelled to request authority to retain the 504th RCT until the completion of SHINGLE. If this authority is granted it is estimated that we should be able to release it in time to load on MKF 29 arriving UK on about 16 March. If, as I expect, this will be too late to permit of its readiness for OVERLORD, I suggest that you examine the feasibility of shipping a substitute airborne RCT from US for OVERLORD."

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JS 29-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0022
May 19-25

310 Overlord

2-404

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

EXERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT INCOMING MESSAGE OF 29 DECEMBER 1943 (CM-IN-17889)
FILED "310 ANVIL".

*****B. Any of the LCT in the Levant, for even if they are
not required for HERCULES they are of very low operational value and it
would not be possible to bring them to Western Mediterranean. *****
NOTE: See table included in subject message listing location and dis-
position of landing craft. One column of this table entitled "Remaining
in Mediterranean after OVERLORD craft have left).

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600 DMR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

Signature-

3116 [REDACTED]

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

EXCERPT FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT "BLUE" DISPATCH TO 242125, NCR 41101-S DECEMBER.
FILED "310 ANVIL"

*****B. Indefinite retention all ships listed Mydis 152106
October and 111934 November not authorized at this time. No definite
ANVIL plan is available yet and balanced division total resources between
ANVIL AND OVERLORD has not been reached. Since latter has first priority
you must remain prepared to release units previously earmarked for trans-
fer unless specific exemption from extant directives is made as has
already been done for certain landing craft. Last 3 PC in Mydis 152106
October being diverted UK now. *****

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DDP DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

Signature-

310 Anvil

[REDACTED]

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

FROM WD OUTGOING CM-OUT-8338
22 DECEMBER 1943
FILED: 310 BUCCANEER

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

* * * * *The following is quoted from the approved report of the
Sextant Conference, CCS 426/1, paragraph 24:

"We have agreed to delay major amphibious operations in the Bay
of Bengal until after the next Monsoon and divert the landing craft
now assigned to Buccaneer to operation ANVIL and OVERLORD.

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By AUTHORITY

SM 522-71
SR

JAN 21 1974

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0022
May 10-52

310 Overlord

2-444

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

[REDACTED]

21 December 1943

EXCERPT FROM WAR DEPARTMENT INCOMING MESSAGE OF 21 DECEMBER (CG-IN-14459,
FILED "310 ANVIL")

***** Owing largely to logistic difficulties in connection with establishment of Air Forces, earliest date for which Middle East can plan to mount HERCULES assault is 22 March. This date is subject to postponement by various factors, including weather. It is necessary, however, that craft for ANVIL should leave ALEX for Western Mediterranean not later than one month before D Day of that operation. B on the time factor alone, therefore, it is doubtful if we can stage HERCULES unless OVERLORD ANVIL have to be postponed for some reason. We cannot afford to take risks as regards our ability to launch ANVIL on date required in conjunction with OVERLORD. C planning is however proceeding for HERCULES and initial steps, such as movement of British Fourth Division to Middle East, have been taken in the hopes that a combination of circumstances may arise which will enable us to stage the operation.

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Date-

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

December 18, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 5303

USFOR LONDON ENGLAND FOR BRITISH C OF S

Number R 7124

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 310, from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff

Para. 1. Letter of General Giraud dated November 23,
1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the
move of French Armored Division to UK has been considered
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Para. 2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:

(A) That for shipping and other reasons it was
undesirable that a French Armored Division should be sent
to take part in operation OVERLORD.

(B) That as a general policy

(1) A French Force should participate in
ANVIL and only a Token Force in OVERLORD

(2) It will probably be best to undertake
the ANVIL operation with U S Forces with French participa-
tion, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British
Forces.

(C) That all French formations should be given
battle experience in Italy.

Para. 3. Please inform Giraud that it will not be
possible to transship a French Armored Division to the UK
but you should assure him that French formations will be
employed against the enemy as soon as possible.

ORIGINATOR: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD GEN STRONG GEN ARNOLD ADM KING LOG

CM-OUT-7578

(20 Dec 43)

1930Z

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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CWP 12-1-71

310 Overlord

GPO 16-53304-1

24-53394ABC

[REDACTED]
FROM WD INCOMING CM-IN-8873
14 DECEMBER 1943
FILED: 310 SHINGLE

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

*****Weekly planning telegram number 14.

Appears at present that only conditions under which HERCULES is likely to be launched are those in which some change outside this theatre made it necessary to decide on a postponement of OVERLORD several months ahead of projected launching date of that operation.

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Date-

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W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 0622
May 20-53

310 Overlord

2-424

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

December 9, 1943

CG FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 4535

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 6761

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, **FAN 308**, from The Combined
Chiefs of Staff

The President and the Prime Minister have approved the
following recommendations of The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. That the unification of command in the Mediterranean
shall take effect from December 10th. There should be no pub-
lic announcement of this change of organization.
2. That General Eisenhower should hand over command of
the Mediterranean Theater on January 1st or as soon after
that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable,
having regard to the progress of the operations to capture
Rome.

You are designated Allied Commander in Chief, Mediter-
ranean Theater effective December 10, 1943.

Your comments as to date of turn over of command of
Mediterranean Theater to your successor are requested.

In addition to the above, The Combined Chiefs of Staff
made the following recommendations which have been approved
by the Prime Minister, but not as yet by the President. They
are furnished you at this time for information only.

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CM-OUT-3623 (9 Dec 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Book Message

December 9, 1943

Page Two

3. That, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower's move from the Mediterranean to the UK, his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

4. That, concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.

ORIGINATOR: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: GEN HANDY
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
ADM HORNE
LOG

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Date-

Signature-
[REDACTED]

CM-OUT-3623

(9 Dec 43)

2318Z

ejm

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

MAP Rom.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

PRIORITY

From: SEXTANT
To: AGWAR 10147 FAN 283
Algiers PF 43
USFOR London MP 68

6 December 1943

For Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, USFOR London for the British Chiefs of Staff, repeated to AGWAR FAN 283.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with OVERLORD, with the object of establishing a bridgehead on the south coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of OVERLORD.
2. You will prepare in consultation with Cossac and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.
3. The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and operation ANVIL will be timed approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD - the exact date to be determined in consultation with Cossac.
4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).
5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line

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CM-IN-3958 (6 Dec 43)

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

310 Overlord

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

From: SEXTANT
To: AGWAR 10147 FAN 283
Algiers FP 43
USFOR London MP 68

Page 2

6 December 1943

and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained,
consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that
Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive
operations elsewhere.

No Sig

ACTION: CCS (Capt Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
Gen Strong
Gen Arnold
SGS
Adm King
Adm Horne
LOG

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SM 522-71

CM-IN-3958 (6 Dec 43) 2151Z jb

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHO

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 22, 1943

CG ETO
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 6101

To USFOR London from Joint Chiefs of Staff

Will both transmitters referred to in your W 7410 of November 19, 1943 probably operate from same location or is it probable they will be located at different points. Is it necessary that both transmitters be equipped for facsimile and voice broadcast as well as telegraph transmission. Will both transmitters handle EFMS or will one be used only for press and Government traffic. If stations will be located at different points is it desirable that both transmitters be installed and operated by same US Commercial Company or is it immaterial whether they are operated by same or different companies. What type of power plant and fuel is recommended.

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: OFD

CM-OUT-9070 (23 Nov 43) 1911Z NEW

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

78JB 39
192130Z
lw

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

WDOG
19 Nov
2351Z

From: USFOR London
To: WAR

No. W 7410 19 November 1943

Signed Devers.

"As authorized by Joint Chiefs of Staff 437, AG 676.3 (19th August 43) OB-S-E, request that a United States Commercial Company to be authorized promptly to ship complete demountable radio station for direct circuit from continent to US as described in paragraphs 2-A, 2-B and 2-C of AG letter 21st August 43, to be installed and operated by authorized US Commercial Company in captured territory under control American Commanding General by approximately D plus 30. Cue channel also required. Equipment should be delivered and available in this theater soonest and certainly prior to D day. Wordage for press alone estimated at 150,000 daily immediately upon continental operation. In addition radio broadcasting requirements will total estimated 3 hours daily. These together with wireless pictures, facsimile, EPT and service messages indicate probably need for 2 transmitters and channels under practical operating conditions with atmospheric interference. Essential that radio facilities be exclusive of Army operational facilities on which African and Sicilian experience shows press cannot rely. Request this requirement be processed for final action Joint Communications Board and other agencies concerned per paragraph 3, letter AG 676.3 (19th August 43) OB-S-E signed Ulio dated 21st August 43. Allocation these transmitters deemed deserving high priority based on Mediterranean press experience and to carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive."

No Sig

ACTION: ASF

INFORMATION: OPD
JCS CAPT ROYAL, USN
BPR

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

CM-IN-12176 (20 Nov 43) 0541Z vo

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RHP

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Transportation Corps, Movements
Div. SPTOM 565 DB London

November 19, 1943

USSOS LONDON ENGLAND

Number S 4467

CG NATO FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 3068

CG AMSME CAIRO EGYPT

Number 8074

To Lee for Ross pass to troopers our SPTOM 279 from Gross signed
Styer, action CG ETO information CG NATOUSA and CG USAFIME

Decision has been made to transfer following troops to UK
from theaters named:

A. From Dakar 38 engineers 900 officers and EM with 7000
measurement tons (1300 weight tons), 830 Signal Company 72 offi-
cers and EM with unknown quantity of equipment. From Accra
830 Signal Service Company 122 officers and EM, amount of equip-
ment unknown. NATO has been queried concerning possibility of
local arrangements moving this personnel from stations where
now located to Casablanca for furtherance to UK. This personnel
all available to move from points named 1st of December. Total
personnel involved 1094.

B. 850 Signal Service Battalion 78 officers and EM now in
NATO available 1st December.

C. From Middle East; 850 Signal Service Battalion 195 officers
and EM, equipment unknown probably very little troops available
1st of January 1944. 16 field hospital 200 officers and EM in-
cluding 15 nurses available 1st December 1943. 147 QM Truck
Company 103 officers and EM available 1st December. 607 Ord-
nance BA Maintenance Battalion 638 officers and EM available
1st January 1944. 146 QM Company 115 officers and EM available
1st February 1944. 903 Signal Depot Company AVN 176 officers
and EM available 1st January 1944. Summarizing there is a total
of 2401 personnel to be moved from NATO and Middle East between
1st December and 1st February, if NATO is successful in arranging
transportation from Accra and Dakar to Casablanca. Total broken

RECEIVED

R. O. 11552, Sec. 3(1) and (2) (E)

OSD Letter, May. 1, 1972

CM-OUT-8084 (20 Nov 43)

By HUR

Date JAN 21 1974

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16

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Troop
movements
to UK

310 Overland

Map Room

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Page # 2

November 19, 1943

Down by availability dates at origin is as follows: 1st December 1942, 1st January 514, 1st February 115. Request information possibility making this lift with available shipping and advise ETDS for UK. BAS has seen this radio and concurs in request made herein

ORIGINATOR: GEN SOMERVELL for Trans

INFORMATION: OPD
OCS (CAPT ROYAL USN) for BAS

CM-OUT-8084 (20 Nov 43) 1916Z pp

SECRET
E.O. 11652, Dec. 1, 1971
Class. Exempt, Dec. 1, 1971

By SLR Date JAN 21 1974 16

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

Operations Division, WDGS
Policy Section, WDOPD
OPD 384.Sec (16 Nov 43)

November 17, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-5874

To Devers for information, for Baker from Marshall.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 126 meeting November 5, 1943 approved a directive to the Air Commander Allied Expeditionary Air Force and directed that it be issued through COSSAC. COSSAC has been informed of this decision. The directive as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff follows:

(A). Under the Supreme Allied Commander, a British air officer, with the title of "Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force," has been designated to exercise operational command over the British and American tactical Air Forces supporting the invasion from the United Kingdom. A US air officer has been appointed as "Deputy Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force."

(B). The Allied Expeditionary Air Force will comprise the RAF Tactical Air Force and its administrative units, the US 9th Air Force, and initially such formations as may be allotted to the air defense of Great Britain.

(C). Other units may be assigned to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force at a later date.

(D). The US 9th Air Force will pass to the operational command of the Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, on December 15, 1943. The RAF Tactical Air Force and the formations for the air defense of Great Britain pass to his

CM-OUT-7211 (18 Nov 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date-12-1-71

Signature-RAF

15

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2.

command at once. Command will be exercised in accordance with the provisions of CCS 75/3.

(E). The Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, will be directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for the air defense of Great Britain until such time as his Headquarters moves overseas, when separate arrangements for the air defense of Great Britain will be made.

In forwarding this directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff instructed COSSAC as follows:

Directives as to the control of the Strategic Air Forces will follow at a later date; in the meantime, subject to the satisfactory progress of preparations for the invasion, the Air Commander, Allied Expeditionary Air Force should, during the preparatory period, exercise operational control of the Air Forces under his command in such a manner as to lend maximum support to the Strategic Air Forces offensive.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: General Arnold
CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)
LOG

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- RAO
ejv

CM-OUT-7211 (18 Nov 43) 1938Z

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[REDACTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

JDJD B56
13/1900A
AB

WDGC
13 Nov
2316Z

From: Algiers
To: War, NAF 517

Nr: W5152/456, 13 November, 1943

This is NAF 517 to AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff
rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower
cite FRGCT.

Proposal to ship 40 Horsa mark 1's noted and in-
formation as to date and destination of shipment will be
notified when determined. This refers FAN 275 November 11.
Proceeding wish trials to ascertain Horsa/Dakota performance.

*British
type
glider*

No Sig.

FAN 275 is CM-OUT-4003 (10 Nov 43)CC/S

ACTION: CC/S (Capt. Royal USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
Log

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Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-8420 (14 Nov 43) 0351Z med

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310 Overland

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 13, 1943

USMILMIS
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Number 16

For General Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In response the request contained in your number 53, November 9, 1943, the following indicates the present U.S. strength in UK and buildup for OVERLORD:

Para A. Strength in the UK as of October 31, 1943:

Army Ground Forces-108,372.

Army Service Forces-157,759

Army Air Forces-200,762.

Total-466,893.

Para B. Current troop basis as of May 1, 1944:

Army Ground Forces-626,847.

Army Service Forces-374,025.

Army Air Forces-455,517.

Total-1,456,489.

Para C. Expected personnel buildup based on available shipping:

November-146,000.

December-226,200.

January-128,000

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 8-13-73

& OSD letter, 8-3-73

JAN 21 1974

CM-OUT-5440 (13 Nov 43)

310 *Amelard*

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NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Page 2

February-180,000

March-160,000

April-210,000

May-91,000.

Para D. Buildup of major units by month:

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Actually in the Theater as of	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Infantry Divisions	4	5	7	9	9	10	12
Armored Divisions	1	1	3	3	4	5	5
Airborne Divisions	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
Bomb Group Heavy	23	25	27	29	31	33	39
Bomb Group Medium	4	4	4	5	6	7	8
Fighter Group	12	15	19	22	25	31	23

ORIGINATOR: JCS (Capt. Royal, USN)

INFORMATION: OPD

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JCS letter, 8-13-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72

CM-OUT-5440 (13 Nov 43) 2221Z ejv

14

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1/2
**SECURITY
CONTROL**

SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

November 11, 1943

CG, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 2334

CG, USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R-5610

Reference NAF 492 for Eisenhower Freedom Algiers, FAN 276,
from The Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We are in general agreement with the strategic con-
siderations set out and approved their being taken as a basis
for planning purposes.

*Re operations in Mediterranean
to assist OVERLORD*

ORIGINATOR: CC/3

INFORMATION: OPD
Adm King
Gen Arnold
Gen Strong
LOG

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JCS 29-71

Date- 12-1-71

CM-OUT-4533 (11 Nov 43) 2233Z JB

Signature- *PHD*

3/0 Overlord

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date *4/13/94*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Joint Chiefs of Staff

November 8, 1943

MILITARY ATTACHE AMEMBASSY
MOSCOW, RUSSIA

Number 826

For General Deane from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Our number 799 (29 Oct 1943) is amended to read as follows:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that full details for the preparation for the operation OVERLORD should not be disclosed to the Russians. You are authorized to pass to the Russians such information on the US buildup for OVERLORD as in your opinion appears appropriate, including such matters as the number of US troops, combat divisions and Air Force groups by type, which have been landed in the UK and furnish information on comparison of such data with the scheduled buildup as known to you.

You will inform the British Military Mission in each instance what information you intend to pass to the Russians regarding operation OVERLORD and other theaters of operation.

You will inform the head of the British Military Mission of the contents of this message.

ORIGINATOR: JCS

INFORMATION: General Handy
General Strong
General Arnold
LOG

DECLASSIFIED

JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-OUT-2946

(8 Nov 43) 1519Z o jv

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
OPD 384 SEC (30 OCT 43)		COMMANDING GENERAL EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS USFOR LONDON ENGLAND NR. R-5111	PRIORITY
FROM OPERA, DIV. WDSB			ROUTINE
RELEASED BY EUROPEAN SEC., WDOPD			DEFERRED
DATE OCTOBER 31, 1943		WAC	PRIORITY
TOR CODEROM 1437			ROUTINE
DECODED BY			DEFERRED
PARAPHRASED BY NILES			

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

P. 1 OF 5. NR. R-5111 OCT. 30, 1943 NCR 17767-8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	QCT
TEXT			

-RECEIVED FROM ARMY BY HAND- **RECEIVED**

R. O. 11653, Sec. 3(1) and (4D) or (C)

OED Letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR Date JAN 21 1974

FOR DEVERS FROM MARSHALL.

AS INFORMATION FOR YOU, THE FOLLOWING FROM COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET, AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO COMMANDER, U S NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE IS QUOTED. ("SUBJECT: TASK FORCE-DIRECTIVE FOR ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMAND OF. REFERENCE: (A) COMINCH SERIAL 001915 OF SEPTEMBER 9 1943. (B) COMINCH AND C. OF S. U S ARMY JOINT LETTER SERIAL 00447 OF JUNE 2 1942. (C) WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE NUMBER 1226 OF JUNE 11 1942. (D) COMINCH AND ACTING C. OF S. U S ARMY JOINT LTR (NOT DATED BUT AGREED TO ON MARCH 8, 1943) IN CONNECTION WITH U AMPHIBIOUS RESPONSIBILITIES. (E) COMINCH SERIAL 001423 OF JULY 15 1943. (F) CNO SERIAL 0141812 OF SEPTEMBER 21 1943.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

16-50200-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
RELEASED BY _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
DATE _____			ROUTINE
FOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION	R. O. 1100Z, 1000, 1100 and 1200 or (10) OnD Letter, May, 1, 1973 By SLR Date JAN 21 1974	PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

P. 2 OF 5 MR. R-5111 OCT. 30, 1943 NCR 17767-8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME DATE TIME OCT
TEXT

PARA 1. EFFECTIVE UPON THE DATE OF REPORTING OF REAR ADMIRAL A G KIRK, YOU WILL ESTABLISH A TASK FORCE OF THE 12TH FLEET OF THOSE FORCES TO BE ASSIGNED TO HIS IMMEDIATE COMMAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF TRAINING FOR AND PARTICIPATING IN OPERATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE; AND INFORM ME OF ITS DESIGNATION.

PARA 2. YOU WILL DIRECT HIM TO REPORT FOR DUTY TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER WHEN THAT OFFICER IS APPOINTED; AND PRIOR TO THAT TIME, YOU WILL DIRECT HIM TO REPORT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR DUTY UNDER THE ALLIED NAVAL COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

PARA 3. THE 11TH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, AND LANDING CRAFT AND BASES, EUROPE, WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE ABOVE TASK FORCE

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**~~SECRET~~**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 78 (4) NAVREGS.)

FORM 18

16-51800-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES		PRECEDENCE
ON	FOR ACTION	R. O. 11655, Sec. 3(1) and (2) or (3) OSD Liaison, Navy, 11-1-72 By SLLR Date JAN 21 1974		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY				ROUTINE
DATE				DEFERRED
FOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION	R. O. 11655, Sec. 3(1) and (2) or (3) OSD Liaison, Navy, 11-1-72 By SLLR Date JAN 21 1974		PRIORITY
DECODED BY				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

P. 4 OF 5 NR. R-5111 OCT. 30, 1943 NCR 17767-S

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	OCT
TEXT			

ARMY TASK FORCE COMMANDERS DURING THE TRAINING AND PREPARATORY PHASES TO THE END OF ADEQUATELY PREPARING THE JOINT TASK FORCES FOR CARRYING OUT THEIR PART OF THE PLANNED OPERATIONS. FOR THE EMBARKATION, AND DURING THE JOINT OPERATIONS OF THE US FORCES, THE COMMAND OF THE U S ARMY AND NAVY FORCES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNITY OF COMMAND. THE SHIFT OF COMMAND FROM THE NAVAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER TO THE ARMY COMMANDER WILL BE ARRANGED BY THOSE OFFICERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NORMAL U S PROCEDURE.

PARA 6. A PART OF THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S STAFF IS BEING FURNISHED FROM THE U S. IT IS DESIRED THAT THIS STAFF BE FURTHER AUGMENTED BY SUCH ELEMENTS OF YOUR OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICS STAFFS AS YOU MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE.

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**~~SECRET~~**

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NCR 18

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	PRIORITY
IN	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM	INFORMATION	RELINQUISHED R. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 and 3.4 or (30) Chief, Major, May 1, 1974	PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED
		By SLR Date JAN 21 1974	

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

P. 5 OF 8. NR. R-5111 OCT. 30, 1943 NCR 17767-8

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRIORITY.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	OCT
TEXT			

PARA 3. ON MATTERS PARTICULARLY APPLYING TO THIS TASK FORCE, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN REFERENCE (F), THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE DIRECT WITH THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U S FLEET AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, KEEPING COMMANDER, 12TH FLEET INFORMED IN THE PREMISES. TO REDUCE DEMANDS FOR ADDITIONAL RADIO EQUIPMENT, COMMUNICATION FACILITIES OF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE, SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. E. J. KING".

COPY OF ABOVE DIRECTIVE WHICH IS SERIAL 002346 DATED OCTOBER 29 1943 WILL BE FURNISHED BY COMINCH TO YOU. REQUEST THAT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE TO STARK BE PASSED.

CM-OUT-3932 (30 OCT 43) 2300Z

No. 1 ADMIRAL

No. 2 FILE

No. 3 F-1 OR CHARTROOM

No. 4 SPECIAL

SEALED**SECRET**

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NCR 18

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 NLR 101
 By RT, NARA, Date 4/2/94

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spl

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WDC
2 Oct
1943

PRIORITY
SECURITY CONTROL

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FC 529-71

From: Algiers
To: WAR

Date- 12-1-71

No: W 3859/4419 30 October 1943

Signature- *RAP*

To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for
British Chiefs of Staff and Mideast for CSINC JCYN please
pass to JCJC. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FHGCT. This is
pass to
NAF 495 reference FAN 255 October 23rd.

Have consulted CSINC Mideast regarding possibility
transfer craft from Levant to Western Mediterranean, in
order release corresponding number craft from Western
Mediterranean to OVERLORD.

CSINC Mideast state:

A. No LCT available Levant, except those in transit
India from Central Mediterranean.

B. No LCT now available, but 4, possibly 7, will be
operational in January. They suggest transfer these craft
would form relatively insignificant addition to OVERLORD
resources, while removal from Levant would entirely preclude
any small scale diversionary operations in Mideast.

As seen here your proposal would not affect this
theater, the result in fact being a transfer of craft from
Mideast to UK. Thus we are not in a position to make
recommendations, since the effects of any transfer would
only be felt outside this theater. Therefore, merely
forwarding the information given me by CSINC Mideast.

No Sig.

FAN 255 is CM-OUT-9958 (22 Oct 43) CCS
ACTION: CCS (CAPT ROYAL USN)
INFORMATION: OPD, GEN STRONG, GEN ARNOLD, ADM KING, LOG

CM-IN-18762 (31 Oct 43) 0608Z mcs

300 Overlord

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

attached

EISENHOWER'S REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN TO ASSIST OVERLORD.
(Brief of NAF 492)

1. LIMITATIONS:

Amphibious craft available will limit assault force to one division. Buildup will be slow until port is taken.

2. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS:

It is believed unsound to decide now that southern France will be best area in which to create diversion. Southern France, Italy and Balkans should be considered as a single belt through which German forces may be moved from one area to another.

By OVERLORD target date, German forces in Italy may hold strong Pisa-Rimini Line. In this case an amphibious turning movement combined with frontal assault on this position might be of greater help to OVERLORD than an isolated operation against southern France.

Or, if by spring Germans have withdrawn to the line of the Alps, operation eastward into Balkans, drawing forces away from France, may give greater help to OVERLORD.

Timing will require careful examination, since threat to southern France may draw additional forces into France rather than divert German strength confronting OVERLORD.

Therefore it is recommended that assault on southern France be regarded as but one of the various opportunities. However, holding French forces ready for operation will in itself constitute threat.

Should the coming months indicate an amphibious assault against southern France to be the best use of Mediterranean forces, considerations and recommendations for such an operation are presented below:

3. OPERATIONS AGAINST SOUTHERN FRANCE:

The form this operation takes will be influenced by our progress in Italy where one of two conditions will exist:

(a) Either the German forces will be established on or south of the line Pisa-Rimini, in which case any operation against southern France must necessarily be entirely amphibious in character,

(b) Or, we shall be in possession of the north Italian plains, in which case the operation is likely to consist of an amphibious assault combined with land advance along coastal strip.

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DECLASSIFIED SM522-71

Date 12-1-71 Signature RHP

310 Overlord

4. TIMING:

Any landing in southern France must be subsequent to the landing in the north. This follows from the fact that Patriot elements in France are expected to rise immediately any force is landed and an uprising prior to the main north coast landings would be premature and possibly abortive.

In view of small size of landing force, the Mediterranean diversion can be expected under condition (a) above to render greater assistance to OVERLORD if held temporarily as a threat rather than treated as a D day landing (D day for OVERLORD). The force should be landed however as soon as situation permits.

Port must be seized as soon as possible. Considering all factors, it is recommended Toulon be seized before Marseilles.

Under condition (b) it is believed more German forces can be contained from this position by actually mounting the attack than by threat. This would be combination land advance and amphibious assault. Three divisions could move overland, with one division in amphibious force. Under this plan buildup will be more rapid.

5. CONSIDERATIONS COMMON TO PLANS "A" AND "B":

Objectives: Sieze Toulon-Marseilles area to permit buildup of forces. Thereafter exploit northwards.

Air. Between now and D-day employment of our air forces will be determined by requirements of combined bomber offensive and of Mediterranean Theatre. A very considerable weight of effort by our air forces will support southern France landings. Fighters will be based on Corsica.

Naval. No problem in providing necessary naval covering forces except possibly carriers.

Army. It is desirable that nucleus of forces be US or British. However since it may not be feasible to release them from Italian front, certain French Units are receiving amphibious training. Bulk of build-up forces will be French.

Command. During phase when troops are establishing themselves ashore land forces should remain under command North African Theatre. Thereafter command will pass to SAC OVERLORD. Air command should receive further study.

Civil Affairs. Plans for civil affairs administration of all French territory whether occupied from northwest or south must be closely coordinated and should issue from London.

JDJD B1
29/1818A
AB

WAR DEPARTMENT
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PRIORITY

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SM 522-71

From: Algiers
To: War W3743
USFOR 3858

Date-12-1-71

Signature-RAH

29 October, 1943

To AGWAR for CCS rptd USFOR for Br COS. This is NAP no 492. Signed Eisenhower, cite PHGCT. BIGOT.

With reference quadrant conference inclosure to CCS 328 date of Aug 24. Memorandum required therein follows in five parts.

Part 1. Operations to assist Overlord. Report by the Commander in Chief to Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. At quadrant conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff required me to submit an outline plan for an operation, against the southern coast of France, destined to serve as a diversion to the main Overlord offensive from the United Kingdom. (Quadrant CCS 319/4-section 4, para 2, (D).)

2. This project has now been studied jointly with Cossac. Cossac representatives now in Algiers consider themselves unauthorized to enter into discussion on the general strategic considerations set out in the first section, since such matters are outside their terms of reference. Maximum size of assault.

3. Owing to limitations of assault shipping and craft, it is unlikely that any amphibious assault mounted from this Theater can be on a larger scale than 1 division, with a total of 3 Brigade Groups in the initial assault. Moreover, the subsequent build up will be very slow until an adequate port can be seized and operated. Use of landing craft in operations during the coming 6 months may still further reduce this possible scale of our

CM-IN-18094 (30 Oct 43)

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24-53594A8C0

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

From: Algiers
To: USFOR 3858

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

29 October, 1943

attack.

Part 2. Section 1. Strategic considerations.
4. This projected operation is but 1 part, and, in view of its size, a very small part, of the whole comprehensive scheme which will, it is hoped, produce by the beginning of next May the requisite conditions for operation Overlord. These conditions have been stated by Cossac representatives as:

(A) The reduction of German Air Force capacity to maintain effort, particularly single engined fighter effort, in the main Overlord assault area.

(B) Prevention of the number of German Divisions capable of operating against Overlord from exceeding a stated maximum.

5. I consider that it would be strategically unsound to decide now that this projected diversionary amphibious assault is certain to be the best contribution this Theater can make at, or near, the time of Overlord. The south of France cannot logically be considered by itself; Southern France, Italy, and the Balkans form a belt containing at present some 60 German Divisions; subject to limitations of communications, and to Allied military pressure, Germany can transfer forces from 1 part to another of this belt.

6. As the result of Allied pressure on the mainland of Italy during the next 6 months, 15th Army Group may in the spring find itself confronting strong German Forces on the general line Pisa - Rimini. This line has great natural strength, and the defeat of the German Forces holding it may well necessitate a combination of an amphibious turning movement with a frontal assault. It may be that such an assault on the German Forces in Northern Italy, carefully timed so as to give the maximum help to Overlord, may prove more valuable than a necessarily isolated and small scale operation against Southern France.

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CM-IN-18094 (30 Oct 43)

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

WAR DEPARTMENT
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From: **INCOMING MESSAGE**
To: **SECURITY CONTROL**
USFOR, 3858

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

29 October, 1943

7. Another situation would develop should weakening German resistance result in our pressure carrying us up to the line of the Alps by the spring. It might be that, from our central position in the northern plains of Italy, greater assistance to Overlord could be given by a main thrust, including amphibious attack, delivered eastwards rather than westwards, well in advance of Overlord, by drawing German forces to southern Germany or the Balkan Theater.

8. The timing of any strategic diversion to Overlord will need careful examination with particular reference to German strategic dispositions at various times. A threat to southern France may, in certain conditions, bring additional German strength into France rather than draw German strength away from confronting Overlord.

② 9. I recommend, therefore, that an amphibious assault against southern France should be regarded as but one of various alternative opportunities, which will lie open to us for assisting Overlord. If an amphibious assault is not to be mounted against southern France, it will still be practicable to hold such re-equipped French formations, as are available, ready to enter southern France as soon as conditions permit them to do so without an amphibious assault. The holding of these prepared forces would in itself constitute a degree of threat.

10. Section 2 of this memorandum, as required, outlines considerations, and contains recommendations, regarding the operation against southern France, should the coming months prove an amphibious assault against the French Coast to be the best use of forces in the Mediterranean Theater.

Part 3. Section 2. Operations against southern France, general.

11. The form of an operation against Southern France will be much affected by our progress on the mainland of Italy. Two main conditions exist:

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Page 4
SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers
To: War W3743
USFOR, 3858

29 October, 1943

Condition 1. That, at the time the expedition is mounted, the Allied Forces in Italy will be confronting a German Force established on, or south of, the general line Pisa - Rimini.

In this case any operation against southern France would necessarily be entirely amphibious in character.

Condition 2. That we shall prior to mounting the expedition, be in possession of the North Italian Plains.

In this case the operation is likely to consist partly of an amphibious operation and partly of a land advance along the coastal strip.

Condition 1. - (Allies south of line Pisa - Rimini)

12. Timing of a landing. Any landing in southern France before D day (D day throughout this paper always refers to D day for Overlord) of Overlord is unacceptable to Cossac. The patriot elements in France are expected to rise immediately any force is landed. Therefore, should a landing in southern France be effected and subsequently, weather conditions prevent the dispatch of the main Overlord operation on the intended day, the internal uprising would be premature and probably short lived. In this event, the chances of success of the whole operation would be most adversely affected. Consequently a landing in southern France would, at earliest, occur shortly after the landing in the north, because the actual sailing of Overlord for its short sea passage would govern the dispatch from port of the Mediterranean Expedition.

13. Effect of a landing, in view of its small size, and slow build up, the Mediterranean diversion can not expect to establish itself ashore until it becomes apparent that the opposition will not be sufficient to

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To: War W3743
USFOR, 3858

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29 October, 1943

overrun it prior to the arrival of reinforcing troops. We cannot therefore expect to land the expedition until the Germans withdraw part of their forces from the south of France. Thus the expedition cannot reasonably expect to fulfil, by landing, the primary object of this diversion - to prevent the Germans from withdrawing forces from southern France - during the critical days of the Overlord operation. I consider the more German Divisions are likely to be contained in the southern France by the mounting of a threat on as large a scale as possible than by the actual launching of an operation which, after the first 48 hours, will have displayed its weakness. The resources in this Theater should, with the assistance of carefully conceived plans, enable a considerable threat to be mounted and maintained. Cossac consider that it will probably become apparent to the Germans somewhere between D minus 40 and D minus 30 that an assault is to be launched from UK against Western Europe. Cossac wishes that the threat from the Mediterranean should first become apparent to the Germans at D minus 6 weeks, should gradually increase in scope, and should be maintained until about D plus 21.

14. Actual assault. Although I consider that a threat will assist Overlord more than would an assault on or about D day, it will be essential to put the force ashore as soon as the situation permits; this may occur as a result of weakening value of our threat with consequent German withdrawals northwards, or in consequence of successful Allied action against the German forces in the north.

It will therefore be necessary to prepare the expedition fully for an assault, and to hold it at immediate readiness.

15. Seizure of a port. Due to limitations of assault shipping and craft. We must aim at early capture of a port. The only 2 ports in south France with the facilities necessary for a quick and extensive

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From: Algiers
To: War W3743
USFOR, 3858
29 October, 1943

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build up of the Allied Force are Marseilles and Toulon.

Marseilles is the better port but Toulon would suffice for the initial needs of the force. Moreover, Toulon is within range of single engined fighters based on airfields in Corsica, but Marseilles is outside that range. There are sufficient airfields, in the vicinity of both Toulon and Marseilles, for the establishment of the requisite degree of air cover.

Beach considerations render a landing in the vicinity of Toulon preferable to one in the vicinity of Marseilles, but an attack in the immediate neighborhood of either port must expect to meet stiff resistance from beach defenses.

Subject to detailed examination by the commander appointed to carry out the operations, it appears that it will be preferable to seize the port of Toulon before that of Marseilles.

Part 4. Condition 2 - (Allied Forces in possession of North Italian Plains).

16. Combination of land advance and amphibious assaults under this condition I would be in a position to make an overland advance from Northern Italy into Southern France along the narrow coastal strip, in conjunction with the amphibious operation. Theoretically, it should be possible to operate up to 3 Divisions along the land route. This line of advance can however be very easily blocked, and small enemy forces might contain greatly superior Allied forces.

I consider that under this condition, where a coastal advance combines with an amphibious operation, more German Divisions may be contained in southern France by actually mounting the attack, as outlined

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

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To: War, W 3743
USFOR, 3858
29 October, 1943

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above, than by a threat. The size of the amphibious assault force would be the same as under condition 1, though it should be possible to obtain a faster build up by using the coastal roads and by the shorter turn round in seaborne build up. Should conditions at the time support this forecast, the attack would be timed so that French territory was entered as soon as possible after the landing of the main Overlord operation.

The object of this operation would, of course, be to prevent removal of German forces to resist Overlord; the threat of attack on southern France would therefore have to become apparent to the Germans in advance of Overlord, even though we intended to fulfil the threat by action starting on D day.

17. Landing of amphibious assault. The point of initial landing or the amphibious assault under this condition would require detailed consideration by the Commander of the Combined Forces. Broadly speaking, there appear to be 2 general alternatives:

Alternative A - Applicable to relatively weak resistance - an amphibious assault as under Condition 1 with the object of securing a port as early as possible.

Alternative B - An amphibious assault in closer conjunction with our land advance.

Part 5. Considerations common to both plans.

18. Objectives. The initial objective of Allied Troops entering southern France would be the Marseilles - Toulon Area so as to permit the build up on the French mainland of as many divisions (primarily French) as could be made available. Thereafter the force would exploit northwards.

19. Air action.

A. Between now and D day for Overlord, the

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From: Algiers
To: War, W 3743
USFOR 3858
29 October, 1943

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

employment of Mediterranean based Air Forces will be determined by the requirements of the Combined Bomber Offensive in support of Pointblank and by those of the Mediterranean Theater. These operations should go a considerable way toward bringing about the necessary air situation which will allow the assault to take place.

B. A very considerable weight of effort by Air Force in the Mediterranean will be available to work for the success of operations in France, whether the amphibious operation lands on D day, or remains a threat till a later period.

C. Fighter protection of the amphibious assault could be based on Corsica (Under condition 2, fighters might also be able to cover landings from the mainland of Italy). The necessary airfields to accommodate the fighter force for the protection of the landing can be developed and be made available in Corsica within approximately 2 months of starting work.

D. Final decision on whether assistance from aircraft carriers will be necessary cannot be given until a more detailed examination has been made of the actual assault area.

M 20. Naval Forces. There should be no problems in the provision of the necessary Naval Forces except possibly in the provision of Aircraft Carriers.

21. Army. I appreciate that it is highly desirable for a nucleus of forces operating against the south of France to consist of US or British formations. Nevertheless I am not in a position to guarantee, so far ahead, that I shall be able to withdraw American or British formations from the battle in Italy in order to prepare them for this operation.

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To: ~~SECRET~~
USFOR 3858
29 October, 1943

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**SECURITY
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In particular, it is desirable that the assaulting amphibious force should consist of American or British rather than French forces. To guard against an eventuality in which French forces only might be available, I have arranged that certain French formations receive amphibious training. In any event French forces, to the extent to which they are equipped and administratively self supporting, will form the bulk of the traffic in the build up phase.

Because the bulk of the forces will be French and are organized and equipped on American Lines, control and maintenance will be facilitated if formations accompanying French troops are US rather than British.

22. Command and Administration. The phase during which land forces are establishing themselves firmly ashore should be one in which they remain under command of this Theater. Subject to this qualification, Command of land forces passes to Supreme Allied Commander of Overlord at such time as he is ready to assume it. If a French Task Force Commander were appointed, owing to no US or British formations being available for inclusion in the force, a competent Allied Military Mission would accompany the French Commander.

Prior arrangements will be necessary, in detail, to coordinate Command and Administration of Army Forces.

Command of Air Forces provides a more difficult problem. I consider this matter should be the subject of detailed examination, initially between the Air Staffs concerned.

23. Firmness of plans. The factors of availability of serviceable landing craft, and of suitable formations, are not predictable, 6 months ahead, in this Theater to the extent that is possible in England.

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From: Algiers
To: War, W3743
USFOR, 3858
29 October, 1943

It would be misleading at this stage were I to put forward plans in the degree of detail which can be settled for the main Overlord plan.

24. Cover Plans. The Cover Plans for the whole French Theater require most careful coordination both in UK and in North Africa of a senior representative of the Overlord Cover Plan Staff should be at my headquarters throughout the planning.

25. Civil affairs. There must be one coordinated plan applicable to French Territory whether occupied by forces entering from the northwest or from the south. I consider that as London is the center of coordination for Overlord and connected plans, general directions regarding civil affairs matters in France should issue from London.

Action requested. I request that this memorandum should receive the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs.

No Sig.

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
SGS
Log

CM-IN-18094 (30 Oct 43) 1014Z

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Date- 12-1-71

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13562

P R I O R I T Y
SECURITY CONTROL

From: AFHQ Algiers
To: WAR

No. 3658/W3682, 29 October 1943.

To AGWAR for Secretary CCS, rptd USFOR for Secretary
British COS and COSSAC NAF 488. Signed Eisenhower.
Cite FHGCT.

1. Reference Quadrant conference inclosure to CCS 328
of 24 August. Memorandum by Commander in Chief on oper-
ations to assist OVERLORD dispatched London today by hand
Brig Gen Chambers of COSSAC Staff. Full text being tele-
graphed Washington.

2. Colonel R E Jenkins of AFHQ Planning Staff flies
London in about 3 days in order to be available there for
any further explanation required. Grateful if COSSAC
will arrange his onward passage Washington for same
purpose.

No Sig

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ACTION: CCS (CAPT. ROYAL USN)

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN. STRONG
GEN. ARNOLD
SGS
ADM. KING

Date-

Signature-

CM-IN-17577 (29 Oct 43) 1546Z cng

310 Arnold
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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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SECURITY CONTROL

Combined Chiefs of Staff

October 22, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
FREEDOM, ALGIERS

Number 703

BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R 4761

For Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers, FAN 255 from Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting this date directed that you consult with the Commander in Chief Middle East with a view to determining the assistance which might be rendered to operation OVERLORD by transfers of landing craft to the Western Mediterranean, thus releasing some from this area to OVERLORD, and following this to make appropriate recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: OPD
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

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Date-

Signature-

CM-OUT-9958 (22 Oct 43) 2337Z ejv
CM-OUT-9959

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Filed 17/12/43
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P R I O R I T Y

SECURITY CONTROL

From: Algiers.
To: WAR

No. 289 17th September 1943.

Your FAN 232 on subject of building up it acknowledged. Action AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff. Signed Eisenhower. Cite FEGCT. This is WAF number 407. Full reply will be submitted immediately C in C returns from 5th Army Area. Rptd Fairfield for information.

No Sig.

NOTE: FAN 232 is CM-OUT-7641 (16 Sep 43) CC/S

ACTION: CC/S

INFORMATION: OPD
GEN STRONG
GEN ARNOLD
ADM KING
LOG

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date MAY 22 1974

CM-IN-13173 (17 Sep 43) 2316Z vc

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Combined Chiefs of Staff

September 16, 1943

CC, FREEDOM ALGIERS

Number 7882

FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR LONDON ENGLAND

Number R 3175

The Combined Chiefs of Staff concur in the suggestion made in Paragraph 3 of COS (W) 808 dated 15 September, which was repeated to you. For Eisenhower: FREEDOM ALGIERS, PAR 232 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is requested that you furnish information regarding the limiting factors affecting buildup, together with suggestions as to what might be done in the U S and U K to assist you

ORIGINATOR: CCS

INFORMATION: CPT
General Strong
General Arnold
Admiral King
LOG

CM-OUT-7641
CM-OUT-7642

(16 Sept 43) 1910Z mjs

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QCC
20th Aug 43

INCOMING MESSAGE

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: WAR
To: BOSCO

No: 137, August 21, 1943

*Overland
troop
requirements*

Shore group organized according your cable 9034 of 24 April completes training at AFAP by 15 September (Marshall for Devers for action for Quebec for Barker for info). Not advisable to upset final training by changing 28 division group at this time. Port Companies, QM RHD Co, and Ord Amm Co are on orders for October shipment but will not have had training with the group. HQ and HQ Co Engr Amphib Brig would be newly activated as all available are committed elsewhere. Recommend you take HQ and HQ Co Engr Combat gp that has trained with this group and reorganize it after arrival to provide your Brig HQ with nucleus of men familiar with division, with attachments, and with amphibious training.

2. No amphibiously trained units are available for 29 Division Group. None can complete training here until late December. Barker recommends units to make up group be shipped to UK and trained with 29 Division. Under orders for October shipment but without amphibious training are 1 HQ and HQ Co Engr Combat Gp, 3 Engr Combat Bns, 1 Med Bn, 2 Port Cos, 2 QM Rhd Cos, 1 QM Gas Supply Co, 1 Ord Amm Co, 1 Ord IM Co, 1 MP Co, and 1 Cml Decon Co. HQ and HQ Co Engr Combat Gp could be similarly be reorganized as Brig HQ and HQ Col 3 Amphib Trk Cos and 1 Sig Co spec will not be available until late December.

3. Realizing that shore group must be crowded a aboard transports in the assault, we have tried to furnish white units for shore groups as far as available. Of the

R. G. 11852, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (H)

OSD Index, Nov. 1, 1943

BOSCO-IN-183

By SLR
(21st Aug 43)

Date JAN 21 1974
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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

PRIORITY

Page 2

From: WAR
To: BOSCO

No: 137, August 21, 1943

units in para 1 or 2 above only the Ord Amm Cos, the Amphib Trk Cos, and the Cml Decon Cos are colored.

4. Units listed in para 1 and 2 as being on orders are in accordance with your 6 months requirement list and priority list. Suggest you establish priority for shipment of the units listed for December. It that date is later than desired, request you indicate willingness to accept units without full training. With Barker this message has been cleared.

ACTION: Gen Barker

INFORMATION: White House Gen Marshall Gen Kuter
Adm Leahy Gen Handy Gen Fairchild
Adm King Gen Deane Gen Somervell
Adm Cooke Gen Arnold Gen Wedemeyer
Adm Willson Col Starbird

SECRET

R. O. 11402, Sec. 8(D) and 8(D) or (E)

OSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLJ JAN 21 1974

BOSCO-IN-183

(21st Aug 43)

0224Z

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25/15512
MC

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SECURITY CONTROL

From: USFOR, London
To: War

Nr: W-1100 25 June, 1943

Planning for cross channel operations in 1944 (Marshall from Devers cite ETICS) indicates that we shall require 4 assault landing divisions (There is a possibility that this may be reduced to 3). I propose to train 1 division here, but the remaining 3 should be given thorough preliminary training in the United States. These assault divisions will be stripped down and specially organized and trained for a specific task.

We expect to have the Naval Assault Forces fully formed and ready for Combined training with associated divisions about 1 February, but enough of these forces will be available by late October to undertake such training on reduced scale.

It is desirable that there be minimum of time lag between training in United States and resumption of same here. To this end, I recommend that 2 of these divisions arrive in October or early November, and the other in December. All 3 should be trained in United States as teams, with their associated far shore groups, including engineers. All elements of a team should arrive here at approximately the same date.

Request information whether this program can be met by War Department. Also request that I be advised, if practicable, as to what divisions will be designated

R.O. 11952, Sec. 3(D) and 4(D) or (E)

CM-IN-16151 (28 Jun 43) 02412 jb

OSD letter, May, 4, 1942

By SLR

Date

JAN 21 1974

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: USFOR, London
To: War

Hr: W-1100 25 June, 1943

For this purpose, and the order in which they will be shipped.

Careful consideration is being given to the future employment of the 4 battle experienced divisions to come from North Africa. It is presently planned to use them after assaulting forces have secured initial beach head, to extend the beach head and operate against enemy mobile reserves, while initial assault divisions are being reorganized and prepared to rejoin battle.

Believe seasoned troops will be of greatest value for that phase of operations. Furthermore, since these divisions will not arrive until the end of February, they will need a period of reorganization for this theater and training.

No Sig.

ACTION: OPD

INFORMATION: G-3
Gen McNair
LOG

CM-IN-16151 (26 Jun 43) 02417 jb

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On 12/12/2002, May 1, 1972

By SLR

Date **JAN 21 1974**

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CORRECTED COPY

For Arnolds Eyes Only

From: USFOR, London
To: War

No.: W-974, 22 June 1943

EXCERPT
R. O. 11832, Sec. 3(1) and (4D) or (E)
CSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR Date JAN 21 1974

British Chiefs of Staff advocate creation of unified tactical air command re your 9728 for support of joint invasion across the channel (for Arnold eyes alone from Baker signed Devers) They propose Air Marshall Leigh Mallory present C in C British Fighter command as commander of this allied tactical force with Brigadier General Hansell as deputy commander subject to approval Combined Chiefs of Staff. Air Marshall Leigh Mallory now taking up responsibilities for planning for this operation with Hansell as assistant. Combined Air Staff now being formed for this project. Brigadier General Hansell has operational experience in this theater as well as planning experiences along this line and has the confidence of British Commanders concerned. In view of the magnitude of the operation ultimately under consideration it appears that the greatest contribution which Brig General Hansell can make will be through continuation of present duties, provided Air Marshall Leigh Mallory is designated commander allied tactical air force. We have no other Officer suitable for this task if Hansell returned now. I have no other officer of Hansell qualification for the job you propose as you know. Agree fully that he is well suited for it but urge he be not taken due to the importance of present assignment as outlined above. General Devers is concurring in this recommendation for retention of Hansell in separate message to Chief of Staff.

No Sig

Note: Corrected copy of CM-IN-13840 (6-22-43) Gen. Arnold

Action: Gen. Arnold

Information: OPD, SGS, Gen. Deane (CC/S)

W-974 re CM-OUT 8090 (19 June 43)
CM-IN-13930 (22 Jun 43) 2058Z vc

SECRET

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12

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4

NLR 101

By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

EYES ONLY

JBBB 15
filed 22/1150Z
dm

CCWD
22-6-43
1329 Z

CORRECTED COPY

PRIORITY

FOR GENERAL MARSHALL'S EYES ALONE

From: USFOR London
To: War

No. W-972 22 June, 1943

Cross Channel Invasion

I have agreed to proposal of British Chiefs of Staff to give to Air Marshal Leigh Mallory, C In C British Fighter Command, the responsibility for planning air operations in support of assault phases of Overlord; this to be without prejudice to the freedom of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to appoint later any other officer they may choose or (from Devers to Marshall eyes alone) at the request of Cossac, I have detailed Brigadier General Hayward S Hansell as Senior American member for planning purposes on Leigh-Mallory's Staff in order that Brigadier General Candee can be relieved and returned to his growing Air Support Command. Arnold has requested, in a personal cable to Eaker, that Hansell be returned to the United States for duty with Joint and Combined Planning Staffs. I recommend that Hansell be retained in this theater for the very important task to which he has just been assigned.

No Sig

Corrected copy of CM IN 13796 (22 Jun 43) OPD

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: OPD

R.O. 11852, Sec. 3(E) and (D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

INFORMATION: GEN DEANE (CC/S)
GEN ARNOLD

By SLR

Date JAN 21 1974

CM-IN-13796 (22

~~SECRET~~

1700Z

msh

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By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Section, WFO
European-N. African Section, WDOFD
OPD 045.43 Sec (16 June 43) CWF

June 16, 1943

FORTUNE
ALAYERS

Number 371

BIGOT insagration of troop convoys BIGOT (Marshall to Eisenhower) for Bolero-Sickle in early August will require withdrawal of 15 US destroyers from Mediterranean on 17 July to allow 12 days for return to US and 12 days to refit prior to departure on 10 August for UK on escort duty. Note destroyers selected for return must be in such condition that refitting can be accomplished within 12 days. A 2nd increment of 15 destroyers will be required on 7 August Mediterranean departure for duty on late August US-UK convoy. Your comments are desired as to effect on HUSKY and practicability of this plan to include earliest estimated date destroyer increments above could be returned if planned departure dates can not be met.

No Sig.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

INFORMATION: General Somervell
Admiral King
General Deane (CG/S)
LOG

REMARKS

R. G. 11652, Sec. 8 (D) and (C) or (E)

OPD Index, May, 6, 1972

By HLR

Date JAN 21 1974

CM-OUT-6841 (16 June 43) 2319 Z mva

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

Index Number

INDEX SHEET

Original filed: 310

May 25, 1943.

From: CCS

To: CG, Fortune, Algiers.
USFOP London, England.

PAN 128

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (RECOT-HUSKY) have resolved:
(A) That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. * * * * *

This for file in "310 Cross-Channel Operations (OVERLORD)"

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

JCS 29-71

Date- 12-1-71

Signature- *PHD*

Show classification number and date of communication on first line, drop two spaces, show source of communication and to whom addressed, then drop two spaces again and give a brief synopsis of subject matter sufficient to identify the document.

W. D., A. G., O. Form No. 6222
May 10-23

2-4114

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

SECURITY
CONTROL

SECURITY CONTROL

Operational Section, WDCS
Combined Subjects Section
S & P Group WDOPD OPD 381
Sec (4-23-43) L.J.L.

April 24, 1943

COMMANDING GENERAL
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
USFOR, LONDON, ENGLAND

Number R-7915

At their meeting April 23 the Combined Chief of Staff approved CCS 169/8/D organization of Command, control, planning and training for cross channel operations (Marshall to Andrews). The major changes from CCS 169/3/D are as follows: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 minor changes. Include old paragraph 5 in paragraph 4. New paragraph 5 is same as recommended in your 9001 April 23 except add to subparagraph C "as early as possible." Remainder of new paper reads as follows: Staff and method of planning paragraph 6 you will be provided with a small permanent Combined Staff drawn from the British and US navies, armies and air forces. For administrative planning you will make appropriate use of the planning agencies of the US and British services. Further guidance paragraph 7 you should maintain close contact with the British Chief of Staff and their organization, through whom you will be given such further guidance as you may require. You should also maintain close contact with Headquarters European Theater of Operations of the United States Army. Allied staffs paragraph 8 the Allied military staffs (other than British and American) will not be brought into the planning at present. The British Chiefs of Staff will inform you at what stage these other Allied staffs should be consulted. Cancellation of previous directives paragraph 9 this directive cancels all previous directives issued to the Combined Commanders for amphibious operations launched from the UK against the continent. Copy of paper follows.

ORIGINATOR: OPD

~~SECRET~~

R. G. 11652, Sec. 8(C) and 5(D) or (E)

INFORMATION: General Deane (CCS)

OPD Index, No. 1, 1972

By SLR

Date JAN 21 1974

CM-OUT-10561 (25 Apr 43) 1758Z ems

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NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECURITY CONTROL

LLW 3 hr 22
1438/28
EW

SECURITY CONTROL

COND
Feb 28 1943
1600

Priority

From: London USFOR
To: War

No. 7592 Feb 28 1943

Under date 22 February British Chiefs of Staff cabled Britman Washington draft proposed directive to "British" Chief of Staff for Cross Channel Operations and requested it be submitted United States Chiefs of Staff for approval (cite ETTCS for General Marshall signed Andrews).

Copy furnished me at my request on 25th. I had not known of it previously.

Following comment, by paragraph, submitted for your consideration.

Paragraph 2 states he report direct to British Chiefs of Staff. I submit he is not a British but a United Nations Commander and as such responsible only to Combined Chiefs of Staff to whom he should report. Do not consider advisable to have an extension of time in London but if he is to report to any London Agency that agency should have adequate American Representation.

As to paragraph 7, Channel Islands are very heavily defended and their capture would be sizable operation almost certainly involving United States Forces. In any event it would have bearing on subsequent joint operations and United States should be consulted.

CM-IN-14597 (28 Feb 43)

This refers to Directive for Lt General Morgan, COSSAC, & his directive to plan for Overlord.

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/13/94

EX-103
E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(b) and (D) - (S)
Class. Exempt, May 4, 1972
By SLR Date JAN 21 1974

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

**SECURITY
CONTROL**

From: London USFOR
To: War
No. 7592 Feb 28 1943

SECURITY CONTROL

page 2

Also seriously question advisability including subject of world wide responsibility of CCO for combined operations training, as regards American forces. Believe his role should be one which will not compromise unity of command. The question of unity of command will be difficult enough without introducing another commander.

Reference paragraph 9 comment parallels that on paragraph 2.

In paragraph 11 it is assumed that reference is to Combined Chiefs of Staff and not, British Chiefs of Staff.

The cablegram directs Britman to ask United States Chiefs of Staff to send British Chiefs of Staff appendices showing American troop shipments month to month. In the past a frequent cause of embarrassment and misunderstanding has been inconsistency of data in hands of British and ourselves. Urgently recommend that policy be adopted of sending this and similar data to ETOUSA which will in turn keep British authorities advised.

Present message does not in any way imply lack of harmony or understanding with British Chiefs. However I considered it essential at all times to stress: (1) Integrity of American Forces as covered in my directive. (2) Responsibility of supreme commander to CCS and not British Chiefs. (3) Avoidance of unilateral decisions by British Chiefs of Staff in proposed Anglo-American operations. (4) That data and information concerning American Troops reach ETOUSA direct instead of from British sources.

Action: OPD Nosig
Information: Gen. Deane (CC/S), Gen. Arnold,
Gen. Strong, LOG
CM-IN-14597 (SECRET) 2101 Z mvs COPY No. 7

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E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.3 or Sec. 3.4
NLR 101
By RT, NARA, Date 4/12/94

EX-107
R. O. 11502, Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) or 3(3)
(S) 11502, Sec. 3(1) and 3(2) or 3(3)
BY JLM
JAN 21 1974