

● PSF

Navy; J. R. Beardall

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memo for President

BSF Beardall
Folde
Cory
Navy

Bismarck sunk by
torpedoes from planes,
destroyers and cruisers
after pounding with
guns of 2 BB. British
report Bismarck unsinkable
by gun fire alone. No
further info on Prince
Eugen or British damage

J.P.B.

PSF Beardall Folder
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 20, 1941.

file
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the President's memorandum of May 19th, the Navy Department received the substance of the attached message via Navy Department officer designated to review all State Department messages and cull out those of possible interest to the Navy Department.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

(Dispatch returned to State Dept)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~VERY CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 19, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you check and see
whether the Navy Department
received this message? Please
return enclosure.

F. D. R.

Message from Linthicum at
Pernambuco re ZAMZAM leaving
Pernambuco for Capetwon direct,
and reporting no information that
orders were changed after her
departure.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached sketch is interesting in connection with the report of the MODOC which was in the vicinity at the time of the action between the BISMARCK and the HOOD.

The MODOC was hove to in the position shown, in a northwesterly gale, speed 4, course 315 true, when she observed a single biplane standing down from the northwest which passed to her starboard, turned and headed back northwest. A couple of minutes later MODOC sighted the BISMARCK bearing about northwest, and about eight minutes later a squadron of planes with British markings, headed southwest. At that time BISMARCK was observed to be firing, presumably at the single plane first sighted.

MODOC about twenty minutes later sighted three naval vessels, which appeared to be one large and two small, bearing north-northeast and headed southwest. The BISMARCK by this time had changed course to the southeast, bearing slightly forward of MODOC's port beam. She was engaged in firing heavy antiaircraft barrages, presumably at the squadron of planes which had previously passed astern of the MODOC.

As the MODOC was in line of fire of the opposing surface forces she increased speed and stood clear to the northwest. The types of vessels were hard to discern on account of distance, haze and approaching darkness.

The MODOC evidently did not see any part of the engagement between the surface forces.

Respectfully,

J.R.B.
J. R. BEARDALL.

*PSF Beardall folder
J Navy
P Conf*

May 24, 1941

57° 18' N


36° 00' W

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BF Beardall Folder
Navy 1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

The enclosed report does not satisfy me in the least bit. On both List A and List B the "status or activity engaged in on July 1, 1941" means nothing at all, as you and I well know.

On the Navy Register every ship has an assignment to a base force or a train or a naval transportation service. That assignment does not mean that the ship is actually operating in any of these capacities.

What I want to know is what each ship was actually doing on July 1, 1941:

(a) Where she was

On the high seas? If so, where and on what mission?

(b) In Harbor

Loading or unloading? How long she had been there and when she was expected to leave?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

In other words, what I want is to show actual continuous use of these ships taken over by the Navy from commercial occupations. If the ships are not in actual use, I want to be able to borrow some for very much needed short runs for other defense purposes.

Will you please go into this personally and let me have a report of what each ship was actually engaged in doing on the first of July? This list, as you and I well know, means nothing at all.

F. D. R.

Confidential letter from Secy. Knox to FDR 7/14 forwarding lists of vessels acquired by the Navy with notations regarding dates of acquisition, dates of placing in service and the present status or the activity to which these vessels are assigned as of 1 July 1941. Also Let from Jerry Land 7/3 with three lists of ships turned over to Navy for conversion, for cargo and transport purposes, etc.

PSF Beardall Folder

Memorandum from Captain Beardall,
Letter from Under Secretary of the
Navy, and lists of vessels acquired
by the Navy.

Navy

Copy in Land Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND

Please read enclosed from Under Secretary Forrestal and let me have your comment.

It is my thought that there could be some kind of an understanding that if and when any merchant type ship belonging to the Navy is not actually on active service, i.e., at sea or loading or discharging, the Maritime Commission should be able, in consultation with the Navy, to use said ship for some special voyage or task.

You will, of course, note that in the last column of this list a very large number of ships are undergoing conversion and that in most of these cases it is stated that they will be assigned to this, that or the other duty. Mere assignment does not mean use.

You might talk this over with Forrestal and work out some method by which actual and active use becomes the criterion.

Please return these papers for my files.
F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Navy
Beardall

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 28, 1941

file 7
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached comparison of United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths, as of July 1, 1941, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

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TABLE A-I

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

AIR STRENGTH

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United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths Compared

Date- 12-2-67

As of July 1, 1941

Signature- *W.D.*

	First line Bombers & Fighters	Utility, Observation & Obscure- cent Combat	Trainers	TOTAL	Estimated Monthly Production All Types
U.S. Navy	1,420	1,092	1,444	3,956	507
U.S. Army	888	1,900	3,989	6,777	1,034
UNITED STATES	2,308	2,992	5,433	10,733	620 (export) 2,161
BRITISH EMPIRE	9,500	(-----8,000-----)		17,500	1,600 609 (fr. U.S.) 2,209
GERMANY	13,000	(-----20,000-----)		33,000	2,600
RUSSIA	4,100	(-----4,300-----)		8,400	350
JAPAN	2,900	550	750	4,200	170
ITALY	400	(-----400-----)		800	15

Definitions: "First line Bombers & Fighters" of the United States are planes rated "Service" by the U.S. Navy, and planes rated "Standard" or "Service Test" by the U.S. Army.

FOREIGN ESTIMATES ARE COMPROMISE FIGURES reached after a study of the material available in D.N.I., M.I.D., and the Army Air Force. They are subject to radical revision. German data derive from many independent neutral and belligerent observation posts and differ widely.

NOTES: The format and content of Table A-I are slightly modified in the present issue. Changes in the content consist chiefly of omission of the figures previously carried for "Maximum Production Capacity per Month". These figures are no longer considered to have meaning, for in July 1941 the production of aircraft unsuitable for military missions has practically ceased while all nations build all the military aircraft which, under existing conditions, they are capable of building. Consequently, it is no longer useful to speculate on the number of military planes which a nation might produce if it were able to employ floorspace, tools, materials and skilled artisans which are not now available and being used. Present production of military aircraft is, in fact, total present potential production of military aircraft.

United States In June, the net increase in Army planes was 675; the net increase in Navy planes was 252. 71 of the Army's new bombers and 9 of its new trainers lack propellers.

Germany Of the estimated 23,000 combat planes in Germany, at least half are believed to constitute a depot reserve in warehouses, storage depots, and in transit to the operating bases. Perhaps 13,000 combat planes, as shown in the Table above, are believed to be at the operating bases and available, except for those undergoing minor repair and adjustment, for immediate combat service. About half of these are being operated in front line training squadrons or are being held in front line replacement squadrons.

Op-16-F-10 DISTRIBUTION:

Op-10	Op-38-W	BuAero	ComAirBatFor
Op-12	Aide to President ✓	Marine Corps	C-in-C Lant
Op-16	Aide to SecNav	C-in-C U.S.	C-in-C A.F.
Op-16-F	Aide to Under SecNav	F.A.T.U.	Com One-Sixteen (15)
Op-16-F-1-7 (7)	Aide to AstNav	ComBatFor	Naval War College
Op-22	Div. of A. R. & S.	ComSecFor	M.I.D.

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PSF Navy Beardall Folder

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 25, 1941.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Navy Department has received confirmation from our Naval Attache at London of the following losses by convoy OG 71, off the coast of Spain:

Note: Convoy shadowed by enemy planes during afternoon August 22nd and by U-Boat which made four reports.

	<u>Time</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Losses</u>
Attack No. 1	2100, 8/22 2250, 8/22	40-43 N, 11-39 W. (do) (do)	British CLONCLARA Tug EMPIRE OAK
Attack No. 2	0120, 8/23	Approximately same as above.	British ALDERGROVE British STORK
Attack No. 3	0530, 8/23	(do)	H.M.S. ZINNIA

Norwegian SPING, straggler from above convoy, was shelled and set afire at 0600 position, 40-42 N., 11-39 W., and was sunk by escort as salvage impossible. Crew of SPING and 16 from H.M.S. ZINNIA picked up.

Norwegian INGER, detached from convoy ON 9, torpedoed at 2303 August 23rd, at 58-58 N., 07-50 W., enroute Reykjavik.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

PSF Beardall Folder
Navy 1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 28, 1941

file ↗

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached comparison, as of August 1, 1941, of United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

J. R. Beardall
J. R. BEARDALL

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authorized except by specific approval of the
Secretary of the Navy.

Division of Naval Intelligence
August 25, 1941

TABLE A-I

A I R S T R E N G T HUnited States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths Compared

As of August 1, 1941

	First line Bombers & Fighters	Utility, Observation & Obsoles- cent Combat	Trainers	TOTAL	Estimated Monthly Production All Types
U.S. Navy	1,406	1,182	1,644	4,232	315
U.S. Army	960	1,895	4,568	7,423	701
UNITED STATES	2,366	3,077	6,212	11,655	361 (export) 1,377
BRITISH EMPIRE	10,100	4,500	6,000	20,600	1,600 349 (fr. U.S.) 1,949
GERMANY	11,500	15,000	5,000	31,500	2,400
RUSSIA	No reliable data available				
JAPAN	2,950	600	750	4,300	170
ITALY	400	(-----400-----)		800	15

Definitions: "First line Bombers & Fighters" of the United States are planes rated "Service" by the U.S. Navy, and planes rated "Standard" or "Service Test" by the U.S. Army.

FOREIGN ESTIMATES ARE COMPROMISE FIGURES reached after a study of the material available in D.N.I., M.I.D., and the Army Air Force. They are subject to radical revision. German data derive from many independent neutral and belligerent observation posts and differ widely.

NOTES:

United States Monthly production figures are actual deliveries in the month of July. They do not include 11 planes delivered for commercial use, or the small trainers being produced for civil training schools.

Germany Combat planes in depot storage, of which perhaps 50% are estimated to be modern types, are included in the "Utility, Observation and Obsolescent Combat" category on the ground that they are not immediately available for front line service.

Russia The Soviet policy of refusing to permit foreign military observers with the field armies has resulted in a total blackout of information regarding Russian air strength. Berlin claims that 11,250 Russian planes have been destroyed since June 22nd. This figure is higher than the total of 8,400 previously carried in this table, and is thought to be higher than the German High Command estimate of Russian air strength prior to the beginning of hostilities on the Eastern front. Moscow admits the loss of 4,500 planes in the war with Germany.

Op-16-F-10 DISTRIBUTION:

Op-10	Op-38-W	BuAero	ComAirBatFor
Op-12	Aide to President	Marine Corps	C-in-C Lant
Op-16	Aide to SecNav	C-in-C U.S.	C-in-C A.F.
Op-16-F	Aide to Under SecNav	F.A.T.U.	Com One-Sixteen (15)
Op-16-F-1-7 (7)	Aide to AstNav	ComBatFor	Naval War College
Op-22	Div. of A. R. & S.	ComSecFor	M.I.D.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSF Navy: Beardall Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you speak to me
about this very confidentially
and please don't let anyone
see this letter?

F. D. R.

I spoke to the President
about the attached letter
and have conveyed his
instruction orally to Asst.
Hooper.

JRB.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON Sept 2, 1941

Dear President Roosevelt:

I appreciated your courteous reply to my letter. Now that I have established the fact, with you, that I do not wish an appointment, I would like to advise you occasionally on national, rather than Naval, Communication matters, if this is all right. Of course any thing about the Navy I would send through official channels. But you need help on national Communication matters, and you are not getting the right picture altogether.

First I would like to recommend General Mauborgne to fill the vacancy on the F.C.C. I have not discussed

the with him as he is away,
but he is a strong man, and
the best Chief Signal Officer the
Army ever had by far.

I would like to have advised
through Chairman T. Ly, but
he is impossible. I called
on him when he first came
and offered to give him the history
of everything, and my convictions,
but he never reciprocated. I
called twice after that, also
Mrs Hooper and I called at
their home. But no calls
were ever returned. It became
evident that he did not
want anyone in the
picture who knew anything
or who had a reputation.
That was a pity - as I
wanted nothing for myself
except to help our country.
All he wanted is publicity
and to be the only one

the L. A. C. V.
with the Navy problems to understand

who talk to you. He is a good talker, -
disarming, and all, but such conduct
is not becoming an Annapolis graduate.
He is not constructive, only "trust busting",
but very courageous, and thinks he is
right, but lacks knowledge.

We need constructive leadership. In
the executive branch in Communications.
Especially now, when people are so critical,
yet you see where Mr. Tidy is getting you -
everyone complaining to me and what can
I do here.

I have prepared several letters which
I hoped you would see, and some
resulted in constructive achievement.

Some reached a stone wall.

Admiral Leahy tried to help, but
the C.F.O. is always too swamped
with the Navy problems to undertake

National problems of the nature.

Any way with the help of yourself and
Admiral Bullard in 1919, my dream
of a U.S. owned Radio system, and
research laboratory came true in time for
this war, and is a going concern.

Everything I predicted about Colonel
Behns scheme came true also. It has
just been a trouble to all of us, and
no good to our country came out of it.
It resulted in loss of exports, the investors
lost most of their money, the Postal dropped
out, and his European factories are gone!

If you wish me to continue to advise
you this way, please let me know.
I am only trying, as a government official
of 40 years service, should.

In all loyalty,

Respectfully yours,

J. C. Hooper.

Dear Admiral.

J. C. Hooper name
the Army-Navy Small Boat for
defense - all volunteers.
I have a Scotch who
can salute with one hand!

PSF Navy: Beardall Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you speak to me
about this very confidentially
and please don't let anyone
see this letter?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President
dated September 2, 1941, from
Rear Admiral S. C. Hooper in
re Chairman Fly and the F.C.C.

*BSF Beardall Folder
Navy 1-41*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

What do you think we should
do?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from A. Bruce Fahnestock, 12 Chelsea Lane, West Hartford, Conn., and Sheridan Fahnestock, Glen Mary Farm, Great Mills, Md., undated, to Gen. Watson, with enclosed letter to the President from Messrs. Fahnestock, giving their impression in connection with their trip to the Indies, Java, Madoera, Kangean, Bali, Singapore, and Biliton.

*PSF Beardall
Navy Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL:

I am returning herewith the menus which Admiral Stark asked the President to sign. The President would very much appreciate it if you had two extra copies -- one for Elliott and one for Franklin, Jr.

Grace G. Tully

PSF Beardall Folder
Navy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. BEARDALL:

Will you tell Aymar Johnson
how interested I have been in
seeing his report and thank him?

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. 10/2 from
Aymar Johnson, Socatean Ledges,
Somerset, Bermuda.

Re: Bermuda Base, tells us enormous
water tank installed on the Naval
Base thereby eliminating the men from
suffering when the drought takes place.
Artillery guns on the West end and
the East end of the Island, etc.

PSF Navy: Beardall Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you get me the low-down
on this without disclosing from
whom it comes?

F. D. R.

Letter to Doc O'Connor, dated
September 30, 1941, from Hans Hinrichs
of 117 Liberty St., N. Y. C., re the
Shinnecock Inlet.

BSF Beardall Folder
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 15, 1941


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following personnel are taking passage in XPB2-Y leaving Scotland 16 October, weather permitting, for Washington via Horta and Bermuda:

Harold Balfour, Under Secretary of
State for Air

W. Averill Harriman
General Cheney
Admiral Standley
Captain Braine
Captain Thomas
Robert P. Meiklejohn
William L. Batt, Jr.

Respectfully,


J. R. BEARDALL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Shinnecock Inlet, Long Island

Letters on file in the Navy Department show that Mr. Edward Frederick Pyle previously approached the Navy Department in April and December, 1939, and on March 8, 1941, in connection with the improvement of the approaches to Shinnecock Inlet and the construction of a jetty there. The Navy Department has consistently taken the stand that the use of Shinnecock Bay for naval purposes is not contemplated and that the improvement is a matter coming under the cognizance of the War Department - that the military value of the inlet is insufficient to warrant a recommendation for its improvement as a national defense measure.

Just recently the Navy Department communicated with the Commandant Third Naval District in regard to this subject and verified that from the strictly Navy point of view there is no contemplated use for Shinnecock Bay, as there is not enough water in the bay (10' low water) and Naval local defense vessels would require at least 12' or more. However, further inquiry of the Coast Guard developed the information that they consider it highly desirable that Shinnecock Inlet be dredged to 10' depth, particularly in order to permit the life boat now located at the new Shinnecock Coast Guard Station at Ponquogue Point to get to sea in rough weather. The depth at Shinnecock Inlet at present is a maximum of 3½', which is insufficient in rough weather.

The Coast Guard is now taking yachtsmen for the Coast Guard Reserve for use largely to effect the security of harbors, but, of course, small boats or light craft could be used within Shinnecock Bay as a kind of a coast patrol and might in this way be of more use in wartime. That would be the only strictly wartime use of this inlet and bay, which is the only opening in this coast for a considerable stretch. Roughly estimated, it would cost one million dollars to build a breakwater and dredge the inlet to 10' depth. The breakwater would be necessary to insure against silting up again. The Coast Guard is anxious that this dredging be done and I feel that this is the only basis for any recommendation that might be made in requesting that necessary funds be made available.

As the project for the inlet seems to be chiefly of local interest for peacetime operations of small boats, pleasure craft, etc., it would, as such, come under the cognizance of the War Department (Rivers and Harbors). Inquiry as to its status among Rivers and Harbors projects shows that it is

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not carried in the present Rivers and Harbors authorisation bill, and there is no record of a survey of this project having been made. As items considered not necessary for the National Defense have little or no chance of passage at this time, it is felt that the only possible grounds upon which the project might be aided at this time are those of the Coast Guard's desire to improve the inlet for the reasons stated above.

I am attaching a chart of this area, together with the return of the letter addressed to Mr. O'Connor by Mr. Hinrichs.

Respectfully,


J. R. BEARDALL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR DOC O'CONNOR:

The enclosed is sent to you
in confidence for your information.

F.D.R.

PSF Beardall Folder

Note: The President asked Harry *Navy*
Hopkins for the Navy Hydrographic
Chart current in 1924 and now
probably in their historic files.

djb

Hopkins had me
ask Beardall to get Chart.

*Telephoned
10/31*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. HARRY HOPKINS

We have searched the Navy Hydrographic Office, and have made inquiries of the Interior Department, the War Department and the National Geographic Society, and can locate no other detailed charts of the Florida Keys except the one herewith of the Long Key area.

JRB.
J. R. BEARDALL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

PSF: Beardall Folder
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL:

To read and return for our
files.


F.D.R.

Jack Carter's memo on Japanese
Problem (West Coast, Mexican Border)
12/8/41

E - Bismarck, Course 140, 22-26 kts. at 1300 G.C.T. 26 May.
 Prinz Eugen position not known. Two Fock-Wulf planes refd.
 in vicinity. Visibility about 3 miles.

A - King George V (C-in-C Home Fleet), 100 mi. to N.E., parallel course E.
 B - Rodney, 35 mi. to north.
 C - Renown + Ark Royal 35 mi. to S.E.

(5)



~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED